Professional Documents
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Titles include:
Gabriela Dutrénit, Keun Lee, Richard Nelson, Alexandre Vera-Cruz and
Luc Soete (editors)
LEARNING, CAPABILITY BUILDING AND INNOVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT
Paul Hoebink and Lau Schulpen
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT AID IN EUROPE
Foreign Aid between the Public and the Private Domain
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Private Development Aid
in Europe
Foreign Aid between the Public and
the Private Domain
Edited by
Paul Hoebink
Extraordinary Professor at the Centre for International Development
Issues Nijmegen, Radboud University
and
Lau Schulpen
Senior Lecturer, Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen,
Radboud University, the Netherlands
Selection, introduction and editorial matter © Paul Hoebink
and Lau Schulpen 2014
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2014
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v
vi Contents
Index 320
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes
Figures
Tables
Boxes
Private aid agencies have come to be very much in the center of the
debate around development cooperation in recent years for at least four
reasons. First, there is the growth of their budgets, or at least there is
increasing flow of private voluntary finance for development, mainly
due to the emergence of some very large foundations in the United
States of America. Second, there is the discussion of their role and the
way they are supposed to finance development: are they intermediar-
ies or direct financers or implementers of programs? Third, is the con-
sideration of their role next to donor governments (bilateral aid) and
international agencies (multilateral aid). Fourth and finally, there is the
ongoing discussion of results: are private aid organizations able to show
results, and if they are, can these be compared with their effectiveness
and impact in relation to other aid agencies?
All these questions are in the center of this volume, but we had first
to take a step back to consider: what sort of picture could we make of
the European private aid landscape? We envisaged sitting in an air-
plane with Yann Arthus-Bertrand trying to create pictures similar to his
famous La Terre Vue du Ciel, but not of the beautiful landscapes beneath
us, but of imaginary landscapes depicting citizens and organizations
coming together to support projects and programs in developing coun-
tries. Both small and large organizations, some aiming at a specific
country and others at a subject or theme; some amateurish, some highly
professional. These pictures would also reveal the financial support
they receive and the relations they have with their homeland govern-
ments. What would be hidden is their quest for results and impact, or
at least their efforts to demonstrate these results, fragmented as these
often are. Luckily there were some colleagues and friends boarding this
imaginary plane of ours. These friends came from a series of European
countries to participate in a workshop we had organized in the realm
of the European Association of Development Institutes’ (EADI) Working
Group 1 ‘Aid and Development Policy’, of which Paul Hoebink is con-
venor. These colleagues and friends presented us with a set of interest-
ing sketches and panoramas, but unfortunately our plane was grounded
for some time, because of changes in EADI arrangements. By the time
the plane finally took off our ambitious colleagues had come to us again
with new data and revised texts.
x
Preface xi
xv
xvi List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
The 1980s have been dubbed the ‘golden age’ of Non Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) or the period when NGOs ‘started to lose the
“security of obscurity” and enter the realm of recognition and embrace
by the official aid system’ (Fowler, 2011, p. 45). Positioning themselves as
‘alternative’ to the work of their bilateral and multilateral peers, they have
become accepted as central actors in development, as donors, as a chan-
nel to transfer aid funds, and/or as recipients of the same. Moreover, they
managed to become part of international negotiations either as organiza-
tions with a consultative status or as participants in social movements
trying to influence such negotiations from the outside. As part of civil
society, they are thus considered to be ‘independent development actors
in their own right’ within present-day aid architecture (OECD, 2011a).
As with all actors in that architecture – and certainly those that are
heralded as ‘essential development partners’ (OECD, 2011b, p. 6) –
their position is not without critique. In fact, some (for instance, Banks
and Hulme, 2012) sincerely doubt whether NGOs (still) deserve being
regarded as a ‘central theme of development’. Central in this critique
are not only more and more ‘collective action problems’ (Severino and
Ray, 2009, 2010; Shafik, 2010) with an accompanying revival of the role
of the state and international organizations but also the emergence of a
large number of alternative actors particularly also in the private sphere.
Foundations are then among the most important and certainly among
the most visible of these alternative private actors. Although some of
them (for example, the Rockefeller, Kellogg and Ford Foundation) have
been active for a longer time already, a new group of philanthropists
has appeared on the scene who earned their money in the international
capital markets (George Soros, Warren Buffett), in software (Bill Gates)
or in hardware (William Hewlett, Gordon Moore, Michael Dell).
1
2 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
It is, however, not only such alternative actors that are rocking the
boat of NGOs by demanding new relations among a growing diversity
of development actors. NGOs are also plagued by questions about their
legitimacy (Tujan, 2012). They suffer from increased questioning of
their moral and ethical legitimacy referring to their recognition ‘as rep-
resenting the people, or a group of people, which comprises their con-
stituency’ (Tujan, 2012, p. 32). Generally, these claims are questioned
by many when asking in whose name NGOs are actually talking. Such
critical questions are not only asked by those outside of civil society.
Even CIVICUS (2013, p. 20) notes that – because of changes in the
‘understanding of what civil society is and does’ – it is pertinent to ask
to what extent these private actors are ‘accredited to multilateral meet-
ings, such as those of international financial institutions, representative
of the breadth and depth of civil society?’ and ‘whose interests can they
claim to represent?’.
This discussion is particularly clear on the international stage where,
Smith (2012) and Paul (2012) point out, the intense exchange between
NGOs and the UN that was clear at various global UN conferences
‘today has drastically diminished’. Paul (2012) adds that those who
predicted ‘a steady upward path of civil society influence at the UN
proved to be wrong’. In fact states have ‘become less tolerant of civil
society’ and ‘increasingly wary [of its] activism’. This process had started
already in the 1990s but really took off after 2000. It should be noted,
however, that the legitimacy of the UN system itself is also under attack.
CIVICUS (2013, p. 11), for instance, in expressing its dissatisfaction
with the Rio+20 negotiations felt that these tell us ‘definitively that the
multilateral system as it stands is no longer fit for purpose, and needs a
major overhaul’. The same sentiments have been expressed elsewhere if
only because of the changing geo-political situation.
Besides questions about the moral and ethical legitimacy of NGOs,
also their ‘relative legitimacy’ or the extent to which they act ‘in
solidarity with [their] constituency, in representing their interest,
in acting on their welfare, in being enablers for the people to claim
their rights’ is under examination. Essentially, this refers to their
effectiveness (although not necessarily in terms of the ‘bang for a
buck’ ideas that are central to development cooperation). In that
sense, it is correct to point out the specific limitations of NGOs as
development actors. The AIV (2010) mentions three such limitations:
(1) some problems are way beyond the scope of what NGOs can
address; (2) their accountability structure is diverse, some NGOs are
not sufficiently transparent and are thus not automatically accepted
Private Aid Agencies in the 21st Century 3
Although official donors slowly move away from equating civil soci-
ety with NGOs (Giffen and Judge, 2010), the terms are still often
used interchangeably. Incorrectly so, considering the overall accepted
idea that NGOs are essentially a subset of the much broader concept
of civil society defined as ‘the arena – outside of the family, the
state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective
actions, organizations and institutions to advance shared interests’
(CIVICUS, 2011). The definitional discussion on the concept of NGOs
seems to be a never-ending one meaning as well that Fowler (2011,
p. 43) is quite correct in stating that ‘there remains no universal
definition, nor a robust or uncontested “positive” characterization of
what NGOs or NGDOs are, what they do, and why they exist across
the world’. It is not our intention to solve this here or to come up
with an all-encompassing definition. Instead we follow a more prag-
matic approach by using as a starting point Vakil (1997) who broadly
described NGOs as ‘self governing, private, not-for-profit organiza-
tions that are geared to improving the quality of life for disadvan-
taged people’. Important to add then is that we are mainly concerned
with NGDOs – that is, those NGOs that are active in ‘development’
and particularly those that ‘acclaim and utilize the tenets of inter-
national aid as a substantive basis for their existence’ (Fowler, 2011,
p. 45). Finally, we principally (but not exclusively) are concerned with
Northern NGDOs; those that reside in European countries and are
still the main receivers of official aid from the respective European
donors going to private aid agencies.
Even with narrowing down our focus to Northern NGDOs it is impos-
sible to be certain about the number of such private organizations. Two
earlier studies (Smillie and Helmich, 1993; Hulme and Edwards, 1997)
pointed at the rapid growth of NGO-sector in the North in the 1980s,
with a 50 per cent growth in the number of organizations. Meanwhile,
de Haan (2009, p. 49) in citing Desai states that ‘in 1989 four thousand
organizations existed in OECD countries alone devoted to international
development’. Getting an understanding of the magnitude of the
NGDO-sector as well as its growth is then one of the first tasks taken up
by the authors in this book for their respective country. They add to this
a perspective on the funds this (presumably) growing group of private
Private Aid Agencies in the 21st Century 5
aid organizations has at its disposal and the role of their governments
in providing (part of) this funding.
Table 1.2 Estimates of private aid (in billion USD) by several sources
not) are by definition estimates or, more precisely, wild guesses. That is
not to say that nothing more can be said on this, particularly not when
focusing on that part of official aid (ODA) that is channeled via NGDOs.
Greenhill et al. (2013) are correct in netting out NGO flows funded
directly by ODA from their estimate on what they call ‘philanthropic
and institutional giving’.
For getting an understanding of these ‘NGO flows funded directly
by ODA’ we again have to turn to the DAC database (and we have to
add the same reliability warning as we did for grants by NGOs above).
A 2011 report by the OECD shows that ‘all DAC members work with and
allocate ODA to NGOs’ and that in 2009 they allocated USD15.5 billion
via these private organizations or 13 per cent of total aid disbursements
(up from less than USD13 billion in 2008) (OECD, 2011b, p. 7). There
are huge differences between donors (as the stories in this book will also
show in more detail) with funding of NGOs ranging from 1 per cent of
bilateral ODA in 2009 (France) to 37 per cent (Ireland). Figure 1.1 pro-
vides an overview of NGO funding by the different DAC donors over
2009 based on DAC data.
In strengthening our grip on these ODA flows via NGOs it is impor-
tant to differentiate between aid through and to NGOs as well as between
funding national or international (including Southern) NGOs. To and
through essentially refer to the difference between funds provided to
NGOs for programs developed by the NGOs themselves and which they
implement on their own authority and responsibility’ (i.e., aid to NGOs)
and for programs developed by the ‘official sector’ and for which that
same official sector is ‘ultimately responsible’ (i.e., aid through NGOs). Of
the total allocation of USD15.5 billion in 2009, the largest part (85.7 per
cent) is provided through NGOs (see Table 2.3 for the division per DAC
8 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
Germany
Austria
United Kingdom
Belgium
United States
Sweden
France
Greece
Portugal
Australia
Denmark
Italy
Spain
Switzerland
Norway
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Ireland
Canada
Finland
Japan
New Zealand
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Figure 1.2 Core funding to/through national and international/local NGOs
(2000–2011; in million USD, constant 2011)
Source: Own calculation based on CRS database.
between the official donor and local implementing NGOs in the South).
The amount of direct funding (i.e., funds going directly from official
donors to local NGOs – in most cases through embassies or local offices
of official donors in developing countries) is not known although the
2011 survey of the OECD learns that twenty DAC donors ‘allocate
between 1% and 30% of their support to NGOs to local organizations’
(OECD, 2011b, p. 19).
Understanding such funding schemes is central to the chapters in
this book. Authors thus set out to provide an answer to such questions
as what are the major changes in the level of subsidies to private aid
organizations, what subsidy arrangements are there, and are there dif-
ferent ones for national, international and local NGOs, what are the
assessment procedures and criteria of these arrangements and how
do NGOs themselves regard them. Such funding structures do not of
course come out of the blue. In fact, it is assumed that ‘donors’ support
models depend […] on what they wish to achieve through working with
[NGOs]’ (Nijs and Renard, 2009). This in turn then raises the question
as to the vision of donors on NGOs – and particularly how they analyze
the position and special place of private aid organizations. Authors
10 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
thus also include (changes in) these government visions and thereby
they simultaneously analyze the government perspective on the roles
of NGOs.
Many authors have shed light on the roles that NGOs perform (or, in
many cases more correctly, should perform). Riddell (2007), for exam-
ple, distinguishes between ‘discrete interventions (projects) in the South
aimed at particular groups’, ‘strengthening of southern NGOs or CSOs’,
and ‘lobby and advocacy’. To this he adds strengthening ‘public sup-
port’ and networks (see also Grotenhuis, 2008). Lewis and Kanji (2009)
make a distinction between three roles and see NGOs as (1) service
providers, (2) catalysts (advocacy, innovation and their watchdog func-
tion) and/or (3) partners (for instance to governments or the corporate
sector). The OECD (2011b) shows in a survey of bilateral donors that
the reasons they work with NGOs should primarily be sought in the
idea that NGOs can provide certain services, that they contribute to
democratization processes and that they raise awareness at home. In an
earlier report of the OECD-DAC Advisory Group on Civil Society and
Aid Effectiveness, six ‘added values’ of International CSOs were distin-
guished. Next to the catalyzing role they play in connecting civil society
in northern and southern countries, these include creating awareness in
the North, facilitating global movements and international solidarity,
and creating political changes in the North needed for righteous and
peaceful international relations (Lingán, 2011).
Others maintain a simple division into two categories, seeing CSOs
as playing the role of service providers (replacing, for example, the gov-
ernment) and/or of political watchdogs keeping watch on other actors,
especially governments and businesses. This does not mean to say
that CSOs themselves always speak in these terms, as Barr et al. (2005,
p. 675) make clear in the case of Uganda: ‘Surveyed NGOs do not see
themselves as service providers, but rather as holistic organizations,
preferring to describe their activities in general terms such as “commu-
nity development”’. It must be acknowledged that every form of role
classification serves to obscure reality as NGOs quite often fulfill a com-
bination of roles and these roles are not static (Lister and Nyamugasira,
2003; De Wal, 2009; Batley and Rose, 2010; Tujan, 2012).
The discussion on roles – and how broad they should be – also shows
that expectations of CSOs are high, notwithstanding the increasing
requirements relating to accountability, effectiveness and efficiency
Private Aid Agencies in the 21st Century 11
The centrality of such an increased political role for CSOs is widely rec-
ognized by certain groups, yet strongly opposed by others. Within the
latter group are those southern governments that over the last couple
of years have restricted the room to maneuver for NGOs and particu-
larly for those organizations with a more political agenda and actions
(Bebbington, 2010; ICNL, 2011; ActAlliance, 2011; Paul, 2012; Banks
and Hulme, 2012; Okumu, 2011; World Movement for Democracy,
2012). Within the former group falls the UNDP (2010) speaking of
private organizations as ‘policy interlocutors and intermediaries that
promote civic participation and representation of minorities and dis-
advantaged groups in decision-making processes’. At the same time,
Tomlinson and Macpherson (2007) make it clear that, for multilateral,
bilateral and civilateral actors, ‘the primary role for civil society is advo-
cacy through monitoring and policy engagement’, while others show
that the perspective of bilateral actors in particular is a mix of political
and service-providing roles (Giffen and Judge, 2010; OECD, 2011b). It
would therefore be better, in the case of these latter actors, to speak of
NGOs as being primarily focused on a more political role while also
playing a (limited) role in service provision.
Interestingly, the role that receives little (if any) attention in this
discussion is that concerning strengthening, broadening or deepening
of public support in the North itself. Interesting because the point of
departure of Paxton and Knack (2008, p. 1) that ‘the supply of foreign
aid to recipients is influenced by public opinion in the donor countries’
is widely seen as accurate. In that sense, one could argue that public
support matters a great deal particularly at a time when development
cooperation seems to be under threat due to the economic crisis. Apart
from a broader discussion about roles, all country studies in this volume
thus also pay specific attention to the role of private aid organizations
in raising public awareness on development problems and support for
development cooperation. Do these organizations see a specific task for
themselves in this field?
References
ActAlliance (2011) Changing political spaces of Civil Society Organizations (Geneva:
ActAlliance).
AIV (2010) Cohesion in International Cooperation – response to the WRR report ‘Less
Pretension, More Ambition’ (The Hague: AIV-Advisory Council on International
Affairs).
Banks, N. and Hulme, D. (2012) The role of NGOs and civil society in development
and poverty reduction (Manchester: Brooks World Poverty Institute) (BWPI
Working Paper 171) (June).
Barr, A., Fafchamps, M. and Owens, T. (2005) ‘The governance of Non-
Governmental Organizations in Uganda’, World Development, 33 (4), 657–79.
Batley, R. and Rose, P. (2010) ‘Collaboration in delivering education: Relations
between governments and NGOs in South Asia’, Development in Practice,
20 (4), 579–85.
14 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
2.1 Introduction
private donations and are very successful in doing so. Added to that,
recently an increasing number of international NGDOs are also find-
ing their way to Belgium and competing with existing initiatives. The
attempt to deal with fragmentation thus meets new emerging complexi-
ties since all these organizations compete for public as well as private
funding to implement their projects and programs. The apparent trade-
off between professionalization and popular support seems – more than
ever – the most fundamental challenge for the NGDO sector in Belgium
today.
First we sketch the degree of fragmentation of the NGDO landscape.
Secondly, we briefly point out the historic and systemic dynamics
underlying this fragmentation. A following section illustrates how both
the government and NGDOs have tried to diminish fragmentation and
increase professionalization through reforming the co-funding system.
This section highlights the gains but also the ever-increasing pressure
exerted by changes in the aid architecture and the principles underlying
the Paris Declaration which push towards a re-interpretation of the roles
of indirect actors in aid. These new tendencies are to a certain extent
perceived to be challenged by the overwhelming success of the fourth
pillar. We conclude by pointing out the most important challenges the
NGDO sector in Belgium is facing today.
It is important to mention that in this chapter we mainly address
those NGDOs that are legally recognized by the state and that figure as
indirect actors in channeling development aid. We also mainly focus
on those NGDOs that are spending a large part of their budget in the
South.
This study draws on existing research on the Belgian non-governmen-
tal aid channel, policy documents and reports of the federal and regional
development agencies, information from the NGDOs themselves2 and
interviews with representatives from the Flemish and Francophone
federations and umbrellas and the DGDC (Directorate General for
Development Cooperation).3 Information on Belgian NGDOs is quite
scarce and since it was crucial to ascertain the sector’s view on certain
evolutions, we launched a web survey which probed NGDOs’ opinions
on several themes of this article and gathered data on their composition
and activities.4
not to say that all services should be delivered by the state, but the state
should – when non-state actors take up this responsibility – at least play
a regulating role.
This emphasis on more political roles for civil society also challenges
NGDOs in the North. The institutional strengthening of southern civil
society partners so that they can take up these new challenges, while
exiting the exclusive focus on funding or implementation of hands-on
projects and programs which deal with beneficiaries directly, is now the
new guiding action scheme. In the North, NGDOs are also supposed to
do more political work: holding their own governments accountable for
the set-up and results of donor aid policies, but also sensitizing public
opinion on the need for, and the complexity of, aid for development.
Important to mention is that the underlying rationale of this NAA
departs from the idea that development is a is not something one can
fix with short term technical interventions, but a long term process of
political, institutional, economic changes. External actors (like donors)
must therefore support these deep and complex processes by tapping
in on local reform drives, identifying drivers of change and smartly
supporting these are considered more sustainable (though slow) strate-
gies than say financing service delivery projects which show visible and
tangible results, but do not necessarily change the structural (hence)
causal conditions of poverty and exclusion.
This international tendency has implications on various levels: the
articulation of direct and indirect aid, the re-positioning of the NGDO
landscape itself, and, the rethinking of the co-funding system.
Firstly, donors are starting to look at (international) civil society as
allies in trying to use aid as a leverage for change. Harmonization as a
concept can thus be stretched. It is used by some donors as a justifica-
tion to rethink coherence, synergy of the different aid agencies, aid
actors, and aid channels within one donor. With this in mind, DGDC
is starting to question the ‘right of initiative’ of NGDOs and argues that
the channeling of aid through indirect actors should follow the same
logic as bilateral aid (that is indirect aid should go to partner countries
and be coherent with bilateral aid objectives). Although the NGDOs
themselves recognize as one of their limitations weak cooperation
with other Belgian agents in the field, especially in bilateral coopera-
tion (NGO Delegation to the steering committee, 2008), they strongly
reject the analysis that improving synergy means working more in and
under bilateral aid strategies. According to the NGDOs this is ‘instru-
mentalization’. Belgian NGDOs claim specificity of their roles (motor
for innovation, watchdog, focus on ‘forgotten’ groups and inequality)
Mapping the Belgian NGDO landscape 31
and respect for the diversity of the NGDO sector which impedes align-
ment of NGDOs geographic/strategic choices with those of the bilateral
cooperation (11.11.11., 2008) NGDOs therefore argue that it is coopera-
tion – and harmonization – with organizations (not necessarily Belgian)
that specialize in the same themes and support similar types of partners
that should be pursued (ibid.). They therefore argue that the main goal
is to increase specialization and task division within the Belgian NGDO
sector and that this means that in the South, NGDOs or bilateral agen-
cies from other countries or multilateral agencies might be the most
appropriate cooperation partners, rather than a forced and exclusive
coordination effort with Belgian bilateral aid.
Secondly, the increasing importance of political roles also brings
forward a set of new challenges. Many Belgian NGDOs are considered
still to be focusing too much on the implementation of service delivery
projects in the traditional sectors with political research, lobbying and
advocacy continuing to play second fiddle. As an illustration, it is inter-
esting to mention that 11.11.11. has established that among all Flemish
NGDOs, there are only nine people fully employed to do political work.
In our survey NGDOs were asked to give their view on the evolution
of their roles. Three-quarters of respondent NGDOs are of the opinion
that the Belgian NGDO sector should continue equally to develop both
projects and programs in the South and awareness and lobbying in the
North. Only a few (10 per cent) NGDOs viewed their activities and pres-
ence in the South as the central focus of Belgian NGDOs in the future,
but what is striking is that these were all very small organizations.15
More than 50 per cent of respondents, including half of the small
organizations, also agreed to the statement that ‘Political lobbying/
advocacy is mainly something for the large NGDOs and the networks’.
Furthermore, half of the respondents felt that ‘Belgian NGDOs should
be a lot more present in the field in the South’. These results show that,
especially for many small organizations, implementation of their own
projects and programs in the South continues to be a central activity
for Belgian NGDOs. It also shows that smaller organizations are often
viewed to be lacking the potential for more political work and self-
renewal. Important to mention, however, is that smaller NGDOs have
more limited staff and organizational capacity, but receive substantial
(some would even say disproportional) subsidy amounts. The admin-
istrative costs of these small NGDOs are proportionally higher than
those of the larger organizations and many of them are extremely busy
with the management of their budgets and projects. Big portions of
their yearly cycle are dedicated to the preparation of funding proposals
32 Nadia Molenaers, Leen Nijs and Huib Huyse
which caused a stir in the NGDO world. The author attacked Belgian
NGDOs for spending too much donated money on personnel and
other costs in the North, with only a fraction of the gifts really end-
ing up in developing countries. The publication was strongly criticized
by NGDOs, not only because its claims were inaccurate, but mainly
because they were based on an outdated vision of development coop-
eration. Accusing NGDOs of not transferring enough resources to the
South completely ignores the structural political work many Belgian
NGDOs in Belgium try to develop and promote among the public.
Accountability claims of the media and the public towards NGDOs are
thus often based on incorrect ideas of what these organizations’ roles
and priorities should be (Aertsen and Bouten, 2007). In consequence, a
rift is growing between on the one hand what people want NGDOs to
do and what they think the organizations actually do, and on the other
hand what NGDOs should and want to do. To counter this growing gap
between organizations, their constituencies, and the general public, sev-
eral voices within the NGDO world have called for an open debate on
the visions and roles of the Belgian NGDOs, who should, in the words
of the general secretary of 11.11.11., ‘do what they say and say what
they do’ (De Standaard, 2007b). Development education and awareness
of the complexities of development cooperation should also take a more
prominent place within the sector.
Notwithstanding the fierce competition with the fourth pillar, in
recent years, NGDOs as well as the regional and local governments
of Flanders have been acknowledging the (potential) role fourth-pillar
organizations can have in development cooperation and awareness.
In collaboration with the Flemish International Co-operation Agency
(VAIS), 11.11.11 has erected in 2008 a supporting structure for fourth-
pillar organizations. This consists of a website, a help desk and courses.
According to our survey, in the whole of Belgium at least 18 other NGDOs
cooperate with fourth-pillar initiatives. This cooperation mainly consists
of provision of information, campaigning, financial support and capac-
ity building. Moreover, the majority of respondents in our survey (22 out
of 28) agreed that NGDOs needed to collaborate more with fourth-pillar
organizations in the future. However, there is less support for subsidizing
fourth-pillar organizations than for other forms of support. Arguments
for this include increased possibilities for synergy, sharing of expertise,
participation and professionalization of fourth-pillar initiatives. On the
other hand, some NGDOs mentioned the risk of further fragmentation
of development efforts and the supposedly inherent different role and
dynamics of fourth-pillar organizations vis-à-vis NGDOs.
Mapping the Belgian NGDO landscape 37
2.6 Conclusion
The Belgian NGDO landscape is, for such a small country, quite frag-
mented. This fragmentation is visible within Belgium in terms of
pillarization and regionalization; but, and this is probably more prob-
lematic in terms of improving aid effectiveness, it is also visible outside
Belgium. Too many actors are channeling relatively small amounts of
aid to a great number of countries and to a huge number of recipients.
There is thus a substantial risk that aid arrives in recipient countries
in a very fragmented way, and so, in terms of aid effectiveness, it can
be argued to be failed aid. There is however a need to consider the
idea that aid which departs Belgium in a fragmented way might not
be fragmented in the field. If Belgian actors cooperate a lot with all
kinds of different actors in the field, if they pool funds and efforts with
other donors (whether governmental or non-governmental), then the
problem might not be as substantial as currently argued by the Belgian
government. To assess this, however, more and new data are needed
in terms of how cooperation in the field takes shape, and to which
extent synergies are actively created with other (non-Belgian) donors
and NGDOs.
The attempts to decrease fragmentation in the Belgian NGDO sec-
tor date back to the beginning of the 1990s with the three subsequent
reforms in the co-funding system. Although some progress was made,
reforms did not achieve the hoped-for results. The international aid
effectiveness debate however boosted the fragmentation concern in
Belgium. DGDC and the NGDO sector are negotiating the role of
indirect actors in development cooperation with a twofold objective:
improving the quality of the NGDO sector as actors in development
cooperation, and rethinking the co-funding system in order to improve
overall official development aid (ODA).
This twofold objective encounters strong countervailing tendencies
within Belgium. At either end of the actor spectrum there are deeply
embedded institutional practices that guard against change. On the side
of the NGDO sector, smaller project NGDOs feel threatened by the calls
for more specialization, more political work, more concentration and
more professionalization; they fear losing their local embeddedness.
The success of the fourth pillar furthermore seems to suggest that small
is indeed beautiful and very capable of tapping into the generosity of
the Belgian public. From the point of view of popular legitimacy thus
it seems more worthwhile to stick to small-scale projects that deliver
directly to poor people. On the side of DGDC there are deep-reaching
38 Nadia Molenaers, Leen Nijs and Huib Huyse
Annex
Table A2.1 Budgets of 37 Flemish and national NGDOs (in € and percentages)
Artsen Zonder
22.053.000 110.530.000 17 83 132.583.000
Grenzen
Oxfam-Solidariteit 8.245.927 12.758.535 39 61 21.004.462
Caritas
10.194.613 6.188.235 62 38 16.382.848
International
Broederlijk Delen 6.311.384 10.070.106 39 61 16.381.490
Handicap Int. 10.130.366 6.030.796 63 37 16.161.162
Damiaanactie 3.764.130 11.130.690 25 75 14.894.820
UNICEF 604.643 12.540.800 5 95 13.145.443
11.11.11 5.734.825 7.043.806 45 55 12.778.631
Vredeseilanden 8.123.477 4.617.602 64 36 12.741.079
Plan België 75.429 12.447.417 1 99 12.522.846
DMOS 5.503.268 3.679.768 60 40 9.183.036
MEMISA 6.706.879 1.881.705 78 22 8.588.584
Trias 7.081.429 1.263.523 85 15 8.344.952
Wereldsolidariteit 4.547.809 3.241.058 58 42 7.788.867
Volens 5.471.852 1.776.415 75 25 7.248.267
PROTOS 5.565.791 1.044.581 84 16 6.610.372
Rode Kruis 3.413.306 2.167.208 61 39 5.580.514
Fos 4.805.559 721.153 87 13 5.526.712
(continued)
Mapping the Belgian NGDO landscape 39
Source: www.ngo-openboek.be.
Table A2.2 Twenty NGDOs with the largest federally subsidized programs
(2008–2010)
(continued)
40 Nadia Molenaers, Leen Nijs and Huib Huyse
Acknowledgments
With thanks to Tom de Bruyn for his contribution on the part of the
fourth pillar. The authors also wish to thank Paul Hoebink and Patrick
Develtere for their comments. Some of the insights presented in this
chapter also draw on earlier research carried out with Robrecht Renard
(Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of
Antwerp, Belgium).
Mapping the Belgian NGDO landscape 41
Notes
1. The fourth pillar is a very diversified group of initiatives in which both
large and institutionalized players (like foundations) and small particular
initiatives are collected. In this paper however we mainly refer to those small
particular initiatives which are non-professional development actors.
2. We gathered a lot of interesting information from a website (www.ngo-
openboek.be) launched by the Flemish federation, which aims to increase
NGDO transparency and accountability through supplying aggregate and
individual information on national and Flemish NGDO activities, visions,
finances and employment. A similar database is being compiled on the
Francophone side.
3. By the time this book went into print, the name of DGDC was changed. It
is now called DGD (Directorate General for Development).
4. All federally registered Belgian NGDOs were requested to participate in the
survey and 42 organizations (36 per cent) submitted their answers.
5. The information in this section is partly based on Stangherlin (2001).
6. The proceeds from this campaign are then divided among their member
organizations for funding of projects and programs.
7. This data must be interpreted cautiously, as it does not involve the NGDOs
that are not a member of the federation or did not supply information. It
also involves national NGDOs, although these should even out the figures
as they are generally members of both organizations.
8. It is estimated that the ngo-openboek figures cover about 75 per cent of
all Belgian NGOs financial information (Coprogram, 2005). AZG/MSF and
UNICEF are excluded from the analysis.
9. This data refers to the 37 NGOs that currently receive program funding and
are active in the South (2008).
10. Until very recently the Belgian socio-political scene has, like the
Netherlands, strongly been characterized by the dominance of vertical
ideological pillars who managed their own social institutions (political par-
ties, unions, women’s groups, the provision of certain social services, etc.).
The pillars existed on both side of the Flemish-French language border.
Belgian society is still very much marked by these pillars but they have lost
their predominance.
11. On the role of these coordinating organizations, see infra.
12. Although this disconnect from bilateral aid in terms of the countries where
one is active might not have been an issue the last couple of decades, today
it is increasingly seen as a potential source of fragmentation. Since the Paris
Declaration, donors are increasingly thinking about concentrating their aid
resources in a limited number of countries and in a limited number of sec-
tors. The obvious question that surfaces from this evolution is if NGDOs, as
indirect actors in development cooperation who implement activities with
ODA, should be inserted in that logic or not. In other words, should all
NGDOs wishing to receive funding, focus on the same countries and sectors,
or not. In many European countries this discussion has or is taken place,
including in Belgium.
13. This rule is known as the ‘1% evaluation rule’, but actually stipulated that
10 per cent of the administrative overhead had to be used for evaluation.
42 Nadia Molenaers, Leen Nijs and Huib Huyse
Starting from 2002, this was replaced by 0.85 per cent of the total budget
NGO’s received from the funding agency.
14. It is interesting to note that when program-financing was introduced for the
first time in 1991, the same implementation issues obstructed a real imple-
mentation of the program approach: too many organizations were, partly
for political reasons, received program financing and the DGDC continued
to work in a project logic, with all of its implications, see Ekstermolengroep,
1994.
15. Very small is defined here as employing maximum five people in Belgium.
16. In our survey, we found that smaller organizations (with a staff of maximum
ten employees) were generally less implicated in international networks,
umbrellas or federations (57 per cent) than larger NGDO’s (85 per cent).
17. This debate is also being held separately with the universities, who are also
substantially subsidized for their development activities.
References
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NGO vijfjarenprogramma’s voor interne evaluaties: synthese rapport (Paris: Ifram).
Mapping the Belgian NGDO landscape 43
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the game (Geneva Occasional paper nr. 1) (Geneva: UNRISD).
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en federaties van ngo’s in België (Paris: Iram) (http://www.diplomatie.be/nl/
pdf/4nlv.pdf).
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ment, results and mutual accountability (Paris High Level Forum) (Paris: OECD).
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Hebdomadaire CRISP, 1714–1715, 5–69.
3
Corporatism and the Development
of Private Aid Organizations in
Denmark
Lars Engberg-Pedersen and Neil Webster, with Adam Moe
Fejerskov and Torsten Geelan
3.1 Introduction
Private aid has long been an important element in the majority of coun-
tries’ development assistance. It has provided means by which to engage
with populations in developing countries and assist their development
without going directly to their governments; it also enables citizens
in the more developed countries of the world to organize and support
those they identify with in the developing world; a way by which ‘to
do some good’. While the emergence and growth of private aid organi-
zations in Denmark might on the surface appear not so different from
that found in most other western European countries, there are some
important differences that emerge on closer investigation. In particular
the corporate nature of Denmark’s development has provided a strong
organizational basis from which to organize private aid; it might also
have provided for a stronger sense of solidarity with those facing social
exclusion and economic marginalization elsewhere. One consequence is
also found in the expectations placed upon the Danish government to
support private aid initiatives. For its part, the Danish state has proved
itself not to be adverse to using this close partnership to serve the gov-
ernment’s other policy agendas. Finally, the Danish economy performed
quite strongly in the 1960s and onwards, providing a relatively broad
wealth base from which private aid can be resourced, both from the
state revenues generated and from private citizens. The following chap-
ter discusses and analyzes how these and related factors have given rise
to and shaped the practice of private aid in Denmark, a story that on
certain points might well be described as something of a success.
44
Private Aid Organizations in Denmark 45
The history of Danish private aid needs to take its point of departure in
relief work at the end of World War II. In 1944, the permanent under-
secretary of the Ministry of Social Affairs together with representatives
of a limited number of private relief organizations started discussions
that led to the creation of Samarbejdsudvalget vedrørende Internationalt
Hjælpearbejde (Cooperation Committee on International Relief Work) in
1945. This committee was intended to coordinate Danish relief being
implemented by private organizations, it did not carry out any form of
humanitarian assistance itself (Kaur-Pedersen, 2008, pp. 32–4).
The committee shows how a close cooperation between private and
public institutions was present from the beginning; in fact it had its
immediate roots in the organization of the food aid provided to Norway
during the war. While the Ministry of Social Affairs had played an
important role in mobilizing the necessary resources for the food aid,
the actual implementation of the aid had been delegated to Dansk Røde
Kors (Danish Red Cross) as a way to avoid the government being accused
of political interference in the German occupation of Norway and the
serious risk of provoking a backlash from the occupying power and the
Nazis in Denmark. After the war the close cooperation between the state
and the private organizations in development assistance continued.
From the latter’s viewpoint the cooperation was advantageous partly
because the state could mobilize substantial funds and partly because
the organizations did not want to engage in competition among them-
selves. The state, on the other hand, had the possibility, through the
Cooperation Committee, to control the private organizations and to
link their work to broader foreign policy concerns. Here one can point
to a desire to use relief assistance to bring the Danish government closer
to the Allies and to distance itself from the ‘cooperation policy’ that
had characterized the Danish relationship with the Third Reich (Kaur-
Pedersen, 2008, pp. 33–8).
The organization of Danish humanitarian assistance just after World
War II can also be seen to reflect the corporatist tradition found in
many other policy areas in Danish political and economic life. Private
organizations and the state meet together in institutions coordinating
the implementation of policies and advising the relevant ministers.
Particularly in the early days, the Non-Government Development
Organizations (NGDO) had a relatively strong platform vis-à-vis the
state as the latter had little experience with the implementation of aid
46 Lars Engberg-Pedersen and Neil Webster
the project approach in favor of sector program support. The phase was
also characterized by a much clearer focus on the political conditions
deemed necessary for aid assistance. In line with international trends,
Danish development cooperation became concerned with democracy,
good governance, human rights, and similar cross-cutting issues. The
relatively strong emphasis on channeling resources through multilat-
eral institutions was maintained, but it was combined with a demand
for efficiency and results under a new policy formulation of ‘active
multilateralism’.
The issue of professionalization became increasingly significant in
relation to the NGDOs during this phase. Civil society organizations
were regarded as important both for development education purposes
in Denmark and because of the increased concern with democratiza-
tion processes in recipient countries. In politically sensitive contexts,
NGDOs were considered to be useful due to the limitations of govern-
mental assistance and the relatively low implementation costs of their
assistance. With approximately 17 per cent of bilateral aid channeled
through Danish NGDOs throughout the 1990s, the demands on these
organizations increased. While the major organizations profited from
relatively flexible framework agreements governing their use of state
money, they also had to specialize in limited themes and to focus on
fewer countries and they were subject to capacity assessments and
impact evaluations. Smaller organizations had to join Projektrådgivningen
(The Project Advice and Training Centre, now Civilsamfund i Udvikling
(CISU, Civil Society in Development) with the purpose of building
capacity among Danish NGDOs.1 Some large private organizations were
criticized however for becoming little more than consultancy firms
when implementing large Danida-financed projects and there was in
particular an increasing concern that the move towards professionaliza-
tion seriously jeopardized the organizations’ relationship to ordinary
Danes. The outcome was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs elaborated
a civil society strategy in 2000 according to which the Danish NGDOs
should focus on capacity building of partner organizations and advo-
cacy activities while abandoning service delivery. The major organiza-
tions also were expected to document their ‘popular anchorage’ in the
Danish society.
support to the big Danish NGDOs was also cut by ten per cent. While
the overall objective of poverty reduction was maintained, issues like
security, terrorism and refugees received increased attention in the fol-
lowing years and a so-called ‘Middle East initiative’ focusing on democ-
racy and human rights was set in motion. Despite not having been
chosen as a so-called program cooperation country, Afghanistan came
to receive some EUR60 million annually in development assistance,
an amount that exceeds the support provided to most other program
cooperation countries, now renamed priority countries. In recent years
governments have begun to emphasize once more the importance of
development cooperation. Members of the ruling parties have men-
tioned a possible increase in aid, and the former prime minister chaired
an Africa Commission working on job creation and economic growth.
In addition to these political changes Denmark has been active in the
aid effectiveness discussions in support of harmonization, alignment
and ownership. Still, governments were slow in abolishing the use of
tied aid and parallel implementation units and only recently a develop-
ment minister adopted a positive stance towards general budget sup-
port. A major point of criticism in the DAC Peer Review in 2007 was
that Denmark is too focused on financial control and too little prepared
to take risks and to try out innovative initiatives (OECD, 2007, p. 16).
The new political situation in 2001 came as a surprise to many Danish
NGDOs. Being heavily dependent on state support, the change from a
basically supportive to a rather critical majority in parliament required
a completely new focus on fundraising. In addition to the cuts that
hit the trade unions’ development organizations particularly hard, the
major NGDOs were met with the requirement that they should raise
at least ten per cent of their budget themselves. In itself and compared
to other European countries the new situation was not remarkable, but
notably Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke and Ibis were heavily hit and had to
invest substantial efforts in recruiting members and raising funds. Other
major private organizations were accustomed to organize national fund-
raising campaigns with street collections and similar activities and they
were less affected by the new requirements.
While the change of government did not influence the orientation of
the NGDOs’ development activities, the break with the long corporatist
tradition in Denmark’s approach to development assistance placed the
private organizations on the sidelines with respect to the official devel-
opment policy. During the 2000s the governments formed their devel-
opment priorities upon very little consultation with other development
actors. For their part the NGDOs have been reluctant to perform the
Private Aid Organizations in Denmark 51
1. National organizations.
2. National organizations having their own aid activities, but linking
up to international organizations or networks.
3. National branches of international organizations.
Of the smaller NGDOs, the large majority belongs to the first category
and some to the second. Of the 25 large organizations identified above,
10 belong to the first category; 12 to the second; and 3 to the third.
Some observations can be made on this basis: First, a limited number of
international organizations have established themselves with national
branches just supporting the international organization. Secondly, quite
a large number of the largest organizations have been established based
on an international organization as a model. Most of these organiza-
tions were founded by Danes and they all have a clear national identity,
but some have moved quite close to their international prototype while
others have become more independent. Thirdly, some of the biggest
52 Lars Engberg-Pedersen and Neil Webster
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
–1990
1900–1920
1920–1940
1940–1960
1960–1985
1985–1990
1990–1995
1995–2000
2000–2005
2005–
international sources. A large part of this money stems from theEU and
finances relief activities. It is not likely that any organization other than
the seven mentioned in the table receive significant amounts of money
from international sources.
Government subsidies for development and relief activities amounted
to DKK1,512,300,000 (EUR202,993,289) in 2009. Of this amount,
DKK1,032,100,000 (EUR138,536,913) or 69 per cent were used
for development activities while relief work was supported with
DKK480,200,000 (EUR64,456,375) or 31 per cent of the total. The sup-
port was extended to 70 different organizations some of which (in par-
ticular Projektrådgivningen) distribute the resources to different smaller
member organizations. The total amount allocated to NGDOs added
up to 17 per cent of the bilateral assistance and to 10 per cent of total
Danish aid. The support of NGDOs’ development activities constituted
11.8 per cent of total bilateral development activities in 2008, while
the support of NGDOs’ relief work accounted for 37.9 per cent of total
humanitarian assistance (Danida, 2008a, p. 5). Government subsidies
for the twelve largest NGDOs have been listed in Table 3.1 below.
The picture regarding private donations is more complicated to
establish. There are no figures available on the totality of the market
of charities in Denmark, and it is probably difficult to distinguish this
market from privately financed activities of public utility. A survey of
18 large enterprises and banks was conducted in 2007 concluding that
DKK466 million (EUR62.5 million) were allocated to various non-profit
purposes such as, handicap friendly play grounds, instruments for
cancer research and the renovation of mills.6 However, this amount is
probably a minor, though not insignificant, part of the private support
for initiatives of public utility.
Limiting the market of charity to private support to poor and mar-
ginalized people, NGDOs focusing on low-income countries probably
collect the bulk of the resources available, but there is certainly also a
significant flow of charity inside Denmark. To get an idea of the actors
in this market, one may refer to the initiative ‘a Good Cause’ where cus-
tomers by purchasing goods from online stores elicit a donation from
these stores to charity organizations. The initiative did not survive the
financial crisis, but in 2007–2008 139 charity organizations in Denmark
had joined the initiative. Of these 20 worked with international relief
and development while 37 were engaged in religiously founded charity
domestically and abroad. The rest dealt with social work in Denmark,
particular illnesses and handicaps, animals, environmental issues and
human rights.7 One of the largest private organizations working with
54 Lars Engberg-Pedersen and Neil Webster
(continued)
Table 3.1 Continued
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Ghana
Sierra Leone
Philippines
Cambodja
Bolivia
Angola
Kenya
Malawi
Uganda
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Afghanistan
India
Nepal
Vietnam
Honduras
Nicaragua
Bangladesh
Albania
Figure 3.2 Countries receiving more than DKK 10 million (€1.34 million) gov-
ernment subsidized NGDO aid in 2008 (in € million)
Source: Danida (2008a, pp. 38–40)
• set clear targets for, and regularly assess their contributions to,
promoting local ownership in the partnerships with civil society
organizations in developing countries.
• set clear priorities for their interventions with respect to country
focus, sector and partner choice, with a point of departure in their
professional competencies.
• strengthen their results-orientation, including evaluation of the
impact of activities in relation to the achievement of this strat-
egy’s long-term objective.
• set clear goals for, and regularly assess the strengthening of their
popular foundation and networks in Denmark.
Number of 77 72 73 71 64 62
organizations
Amount (1,000 DKK) 892,917 866,333 870,334 893,122 966,416 932,477
have rightly argued that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has dominated
and partly internalized aid discussions (Olsen, 2005, pp. 199–202), the
NGDOs cannot free themselves from a responsibility for the mediocre
results of development education.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has for many years drafted an annual
Program and Project Report (Program- og Projektorienteringen) for the
Danish parliament. This provides a summary of targets, results and
status for all the current approved bilateral and multilateral programs
and projects as well as humanitarian activities and NGDO projects. For
projects where the allocated funds are less than DKK5 million, the basic
facts are provided, but without description of the nature of the activi-
ties or similar. For all others an annual statement of the activities’ status
has to be provided; a form of annual report to the Danish parliament.
The larger organizations organize regular evaluations of their activi-
ties; this can extend to a periodic request from Danida for a full evalu-
ation of elements of a program, of a full program, or in exceptional
instance of the program and the organization itself. Particularly around
the elaboration of the civil society strategy in 2000, a number of frame-
work agreement organizations were evaluated, and an attempt was
made to assess the impact of the activities of several Danish NGDOs in
three countries (Oakley, 1999).
Smaller organizations with minor projects with a short time frame
(e.g., 3 years for a phase) tend to submit annual reports that include an
assessment from a consultant or a qualified adviser to the organization.
These assessments are often important for an application for additional
funds for a second phase of the project or an extension of an existing
activity to other localities. Few if any private organizations, large or
small, framework or project, have sought to assess the impact or aid
effectiveness of their activities. A notable exception was, however, the
above-mentioned study.
3.8 Conclusion
were then of much less importance until the late 1970s where changes
of the relationship between the state and the private organizations
paved the way for much stronger financial support of NGDO activi-
ties. During the 1980s and 1990s, the private aid organizations steadily
increased their political influence and economic importance. With the
change of government in 2001, their influence on official development
policies was heavily curtailed, however in recent years the position of
the government appears to have softened at least with respect to some
of the NGDOs.
Apart from the political changes in 2001 and their implications for
the NGDOs, two opposing tendencies have affected the influence of
private aid organizations in Denmark in the last couple of decades. On
the one hand, the corporate tradition has enabled private organizations
to influence official development policies. Some NGDOs can do this
directly through their representatives on committees, panels, or similar
that provide advice to the development minister, otherwise the means
have been advocacy through the media, lobbying, and other advocacy
means.
On the other hand and partly as a response to the perceived influence
of the NGDOs, there has been a growing tendency to question the legiti-
macy of private aid organizations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and among politicians. In particular the extent of their popular base in
terms of numbers of members and supporters is regularly pointed to
as is the apparent mediocre level of public concern with development
cooperation. These can be seen as valid criticisms. At the same time it
is important to observe the comparatively high level of government
subsidies for Danish NGDOs. As the chapter has noted, since the early
1980s there has been a growing and significant amount of Danish aid
channeled through private aid organizations. Smaller organizations
have been actively encouraged to undertake development activities
largely subsidized by the government, and framework agreements have
enabled bigger organizations to engage in long-term collaboration with
partner organizations based on relatively secure financing. How should
we see these mixed messages? It is important to note the way that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to assert itself a little more in
the world of private aid in Denmark. The attachment of conditions to
funding and the reduction in policy consultation reflect a shift toward
a more asymmetric partnership. At the same time the government com-
mitment to the private aid organizations remains strong in terms of the
level of funding, especially when compared to many other countries.
68 Lars Engberg-Pedersen and Neil Webster
Notes
1. ‘The Project Advice and Training Centre (PATC, now CISU) is a platform
for Danish civil society organizations (CSOs), established in December
1995 in response to a general need among small Danish CSOs to exchange
experiences and build the general capacity of staff and volunteers. Today it
is a well-established association of more than 240 small and medium sized
Danish CSOs’ (http://www.prngo.dk/Default.aspx?ID=19060 accessed 2009-
08-24). Projektrådgivningen was also established in response to the difficulties
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to handle the contact with numerous
small private organizations, and it is, accordingly, not least an intermediary
organization between small CSOs and the state.
2. Throughout the chapter the following exchange rate has been used: €1 =
DKK7.450551.
3. The status of UNICEF Danmark as a private organization can evidently be
disputed. It does, however, collect a substantial amount of private funds in
Denmark.
4. The categorization is tentative as the borders between the categories are not
very clear.
5. This sample has not been elaborated according to other criteria than acces-
sibility of data. It includes the bigger organizations, but not all of them.
Smaller NGDOs left out of this sample are likely to have been created within
the last 20 to 30 years. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to collect
information on more organizations.
6. http://www.finansforbundet.dk/udskriv.asp?mId=708&ArtId=113835
accessed 2008-12-03.
7. http://www.engodsag.dk/index.php accessed 2008-12-03.
8. http://www.kirkenskorshaer.dk/forside/ accessed 2011-05-06.
9. http://www.frelsens-haer.dk/ accessed 2008-12-03.
10. Some of the organizations are engaged in both relief and development activi-
ties. They have been categorized according to whether they primarily fund
relief or development activities. It has not been possible to get data from Red
Barnet on the allocation of funds between the two activities, but the organi-
zation has tentatively been categorized as primarily a relief organization.
Folkekirkens Nødhjælp has been categorised as a development organization
despite its large relief work.
11. Another major national fundraising event in 2011 was a television show,
Danmarksindsamlingen, raising DKK 87 million (€11.7 million) for 12 differ-
ent NGDOs.
12. http://www.socialrdg.dk/index.dsp?page=8179 accessed 2008-12-03.
13. Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke/ActionAid Denmark, Folkekirkens Nødhjælp, Dansk
Røde Kors, Ibis, CARE Danmark, and Red Barnet.
70 Lars Engberg-Pedersen and Neil Webster
References
Bach, C.F. (2008) ‘Foregangslandet under forandring 1989–2005’ in Due-Nielsen,
C., Feldbæk, O. and Petersen, N. (eds) Idealer og realiteter: Dansk udviklingspoli-
tiks historie 1945–2005 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal), pp. 390–515.
Danida (1998) Evaluering: Danidas oplysningsbevilling – kontinuitet og fornyelse i
dansk ulandsoplysning (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Danida (2000) Strategy for Danish Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries –
Including Cooperation with the Danish NGOs: Analysis and Strategy Document
(Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Danida (2008a) Danidas NGO-samarbejde 2008 (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs).
Danida (2008b) Strategy for Danish Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries
(Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Kaur-Pedersen, S. (2008) ‘Spiren til dansk udviklingspolitik 1945–1962’ in Due-
Nielsen, C., Feldbæk, O. and Petersen, N. (eds) Idealer og realiteter: Dansk
udviklingspolitiks historie 1945–2005 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal), pp. 24–115.
Olesen, Thorsten Borring (2008), ‘Stabilitet og turbulens: Udviklingspolitikken
1975–1989’ in Due-Nielsen, C., Feldbæk, O. and Petersen, N. (eds) Idealer og
realiteter: Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945–2005 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal),
pp. 258–389.
Olsen, G.R. (2005) ‘Danish aid policy in the post-Cold War period: Increasing
resources and minor adjustments’ in Stokke, O. and Hoebink, P. (eds)
Perspectives on European Development Co-operation (London: Routledge).
Oakley, P. (1999) The Danish NGO Impact Study: A Review of Danish NGO Activities
in Developing Countries: Overview Report (Copenhagen: Danida).
OECD (2007) Denmark: Peer Review (Paris: OECD).
Pedersen, J. (2008) ‘Det bilaterale program i støbeskeen 1962–1975’ in Due-
Nielsen, C., Feldbæk, O. and Petersen, N. (eds) Idealer og realiteter: Dansk
udviklingspolitiks historie 1945–2005 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal), pp. 116–257.
TNS Gallup (2008) Danida: Kendskabsmåling 2007 (Copenhagen: TNS Gallup).
4
Non-Governmental Organizations
and Finland’s Development Policy
Lauri Siitonen
4.1 Introduction
71
72 Lauri Siitonen
250
200
150
100
50
0
1985 1989 1995 2001 2005 2011
possibly also used the term ‘Third World’ certainly included students
and leftist activists. Very likely they also had participated in the tra-
ditional high school students’ day off for voluntary work (taksvärkki <
dagsverke in Swedish: a day’s work), which in the late 1960s was devoted,
for the first time, to help African countries. However, the third major
grouping of Finnish non-governmental development organizations –
the solidarity movements – was only forming in the 1960s. Finally, the
fourth grouping, which consists of national branches of international
non-governmental organizations (INGO), appeared even later, in the
1980s. In the following, some of the prominent civic aid organizations
representing these four major groupings will now be presented.
official policies took part in the radical youth movement, which paid
growing attention to the ‘hot spots’ of the Third World – Vietnam in
the 1960s, Chile in the 1970s and Nicaragua in the 1980s. In addi-
tion, there was the long-standing anti-apartheid movement, which
curiously united people with a missionary background with those
more engaged in humanitarian concerns or the solidarity movement,
including the labor movement. In the 1980s, Finnish Labor man-
aged to stop all importation from South Africa as a political action
against the Apartheid regime – a real tour de force. No wonder that
the largest Finnish organizations specialized in international solidar-
ity are those established within the labor movement, The International
Solidarity Foundation (established 1970) and The Solidarity Centre of the
Finnish Labor (established 1986). The former is closely related with the
Social Democratic Party and operates in Nicaragua, Uganda, India and
Somalia. The Finnish Labor’s Solidarity Centre focuses on supporting
labor organizations in over 20 developing countries. Whereas the more
radical solidarity organizations used to focus on countries ‘under colo-
nial or imperialist oppression’, the traditional labor movement has its
strength in its long-standing expertise in supporting labor organizations
and labor controlling (for instance child labor) as well as enhancing
labor conditions in developing countries.
Another kind of solidarity initiative is organized around the idea of fair
trade. The first fair trade shop in Finland was opened in Oulu in 1979
(Korhonen, 2000, p. 116). Thereafter the number of fair trade shops has
increased to over 40. In addition to selling handicrafts and other products
from developing countries, these shops provide meeting points for Third
World activists and local NGOs. According to the Register of Associations,
there are 16 local fair trade associations around the country, from
Helsinki to Lapland. These associations spread information on develop-
ment issues, maintain shops and often also run small development pro-
jects. The more commercially oriented branch of fair trade works through
the principle of ‘direct importation’ of goods marked with the fair trade
logo and sold in regular shops and super markets. Bananas, coffee, cot-
ton, flowers and wines are currently the most popular fair trade goods in
Finland Fairtrade Finland Vuosiraportti 2013 [Annual Report 2013].
The first larger civic initiative closely related with the official devel-
opment aid organized in 1979 under the name ‘movement for devel-
opment cooperation’, which in 1980 was renamed the ‘One Per Cent
Movement’ (prosenttiliike). This name referred to the original 1960s
international target for resource transfers to poor countries, already met
by the neighboring Scandinavian countries. The movement successfully
Non-governmental Organizations and Finland’s Development Policy 79
The guidelines further set out that NGOs are free to choose their tar-
gets ‘within the limits of the overall goals of the Finnish development
strategy’. NGOs are expected to contribute, in the first place, to the
development of civil societies in developing countries. However, a clear
majority – two-thirds – of Finnish NGOs specializes in delivering welfare
services in health care, the social sector and education, not in advocacy,
democracy support or building other aspects of civil society.
The government’s development policy program (MFA, 2007b, p. 34)
continues with the same tone of glorifying the role of the NGOs: ‘The
special value that NGOs can add is their direct contacts with the grass-
roots level and their valuable work to strengthen the civil society in
developing countries.’ At the same time, however, the program calls for
increased effectiveness in terms of the NGOs’ general capacity and the
quality of development cooperation. These are the same goals as set in
the MFA Guidelines mentioned above. However, the dubious part of the
text is the expectation that ‘in their own development cooperation pro-
grams, NGOs should enhance, whenever possible, implementation of
the principles contained in the Government Program and in the devel-
opment policy program’ (ibid.). The statement is rather problematic, as
the very same policy program received harsh criticism – more than any
Finnish aid policy program before – particularly from the NGO sector.
The NGO umbrella organization KEPA in particular criticized the way
the program was adopted, which led to some doubts among the NGO
community about the sincerity of the policy:
The new program was briskly processed and approved within just
three weeks. Representatives of civil society were given a week to
comment on its first draft, and in all the haste there was little oppor-
tunity for the voices of NGOs to be heard. This is particularly regret-
ful here in Finland – a country that so often boasts of its exemplary
democratic processes and good governance both here and abroad.
(Lappalainen, 2008, p. 3)
The 2010 Guidelines for Civil Society (MFA, 2010) claims to respond
to the growing national and international pressure towards increased
cooperation between public authorities and civil society actors. On the
national level, the government has published a citizen participation
program and its 2007 resolution emphasizes the promotion of the oper-
ational preconditions for civil society organizations. On the interna-
tional level, the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra
Agenda for Action stresses the potential in improving the effectiveness
84 Lauri Siitonen
Part of Finland’s official aid funding has been channeled to civic aid
organizations since 1974. That was more than a decade later than
the beginning of the official aid program. In fact, NGOs were actively
involved in campaigning for the opening of such funding program
(Onali, 2008, p. 51). Obviously the experiences of similar funding pro-
grams in other donor countries also played an important role.
There are currently six main channels of governmental subsidy
schemes for NGOs (MFA, 2010, p. 8):
Table 4.1 Official support to civic aid organizations, 2000–2010, in Million Euro
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
31.8 33.6 38.2 38.6 38.4 45.1 57.1 64.5 76.2 86.1 90.3
Data for reference: annual ODA disbursements and the per cent share of NGO
support
402.2 434.4 490.4 494.3 547.2 725.7 664.8 716.9 808.2 926.5 1007.6
7.9% 7.7% 7.8% 7.8% 7.0% 6.2% 8.6% 9.0% 9.4% 9.3% 9.0%
Source: MFA.
90 Lauri Siitonen
a volunteer program started anew and NGOs were invited to prepare the
initiative. In this connection Dr. Marja-Liisa Swantz (the first director of
the Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki) came up
with the idea of transforming the loose One Per Cent movement into a
coordinating organization that would run the volunteer program.
above. Let us note, first, that the relationship between NGOs and the
development policy leadership is far from fixed. In the early 1990s, the
very first Finnish Minister for Development Cooperation, Mr Toimi
Kankaanniemi was keen on emphasizing the role of civic organiza-
tions in development cooperation. His own party, the Christian League
(now renamed Christian Democratic Party) has thereafter continued
this policy. The successor Ministers for Development Cooperation, like
Mr Pekka Haavisto (1995–1999) and Ms Satu Hassi (1999–2002), both
from the Green Party, also sympathized with NGOs. The honeymoon
was somewhat disturbed only under the Minister for Foreign Trade and
Development (2007–2011), Mr Paavo Väyrynen (Centre Party). At least
in the beginning he was much criticized by some organizations and the
relationship with the NGO sector went colder. His successor, Ms Heidi
Hautala was again from the Green Party and a former (2002–2007) head
of KEPA. Due to reasons unrelated with development policy, Hautala
suddenly resigned in October 2013 and was replaced by Pekka Haavisto.
While the relationship has seen its ups and downs, it is still worth
emphasizing the broad political consensus on the basic principles of
development policies.12
Nevertheless, when it comes to the overall public support to develop-
ment cooperation in general, the Finnish non-governmental develop-
ment organizations have been rather positive and actively campaign
for the growth of official aid. This is a tricky issue in Finland, where the
level of ODA (currently at 0.5 per cent of GNI) continuously remains
below the international target (of 0.7 per cent) already met by other
Nordic countries. For example in 2006, KEPA advocated the interna-
tional ODA target by publishing a report where Finland’s development
policy was compared with the policies of the much better-performing
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands (Nahi and Halonen, 2006).
Another recent topic of KEPA’s advocacy work is the follow up and
monitoring of Finland’s progress towards the Paris Declaration targets.
One of the main concerns seems to be the predictability of aid, an area
where Finland has performed less than well (Pitkänen, 2008).
The means of influencing public support differ according to target
group. Activities aiming to influence decision-makers (the government,
parliament and officials) are known as lobbying. When the target is to
influence the general opinion, the activities are called campaigning.
I will first look into campaigning on development issues and then shortly
into lobbying. Public campaigns are often organized by several organi-
zations that share similar goals. For example the FinnChurchAid, the
Finnish UN Association and Friends of the Earth, in addition to KEPA,
96 Lauri Siitonen
from the only voice from the whole Finnish NGO sector. Most probably
the NGO sector’s campaigning and lobbying have successfully increased
public interest in development issues, although it is difficult to say how
much they have influenced the public support for Finnish development
policy.
The 2010 Guidelines (MFA, 2010, p. 16) ‘do not require radical changes’,
nor see it ‘necessary to abandon the provision of basic services’, but
nevertheless they encourage NGOs ‘to consider further investment in
the strengthening of civil societies in their partner countries.’
The overall performance of Finnish NGOs seems to vary much,
depending on the type of organization. The more professional NGOs
are increasingly focusing on clearly defined issues (for instance child
labor) where the organization has expertise, and thereby ability to make
a difference. A good number of the partnership organizations are focus-
ing on fewer countries and intend to focus on fewer thematic areas and
reduce the number of projects. Some other NGOs in the partnership
program seem to have adopted perhaps a too wide mission. Particularly
some of the missionary organizations have continuously increased the
number of partner countries, a trend that may be logical from the point
of view of their mission, but not necessarily from a developmental point
of view (MFA, 2008d, p. 39). Then again, a recent evaluation found
development cooperation activities of the Finnish Missionary Society
effective and efficient in enhancing the lives of peoples in poor coun-
tries in a sustainable way (Tapaninen et al., 2011).
Finally, civil society organizations play a particular role in advocacy
activities. Therefore it is politically interesting to note what kinds of
organizations are given a particular status. At the beginning of the cur-
rent Partnership Scheme, seven organizations included in the former
framework were adopted without formal appraisal (MFA, 2008d, p. 33).
100 Lauri Siitonen
Only the three new organizations (Plan Finland, Save the Children
Finland and World Vision Finland), all of them branches of large pro-
fessional international networks, were audited (ibid.). In fact, almost
half (five of eleven) of the partner organizations are faith-based. Three
of them (FELM, Fida and FS) do both missionary work and develop-
ment work, using a major part of their resources for the missionary
work (ibid., p. 34). Furthermore, one NGO is very close to the Social
Democratic Party and one represents Finnish Labor. Finally, three of
the organizations (the Red Cross, Save the Children and Plan Finland
Foundation) have close relations with their international mother organ-
izations that are global players in the aid industry. Indeed, it is question-
able to what extent any foreign aid can be ‘pure’. For a good reason, the
2008 evaluation of the partnership program proposed codes of conduct
to ‘separate development work from ideological work and to distinguish
marketing and information services from advocacy’ (ibid., p. 81).
The evaluation report also noted that ‘in the Finnish scheme no
clear goals are set in terms of advocacy work and capacity building
versus service delivery’ (ibid., p. 36). In practice, the advocacy work
depends on the type of civil society organization. Thus, missionary
organizations with their worldwide approach and focus on doctrinally
similar partners can rely on loyal and strong support in their religious
communities, but their advocacy work and campaigning is sometimes
limited to activists within these background communities. Professional
humanitarian organizations usually reach the general public with their
campaigning and advocacy work. The labor organizations have strong
thematic expertise and natural partners in developing countries’ labor
organizations in campaigning for labor rights. The ‘transnational’ NGOs
with their wide international networks are, in principle, particularly
strong in advocacy and campaigning, but remain nationally perhaps
less visible than one could expect.
Another significant evaluation of the NGO sector concerns the
Service Centre KEPA. As mentioned above, KEPA is highly dependent
on governmental funding for over 90 per cent of its annual budget.
The leading motive for this support is to enhance the quality of NGO
aid (MFA, 2006, p. 16). According to the evaluation (MFA, 2005, p.
6), the competence of KEPA is between the two extremes, a ‘service
centre’ (towards its member organizations and the MFA) and a ‘devel-
opment agency’ (towards its southern partners and beneficiaries).
Whereas KEPA’s primary customers are the member organizations, its
advocacy draws legitimacy from the South. The 2005 evaluation of
the service centre stated that ‘the organization … has shifted from
Non-governmental Organizations and Finland’s Development Policy 101
4.7 Conclusion
Annex
Table 4.2 Eleven larger NGOs with the status of partner organization
(continued)
Non-governmental Organizations and Finland’s Development Policy 103
Source: MFA.
104 Lauri Siitonen
Notes
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Tiina Kontinen for her com-
ments to an earlier version of this article. The usual disclaimers apply.
1. For the Register of Associations see: http://www.prh.fi/en/yhdistysrekisteri.
html.
2. Around 33 per cent of the Finnish population is reported participating in the
activities of a voluntary organization. That is less than in Denmark (35 per
cent), Island (40 per cent), Norway (52 per cent), or Sweden (52 per cent),
yet clearly more than in the Western countries on average (15 per cent).
Due to a different data basis, the numbers may be somewhat inaccurate, but
nevertheless indicative. See Matthies (2006a), in Nylund (2008); http://www.
norden.org/pub/velfaerd/social_helse/sk/TN2006517.pdf.
3. The Collaborative Model draws from the typology of Government-NGO rela-
tions proposed by Gidron et al. (1992, p. 18).
4. Since non-governmental development organization is not a legally defined
concept in Finland, but a sociological category, there are obvious methodo-
logical difficulties in determining the exact size of the sector. I have used
here two main sources: the membership register of The Service Centre for
Development Cooperation (KEPA) for the overall size of the sector and the
number of organizations that have received support from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs (MFA) for an indication of development activities.
5. I am indebted to Dr Tiina Kontinen for the explanation.
6. In the early 1960s, expertise was sought from the staff of Students’ interna-
tional relief organization to run the new Office for international develop-
ment aid – the future Department for Development Policy. One of them was
Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, who later made a splendid carrier in diplomacy, became
President of the Republic and recently a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.
7. The committee joined the European wide EU-NGDO Liaison Committee
(today known as CONCORD).
8. Speech delivered by Mr Antti Pentikäinen, the executive director of
FinnChuchAid, in Helsinki, November 25, 2008.
9. Over the years 2004–2009 the EC grants to Finnish NGOs amounted to over
€21 million (estimation by KEHYS, e-mail to the author on February 16,
2009).
10. In the way of comparison, the Finnish NGO Platform to the EU (KEHYS) has
some six staff member and an annual budget of around €100 000.
11. For the organizations focusing on the welfare of the disabled, the percentage
is even lower, 7.5 per cent.
12. Only the populist True Finns Party has openly campaigned against official
development aid. The party received 20 per cent of votes and more than
doubled its seats in the parliamentary elections of April 2011, but remained
in opposition.
References
Aila-Leena Matthies: “Toisenlainen kolmas sektori: Pohjoismaiden sosiaali- ja
terveysjärjestöt tutkimuksen valossa” [Another kind of third sector: Nordic
Non-governmental Organizations and Finland’s Development Policy 105
MFA (1993) Finland’s Development Cooperation in the 1990s: Strategic Goals and
Means (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland).
MFA (2002) Kehitysuutiset [Development News] (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland) 7–8/2002.
MFA (2005) Evaluation of the Service Centre for Development Cooperation in Finland
(Kepa): Main Report (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland).
MFA (2006) Kansalaisjärjestölinjaus [NGO Development Cooperation Guidelines]
(Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland).
MFA (2007a) Report of Evaluation Study: Implementation of the Paris Declaration,
Finland. Evaluation report 2007:3 (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of
Finland).
MFA (2007b) Development Policy Program 2007 – Towards a Sustainable and Just
World Community, Government Decision-in-Principle (Helsinki: Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of Finland).
MFA (2008a) Kansalaisjärjestöhankkeet 2008: Ulkoasianministeriön tukemat
kansalaisjärjestöjen kehitysyhteistyöhankkeet vuonna 2008 [NGO develop-
ment projects subsidised by the MFA in 2008] (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland).
MFA (2008b) Kansalaisjärjestöjen kehitysyhteistyö; kumppanuusjärjestöjen uudet
valinnan kriteerit (25.08.2008) [NGO development co-operation; the new crite-
ria for partner organizations] (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland)
Available online in www.formin.fi.
MFA (2008c) Kehitysuutiset [Development News] 1/08 (Helsinki: Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of Finland).
MFA (2008d) Report of Evaluation Study: Finnish Partnership Agreement Scheme.
Evaluation report 2008:1 (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland).
MFA (2010) Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy (Helsinki: Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of Finland). Available online in www.formin.fi.
MFA (2011) Kansalaisjärjestöhankkeet 2011. Ulkoasianministeriön tukemat
kansalaisjärjestöjen kehitysyhteistyöhankkeet vuonna 2011 [NGO develop-
ment projects subsidised by the MFA in 2011] (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland).
MFA (2012) Finland’s Development Policy Programme. Government Decision-in-
Principle, 16 February 2012 (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland).
Nahi, T. and Halonen, P. (2006) Näin naapurissa: Suomi ja kehitysyhteistyön
edelläkävijät [This way in the neighbourhood: Finland and the forerunners of
development cooperation] Kepa reports no. 84 (Helsinki: Kepa).
Nurminen, A-M. (1969) ‘Sanastotutkimus’ [An interview study on terminology]
in PTS-tutkimuksia 18/69 (Helsinki: Oy Yleisradio Ab).
Nylund, M. (2008) ‘Vapaaehtoisuuden arvot ja motiivit’ [The values and motives
of volunteerism] in Hakkarainen O. and Kontinen T. (eds) Vapaaehtoisuus kehi-
tystyössä (Helsinki: Kepa), pp. 24–38.
OECD (2005) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Ownership, Harmonisation,
Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability (Paris High Level Forum) (Paris:
OECD).
OECD (2007) DAC Peer Review: Finland (Paris: OECD).
OECD (2008) Accra Agenda for Action (Accra High Level Forum) (Paris: OECD).
OECD (2011a) Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (Paris:
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Non-governmental Organizations and Finland’s Development Policy 107
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styössä (Helsinki: Kepa), pp. 51–8.
Pitkänen, N. (2008) ‘Making aid work’ in Kepa Newsletter 2008, pp. 4–5.
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Vapaaehtoisuus kehitystyössä (Helsinki: Kepa), pp. 8–10.
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5
Irish Development NGOs and the
Official Aid Programme of Ireland:
A ‘Special’ Relationship?
Éamonn Casey and Helen O’Neill
The Irish government launched its official aid program in 1974, the
year after the country joined the European Economic Community (now
Union). A nascent non-governmental development community already
existed in the form of Irish missionaries dispersed around the world
but with headquarters in Ireland. The greatest number was located in
English-speaking Africa and this influenced Ireland’s choice of program
countries in the early years.
From its beginnings in the 1970s – not surprisingly, given that
Christian missionaries had pioneered Ireland’s involvement in develop-
ing countries – the official Irish aid program was imbued with a strong
humanitarian motivation and partnerships were formed with devel-
opment non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This partnership
remains at the heart of the program today.
Early ministerial speeches and departmental documents stressed a
‘moral obligation’ to help ‘poor countries and poor people’ and to
‘promote the development of developing countries’. Interestingly,
promotion of human rights, a huge issue at the global level today,
was included in the aims of the Irish aid program as early as 1979.
Poverty reduction, satisfaction of basic needs, an equitable internal dis-
tribution of the benefits of economic development, and promotion of
self-reliance were repeatedly cited as the main aims of the program from
its earliest days (O’Neill, 1984).
The geographic focus was on a small number of very poor countries
in sub-Saharan Africa and the sectoral focus was on agriculture and rural
development, health, and education. This remains largely true today. In
2012, the nine ‘program countries’ (PCs) − now ‘key program countries’
108
Irish Development NGOs and the Official Aid Program of Ireland 109
Table 5.1 Irish ODA, selected years 1974–2013 (EUR million and per cent)
a = this figure includes all administration costs associated with managing the entire aid
program both at headquarters and in the field (€28.2m in 2013).
Sources: Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland’s official development assistance, various years,
and data kindly supplied by Irish Aid in July 2014.
The Irish government published its first White Paper on foreign policy,
Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, in 1996 (Government of Ireland,
1996). It included a chapter on development cooperation and also a
chapter on human rights. Ten years later, the government published
its first White Paper on Irish Aid (Government of Ireland, 2006). It
included a chapter on civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs).3
That chapter described the relationship between the official Irish
aid program and the non-governmental development organizations
(NGDOs). It began by describing these organizations as ‘a vital compo-
nent of healthy democracy in both developed and developing coun-
tries’ and the Irish NGDOs as ‘key partners’ in the Irish Aid program.
It continued by stating that, while ‘poverty reduction is our shared
goal, we can work towards it in separate and complementary ways’
(Government of Ireland, 2006, p. 75). The White Paper acknowledged
that Irish NGOs and missionaries had been working in developing
countries since before the establishment of the government’s official aid
program in 1974 and stated that they enjoyed ‘an excellent reputation
domestically and internationally’ (ibid.).
The paper also stated that the relationship between Irish Aid and the
development NGOs goes beyond funding arrangements and includes
policy dialogue across a range of areas. It acknowledged that the
NGDOs play an important role in development education by helping
to keep development issues on the public policy and media agenda.
Highlighting the advantages that accrue to Irish Aid from working
with NGDOs, it pointed to the speed with which they can deploy in
Irish Development NGOs and the Official Aid Program of Ireland 111
were established in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The two largest Irish
NGDOs today were founded during that period: Concern in 1968 during
the Biafran war, and Trócaire (the development organization of the Irish
Catholic bishops) in 1973. Goal, the third largest Irish NGDO today, was
established in 1977.
The early activities of the Irish NGDOs covered a wide field but,
according to Connolly, fell roughly into three areas: 1) raising and
disbursing funds to help development projects in developing countries
(DCs); 2) non-fundraising bodies concerned with development educa-
tion, policy issues and/or research; and 3) bodies concerned with special
interest groups such as returned development workers or DC students
in Ireland.
The establishment of Irish Aid and of the government’s Agency
for Personal Service Overseas (APSO) and DEVCO (the state agencies’
development cooperation organization) in 1974 helped the NGDOs
‘to define themselves more clearly as a distinct grouping with com-
mon interests’ (Connolly, 1979, p. 27). Accordingly, a loose structure
called the Voluntary Agencies Liaison Committee (VALC) was set up
that same year to promote exchange of views and possible cooperation
among these various bodies. VALC operated quite successfully for over
two years but was superseded by a more permanent structure called
the Confederation of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGOOD)
in 1977, which brought together 16 NGDOs but excluded APSO and
DEVCO. It was this decision, that the organization would include only
NGOs, which promoted the growth of a distinctive and self-aware
Irish NGDO sector, according to Connolly (ibid., p. 28).
At this same time, the European Commission (EC) expressed a wish
to see the establishment of national NGDO structures in the nine
member states so as to obviate the need for it to deal with a large
number of individual NGDOs. Thus, CONGOOD was showing the way
in having already established itself as a national structure. The EC set
up the EC-NGO Liaison Committee which, at that time, linked over
700 European NGDOs. That initiative also led to the establishment of
the Irish National Assembly (INA), or ‘national platform’ that acted
as a conduit for Irish-based organizations to interact with the new
EC committee.
Interestingly, when the EC and official aid agencies are today encour-
aging national NGDOs to get involved directly with their counterparts
in DCs, it is worth recalling that Irish NGDOs – probably largely as a
result of their missionary links – were already handling funds and spon-
soring projects in 1979 equal to a quarter of the ODA transfers that year
Irish Development NGOs and the Official Aid Program of Ireland 113
by Irish Aid (Connolly, 1979). Connolly describes the work of the Irish
NGDOs as follows: ‘They are involved with hundreds of local grassroots
communities and organizations, as well as with regional, national and
international groups.’ He added: ‘It is this direct contact with the poor,
the marginalized and the weakest, in a way that is out of the question
for government linked programs, that gives Irish NGOs much of their
cutting edge’.
Connolly conceded that it was difficult to quantify the full contribu-
tion of the Irish NGOs at that time. However, he stressed their growing
influence in terms of the emergence of a consciousness in Ireland in
relation to development issues in the late 1970s: ‘Behind every pound
given there is the involvement of people, the arousal of interest and
sympathy, the posing of questions about the very nature of develop-
ment itself, and increasingly the conversion of development questions
into political issues’ (Connolly, 1979, p. 29).
Connolly concluded by presenting his views on the challenges that,
in his opinion, faced the NGO sector in 1979. He said that the interest
by NGOs in development education at that time implied an acceptance
that much of the roots of maldevelopment and the obstacles facing DCs
derive from international market, financial and technological structures
and that many of these structures have their roots within the indus-
trialized countries, ‘including our own’. He concluded: ‘This is not an
easy or straightforward process for NGOs, as it must bring them into
sensitive domestic areas, and to a sometimes painful reassessment of
their own understanding of development. The nettle is however being
grasped, even if very warily at times’ (ibid.).
The key issues that engaged CONGOOD in the 1970s and 1980s
included: informing and engaging with the public on development and
humanitarian issues (now called development education); lobbying Irish
Aid for substantial and targeted increases in ODA, for the establishment
of a National Council for Development Cooperation, for the appoint-
ment of a junior minister in charge of development cooperation, and
for clarity in relation to the criteria used to select program countries.
On a wider front, CONGOOD mounted a campaign to raise public and
political awareness of European Economic Community (EEC)/DC rela-
tionships in the context of direct elections to the European Parliament.
It also criticized the slow rate of disbursement of EEC development
funds, and drew attention to the issues involved in re-negotiating the
Lomé Convention.
Financing of CONGOOD itself was a problem in its early days.
The confederation relied heavily on voluntary assistance provided
114 Éamonn Casey and Helen O’Neill
norms and standards, on the one hand, and some of the modalities
used to pursue Ireland’s economic interests overseas, including in DCs,
on the other hand. However, these tensions seem unlikely to cause a rift
in a partnership that has been built up in pursuit of a common interest
in promoting development and eradicating or at least reducing poverty
in developing countries.
Irish NGDOs are involved in a wide variety of Irish and interna-
tional networks and peer learning organizations. The 2012 Dóchas
Members Survey captured that the responding NGDOs were involved
with two other membership or professional networks on average,
and that 92 per cent of members surveyed belonged to at least one
other network.
Other networks and membership organisations that are important
in the Irish development context include: the Irish Development
Education Association (IDEA), the gender-based violence (GBV) consor-
tium, Comhlamh (development workers and returned volunteers acting
in global solidarity) and Misean Cara (which specifically supports
missionary organisations and their partners), as well as The Wheel, a
support network for the community and voluntary sector more broadly.
Many Irish NGDOs are also members of European and international
alliances and networks.
In addition to policy influencing sector relations with Irish Aid,
research and international initiatives, formal consultations and sector
campaigns (such as on Ireland’s commitment to the 0.7 per cent target),
Irish NGDOs identify the need for continued network investment on:
information sharing, effective working groups, NGO support with
regard to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and results-based manage-
ment, and NGO capacity for enhanced management and governance
(Dóchas, 2012).
Dóchas is the Irish member of the European Confederation of NGOs
for Relief and Development (CONCORD), although Irish agencies can
also be members of the European group through other networks of
which they are members, including CIDSE, Aprodev, Eurostep,7 and
others. Irish NGDOs participate in CONCORD working group meet-
ings and seminars. Moreover, the Director of Trócaire was President of
CONCORD between 2006 and 2012. This European involvement by
Irish NGDOs affords them the opportunity to become more involved in
issues central to their specific development interests as well as promot-
ing, among European counterparts, the priorities of Irish NGDOs, such
as the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages initially developed
within Dóchas.
Irish Development NGOs and the Official Aid Program of Ireland 119
120
No Background – national Focus Size* Type**
International Focus
121
122 Éamonn Casey and Helen O’Neill
100%
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60%
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(10 per cent), and then information and communications (9 per cent).
Surprisingly, given the big push on results-based management in recent
years, monitoring & evaluation was reported to account for only 4 per
cent of staffing allocation, with policy (3 per cent) and advocacy/ cam-
paigns (4 per cent) also low on the staffing count.
Figure 5.3 provides a breakdown of staff allocation per function and
compares the percentage with those of the 2006 Survey.
The survey results indicated that there were also 464 volunteers
working with the surveyed Dóchas member organizations, a more than
threefold increase from the 2006 level. The results showed that 59 per
cent of staff, and 51 per cent of management level staff, are female.
The overall non-profit sector’s workforce is three-quarters female (The
Wheel, 2014).
126 Éamonn Casey and Helen O’Neill
0
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127
128 Éamonn Casey and Helen O’Neill
- 4,00,00,000 8,00,00,000
*‘Other’ covers sectors where expenditure is less than € 1M
100%
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HDI‡
Haiti 2,57,11,723 –158
Pakistan 2,13,73,173 –145
Zimbabwe 1,15,54,225 –173
Sudan* 1,13,22,530 –169
Kenya 1,10,62,946 –143
Uganda 1,07,26,750 –161 (IA)
Ethiopia 1,05,24,610 –174 (IA)
Ireland 83,73,954 –7
Niger 82,21,000 –186
Malawi 82,04,087 –171 (IA)
Somalia 72,04,372 –n/a
Tanzania 64,00,671 –152 (IA)
DRC 60,50,936 –187
Sierra Leone 51,46,739 –180
Zambia 49,65,733 –164
India 45,15,599 –134
Bangladesh 44,60,347 –146
Afghanistan 44,47,023 –172
Mozambique 38,33,838 –184 (IA)
Liberia 33,23,446 –182
Cambodia 30,82,832 –139
Rwanda 28,11,946 –166
Burundi 20,98,118 –185
Honduras 20,43,204 –121
Nicaragua 19,70,706 –129
Ghana 13,89,799 –135
Burma 13,19,756 –149
Colombia 12,91,296 –87
Guatemala 12,53,223 –131
Guinea 12,52,565 –178
Chad 12,31,000 –183
Eritrea 12,00,000 –177
El Salvador 11,99,425 –105
Angola 11,97,911 –148
DPRK 11,24,000 –n/a
Other** 1,16,20,096
– 1,00,00,000 2,00,00,000
*Includes South Sudan and Republic of Sudan
**Includes all countries where expenditure is less than €1m
‡HDI ranking (out of 187). (IA) indicates Irish Aid programme country.
Average Median
tax justice, policy coherence for development), the platform has also
continued to focus on issues of long standing: advocating that Ireland
should reach the United Nations 0.7 per cent ODA target, as well as
for more and better EU aid, and for enhanced quality in develop-
ment cooperation and humanitarian response overall. Irish NGDOs
are unified in targeted political advocacy for ‘more and better aid’
(particularly through the Act Now campaign) the date by which the
Irish Government has committed itself to achieving the 0.7 per cent
has been repeatedly postponed, from 2007 to 2012 and then 2015.
This date was dropped in 2014 and there is now no firm target date
in mind.
Yet ‘overseas aid’ is acknowledged to be only part of the story for Irish
NGDOs. Dóchas members recognize that effective work on broader and
interlinked issues of policy coherence for development and human
security may be more effective in the long term in advancing the over-
arching goal of eradicating poverty and inequality to achieve equitable
and sustainable human development.
In addition to the national platform and its thematic working groups,
Irish NGDOs interact in various other associations, groupings, alli-
ances and coalitions, including but not limited to: the Irish Association
for Development Education, the Stop Climate Chaos coalition, Trade
Justice Group, the Gender-Based Violence Consortium, the Debt and
Development Coalition, and the Tax Justice Network.
Health 6%
3%
Environment 2%
4%
International 15%
4%
Religion 0.6%
3%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
%
Despite the limitations of definition and data, the Third Annual Report
into Fundraising in Ireland (2into3, 2013) estimated that the size of the
sector in 2011 was at least EUR4.9 billion, it provided a contribution to
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 3.5 per cent, and that state funding as
a percentage of total income (2011) at 73 per cent. The report estimated
that the international NGO sector accounts for 15 per cent of the income
of the not-for profit sector (ibid., p. 13). While the international NGO
sector accounts for a relatively small proportion of the total number of
not-for-profits, it accounts for a disproportionately large share of what
the report terms large organizations (Figure 5.8).
The 2011 version of 2into3’s annual report on not-for-profits’ fun-
draising in Ireland identified a major surge in donations following
134 Éamonn Casey and Helen O’Neill
Culture and Recreation, 5.2% Education and Research, 3.1% Health, 2.8%
1%
0%
2%
5%
3%
3%
23%
28%
12%
3%
14% 6%
earthquake and Pakistan floods crises of 2010), with each accounting for
more than one in every five euros raised (2into3, 2013).
The fundraising environment for non-profits in Ireland is character-
ized by keen competition, strong public demand for innovative strate-
gies, increasing costs per additional euro raised (alongside low public
tolerance for charitable spending on fundraising and administration),
and increasing demand across a range of stakeholders (government,
political, corporate and public) for enhanced transparency and account-
ability (2into3, 2013). The future directions for fundraising by non-
profits include a requirement for greater professionalism, a higher focus
on committed giving, alliances and joint initiatives, evolving corporate
relationships and diversity of funding, concentration of funding in
fewer but bigger organizations, and potential merging of organizations
to achieve scale and efficiencies.
In 2008, one such merger occurred when the medium-sized Irish
NGDO Self-Help Development International merged with the British
NGO Harvest Help, also founded in the mid-1980s and focused on rural
development and livelihoods, to form Self-Help Africa. The merged
entity had income of around EUR10 million in 2008. Self-Help Africa
is now merging with Gorta (an NGDO focused on food and nutrition,
water and sanitation, and enterprise development) in 2014 and the
merged entity will be a sizeable actor in the Irish NGO scene. Even so,
the number of mergers (and closures) has not been as high as many
observers of the sector anticipated, given the serious economic crisis
that has hit Ireland since 2008.
initiatives and work much harder to attract the voluntary funding they
do manage to raise (ibid.). The cost of raising each euro of voluntary
income has increased significantly from 6.4 cents in 2006 to 17.3 cents
in 2012 (Dóchas, 2012, p. 48). Research by 2into3 has reported this cost
at 50.3 cents for the non-profit sector as a whole, though advising cau-
tion as its estimate was based on a small sample (2into3, 2013).
Table 5.5 captures the disparity in income levels among NGDOs of
different sizes, with three larger ones accounting for three-quarters of
total NGDO income. The disparity in scale and public support is also
evident from Table 5.6 below, from which we can see that 11 mid-size
organizations account for over 24 per cent of the total number of sup-
porters, but the largest four Dóchas NGDOs account for 75 per cent.
The number of supporters (who promote, advocate for or financially
support NGDOs) is down about one-tenth from the 850,000 figure
reported in 2006.
The Wheel (2014) has reported that almost 60 per cent of Irish
non-profits have experienced a drop in their income between 200 and
2012, with the majority (60 per cent) of these experiencing a decrease
of between 11 and 25 per cent. Although most organisations are
Irish Development NGOs and the Official Aid Program of Ireland 137
Table 5.8 Irish Aid funding from its CSO schemes to NGDOs
(EUR and per cent, 1993–2012)
NGDOs, now exceeded their income from their own private fund-
raising activities. For Irish Aid, the risks attached to spending taxpayers’
money for the benefit of people in other jurisdictions was now spread
more widely. The audit and evaluation obligations remained unchanged
in essence but became more complex in terms of execution.18
Total funding for NGDOs peaked at EUR134 million in 2007 but
declined thereafter as the Irish ODA budget was subjected to huge
cuts. In 2012, funding for NGDOs amounted to around EUR90 mil-
lion. The final (to date) reform of the funding schemes for NGDOs
was introduced in 2012. MAPS II and block grants were replaced by
the Program Fund and the MAPS scheme was extended to 18 NGDOs.
These18 NGDOs have to take a focused programmatic approach to
their work in DCs and the five biggest NGDOs have to reduce the
number of countries in which they work; this reduction in geographic
program coverage is a trend evident in the 2012 survey of Dóchas
member organisations. In addition, part of the NGDOs program has to
include a strategic engagement through development education with
the Irish public.
The work of all NGDOs, funded by Irish Aid under these various
schemes, is now required to be results-focused – again in line with Irish
Aid’s own strategic approach. The most significant managerial change
effected in 2012 was the merger of the civil society section of Irish Aid
(which deals with the NGDOs) and the development education section.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
en y
en d
ec to
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em an
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t
ts
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ag p’l
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an o
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m
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the survey suggest that the focus on ‘managing for results’ has increased
considerably in recent years and will continue to receive considerable
attention. In the non-profit sector overall, two-thirds of organisations
report that they have indicators in place to measure their progress:
90 per cent considering that these indicators measure outputs and
70 per cent that they capture outcomes (The Wheel, 2014).
When probed on dimensions of monitoring & evaluation:
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
ts
rt
or
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rs
ts
ns
ge
be
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ire
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now being adapted and rolled out by NGDO platforms and networks
across Europe. Specific training courses are now on offer on the imple-
mentation of the code, as well as a booklet to guide understanding and
application.
Similarly, the Code of Corporate Governance has earned recognition
and praise from the Irish government, wider civil society and the incom-
ing charities regulator. The code, formally adopted by Dóchas members
in 2008, sets out clear standards on the main principles of corporate
governance, and offers help in relation to decision-making, account-
ability and roles of NGDO board members. The EU’s Directorate-General
of Justice, Freedom and Security has included the code as a case study
of good practice in a study on public and self-regulatory initiatives aimed
at improving transparency and accountability of non-profit organiza-
tions in the EU.
Irish Development NGOs and the Official Aid Program of Ireland 149
the Irish government in reducing the potential for fraud or waste, and
stated that NGDOs should have a formal role in risk analysis in the
use of various aid modalities. In its specific analysis of the efficiency
and effectiveness of Irish Aid support for NGDOs and missionaries, the
Committee stated that ‘the potential and knowledge of missionaries
and NGOs need to be tapped, especially at the planning stage, if aid
programs are to be more effective’ (ibid., p. 7).
The Committee recommended that Irish Aid should:
PCs and South Africa as well as the work of international human rights
organizations.
In providing funding under the human rights heading, Irish Aid tries
to link the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
to practical actions on the ground by funding the work of national
and international NGDOs that provide basic needs and promote and
protect human rights, as well as funding for international think-tanks
and pressure groups and UN organizations that operate internationally
to promote and protect human rights and democratization. In recent
years, about 75 per cent of the funding for human rights and democra-
tization went to 33 international NGDOs while most of the remainder
went to six Irish NGDOs. Among these, usually the most significant
recipient of funding was Frontline, an international foundation set
up in Dublin in 2001 for the protection of human rights defenders in
developing countries.
In 2011, reflecting a clearer rights-based approach in line with the
Istanbul Principles on CSO Development Effectiveness, Dóchas made a
submission to the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of
Ireland’s human rights record (Dóchas, 2011b). In that, it cited increas-
ing international recognition of extra-territorial obligations towards
progressively achieving the full realisation of human rights, and raised
related questions for how Ireland integrates its development coop-
eration and human rights priorities. The NGDO platform cited human
rights-based concerns with regard to the country’s ODA commitment,
engagement with DCs on particular human rights issues, linkages
between Irish Aid policy and human rights, and broader government
policy coherence for development. In 2014 then, Dóchas recommended
in its submission to a government review of foreign policy that Ireland
should advance and implement a rights-based approach to foreign
policy and external relations in their totality.
within Ireland, have always shown a strong support for the Irish aid
program.
A review commissioned by Irish Aid in 1988 recommended that a
national committee be established to administer Irish Aid’s total funding
for development education. This led to the establishment in 1990 of the
National Development Education Grants Committee (NDEGC) consist-
ing of 10 representatives from NGDOs and the formal education sector.
Recommendations from another review in 1993 led to the replacement
of the NDEGC by the National Committee for Development Education
(NCDE) in 1994. It subsumed the activities of DESC which was closed
down and it took over the allocation of grants to all actors involved in
development education. Its brief, before its absorption into Irish Aid,
included a role in assessing and evaluating the quality of development
education in Ireland and supporting development educators. Irish
Aid established a Development Education Unit in 2003, charged with
implementation of its first three-year strategy plan (2003–2006) with its
own dedicated budget.
During the lifetime of the 2003–2006 strategy plan Irish Aid provided
grants through various mechanisms to various organisations and insti-
tutions (youth, third-level education, NGDO and community groups)
that delivered development education or enabled others to do so. That
included providing support to capacity-building, including in-service
training for teachers in the formal sector (principally at primary and
secondary levels) and in the non-formal sector (adult, community and
youth groups). Irish Aid became the single largest funder of develop-
ment education in Ireland. Around 75 per cent of grants were provided
for multiannual programs and 25 per cent for annual programs.
When the strategy plan was reviewed, it was deemed to be a success
and a second strategy plan, Promoting public engagement for development,
was launched in 2007 to run for five years through 2011. That strategy
was guided by the 2006 White Paper on Irish Aid and built on the long
history of work in development education in Ireland, both formal and
informal. The sub-title of the strategy paper is Promoting public engage-
ment for development. It aimed to provide everybody in Ireland with
information on the Irish aid program and to improve access to educa-
tional opportunities to help them understand their rights and responsi-
bilities as global citizens.
Dóchas, which has its own strategy for Dev Ed, made a comprehen-
sive submission to Irish Aid during the planning stage of Irish Aid’s
2007–2011 Development Education Strategy Plan and its associated
158 Éamonn Casey and Helen O’Neill
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
s
es
ct
ey
ut
pa
om
tp
rv
im
ou
su
tc
ou
of
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e
lin
ns
of
n
tio
se
tio
n
ua
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Ba
ua
ua
al
al
Ev
Ev
al
Ev
Figure 5.12 Percentage of Dóchas members that carry out baseline studies and
evaluations in their programs.
When the Ireland Aid Review Committee (IARC) published its report
on the Irish aid program in 2002 and made recommendations for new
funding mechanisms for NGDOs, it was as much for transparency as for
efficiency reasons. According to the report, it would ‘ensure that NGOs
and the public have a full picture of the government funding available’
(Government of Ireland, 2002, p. 81).
The IARC report suggested that specific deliverables and monitoring
arrangements be agreed with the NGOs and published and that they
give ‘due recognition’ to Irish Aid by using its logo. It recommended
that, while funding provided to NGDOs should be ‘significantly
increased’ as the aid budget expanded, it should be poverty-focused and
‘subject to the standards for planning, implementation, effectiveness,
evaluation and best practice which apply universally in the Ireland Aid
program’ (ibid., p. 82).
The report also recommended that an NGDO Liaison Unit should
be established within the Irish Aid management structure and that
a Development Forum be established ‘to enhance policy dialogue
between NGDOs and Irish Aid policy-makers at both political and offi-
cial levels’ (ibid., p. 84). Moreover, it recommended that, in the interests
of accountability, legislation on regulation of charities and charitable
fund-raising be enacted ‘as quickly as possible’ (ibid., p. 85).
The result was a huge increase in spending through the NGDOs. Irish
Aid’s annual budget for supporting their activities amounted to over
EUR117 million for project and program activities in 2007. As already
noted, when funding from Irish Aid to NGDOs for work in emergency
and recovery activities as well as human rights and development educa-
tion is taken into account, the total amounts to around 25 per cent of
Irish ODA. This is very high relative to other DAC donors.
The 1999 DAC peer review team, and subsequent peer review teams,
suggested that Ireland should be cautious about increasing substan-
tially the amount of aid channeled through Irish NGDOs, arguing that
they already absorb ‘a relatively large share’ of the aid budget and, in
addition, ‘are generously supported by the Irish public and receive
funding from other sources, such as the EU and United Nations agen-
cies’ (OECD/DAC, 1999, p. 18). It suggested, instead, that additional
funding channeled through NGDOs could be directed toward indig-
enous organizations in developing countries. In contrast, the 2002
IARC report recommended that funding to NGOs should ‘increase
164 Éamonn Casey and Helen O’Neill
Table 5.9 Selected key challenges facing Irish NGDOs after 2009
Area Challenges
Notes
1. A new White Paper on the Irish aid program, One world, one future: Ireland’s
policy for international development, was published in 2013. It included a
stronger focus on fragile states. The word ‘program country’ was replaced
by ‘Key partner country’ (KPC). Sierra Leone became a KPC and Timor Leste
ceased to be a KPC.
2. DAC is conducting a Peer Review of Ireland’s aid program in 2014. It has
already indicated that it is pleased that Ireland has managed to ‘stabilise’ its
ODA flows and is doing the best it can with the available resources.
3. Irish Aid now tends to use the term Civil Society Organization (CSO) to
describe the actors in the non-governmental development sector. This paper
Irish Development NGOs and the Official Aid Program of Ireland 169
References
2into3 (2013) Fundraising Performance: The Third Annual Report on Fundraising in
Ireland, (Dublin: 2into3).
Connolly, J. (1979) ‘The Irish Non-Governmental Sector’, Development
Cooperation: Ireland’s Bilateral Aid Program (Dublin: Department of Foreign
Affairs), 27–30.
Corporate Governance Association of Ireland and Dóchas (2008) Irish Development
NGOs Code of Corporate Governance (Dublin: Dóchas), http://www.Dóchas.ie/
documents/CGAI%20Governance%20Code_%20FINAL.pdf.
Department of Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid (2007a), speech by Minister of State
for Development Cooperation, Mr Michael Kitt, TD, at the launch of the
Special Emergency Funds for NGDOs, Press Release, (29 August), available at
http://www.irishaid.gov.ie/latest_news.asp?article=1078 (25 September 2008).
Department of Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid (2007b), speech by Minister of State
for Development Cooperation, Mr Michael Kitt, TD, at the Irish Aid/Third-
level education conference in the National University of Ireland Galway, Press
Release (24 November).
Dóchas (2005) A History of Dóchas 1974–2004: The First Thirty Years (Dublin:
Dóchas).
Dóchas (2007) Dóchas Member Survey: Consolidated Report (Dublin: Dóchas).
Dóchas (2006a) Dóchas Submission to Irish Aid on Development Education
(Dublin: Dóchas).
Dóchas (2006b) Code of Conduct on Images and Messages (Dublin: Dóchas).
Dóchas (2010) 2009 Annual Report (Dublin: Dóchas) (March).
Dóchas (2011a) Dóchas Report on a Review of Annual Reports and Financial
Statements of Dóchas Members (Dublin: Dóchas).
Dóchas (2011b), Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review of
Ireland, Twelfth Session of the Working Group on the UPR, Human Rights Council,
6 October 2011 (Dublin: Dóchas).
Dóchas (2012), Members Survey 2012 (Dublin: Dóchas).
Irish Development NGOs and the Official Aid Program of Ireland 171
6.1 Introduction
173
174 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
This article moves away from these discussions and sets out to pro-
vide an overview of the history, characteristics and underlying ideas
about non-governmental aid organizations and their relationship with
the Dutch government. Section 1 takes a birds-eye view of the Dutch
NGDO landscape concentrating on what is generally called the civi-
lateral channel for development cooperation but introducing a fourth
channel of alternative (and sometimes new) non-governmental actors
in development. Next, in Section 2 we take a look at the official (and
perhaps unofficial) view and perspective of the Dutch government
regarding the civilateral channel, followed in Section 3 by an analysis
of the government’s funding schemes for NGDOs, on the basis of a
few main characteristics. One of these characteristics (public support)
is the topic of Section 4. Finally, Section 5 delves into the evaluation
of aid by NGDOs and shows the major results from a cross-section of
evaluation studies.
In % Absolute
50
40
30
20
10
0
<1900
1901–1950
1951–1960
1961–1970
1971–1980
1981–1990
1991–2000
>2000
Figure 6.1 Founding years of Dutch NGDOs (N=188)
Source: Websites of the NGDOs concerned.
volunteers and/or experts and are therefore active in the field of techni-
cal assistance (also see Hoebink and Van der Velden, 2001).
Another way of categorizing Dutch NGDOs is by a division between
intervention strategies. For a long time, three of these strategies have
been distinguished: 1) direct poverty reduction, 2) civil society build-
ing, and 3) lobby and advocacy. Although these strategies are central in
the discussion on NGDO-government relations (and particularly in the
restructuring of the government’s grant system, see section 4 below),
they are not used as a means to distinguish between individual NGDOs.
A survey by CIDIN covering ninety-four Dutch non-governmental
agencies overall shows that they still consider direct poverty reduc-
tion as the most important strategy in fighting poverty. Interestingly,
the ministry emphasizes the more political strategies of civil society
building and lobbying/advocacy. Besides, in the discussion on these
intervention strategies, additional strategies have been added in later
years. This holds, for instance, for public support with its focus on the
Netherlands. Public support is also one of the three additional strategies
distinguished by the NGDO branch organization Partos (the two others
are networking and research/knowledge provision).
Others differentiate between NGDOs on the basis of their different
roles. Potentially, this is a useful way of gaining an insight into the
Dutch NGDO landscape. Various authors suggest different categories.
De Wal (2009), for instance, distinguishes six different roles: consultant,
banker, networker, aid provider, activist and entrepreneur. Grotenhuis
(2009) distinguishes between roles and functions, identifying three
roles: 1) service provider (direct poverty reduction), 2) ‘the voice in soci-
etal and political debate’ (influencing policy and civil society building),
and 3) a combination of service delivery and voice. He then specifies
six functions of civil society, mainly as a way of showing what he feels
will be changing for Northern NGDOs: funding, knowledge develop-
ment and knowledge-sharing, partnering the state and businesses, net-
working, lobbying and influencing policy, and, finally, a specific role
in effecting changes in the North. Finally, Partos (which had some 120
member organizations in 2012) distinguishes five different roles ‘within
the cooperation chain’: advisor, financier, intermediary, knowledge cen-
tre, and (co-)implementing organization.
Combining these different authors would produce six different roles
(see Table 6.1). Unfortunately, such an exercise is of little use as long
as there is insufficient data to place one NGDO under one role and
another under a different one. None of the authors mentioned provides
From Favoritism via Abundance to Austerity 177
strengths and limitations. Apart from the fact that they concentrate on
different characteristics, they also cover different NGDOs.
The Partos database is restricted to its own members and strongly con-
centrates on their self-proclaimed sectoral, target group, strategic and
country expertise. Furthermore, it provides information on their sources
of funding (as does CBF, see below). Interestingly, it also provides data
on the gross salaries of the different NGDOs. There is considerable dis-
cussion about whether NGDOs have high overhead costs (in the public
debate usually referred to as ‘rake-off’). If these overhead costs are taken
here as all salary costs,3 the data for 90 Partos members show them to
be on average 10 per cent of the total budget. There are, however, huge
differences between NGDOs, with salaries ranging from 2 to 65 per cent
of the total budget. Figure 6.2 shows that more than half of the Partos
members are in the 2–20 per cent bracket. In the public debate such
differences can easily be used to support the idea of high rake-offs. In
reality, however, they should primarily be seen as reflecting the differ-
ent types of organizations. In other words, they most likely express the
different roles played by NGDOs.
The CIDIN NGDO database in 2011 covers eighty-one organizations
and includes data derived from CBF and Partos. In addition, it covers
country-specific and sectoral (according to DAC sectors) expenditures.
It shows that 8 per cent of total NGDO funds was spent on global or
regional programs and projects. The remaining 92 per cent was used in
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2% – 10% 11% – 20% 21% – 30% 31% – 40% 41% – 50% 51% – 60% 61% – 70%
Figure 6.2 Salaries as % of total budget (2007) (Partos members, absolute and in
percentage, N=90)
Source: CIDIN NGDO database. Own calculations on the basis of Partos data.
From Favoritism via Abundance to Austerity 179
specific countries. Congo DR ranked first with slightly more than 4 per
cent of total expenditure, followed by Haiti, Kenya and India. In total,
country-specific expenditure by Dutch NGDOs went to 113 different
countries. Panama foots the list, receiving only one thousand euros. In
terms of Dutch NGDO aid per capita Haiti is by far the main recipient,
with slightly less than EUR4 per capita. In sectoral terms, humanitarian
aid was the most important, with more than 18 per cent of all expendi-
ture, followed by government & civil society (17 per cent), agriculture
(11 per cent), health (10 per cent), and education (8 per cent). Contrary
to the expenditure data of bilateral donors, Dutch NGDOs have a minor
unallocated and unspecified item (3 per cent).
The CBF database covers more than 600 non-governmental organiza-
tions active in the field of international aid. Their total budget over 2011
comes close to EUR1.5 billion. Table 6.2, however, shows that there are
a few large organizations and hundreds of (substantially) smaller ones.
The 30 biggest and most well-known NGOs in Table 6.2 taken together
already have a budget of more than EUR1.1 billion. Besides, the six
biggest ones (including the four NGDOs – Oxfam Novib, Icco, Cordaid,
and Hivos – formerly known as the co-financing organizations or MFOs)
account for 63 per cent of total government grants. Table 6.2 also shows
that, for the 30 organizations covered here, government grants are the
most important source of income (43 per cent). This includes, of course,
contributions from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as from
other governments (e.g., the UK or Germany), local authorities in the
Netherlands, other ministries, and the European Union. Dependence
on government grants varies substantially per organization, ranging
from 3.1 per cent in the case of Kerk in Actie to around 98 per cent for
Agriterra. Section 3 (Funding schemes) takes a closer look at this govern-
ment funding of NGDOs concentrating on DGIS.
The same six organizations that take up more than half of the total
income also account for 41 per cent of private fundraising for these
30 organizations. According to the bi-annual survey ‘Giving in the
Netherlands’ (Schuyt et al., 2013) which aims to cover all private dona-
tions to charitable organizations, the total contribution to international
aid in 2011 was EUR569 million. The major part of that (49 per cent)
comes from households in the Netherlands, followed by lotteries (22
per cent),4 and estates (13 per cent). International aid was the third
charitable goal, after churches (€806 million, with 92 per cent coming
from households) and sports and recreation (€702 million, 5 per cent).
Data for the period 1995–2011 shows some fluctuations between these
different goals, with international aid generally coming third or fourth
180 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
Table 6.2 The 30 largest Dutch NGDOs – total budget for 2008 (showing sources
of funding) – in euros
Table 6.3 Income of charity funds in the Netherlands (in millions of euros)
Two other groups deserve special mention here because they are
either considered to be major players or because some initial research
has been done on them. The first of these is charitable foundations or,
more accurately, millionaire philanthropists. Charitable foundations,
according to De Haan (2009, p. 21), represent ‘the biggest change to the
aid industry’. Although several publications and television documenta-
ries identify a rise in philanthropy in the Netherlands and internation-
ally, that may be true for broad segments of the Dutch population but
not necessarily for the super-rich. Some rich philanthropists are active,
particularly in the health, culture and sports sectors, but their number
in development cooperation is limited. However, there are a number of
Dutch philanthropic foundations involved in financing development.
One of the oldest and perhaps most professional is the Bernhard van
Leer Foundation, established by and named after the founder of the Van
Leer packaging empire. The foundation, which focuses on early child-
hood and child rights projects, has an income from venture capital of
EUR23 million and a project portfolio of EUR18.5 million. Other foun-
dations have more limited resources (also see Table 6.4).
The second type refers to that subsection of the philanteral channel
known in the Netherlands as private initiatives (PIs) broadly defined as
concrete development interventions conducted by groups of citizens
(Schulpen, 2007). Many (if not all) PIs are also active in the field of
public support in the Netherlands (albeit for a large part for fundrais-
ing reasons. See also Smeets, 2009), but their main raison d’être is their
contribution to development in the South. Research (Kinsbergen and
Schulpen, 2010, 2011) shows that PIs in the Netherlands are largely run
by volunteers over the age of 50, have been set up over the last 20 years,
and receive the larger part of their funding from the general public.
On average, Dutch PIs have an annual budget of some EUR50,000. The
majority of them work in only one developing country (with Kenya,
India and Ghana topping the list) where they concentrate on activities
in the field of health and education. Within their activities they have
a strong preference for concrete interventions aimed at direct poverty
reduction, like teaching aids, building schools and digging wells.
major government scheme came down with twenty (under MFS-1, and
including the so-called ‘young & innovative’ scheme (see below), a total
of eighty-six different organizations were funded). As such, the ministry
succeeded in reducing the number of subsidized NGDOs. Whether that
also means they managed to reduce the feared, condemned or admired
fragmentation of the NGDO sector in the Netherlands is doubtful,
however.7 The discussion on this will undoubtedly continue and is of
particular interest because, as the next section will argue, the fragmenta-
tion has partly been created by the ministry itself.
eligible for TMF financing as per 1 January 2006’ (De Ruijter et al., 2006,
p. 22, own translation).
Whereas the emergence of the MFP-broad and TMF systems already
represented a substantial break with earlier ways of funding NGDOs by
the Dutch government, they only lasted for four years. From 2007 MFP-
broad and TMF were merged in the MFS, described by some as ‘a logical
continuation of the earlier grant schemes in the sense that it is built on
the basis laid out in both policies’ (De Ruijter et al., 2006, p. 86, own
translation). True as that may be, the MFS differs from MFP and TMF. The
assessment of proposals, for instance, is done by an independent outside
committee rather than by ministry officials (see also Schulpen, 2007).
The MFS covers the period 2007–2010. In 2008, the ministry started
preparing for its successor, MFS-2. At the end of 2009, a total of forty-three
applications for funding had been received by the ministry and, once
again, the proposals were assessed internally by ministry officials (Ruben
and Schulpen, 2009). Another difference in the MFS-2 scheme is that pro-
posals have to pass through two rounds of appraisal. The first round was
concluded in April 2010, leading to twenty of the forty-three applications
being rejected. Of the remaining twenty-three in total nineteen survived
the second round and were thus granted a subsidy. The nineteen alli-
ances cover a total of sixty-six different NGDOs with seventeen of them
participating in more than one alliance. At the time of granting the sub-
sidy a total sum of EUR2,125 million was made available for the period
2011–2015. This was already 26 per cent less than the nineteen alliances
asked for. A few weeks later, a further reduction with EUR250 million was
announced as part of the overall budget cuts agreed upon in the new cabi-
net. In effect, particularly the larger NGDOs such as Icco and Cordaid lost a
substantial amount of government funding compared to the period of the
first MFS. It led to a downsizing of their programs and to a serious contain-
ment of their organization. Almost immediately following the granting
of MFS-2 subsidies, the then state-secretary for development cooperation
Bert Knapen announced a further reduction in government funding of
NGDOs. This line was then prolonged by the next cabinet of liberals and
social-democrats and by his successor Lianne Ploumen (minister for inter-
national trade and development cooperation since 2012). In fact, from
2016 onwards (and following substantial budget cuts – particularly also
in the NGDO field – between 2012 and 2015) the total available annual
budget for ‘strengthening civil society’ will be reduced to EUR219 million.
Like the earlier support programs such as MFS, MFP-broad and the last
round of TMF, the MFS-2 was only open for Dutch NGDOs. To allow
the ministry also to fund non-Dutch (that is, international) NGDOs a
190 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
Practically all of them go back a long time, like the funding schemes
for the NCDO (working on public support for international develop-
ment in the Netherlands, see below), PSO, SNV and the labor unions
CNV and FNV.
Using these four categories of funding schemes (major, minor, the-
matic/country, and individual) as a point of departure, Figure 6.3 shows
that several schemes date back before the restructuring period (dotted
arrows) and that, particularly in more recent years, the number of new
schemes has increased. Put more strongly, there has been a proliferation
PPS
Trade unions
Daey Ouwens
MFS
SALIN
TMF
MFP
J&V
MDG-3
PPP Health
Mesofunding
Migration
PSO
SNV
NCDO
Schokland
of (mostly small) funding schemes that are also open to NGDOs. This
already shows that the idea of streamlining NGDO funding which was
at the basis of the TMF and, later, the MFS has in fact not led to a sim-
plification of funding NGDOs but to a plethora of funding schemes.
This leads to the question why the ministry obviously felt it necessary
to create several new funding schemes in recent years.
Overall, the suggestion would of course be that these new schemes
provide an opportunity to fund new priorities. Directly related to that
is the fact that particularly the major schemes are ‘untouchable’ for
longer periods leaving little room to maneuver for a minister look-
ing for ways to implement new policies through the civilateral chan-
nel. Simultaneously, resolutions accepted in parliament also lead to
new funding schemes. The Daey Ouwens fund (aimed at promoting
small-scale projects in the area of renewable and job-creating forms of
energy supply), for instance, is the direct outcome of a parliamentary
resolution from the Labor Party. The PPS (Political and Parliamentary
Cooperation aimed at strengthening political parties and their coopera-
tion in developing countries) can also be seen as such although this
was due to less open pressure from political parties. Finally, it is quite
possible that some of these schemes actually spring from pressure from
departments within the ministry itself based on the idea that having a
funding scheme at their disposal creates an opportunity to broadcast
their own importance.
Whatever the reason or trigger behind the emergence of funding
schemes, the fact remains that several new schemes have been created
in recent years. ‘Wisdom comes with age’ is a saying that seems to be
highly applicable here, considering the fact that, once again in the
2009 NGDO policy paper, a streamlining of grant schemes has been
announced to combat the fragmentation of the NGDO landscape. Apart
from the question why exactly this fragmentation is considered to be
something bad (and who feels that way),10 it is interesting to see that
combating this fragmentation is obviously considered to be primarily
the task of the government and not of the NGDOs themselves. The min-
istry then has two options at its disposal, and it intends to use both. Not
surprisingly, both are directly related to its grant schemes.
The first has already been discussed before and refers to the ‘premium’
for joint proposals and reduction of the number of NGDOs to be funded
under the MFS-2. It could be argued that this will undoubtedly reduce
the monitoring burden of the ministry, as it will only have to deal with
the nineteen principal applicants. Still, in total the number of NGDOs
behind these alliances is 66. The second option refers to the announced
From Favoritism via Abundance to Austerity 193
these two schemes were previously funded under SALIN. A last new
scheme is SBOS – replacing part of the NCDO – which will be discussed
more in detail below.
All in all, while several schemes have (as was expected) been discon-
tinued since the end of 2010, several new ones have been set up and
often as a replacement of abandoned ones. In the new NGDO policy
paper of October 2013, the ministry announced new plans (to be effec-
tive from 2016 onwards) that will again fundamentally change the
Dutch subsidy structure for NGDOs. Apart from the fact that the indi-
vidual schemes of SNV and NCDO will stop entirely, those for the labor
unions are still under negotiations, and the more thematic schemes (in
such fields as food security and sexual and reproductive health) will
most likely continue, two new subsidy schemes are envisaged that are
meant to replace MFS-2. The first of these is known as ‘strategic part-
nerships’ meant for a selected group of Dutch NGDOs. In this scheme,
the idea of alliances that was so central in MFS-2 is abandoned and the
main focus will be on the political role (lobby and advocacy) of NGDOs.
Although the policy paper already mentions several criteria for funding,
a more elaborate system still has to be worked out. The same holds for
the second scheme labeled the ‘innovation facility’, which will be based
on annual calls for proposals and will only be open for those NGDOs
that are not part of the strategic partnerships scheme.
Next to these two new schemes, the 2013 policy paper also announces
the intensification of direct support to Southern civil society organiza-
tions. Under the name ‘Accountability Fund’, the ministry will reserve
a budget of EUR15 million for this direct funding (or nearly 7% of
the total annually available budget for NGDOs from 2016 onwards).
Whether these are extra millions (in reality direct funding is already
substantially larger now) remains to be seen.
Southern NGDOs can apply and in some cases, they seem to be quite suc-
cessful. The majority of the forty-five NGDOs approved for funding under
the MDG-3 scheme at the end of 2008, can be classified as SNGDOs.
Nevertheless, funding of SNGDOs by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs directly still seems to be extremely limited. However, focusing
only on the grant schemes offered by the ministry in The Hague obscures
the fact that direct funding of Southern NGDOs without an intermedi-
ary is already part and parcel of Dutch bilateral aid. It is definitely less
well known that Dutch embassies have already been funding SNGDOs
directly for quite some time. Part of this funding is provided through
Small Embassy Funds, which generally provide small grants to one-time
projects by local NGDOs, but total funding is far more substantial than
that. In 2000, for instance, the Dutch embassies are reported to have
spent some EUR167 million on NGDOs, 39 per cent (or €65 million) of
which went directly to local NGDOs (also see DGIS, 2009c)”.
In 2005/2006, figures of only 24 Embassies in Dutch partner coun-
tries indicated that they spent a total of nearly EUR72 million in direct
support of southern NGOs (Ruben et al., 2008). The latest figures for
the period 2008–2010, covering all thirty-three partner countries of
Dutch bilateral ODA, show a further increase from EUR117.6 million to
EUR129.7 million for local NGOs. As such, the 2007 policy intention to
increase direct funding to local NGOs annually with 10 to 15 per cent
did not materialize but stalled at 3 per cent (2008 to 2009) and 6.7 per
cent (2009 to 2010).11
Individual countries, however, substantially deviate from this gradual
growth pattern in direct funding. In fact, such a constant increase over
2008–2010 can only be witnessed in ten countries, whereas another ten
countries show a constant decrease in direct funding and twelve coun-
tries move up and down. In some cases, these increases and decreases
are substantial (as in the cases of Suriname and Mali) while in others
they are only minor (e.g., South Africa and Pakistan). In effect, the
amount of direct funding to local NGOS differs substantially between
countries. Bangladeshi NGOs, for instance, received over 2008–2010
more in direct funding than all the lowest 22 countries on the list
combined. The top five countries on the list (Bangladesh, Bolivia, the
Palestinian authorities, South Africa and Ethiopia) were good for more
than half of all direct funding in the thirty-three partner countries.
Also the percentage of delegated funds used for direct funding differs
substantially between Embassies. Over 2008–2010, for instance, the
average percentage of total Dutch bilateral ODA for thirty-two partner
countries that went into direct funding was 12.8 per cent. In the case
196 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
Also under the MFS (starting in 2007), the MFOs included front office
funds in their regular grant proposals to the government and the front
offices thus continued. In 2007, the four MFOs plus NCDO spent a
total of EUR16 million in government funds through their front offices
(IOB, 2009). This figure however does not show all expenditures as
MFOs also finance the front offices from their own funds. The excep-
tions are Hivos, which restricts PI funding to the sum received from
the government for that purpose, and NCDO, which essentially does
not have any ‘own money’. How much of these own funds are being
used is difficult to determine. Linkis, the organization set up to act as
an intermediary between PIs and the front offices, only reports on the
number of PI proposals submitted, accepted and rejected but not on the
funds distributed.
The fact that it is extremely difficult to determine exactly how much
funding went to PIs is undoubtedly due to the fact that there is no
uniform definition of what constitutes a PI. Whereas all front offices
essentially view PIs as public support organizations and development
organizations, some (including Hivos and NCDO) emphasize the former
and others (e.g., Oxfam Novib and Cordaid) the latter.14 Not surpris-
ingly, PI grant proposals are judged on both specific development crite-
ria and specific public support criteria, and all front offices demand that
PIs that receive funding also undertake specific activities in the field of
public support.
Major changes in PI-funding occurred following the ministerial pub-
lic support policy paper (DGIS, 2009b). Although the paper left the door
open for MFS organizations to continue funding PIs with government
funds in the future, this was only allowed if the PIs were regarded as
development organizations and were as such an integral part of the
organization’s grant proposal. Whereas this most likely would have had
a negative effect on the amounts made available to PIs, the fact that
the NGDOs with front offices received substantial less money under
MFS-2 than anticipated proved to be more important. In effect, the
front offices were either closed (Hivos) or substantially reduced (Oxfam
Novib, Icco and Cordaid). A further decline in PI-funding occurred
because the agreement between the ministry and NCDO was substan-
tially revised. From 2011 onwards, the NCDO is a knowledge center
and no longer subsidizes PIs. The former subsidy part of the NCDO
was transferred to a new public support scheme (SBOS – see below) for
which, however, substantially less money was available and certainly
for PIs.
198 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
For a long time, with an exception of the early 1970s when the role
of Prince Claus, husband of Princess (later Queen) Beatrix, was heav-
ily discussed, the financing of activities to promote public support for
development cooperation played a minor role in discussion on devel-
opment cooperation in the Netherlands, and certainly in connection
with these type of activities by NGDOs. This has only changed since
the mid 2000s, reaching a peak in the second half of 2008. Following
political discussions about the position of the NCDO (a public support
organization par excellence, established in the 1970s following a UN call
to strengthen public opinion in developed countries), political parties
from the left and right campaigned against public support activities. It
was felt that it was principally wrong for the government to be facilitat-
ing these kinds of activities because the primacy for influencing govern-
ment policy lies with parliament and that strengthening public support
with government funds resembles government propaganda. It was also
felt that public support activities do not contribute to poverty reduction
and that too much money was going into strengthening public support,
while it could be better used in the South. Furthermore, in the eyes of
the critics, the obligation for all NGDOs receiving government funding
to also be active in the field of public support, only led to competition.
Finally, it was questioned whether public support activities were neces-
sary at all considering the fact that the Dutch public is not only positive
towards development cooperation but also very active itself (e.g., in PIs).
These critical remarks are interesting if only because they show differ-
ent ways of looking at public support and thus the different objectives
attached to it. Public support is regarded as a means to influence gov-
ernment policy, as action in the sense that it should lead citizens to do
something for developing countries or development, and as a means of
raising awareness about the work of NGDOs. This combination of dif-
ferent objectives is not strange and reflects those of the Dutch interna-
tional development community. However, despite decades of activities
in this field, the community has not succeeded in producing a clear and
widely accepted definition, objective and structure for public support.
From Favoritism via Abundance to Austerity 199
MFS-2. More important for now is, however, the fact that the ministry
in August 2011 decided to postpone further grant-making activities by
SBOS up to 2013. No further explanation was given apart from the fact
that this was part of the overall cut in the development budget as agreed
upon for the period 2011–2015. This postponement in the end turned
out to be a cancellation. Since then little has been heard about SBOS
(let alone that it will be revived) meaning that this subsidy scheme fell
victim to a kind of ‘out of sight, out of mind’ strategy.
was rather young. This meant that in several cases it was too early to
draw conclusions on effectiveness, sustainability and impact.
The outcomes of the theme-based evaluations were generally positive,
although complex situations made it very difficult to come to any firm
conclusions. The conclusions regarding conflicts and peace building,
for example, go no further than to state that ‘the six organizations do
important and very good work in often insecure and difficult circum-
stances and regions’ (De Ruijter et al., 2006, p. 34). A second conclusion
was that the relevance of the work performed by these organizations
could be made more visible if they made their choices more explicit and
explained how their interventions complemented the strategies of other
development actors.
A similar conclusion was reached by the evaluation of human rights
activities, a field in which the Dutch government has for a long time
relied heavily on NGOs, for obvious reasons. Although the objectives
were clearly defined and coherent it was not possible to make any
strong statements on effectiveness and efficiency. This is also because
organizational stability was threatened by a lack of core funds, unpre-
dictability of donor support and brain drain. As with activities aimed at
biodiversity, the success of human rights activities depended highly on
an enabling environment, conducive to change.
The main conclusion of the first cross-cutting study on monitoring and
evaluation of the TMF-program was that the co-financed organizations
and their partners had a rapidly growing interest in program monitoring
and evaluation (PME). They had in recent years put considerable effort
into improving their PME systems, training their staff and supporting
partners to the same effect. In this respect, the larger organizations per-
formed better than the smaller ones. Having said that, the evaluation
team concluded that only 8 per cent of the organizations had excellent
PME systems and that, in half of the cases, they needed serious improve-
ments. A major weakness found was the problem of using quantitative
and qualitative data and assessments at the top of the objectives pyramid.
The second cross-cutting evaluation on the added value of the TMF
program also made some critical observations. The added value of the
TMF program for the ministry was seen as very positive in terms of
management (more uniform rules), organization (a quality impulse),
and relations (contracts, mutual learning). In terms of internal added
value (the importance of the TMF funding, and of the TMF program
for strengthening the TMF-funded organization and the capabilities
of its recipients/partners) the evaluation concluded that the program
was of particular value for the TMF organizations but much less so for
From Favoritism via Abundance to Austerity 205
6.7 Conclusion
The first conclusion that we might draw from the above is that the
Netherlands has a vibrant community of non-governmental aid organi-
zations. They may vary in age, size and professionalization, but behind
206 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
all of them are thousands of paid and unpaid activists who invest
money, time, energy and love in all types of activities which they
hope will contribute to a better world. Originally, as in most devel-
oped nations, religious and political organizations and beliefs were at
the root of all this activism and solidarity. Secular organizations may
have become more important in the last decades, but for historical and
organizational reasons and as a result of the strong support for develop-
ment cooperation in the churches, faith-based non-governmental aid
organizations still play a role that extends beyond the role of religion
and religious activities in Dutch society. Cordaid, a Catholic-based aid
agency, is a good example. While Catholic churches in particular in the
south of the Netherlands have emptied and are being demolished or
used for non-religious purposes, Cordaid remains the biggest non-gov-
ernmental aid organization in the Netherlands, playing an important
role vis-à-vis the Dutch government and Dutch society.
Similar remarks can be made about political convictions and beliefs
about solidarity with the oppressed and poor in developing countries.
A certain depoliticization can be observed, due to changes in the politi-
cal climate. In the 1960s and 1970s non-governmental aid initiatives
were often founded in solidarity with liberation, feminist and social
movements. In the Cold War years this often led to bitter disputes
between conservatives and liberals, and the right and the left. This
started changing many years before the end of the Cold War in 1989,
as sharp political divisions vanished. Partly this was because repression
and liberation were no longer voiced in Cold War terms and resistance
to repression was better understood, and partly because disappointment
with liberation movements that had gained power gradually gnawed
away at self-congratulatory convictions. Only the Israel-Palestine con-
flict seems to be able to raise the same blazing disputes nowadays. That
means that aid and advocacy by NGDOs now finds itself in a much
more reformist setting. It also means that political convictions might
be still an important source of solidarity with the poor and oppressed
in developing countries, but they are now expressed much more in
humanitarian than in political terms.
In the past fifty years Dutch governments have mostly been more or
less strong supporters of non-governmental aid. In the beginning this
was because faith-based organizations, stemming from missionary activ-
ities, were strongest but were also close allies of the Christian parties in
government. Many leaders, directors and managers of faith-based non-
governmental aid organizations were active members of these parties,
From Favoritism via Abundance to Austerity 207
Notes
1. It is generally accepted that the Netherlands has a long civil society tradi-
tion and that the government created an environment that stimulated its
growth. This also seems to apply to that part of civil society active in the
field of development cooperation under scrutiny here. For a more general
overview of the origins and history of Dutch civil society (not restricted to
NGDOs) see Burger et al. (1999), Burger and Veldheer (2001) and De Nieuwe
Dialoog (2006).
2. Such ideas and critiques not only reflect the idea that the government, as a
major NGDO donor, should be in the driver’s seat but are also a reaction to
the continuing debate on the effectiveness of development aid in general and
of the assistance provided by and through NGDOs in particular. It thus links
up to a more international debate about what aid contributes to the fight
against poverty (Sachs, 2005; Easterly, 2006; Stiglitz, 2006; Riddell, 2007).
3. There is quite some debate on what ‘overhead’ exactly is. Overhead costs
generally cover more than just salaries. Unfortunately, data is only available
on salaries for Partos members. CBF does include a larger number of organi-
zations but does not provide an insight into overhead costs, but only in the
direct costs of fundraising.
From Favoritism via Abundance to Austerity 209
4. In particular a lottery based on postal code has become very popular in the
last ten years. This lottery pays out about half of its €460 million in income
(2007) to 53 organizations in the areas of development, the environment
and refugees.
5 Connected to the latter is the rise of celebrity activism and advocacy for
specific organizations. The Dutch branch of War Child, for instance, benefits
greatly from the support of one of the most popular Dutch pop stars, Marco
Borsato. UNICEF (one of the biggest fundraiser in the Netherlands) has at
present six Dutch ambassadors, including cabaret artists, a film star, disk
jockey and a pop singer. Relatively new and innovative is a production line
under the name Return to Sender, funded by a Dutch film star and televi-
sion presenter, Katja Schuurman. It develops and produces fashion products
in 15 developing countries, sold by one of the Dutch warehouse chains and
promoted by television documentaries.
6. Core funding, for instance, was no longer possible in MFS (and was replaced
by program funding). TMF, and also MFS, set government policy (MDGs,
themes) at the forefront more strongly than earlier grant schemes and essen-
tially demanded that applicant NGDOs fit their programs to this policy.
7. As far as known, all alliances that did not manage to get MFS-2 funding dis-
solved soon after. Besides, in the latest policy paper (DGIS, 2013) forming
alliances was no longer considered a must.
8. Over the period 1965–2002, the main changes occurred in 1980 when a block
grant system was introduced (with accountability afterwards), in the 1990s
when the MFP ceiling was increased to 10 per cent of the total governmental
budget for development cooperation, and in 1999 when for the first time
in more than twenty years a new NGDO (Foster Parents/Plan International
Netherlands) joined the original four recipient organizations of MFP grants.
9. SALIN hardly features in these discussions, most likely because no Dutch
NGDOs are part of it.
10. It is clear that this fragmentation is considered ‘bad’ by the government
because of the selection, monitoring and evaluation pressure from co-fund-
ing tens of (and in reality more than 200) NGDOs. Some would naturally
argue that this ‘fragmentation’ is a healthy expression of the diversity in
Dutch society and that combating it might actually lead to an impoverished
civil society. This does not mean that they also object to the need for more
cooperation and coordination in the field of international cooperation
because of the expected gains in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.
11. Next to direct funding to local NGOs, Dutch embassies also support inter-
national NGOs (including some Dutch ones). Over 2000, such funding
amounted to EUR58.9 million, going down an annual average of EUR36
million over 2005 and 2006 and up again to EUR49 in 2008, EUR55 in 2009
and EUR63 million in 2010. Even if we included such INGOs in our defini-
tion of direct funding (which we do not) the intention of an annual 10–15
per cent increase has not been reached.
12. This request was the direct outcome of the changes proposed at that time
in the funding system for NGDOs leading to the division between MFP-
broad and TMF. Whereas these schemes were intended for two groups of
NGDOs (MFP-broad for NGDOs with a ‘comprehensive approach’ and TMF
for NGDOs working on a specific theme), a third group of ‘development
210 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
organizations’ were distinguished: the PIs (DGIS, 2001b; see also Schulpen
and Hoebink, 2001). As such, the request was part of the attempt to stream-
line funding to non-governmental development organizations, but was also
inspired by the desire to reduce the administrative burden on the ministry
itself in assessing, supporting and monitoring the growing number of grant
applications from small private initiatives.
13. This also means that indirect government funding to PIs via the NCDO
already existed before the establishment of the front offices.
14. Interestingly, the front offices have been taken up as part of IOB’s evaluation
of public support (2009).
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212 Lau Schulpen and Paul Hoebink
7.1 Introduction
214
Spanish Development NGOs and the State 215
part briefly deals with the role of Spanish NGDOs in public support for
development. The chapter ends with some general reflections on key
issues for the future.
from 0.24 per cent to 0.48 per cent of GDP. The second pillar was the
upgrading of political commitment and a new discourse which aimed
to overcome the traditional view that sees development merely as a tool
at the service of foreign policy. This cosmopolitan perspective sought
to frame development within a multilaterally focused foreign policy
(Sanahuja, 2007, pp. 40–1).
The third change consisted in institutional and normative advances,
including the creation of a directorate general in charge of planning and
evaluating Spain’s development policy and the reform of the main aid
management body, AECID (Martínez, P.J. and I. Martínez, 2011, p. 7).
Finally, the last pillar which is also probably the most directly relevant
to the issue addressed in this chapter was the effort to rebuild social and
political consensus around development policy. In this period, relations
with NGDOs were ‘normalized’,4 and a new financing framework was
established, and, for the first time, a broad consultative process was used
to draft the new Master Plan.
This trend towards convergence with ‘international best standards’
initiated in this new cycle was interrupted abruptly after 2009. All of
the four pillars were negatively affected, and as a result, Spanish devel-
opment policy was significantly weakened, particularly since 2012,
coinciding once again with a change in government.
Nevertheless there were already signs of stagnation in 2009 when
aid volume reached its peak. The following year marked the beginning
of a steady process of ODA reductions which continues till today (i.e.,
the latest example are the cuts in the 2014 budget proposal). In 2012
Spanish aid had fallen to EUR1,652 million, 66 per cent less than 2008,
and it declined again in 2013.
The first major cut in ODA – by the Socialist government – announced
in May 2010 was an early sign of weakening political resolve, contra-
dicting the State Pact against Poverty and the 2009–2012 Master Plan.5
This made it clear that development policy was considered one of the
most dispensable policies in times of crisis.
Later, with the change of government in November 2011 (through
the election of the conservative Popular Party) and worsening economic
conditions in Spain, aid policy shifted towards a realist orientation.
In this regard, the government sees external action, including devel-
opment policy, as an important contribution to efforts to return to
economic growth, internationalization of Spanish companies and the
attraction of foreign investment. One of the main examples of this shift
is the government’s decision to position the ‘Marca España’ (the ‘Spain
brand’) project as an overriding theme in the country’s foreign policy.6
218 Christian Freres and Ignacio Martínez
In addition, the Master Plan for the period 2013–2016 notes that
development policy contributes to Spain’s external action because it
‘strengthens relations with other countries in which strategic interests of
Spain and global responsibilities come together’. The document goes on
to say that development cooperation is linked with Spain’s own efforts
to overcome its current economic crisis (MAEC, 2013, p. 16).
Currently the capacities of the system have also been diminished,
largely as a result of the steep decline in aid. One of the main impacts
has been on AECID, which despite being the main executive body, has
suffered budget cuts of over 70 per cent in the last three years and which
now manages less than 15 per cent of the country’s ODA.7 Decentralized
cooperation, one of Spanish cooperation’s distinctive characteristics
thanks to active civil society organizations at the regional and local
levels, has been notably debilitated over the past few years.
Finally, in this period the social and political consensus which existed
before has been severely affected. This is one of the factors that has had
the greatest impact on the relations between NGDOs and the govern-
ment. In the current phase of Spanish cooperation there is a wide gap
between a large part of the political spectrum and the non-governmen-
tal organizations and the current administration on the importance
of participation in building development policy. This disassociation
can be seen in several ways: the government’s failure to comply with
its commitments in the State Pact against Poverty, the opposition par-
ties’ growing criticism of the administration’s policies in parliamentary
debates,8 and an apparent crisis in the model of participation in the
policy-making process seen in the consultative bodies as well as other
ad hoc organizations.9
A review of the Spanish NGDO sector must take into account the broad
variety of organizations which have increased and transformed in a
relatively short time. From a comparative perspective this is an inter-
esting fact, because while in many Western European countries these
organizations date from the 1960s or 1970s, in Spain it is not until the
second half of the 1980s that an NGDO sector can be identified as such.
Note: These categories are those which the organizations themselves claim to be their
area of activity.
Source: Ministerio del Interior (2008).
In sum, due to the various registries that exist and the variety of clas-
sifications of NGDOs, it is difficult to determine the exact number of
charitable organizations. In contrast, it is easier to identify those that
are dedicated to international development cooperation, whether they
do this exclusively or whether this is only one of their areas of activity.
For this reason, it is best to distinguish between development organiza-
tions and the rest. In this manner, despite certain inconsistencies in the
data and some methodological difficulties, it can be said with relative
certainty that between 5 and 10 per cent of charitable organizations in
Spain are engaged in development co-operation, close to 1,900 organi-
zations, as can be seen in the following table (Table 7.1).11
Nevertheless, there are indications from news reports and recent stud-
ies that there has been a decline in the number of charitable organiza-
tions since 2011 as a result of the fall in funding, particularly from
public entities (Fundación PwC, 2013). Although there is no specific
data on how this has affected the number of NGDOs, there is evidence
of some closures and a rise in mergers between several entities (i.e.,
Spanish Development NGOs and the State 221
Source: Compiled by authors based on registries at: Ministerio de Sanidad, Política Social
y Deporte; Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Medio Rural y Marino; Ministerio de Cultura.
Table 7.2 Public financing of NGDOs, 2000–2012 (€ million and per cent)
Volume 263 301 512 579 644 671 638 462 302
% of Net
19.9% 12.0% 16.9% 14.9% 13.5% 14.2% 14.2% 15.5% 19,0%
ODA
Source: prepared by authors based on database from monitoring reports of Plan Annual de
Cooperacion International (PACI), various years.
Spanish Development NGOs and the State 223
subsidies for NGDO activities, which fell about 50 per cent to €301 million
in 2012, although their share in total Spanish aid increased to 19 per cent.
Public Private
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011
members are the NGDOs that have raised the most funds from private
sources, a total of EUR126 million in 2009, representing about one half
of private monies channeled through Coordinadora members.16
Despite the difficulties in making definitive conclusions on private
funding, it can be said that the evolution of this type of financing partially
reflects external factors beyond the control of NGDOs. As a result, Spanish
NGDOs face clear limits in increasing the ‘market’ of private financing
through their own efforts. On the other hand, the economic crisis has
shown the limited reliability of public funding over the long term. Until
recently this was considered more stable than private financing which
seemed to respond mostly to humanitarian crisis and natural disasters.
The situation at present seems to be more complex with different fac-
tors having varying effects on private financing to NGDOs. One factor
which has favored increased private support is a law on the tax status
of non-profit organizations which allows companies to deduct 35 per
cent of donations to these entities. However, the disappearance of the
savings banks (Cajas de Ahorro) in the restructuring of Spain’s financial
sector eliminated an important source of private financing for the Third
Sector (Fundación PwC, 2013, pp. 11–2).
efficiency and to link with larger structures with which they share a
vision on how to promote development. This process of international-
ization of Spanish NGDOs is seen by the sector itself as a natural pro-
cess, coherent with globalization and the emergence of a transnational
civil society. This linkage takes place through the formal integration
of a Spanish NGDO in an international organization as a new partner.
This option has been used mostly by relatively large NGDOs.
Other NGDOs, generally small and medium-sized, are also evolv-
ing in this process of internationalization, although through more
informal channels, by joining regional or global networks through
local networks. For instance, the organizations which form part of the
Coordinadora participate in a process of internationalization through
the Coordinadora’s activities in the European network, CONCORD.
4. Establishment of international NGDOs in Spain. The last type of NGDO
found in Spain is that of international organizations that have
established offices in the country. These are mostly NGDOs with a
long tradition of working in other countries and which do not have
much experience or social foundations in Spain. Their basic moti-
vation for entering Spain is to access the ‘solidarity market’ which
has expanded notably in the past decade. This phenomenon is seen
with general concern by many Spanish organizations mainly because
the fundraising methods used by many of these NGDOs –primar-
ily through child sponsorship schemes – is not seen as compatible
with practices used and widely supported by most Spanish NGDOs
in development education. Furthermore, the contribution of these
NGDOs to the process of building a more conscientious and active
civil society in Spain is seen by Spanish organizations as minimal. In
that sense Spanish NGDOs are concerned about the risk of ‘instru-
mentalizing’ the solidarity of civil society in the country.
Although this classification should help to explain the NGO sector in Spain
in the last two decades, the sector will probably suffer important changes
as a result of the current crisis which affects the very survival of many
organizations as well as their relations with the Government (see Table 7.3).
0
Año 1902 1947 1960 1968 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2007
The ‘0.7% movement’ had a strong impact at the local level. It lead
to greater involvement by many municipalities, provincial and regional
governments in promoting development cooperation. Since NGDOs
were at the forefront of this change, they soon became the main chan-
nel for distributing decentralized cooperation. Today close to 70 per
cent of decentralized cooperation is carried out by Spanish NGDOs, so
this factor was key in their expansion in the 1990s. This, in turn, proved
to be an incentive for the emergence of new organizations. As a result
of these factors most of the new NGDOs that emerged in these years
had a more technical profile than those created in the previous decade.
In the late 1990s there was a considerable drop in the number of
NGDOs created (Figure 7.2). However, the situation is more complex
because the graph only registers the membership of the national plat-
form (Coordinadora), and while there is no other data source available,
it would appear that a number of NGDOs have been created in the last
few years, although many of them have not joined the Coordinadora.
Currently, decentralized cooperation is in a deep crisis. A first piece
of evidence is seen in the sharp fall in resources. In 2008 decentralized
ODA reached EUR613 million and in 2011 it had declined to EUR371
million. The second element is visible in the legislative area, through
the draft Law for the Rationalization and Sustainability of Local
Administration which, if approved, will considerably reduce these enti-
ties’ resources. This crisis will have a profound debilitating effect on
232 Christian Freres and Ignacio Martínez
€ % € % € % € % € % € %
Africa 95.8 29% 99.9 28% 121.4 30% 159.2 33% 160.3 29% 144.6 25%
Latin
181.7 56% 179.9 51% 208.4 52% 256.4 53% 301.9 55%
America 349.4 61%
Asia* 24.1 7% 55.8 16% 57.1 14% 49.8 10% 48.4 9% 49.4 9%
Europe 4.8 2% 5.8 2% 4.9 1% 4.9 1% 4.2 1% 3.2 1%
Middle
19.3 6% 9.6 3% 12.7 3% 17 3% 30.2 6%
East 15.9 3%
Total 325.7 100% 350.9 100% 404.5 100% 487.4 100% 544.9 100% 570.3 100%
2010 2008
Countries marked with A and B are Priority Countries, according to Spanish Cooperation Master Plan, 2009–2012 (Madrid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
235
and Cooperation, 2010); Group A are LLDCs, Low Income Countries and Lower Middle Income Countries; Group B refer to Middle income countries.
LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean.
Source: Prepared by authors based on Informe Coordinadora, various years.
236 Christian Freres and Ignacio Martínez
situation: Honduras and Mozambique. In the first case there are many
Spanish NGDOs (33) present although the average organization manages
a relatively small budget; in Mozambique, there are not so many NGDOs
working in the country (24) and each manages a larger budget.
800 25.0%
700
20.0%
600
Milliones of euros
500
15.0%
400
10.0%
300
200
5.0%
100
0 0.0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 7.3 Evolution of Spanish ODA through NGDOs (total and as % of net
ODA, 1998–2012)
Source: Prepared by authors based on: Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation,
PACI Seguimiento, various years.
Spanish Development NGOs and the State 237
to an instrumental role –in which case the accent will be on the financ-
ing framework – or it could be more strategic, dealing with issues in
which NGDOs provide added value to this policy.
In this regard, after reviewing the overall framework in which NGDO-
governmental relations are situated, it seems natural that Spanish
NGDOs need to evolve, by putting greater stress on their role as mobiliz-
ers of public opinion in the North to support development cooperation
(without that public support, aid may fall) and policy advocacy. In the
Spanish case NGDOs are mainly focused on managing aid projects.
It may be true, however, that the large increase in public and private
funding of NGDOs in recent years created disincentives for spending
more resources on development education or advocacy activities. In
addition, this funding comes with considerable administrative bur-
dens which consume large amounts of time for NGO staffers. Some in
government are also concerned about what they perceive as a limited
analytical capacity on the part of NGDOs in Spain (Plataforma 2015 y
más, 2011). These organizations do spend considerable efforts monitor-
ing the co-financing program because that is their main concern, but
they are not able to see how some aspects of the current system (i.e., the
excessive percentage of decentralized cooperation channeled through
small projects run by NGDOs) contradict their general concern with
greater aid effectiveness.
For their part, the NGDOs are generally not so self-critical. They see
themselves as evolving although they recognize that some advances
have been very slow in coming. In any case, NGDOs generally see
themselves in a phase of maturity – which is at risk presently – when
compared to earlier periods. Through the Coordinadora these organi-
zations are working towards progress on processes of regulating the
sector, quality issues, and increasing transparency through the indica-
tors of good governance and transparency that they are developing.23
As a result of this work the Coordinadora published its own tools for
transparency and good governance (Coordinadora, 2010b), showing the
commitment of NGOs to these goals.
Due to their nature, characteristics, and structures, and to the fact
that they are non-profit organizations, many NGDOs in Spain find it
extremely difficult to raise funds (see Hursey, 2005). For that reason
these institutions spend considerable time and resources on fundrais-
ing, which generates specific organizational needs. To sustain these
structures many NGDOs seek other funds. In sum, an important part of
the NGDO sector is trapped in a vicious circle which leads them to stress
project management and spend little effort on more strategic reflection.
240 Christian Freres and Ignacio Martínez
350000000 100%
90%
300000000
80%
250000000 70%
200000000 60%
50%
150000000 40%
100000000 30%
20%
50000000
10%
0 0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Spanish NGDOs are the prime actors in promoting public support for
development. As one author noted, these organizations are a key part of
the ‘lobby for development’ in Spain (Angulo, 2007, p. 23). In fact, it can
be said that prevailing opinion in Spain on the aid field is determined
Spanish Development NGOs and the State 245
The current crisis scenario which has lead to cuts in ODA and NGDO
funding demands profound reflection by both actors on their rela-
tions. The government needs to develop a strategy on the model of
relations it would like to establish with the CSOs. For this purpose it is
fundamental that it abandons an instrumentalist view – both politically
and administratively – in its relations with civil society. For their part,
NGDOs need to orient their participation towards building an integral
development policy. This involves examining their role in develop-
ment, their institutional models and their relations with partner organi-
zations in developing countries.26
Herein lies one of the main challenges for NGDO-State ties. The
central government until now has sought to maintain the high pro-
file of NGDOs in its official aid program but at the same time it needs
greater strategic orientation. For their part, NGDOs want to reduce their
dependence on the State because that impinges on their ‘independence’,
but at the same time they seek a minimum level of support that guar-
antees their survival. The danger is that this situation may lead to an
implicit decision by both parties to not ‘upset the waters’, maintaining
things more or less as they are: the government will guarantee a certain
minimal funding for as many NGDOs as possible and these organiza-
tions will promise not to pressure too much on the broader policy front.
In any case, they are far from being equal partners in the current situ-
ation. Given past experience, official policy could shift to a less benevo-
lent position towards NGDOs and given their current fragility, these
organizations could do little to block this change. Their public support
has declined considerably as a result of increased focus on domestic
issues but also because of several highly publicized cases of misuse of
public funds.
The crisis situation may lead to a stalemate as each side dares not to
give ground. However, the complexity and the continuing transforma-
tion of development problems require that the Government and the
NGDOs enter into a strategic dialogue to strengthen cooperation policy.
As noted before, this implies that the government recognizes the role
non-governmental organizations can play in this policy and promotes
a favorable environment for that purpose. For their part, the NGDOs
should face this dialogue based on an honest exercise of self-criticism
about their practices and how these should shift towards areas in which
they have greater value added. What is at stake here is not only the rela-
tions between these actors but also whether Spain will finally be able to
overcome the fragile pillars which have underpinned its development
cooperation until now.
250 Christian Freres and Ignacio Martínez
Appendix
Notes
1. The concept of ‘private aid organizations’ used in this project is not com-
monly used in Spain since the term private is most often associated with the
business sector and not the (charitable/voluntary) entities that make up the
NGDO sector.
2. Data is from 2012, the last year for which there are official figures available.
3. This change was incorporated through Royal Decree 281/2001, published in
the Official Bulletin nº68, on March 20, 2001.
4. In 2004, through a new royal decree (Royal Decree 2217/2004, published in
the Official Bulletin/BOE Nº286, on March 27) the Development Council
returns to the situation before 2001 in which the NGDO members are nomi-
nated by the Coordinadora.
5. The State Pact against Poverty included, among other commitments, the
promise by all the political parties to ‘maintain the efforts in official devel-
opment assistance in order to guarantee that by 2012, 0.7% would be dedi-
cated to ODA’. The Master Plan included a preface signed by then José Luis
Rodríguez Zapatero in which he noted that ‘despite the crisis, Spain will
maintain its development commitments’, including financial levels.
6. The Royal Decree 998/2012 through which Spain created the High
Commissioner for Marca España indicates that this program should propose
any initiative or activity which contributes to improving the external image
of Spain. More information at: http://marcaespana.es/en
7. See analysis by the Coordinadora published on November 11, 2013: http://
www.congde.org/contenidos/aecid-25-anos-de-solidaridad-y-lucha-contra-
la-pobreza-amenazados-por-los-recortes-en-cooperacion.html
8. This lack of consensus can be seen in the debate on two main plan-
ning documents, the Master Plan and the Annual Plan for International
Cooperation (PACI) for 2012. In this regard, see government presentations
and debates in the Development Cooperation Commission of the Congress:
nº 123 (13/06/2012), nº 125 (14/06/2012), nº230 (28/11/2012) and nº 231
(05/12/2012), available on the web site of the Congress: http://www.con-
greso.es/
252 Christian Freres and Ignacio Martínez
sector activities has declined considerably (see Iñigo de Barrón, ‘La crisis de las
cajas golpea la obra social’, El País (Madrid), 16 October 2011, p. 28).
16. These organizations are: Intervida, Fundación Vicente Ferrer, Anesvad,
Plan España and Global Humanitaria. Most of their resources rely heavily
or exclusively on the child sponsorship model which is repudiated by the
Coordinadora members (various child sponsorship NGDOs such as Planned
Parenthood International have not been able to join this platform because
of lack of membership support for their entry).
17. There is no ‘official’ information on these types of NGDOs in Spain. This
data has been obtained through the research for this study, through informa-
tion available on the NGDOs’ web sites and through telephone contacts.
18. There is considerable literature on the motivating factors and origin of
Spanish NGDO. The principle references include: Ortega (1994); Baiges
et al. (1996); Burgui and Serrano, (1998); Freres, et al. (1998); Martínez
(1998); Gómez and Sanahuja (1999); Nieto (2001 and 2004); Abad (2004);
and Guedán (2004).
19. This period also witnessed a number of factors that served to increase civic
consciousness and a more active and critical NGDO sector. Among these
we can mention the organization of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the World
Bank and the IMF in Madrid which lead to an active protest movement; the
humanitarian tragedy in the Great Lakes region in Africa which awakened
the relatively dormant private charitable giving in the country; the first Peer
Review of Spain in 1994 which was highly critical of numerous aspects,
including the low ODA levels. See Freres et al. (1998, pp. 164–5).
20. For analysis on this issue, see Badia and Coll (2012).
21. The information in this section includes NGDO projects which are publicly-
funded as well as those that receive private financing.
22. In this regard, Spanish development community was alarmed by statements by
the foreign minister who in the Development Cooperation Commission of the
Congress declared that cutting aid hurts, but it is more painful to ‘do so with
pensions or to close clinics, so one has to make a political choice’ (14/03/2012).
23. This is partly an effort to develop an instrument for public evaluation of
NGDOs that they are comfortable with, as a response to the efforts of a
private foundation, Fundación Lealtad, to create a set of indicators to assess
NGOs (aimed at companies interested in working with these organizations).
24. For example Intermon-Oxfam produces an annual report on Spanish aid
(Realidad de la Ayuda) which is considered to be an important reference in
the national aid system. Currently the organization, Plataforma 2015 y más,
which is promoted by 14 NGDOs, has initiated, through a framework agree-
ment with AECID, a unit to carry out studies and develop a research strategy
focused on the analysis of policy coherence for development.
25. A study by the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces/
Federación Española de Municipios y Provincias (FEMP) shows that the aver-
age commitment for projects financed by Spanish local administration in
2007 was €24,823. See FEMP (2008).
26. This critical issue for the future of NGDOs and their participation in develop-
ment policy is analyzed in the summary of the seminar, Eficacia del desarrollo
y ONGD: renovando nuestro papel (available at http://www.2015ymas.org/
IMG/pdf/Resumen_jornadas.pdf).
254 Christian Freres and Ignacio Martínez
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de la ayuda 2012 (Madrid: Intermón Oxfam).
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Organizaciones no gubernamentales para el Desarrollo-España).
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Coordinadora (2010b) Indicadores de transparencia y buen gobierno (Madrid:
Coordinadora de Organizaciones no gubernamentales para el Desarrollo-España).
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rollo/CAONGDE (2013) La AOD andaluza se reduce en torno al 30% durante el
periodo 2009–2011, con dificultades añadidas por incumplimientos presupuestarios
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De los Llanos, M. (2010) ‘El sistema española de cooperación al desarrollo’ in
Calabuig, C. and M. de los Llanos (Coords.) La cooperación internacional para el
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(Madrid: Federación Española de Municipios y Provincias).
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Nuevos Agentes, Nuevas Potencialidades’ Report prepared for: Latin America
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Spanish Development NGOs and the State 255
Interviews
The authors have interviewed the following individuals in the process of pre-
paring this chapter:
8.1 Introduction
Member States joining the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007 have
through accession also ‘graduated’ to a donor status and became politi-
cally and morally obliged to build up an effective strategy for interna-
tional development cooperation, based on the principles and policies,
accepted within the EU. These countries, however, often lack the nec-
essary complex legal and institutional infrastructure to act as efficient
donors, face serious difficulties to increase the resources according to
the agreed dynamics and have serious human resource problems in area
of international development cooperation (Bučar et al., 2007).
On the other hand, the countries are not without experience in the
area of international cooperation. In particular, non-governmental
development organizations (NGDO) have established links with civil
society organizations in the EU networks as well as in the developing
countries where development cooperation projects have been imple-
mented. NGDOs have been increasingly involved in development edu-
cation activities and awareness-raising campaigns in their countries.
The key argument of this paper is that the recently joined member
states otherwise known as new member states (NMS)1 have insufficient
multi-stakeholder approach to international development policy and
strategic planning of development aid. We believe that the development
institutions at the national level should not be divided into governmen-
tal and non-governmental but should build stronger partnerships, if the
goals and objectives of EU international development cooperation are
to be fully implemented. Only by building partnerships with civil soci-
ety organizations can the governments in NMS hope to become more
257
258 Maja Bučar, Eva (Pliberšek) Nastav and Anija (Pukl) Mešič
Until their accession to the EU, many of the NMS were themselves
recipients of donor funds (some still are). Their new donor status
requires a different attitude in this area. To participate fully in the activi-
ties at the level of the European Commission and to contribute to the
effectiveness of EU aid, these countries first had to design their develop-
ment policies and strategies, raise awareness among their citizens and
engage in different development cooperation projects. The integration
of already well-developed concepts, principles and commitments of the
EU and implementation of these policies is a challenging task for MNS
as they emerge or re-emerge as donors (Bučar and Mrak, 2007).
At the initial stages of official aid programs in NMS, NGOs were de
facto not recognized by the state authorities as strategically important
partners. A particular feature in all these post-communist societies was
a lack of confidence between government and civil society. This attitude
has its origins in the pre-transition period when NGOs often established
Development Cooperation in New EU Member States 259
education and awareness raising (Bedoya, 2007). Their main tool for
planning of joint advocacy, lobbying and awareness-raising activities
has been the establishment of specific thematic working groups (WG) –
following the already well-developed practice of their ‘Western’
counterparts. These working groups have created a place for mutual
cooperation, capacity building, defining of common positions, informa-
tion sharing and coordination among NGDOs towards the partners and
the general public.
Even prior to accession to the EU, the NMS NGDO platforms have
been able to join common development activities at the European level,
particularly capacity-building seminars and working groups, through a
specific project for the support to the European NGDO in the enlarged
Europe – TRIALOG.4 In 2003, the first NMS platform to become a mem-
ber of CONCORD was the Czech NGDO platform. This was followed
soon by the membership of Hungarian, Latvian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak
and Slovenian NGDO platforms.5 The NGDO platforms and networks
from the remaining NMS have been present within CONCORD work-
ing groups as observers.6 This was an important place for strengthening
their capacities, especially in the field of development education and
awareness raising where the majority of state institutions have failed
to act.
A good example of the evolution of such activities is the Development
Awareness Raising and Education Forum, as one of the core CONCORD
Working groups and the new NGDO-EU partnership (DEEEP, 2013).
It has initiated the Development Education Exchange for Europe
Project (DEEEP) to increase capacities of non-governmental organiza-
tions in development education and awareness raising, to strengthen
their cooperation with other European civil society actors with the
aim to improve effectiveness of development education projects,
as well as to establish and strengthen partnerships between non-
governmental organizations, member states and European institutions
to gain political support for development education and awareness
raising in Europe.7
As a result, the CONCORD Development Awareness Raising and Edu-
cation Forum has initiated the European multi-stakeholder process for
promotion and development of Development Education in Europe in
2005 (DEEEP, 2013). At 2007 European Development Days in Lisbon,
the Development Education Multi-stakeholder Group, which consists of
governmental and non-governmental organizations, European institu-
tions and government representatives, presented the European Strategy
framework for Development Education and Awareness Raising (European
Development Cooperation in New EU Member States 261
the thematic and geographic focus of their activities. The list of work-
ing groups reflects the short- and long-term needs of FoRS member
organizations.9
Members of FoRS are rather diverse in regard to their activities and
field of operation as well as regarding their size and experiences. NGDOs
work in the following fields: humanitarian aid and relief, drug abuse,
the increase of aid effectiveness, mediation, education, respect of human
and children’s rights, volunteering, health issues, democratic freedoms
and migration. In terms of size, revenues and number of employees dif-
ferences are even bigger – there are some small NGDOs with no more
than one employee (and sometimes some volunteers) with revenues not
exceeding EUR40,000. On the other hand there are several NGDOs with
up to 200 employees, where their revenues exceeded EUR12 million in
2008 and enabled project implementation in more than 15 recipient
countries (FoRS, 2012a).
In terms of dialogue with the government, FoRS actively monitors
and influences the legislative and financial framework of the devel-
opment and humanitarian NGOs, putting pressure on the Czech
government to support civil society to establish dialogue and foster
participation in decision-making. Since January 2008, FoRS has been
setting up policy and advocacy activities (in cooperation with the
Irish and UK NGDO platform) (FoRS, 2012d). Further, in 2008 FoRS
in cooperation with Slovak and Polish NGDO platform launched
the Aid Watch Report, monitoring transparency and effectiveness of
Official Development Aid (ODA) for the year 2007. Within the Czech
Presidency to the EU Council in 2009, the main FoRS priority was civil
society organizations’ development effectiveness and development
education effectiveness.10
The main objective of the FoRS Presidency project was to formulate
principles of development effectiveness from the point of view of Czech
civil society organizations (CSOs) and promoting these among the
public and political stakeholders. FoRS promoted civil dialogue at the
national and European level, as well as the European multi-stakeholder
process in development education, through two high-level interna-
tional conferences with the support of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the European Commission.11
8.3.1.5 Evaluation
The Czech Republic started with evaluation of their ODA system in
2003 but has been criticized for being complicated and not transparent
(TRIALOG, 2009d). Projects or programs have usually been identified
solely by the ministry of foreign affairs with or without consulta-
tions with line ministries. The Development Centre of the Institute of
International Relations was responsible for managing evaluations. Such
evaluations were not autonomous (involvement of governmental bod-
ies, directly involved in ODA management), moreover, there was a prob-
lem with the application of evaluation results in future ODA planning.
Since January 2008 and the establishment of the Czech Development
Agency, the evaluation system has been transformed with the introduc-
tion of an independent evaluation system. According to the system,
the Foreign Ministry should order evaluations from external evaluators
and the results should be public and discussed within the Council for
Development Cooperation.
Within the program of Czech official development cooperation, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has financially supported the International
Program for Development Evaluation Training (IPDET), which program
has taken place on a yearly basis since 2007. The program is organized
by the civic association Development Worldwide (DWW) in cooperation
with the International Development Evaluation Association (IDEAS) and
the Czech Evaluation Society. Training is recommended for evaluators
and managers of development projects and programs from the Czech
Republic and new EU member states. The training graduates receive a
certificate from the World Bank and IDEAS – International Development
Evaluation Association (www.ideas-int.org).
With regards to the Czech platform FoRS, civil society effectiveness
was its main priority during the Czech EU Presidency (FoRS, 2012a).
With an international conference as the main NGDO presidency event,
the Czech platform managed to gather key actors in development
cooperation – civil society organizations (CSOs) and donors – from the
Czech Republic, and new and old member states of the European Union
as well as developing countries for a discussion about the principles of
development effectiveness.
Based on relevant information (formal documents, reports), we can
observe that the situation of Czech development NGOs has been slowly,
but undoubtedly improving. During the past year they have gained
more political weight in cooperation with the Czech government
when it comes to development policy formation and implementation.
One can prove this by reference to the constantly improving legal
268 Maja Bučar, Eva (Pliberšek) Nastav and Anija (Pukl) Mešič
8.3.2 Hungary
8.3.2.1 An overview
The Hungarian NGDO platform – HAND was established in 2003 by
12 regular members and five observers (HAND, 2012a). The number of
member organizations has increased to 14 members, whereas the num-
ber of observer organizations has dropped to one by November 2013
(HAND, 2012b). According to the Hungarian platform coordinator, six
are small, four medium and three big member organizations in terms
of size, and only two out of thirteen are international organizations.14
Among the observers, three are small organizations and six are medium-
sized organizations, whereas in terms of origin, five are national and four
are international organizations. With regards to existence, the majority
of medium and bigger organizations have been established around
the 1990 on the basis of the introduction of the new legal ground for
NGOs and financial support of USAID and other non-European sources,
whereas the majority of smaller NGOs (grassroots organizations) have
been established only five to seven years ago.
Development Cooperation in New EU Member States 269
8.3.2.5 Evaluation
Hungary has no effective evaluation system at work (TRIALOG, 2009d,
Szent-Ivány, 2011). According to the platform coordinator, the platform
board has already identified a need for establishing an NGDO evalua-
tion system. However, due to available resources this remains a future
challenge.
Currently, evaluations are focused on individual projects or activi-
ties, mainly events, which are measured mainly by their financial and
organizational management. After implemented activities, question-
naires are distributed to the target groups or participants which request
feedback on the satisfaction of users with the organization of a certain
activity.
Based on the gathered information, we can conclude that coopera-
tion between the Hungarian NGDOs and the government was gaining
weight a couple of years ago, but has stagnated now. The relationship
between the two is also perceived differently by the representatives of
the MFA – they feel that the communication has improved significantly
(Szent-Ivány, 2011). NGDOs are important partners of the Hungarian
government when it comes to drafting the policy papers, and, even
more, when it comes to implementation, however there is often a ques-
tion about implementation. MFA sees NGDOs, especially the platform
274 Maja Bučar, Eva (Pliberšek) Nastav and Anija (Pukl) Mešič
HAND, as the main partner to liaise with in the policy framework. The
importance of NGDOs is also reflected in all of the most important
policy papers and guidelines of Hungarian development policy. The
government is planning to increase support to NGDOs and thus to
further improve the relationship among both partners. Both partners in
the dialogue, the government and the platform are, however, faced with
serious constraints in the area of human resources and their expertize.17
This limits the possibility of systematically developing and deepening
the cooperation. As in the other two countries, the cooperation has
intensified during the EU Council presidency.
Government considers NGDOs as one of the most important imple-
menting partners when it comes to development projects. Although the
role of NGDOs is limited to the implementation of projects (with HUN
IDA being the main implementing body of development programs),
their work has been far from underestimated, by the government.
NGDOs are even considered as the main implementing body in the field
of humanitarian aid as well as in the other fields of expertize.
However, from the NGO point of view, the situation has worsened
when it comes to policy dialogue and project implementation (Szent-
Ivány, 2011). There has been no improvement of the situation when it
comes to evaluation, and some major policy papers have been in the
process of adoption for a several years.
To conclude; Hungary was gaining its momentum a few years ago and
was on a good path to becoming a major success story when it comes
to the government-NGO cooperation in the field of policy setting and
implementation of development projects. The 2011 EU presidency even
improved the overall picture. However, partly due to the economic cri-
sis, partly due to lack of political support there were no major improve-
ments during recent years.
8.3.3 Slovenia
8.3.3.1 An overview
The development of the Slovenian NGO sector was, as in many Eastern
European countries, directly linked to the establishment of nation states
and the historical context of civil society development. If the period
before political movements and Slovenian independence was marked
by a limited number of associations and interest groups, the period after
1990 saw a significant growth in different types of NGOs. With the aim
to improve their activities as well as to foster the cooperation among
NGOs, provide the technical-administrative support to NGOs and
encourage further involvement of NGOs into a decision-making process,
Development Cooperation in New EU Member States 275
cooperation and humanitarian aid (MFA Slovenia 2013a). The group has
prepared common NGDO positions and recommendations19 by joining
together Sloga members and observer organizations (the latter refers to:
UNICEF Slovenia, Slovenian Caritas, Missionary centre and Slovenian
Red Cross).
In 2007, Sloga established the Presidency steering group to prepare
and implement the Slovenian NGDO Presidency project.20 In parallel,
the Sloga secretariat has been coordinating more than five thematic
working groups to be able to follow and advocate for relevant develop-
ment topics. Among the most active working groups were groups on
t development education, ODA monitoring and evaluation, Africa and
migration, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and global call
against poverty.21
During the Slovenian EU Presidency, the main thematic focus was on
development education with the aim to raise awareness among the gen-
eral public and individuals about relevant development issues through
a national campaign. The platform initiated a process of drafting a
national global education strategy.
At the European level, the platform was active in the European devel-
opment education consensus process and organized an international
conference on intercultural dialogue in development education as its
main program activity for the Slovenian EU presidency. As a follow-up
activity, the Slovenian platform took over the coordination of Global
Education Week at the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe
in November 2008. With this event, the platform managed to start a
national consultation on the possibilities of civil society – government-
institution partnership in school curricula development.
Civil dialogue between the Slovenian NGDOs and the MFA intensi-
fied within the framework of the Slovenian EU presidency, as well as
the process of creation of the Development Cooperation Strategy and
Resolution framework in 2007. Moreover, the MFA agreed on the co-
financing of the main platform conference for the EU Presidency in
2008 and participated at the Sloga international conferences and semi-
nars. In 2008, the MFA for the first time issued calls for proposals for
NGO development projects in the developing countries. The call was
launched again in 2009 in cooperation with other line ministries and
was repeated in the following years.22
MFA, the mechanism was about to change in 2009, especially for those
organizations where the government was one of the co-founders. They
were no longer treated as partly NGDOs, but as government organiza-
tions, implementing government policies. Funds were still provided
under direct request but the MFA was aiming at limiting direct funding
only to the organizations that were co-founded by the MFA. The plan
was that in 2010 some of them would be offered participation in the call
for proposals from NGDOs and would present their project proposals in
order to qualify for funds (with some direct funding available). In the
longer term, the aim of the MFA was to strengthen these organizations
to be as financially independent of MFA funds as possible. However the
report on development cooperation in 2012 still shows that about 12
per cent of bilateral funds (which represents almost EUR1.25 million)
were given directly to those organizations for their operational activities
(MFA Slovenia, 2013e).
8.3.3.5 Evaluation
There is no evaluation system in place. Moreover, the government has
until 2009 prepared no overall evaluation of Slovenian development
activities (MFA Slovenia, 2013a). The platform therefore initiated a
process to prepare development project evaluation guidelines by the
end of 2009 in cooperation with all relevant governmental and non-
governmental organizations and line ministries.
Development projects have been evaluated according to the project
financier’s requirements for a specific project through financial revi-
sion and narrative reporting. Under the call for proposals for NGDOs
in 2008 and 2009, the project evaluations and reporting requirements
are specified in the contracts. In 2008, all the evaluations were prepared
internally, by the implementing NGDO and sent to MFA for informa-
tion. However, due to the lack of evaluation and reporting directives,
the quality of evaluations is limited mainly to financial management.
Although the Slovenian government did not cooperate much with
NGDOs in the initial stages of development of the international coop-
eration policy few years ago, the situation changed considerably during
the Slovenian presidency of the EU Council. The government needed
the support of all available stakeholders to carry out multiple tasks:
from organizing various events and conferences to its own implemen-
tation of the development cooperation strategy. The government is
now trying to fully integrate the NGDOs into the drafting of policy
papers as well as into the implementation of development politics. MFA
is particularly prone to cooperate with the NGDO platform and consid-
ers Sloga as an important partner, which has been gaining its weight
in the last couple of years. Except for continuous financial support
to the platform, there were no other mechanisms of NGDO funding in
the past. Even support to the platform started with relatively symbolic
levels of funds.30 However the MFA started to give more importance
to the work of NGDOs after that, but the funds dropped again. However
the reason behind this drop is not the deterioration of the relationship
with NGOs, but the overall lowering of development funds.
Development Cooperation in New EU Member States 283
New member states are still facing several other open issues in interna-
tional development cooperation (see details in Bučar and Mrak, 2007)
as well as problems of low awareness of development issues among
the general public and politicians. As observed in our earlier work on
development policies in NMSs (Bučar et al., 2007), most NMSs are still
looking for the best institutional setting for development cooperation.
Also, the expected level of funding to which they have committed
themselves as new members of EU, is still a difficult target to achieve.
The integration of the EU development aid principles and priorities into
national strategies has proved to be a demanding exercise. In recent
years, decreasing political commitment can be also detected in some
members.
The paper examines the importance of partnerships between govern-
ment bodies and non-governmental development organizations in the
process of establishment of effective development cooperation, public
awareness and development education processes in NMS. According to
our preliminary investigation, this type of cooperation is increasingly
important in each of the three countries that we examined. Much to our
surprise we found a very dynamic evolution of partnership among the
governments and NDGO communities, especially through the NGDO
284 Maja Bučar, Eva (Pliberšek) Nastav and Anija (Pukl) Mešič
platforms. The three case studies show that the cooperation between
NGDOs and the relevant governments is developing quite dynamically.
After the initial uneasiness of the governments (probably as a result of
the historical experience of NGOs being the voice of opposition), the
governments in the three studied countries found that part of their
efforts to develop a full-fledged system of international development
cooperation can be implemented through involvement of NGDOs. In
fact the activities reported by the three NGDO platforms can be cited
as good examples of gradually establishing the settings for closer and
more productive partnership, not only at the institutional level, but also
through providing specific financing mechanisms.
Several NMS have already prepared their basic strategic papers in the
area of development aid and are in the process of setting up appro-
priate organizational infrastructure. In view of limited financial and
human resources, the governments turned to NGDOs to provide addi-
tional capacities in the area of international development cooperation.
NGDOs (at least in the studied countries) actively participate in many
areas and offer their capabilities in the area of raising public awareness,
development education as well as specific experiences in implementa-
tion and cooperation in development aid projects. Also developing
is an important role for NGDOs in monitoring the official policies
of international development cooperation and controlling the obser-
vance of the agreed objectives and principles, especially the three Cs:
coherence, coordination and cooperation. The latter is in particular the
result of active participation of national networks in the all-EU network
CONCORD. Interestingly, the government doors have opened even
wider to the NGDOs during the preparation and the implementation
of the presidency of the EU Council in all three cases. The task of presi-
dency, with the many different topics that governments have to address
and agendas they have to follow, can only be met by governments
if active cooperation with NGDOs is sought. The ability to productively
assist the governments in implementation of the programs and events
during the presidency increased the visibility of the NGDOs and con-
tributed to their status in the eyes of official politics. This opened new
possibilities for dialogue in the future.
The formation of national platforms and the strengthening of their
potential with the help of European programs is leading to better coor-
dination among NGDOs. This, in the long run, is extremely viable as
their future national role. One of the common observations of different
studies on NMS development cooperation has been the understaffing
of different government offices, involved in these issues. The awareness
Development Cooperation in New EU Member States 285
that closer and more structured cooperation with NGDOs could relieve
these problems has gained ground in NMS. Two of the important areas
of NGDO activity, development education and awareness raising, can
contribute immensely to setting a more favorable political climate for
increased government spending on development cooperation. This
would suggest that the government offices in charge of development
cooperation are beginning to see in NGDOs as their natural allies who
can help them achieve their strategies and commitments. One can only
hope to see this strategic partnership develop further.
Notes
1 Even though the European Commission uses the expression ‘recently joined
member states’, we will be using the abbreviation NMS – new member states
for the sake of simplicity.
2 This section draws extensively on Bučar and Mrak, 2007.
3 Before the official registration, the majority of NGDO platforms in NMS
had acted initially as informal networks of NGDOs. Their advocacy activi-
ties were therefore limited. The Bulgarian NGDO platform was formally
established only in 2009 (Presidency Fund, 2010). For more information see
Annex 1.
4 TRIALOG is a project to raise awareness of development issues in the enlarged
EU. It was initiated in March 2000 for the period of 3 years and is now in the
third phase (2006–2009). It is financed by the European Commission (83.6
per cent), Consortium partners and private European sources (12.4 per cent)
and Austrian Development Cooperation (4.0 per cent) (TRIALOG, 2009a).
5 CONCORD currently consists of 18 international networks and 27 national
associations from the European Member States who together represent more
than 1,800 European NGOs vis-à-vis the European Institutions (CONCORD,
2012a)
6 The NMS NGDO platforms have been represented in the following
CONCORD Working groups: WG Policy and European Presidency, FDR – EU
Funding for Development and Relief, DEF – Development Education Forum,
AidWatch, WG Enlargement, Pre-Accession and Neighbourhood (under the
auspices of TRIALOG). See Annex 1.
7 DEEEP is a program initiated by the Development Awareness Raising and
Education Forum of CONCORD to strengthen capacities of NGDOs to raise
awareness, educate and mobilise the European public for worldwide poverty
eradication and social inclusion. The project is managed by UCODEP (IT),
ITECO (BE), DEA (UK), under the auspices of and in co-ordination with the
Development Awareness Raising and Education Forum of CONCORD and
co-financed by the European Commission (DEEEP, 2013).
8 The CONCORD Aid Watch Working group has in cooperation with the
Slovenian and French NGDO platforms organised an international NGDO
consultation seminar in Ljubljana, Slovenia, from 9–11 April 2008, to draft
a common NGDO position to be presented in Accra.
286 Maja Bučar, Eva (Pliberšek) Nastav and Anija (Pukl) Mešič
9 FoRS long-term working groups (WG) are: Policy WG, Gobal devel-
opment education and awareness WG, Efficiency WG, Gender WG,
Humanitarian aid WG, Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation
for the Disabled WG, Communication and Public Relation WG, Finance
WH and Development Studies WG. Working Group formed for the Czech
EU Presidency were: Migration WG, Sustainable technologies and Local
Energetic WG, Agriculture and Food Security WG. Working groups provide
a platform for joint work, capacity building, preparation of papers, infor-
mation sharing and the coordination of common positions vis-à-vis FoRS
partners and public (FoRS, 2012c).
10 Other priority topics, from the development effectiveness perspective were
Good Governance, Development Education, Sustainable Technologies for
Sustainable Development, Migration and Development and Agriculture and
Food Security (FoRS, 2012d).
11 International Conference ‘Effectiveness in Development Education and
Awareness Raising’ took place from 28–29th of May 2009 in Prague.
Second International Conference ‘Civil Society Organizations Development
Effectiveness Conference’ was held from 23–24th of June 2009 in Prague
(FoRS, 2012d).
12 Presentation of FoRS at the TRIALOG Central Training 2006, Budapest
(TRIALOG, 2009b).
13 Partnership between the civil society and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
development cooperation, Presentation for the Seminar on the role of the
New Member States in the EU Development Policy, Warsaw, 18–19 April
2007 (TRIALOG, 2009c).
14 Size of NGO is estimated according to the number of employees; small
meaning 1–2, medium 2–8 and big more than 8. Source: Interview with Ms
Blahó Györgyi, the Hand coordinator, Skype conference, 17 April 2009.
15 By the end of 2007, HAND established the following WG: the Aid Watch
WG, the Africa strategy WG (link to the CONCORD Cotonou WG), the
Global Education WG, European Integration and Neighbourhood Policy
WG (link to the TRIALOG EPAN WG), WG ODA and Awareness raising/cam-
paigning WG. With regard to the results in 2007, the most active were the
Aid Watch, the Global Education and Awareness raising/campaigning WG.
In 2008, the ODA WG started working on ODA law, DE WG developed the
advocacy strategy in the framework of the national DE strategy preparation,
Aid Watch WG issued the Aid Watch Report, Africa WG covered EU-Africa
issues but stopped with the activities in 2009. In 2013 the number of WG
dropped to four: European Integration and Neighbourhood Policy WG,
Afrika WG, Development Education WG and Aidwatch WG (HAND, 2012c).
16 In 2004 the Hungarian International Development Agency won an appoint-
ment from the MFA to be the Executive Institution of the Hungarian
bilateral development cooperation. It was reappointed for a second time
in September 2006 for the period of three years. The activities of HUN IDA
in terms of development cooperation programs implementation include
identification, planning and implementation of the development programs
in a specific priority country, technical and financial monitoring, technical
cooperation as well as the development education and awareness raising
activities (HUNIDA, 2007).
Development Cooperation in New EU Member States 287
17 The Platform for example, has only two full time employees in charge of all
the activities and contacts.
18 The first NGO initiative for the creation of a national platform dates back
to the year 2001 when a group of interested NGOs formed an informal
NGO-coalition for cooperation with MFA and other relevant national and
European stakeholders. The coalition was operating as a Working group,
under the framework of CNVOS (Sloga, 2013a).
19 Internal reports of the Sloga Policy WG meetings.
20 The NGDO Presidency project had been developed in two years time and
was submitted to the European Commission for approval in 2007. The
project involves 7 Consortium members who aim to raise awareness about
relevant development issues in Slovenia and Europe and to strengthen coop-
eration between different DE stakeholders at the national level. The project
is focused on the following development topics: development education,
social inclusion (intergenerational dialog, children advocacy, migration and
human trafficking) and climate changes and development. The project »You
too are part of this world« was launched in February 2008 with a press con-
ference, presenting the NGDO Manifesto for the Slovenian EU Presidency
and the project webpage: www.tuditi.si (Sloga, 2013c).
21 The working groups promoted multi-stakeholder approach to civil dialogue
by organising the following events in the framework of the Slovenia EU
Presidency: (a) national seminar on DE for NGO- and GO-representatives
(in collaboration with DEEEP), (b) international seminar on monitoring and
evaluation of ODA for the Slovenian and European NGO platform and gov-
ernmental representatives (in collaboration with French NGDO platform,
CONCORD and OECD DAC), (c) side events to the ACP-EU JPA in Ljubljana
in March 2008 for ACP-EU CSO and NGOs (i.e. seminar on EPAs and EDF),
(d) international seminar on sexual and reproductive health and rights (in
collaboration with IPPF and WPF), (e) photo-exhibition on women and
children, affected by armed conflicts, at the launching of the MFA study in
Brussels, (f) national high-level Round-table on MDGs on world day against
poverty in 2007 (presence of the Slovenian MFA, MPs, representatives from
the EC and EP).
22 See more on dialogue between NGDO sector and government as well as on
funding arrangements in the following chapters.
23 The role of coordination was given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the
Act on international development cooperation (Article 5).
24 According to the Act on Slovenian international development cooperation
the planning and implementation of development projects should be based
on the Resolution of international development cooperation. The resolu-
tion should include the geographic and sector priorities as well as financing
mechanism and should be adopted by the Slovenian parliament.
25 More on calls for proposals in the section on NGO funding.
26 Interview with Aleš Verdir, Division on International Development
Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, MFA (9 April 2009).
27 There are two different types of NGOs/institutions that are not formally
members of the platform: development institutions that were established by
the Slovenian government and are still (co)financed by the different minis-
tries and other NGOs.
288 Maja Bučar, Eva (Pliberšek) Nastav and Anija (Pukl) Mešič
References
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Member States, Paper presented at ABCDE World Bank Conference, 7–18 May,
Bled, Slovenia.
Bučar, M., A. Mesic and E. Plibersek (2007) ‘Development Policies of New Member
States and Their Participation in EU Development Cooperation; Annex 1’, in H.
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Bučar, M., A Mešič and E. Plicberšek (2008) Development cooperation in New EU
Member States: The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations. Paper presented
at the General EADI conference, geneva, June 2008.
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Development Cooperation in New EU Member States 289
Interviews
292
From Plains and Mountains 293
more in the line of relief and charity. In Europe or the United States in
the early 20th century and also still in the 1930s, most organizations
had a religious background. Many of the present-day private aid organi-
zations with a religious background stem from missionary organizations
which in an earlier stage went into activities other than purely mission-
ary activities, mostly in education and health. The countries, regions
and partners of these aid organizations all bear the traces of this early
existence. Some of these organizations with a religious background,
however, have their origin in working in their home countries, in char-
ity work and relief work, mostly for children or for the disabled. A few
started working internationally in relief activities during World War I.
Whereas some present-day child-sponsoring organizations have a reli-
gious background, the majority started as a non-religious relief organiza-
tion. These organizations began with relief activities in urgent situations,
like feeding children at the end of World War I or during World War II
(Save the Children), helping and adopting children during the Spanish
Civil War (Plan International), taking care of war orphans and homeless
children in Austria (SOS Children’s Villages), or – a bit further away –
helping children in China after World War II (World Vision). In particular
relief activities for children have been ‘popular’ for more than a century.
Child-sponsoring and adoption organizations are blooming and new
organizations seem to be formed from year to year.
Some of these non-religious relief organizations broadened their work
later, going from relief into development activities. Red Cross socie-
ties are perhaps the most well known and oldest among these, with
Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) at a good second
place. Both organizations stayed in humanitarian assistance mainly, but
some religious relief organizations evolved into broader development
activities, like the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam). Oxfam,
founded in 1942 on the initiative of the Quakers, started by providing
food to starving Greek and Belgian children during World War II, but
gradually grew to fight starvation in Bihar in India (1950s), offer emer-
gency assistance to India and Africa (1960s) and into the promotion of
fair trade by selling handicrafts (from 1964 onwards). CARE began with
giving food aid to post-war Europe and expanded its activities to disaster
prevention and poverty reduction and still is important in providing
American food aid. Christian Aid, founded in 1945, started as Christian
reconstruction in Europe and went on to widen its activities later.
Looking at the situation now, it is perhaps surprising that very few of
the non-religious private aid organizations started as development organi-
zations. Most of them actually began as relief organizations in times of a
294 Paul Hoebink and Lau Schulpen
World Vision 1950 USA Federation with 19 Income: US$2.08 billiona Child sponsorship 95
‘support offices’ Expenditure: US$1.87 (4.1 million children)
billion and community work
Save the 1919 UK 25 full members and Income: US$1.578 bil- Child support 120
Children* 5 associates liona Expenditure: US$1.08
billion
Caritas** 1951 Italy Confederation of 164 Income: unknown Service delivery and 164
member organizations Expenditure: unknown humanitarian aid
International 1863 80 delegations Income: €938 million Humanitarian aid 80
Committee of Switzerland (188 members in the Expenditure: €771 million
the Red Cross Red Cross Federation)
Doctors without 1971 France 23 associations Income: €938 millionc Humanitarian aid 60
Borders Expenditure: €762 million
SOS Children’s 1952 Austria Confederation with 18 Income: €887 millionc Child and family support 133
Villages supporting and Expenditure: €720 million
promoting associations
Oxfam 1942 UK Confederation of 17 Income: €918 millionb From emergency relief to 94
International organizations Expenditure: €639 million advocacy and campaigns
(continued)
297
298
Table 9.3 Continued
CARE 1945 USA Confederation with 12 Income: €610 millionb Humanitarian aid, 84
members and 2 affiliates Expenditure: €518 million reconstruction, disaster
prevention
Plan 1937 UK 14 members Income: €634 millionb Child sponsorship and 50
International Expenditure: €487 million community support
Action Aid 1972 UK Association with 45 Income: €217 millionc Started with child 45
affiliated and associated Expenditure: €181 million sponsoring, from commu-
members nity support to advocacy
Note: * = Save the Children is in transition to bring all the implementation under one umbrella, this is why programme expenditure has to be derived
from its annual report and is not a consolidated figure. ** = Caritas organizations, mostly independent organizations but working together under
the catholic Caritas label like CAPFOD, Cordaid, Misereor; Wallace (2000) suggests that Caritas Italiana is the largest private aid organization, but
annual reports suggest that Caritas Italiana and also Caritas Internationalis are very far from reaching these amounts. *** expenditure = expenditure
on humanitarian activities and development programmes. a = 2011; b = 2011–2012; c = 2012.
Source: Annual Reports of the organizations.
From Plains and Mountains 299
sponsorship, which still is the best way to attract money from the char-
ity market. Four of the ten largest are in child support. Three are mainly
in humanitarian and relief operations (Red Cross, Doctors without
Borders and CARE). Oxfam International and Action Aid are broader
development organizations, while the Catholic Caritas organizations
are in relief and services provision, mainly in health and education.
Their incomes range from more than EUR200 million to more than
USD2 billion meaning that most of them spend more money than some
of the smaller DAC-donors like the Czech Republic, Greece or even
Poland. The largest of these private aid organizations are also present in
a high number of countries, around 100 on average, which again means
that they spend their money thinly, with an expenditure per country
between USD4 and USD19 million.
(see Box 9.1), but also here the landscape is that of some giants and
many dwarfs. The latter also holds for Germany where the NGO land-
scape has been summarized nicely under the title ‘some elephants and
many ants’ (Eberlei, 2002, p. 23). Of all private spending to German
development NGOs, 70 per cent goes to the ten largest, while the other
5,700 receive the remainder. In Germany the big ‘elephants’ are primar-
ily the religious organizations (see Box 9.2).
More than in the UK the German large NGOs are religiously oriented
and they are also more dependent on German government support.
The protestant organization Brot für die Welt had an income in 2012
of EUR248 million of which close to half comes from the German
government. Brot für die Welt is a merger of two evangelical organi-
zations, the Evangelischen Entwicklungsdienstes e. V. (EED) and
Aktion Brot für die Welt which were united in 2012.
Misereor, the Catholic organization founded in 1962 after a first
collection in the catholic churches for ‘hunger in the world’ in 1959,
had an income in 2012 of EUR182.7 million in 2012, including
EUR113.8 million from official sources, of which 99 per cent was
from the German government.
In comparison with these two giants other German NGOs are rather
small, but they might collect, like Doctors without Borders Germany
(EUR71 million) and in particular SOS World Villages Germany
(EUR130 million) and Plan International Germany (EUR115 million)
(much) more from the German ‘charity market’ than Brot für die Welt
or Misereor.
When the German government in 1962 decided to support the
overseas work of the German catholic and the protestant churches,
they decided each to form a central office as a legal body to receive
and distribute aid from this co-financing program. The churches still
receive the major part of co-funding. Political foundations, linked
to the German political parties, also have a separate co-financing
scheme. The German Bundestag decides on this program every three
years, with an annual budget now of around EUR250 million.
Sources: Annual Reports of the organizations; Smillie and Helmich (1999);
Woods (2000); Eberlei (2002).
than six subsidy schemes from grants for project preparation and indi-
vidual projects to a partnership scheme with a limited number of Finnish
organizations (since 1993 receiving half of the allocation for NGOs) and
a subsidy instrument for international NGOs. The budget grew, as total
Finnish ODA, rather fast since 2000, but remains limited in euro terms.
The chapter on Belgium not only indicated that the Ministry (the
Directorate General for Development Cooperation) lacked vision and
had no guidelines, but also that it subsidized Belgian NGOs in a frag-
mented way, via five budget lines and additionally via humanitarian
funds. As the authors point out: ‘Without guidelines or vision in place,
the DGDC varies between subsidizing activities fully freely conceived by
the NGDOs, and trying to gain some grip on NGDO programs and pro-
jects, more recently by trying to push for guarantees on their coherence
and complementarity with the bilateral aid policy (a strategy strongly
objected to by the NGDO sector out of fear of “instrumentalization”)’.
Other European donors are much less generous in NGO co-financing.
Still, some of them also have long-standing relationships with the
older private aid agencies, in particular with faith-based organizations.
In Germany two ‘Zentralstellen für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit’
(Centers for Development Cooperation) have been since 1962 special
partners of and are subsidised by the German Federal Government.
These are the ‘Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe e.V’
and the ‘Katholische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe e.V’, which via
respectively Brot für die Welt and Evangelische Entwicklungsdienst and
the Catholic Misereor implement aid activities. The last two German
governments have emphasised again and again that they reserve 10 per
cent of the development budget for co-financing activities of NGOs.
This 10 per cent is not only reserved for the two church organizations,
but also for foundations of all the major political parties. Some special
programmes in food aid and emergency relief also channel aid via
German NGOs. In 2001 the German Federal Government estimated
the income of private aid organizations in Germany at EUR2 billion
(BMZ, 2001, p. 43). The German Ministry for Development Cooperation
(BMZ) calculated the own income of the church organizations it sup-
ported at EUR500 million.
Some British organizations have always been much more reluctant in
their subsidy relations with the British government. Oxfam UK had for
a long time a policy of not receiving more than 10 per cent of its pro-
gramme funds from the government. Other organizations had the same
principle, but gradually distanced themselves from it (Wallace, 2006,
p. 53–6). About half of the budget line for NGOs of DFID subsidises five
308 Paul Hoebink and Lau Schulpen
large organizations, while the other half is distributed over a large group
of small NGOs, which according to Wallace (2006) has led to a prolifera-
tion of new British aid organizations.
In conclusion many private aid organizations in northern Europe
receive a substantial part of their income from their home govern-
ments’ subsidy schemes even when these schemes are not a big part of
total ODA of these governments, while this might be a limited amount
only in southern Europe or even hardly anything at all, like in France.
Nevertheless, also in northern Europe there are organizations that are
more reluctant to receive government subsidies and prefer to keep a cer-
tain distance from their governments (next to those that don’t see any
problem in receiving the major part of their income from their govern-
ment). If we take the example of Oxfam International, we see that about
38 per cent of its income comes from multilateral organizations and
governments, 41 per cent from what it calls community fundraising
and the remainder mainly from its trading activities. The International
Committee of the Red Cross receives around 83 per cent from govern-
ments, an additional 9 per cent from the EU and only around 3 per cent
from private sources. In contrast Doctors without Borders receives 89
per cent of its income from private donations.
A second conclusion might be that government documents, policies
and the statements of politicians all over Europe emphasize the impor-
tance of private aid organizations and that this discourse has widened to
the importance of civil society in creating democratic societies, but that in
some cases this appears merely as lip-service as it is not always translated
into larger budgets or closer collaboration and warm relations. Private aid
organizations also tend to challenge their governments, while the gap
between governments and private organizations might be widened also
by results-based management and logical framework approaches that are
imposed on private aid organizations via the subsidy schemes.
and the private aid sector. There is essentially no subsidy scheme and
at best under certain circumstances, for example a humanitarian emer-
gency situation, private aid organizations are involved in some of the
activities.
Based on the country chapters in this book and some overview papers
(Smillie and Helmich, 1993, 1999; Smillie at al., 1996; Nijs and Renard,
2009; Giffen and Judge, 2010; DAC, 2011; Keijzer & Spierings, 2011),
France and Greece would fit this ‘distant partners’ model and Portugal
also in terms of budget allocation but not in the number of financing
instruments (DAC, 2011). This shows that governments and private aid
organizations in donor countries will be and are affected by dominant
political views on state-civil society relations. A difficulty here of course
is that donors don’t report well on their relations with private aid organ-
izations (with an exception maybe for the DAC report of 2011 on the
way how DAC donors work with CSOs), also because very often their
subsidies to NGOs are ‘scattered over different departments and budget
lines’ (Nijs and Renard, 2010, p. 9), not forgetting also the embassies or
field offices. It means that figures that float around in the papers cited
might be different from those in the DAC report. We have tried to fill
that gap with the chapters in this book.
What pops up from these figures anyway is not so much that there
is a difference between an Anglo-Saxon and a Scandinavian model, as
Nijs and Renard (2009) seem to suggest, but that there are several pat-
terns. There is one country, the Netherlands, in which the framework
subsidy model (the ‘aid through NGOs model’) prevails, which seems
to be based on a strong position, ideologically and in terms of political
connections with, in particular, the Christian democrat and social-dem-
ocrat parties. It is not surprising that with the Christian-democrat party
losing a major part of its political support, this model comes under
pressure. This looks like a ‘third-sector dominant model’, but recent
shifts in Dutch policy vis-à-vis subsidies to private aid organizations
demonstrate that this model is not carved out of marble.
The third model is a more mixed model in which ‘to and through’
seems to be balanced and could be considered a ‘dual model’. This seems
to be the model of Ireland, related to the very strong position of catho-
lic organizations in this country. To a lesser extent this is also visible in
Belgium and Switzerland, but we have to keep in mind here that aid vol-
umes are much more limited in these countries, with resulting subsidy
programs that are not very large. This is even more true for Italy and
Spain, and to a lesser extent also Austria, with very small bilateral aid
programs and in consequence also very small budgets for their NGOs.
From Plains and Mountains 311
Lastly we have a category with the UK, Germany and Denmark with –
compared to Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden – limited
budgets for NGOs. These budgets are limited because the number of
NGOs having access to them is historically limited (Germany), because
the private aid organizations are most probably not that strong and
influential (Denmark) or because they are old, prioritize their inde-
pendence and are reluctant to be under government control and to
be instrumentalized by their governments (like Oxfam in the UK and
Doctors without Borders). If the project mode of financing is dominant
we could call it a ‘government dominant’ model, but in the cases of
Denmark, Germany and the UK it has more the characteristics of the
‘dual’ or ‘collaborative’ models, but maybe only in the case of Denmark
strategies and policies are worked out in such a way that it can be called
‘collaborative’.
In their home countries, private aid organizations are not operating
in a political and societal vacuum. They are part of societies with spe-
cific religious, cultural and social histories and backgrounds. It would
thus be interesting to compare these policies, figures and subsidy pro-
grams for private aid organizations with wider relations that European
governments have with civil society in other sectors of society, like
health and education, and to see what role these organizations play
and the importance that governments attach to them, what influence
on and connections they have with political parties and the political
system. Also what changes have occurred in those sectors with regard
to privatization and how that affects these relations. Some interesting
comparisons, but also some differences with the subsidy systems for
private aid and the way they are represented and framed in the political
discourse might pop up.
9.5 Evaluation
have improved their evaluation capacity and the quality of their evalu-
ation work, but real impact evaluation with panel data and control
groups is still scarce.
Looking at what has been described above and at the sections on
evaluation in some of the chapters, it will not come as a surprise, that
most of the thorough programme evaluations come from Northern
Europe. Some of these evaluations are more on the functioning of the
subsidy schemes themselves, like the Finnish programme evaluation in
2008. Others also include the outcomes of the activities supported by
the subsidy schemes or partnership programmes in several developing
countries. Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark are among the coun-
tries who arranged these type of evaluations.
Two of the most well-known evaluations on NGOs and their work
were both done by ODI on sustainable agricultural development
(Farrington and Bebbington, 1993) and on poverty alleviation (Riddel
and Robinson, 1992). They are both however on NGOs in developing
countries, which are at best partners of private aid organizations from
the North. Then there are several other meta-evaluations ordered by
private aid organizations themselves or by their sponsors, donor min-
istries. One of the first of these evaluations was ordered by the four
co-financed private aid organizations in the Netherlands (Stuurgroep
Impact Medefinancieringsprogramma, 1991), which was followed later
by a series of meta-studies commissioned by the organizations them-
selves again in two rounds between 1999 and 2002 and between 2003
and 2006 on themes like women’s organizations, civil society participa-
tion, basic education and HIV/AIDS. Also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in the Netherlands had evaluation studies prepared on thematic co-
financing (Steering Committee Evaluation TMF Programme, 2006) and
by its evaluation unit (IOB), sometimes comparing channels or as part
of a country study, for example on Dutch bilateral aid to Bangladesh.
Similar types of commissioned evaluations we see during the 1990s
in the Nordic countries as part of country and regional studies, but
mainly as part of the evaluation of their NGO co-financing programs.
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation NORAD and the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to evaluate the NGO chan-
nel in 1992. Later they commissioned a country study of aid through
NGOs in Guatemala and more recently in East Africa. Denmark was the
very first country to start country and regional studies to evaluate its
NGO programs in West Africa and Central America. It also evaluated its
support to civil society via its strategy of 2008, in 2013, and before the
engagement of civil society in policy dialogue, and Danish private aid
From Plains and Mountains 313
also about the access for the poorest of the poor to loans and credit and
the sustainability of the results. Micro-finance seems to be able to lift
people out of poverty, but very often only temporarily and there are
questions raised also about the social and economic effects of micro-
finance like group pressure, indebtedness and debt-traps.
Child-sponsorship organizations have been criticized, because they
could not live up to the promises to actually sponsor each child that
was adopted by foster parents in the developed countries. First organi-
zations like Save the Children were under fire, later also Foster Parents
Plan (now Plan International).5 Apart from the fact that it seemed very
difficult to support all the children that were adopted, the model itself
appears very attractive in terms of raising money, but rather expensive
in its communication with the foster parents. Under this critique some
child sponsor organizations changed their communication and strate-
gies, laying more emphasis on the support to communities of ‘their’
children and/or on the empowerment of girls.
In the second field of results, of building a strong civil society, the
early evaluations indicated that there were few visible results of capac-
ity building. Some of the larger organizations, as well as some bilateral
donors then started to formulate strategies giving their programs a bet-
ter focus, for example aiming at organizations within specific sectors,
at larger organizations, or at membership and grassroots organizations.
Also the objectives were more clearly formulated with organizations
aiming at ‘giving voice’ to the poor or to ethnic and other minorities,
to make governments more accountable. This is observed in later evalu-
ations which show that capacity building has been successful with some
doubts about the sustainability of these efforts. Evaluations also point at
the limited results of the advocacy work of these partner organizations,
mainly due to the sometimes extremely difficult political situations
under which this advocacy work has to be done.
Private aid organizations have in the last two decades given their
advocacy work in Europe much more emphasis and this seems to
be also one of the fields in which they have been very successful.6
There are fewer evaluations on this type of work, but those there are
and also some scientific studies point at the successes of campaigns like
Jubilee 2000 on debt-forgiveness, for more policy coherence in the EU
in particular with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy and its
subsidies for exports and on fair trade and better trade agreements, for
decent work in the textile and electronics industries. From chocolate to
the t-shirt, from offices in Geneva to those in Brussels, these campaigns
From Plains and Mountains 315
9.6 Conclusions
Notes
1 The Spanish NGO-umbrella calculated that support to Spanish NGOs was
halved in 2012 and 2013 and support for humanitarian NGOs reduced by 80
per cent: http://www.coordinadoraongd.org/contenidos/los-pge2014-rema-
tan-a-una-cooperacion-ya-practicamente-desmantelada.html.
2 Please look at the literature list for a series of evaluations, see amongst oth-
ers Bebbington et al. (2008), Braathen (2007), Carl Bro Management (1994),
Centre for Development Studies Bergen (1992) and in particular also the
evaluations by Riddell a.o. (1994, 1995).
3 This observation is not only based on our experiences with private aid organi-
zations and their evaluation practices as well as on our participation in sev-
eral (meta) evaluations, but also on the evaluation of evaluations in a Dutch
private aid organization (Hoebink, 2001) and the reception of that report by
other organizations. An earlier conformation comes from Riddell (1990) and
Riddell (1995), who also admits things are changing in some of the larger
NGOs (Riddell, 2007).
4 For a good and more extensive overview see chapters 16 and 17 of Riddell
(2007) and for an older first big overview Riddell (1997). The paragraphs below
are built on these and reports mentioned above and in the listed literature.
5 This started with two articles in the Chicago Tribune on 15 and 22 March 1998
under the title ‘The Miracle Merchants’ and was followed by a series of articles
later that year on reactions of the organizations and court cases. The Chicago
Tribune alleged among other things that 23 already dead children were sup-
posed to be being sponsored. Foster Parents Plan, then the largest private aid
organization in the Netherlands, was challenged by groups of disillusioned
foster parents, which led to a report by Boer et al. (2001).
6 An interesting study by Celina del Felice (2013) gives a fine account of two of
these (trade) campaigns.
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From Plains and Mountains 319
Note: Page numbers followed by “f” and “t” denote figures and tables, respectively.
320
Index 321
number and types of, 218–21, Third World, 75, 76, 78, 79
250t ‘tiers-mondist’ paradigm, 23–4
origins of, 225–8 Trade Justice Group, 132
private funding, 223–5, 224f transnational NGOs, 79–80
public financing, evolution of, TRIALOG, 119, 260
222–3, 222t Trias, 38t, 40t
sector and geographic focus, Triodos Bank, 175
232–6, 234t, 235t Trócaire, 112, 119, 138, 143, 153, 159,
private aid organizations, public 300
subsidy arrangements for True Finns Party, 104n12
access to subsidies, 243 Turing Foundation, 184t
changes over time, 240–2, 241f 2into3, 133–7, 164
framework agreements, 242
level of, 240–2 Umubano, 39t
NGDO view of, 243–4 UNCED, 201
project funding, 242 UNDP, 12
Special Emergency Funds (SEFs), 153 UNICEF Danmark, 51, 54t, 56, 69n3
Stability Fund (SF), 153 UNICEF Slovenia, 276
Statement of Recommended Practice: United Kingdom (UK)
Accounting and Reporting for NGDOs
Charities (SORP), 143, 144, 147, development in, 301
169n17 government support to,
State Pact against Poverty, 218, 251n5 307–8
Steering Group Evaluation United Nations (UN)
Co-financing Program, 202–3 Common Emergency Response
Steunfonds Derde Wereld, 39t Fund, 153, 154
Stichting The Home Foundation, 184t Human Development Index, 129
Stichting Woord en Daad, 199 Universal Periodic Review (UPR),
Stop Climate Chaos coalition, 114–15, 156
132 United Nations Children’s Fund
Strategic Alliances with International (UNICEF), 38t, 153, 209n5,
NGDOs (SALIN), 190, 193–4 300
Strengthening Dóchas Group, 116 Universal Declaration of Human
Studio Globo, 39t Rights (UDHR), 154, 156
subsidy arrangements, 61–3, 62t upward accountability, 142–5
Swantz, Marja-Liisa, 90
Sweden, 80, 311, 312, 315 Väyrynen, Paavo, 95
private aid landscapes, 299t, 300, VENRO, 295
303 VIC, 39t
solidarity movement, 77 Volens, 38t
Switzerland, 84, 310, 315 Voluntary Agencies Liaison
International Committee of the Red Committee (VALC), 112
Cross, 297t, 299, 308 Voluntary Services International (VSI),
private aid landscapes, 299t, 300, 159
303 Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO),
159
Tax Justice Network, 132 Volunteering and Information Centre,
Tearfund, 39t 158
Third Sector, 90 Vredeseilanden, 38t, 39t, 300
330 Index