Journal of Political Ideologies, 2013

Vol. 18, No. 1, 35–55, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2013.750172

Europe’s new civilizing missions: the

EU’s normative power discourse
JAN ZIELONKA

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford,

St Antony’s College, OX2 6JF Oxford, UK

ABSTRACT This article focuses on two cases of the European Union (EU)’s
efforts to promote its values and norms in its immediate neighbourhood, first in
central and eastern Europe after the fall of communism, and then in North Africa
and the Middle East after the fall of oppressive regimes there. These two
neighbourhoods are seen as the EU’s peripheries that need to be taken care of lest
they become a source of political or economic instability. This explains the use of
the imperial paradigm for analysing the content of the EU’s normative power
discourse. The article shows numerous parallels between the rhetoric of EU
officials and the writings of leading philosophers in the Enlightenment period.
While there is little doubt that the imperial discourse helped the EU to legitimize
its enlargement project in central and eastern Europe, the Arab world seems less
eager to ‘import’ European norms for a variety of reasons analysed in the article.

It is often argued that the European Union (EU) is a peculiar, if not unique,
international actor. Unlike other major actors it is a largely civilian power
promoting universal norms in its vast neighbourhood and beyond. The EU is said
to be an agent of peace, democracy, sustainable growth and good governance. It
represents a unique project congruent with the deeper forces of modernization and
cross-border integration. It contributes to order, development and cooperation by
spreading institutional structures and rules of legitimate behaviour. In essence, it is
a normative power ‘civilizing’ the external environment. However, this noble,
normative self-image is not always recognized by the EU’s competitors and
partners. They see the EU as a vast territorial unit with sizeable power and
resources. They observe the EU’s efforts to determine the notion of legitimate
behaviour, dictate international rules and impose domestic constraints on a
plethora of formally sovereign actors. They do not find the EU’s normative agenda
universal enough, and question the motives behind the EU’s policies. Basically,
the Union is often perceived as a kind of empire with a post-modern version of

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

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mission civilisatrice. This article will use the imperial paradigm for analysing the
content of the EU’s normative power discourse. It will trace the origin and utility
of this discourse and examine its initial application in central and eastern Europe,
and then most recently in the Middle East and North Africa. In other words, this
article will not only try to apply the imperial paradigm for comprehending the
language behind the EU’s policies in its periphery but also offer a tentative
assessment of the prospects of EU ‘imperialism’ in the new phase of history
following the Arab Spring.
A different take on normative power
Over the last decade there has been a heated academic debate regarding the EU’s
normative nature and credentials.1 Some authors endorsed the concept of
normative power Europe, while others criticized it on various theoretical and
practical grounds.2 This article is inspired by that debate, but takes a different
approach to the issue. First, the existing literature focuses on the EU’s global
efforts to promote its values and norms. The most discussed cases involve the
EU’s campaign for abolition of the death penalty, global climate change regulation
and sustainable development.3 This article focuses on two cases of the EU’s efforts
to promote its values and norms in its immediate neighbourhood, first in central
and eastern Europe after the fall of communism, and then in North Africa and the
Middle East after the fall of oppressive regimes there. (Especially the latter case is
still unexplored by the normative power literature.) These two neighbourhoods are
seen as the EU’s peripheries that need to be taken care of lest they become a source
of political or economic instability.4
This leads to another novel aspect of this article. Namely, while the existing
literature on the normative power discourse treats the EU as a sui generis entity
unknown in history, this article treats the EU as a modern type of empire, sharing
many common characteristics with its predecessors. Of course, the EU does not
resemble 19th century Britain or Russia. The Union has neither a clearly defined
centre of authority nor sizeable military forces. That said, the EU represents a vast
territorial unit with the ability to influence (if not manipulate) the international
agenda and shape the notion of legitimacy (if not normality) in various parts of the
world, and especially in its neighbourhood. These are all key characteristics of
empires. The EU does what all historical empires have always done, namely it
exercises control over diverse peripheral actors through formal annexations or
various forms of informal domination.5
This leads to the third difference between this article and other works on the
EU’s normative power discourse. Much of the existing literature debates the moral
virtues of European policies. What are the ethical foundations of the EU’s
normative discourse? Is the EU’s moral stance genuine or hypocritical? Do the
EU’s policies live up to their moral claims and standards? Are they altruistic or
egoistic?6 This article is not concerned with moral issues. It views the EU’s
normative discourse, whatever else can be said about it, as a device to legitimize
the EU’s imperial policies in its neighbourhood. This legitimization is directed,
both internally and externally, towards the EU’s citizens and citizens of the

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targeted countries. Empires notoriously interfere in what they consider to be their

peripheries, including some formally independent states. The nature of this
interference differs depending on the governance system of the metropolis, the
type of borders separating the metropolis from the periphery and the brand of
civilization mission. Civilizing missions are not merely rhetorical exercises: they
try to convince the peripheries that imperial policies are good for them, not
merely for the imperial centre. They make the peripheries comply rather than
rebel. They create normative bonds between the peripheries and the metropolis.
Civilizing missions are also important for the formation of the imperial identity.
They help empires to define their vision of the world and their own role in it. They
also help to identify and explain the purpose of imperial policies.7 As Thomas
Diez put it in the contemporary European context: ‘The discourse of the EU as a
normative power constructs a particular self of the EU (and it is indeed perhaps the
only form of identity that most of the diverse set of actors within the EU can agree
on), while it attempts to change others through the spread of particular norms.’8
Civilizing missions always have ethical connotations, and cannot be seen as
products of rational calculations only. But civilizing missions also reflect complex
historical and ideological processes that do not correspond neatly with rigid moral
positions. The success or failure of civilizing missions therefore depends on their
ability to generate internal and external legitimacy rather than on their ability to
meet moral criteria. Civilizing missions are seen as fulfilling their purpose if both
the metropolis and periphery view them as credible and desirable for a mixture of
moral, historical, cultural and utilitarian reasons. This article will examine the two
chosen cases from this analytical perspective. It will investigate how the EU’s
normative discourse operates in two different regions and with what implications.
The question—what is the EU’s latest civilizational mission up against?—seems
particularly timely and important. The focus is on discourse and not on policies,
even though the latter are clearly linked to the former, albeit not always directly.
Although the article only explores two regional cases, its findings also seem to be
relevant to other cases such as the EU normative discourse towards the western
Balkans or more recently towards Greece, Spain and other ‘peripheral’ countries
of the Eurozone.9
The term ‘mission civilisatrice’ should be seen as an investigative rather than
political concept. The EU officially denies pursuing any civilizing mission with
imperial and colonial connotations. Mrs Ashton and Mr Barroso may rightfully
argue that the EU’s active external engagement does not need to be seen as
imperial, and is welcomed by EU neighbours. Would a policy of benign neglect
towards neighbours be any better? Should EU policy be value neutral and purely
based on selfish interests? Should the EU abandon universalist pretensions and
conclude that European norms emerged from a unique civilizational experience
and are unsuited to the ‘other’ in different regions? The EU’s effort to promote
‘deep democracy’ in the Arab world, for instance, may well be seen as
overambitious, but would promotion of ‘shallow democracy’ be better? Should the
EU abandon its policy of conditionality and let local actors misuse EU money?
And can one label the EU policy of ‘mutual accountability’ imperial?10

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Mrs Ashton forcefully argued in her speech at Corvinus University that the EU
tries to promote ‘post-imperial partnership for a post-imperial age’.11 It would be
wrong to treat these arguments as mere propaganda aimed at disguising the EU’s
imperial ambitions. However, in this article we are talking about a different sort of
empire and imperial ambition. The EU obviously does not want to be associated
with the legacies of colonial and military empires, but this does not mean that it
lacks imperial characteristics. The EU may well have no ‘imperial’ ambitions, but
this does not mean that its discourse does not bear any resemblance to civilizing
missions. As Kenneth Pomerantz observed, empire was often justified as a
‘tutelage that would eventually make those societies fit either for self-rule or full
union with the metropole’.12 Moreover, the European discourse takes place in a
structural environment characterized by a huge material asymmetry between the
EU and its neighbours. Such terms as partnership or mutual accountability take on
a different meaning when partners are equal from when they are unequal, despite
all intentions and rhetoric.
This article endeavours to discover how the EU articulates and reasons its
policies and to what effect. The various theories of power and discourse are not
drawn upon, but rather the history of political ideas associated with the era of
imperial politics in the period of Enlightenment.13

The civilizing mission: past and present

The term ‘civilizing mission’ was frequently used in the 18th and 19th centuries to
justify European engagements in different parts of the world.14 In its extreme
version the term was associated with colonialism, racism, slavery and imperial
domination.15 This probably explains why contemporary politicians and officials
do not use the term any longer. However, the term also had more benign meanings
in the past; it was used to rationalize policies of promoting economic development,
political order, good government and entrepreneurial ethics. Some of the
most prominent liberal thinkers have advocated a civilizing mission of some sort:
Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, John Locke, Adam Smith, Richard
Cobden and even Immanuel Kant. ‘Despotism,’ wrote Mill, ‘is a legitimate mode
of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement,
and the means justified by actually effecting that end.’16 Tocqueville believed that
conquest of Algeria would contribute to the spread of the liberal order he had
admired in America. In his view, Algiers might have proved to be a ‘Cincinnati on
the soil of Africa’ under French enlightened rule—an economic dynamo with
traditions of local self-government and self-reliance.17 Kant argued that
(consensual) trade would have a civilizing effect on less developed countries
and represented a precondition for a future perpetual peace. For Kant, peace could
not be achieved as long as pre-civil societies exist. They must ‘renounce their
savage, and lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and form
an international state’ resembling a republic.18
The liberal philosophers mentioned earlier believed in freedom, the rule of law,
representative government and peaceful international cooperation, but they also

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shared the view that liberal principles can only function properly where people
acquire sufficient levels of rationality and civilization. This is why they argued that
civilization ought to be promoted and spread through a variety of policies
involving both carrots and sticks across various parts of the world.
These liberal philosophers believed in the power of norms more than in that of
swords. The appeal of their norms was said to rest on ethical, scientific and
historical foundations. These norms elevated Western societies above all others
and gave them mastery of the material world.19 Export of these norms could
help others to emulate the Western experience. In this sense, liberal thinkers saw
themselves as carriers of modernity, harmony, progress and development. Their
project had a universal character, and as such was seen as adaptable to diverse
cultural settings.
The ‘others’ were not just different, but also less rational, energetic, systematic,
disciplined and progressive. In short, they were inferior in one way or another.
This did not necessarily imply racism or cultural determinism. In fact, liberals
believed that given the opportunity inferior societies could catch up with the
developed and enlightened world. Inferior societies needed to replace corrupt and
wasteful indigenous regimes with honest and efficient bureaucracies according to
the suggested blueprint. They needed to embrace Western inventiveness and
understanding of the natural world. They needed to be brought into line with
European conceptions of time and space.20
The work of liberal philosophers reported earlier has influenced two recent
generations of contemporary scholars specialized in international relations.
Contemporary concepts such as democratic peace, humanitarian interventionism
or peace through trade have extensively cited Kant, Mill, Smith or Cobden. True,
Tocqueville’s work on America has been quoted more than his work on Algeria.
Although Kant seemed to embrace the concept of empire, he also advocated what
Muthu calls ‘cultural pluralism’ with its egalitarian and non-hierarchical footing.21
That said, one cannot but agree with Martin Hall and John M. Hobson’s
observation that contemporary and 19th-century liberals share the view that the
West ‘has a duty or a burden to remake (or civilize) the uncivilized non-Western
world in the West’s image for the betterment of global humanity’.22

Are empire and ideology dead?

The civilizing mission has always been a pillar of the ideology of empire. But
today we are encouraged to believe that the era of empire has ended and that we
are living in a post-ideological age.23 However, these claims can only be justified
if one adopts a narrow definition of both ideology and empire. If ideology is
understood in broad terms as a body of ideas reflecting social needs and
aspirations, then it is hard to claim that ideology is dead.24 Likewise, it is difficult
to announce the demise of empires if by empire one understands ‘a type of
political organization in which the metropolis exercises control over diverse
peripheral actors through formal annexations and/or various forms of informal
domination’.25

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In fact, over the last decade several important books have argued that the US acts
as an empire, despite official denials.26 American intellectuals have also recently
articulated a set of political arguments that closely resemble the narrative of the
civilizing mission from two centuries earlier. John G. Ikenberry expressed this in
the most telling words: ‘The United States makes its power safe for the world and in
return the world agrees to live within the American-led international order.’27
The US’s normative agenda is framed in universal terms to make it suitable for
application in various cultural and geographic contexts. The declared purpose of
the American policies is to spread freedom, democracy and the free market. The
surest way for other countries to achieve peace and progress is to embrace
American military ‘protection’ and its model of economy.28 America is said to be
an ‘indispensable nation’ maintaining global order and possessing an economic
‘project congruent with the deeper forces of modernization’.29 The current
economic crisis has not undermined US self-confidence, if only because other
powers have been deterred from exploiting American weakness or offering a
plausible alternative to the American model. Besides, those who do not share the
US normative agenda are quickly reminded of the US’s formidable power in all its
dimensions. For instance, American leaders repeatedly argue that their purpose in
never ceasing to augment their power is to maintain their ability to save the world
from the enemies of freedom and capitalism. One cannot do any good without
power, it is declared, and by extension ‘might is right’.
Europeans have much less confidence in the universal application of their own
model. This is largely because of the traumatic legacy of European wars and the
collapse of colonies. As Michael Adas has observed: ‘Years of carnage in the very
heartlands of European civilization demonstrated that Europeans were at least as
susceptible to instinctual, irrational responses and primeval drives as the peoples
they colonized.’30 Moreover, military dependence on America has tamed Europe’s
geopolitical ambitions. However, the progress of European integration has
strengthened Europe’s collective economic might, and the fall of the Soviet Union
has presented the EU with a historic geopolitical window of opportunity.31 This
window of opportunity has become even wider with political and economic
reforms in Turkey and the Arab ‘Spring’. Not surprisingly therefore, more and
more analysts have begun to see the EU as an empire of some sort: cosmopolitan,
post-modern or neo-medieval.32 Even the President of the European Commission,
Jose Manuel Barroso, stated that the EU has the ‘dimensions’ of empire (but no
imperial structure).33
The term empire refers to the organizational characteristics of certain actors and
not to their overall prowess. This is important because the EU is currently in a
deep crisis and one could ask whether the term empire can be applied to it.
However, all empires have their moments of glory and demise. Their ability to act
effectively varies depending on time and circumstances. Nor do political
narratives necessarily reflect actors’ prowess. As Norman Davies has pointed out:
‘The classics, propagating supposedly universal values, were the product of a
revered but dead civilization. The “Glory that was Greece” and the “Grandeur that
was Rome” had evaporated thousands of years before; they suffered the fate of

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Carthage and Tyre, but were still alive in people’s minds.’34 Moreover, it might be
premature to condemn the EU to an imminent downfall. With some courage,
determination and wisdom, it may come out of the current crisis stronger rather
than weaker.35

Origin of the new ideology

The normative power discourse was prompted by a variety of factors related to the
end of the Cold War. However, two of these factors already originated in the Cold
War period. First, the European integration project has been unique to some
degree and it created a very distinct type of international actor. The European
Community was merely a trading bloc at the outset, and so it was legitimate to call
it a ‘civilian’ (as opposed to military) power. This encouraged thinking about a
new type of European exceptionalism because, as François Duchêne argued,
civilian powers are able to supplant the balance-of-power reasoning and offer
trade-based solutions to common problems. Duchêne observed that politics based
on trade is not only less militarized but also more transnational and more norm
based. Therefore, he saw the domestication of international relations as one of the
EC’s core tasks. According to him, shared values should give rise to a form of
collective action that would ‘bring to international problems the sense of common
responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have in the past been
associated almost exclusively with “home” [ . . . ] affairs’.36
This leads to the second important observation, namely that the Cold War
ideological competition had a distinct (West) European dimension. West Berlin
epitomized this dimension. It was a symbol and vivid manifestation of Western
norms that were clearly distinct from the American ones, albeit dependent on
American military protection. Of course, the notion of Western or (West)
European norms is as misleading as the notion of Arab or Balkan norms. In all
these regions we observe a variety of normative systems that defy simple labels.
However, in the context of the Cold War ideological competition such crude
overgeneralizations have been common and tolerated.37 Some of these labels and
generalizations persist until today, as we will show later.
The EC learnt quite early to exercise a distinct form of normative power
politics. When Spain under General Franco attempted to sign an association
agreement with the European Community in the early 1960s its application was
put on hold, even though such a move could have been economically beneficial for
the EC.38 This was in spite of the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Georges
Bidault, forcefully arguing during a debate on the ‘Spanish question’ in the French
National Assembly a few years earlier that ‘il n’y a pas d’oranges fascistes; il n’y a
que des oranges’.39 But the EC found itself under pressure from the European
Parliamentary Assembly together with several vocal NGOs who argued against
formal links with the Franco regime on purely democratic grounds.40
However, it was the end of the Cold War which allowed or even demanded a
serious normative discourse. The Soviet Union disintegrated and with it the
ideological and geopolitical constraints of the two-bloc competition. central and

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eastern Europe began its ‘return to Europe’, which was chiefly about embracing
‘Western’ values of freedom, democracy and capitalism. The EC was transformed
into the EU with its important political dimension and even its own Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The newly created foreign policy and the
prospect of territorial expansion required a new justification and narrative. And so
the EU began to construct a normative discourse about protecting human rights,
promoting democracy and spreading prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood.
Developments in this neighbourhood demanded not just discourse, but action in
support of human rights, democracy and prosperity. The entire post-communist
region experienced traumatic economic hardship in the first years of transition.
Populist if not praetorian politics spread, threatening the democratic prospects of
these countries. Protecting basic ‘European’ or, if you wish, ‘Western’ values has
thus become a matter of real politik, and not just an intellectual exercise. The EU’s
eastward enlargement has been identified as a means for addressing the mounting
problems in central and eastern Europe. (The Balkan case demands a separate
treatment and is not discussed here.) Enlargement had to be conceptualized,
articulated, communicated and justified. It is no wonder therefore that the role of
normative discourse has become so prominent and important.

EU as a normative agent in the East

As early as 1990, the German President Richard von Weizsäcker, recalling the
basic values behind European integration and the ideas of Schuman and Monnet,
appealed to eastern and western Europeans to follow their example under the new
conditions.41 He was followed by several other European leaders eager to make
Europe ‘whole and free’. In 1992 the European Commission declared that the EC
could not refuse the historic challenge to assume its continental responsibilities
and contribute to the development of a political and economic order for the whole
of Europe. According to the Commission, ‘For the new democracies, Europe
remains a powerful idea, signifying the fundamental values and aspirations which
their peoples kept alive during long years of oppression.’42
Values and norms constituting the new European project were obviously
‘Western’. No one spoke about a genuine eastern European contribution to norm
creation. Post-communist countries were seen as norm takers, not givers. The
traffic of norms was uniformly in one direction, from the West to the East.
Adoption and assimilation of western European norms was seen as a precondition
for entering the ‘European club’.
In 1993 the EU spelled out normative conditions for joining it. According to the
so-called Copenhagen criteria, candidates had to achieve ‘stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and
protection of minorities’ and ‘the existence of a functioning market economy’ as
well as the ability to adopt the acquis. In other words, central and eastern Europe
was asked to adopt not only the basic principles of democracy and the free market
but also a very detailed normative blueprint laid down by the vast body of

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European stipulations made up of some 20 000 laws, decisions and regulations,

which spanned nearly 80 000 pages.43
The EU not only told eastern European applicants what they should do—in
terms of say new legislation or administrative reform—but also sent
representatives to specific ministries to make sure that the changes were being
made as prescribed through its ‘twinning’ programme. The whole process of
readjustment was carefully monitored. At every stage, the champions and laggards
among the applicant countries were identified at regular review sessions. The EU
provided models and the applicant states were supposed to copy or imitate them.
The EU offered teaching and training, and the applicant states were expected to
socialize and learn.
The key terms of the conditionality policy were safeguards, benchmarks,
guidance and screening. The EU discourse was exceedingly inflexible and
hierarchical, leaving little space for negotiation. The EU proposals and solutions
were to be taken over by virtue of their place of origin and not necessarily by virtue
of their substance. Only the EU was in a position to provide authoritative
interpretations of these norms. When a group of scholars analysed the language of
the European Commission’s regular reports on the candidate countries, they
concluded: ‘The idea of an inferior Eastern Europe, counterpoised to the dominant
Western Europe, is embedded in the discourse between the EU and the applicant
Eastern European states . . . . In its discourse, the EU appropriates discursive power
over eastern applicants.’44
In 2009 the European Commission summarized the success of its policy of
exporting European norms to the countries of central and eastern Europe: ‘The
fifth enlargement of the EU has helped to consolidate democracy and the rule of
law in Europe. It has enhanced economic opportunities and increased the weight of
the EU in tackling global challenges such as climate change, competitiveness and
the regulation and supervision of financial markets.’45 In 2011 the President of the
European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, expressed the same idea in a more triumphal
fashion: ‘Europe has become a role model. The universal appeal of our values can
be seen in our Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods. Unlike in the past, these
values are integrated not through conquest or domination, but through free and
voluntary acceptance. This is not only a chance for peace, justice and a better life
for these people—this is also our chance to make Europe shine in the world.’46
Three general observations can be made about this particular normative
discourse. First, European integration is seen as an expression and guarantor of
universal Western values such as freedom, democracy and peace. By extension,
European institutions are described as the carriers of these values. Some authors
have called this the founding myth of integration: ‘Only a union of the democratic
European states could create lasting peace among them, strengthen their domestic
as well as international ability to resist totalitarianism, and make Europe’s voice
felt in international relations.’47 Such a union is not only a model to emulate but
also an agent of change for the good.
Second, the EU’s normative discourse has been guided by a mixture of
pragmatic and idealistic considerations. As Tony Blair put it in November 2002:

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‘Enlargement will extend Europe’s area of peace, democracy and prosperity. We

will also be safer and more secure through better cooperation on border controls,
asylum and immigration, joint efforts to tackle cross border crime, and shared
environmental standards.’48 The President of the European Commission at the
time, Romano Prodi, argued in a similar vein: ‘Enlargement is the fulfilment of the
European project. This project has given us half a century of peace and prosperity,
and it should be extended to the whole continent . . . . Enlargement is also a terrific
opportunity to redefine our role in the world.’49
Third, Western norms were by and large ‘imported’ voluntarily by central and
eastern European countries. This was partly because they viewed Western norms
as their own in some sense, and partly because adoption of Western norms was
seen as a precondition for entering the special club of prosperity and peace.
Enlargement took place within an asymmetrical power structure in both material
and ideational terms. Central and eastern European countries viewed the EU as an
embodiment of freedom and prosperity and could not afford to turn their backs on
the EU’s normative demands and expectations. This has led some scholars to
argue: ‘Eastern enlargement involves the construction of an empire that grows by
willing dependencies, not by force. The illusion of self-determination by the
applicants allows them to make application their own decision, since there is no
direct coercion or military aggression.’50 Of course, with the passage of time there
came a growing realization in central and eastern Europe that ‘Western’ norms
such as freedom, the rule of law, democracy or good governance may have
different, if not contrasting, meanings. Instrumental use of these norms by external
political and economic entrepreneurs has also been noticed and at times resisted.51
That said, political discourses in the region continue to emphasize that Central and
Eastern Europe is part of Europe and that it shares its basic ‘Western’ values.

EU as a normative agent in the South

The EU has never defined any limits to its expansion. As Olli Rehn, the EU
Commissioner, put it: ‘Europe’s borders are defined rather by values than
geographical guidelines. Certainly, geographical borders set out the framework, but
values define the borders.’52 Nevertheless, the values defined by the EU have been
endorsed by individual neighbours to an uneven degree, and inside the EU there has
been no appetite for unlimited enlargements either. This has certainly been the case
with southern neighbours in North Africa and the Middle East. Although Beirut is
very close to Nicosia and Lebanon is relatively rich and culturally close to France, it
has never been considered a prospective EU member. Morocco applied to the
European Communities in 1987, but its application was rejected because of its poor
democratic and human rights standards, among other grounds.
However, the Union could not just ignore its southern neighbours, partly
because of its colonial legacy there, and partly because of the cross-border
interdependence, with all the security and migratory implications. In 1995 the
Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP) was launched and the promotion of
political reform, broadly speaking, became a declared EU objective vis-à-vis its

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‘neighbourhood’ in North Africa and the Middle East. The EMP committed the
governing elites of all southern partner countries to develop democracy and
the rule of law in their political systems and to act in respect of the UN Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Less than a decade later
Mediterranean countries became part of the so-called European neighbourhood
policy (ENP). The ENP spoke about a ‘commitment to shared values’, including
human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights. The EU promised reform-minded countries a substantial stake in the EU’s
internal market in return for compliance with commitment to the above-mentioned
shared values. Adoption of EU laws and regulations was also advocated to these
countries. The EU argued that its acquis offers a well-established model to set
up functioning markets and common standards for industrial products, services,
transport, energy and other economic sectors.
However, none of these initiatives has produced the envisaged normative
objectives. Although the EU demanded compliance with human rights standards,
it rewarded regimes that notoriously violated these standards, such as Ben Ali’s
regime in Tunisia, most shockingly.53
The Arab Spring of 2011 has created a new opportunity to reshape mutual
relations. Although the EU has been a passive observer rather than participant in
the rapidly evolving events in the Middle East and North Africa, it has not
refrained from taking an ambitious normative stance. As the President of the
European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, argued: ‘Without Europe, there would
still have been an Arab Spring, but without us there will be no Arab summer!’54
The Union justifies its special role in the region on three familiar grounds. First,
the Union has its own successful experience in striving for liberty, democracy and
peace. As a Joint Communication on Partnership for Democracy and Shared
Prosperity with the southern Mediterranean put it: ‘The European Union in its dual
dimension of a community of democratic member states and a union of peoples
has had to overcome historical hurdles. This success story was possible when hope
triumphed over fear and freedom triumphed over repression. This is why there is
deep understanding in the EU for the aspirations of the peoples in the Southern
Neighbourhood.’55 And High Representative Ashton added: ‘The EU is a union of
democracies—we have a democratic calling.’56
Second, the EU has ‘a proud tradition of supporting countries in transition from
autocratic regimes to democracy, first in the South and more recently in Central
and Eastern Europe’.57 Third, the EU has a special responsibility for protecting
and promoting its core norms and values in the periphery. As Van Rompuy put it:
‘Our values are at stake: democracy, the rule of law, the freedom of peaceful
expression . . . . These countries are our neighbours! At some spots in the Union,
one can see the coastline! . . . As Europeans, we do have a special responsibility
here, in a way going beyond a “normal” international responsibility.’58
The authoritarian historical legacy of the Arab world, its relative economic
backwardness and striking cultural differences have not discouraged the EU from
setting up an ambitious normative agenda. The prime EU objective in the Arab
world has become so-called ‘deep democracy’. As Ashton told the Senior EU

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Officials Meeting on Egypt and Tunisia: ‘We need to help build what I call
deep democracy (political reform, elections, institution building, fight against
corruption, independent judiciary and support to civil society). Where relevant, we
can draw on our own history of building democracy and reconciliation including
from those among us that have gone through these transitions recently.’59
EU Commissioner Füle spelled out the deep democracy concept in more detail:
The transformation at play in the Southern Mediterranean reaches very deep into these
countries. Elections are, of course, of paramount importance but they are only a part of the
picture. Deep democracy is when a simple citizen, man or woman, can go and face their
judges knowing they are independent. When they can face the police or the administration
without being asked for bribes. When they can live their lives, express their views, invest in
their businesses, plan for their future and that of their children freely and without fear. It is
the fear, the abuse of power, the self-censorship that has to be uprooted.60
The universal nature of European norms has been seen as the prime reason for
promoting an ambitious democracy agenda. As High Representative Ashton put it:
‘The European Union is sometimes accused of trying to “export” so-called
European values to other countries. I reject that accusation. The rights to free
speech, freedom of assembly, justice and equality are not European rights: they are
universal rights.’61 And President Barroso added: ‘European and Mediterranean
countries share a common history and cultural heritage. The basic hopes and
ambitions of people in the South of the Mediterranean do not differ from those
living in the North of the Mediterranean: dignity, well-being and respect for
personal freedoms.’62
Although EU rhetoric emphasizes ‘partnership,’ ‘mutual accountability’ and
‘shared prosperity’, asymmetry and hierarchy are always there, especially in the
emphasis on differentiation and conditionality. The Joint Communication on
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the southern Mediterra-
nean promises an ‘incentive-based approach: those that go further and faster with
reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU. Support will be
reallocated or refocused for those who stall or retrench on agreed reform plans.’63
And President Van Rompuy added: ‘We will build on individual assessments of
partners’ performance and needs: “less for less”, and “more for more”.’64
Two general observations can be made about the EU discourse on the South.
First, the civilizing mission towards the Arab world is very similar to that two
decades earlier directed towards central and eastern Europe.65 The EU has not
adjusted its normative objectives to fit the rather different sociopolitical setting in
the Mediterranean. Promotion of democracy, even ‘deep democracy’, is its prime
objective rather than developmental goals such as eradicating poverty, wider social
communication or better education. This ‘our size fits all’ approach not only has
ideological, but also bureaucratic roots. The policy towards Arab states is part of a
broader policy ‘package’ towards the vast European neighbourhood elaborated
along the guidelines coming from the top rather than the bottom of the EU
bureaucracy (the Council and the Commission).66 Key guidelines need the
acceptance of all 27 member states, so they often represent the lowest (and quite

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vague) common denominator. Although the new ENP approach recognizes the
importance of differentiation, this applies to individual countries rather than
regions.67 After all, the EU negotiates its set of relations with states and not regional
organizations. However, ideology plays an important part too. As indicated earlier,
EU officials seem convinced that there is something like a European normative
model; they see it as principally ‘good’ (if not superior) and exportable to different
settings. Besides, EU leaders always emphasize that their norms promotion policy
responds to Arab demands. As High Representative Ashton put it in her 2012
speech to the European Parliament: ‘It is also important to remember “why” we do
what we do. We do this to promote and protect human rights and democracy . . . to
help others obtain what we have. As I’ve many times reported a young man in Libya
who said “we want what you have every day. You have deep democracy and
freedom.”’68
The second observation concerns material and ideational asymmetry between
the EU and the South. Although the economic gap between the two sides of the
Mediterranean is enormous, the EU’s leverage over the Arab world is undermined
by the lack of a credible enlargement perspective in the area. Central and eastern
European countries were able to tolerate Western European ‘intrusion’ into their
domestic politics because at the end of the rather humiliating accession process
they would attain access to the EU decision-making and resources. A similar
motivation is lacking in the Arab world at present. Individual Arab countries are
prepared to meet some demands in the field of immigration in exchange for the
EU’s financial and technical assistance.69 However, these concessions should not
be seen as leading to any political, let alone normative, convergence between the
EU and its southern neighbours.70
Normative convergence is also complicated by historical and cultural factors.
The Arab Spring has underlined the universal character of such norms as freedom,
the rule of law and democracy, but it has also demonstrated that these norms are
comprehended and applied differently in Islamic and Christian countries. For
instance, religion played a major role in Poland’s transition to democracy, but no
Polish politician ever argued that the democratic principle envisaging the ultimate
sovereignty of the people is in conflict with her/his religious principles. Moreover,
unlike in central and eastern Europe, democracy in the Arab world was not
‘foreign made’.71 The Arab Spring was a succession of indigenous upheavals,
delinked from Western influence. The EU democracy promotion policy had no
traceable impact on this democratic turn, and in cases such as Egypt or Tunisia it
was even seen as linked to the dictatorial regimes.
This means that the EU democratic discourse may fall on deaf ears or even face
resistance in the Arab world. The EU would have to ‘live’ with democrats who are
neither liberal nor secular.72 As Olivier Roy has pointed out: ‘The democratization
movement in the Arab world came precisely after thirty years of what has been
called the “return of the sacred”, an obvious process of re-Islamization of everyday
life, coupled with the rise of Islamist parties . . . There was no flowering of “liberal
Islam” preceding the spread of democratic ideas in the Middle East. There are a few
reformist religious thinkers who are lauded here and there in the West, but none has

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ever had much popular appeal in any Arab country.’73 This cannot but frustrate the
EU’s democratic and economic agenda. For Islamists, democracy is less about
parties and elections and more about consultation, cooperation, justice, equality,
mutual obligation and [Muslim] community. Islamists insist that for good
government to take root and be sustainable and successful it has to be home-grown
and sensitive to local conditions and cultures (with Islam informing such a
government). Western democracy promotion policies are viewed with suspicion as
they are likely to import ‘alien values’ of either secular or liberal nature. Islamists
criticize the liberal notion of individualism and instead prize collective or
communitarian values.74 Mass protests within the Arab world in September 2012
against the Innocence of Muslims film have evidenced the clash between individual
and communal values: the right of Muslims not to have their faith insulted was
clearly prioritized over the right of an individual to make a bigoted film. Tension
between liberal and communal values has also featured in the still-unresolved
debate over the place of religion in the new constitutions of Egypt and Tunisia.
Moreover, tensions between individual and communal values have implications
for the EU’s promotion of its model of capitalism. So far, Islamists are fairly status
quo friendly when it comes to economic affairs, and they do not propagate any
specific Islamic economic model.75 However, they are unlikely to embrace,
let alone imitate, the neo-liberal version of capitalism based on individual
entrepreneurship, sweeping liberalization and limited role of the state in the
economy. Central and eastern European countries adopted the neo-liberal model
rather uncritically.76 Although it has boosted economic growth in some countries
it has also increased inequality and fostered support for populist parties. This
eventually proved detrimental to both democracy and the economy as the case of
Hungary illustrates most vividly.77 In fact, today Arab countries do not need to
look at Hungary to see deficiencies of the Western type of capitalism. Europe’s
promotion of the notion of ‘good governance’ in the Arab world is also less
credible than two decades earlier in central and eastern Europe. EU policies
towards debt-ridden members of the Eurozone made Europe look rigid, stingy and
oppressive; hardly a model to emulate in the Arab world.
Last but not least, the EU discourse towards the Arab world needs to confront
Europe’s colonial legacy, a factor absent in the case of central and eastern Europe.
The EU is a relatively new international actor and does not want to be associated
with the colonial legacy of some of its member states. The problem is that former
colonial states are often behind EU policies. As Nick Witney and Anthony Dworkin
recently observed: ‘The chastened mood in the capitals of Europe’s Mediterranean
states, and concomitant readiness to follow a Brussels lead, is on the wane. The “big
three” – Italy, France and Spain – have substantial national interests at stake, in
trade, investment and energy links. They host the biggest North African immigrant
communities and worry about radicalisation and terrorism. And they can draw on
assets—ties of history, culture and language, and military links—of which Brussels
does not dispose. They can put the brake on any EU aspiration to allow greater
access to Europe, whether for North African people or goods.’78

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Because internal rather than external pressures chiefly drive the political
transition in the Middle East and North Africa, there is little anti-colonial
discourse in the Arab world at present. However, unlike in central and eastern
Europe, there seems to be a widespread suspicion in the Arab world that Europe’s
normative discourse is hypocritical and aimed at disguising Europe’s selfish aims.
Prior to 2011 the EU’s rhetoric embracing democracy went hand-in-hand with
policies embracing autocratic Arab leaders. The EU’s rhetoric and policies
towards the Israeli – Palestinian conflict often diverged too. The atrocities
committed in Iraq by some western Europeans (or by the Americans with
European acquiescence) also tarnished Europe’s reputation in the Arab world.79
Europe has also manifested double standards vis-à-vis the civil wars in Libya and
Syria. And harsh treatment of Arab immigrants within the EU has often been seen
as motivated by cultural prejudices, if not racism.80 In sum, a civilizing mission
cannot produce wonders if it is not backed by corresponding policies.

Conclusions
This article observes that the EU has several important imperial characteristics,
and therefore its discourse can well be seen as a kind of ideology of empire. In fact,
the article shows numerous parallels between the rhetoric of EU officials and the
writing of leading philosophers in the Enlightenment period. There is little doubt
that this discourse helped the EU to legitimize its enlargement project in central
and eastern Europe. The proposition that exporting European norms to the
unstable post-communist region would secure growth, democracy and peace
across the entire continent has been overwhelmingly endorsed by the elites and the
public in both parts of Europe. It legitimized the EU’s territorial expansion,
transfer of laws and resources and even the sharing of sovereignty. Today, new EU
members from central and eastern Europe are the most fervent promoters of
democracy, and the article’s quote from Mr Buzek shows that they fully
internalized Europe’s civilizational mission.
It is too early to assess the impact of the EU discourse on Arab countries. It took
central and eastern Europe 15 years to move from the Soviet Union to the
European Union. Not all post-communist countries have secured democracy or
stability, let alone EU membership. Culture and history have influenced their own
models of democracy and capitalism: consider different corporate cultures in
Romania, Slovenia and Estonia. Religion plays an entirely different role in the
politics of Poland and the Czech Republic. Ethnic issues shape politics and the
market differently in Latvia and Bulgaria. It would be irresponsible to expect that
Arab countries could adopt norms propagated by the EU in a few short years.
Equally, it would be naive to suggest that the chances for democracy and market
capitalism are equal in Tunisia and Libya, for instance. In short, the EU’s
civilizing mission has generated different outcomes in different countries for
many local reasons. That said, it is important to ask whether the current European
project is seen as legitimate on the one hand in Paris, Berlin and Brussels, and on

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the other in Cairo, Tripoli and Tunis. A civilizing mission is only successful if it
generates legitimacy in both the metropolis and the periphery.
The key figure of the French Enlightenment, Nicolas de Condorcet, postulated a
‘holy duty’ to help those peoples ‘which, to civilize themselves, wait only to
receive the means from us, to find brothers among Europeans and to become their
friends and disciples’.81 European officials propagate a similar idea vis-à-vis
Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods. In the East the disciples have been
transformed into friends. We do not know whether this will also be the case in the
South.

Acknowledgements
This article greatly benefited from thoughtful comments by Federica Bicchi,
Raffaella del Sarto, Sonja Momberg, Elijah Zarwan and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes and References

1. See H. Sjursen (Ed.) Special Edition of Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2006); S. Lucarelli and
I. Manners (Eds) Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006);
H. Mayer and H. Vogt (Eds), A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Z. Laı̈di, Norms over Force: The Enigma of European Power
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Z. Laı̈di (Ed.) EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative
Power and Social Preferences (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); R. G. Whitman (Ed.), Normative Power
Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
2. See R. Youngs, ‘Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU’s external identity’, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 42 (2004), pp. 415–435; T. Diez, ‘Constructing the self and changing others:
reconsidering “Normative power Europe”’, Millennium—Journal of International Studies, 33 (2005),
pp. 613–636; T. Forsberg and G. P. Herd, ‘The EU, human rights, and the Russo-Chechen Conflict’,
Political Science Quarterly, 120 (2005), pp. 455–478; F. Bicchi, ‘“Our size fits all”: normative power
Europe and the Mediterranean’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2006), pp. 286–303; A. Hyde-Price,
‘“Normative” power Europe: a realist critique’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2006), pp. 217–234;
M. Merlingen, ‘Everything is dangerous: a critique of “normative power Europe”’, Security Dialogue, 38
(2007), pp. 435– 453; M. Pace, ‘The construction of EU normative power’, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 45 (2007), pp. 1041– 1064; E. Barbé and E. Johansson-Nogués, ‘The EU as a modest “force for
good”: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs, 84 (2008), pp. 81– 96; E. De Zutter,
‘normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological appraisal’, Journal of European Public
Policy, 17 (2010), pp. 1106–1127; T. Forsberg, ‘Normative Power Europe, once again: a conceptual analysis
of an ideal type’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 49 (2011) 1183–1204.
3. I. Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40
(2002), pp. 235 –258; S. Lightfoot and J. Burchell, ‘The European Union and the world summit on
sustainable development: normative power Europe in action?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 43
(2005), pp. 75–95; J. Vogler, ‘The European contribution to global environmental governance’,
International Affairs, 81 (2005), pp. 835–850; M. Lerch and G. Schwellnus, ‘Normative by nature? The role
of coherence in justifying the EU’s external human rights policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13
(2006), pp. 304 –321; A. Storey, ‘Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and Africa’,
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24 (2006), pp. 331–346; R. Falkner, ‘The political economy of
“normative power” Europe: EU environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation’,
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power Europe: a credible utopia?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (2007), pp. 435 –457; S. Scheipers
and D. Sicurelli, ‘Empowering Africa: normative power in EU– Africa relations’, Journal of European
Public Policy, 15 (2008), pp. 607–623.
4. One can argue that the EU has not only external, but also internal peripheries. For instance, Bulgaria and
Romania are members of the EU but are not admitted to the Schengen system. Greece, Portugal and even

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Italy are increasingly termed as southern provinces of the EURO-zone that ought to be supervised if not
governed by the EMU’s centre.
5. I offer a much more elaborate theoretical account of the nature of EU imperial power and how it differs from
traditional models of empire in a series of previous publications. See especially J. Zielonka, Europe as
Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and
J. Zielonka, ‘The EU as international actor: unique or ordinary?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16
(2011), pp. 281–301. See also R. A. Del Sarto, ‘Borderlands: The Middle East and North Africa as the EU’s
southern buffer zone’, in D. Bechev and K. Nicolaı̈dis (Eds) Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflict and
Memory in a Transnational World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), p. 149– 165.
6. K. Nicolaı̈dis and R. Howse, ‘“This is my EUtopia . . . ”: narrative as power’, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 40 (2002), pp. 767–792; R. Youngs, ‘Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU’s
external identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (2004), pp. 415 –435; T. Diez, ‘Constructing the
self and changing others’, op. cit., Ref. 2; B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum, ‘Civilian power or soft imperialism?
The EU as a global actor and the role of interregionalism’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10 (2005),
pp. 535–552; H. Sjursen, ‘The EU as a “normative” power: how can this be?’, Journal of European Public
Policy, 13 (2006), pp. 235–251; I. Manners, ‘The European Union as a normative power: a response to
Thomas Diez’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 35 (2006), pp. 167–180; A. Hyde-Price,
‘“Normative” power Europe: a realist critique’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2006), pp. 217– 234;
M. Pace, ‘The construction of EU normative power’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (2007),
pp. 1041–1064; A. Hyde-Price, ‘A “tragic actor”? A realist perspective on “Ethical power Europe”’,
International Affairs, 84 (2008), pp. 29–44.
7. As Richard Bulliet has observed, ‘In March 1798, Napoleon invaded Egypt in pursuit of a grandiose dream.
In an Arabic propaganda broadside printed aboard ship while his army crossed the Mediterranean, he
proclaimed his intention of liberating the Egyptians from their Mamluk oppressors. And he brought an army
of scholars and advisers with him to make the occupation of Egypt a model of European benevolence.” See
R. Bulliet, ‘Bush and Napoleon’, International Herald Tribune, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
08/02/opinion/02iht-edbulliet.1.6957129.html (accessed 2 August 2007). See also R. Flower, Napoleon to
Naser: The Story of Modern Egypt (London: Tom Stacey, 1972).
8. T. Diez, ‘Constructing the self and changing others’, op. cit., Ref. 2, p. 614.
9. As Rasmus Alenius Boserup and Fabrizio Tassinari pointed out: ‘The “indignados” in crisis-stricken Greece
and Italy or the emergence of a “Tahrir Square” in Madrid remind us of the European neighbourhoods
indispensable function as a mirror of Europe’s own travails. As in previous ages, Europe’s neighbours
provide the much-needed impulse to look again beyond borders’. R. A. Boserup and F. Tassinari, ‘The return
of Arab politics and Europe’s chance to engage anew’, Mediterranean Politics, 1 (2012), pp. 102.
10. For a selection from the EU official discourse in which terms such as ‘deep democracy’, ‘mutual
accountability’ and the ‘3 Ms’ (money, market access and mobility) are developed, see C. Ashton, The EU
wants ‘deep democracy to take root in Egypt and Tunisia’ Guardian, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2011/feb/04/egypt-tunisia-eu-deep-democracy (accessed 4 February 2011]); European
Commission, ‘Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—A Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, COM (2011) 200 Final, Brussels, 8
March 2011; European Union, ‘Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on main aspects and basic
choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy’, A 179/
11, Brussels, 11 May 2011; S. Füle, ‘Revolutionising the European Neighbourhood Policy in Response to
Tougher Mediterranean Revolutions’, SPEECH/11/436, Brussels, 14 June 2011.
11. C. Ashton, ‘A world built on co-operation, sovereignty, democracy and stability’, SPEECH/11/126,
Budapest, 25 February 2011.
12. K. Pomeranz, ‘Empire & “civilizing” missions, past & present’, Dædalus, 134 (2005), pp. 36.
13. M. Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). (Original work published in 1969).
See also: Merlingen, op. cit., Ref. 2.
14. A. L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa 1895–1930
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); D. Costantini, Mission Civilisatrice: Le Rôle de l’Histoire
Coloniale dans la Construction de l’Identité Politique Française (Paris: La Découverte, 2008).
15. However, as Pomeranz observed, even empires that did not share Enlightenment notion about progress,
tutelage, and self-rule also worked to ‘civilize’ their subject populations. For instance, in the late 18th
century the Ottomans begun working to standardize administration and property law, reform social practices,
and rein in mystical and enthusiastic forms of Islam in their outer provinces (Pomeranz, op. cit., Ref. 12,
p. 36).

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16. J. S. Mill, ‘On liberty’, In R. B. McCallum (Ed.), On Liberty and Considerations on Representative
Government (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), pp. 1–104 (Original work published in 1859).
17. J. Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2005), p. 11.
18. I. Kant, ‘Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch’, In H. S. Reiss (Ed.), Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 90–130. (Original work published in 1795), p. 104.
19. R. Giradet, L’Idée Coloniale en France: De 1871 à 1962 (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1972), pp. 96–98.
20. M. Adas, ‘Contested hegemony: the Great War and the Afro–Asian assault on the civilizing mission
ideology’, Journal of World History, 15 (2004), pp. 31 –63.
21. S. Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) p. 7.
22. M. Hall and J. M. Hobson, ‘Liberal international theory: Eurocentric but not always imperialist?’
International Theory, 2 (2010), p. 242.
23. J. N. Rosenau, ‘Illusions of power and empire’, History and Theory, 44 (2009), pp. 73 –87; D. Bell, The End
of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (2nd edn) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2001) p. 393; F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. (New York: The Free
Press, 1992), p. xi.
24. See e.g. M. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
25. ‘Empire’ in B. Badi, D. Berg-Schlosser and L. Morlino (Eds) International Encyclopedia of Political
Science, Vol 8 (London: Sage, 2011).
26. A. J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2002); N. Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Allen
Lane, 2004); C. S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2006); H. James, The Roman Predicament: How the Rules of International Order
Create the Politics of Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
27. G. J. Ikenberry, ‘American unipolarity: the sources of persistence and decline’, In G. J. Ikenberry (Ed.),
America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power ( Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002),
pp. 284–310. It should be noted that Ikenberry is a leading liberal intellectual. The (neo) conservative
imperial rhetoric is even more self-righteous. Consider, for instance, the writings of Robert Kagan, Joshua
Muravchik or Richard Haass or some of the official documents of the Bush administration.
28. As argued forcefully in C. Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good
Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003) p. 36. See also E. Hobsbawm, On Empire: America, War, and
Global Supremacy (New York: Pantheon, 2008).
29. Ikenberry, op. cit., Ref. 27. The term ‘indispensable nation’ is attributed to Madeleine Albright.
30. Adas, op. cit., Ref. 20, p. 41.
31. The Union may not be a state, but it is nevertheless a very powerful international actor. What is this 2nd 27
for? With its 27 member states, nearly 500 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, around 40% of
the world merchandise exports and the comprehensive array of economic, legal, diplomatic and military
instruments at its disposal, the EU is able to exercise significant influence in various parts of the world. The
Euro is now the world’s second most important international reserve and trade currency, giving the EU a
major influence globally. European norms and regulations are progressively being adopted across the world,
even prompting accusations of regulatory imperialism’. Anon., ‘Europe v. US business’, Wall Street Journal
(17 January 2008), p. A16.
32. R. Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order (London: Demos, 2000); U. Beck and E. Grande,
Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); J. M. Colomer, Great Empires, Small Nations: The
Uncertain Future of the Sovereign State (London: Routledge, 2007).
33. J. M. Barroso, ‘Dimensionen eines Imperiums’ Die Welt, 3 (17 October 2007).
34. N. Davies, Vanished Kingdoms. The Rise and Fall of States and Nations (New York: Viking Penguin, 2012),
p. 6.
35. J. M. Barroso, Speech by President Barroso to the European Parliament during the Debate on the Economic
Crises and the Euro, SPEECH/11/572, Strasbourg, 14 September 2011.
36. F. Duchêne, ‘The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence’, In M. Kohnstamm and
W. Hager (Eds), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community. (London:
Macmillan, 1973), p. 20.
37. These were particularly pronounced within the Soviet ideological ‘camp’. See G. Gill, Symbols and
Legitimacy in Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
38. C. Powell, ‘The long road to Europe: Spain and the European Community, 1957–1986’, In J. Roy and
M. Lorca-Susino (Eds) Spain in the European Union: The First Twenty-Five Years (1986–2011) (Miami:
Jean Monnet Chair, University of Miami, 2011), pp. 21–44. Also see: C. Powell, ‘Spain’s external relations

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 europe’s new civilizing missions
1898–1975’, In R. Gillespie, F. Rodrigo and J. Story (Eds) Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations
in a Changing World (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 16 –20.
39. P. A. Martı́nez Lillo, ‘Las Relaciones Hispano-Francesas entre 1948 y 1952’, In J. P. Etienvre and J. R.
Urquijo (Eds) España, Francia y la Comunidad Europea (Madrid: CSIC/Casa Velázquez, 1989),
pp. 145 –147.
40. Charles Powell emphasizes the impact of a report by the European Parliamentary Assembly compiled by the
German social democrat Willy Birkelbach, a former political prisoner under the Nazis, which argued that
‘states whose governments do not have democratic legitimacy and whose peoples do not participate in the
decisions of the government, neither directly nor indirectly by freely elected representatives, cannot expect to
be admitted in the circle of peoples who form the European Communities’, and concluded that ‘the
guaranteed existence of a democratic form of state, in the sense of a free political order, is a condition for
membership’. Powell also refers to the 1962 Congress of the European Movement in Munich that came to the
conclusion that ‘integration of any country with Europe, whether in the form of full membership or of
association, requires democratic institutions’, and produced a catalogue of prerequisites for Spanish
membership largely borrowed from the European Convention on Human Rights. See Charles Powell, op. cit.,
Ref. 38, pp. 7–8. See also: D. C. Thomas, ‘Constitutionalization through enlargement: the contested origins
of the EU’s democratic identity’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2006), pp. 1190–1210.
41. R. von Weizsäcker, Discours lors de l’Ouverture de la 41eme Année Académique du Collège d’Europe.
Bruges, 24 September 1990.
42. European Commission, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, Supplement 3/92. Luxembourg: Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities (1992).
43. Manners identifies nine core norms in the EU’s acquis communautaire et politique: sustainable peace, social
freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, the supranational rule of law, inclusive equality,
social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance. I. Manners, ‘The normative ethics of the
European Union’, International Affairs, 84 (2008), pp. 65–80.
44. M. Kovács and P. Kabachnik, ‘Shedding light on the quantitative other: the EU’s discourse in the
commission opinions of 1997’, in J. Böröcz and M. Kovács (Eds) Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling EU
Enlargement (Telford: Central Europe Review, 2001), p. 172; M. Kovács, ‘Putting down and putting off: the
EU’s discursive strategies in the 1998 and 1999 follow-up reports’, In J. Böröcz and M. Kovács (Eds)
Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement (Telford: Central Europe Review, 2001), p. 230.
45. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009–2010, COM (2009) 533, Brussels, 14 October.
46. European Parliament, Buzek’s Speech at Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Berlin: ‘Let Europe shine again’
(2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/president/preview/de-en/press/speeches/sp-2011/
sp-2011-June/speeches-2011-June-4.html.
47. F. Schimmelfennig, ‘The community trap: liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern enlargement of
the European Union’, International Organization, 55 (2001), pp. 66–67. See also A. Littoz-Monnet, ‘The
EU politics of remembrance: can Europeans remember together?’, West European Politics, 5 (2012),
pp. 1182–1202.
48. Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, PM: A Clear Course for Europe, Cardiff, available at http://www.pm.
gov.uk/ (accessed 28 November 2002).
49. R. Prodi, Enlargement—The Final Lap, SPEECH/02/463, Brussels, 9 October 2002a; R. Prodi, The Reality
of Enlargement, SPEECH/02/539, Brussels, 6 November 2002b.
50. M. Kovács and P. Kabachnik, op. cit., Ref. 44, p. 171. See also J. Galtung, ‘A structural theory of
imperialism’, Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1971), pp. 81– 117.
51. For instance, the Czech president, Vàclav Klaus, argued that: ‘The claims for quasi-universal social rights are
disguised . . . . attempts to protect high-cost producers in highly regulated countries, with unsustainable
welfare standards, against cheaper labor in more productive countries.’ See V. Klaus, Renaissance: The
Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1997), p. 113.
52. C. B. Schiltz, ‘Die EU-Perspektive ist ein Reformmotor’, Die Welt (2006), available at http://www.welt.de/
print-welt/article209748/Die_EU_Perspektive_ist_ein_Reformmotor.html.
53. R. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, ‘From Brussels with love: leverage, benchmarking, and the action plans
with Jordan and Tunisia in the EU’s democratization policy’, Democratization, 18 (2011), pp. 932–955.
54. European Council, Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy President of the European Council at the European
Parliament Conference of Presidents. EUCO 32/1/11 REV 1, Brussels, 28 June 2011a.
55. European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—A Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, COM 200 Final, Brussels, 8 March
2011.

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jan zielonka
56. C. Ashton, Remarks by HR/VP Catherine Ashton after her Meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Tunisia, Mr. Ahmed Ouneies, SPEECH/11/65, Brussels, 2 February 2011.
57. European Commission, op. cit., Ref. 55. In her 2012 comment Catherine Ashton reiterated this point by
writing: ‘Look at the “Arab Spring” and what people in Tahrir Square called for - they want jobs, dignity and
rights. The EU has a better record delivering on and supporting these demands than any other power’. See
C. Ashton, ‘The EU’s rights of passage’, European Council on Foreign Relations (London, 2012), available
at http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_the_eus_rights_of_passage.
58. European Council, Keynote Address by Herman Van Rompuy President of the European Council at the
Annual Conference on Europe, A Changing Europe in a Changing World, PCE 084/11, Oslo, 30 March
2011.
59. European Union, Remarks by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Senior Officials’ Meeting
on Egypt and Tunisia. A 069/11, Brussels, 23 February 2011.
60. S. Füle, Strengthening Cooperation on Democracy Support, SPEECH/11/179, 2nd Transatlantic Dialogue
Conference, Brussels, 15 March 2011.
61. C. Ashton, Speech before the Human Rights Council. SPEECH/11/127, Geneva, 28 February 2011.
62. European Union, European Commission Calls for Orderly Transition and the Holding of Free and Fair
Elections in Egypt. MEMO/11/63, Brussels, 2 February 2011.
63. European Commission, op. cit., Ref. 62.
64. European Commission, op. cit., Ref. 58.
65. This has been a pattern observed for several years already. See F. Bicchi, ‘“Our size fits all’”, op. cit., Ref. 2.
66. See F. Bicchi, ‘Dilemmas of implementation: EU democracy assistance in the Mediterranean’,
Democratization, 5 (2010), pp. 976–96.
67. See European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, ‘Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy,’ Joint Communication to the European
Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions, Brussels, 15 May Joint (2012) 14 final.
68. Speech by European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton in
the European Parliament on the Brok Report on the Annual Report on CFSP, 11 September 2012, Strasbourg,
available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_12568_en.htm.
69. European Union, Joint Statement by Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European
Neighbourhood Policy and Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, on their Trip to Tunisia.
MEMO/11/204, Brussels, 30 March 2011.
70. A similar pattern has been observed in the Balkans. See G. Noutcheva, ‘Fake, partial and imposed
compliance: the limits of the EU’s normative power in the Western Balkans’, Journal of European Public
Policy, 16 (2009), pp. 1065–1084.
71. This term underlines the importance of international factors of democratization coinciding with domestic
ones. For a detailed argument see J. Zielonka, ‘Foreign made democracy’, in J. Zielonka (Ed.) Democratic
Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Vol. 2: International and Transnational Factors (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
72. This dilemma has already influenced EU-Turkey relations. See, for example, E. Hughes, ‘The secularism
debate and Turkey’s quest for European Union membership’, Religion and Human Rights, 3 (2008),
pp. 15 –32; S. Toktas S. and B. Aras, ‘The EU and minority rights in Turkey’, Political Science Quarterly,
124 (2009), 697 –720.
73. O. Roy, ‘The transformation of the Arab world’, Journal of Democracy, 3 (2012), p. 6.
74. L. Sadiki, The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses (London: Hurst, 2004),
pp. 366 –368. Also J. L. Esposito and J. O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), pp. 11–32.
75. Although scholars talk about the so-called Khaleeji variant of capitalism, especially in the Gulf Arab states.
See A. Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
76. H. Wydra, Imitating Capitalism and Democracy at a Distance: Identifying with Images in the Polish
Transition (Florence: European University Institute, 1997).
77. B. Greskovits and D. Bohle, ‘Poverty, inequality and democracy: East-Central Europe’s quandary’, Journal
of Democracy, 4 (2009), pp. 50 –63. Also M. A. Orenstein, ‘What happened in East European (political)
economies? A balance sheet for neo-liberal reform’, East European Politics and Society, 4 (2009), pp. 479–
490.
78. N. Witney and A. Dworkin, Power Audit of EU–North Africa Relations (London: European Council on
Foreign Relations, 2012), available at http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR62_NAPA_REPORT.pdf.
79. When it comes to representations of the EU in Arab media, a case study of Al Jazeera suggests that both
indifference and perceived synonymity with the US will hamstring European norm promotion. D. Della

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 europe’s new civilizing missions
Ratta, ‘Non-Western media and the EU: perspectives from Al Jazeera’, In S. Lucarelli and L. Fioramonti
(Eds), External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010),
pp. 195 –206.
80. See, for example, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Experience of Discrimination, Social
Marginalisation and Violence: A Comparative Study of Muslim and Non-Muslim Youth in three EU Member
States (2010). But for a sociological account of how Arab immigrants unwittingly contribute to the
perpetuation of their own plight, see A. Sayad, The Suffering of the Immigrant (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2004).
81. Condorcet, Esquisse d’un Tableau Historique des Progrès Historique de l’Esprit Humain (Paris: Garnier-
Flammarion, 1988). (Original work published in 1795), p. 269.

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