The problem of predestination: as a prelude to A. N.

Prior's tense logic

Author(s): Per F. V. Hasle
Source: Synthese , October 2012, Vol. 188, No. 3, FROM A LOGICAL ANGLE (October
2012), pp. 331-347
Published by: Springer

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Synthese (2012) 188:331-347
DOI 10.1007/sl 1229-01 1-9942-4

The problem of predestination: as a prelude

to A. N. Prior's tense logic

Per F. V. Hasle

Received: 13 April 201 1 / Accepted: 13 April 201 1 / Published online: 2 June 201 1
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 201 1

Abstract Arthur Norman Prior's early theological writings have been relatively
neglected for many years. Moreover, to the extent that they have been discussed at all
they have been treated mainly as youthful work quite separate from Prior's later work
as a philosopher and logician. However, as interest in Prior's achievements has been
growing significantly in recent years it has become more important to investigate the
development with his overall work. In fact, Prior's putatively "youthful" theological
work overlapped his work as a philosopher and logician for many years, as is richly
documented by examples discussed in this paper. A particularly important theme is
the problem of predestination. This paper presents comprehensive evidence that this
theme, which was Prior's most important single preoccupation as a theological writer,
was a most important source of inspiration for his development of tense logic. Via
questions regarding divine foreknowledge and human free will, predestination was to
motivate Prior as a logician to focus on time and tense. Whilst investigating this devel-
opment, the paper also traces Prior's parallel development from Calvinist Christian
believer to a more agnostic position.

Keywords Arthur N. Prior • Predestination • Calvinism • Knox • Barth •

Determinism • Indeterminism • Free will • Foreknowledge

1 Introduction

In his memorial paper on the founder of temporal logic A.N. Prior (1914-1969), A .J.P.
Kenny summed up his life and work with these words:

P. F. V. Hasle (El )
Royal School of Library and Information Science, Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: pha@iva.dk

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 332 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347

Prior's greatest scholarly achievem

opment of tense-logic. But his res
elaborate, piece by piece, a whole
characteristic stamp. He had many d
life, but from different angles he
unchanging themes. Throughout h
knot of problems surrounding dete
then as a moral philosopher, fina
1970, p. 348)

It is by now recognized that, with th

original and lasting contribution to
can be said for his early theologica
a continuity within Prior's work as
approach notwithstanding, one can
theological nature underlying later
Until now, it is rather limited what
between his theological work and h
the present paper, published in 19
to this. One reason for this is the s
inaccessible, a significant part of it
observation - already suggested abo
ing than his early writings. But apar
philosophical logic - as well as theo
relation in somewhat greater detail
The aim of my paper is to disclose
pose I shall make use of some still
after the death of Arthur Norman
aided by Peter Geach, went through
suitably grouped and deposited in t
21 boxes. This material bears signif

2 The problem of predestination

Prior was brought up as a Methodist

at Otago University,
he be 18 of age,
dissatisfaction with the lack of sys
with its emphasis on the importanc
had not had, and never was to hav
studies in Philosophy, he attended
to entering the Presbyterian ministr
many years to come a practising m
The Presbyterian denomination is
mation was that man could not save
pure grace, a gift from God, deman
the question whether faith is some

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 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347 333

some are 'elected' to be believers - r

are not accorded that gift. The refo
rate, took a firm and consequent st
choice with respect to faith; every
and thus to salvation or damnation. T
is its teaching concerning predestin
statement of Presbyterian Christian
London 1643, states on predestinati

III. By the decree of God, for the

angels are predestinated unto ever
lasting death. - IV. These angels an
are particularly and unchangeably
definite, that it cannot be either in

The understanding of these articles in

other major decrees by God, especia
(2) to permit the Fall, (3) to redeem
(5) to elect some to believe in Chris
them to damnation.
The order among the above decrees can in no way be taken for granted, but on the
contrary it determines how predestination should be understood. One crucial concom-
itant question is whether Christ died for all men, or for 'the Elect' only. We shall come
back to these issues below.

It is rather a striking fact that even though Prior had become a Presbyterian by his
own choice, he was from a very early point concerned about the doctrine of predestina-
tion. He quickly took up the "revisionist" Calvinist theology of Karl Barth, who was a
leading theologian at that time (in fact Barth remains one of the most important theolo-
gians of the twentieth century). After completing his M.A. thesis, Prior spent the years
1937-1940 in Europe, where he hoped to make a living out of religious journalism. In
1938 he attended the 4th International Congress of Calvinists in Edinburgh, writing
up its proceedings for various journals. In 1939 he took part in the World Conference
of Christian Youth, Amsterdam, recording his impressions for various journals (and
praising the Barthian Calvinist resistance to nazism). Back in London, he wrote on a
proposed revision of the Westminster Confession. His concern about predestination is
evident (Prior 1940c, p. 1)

There would be almost universal agreement that the original Calvinist doctrine
of predestination requires revision . . . The cue to the revision that is necessary
is already given in the original confession itself, when it takes over the Biblical
description of the Church as "the fulness of him that filleth all in all." The Cal-
vinist doctrine of predestination should be criticised in the light of what is here
cited as its own proof-text, Ephesians 1 .

These remarks are followed up in another unpublished paper, The Logic of

Calvinism (Prior 1940a): Here he criticises The Orthodox Calvinist doctrine' of
predestination for maintaining

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 334 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347

. . . that men are created saved men

sity of a "new creation"? We seem
premise of the doctrine of predestin
for in themselves, and everything
them from all eternity. (Prior 1940

These remarks are indicative not o

(Barthian) answer to such worrie
Quaker or Calvinist? (Prior 1942d).
sion of the different attitudes tow
to Calvinists. The Quakers eagerly e
tant - a difference, which stems from
died for all men or for the Elect only
predestination.
In Prior ( 1 942d, p. 8), the distinctio
destined to damnation) made by the
John Knox is determined as essentia
and what they are in themselves or
Barth's discussion of Election in his

. . . unites the doctrine of Predestina

intimately that neither has any me
doctrine that God "chooses" men f
may be or do - means that from a
selves, lost men and reprobates, bu
place ... (Prior 1942d, p. 12)

One might say - somewhat crudely

introduced by the doctrine of predes
ent individuals as a division within each individual. Prior concludes that

. . . Calvinists have increasingly succumbed to the temptation to replace the dis-

tinction between what men are in Christ and what they are in themselves, by one
between different groups of men. (Prior 1942d, p. 13)

In The Reformers Reformed: Knox on Predestination , (Prior 1946)1, these consid-

erations are dealt with in greater depth. The paper opens with a quote from George
Every, stating inter alia:

. . . Where the logic of Calvin is pressed to a conclusion, the struggle between the
self and God is gone, for either the self has been by decree united to God, or left
to build a life of its own . . . And the difficulty must lie not with predestination,
but with the individualistic, atomic way of thinking about predestination

which, according to Every, was a heritage from Hellenistic thinking. Clearly these
passages condense the task which Prior takes up in this paper. He does so through a
discussion of John Knox's Treatise on Predestination , which he immediately declares

1 http://www.prior.aau.dk/biblio/bibliogr.htm.

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 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347 335

to be 'a useful starting point for thos

tion" of the Church's teaching abou
The main distinction drawn in the
men, a notion which stands in dange
having received special grace - almo
where men are united solely on gro
also directed towards unbelievers. Pr
tination to damnation, he usually t
grace of God - in fact, that the doctr
it stresses that
ours while we are in
A main point in the same paper is
should not lead the Elect to feel any
contrary to realise that they, and al
given to them in Christ:

In Knox the doctrine of reprobation

with, continually dissolves into an as
of election (Prior 1946, p. 20)

which is exactly seen to be free and

Nevertheless, Prior admits that in
sions from the idea of predestinati
Prior explicitly wants to "reform" K
ing predestination along the lines alr
for his consequent thinking:

But it is not enough to deplore his w

in part shows an admirable and even
as he sees it and hide nothing and

The paper proceeds to deliver a "crit

the lines suggested above - stressin
idea of election in Christ. The latter
"Salvation is not salvation if we are saved alone" and "election into Christ means
election into a living body, whose Head is the Head of the Elect because he is the Head
of Mankind" (Prior 1946, p. 23). These observations are related to the discussion on
whether Christ died for all Mankind or for the Elect only. We have already seen this
theme touched on in Prior (1942d).
In the paper Supralapsarianism (Prior 1947), this issue is discussed with greater
systematicity. As said at the beginning, God's 'decrees' - and the internal order among
them bear upon the understanding of predestination. In Supralapsarianism , some
major lines of interpretation concerning the doctrine of predestination (as determined
by the order of decrees) are analysed with a special view to the theology of Karl Barth.
In the seventeenth century, there were three major 'schools' within Calvinism as
regards the interpretation of these questions. It should be noted that the order among
the decrees was "not a time-order but a logical one" (Prior 1947, p. 20), as was real-
ised by all parties. Now the supralapsarians, in brief, held that, "first", God decreed to
manifest his own Glory by his attributes of mercy and justice, this being the purpose

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 336 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347

of creation, "second", God decreed t

the purpose just stated, "third", God
this election, "fourth", God decreed
Christ.
The obvious consequence is that Ch
only. The infralapsarians, by contr
be created with the purpose of vis
held that God "first", for reasons u
deserving justice (punishment) - an
others by. However, they agreed wit
to redeem the world was a means to
that Christ died for those only.
Even so, the latter position seems m
least as seen from our day and age
one step further. The post-redempt
preceded the election - such that G
world through Christ; but contemp
redemption, He decreed to elect so
saved. The consequence is that Chri
fallen, election "taking place" logica
Having described these differences
real disputes", the paper examines t
sised that Christ died for all men, bu
that the world was created in order to be redeemed. In this manner Barth combined
Post-redemptionism with Supralapsarianism; but it becomes clear that Prior would
like a still more radical re-interpretation of predestination, for he then concludes the
paper by saying:

Although his Post-redemptionism removes some of the more objectionable fea-

tures of seventeenth century Calvinism, his Supralapsarianism seems to be still
open to what was even then the principal objection to the doctrine, namely that
the redemption of a world created for the very purpose of being redeemed has a
certain moral artificiality about it, as it seems to involve the artificial engineering
of the need for redemption. It still seems a too incautious application to the ways
of God of the category of means and end.

We have seen how Prior struggled, intellectually as well as morally, with the doctrine
of predestination. This struggle began no later than at the end of the thirties, and at least
lasted towards the end of the fourties. For most of this period, Prior was nonetheless
a committed Presbyterian.

3 A crisis of belief

The most quoted and referred theological paper by Prior is without doubt Can Reli-
gion be Discussed? (Prior 1942a). Written in 1942, it does express, one can safely say,
deep worries about the tenability of Christian belief. Kenny (1970, p. 326) describes

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Synthese (2012) 188:331-347 337

how, at this time, "Prior passed thro

philosophical article which is still
re
Freud, and clearly the most serious
of religious belief.
The paper is built as a discussion
Barthian Protestant, Modernist Prot
Barthian Protestant represents the
be discussed since the faith itself is a
lectual possibility, but no rational d
only a religious leap. Catholic, on the
that God is a 'necessary being', and h
course, that it must also be able toan
seem to be fairly demolished by Log
The fideism of the Barthian is reject
no choice or rational decision betwee
religious belief consists of meaningl
thing" of this sort to believe at all
Logician destroys his notion of "nec
itivist vein (existence is not a predic
'God' as an abstract and as a concret
made by Logician - clearly, the two
step deeper by explaining the roots
the Oedipal Complex, concluding th

These 'irresistible' illusions are thing

by the metods we are using just n
But a time may come . . . when in t
will see for themselves the roots o
genuine atheists made. (Prior 1942

This concludes the discussion, save

help Thou my unbelief'. As for the
hearing - he is allowed just one (sli
be said to dispatch of this kind of p
to believe "by inventing milk-and-w
religious language to describe anyth
ous" (Prior 1942a, p. 11). But, as K
be Discussed?' does not seem to hav
he resumed the writing of Presbyt
ever, the influence of Freud is in fa
(unpublished) papers, (ca. 1942):
In The Case of Edward Irving (P
century minister of the Scottish E
encompassed not only outward homa
or values cherished by us, e.g. Mam
but he went further and also contend
infants in early childhood. He ther

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 338 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347

Prior - which could not be tolerate

our wider motives for being religio
to a degree to at where it must lead
The same can be said of Children
the cases of four persons directly o
themselves, or one of their parents,
are Frederick Denison Maurice, a Vi
century Danish Christian philosophe
tish Presbyterian minister and miss
a Freudian analysis is offered as an
tion, especially with reference to t
sharp and inventive. Also this pape
motivated atheism. It is obvious tha
predestination merge with his doub
However, around 1944 the influenc
in October 1944, Prior wrote:

God "dwelleth not in temples mad

structures erected by psychoanaly

His Christianity had always had a s

religion were inadequate to account
An interesting paper, Faith, Unbeli
time in this volume (and thus unpubl
astriking counterpart to Can Reli
dialogue, this time between Histori
The paper opens with a quote from
God's Election of Grace in his Dogm

. . . that the choice of the Godless i

from eternity and thus is not rejec
that the reprobation which he dese
and removed by Jesus Christ . . . (

This being a significant prelude, gi

lems of predestination and determ
the three on the subjects of (i) Ou
Paradox of Evil, (iii) Atheism and
gic Retreat. In good Priorean style,
debated, but I content myself with
by 'Theologian' (Prior 2011b, p. 17)

We are not called upon to do the

upon to "take damnation lovingly"
do it if we were; but we are called
has done this. And that is the who
whole meaning of "predestination
is the Gospel.

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Synthese (2012) 188:331-347 339

This, especially when taken togethe

reply to his the own worries about
It is interesting to compare (Prior
are cameos built as dialogues betwe
But here, in Prior (201 lb), the imp
cussed? is a (qualified) affirmation.
seem to be on the point of saying
reservations that have no doubt been

It seems to me frankly, that the cent

dictory and absurd, and Barth even
. . . One cannot even discuss Christia
its statements just cancel out one
2011b, pp. 3-4)

These remarks are obviously very

Actually, Theologian and Historian
long run make it clear - are on the p
ingless; but the discussion does carr
is later than Prior (1942a), it may we
sonal religious crisis vented in Prio
is given the last word:

Faith may be awakened in men by t

the loss of it - as we all brought G
theCross] - or it may not; but to th
must the servant be". (Prior 201 lb

David Jakobsen's study of Faith, Un

ysis offered here. Jakobsen sees th
first and foremost as an analysis and
to which Prior otherwise adhered. J

Can Religion be Discussed and F

voicing Prior's misgivings about B
logical tenability of Christianity.

There is no doubt that this observa

ever, that, Jakobsen studies the su
relation between logic and theology
part of theology, namely the issue
development of a specific part of logi
lish this relation as crucial to Prior
Thisof course does not indicate any
other hand, I disagree with Grimsh
apparently with some consent:

For as Prior notes, the issue is tha

- and, if not, 'no amount of believ

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 340 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347

the initial moving of his focus fro

does not emphasize it enough. It c
2002)

But this statement really misses the crucial issue of predestination, probably because
the early Prior is obviously much better known to Grimshaw than the Prior of tense
logic (and symbolic logic for that matter). While Grimshaw rightly points to one impor-
tant element in the general picture, it is not the element, nor does it signal "the initial
moving of his focus from theology to philosophy". This is made all the clearer by the
simple fact that the Prior-statements in the quote are from 1937 (Prior 1937), more
than a decade before Prior's theological interest and contributions began to decrease.
Prior's knowledge of and publications in philosophy greatly increased in the course of
the Forties. During that period this was not at odds with and did not detract from his
commitment to theology, but rather, his theological and philosophical interest were
closely interwoven and underpinning each other.

4 From predestination to indeterminism - the 'invention' of tense logic

One remarkable defence of predestination, respectively determinism, is given in the

paper Determinism in Philosophy and Theology (DPT). This paper is difficult to date,
but it was probably written in the mid-fourties. In contrast to Prior's other "theological
papers" from the fourties (and earlier), this paper thematically compares the doctrine
of predestination with philosophical determinism, respectively, indeterminism. The
paper opens by observing that in "modern discussions", determinism is often associ-
ated with a "scientific creed" as opposed to the idea of free will, which is considered
to be religious. But this perception is immediately countered (Prior 1943, p. 1):

It is exceedingly rare for philosophers to pay any great attention to the fact that
a whole line of Christian thinkers, running from Augustine (to trace it back no
further) through Luther and Calvin and Pascal to Barth and Brunner in our own
day, have attacked freewill in the name of religion.

The paper then proceeds in four major steps:

First, it is emphasised that philosophical or scientific determinism is in part differ-
ent from the idea of predestination: the Calvinism expounded by Barth and Brunner is
not pure determinism, but a paradoxical mixture of determinism and free will (Prior
1943, p. 1). They wish to replace the "secular mystery of determinism", respectively,
indeterminism, by the "holy and real mystery of Jesus Christ." Man is seen as unable
to perform by himself an act of faith, but when, by the grace of God, he does perform
it, that is an act of real freedom, "freewill for the first time".
Second, it is argued (with reference to arguments put forward by the contemporary
philosopher C. D. Broad) that the ordinary ideas of free will, when understood as
moral accountability and general indeterminism, are at least as absurd as the idea of
predestination:

We are guilty of that which we are totally helpless to alter; and to God alone
belongs the glory of what we do when we are truly free. - Absurd as these doc-

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 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347 341

trines appear, they are in the end no

concept of "moral accountability"

Thirdly, Prior goes on to describe h

patible with the notion of predestina

Even those of us who accept a strai

account of men's feeling of freedom
conceiveable that the "absurdities"
psychological description of the sta
dity" of the ordinary non- Augusti
1943, p. 3)

Various - quite convincing - arguments are offered to underpin the plausibility of

Augustinianism in the face of human experience. Up to this point, the paper - even
if brief in its analysis - is a vivid and convincing defence of predestination, or deter-
minism in an Augustinián sense. But this perception is modified in the final step of the
analysis. In the fourth and concluding part, Freudian psychoanalysis is thus brought
into the picture. It is argued that religious determinism is concerned with "particu-
lar inward compulsions and dependences", from which we can be released through
(psycho)analysis (Prior 1943, p. 4).
Following Freud, the doctrine of sin and salvation in St. Paul and Augustine is seen
as a partial psychoanalysis, leading to the conclusion that "The theological doctrine
of predestination is a Theory of Obsessions', prefaced to the analysis of a partic-
ular case" (Prior 1943, p. 4). Nevertheless, it is not quite clear whether this means
that Christianity, and especially the doctrine of predestination, are "subjected" to a
psychoanalytical viewpoint, or whether it rather implies that evidence from psycho-
analysis corroborates the idea of predestination within (Prebyterian) Christianity. The
final remarks point in the former direction, the overall context rather points in the latter
direction. This has nothing to do with inconsistency, of course, but there is a tension
here which may well reflect Prior's own state of mind at the time of writing.
As is probably known to most students of tense logic, Prior's stance on determin-
ism was to change from the early fifties and onwards. Throughout the fourties, he was
interested in logic - mainly classical and non-symbolic logic - but apparently even
more interested in philosophical and historical issues within theology. In 1949, he was
in the process of writing a history of Scottish Calvinist theology. However, the Priors'
house was burnt in March 1949, the loss including parts of the manuscript for this
history. That was a turning-point, he gave up the project, and increasingly turned his
attention to logic. His first interest in modal logic was aroused in 1951, leading to the
publication of The Ethical Copula (Prior 195 1).2 At this time he also developed into
an adherent of indeterminism, and indeed, of free will. Jack Copeland describes how

. . . Aristotle speaks of some propositions about the future-namely, those about

such events as are not already predetermined-as being neither true nor false when
they are uttered . . . This appealed to Prior, once a Barthian Calvinist but now

2 Reprinted as Prior (1976).

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 342 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347

[ca. 1950/51] on the side of indete

that Prior's interest in tense logic
of real freedom. (Copeland 1996,

But in one
respect this perhaps sa
Presbyterian, becoming an elder of
have been revising his former atte
apparently this did not at the tim
when the Priors were in to Oxford
there.
At any rate, Prior's first hint at the possibility of a logic of time-distinctions is
found in the unpublished manuscript The Craft of Logic 1951 (cf. Copeland (1996,
p. 15)). In 1953, when he was reading a paper of Findlay Time : A Treatment of Some
Puzzles , he decided to take up Findlay's challenge of working out a calculus of tenses
(cf. 0hrstr0m and Hasle (1995, p. 25)). Major sources for him were also Lukasiewicz'
discussion of future contingents, which was inspired by Aristotle's De Interpretationen
and the Diodorean "Master Argument", which he came to study via a paper by Benson
Mates on Diodorean Implication. In both of these problem sets - future contingents,
and the Master Argument - the logic of time is strongly interwoven with the discussion
of determinism versus indeterminism.
Thus from the very outset of Prior's development of tense logic, the problem of
determinism was dealt with in parallel with the logic of time. (Here, I shall leave aside
a richness of details, but see (0hrstr0m and Hasle 1995) for a discussion of these
and related subjects.) Moreover, it is clear that the determinism-issue has roots in the
problem of predestination, and that Prior's dealing with it was a natural continuation
of his earlier preoccupation with predestination. At the same time, however, there also
is a breach in the very approach to these problems. The emphasis on time and change
is itself a marked departure from the peculiarly atemporal spirit of the Calvinist teach-
ing on predestination, as witnessed by the Westminster Confession in general and in
particular by the articles III and IV quoted earlier.
Prior's early work on the logic of time led to the papers Three-valued Logic and
Future Contingents (Prior 1953) and Diodorean Modalities (Prior 1955). In the sec-
ond half of the fifties, he increasingly took up the notion of (Divine) 'foreknowledge',
which is obviously related to the issues of determinism and predestination. His studies
led him to consider the classical Christian belief in Divine Foreknowledge as untena-
ble (except perhaps in a very restricted form). In Some Free Thinking About Time , he
stated his belief in indeterminism as well as the limitations to Divine Foreknowledge
very clearly (Prior 1996, pp. 45-46):

I believe that what we see as a progress of events is a progress of events, a coming

to pass of one thing after another, and not just a timeless tapestry with everything
stuck there for good and all . . .

This belief of mine ... is bound up with a belief in real freedom. One of the big
differences between the past and the future is that once something has become
past, it is, as it were, out of our reach - once a thing has happened, nothing we
can do can make it not to have happened. But the future is to some extent, even

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Synthese (2012) 188:331-347 343

though it is only to a very small ext

if something is the work of a free a
that agent decided that it was .

I would go further than Duns Sco

future that God doesn 'tyet know be
about knowing them is like saying

In December 1958, the Priors left N

ship at the University of Manchest
Presbyterian community. His logical
he regarded as indispensable parts o
although not an atheist. He remaine
as an intellectual possibility, but at
science and theology on Karl Barth
pinnacle of theological thought in t
for him:

One silly thing it's only too easy

name of some kind of stuff out of which the world was made. I've even read a
theologian (Barth) who [in his Dogmatics in Outline, 1949] talks as if "nothing"
were a sort of hostile power from which God rescued the world in giving it being.
(Prior 1959, p. 89)

In The Formalities of Omniscience (Prior 1 962) he further investigated the problems

of determinism and foreknowledge. The paper examines the idea of omniscience,
especially in the form of statements such as - God is omniscient , and some putative
consequences of it, such as:

It is, always has been, and always will be the case that for all /?, if p then God
knows that p ('7', p. 1 17), and:
For all /?, if (it is the case that) p, God has always known that it would be the
case that p ('8', p. 1 17).

Various interpretations of such statements are discussed, especially with reference to

St. Thomas Aquinas, Ockham, and Peirce. It is argued that, for logical reasons, future
contingents cannot be 'known' at all, leading to the observation:

I don't think we get my proposition '8' ... except in the weak sense that He
[God] knows whatever is knowable, this being no longer co-extensive with what
is true (Prior 1962, p. 122)

Prior concludes with the following statement (which may be indicating not an atheist,
but rather an agnostic position):

I agree with the negative admission of Thomas . . . that God doesn't know future
contingencies literally . . . But (and this is what Thomas himself says) this is only
because there is not then any truth of the form 'It will be the case that p ' (or 'It
will be the case that not p ') with respect to this future contingency /?, for Him

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 344 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347

to know; and nihil potest sciri nis

is) true). (Prior 1962, p. 129)

For completeness' sake, it should b

also dealt with the ideas of Creation
bearing, directly and indirectly, on
this connection is also another pape
Fable of the Four Preachers (Prior
ideas of immortality. It is clear fro
ral and 'trans-world' identity are o
background is also traceable in the

5 The freedom of inquiry

Already in the late thirties, Prior c

ment to the cause of the poor and
for him a welcome confirmation of
socialism was for him an integral p

Christian socialism is neither a su

ity, nor a sugaring of the Christ
Prebyterianism properly understo

Prior was to remain left wing, even

Although "conservative" in his th
"fundamentalist". This is made qui
Stocktaking (Prior 1940b) (ca. 1940),
of "Modernism", especially the righ
the position of Christianity in the
otherwise embraces Christianity - w
of Christianity such as the one tak
ple from Germany may well have c
manipulative modernisations of Ch
be Discussed . On the other hand it
defended from making a religion ou
thinkers. Finally, the modernist spir

... the Modernist spirit, the spirit o

geous thinking, is as unpopular as
for a very long time to come. (Pri

At that time, and for many years

and his insistence on the freedom
gradually came to doubt the dogma
"trilemma":

1 . the doctrines of predestination a

tian faith,

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 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347 345

2. the doctrine of foreknowledge is

doctrine of predestination is incom
will,
3. any convenient 'abbreviation' of Christianity is dishonest and untrustworthy.

The last paper, wherein Prior seems to be endorsing Christian faith, if only vaguely,
is The good life and religious faith (Prior 1958). This is a discussion between Prior
and a few other philosophers on religion - among them John Mackie. Prior seems at
this point to be still "defending" religion (Christianity) in replies to Das and Mackie.
However, one statement by Mackie seems to anticipate an essential reason why Prior
became an agnostic. The statement Mackie makes is this:

In fact I think it [religion] hostile to the good life, because of the value it always
puts upon firm belief for inadeqaute reasons. It blocks inquiry, which is a prin-
cipal ingredient of the good life. (Prior 1958, p. 10)

6 Conclusion

On the face of things, Prior became agnostic because he came to see Christianity as a
obstacle to the freedom of inquiry. According to Mary Prior, he felt that as a logicia
it was his job to (freely) investigate the consequences of any assumptions, which we
may make, and:

He found having a total commitment to any particular set of theological beliefs

made it difficult to follow the logical consequences of a system with complete
freedom, and this made him agnostic. (Prior, Letter to the author, Personal com-
munication, July 31, 1996)

At the same time, it should be remembered that even as a young and devout Christian
he insisted on this very same freedom of inquiry - cf. A Modernist Stocktaking. Hi
problem, then, seems to have been a discovery that Christian doctrine, as he saw it, led
to unacceptable conclusions. What worried him were first and foremost the doctrin
of predestination, and the related doctrine of foreknowledge.
Of course, to become an agnostic on these grounds presupposes that an honest and
consistent believer must actually accept these doctrines as inherent in Christianity.
We have seen Prior praising Knox for his honesty and "almost scientific mind" in th
matter of predestination. At that time (1946) Prior attempted a Barthian solution to
avoid the "horrifying beliefs" imparted by the doctrine of predestination to damnation,
but obviously this approach became unsatisfactory to him in the course of the fifties. In
parallel with his development of tense logic he became a firm believer in indetermin
ism and free will, tenets incompatible with Calvinism (even in its Barthian version)
Moreover, on strictly logical grounds he came to consider the ideas of omniscience
and foreknowledge as untenable. It is worth noting, though, that agnosticism was fo
Prior a position different from atheism:

. . . agnosticism was for him not an alternative belief but a neutral basis from
which inquiry could be made - he was not so much an agnostic as 'agnostic'
(Prior, Letter to the author, Personal communication, July 31, 1996)

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 346 Synthese (2012) 188:331-347

Even so, a modernist-liberal "milk-

lay open to Prior; he obviously saw
at any rate inconsequential way of
Prior in this on a general level, but
Methodism in favour of Presbyteria
consistent and well worked out. A
lack of any 'conversion experience',
emphasized in Methodist theology.
predestination, Methodism is more c
ista conviction. Methodism traces i
a Calvinist who sought to modify th
to predestination: t in particular, he
At any rate, the founder of Meth
influenced by Arminius, not least
accord left one interpretation of C
distinctive feature was that doctrin
main motive for his later becoming
Such observations can, of course,
He has, perhaps more clearly than an
of foreknowledge. Likewise, he has
indeterminism. Theology is challen
philosophyby those insights.
In the wider perspective of our cult
Prior's achievements.

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