When Great Theologians Feuded

When Great Theologians Feuded

________________________________________

Thomas Lemos and Leonardus Lessius on Grace and

Predestination

By

Guido Stucco
Copyright © 2017 by Guido Stucco

ISBN-13: 978-1539962038 Softcover

ISBN-10: 1539962032

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 Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION 1

PART ONE – Lemos’ Acta

Chapter 1 Tomas de Lemos: A Bio-bibliographical sketch ……………………………….. 12
Chapter 2 Lemos’ Acta: Thirty-Sixth Congregation………………………………………. 27
Chapter 3 Thirty-Eight Congregation……………………………………………………. 34
Chapter 4 Thirty-Ninth Congregation……………………………………………………. 39
Chapter 5 Fortieth Congregation…………………………………………………………. 46
Chapter 6 Forty-First Congregation………………………………………………………. 52
Chapter 7 Forty-Second Congregation……………………………………………………. 61
Chapter 8 Forty-Third Congregation……………………………………………………… 74
Chapter 9 Forty-Fourth Congregation……………………………………………………. 84
Chapter 10 Forty-Fifth Congregation………………………………………………………. 91
Chapter 11 Forty-Sixth Congregation………………………………………………………. 99
Chapter 12 Forty-Seventh Congregation…………………………………………………....115

PART TWO – Lessius’ De gratia

Chapter 1 Leonardus Lessius: A Bio-bibliographical sketch……………………………...... 124
Chapter 2 Lessius: De gratia – Outlining the main problems with PP……………………...135
Chapter 3 Exegesis of biblical passages for and against PP……………………………….. 146
Chapter 4 Conciliar statements for and against PP………………………………………... 158
Chapter 5 Refutation of PP based on the writings of the Fathers and the Scholastics…….168
Chapter 6 Unacceptable logical consequences stemming from PP……………………… . 173
Chapter 7 Predestination…………………………………………………………………… 179
Chapter 8 Theological arguments for and against PP……………………………………... 182

PART THREE – Lessius’ Annex De praedestinatione

Chapter 1 Lessius: De praedestinatione et reprobatione - Parts One and Two..............................191
Chapter 2 De praedestinatione - Parts Three and Four……………………………………..205
Chapter 3 De praedestinatione - Part Five…………………………………………………..212
Chapter 4 De praedestinatione - Parts Six and Seven……………………………………….222

PART FOUR – Lemos’ Rebuttal: Brevis tractatus

Chapter 1 Tomas de Lemos: Brevis tractatus Chapter 1…………………………………….233
Chapter 2 Chapters 2, 3……………………………………………………………………..243
Chapter 3 Chapters 4, 5, 6…………………………………………………………………..258
Chapter 4 Chapters 7, 8, 9…………………………………………………………………..277

PART FIVE – Lemos’ Treatise De praedestinatione……………………………………288

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………....326

Appendix A …………………………………………………………………………………338
Appendix B …………………………………………………………………………………340
Appendix C …………………………………………………………………………………344
Appendix D …………………………………………………………………………………345
Appendix E…………………………………………………………………………………...350
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………357
 1

Introduction

This book is an introduction to the clash of theological and philosophical

views upheld in the XVII century by the Dominican Tomas de Lemos and the
Jesuit Leonardus Lessius. Working primarily as a researcher, I continued to
summarize the contents of mostly primary sources,1 leaving up to other scholars
the task of pursuing historical and social trajectories and reaching theological
conclusions.
As I explained elsewhere, after the general ecclesial consensus concerning the
understanding of grace and predestination came to an end in the XIV century
through the work of Peter Aureol,2 a new era began, in which original
interpretations were outlined at first irenically,3 eventually giving way to
increasingly rigid and irreconcilable stances, reaching in the works of Lemos and
Lessius what I consider to be “the end of the road.” I believe that the views of
these two great theologians represent a non plus ultra, a status quaestionis not be
changed until the publication of the bold and innovative insights of XX century
theological “giants” Barth, Lonergan, and Rahner: these modern theologians
operated a paradigm shift focusing on the predestination of the whole humankind
rather than of individuals; on God’s universal salvific will; and on the unique
predestination of Christ, thus re-stating the Christological foundation of the
doctrine.4

1
Antonio Gerace in his book review of my The Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Luther
to Jansenius, criticized what he called “the absence of secondary sources, which are almost
entirely missing in the bibliography quoted in the endnotes,” in Augustiniana 66 (2017): 319.
Notwithstanding my eight pages bibliography at the end of that book, which contains many
secondary sources, it was and still is my declared intention to work mostly with primary sources,
namely with untranslated texts from Latin, French and Spanish.
2
See my God’s Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from
Augustine to the Renaissance (Xlibris, 2009), 503-13; and James Halverson’s celebrated Peter
Aureol on Predestination: A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought (Brill Academic, 1998).
Besides Aureol, other theologians, such as William of Champeaux, Honorius of Autun, Peter
Aureol, Gerard Odonis, William of Ockham, and Thomas of Strasburg were responsible for a
substantial deviation from the traditional theological view of predestination.
3
See for instance the views formulated by Ambrosius Catharinus (Summa doctrinae
praedestinationis, 1550), John of Bologna (De aeterna Dei praedestinatione et reprobatione,
1554), and Girolamo Dinami (Divina predestinazione ristretta in cinque capitoli, 1565).
4
Their epigones as well shifted the emphasis from individual to communal or corporate election:
see for instance Robert Shank, Elect in the Son (1970); Donna Bowman, The Divine Decision: A
Process Doctrine of Election (2002); William Klein, The New Chosen People, Revised and
Expanded Edition: A Corporate View of Election (2015).
 2

At this point in my ongoing investigation of the history of the Catholic

doctrine of predestination, I could have chosen to focus on the via media between
the views of Lessius and Lemos represented by the Congruism of Suarez and
Bellarmine,5 who outlined a modified view of predestination according to scientia
media proposed by Molina in his Concordia; or discuss the origin of the
controversial notion of “Physical Premotion” in the works of Dominican
theologian Banez.6 I decided instead to outline the polarized views of Lessius and
Lemos, because in my view these two great minds championed in the best,
clearest and most comprehensive fashion two irreconcilable ways of
understanding the very intricate and complex categories of divine grace and
predestination. Incidentally, readers may benefit from reading first APPENDIX
E, which I believe represents a helpful introduction to these views, though they
were first articulated during the de auxiliis controversy.
Both Lemos and Lessius were very learned and gifted scholars who excelled
in their personal areas of expertise. Lemos’ remarkable mastery of Augustine’s
and Aquinas’ works was proverbial: a powerful debater who articulated his
arguments in a very logical albeit not original fashion, Lemos could vanquish his
opponents and win the respect and favor of his audience with his ingratiating
attitude and rhetorical skills. On his part, Lessius, who never participated in
verbal disputes, consigned his creative ideas to writing; thanks to the clarity of his
exposition and a logical, persuasive defense of his views, he won admirers and
supporters all over Europe.
Lemos never had to justify his beliefs: he was never accused of holding
heretical or heterodox views in an academic setting since he did not teach in a
university, nor was he ever fired or removed from office, thus enjoying the
advantage of being pressure-free. Unlike Lemos, Lessius was embroiled in
controversies all his mature life and had to fight every step of the way to defend
his career and views against critics both outside and inside his order.
Overall, Lemos represented the “old” way of thinking and theologizing: he
best exemplified the scholastic, classical and traditional approach that reached its
arguable apogee in the late XVI century. Conversely, Lessius was a modern
thinker who was less focused on and concerned about the past, but rather had

5
H. Quilliet, s.v. “Congruisme,” in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique. According to
Congruism, God in the primary act bestows in the form of various helps a grace that is congruous
with the needs of those persons whom he wants to convert and save, and at the time when he
knows they will respond favorably. Augustine said: “A person on whom God has mercy is called
in such a way that He knows is fitting with his needs, so that he will not reject Him” (De
diversibus quaestionibus ad Simplicianum I, ch. 2, 13).Thus, Congruists reject the idea that it is
human cooperation that makes grace efficacious in the primary act.
6
See the valuable and detailed study by R.J. Matava, Divine Causality and Human Free Choice:
Domingo Banez, Physical Premotion and the Controversy de auxiliis Revisited (Brill, 2016).
 3

eyes wide open on contemporary issues and challenges. These two men could not
have been further apart, bot temperamentally and ideologically, and yet they
shared few things in common, such as a deep commitment to the religious life and
vocation, an intensely lived spirituality, and a strong faith. These men were not
professors living in ivory towers: they were prayer-warriors, in constant pursuit
of Truth and Orthodoxy, who shunned error and sought to make the Christian
faith more comprehensible to the people of God.7
Generally speaking, the conflict between these two theologians could be
characterized as “Phase III” of an intense and momentous effort within the
Catholic Church in the XVI and XVII centuries to rethink the categories of grace
and predestination. Ideally, “Phase I” was marked by the publication of Molina’s
Concordia and the reactions it generated, all the way to the end of the first thirty-
seven debates before Pope Clement VIII’s Congregation de auxiliis (November
1597- January 1605). “Phase II” consisted in the last ten debates before Pope Paul
V and said Congregation (September 1605- March 1606). “Phase IV” consisted in
the fierce “fight to the death” between Jesuits and Jansenists in the XVII century
following Jansenius’ posthumous publication of his masterpiece Augustinus; finally,
“Phase V” was marked by the contrast and plurennial polemics between the
Dominican Serry and the Jesuit de Meyer in the XVIII century, preceded by a few
decades by the systematic defense of their respective orders’ views operated by
the French scholars Bartholomew Germon, S.J., and Antoine Ravaille, O.P..
Before the readers embark on the project of reading my book, and in order to
acquaint them with the terminology and rhetorical strategies employed by Lemos
and Lessius, I intend to summarize the meaning of the main terms and styles of
argumentation found in these theologians’ works. First and foremost is the notion
of grace. What is “grace”? Both authors would agree that it is the unmerited
favor of God, which is freely bestowed by him and which cannot be earned,
acquired, extorted or obtained through natural efforts. Grace is the means by
which God elevates a human being from his natural, limited, sinful condition to a
whole new supernatural level. Disputed questions include: to whom does God
bestow his grace? Is there a grace that overcomes human beings inability to do
good on their own? How does grace transform the human heart? Is grace
infallibly efficacious? Is God’s grace a unitary concept or does it break down into
multiple types? More specifically, what is the real difference between sufficient
grace and efficacious grace?
Closely associated with grace is the notion of predestination. Both authors
would agree that it stems from God’s will and intention and that as such it is a
particular and very specific form of divine providence. According to both men,
God, before the creation of the universe and the coming into existence of human

7
See Lessius’ pastoral concerns which he expressed in his introduction to De gratia.
 4

beings, determined to accomplish the salvation of some people, bequeathing to

them the incommensurable gift of heaven. Disputed questions include: taking for
granted that God does not play favorites, what is this divine predestination based
on: God’s foreknowledge of what human beings will do when their time to be
born, live, and die comes; or on his decision and good pleasure, without
consideration of human beings’ future deeds? Is predestination “set in stone”?
How can it be reconciled with free will?
The third contentious notion hotly debated in the two theologians’ works is
Physical Premotion (or Predetermination), for which I will use the
abbreviation “PP” throughout my book. This term was first coined and amply
used by Dominican theologian Banez, who claimed that although it does not
appear in Scripture and Tradition (just as the term “Trinity” did not either prior
to the Council of Nicaea), it fittingly conveyed what Augustine and Aquinas8
taught concerning the way God operates in the human heart and will, by causing
and determining a person to physically move and perform certain deeds even
before (pre) he/she arrives at the moment of exercising the choice of doing or not
doing a certain deed. Disputed questions include: does PP consist of an irresistible
physical movement or in moral exhortations and suasions? Can PP be resisted
and opposed? Does PP really differ from Luther’s and Calvin’s views of how God
operates on the human will? Is it a heretical or an orthodox view? Does it apply
to evil deeds as well, meaning: does God predetermine human beings to commit
sins?9
Let us now turn to the rhetorical strategies employed by Lemos and Lessius
to defend their views. Lemos consistently used the scholastic distinction between
the necessity of consequence and the necessity of consequent, or the difference between
composite and divided senses. As Aquinas himself put it:

If each thing is known by God as seen by him in the present, what is known by God will then
have to be. Thus, it is necessary that Socrates be seated from the fact that he is seen seated.
But this is not absolutely necessary or, as some say, with the necessity of the consequent; it is
necessary conditionally, or with the necessity of the consequence. For this is a necessary
conditional proposition: if he is seen sitting, he is sitting. Hence, although the conditional
proposition may be changed to a categorical one, to read what is seen sitting must
necessarily be sitting, it is clear that the proposition is true if understood of what is said, and

8
It must be noted that the expression praemotio physica is not found in Aquinas’ works, hence
the legitimate question: did Banez faithfully deduce the concept from Aquinas’ writings, or did
he misinterpret him altogether? See Matava’s treatment of the issue, pp. 48-54. See also
Garrigou-Lagrange, s.v., “Premotion physique,” in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique XIII/1
(Paris, 1936), cols. 31-77.
9
Michael Torre, in his God’s Permission of Sin: Negative or Conditioned Decree?(Fribourg,
2009), documented the 1920s debate on such topic between Dominican theologians Garrigou-
Lagrange and Francisco Marin-Sola .
 5

compositely; but it is false if understood of what is meant, and dividedly. Thus, in these and
all similar arguments used by those who oppose God’s knowledge of contingents, the fallacy
of composition and division takes place.10

Lemos went on to apply such distinctions to all the scriptural passages,

Church Fathers quotations and conciliar decrees and canons that the Jesuits
produced in their attempt to argue that free will and divine grace or
predestination are two partial causes of the effect of salvation and admittance into
heaven (though admittedly grace and predestination were considered by the
Jesuits to be more important and logically prior to man’s free will’s actual
contribution).
Secondly, whether attacking the notion of “middle knowledge” upheld by
Molina, or “absolute foreknowledge” advocated by Lessius, Lemos always
endeavored to point out that God’s will and foreknowledge are simultaneous, and
that since knowledge of hypothetical situations in which man could find himself in
can never be absolute and certain, in order for God’s predestination to be
effective, it requires a divine determination of the human will rather than its
cooperation brought about through mere moral suasions.11
Third, Lemos vigorously argued that the Jesuit view of predestination and
grace resembled, or better, was the same as that upheld by Semipelagians and
stigmatized by Prosper and Augustine.
Fourth, Lemos emphasized the idea of Aristotelian-Thomistic view of
causality to suggest that God, as First Cause, is the main force behind any
movements in the universe, including acts stemming from human beings’ exercise
of free will. In this way he legitimized the idea of PP and argued that the Jesuit
notion of divine grace and free will operating as two partial causes was logically
incoherent and theologically un-orthodox. Lemos took special care in his Panoplia
(especially in Book III, Part One, Fourth Treatise)12 to argue that although
Augustine never used the term PP, he firmly upheld its meaning by using
equivalent expressions (e.g., “Deus ex nolentibus volentes facit;””potens ergo est Deus et
a malo in bonum flectere voluntates;” “cor regis occultissima et efficacissima potestate
convertit;” and the famous expression found in On Rebuke and Grace 12, 38:

10
Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, I, 67 (see http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm ).
All my quotes from Aquinas’ works and church fathers are taken from online websites such as
newadvent.org and augustinus.it. If an English translation of a text was not available online I
translated it myself.
11
Lemos brought up several times a passage from Augustine’s On the Grace of Christ I, 10, 11:
“…by which everything that is good is not only recommended, but pressed upon us until we
accept it” (nec solum suadetur omne quod bonum est, verum et persuadetur).
12
See Martin’s article “Tomas de Lemos y su interpretacion agustiniana de la eficacia de los
divinos auxilios,” 116-36, which focuses on this aspect.
 6

“indeclinabiter et insuperabiliter”13). He also endeavored to rebuff the Jesuit charge

that PP promotes fatalism and absolute necessity, as well as the claim that moral
suasions, and not divine predetermination, are the means through which God
moves the human will.
Using these four main rhetorical arguments in leading the Dominican
offensive against the Jesuits’ views, Lemos made abundant use of quotes from
Augustine’s and Aquinas’ works to support his view of efficacious grace and
predestination based on God’s will.
As far as the Jesuits were concerned, after the Congregation de auxiliis was
dissolved by Pope Paul V, they found in Lessius a new champion. Taking on the
Dominican views outlined by Francisco Davila in 1599, Lessius followed an iron-
clad logic: the notions of PP, grace efficacious in itself and predestination based
on divine will echo Calvin’s own views: as such, they jeopardize the integrity of
human free will; contradict the decrees of the Council of Trent’s Session VI; and
cannot be harmonized with Scripture, patristic and scholastic views, and the
growing consensus of recent theologians. On the contrary, the views set forth by
Jesuits concerning grace, predestination and free will have the advantage of being
in full compliance with the Council of Trent’s decrees; of dispensing with the view
of an arbitrary God who picks favorites; and of being heresy-free, including the
alleged charge of Semipelagianism.
Notwithstanding Lemos’ and Lessius’ theological argument, Rivka Felday
rightly remarked, “Jesuit and Dominican teaching on grace and free will should
not be discussed in terms of disembodied ideas alone. It should also be embedded
in the general cultural orientations of both orders in that period.”14 Felday went
on to explain that “the Dominicans’ privileged status as educational and doctrinal
leaders in both universities and church leadership began to slip away from their
grip, as Jesuits gained momentum in terms of prestige, power of influence and
trust in both the universities and at the papal court.”15
In order to retain their status, the Dominicans led an uncompromising
campaign to have the Jesuits’ views concerning grace and predestination declared
unacceptable if not downright heretical. In commenting on the events leading up
to and following the Congregation de auxiliis, Felday pointed out:

13
It should be noted that several theologians in history have debated the meaning of Augustine’s
expression: “Help, therefore was given to the weakness of the human will so that it was moved
by God’s grace unfailingly and insuperably.” Some even suggested that insuperabiliter is an
incorrect spelling that eventually replaced the original inseparabiliter. For a refutation of this
idea, see Filippo Capponi “Insuperabiliter o inseparabiliter?,” Latomus 28 (1969): 681-84.
14
See Rivka Feldhay, Chapter 9 “Dominicans and Jesuits: A Struggle for Theological
Hegemony,” in Galileo and the Church: Political Inquisition or Critical Dialogue?(Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
15
Feldhay, 191.
 7

The Jesuit point of departure was different from the beginning. Although, when drawn into
polemics, they accused the Dominicans of drifting towards the Calvinist heresy, they never
attempted to make the Dominican opinions as the object of a censure. Their chief aim was a
declaration from the pope that the Molinist opinions were recognized as ‘probable’ in order
to allow freedom of discussion and deference of their positions. Failing to achieve this,
however, the Jesuits concentrated their efforts on an attempt to prevent the publication of a
censure and to avert an apostolic decision.16

Such strategy was also at work in the case of Lessius’ writings on the
contested topics of grace and predestination. As we shall see, Lessius had to
struggle on two fronts: the Dominicans and the leadership of his own order (i.e.,
the two Generals, Acquaviva and Vitelleschi, and cardinal Bellarmine), which
struggled to rein in their famous and combative confrere in order not to create
trouble at the papal court and to continue to exercise their widespread and
growing influence.
A far as the structure of my book is concerned, I have divided the material
into five parts.
In Part One I will introduce the readers to eleven debates Lemos sustained
during the celebrated Congregation de auxiliis, before two Popes: one (the 36th) in
front of Clement VIII, and ten (38th to 47th) before Paul V. Each chapter will
cover only one debate, in order not to over-tax the reader’s mental endurance.
These debates reveal to us the skills Lemos possessed as a confident apologist and
fierce debater endowed with a prodigious memory.
In Part Two I will summarize the contents of Lessius’ De gratia (1610) and
show how he powerfully rebutted the Dominicans’ view of PP.
Part Three focuses on Lessius’ treatise on predestination based on God’s
absolute foreknowledge. Such bold view went beyond Molina’s theory of “middle
knowledge” and Congruism’s view, generating a lot of controversy even among
fellow Jesuits.
Part Four contains Lemos’ step-by-step rebuttal of Lessius’ view. Lemos
devoted to this task an entire treatise in his Book II of his monumental Panoplia.
In Part Five I will summarize Lemos’ view of predestination and grace
articulated in his treatise De praedestinatione, also found in his Panoplia, Book II
(Third Treatise).

16
Ibid., 192.
8
 9

PART ONE

Lemos’ Acta
10
11
 12

Chapter 1

Tomas de Lemos – A Bio-Bibliographical Sketch1

There are not many sources documenting the life and works of Tomas de
Lemos, one of the greatest Dominican theologians of the XVII century. The
following five sources, listed in chronological order, are the ones I relied on in my
research. The first is a twelve page Praeloquium [Foreword] to Lemos’ account of
the Congregation de auxiliis debates, written by an anonymous confrere.2 The
second is Louis Dupin, Histoire Ecclesiastique du Dix-septieme Siecle, Tome premiere
(1714): 158-75. The third, Jacob Echard, O.P., Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum
recensiti (1721): 461-65. The fourth, Antoine Touron, Histoire des hommes illustres
de l’ordre de saint Dominique, v. 5 (1748): 103-23. The fifth is a short (one hundred-
fifty pages) biography divided into nine chapters, by Leopoldo Meruéndano,
Apuntes históricos sobre la vida, trabajos y escritos del insigne teólogo Fray Tomás de
Lemos (Orense, 1906). Last but not least, Ramón Hernández Martín, O. P., has a
concise but useful web page in Spanish: “Tomas de Lemos. Vida y Obras.”3
Tomas Lemos was born in the town of Ribadavia, in the province of Orense,
in the northwestern Spanish region of Galicia. The exact year of his birth is
disputed; most biographers date it in 1545, but Meruendano assigns it to 1559.
Tomas’ parents, Diego and Beatriz, descended from aristocratic families from
Monforte de Lemos, a town located about forty-five miles north east of Ribadavia.
After Diego died, Tomas’ elder brother James became responsible for the Lemos
household, taking good care of his younger brother’s education. After the passing
of his mother, which occurred while he was in his teen years, Tomas continued
his studies at home until the year 1579, when his brother sent him to study at the
University of Salamanca, where he obtained a Licentiate in both civil and canon
law (utroque iure) in 1585. Ramon Hernandez Martin disagreed: “His biographers
have been saying from generation to generation that James also paid for his
brother’s legal career in Salamanca, and that he graduated from that university in

1
In the course of this book I will also use the Anglicized form of his name, i.e., Thomas of
Lemos, or Lemos for short.
2
Acta omnium congregationum ac disputationum quae coram SS. Clemente VIII et Paulo V sunt
celebratae in causa et controversia illa magna de auxiliis Divinae Gratiae (Louvain, 1702).
Henceforth, Acta.
3
http://angarmegia.com/tomas_lemos.htm#_ftnref4. See also Martin’s article “Tomas de Lemos
y su interpretacion agustiniana de la eficacia de los divinos auxilios,” Augustinus 26 (1981): 97-
138.
 13

both civil and canon law. I have looked carefully at the books where the names of
enrolled students were recorded, but I did not find his name.”4
Following the dictates of his heart, not to mention what he considered
genuine supernatural apparitions, Tomas renounced a lucrative career in the
practice of Law and joined the Dominican order as a novice in 1587, before the
age of thirty. After the profession of his vows, Lemos was sent to the College of
St. Gregory in Valladolid where he received a degree in Theology and was
eventually ordained to the priesthood. It was during these years that Lemos
immersed himself in the study of Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinas’ works.
Meruendano says that “his memory was so prodigious that a person could hardly
misquote the shortest of these works [i.e., Augustine’s and Aquinas’] before Fr.
Lemos without him instantly realizing that an error had been made” (“Su memoria
era tan prodigiosa, que con dificultad uno hubiera ' equivocado la menor cita de esas obras
delante del P. Lemos sin que éste advirtiese en el acto el error”).5
According to most biographers, upon the conferral of his degree he began
teaching at that University6 as well at the Dominican convent of St. Paul in
Palencia, thirty-five miles north of Valladolid. After he was removed by his
superiors from the teaching post he held at Palencia, Lemos did not display
disappointment or frustration but endured this change with great humility and
forbearance. One day, as the Provincial was visiting the convent of Palencia he
started a theological conversation with several friars, and was so impressed by
Lemos’ humble yet competent rhetorical skills and intellectual depth that he
ordered him to head to Rome where a theological storm was brewing. Molina’s
book Concordia (1588) had become a major point of contention between
Dominicans and Jesuits, who debated each other on an ongoing basis all over
Europe; the Dominicans needed to articulate an in-depth criticism of the Jesuit’s
notion of middle knowledge (scientia media), and Lemos was chosen for the task,
together with his confrere and fellow Spaniard Diego Alvarez.
When the Dominicans held a General Chapter in Naples on May 21st, 1600,
Lemos defended some theses on grace, upholding physical predetermination and

4
Martin, 98. In footnote 3 on the same page Martin goes on to list a few names bearing
resemblance to Lemos’ name, which may have confused his biographers.
5
Meruendano, 42.
6
Again, Hernandez Martin disagreed. After consulting papers about the history of this
university, he said he did not find any mention of Lemos’ name in them. He then concluded :
“The lengthy recorded history of this university written by Mariano Alcocer does not give him
credit for this” (“La voluminosa historia de esta universidad de Mariano Alcocer no le reconoce
ese mérito”). Mariano Alcocer is the author of Anales universitarios. Historia de la Universidad
de Valladolid (1919).
 14

efficacious grace.7 Reminiscing about his contribution to that Chapter four and a
half years later, Lemos rebuffed the Jesuit Bastida’s insinuation during the 35th
Congregation (December 6th, 1604) that he was acting merely as a spokesperson
for some powerful Dominican figure (i.e., Cardinal Davila).8 In that occasion, as
Lemos recalls, he also upheld the controversial view that God, as First Cause and
First Mover, concurred in the sinner’s movement towards sin but not in the sin
itself.9
Because of his performance at the General Chapter, deemed to be impressive,
competent and scholarly,10 Lemos was asked to accompany his confrere Diego

7
I was not able to find any material concerning this event, as important as it was in Lemos’ life.
What did Lemos argue for? What specific theses did he endorse? His biographers say that the
theses Lemos upheld were dedicated to Cardinal Davila (e.g., Meruendano, 63). Taking the
Latin text of Praeloquium, i literally (“publicas theses de divina gratia Cardinali de Avila
nuncupatas, propugnavit”) leads us to conclude that Lemos followed the example of his confrere
Diego Alvarez, who in January 1599 published the first volume of his Commentary to the book
of Isaiah and dedicated it in a three page un-numbered Forward to the learned cardinal: a
strategically ingratiating move indeed, aimed at attaining his respect and eventual support.
Davila is listed by Serry, History of the Congregations de auxiliis, col. 602, and by Coronel,
Brevis enarratio, 8, as one of the cardinals present at the ten Congregations presided by Paul V,
though he died before the final ballot on the matter was cast. Cardinal Davila is sometimes listed
as Francisco Guzmán, or Francisco Dávila y Guzmán, owing his last name to his mother,
according to Ughelli; others say that he owed the name “Avila” to the town he was from, e.g.,
according to Alfonso Chacon, Vitae, et res gestae pontificum romanorum et S.R.E. cardinalium
ab initio nascentis Ecclesiae usque ad Clementem IX, Tomus Quartus, col. 306, and Lorenzo
Cardella, Memorie storiche de' cardinali della santa romana Chiesa, VI, 36. Davila studied at
the University of Salamanca; was Canon of the cathedral chapter of Toledo and later its
archdeacon; Inquisitor of Toledo; Commissary general of the Crusade, 1589-1596; and Consultor
of the Supreme Council of the Spanish Inquisition. He was appointed Cardinal in 1596 and died
in January 1606.
There actually was another person by the name Francisco Davila, and he too was from
Spain: this Davila was a Dominican theologian who published in 1599 a controversial book
named De auxiliis divinae gratiae ac eorum efficacia. This book incensed Jesuits so much that
Cardinal Bellarmine wrote to the Pope a memorandum in which he argued that Davila had
misunderstood and misrepresented Molina’s thought. Twenty years later, Lessius was motivated
to write his De gratia to stigmatize Davila’ views.
8
Acta, cols. 924-26.
9
Ibid col. 926. Lemos, however, on that occasion made an important concession to the Jesuit
Bastida: “Clearly it is better to deny that the material of sin is caused by God in order to
eliminate this kind of confusion.”
10
In Hernandez Martin’s web page we read: “His brilliant eloquence, the force of his arguments,
the knowledge and familiarity with the writings of St Thomas and St Augustine, made such an
impression among the Chapter Fathers that they all proposed him to be their champion in the
struggle against Molinism” (La brilantez de su elocuencia, la fuerza de su argumentación, el
conocimiento y familiaridad con los escritos de santo Tomás y de san Agustín, le crearon una
 15

Alvarez to Rome in order to participate in theological debates about Molina’s

book, in which Jesuits and Dominicans outlined their respective views. Lemos
arrived in Rome right after Molina’s theses had been analyzed a second time.
Once there, his first contribution to the Dominican cause was a short writing,
dated August 1600, addressed to Pope Clement VIII, in which he rebuffed as
“illusory, futile and foolish” two attempts to reach a compromise between Jesuits
and Dominicans as set forth by the Jesuit Gagliardi and the Franciscan Arriba.11
After Clement VIII formed the Congregation de auxiliis, with the exception of
the 1st (held on February 3rd, 1602)12 and the 25th (held on February 16, 1604)13
congregations, in which Alvarez was the spokesperson for the Dominican views,
Lemos participated in all the remaining 45 congregations (35 before Clement
VIII, 10 before Paul V) held between 1602 and1605. His debut occurred on July 8,
1602, at the second Congregation, in which he faced Gregory Valencia, S.J., in the
presence of the Pope, two cardinals (Borghese and Arrigoni) and all the censors,
debating the first proposition of Molina’s, namely whether man is able, with the
mere general concourse of God, to do what is morally good and raise his actions
to the supernatural level.
The Praeloquium to his Acta, which was quoted in Serry’s History of the
Congregations about the Helps of Divine Grace (1700), says that he eventually
became known for his “iron and un-faltering voice, firmness of speech, strong
chest, and sharp and vigorous mind.”14 We should also mention in passing that
Lemos was endowed with an extra-ordinarily prodigious memory, whereby he
was able to recall texts and quotes from Augustine’s and Aquinas’ works with
unparalleled precision.
In May 1605, between the two sets of congregations de auxiliis held before
two different Popes, the General Chapter of the Dominican Order held in
Valladolid awarded Lemos the Magisterium in Sacra Theologia. When Paul V put
an end to the Congregations, Lemos eventually withdrew to the convent of Saint
Mary over Minerva;15 he was also appointed General Consultor of the Holy Office

aureola de tanta luz entre los Padres capitulares que todos le propusieron como el campeón
señalado para la lucha contra el molinismo”).
11
I outlined Gagliardi’s proposal in my The Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Luther to
Jansenius (Xlibris, 2014), 194-96.
12
Acta, col. 53.
13
Ibid., col., 671.
14
Praeloquium, ii.
15
A Wikipedia article dedicated to this church explains: “The church's name derives from the
fact that the first Christian church structure on the site was built directly over (Latin: supra) the
ruins or foundations of a temple dedicated to the Egyptian goddess Isis, which had been
erroneously ascribed to the Greco-Roman goddess Minerva.”
 16

in November 1607 by Paul V,16 and professor of Theology at the College of St.
Thomas (the future Pontifical University Angelicum). At that time he was offered
two bishoprics, one by Paul V and the other by Philip III, king of Spain: he turned
both down, though he accepted a yearly pension from the king, which he then
donated to his convent.
Late in his life, Lemos participated in the first trial against Galileo, which
took place between February16 and 23, 1616. Tomas strongly disapproved of
Galileo’s views, claiming that they amounted to an “absurd and heretical
philosophy which contradicts Scripture and the Holy Fathers,” and also to “a
grave error of faith.”17 As Galileo persevered in his views, the first trial was
followed by a new one in 1632, in which he fared even worse, though by that time
Lemos had died.
When Tomas’ brother James died in 1619, he wrote to his sister in law a
comforting letter, as she had written to him to announce James’ death and to
request that Tomas return to Spain to help her take care of her family (she had
eight children). As he tried to explain that such relocation would not be possible
of his own accord, insofar as he was bound by vows of obedience to his Order, she
did not lose hope; she asked him instead to help her oldest son Antonio (a priest
and a Doctor of Theology) to find a suitable job in Rome. Antonio came to Rome
and left a few months later; apparently, thanks to his uncle’s help, he got a job as
Choir Master at the Cathedral of Tuy.
In the last twenty-two years of his life following the end of the Congregation
de auxiliis, Lemos devoted his time to prayer, study, writing theological works
and participating in various meetings of the Roman Inquisition. During the last
three or four years of his life he lost his sight, an infirmity he bore with great
forbearance and Christian resignation.
The exact date of his death is unclear, though according to his biographers he
died in August 1629. Dressed in the order’s habit, his body was exposed in the
church of Santa Maria over Minerva and people came from all over Rome to
admire and pay their respect, at times taking pieces of his clothes as relics, so
great was his saintly fame. The Master of the Sacred Palace (i.e. the Theologian
of the Pontifical Household, a curial office that has always been awarded to a
Dominican) Nicolas Ricarde, writing to Juan Lopez, O.P., Bishop of Monopoli,
said: “He died like an angel. After his passing, the whole court went to honor his
lying in state, and afterwards to visit his tomb, with the vast participation of the

16
Dupin, Histoire ecclesiastique du dix-septieme siècle. Tome premier (1714), 159.
17
http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/portada/2009/02/03/0003_7503646.htm.
 17

people, who cut pieces of his clothes so much so that he had to be dressed twice
before a third and final time.”18
Meruendano’s words fittingly sum up the life and death of this formidable
champion of the Catholic faith:

The celebrity of Tomas de Lemos does not stem merely from his profound knowledge of
theology, his very clear and high intelligence and prodigious memory, nor does it owe little
to his admirable writings; it is also due to his virtues and eminent deep humility, which while
he was still alive, earned him the reputation and appellation of holiness on the part of the
people of Rome. The populace, in fact, constantly surrounded his body during the three days
it laid in state in the church of Santa Minerva, cutting into pieces his burial clothes and
preserving them as precious relics, just as Pope Urban VIII himself did, who held him in
high esteem, and after he died entrusted himself to him as one would to a saint.19

Lemos’ Works on Grace and Predestination

Acts

Two of Lemos’ works stand out as his magna opera. The first work is his
account of the debates that took place at the Congregation de auxiliis: “All the acts
of the congregations and debates that occurred before Popes Clement VIII and Paul V in
that great cause and controversy about the aids of divine grace, debates in which I, friar
Thomas de Lemos, sustained by the same grace, engaged many members of the Society of
Jesus.”20
Lemos committed these debates to his prodigious memory and abundant
notes, focusing on important points and dismissing irrelevant ones.21
18
“Murió como un ángel. Después de muerto acudió toda la corte á honrar su sepultura y
después su sepulcro con infinito concurso del pueblo, que tomando de los hábitos á porfía le
desnudó dos veces, y fué menester vestirle la tercera,” Meruendano, 133-34.
19
Ibid., 6: “La celebridad de Tomá s de Lemos no proviene sólo de sus profundos conocimientos
teológicos, de su clarísima y elevada inteligencia y de su portentosa memoria, ni tampoco de sus
admirable s escritos: procede también de sus virtudes eminentes y de su profunda humildad, que
ya en vida le captaron el dictado y la consideración de santo, no ya por parte del pueblo de
Roma, que rodeó constantemente su cadáver durante los tres días pie estuvo expuesto en la
iglesia de la Minerva, cortando en pedazos los hábitos con i|ue le habían amortajado y
guardándolos como preciosas reliquias, sino hasta del mismo PapaUrbano VIII, que le tenía en
gran estima, y después de muerto se encomendaba á él e-orno á santo.”
20
Acta omnia congregationum ac disputationum quae coram SS. Clemente VIII et Paulo V ...
sunt celebratae in causa et controversia illa magna de auxiliisdivinae gratiae quas disputationes
ego F. Thomas de Lemos eadem gratia adjutus sustinui contra plures ex Societate (Louvain,
1702).
21
For instance, in Congregation 35 (col. 924), he wrote: “But since I resolved not to respond to
him [i.e., Bastida], I did not commit much of what he said to memory. If I remember correctly,
among the things he said was that….”
 18

The XVIII century French historian Dupin relates that a few decades after
Lemos’ death the original manuscript came in possession of fellow Dominican
Francois Vermeil, professor of Theology at Douai. Vermeil wrote in his Clavis
regia ad primam partem S. Thomae [The royal key to St. Thomas’ Summa, Ia]: “I
saw, often read and have had this manuscript with me for many years. Do you
have any doubts about it? Come and see.”22 At that time many copies were made
of the manuscript and given to various Dominicans in Europe.23 Vermeil had the
manuscript authenticated in July 1651 by Roger, the Apostolic Notary and clerk
of Paris’ Archbishop, and eventually donated it to Angran, Counselor of the
Parliament of Metz.24 The manuscript was finally published in Louvain, in 1702,
and prefaced by an anonymous dedication to Antonin Cloche (1628 - 1720), who
was Master of the Dominican order from 1686 to 1720, and to all Dominicans
friars as well.
Lemos’ Acts are divided into three parts:
1) Pars prima - Detailing twelve notes accompanied by copious quotations from
Augustine’s writings, that were submitted to the two orders’ representatives by
the Pope for debating purposes (the sixth of which was broken down into fifteen
topics related to Augustine’s understanding of grace) (columns 1-49).
2) Pars secunda - Detailing thirty-seven disputations about the controversial
cause of divine aids (columns 50-992), in which Lemos championed the
Dominican cause.
The topics of these debates included:
• Seven views of Molina (disp. 2-8)
• Replies to the Pope’s notes (disp. 9-12)
• Does Molina’s view of foreseen good works agree with Cassian’s? (disp. 10-17)
• Extent and implications of the axiom facienti quod est in se deus non denegat
gratiam
• Middle knowledge (disp. 33-35)
3) Pars tertia - Detailing ten disputations held before Paul V concerning “physical
predetermination” (columns 993-1358); whether this concept can be reconciled
with Scripture, Augustine, the Church Fathers (both Latin and Greek) and the
Council of Trent; and whether it echoes Calvin’s errors.
On April 23, 1654, Pope Innocent X issued a decree to be promulgated by the
Holy Office. This decree, De libertate docendi in quaestionibus de auxiliis, established
the following guidelines:

But, since at Rome as well as elsewhere there are being circulated certain assertions, acts,
manuscripts, and, perchance, printed documents of the Congregations held in the presence of

22
Clavis regia, I, disp. II “De praedefinitionibus,” 163.
23
Jacobus Echard, Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum recensiti (1721), 462.
24
Dupin, 160.
 19

most happily reigning Clement VIII and Paul V on the question of ‘Aids of Divine Grace,’
both under the name of Francis Pegna, once Dean of the Roman Rota, and under the name
of Fr. Thomas of Lemos, O.P., and of other prelates and theologians, who, as it is asserted,
were present at the aforementioned Congregations, besides a certain autograph or exemplar
of the Constitution of the same Paul V on the definition of the aforesaid question de auxiliis,
and of the condemnation of the opinion or opinions of Louis Molina, S.J., His Holiness by the
present decree declares and decrees that no trust at all is to be placed in the above-
mentioned assertions, acts, on behalf of the opinion of the Brothers, O.S.D. [Order of Saint
Dominic], as well as of Louis Molina and of the other religious, S.J., and in the autograph or
exemplar of the above mentioned Constitution of Paul V; and that nothing can or ought to
be alleged by either side or by anyone whatsoever; but that on this aforesaid question, the
decrees of Paul V and Urban VIII, their predecessors, are to be observed.25

Much has been made out of the phrase “no trust at all is to be placed” (nullam
omnino esse fidem adhibendam) in the above-mentioned assertions and Acts.
According to some people, these documents should not be consulted at all because
they were thought to be spurious and untrustworthy; according to others, this
papal injunction is aimed at downplaying the value of these texts in order to keep
the peace between the two quarrelling parties.
Let the careful reader, however, notice that the decree of Innocent X did not
a) Condemn the contents of the texts; b) Call them “apocryphal” (namely, deny
the paternity of their authors); c) Declare them to be forgeries (in other words,
state that their contents were manufactured) ; d) Place them on the Index of
Forbidden Books (though several works for and against both Jesuits and
Jansenists ended up in such list); e) Forbid Catholic scholars to consult them; f)
Deny their historical accuracy; g) Ordered them to be destroyed – again, the
Pope’s decree simply said that “they should not be trusted at all.”
But what does it mean “not to trust at all”? The answer depends on the
context in which this statement is found: in other words, they cannot be trusted
as “evidence” in support and/or condemnation of either one of the two litigant
orders, namely the Dominicans and Jesuits, especially considering that the
resolutions of Paul V and Urban VIII were at the time still in effect (i.e., waiting
for a pontifical official pronouncement on the matter of de auxiliis). In summary,
they cannot be trusted as a tool to put to rest either the Molinist or the
Dominican views because they do not possess an official juridical status (fidem in
judicio nullam faciunt)26(especially the never-issued pontifical Bull by Paul V,
condemning Molinist views), or ecclesiastical imprimatur. Nonetheless, as Serry
aptly put it: “I believe it is plain foolish to attempt to define and to evaluate

25
See patristica.net/denzinger, # 1097 (in the new version of Denzinger the text is listed as #
2008).
26
Serry, Historiae congregationum de auxiliis divinae gratiae (1700), XLIII.
 20

historical events associated with the de auxiliis controversy other than through
these documents.”27
The XVIII century Jesuit polemicist De Meyer railed against the texts
employed by Serry:28 he claimed that even if we supposed that these Acts were
originally written by their declared authors, they are nevertheless: a) Interpolated
and corrupted; b) Published in subtle and direct violation of the instructions given
by the Pope, namely that no works should be published on the topic of divine
grace, under threat of severe canonical sanctions;29 c) Even though some of them
(i.e. Coronel’s) contain the Congregation de auxiliis’ censors’ resolutions, such
resolutions and censorships were nonetheless ignored by Pope Paul V, who never
acted upon them: so what weight do these Acts actually have, doctrinally
speaking?; d) They occasionally contradict each other.30
We can reasonably speculate that the reason that prompted Jesuits to
criticize, disparage, and vehemently object to what they regarded as an
illegitimate and unlawful use of questionable sources was that they portrayed
Molina’s views and his Jesuits defenders’ arguments in an unfavorable light.

Panoplia

The second major work in Lemos’ literary production is Panoplia gratiae

(The Armor of Grace, or Concerning the freely bestowed, divine, suave, and powerful
ordaining, guidance, and means bestowed on and free progress of a rational creature
towards a supernatural end), published in four volumes in 1676 in Liege, Belgium.
Lemos’ rebuttal of Molina’s and the Jesuits’ views, in his most recent biographer’s
words, occupies “la parte más extens a y principal de este preciado monumento de
teología católica , en que campea el carácter ingenuo y candoroso de nuestro Dominico, la
facilidad y pureza de su estilo y el rigor del método que tan poderosamente ayudó á sus
triunfos.”31

27
Ibid., XLVI.
28
Lievin De Meyer, Historiae controversiarum de divinae gratiae auxiliis (1705).
29
Serry (Historia congregationum de auxiliis divinae gratiae, 1709 edition) remarked that even
if the publication of these Acts was indeed in subtle and indirect violation of the instructions
given by the Pope, namely that no works should be published on the topic of divine grace under
threat of severe canonical sanctions, the fact remains that many Jesuit authors, such as Juan de
Ripalda, Gabriel Henao, and Lessius, egregiously violated the injunction of silence in a blatant
and impertinent manner (Serry, xxxiv).
30
Serry noted that the occasional inconsequential discrepancy (“not concerning events, but
words or the order of statements,” ibid., xxx) between Coronel’s and Lemos’ Acts, far from
discrediting them, strengthens their reliability, since they are mutually corroborating.
31
Meruendano, 107-08. The contents of Panoplia are outlined in Dupin, 160-171; and Touron,
119-22.
 21

Towards the end of 1680 a packet was anonymously delivered to the

Dominicans in Rome, containing a copy of the work The Armor of Grace, authored
by Thomas Lemos. The Master of the Order at that time, Antonio de Monroy,
sent it to the Pope through a trusted subordinate. At the papal court somebody
got a chance to look at this text and began raising doubts about its Lemosian
authorship and even orthodoxy, claiming that it contained Jansenist errors.
The two main reasons advocated by the un-named critics for rejecting this
text were:
1) Any and all books dealing with the subject matter of grace, a topic on which
the Pope has not yet expressed his final and binding judgement must be
prohibited. Another alleged inconvenient and deplorable feature of The Armor of
Grace was that it contained over twenty passages in which Lemos vehemently
attacked Jesuit views, censoring them and labeling as “heretical,” “Pelagian,” and
“Semipelagian,” defying several pontiffs’ injunctions that debating parties should
not call into question each other’s good faith and orthodoxy.
2) There are several passages in The Armor of Grace that echo, faithfully
reproduce, or parallel the five Jansenist propositions condemned in the 1653
Apostolic Constitution Cum occasione.
Some Dominicans rose to meet this challenge to the honor and orthodoxy of
their confrere Thomas of Lemos. In 1682, a one hundred fifty-three pages
anonymous treatise was published, titled A memorandum shown by some members of
the Dominican order to Innocent XI, containing the vindication against misguided critics,
of the books written by Thomas of Lemos, O.P. with the title Panoplia Gratiae.32
The response in this memorandum to the first point made by its un-named
critics was that if this standard had to be upheld in a rigorous and fair manner,
very few books written by Jesuits should have been allowed to circulate as well; in
fact, Henao, Lessius, Juan de Ripalda, Suarez and many other Jesuit theologians,
not only incidentally and peripherally, but openly and boldly, dealt at great
length with the topic of divine helps, completely by-passing or cavalierly ignoring
Paul V’s specific instruction.33 The Dominicans concluded that to point the finger
at Lemos for doing that was hypocritical and unfair. Moreover, a closer analysis
of each of those twenty passages reveals them to be legitimate considerations and
not slanderous, or unfair labeling of Lemos’ opponents and their views.
As far as the second point is concerned, the author of the memorandum
shows that the accusation is preposterous; under the heading of each of the five

32
Memoriale cum vindiciis librorum P. M. F. Thomae de Lemos ... panoplia gratiae in
scriptorvm ... Innocentio XI exhibitum a quibusdam PP. ejusdem ordinis contra indiscretos
censores (1682).
33
The Pope forbade the members of the two orders to accuse each other of heresy, to write books
about grace and predestination, and to preach against each other’s views.
 22

Jansenist propositions,34 after quoting each and every incriminated passage from
Panoplia allegedly reflecting them, the author demonstrates that such texts were
invariably taken out of their context, inaccurately quoted, wrongly interpreted, or
just plainly contradicting what the Jansenist propositions were saying.
Statements such as: “I do not see in what sense, and with what words Lemos said
anything like that. Actually, when we read the entire chapter, we can see Lemos
said quite the opposite of the condemned Jansenist proposition” (p. 69), and “It is
sad to see men who are members of a religious order be so duplicitous and partial
in their rendering a verdict” (p. 115), are found throughout the memorandum.
Thomas of Lemos’ monumental Panoplia is divided into four books. I have
translated their Table of Contents for the readers’ benefit.35

BOOK I - Introductory study: Pelagius and his followers’ celebration of the

powers of free will instead of a humbler assessment of it, in light of the
consequences of Original Sin; the infallibility of divine predefinitions safeguarding
the contingency of things, and the freedom of the will.
PART ONE:

FIRST TREATISE: Pelagius and his errors (19 chapters): pp. 1-50.
Lemos attempts to show that Pelagius did not deny the supernatural and
inner graces that are supposed to clear one’s understanding and clarify one’s
will, but rather denied efficacious grace and sufficient grace that bestows the
power to act.

SECOND TREATISE: The error of the Manicheans and other sects (i.e., Lutherans and
Calvinists) concerning freedom of the will (3 chapters, with the views of
Pelagians, Catholics and Calvinists listed in three parallel columns): pp.
51–60.

THIRD TREATISE: The errors of Celestius and Julian (Pelagius’ disciples) (2 chapters), and
the differences between the last two: pp. 61-68.

FOURTH TREATISE: Criticism, refutation and condemnation of the Pelagian heresy in

Augustine’s writings, various councils, and papal decrees (3 chapters): pp.
69-81.

34
1) Man is unable to keep some of God's commandments for want of grace; 2) In the state of
fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace; 3) To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature
it is sufficient to be free from external constraint; 4) The Semipelagian heresy consisted in
assuming the existence of a grace which man may either obey or resist; 5) Christ did not die for
all men, but solely for the predestined.
35
I stand by my customary habit of translating an important book’s Table of Contents, in the
hope of generating further interest in it.
 23

FIFTH TREATISE: The Semipelagians Cassian and Faustus of Rietz, and their errors (19
chapters): pp. 82-124.
Lemos highlighted the similarities between these theologians’ views of
grace and their Jesuits epigones’. For instance: they denied efficacious grace,
but merely admitted an exciting grace that morally stimulates the human
will; they claimed that the predestined are such in virtue of God’s
foreknowledge of their good works; and said that final perseverance is not
due to an irresistible divine gift but rather to the assent of the human will to
such gift. Lemos also pointed out thirteen errors incurred by Faustus which
are echoed by Jesuits.
Lemos went on to criticize some of Gennadius’ and Vincent of Lerins’ views,
claiming that Peter de Rivo’s theory of future contingents revived them,
only to be condemned by Pope Sixtus IV.

SIXTH TREATISE: Molina’s and recent theologians’ views concerning Original Sin and
God’s causation, will, predestination and knowledge of future events
(26 chapters): pp. 125-160.

PART TWO:

FIRST TREATISE: The wounds to free will caused by Original Sin (24 chapters): pp. 1-55.
Lemos quotes abundantly from councils and the Greek and Latin fathers
on this matter.

SECOND TREATISE: The nature of contingent things, and the root of contingency itself (18
chapters): pp. 56-86.

THIRD TREATISE: Divine predefinitions (24 chapters): pp. 87-145.

FOURTH TREATISE: The composite and divided senses according to Thomist philosophy
(21 chapters): pp. 146-199.
Particular emphasis is given to the idea that although free will never
resists divine grace, it always retains the power to do so.

FIFTH TREATISE: Analysis and criticism of “middle knowledge” on the basis of reason and
theological authorities (38 chapters): pp. 200-294.

SIXTH TREATISE: The true manner in which God knows future contingents and free actions
in relationship to the divine will (25 chapters): pp. 295-354.

BOOK II - God’s gratuitous, suave and powerful ordering of the rational

creature to a supernatural end.
FIRST TREATISE: Common Providence (39 chapters): pp. 1-77.

SECOND TREATISE: God’s eternal predilection, by which he called people to his kingdom
 24

and chose them for glory (39 chapters): pp. 78- 153.

THIRD TREATISE: Predestination, mostly criticizing the idea that it is based on God’s
foreseen good use of free will (49 chapters): pp. 154-256.

FOURTH TREATISE: Reprobation (22 chapters): pp. 257-311. Lemos rejected the view that
reprobation and election occurred before God’s foreknowledge of the Fall;
according to him, they occurred after it.

FIFTH TREATISE: The Predestination of Christ, who merited our predestination (28
chapters): pp. 312-364.
Lemos argues that God has not chosen from all eternity any person for
grace and glory other than through Christ and his merits.

SHORT TREATISE AGAINST LESSIUS: Lessius claimed that God’s predestination does not
take place according to God’s will (propositum), nor
to his middle knowledge, but rather to his
absolute foreknowledge (9 chapters): pp 1-84.

BOOK III - The influence of God in the secondary causes of the natural order to
produce its natural operations, namely his prevenient and predetermining
concurrence (rather than simultaneous concurrence, as per in the Jesuits’ view).
PART ONE:

FIRST TREATISE: The necessity, substance and manner of God’s general influence on
secondary causes (46 chapters): pp. 2-94.

SECOND TREATISE: Human free will and the way it is moved by God’s previous influence
(29 chapters): pp. 95-166.

THIRD TREATISE: The quality and manner of divine concurrence by which the will is
moved (15 chapters): pp. 167-205.

FOURTH TREATISE: The concurrence of God previously influencing the will is aptly called
Physical Predetermination (32 chapters): pp. 206-284.

PART TWO:

FIRST TREATISE: Original Sin, and the wounds and evils it engendered in humankind (7
chapters): pp. 1-16.

SECOND TREATISE: The concurrence of God required for the performance of morally good
deeds (39 chapters): pp. 17-126.
 25

BOOK IV - The efficacy of prevenient grace by which God works in us the

willing and the performing of good deeds.
PART ONE:

FIRST TREATISE: The supernatural character of the acts of faith, hope, and charity, and of
other infused virtues (4 chapters): pp. 1-8.

SECOND TREATISE: The necessity of divine grace in order to observe God’s commandments
and to avoid sins (18 chapters): pp. 9-54.

THIRD TREATISE: The necessity of grace to overcome temptations (13 chapters): pp. 55-85.

FOURTH TREATISE: The necessity of grace in order to believe and to be saved (17
chapters): pp. 86-128.

FIFTH TREATISE: Concerning human powers to desire and request God’s grace (2
chapters): pp. 129-133.

SIXTH TREATISE: The required dispositions to receive grace (28 chapters): pp. 134-209.

SEVENTH TREATISE: Concerning prevenient, exciting and helping grace (22 chapters): pp.
210-262.

EIGHTH TREATISE: Operating and cooperating grace (10 chapters): pp. 263-286.

PART TWO:

FIRST TREATISE: The necessity of actual helps of divine grace (4 chapters): pp. 1-11.

SECOND TREATISE: The division of grace’s helps (10 chapters): pp. 12-35.

THIRD TREATISE: Sufficient help (20 chapters): pp. 36-99.

FOURTH TREATISE: Efficacious help of divine grace (39 chapters): pp. 100-222.

FIFTH TREATISE: The great gift of final perseverance (5 chapters): pp. 223-234.

Lemos’ Minor Works

There are many other essays, letters and theological writings authored by
Lemos, none of which were ever published in his lifetime.36

36
Dupin listed twenty (pp. 172-75); the Praeloquium to his Acta, seventeen (v-xi); Echard,
nineteen (463,64).
 26

The original manuscripts of Lemos’ works are in the General Archive of the
Order of Preachers (AGOP)37 in Series XIV, contained in sixteen thick volumes.
Some copies of the Lemosian manuscripts are found in the National Library in
Paris, others in the ancient Vatican libraries. Hernandez Martin wrote on his web
page:

Antonio Michelitsch offers an extensive list of Lemos’ works, but I have seen many
mistakes, as he worked on catalogs that are not complete. Also, Rome’s Casanatense
Library38 does not mention the codices 2447-2448 (ancient symbol X.IV. 15-16). There are
also Lemosian manuscripts on the topic of grace in the Vatican Apostolic Library, such as
the codices 862, 1059-1074 and 8532 of the Latin Barberini Library Fund. The detailed list
would occupy many pages.

37
Archivum Generale Ordinis Praedicatorum (A.G.O.P) is a special ecclesiastical archive
containing a collection of more than five hundred papal Bulls, priceless manuscripts, the Acts of
the General Chapters, the Registers of the Masters, the Records of Provinces, the Causes of the
Dominican Saints, foundation of Monasteries, reports of Congregations, and personal files of the
brethren (http://www.op.org/en/content/archivum).
38
See the YouTube video “Library Casanatense, a cultural treasure hidden among the streets of
Rome.” Girolamo Casanate (1620-1700) was an Italian cardinal who donated twenty-five
thousands books to the Dominican order.
 27

Chapter 2
Lemos’ Acta
THIRTY-SIXTH CONGREGATION (January 4, 1605. The following
cardinals were absent: Pinelli, Arrigoni, Sfondrati and de Givry. A new cardinal in
attendance was Del Bufalo. Two ecclesial censors were absent as well: one had
died in December 1604 (Ippolito Massari), and the other (Landi) fell ill).39

Topic: Assuming the use of middle knowledge in God, is the decree of predestination
nonetheless absolute and un-conditional, or does it depend on the use of free will, and is it
under this condition, namely that man must consent to grace out of his innate freedom?

Following the inconclusive outcome of several debates that occurred before a

commission of two cardinals and several bishops and theologians between 1597
and 1601 concerning Molina’s controversial book Concordia, Pope Clement VIII
decided to preside himself over a new round of debates: on February 3rd, 1602 he
communicated to the superiors of both the Dominican and Jesuit orders the topics
that were to be discussed in his presence and before the Congregation de auxiliis
on the first session scheduled for March 20th, 1602; these disputations took place
from March 20, 1602 to Jan 22, 1605 for a total of 68 sessions and 37 debates.
The number of members of the Congregation was also increased, now to include
14 cardinals (10 in Coronel’s list), most of whom held Law degrees (and thus were
skilled in argumentation); 5 consulting bishops; and 5 theologians censors (4 in
Coronel’s list).40
This debate addressed the question formulated by the Pope on November
4th, 1604. Clement VIII had asked whether Peter’s salvation was contingent upon
God knowing future contingents through his middle knowledge and placing him
in this order of things, whereby Peter, consenting out of his free will to the divine
aids made available to him, is going to be saved; or was Peter’s salvation
absolutely decreed by God? Moreover, what did Augustine and Molina have to
say about this?
The Jesuit Bastida spoke first.41 He said that the decree of predestination, by
which God wanted to save Peter, is absolute: in other words, as Molina himself
claimed, it is not conditional. However, such decree presupposes middle
39
For a Jesuit perspective of the congregations being examined in this chapter, see the previously
mentioned Lievin de Meyer, Historiae controversiarum de divinae gratiae auxiliis (1705): 513-
21; 567-698. De Meyer (1655-1730) was a learned Jesuit scholar, poet, and Rector of the Jesuit
College in Louvain.
40
See Appendix A at the end of the book.
41
Acta, 927-34.
 28

knowledge. Bastida backed his claim with the following three views, which he
resolved to prove:
1) Even though the divine decree presupposes middle knowledge, it is nonetheless
absolute (in other words, middle knowledge is compatible with the absoluteness
of the decree of predestination).
2) This decree does not just happen to be absolute: it necessarily must be
absolute.
3) There is no other way this decree could be absolute, unless it presupposed
middle knowledge.
Bastida proved the first point by quoting Mt 24:22: “If those days had not
been cut short, no one would survive, but for the sake of the elect those days will
be shortened;” and Mt 26:53,54: “Do you think I cannot call on my Father, and he
will at once put at my disposal more than twelve legions of angels? But how then
would the Scriptures be fulfilled that say it must happen in this way?” The gist of
these two passages, according to Bastida, is that both decisions on the part of God
(i.e., to shorten the days, and to allow Jesus to suffer) are absolute, and yet
presuppose the knowledge of the possibility (i.e., middle knowledge of future
conditionals) that things could have been different in other orders of things (i.e.,
the days could have not been shortened; and the Father could have sent legions of
angels, had Jesus asked for his help).
More specifically, in Peter’s case, God’s decree to place him in this order of
things is absolute and does not require Peter’s faithfulness and willingness to
follow Jesus as a preliminary condition. Bastida reminded his audience of the
truth of the well-known proposition: “If Peter runs, he moves.” The consequence
of this statement (“he moves”) is absolute, even though it is predicated upon the
non-determined or not-necessary presupposition that he indeed chose to run.
Bastida then applied this principle to his view of God’s (absolute) decree and
middle knowledge (i.e., the choice of possible scenarios presupposing human free
will).
Bastida went on to prove the second point by claiming that in God the
foreknowledge of all possible means to be employed, though preceding (logically
speaking) the willing of a specific end and of the means to that end, does not
prevent such willing from being absolute. Thus, both God’s decision to save Peter
and his willingness to employ the means necessary for that end are absolute, even
though such decision presupposes the foreknowledge of all possible conditional
means through his middle knowledge. If the decree of predestination did not
presuppose middle knowledge, such decree could not be really absolute,
considering that the two are inter-related: in other words, an absolute decree to
save a person must indeed presuppose the foreknowledge of the means to be
utilized (to some of which, in some other hypothetical scenarios, a person would
admittedly not respond).
 29

In regard to point number three, Bastida claimed that even the Dominicans
admit that God’s absolute decree presupposes the simple (fore)knowledge of
future contingents (praescientiam conditionalium),42 as in the case of Tyre and Sidon
(Mt 11:21: “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the miracles that
were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have
repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes”).
Augustine himself in The Predestination of the Saints 9, 17 (in which he quoted
a passage from his treatise against Porphyry as to why the Gospel came so late in
the world) said that much, and so did Thomas Aquinas in Summa IIIa, q.1, art. 3
and 5. Thus, the absolute decree of the divine will remains absolute even though
it presupposes foreknowledge of futuribles (a neologism, meaning “future
possible”) under condition. On this note, Bastida rested his case.
Now it was the Dominicans turn to speak. Lemos repeated the question the
Pope had asked, which was the object of the debate: “Is God’s decision to save
Peter unique and absolute, efficacious in and of itself, and independent of Peter’s
foreknown inner freedom? Or
rather does it include that condition, whereby the decision to save Peter depends
for its efficacy on Peter’s will; awaits for it; and almost remains suspended ‘until’
it foresees what Peter’s inner freedom will do?”
Lemos suggested that the answers we give to these questions engender two
different situations: if we agree that the decision to save Peter is absolute and
independent from his foreknown will, it is very obvious that the good use of his
will derives from the grace of God, which makes him use well the aforementioned
aids; conversely, if God’s decision is established
under that condition, and in dependence of Peter’s innate freedom, which is
foreknown—it then manifestly follows that the good use of divine aids proceeds
only from Peter’s innate freedom.43
Lemos proceeded to make four points. First, he said, it must be firmly
established that in God there is only one decree of predestination, by which he
wanted to save Peter out of his absolute will, without any dependence whatsoever
on the created will of Peter, even as it was previously foreknown. Likewise, it
must be firmly denied that there is a second or another decree existing under
certain conditions, as Molina claimed. The first type of God’s decision mentioned
by the Pope in his query must be upheld and preached since it contains the
Catholic doctrine of predestination against the noxious Pelagian view: this view,
also upheld by Semipelagians, faulted Augustine’s doctrine of predestination with
removing free will and introducing a fatalistic necessity. Semipelagians also
claimed that predestination is merely God’s providence indifferently supplying
aids to everybody, a providence accompanied by God’s foreknowledge of who will
42
Ibid., 932.
43
This will be the topic of the next congregation, number thirty-seven.
 30

make good use of them; however, Augustine, Prosper, and eventually the Second
Council of Orange rose up against such view. Thus, any view that claims that
predestination is contingent upon God’s foreknowledge must be rejected as the
accursed Pelagian doctrine.44
Second, the Second Council of Orange, in its fourth canon says: “If anyone
contends that in order that we may be cleansed from sin, God waits for our good
will, but does not acknowledge that even the wish to be purged is produced in us
through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, he opposes the Holy Spirit
himself, who says through Solomon: ‘Good will is prepared by the Lord’[ Prov.
8:35: LXX], and the Apostle who beneficially says: ‘It is God, who works in us
both to will and to accomplish according to his good will’ [Phil. 2:13].’”
This canon expressly denies that God awaits for man to make up his mind
and to choose out of his innate freedom to be reconciled with his Maker.
Third, the decree of predestination must be certain and firm according to
God’s decision, not man’s. Thus, Molina’s view blatantly contradicts Augustine’s
and, worse yet, Paul’s teaching, because it introduces the notion of certain
conditions on the part of man (namely, that he would use well the aids of grace
out of his innate freedom), thus turning the decree of God into the decree of man
(ergo decretum illud per illam conditionem sit certum secundum hominis propositum).45
Fourth, Molina’s view goes against the Scripture and the sayings of the
Fathers and especially Tomas Aquinas’ view in De veritate q. 6, art. 3. Aquinas
argued that it is impossible for any power, no matter how complex, to exist in act,
other than in virtue of a divine motion moving and actualizing it; therefore, it is
impossible that the human will, out of its inner freedom alone, be actualized by
making good use of the aids of grace, unless it is first moved and oriented to its
actualization by divine grace. In Philosophy as well, it is claimed that a secondary
cause is moved by a first cause; unless moved by it, the secondary cause remains
un-actualized.
In conclusion, Lemos argued, the good use of the aids of divine grace does
not stem from the mere innate human freedom, but from divine grace, which truly
and actively ensures that man uses well the gifts given to him. Thus, we could not
make sense of the following three texts if all they were saying was that God
exercises a mere external, moral influence on us:

• Pope Celestine, in his letter to the bishops of Gaul: “No one ever uses well free
will other than through Christ.”
• The Council of Orange’s (which Lemos mistakenly placed under the pontificate
of Leo I) canon 9: “For as often as we do good, God is at work in us and with us,
in order that we may do so.”
44
Ibid., 935.
45
Ibid., 937.
 31

• Paul’s claim in Phil 2:13: “For it is God who works in you to will and to act in
order to fulfill his good purpose.”

Therefore, Lemos lamented that Molina would say something along these
lines: “I owe it to my innate freedom alone that I used well my will and the aids of
grace. This is from myself; I did not receive it from God or from his grace. I can
glory in it!” Obviously, this view is radically
opposed to everything Augustine wrote in various works (at this point Lemos
brought up several quotes from Letter to Vitalis, On Rebuke and Correction, and
Retractions).
Addressing the Pope directly, Lemos claimed that Molina and his supporters
find in our will something good that stems from us, namely the good use of free
will and the good use of the aids of grace: truly, Molina does not mean anything
else in his Concordia other than that (Quod enim in hoc laboret Molina, et quod in tota
sua Concordia nihil aliud intendat, immo id apertis verbis affirmet, ostensum fuit
saepe).46According to Molina, God first foreknows through his middle knowledge
what a person’s free will, if placed in such and such circumstances would do; then
God wills this particular order we are all living in. Thus, predestination
according to the Jesuits is an absolute decree all right, but not one stemming from
the absolute, unconditional divine will, since that, according to Molina, would
completely eliminate free will.47
At this point Bastida interjected that he wanted to hear Lemos quote Molina
himself. Lemos obliged by quoting a brief passage from Concordia and commented
that Molina says apertis verbis that although God wants with an absolute will to
create this particular order of things, nonetheless, even in this order of things he
does not want man to act and behave according to his (i.e., God’s) absolute will,
but only according to the condition that man wants to, since God delights in
man’s act of free will. Moreover, Molina also openly says that God has not
established a certain election of predestination to glory of certain people until
after (logically, not chronologically speaking) his absolute foreknowledge of the
good use of their free will, as they use well the aids of grace out of their inner
freedom.48
Lemos concluded:

Fr. Bastida, in all his examples, spoke about God’s absolute decree, which presupposes the
foreknowledge of something conditioned, though not dependent upon somebody else’s will.
However, the questionable issue at stake is not this general foreknowledge, but the
foreknowledge stemming from middle knowledge, by which God saw the future under a set

46
Ibid., 945.
47
Ibid., 946.
48
See the last question in Molina’s Appendix, at the end of the second edition of his book.
 32

of conditions depending upon the created human will. Thus, the decree of predestination
always includes that condition depending on the will of man; this is why it is not an absolute
decree of predestination, but a conditional one, as Molina himself said with clear words: thus,
it appears that when Fr. Bastida says it is absolute, he is expressly contradicting Molina!49

What followed was an intense and quick exchange between Lemos, on the
one hand, and Bastida and his confrere Salas, on the other. Bastida wondered how
can it be denied that the decree of predestination depends on the created will; on
his part, Lemos said that the good use of human free will depends on the will of
man, but that the efficacy of the decree of predestination does not depend on the
created will, unless one was to agree with what Pelagians used to claim. In
response, the two Jesuits insisted that election to glory does not come before
foreknowledge of human choices. Lemos disagreed, quoting Thomas Aquinas,
who in Summa q. 23, art. 4, listed the following “sequence” in God: 1)
Predilection, by which God loves with his divine will those whom he wants to
lead to a supernatural end (i.e., heaven); 2) Election, by which God, with his
divine will, chooses to bestow on his loved ones eternal glory; 3) An act of
practical intellect, by which, in virtue of that efficacious election to the kingdom
and eternal glory, he prepares specific means and aids through which (out of their
intrinsic efficacy) he destines people to glory.
Therefore, Lemos claimed, efficacious election to glory precedes every
preparation and foreknowledge of the means to be employed; Scotus too made
this claim when he said that in the divine mind what comes first is the will of an
end, rather than the will to confer specific means unto it. Augustine (Tractate n. 68
on the Gospel of John)50 talked about a double order of election to glory: the order of
intention (in which the divine decision to confer gratuitous gifts precedes all
foreseen merits), and the order of execution, through rewards and merits, which
presupposes foreknowledge of merits.
At this point, both Salas and Bastida replied that Molina’s view of election to
glory based on preaevisa merita should not be compared to that of Pelagians, since
they talked about predestination based on foreknowledge of natural good works,
performed without grace, whereas Molina upheld the necessity of grace.
Lemos disagreed and claimed that neither Pelagius nor his epigones ever said
that election unto glory comes from merely natural good works, since they too
upheld the need for grace; however, they said that heavenly glory stems from the
merit accrued by performing merely natural deeds. Semipelagians too said almost
the same thing, and went on to claim that predestination was indeed based on
foreseen good use of free will assisted by grace; and in this they erred (et in hoc
errabant). The Jesuits countered by saying that some scholastics said that
49
Ibid., 947, 948.
50
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1701068.htm
 33

predestination to glory derives from foreknowledge of good works, and that their
view was not Pelagian.51 They also argued that when Augustine talked about
predestination as the “foreknowledge and the preparation of God’s benefits,
whereby they are most certainly delivered, whoever they are that are delivered”
(The Gift or Perseverance, 35), by “foreknowledge” he meant that of persons who
are foreknown before being predestined (as Paul says in Rom 8:29). Lemos
disagreed, insisting that such text referred to the foreknowledge of benefits, not of
the innate human freedom.
Bastida replied that if that was the case, even so, Augustine must have had in
mind that foreknowledge of gifts applies to the good use people will make of
them, under a future condition. Lemos repeated that God through his simple
knowledge (in his view, middle knowledge was un-necessary to explain
predestination) foreknew who would make good
use of his gifts, because prior to those merits that human beings would one day
earn he had already decided to predestine those people, anyway; the only
foreknowledge that really matters is of what God, rather than humans, decides to
do.
What followed was a brief exchange in which Lemos denied saying what
Bastida claims he is saying, and accused the Jesuit of putting words in his mouth.
Bastida replied that in the next debate he will show how Lemos’ view is basically
in agreement with the view of Calvin, according to which the human will cannot
dissent from God’s will. At this point Alvarez cried foul: “We have never said
that!” followed by Cardinal Bernerio’s comment to the Jesuit fathers: “You Jesuits
bring up many things that these Dominicans do not claim; nor do you really reply
to the very clear testimonies adduced by them against your doctrine!”52
Thus ended the thirty-sixth debate, which Lemos noted lasting about four
hours.53
51
I find it very puzzling that no one seemed to remember and utilize the contribution on the topic
of predestination made by medieval authors and scholastics, other than the usual Scotus, Aquinas
and Bonaventure. On such authors’ contribution, see my The Colors of Grace: Medieval
Kaleidoscopic Views of Grace and Predestination (Xlibris, 2008), and Parts Two and Three of
my God’s Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to
the Renaissance (Xlibris, 2009).
52
Acta, 953. Lemos, always a stickler for precision, said that these may not have been the exact
words spoken, but rather their gist.
53
Lemos added that another brief exchange ensued when Bastida said that Molina should not be
reprehended for saying that God is pleased with the good deeds of human beings performed out
of their innate freedom (a reference to Lk 12:32: ‘Do not be afraid little flock, for your Father
has been pleased to give you the kingdom.’). To this, Lemos replied that God is pleased with his
will and with what he is going to do, and then remarked: “The Holy Father said: ‘God is pleased
with his own will indeed, not with the alien human will,’ thereby almost upholding the view
previously defended by Tomas Lemos,” Acta, 954.
 34

Chapter 3

THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGREGATION (September 20, 1605. Eight cardinals

in attendance; all other censors present, except the Carmelitan Antonio Bovio.
The debate lasted about three and a half hours).

Topic: The sixth question of Clement VIII: do the fifteen propositions listed in it faithfully
represent Augustine’s thought concerning grace?54

Following Clement VIII’s death on March 3rd, 1605, Pope Paul V, formerly
Cardinal Borghese, chose September 20th as the date of the new congregation (the
38th, since the pontificate of Clement VIII). At this time, Lemos debated the
Jesuits Bastida and Perez for almost four hours on the question submitted by
Pope Clement to the debating parties two years beforehand (on July 9, 1603),
concerning Augustine’s views on grace.
Considering that Clement’s question was very complex (i.e., it was broken
down into fifteen propositions, at the end of each he asked whether it reflected
Augustine’s thought), and considering that it would have taken an inordinate
amount of time to debate all of the propositions contained in it at great length,
Paul V decided to cut through the chase and to review Augustine’s view of grace
in only one congregation.
Bastida went first, and began to expound the Jesuits’ view (he announced he
had consulted his order’s theologians from all over Europe on this matter), which
he condensed in two propositions. In the first proposition, he agreed that the
fifteen statements gathered by Clement concerning Augustine’s view of grace
neatly and faithfully summarized it, either expressly or in equivalent terms (with
the exception of the fifth statement, which claims that grace’s efficacy derives
from God’s omnipotence, namely from the power that he exercises on the human
will, as well as on the rest of creation).55 Bastida also claimed that nine statements
reflected Augustine’s views in the very terms he employed, while the other five
reflected it in equivalent terms.56 In the second proposition, Bastida claimed
54
For an excellent summary of this congregation see Sylvio Hermann De Franceschi, “El
tomismo agustiniano de Tomas de Lemos y la referencia a san Agustin en tiempos de las
Congregaciones de auxiliis,” Criticon 111-112 (2011): 196-201.
55
Bastida quoted Banez, Avila and Alvarez to the effect that these theologians compared the
human will to inanimate objects, such as a stone or a piece of wood. Bastida pointed out that
such view ran contrary to Trent’s VI, canon 4, which condemned Calvin’s and Luther’s views.
Moreover, Augustine, in his Various Questions to Simplician I, 2, attributed the efficacy of
God’s will to the congruous call and persuasions which God directs to the attention of man’s free
will.
56
Acta, 1002.
 35

that these fifteen statements by Clement did not completely and fully accurately
represent Augustine’s view of grace, since Augustine said and taught many more
things on the matter.57
When Lemos’ turn to speak came, he replied that the fifteen statements found
in Clement’s question most perfectly (perfectissime) included Augustine’s views on
grace. Lemos also said that many remarks by Bastida were off-topic and that
therefore he would not address them. He then proceeded to dispute Bastida’s
claim that some of those statements were not the very words of Augustine, but
merely conveyed his thought in equivalent terms. As far as the fifth statement is
concerned (“God has power over the human will as (sicut) on all other things that
are under the heaven”), Lemos argued that there are at least four other passages
in Augustine’s works that uphold this principle (i.e., God’s power to turn the
human will where he wants it to go); and that the efficacy of God’s grace resides
in his omnipotence rather than in his foreknowledge.58 Lemos went on to add
confidently that these four texts clearly exemplify PP: “Physical premotion is
openly found in the teaching of this statement, and it has been handed down to us
by St. Augustine through the Supreme Pontiff.”59
Next, Lemos tackled the Jesuits’ objection that in the Our Father the
preposition “as,” in Latin sicut (i.e., “Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven”),
cannot possibly mean “in likewise manner,” since this would abrogate free will,
and that it should rather be understood to mean in a general sense “in proportion
to.”60 Lemos objected to the Jesuits’ interpretation saying that even though he

57
The ninth statement, for instance, claims that God’s efficacious grace is prevenient and not
subsequent, and that it is given not because we want, but so that we may want. True, said
Bastida; however, just because it is not subsequent does not exclude that it may be simultaneous,
accompanying and cooperating, just as Jesuits had been claiming all along. Also, the tenth
statement says that according to Augustine the effect of efficacious grace is certain and infallible:
true, said Bastida, but this certainty is based on God’s foreknowledge, not on his omnipotence.
58
Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace 5, 8: “Although it is not denied that God is able, even when
no man rebukes, to correct whom he will, and to lead him on to the wholesome mortification of
repentance by the most hidden and mighty power of his medicine;” On Grace and Free Will 20,
43: “I think it is sufficiently clear that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills
wherever he wills, whether to good deeds according to his mercy, or to evil after their own
deserts;” On Rebuke and Grace 14,43: “For so to will or not to will is in the power of him who
wills or wills not, as not to hinder the divine will nor overcome the divine power. For even
concerning those who do what he wills not, he himself does what he wills;” On Grace and Free
Will 14,29: “Now, if faith is simply of free will, and is not given by God, why do we pray for
those who will not believe, that they may believe? This would be absolutely useless to do, unless
we believe, with perfect propriety, that almighty God is able to turn to belief wills that are
perverse and opposed to faith.”
59
Acta, 1008.
60
Ibid., 1007.
 36

believed that the human will is not an inanimate object like a piece of wood
(Jesuits are fond of accusing Dominicans of upholding such view), nonetheless any
attempt to suggest that therefore our wills are not acted upon by God’s grace is
bound to be rebuffed by Scripture. Does not Is 10:5 speak of the Assyrians as the
rod of God’s anger? Do we not read in Jer 18:6 and Rom 9:21 that we are clay in
the hands of the potter? Did not Jesus say in Jn 15:1 that he is the vine and we are
the branches? And yet, none of these verses are to be taken to mean that we are
inanimate objects and that we have no real freedom, as Thomas Aquinas
explained in his Summa Ia, q. 83, art. 1: “Does Man Have Free Will?” Even
mediocre theologians know this to be the case!
In regard to the ninth statement, whether God’s grace is previous or
simultaneous or subsequent, Pope Clement perfectly understood that it cannot be
just simultaneous, since something has to bring about a beginning: thus, either
God moves man through his grace, or man through the freedom of his will
attracts God’s grace. Thus, Jesuits think like Semipelagians of old, who argued
that God’s grace acts simultaneously with human free will, as Prosper reported in
his letter to Augustine.61
In regard to the tenth statement, concerning the effects of God’s grace being
certain and infallible, the Jesuits try to base this certainty on God’s middle
knowledge. However, Lemos pointed out that both Augustine (who allegedly
rejected this view as the foundation of Semipelagian doctrine)62 and Thomas
Aquinas (De veritate q. 6, art. 3: “Is Predestination Certain?”) rejected the idea that
God’s foreknowledge is the cause of predestination. Moreover, Lemos
complained, there have already been three full congregations devoted to the topic
of middle knowledge: thus, there is no need to revisit this discussion.
Lemos concluded that a) all the fifteen statements, without any exception,
faithfully encapsulate Augustine’s view of grace against the Pelagians; b)
Augustine’s view of grace can be reconstructed either through all of these
statements taken together, or through any of them taken individually.63
Bastida objected that these statements contain Augustine’s entire doctrine of
grace against the Semipelagians, but not against the Calvinists. He also referred
to a passage from one of Augustine’s works, upholding the role of man’s free will:
“But if this is true and consequently not everyone who is called obeys the call,
since it is in the power of his will not to obey, it can rightly be said that it is not of
God who has mercy, but of the man who wills and runs, because the mercy of
61
I was not able to find an exact quote. Was Lemos dead wrong or did he misinterpret Prosper?
62
Jesuits through the ages have argued that what Semipelagians and Pelagians say about grace is
not what Molina and his followers were suggesting. Several books were specifically devoted to
defend Jesuits from this accusation. See for instance Lievin de Meyer’s De Pelagianorum et
Massiliensium contra fidem erroribus (1709).
63
Acta, 1011.
 37

God’s calling him does not suffice unless it is followed by the obedience of him
that is called” (Various Questions to Simplician 2, 13). Bastida went on to express his
dismay that a learned man like Lemos would say that there is no grace between
previous and subsequent grace, which is working simultaneously with human free
will: “What is ‘cooperating grace,’ then?” he asked.64
Lemos responded by saying that Bastida was misunderstanding Augustine’s
words, since how could the great saint possibly contradict what Paul wrote: “So
then it does not depend on the man who wills or the man who runs, but on God
who has mercy” (Rom 9:16)? Lemos also argued at length that God’s prevenient
grace is the reason why we cooperate with him in doing what is good, as
Augustine and Aquinas amply demonstrated. Lemos admitted the existence of
cooperating grace, though he insisted that in order for cooperation to begin to
exist something has to come first: in other words, God’s grace must first act
within a person, as both Augustine and Aquinas clearly argued.65 Moreover,
Lemos said, what is the point of accusing Dominicans to agree with Calvin, just
because it is possible to find an occasional convergence of views between
orthodox Christians and heretics? So what, if both Dominicans and Calvinists
agree that God’s grace is intrinsically efficacious and induces the human will to do
his bidding? The real difference, Lemos reminded Bastida, is that Calvin 1) insists
that there is no such thing as sufficient grace, or exciting grace, as he only admits
efficacious grace; 2) denies free will; 3) rejects the distinction between necessity of
consequence (i.e., conditional necessity, which does not harm freedom), and necessity
of the consequent (i.e., absolute necessity); 4) insists that God moves people to do
good but also to do evil. Lemos reminded his audience that Dominicans
vehemently oppose Calvin on all these accounts, as they follow the Catholic
theological tradition and the teachings of Trent.
When it was his turn, Bastida immediately replied that the consequence of
upholding PP is that it makes God the author of sin; it is therefore more fitting to
uphold the notion of “congruous grace,” whereby God gives his grace to those he
foreknows will make a good use of it. However, this does not amount to say that
God waits to see what man will do before giving him grace (i.e., the Pelagian and
Semipelagian error), but rather that he acts concurrently with man’s choices.66
Lemos was not impressed. He claimed that both Calvin and Pelagius are
wrong as they drew opposite extreme conclusions: Pelagius said that since we
have free will there is no such thing as efficacious grace, while Calvin said that
64
Ibid., 1017.
65
In Summa Ia IIae, q. 111, art. 2, entitled: “Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Operating
and Cooperating Grace,” Aquinas wrote: “And thus, if grace is taken for God’s gratuitous motion
whereby he moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating
grace.”
66
Acta, 1021.
 38

since there is efficacious grace, there is no free will. On the contrary, the Catholic
tradition teaches that our free will exists, though it is vulneratum, laesum and
extenuatum, but never irretrievably exctinctum. Lemos argued that though both
heretics erred, they agreed on one thing: the necessity of consequence, arising from
the divine decree, removes free will. However, Catholic tradition upholds against
Calvin the efficacious and exciting grace that leaves human freedom intact while
perfecting it, and against Pelagius, the efficacious grace that induces man to act
according to God’s will.
At this point, Cardinal DuPerron (i.e., a convert from Calvinism) interrupted
Lemos with an offside remark: Calvin did not deny Adam’s freedom before the
Fall, nor did he ever say that foreknowledge removes freedom. To this, Lemos
politely remarked that he was aware of Calvin’s views and proceeded to illustrate
them in great detail, to the satisfaction of the French cardinal, whom Lemos
noticed remaining silent and nodding approvingly.67

67
Ibid., 1024.
 39

Chapter 4

THIRTY-NINTH CONGREGATION (October 12, 1605. All in attendance.

Debate lasted about four and a half hours).

Topic: Efficacious grace in the form of Physical Predetermination is discussed for the
first time in a general way.

On September 23rd, Paul V submitted a question to both parties: “Does

efficacious grace move the human will to freely perform good deeds, not only
urging, inviting, exciting a person from within, but also differently than by
merely exercising a moral influence on him? And if so, may such grace be said to
be ‘physically predetermining’ as some Scholastics would have it?”
On October 12th 1605, the Congregation resumed its work and both parties
began debating the question submitted by the Pope.
At first Bastida allegedly became very defensive, complaining that he knew
that the minds of the censors were already made up, and that the Jesuits’ view
already stood condemned. This remark brought about the Pope’s irritated
response: “Answer the question! How do you know what other people think and
feel? What’s the point of such remark? We shall see in the various meetings what
the outcome will be.”68 Thus chastised, Bastida proceeded to argue his religious
order’s view. There are three terms, he said, that first need to be defined: 1)
efficacious grace; 2) moral influence; and 3) PP. As far as PP is concerned, Bastida
said he had a problem not so much with the term itself (first introduced by the
Dominican theologian Banez), but with the idea that it conveyed, namely that
God’s grace is a help given before the human will has a chance to consent to it,
infallibly inducing the human will to cooperate in such a way that the will cannot
de facto dissent. Moreover, PP must not be confused either with predetermination
of the human will, or with predestination. All in all, Bastida declared that PP
cannot be sustained as Dominicans envision it. To uphold his point, he drew two
conclusions.
First conclusion: God moves the human will not only suavely, morally
exciting and attracting the will to perform good deeds, but also “vere et active”
within one’s soul. In this sense, there is agreement with the Dominicans. He then
suggested two contrary ways to understand in what way something is produced
“very et active” (hence the difference of opinion with the Dominicans), in the sense
of something producing something real in something else: 1) A source of heat
generates heat in the water; in a similar fashion God, by true activity and his own

68
Acta, 1026.
 40

causality, impresses within a soul his own influence and stimuli. As long as we
imagine a person having the ability and possibility of removing the water from
the source of heat, Jesuits have no problem admitting this; or 2) A painter
bringing color on a house’s walls; if God is understood to move the human wills
in such manner, the principle of free will would not be safeguarded because the
human will must be thought of as capable to resist change. In essence, PP as
upheld by Dominicans is incompatible with free will’s power of contrary choice.
Second conclusion: there is no ground for either using the term PP or
supporting its theological value, since no matter how you look at it, engenders
three unsavory consequences: it removes free will; sufficient grace is rendered
useless, since unless PP is present the human will cannot operate; and finally, it
portrays God as physically predetermining the human will to material sin, thus
making him the author of sin.
Lemos replied with two conclusions of his own. First conclusion: it takes
more than just morally influential or suavely persuasive grace awaiting for our
consent in order to explain the way God operates in our hearts and wills; even
Pelagius admitted the existence of these inner influences (namely of God’s
exciting grace), and yet he was condemned by the Church for denying God’s
grace!69 Augustine railed against him in these terms:

Now what does it avail for Pelagius, that he declares the self-same thing under different
phases, that he may not be understood to place in law and teaching that grace which, as he
avers, assists the capacity of our nature? So far, indeed, as I can conjecture, the reason why
he fears being so understood is because he condemned all those who maintain that God’s
grace and help are not given for a man’s single actions, but exist rather in his freedom, or in
the law, and the teachings of our faith. And yet he supposes that he escapes detection by the
shifts he so constantly employs for disguising what he means by his formula of law and
teaching under so many various phases.70

Lemos insisted that it is not enough for the Jesuits to claim that they, unlike
Pelagius, uphold the existence of cooperating grace, for that cooperation is rooted
in the belief that the human will, out of its innate freedom, first decides to agree with
those inner moral persuasions: Julian, Cassian and Faustus said that much, and
were consequently condemned by the Church for denying the true grace of
Christ.71 Thus, it will not do to merely uphold God’s moral influences: what
human beings need is efficaciously prevenient grace, which pre-determines our
wills. Second conclusion: this grace efficacious in itself, which leaves free will

69
Ibid., 1032.
70
Augustine, The Grace of Christ 9, 10.
71
Acta, 1034.
 41

intact,72 can appropriately be termed PP, and we should embrace it (though the
Jesuits vehemently object to it as a concept, not so much as a term) against the
extremes of Pelagianism and Calvinism. In support of his conclusion, Lemos
quoted the testimony of Pope Celestine I and of St. Augustine, to the effect that
PP properly explains how grace operates on man’s will and concluded: “It cannot
be explained or perceived how man wills, without a real and proper physical pre-
motion by which God infallibly moves man’s free will to give its assent.”73 As
Aquinas explained, there are various ways to make someone move: by means of
influence, persuasion, excitement or urging; however, let us not forget the main
way, namely that which makes something move, effectively bringing about its
motion (causa perficiens), which infallibly produces an effect. On the other hand, a
moral cause may or may not produce an effect, depending on whether the subject
agrees with it or not; thus, we cannot say that a moral cause is a true and proper
cause in the strict sense of the term.74
Next, Lemos turned to Trent’s VI, can. 4, which says that man’s will is motum
et excitatum. According to him, the combination of these two terms clearly proves
that the Council can indeed be cited in support of PP. Not only the term “motum”
denotes a real and true physical motion: the addition of the term “excitatum”
would be superfluous and redundant if indeed “motum” only referred to a mere
moral influence.75 Lemos pressed his point further by remarking that when we
take a closer look at Trent’s canons and definitions we notice that they perfectly
uphold a balance of God’s initiative and necessity of efficacious grace, and human
free will.
But even so, how are we to interpret the statement in canon 4: “If anyone
says…that human free will….cannot refuse its assent if it wishes, but that, as
something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive, let him be
anathema”? Lemos was quick in pointing out that Dominicans fully agree that
human beings retain the power to dissent from grace (potentiam liberam ad non
volendum). Let us take a closer look at what he said, since it reveals the heart of
the Dominicans’ understanding of free will:

72
Lemos said: “Deum ita movere, ut homo liberrime, liberrime, liberrime, inquam, consentiat.”
Notice the thrice repeated “most freely.” Ibid., 1035.
73
Ibid., 1039.
74
Ibid., 1040.
75
In all fairness, it could be objected to Lemos that if indeed the human will is “motum” Trent’s
canon’s term “excitatum” would be superfluous as well. What would really have helped Lemos’
argument is a reversed order of terms: the human will being “excitatum et motum:” in other
words, had the canon said that first God’s grace arouses the will in an inner, morally attractive
way, and then efficaciously moves it.
 42

The fact remains that when the wills wants, it does not have the free potentiality to want and
not want at the same time; nor does it have the free power to combine simultaneously these
two things, namely willing and not willing, since this would amount to the power to do two
contradictory things, which is no real power at all. Nor can human free will consist in this,
namely to have the power of contrary choice. Therefore, it is fitting to say that human
free will, moved and excited by God, does not have the free power to combine and reconcile
these two situations: human free will is moved by God to agree, and yet it does not do that.
Nor can human free will consist in this, namely in the efficacy of the divine aid to consent
and dissent to itself. However, free will, as it is moved efficaciously and excited by God
retains the free potential to dissent if it wants to; this is why we may simply and absolutely
say that it may dissent if it wants to, even when divinely moved and excited, as the Council
openly stated.76

At this point, the Jesuit party interjected that free will still retains its
freedom, even as it applies itself to a particular choice it freely made, because if
grace is indeed efficacious in and of itself and moves the will before it can make its
own choices, as the Dominicans claim, it cannot be said to be truly free.
Lemos disagreed, citing Augustine’s Rebuke and Grace 14, 45 (“The Almighty
has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have”) and Aquinas’
Summa Ia IIae, q. 10, art. 4 ad. 3 (“If God moves the will to anything, it is
incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto; but it is
not impossible simply. Consequently, it does not follow that the will is moved by
God necessarily”). Lemos produced more quotes from Aquinas to the effect that
God’s will cannot be thwarted; in conclusion, true freedom of the will does not
consist in de facto choosing differently than what God wants it to, but rather in
retaining the power to do so (though this does not entail necessity or coerciveness
on God’s part).
Lemos went on to emphasize what freedom consists of according to
Augustine’s view expressed in On Rebuke and Grace 8, where Augustine referred
to Jesus’ words: “But I have prayed for you, Simon, that your faith may not fail.
And when you have turned back, strengthen your brothers” (Lk 22:32). Is it
admissible to say, Lemos quipped, that Peter could have thwarted Jesus’ intention
by that freedom of choice fancied by the Jesuits (i.e., the power of contrary
choice)? We should rather say, Lemos argued, that as a result of Jesus’ prayer
Peter enjoyed a “most free, strong, invincible, persevering will.”77
Lemos went on to quote Aquinas to the effect that just because nothing
resists the will of God, it does not follow that everything happens necessarily:

Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done
which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way he wills. Now, God wills

76
Acta, 1044, 1045.
77
Ibid., 1047.
 43

some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
the building of the universe. Therefore to some effects he has attached necessary causes that
cannot fail; but to others, he has attached defective and contingent causes from which
contingent effects arise. Hence, it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the
effects willed by God happen contingently, but rather because God prepared contingent
causes for them, being his will that they should happen contingently.78

In summary, God has ordained that man act freely; however, if he acted un-
freely, it would run counter to God’s will, which is impossible. Thus, according to
Lemos, “freedom consists in this, namely that although the human will is always
moved by God, it nevertheless operates freely, truly possessing the free power by
which a person may choose not to operate, if he so chooses.”79 More specifically,
when God acts on the will he first influences the intellect so that a person may
perceive as desirable an object he may at first have regarded with indifference. At
that point, the intellect, freely and not necessarily, proposes that object to the
will; God then excites the will with his grace by means of moral attractions and
invitations, and eventually with most efficacious strength (“dat vires efficacissimas
animae ”), so that the human will freely pursues that which it has come to love.
Aristotle himself outlined this process, even though he did not use the term
“God,” but “First Mover.”
But what about the objections made by the Jesuit party? They protested that
they too believe that God’s prevenient grace moves the will “vere et active.”
However, Lemos insisted, this is a misrepresentation, since the Jesuits merely
play lip service to the concept: in reality, if a motion is to be really “vere et active,”
it has to infallibly produce an effect. Moreover, considering that the Jesuit
Francisco Suarez described this motion as “metaphorical,” how can the Jesuits
claim they believe it to be real?80
The Jesuits argued that PP takes away free will’s indetermination and
indifference of choice, which is the essence of freedom. Lemos disagreed: in human
beings there are only two types of indifference and indetermination: the first is
substantial and essential, namely the potential or power to act in a certain way,
while the second is privative.81
At this point, the Jesuit Perez interjected that if divine grace places
“something” in a person that precedes a person’s act of the will (i.e., “I will….”),
and if that “something” efficaciously moves the will to want whatever grace wants
it to choose, the will is thereby determined, and thus loses the indifference and

78
Aquinas, Summa Ia, q. 19, art. 8: “Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things
willed?”, ad. 2.
79
Acta, 1048.
80
Ibid., 1051.
81
Ibid., 1054.
 44

indetermination that constitute the basis of its freedom. Lemos remained

undeterred: he replied that the Council of Trent did not deny the role of
prevenient grace acting on the will, but affirmed it instead. As far as that
“something” placed in the will is concerned, we Dominicans do not see it, he said,
as endowed with a permanent quality determining the will, but rather as a divine
motion originating from the divine will, and as such infallibly efficacious. In
regard to the alleged abrogation of the will’s freedom, PP does not remove the
substantial and essential indetermination of the will in general, but its
indetermination in regard to a specific act (i.e., a case of indifferentia privativa):
“PP fulfils the essential and substantial indifference of the will because it reduces
it from potentiality to first act, so that according to its proper function the same
will determines itself in the secondary act, thus safeguarding its freedom, out of
which it could dissent, if it so wished.”82
At this point, the Dominican Alvarez joined the debate and addressed the
Jesuits, asking them point blank whether they believed that the help of prevenient
grace is really efficacious, and whether it efficaciously moves people to act. The
Jesuits at first digressed, but being pressured for an answer by Archbishops Rada
and Lombard, they responded that they did, though only in the context of “middle
knowledge.”
The debate continued, with the Jesuits claiming that PP, as expounded by
Banez, removes free will, and thus goes against Trent’s teachings. Lemos
remained un-impressed, as he defended Banez’s view that the will cannot resist
grace’s promptings in sensu composito, and quoted Aquinas in his support: “Man’s
preparation for grace is from God, as Mover, and thus it has a necessity – not
indeed of coercion, but of infallibility” (Summa Ia IIae, q. 112, art. 3). Lemos went
on to show how Jesuits, despite their claims that grace is efficacious according to
Molina’s view of middle knowledge, believe that grace ultimately owes its efficacy
to the will’s assent, which amounts to say that it depends on man, not on God.
For extra measure Lemos quoted Esther 13:9: “O Lord, almighty king, for all
things are in your power, and there is no one who can resist your will.” Thus, he
concluded, the Council of Trent only taught that man can dissent, if he so wishes,
but not that he can resist.
The Jesuits fired back that obviously God’s will cannot be resisted, but his
wishes and helps can be, adducing as proof Mt 23:37 (“How often I have longed to
gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but
you were not willing”); Acts 7:51 (“You stiff necked people, with uncircumcised
hearts and ears! You are just like your fathers: you always resist the Holy
Spirit!”); the decrees of the Council of Sens; and Aquinas’ Quodlibet 1, art. 7, ad. 2.

82
Ibid., 1052-53.
 45

To this, Lemos objected that 1) The Council of Sens admitted the possibility
of “resisting” grace in sensu diviso; moreover, it spoke broadly about resistere,
where it could be read to really mean dissentire; 2) As far as being able to resist to
God’s help is concerned, it is true that man can do that, but not if God associates
his efficacious will with a particular help (in other words, if God really wants
something to take place, as opposed to him just wishing that it did, as in the
instance of the Jewish people foregoing the institution of monarchy); as far as
Aquinas is concerned, he was referring to sufficient grace.
When veteran Jesuit theologian Bastida objected that Aquinas was talking
about all motions of divine grace, Lemos disagreed, insisting that he was talking
only about remote preparation for grace through sufficient grace.
 46

Chapter 5

FORTIETH CONGREGATION (October 26, 1605, lasting about three hours.

All cardinals and censors in attendance)

Topic: Is the concept of PP based on Sacred Scripture?

Bastida claimed that he could prove that PP was neither mentioned nor
justifiable in Sacred Scripture. He claimed that he could establish his claim from
more than five hundred scriptural passages (!), though he resorted to four main
ones to make his point:
1) 2 Cor 6:1: “As God’s co-workers, we urge you not to receive God’s grace in
vain.” This passage, Bastida, argued, shows that the human will can render
grace inefficacious and vain. He repeated himself so much concerning this
passage, Lemos noted, that he earned himself a formal reproach by the
Pope, who said Bastida was making a nuisance of himself and that for his
own good he should assume he was talking to an intelligent a competent
audience.83 Thus rebuffed, the learned Jesuit summed up his argument,
saying that efficacious grace is liable of being turned down by man’s
disobedience, and then solicited a response from Lemos. Lemos retorted
that he wanted Bastida to say everything he had to say before he
commenced his response, but after Bastida’s insistence, he obliged him.
Lemos first recapped the general assumptions behind PP; then, he said that
it excludes middle knowledge; that it is not limited to moral, inner
persuasions and excitements, since merely moral predetermination is no
predetermination at all (col. 1064); and finally, that it does not necessitate
or does violence to the human will. When we examine the terms
themselves (i.e., “physical predetermination”), we can infer that “physical”
means the real and proper way (not just metaphorical and moral) in which
the prior and first cause applies and determines the human will to
determine itself in the secondary act. “Pre” refers to the prior activity of
God, and it excludes a simultaneity of the wills (human and divine); or their
sharing the role of first cause (the way the Jesuits insisted); or, in other
words, that God as first cause moves the will prior to the will moving itself
in the second act. “Determination” refers to God’s determining the human
will by moving it and inclining it to perform a certain deed.

83
Acta, 1062.
 47

At this point Lemos challenged Bastida to explain his understanding of a

biblical passage Dominicans claimed supported PP, namely Eph 3:8-11,84
suggesting that the future ongoing conversion of the Gentiles to the
church was clearly thought by Paul to be predetermined by God from all
eternity according to his immutable will (i.e., not correlated with human
response stemming from human free will). What do Jesuits have to say
about that?
However, Bastida recused himself from commenting on that, reminding
Lemos he first had to address the passage that he, Bastida, marshalled
earlier. Lemos did not sweat it, and said that even though Bastida refused
to answer his challenge, he would articulate his reply in three points:
a) Augustine said that Paul is exhorting us not to receive God’s grace in
vain as a way to acknowledge/appreciate the source of the gift, and not
the reality/possibility of rejecting it.
b) According to Aquinas, all passages in Scripture that uphold man’s free
will do not thereby negate the efficacy of divine grace, but must be
harmonized with or subordinated to it.85 Lemos used a passage from
Summa contra gentiles (III, 90):

So, if acts of human choice and movements of will do not fall under divine
providence, but only their external results, it will be truer that human affairs are
outside providence than that they come under providence. But this view is
suggested by the words of the blasphemers: ‘He walks about the poles of heaven
and He does not consider our things (Jb 22:14); and again: ‘Who is he who will
command a thing to be done, when the Lord does not command it?’ (Lam 3:37).
However, certain passages in sacred Scripture appear to be consonant with the
aforementioned view. It is said in fact (Sir 15:14): ‘God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel’; and later: ‘He has set
water and fire before you: stretch forth your hand to whichever you wish. Before
man is life and death, good and evil; that which he chooses shall be given to him’
(Sir 15:14, 17-18). And also: ‘Consider that I have set before you this day life and
good, and on the other hand, death and evil’ (Dt 30:15). But these words are
brought forward to show that man is possessed of free choice, not that his choices
are placed outside divine providence. Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa states in his
book On Man: ‘Providence is concerned with the things that are not in our power,
but not with those that are in our power.’ Following him, Damascene states in

84
“Although I am less than the least of all the Lord’s people, this grace was given me: to preach
to the Gentiles the boundless riches of Christ, and to make plain to everyone the administration
of this mystery, which for ages past was kept hidden in God, who created all things. His intent
was that now, through the church, the manifold wisdom of God should be made known to the
rulers and authorities in the heavenly realms, according to his eternal purpose that he
accomplished in Christ Jesus our Lord.”
85
Acta, 1067.
 48

Book II that ‘God foreknows the things that are within our power, but he does
not predetermine them.’ These texts should be explained as meaning that things
in our power are not subject to determination by divine providence in the sense
that they receive necessity from it.

Thus, concluded Lemos, the exhortation with which Paul urges us

not to take God’s grace in vain is meant to show that we have free will,
and not that our free good choices are not subdued by the efficacy of
God’s grace.86 Lemos even brazenly suggested that this text actually
supported the Dominicans’ view! Moreover, though he admitted that
there are no direct scriptural passages that mention PP, texts like Rom
9:16; Is 26:12 and 1 Cor 4:7 strongly imply it.
c) Lemos wondered whether the Pauline verse quoted by Bastida is also at
odds with the Jesuit doctrine of congruous grace, according to which, on
the basis of middle knowledge, God congruously calls a man who will
thereby infallibly assent to divine grace, even though out of his own free
will. Having said that, Lemos proceeded to answer in a formal way to
Bastida’s earlier query. He argued that grace mentioned in his passage is
justifying grace, or sufficient grace, and not actual, or efficacious grace;
and even in the event that this was indeed actual grace, this text would
be true in a divided sense, but not in a composite one.
When Bastida began to oppose Lemos’ argument, the Pope
interrupted him, saying in Italian: “Why do you keep arguing about
something that has already been explained enough? Say something else!
I did not instruct you to debate in this way, for the conversation always
keeps coming back to this point. On the contrary, I only told you to stay
focused on the topic at hand. So, let the dispute proceed the way it did
before, in other words, by introducing arguments that are on target, and
without repetitions and digressions!”87 Then he instructed Bastida to
submit all the materials he had prepared, since he did not want the
Jesuits to prolong the dispute, but rather to get to the bottom of it and
resolve the matter.88
Under such instructions, Bastida introduced his second biblical text.

2) Is 5:40: “What more could have been done for my vineyard than I have
done for it? When I looked for grapes, why did it yield only bad ones?”

86
Here Lemos may well have added that passages in Scripture that point to Jesus’ humanity are
to be subordinated/harmonized with passages pointing to his divinity.
87
Acta, 1071.
88
Idem.
 49

According to Bastida and Perez, who briefly intervened in the

discussion, this verse allegedly gives man all he needs to obey grace, and
encompasses everything God could do for man; thus, this verse fittingly
refutes the notion of PP.
Lemos countered by saying that God gives everyone his sufficient
grace, but man’s sinfulness, stemming from both actual and original sin,
eventually frustrates God’s initiative.89However, God gives his efficacious
grace to some out of his mercy, and denies it to others out of his justice.90
For a brief time after that, the Jesuits debated Lemos on whether
sufficient grace is really “sufficient” in the Dominican way of understanding
of PP.

3) Sir 15:14: “It was he who created man, and he left him in the power of his
own inclination. If you will, you can keep the commandments, and to act
faithfully is a matter of your own choice.”
Bastida said that PP is not in the power of man, but up to God to
bestow. However, this verse says that God has indeed put into man’s
inclination the power to choose; therefore, God does not act through PP.
For instance, if somebody stronger than I grabs my hand and leads me
where he wills, it is not in the power of my hand to resist or free itself.
According to Lemos, this verse does not invalidate the fact that it is
God who ensures that the velle and posse are given to a person through his
efficacious will. Together with Augustine, Lemos says that we are not
giving all merit to God, as if man was not free to determine himself to do
what is good: rather, we give all credit to God for being the first to move us
to want and to do what is good.
Lemos quoted two texts of Augustine’s in support of his view. The first
was from On Man’s Perfection in Righteousness 19, 40:

Pelagius, however, thought he had discovered a great support for his cause in the
prophet Isaiah, because by him God said: ‘If you be willing and harken unto me, you
shall eat the good of the land, but if you be not willing and harken not to me, the
sword shall devour you: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken this’ (Is 1:19-20). As if
the entire law were not full of conditions of this sort; or as if its commandments had
been given to proud men for any other reason than that ‘The Law was added because
of transgression, until the seed should come to whom the promise was made’ (Gal
3:19); ‘It entered, therefore, that the offense might abound; but where sin abounded,
grace did much more abound’ (Rom 5:20). In other words, that man might receive

89
Augustine made this point in his On Rebuke and Grace, 6, in the chapter entitled: “Why they
may justly be rebuked who do not obey God, although they have not yet received the grace of
obedience.”
90
As we have seen, this is a classic Augustinian and Dominican view.
 50

commandments, trusting as he did in his own resources, and that, failing in these and
becoming a transgressor, he might ask for a deliverer and a savior; and that the fear
of the law might humble him, and bring him, as a schoolmaster, to faith and grace.

The second text used by Lemos was Enchiridion, 32:

In what sense it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows
mercy, except that, as it is written, the preparation of the heart is from the Lord?
Otherwise it is said, ‘It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that
shows mercy,’ because it is of both, namely, both of the will of man and of the mercy of
God, so that we are to understand the above mentioned saying as if it meant the will of
man alone is not sufficient, if the mercy of God does not accompany it – then it will
follow that the mercy of God alone is not sufficient, if the will of man does not go with
it. Therefore, if we may rightly say, it is not of man that wills, but of God that shows
mercy, because the will of man by itself is not enough, why may we not also rightly put
it in the converse way: ‘It is not of the God that shows mercy, but of man that wills,’
because the mercy of God by itself does not suffice? Surely, if no Christian will dare say
this, lest he should openly contradict the apostle, it follows that the true interpretation
of the saying ‘It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows
mercy,’ is that the whole work [emphasis mine] belongs to God, who both makes the
will of man righteous, and thus prepares it for assistance, and assists it when it is
prepared.

According to Lemos, these words of Augustine’s completely put to rest the

Molinist idea of partial causes operating simultaneously.91 The Jesuits, he argued,
reject PP and assume that God acts only through morally exciting grace, and that
he helps the human will after such will decides to accept God’s grace: however,
this view hardly harmonizes with Augustine’s, who saw God’s prevenient grace
as efficaciously helping grace. When Bastida urged Lemos to reply to his
argument, Lemos responded that he just did!92

4) Mt 11:21: “Woe to you Chorazin! Woe to you Bethsaida! For if the

miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and
Sidon, they would have repented long time ago in sackcloth and ashes.”
Bastida argued that:
a) The inhabitants of Tyre would have been converted with the only and same
aids that were given to the Jews.
b) However, if the people would have been converted through efficacious
grace, Jesus’ reproach to the Jews would have been unfair, since the Jews
did not receive it.
c) God does not predetermine us to do evil.
91
Acta, 1080.
92
Ibid., 1081.
 51

To this, Lemos replied that in regard to a) Jesus did not say that their
inhabitants would have been converted ONLY through external means; rather,
the Lord knew that in addition to the preaching and miracles, God would have
given them an efficacious aid that would have caused them to believe (Augustine
made the same point in The Predestination of the Saints 9, and in The Gift of
Perseverance 12 and 14). Moreover, in regard to Bastida’s point b), Lemos noted
that the Jews indeed received sufficient grace to believe, and that those who did
not believe refused to do so out of their own malice; moreover, they had
previously committed sins and hardened their hearts in a way that Tyre and
Sidon inhabitants would not have. Also, isn’t it God’s privilege to bestow more
grace to some rather than others? In regard to Bastida’s point c), Lemos said that
such comment is not within the scope of the question being discussed; not to
mention that he, Lemos, had repeatedly pointed out that God does not move,
predetermine or cause anyone to evil: Bastida should quit bringing up such
insinuation!93
In a delayed response to the example given earlier by Bastida, concerning a
strong man leading a person by the hand, Lemos offered the same old response:
this is a poor example because it just speaks of violence done to one’s will, which
is not the way PP works. Lemos pointed out to Bastida the words of Ps 72:24
(RHEM): “Thou has led me by my right hand, and by Thy will Thou has
conducted me…” This verse suggests that God leads our wills fortiter et suaviter
(Lemos chose these words on purpose, since they were Cardinal Bellarmine’s
motto!), safeguarding our freedom of choice, just as Cyril argued in his exegesis of
Gen 19, when he suggested that God moves us with a double help: a strong one,
consisting of admonitions and encouragements (which we are still liable to
ignore), and an even stronger one, whereby God leads us out of sin, and yet
without doing us violence or dragging us, so to speak, forcing our wills to obey.
The congregation ended on a polemical note: Bastida added several more
comments, which Lemos characterized as inconsequential and weak, if not
outright plainly absurd.94

93
Ibid., 1084.
94
Ibid., 1086: “Past haec in quibus minus necessariis et nullius difficultatis insistebat P.
Vastida…et similia quaedam plane absurda dicebat.”
 52

Chapter 6

FORTY-FIRST CONGREGATION (November 9, 1605. Ten cardinals in

attendance, as well as all the censors. Meeting lasted a little over four hours).

Topic: PP according to the ecumenical Council of Trent and the local council of Sens.

Bastida began by saying that he would show how Trent and Sens rejected the
idea of preveniently efficacious grace, and therefore, PP. He went on to quote
Trent VI, ch. 5:

In adults, the beginning of that justification must proceed from the predisposing grace of
God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his vocation, whereby, without any merits on their
part, they are called; that they who by sin had been cut off from God, may be disposed
through his quickening and helping grace to convert themselves to their own justification by
freely assenting to and cooperating with that grace; so that, while God touches the heart of
man through the illumination of the Holy Ghost, man himself neither does absolutely
nothing while receiving that inspiration, since he can also reject it.

Bastida also read canon 4: “If anyone says that man’s free will moved and
aroused by God, by assenting to God’s call and action, in no way cooperates
toward disposing and preparing itself to obtain the grace of justification, that it
cannot refuse its assent if it wishes, but that, as something inanimate, it does
nothing whatever and is merely passive, let him be anathema.” Last but not least,
Bastida read from the council of Sens’ fifth chapter (1528), in which we read that:
a) Aroused by God’s grace, and out of his free will, man predisposes and prepares
himself to receive grace leading to eternal life;
b) Grace, which always knocks at man’s heart, does not necessitate him to accept
it;
c) There are several Bible passages showing that God’s help and assistance can
indeed be resisted.95
On the basis of these texts, the Jesuits made the following five points:
 Human free will, while touched with divine inspiration and every kind of
prevenient grace, is able to reject it.
 Free will is not merely passive when receiving divine inspiration and
prevenient grace.
 Free will moved and stirred by God’s grace may still dissent.
 The help of God, as he moves someone, is such that it can be resisted.
 Human free will is not destroyed through the help of grace.

95
Acta, 1088.
 53

Next, the Jesuits quoted five statements taken from the works of Dominicans
Banez, Nunez, Avila, Alvarez and Lemos himself,96 that allegedly stood in total
opposition to the five above mentioned points (all drawn from conciliar texts)
made by the Jesuits. Bastida firmly dismissed the use these Dominicans made of
the distinction between sensu diviso and sensu composito when interpreting the
meaning of the conciliar texts (i.e., man can resist God’s grace in sensu diviso but
not in sensu composito), seeing it as a mere sleight of hands; he also rejected their
claim that conciliar texts referred to sufficient grace and not to actual grace. On
the contrary, Bastida said that Trent was actually talking about actual grace as
grace that can indeed be resisted, becoming irresistible only after a person’s free
will gives its assent.
To anchor his point, Bastida supplied five examples (for brevity’s sake I will
only mention three), all following the same logic, namely that man can indeed
turn down the help of grace in a composite sense, insofar as he can juxtapose
opposite dissent with such help:
1) If it is enough that the human will retains its power to dissent to remain
free, even when that motion of grace is taken away, then by the same token,
the reverse is true, namely that in the absence of grace, a man subjected to
grave temptation, as long as that temptation lasts, should be able to resist it
without the help of grace, because allegedly he has the power to resist
while he is being tested.
2) Even though a person while sitting cannot simultaneously not be sitting in
a composite sense (because it is impossible that as he sits he is also not
sitting), nonetheless a person who is asked to sit, once the request has been
made, retains the potential in a composite sense not to acquiesce, namely
not to sit, insofar as he has the potentiality to respond to such request by
not sitting. In the same way, Bastida argued that once the human will is
anticipated by the help of grace, it retains the potentiality to dissent and to
meet such prevenient grace with a contrary choice.
3) It is not sufficient to say that free will exists when it retains the potential to
dissent, if efficacious grace is taken away. Likewise, one cannot say with
Lemos that while a giant pulls a child by the hand, the latter retains the
power to come freely, because that child also has the free power not to
come if that efficacious motion of the giant is taken away.

In support of his five examples, Bastida offered the following texts:

96
At the conclusion of the Dominican General Chapter in Naples (1600), Lemos claimed that the
secondary cause cannot operate without God’s previous (not simultaneous) concurrence (Acta,
1090).
 54

a) Council of Orange, Conclusion: “According to the Catholic faith we also

believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all baptized
persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully,
to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of essential
importance in regard to the salvation of their soul.”
From this, Bastida deduced that any prevenient grace is such that man
can render it inefficacious, if he so wills; however, if God’s grace was
efficacious a priori, it would make man always to comply with it, thus
contradicting the council’s words “if they desire to labor faithfully.”
b) Council of Trent, VI, ch. 13: “Let no one promise himself herein something
as certain with an absolute certainty, though all ought to place and repose
the firmest hope in God’s help. For God, unless men themselves fail in his
grace, as he has begun a good work, so will he prefect it, working to will
and to accomplish.”
Bastida remarked that if grace was indeed efficacious in and of itself,
the Council would not have said: “unless men themselves fail in his grace.”
c) Council of Trent, VI, ch. 11: “No one should use that rash statement, once
forbidden by the Fathers under anathema, that the observance of God’s
commandments is impossible for one that is justified.”
And yet, Bastida ventured, those who were not given PP would indeed
find it impossible to fulfil the commandments, thus expressly contradicting
this conciliar text. At this point, Bastida quoted Lemos’ conclusions at the
Dominican General Chapter in Naples (1600) that appear to contradict
such conciliar texts.

Bastida ended his full two hour speech by reminding his audience that Trent
defined against Calvin that God’s prevenient grace does not remove free will, by
acting in an irresistible way in our election and salvation.
It was now Lemos’ turn to speak. The learned Dominican assured his
audience that he would not introduce again the evidence he supplied in previous
congregations, namely the testimony of Popes and Councils that upheld the
efficacy of grace, but that he would rather limit himself to speak about Trent.
Trent made it clear, he said, that a) Prevenient grace is not only exciting, but
helping grace, which always ends up obtaining man’s cooperation (what PP
amounts to); and b) Man can dissent, if he so wishes: in other words, he still
retains the potential to disagree (semper liberam habet potentiam ad sic
dissentiendum),97 though in fact, he will always cooperate.98 He concluded that
97
Acta, 1096.
98
Lievin de Meyer, in his 1708 book De mente S. Concilii Tridentini circa gratiam physice
predeterminante (p. 103), will accuse Dominicans of distorting and twisting the words of the
council.
 55

efficacious grace is physically predetermining, and thus it excludes “middle

knowledge.” According to Lemos, this idea of merely helping grace, which was
discussed before Clement VIII during three full congregations, was invented by
Semipelagians in order to attack the efficacy of divine causation and grace, and
yet the council of Trent rejected it. Why did it do so? Because, Lemos claimed,
according to the defenders of “middle knowledge,” prevenient grace is only
exciting and not helping grace; however, Trent expressly said that prevenient
grace by which we are converted is not only exciting but also helping grace.
At this point, Lemos turned to the five points raised by Bastida earlier on,
noting that they are very true and most certainly not denied by Dominicans.99
More specifically:
1) When free will receives divine inspiration it may push it aside. This view is
certa, and to deny it is an error in the faith.
2) When free will receives divine inspiration it is not merely passive, but it
does something by concurring with it in an active way. The first part of
this view is de fide; the second part, certissima. Note, however, that the
council did not define that the will is not passive, but that it is not “merely
passive” (mereque passive se habere).
3) Free will, excited and moved by God, may dissent if it so wishes. This is de
fide.
4) God’s help, as he draws us to him, is not such that it cannot be resisted.
This view, upheld at the Councils of Sens and Trent, is true according to
the faith (secundum fidem).
5) Through God’s help human free will is not inevitably taken away. From the
perspective of the secondary cause, this is verissimum (most true).100

Though Lemos declared to have no problems accepting the five points

introduced by the Jesuits, he claimed he had a quarrel to pick with them about the
alleged incompatibility of the views upheld by the Dominicans and the conciliar
texts. Lemos replied that what Trent says about point 1) is true in a divided sense;
Dominicans are upholding its composite sense. Why is then Bastida disparaging the
difference between the divided and composite senses in which a proposition may
be true? The difference between the two senses is an ancient one and it has been
variously employed by many venerable theologians in the past, such as Peter
Lombard (who used the equivalent terms conjuntim et disjunctim); Scotus; the
Scholastics (who spoke of the necessity of the consequent, which is the equivalent of

99
Acta, 1098, 1099.
100
In order to understand the difference between these theological qualifications, ranging in
order of importance from de fide to probabile, see Harold Ernst, “The Theological Notes And the
Interpretation of Doctrine,” Theological Studies 6 (2002): 813-25.
 56

the sensu diviso, and the necessity of consequence, the equivalent of sensu composito);
Aquinas (especially in his work De veritate);101 recent theologians such as Driedo;
and even Jesuit authors such as Valentia, Suarez and Bellarmine (who accepted
middle knowledge, and yet agreed that efficacious grace cannot be rejected in a
composite sense), though it is rejected by “Calvinist heretics.”102
Bastida reacted by saying that the Council spoke in a composite sense, and
that it is indeed possible for this situation to exists, namely that God excites and
moves the will though the will actually resists him, defeating his intention.
Lemos considered this reasoning to be fallacious and illogical, as Aquinas
previously did in Contra gentes 1, 7:

For this is a necessary conditional proposition: if a man is seen sitting, he is sitting. Hence,
although the conditional proposition may be changed to a categorical one, to read ‘what is
seen sitting must necessarily be sitting,’ it is clear that the proposition is true if understood

101
Lemos made reference to several passages. De veritate, q. 6, art. 4, ad 8: “While it may be
granted with reference to a determined person that God, absolutely speaking, can predestine or
not predestine him, nevertheless, supposing that God has indeed predestined him, he cannot not
predestine him. Nor is the opposite possible, because cannot change. Consequently, it is
commonly said that the following proposition, ‘God can predestine one who is not predestined,
or not predestine one who is predestined,’ is false if taken in a composite sense, but true if taken
in a divided sense. All statements, therefore, which imply that composite sense, are absolutely
false.” And also, De veritate q. 23, art. 5, ad 3: “Although the non-existence of an effect of the
divine will is incompatible with the divine will, the possibility that the effect should be lacking is
given simultaneously with the divine will. God’s willing someone to be saved and the possibility
that that person be damned are not incompatible; but God’s willing him to be saved and his
actually being damned, are.” Also, De veritate q. 6, art. 3, ad 7: “A thing can be said to be
possible in two ways. First, we may consider the potency that exists in another thing, as when we
say that a stone can be moved upwards, not by a potency existing in the stone, but by a potency
existing in the one who hurls it. Consequently, when we say: ‘That predestined person can
possibly die in sin,’ the statement is true if we consider only the potency that exists in him. But,
if we are speaking of this predestined person according to the ordering which he has to another,
namely to God, who is predestining him, that event is incompatible with this ordering, even
though it is compatible with the person’s own power. Hence, we can use the distinction given
above; that is, we can consider the subject with this form or without it.’ Lemos also referred to
Aquinas’ Summa Ia IIae, q. 10, art. 4, obj. 3: “Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible
follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the
will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that case God’s operation would be
ineffectual. Therefore, it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it.
Therefore, it wills it of necessity…If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this
supposition, that the will be not moved thereto, though it is not impossible in a simple manner.
Consequently, it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.’ Lemos concluded
by saying that it is impossible that free will of man be excited and moved by God, and yet
actually dissent.
102
Acta, 1103.
 57

of what is said, and compositely; but it is false if understood of what is meant, and dividedly.
Thus, in these and all similar arguments used by those who oppose God’s knowledge of
contingents, the fallacy of composition and division takes place.

In summary, while according to Lemos the will retains the potentiam liberam
ad dissentiendium, and thus is truly free, Bastida objected that this is not enough to
be truly free, and used several examples to prove his point, such as temptations;
the case of a person who chooses to sit; and the case of a child pulled by a hand by
a giant.
Lemos remained undeterred, as he pointed out that these examples address a
very different situation than what the Dominicans are talking about. For instance,
a giant would simply force a child to follow him, while Dominicans say that God
makes us follow him and consent to his will freely. Countering with an example of
his own, Lemos referred to the blessed in heaven: they have free will, but cannot
stop loving God. Why? Because as in the case of people on earth, efficacious grace
first enlightens their mind, proposing a good to the will through an “indifferent”
practical judgment; then, it inclines it to follow its influence/bidding, all the while
safeguarding the potential to dissent.
Lemos also noted that when the Jesuits quoted the Conclusion of Orange II
(i.e., Bastida’s previously quoted conciliar texts a) and b)), we must remember that
both councils talk about those who are justified, who all receive God’s sufficient
grace to do God’s will; however, only those who receive God’s efficacious grace
will persevere to the end. To this effect, he quoted Aquinas’ Summa Ia IIae, q. 112,
art.3, ad 2 (“Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for
it, or to whoever does what he can?”): “Further, Anselm says (De causa diaboli iii)
that the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not
wish, nor was he prepared to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect
needs to be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace, it is
bestowed on them of necessity.” Aquinas answered this objection by saying: “The
first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal
of grace is on God, according to Hosea 13:9: ‘Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy
help is only in me.’”
Concerning man’s intention to do what is good, that comes from God! Lemos
quoted Aquinas again: “As Augustine says in Hypognosticon [Prosper is now
credited as the author of that text], this saying is to be understood of man in the
state of perfect nature, when he was not yet a slave to sin: hence, he was able to
sin and not to sin. Now too, whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing
what is good, he has by God’s assistance” (Summa Ia IIae, q. 109, art. 8, ad 3).
Therefore, if man does not abandon grace, grace does not abandon him; but that
man does not abandon grace first, it is due to the help of grace.
 58

Lemos recalled Augustine’s words in On Man’s Perfection in Righteousness 19,

40:

Now with all their effort of disguise they here betray their purpose; for they plainly attempt
to controvert the grace and mercy of God, which we desire to obtain whenever we offer the
prayer ‘Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven’ (Mt 6:10), or again this other one, ‘Lead
us not into temptation but deliver us from evil’ (Mt 6:13). For indeed why do we present
such petitions in earnest supplication, if the result is of him that wills, and him that runs, but
not of God that shows mercy? Not that the result is without our will, but that our will does
not accomplish the result, unless it receive the divine assistance. Now, the wholesomeness of
faith is this, that it makes us seek, that we may find; ask, that we may receive; and knock, that
it may be opened to us (Lk 11:9). Whereas the man who gainsays it, does really shut the door
of God’s mercy against himself. I am unwilling to say more touching so an important a
matter, because I do better in committing it to the groans of the faithful, than to words of my
own…Or again, because it is said, ‘The commandments, if you will, shall save you’ (Sir 15:15)
– as if a man ought not to thank God, because he has a will to keep the commandments,
since, if he wholly lacked the light of truth, it would not be possible for him to possess such
will.

In other words, according to Lemos, man has received sufficient grace to

potentially fulfil God’s commandments out of his own free will; but that he actually
observes them is due to efficacious grace.103 Thus, just because we say that if man
does not abandon grace, grace does not abandon him, we cannot conclude that
man makes grace efficacious by consenting to it (the Jesuits envision it), for that
would be an unwarranted leap in logic.
The Jesuits went on to accuse the Dominicans to say the same things Calvin
said (a subsequent congregation, the 44th, will be entirely devoted to this topic),
but Lemos firmly rebuffed the charge. As far as the Jesuits’ frequent references to
the council of Sens’ canons are concerned, Lemos pointed out that they were
never officially approved by a Pope (nor were the canons and decisions of the local
councils of Trevis and Cologne), and therefore they carry relative weight, since
Sens was merely a provincial council.104
At this point, the Dominican Alvarez jumped into the discussion and
addressed the Jesuits’ complaint about what he wrote, namely that man is like a
tree trunk or a stick in the hands of God: the Jesuits argued that if that was the
case, how can man be really free? Alvarez said that the Jesuits quoted him out of
context, since he did not mean to suggest that man is lifeless and without free
will, but that he cannot move to goodness without first being moved by God (See
Summa Ia IIae, q. 105, art. 4, ad 2; and Jn 5:19).
103
Ibid., 1112.
104
Lemos pointed out that provincial councils may err, such as an African council (256 a.d.)
attended by eighty-five bishops, among whom St. Cyprian, which erred by claiming that
backsliding Christians had to be re-baptized (col. 1114).
 59

Bastida went on to challenge Lemos to produce evidence in the form of papal

documents supporting his interpretation of Trent’s canons. For instance, canon 4
does not say that man always cooperates (semper cooperari) after being moved and
excited by God’s grace; rather, by the words “If anyone says that man’s free will
moved and aroused by God, by assenting to God’s call and action, in no way
cooperates toward disposing and preparing itself to obtain the grace of
justification, that it cannot refuse its assent if it wishes, but that, as something
inanimate, it does not nothing whatever and is merely passive, let him be
anathema”), the council of Trent condemned those who say that man nihil
cooperari, acting in a merely passive way.105
Bastida agreed that Trent did not expressly mention middle knowledge;
however, its words can be taken to implicitly endorse the concept, granting it a
most orthodox status. He also agreed that the distinction between composite and
divided senses is legitimate; however, he disavowed Lemos’ interpretation
according to which Trent’s words are to be taken in a divided sense. According to
him, the efficacy of grace depends on man’s consent to it. In any event, we should
be mindful of Cajetan’s suggestion that the distinction between the two senses
still leaves man’s logic somewhat dissatisfied (non quietari hominis intellectum). As
far as Sens is concerned, while it was indeed a provincial council, it did not say
anything different than what Trent would say years later. In any event, Bastida
rebuffed Lemos’ objection, since Dominicans are fond of bringing up in support of
their view the council of Cologne (1536), and the Catechism it produced (1538),
even though it was never formally ratified by the Church!
Lemos did not want to respond to any of these points, despite the insistence
of some cardinals. However, when the Pope requested him to do it, he relented.
Bastida, he said, denied that what the Council said about helping grace also
applies to prevenient grace; in this, he openly contradicts the Council! When
Bastida claims that the council said that when man consents to exciting grace he
cooperates with helping grace, he does violence to the conciliar text, since the
text says that man’s free will assents to exciting grace and cooperates with
operating, prevenient and helping grace. Moreover, of the four claims of canon 4,
Bastida forgot to mention that three of them were directed against Lutherans and
Calvinists who deny free will altogether (i.e., the council anathemized the
heretics’ views about free will as “something inanimate;” “does nothing whatever;”
and “is merely passive”).106
105
In rather polemical and unpleasant manner, Lemos remarked that Bastida went on and on, acting like Pharisees
who “made their phylacteries wide” (Mt 23:5). See Acta, 1115.
106
I found this disconcerting statement by Lemos in col. 1117: “The Council in the first part of canon 4 defined that
man’s will always [emphasis mine] cooperates when it is previously excited and moved by God. And then it says
that it always [emphasis mine] cooperates with God who moves and excites him in such a way that it agrees not
only freely, but with full freedom, even though it is still able to dissent, if it so wishes.” This claim by Lemos is
unfounded: I did not find the two “always” in the text of the canon.
 60

In regard to Cajetan (who upheld agnosticism on the manner in which grace

and free will are to be reconciled), Lemos made the sly remark that had the Jesuits
followed his prudent approach, the Church would not have been troubled by the
present controversy.
 61

Chapter 7

FORTY-SECOND CONGREGATION (November 22, 1605. Everybody was in

attendance. It lasted about four and a half hours).

Topic: PP and Augustine’s views on grace.107

The object of discussion before the Congregation had been: “Does God, in
virtue of his prevenient grace move the will of man to perform good deeds, not
only by persuading him, but also actively making him? And can such efficacious
grace be properly called ‘Physical Predetermination?’” The debaters attempted to
find in Augustine’s views a validation of their own.
Bastida went first. In his opening remark, he argued that Augustine was
opposed to PP and that he denied man always and infallibly consents to God’s
prevenient help.
First Bastida identified seven views about PP upheld by its supporters:
1) God’s prevenient help does not consist in inner inducements, but in a
physically predetermining entity.
2) Helping grace, while it helps man, also pertains to prevenient grace, and
therefore is not merely concomitant.
3) Through it, God drags man along, so that he may not be left to his own
will’s devices.
4) This help does not consist in a congruous vocation, which is congruous for
one person, but not for another; however, when it is bestowed, it applies to
all those to whom it is given, and thus, all those who are called unfailingly
come.
5) When such help is bestowed, all those to whom it has been given always
respond and come along, for it is impossible to be otherwise. It is not up to
man to accept or reject such help.
6) Without such predetermining help man can neither be converted nor do
what is good.
7) Such PP help is the adequate cause of our conversion and salvation.

107
For a helpful summary of this congregation, see Sylvio Hermann De Franceschi, “La
predetermination physique au tribunal de magistere romain: Tomas de Lemos et la defense
augustinienne du thomisme au temps des congregations de auxiliis,” Roma moderna e
contemporanea 18 (2010): 138-50. The first part of the article (pp. 128-137) contains a summary
of the detailed critique of the notion of PP found in Jansenius’ Augustinus.
 62

Secondly, Bastida claimed that since all these seven views were expressly
rejected by Augustine, we can safely conclude that the great saint and doctor
would have opposed PP.
Thirdly, Bastida quoted from Augustine’s works to contradict each of these
seven points upheld by Dominicans.
1) To Simplician on Various Questions: “What did Saul will but to attack, seize,
bind and slay Christians? What a fierce, blind will that was! Yet, he was
thrown prostrate by one word from on high, and a vision came to him by
which (quo) his mind and will were turned from their fierceness.”
Bastida said that this text suggests that according to Augustine God
converts some people not by means of PP, but through visions. He also
quoted The Gift of Perseverance 35: “From which fact it appears that some
have in their understanding itself a naturally divine gift of intelligence, by
which they may be moved to faith, if they either hear the words or behold
the signs that are congruous to their minds.”
2) Augustine differentiated between helping grace and exiting/prevenient
grace by not conflating the two. Rather, he taught that exciting grace is
prevenient grace, while helping grace is concurrent or even subsequent
grace, as we read in To Simplician on Various Questions 12: “So, the sentence,
‘It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that has mercy’
cannot be taken to mean simply that we cannot attain what we wish
without the aid of grace, but rather that without his calling we cannot even
will.” And in Enchiridion 32: “The whole work belongs to God, who both
makes the will of man righteous, and thus prepares it for assistance, and
assists it when it is prepared.”
Bastida claimed that these two texts suggest that helping grace (which is
distinct from exciting grace), is not prevenient, but concomitant and
subsequent, for no one is helped unless he does something first.108
3) God draws people, but also leaves them the power of their free will. Bastida
quoted from two texts, the first being Against Felix the Manichean II, 4:
“When he says ‘Do this,’ or ‘Do that,’ this is a reference to ability, not to
nature. No one besides God can create a tree; and yet everyone has in their
own will the faculty to choose things that are good, and thus be a good
tree; or to choose evil things, and thus be a bad tree.’” Then he quoted from
Against the Letters of the Donatist Petilianus II, 84: “If I was to ask you: ‘How
does God the Father draw people to his Son, whom he leaves free?,’ most
likely you would find it very hard to solve the dilemma. How can he draw
them if he leaves them all free to choose? And yet both statements are true,
but only a few are able to understand this with their intelligence.”

108
Acta, 1121.
 63

4) Again, Bastida resorted to Augustine’s To Simplician 13 to uphold his view

of congruous calling which runs contrary to PP help:

Possibly those who are called in this way and do not consent might be able to direct
their wills towards faith if they were called in another way; thus, it would be true that
‘Many are called but few are chosen.’ Many, that is to say, are called in one way, but
all are not affected in the same way; and those only follow the calling who are found
fit to receive it…If God wills to have mercy on men, he can call them in a way that is
suited to them, so that they will be moved to understand and to follow…Those are
chosen who are effectually (congruenter) called. Those who are not effectually called
and do not obey their calling are not chosen, for although they were called they did
not follow.

5) Augustine wrote in To Simplician 10: “Esau then, was unwilling and did not
run. Had he been willing and had he run, he would have obtained the help
of God who by calling him would have given him power both to will and to
run, had he not been reprobate by despising the calling.”
Bastida concluded that Augustine expressly taught that those who do
not obey their call have only themselves to blame for, if they do not come,
for had they not rejected the call and been willing, they would have come
and thus be saved.
6) On Rebuke and Grace 32: “If, however, this help had been wanting, either to
angel or to man when they were first made, since their nature was not
made such that without the divine help it could abide if it would, they
certainly would not have fallen of their own fault, because the help would
have been wanting without which they could not continue.”
Bastida reasoned that if PP is such that without it man cannot be
converted, and if a man is denied it, then he cannot be blamed if he does not
convert. On the contrary, prevenient or sufficient grace consists in giving
man the ability to do what is good, as well as practical opportunities to do
it.
7) Bastida used several texts (Lemos only recorded two) to argue that the help
of grace is not the exclusive adequate cause of our conversion and salvation
(i.e., Calvin’s error). On Merit and the Forgiveness of Sins II, 5: “And yet, this
is not a question about prayers alone, as if the energy of our will also
should not be strenuously added…God is said to be our helper, but nobody
can be helped who does not make some effort of his own accord. For God
does not work our salvation in us as if he was working in insensate stones,
or in creatures in whom nature has placed neither reason nor will.” On
Grace and Free Will 5: “Paul wrote: ‘Not I alone, but the grace of God with
me.’ And thus, neither was it the grace of God alone, nor was it he himself
alone, but it was the grace of God with him.”
 64

In conclusion, Bastida argued that the foundation of PP runs totally contrary

to Augustine’s thought and that PP is a superfluous explanation of God’s
knowledge of future contingents. Finally, he quoted Banez to the effect that the
latter, as well as other Dominicans, departed from Augustine in matter of
reprobation, noting that Molina too criticized him/them for it.
Lemos recalled: “He said few more similar things that I do not recall, nor I
need to recall: what I just mentioned are his main points. I believe that
substantially he did not say anything else.”109
Now it was Lemos turn to speak, and he went straight to the offensive.
Nothing is more clearly established, he said, than the fact that Augustine upheld
prevenient and efficacious grace! He briefly mentioned in passing what Augustine
wrote in his Letter to Vitalis (217) 7, 28: “These and other divine testimonies,
which would take too long to mention, show that by his grace God removes from
non-believers their heart of stone, and that he anticipates in human beings the
merits of their good wills by his antecedent grace, not so that grace might be
given because of the antecedent merit of their wills.” According to Lemos, this is
indeed the first foundational idea in Augustine’s construction of his theology of
grace.
Lemos lamented that the Jesuits’ misguided and misleading interpretation
(falsam intelligentiam) of Augustine’s view of grace as exercising a merely moral
influence and made efficacious or inefficacious by man’s consent or dissent from it,
is precluded by what Augustine wrote in the very same letter: “You recognize, I
think, that I did not want to mention all the truths that pertain to the Catholic
faith in those that I said we know, but only those that pertain or follow upon the
will of a human being, that is (to speak more plainly), whether grace is given to us
because we will, or by grace, God also makes us will it.”110
Lemos reminded his audience that this was the “bone of contention” between
Augustine and the Pelagians, who claimed that grace is given because man wants
and asks for it. Consequently, it’s not true that we have the power to make this
grace efficacious, as the Jesuits claim: rather, according to Augustine, it is God’s
grace that makes us willing. Quoting from On Rebuke and Grace 12, 38, Lemos
argues that God, through the antecedent grace given to us in Christ, makes it so
that people will desire and do that which is good: “Therefore aid is brought to the
infirmity of human will, so that it would be unchangeably and invincibly
(indeclinabiter et insuperabiliter) acted upon by divine grace: and thus, although
weak, it still might not fail, nor be overcome by any adversity.” Thus, for all
practical purposes, man will not dissent or deviate, all the while fully retaining
the faculty and power to dissent, if he so wishes.

109
Ibid., 1125.
110
Ibid., 1126.
 65

According to Lemos, Jesuits err by attributing to all men what was properly
true of the first man, Adam, of whom Augustine wrote:

Such was the nature of the aid, that he could forsake it when he would, and that he could
continue in it if he would; but not such that it could be brought about that he would. The
first is the grace which was given to the first Adam; but more powerful than this is that in
the second Adam. For the first is that whereby it is affected that a man may have
righteousness if he will; the second, therefore, can do more than this, since by it, it is even
effected that he will.111

As he introduced a text from The Gift of Perseverance 6, 10 (“ For we are

speaking of that perseverance whereby one perseveres unto the end, and if this is
given, ones does persevere to unto the end; but if one does not persevere unto the
end, it is not given…But since no one has perseverance to the end except he who
does persevere to the end, many people may have it, but none can lose it”), Lemos
argued that we must distinguish between the composite and divided senses of
these statements. In a composite sense, it is impossible for a man who has been
given perseverance to depart from it (“How then, can that be lost, whereby it is
brought about that even that which could be lost is not lost?”); however, in a
divided sense man is free to reject this gift and depart from perseverance. This
distinction was recognized by the Church Fathers and by Aquinas himself, and it
can easily accommodate the notion of PP, as even two Jesuit cardinals (i.e.,
Francisco de Toledo and Robert Bellarmine) indirectly admitted in their works.112
Departing somewhat from the topic at hand, Lemos made the following
considerations:
1) Divine predetermination was denied by Pelagians and Semipelagians, as
they claimed that it would introduce determinism and necessity in man’s
actions, undermining merit stemming from human good works and virtues.
2) Divine predetermination occurs without God’s foreknowledge of human
beings’ good use of their free will, either absolutely or conditionally
speaking, since such foreknowledge is incompatible with PP.
3) Jesuits oppose not just the idea of physically predetermining help of God
generally considered, but the individual acts of PP as well (divinae voluntatis
praedeterminationes or praedefinitiones) that are mentioned in Scripture (e.g.,
Rom 8:28; and Ps 111:2) and in the Church’s liturgy. Lemos quoted a
statement from Suarez’ De auxiliis divinae gratiae in which the learned
Jesuit said that a PP help does not hurt human freedom any more than
God’s will considered apart from middle knowledge does.

111
Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace 11, 31.
112
Acta, 1131.
 66

4) Trent called the efficacious prevenient grace “the impulse of the Holy
Spirit,” which does not remove, but rather perfects human freedom.
5) The Church’s prayerful invocation used as the Prayer over the Gifts on the
4th Sunday after Pentecost (“Et ad te nostras etiam rebelles compelle propitius
voluntates”) sounds stronger than the notion of physical or efficacious
predetermination, considering the verb compelle is being used here!
However, this prayer, which underscores God’s efficacious will and grace of
God is not rejected by the Jesuits.

Having said that, Lemos set out to respond specifically to Bastida’s seven
points, but first, in a general way, he claimed that Augustine, as per testimony of
all the texts used by Bastida, did not mean anything else but that human beings
retain free will in their choices, and power over their actions, and that free will is
not coerced, necessitated or obliterated by God, but always operates freely.
However, this is not to say that Augustine thereby denied the efficacy of
prevenient grace: on the contrary, through it, free will is perfected and re-
invigorated.
Then Lemos articulated seven propositions upheld by Jesuits concerning
their understanding of Augustine’s views on grace (paralleling Bastida’s earlier
seven-point characterization of the Dominicans’ understanding of PP).
1) Augustine not only taught that the efficacy of grace is accompanied by
inner persuasions, revelations, illuminations and enlightenment of the
mind, but that it only consists of them.
2) Augustine distinguished between helping grace and exciting grace;
exciting grace is prevenient grace, and helping grace is concomitant and
subsequent grace.
3) Augustine taught that God draws people through the help of grace, all the
while leaving man in the power of his free will to choose or to reject divine
grace.
4) According to Augustine, God’s calling is congruous for some but not for
others, so that some accept it while others reject it.
5) Augustine taught that those people who did not obey God’s call, had they
not rejected it, they would have been anticipated by God’s help and obeyed
it.
6) According to Augustine, man can do what is good ad be converted without
God’s PP; otherwise those who did not receive it would not be accountable
for their disobedience.
7) Augustine believed that God’s prevenient grace cannot be the adequate
cause of our conversion.
Let us now see how Lemos responded to Bastida’s understanding of
Augustine’s mind.
 67

In regard to the first view, Lemos argued that God’s grace is not merely
persuasive and exciting, as Bastida proposed. Moreover, consider Paul’s
conversion in Acts: it was not only because of what he saw in the desert that Paul
was converted, but also and especially as a result of the inner working of God in
his heart. Moreover, Augustine criticized Pelagius for making the same point
Jesuits are making. In his On the Grace of Christ I, 10, 11, Augustine quoted
Pelagius’ view, “He works in us to will what is good, persuading us to everything
which is good,” and contrasted it with his own view: “We, however, on our side
would gladly have him sometime confess that grace, by which not only future
glory in all its magnitude is promised, but also is believed in and hoped for; by
which wisdom is not only revealed, but also loved; by which everything that is
good is not only recommended, but pressed upon us until we accept it.”
To further stress his point, Lemos quoted Augustine’s comment concerning
the difference between those who obey the divine call and those who do not as
something not to be attributed to a mere human decision:

Now, should any man be for constraining us to examine into this profound mystery, why
this person is so persuaded as to yield and that person is not, there are only two things
occurring to me, which I should like to advance as my answer: ‘O the depth of riches!’ (Rom
11:33), and ‘Is there any unrighteousness with God?’ (Rom 9:14). If the man is displeased
with such an answer, he must seek more learned disputants; but let him beware, least he finds
presumptuous ones.113

In regard to the second view, Lemos said that the opposite is true.
Augustine’s polemics against the Pelagians focused on the idea of prevenient
grace, which makes man do what God wants him to; Pelagians denied the
existence of such grace. Against them, Augustine said in his
On Merit and the Forgiveness of Sins II, 5, 5:

For as the bodily eye is not helped by the light to turn away therefrom shut or averted, but is
helped by it to see, and cannot see at all unless it helps it; so God, who is the light of the
inner man, helps our mental sight in order that we may do some good, not according to our
own, but according to his righteousness…When we turn to him, therefore, God helps us;
when we turn away from him, he forsakes us. But then he helps us even to turn to him; and
this, certainly, is something that light does not do for the eyes of the body.

Lemos emphasized that Augustine did not merely say: “When we turn to him,
therefore, God helps us” (which would have helped Bastida and Pelagians to
argue that helping grace is subsequent), but that “He helps us even to turn to
him,” which clearly shows that helping grace is prevenient as well, since God
helps man first, so that he may be converted.

113
Augustine, On the Spirt and the Letter 34, 60.
 68

For good measure, Lemos added yet another quote from Augustine’s:

The whole of this dogma of Pelagius, observe, is carefully expressed in these words, and
none other, in the third book of his treatise in defense of the liberty of the will, in which he
has taken care to distinguish with so great subtlety these three things – the capacity, the
volition, and the action, that is, the ability, the volition, and the actuality, - that, whenever
we read or hear of his acknowledging the assistance of divine grace in order to promote our
avoidance of evil and accomplishment of good – whatever he may mean by the said
assistance of grace , whether law and the teaching or any other thing – we are sure of what
he says; nor can we run into any mistake by understanding him otherwise than he means.
For we cannot help knowing that, according to his belief, it is not our volition nor our action
which is assisted by the divine help, but solely our capacity to will and to act, which alone of
the three, as he affirms, we have of God. As if that faculty were infirm which God himself
placed in our nature; while the other two, which, as he would have it, are our own, are so
strong and firm and self-sufficient as to require none of his help! so that he does not help us
to will, nor help us to act, but simply helps us to the possibility of willing and acting.114

Lemos went on to argue that the Council of Trent’s Decree on Justification 5

expressly teaches that helping grace is prevenient grace:

The Synod furthermore declares that in adults the beginning of the said justification is to be
derived from the prevenient grace of God, further adding: “Through Jesus Christ, that is to
say, from his vocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their part, they are called; so
that they, who by their sins were alienated from God, may be disposed through his
quickening and assisting grace to convert themselves to their own justification by freely
assenting, and to cooperating with said grace.”

In other words, according to the Council, prevenient grace (from which the
beginning of justification originates) is God’s calling; and this calling is the
helping and exciting grace by which men are disposed to convert to God. The
Council also added that man can freely consent to and cooperate with this grace.
However, such view does not validate the Jesuits’ perspective, since the Council
did not say that helping grace pertains to subsequent grace. Also, in canon 3 we
read: “If anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost,
and without his help, man can believe, hope, love or be penitent as he ought, so as
that the grace of justification may be bestowed upon him, let him be anathema!”
Again, this goes to show that divine help and inspiration pertain to prevenient
grace.
Lemos argued that the two quotes adduced by Bastida in his point n. 2 (i.e.,
To Simplician, and Enchiridion) do not really bolster his claim, considering that
Augustine wrote: “The whole works belongs to God, ut totum Deo datur,” implying
that if our willing is not helped by God, the whole work could not be attributed to

114
Augustine, On the Grace of Christ I, 5, 6.
 69

him, since a part, no matter how minuscule, would come from us, from our
decision making.
Responding to Bastida’s third view, Lemos suggested that Augustine was
talking about efficacious, prevenient grace and the difficulty of explaining how it
is to be reconciled with free will; had he intended to refer to sufficient or helping
grace, there wouldn’t be any difficulty here.
In his fourth view, Bastida tried to defend the notion of congruous calling,
whereby man’s natural disposition and mood at a particular moment are the cause
and root (prima radice et causa) of God’s grace, which, given at such congruous
moment is rendered efficacious, whereby, given at a different moment would be
rendered ineffective, or incongruous.115 However, Lemos suggested, this notion
runs totally contrary to Augustine’s view, since he claimed that the congruity of
grace is an effect of his efficacious grace and that no disposition or attitude or
work on the part of man issues prior to the dispensation of divine grace. Lemos
also quipped that Bastida failed to mention what we read in Heb 13:21: “…may
God equip you with everything good for doing his will, and may he work in us
what is pleasing to him,” a text that shows no hints of the notion of “congruous
grace.”
In regard to the quote produced by Bastida (i.e., To Simplician), Lemos noted
that this was an earlier work by Augustine, written around 396, way before he
developed and articulated his full blown theology of grace, as even Cardinal
Bellarmine pointed out in one of his works: and yet, Lemos urged his listeners,
the Jesuits put so much emphasis on this text and ignore other texts and
Augustine’s anti-Pelagian literature, in which the great bishop dispensed with the
idea of “congruous grace” and emphasized efficacious grace instead! Aside from
that, coming back to that quote from To Simplician, Augustine only said that he
acknowledged the congruous and efficacious grace of God, without specifying
that its efficacy depends on the human will, industry or natural sentiments. On
the contrary, Augustine said in the same work:

If those things delight us which serve our advancement towards God, that is not due to our
own whim or industry or meritorious works, but to the inspiration of God and to the grace
which he bestows. He freely bestows upon us voluntary assent, earnest effort and the power
to perform works of fervent charity. We are bidden to ask that we may receive, to seek that
we may find, and to knock that it may be opened unto us.116

Moreover, in The Predestination of the Saints 4, 8, Augustine wrote:

115
Acta, 1142.
116
Augustine, Letter to Simplician, 2,21.
 70

In the solution of this question I labored indeed on behalf of the free choice of the human
will, but God’s grace overcame, and I could only reach that point where the apostle is
perceived to have said with the most evident truth: ‘For who makes you differ? And what do
you have that you have not received? Now, if you have received it, why do you glory as if you
did not receive it?’

In response to the Jesuits often quoted On the Gift of Final Perseverance 14:35:
“From which fact it appears that some have in their understanding itself a
naturally divine gift of intelligence, by which they may be moved to the faith, if
they either hear the words or behold the signs that are congruous to their minds,”
Lemos replied that since the context in which this paragraph is found mentions
preaching and the witnessing of miracles, to claim that such things are enough to
believe, amounts to overt Semipelagianism; Augustine, on the contrary, claimed
that in order to believe one needs not only external aids (such as preaching and
miracles), but an inner help giving a person not only the ability to believe, but
also the wanting to and the embracing of it.
In his fifth view, the text quoted by Bastida (“Esau then was unwilling and
did not run. Had he been willing and had he run, he would have obtained the help
of God who by calling him would have given him power to both will and run, had
he not been reprobate by despising the calling”) can be understood in two ways: a
Catholic and orthodox one, and a false and heretical one. The latter characterizes
the Pelagians’ reading of this text; the former amounts to say that Esau was given
sufficient grace and yet he spurned it, though he was not given efficacious grace,
and that did not depend on his will. Thus, according to Lemos, the conditional
clause “had he been willing and had he run” does not necessarily logically precede
or is the cause of what the rest of the sentence says, no more than what we read in
Jn 16:27: “The Father loves you because you loved me” – which is to say, that it
was not because the disciples loved Jesus that this love of theirs caused the Father
to love them in return: rather, the disciples came to love Jesus because of the
Father’s predilection for them.
In regard to Bastida’s sixth view, Lemos objects that the quote from On
Rebuke and Grace 11, 32 (“If, however, this help had been wanting, either to angel
or to man when they were first made, since their nature was not made such that
without the divine help it could abide if it would, they certainly would not have
fallen by their own fault, because the help would have been wanting without
which they could not continue”) does not help the Jesuits’ cause, since this was a
reference to sufficient help and not to efficacious grace, and also a reference to
Adam, and not to his progeny, which is affected by Original Sin. Thus, it is
evident and very clear that the first man would be blameless had he fallen without
first receiving God’s help.
In his seventh view, Bastida argued that the help of grace is not the
exclusive adequate cause of our conversion and salvation, and that the
 71

Dominicans were wrong for claiming otherwise. Lemos responds by saying that
the expression “The help of grace is the adequate cause of our justification” is
liable to two interpretations. The first consist in saying that being adequate, it
acts alone and does not require our cooperation: this is what Calvin claimed, and
such view is heretical. Augustine rejected this interpretation, and so do the
Dominicans. The second interpretation is orthodox and upheld by the supporters
of PP: according to it, prevenient grace, whose efficacy does not depend on man,
is indeed the adequate cause of our justification: to claim the contrary amounts to
incur the Pelagian heresy.
As far as Bastida’s criticism of Banez is concerned, Lemos remarked that a) it
is off topic; b) it is not up to him to defend whatever any disciple of St. Thomas
says or writes. In any event, Lemos distanced himself from Banez, insofar as the
latter defended the idea that reprobation is not the result of either foreseen actual
sins, or Original Sin itself; rather, it is the result of God’s sovereign unconditional
decision. Lemos sided with Augustine and Thomas and says that reprobation is
the result of God’s foreseen Original Sin. Having spoken at length, Lemos rested
his case.
Next, it was Bastida’s turn to speak. First, he commented on the improper use
by Lemos of the two Jesuit sources he quoted. For instance, Cardinal de Toledo
never said that Augustine upheld PP, but rather that it is sufficient for God to
give us the ability to do what is good. As far as Bellarmine is concerned, while he
admitted that Thomas upheld PP, he also went on to condemn it as an error in
faith and in agreement with Calvin. Bastida agreed with Suarez that eternal PP
without middle knowledge is more detrimental to human freedom than PP help;
and even if we dispense with middle knowledge we do not have to endorse PP,
but rather follow what Aquinas wrote in De veritate q. 6, resp. ad 3:

A thing should be placed in the genus to which it always belongs, rather than in a genus
which is not always proper to it. Now, the element of knowledge always belongs to
predestination because foreknowledge always accompanies it. The granting of grace,
however, which takes place through the will, does not always accompany predestination,
since predestination is eternal, while the bestowal of grace takes place in time.
Predestination, therefore, should be placed in the genus of knowledge rather than in that of
will acts.

As far as the prayer of the Church on the fourth week of Lent is concerned,
Bastida said that it could be interpreted along the lines of what Jesus said in Lk
14:24 (“And the master said to the slave: ‘Go out into the highways and along the
hedges and compel them to come in, so that my house may be filled’) and what
Aquinas said in his comment to this text in De veritate q. 22, art. 9, ad 7: “The
compelling there mentioned is not that of force, but that of efficacious persuasion
either by harsh or by gentle means.”
 72

Bastida went on to remark that Lemos failed to address a point he had

previously made, namely that Augustine in To Simplician saw a difference
between God’s calling and help: “Not because we cannot act without his help, but
because without his calling we do not want to.” Also, in regard to the difference
between God’s help and his exciting grace, Lemos recorded that Bastida, despite
having been somewhat proven wrong by him (iam quadammodo convictus)117
insisted that God helps man with his prevenient grace, not in an automatically
efficacious way, but as a true cause, since even a moral cause is indeed a real cause.
Bastida denied placing congruous vocation on one’s affections and temperament,
and added that it is not enough, in order to promote one’s views, to claim as
Lemos does that God does not do violence to the will, since even Calvin did and
yet failed to safeguard human freedom.
At this point, since so much had elapsed, the cardinals gestured to Lemos not
to take too long in his reply to Bastida; the Pope himself ordered Lemos to be
brief: “Dicas breviter aliqua.”118
About cardinal de Toledo, Lemos said that he only quoted him because he
acknowledged the Augustinian view that God, through the assistance of his
prevenient grace, determines the human will, and not because he upheld PP.
Bellarmine acknowledged Thomas to be a supporter of PP, and yet he distanced
himself from him: Lemos said that he left it up to the congregation to decide
whether this was a good thing, considering that many Popes, including Urban VI,
stood by the great Doctor. Also, philosophically speaking, it makes sense to say
that God is the moral cause of things, but the question remains: is he also the
efficient cause? Indeed he is, said Lemos, as Scripture suggests that he will make
us do what he wants us to do.
At this point the Jesuit Perez jumped into the discussion, and said that it is an
error in faith to say, as Lemos did, that a grace giving a person the ability to do
what is good is not true grace. Lemos corrected him and reminded him that he
claimed that grace giving such ability only through revelations and inner
persuasions is not true grace. Perez retorted that such grace is real grace indeed,
and that its outcome consists of certain undeliberate acts: Pelagius never admitted
such inwardly working grace, and therefore the Jesuits cannot be accused of
echoing his views. He went on to say that Augustine, in his On Free Will said
expressly that that if something is placed beforehand in the will that cannot be
resisted, freedom is thereby removed.
Lemos countered that Pelagius indeed admitted those inner revelations and
persuasions besides the God’s law and church teachings, as Augustine showed in
his On the Grace of Christ 7. He added that Prosper wrote in his Letter to Rufinus:

117
Acta,1152.
118
Ibid.,1153.
 73

They, as I said, pretended that the whole of man’s justice comes from his natural rectitude
and ability. But Catholic doctrine rejects that statement. Yet, the very opinion which was
condemned by Catholics, the Pelagians afterwards with heretical cunning proposed under
many various hues, and they managed to keep it while yet confessing that God’s grace is
necessary for man to begin what is good, to advance and to persevere in it. But the very
grace of God revealed to the vessels of mercy the fraud by which the vessels of wrath
maneuvered to steal into this insincere profession of faith.

In conclusion, Lemos said that Pelagius, Cassian and Faustus did not admit
true, real grace, but only the grace found in God’s law and in the church’s
teachings. Also, in response to the text quoted by Perez, Lemos countered by
proposing this Augustinian text: “It must not be doubted that human will cannot
resist the will of God who in heaven and on earth has done everything he willed
and who has brought about even those things that are in the future.”119 Let Perez
bring these two texts in agreement, for if he cannot do that, I can, quipped Lemos!
Perez objected that these two statements are not about the same subject, and with
that the Pope adjourned the meeting.

119
Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace 14, 45.
 74

Chapter 8

FORTY-THIRD CONGREGATION (December 14th, 1605. Ten cardinals

present, all other censors in attendance as well. No mention of how long the
meeting was).

Topic: The opinion of Latin and Greek Fathers concerning PP.

Bastida, assisted by Perez, divided the Church Fathers into five categories:

1) Those who expressly denied PP, or the automatic efficiency of prevenient

grace, which determines the human will so that it may always unfailingly
obey God’s promptings.
Among the Fathers cited were Cyril, Anselm, Jerome, Chrysostom, Prosper
and John Damascene. Prosper, for instance, wrote: “But it is absolutely foolish to
say that the predestination of God is operative in men both for good and for evil.
This seems to imply that some sort of necessity drives men to both good and evil,
when actually in good men their willingness comes from grace, while in the
wicked their wills act without grace.”120
According to Anselm: “For although it is necessary to abandon either life or
uprightness, nevertheless no necessity determines which of the two is maintained
or abandoned. Without doubt the will alone determines which one is to be
preserved in this situation and the power of necessity effects nothing when the
will’s choice alone is operative.”121
Aquinas, quoting and commenting on Damascene’s text, wrote:

Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa states in his book On Man: ‘Providence is concerned with the
things that are not in our power, but not with those that are in our power;’ and, following
him, Damascene states in De fide orthodoxa II that ‘God foreknows the things that are in our
power, but he does predetermine them.’ These texts should be explained to mean that things
in our power are not subject to determination by divine providence in the sense that they
receive necessity from it.122

2) Those who say that God moves in people’s hearts through his grace and
yet leaves them free to choose to act or not.
Among the Fathers cited were Cyril, Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Origen,
Justin Martyr, Leo I. Chrysostom, in particular, upheld the idea that God moves a

120
Prosper, Answers to the Gauls resp. ad 6.
121
Anselm, De Concordia I, 6.
122
Aquinas, Contra Gentiles III, 90.
 75

man without forcing him, and, according to Bastida, that God will supply his
congruous grace to a man whom he foresees will accept it.

3) Those who say that given the same amount of grace, it may happen that
one person converts, but the other does not.
Lemos did not record the names of the authorities cited, but only the
argument itself. Bastida gave the example of Judas, who allegedly received the
same prevenient grace the other eleven apostles received: the fact that he did not
persevere in faith while the others did, shows that PP does not exist.

4) Those who say that free will is removed by establishing the necessity of the
previous assumption, and not because of the consequent assumption.
Bastida quoted some Fathers, but mostly Anselm, to the effect that God has
two kinds of will: the first one, merciful and not forcing the human will, by which
he wants all men to be saved; the second, which arises from the consequence of
things chosen, which is irresistible. For Anselm said:

If I say, ‘A rebellion shall take place tomorrow,’ it does not follow that a rebellion shall
happen out of a previous necessity which makes a thing happen, but rather of subsequent
necessity which does not compel an event to occur…So free choice is able to will what it does
will and unable not to will what it wills, and it is necessary that it wills this. It has the power
not to will, of course, before it does will, because it is free, but it is necessary that it be
willing, for it is impossible for it to be willing and not willing the same thing at the same
time.123

Bastida deduced from passages such as these that these fathers would not
have approved of PP.

5) Those who say that God, by his prevenient grace, moves men’s wills
through inner persuasions, excitements and illuminations; thus, they would
condemn PP because it does not leave men free.
The Fathers cited were Cyril, Prosper and Ambrose. According to Prosper:

The special grace of God is certainly the more prominent factor in every justification. It
urges on with exhortations, moves by examples, inspires fear from dangers, rouses with
miracles, gives understanding, inspires counsel, illumines the heart itself and inspires it with
the aspirations of the faith. But man’s will is also associated with grace as a secondary factor.
For it is roused by the above-mentioned aids in order that it may co-operate with God’s work
which is being accomplished in man, and that it may begin to practice and gain merit from
that for which the divine seed inspires the effective desire.124

123
Anselm, De Concordia I, 3.
124
Prosper, De vocatione gentium II, 26.
 76

Having finished his argument, Bastida rested his case and Lemos began his
rebuttal.
How is it possible, Lemos quipped, that the Jesuits fail to see that these very
same arguments were adduced by Pelagius, who was condemned as a heretic for
upholding the moral, inner working of God at the expense of his efficacious
grace? Yes, of course, God does indeed work by exercising a moral influence in
our hearts, and Augustine himself supplied plenty of references for it in The Grace
of Christ. However, Augustine went on to add:

Now, who can help wishing that he would show us what grace it is that he would have us
understand? Indeed we have the strongest reason for desiring him to tell what he means by
saying that he does not allow grace merely to consist in the law. While, however, we are in
suspense of our expectation, observe, I pray you, what he has further to tell us: ‘God helps
us,’ says he, ‘by his teaching and revelation, while he opens the eyes of our heart; while he
points out to us the future, that we may not be absorbed in the present; while he discovers to
us the snares of the devil; while he enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of
heavenly grace.’ So, there we have Pelagius admitting the necessity of the inner working of
God, besides the already celebrated external law and apostolic teachings, but only to make
obedience to God’s law easier (facilius), and not as simply necessary, period. The Synod of
Mileve (416) condemned Pelagius for denying that God’s grace is not only unto forgiveness
of sins, but also a help not to commit sin, given to us so that we may like and want to do his
will. The way Pelagius conceives of grace is in the form of inner revelations and stimulations
that do not really confer to a person the real ability to do what is good, nor real sufficient
strength to do it, but a vague extrinsic ability not to depart from God’s law and teachings;
thus, even though Pelagius called them ‘inner,’ they remain, for practical purposes, external
to man, and not the true grace of Christ that makes us do what we do.125

Lemos, asked: what about Jesuits, then? Are they not saying the same thing
as Pelagius? And yet they pretend they are not, because according to them, while
they uphold the existence of cooperating grace, Pelagius denied it. This left
Lemos un-convinced, who argued that while it is true that Pelagius denied
cooperating grace, the Jesuits however, are not quite “off the hook,” for they
believe that God cooperates with us on account of the fact that out of our own
decision we agree to consent to those moral invitations. Thus, Lemos concluded,
this cooperating grace does not amount to much, since Julian, Cassian and
Faustus were condemned for upholding this type of grace, which is given after we
decide to consent to it, and which does not make us do what it wills. Lemos
concluded that this view is erroneous, as Aquinas argued in Chapter 88 of his
Summa contra Gentiles, entitled: That separate created substances cannot be directly the
cause of our acts of choice and will, but only God: “Only God therefore can move the

125
Augustine, The Grace of Christ 7 and 8.
 77

human will in the fashion of an agent, without doing violence to it.” In chapter 89
of the same Summa, Aquinas went on to say:

Some people, as a matter of fact, not understanding how God could cause a movement of the
will in us without prejudice to freedom of ill, have tried to explain these texts in a wrong
way. That is, they would say that God causes willing and accomplishing within us in the
sense the he causes in us the power of willing, but not in such a way that he makes us will
this or that. Thus does Origen, in his Principles, explain free choice, defending it against the
texts above… To these people, of course, opposition is offered quite plainly by the texts from
Sacred Scripture.

As far as Scripture is concerned, in Lemos’ view, the best way to understand

biblical passages such as Eph 2:10 (“For we are God’s handiwork, created in
Christ Jesus to do good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do”); Pr
21:1 (“The king’s heart is like channels of water in the hand of the Lord; he turns
it wherever he wishes”); Is 26:10 (“For you also have done all our works in us”);
Sir 33:10 (“But the Lord, in his wisdom, made them all different and gave them
different tasks. He blessed some, making them honored and holy, keeping them
near him. Others he cursed, humbling them and removing them from their
positions”) is to resort to the notion of PP, which best accounts for the way
efficacious grace transforms people, rather than to the general idea of external
suasions and moral influences. Lemos went on to say that Jesuits like Bastida are
mistaken in rejecting PP found in Sacred Scripture and in Thomas Aquinas’s
teaching. Such teaching, according to Lemos, was upheld at Trent VI, ch. 5,
which taught:

It is furthermore declared that in adults the beginning of that justification must proceed from
the predisposing grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his vocation, whereby,
without any merits on their part, they are called; that they, who by sin had been cut off from
God, may be disposed through his quickening and helping grace to convert themselves to
their own justification by freely assenting to and cooperating with that grace; so that, while
God touches the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Ghost, man himself
neither does absolutely nothing while receiving that inspiration, since he can also reject it,
nor yet is he able by his own free will and without the grace of God to move himself to
justice in his sight.

Thus, Lemos insisted, if the Council taught that the beginning of the motion
of justification lies in prevenient grace, then we must agree that God moves man
in an efficacious way to be disposed to be justified; thus, inner illuminations and
quickenings alone may well be the sine quo, but not the ex quo help unto
justification.
Having said that, Lemos next took issue with Jesuits like Francisco Suarez,
who allegedly went as far as claiming that the motion of the will does not issue
 78

from God’s grace or predetermination, thus apparently contradicting the

teachings of Trent.126 Molina himself claimed in his Concordia that in order for a
human deed (simultaneously chosen by prevenient grace and by an act of the
human will) to be truly free and deserving of honor and praise, it cannot be
produced by prevenient grace alone. Lemos remarked views such as these are
opposed by the authority of Scripture, the councils, Augustine and Thomas
Aquinas.
At this point, Lemos began to address in a general fashion the arguments
advanced by Bastida, before tackling them in a more specific way. First, all the
Greek and Latin Fathers quoted by Bastida do not openly deny that God acts
efficaciously in us, or claim that he merely empowers us to act, leaving up to us to
want and to act; rather, these fathers only say that God does not force, use
violence against, or absolutely necessitate the human will. Second, this strategy
of setting up the testimony of ancient fathers against the orthodox teachings of
grace can be dated back to the Provencal Semipelagians, who criticized Augustine
for subverting the Church’s theological tradition; the Jesuits are now doing the
same thing, in their attempt to condemn PP. Third, Lemos resorted to
Augustine’s words in The Predestination of the Saints 14, 27:

What need is there, then, for us to look into the writings of those who, before this heresy
sprang up, had no necessity to be conversant in a question so difficult of solution as this,
which beyond a doubt they would have done if they had been compelled to answer such
things? Whence it arose that they touched upon what they thought of God’s grace briefly in
some passages of their writings, and cursorily; but on those matters which they argued
against the enemies of the Church, and in exhortations to every virtue by which to serve the
living and true God for the purpose of attaining eternal life and true happiness, they dwelt at
length. But the grace of God, what it could do, shows itself artlessly by its frequent mention
in prayers; for what God commands to be done would not be asked for from God, unless it
could be given by him that it should be done.

Fourth, even if some of the Fathers quoted by the Jesuits appear to be saying
what they are saying, their words need to be explained and not quoted at length,
out of context, or worse yet, to be regarded on the same level as Augustine’s
views, considering that the latter’s teachings on efficacious grace were well
received, approved and endorsed by Popes, Councils and by the Apostolic See.
Finally, when it comes to a handful of Greek Fathers’ quotes used by the Jesuits,
their testimony should be regarded with suspicion, as Pelagius’ doctrine was an
offshoot of Origen’s teachings; Clement of Alexandria’s works are regarded as
spurious by the Church; and Justin Martyr’s small treatise concerning some
questions about the Christian faith was not written by him.

126
Acta, 1174.
 79

Finally, Lemos began to address in greater detail the five categories of

Church fathers set up by Bastida earlier on:

1) Anselm’s testimony merely shows that the human will determines itself as the
secondary cause and that it is not imposed upon by a previous, crippling and
compelling divine necessity. Moreover, Anselm seems to be championing PP
when he says:

Of course, every quality, every action, everything that has existence owes its being at all to
God, who is the source of all uprightness, but not of unrighteousness. Therefore, although
God is a factor in all that is done by a righteous or unrighteous will in its good and evil acts,
nevertheless, in the case of its good acts he effects both their existence and their goodness,
whereas in the case of its evil acts he causes them to be, but not to be evil…The very act of
willing, which is sometimes righteous, sometimes unrighteous, and is nothing other than the
employment of the will and power given by God, insofar as it exists, is something good and
proceeds from God…So, in this fashion God causes in all volitions and good actions both
that they actually exist and that they are good, while in evil actions he is not the cause of
their evil, but only that they exist.127

As far as Prosper’s quote is concerned, Bastida employed it to argue that

Dominicans teach that God predestines or predetermines people unto evil;
however, says Lemos, I have already shown how this charge can be defused.
Finally, Lemos recalled Bastida quoting Damascene to the effect that he rejected a
PP that necessitates the human will; however, the Jesuit conveniently omitted
Aquinas’ previous comment, whereby St. Tomas specifically said that human
choices and acts of the will are subject to divine providence. In fact, we read in
Summa contra Gentiles 90:

However, certain passages in Sacred Scripture appear to be consonant with the

aforementioned view. It is said in fact that ‘God made man from the beginning, and left him
in the hand of his own counsel’ (Sir 15:14); and later: ‘He has set water and fire before you:
stretch forth your hand to whatever you wish. Before man is life and death, good and evil;
that which he chooses will be given him’ (Sir 15: 14, 17-18). And also: ‘Consider that I have
set before thee this day life and good, and on other hand death and evil’ (Dt 30:15).’ But these
words are brought forward to show that man is possessed of free choice, not that his choices
are placed outside divine providence.

Moreover, in the section of the same Summa dealing with the topic of
predestination, Aquinas first quotes Damascene’s statement as a possible
objection to it: “It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene
says (De fide orthodoxa ii, 30): ‘It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but
does not predetermine everything, since he foreknows all that is in us, but does
127
Anselm, De Concordia I, 7.
 80

not predetermine it all.’” He then replies to the objection by saying: “Damascene

calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things
which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: ‘He does
not will malice, nor does he compel virtue.’ Therefore predestination is not
excluded by God.” Lemos concluded that Damascene only opposed a false view of
PP which removes man’s freedom.
Suddenly, Bastida interjected that the Dominicans’ understanding of PP does
indeed remove freedom since, according to it, God forestalls the human “power of
indifferent choice” and moves the human will as if it was a brute animal;
conversely, the moral and physical predetermination envisioned by Jesuits,
moving efficaciously a person through the power of decision-making that stems
from his/her own indifferent reason (i.e., the root of real freedom), leaves that
freedom intact.
Lemos ignored that comment and pressed on with the second category of the
Fathers proposed earlier on by Bastida.
2) Cardinal Toledo of blessed memory argued that Augustine and Chrysostom
ought to be understood differently than what his fellow Jesuits suggest.
Bellarmine openly said that Augustine has a place of honor in teaching about the
subject of grace. In conclusion, Chrysostom’s words taken to mean what the
Jesuits understand them to mean, go against the faith of the Church. In reference
to some comments made by Chrysostom, Augustine wrote in The Gift of
Perseverance 19, 48:

For God foreknew the remnant which he should make so according to the election of grace.
That is, therefore, he predestinated them: for without doubt he foreknew if he predestinated,
but to have predestinated is to have foreknown that which he should do. What the, hinders
us when we read of God’s foreknowledge in some commentators on God’s word, and they are
treating of the calling of the elect, from understanding the same predestination?

3) In regard to the third group of Church Fathers who say that of two men given
the same amount of grace, once converts and the other does not (i.e., thus
implicitly condemning PP), Prosper words are often used by Jesuits. In response
to this, Lemos argued that what Prosper was referring to is exciting grace, not
helping grace. The helping, prevenient grace of God is efficacious grace that
cannot be refused, as Augustine made clear in The Predestination of the Saints 8, 13:

This grace, therefore, which is hiddenly bestowed in human hearts by the divine gift, is
rejected by no hard heart because it is given for the sake of first taking away the hardness of
the heart. When, therefore, the Father is hears within, and teaches, so that a man comes to
the Son, he takes away the heart of stone and gives a heart of flesh, as in the declaration of
the prophet he has promised. Because he thus makes them children and vessels of mercy
which he has prepared for glory.
 81

Thus, according to Lemos, that out of two men who receive the same amount
of God’s grace, that one converts and the other does not, is to be ascribed to one’s
will’s response to exciting grace; but for one to actually convert, he needs to
receive the greater gift of God’s helping grace.

4) Lemos pointed out that the necessity that Anselm rebuffed is an antecedent
necessity, which indeed removes freedom, such as that which is found in physical
laws (e.g., the sun will rise tomorrow). But when it comes to consequent necessity,
which is admitted by Anselm, we must not think of it only in terms of the
consequences of what a person’s free will chose and decided on, but also and most
fittingly so, of that which follow God’s free and originating will that retains and
safeguards the created will’s freedom in the secondary causes. Anselm suggests
this much, when he wrote: “For since what God wills, is not able to occur, when
he wills for no necessity either to compel the human will or to prevent it from
willing, and when he wills that the effect follow from the act of human willing, it
is necessary that the human will be free and that there occur what it wills.”128
What can be clearer than this, asks Lemos?129 He then proceeded to quote
from Aquinas’ Summa Ia IIae, art. 8 (“Whether the will of God imposes necessity
on the things willed”), ad 1,2,3:

Reply to objection 1. By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things

willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God
wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true. Reply to objection 2. From the very fact
that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God
wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to his will. Reply
to objection 3. Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the
antecedents. Hence, things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God
wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute
necessities.

5) Against the Jesuit view (according to which the Fathers say that God by his
prevenient grace moves men’s wills through inner persuasions, excitements and
illuminations, thus excluding PP, because it does not leave men free), Lemos said
that the aids that God bestows amount to more than mere moral influences, but
rather to efficacious PP. Trent said expressly that God’s prevenient grace by
which we are converted is both exciting and helping: the Jesuits instead claim that
God’s helping grace is subsequent and not prevenient.
At this point, Bastida took some time to respond to Lemos’ claims, making
the following points:

128
Anselm, De Concordia I, 3.
129
Acta, 1186.
 82

 Pelagius did not admit these inner illuminations: thus, the Jesuits cannot be
said to imitate him.
 Ancient councils said that Pelagius did not admit true grace, and yet such
inner illuminations amount to true grace: thus, Lemos is wrong for saying
they are not. Bastida said: “In order to portray us Jesuits as Pelagians,
Lemos first turns Pelagius into a ‘Catholic.’”130
 God does change man’s wills indeed, but only through moral applications,
not by means of PP.
 In regard to Trent, Bastida emphasized that if PP was true, what the
Council said about man’s origin and role in the motion unto justification is
rendered null and void.
 Lemos’ use of Eph 2:10 in support of PP does not hold water. Creation
implies that there is nothing before it, not even the good works that God
has arranged to be performed by us through PP.
 Molina simply said that an act produced by the human will does not owe its
freedom to prevenient grace, but only to the freedom inherent in human free
will; it derives a supernatural character from grace in the performance of
morally good deeds.
 Lemos did not produce any saint or major theologian openly supporting
PP, besides Dionysius.
 The Fathers understood prevenient grace only in terms of these inner
illuminations and excitements: there is no need to use other names for this
grace. Also, the Pelagian heresy has been dead for a thousand years: no
need to use it now as a scarecrow.

Lemos’ final retort:

 According to the Jesuits, Pelagius did not admit any other inner grace than
the Law and teachings of Jesus and of the Church. However, Augustine in
On the Grace of Christ 14, 15 wrote: “Now the possibility of coming, Pelagius
places in nature, or even – as we found him attempting to say some time
ago – in grace (whatever that may mean to him), when he says ‘Whereby
this very capacity is assisted’; whereas the actual coming lies in the will and
act.’” Thus, Pelagius taught that men can indeed come, but not that they do
de facto thanks to God’s grace.
 I never claimed that efficacious grace is twofold, namely that it begins by
exercising its influence through moral persuasion and ends in becoming

130
Ibid.,1188.
 83

helping grace. I said that efficacious grace at the beginning is exciting and
in the end, helping.

When Bastida petitioned the Pontiff to request Lemos to qualify the

statement that inner excitements and revelations are not true grace, Lemos
replied that he never said that. What I said, claimed Lemos, was that inner
illuminations and excitements only helping in the guise of the Law and the
teachings of Jesus and the Church and consisting only of this, are not true grace,
neither efficacious nor sufficient, even though they are sometimes referred to as
“grace” in a general sense; thus, Bastida is wrong when he says that the apostle
Judas received the same grace as did Peter, and when he says that the Church’s
theologians teach this to be the case. The truth is that Judas received the same
grace of being an apostle; with the other eleven he shared in the same grace of
participating in the sacraments, of enjoying a common fellowship, and even in the
same justifying grace. However, he did not receive persevering grace, which was
denied to him and yet given to the other apostles for reasons only God knows.
 84

Chapter 9

FORTY-FOURTH CONGREGATION (January 10, 1606. Lasted a little over

six hours. Some cardinals were absent, but all other prelates were in attendance).

Topic: The Dominican view of physical predetermination, or of grace efficacious in and

of itself, agrees to a large extent with Calvin’s errors.

Bastida began his presentation announcing that he could prove that PP

cannot be defended by resorting to three arguments: 1) The efficacious grace
envisioned in this concept, as it precedes any use of human free will, radically
injures human freedom; 2) Those who are lacking this efficacious or
predetermining grace do not have sufficient help by which they can be converted
to God; 3) It can be inferred from this efficacious and predetermining help that
God predetermines people to evil. Before demonstrating these three points,
Bastida declared his intention of showing how the Dominicans’ view concerning
grace and predestination agreed with the views expressed by Calvin.131
The learned Jesuit quoted more than twenty-two passages from Thomist
writers’ works that appeared to agree with Calvin’s views; then he focused on
eleven statements to which both Calvin and Dominicans allegedly subscribe in
their respective theologies. For the sake of clarity I will list these statements in
italics immediately followed by Lemos’ qualification of each of them, even though
in the Latin text Lemos’ response appears many pages later:

1) The help of prevenient grace is efficacious in and of itself alone, and independent of
human free will, in a way that the latter cannot render the former efficacious or
inefficacious.132
This view is perfectly orthodox (“propositio Catholica est,” col. 1223) and
upheld by Augustine himself (especially in his Epistle to Vitalis 107). The
Dominicans agree with him, and so does Calvin indeed, who is not wrong
for saying this much: rather, he was wrong for concluding that human free
will is thereby compromised. Jesuits fail to appreciate how this view
preserves and enhances human freedom.

131
Lemos remarked that this approach exemplified Bastida’s strategy of “beating about the
bush,” by either carrying on indefinitely, or by recycling the same ideas in different categories.
132
Lemos polemically remarked that since according to Bastida this statement is the root of all
others, why did he even bother to include ten more? See Acta, 1223.
 85

2) Once the help of grace, which is efficacious in and of itself, reaches us, we cannot
not want, dissent or oppose it.
This is not what Dominicans are saying. Trent condemned this view in
canon 4. Dominicans follow St. Thomas by saying that in a composite sense
man cannot resist, but in a divided sense, he can. Calvin said that man cannot
resist in either sense, and thus his view was condemned.

3) The act of the will stems necessarily out of this grace, not of its own nature, but out
of being placed under the divine decree, or out of another prior cause.
Dominicans uphold this view because it is a “Catholic truth” against the
Pelagians: so what, if Calvin agreed with it? Calvin was wrong to conclude
that since the act of the will stems necessarily out of grace, we have no
freedom: Dominicans condemn him for saying that.

4) Without the help of efficacious grace, man cannot do what is right, nor convert to
God.
Calvin was condemned for saying that sufficient grace is nothing but
efficacious grace, in virtue of which alone man is able to operate.
Dominicans say that only as a result of efficacious grace can man really or
de facto operate what is good and pleasing to God. Taking this statement at
face value, said Lemos, we should remember that Calvin emphasized the
word “cannot,” while Dominicans emphasize the word “do,” thus salvaging
free will.

5) The fact that out of two men one is converted and the other isn’t depends on
nothing else than on different degrees of grace being bestowed on each of them.
Calvin said that much but denied man’s free assent and cooperation.
Dominicans say that at the origin of such a situation lies God’s grace, but
the proximate cause of man’s conversion is his own cooperation.

6) Those to whom the Holy Spirit has bestowed equal amounts of grace need to
equally consent to it.
Aquinas taught that the Spirit bestows gifts to each person as he sees fit.
On this issue we must be careful and consider that if we claim that we can
respond with more or greater impetus and zeal than the grace we were given,
we would have to give more credit to our free will than to divine grace: in
other words, if grace gives a person say “eight,” and he strives with
“twelve” out of his own free will, such a situation would run counter to
Catholic truth.133

133
Acta, 1228.
 86

7) To accept the offer of grace is not up to our free will.

Calvin denied free will, which is heretical; Aquinas denied this statement,
though he added that it is not up to us to make it efficacious or inefficacious
(as Pelagians used to claim).

8) This grace acts in such a way on a person’s will, that even though the will acts,
nonetheless the adequate cause of his conversion is grace alone.
This statement can be understood in two senses: a Catholic and a heretical
one. In the Catholic sense, free will is the proximate cause, but not the
entire cause.

9) The help which the gift of perseverance consist of, cannot be refused; it makes a
person dwell unwaveringly in doing good, and, independently of his free will, it
makes him persevere.
Lemos denied that it Calvinistic to say “independently of free will,”
considering what Augustine said in The Gift of Perseverance 6. Catholic
theologians say that during the entire time of grace’s action, man fully
retains his power and faculty to not persevere.

10) God, by his eternal and inevitable decree, chooses and determines all our
actions, both good and evil ones.
We disagree with Calvin, Lemos said, as we uphold Trent’s session 6,
canon 6. God does not determine anyone to evil.

11) Accidental and fortuitous effects not only are allowed by God, but are also
foreknown and predetermined by him.
I am amazed, Lemos said, that Jesuits deny the truthfulness of this
statement, when Scripture itself declares: “Aren’t two sparrows sold for a
penny? Yet not even one of them falls to the ground apart from your
Father’s will” (Mt 10:29); and also: “Even all the hairs on your head are
numbered” (Mt 10:30).

When Bastida announced that he was leaving out more propositions to be

discussed in future congregations, the Pope himself instructed him to present
them all now; the learned Jesuit had no choice but to comply, and went on to
quote more alleged similarities between Calvin and the Dominicans, reading them
for a marathon three and a half hours.134

134
Lemos drily remarked (Acta, 1194) that rather than an argument this felt like the recitation of
the proceedings of a conference.
 87

Now it was the Dominican’s turn to speak. Before expounding in detail those
propositions, Lemos laid out several principles upholding the efficacy of
prevenient grace:
1) Pelagius was condemned for denying the help of God’s prevenient grace by
which God makes sure that man’s will and action coincide. But isn’t this
type of help what Dominicans call “predetermining physical and moral
help?”
2) The efficacy of grace depends either on God’s mere external calling or on a
help that is objectively and intrinsically predetermining: tertium non
datur,135 as even Cardinal Bellarmine admitted.
At this point the Italian cardinal, probably irritated by Lemos’
occasional use of his writings to back up the Dominicans’ claims,
interrupted him and said in Italian: “Fr. Lemos, there is no need to quote
my own writing to me: if you need to make a point from my works, just tell
me what you are looking for in particular!”136 Lemos continued unfazed by
saying that the defenders of congruous grace have to explain where man’s
assent comes from. If one says that it has to come from natural powers,
such as one’s mental disposition, character, state of mind at the time of
God’s offer of grace, it would then follow that God will be merely waiting
for the “right time” to “zap” a person. However, such view contradicts
sacred councils (e.g., Orange, Trent), as they clearly asserted that there is
no such thing as the “right” disposition issuing from man, which is followed
by grace or making grace efficacious.
Moreover, defenders of congruous grace claim that this grace begins to
affect man while he is a state of indecision. Therefore, the instant man
decides to do what is good, he is still dwelling in a state of natural powers
and relying only on them to do what is good, and thus he perfectly converts
himself to God out of his memory of previously offered grace; however, this
cannot be the case, remarked Lemos!
3) The Church prays that God may convert sinners and change their wills,137
thus upholding predetermining grace. But Jesuits argue that when we
beseech God to supply us with his grace at the precise moment he knows we
will consent to it (since, had he called us at another time, we would not
consent), amounts indeed to asking for a great gift! Lemos disagreed with
their view, as he pointed out that this is not at all the same thing as asking
God to convert people: “To invite is not to bring about; to induce is not to
135
Acta, 1200.
136
Idem.
137
Lemos quoted the previously mentioned Prayer over the gifts on the 4th Sunday of Pentecost,
in the traditional Roman Rite: “”Be appeased, we beseech you Lord, by the acceptance of our
offerings, and graciously compel our wills, even though rebellious, to turn to you.”
 88

make one do something; to excite objectively is not to convert effectively;

and yet this is precisely what the Church asks for in her prayers.”138
4) Lemos said that “the determination of the will unto good stems from God
as the first, really accomplishing cause; thus, God not only predetermines
the will in the first act in an objective manner, but also in a really efficient
manner, so that the will itself may determine itself in the secondary act.”139
Lemos then proceeded to employ a syllogism to defend his assertion.
Moreover, Paul’s rhetorical question: “What do you have that you have not
received?” seems to contradict what Bastida said earlier on, namely that we
produce by ourselves the resolve to do what is good, instead of receiving it
in an efficacious way from God himself.
5) God efficaciously and physically predetermines the will in the first act, so
that the human will may freely determine itself in the second act. Lemos
adduced three arguments to bolster his claim, including Scotus’ view.
6) To say that man’s will is the first principle in his determination amounts to
denying God’s efficient causality; Thomas Aquinas criticized such view, and
prior to him, so did Jerome.
7) A created will that is not determined by anything would be the equivalent
of God’s will! Also, a will that is still, unbiased and un-moved, is lifeless.
But this is madness, Lemos quipped: it amounts to denying the First
Mover, and consequently such view destroys real human freedom. To back
his claim, Lemos quoted from Jerome’s Letter to Chtesiphon 6 (“They are
forever objecting to us that we destroy free will. On the contrary, we reply,
it is you destroy it, for you use it amiss and disown the bounty of its
Giver”), and Augustine’s Against Two Letters of the Pelagians II, 1:

What need is there to refute those things that do not contain the insidious poison of
their doctrine, but seem only to plead for the acquiescence of the Eastern bishops for
their assistance, or, on behalf of the Catholic faith, against the profanity, as they say, of
the Manicheans; with no other view except a horrible heresy being presented to them,
whose adversaries they profess themselves to be, to lie hidden as the enemies of grace in
praise of nature?

Thus, Lemos concluded, Calvin is dead wrong either out of ignorance

or out of obstinacy, when he denies free will, which is indeed safeguarded
and perfected by God’s physical predetermination.

At this point, Lemos declared his intention to briefly respond to the three
arguments traditionally advanced by the Jesuits, and more specifically by Bastida,

138
Acta, 1204.
139
Ibid.,1205.
 89

at the beginning of this congregation, namely: 1) Predetermining grace removes

human freedom; 2) All those who lack predetermining grace were not given
helping grace at all; 3) The inescapable consequence of the previous two points is
that God is the author of sin.
Lemos replied that 1) These criticisms used to be leveled by the Pelagians
against Augustine (he supplied a couple of quotes from Prosper and Fulgentius as
evidence of this); 2) The Jesuits uphold similar things Pelagians used to believe; 3)
The three Jesuit objections can easily be defeated in the following fashion:
a) Not only predetermining grace does not remove human freedom: on the
contrary, it causes and perfects it! God is not only the cause of the
substance of the action, but of its manner. Thomas Aquinas made this
abundantly clear in his Summa Ia IIae, q. 83, ad 3:

Free will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free will man moves himself
to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first
cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be the cause of another is to be the first cause.
God, therefore, is the first cause who moves causes that are both natural and voluntary.
And just as by moving natural causes he does not prevent their acts being natural, so by
moving voluntary causes, he does not deprive their actions of being voluntary; rather,
he is the cause of this very thing in them, for he operates in each thing according to its
own nature.

Lemos also quoted from the same Summa, q. 19 the entire article 8, entitled
“Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things that are willed.” He
then confidently concluded: “There is no need to respond in more detail to this
objection.”140

b) How can Jesuits say that unless man is given efficacious grace he does not
have sufficient grace? This is a non sequitur! Augustine made this very clear
in his On Rebuke and Grace 12, where he distinguished between the help
since quo, in the absence of which a good deed cannot take place (i.e., the
grace upheld by the Jesuits), and the help quo, in virtue of which such good
deed gets done (i.e., the grace envisioned by Dominicans). In our time,
Lemos commented, we call the former “sufficient grace,” and the latter
“efficacious grace.”

c) In no way does PP entail that God is the cause of sin or that he

predetermines men to sin. God does not determine man’s will to sin, but
rather the physical action and movement that occur in sin, since he is the
First Mover; however, when it comes to supernatural good deeds, God

140
Ibid., 1219.
 90

does predetermine the human will as well (Lemos at this point remarked
that all the cardinals in attendance warmly approved of this distinction).141
Moreover, Aquinas argued this much in his Commentary on the Sentences II,
dist. 37: “Is God responsible for Sin and Punishment?” However, since the
Jesuits are likely to bring up against this accusation in later congregations,
Lemos reserved the right to quote more texts from Aquinas at the proper
time, if need be. At this time, though, he only wished to point out four
elements present in sin: a) Sin considered as a whole; b) The deformity and
malice that accompanies it; c) The material and formal aspects of sin; d)
The physical action and movement that accompanies it. It is de fide that
God is not the cause of a) and b), as Calvin erroneously argued. God is not
the cause of c) either. However, it can be argued that God is the cause of d)
as Augustine and his followers previously argued against the Pelagians.

After Lemos was done, Bastida said many more things which Lemos declined
to address in order not to impose on the sapped mental energy of the Pontiff and
the other members of the Congregation (six hours had already gone by!).
Apparently Lemos’ decision was welcomed by everybody!142
Lemos recorded that he felt this was a remarkable session in which he scored
many points in favor of efficacious grace, laying waste to the Jesuits’ arguments,
more so than in all the previous congregations, and humbly concluded: “I am
what I am thanks to God’s grace!”

141
Ibid., 1221.
142
Ibid., 1232.
 91

Chapter 10

FORTY-FIFTH CONGREGATION (January 25, 1606. Seven cardinals in

attendance. Everybody else was present. About four hours long).

Topic: Theological reasons adduced to uphold PP

Bastida began by outlining his objections to PP. The first is that PP

completely removes human free will. The second, is that all those who have not
been acted upon by PP allegedly are denied sufficient grace. The third, is that the
defenders of PP claim that God predetermines people to sin, thus echoing Calvin’s
teachings. Before going into details, Bastida quoted Banez to the effect that it is
inexplicable how divine PP coheres with human free will, even though PP must
be upheld de fide.
In regard to the first objection, Bastida stated that a) According to the
defenders of PP, it cannot be resisted; b) PP inevitably moves human freedom; c)
PP cannot exist side by side with human dissent. In specific regard to a), the
Council of Sens expressly said that God’s grace can be resisted. Aquinas too, in a
couple of passages of his Summa said that much.143According to Bastida, since PP
removes indetermination from the will, it removes the essence of free will, which
consists in indetermination and indifference of choice.144 While it is true that God
moves people in a gentle manner, he does so, not by predetermining, but by
leaving man to his own will, so that he himself may determine it. He then
suggested that Dominicans should explain how their views differ from Calvin’s.
In regard to the second objection, Bastida suggested that since without PP
man cannot be converted, he lacks what is necessary for his conversion, thus
making him excusable for his sins and unrepentance.
In regard to the third objection, God predetermines man to evil and sin in
virtue of PP, since without such predetermination the will cannot move itself
towards sin. Bastida also disavowed the distinction upheld by Thomists, whereby
God only predetermines people to material sin, but not to formal sin, or to the

143
“The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the
mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the
capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any
individual good. And therefore, it is not of necessity moved by it” (Summa Ia IIae, q. 82, art. 2,
ad 2). Also: “As we have said above, the sensitive appetite, though it obeys reason, yet in a given
case can resist by desiring what reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not
when he wishes – namely, ‘not to desire against reason,’ as Augustine says” (Summa Ia IIae,
q.83, art.1, ad 5).
144
Acta, 1235.
 92

malice/and or moral disorder found in it. Bastida pointed out that since the
movement towards sin cannot be separated from malice, God allegedly
predetermines man to malice as well (an idea condemned at Trent VI, canons 6
and 7).
Lemos responded by remarking how these three points had already been
discussed in previous congregations, their difficulty solved, and objections
refuted, not to mention that in the past Semipelagians used these arguments to
defend their views on grace. Moreover, paradoxically Jesuits ended up denying
sufficient grace since they believed that it consists in inner promptings and
illuminations, rather than in sufficient strength to the soul (dans veras virtutes
sufficientes animae).145
In regard to the three arguments adduced by Bastida in support of his first
objection, Lemos repeated that man cannot dissent from PP in a composite sense,
though he can in a divided sense. As far as the Council of Sens is concerned, it
spoke in those terms about sufficient rather than efficacious grace: yes, indeed
man can resist sufficient grace, but even if Sens had efficacious grace in mind,
then it meant the expression in a divided sense. Moreover, Lemos suggested that
when Sens spoke about resistere it really meant dissentire, since the verb “to resist”
cannot be taken literally: how can finite man resist God’s infinite will? (e.g.,
Esther 13:9). Trent on its part did not say that man can resist but that he can
dissent with God’s moving him. Moreover, Lemos accused Bastida of quoting
Aquinas out of context, since he always taught that the divine will is the root and
first cause of our freedom. Thus, when Bastida claims that true freedom consists
in the indetermination of the will or in the indifference to opposite choices, he
ought to take heed to what Aquinas taught in the Summa contra Gentiles I, 82,
entitled “Awkward consequences seem to follow if God does not will necessarily
the things that he wills:”

But of these conclusions none necessarily follows. For to be open to opposites belongs to a
certain power in a twofold way: in one way, from the side of itself; in another way, from the
side of its object. From the side of itself, when it has not yet achieved its perfection, through
which it is determined to one effect. This openness redounds to the imperfection of a power,
and potentiality is shown to be in it; as appears in the case of an intellect in doubt, which has
yet not acquired the principles from which to be determined to one alternative. From the side
of its object, a certain power is found open to opposites when the perfect operation of the
power depends on neither alternative, though both can be. An example is an art which can
use diverse instruments to perform the same work equally well. This openness does not
pertain to the imperfection of a power, but rather to its eminence, in so far as it dominates
both alternatives, and thereby is determined to neither, being open to both. This is bow the
divine will is disposed in relation to things other than itself. For its end depends on none of

145
Ibid.,1239.
 93

the other things, though it itself is most perfectly united to its end. Hence, it is not required
that any potentiality be posited in the divine will.

Lemos argued that such indetermination of the will not only does not
constitute its essence, but it is rather an imperfection removed by PP, by which
God, in the first act, moves the created will out of its potentiality so that it may
freely determine itself in the secondary act;146 he then referred to three
philosophical principles to shore up his conclusion. Also, the similarity with
Calvin’s view is superficial, since Calvin denied that once the efficacious grace of
God touches man the flexible potential and freedom of the created will remains,
by which he could dissent, if he so wished.
In regard to Bastida’s second objection, Lemos agreed that without PP man
cannot be converted de facto, though he retains the potential to be converted.
Aquinas explained this difference in Summa IaIIae, q. 25, art. 5, ad 2:

God is bound to nobody but himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what he
ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to
himself, and just. But these words ‘befitting’ and ‘just’ may be understood in two ways: one,
in direct connection with the verb ‘is’; and thus they would be restricted to the present order
of things; and would concern his power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the
sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be
joined directly with the verb ‘can’ (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then
secondly with ‘is,’ the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The
sentence would then be true in this sense: ‘God cannot do anything except that which, if he
did it, would be suitable and just.’

In other words, said Lemos, it’s like saying that a man without a light,
operating in total darkness, cannot see; ‘cannot see’ refers to a particular
situation, not to the power of sight itself, which remains intact even in total
darkness; or like saying that a priest cannot consecrate the Eucharist without
bread and wine: “cannot consecrate” refers to the situation in which no bread and
wine are available, not to the power of the priest to transform the elements.
Also, Aquinas wrote in Summa I, q. 83, art 1, obj 3: “Further, what is free is
cause of itself, as the Philosopher says (Metaphysics. i, 2). Therefore what is moved
by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Pr 21:1): ‘The
heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever he will he shall turn it,’
and (Philippians 2:13): ‘It is God who works in you both to will and to
accomplish.’ Therefore man has not free-will.”
To this objection, Aquinas responded:

146
Ibid.,1244.
 94

Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to
act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of
itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore,
is the first cause, who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving
natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes
he does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is he the cause of this very
thing in them; for he operates in each thing according to its own nature.

In regard to Bastida’s argument that if PP is not given to a person he/she

does not have sufficient help to be saved, Lemos dismissed it as “inconsequential”
(nullam esse consequentiam).147 In the Summa Ia IIae q.109, art. 9, entitled “Whether
one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without further help of
grace, do good and avoid sin?” Aquinas set up as the first objection: “It would
seem that whoever has already obtained grace can do good and avoid sin by
himself and without further help of grace. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it
does not fulfil what it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do
good and keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that
grace is either useless or imperfect” - which is precisely what the Jesuits are
arguing now.
Lemos quoted approvingly Aquinas’ response to such objection:

The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the Divine
help; for every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after
having received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be concluded that grace is
given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man will need the Divine help even in the
state of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent imperfect,
inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated above.

Thus, according to Lemos, the Jesuits’ objection fizzles. Even from a

philosophical point of view it is an invalid conclusion to argue that if a cause is
not operative, it is insufficient and incomplete; for instance, while sufficient and
complete in itself, it may not be operative not because it is defective, but because
it is impeded by another. Thus Lemos concluded: “Therefore, sufficient help is
truly sufficient and constitutes a proximate power to operate; however, it does not
operate de facto because impeded by an evil will, which resist against it, and if it
did not resist it, the same sufficient help would become efficacious in a person, not
out of that person’s will, but out of God himself.”148
As Aquinas said in Contra Gentiles III, 159, entitled “That it is reasonable to
hold a man responsible if he does not turn toward God, even though he cannot do
without grace”: “But those alone are deprived of grace who offer an obstacle

147
Ibid.,1250.
148
Ibid.,1252.
 95

within themselves to grace; just as, while the sun is shining on the world, the man
who keeps his eyes closed shut is held responsible for his fault, if as a result some
evil follows, even though he could not see unless he was provided in advance with
light from the sun.”
In regard to the third objection raised by Bastida, Lemos pointed out that
Aquinas, in his Commentary to the Sentences II, dist. 37, q. 2, art. 2, stated that the
action that is in sin cannot be attributed to God as an action: “Everything that is a
cause of an action in which a deformity is established, according to which an
action is said to be evil, moves to and cooperates with evil: for in fact nothing
operates towards evil, if not that it produces such an action. Now, in no way can
we say that God cooperates with evil; thus, we cannot say that he is the cause of
the action in which evil is found.” And this, Lemos remarked, is precisely what the
Jesuits are saying!
Aquinas further developed this point in his later work, the Summa:

The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every
being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius
declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since
nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to
the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, who is act by his essence. Therefore God is the cause
of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect:
and this defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of
the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to
the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to
the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping.
Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet he is not the cause of sin, because he
does not cause the act to have a defect.149

At this point Lemos said that he could muster about thirty passages in
Augustine, all giving witness to the same idea. Mercifully he omitted doing that
for the sake of brevity, though he supplied an instance from the Gospel (Jn 18:14)
in which the tongue that spoke those words did so under God’s motion, yet not as
a sin, but as an action.150
As far as PP echoing Calvin is concerned, Lemos said that insofar as Calvin
upheld efficacious grace, he did not err; he erred by concluding that such grace
removes free will. He did not err, however, when he said that God moves the
action of sin, because God is not subject to the Law. Catholic truth upholds that
God moves man to the action which is in sin as far as the kinetic action if
concerned, but he does not move to the deformity and evil of sin itself, but rather
merely allows it.

149
Aquinas, Summa Ia IIae, q. 79, art. 2.
150
Acta, 1257.
 96

Lemos ended his tour de force by recalling Augustine’s words:

Now, although I may not be able myself to refute the arguments of these men, I yet see how
necessary it is to adhere closely to the clearest statements of the Scriptures, in order that the
obscure passages may be explained by help of these, or, if the mind be as yet unequal to
either perceiving them when explained, or investigating them while abstruse, let them be
believed without misgiving.151

In his response, Bastida repeated that he could not believe that someone
could say that man cannot resist God’s help, and that he saw no difference
between being able to dissent and being able to resist: such alleged difference
merely amounts to semantics. He also claimed that the difficulty of PP removing
human freedom had NOT been solved yet, since it amounts to breaking through
an open door to say that the will has freedom in regard to an object and that there
is no determination on the part of its power to choose.152
To this, Lemos agreed that the will has indetermination towards this or that
object (respectu huius vel illius objecti), and this is what freedom consists of.
However, the will also has another indetermination towards itself (respectu sui),
which is a potentiality not reduced to an act; this indetermination, which is an
imperfection, is removed through divine predetermination.
Bastida countered by repeating yet again that PP, out of its own power and in
and of itself, determines the human will, taking it out of the equation, so to speak.
He also specified that God moves people by his gentle power, and not through his
omnipotence (Lemos replied by quoting Aquinas, Augustine and five statements
of Pope Clement VIII to the contrary). He also added that the argument about
sufficient grace (i.e., Dominicans do not have much need for it, nor can they say
that it is really “sufficient” after they uphold PP) had not been settled, nor had the
difficulty about God predetermining the act of sin (he alleged that Aquinas never
said that).
To this, Lemos replied that human freedom does not and cannot consist in
the ability to resist God’s will, but rather in the ability to dissent. Thus,
efficacious help draws its efficacy from God himself and not from our consent to
God’s grace, as the Jesuits would have it, since such help is an actual motion of
God and the instrument he employs to convert man, who remains willing on his
part (which was the belief of both Augustine and Aquinas). Molina was the first to
reject such view, as he wrote in his Concordia:

Some people [i.e., Dominicans] defend this view, as they envision a double divine help,
namely an efficacious one and a sufficient one, which is nevertheless inefficacious. According

151
Augustine, On Merit and the Forgiveness of Sins III, 4, 7.
152
Acta, 1261.
 97

to them, whether such help may or may not turn out to be efficacious, cannot by any means
be attributed to human free will, as they deny that free will can render the divine help (no
matter how big or small) efficacious or inefficacious, by agreeing or disagreeing, cooperating
or not, with divine grace. These people claim instead that whether free will consents or
dissents with such help, is to be attributed to the efficacy of the help itself, or to God moving
efficaciously a person through it. Consequently, as long as God moves a person through such
help (namely through a divine motion which is efficacious in and of itself), free will is going
to consent and cooperate towards salvation; but of a person is moved by sufficient help,
which is not efficacious in and of itself, human free will is not going to consent nor cooperate
towards salvation.153

Lemos reminded Bastida that man does not own, nor can acquire efficacious
help, since a secondary cause cannot acquire or dispose of the motion from a
primary cause. Aquinas said:

It might seem to some person that man should not be held responsible for the lack of such
aids. Especially so, since he cannot merit the help of divine grace, nor turn toward God
unless God convert him, for no one is held responsible for what depends on another….To
settle this difficulty, we ought to consider that, although one may neither merit in advance
nor call forth divine grace by a movement of his free choice, he is able to prevent himself
from receiving this grace: Indeed, it is said in Job(21:34): ‘Who have said to God: Depart
from us, we desire not the knowledge of your ways;’ and in Job (24:13): ‘They have been
rebellious to the light.’ And since this ability to impede or not to impede the reception of
divine grace is within the scope of free choice, not undeservedly is responsibility for the fault
imputed to him who offers an impediment to the reception of grace. In fact, as far as he is
concerned, God is ready to give grace to all; ‘Indeed he wills all men to be saved, and to come
to the knowledge of the truth,’ as is said in 1 Timothy (2:4).But those alone are deprived of
grace who offer an obstacle within themselves to grace; just as, while the sun is shining on
the world, the man who keeps his eyes closed is held responsible for his fault, if as a result
some evil follows, even though he could not see unless he were provided in advance with
light from the sun.154

Aquinas also said:

From what has been said it is quite manifest that man cannot merit divine help in advance.
For everything is related as matter to what is above it. Now, matter does not move itself to
its own perfection; rather, it must be moved by something else. So, man does not move
himself so as to obtain divine help which is above him; rather, he is moved by God to obtain
it. Now, the movement of the mover precedes the movement of the movable thing in reason
and causally. Therefore, divine help is not given to us by virtue of the fact that we initially
move ourselves toward it by good works; instead, we make such progress by good works
because we are preceded by divine help.155

153
Molina, Concordia, q. 23, art. 4 and 5, disp. 1, membrum 6.
154
Aquinas, Contra Gentiles III, 159.
155
Ibid., III, 149.
 98

And in Quaestiones disputate 3, art. 7, 13, St. Thomas set up the problem in
these terms: “The will is mistress of her own actions; yet this would not be the
case if it could not act without God’s activity in it, also considering that our will
is not the mistress of the divine operation. Therefore God does not intervene in
the activity of our own will.”
Aquinas solved this difficulty by suggesting: “The will is the mistress of her
own actions. Not by excluding the first cause, but because the first cause does not
act in it in a way that the will is determined out of necessity to only one way of
responding, the way nature is; therefore, the determination of the act remains in
the power of human reason and will.”
Lemos concluded: efficacious help is necessary for the will to operate, but it
does not follow, as Jesuits are fond of saying, that without it sufficient help is
insufficient.
Bastida replied that when he characterized the Dominicans’ view he did not
draw that consequence, but the following one instead: efficacious help is necessary
so that man may work, and man does not have that in his power; thus, he does not
have “sufficient” help.
Lemos countered by saying that he already disposed of that objection: man
does not have sufficient help in his power, and yet he is responsible for putting
obstacles to such help. He also added that Bastida is verbose and gives the
impression of answering the points Lemos was making by setting up sophisms
and intricate arguments. In the end, Lemos argued, one argument settles
everything: Christ was most efficaciously predetermined to obey the Father’s
command concerning his death, so that de facto he could not have dis-attended it;
moreover, he obeyed freely, which goes to show that divine predetermination can
be reconciled with human freedom.156
Asked by the Pope to reply to this argument, Bastida replied that this is
indeed a very difficult and exceptional case to explain, namely how Christ was
predetermined and yet remained free: no wonder Dominicans loved to use it as a
weapon in their “theological arsenal!” However, he also suggested that we should
not use the exception in a normative fashion.
Lemos disagreed.

156
Acta,1267.
 99

Chapter 11

FORTY-SIXTH CONGREGATION (February 25, 1606. Nine cardinals in

attendance, and all the censors present. Five and a half hours long).

Topic: PP according to Thomas Aquinas

Bastida began by saying that Aquinas did not uphold PP and that the Jesuits
held the correct interpretation of his views.157 Introducing a series of syllogisms,
Bastida for about two hours claimed that:
1) According to illustrious commentators such as Cajetan, Capreolus and
Conradus, and even Aquinas himself, God’s pre-motion is not previously
applied to secondary causes, but is found simultaneously with them in
their operations. Even if we admit God’s previous influence in secondary
causes, it does not follow that he does so through PP: rather, he influences
the will through sufficient grace and moral persuasion, without
predetermining the human will.
Lemos’ response: it is utterly false to claim that these authors denied that
God influences secondary causes (and that therefore this invalidates PP);
rather, they always upheld the contrary.158 Having erred at the beginning
of their reasoning, the Jesuits are also wrong for insisting on God’s “moral
influence” as an alternative to PP.
2) God does not predetermine all acts, whether natural or supernatural, good
or evil ones: man, not God, determines himself to this or that good act
through his own reason, while God simply acts as a universal mover to the
general good.
Bastida quoted these two texts in support of his view: a) “God moves
man’s will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will,
which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will
anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that
which is true or apparently good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves
some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good, as in
the case of those whom he moves by grace” (Summa IaIIae, q. 9, art. 6, ad
3); and b) “God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man;
but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to

157
Again, for clarity’s sake I have decided to mention Lemos’ response after each of Bastida’s
arguments, even though he replied to them after the Jesuit was done talking, and even after
Lemos himself was done listing his own views of Aquinas’ understanding of PP.
158
Acta, 1297.
 100

the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of
appetite” (Summa Ia IIae, q. 80, art. 1, ad 3).
From this latter text, Bastida concluded that God, acting as a general
principle of all human motion, does not move man to evil, which is and
remains a human act.
Lemos’ response: The true understanding of these passages depends on what
Aquinas taught in Summa Ia IIae, q. 9, art. 3 and 4 (“Whether the will
moves itself?” and “Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?”),
as well as in Summa Ia IIae, q. 111, art. 2 (“Whether grace is fittingly
divided into operating and cooperating grace?”). In these passages Aquinas
clearly said that the will does not move itself towards an end, but is moved
by God alone (which is to say: not simultaneously with God); and yet, it
does so freely. Having been so predetermined, the will then moves itself to
the choice of means aimed at attaining the pre-determined end: “The will
moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say
as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have
shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.”159 Thus,
according to Lemos, the Jesuits apply to the choice of the end, which is
predetermined by God, what Aquinas is saying concerning the choice of the
means (which is determined by the will, as the proximate cause). In regard
to the second text used by Bastida, Lemos said that God does not move an
agent towards sin as vice and guilt (since only the human will determines
itself to that), but merely acts as the mover of his physical action (i.e.,
acting as First Mover).
3) In the first of the previously quoted two texts, Bastida, commenting on the
last words (“Sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of
something determinate”), remarked that Aquinas did not say that God
predetermines the will through grace, but that he moves it to want
something; consequently, God does not determine the human will to a
supernatural act through his grace either. He backed his claim with the
following texts: a) “God operates in all things, however he does so in each
thing according to its own conditions; thus, in natural realities he operates
as the one who imparts the ability to act and as the one who determines
nature to such act; conversely, he operates in free will only as the one
imparting the ability to act, so that free will may act according to its own
operation. Thus, the determination of the act and of its end is in the power
of free will, which has mastery over its actions, though not as a first

159
Aquinas, Summa Ia IIae, q.9, art. 4, ad 3. This article is called “Whether the will is moved by
an exterior principle?”
 101

cause”160; b) “Man would not have free will if he did not have the power of
determination over his own actions, so as to choose this or that thing on
the basis of his own counsel”161; and c) “Therefore, free will can only be
found in those who have an intellect, and not in those things whose actions
are not determined by the agents themselves, but by some pre-existing
causes.”162
From these last words, Bastida argued that if free will is determined by
a cause other than itself, it is not really free.163
Lemos’ response: In regard to a), Bastida is crashing through an open door: of
course, the will determines itself, but, as we can read at the end of the
passage: “though not as the first cause.” How can Bastida fail to see the
difference between divine will (not determined by anything) and the created
will (determined by God)? As Aquinas wrote: “A naturally contingent cause
must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which
is by nature necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.”164 As far as b) is concerned, Aquinas is simply saying
that man is free and determines himself, and that is true; however, it does
not follow, as the Jesuits claim, that man is not determined in the first act
by God. Lemos also addressed c) by saying that nothing in this text
suggests that Aquinas is thereby denying God’s predetermination in the
first act.
4) According to Bastida, Aquinas denied the existence of PP determining the
human will, since he wrote: “The will is said to have control over its actions
not by exclusion of the first cause, but because the first cause does not act
in the will so as to necessarily determine it to a specific action;”165 and:
“Since therefore the will is an active principle, not determined to one thing,
but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it, that he
does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains
contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved
naturally.”166 Bastida added that it is false and misleading to say, as
Dominicans are fond of doing, that God determines the will, but not in a
necessary manner because this denial does not follow but precedes what
Aquinas wrote: Aquinas wrote ut eam de necessitate ad unum determinet, and

160
Aquinas, Commentary to the Sentences II, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3.
161
Aquinas, Commentary to Sentences II, dist. 28, q. 1, art. 1.
162
Aquinas, Commentary on Sentences II, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 1.
163
Acta, 1273.
164
Aquinas, Summa I, q. 19, art. 3, ad 5.
165
Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, q. 3, art. 7, ad 13.
166
Aquinas, Summa IaIIae, q. 10, art. 4.
 102

NOT ut eam ad unum determinet de necessitate. Thus, according to Bastida,

Aquinas denies every determination.
Lemos’ response: Lemos thought it was strange that Jesuits did not see how
Aquinas is indeed affirming God’s PP, yet without harming or removing
the free will of man with an absolutely necessitating action. As far as
Bastida’s argument about the denial that precedes, it is a total non sequitur
and a frivolous argument.167 If someone said: “Peter is not a white man,” the
denial (i.e., “not”) comes before the term “white,” but this only denies that
Peter is white, not that he is a man; in other words, what it denies is the
predicate, rather than the substantial claim that Peter is a human being. So,
when Thomas Aquinas says that God does not determine the will out of
necessity, he only denies the necessitating determination taking place in
natural events controlled by providence; he is not denying non-
necessitating PP!
5) Aquinas said (Quodlibet 1, art. 7, ad 2) that man can resist each and any
prevenient and preparing help God supplies him with; however, once PP is
bestowed, man cannot resist; hence, Aquinas denies PP.
Lemos’ response: “I have said and shown several times that man can resist to
and dissent from God’s PP help (taking the verb “resist” as synonymous
with “dissent”). So I will not repeat myself.”
6) According to Bastida, once PP is placed in the will of a person, in order to
safeguard freedom of choice it must be subjected to a person’s power of
reason otherwise it would remove free will. Aquinas said: “The adventitious
qualities and habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to
one thing rather than to another. And yet, even these inclinations are
subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities too are subject to reason,
as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or
disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in
this that is repugnant to free will.”168
Lemos’ response: This argument goes beyond the boundaries of the topic
being discussed, since Aquinas in this text is NOT talking about PP, but
about natural passions and feelings that have an effect on us, inclining us to
act in a certain way, and he says that they do not necessitate the will, since
they fall under the power of reason. What he meant in his reply is clearly
shown in what is said in Objection 5: “Further, the Philosopher says (Ethics
iii, 5): ‘According as each one is, such does the end seem to him.’ But it is
not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from
nature. Therefore, it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and

167
Acta, 1305.
168
Aquinas, Summa I, q. 83, art. 1, ad 5.
 103

therefore we are not free in so doing.” I do not see how Jesuits would
thereby conclude that God’s PP, which is the instrument used by God to
safeguard our freedom, must be subject to the power of one’s reason: we
should remind the Jesuits that grace does not submit its efficacy to free
will, as Pelagians used to say.
7) Bastida said that according to St. Thomas the necessity that comes from a
previous thing removes freedom; however, PP as a prior cause determines
the will to operate in a certain way, and thus, it removes free will. Bastida
proved the first point by quoting Aquinas: “In another sense a thing may be
necessary from some cause quite apart from itself; and should this be either
an efficient or a moving cause, then it brings about the necessity of
compulsion; as, for instance, when a man cannot get away owing to the
violence of someone else holding him.”169 And again: “In order to
understand this, it must be noted that the necessity which depends upon
prior causes is an absolute necessity, as is clear from the necessity which
depends upon matter. That an animal is corruptible is absolutely necessary.
For to be composed of contraries is a consequence of being an animal…But
that which has necessity from that which is posterior in existence is
necessary upon condition, or by supposition.”170 According to Bastida, the
necessity of PP is absolute necessity, and therefore it removes free will.
Lemos’ response: Divine PP is different than extrinsic and prior causes that
do violence to the will. By PP God the Father determined that Christ
would suffer, and yet Christ suffered freely and willingly, without being
forced by absolute necessity. In the passage Lemos used previously (Summa
I, q. 19, art. 8: “Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things
willed?”) Aquinas showed how God does not operate through absolute
necessity, but through conditional necessity, which safeguards and perfects
human freedom. As far as the second passage used by Bastida is concerned,
Aquinas is merely referring to absolute necessity found in natural events
(e.g., the sun’s rising; the fact that man has reason; that our mortal bodies
will decompose). When it comes to God’s will, he employs conditional
necessity, safeguarding human freedom.
8) Again, the way Bastida understood Aquinas was that not every action is
predetermined and predefined by God:

Secondly, God foreknows certain things in themselves – either as to be accomplished

by himself, and of such things is the prophecy of ‘predestination,’ since according to
Damascene (De fide orthodoxa ii, 30), ‘God predestines things which are not in our
power – or as to be accomplished through man’s free will, and of such is the prophecy

169
Aquinas, Summa III, q. 46, art 1.
170
Aquinas, Commentary on Physics II, Lectio 15, 270.
 104

of ‘foreknowledge.’ This may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the
prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards good alone.171

In other words, even though every action of ours is foreknown, does

not entail that it has been predestined or predetermined as well. For
instance, Aquinas wrote: “Whence, although God knows the total number
of individuals, the number of the oxen, flies and such like, it is not pre-
ordained by God per se; but divine providence produces just so many as are
sufficient for the preservation of the species.”172
Lemos’ response: In De veritate q. 12, art. 10, ad 3 (“Is prophecy suitably
divided into prophecy of predestination, foreknowledge and threats?”)
Aquinas answers Bastida’s argument: “Foreknowledge is taken here in
contrast with predestination in so far as foreknowledge has a broader
extension than predestination. Now, foreknowledge has a broader
extension than predestination not only in evil things, if predestination be
taken strictly, but also in all good things which do not take place
exclusively by the divine power. Hence, the argument does not follow.”
In other words: predestination differs from foreknowledge in that it
concerns itself only with those things that stem from the divine will;
foreknowledge applies to our acts, whether good or evil ones, stemming
from our free will. Aquinas went on to address a Difficulty (n. 4) pitting
Augustine against Jerome and Damascene: “As Augustine says,
predestination concerns goods connected with salvation. But our merits,
also, which depend on free choice, are numbered among these goods.
Therefore, our free choice is involved in prophecy of predestination. Thus,
Jerome made a poor division.” How did Aquinas solve the Difficulty? He
wrote: “Our merit is form grace and from free will. However, it belongs to
predestination only in so far as it comes from grace, which is from God
alone. Hence, that which is from our free will is said to belong to
predestination for some extrinsic reason.”173
Consequently, Lemos argued, since our good works fall under divine
predestination, its efficacy does not depend on our free will, nor on its good
use. Molina, when he denied that grace is efficacious in and of itself (i.e.,
depending on God’s will alone and independently from our free will),
recognizing that from this denial it would logically follow that the good use
of the will is not predestined by God but only foreknown, made the basis of
his teaching the idea that the good use of our will is not an effect of

171
Aquinas, Summa IIa IIae, q.174, art. 1.
172
Aquinas, Summa I, q. 23, art. 7.
173
Acta, 1310.
 105

predestination.174 However, Augustine had already argued against the

Pelagians that this is not the case, especially in his late works The Gift of
Perseverance and The Predestination of the Saints:

He promised not from the power of our will, but from his own predestination. For he
promised what he himself would do, not what men would do. Because, although men
do those things which pertain to God’s worship, he himself makes them do what he
has commanded; it is not they that cause him to do what he has promised. Otherwise
the fulfillment of God’s promises would not be in the power of God, but in that of
men; and thus what was promised by God to Abraham would be given to Abraham by
men themselves. Abraham, however, did not believe thus, but believed, giving glory
to God, that what he promised he is able to do also (Rom 4:21). He does not say, to
foretell – he does not say, to foreknow; for he can foretell and foreknow the doings of
strangers also; but he says, he is able to do; and thus he is speaking not of the doings
of others, but of his own.175

How could then the Jesuits introduce a bad interpretation of Aquinas’ text,
striving to show that the good use of our will is not predestined by God but
merely foreknown, thus going against Augustine and Aquinas?
In regard to the second text used by Bastida, concerning the
corruptible things merely foreknown but not predestined by God, Lemos
said that it does not follow that just because they are predefined they are
not predetermined in a secondary sense.
9) Bastida insisted that Aquinas expressly taught that future contingents are
not known with absolute certainty by God in their causes, but only insofar
as they are present in his eternity; but if God would know the contingent
future through his PP, he would not have made such claim.
Lemos’ response: Aquinas always and only said that God does not know
future contingents in their indeterminate causes. Aquinas also said that God
knows with absolute certainty the future contingents in the predefinition
and predetermination of his will:

Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as
each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual
successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are
in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because his knowledge
is measured by eternity, as is also his being; and eternity being simultaneously whole
comprises all time, as said above (Question 10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in
time are present to God from eternity, not only because he has the types of things
present within Him, as some say; but because his glance is carried from eternity over
all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things

174
Ibid., 1311.
175
Augustine, The Predestination of the Saints 10, 19.
 106

are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their
presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.176

Aquinas also said:

Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does not pass away, eternity is
present in its presentiality to any time or instant of time. We may see an example of
sorts in the case of a circle. Let us consider a determined point on the circumference
of a circle. Although it is indivisible, it does not co-exist simultaneously with any
other point as to position, since it is the order of position that produces the continuity
of the circumference. On the other hand, the center of the circle, which is no part of
the circumference, is directly opposed to any given determinate point on the
circumference. Hence, whatever is found in any part of time coexists with what is
eternal as being present to it, although with respect to some other time it be past or
future. Something can be present to what is eternal only by being present to the
whole of it, since the eternal does not have the duration of succession. The divine
intellect, therefore, sees in the whole of its eternity, as being present to it, whatever
takes place through the whole course of time. And yet what takes place in a certain
part of time was not always existent. It remains, therefore, that God has a knowledge
of those things that according to the march of time do not yet exist.177

In conclusion, according to Lemos, Aquinas makes it clear that though

God does not know absolutely future contingents in their causes, he knows
them after the determination of his will and in the very determination of his
will, as a first root and cause.
10) In De veritate q. 6, art. 3, Aquinas talks about the certainty of
predestination; had he believed in PP, he would have placed the certainty of
predestination in it, and yet he did not do so. Likewise, when talking about
the gift of perseverance, Aquinas referred to the protection exerted by the
angels, but made no mention of PP.
Lemos’ response: Nothing could be more incorrect. In this text Aquinas
makes it clear that predestination is certain and based on God’s efficacious
grace: predestination is not based on foreknowledge, though foreknowledge
applies to the certitude of the means employed to predestine a person.
11) Finally, Bastida reported what Banez had written on the subject of
PP, comparing it to what Aquinas himself wrote, claiming in so doing that
he wanted to “free” Aquinas from the distortions his disciples had brought
about.

176
Aquinas, Summa I, q. 14, art. 13: “Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingents?”
177
Aquinas, Contra gentiles I, 66, rat. 7.
 107

Thus ended Bastida’s two hours long presentation. Now it was Lemos’ turn
to speak. He began by saying that the Jesuits had their Aquinas all wrong, since
the great saint, who followed in this Augustine, was all about defending the
notion of prevenient and efficacious grace, independent (not simultaneous with) of
man’s will. Contradicting some Jesuit authors (even Cardinal Bellarmine wrote
that God changes man’s will: hence PP) and even the Jesuit-issued Ratio studiorum
(which said that according to Aquinas God exercises his influence in causes),
Bastida, not daring to openly contradict Aquinas, endeavored to alter and
misrepresent his thought. In order to prove his view, Lemos stated his intention
to argue five main points:
1) Aquinas openly taught the efficacy of the divine will preceding any
cooperation of the human will (from which it infallibly follows that the
human will operates); this will is the first cause and root of the contingency
of our freedom; far from harming it or removing it, divine will strengthens
and causes the human will to operate.178
2) Aquinas upheld that by his efficacious will God has predetermined every
good action of our will, before any absolute or conditional foreknowledge
on his part, recently referred to by Jesuits as “middle knowledge.”
3) According to Aquinas, God, by his efficacious PP, impresses something in
the wills of men, by which he works on and changes these wills; in the first
act God determines their choices, so that the created wills may determine
themselves in the secondary act.
4) According to Aquinas’ expressed teaching, once God’s PP is in place, the
will always operates; thus, it follows that the will is not going to dissent de
facto, though it retains the potential to dissent, if it so wishes.
5) All the arguments on which the Jesuits base their views, not only have been
solved by Aquinas, but they have also been opposed and refuted by him.

Let us now look in greater detail each of these five views articulated by
Lemos.
In regard to the first point, Lemos pointed out that in the Summa I, q. 19,
art. 8, entitled: “Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things
willed?,” Aquinas replied by saying: “The divine will imposes necessity on some
things willed but not on all,” and went on to say:

Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done,
which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that he wills. Now God
wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things,
for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects he has attached necessary
causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise

178
Acta, 1278.
 108

contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the
effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for
them, it being his will that they should happen contingently.

Lemos concluded that two things stand out: a) The fact that an act would
happen contingently and freely does not depend only on the secondary free and
contingent cause, since such free act produces other factors beyond God’s
intention and express will. In this Bastida erred, distorting Aquinas’ thought; in
fact, Bastida and the Jesuits say with Molina that for an act to be free and worthy
of praise and goodness it must be produced only by the created will, though
Aquinas says quite the opposite; b) The freedom of an act has its root in the
efficacy of the divine will; it is amazing that the Jesuits would think that this
divine efficacy would actually remove created freedom!179
The Jesuits think they have a “slam dunk” when they say that a necessity
placed beforehand by God removes freedom. Aquinas posed this problem in these
terms in Objection 3:

Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus

necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things
created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have
necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass;
and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills
is necessary absolutely.

However, Aquinas went on to deflate the Jesuits’ view when he wrote exactly
the opposite: “Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the
mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind
of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all
things, therefore, are absolute necessities” (Reply to Objection 3).
Thus, Aquinas argued that conditional necessity does not remove freedom,
but absolute necessity does. PP is not an instance of absolute necessity; therefore
PP does not remove freedom of the will. Lemos added that what Aquinas wrote in
Reply to Objection 2 would suffice to refute the Jesuits’ claim: “From the very fact
that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen
that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently
according to his will.”
The fact that the efficacy of the divine will is an eternal predetermination of
God and is called by Aquinas with such term can be seen in Summa I, q. 23, art. 1,
entitled: “Whether men are predestined by God?” Aquinas’ conclusion is that they
are. He formulated the first objection to this view in these terms:

179
Ibid.,1279.
 109

It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orthodoxa ii, 30):
‘It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since
He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.’ But human merit and demerit
are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains
therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is
done away.

Aquinas replied to this objection in this fashion: “Damascene calls

predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things
which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: ‘He does
not will malice, nor does he compel virtue.’ Whence predestination is not
excluded by him.” Notice, said Lemos, the distinction made by Aquinas between
predestination (i.e. predetermination) that removes free will by sheer necessity,
and predestination that does not. Aquinas made this point again in Contra Gentiles
III, 90 (“That human acts of choice and of will are subject to divine providence”):

Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa states in his book On Man: ‘Providence is concerned with the
things that are not in our power, but not with those that are in our power’; and, following
him, Damascene states in Book II, that ‘God foreknows the things that are within our
power, but he does not predetermine them.’ These texts should be explained as meaning that
things in our power are not subject to determination by divine providence in the sense that
they receive necessity from it.

And again, in De veritate q.5, art. 5, ad 1: “The statement of Damascene does

not mean that the things in us (that is, in our power to choose) are entirely
outside of God’s providence, but it rather means that our choice is not determined
to one course of action by divine providence, as are the actions of those beings
which do not possess freedom.” And also (q. 3, art. 7): “On the other hand, since
we affirm that God is the direct cause of each and every thing because he works in
all secondary causes and since all secondary effects are results of his pre-
definition, we posit ideas in him not only of first beings but also of second beings.”
Lemos pointed out to his audience the expression “all secondary effects are
results of his pre-definition” (omnes effectus secondi eius definitione proveniant). Also
(q. 3, art. 8): “We, however, assert that God is the cause of singulars, both of their
form and of their matter. We also assert that all individual things are determined
by his divine providence. Hence, we must also posit ideas for all singulars.”
In regard to the second point, it is very clear that Aquinas established the
efficacy of PP before any foreknowledge on his part, even the conditional
foreknowledge fancied by the supporters of middle knowledge. Lemos reminded
his audience that he already showed in three previous congregations under Pope
Clement VIII that such middle knowledge has its roots in Pelagianism.
In regard to the third point, on whether God’s PP places something in the
created will to make it act the way it wants to, Aquinas wrote:
 110

The natural forces implanted in natural things at their formation are in them by way of fixed
and constant forms in nature. But that which God does in a natural thing to make it operate
actually, is a mere intention, incomplete in being, as colors in the air and the power of the
craftsman in his instrument. Hence even as art can give the axe its sharpness as a permanent
form, but not the power of the art as a permanent form, unless it were endowed with
intelligence, so it is possible for a natural thing to be given its own proper power as a
permanent form within it, but not the power to act so as to cause being as the instrument of
the first cause, unless it were given to be the universal principle of being. Nor could it be
given to a natural power to cause its own movement, or to preserve its own being.
Consequently just as it clearly cannot be given to the craftsman’s instrument to work unless
it is moved by him, so neither can it be given to a natural thing to operate without the divine
operation.180

According to Lemos, once placed in the created will, PP moves it in an

unchangeable way. Aquinas wrote in De malo q.6:

Brute animals are moved through the instinct of a superior agent, being determined to
something according to the manner of their particular form, the sensitive appetite following
its reception. However God moves in an un-alterable manner [pace Lemos, the text reads
immutabiliter, not infallibiliter] somebody’s will according to the efficacy of the ability of the
mover, which cannot fail (quae deficere non potest); and yet, due to the nature of the will being
moved, which relates indifferently to different choices, no necessity is being introduced, but
freedom remains intact. Divine providence works unfailingly in all things, and yet the effects
issue contingently from contingent causes, insofar as God moves all things in a proportional
manner to anything, according to their proper mode.

Lemos quipped: what could be clearer and more openly stated? Moreover,
Lemos argued that to change the will amounts to PP, as we read in De veritate q.
22, art. 8 (“Can God force the will?”):

The case is parallel to that of a stone, in which by reason of its heaviness there is an
inclination downward. While this inclination remains, if the stone is thrown upward,
violence is done to it. But if God were to subtract from the stone the inclination of its
heaviness and give it an inclination of lightness, then it would not be violent—for the stone
to be borne upward. Thus a change of motion can be had without violence. It is in this way
that God’s changing of the will without forcing it is to be understood. God can change the
will because He works within it just as He works in nature. Now, just as every natural action
is from God, so too every action of the will, in so far as it is an action, not only is from the
will as its immediate agent but also is from God as its first agent, who influences it more
forcefully. Then, just as the will can change its act to something else, as is apparent from the
explanation above, so too and much more can God.

We also read in the next question of De veritate (q. 9: “Can any creature
change the will or influence it?”):
180
Aquinas, De potentia q. 3, art. 7, ad 7.
 111

The will can be understood to be changed by something in two ways. (1) This is referred to
its object. In this sense the will is changed by the appetible thing. But nothing which changes
the will in this way is in question here; for that was treated above, where it was shown that a
certain good does move the will with necessity (in the way in which the object moves it),
though the will is not forced. (2) The will can be taken to be moved by something in the
manner of an efficient cause. In this sense we say that not only can no creature by acting
upon the will force it (for even God could not do this), but also it cannot even act upon the
will directly so as to change it with necessity or in any way to incline it (which God can do).

Some might argue that God does things out of strict necessity and that he
does not really enjoy freedom of choice: “Further, on the part of that which is
indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined
to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [Averroes] says in
Physics ii. If, then, the will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows
that his determination to act comes from another; and thus he has some cause
prior to himself.”181 Responding to this objection, Aquinas wrote: “A naturally
contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine
will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it
has no necessary relation.”
With these last words, noted Lemos, Aquinas established the difference
between the created will, which is contingent in and of itself, and the divine will,
which is necessary. Thus, the created will first needs to be determined by an
efficient cause in order to operate freely: Lemos said that “to determine to an
effect is to determine before an effect.”182
Coming to the fourth point, in which Lemos argued that once PP is in place
the will cannot dissent, he reminded his audience of what Aquinas taught in
Summa Ia IIae, q. 10, art. 4, entitled: “Whether the will is moved of necessity by
the exterior mover which is God?” In the Third Objection Aquinas wrote: “A
thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But
something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that
to which God moves it: because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual.
Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it.
Therefore it wills it of necessity.” He then replied to the objection in this fashion:
“If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that
the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it
does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.” And even more
specifically: “But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and
thus it has a necessity--not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility--as regards what
it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail.”183 By “coercion,”
181
Aquinas, Summa I, q. 19, art. 3, obj. 5.
182
Acta,1289.
183
Aquinas, Summa Ia IIae, q. 112, art. 3.
 112

Lemos argued, Aquinas meant any violence done to the will, removing its
freedom, but necessity of infallibility does not:

The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above (2; Q 23,24). We can, accordingly,
consider charity in three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, who moves the soul to
love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the Holy
Ghost, who does unfailingly whatever he wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two
things to be true at the same time--that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to
an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of
perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby ‘whoever is delivered, is most
certainly delivered,’ as Augustine says in his book about the predestination of the saints (The
Gift of Perseverance xiv).

In this last text, Lemos said that Aquinas is showing that dissent cannot be
associated in a composite sense with God’s efficaciously moving the created will.184
Aquinas affirmed this in this way:

A thing can be said to be possible in two ways. First, we may consider the potency that exists
in the thing itself, as when we say that a stone can be moved downwards. Or we may
consider the potency that exists in another thing, as when we say that a stone can be moved
upwards, not by a potency existing in the stone, but by a potency existing in the one who
hurls it. Consequently, when we say: ‘That predestined person can possibly die in sin,’ the
statement is true if we consider only the potency that exists in him. But, if we are speaking of
this predestined person according to the ordering which he has to another, namely, to God,
who is predestining him, that event is incompatible with this ordering, even though it is
compatible with the person’s own power. Hence, we can use the distinction given above; that
is, we can consider the subject with this form or without it.185

Even more specifically, Aquinas said:

As is clear from what was said previously, while it may be granted with reference to a
determined person that God, absolutely speaking, can predestine or not predestine him,
nevertheless, supposing that God has predestined him, He cannot not predestine him. Nor is
the opposite possible, because God cannot change. Consequently, it is commonly said that
the following proposition, “God can predestine one who is not predestined or not predestine
one who is predestined,” is false if taken in a composite sense, but true if taken in a divided
sense. All statements, therefore, which imply that composite sense are absolutely false.186

What is clearer than that, quipped Lemos?

184
Acta,. 1293: “Non potest ergo homo conjungere et componere cum efficaci dei praevia
motione, propter eius efficaciam, contrarium dissensum: quod est, non posse dissentire in sensu
composito.”
185
Aquinas, De veritate q. 6, art. 3, ad 7.
186
Ibid., q. 6, art. 4, ad 8.
 113

Summing up: in a divided sense, it is always possible for the human will to
dissent, even after God’s efficacious grace has been applied to it, as Aquinas made
clear in an article entitled “Does the divine will impose necessity upon the things
willed?”: “Although the non-existence of an effect of the divine will is
incompatible with the divine will, the possibility that the effect should be lacking
is given simultaneously with the divine will. God’s willing someone to be saved
and the possibility that that person be damned are not incompatible; but God’s
willing him to be saved and his actually being damned are incompatible.”187
Lemos concluded that this quote shows the difference between the two ways of
understanding whether the divine will can be dissented with or not: thus, the
Jesuits err by claiming that PP is not possible.
In Contra Gentiles I, 67 (“That God knows future contingent singulars”), St.
Thomas wrote:

For this is a necessary conditional proposition: if he is seen sitting, he is sitting. Hence,

although the conditional proposition may be changed to a categorical one, to read what is
seen sitting must necessarily be sitting, it is clear that the proposition is true if understood of
what is said, and compositely; but it is false if understood of what is meant, and dividedly.
Thus, in these and all similar arguments used by those who oppose God’s knowledge of
contingents, the fallacy of composition and division takes place.

Lemos went on to remark that the Jesuits’ objection that even if we consider
the composite sense, the fact that God’s antecedently places his PP in a person
removes his free will, has been answered and resolved by Aquinas himself, since
he distinguished between absolute necessity, which removes free will, and conditional
necessity, which causes and perfects freedom.188
After Lemos gave his response to each of Bastida’s ten points (he omitted the
eleventh, in which Bastida attacked Banez’ views), the learned Jesuit, with
allegedly great verbosity, made some remarks concerning various points.
According to Lemos, “Bastida went on to point out many more things which he
said had been twisted, though for the sake of brevity I refrained from replying to
them, nor do I remember them all.”189
Finally, Lemos after quoting Aquinas one more time, said: “As for the
dominion that the will has over its acts, through which it lies in the power of the
will to will or not to will, this excludes the determination of the power to one
effect and any violence from a cause acting from the outside; but it does not
exclude the influence of a higher cause from which come its being and operation.”

187
Ibid., q. 23, art. 5, ad 3.
188
See Summa I, q. 105, art 4 (“Whether God can move the created will?”), and I, q. 83, art. 1
(“Whether man has free will?”).
189
Acta, 1315.
 114

When all is said and done, according to Lemos, “Human freedom excludes
these two things, namely that it does not have a permanent virtue determined to
an end (i.e., PP), and that it is forced by an external cause; however, it does not
exclude, but on the contrary, it essentially presupposes the influence of a first
cause by which the will is previously and efficaciously moved and determined to
act.”190

190
Ibid., 1318. The chapter ends with this comment: “In regard to the congregation focusing on
St. Thomas Aquinas, all the cardinals and censors said that brother Lemos never spoke in such a
way in all the previous congregations. Praise be to God!”
 115

Chapter 12

FORTY-SEVENTH CONGREGATION (February 22, 1606, lasting five and a

half hours. Seven cardinals attended; everybody else was present).

Topic: PP in the views of scholastic theologians.

Following the usual prayer addressed by Paul V to the Holy Spirit (the
Adsumus), Bastida began to argue (in what Lemos condescendingly characterized
as “typical fashion”) against physical predetermination, by resorting to the views
of scholastic theologians, whom he divided into three groups.
The first group consisted of theologians who wrote against various recent
heretics, and who suggested that efficacious grace does not cohere with human
free will, such as the Carmelitan Thomas Waldensis (d. 1430), who wrote against
Wyclif; Albert Pighius, who authored De libero hominis arbitrio et divina gratia libri
X (Cologne, 1542) against Martin Luther and John Calvin; John of the Cross, who
denied that God determines the human will; Clictovaeus, a theologian who taught
in Paris; the bishop of Metz, Franciscus Belcarius (d. 1580), who wrote against
Calvin; Cardinal Bellarmine (who gestured to Bastida to omit quoting him from
his book); Gregory of Valentia; Thomas Stapleton (English theologian, d. 1598);
and several others. All of these scholars directly denied efficacious
predetermination.
The second group of theologians claimed in their works that God’s
predetermination either weakens or removes human free will. Among them,
Bastida listed Alexander of Hales; Henry of Ghent; William of Ockham; Gregory
of Rimini; and Ruard Tapper.
The third group of theologians upheld the view that if God predetermines man
to material sin, or to the action that accompanies sin, he also predetermines man
to sin itself, which is a most reprehensible view. Among the authors cited, Peter
Aureol; Durandus of Saint-Porcain; Thomas Waldensis; and even Molina’s arch-
enemy, Zumel.
As he read quotes from all these theologians, Bastida emphasized words and
sentences for maximum effect on his audience.191
When his turn came, Lemos suggested that all authors who are not
important should be omitted from the discussion: attention should focus only on

191
Acta, 1320.
 116

what the major players had to say on the topic of efficacious grace.192Talking
about major players: Molina himself admits that Thomas Aquinas and Duns
Scotus, and consequently their respective schools of thought, upheld divine
predetermination. Also, at the Jesuit College of Coimbra (in Portugal), the views
of two leading Dominican scholars, Francesco Silvestri (aka as Ferrarriensis) and
John Capreolus, were reported to be clearly supportive of divine
predetermination. Next, Lemos introduced several quotes from the works of a
person he qualified as an “outstanding interpreter of St. Thomas,” namely cardinal
Cajetan, who allegedly upheld PP in his works;193 however, Lemos first had to
rebuff the interpretation of some passages in his works that appear to merely
uphold God’s cooperative action rather than his prevenient and efficacious grace.
These quotes were followed by several quotes from Ferrariensis and Capreolus
(again, rebuffing the Jesuit interpretation given to some of these passages) and a
lengthy one from Albert the Great, to the effect that God is in all things as
essence, presence and power, and that it is necessary that he acts in all causes,
inducing them to act and to move.194 Albert also made the point that Augustine
distinguished between operating and cooperating grace, namely prevenient and
following grace, in order to show that everything is from grace, contrary to what
Jesuits claim, who reserve for the freedom of the will something that is not from
grace, i.e., the fact that it applies and determines itself to act.
Lemos ended these introductory comments with a couple of quotes from the
Roman Catechism (also known as the Catechism of the Council of Trent, issued in
1556), and more specifically from Article I concerning the Apostles’ Creed:

We are not, however, to understand that God is in such wise the Creator and Maker of all
things that his works, when once created and finished, could thereafter continue to exist
unsupported by his omnipotence. For as all things derive existence from the Creator's
supreme power, wisdom, and goodness, so unless preserved continually by his Providence,
and by the same power which produced them, they would instantly return into their
nothingness. This the Scriptures declare when they say: How could anything endure if thou
wouldst not? or be preserved, if not called by thee? Not only does God protect and govern
all things by his Providence, but he also by an internal power impels to motion and action
whatever moves and acts, and this in such a manner that, although he excludes not, he yet
precedes the agency of secondary causes. For his invisible influence extends to all things,
and, as the Wise Man says, reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things
sweetly. This is the reason why the Apostle, announcing to the Athenians the God whom,

192
Lemos somewhat contradicted his own intention when he quoted from Conrad of
Gerlenhusen, bishop of Worms (Col. 1329-1330), and St. Anthoninus (Col. 1336), a onetime
Dominican archbishop of Florence (d. 1459).
193
Acta, 1322.
194
Ibid., 1335.
 117

not knowing, they adored, said: He is not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and
move, and are.195

Next, Lemos turned to those illustrious scholastics who upheld prevenient,

efficacious grace, such as Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and
Scotus, quoting from their works to the effect that efficacious grace neither
determines nor necessitates the human will, but rather freely determines that we
do what it wills as we retain the power to dissent. Lemos took issue with Molina’s
understanding of God’s simultaneous cooperation with human free will (i.e. the
examples set by Molina were two men tugging a boat, or two people carrying a
stone), arguing that these scholastics emphasized God’s previous cooperation with
the human will in producing good deeds, but acting simultaneously only in
morally indifferent or evil deeds. Bonaventure, for instance, in his Commentary to
Sentences II, distinction 26 (“Whether grace is compared to the soul in the
reckoning of a mover”), q. 6 (“On free will with the help of grace”), wrote:

There is another way of understanding how free will is said to be moved by grace. For grace
is like a certain influence proceeding from a heavenly light, which is always conjoined with
its source, like the sunlight is with the sun. And since it is always conjoined with its source, it
follows that not only its activity is attributed to it in virtue of the subject in which it exists,
but also in virtue of the subject from which it is produced. Thus, just as the light does not
merely operate with the air, but also operates in the air, in virtue of being conjoined with its
source; likewise grace not only operates with free will, but also in free will, moving it.
Therefore, nothing else is meant when we say that grace moves free will, that grace is the
instrument the Holy Spirit employs to move human free will, and that not only it operates
with free will, but also in free will.

And yet, Lemos remarked, Molina and his supporters contend that grace
operates with free will, but not in it. Lemos noted how Bonaventure went on to
say:

God, through his grace moves this way, and grace makes it so, that free will wants to be
moved this way by God…In response to the question, does free will move itself naturally, we
must say that it moves voluntarily; not with a will which grace forces to be willing, but with
a will that is willing because it is influenced by God’s grace; in other words, with a will in
virtue of which the graced free will wants to move itself.

These words, Lemos pointed out, refute Molina’s and his followers’ teaching,
since they say that the human will moved by grace operates out of necessity, even
though this is an unwarranted conclusion. Even Molina’s example of two men
tugging a small boat on the opposite sides of a river (the example he used in his

195
http:// http://cin.org/users/james/ebooks/master/trent/tcreed01.htm
 118

Concordia to suggest how free will and God’s grace cooperate) is refuted by
Bonaventure as he wrote: “It must not be understood that God cooperates with
free will like two men carrying a heavy object, each one helping the other; but
rather in the sense that God is acting in an inner fashion in every human action
and is intimately present as power within a person who is carrying out an action.”
Lemos noted that Bonaventure characterized God’s cooperation with the human
will as previous rather than simultaneous, the way Molina did.196
Next, Lemos turned to more recent theologians, such as Andreas de Vega,
O.F.M. (d. 1560), Scotus’ disciple, and Giles of Viterbo, O.E.S.A. (d. 1532), who
referred to God’s prevenient grace as an impetus acting on man’s free will:
according to him, God does not force free will, but changes it, as he did in Paul’s
case. Lemos also mentioned several authorities whom the Jesuits claimed opposed
predetermination, beginning with Alonso Tostado, bishop of Avila (aka,
Abulensis), and Thomas Waldensis. According to Lemos, Tostado did not oppose
PP, but only said that the will determines itself in the secondary act; he even
rejected as Pelagian the view that determination of the will excludes God’s first
act and entirely depends on created beings’ choice. Waldensis was also allegedly
quoted out of context by the Jesuits, since he was arguing against Wyclif, who
claimed that all things happen by an antecedent necessity; and so was Diego
Andrada de Payva (d. 1575), a Portuguese theologian who wrote against
Chemniz. Payva wrote that “unless the most powerful grace of God was to
precede and enlighten our will, it is impossible that we would perform any of
those deeds that deserve the name of ‘perfectly good’;”197 and added: “God not
only gives us that we are able to be converted, but also that we would convert,”
thus implicitly rejecting Molina’s and his Jesuit supporters’ view which denies
any efficacious grace besides sufficient grace.
Lemos also mentioned Johannes of Bologna, author of De aeterna
praedestinatione et reprobatione sententia (1555), who upheld the efficiency of grace
apart from the human will, merely claiming that God does not necessitate the
will, which remains free and able to determine itself. Ruard Tapper also said that
the will is moved by God as an instrument, and determined to a certain task.
After stating his desire to submit his view on human free will to the judgment of
Church authorities, Tapper said that “grace, which is God’s efficacious operation,
brings about in us these gifts, namely faith, conversion, and the works of
mercy.”198 Tapper also wrote: “Persuasion alone, whether stemming from God or
from man, does not move the will in an efficacious manner; it may be an active
cause, but not a sufficient one.” Johannes Driedo too resorted to the analogy of

196
Acta, 1342.
197
Ibid., 1350.
198
Ibid., 1354.
 119

the human will as a musical instrument, or as a pen, or as a piece of wood in the

hands of a person (i.e., God); however, Driedo remarked that this analogy falls a
bit short, considering that none of these inanimate objects have free will, though
we do. Lemos quoted Driedo further, showing how he went on to stigmatize
Pelagians for denying prevenient and efficacious grace.
Then, Lemos remarked that the testimony of Ockham, Adam Loftus
(archbishop of the Irish town of Armagh) and Durandus, quoted by Jesuits as
being opposed to PP, should be discarded as unworthy of consideration: Ockham
was never beloved by the Hoy See; Loftus denied divine providence over future
contingents; and Durandus denied the concurrence of God with human free will.
In regard to the first two groups of scholars mentioned by Bastida, Lemos
briefly commented that a) the first group was engaged in refuting heretics who
denied free will: all they did was to say that man is not necessitated or determined
by God’s grace; and b) the quoted scholars did not say that man makes God’s
grace efficacious or inefficacious out of his own free will; nor did they claim that
God’s grace acts as a merely moral influence. On the contrary, they claimed that
it is grace that operates on us, making us do what it wills.
As far as Zumel is concerned, he only denied that God moves man to commit
material sin, though he upheld the idea that God as First Mover predetermines a
sinner’s motion contained in sin, which according to Lemos is a view explicitly
taught by Aquinas and Bonaventure.199
Lemos concluded by apologizing if in the course of all congregations held so
far he offended anyone either in what he said, or in the manner in which he said.
He also appealed to the Pope’s magnanimity and patience, and ended by uttering
the words: “Praise be to God and to his grace!”200

199
Ibid., 1358-59.
200
Ibid., 1360.
120
 121

PART TWO

Lessius’ De Gratia
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Chapter 1
Leonardus Lessius – A Bio-Bibliographical Sketch
Just like in Lemos’ case, there are no significant works in the English
language about this formidable and indomitable Jesuit theologian: in my research
I relied instead on two French sources, namely his biography by Charles van Sull,
Leonardus Lessius de la compagnie de Jesus (Louvain, 1930), and the indispensable
Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet, S.J.’s, Prédestination et grace efficace controverses dans la
Compagnie de Jésus au temps d'Aquaviva (1610-1613) (Louvain, 1931): I said
“indispensable” because of the author’s abundant use of primary sources in the
form of correspondence and documents. I also utilized G. Schneemann, S.J.,
Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia (Friburg, 1881), who in
an Appendix to his book listed the primary sources about some of the
controversies his Flemish confrere became involved in. Last but not least, I drew
valuable information from the Italian scholar Eleonora Rai’s 2013 doctoral
dissertation: “Le petit prophète. Leonardo Lessio SJ tra controversie teologiche e santità
(1554-1623).”1
Born in 1554 in Brecht, The Netherlands, Lenaert Leys (rendered in Latin as
Leonardus Lessius) shared with his Dominican rival Lemos the un-enviable
condition of being an orphan. In his tender age he earned the nickname “petit
prophète,” due to his propensity to teach his own peers, and to strive to instill in
them a Christian lifestyle. Rai says that according to Schoofs, a contemporary of
Lessius who wrote a controversial biography of his confrere,2 the ‘small prophet’
eventually came to be referred to as the Belgicum oraculum, namely “a
knowledgeable and wise person to whom many people turned to get advice.”3
Having lost his parents at the tender age of six, young Leonard entered one
of the colleges of the University of Louvain, in Belgium, where he studied
classical languages and Philosophy. He joined the Society of Jesus in 1572 and
went on to get a degree in Theology, studying in Rome for a couple of years in
the Roman College under the famous Jesuit scholars Francisco Suarez and Robert
Bellarmine, with whom he developed an intellectually conflicted relationship for
the rest of his life.

1
Rai, who earned her Ph.D. in History in Milano, is currently a post-doctoral researcher at the
University of Western Australia’s ARC Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions in
Europe, with special focus on the period 1100-1800. See also her unpublished paper “Between
Augustine and Pelagius: Leonard Lessius in the Leuven Controversies, from 1587 to the 20th
century,” uploaded in www. academia.edu.
2
Leonard Schoofs, De Vita et Moribus L. Lessii (Brussels, 1640).
3
Rai, 14. Rai’s dissertation is available online as a PDF.
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After returning to Belgium, Lessius taught Philosophy at Douai for seven

years, and then Theology at Louvain from1585 to 1600. Though he became
famous for his intellectual endeavors, publishing books about Theology, Law,
spirituality and Politics, he yearned to foster a quiet and spiritual life. His
seraphic attitude, however, did not keep him out of the spotlight: quite the
contrary, during his life he became involved in several theological controversies.
His correspondence with major figures of his day, including cardinals, two
Generals of his order, and several fellow theologians, reveal a sophisticated,
humble and yet stubborn personality who did not yield to mere authority, but
rather to well-reasoned arguments. We read for instance in one of his letters to
Bellarmine:

If you are free from attending to very urgent matters concerning the Church, and have time
to ponder these speculations of mine, I would ask you to compare my views with those of
these fathers [i.e., Molina, Vazquez and Valentia] and revisit the whole issue from the
foundations. If you do not have time to do so, I would kindly ask you to give some time to
our professors of Theology who are in other provinces to examine my views and to listen to
their opinion. In this whole affair I have not sought anything else but the greater glory of
God and the consolation of souls.4

The two works that earned Lessius recognition and respect were De iustitia et
iure (1605),5 dealing with economic and financial matters, and De antichristo
(1611), in which he argued against Protestants that the Papacy as an institution
could not possibly be the Antichrist referred to by the apostle John in two of his
letters (i.e., 1 Jn 2:18-23; 2 Jn: 7-10).
Beginning in 1587, Lessius became embroiled in theological controversies
that lasted up to the end of his life. First, came his struggle against the theses
upheld by Baius, which were eventually condemned by the Pope; then came the
protracted dispute with the theological faculty at Louvain.
In May 1587 the doctors of the theological faculty at the University of
Louvain gathered thirty-four propositions taken verbatim from public lectures
delivered in the same city by Jesuit professors Lessius and Hamelius in the
previous couple of years, and submitted them to their Society’s consideration,
since they found them to be “unheard of, offensive, strange and dangerous”
(inauditas, offensivas, peregrinas et periculosas).6 Thirty-one of the thirty-four
4
Le Bachelet, 198. All translations from the French are my own.
5
A selection of this work of Lessius’ has been published as On Sale, Securities, and Insurance,
trans. by Wim Decock and Nicholas De Sutter (2016).
6
One of the best accounts of the controversy was detailed in a recent study: see E.J.M Van Eijl,
“La controverse louvaniste autour de la grace et du libre arbiter a la fin du XVI siècle,” in M.
Lamberigts ed., L’augustinisme a l’ancienne faculte’ de theologie de Louvain (Leuven
University Press, 1994), 207-82.
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propositions that were censored reflected Lessius’ and Hamelius’ views on

predestination and grace, as well as their opposition to belief in pre-determining
grace.
When the Jesuits refused to see any problem with those views, the Louvain
faculty took exception to their endorsement of Lessius. In its censure, the faculty
body declared its dismay and indignation at the fact that the topics of the grace of
Christ and predestination had been expounded by Lessius through what it
regarded as the Pelagian and Semipelagian views that had been repudiated a long
time ago by the Church as heretical. As the Louvain faculty formally censored
these propositions on September 12th, 1587,7 followed shortly after by Douai’s,
debates and arguments began to erupt not only among the professors, but also
the student body and the sympathizers of each party. At an academic level, some
universities (e.g., Trier, Ingolstadt and Mainz) rallied on the side of Lessius and
deplored Louvain’s censure; also, individual theologians, such as Thomas
Stapleton, openly sided with Lessius. The counter-charge by Lessius and his
supporters was that Louvain’s faculty endorsed views on grace that echoed
Calvin’s own views (which had been condemned at Trent).
In July 1588, such tensions caused Bishop Ottavio Mirto Frangipani,
apostolic nuncio in Belgium, to notify the Holy See and ask for papal intervention.
As he waited for instructions, he imposed silence on both parties and ordered
them to stop labeling each other “heretics” under threat of automatic
excommunication (latae sententiae).
Lessius at first sought to engage his critics in a constructive face to face
conversation, but the Louvain faculty denied him the opportunity, insisting
instead that any exchange of views was to take place in writing considering that
every conversation they had so far ended in an argument. Stung by Louvain’s
faculty’s censure,8 Lessius decided to write to Bellarmine and ask his opinion on
this matter; his old teacher replied in the summer of 1587.
Eleonora Rai wrote:

Though his letter [i.e., Bellarmine’s] to Lessius was never found, some fundamental
documents were nonetheless preserved. First, a handwritten note was found in the back of
the letter that Lessius wrote to him on May 15th, 1587, in which he succinctly explained his

7
See Appendix B. The censure is found in its entirety in J. A. Gazaignes’ Annales de la société
des soi-disans Jésuites, ou Recueil historique-chronologique de tous les actes, ecrits,
dénonciations, avis doctrinau, requêtes, ordonnances ... sentences, jugemens émanés des
Tribunaux ecclasiastiques & séculiers: contre la doctrine, l'enseignement, les entreprises & les
forfaits des soi-disans Jésuites, depuis 1552, époque de leur naissance en France, jusqu'en 1763,
Volume 1, 163-275.
8
In a letter to Bellarmine Lessius complained: “I wonder if Catholics have ever been so diligent
in fighting Protestants, as the two faculties of Louvain and Douai have been in attacking me,”
Van Sull, 102.
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conclusions: ‘I approve the propositions: the ones that I have underlined suggest that
predestination concerns more the means than the end. I personally believe the opposite to be
more the case, but this is not a matter that compromises the faith.’9

Bellarmine went on to write a report for the Holy See, entitled De controversia
Lovanienesi nuper exorta inter facultatem theologicam, et quondam professorem Societatis
Jesu. Summa totius controversiae. According to Bellarmine, the root of the dispute
lied in the parties’ opposing views concerning God’s cooperation with human free
will: from this dispute, Bellarmine said, the divide between the two parties
widened, now to include their respective views of Providence, sufficient and actual
grace, predestination and election to glory.10
Lessius replied to the faculty’s censure with an Apologia of his own, to which
the faculty replied with a rebuttal (“Antapologia ”), to which Lessius in turn
responded with a new treatise in 1588.11
In the following two decades the querelle between Louvain and Lessius took
back seat to the clamor raised by the publication of Molina’s Concordia, and to the
ensuing Congregation de auxiliis debates. Lessius stayed out of this controversy
altogether, only to emerge from his silence in 1610 with the publication of his De
gratia efficaci. I will devote the next chapter to the analysis of this work: here I
will limit myself to summarize the history of this text.
In response to the views expressed by Dominican theologian Franciscus
Davila in his book De gratia et libero arbitrio sive de auxiliis gratiae (Rome, 1599)12,
Lessius submitted the manuscript of his De gratia efficaci to the exam of his
general, Claudio Acquaviva, who first approved it on December 2nd, 1602. Fellow-
Jesuit Bastida, who had debated Lemos in the Congregation de auxiliis, also
praised Lessius’s Annex concerning predestination, which was given to Pope
Clement VIII for his perusal. Despite this positive reception, the General of the
Jesuits hesitated to authorize Lessius to publish his work also because by the end
of the Congregation’s activities in 1607 a papal pronouncement was regarded to
be imminent. When such pronouncement failed to materialize, Lessius was finally
allowed to go ahead with his project, which was approved by his provincial
superior at the end of 1608 and eventually given to the press in March 1610.
Van Sull tells us how several theologians (e.g. Martin Becanus, Jean Deckers,
a long-time friend and admirer of Lessius, Christophe de los Cobos, a former
debater at the Congregation de auxiliis, and some members of Acquaviva’s
entourage) and various universities in Spain, France, Belgium enthusiastically
9
E. Rai, 89. E.J.M Van Eijl, in his article, dated the letter to May 29, pp. 212-213.
10
Rai, 90-92.
11
All these documents are found in G. Schneemann, S.J., Controversiarum de divinae gratiae
liberique arbitrii concordia (Friburg, 1881), 367-464.
12
See its Table of Contents in Appendix C.
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received Lessius’ work despite some reservations and criticisms issuing from
some of the more conservative Jesuits (e.g. Andre’ Eudemon-Joannes; Bellarmine,
now a cardinal; Suarez; and Acquaviva himself).13 At the end of 1610, Bellarmine
wrote to his younger friend a letter in which he expressed his dismay at the
notion, upheld throughout Lessius’ book, of predestination post praevisa merita,
and the implied view that divine grace is not strictly necessary but merely
“useful” for the performance of good works. Lessius response, in which he
declared to be hurt by his friend’s criticism, came a couple of months later: “I was
hurt, and not just a little, when I understood that you oppose that view that I
have been teaching.”14 After all, Lessius noted, Bellarmine had supported him two
decades earlier and declared that his views were “probable;” why the change in
Bellarmine’s attitude?
Acquaviva himself, the General of the Jesuits, wrote to Lessius several letters,
urging him to revise his book and bring it in line with the more traditional views
upheld by the Society: in particular, the General took exception to his Flemish
confrere’s denial of the existence of efficacious grace as distinct from sufficient
grace. The following year, Lessius received from his “boss” a stern letter, dated
April 11th, 1611. The reason for the General’s displeasure with Lessius was Pope
V’s warning, following the complaints of the Dominicans Lemos and Alvarez, to
have Lessius’ book placed on the Index of Forbidden Books unless a new revised
and amended edition would be forthcoming.
Lessius’ response was decisive and yet humble: he appealed directly to the
Pope himself in a letter dated August 25th, 1611:

I am aware that Fr. Suarez and some other people do not share my way of thinking…My
work has been favorably received by scholars from virtually all provinces. Moreover, the
view that I defend has been upheld not only by the majority of ancient scholastics, but also
by the most famous writers of our time, including Molina, Vasquez, Valentia, Stapleton, John
of Bologna, Becanus and many others who are defending today the Catholic faith and the
honor of the Apostolic See against the heretics. I could name more than twenty doctors and
professors of Theology from different countries who believe that the doctrine I expounded is
more conformed to the Sacred Scriptures and to the Fathers, and that it offers a more exact
interpretation of Augustine’s views than my opponents. I have taught at Louvain for twenty-
five years with great joy and pride in my reputation…I do not believe my opinion is
erroneous. As far as revising and amending my book is concerned, such amendment is
absolutely unnecessary, other than to further explain and corroborate some parts in it that
some people have not correctly understood.15

13
Van Sull, 236-38.
14
Rai, 152.
15
Ibid., 248.
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Feeling he had been by-passed, Acquaviva was incensed: not only Lessius had
taken matters directly to the Pope rather than going through the ordinary chain
of command within his order, but he even had gone as far as suggesting to the
Pope that the Jesuit directors of the Roman College should be fired and then
replaced with other theologians because they censored his book!16
Acquaviva issued a decree on December 14th, 1613, De observanda Ratione
Studiorum deque doctrina Sancti Thomae tenenda, in which he sternly admonished
the members of his order to abide by the “official” views of the Society concerning
grace and predestination (i.e., the so-called theory of “Congruism”); the decree
was upheld four years later by his successor, the Italian Muzio Vitelleschi. To his
credit, Lessius obeyed and remained silent for the next fourteen months, until
Acquaviva passed away.
Despite all these controversies, Lessius’ resolve never wavered. Remarkably,
during his life Lessius never enjoyed good health: he suffered from recurring
kidney stones, stomach aches, migraines, which he endured with saintly patience
and stoic resignation.17 Van Sull, in the twenty-first chapter of Lessius’ biography,
recounts the events leading to his death. In late 1622, after falling ill, he was
confined to bed, his body wrecked by severe pain. He found comfort in prayer and
in reading Scripture. On Christmas morning, after celebrating the last of three
Masses, he thought he was going to collapse on the altar and promptly returned
to bed. He spent the next few days praying, receiving the sacraments and
conversing with friends. The night before his passing he was heard exclaiming
out loud: “Mi Iesu quando venies, me laetum quando facies?”18 Eventually, he
succumbed to his illness and died on Sunday morning, January 15, 1623.

LESSIUS’ WORKS ON GRACE AND PREDESTINATION

Lessius’ De gratia efficaci, decretis divinis, libertate arbitrii et praescientia dei

conditionata disputatio apologetica, consists of three works: the De gratia proper, and
two annexes: the first, De praedestinatione et reprobatione angelorum et hominum, and
the second, De praedestinatione Christi - all published in Antwerp in the same
volume in 1610. Such works were an exposition and a further refinement of the

16
Ibid, 155.
17
As a result of his experience with pain he wrote Hygiasticon, Or the Right Course of
Preserving Life and Health into Extreme Old Age (1614). See Rebecca Anne Havens, M.A.
Report: “The Rule of Health and ‘The Prince of Philosophers:’ The Hygiasticon of Léonard
Lessius” (University of Texas at Austin, 2011). In the PDF abstract she wrote that Lessius’ book
concerns “what is natural, what is the relationship between body, mind and soul, and what is
necessary for health, wealth, and spiritual and self-improvement.”
18
“O, my Jesus! When will you come? When will you make me happy?” Van Sull, 302.
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theses he upheld in 1587 at Louvain. In Part Two I will first discuss the text of
De gratia, and then, in Part Three, the first Annex on predestination.

De gratia efficaci et decretis divinis, libertate arbitri, et praescientia Dei

conditionata
[On efficacious grace, divine decrees, freedom of the will, and God’s conditional
foreknowledge].19

Lessius dedicated his book to Cardinal Guido Bentivoglio, at that time

Archbishop of Rhodes, head of the Roman Inquisition during the Galileo trial,
and Nuncio in Flanders. In the Forward addressed to the cardinal, Lessius
reminded him that since the end of the Congregation de auxiliis no papal
definition had been forthcoming, though both parties were allowed to retain their
opinions but forbidden to mutually censor each other; such opinions had indeed
been expressed in various lectures and books published by members of both
schools. Lessius himself wrote some disputations around 1590, which remained
unpublished; however, in 1601, one year after Molina’s death, he wrote this
present work in response to a book published a couple of years earlier, titled De
auxiliis divinae gratiae ac eorum efficacia [The helps of divine grace and their
efficacy] (December 1599).
The author of this text, the Dominican Davila, never once mentioned the
Society of Jesus or any of its theologians by name; however, in his book there
were plenty of references to the fact that “in our days many people agree” with
the opinions of Pelagians and Semipelagians, and that “many others” opposed
such views: the subtext was obviously a reference to Jesuits and Dominicans,
respectively. Indirectly accusing Jesuits of following the opinions of condemned
heretics from the past was more than an insult to Jesuits: it was a caricature of
19
Because the De gratia underwent several revisions, the version of the text I decided to use is
not the first edition, but the second, found in his collected works bearing the title Opuscula varia
in unum corpus redacta (Louvain, 1651), 423-511. Le Bachelet devoted a section in his book
(Chapter VI, section 5, pp. 321-330) to explain the differences between the first and second
editions. After comparing the two texts, he concluded that there are three types of differences:
modifications, deletions, and additions. The first two, according to Le Bachelet were few and
insignificant from a doctrinal point of view; the last one consisted of three types: explicative,
confirmative and apologetical, and were numerous. After supplying several instances of each, Le
Bachelet concluded: “This comparison [of the two editions] clearly shows that the work of
revision made by Lessius had neither the character of a retraction nor of a correction, properly
speaking. Rather, such work was an explanation or declaration in which he explicitly said many
things that originally he neither denied nor openly stated because he was looking at an issue from
another relative, and therefore incomplete, perspective. More specifically, Lessius neither
changed nor attenuated his doctrine concerning election to glory, but rather gave to some of its
fine points a greater clarity and firmness.” Le Bachelet, 328.
 131

their doctrine, filled with inaccuracies and misunderstandings especially

concerning Molina’s views. To this day, Jesuits have nothing good to say about
this book. A century ago, Antonio Astrain, who wrote a lengthy history of his
order, remarked: “I do not know of any book that has slandered the Society in
such appalling manner in the matter of de auxiliis.”20
Feeling appalled at the indirect criticisms of their order, Jesuit theologians
such as Bellarmine and Acquaviva denounced the book to the Pope, who forbade
its publication. Bellarmine in particular wrote a brief for Pope Clement VIII, in
which he listed sixteen passages from Davila’s book where he showed how the
Dominican theologian had misrepresented Molina’s views, quoting next to these
passages some sentences taken from Molina’s Concordia, in order to set the record
straight. Worse yet, as Bellarmine pointed out, Davila had ignored the Pope’s
clear instructions to both Jesuits and Dominicans to refrain from denouncing each
other as heretics. As a result of these arguments the Pope ordered Davila to recall
his book; Davila pleaded in vain to lift the recall, but to no avail.
Lessius submitted his text to Acquaviva for approval, which he granted on
December 2, 1602; however, his De gratia remained unpublished because all
parties were expecting an imminent declaration issuing from the Holy See (which
never came). Lessius said that some of his acquaintances had recently asked him
to respond to Davila’s claims; he responded by writing this work, to which he also
added two disputations: one about the predestination of human beings and angels,
and the other about the predestination of Christ. The book was finally published
in March 1610 after receiving the approval of the Jesuit superior in Belgium in
late 1608, and was well received among Jesuits in Germany, Spain and Rome,
though some theologians accused his Annex to contain views that ran contrary to
those of Augustine’s and Aquinas’ on the matter. As we shall see in my Part Four,
Thomas of Lemos reacted to this Annex by devoting a section of his opus magnum,
Panoplia, to its rebuttal.
A well-reasoned and non-polemical book, the De gratia differs from
Pelagianism by its emphasis on the role of grace and also by giving a different
meaning to the term “merits” than Pelagians and Semipelagians had given to it.
Nonetheless, Bellarmine, Suarez, and the two generals of the order, Acquaviva
and Vitelleschi, found issues with it: eight propositions were singled out from De
gratia for being suspiciously non-traditional and deserving of censure; on his part,
however, Lessius had many defenders.
On December 11, 1611 a decree was issued prohibiting the publications of
writings on grace without a previous approval of the Holy Office, though by that

20
Antonio Astrain, S.J., Historia de la compania de Jesus en la asistencia de Espana, Tomo IV,
Aquaviva (Segunda parte) 1581-1615 (Madrid, 1913): 288.
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time both Lessius and his critics had produced and published significant works on
the subject.
A cursory reading of the titles of the twenty chapters of Lessius’ De gratia
reveals a threefold strategy typical of scholastic authors. First, he seeks to
demolish the philosophical, scriptural, conciliar, patristic and theological
foundations of PP; secondly, he sets out to refute the arguments usually adduced
by Dominicans to defend PP; thirdly, he upholds the theory of conditional
foreknowledge with solid arguments, and then responds to various criticisms
leveled against it.
In the Preface to the first edition of his book, Lessius declined to identify his
Dominican opponents by name, stating he wished to follow the example of the
Fathers and of St. Thomas, so as not to exacerbate the debate or to give an
opportunity to the Church’s enemies to slander her. As I said, he particularly took
issue with a specific book; though Lessius did not name the author of this treatise,
through the quotes from various parts of his work we can ascertain his identity as
the Spanish Dominican theologian Francisco Davila. Lessius referred to that
person as “the Author” (omitting “of that treatise” for brevity’s sake) throughout
his De gratia. Lessius also said that Davila’s long treatise about the help offered by
efficacious grace was written “to present the point of view of the Dominicans to
the Holy See, in a way that it would be more easily understood” (tractatus iste ad
instructionem causae conscriptus est; nempe ut sententia a S. Sede Apostolica facilius ferri
posset).21
In Chapter Two, in the process of outlining the controversial issues dividing
Dominicans and Jesuits, Lessius also made a brief reference to some theological
theses defended in Naples in 1600:22 this must be a reference to Thomas of Lemos’
speech at the Dominicans’ General Chapter, after which he was sent to Rome with
Alvarez to represent their order’s view in the Congregation de auxiliis. I was also
able to identify Banez as “a certain doctor” (quidam doctor) mentioned by Lessius
in the same chapter, thanks to a quote taken by Lessius from Banez’s commentary
to the Summa.23
What irked Lessius and led him to write a treatise of his own was the fact
that these Dominicans misrepresented Molina’s views, and upheld Physical
Predetermination as the orthodox view. More specifically, Lessius claims to have
refrained in his treatise from censoring and bitterly criticizing Davila’s views,
though he did not shy away from subjecting his opponent’s views to a stringent
critical analysis and criticism, which he felt was required in order to arrive at the

21
Lessius, De gratia, 423.
22
Ibid., 424. See Gerhard Schneemann, Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii
concordia, 204.
23
Schneemann, 59.
 133

truth.24 Thus, in upholding the freedom and merit stemming from human free
will, and in rejecting the fatalistic, deterministic views upheld by the Reformers,
who even dared attributing evil deeds to God, Lessius believed he had honed on
in a very important core of Christian doctrine that is very much in need of further
elucidations. Even though fellow Jesuit Suarez authored a very scholarly work on
the same subject matter discussed here by Lessius, the latter felt justified in
writing his own work in order to include more recent perspectives and explain
difficult concepts discussed in Suarez’s work.
The De gratia consists of twenty chapters. The following is its Table of
Contents:
Chapter One. The occasion of the controversy. The state of the question according to the
author of a treatise [whom Lessius did not identify]. This treatise does not
present the status quaestionis correctly. Many things are falsely attributed to
Molina.

Chapter Two. Explanation of the main issues debated in the controversy.

Chapter Three. First refutation of PP through the overturning of our opponents’ main tenet
which they derive from the divine decrees and from the motion imparted by
the First Cause.

Chapter Four. Reply to our opponents’ further arguments upholding the divine decrees and
motion issuing from the First Cause.

Chapter Five. Second refutation of PP through the overturning of their other main tenet,
concerning the nature of free will.

Chapter Six. Third refutation of PP from the testimony of biblical passages.

Chapter Seven. Fourth refutation of PP from various church councils.

Chapter Eight. Fifth refutation of PP from the Fathers, the Scholastics and recent theologians.

Chapter Nine. Sixth refutation of PP through various reasons and troublesome consequences
stemming from it.

Chapter Ten. The error of Semipelagians, and the axiom “To those who do what is in their
power, God does not deny grace.” Reply to some arguments adduced against
non-determining grace.
APPENDIX to this chapter: “To those who do what is in their power, God does not deny
grace.”

Chapter Eleven. Reply to biblical passages adduced by our opponents to uphold PP.

24
De gratia, 420.
 134

Chapter Twelve. Reply to the conciliar statements adduced to uphold PP.

Chapter Thirteen. Reply to the patristic quotes that appear to uphold PP.

Chapter Fourteen. Reply to Thomas Aquinas’ and Bonaventure’s quotes that appear to uphold
PP.

Chapter Fifteen. Explanation and defense of the view claiming that prevenient help does not
cooperate in a man’s good work by means of physical influence.

Chapter Sixteen. Replies to the arguments adduced by the author of the treatise [i.e., Davila]
to claim that predestination is certain and that the effect of grace does not
stem from God’s foreknowledge, but from the intrinsic strength and power of
grace.

Chapter Seventeen. Reply to few more biblical and patristic arguments used in support of PP.

Chapter Eighteen. Reply to the theological arguments marshalled by that author and to few
other defenses of PP.

Chapter Nineteen. Explanation and defense of middle knowledge, which we call “conditional
foreknowledge.”

Chapter Twenty. Reply to arguments marshalled against middle knowledge.

I will now summarize the contents of De Gratia, leaving out a few chapters that I regarded
as either peripheral (i.e., 14) or more philosophical than theological (i.e., 19 and 20).
 135

Chapter 2

OUTLINING THE MAIN PROBLEMS WITH PP

In Chapters One and Two, after identifying as a way of example ten views
that Dominicans falsely attribute to Jesuits,25 views that Molina himself rejected
(as proof of it, Lessius referred his readers to ten passages in the Concordia),
Lessius says that the real controversy between the two orders is not whether or
not free will anticipates grace, since “no Catholic theologian doubts in our day
and age that grace indeed precedes free will.” Rather, the question that has been
bitterly disputed for many years is: “Does prevenient and helping grace supply
the human will just a moral help, or a physically predetermining one as well?”
The Dominicans claim that what is needed for each and every good deed, and
indeed for every motion of the will, is a previous motion imparted by God
predetermining the human will to consent (once this motion occurs, free will
cannot dissent); they call such motion “divine “predefinition,”” or “Physical
Premotion,” or “Physical Predetermination.” On their part, Jesuits deny that such
motion is required, and also fail to see how such motion would not end up taking
free will away. According to Lessius, all other issues are secondary, arising either
as solutions or proofs and arguments in support of this main one.
More specifically, Lessius describes the Dominican view of PP as
characterized by the following six features:26
1) PP precedes our wills.
2) It is not in our power whether such motion is bestowed on us or not at
different moments, since such bestowal stems from a divine decree which is
logically prior to any foreknowledge of our choices/works.
3) Once it is placed in us, we cannot resist it.
4) As it is placed in our wills, it determines the will’s consent.
5) This impulse is placed in our will before we consent to it, and through it
the will is determined to consent.
6) This impulse is required in virtue of the relationship of dependency and
subordination existing between secondary causes and the First Cause: this
is the case of all supernatural, natural, and even evil acts.

In contrast to such view, Lessius presents the Jesuit view as claiming:27

25
De gratia, 423-24. The sources quoted by Lessius are Davila; a thesis upheld by Lemos at the
Dominican General Chapter in Naples in 1600; and Banez.
26
Ibid., 424.
27
Ibid., 425.
 136

1) No prevenient motion or impulse predetermining the will to consent is

required for our conversion or for any other work of mercy (much less so,
for works that are less than morally good, or downright evil): indeed, such
motion would remove any and all freedom of our actions.
2) The prevenient helps of God’s grace are sufficient for us to do good works;
our will can consent to them in such a way that even when they are present
we could still turn them down if we decided to. It is in our will’s power to
determine itself to either consent or reject such helps. Prior to our consent,
God’s prevenient grace does two things; a) it attracts and woos the will in
order to elicit its consent; b) it gives to the will the necessary strength to
consent, if indeed our will wants to. In the process of the will giving its
consent, this grace runs concurrent with it: we may call this a “moral
flowing” in the consent, though some Jesuits would even accept to call this
a “physical flowing” (physico influxu).
3) God’s prevenient helps consist in inspirations and illuminations of the
mind; in various delights proposed to the will; and in encouragements to
pursue a certain course of action. These helps are supernatural in
themselves because the will would not get excited simply by receiving
them; however, such helps do not automatically produce an effect on their
own account, unless the will consented to them.

LOGICAL ARGUMENTS PP IS BASED ON

In Chapter 3 Lessius introduces his readers to the two foundational views on

which the Dominican theory of PP is built. First view: all human actions and
their ensuing consequences have been pre-ordained by God from all eternity; they
will infallibly take place because the First Cause always influences secondary
causes, and because otherwise God would not be able to exercise his providence
over all things (Lessius will tackle this view in this chapter, as well as in Chapter
Four). Second view: God’s PP is not incompatible with human free will as long
as the mind’s decisions remain un-determined (Lessius will tackle this view in
Chapter Five).
However, according to Lessius, if the first view is true, two very undesirable
conclusions (gravissima incommoda) will ensue: a) God is the author of sin; and b)
everything happens as if it was dictated by an un-avoidable Fate.
In regard to a), Lessius suggests that if the First Cause determined the
course of events through secondary causes, then Satan’s Fall, the human Fall, and
Judas’ betrayal took place just like God decreed they would, and all these beings
should not be blamed since they could not have acted otherwise. But in this case, how
is this view different than the one advocated by the Reformers, and condemned by
the Church as an abhorrent heresy?
 137

Lessius goes on to describe five more reprehensible conclusions which he

claims unavoidably stem from a):
1) The Council of Trent, Session VI, canon 6, declared: “If anyone says that it
is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil
as well as those that are good God produces, not permissively only but also
proprie et per se, so that the treason of Judas is no less his own proper work
than the vocation of St. Paul, let him be anathema.”
How can supporters of PP whitewash their view and say that God only
“permits” evil when they openly say that he decrees it? How do they fail to
see that their view is condemned by this canon?
2) PP implies that God predestines some people to evil, and yet such view was
condemned in Orange II’s Conclusion: “We not only do not believe that
any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter
abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they
are anathema.”
3) The Vincentian articles’ claim quoted by Prosper is true, after all:
“Adulteries and seductions of consecrated virgins take place because God
predestines those people to fall…When fathers defile their own daughters,
or mothers their own sons, when slaves murder their masters, all this
happens because God predestined it to happen.”28
What else does “to predetermine” mean, other than “to predestine”?
Lessius says that Prosper replied in the same way the Jesuits of his day
would against supporters of PP: “It is a horrible and abominable thought to
believe that God is the author of an evil desire or any evil action. His
predestination never swerves from his goodness nor from his justice. God,
who is all-holy, cannot be the cause of adulteries of married women or of
seductions of consecrated virgins: he does not preordain them, but only
punishes them.”
And in his next reply, Prosper said: “What folly then, and what
insanity it is to dare say that one should attribute to God’s counsel what
cannot even be ascribed fully to the devil; for though the devil may foster
the temptations to these shameful deeds of sinners, yet he may not be
regarded as the cause of their evil desires.”29
4) God is contradicting himself because he decreed and wanted evil deeds to
be done, determining our wills to perform them, even though he also
forbade them under threat of severe consequences: thus, in punishing
people for doing what he absolutely brought about, he is acting in an unfair,

28
Prosper, Answers to Vincentian Articles, 10, 11.
29
Idem.
 138

cruel, and despotic manner. However, Fulgentius in his Ad Monimum

rebuffed such an idea.30
5) Those biblical passages that say that God hates sin and unrighteousness
are not telling us the truth.

Lessius explains to his readers that when confronted with such objections,
supporters of PP at this point protest and claim that according to them God
neither is the author of sin, nor does he want it to occur, since he is not
responsible for the malice found in sin, or, in other words, for the mental attitude
out of which a sinful deed is performed: rather, God is simply the First Cause of
physical movement and the underlying condition of life in which sinful acts are
performed.
Despite such subtle distinctions, according to Lessius this response is less
than satisfactory on four accounts:31

1) Wycliffe and contemporary heretics such as Calvin never said that God is
the author of malice, but rather that he positively intended those evil works
to be done; sinners simply go along and add their own malice to the sinful
act; thus, supporters of PP agree with heretical doctrines. Moreover, it does
not help to say that the devil wants sins to be done as he acts out of his evil
nature, while God wants sins to be done out of his perfectly good nature:
the end result is the same!
2) Man does not add malice to an evil deed: he doesn’t perform an evil deed
because it is evil, but because it is convenient for him.
3) What does it matter that God is not the author of malice? Malice
necessarily ensues anyway, after God positively decrees a sinful deed to be
performed; we may as well say that he is responsible for that malice too!
4) Scripture, conciliar decrees and the writings of Church Fathers not only
deny that God is the author of sin, but also that he is the author of the deed,
qua action.

Supporters of PP reply that God is the author of a sinful deed, not as its moral
cause but as its natural cause, moving the human will not by ordering it or
persuading to do evil, but by concurring with it, just as he does in all other
natural causes, such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, and other natural disasters.
To this Lessius retorts: so what, that according to PP supporters God is not the
moral cause of a sinful deed? He still wills it by his all-powerful determining
decree!

30
De gratia, 426.
31
Ibid., 427.
 139

In regard to b), Lessius says that God’s PP smacks of fatalism, not of the
astrological kind, but of the Stoic kind. For instance, if God, without any regard
to his foreseen determination of my will on my part, decreed that at this
particular moment I will be writing and predetermined me to do so, I could not in
any way prevent such a divine decision to take place. Such divine decision
allegedly took place independently of and separately from my free will; but if this
is the case, Lessius says, I find the idea of what “free will” is all about to be more
mysterious and obscure than any other mystery of our Christian faith! Moreover,
from such view three consequences logically arise:
First, our lives and all of our decisions in it are determined by quasi-fatalistic
divine predeterminations, and it is not in our power to decide or do anything:
when we act, we do so because we are predetermined to that action; when we do
not act, it’s because we were not predetermined to act, nor it is in our power to
change or remedy this situation. Second, we have no real merit or demerit, since it
is not up to us to do or not to do anything, but it is up to God’s PP. Third,
Wycliffe’s statement that was condemned at the Council of Constance was true
after all: “All things happen out of absolute necessity,” in other words, it is not up
to man to keep situations and events from happening (Luther and Calvin too said
this much).
Lessius noted that the Dominican Davila in his book made three attempts to
reply to such objections. A first response to Lessius’ alleged three consequences
is found in Chapter 27 of Davila’s treatise, in which he argued about the difference
between the necessity of consequence and the necessity of the consequent (Lessius did not
employ these terms, but explained the meaning they convey).
According to Lessius such response is unsatisfactory as well, on four
accounts. First, because heretical views are deemed to be heretical for saying that
necessity of things consists only in the divine decree or pre-motion. Second,
animals do not move out of necessity, but out of their perceptions of objects
surrounding them; yet, this is not enough to say they are “free agents.”
Supporters of PP say that we do not act necessarily, but only out of divine PP,
which amounts to the same condition animals find themselves in. Third, such
divine decree takes away my freedom of the will, because once PP has been placed
in me, there is nothing I can do to prevent it from making me do whatever it
wills, and vice versa: if it has NOT been placed in me I cannot make things
happen either. Theologians such as Ockham, Gabriel Biel, Gregory of Rimini and
Thomas of Walden rightly concluded that if it is not in my power to prevent the
efficacy of a first cause, it is not in my power to prevent its effect from ensuing,
either. Fourth, we can argue that God uses PP, but only in conjunction with his
foreknowledge of the right moment when I will consent to it; in this case, rather
than talking about absolute God’s will, we should talk about God’s conditional will.
 140

A second response offered by Davila, is that the human will wants

necessarily only in a composite sense, though it is free to dissent in a divided sense.
Lessius claims that this response is going to fail as the previous one: first,
heretics said the same thing; second, it is not up to the human will to accept/repel
the efficacy of divine PP, and thus of its effects; third, in order for a necessity
which is admitted in a composite sense to be true, it must be able to be reconciled
with my free will. For instance, when we say that God knows a person is going to
be damned, we say he will be for sure, but not out of an absolute decree, but
rather out of a conditional one, which takes that person’s free will into account; in
other words, there has to be a necessary logical connection between God’s
foreknowledge of his damnation and his damnation stemming from his free
choices, because that person would otherwise have been foreknown to be saved
had he not sinned unrepentantly.
A third response marshalled by Davila is that God’s omnipotence consists
not only in doing what he wants, but also in the manner in which he wants: thus, if
he decreed that we should necessarily choose what he wants us to choose in a free
manner, we will do so without there being any contradiction in all of this.
Lessius replies that while it is true that all the things that God wants to
happen freely truly do so, it does not mean that he wants each and every thing
that humans do to actually occur (i.e., sins). He points out four more inconvenient
consequences attached to the concept of PP, one of them being that the concept of
PP is superfluous in the case of natural causes, such as heat; if fire naturally
transmits heat, what need is there for an external, additional PP to transmit such
heat, say, to water? Either God is able to add PP to natural causes or he is not; if
he is able, why did he create natural things in need of PP, leaving them imperfect
and deficient in and of themselves?32
In conclusion, Lessius reminds his readers that Jerome wrote in one of his
commentaries to Scripture: “It is not because God knows something is going to
happen that it will; but rather, because it will happen, God knows it, as he
foreknows all future things.” John Damascene, Justine Martyr, Eusebius, and
Chrysostom said something equivalent: however, if all human deeds are
predetermined, these Fathers were wrong and Calvin was right when he wrote:

If the choices men make are merely foreseen by God, but not arranged and disposed
according to his good pleasure and will, we may as well question his providence. However,
since there is no other reasons he foresees things besides the fact he decreed they would
happen, it is pointless to argue about foreknowledge when it is rather obvious that things
happen due to God’s decree and motion.

32
Ibid., 430.
 141

Thus, Lessius ended on a triumphant note: “Based on all the objections I have
produced, it seems that the first foundational principle of predetermining grace
has been subverted.”33

REPLY TO ARGUMENTS USED IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRST CAUSE’S

IMPARTED MOTIONS

In Chapter Four, Lessius tackles eight logical arguments adduced by

Dominicans (more specifically, by Banez) in support of the first foundation of PP,
namely that all human actions and their ensuing consequences have been pre-
ordained by God from all eternity and that they will infallibly take place because
the First Cause always influences secondary causes, and because otherwise God
would not be able to exercise his providence over all things.
Let us take a closer look at them.
First argument. Davila claimed (in his chapter 6) that all physical beings
require a First Mover for their motion to occur; more specifically, human beings
require God to direct their steps (e.g., Is 26: 12; Jn 15:5; Phil 2:13).
Lessius countered by saying that while it is true that generally speaking
physical beings require a First Mover, this does not mean that such mover has to
direct, impart and inspire every single motion to specific ends. For instance, what
motion has to be conferred to fire for it to warm up water? Or for water to put
out a fire? Or for a magnet to attract metal? Thus, all the earthly and celestial
bodies’ motions do not depend on a First Mover directly, but rather indirectly, in
virtue of their own nature. Thus, Davila’s comparison to God as the First Mover
does not hold water: God does not have to instigate every single human motion,
no more than a First Mover has to direct all the physical motions of every living
being; rather, God considered as First Mover simply acts as living beings’
universal cause by giving them the ability and power to move. It therefore does
not follow that God determines secondary causes; otherwise, says Lessius, I
cannot understand why we Catholics say that Melanchthon was wrong when he
claimed that “God not only allows creatures to operate, but makes them do all
things.”34
Second argument. Banez claimed that since God is the first cause of human free
will and of its choices, he acts as the efficient and chronologically prior cause of
human free will, which is subordinated to him.
According to Lessius, God does not act on human free will before it has the
chance to exercise its choice, but does so concomitantly and simultaneously with our

33
Ibid., 431.
34
Ibid., 433. Lessius proceeds to exegete the three biblical passages produced by Davila,
showing how they do not offer strong support for his view.
 142

decisions: otherwise, how could we not avoid the conclusion that our wills are not
free and merely passive? Lessius gladly acknowledges that the First Cause shapes
and empowers secondary causes; that secondary causes cannot do anything
without the concurrence of the First Cause; and that they are subordinated to it.
However, Lessius remarks, the Dominicans are wrong in the conclusions that
they draw from all this.
Third argument. All those things to which God’s divine predefinitions apply
have also been imparted God’s causality and efficient grace; they include human
beings’ free and contingent acts.
Lessius denies that such predefinitions apply to sinful actions, lest we make
God the author of sin, just as Calvin and Luther did.
Fourth argument. Unless God was to predefine every single specific action
carried out by human beings, he would be unable to exercise perfect control over
the created order; nor can we claim that some things take place out of either
chance or mere luck.
It is neither true nor necessary for God’s most perfect providence to
absolutely preordain each and every specific action together with all the
accompanying circumstances, since so many things that take place in the world
are either indifferent or unable to magnify God’s glory or the overall welfare of
creatures. In fact, God supplied things with most convenient means and necessary
powers to pursue their ends.35 Concerning the performance of human beings’ free
actions, God does not need to predefine them absolutely in order to exercise
perfect providence. He can, for instance, have recourse to conditional
foreknowledge; utilize his permissive will; supply his concurrence; employ his
absolute foreknowledge.36
Fifth argument. Unless God predetermined efficaciously and physically human
free will, but only did so in a moral fashion, the way Jesuits claim, he would not be
able to know the effects of human actions in the act of determining things by the
decree of his will; rather he would only know them by supposition or by a most
educated guess.
Lessius objected that it is not necessary for God to know all things through
the decree of his will: in fact, he can know future contingents through the power
of his foreknowledge. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, when explaining the way
God knows future contingents, never suggested that he did so through the power
of his will.
Sixth argument. When God and man concur in the performance of the same
effect, they do so either out of sheer luck or coincidence, or out of an almost

35
I can think here of animals’ instinct of self-preservation and to reproduce, each species
according to its own characteristics.
36
De gratia, 435.
 143

natural and simultaneous concurrence and coincidence. The first option is not
viable, since things would be out of God’s control; the second option is not
possible either, because to affirm the notion of simultaneous concurrence would
make the First and secondary causes equal, thus nullifying their ontological
difference. Worse yet, to suggest that God needs the assent of our wills to his
grace before concurring with them, would engender the weird situation where an
effect precedes its cause.
Lessius devoted four pages to rebut Banez’ view; for the sake of brevity I will
not summarize them, but refer the readers to the text itself.37
Seventh argument. God predefined how many human beings would be born
and then preordained their deeds.
Lessius pointed out that if that was the case, we may well say that he also
preordained every adultery, illicit sexual relationship, incest, rape ever
committed, which is patently false. Moreover, if he did not predefine the
punishments of the impious before the foreknowledge of their sins, it logically
follows that he did not predestine Christ’s Passion before the foreknowledge of
Judas’ betrayal. He concluded: “I fail to see how those who claim the contrary do
not make God the author of sin.”38
Eight argument. According to Dominicans, God’s concurrence with his
creatures’ actions (or the influence of God in the creatures’ effects) is
indistinguishable from said actions; thus, God would want those actions to really
occur (e.g., the act of hating someone).
Lessius replied that God’s concurrence, even when we consider that it really
proceeds from God, is general and indeterminate to this or that kind of action;
God never pre-establishes specific actions (whether good or evil) as an end to be
pursued.

FURTHER REFUTATION OF PP’S FOUNDATION

In Chapter Five, Lessius endeavored to undermine the second foundational

idea on which PP is built (namely that God’s PP is not incompatible with human
free will as long as the mind’s decisions remain undetermined). Davila saw the
root of freedom in the indifference of the mind’s judgement; according to the
Dominican, as long as people remain indifferent to the choice of the means to
actualize a certain end, they can be said to be free. In fact, the act of the will arises
from a judgement of the mind concerning such means: thus, when grace acts and
predetermines the will, it does not alter or bind the previous judgement of the
mind, leaving that indifference of choice in place.

37
Ibid., 436-39.
38
Ibid., 439.
 144

Lessius replies that in order to have true freedom what is needed is not only
indifference of the mind but of the will as well; this way, any divine (rather than
human) predetermination of the will would indeed take human freedom away.
Lessius goes on to articulate his view in seven points:
1) Lutherans and Calvinists, who claim that all good and evil deeds happen
necessarily, claimed the same thing as Davila did; conversely, according to
the Church’s teachings, such view is not acceptable.
2) Certainly the motions of grace and the lure of temptations are not free
human acts (in fact we cannot help but being stirred by either one of them);
experience teaches us that these two different influences continue to remain
in us while the judgement of the mind remains indifferent concerning our
choice. Thus, indifference of judgement is not enough to safeguard human
freedom. Moreover, the acts of the will do not stem immediately from the
indifference of the mind, but rather form a practical judgement that has
been determined by us in order to make a given choice.
3) This indifference of judgement does not seem to really safeguard the
freedom of the acts of the will: Davila admitted that besides that judgement
that looks indifferently at the means to be employed, something else is
required, namely an act of the mind which is an efficacious command by
which the mind orders the will to pursue a given choice. Thus, indifference
of judgement concerning the choice of means is clearly irrelevant to the
freedom of the will, since the will is not directed by it.
4) For an act of the will to be free, it is most important for the will to remain
free and not divinely determined: only when the will remains indeterminate
by any previous impulse we can properly speak of an act stemming from
“free will.”
5) Dominicans establish only the indifference of the mind concerning the
means that do not have a necessary connection with a certain end.
However, not only such indifference is not enough to establish freedom: it
is hardly necessary to it!
6) Lessius goes on to quote Henry of Ghent, Durandus, Scotus, Marsilius,
Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Denis the Carthusian, Herveus, Capreolus,
Cajetan, and even Molina’s fierce critic Zumel, showing how these authors
claimed that if the power of the will is determined to make a given choice,
the indifference of the mind is not enough to preserve human freedom;
moreover, they all clearly affirmed that any prevenient influence of grace
that determines the will to perform an action, would ipso facto suppress
freedom.
7) In vain does Davila claim that “A free power is that which, once all the
required elements are put in place in order to be able to act, is able to act or
 145

not to act.”39 How can he seriously say that, wonders Lessius, when he
claims that in order to act the will needs a previous determining impulse
from God?

39
Ibid., 443.
 146

Chapter 3

EXEGESIS OF BIBLICAL PASSAGES FOR AND AGAINST PP

Lessius begins Chapter Six by quoting seven biblical texts opposing the idea
of PP.

 Dt 30:11-12: “Now what I am commanding you today is not too difficult for
you or beyond your reach. It is not up in heaven, so that you have to ask,
‘Who will ascend into heaven to get it and proclaim it to us so we may obey
it?’”
This text disproves the idea that for every good work we perform we
need a “shot” of grace, or a certain injection of PP to be administered at
certain specific moments. Such grace according to Dominicans is negated to
some; it remains un-accessible and unavailable to people, unless bestowed
by God, without any foreknowledge of good works. Consequently, such
grace is not in the power and reach of human beings, no more than the gifts
of prophecy and healing are. This text challenges such assumptions.

 Sirach 15:14-18: “It was he who created man in the beginning, and he left
him in the power of his own inclination. If you will, you can keep the
commandments, and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice. He has
placed before you fire and water: stretch out your hand for whichever you
wish. Before a man are life and death, and whichever he chooses will be
given to him. For great is the wisdom of the Lord; he is mighty in power
and sees everything”
How are we left to the power of our own inclinations, if God
determines and imposes good works on us through his PP even before and
regardless of him foreseeing we will do them? How can we truly stretch
out our hands, if God has already determined who and when will do so?
Lastly, if death and life are set before us and God has pre-determined to
give life to some, how can we be said to really make a choice, since his
efficacious and absolute decree has made that choice for us?

 Is 5: 4: “What more could have been done for my vineyard than I have done
for it? When I looked for good grapes, why did it yield only bad?”
Here the Lord is saying that he gave people all the necessary tools and
means to do his will (i.e., sufficient grace); there is no mention of an extra
grace that has not been given or held back (i.e., PP). Thus, Lessius
concludes that PP is un-necessary. The defenders of PP still argue that
 147

God would have given his PP had people used well his sufficient grace;
however, such retort is inconsistent since people could not properly avail
themselves of sufficient grace unless they were given PP first!

 Ez 18: 30-32: “Therefore, you Israelites, I will judge each of you according
to your own ways, declares the Sovereign Lord. Repent! Turn away from
all your offenses; then sin will not be your downfall. Rid yourselves of all
the offenses you have committed, and get a new heart and a new spirit.
Why will you die, people of Israel? For I take no pleasure in the death of
anyone, declares the Sovereign Lord. Repent and live!”
Lessius claims that the following considerations clearly emerge from
this text: a) In order to repent we do not need to postulate the need for a
PP help that lies outside the power of man. It is ridiculous to say to a man
who is in darkness: “See the light!”, if that man cannot have a way to
acquire for himself a source of light. Likewise, it is ridiculous to say
“Repent! Turn away from sin!” if people have not been given PP to enable
them to do so; b) God, out of his goodness and generosity, has given us all
the helps we need to repent; c) God did not decree that man would sin or
even to abandon him to his sinfulness without first foreseeing man’s
stubborn refusal of his grace.

 Mt 11: 21: “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the
miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and
Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.”
According to Lessius, this text shows the un-necessary nature of PP:
miracles would have sufficed to convert the people of Tyre and Sidon (says
Jesus through his divine foreknowledge)! In response to that, the defenders
of PP would argue that all this text is saying is that the people of Chorazin
and Bethsaida were worse than the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, since due
to their malice the Lord refused to give them his PP. However, this
objection cannot stand. First of all, Lessius argues, it is inconsistent with
what Dominicans have been saying all along, namely that God gives his PP
before and independently of any foreknowledge on his part of how man will
respond; in fact, if people can prevent God to give them his extra help (i.e.,
PP), it logically follows that he did not decree in an absolute manner to
give it to them other than by postulating a foreknowledge by which he
foresaw that they would not place impediments to his grace. Secondly, how
do we get to the situation where one town places impediments to God’s
gifts while the other does not, other than by accepting the fact that one
would use well smaller gifts while the other would not? If we accept PP, we
would have to reach the unsavory conclusion that it was God’s
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predetermining decree that established this order of affairs, independently

from his foreknowledge; it would therefore follow that Chorazin’s
inhabitants could be excused on the ground that they did not receive the
necessary help for their conversion, namely PP. The Lord clearly pointed
out that the signs performed in those towns, in conjunction with the inner
helps bestowed to their inhabitants, were sufficient to lead people to
repentance, without the need for an extra help (i.e., PP) that was not in
their power to attain.
When Augustine exegeted this passage, he wrote: “From which fact it
appears that some have in their understanding itself a naturally divine gift
of intelligence, by which they may be moved to the faith, if they either hear
the words or behold the signs congruous to their minds” (The Gift of
Perseverance 14, 35).
However, this would not be true at all if people could not be moved to
believe unless God physically pre-determined them.

 Mt 23:37: “How often I have longed to gather your children together, as a

hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were not willing.”
If PP was truly necessary, then the inhabitants of Jerusalem would
have come to Jesus, had God decided to give them such PP: however, since
he did not, they could rightly complain of being excusable, since they did
not receive it.

 Rev 3:20: “Here I am! I stand at the door and knock. If anyone hears my
voice and opens the door, I will come in and eat with that person, and they
with me.”
Those on whose hearts God knocks, have all the necessary help of grace
they need in order to open the “door,” otherwise, why would Jesus knock?
Would it make sense for Jesus to knock, if people could not open because
they did not receive PP to do so? Defenders of PP read the words “if anyone
opens the door” to mean “if I [i.e., God] will make you open the door.”
Really?, wonders Lessius: does this text say that God has to induce someone
to open the door, otherwise they would not be able to open it? Come on,
now!

Lessius ends this section by saying he will omit expounding several other
passages, e.g., “Today, if only you would hear his voice, do not harden your
hearts” (Ps 94:8); “But since you refuse to listen when I call and no one pays
attention when I stretch out my hand” (Pr 1:24); “He gave them the power to
become children of God” (Jn 1:12).
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All these verses suggest that those who did not obey God were indeed able to
do so, had they paid attention to the prevenient grace by which they were
stimulated and encouraged. Such grace was at their disposal: out of their free will
and decision they were always able to resist it, and so they did. Therefore, there is
no need to postulate any physically predetermining grace.40

***

But what about the passages used by Dominicans to uphold PP? In Chapter
Eleven, (I am skipping ahead in Lessius’ book in order to remain on topic) Lessius
tackled thirteen biblical texts marshalled by Dominicans in support of their view;
after refuting their interpretation, Lessius presents his own exegesis. He first
observes that many of these texts were used by Augustine against the Pelagians
to bolster his claim that without the grace of God we cannot do anything to attain
eternal life, but not to uphold what has recently been called “Physical
Predetermination.” These texts were also used by Calvin to suggest that the
grace of God operates monergistically, necessitating man’s assent, without the
cooperation of his free will. Dominicans use them to prove we cannot do anything
unless the grace of God moves us and determines us, in such a way that we
cannot truly resist it. Lessius declares that he does not understand how the last
two views really differ from each other.41
Let us now see how Lessius disposed of his opponents’ biblical arguments.

 Davila noted that in 2 Chronicles 30:12 the sons of Judah were asked to
return to the Lord, and yet this conversion was not left only to the innate
freedom of their will, but entrusted to God who operated in their hearts:
“Also in Judah the hand of God was on the people to give them unity of
mind to carry out what the king and his officials had ordered, following the
word of the Lord.”
Lessius rebuffed Davila’s use of the of the word “only,” since Jesuits,
following Molina, never said that conversion is only up to man and to his
free will. On the contrary, Molina wrote that grace is needed, and very
much required! Even though conversion depends on man’s decision, namely
on his free will, it still requires his simultaneous cooperation with God’s
prevenient grace influencing him. It must not be doubted that God leaves
man to his decision after enlightening, inspiring him, guiding him:
Augustine used the verse from Pr 8:35: “The will is prepared by the Lord”
to suggest the same thing. Thus, in order to understand how God works in

40
De gratia, 446.
41
Ibid, 468: “Quid autem inter haec duo postrema intersit, non intelligo.”
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us, all we have to do is to assert that God instills strength in us and

concurs with our free will in the performance of a good action: nothing
more (i.e., PP) is required.

 Ez 36: 26-28: “I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit in you; I will
remove from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. And I
will put my Spirit in you and move you to follow my decrees and be careful
to keep my laws.”
Davila says that God will make us do this and that good work, thus
insinuating that we have a need for PP.
Lessius responds that if “make” and “move” means exciting and
stimulating the consent of our wills to do good things (a consent the “new
heart” consists of), then no problem; but if the verbs refer to God’s
immediate action, bypassing our free will, then he denies they precede our
own assent: worse yet, this view is Calvinistic. However, there is nothing in
this text that requires the presence of PP grace. The verb “I will give you”
does not require an intrinsic activity of efficacious grace: that can occur
when God through his prevenient grace, consisting of threats and suasions,
offers to recreate our hearts, our lives. Having said that, Lessius concluded
that we always have the power to resist and reject God’s offer, as the
Council of Trent taught in Session VI, canon 4.

 Esther 4:41 (RHE): “Give me a well ordered speech in my mouth in the

presence of the lion, and turn his heart to the hatred of our enemy.”
Davila utilized the reasoning of Augustine in one of his letters against
Pelagians and over-stressed what he said. “Give me a well ordered speech”
does not require PP: it is just Esther’s request addressed to God to suggest
to her the proper words and actions at the right time. Moreover, God may
well turn his heart to the hatred of our enemy without PP’s bestowal, simply by
influencing him just as easily as human beings can be influenced to love or
hate their fellow human beings.

 Phil 2: 12: “For it is God who works in you to will and to act in order to
fulfill his good purpose.”
Davila claimed that this verse upholds God’s most efficacious will and
its ability to make human beings to its bidding.
Lessius replied that this verse has been quoted many times by Calvin to
argue we have no free will, and by some Catholics to prove PP (again,
Lessius claimed he fails to fail to see how the two views differ). However,
far from upholding PP, the context of this verse (i.e., imitation of Christ
and appeals to humility) suggests that Paul was reminding his audience
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that God is the main cause of their salvation, and that they should attend to
it with fear and trembling rather than being proud: if they had not been
predetermined by God, why would they bother to be anxious and attend to
their (inexistent) salvation?
Lessius concluded that it is in our power to accomplish salvation or to
turn away from it: “All of his gifts and helps are such that in each and every
work of ours we have the ability of doing them or not, to obey his grace or
to resist it.”42In conclusion, God is the main reason why we are saved,
insofar as he provides all that we need to make it to heaven, just as we say
that a king conquered a city, or new territories, when it was the soldiers
under his leadership who accomplished that.

 Is 50: 4: “He wakens me morning by morning, he wakens my ear to listen

like one being instructed.”
Davila said that to wake and to open one’s ear is the same as to
anticipate a man’s every action.
Lessius disagrees: the prophet is speaking as Christ about his will and
desire to redeem humankind and to listen to his Father’s will, as we gather
from the following verses: “I offered my back to those who beat me, my
cheeks to those who pulled out my beard; I did not hide my face from
mocking and spitting. Because the Sovereign Lord helps me, I will not be
disgraced” (Is 50:6).

 Acts 16: 14: “One of those listening was a woman from the city of Thyatira
named Lydia, a dealer in purple cloth. She was a worshiper of God. The
Lord opened her heart to respond to Paul’s message.”
Lessius is quick in pointing out that this verse hardly supports PP:
God can warm a person’s heart to receive the Gospel by enlightening the
mind and stimulating the will (something that is accomplished through
exciting or prevenient grace): however, even then a person would still be
free to close his/her heart and refuse God’s help.

 Jn 8: 47: “Whoever belongs to God hears what God says. The reason you
do not hear is that you do not belong to God.”
Davila argued that only the predestined are able to hear Jesus’ words:
in other words, the ability to hear comes after God’s PP has been bestowed.
Lessius replied that if that was the case, why did Jesus reproach the
Pharisees in this chapter for not heeding God’s message, since it was not up
to them to be predestined (since this depends entirely on God’s good
42
Ibid., 470.
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pleasure)? According to the same logic, they could not conceivably feel
attracted to God, since only PP produces such feelings! However, the
Council of Trent taught the opposite in Session VI, chapter 13: “For God,
unless men themselves fail in his grace, as he has begun a good work, so
will he perfect it, working to will and to accomplish.”
Lessius says that it was in the Pharisees’ power to avail themselves of
God’s prevenient grace and to become Jesus’ followers: “I do not see what
use we have for PP in this context: if anything, such verse refutes rather
than upholds PP.”43 Augustine, in his Tractate on the Gospel of John 42, 13,
wrote:

But foreknowing those who should yet believe, them he called of God, because yet to
be born again of God by the adoption of regeneration. To these apply the words he
that is of God hears the words of God. But that which follows, ‘You therefore hear
them not, because you are not of God,’ was said to those who were not only corrupted
by sin (for this evil was common to all), but also foreknown as those who would not
believe with the faith that alone could deliver them from the bondage of sin. On this
account he foreknew that those to whom he so spoke would continue in that which
they derived from the devil, that is, in their sins, and would die in the impiety in
which they resembled him; and would not come to the regeneration wherein they
would be the children of God, that is, be born of the God by whom they were created
as men.

 Jn 3:27-29: “To this John replied, ‘A person can receive only what is given
them from heaven.’ You yourselves can testify that I said, ‘I am not the
Messiah but am sent ahead of him.’ The bride belongs to the bridegroom.
The friend who attends the bridegroom waits and listens for him, and is full
of joy when he hears the bridegroom’s voice.”
In Davila’s view this verse refutes the idea that a person, on account of
her innate freedom alone, can agree to grace’s promptings and prepare
herself to receive it.
On the contrary, Lessius repeated what he said earlier: Molina never
said that free will alone can accomplish that. What Jesuits have always been
saying is that man, out of his innate freedom, can consent to divine grace,
though not without the help of said grace: they only deny that such help
predetermines the will to consent!

 Is 46: 9, 10: “I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is none
like me. My purpose will stand, and I will do all that I please.”

43
Ibid., 471.
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Davila uses this verse to argue that one’s justification and salvation are
established and accomplished infallibly and unavoidably by God through
his absolute will. Thus, it is not up to my free will alone to bring this about,
or to resist God’s plan; moreover, if it was up to a man to be converted or
not, what are we to make of God’s purpose? Lastly, how could God predict
and be in control of the choices of his creatures, if he is not the one calling
the shots?
First, Lessius replies that the Dominican use of the term “alone” is
misleading and false. Secondly, to deny the role of free will implies that
salvation and justification are brought about by an irresistible grace;
however, such view is rejected by other biblical texts and conciliar decrees.
Thirdly, how can God know the future infallibly in the absence of PP?
Easily, through his foreknowledge of conditional futuribles (i.e., middle
knowledge), by which he foresees that through the bestowal of congruous
grace at a very specific moment a person will respond favorably if
stimulated, encouraged, attracted. Thus, it is wrong to say a man will
inevitably convert (for that excludes human free will), but it is right to say
he will infallibly convert (because God cannot be mistaken about what will
happen).

 2 Cor 3: 4: “Not that we are competent in ourselves to claim anything for

ourselves, but our competence comes from God;” Jn 15: 5: “Apart from me
you can do nothing;” 1 Cor 12: 3: “No one can say, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ except
by the Holy Spirit.”
Davila appealed to these verses to shore up PP; conversely, Lessius
retorts that all these verse manage to do is to uphold sufficient grace, for
which Davila has no use, as he replaced it with efficacious grace alone.

 Song of Songs 1: 3: “Draw me to you! We are attracted by the fragrance of

your perfume.”
Davila suggests that the verb “draw” suggests God’s powerful
operation on our wills; it is not the other way around, namely that God is
drawn to us on account of our prior good deeds.44
Lessius replies by saying that to say that only those who are drawn to
God by means of PP can come to him goes against sana doctrina. How can
we exercise free will in the process of following God if we are forcefully

44
Calvinist scholar D.A. Carson, in his Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical
Perspective in Tension (2002) expounded at length the meaning of Jn 6:44 (“No one can come to
me unless the Father who sent me draw him”), where the verb “to draw” implies irresistible
grace.
 154

drawn? Thus, the expression “free” is only a sound and devoid of real
meaning (sine mente sonus).45 Lessius says that our being drawn is caused by
the powers of our nature together with grace, which elevates them to the
supernatural order (non tamen solis naturae viribus liberum arbitrium est illius
causa, sed una cum viribus gratiae, sicut vicissim gratia est causa cur opus sit
supernaturale).46

 Rom 9:16: “So then it does not depend on the man who wills or the man
who runs, but on God who has mercy.”
Lessius remarks that while it is wrong to say that we attract God’s
grace before he attracts us, there is nothing wrong in saying that after he
attracts us somehow we attract it as well, in order that it may help us
further. Lessius claims that when Anselm wrote: “Therefore, just as no one
receives uprightness except by means of grace preceding, so no one keeps
uprightness except by means of this same grace following” (De Concordia
III, 4), he did not wish to deny that man’s natural powers are a partial and
less important cause of our salvation, but rather wanted to affirm that grace
is the main one (though not the only one). Moreover, Anselm did not deny
the cooperation between the two causes, and that human free will has the
ability to reject God’s grace (unlike what Calvin said). According to
Lessius, the following statement by Anselm, if read correctly, refutes the
concept of PP:

If the points which have been made are considered carefully, one recognizes clearly
that when Sacred Scripture says something in favor of grace, it does not completely
do away with free choice; and when it speaks in favor of free choice, it does not
exclude grace. The case is not as if grace alone or free choice alone sufficed to save a
man (as it seems to those who are the cause of the present controversy). Indeed, the
divine sayings ought to be construed in such way that, with the exception of what I
said about infants, neither grace alone nor free choice alone accomplishes man's
salvation. Indeed, when the Lord says: “Without me you can do nothing,” what he
means is not “Your free choice is of no avail to you,” but “It is of no avail without my
grace.” And when we read “It is not of him who wills or of him who runs but is of
God, who shows mercy,” Scripture is not denying that free choice is of some use in
the case of one who wills or runs; rather, it is indicating that the fact that he wills and
the fact that he runs have to be credited to grace rather than to free choice. For when
Scripture says “It is not of him who wills or of him who runs,” we must supply: “The
fact that he wills and the fact that he runs.” The case is like someone's giving clothes
to a naked person to whom he owes nothing and who by himself is unable to obtain a
garment. Although the naked person has the ability to use and not to use the clothing
he has received, still if he does use it, the fact that he is clothed must be credited not

45
De gratia, 472.
46
Idem.
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to him but to the one who gave him clothes. Therefore, we can speak as follows: “The
fact that he is clothed is not of the one who is clothed but is of the one who shows
mercy—i.e., of the one who gives the clothing.” Much more would this be said if the
one who gave the clothing had also given the ability to keep it and to use it—as when
God gives to a man the oft-mentioned uprightness, he also gives the ability to keep
and to use it, because he first gave the free choice for keeping and using uprightness
(De Concordia III, 5).

Pelagius said that human free will is the sole cause of our salvation;
Calvin said God’s grace is. According to Lessius, we must keep the middle-
of-the-road approach (tenenda igitur via media) and claim that both free will
and God’s grace together make up the entire cause of our salvation.47
However, we should not think that each plays a 50% role in the process of
salvation (as if human free will is responsible for half of the phases of the
salvation process, while grace takes up the other half); rather in each of the
phases of salvation, both exercise100% influence simultaneously, like two men
pulling a boat in a river. Therefore, it does not follow that if we say that
grace is a partial cause we must conclude that it does not lend strength to
free will. Lessius concludes: “In fact, a partial cause does not only consist of
a helping support which is partially concurring (as in the example of two
men pulling a boat), but also of the partial powers of that support, in other
words, of the natural powers of free will and the powers of supernatural
grace.”48

 Pr 21: 1: “The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water:
he turns it whithersoever he will.”
Lessius refers his readers to his previous response to Davila’s use of Is
5:4.

In Chapter Seventeen Lessius reviewed a few more biblical texts used by

Dominicans.

 Gen 17:5: “For I have made you a father of many nations.” About this verse,
Paul wrote: “Therefore, the promise comes by faith, so that it may be by
grace” (Rom 4:16). Commenting on these verses, Augustine wrote:
“Therefore it is of faith, that the promise, according to grace, might be
established to all the seed (Rom 4:16). He promised not from the power of
our will but from His own predestination” (The Predestination of the
Saints10, 19). And Aquinas added: “And that is what he says, in order that

47
Ibid., 474.
48
Idem.
 156

the promise may be guaranteed and rest not on actions, which can fall
short, but on grace, which is infallible.”49
Davila suggested that these texts clearly show that God does not wait
for man’s will to make a choice, but rather that he fulfils in them what he
himself promised.
Lessius points out that all Augustine wanted to say was that men do
not have power in themselves (without the assistance of grace) to attain
faith: “He promised not from the power of our will but from his own
predestination. For he promised what he himself would do, not what men
would do… Otherwise the fulfilment of God's promises would not be in the
power of God, but in that of men; and thus what was promised by God to
Abraham would be given to Abraham by men themselves.”
Lessius agrees that the cause of God’s calling and fulfillment of the
promise he made to Abraham in and of itself does not depend in any way on
man’s will. However, that such promise would be fulfilled in man’s good
works depends on man’s free will adequately prepared by divine grace.
Thus, Lessius rejects Davila’s conclusion according to which God does not
wait for man’s will as it was prepared by God’s sufficient grace, but that he
acts in absolute and arbitrary manner before any foreknowledge of man’s
cooperation. He also adds that such view precludes free will: “I cannot
reasonably see how this view does not destroy free will.”50

 Jn 15:5: “Apart from me you can do nothing;” Jn 15:16: “You did not choose
me, but I chose you and appointed you so that you might go and bear fruit;
Is 26: 12: “All that we have accomplished you have done for us;” 1 Cor 4:7:
“For who makes you different from anyone else? What do you have that
you did not receive?
Lessius denies ever suggesting that man can hope, pray or believe
without any divine help, and agrees that man’s mind is enlightened by it
and that his will is drawn by a real and even physical disposition; what he
denies, however, is that man is predetermined and unable to resist God’s
grace, the way Davila would have it. Lessius agrees that man performs
good deeds, though not through the mere powers of nature, but rather
through the strength of prevenient grace which helps him in a moral way,
both in an accompanying and in a physical manner. In regard to 1 Cor 4:7,
he claims that no man can boast in himself.

49
See Aquinas Study Bible, Commentary on Romans 4, lect. 360.
50
I had to refer to Lessius’ first edition of De gratia, p. 191, since the second edition’s pages
were not properly digitized by Google.
 157

Lessius proposes the following analogy: if two paupers are offered help
and one accepts it while the other refuses it, it does NOT follow that the
one who accepts it can boast in his merits or in his ingeniousness: rather he
should boast in the generosity and goodness of the donor.
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Chapter 4
CONCILIAR STATEMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PP

In Chapter Seven Lessius introduces five conciliar statements he regards as

incompatible with PP.
Orange II, canon 25: “According to the Catholic faith we also believe that after
grace has been received through baptism, all baptized persons have the ability and
responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully, to perform with the aid and
cooperation of Christ what is of essential importance in regard to the salvation of
their soul.”
According to Lessius, the Council is teaching here that the power of laboring
in works of justice is up to a man’s desire, rather than PP, efficacious in and of
itself, is required for the performance of each and every single good work;
otherwise, how could we explain the words of the council that “all the baptized”
have it in their power (i.e., “if they desire”) to perform works that lead to
salvation, if indeed only those who have received PP can do so, namely certain
persons who have been predestined according to God’s good will and pleasure?

Council of Trent, VI, chapter 13: “Let no one promise himself herein something
as certain with an absolute certainty, though all ought to place and repose the
firmest hope in God's help.
For God, unless men themselves fail in his grace, as he has begun a good work, so
will he perfect it, working in us to will and to accomplish.”
Lessius says that according to his Dominican opponents, every single good
act has to be determined by God’s PP: but if God reserves to bestow faith and a
life of sanctification only on some people, why does the Council say that “all”
must “place and repose the firmest hope in God’s help?” Also, how can I place
such hope if I am not sure that God’s PP has been bestowed on me? Moreover,
how is it possible for us to “fail in his grace” if PP has been prepared for us?
Conversely, how can we avoid “failing in his grace” if PP has not been prepared
for us?
Lessius says: “I honestly don’t see how any of these conciliar statements can
be explained or even make sense if one reads them through the lenses of PP. On
the contrary, if one adopts our [i.e., the Jesuits’] perspective, they will be easily
understood.”51 In other words: it is up to us to accept or reject God’s grace,
thereby making it infallible; moreover, God will do his part in operating in us the
willingness and the ability to accomplish good deeds, and as long as we do not
put impediments to him we will absolutely and easily be saved.

51
De gratia, 447.
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Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 11: “No one should use that rash statement,
once forbidden by the Fathers under anathema, that the observance of the
commandments of God is impossible for one that is justified. For God does not
command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you to do what you can
and to pray for what you cannot, and aids you that you may be able.”
Lessius points out that this conciliar statement cannot be harmonized with
belief that PP is necessary for every single good act, since according to it only
those who have been predestined and pre-determined can fulfil God’s
commandments, while those who have not, will not be able to.
Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 11: “For God does not forsake those who
have been once justified by his grace, unless he be first forsaken by them.”
Supporters of PP claim that God does not abandon sinners because or after
foreseeing that they will abandon him; rather, they claim he decides not to bestow
PP before and regardless his foreknowledge that some people will abandon him.
Moreover, “to abandon” is the same as to subtract or refuse to give PP: but if
some people were not given PP, how can they resist temptations, and how is it
their fault if they cannot? Thus, PP contradicts this conciliar statement.

Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 5: “While God touches the heart of man
through the illumination of the Holy Ghost, man himself neither does absolutely
nothing while receiving that inspiration, since he can also reject it…”
Therefore, concludes Lessius, to consent to the Spirit’s action we do not need
an extra dose of grace, or PP. On the contrary, according to supporters of PP, the
illumination or inspiration of the Holy Spirit is not PP, nor does it contain all the
grace that is needed to elicit man’s consent. Thus, this view contradicts the
conciliar statement.
Trent also claimed in canon 4 that “If anyone says that man's free will moved
and aroused by God, by assenting to God's call and action, in no way cooperates
toward disposing and preparing itself to obtain the grace of justification, that it
cannot refuse its assent if it wishes, but that, as something inanimate, it does
nothing whatever and is merely passive, let him be anathema.” Two views were
condemned by this canon: Luther’s, who claimed that man’s will does not
cooperate with God in the process of conversion, but rather remains passive; and
Calvin’s, who claimed that the will cooperates somewhat, but is so moved by God
as not to be able to dissent. How does PP differ from Calvin’s view, Lessius
wonders, if man cannot resist God’s prevenient grace?
Dominican supporters of PP claim that man cannot dissent in sensu composito,
though he can in sensu diviso. This explanation will not do, claims Lessius, and he
presents three reasons for it:
FIRST, Calvin too claimed that if grace is present or put into place (the
equivalent of PP) man’s will cannot dissent. Calvin spoke in sensu composito, and
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this view was condemned by Trent (and, indirectly, the Dominican view of PP
was too)! Why is Lessius persuaded that Calvin meant this in sensu composito?
First, because Calvin denied it is in our power to oppose God’s efficacious motion.
Second, when he said “This movement of the will [i.e., the way envisioned by
Calvin] is not of that description which was for many ages taught and believed,
namely a movement which thereafter leaves us the choice to obey or resist it, but
one which affects us efficaciously,” Lessius’ conclusion is that the Jesuits’ view is
not an innovation, but rather an old and well established one, as it was promoted
by the Fathers (among whom Chrysostom); moreover, since Calvin rejected the
sensu diviso endorsed by the Fathers, he could not but have had sensu composito in
mind.
SECOND, the Council of Trent had the sensu composito in mind when it said:
“If anyone says that man's free will moved and aroused by God, cannot refuse its
assent if it so wishes, let them be anathema!” In fact, the idea that free will is
moved and aroused by God, evokes the notion of PP.
THIRD, nobody ever said that the human will moved by God cannot dissent
after that motion ceases. In other words, the church believed that the will can
oppose resistance while God’s grace is present and moving a man’s will; how
could we think differently? In Lessius’ words: “I have often been amazed that
some learned man would reach the conclusion that this was the view of the
Council [i.e., endorsing the idea that God’s will cannot be resisted in sensu
composito]. But maybe they never fully considered the inconvenient conclusions
that stem from this conciliar statement.”52
Lessius suggests that some supporters of PP, recognizing that the distinction
between the two senses cannot be correctly applied to the words of the Council,
nor conveniently explain its canons and statements, came up with a new
subterfuge. They claim that “free will” does not merely contain the will, but the
mind as well; accordingly, when the Council says that “free will can agree with or
resist divine grace,” they say that this means that the mind agrees with divine
grace’s calling and prevenient activity, insofar as this grace sheds light and
persuades it, though the will, as it is not yet inclined by God, can resist grace’s
persuasive illumination.
However, Lessius claims that these theologians are still wrong. The error to
which the council reacted is not that the intellect cannot oppose the activity of
persuasive grace, but that the will cannot dissent. What the Council rejected was
the heretical views denying the will’s flexibility once divine motion is in place.
Thus, it is not true that the council was talking about the will in a suspended
state, or not yet inclined, because it expressly talked about the will motum et
excitatum. Thus, Lessius wonders:

52
Ibid., 448.
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If the Council of Trent did not mean to uphold anything else other than that the will not yet
inclined can dissent from the persuasion of the mind, what view is it condemning here,
considering that no one ever claimed the contrary? What heretic has ever taught that the
persuasion of the mind imposes a certain necessity of consent to the will which is not yet
inclined to a choice, so that the will find itself unable to dissent? Certainly, no one thought
this to be the case, for they say that what necessitates the will is not the persuasion of the
mind, but the efficacious grace of God, which moves the will, not the mind, as we can clearly
read in Calvin’s work.53

Having introduced conciliar statements that he regarded to be incompatible

with PP, in Chapter Twelve (again, I am skipping ahead in his book in order to
stay on topic) Lessius deconstructs eleven conciliar passages used by Davila to
uphold PP. According to Lessius, just as the biblical quotes used by his
Dominican opponent rather than upholding PP can only be brought in support of
the idea that without the help of prevenient grace we are utterly unable to attain
salvation, likewise the conciliar texts Davila employed fail to shore up PP.
Davila was adamant that Molina and other Jesuit theologians were following
in the footsteps of Semipelagians: he claimed that Semipelagians erred because
they denied that without PP men can want and are able to do what is good
(Lessius reminds his readers that he disposed of that claim in Chapter Ten).
However, according to Lessius, Davila is greatly mistaken, since the Church has
always taught that God, after doing all that he wanted and could do, leaves us
absolutely free to obey or disobey, to follow or to resist his grace.54
The following are the conciliar texts used by Davila in his book:
Orange II, canon 4: “If anyone maintains that God awaits our will to be
cleansed from sin, but does not confess that even our will to be cleansed comes to
us through the infusion and working of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Holy Spirit
himself who says through Solomon, ‘The will is prepared by the Lord’(Prov. 8:35,
LXX), and the salutary word of the Apostle, ‘For God is at work in you, both to
will and to work for his good pleasure’ (Phil. 2:13).”
Davila used this canon to reject the view upheld by Jesuits that if two men
are given equal amounts of grace, and one is converted but the other is not, this is
to be attributed to their innate freedom and personal decision.
Lessius replies that if the canon is read through the lenses of PP (i.e., after
placing a sufficient illumination and calling into a man’s heart God still needs to
add an extra amount of grace, namely PP, to determine man’s will to consent), we
will have a hard time reconciling such view with verses like Is 5: 4, 5, 7: “What
more could have been done for my vineyard than I have done for it? When I

53
Idem.
54
Ibid., 475.
 162

looked for good grapes, why did it yield only bad?.. .And he looked for justice, but
saw bloodshed; for righteousness, but heard cries of distress;” and Is 30: 18: “Yet
the Lord longs to be gracious to you.” How could God be said “to await our will
to be cleanses from sin” if he himself makes us do that? Should not the conciliar
canon have said instead: “God requires our will to be cleansed,” since he alone
brings it entirely about? Lessius, like all Jesuits, is adamant that to deny PP does
not amount to endorse by default the Pelagian view, according to which such
desire to be cleansed from sin stems from the sheer natural powers of free will;
rather, the Jesuit view according to which the view that human free will aided by
God’s grace is able to produce a consent is perfectly anti-Pelagian and in
agreement with this canon. God, concludes Lessius, does this absolutely, but in no
other way than in dependence on human free will; it is up to us to either be
cleansed from sin or not. Lessius said “absolutely,” because it neither depends on
us that God would bestow his grace in this way or that way, nor because we are
able to prevent God from doing this.

Orange II, canon 6: “If anyone says that God has mercy upon us when, apart
from his grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask,
or knock, but does not confess that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the
Holy Spirit within us that we have the faith, the will, or the strength to do all
these things as we ought; or if anyone makes the assistance of grace depend on
the humility or obedience of man and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself
that we are obedient and humble, he contradicts the Apostle who says, ‘What
have you that you did not receive?’ (1 Cor. 4:7), and, ‘But by the grace of God I
am what I am’ (1 Cor. 15:10).”
Davila said that even though Jesuits admitted the necessity of grace, they
nonetheless subordinated it to human free will.
Lessius made two objections. First objection: we Jesuits do not say that
people can have these things without God’s grace, nor do we subordinate grace
per se to free will: what we subordinate, is the use of grace to free will. Second
objection: if this canon can be used against Jesuits in support of PP, it also
follows that:
1) Davila contradicts the Apostle, since the canon says that after the infusion
of the Holy Spirit (i.e., sufficient grace), and not because of PP, man can do
all these things.
2) When someone does something through sufficient grace, without PP,
he/she does not perform anything of salvific value, nor is any of his/her
works of divine origin; however, such conclusion runs contrary to what the
canon says.
3) Since Davila does not believe that “the infusion and inspiration of the Holy
Spirit” are PP, but that PP is an additional help given by God to some
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people, we must conclude from this canon (which does not mention PP)
that the help of PP grace is subordinated to human humility and obedience;
4) in which case, such consent or work is not the gift of grace;
5) this man has something he did not receive;
6) he is not what he is by virtue of grace;
7) grace follows rather than precedes him;
8) in such a man, nature comes first, predetermining grace second;
9) and thus, the ability to knock is not given by God;
10)man’s will to do any of these things is self-produced.
Orange II, canon 7: “If anyone affirms that we can form any right opinion or
make any right choice which relates to the salvation of eternal life, as is expedient
for us, or that we can be saved, that is, assent to the preaching of the gospel
through our natural powers without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy
Spirit, who makes all men gladly assent to and believe in the truth, he is led
astray by a heretical spirit.”
The Dominican theologian accuses Jesuits of following a heretical spirit
because they say that in the absence of PP man can make a choice to follow God’s
grace out of his innate freedom.
Lessius replies that this charge is unfounded: Jesuits do not believe that man
can make choices that lead to salvation through the mere powers of nature, but
only through prevenient, sufficient grace coming to the aid of his natural innate
freedom of choice. Jesuits have never defended the opposite view, which was also
explicitly stigmatized by Molina in more than ten places in his Concordia. Thus,
when reading this canon, Jesuits would rather conclude: “If anyone denies that
man is able to think or choose something good through sufficient grace and in the
absence of PP, is led astray by a heretical spirit.”

Orange II, canon 9: “Concerning the help of God. It is a mark of divine favor
when we are of a right purpose and keep our feet from hypocrisy and
unrighteousness; for as often as we do good, God is at work in us and with us, in
order that we may do so.”
Why does Davila insist, asks Lessius, on claiming that this canon opposes the
Jesuits’ view? Jesuits have never said that man can be converted out of their
innate freedom alone. To deny that conversion happens because of PP, does not
amount to say that conversion happens only because of man’s innate freedom!55

Orange II, canon 13: “Concerning the restoration of free will. The freedom of
will that was weakened in the first man can be revived only by the grace of
baptism, for what is lost can be returned only by the one who was able to give it.

55
Ibid., 476.
 164

Hence the Truth itself declares: ‘So if the Son makes you free, you will be free
indeed’ (John 8:36).”
Lessius’ Dominican opponent argued that since the canon says that human
free will was infirmatum (i.e., weakened) through the Fall, it remains weak and ill;
therefore, it cannot do on its own what a healthy will would be able to do, unless
it is first healed and strengthened by God, which is what PP is all about.
Lessius replies that in this canon there is no indirect mention whatsoever of
PP: the canon simply says that without grace man cannot be justified; thus, it can
only be used against Pelagians. Davila assumes that efficacious grace is required
to strengthen our weakened free will. However, Lessius argues, since according
to this canon freedom of the will is revived through the grace of baptism, that is,
through one general sufficient grace, why does he postulate the need for a new grace
(i.e., PP) for each and every specific good choice or work we do?

Orange II, canons 14, 15, 18, 20, 23. Davila employs all these canons to make
the same point, namely that sufficient grace is not really sufficient; that PP, which
is not in the power of man to elicit, is required to do anything good.
Lessius says that if anything, Canon 23 contradicts PP, since it claims that
“Men do their own will and not the will of God when they do what displeases
him;” however, according to PP, everything men do is performed through it!

Orange II, canon 24: “Concerning the branches of the vine. The branches on
the vine do not give life to the vine, but receive life from it; thus the vine is related
to its branches in such a way that it supplies them with what they need to live,
and does not take this from them. Thus it is to the advantage of the disciples, not
Christ, both to have Christ abiding in them and to abide in Christ. For if the vine
is cut down another can shoot up from the live root; but one who is cut off from
the vine cannot live without the root (John 15:5ff).”
Davila argued that a) Jesuits say that sufficient grace comes first only in
ratione entis but not in ratione causae, meaning, it does not cause/make the will to
be predetermined to move/choose in the way God wants it to; from this it follows
that; b) free will comes before and causes grace to be bestowed; and c) grace
awaits for man’s consent to become efficacious.
Lessius’ response is articulated in several steps. First of all, he says, those
who believe what Davila claims usually distinguish between pre-moving and
prevenient grace, even though this prevenient grace is the divine motion itself,
moving and inclining the will to operate. These people, however, admit that this
grace does not cause in the human will any motion that is distinct from itself,
through which human consent takes place, or through which the will is
determined to consent before nature rather than itself may concur to produce
such consent. In fact, if grace must cause in the will something distinct from itself
 165

by which the will is predetermined to operate, it follows that TWO

determinations are necessarily found in the will, naturally preceding the
operation of the human will itself, namely efficacious grace and the motion that
this grace causes in the human will, so that it may operate.
If Davila says that this motion is not different than the act of the human will,
how can it possibly precede the operation of the will? How is the will pre-moved
to operate through it? The idea of “pre-moving” means to be moved before the
nature which is pre-moved, and therefore it is different than this operation, and
also as the product of this operation. For to produce an operation is not prior to
operating, since to operate is nothing else than to produce an operation, and to
produce in a life-giving way is to produce a life-giving operation in itself. But this
motion is unnecessary and totally imaginary, when efficacious grace is a certain
motion through which the will is moved formally and compelled to act. In the
same way, it is not necessary for sufficient grace to cause in the will any motion
distinct from itself, by which the will is moved before nature, which it leads to
consent, since of its own nature it moves, draws and strengthens the will to give
its consent, all the while leaving the will able to resist such pull (which is
necessary to safeguard human freedom).
Therefore, it is false to claim that Jesuits uphold a sufficient grace that
precedes the willing of the human will only in ratione entis but not in ratione
causae, because even before the human will begins to will, sufficient grace
encourages, urges on and bestows powers to the human will, so that it may elicit
its consent. Though it is God’s grace that elicits that consent, it also cooperates
with human free will as a partial, and of course, main cause. This grace acts as a
moral cause, and when the human will consents to it, it makes this grace
efficacious, turning the action it produces into a supernatural, salvific one.
It is also false to claim that according to Jesuits our free will comes before
grace, in that it causes our will to act, since Jesuits teach that free will does not
operate what is good other than by being strengthened by grace and
simultaneously cooperating with it.
According to Davila’s misleading view, grace must precede human free will’s
wanting to do something by causing it to do it; therefore, to cause something in
an effective way must precede the will’s choice: this is how he ends up placing two
determinations in the human will, which are by nature prior to the willing itself.
Davila uses the example of babies who are baptized before dying and are
saved without any cooperation of free will on their part: just as Prosper had
denied that they received the grace of baptism and were therefore saved on the
basis of the foreseen merits they would have acquired, had they lived longer, so
does Davila deny that our free will can choose to abide in God other than by PP.
Lessius wonders what is the point of making this observation, since, once again,
 166

Jesuits deny that grace is conferred because of the foreseen good use of free will
apart from grace?

Council of Sens (1528), Preface: “If someone is to approach God, it is necessary

to believe that he must first receive the help of God’s grace. Then, in regard to
good works, we must understand that both free will and grace play a role in their
performance, though grace plays the first and main one. It is Pelagian to say that
man does what is right and achieves salvation without grace; or to attribute to
human free will the main role in the performance of good works rather than to
grace.”
Lessius agrees with this conciliar statement, since Jesuits do indeed uphold
the primacy and priority of grace; what they do not agree with, is the view that
grace has the primacy insofar as it predetermines the will to move and to do good
works before the concurrence of free will. Lessius says that there are many
statements in this council’s decree, opposing the idea of PP. For instance, in
Decree 15, On Free Will, we read that we can resist God’s drawing us to himself;
that we can receive God’s grace in vain; that God’s grace does not necessitate the
human will; and that we can prepare ourselves to be converted, to receive God’s
grace with the assistance of God’s (sufficient) grace.56

Council of Milevis, canon 4. There is nothing in this canon upholding the need
of grace in order to be informed about God’s will and laws, about what we ought
to do and to love, that can be used to back up PP and refute the Jesuits’ views.
However, Lessius says, Davila’s inferred conclusion is that there is no need
for sufficient grace, but only for efficacious grace.

The Enchiridion of the Council of Cologne, in a chapter devoted to the

Sacrament of Penance, said: “Grace can be distinguished into operating and
cooperating grace, or in prevenient and subsequent grace. Both of them are found
in Scriptures. It is the work of prevenient grace to prepare the will to do good
things and to free it from its slavery to sin, and the work of subsequent grace to
keep it steady on course. The human will does not naturally have these abilities,
but thanks to grace it is able to accomplish God’s will, as Paul said in his letters,
which heretics (i.e., Lutherans) misinterpret according to their impiety.”
Davila remarked that it is not the case that God has mercy on us because we
strive to do his will, but rather the other way around: we strive to do his will
because in his mercy he bestows his grace on us.
Lessius remarked that he could not agree more, and added that the
Enchiridion provides several statements that can be used to refute PP. PP cannot

56
Decreta provincialis Concilii Senonensis 1528 (Paris, 1532), ciii.
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be properly called “cooperating grace,” but only “operating grace,” or better yet
“pre-operating,” since it produces a consent before our natural will does. Likewise,
since it works in such a way that the will cannot resist, it cannot be called
“helping grace,” for how does it really “help” the will, considering it does
everything before the will has a chance to cooperate, and whose operation does
not depend in any way on our will?57 PP cannot even be said “to prepare” the will
to consent, since it automatically produces that consent independently from the
will’s concurrence. Moreover, if PP is necessary, Lutherans are right after all,
since grace does everything without any role for human free will, and without any
possibility for the will to resist.

Synod of Mentz (1549), chapter 7: “The beginning of this justification comes

from the grace of God. In virtue this grace, before any merit on our part, while
they were still enemies of God and sinners, those who are excited and helped by
his grace, as they consent and cooperate with it, are disposed to receive
justification.”
Lessius argues that this statement actually supports the Jesuits’ view since it
claims that the same exciting grace is cooperating with and helping us to produce
a consent of the will; however, those who support PP have to deny that this
exciting grace is the grace that prepares the consent, since they attribute that role
to predetermining grace; thus, to help and cooperate cannot be properly
attributed to predetermining grace.

Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 3: “If anyone says that without the
predisposing inspiration of the Holy Ghost and without his help, man can believe,
hope, love or be repentant as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be
bestowed upon him, let him be anathema.”
Lessius says: who among us has ever said the contrary? Just because we
reject PP does not mean that we claim that justification can be attained by the
unaided powers of nature. If sufficient grace needs an extra dose of grace (i.e.,
PP), why in the world do we call it “sufficient”?

57
Ibid., 478.
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Chapter 5

REFUTATION OF PP BASED ON THE WRITINGS OF THE FATHERS

AND SCHOLASTICS

In Chapter Eight Lessius attempts to refute PP by utilizing the views of the

Fathers and some recent Scholastics. After quoting Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen
and Basil he focuses on seven texts by Augustine, who, according to him, never
promoted the notion of grace predetermining the human will, but rather the
notions of persuasive and congruous grace.

 To Simplician: On various Questions I, 2.10: “Esau did not want and did not
run: but had he wanted to, and had he run instead, he would have arrived
with the help of God, who, by calling him, would have given him both the
will and the ability to run, unless, by refusing his calling, he would have
proven himself to be worthy of condemnation. In fact, God bestows the will
in one way, and in another way what we asked of him. For he wanted our
willing to be both his and our work: his work, by calling us; ours, by
following his call. Only God bestows what we have asked for, namely to
operate what is good and to be eternally happy.”
Lessius remarks that had Augustine envisioned a prevenient motion
predetermining the will and different than God’s calling, he would not have
said: “his work, by calling us; ours, by following his call,” but rather: “his
work by determining us; ours by following his predetermination.”
 To Simplician: On Various Questions I, 2.12: “If we asked whether our good
will is a gift of God, it would be strange indeed if anybody dared to
question that. Now, since our good will does not precede the calling, but
rather the other way around, we therefore rightly attribute to God our
good will, though we cannot attribute to ourselves the fact that we were
called… But if this calling is the cause of our good will, so that any person
called may follow it, how true then is Jesus’ saying: ‘Many are called, but
few are the elect’ (Mt 20, 16; 22, 14).”
Lessius says that Augustine had in mind congruous calling rather than
a predetermining efficient grace when he wrote: “Thus, even though many
were called in only one way, however, since not everybody has been
touched [by grace] in the same way, the only ones who will follow the
calling are those who have been judged fit to receive it.” (I, 2.13).
 On the Spirit and the Letter 34, 60: “Let the objector, however, attentively
observe that this will is to be ascribed to the divine gift, not merely because
it arises from our free will, which was created naturally with us; but also
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because God acts upon us by the incentives of our perceptions, to will and
to believe… Since God, therefore, in such ways acts upon the reasonable
soul in order that it may believe in Him (and certainly there is no ability
whatever in free will to believe, unless there be persuasion or summons
towards someone in whom to believe), it surely follows that it is God who
both works in man the willing to believe, and in all things prevents us with
His mercy. To yield our consent, indeed, to God's summons, or to withhold
it, is (as I have said) the function of our own will.”
Lessius emphasized the last sentence: “To yield our consent, indeed, to
God's summons, or to withhold it, is (as I have said) the function of our
own will” to drive home the point that God leaves it to our will’s power of
indifference whether to follow his calling or not.58
 De diversis queastionibus octoginta tribus q. 68: “In regard to that banquet that
the Lord said was prepared in which not all who were invited wanted to
come; those who came could not have come unless they were first invited.
Thus, they should not credit themselves for having been invited, because
they responded to the invitation; nor should those who neglected to come
blame anyone but themselves, because it was up to their free decision to
come or not. Thus, the calling precedes the will before any merit on our
part. Therefore, even though some may be given credit for responding to
the call, they cannot be credited for originating the invitation itself.”
According to Lessius this text shows that there is no need for PP, since
it is up to our wills to respond to God’s grace or not.
 The Gift of Perseverance 14.35: “But where are the rest left by the righteous
divine judgment except in the mass of ruin, where the Tyrians and the
Sidonians were left? Who, moreover, might have believed if they had seen
Christ’s wonderful miracles. But since it was not given to them to believe,
the means of believing also were denied them. From which fact it appears
that some have in their understanding itself a naturally divine gift of
intelligence, by which they may be moved to the faith, if they either hear
the words or behold the signs congruous to their minds.”
Congruous grace: that’s where it’s at, claims Lessius! Given the same
grace one person converts, but another does not. Why? Because it is up to
man’s free will!
 The City of God XII, 6: “If two men are tempted equally and one yields and
consents to the temptation while the other remains unmoved by it, what
other account can we give of the matter than this, that the one is willing,
the other unwilling, to fall away from chastity? And what causes this but
their own wills, in cases at least such as we are supposing, where the

58
Ibid., 451.
 170

temperament is identical? The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes
of both; the same secret temptation pressed on both with equal violence.
However minutely we examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing
which caused the will of the one to be evil. For if we say that the man
himself made his will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil
but a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good? Here are two
men who, before the temptation, were alike in body and soul, and of whom
one yielded to the tempter who persuaded him, while the other could not be
persuaded to desire that lovely body which was equally before the eyes of
both.”
Lessius says that had Augustine upheld PP, he would have said that
one man received it while the other did not: however, no such statement is
found in Augustine’s text.
 De dogmatibus ecclesiasticis, 21: “We are left to ponder the state of our free
will, which is to say our rational will, keeping in mind that God first
admonishes us and invites us to salvation. That we may choose and follow
him, happens under his inspiration…The beginning of our salvation lies in
God’s decision to be merciful to us; whether we acquiesce or not to the
inspiration issuing from him, is in our power.”59

After presenting these texts Lessius draws the following conclusions:

1) Augustine did not uphold any prevenient motion, predetermining the
human will.
2) According to Augustine, operating and prevenient grace is nothing but
holy calling.
3) The efficacious grace by which God operates in us the willing is nothing
else but congruous vocation.
4) Given the same grace, one person converts and another does not.

Lessius goes on to quote Prosper’s The Call of All Nations II, 26:

In every justification grace is the outstanding factor, while the human will is a secondary
one, united with grace and co-operating with God working in man; grace prepares the will
for this co-operation. We believe and we know from experience that this abundant grace
acts in man as a powerful influence; but in our opinion this influence is not such as to be
over-powering, to the extent that whatever transpires in men's salvation is achieved by
God's will alone; for already in the case of children it is the assent of another man's will
that is the medium for them to be relieved of their affliction. The special grace of God is
certainly the more prominent factor in every justification. It urges on with exhortations,
moves by examples, inspires fear from dangers, rouses with miracles, gives understanding,
59
Idem. Lessius did not know at that time that this work was not Augustine’s but rather
Gennadius’, a Semipelagian priest and theologian who died in 496.
 171

inspires counsel, illumines the heart itself and inspires it with the aspirations of the faith.
But man's will is also associated with grace as a secondary factor. For it is roused by the
above-mentioned aids in order that it may co-operate with God's work which is being
accomplished in man, and that it may begin to practice and gain merit from that for which
the divine seed inspires the effective desire. Thus its eventual failure is due to its own
fickleness; but its success is due to the help of grace. This help is given in countless ways,
some of which are hidden, and others are easily discernible. If many refuse this help, it is
only their malice that is the cause. If many accept it, then this is due to both divine grace
and their human will.

Lessius also quoted from Scholastic authors Driedo, Ruardus and Peter
Cunerus, Bishop of Leeuwarden (1531-1580),60 who wrote two short treatises
attacking the notion of predetermining grace.

In Chapter Thirteen Lessius addresses fourteen patristic texts and

scholastics’ writings that appear to be supportive of PP (Davila used them in his
Chapter Thirteen). I will limit myself to quote the most significant ones.
In the third text, Davila quoted Augustine:

Therefore in what pertains to religion and piety (of which the apostle was speaking), if we
are not capable of thinking anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God, we are
certainly not capable of believing anything as of ourselves, since we cannot do this without
thinking; but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is of God. Wherefore, as no one is
sufficient for himself, for the beginning or the completion of any good work whatever—and
this those brethren of yours, as what you have written intimates, already agree to be true,
whence, as well in the beginning as in the carrying out of every good work, our sufficiency is
of God—so no one is sufficient for himself, either to begin or to perfect faith; but our
sufficiency is of God. Because if faith is not a matter of thought, it is of no account; and we
are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God.61

According to Lessius, “to begin” a good work, in this context, does not refer to
the act of beginning a good work before grace’s cooperation and assistance (which
is what Davila understood the Jesuits to be saying), but to conceive the intention
of a good work (e.g., to remain chaste; to do penance). “To begin or to perfect
faith” according to Semipelagians was up to us, without the need for grace.
Lessius asks how is such view attributed to Jesuits, who insist that our free will to
believe and to do what is good is only a partial cause in the total cause of such
actions?62

60
This unsavory character greatly persecuted Mennonites. Reytse Aysesz, an Anabaptist martyr,
was drowned under Cunerus’ governance of the diocese.
61
Augustine, The Perseverance of the Saints 2, 5.
62
De gratia, 480.
 172

In the fourth text, Davila quoted Augustine again (The Gift of Perseverance,
6):

Many hear the word of truth; but some believe, while others contradict.
Therefore, the former will to believe; the latter do not will. Who does not know
this? Who can deny this? But since in some the will is prepared by the Lord, in
others it is not prepared, we must assuredly be able to distinguish what comes
from God's mercy, and what from his judgment.

Lessius counters that Augustine was not talking about PP here, but rather
about congruous vocation (as in Ad Simplicianum I, 2, 2). In fact, PP does not
prepare the will so that it may believe, but the very instant in which it is placed in
a man, it establishes the will’s consent even before the will agrees to cooperate
with such irresistible grace. Thus, this text not only does not support PP, but it
strengthens the Jesuits’ view.
In the sixth text Davila quoted from the same Augustinian text: “Therefore
God chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world, predestinating us to
the adoption of children, not because we were going to be of ourselves holy and
immaculate, but he chose and predestinated us that we might be so” (The Gift of
Perseverance, 18).
Again, Lessius wonders how does this text support PP? Calvin too thought
that such passage upheld efficacious grace: but this amounts to misunderstand
Augustine!
In the ninth text, Davila quoted Prosper’s Against Cassian 3,1:

You fully agree neither with the heretics nor with the Catholics. The first held that in all
good works of men the initiative belongs to the free will; we believe that the beginning even
of good thoughts always come from God. You have invented some hybrid third system,
disagreeing with both parties, and so you neither find approval with our opponents nor keep
in one mind with us. Moreover, you do not see that, when you assert that men themselves
take the initiative of their good works and because of that they are given grace, you fall into
an error that was condemned and will-nilly appear to say that the grace of God is given in
answer to our merits.

Lessius agrees that God’s initiative always precedes our works and claims
that his view stands between the Pelagians’ and the Calvinists’ view: with
Pelagians he upholds freedom of the will and the absence of divinely imposed
necessity, and with the Calvinists he upholds that no salvific deed can be
performed without grace.
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Chapter 6

UNACCEPTABLE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES STEMMING FROM PP

In Chapter Nine Lessius exposes ten difficulties that arise as a consequence

of upholding PP.
First. If PP is required for a sinner’s conversion and for all good works, it
follows that no sufficient help is given other than efficacious help: however, such
view runs contrary to the teachings of our faith. Moreover, we must believe that
sufficient help is given to everyone (Orange II’s canon 25; and Trent VI, canon 13).
Second. No one can be converted, do what is good and be saved without PP.
Moreover, we cannot even use lesser helps to implore greater ones, such as good
inspirations and pious affections. Why? Because this help is reserved only for
some people, and not even by God’s foreknowledge, but by his absolute decree.
Third. No one can do any more good works than the set number allocated to
him/her by God through his PP, which disposes of when, where and how they
will carried out, even before any foreknowledge of how secondary causes will
work out (as Dominicans have made abundantly clear). What ever happened,
then, to that sufficient grace Dominicans admit is necessary and to which people
can oppose resistance?
Fourth. Observance of divine precepts is impossible for all the people who are
not aroused by efficacious grace: in order to observe these precepts, one would
need PP to be moved to fulfill them.
Fifth. Man sins in a damnable way even in that which he cannot avoid (a view
that was condemned by Popes Pius V and Gregory XIII). However, unless a
person received grace which is efficacious in itself and which determines him to
observe a moral precept and resist temptation, he will fail and fall; yet,
Dominicans say he is still responsible! God is therefore cruel to punish man for all
eternity for that which he could not avoid.
Sixth. God abandons a man before being abandoned by him by not supplying
him with necessary help.
Seventh. Man does not truly merit eternal life because unless he receives PP
he does not have in his power to do what is good; moreover, he never enjoys
indifference of choice (i.e., potens ad utrumlibet), which is the feature of authentic
freedom. However, we know from Trent VI, canon 4, that the consent of free will
to God’s calling and exciting it, is in the last disposition to the grace of
justification. In fact, man stimulated and strengthened by God’s grace must
dispose himself through his free actions to receive justification. The consent does
not issue from efficacious grace but from prevenient grace: if it depended on
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efficacious grace it would not be in man’s power, but it would be up to God to

first impart it.
Eight. God would give to all people useless prevenient helps if he decided not
to add efficacious grace as well. God would also have bestowed to humans useless
natural strength when he decided to also add his efficacious concurrence. Thus,
all precepts, exhortations and corrections would be given in vain, since no one
could heed them without efficacious grace.
Ninth. This PP is required either because a) it is regarded as stemming from
the First Cause; or b) because of the weakness of free will after the Fall; or c)
because of both. If a) then God’s necessary help applies not only to good works,
but to evil ones as well. If b), then Adam and the angels did not need it before
their respective Fall (though they did, indeed!). Also, why wouldn’t sufficient
grace (which does not determine the will) be enough to remedy this weakness? If
c) is the case, it un-necessarily multiplies the types of PP that is necessary to
perform good deeds.
Tenth. The champions of PP talk about it in an inconsistent manner: some,
who emphasize the weakness of free will after the Fall, say that it consists in the
performance of good works instilled in them; others say it consists of grace itself.

THE ERRORS INCURRED BY SEMIPELAGIANS

In Chapter Ten, Lessius forcefully argues that Molina’s view is neither

Pelagian nor Semipelagian, contrary to what the Dominicans are fond of claiming.
He then proceeds to identify the main doctrinal errors the “reliquiae Pelagianorum”
(i.e., the Provencal Semipelagians) were guilty of:
 They believed that human beings, by wanting, yearning and being willing
through the mere powers of nature to believe, to be justified and to be
saved do indeed deserve de congruo to be given an increase of faith and to be
justified.63 Cassian even said that “sometimes” free will anticipates grace.
 They believed that the initium fidei stems from us, and that grace follows
suit insofar as it is contingent upon human desire.
 They believed that free will has in itself the power to choose good, even
though it has been weakened by the Fall. In other words, God’s prevenient
grace consists in the nature of our free and rational ability to make choices.

In summary, the main tenet of Semipelagianism was that free will, in virtue of
the mere powers bestowed by God in nature, is able to begin any good work
whatsoever by wishing and yearning to do it. Such desire, conceived by human
powers, was able to procure ex congruo the grace to carry it out.
63
De gratia, 458.
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When Semipelagians claimed that the beginning of salvation comes from us,
they meant that we can deserve the gift of faith, or to come to believe, or to
conceive a serious desire to be saved by which we procure the grace of
justification, by believing without the help of God’s grace. However, though they
erred, it is still possible to say that to have a spiritual stirring (which does not
deserve anything from God) on the basis of mere human powers, such as the
desire to hear the preaching of the Gospel or the human wish to have faith, does
not go against our Catholic faith, nor it is a Pelagian view.
Also, to say that grace follows the prompting of the will does not mean that
free will naturally precedes grace in the performance of a supernatural work (a
claim which is not heretical), but that free will before receiving the help of grace
is able to carry out a good work on its own or to develop a positive
disposition/intention through which it deserves the gift of faith.
The damnable proposition “the help of grace joins with human obedience”
does not mean that the influence of grace is subject to free will (as Davila
presupposed in his condemnation), but to deserve and procure the help of grace
through the obedience stemming from mere natural powers. On the contrary,
grace joins with human freedom not because it predetermines it, in such a way
that the will cannot resists it, but because it precedes, excites and inclines it to do
what is good.
Lessius agrees that the human will is unable to strive properly and
sufficiently to attain the grace of justification as Trent VI, canon 3 states;
however, nothing forbids us to say that it is able to strive with an imperfect and
insufficient act. If people are able to uphold other religious beliefs, such as the
errors of the Koran and the Jewish Talmud, and Protestant heresies, thinking as
they do that such beliefs are probable and true, why can’t we also say that people
who are exposed to the preaching of the Gospel can be inclined to be sympathetic
to it and believe it with a merely human faith (fide quadam humana credere)?64 Free
will can, out of its mere natural strength, strive somewhat towards supernatural
objects, even though such striving is totally insufficient from a supernatural point
of view.
Davila claimed that free will cannot strive at all to perform supernatural
deeds unless it is preceded by divine grace; Lessius replied that it cannot strive as
it needs to (sicut oportet),65 though nothing in our faith prohibits us to say that it
strives in an imperfect and totally (omnino) insufficient manner.66 Lessius
reminded his readers that the denial of such view, upheld by Gregory of Rimini,
was condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII.

64
Ibid., 459.
65
See Trent VI, canon 3.
66
De gratia, 459.
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Again, it’s not that grace must be given for each individual good deed of ours:
rather, it exists in us as a “field of opportunities:” we should therefore not quarrel
about whether nature precedes grace, or vice versa, or whether they act
simultaneously. Lessius argues that the basic tenets to be upheld in this matter
are:
 Grace must precede free will to excite and strengthen it: free will cannot do
anything good without it.
 Grace does not cause such good work by producing it itself, unless it acts in
dependence on free will, so much so that it can block grace’s influence.
 Any good work done before the influence of God’s grace is not meritorious.
If a disagreement needs to exist between various schools of thought, it should
be concerning the “profundiores et difficiliores” parts of the doctrine of
predestination as mentioned in Pope Celestine’s Letter.67
Davila claimed incorrectly that Molina taught that free will naturally
operates a supernatural good deed before grace’s cooperation, and that therefore
he was guilty of Semipelagianism; on the contrary, Molina said that the efficacy of
God’s help resides in God as first act, but whether it is finally efficacious or not in
the secondary act depends on free will: to deny this amounts to taking away
freedom of choice. Moreover, when several partial causes concur to bring about a
simple effect, they necessarily concur in mutual dependence: this is the case of free
will and divine grace producing the common cause of a good deed.
Lessius at this point addressed a complaint that some people, myself included,
have instinctively raised: “Even though all this may be true, it still doesn’t sound
right to say that free will may render God’s grace efficacious or inefficacious.”68 In
response to this, Lessius stated that said an explanation (which Molina himself
offered) is in order. Consider these texts:
1) “Stir up the gift of God which is in you by the laying of my hands” (2 Tim
1:6).
2) “By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me was not without
effect” (1 Cor 15:10).
3) “As God’s co-workers we urge you not to receive God’s grace in vain.” (2
Cor 6:1).
Lessius said that these verses are the equivalent of what he was claiming; but
he insisted that they refer to the secondary actuality, and not to the first actuality, as
Davila incorrectly assumed. He then went on to add three specifications to his
understanding of efficacious grace: 1) it has supernatural strength, which is
sufficient once conjoined to free will, to carry out its work; 2) it persuades and
woos the will in a congruous manner, even though it is not irresistible per se; 3) it

67
See my Not without Us, 57, 58.
68
De gratia, 461.
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acts as a medicine which has the power to heal, but only if the patient agrees to
take it. Thus, free will makes grace efficacious not in virtue of its natural strength,
but rather in virtue of grace’s intrinsic power, by allowing it to run its course.
There are people in hell who received many more helps in this life than
others who are now in heaven ever did. This is evident in the case of angels: many
of those who rebelled against God received greater natural and supernatural
helps than many of those who remained faithful. And what about the religious and
lay people who started their Christian walk as living saints, having received many
blessings from God, but ended up falling away, while many lukewarm Christians
ended up in heaven by receiving the sacraments on their death beds?
Thus, if one will persevere to the end (as one could and should) with the
helps given to him, it follows that he had been predestined from all eternity;
otherwise, he was not.69
Davila protested that this way of thinking makes predestination depend on
foreseen merits. Lessius replied that if we consider predestination as it extends to
the bestowal of the first helps of grace given to people (e.g., first call to faith, and
the grace of justification), in no way it depends on foreseen merits, as Augustine
said in his The Predestination of the Saints. But if consider predestination as it
extends to some of its later effects, it does depend on foreseen merits indeed!
Lessius claims: “Not only man deserves an increase of grace: he also deserves
divine affection as we read in Jn 14:23: ‘Anyone who loves me will obey my
teaching. My Father will love them, and we will come to them and make our
home with them.’”70
Augustine in The Gift of Perseverance 14 talked about foreknowledge and
preparation of the gift. Lessius takes this definition in support of his view
concerning parts in predestination that depend on God’s will, and parts that
depend on his foreknowledge. It will not do, says Lessius, to quote Aquinas and
other scholastics to the effect that there is no human cause of predestination
whatsoever, for they referred to it as an act of the divine mind, though not in
regard to its end. This is confirmed in what we read in Mt 25:34: “Then the King
will say to those on his right, 'Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your
inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world.” Why
prepared? Because as the following verse says: “For I was hungry and you gave me
something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a
stranger and you invited me in…”71
Moreover, all those who have been justified in Christ are called “predestined”
(e.g., Rom 8; Eph 1; Acts 14).
69
Ibid., 463.
70
Idem.
71
As we shall see later on, Lemos criticized Lessius’ understanding of this text and his
conclusions about it.
 178

In conclusion, Lessius says that God’s general concurrence is not the

influence on secondary causes (as Dominicans claim), but in the common effect:

The first and secondary causes are like two partial causes or parts of one whole and global
cause which requires nothing else besides itself: their synthesis is the total cause. Thus, it is
certain that a good work is not from grace as if from a total cause: if it was all from grace,
free will would be excluded! Likewise, it is certain that a good work does not have free will as
its total cause either, otherwise there would be no grace!72

72
De gratia, 464. See Hypognostikon 9, at the end.
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Chapter 7
PREDESTINATION

In Chapter Sixteen Lessius says that there are two ways of understanding
how a given effect (such as predestination) will certainly and infallibly ensue in
the future, and thus be known to God. According to the first explanation, which
was upheld by Dominicans, this is due to the nature of God’s grace itself; once in
place, it invariably produces its intended effects in virtue of its own infinite and
irresistible power. According to the second explanation, which was favored by
Molina, there is no necessary and determining connection between grace and the
human will’s consent, other than what is known in the infinite power of God’s
foreknowledge. The “million dollar question” to be pondered is this: in what way,
once prevenient grace is in place at a precise moment in a person’s life, is it
certain and infallibly true whether he/she will consent to it? Molina and many
others denied that predestination is certain in virtue of grace’s irresistible nature
itself, but rather claimed that it is so in virtue of the infinite power of God’s light,
which not only understands the nature and state of mind of the human will at any
particular moment, but is also able to penetrate its innermost areas and exercise
its suave and persuasive influence on it, leaving it nonetheless free and able to
resist such influence.
Lessius recalls that Davila articulated three criticisms to Molina’s view.
First, to believe that predestination is based on God’s foreknowledge is not
and never has been the traditional consensus of the Church. Davila went on to
quote Aquinas’s De veritate, q. 6. Art. 3: “Is predestination certain?”:

Hence, it seems difficult to reconcile the infallibility of predestination with freedom of

choice; for we cannot say that predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence
except the certitude of foreknowledge, because this would be to say that God orders one
who is predestined to his salvation as he orders any other person, with this difference, that,
in the case of the predestined, God knows he will not fail to be saved. According to this
position, one predestined would not differ in ordination from one not predestined; he would
differ only with respect to [God’s] foreknowledge of the outcome. Consequently,
foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not take
place by the choice of him who predestines. This, however, is contrary to the authority of
the Scriptures and the sayings of the saints. Thus, the ordering of predestination has an
infallible certitude of its own—over and above the certitude of foreknowledge.
Nevertheless, the proximate cause of salvation, free choice, is related to predestination
contingently, not necessarily.

Lessius replied that if among the “effects of predestination” we include not

only prevenient grace, but also helping grace (gratia adjuvans), then it is certain
that the final end of the predestined person is salvation and eternal life with God:
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this outcome is certain not only due to divine foreknowledge, but also to the
condition of those effects themselves. According to this way of looking at things,
the predestined person differs from the non-predestined in regard to the order of
means: according to Lessius, this is what St. Thomas had in mind in the above
mentioned passage. However, if we consider only those effects of predestination
by which God anticipates our will, it then follows that it is certain that we will
consent and be saved out of divine foreknowledge alone, and not out of the
condition of those means themselves. Lessius added this comment:

By ‘foreknowledge’ I mean foreknowledge arising from the hypothesis of future things,

which is not knowledge of vision, but rather simple intelligence. From this it doesn’t follow
that predestination is not through election, since that foreknowledge precedes
predestination. For God foreknows whether a man, once he has been given a series of
prevenient aids, will persevere in them, even before he decides to bestow on him such means.
In such view as well, God’s predestination happens through election. This view in no way
runs counter to the Scriptures or the teachings of the Church, but rather is conformed to
them.73

Lessius goes on to specify that what Aquinas was talking about in the quote
produced by Davila applies to God’s (fore)knowledge of vision, which follows the
occurrence of a thing: thus, that election of people to the means of salvation is not
certain and infallible in and of itself.
Second, Davila says that it is unacceptable to claim that God has foreknown
the operations of the will in the very power of human free will as if that was a
cause; in chapter ten of his book he attempted to show why and how such view is
false.
Lessius replied that no Jesuit ever claimed that; rather, Jesuits teach that such
operations are foreknown out of the infinite power of the divine light, which
comprehends not only free will and all the things that anticipate, entice or hinder
it, but also penetrates all its operations and effects. In other words, Jesuits do not
claim that God is like a spectator who after and because taking notice of human
free will’s choices decides to respond or react to them (i.e., the Semipelagian and
Pelagian view of divine foreknowledge/predestination); rather, the infinite power
of God’s knowledge extends to all things and knows them as either hypothetical
or real in the future (see Molina’s disp. 47). However, even if Jesuits taught what
the author accused them of teaching, Lessius, while believing such view to be
wrong, would still not regard it to be “unacceptable,” considering that Durandus
taught it, and that it was never censored as heretical (even some recent
theologians have embraced it). Lessius still maintains, against Davila and PP’s
supporters, that God does not know future human choices in an absolute

73
De gratia, 490.
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manner, because they have been determined by his will, but rather only
conditionally and hypothetically.
Third, Davila claims that God foreknows all the future choices of the human
will because he foreknows all the determinations by which his will ensure human
beings will do his bidding.
Lessius says that if that what the case, fatalism would ensue and God should
be considered the author and instigator of all deeds, good and bad.
Lessius concludes:

From such view it follows that God does not know with certainty which of all hypotheses
will actually take place. In fact, if he cannot know future effects other than in the decree of
his will, by which he predefined them, or in the determination of the human will which he
imparts to an individual – it follows that he cannot truly know them (God neither predefined
them nor was a determined cause assigned to them) unless we are prepared to say that God
has also predetermined all possible future events, which will therefore necessarily happen.
But in such case we would have to conclude that there is no foreknowledge of future
contingents, but rather of future necessities. Such view is neither awesome nor admirable, and
it even contradicts Thomas Aquinas, who never placed God’s foreknowledge of future free
human choices in the determination of his will.74

74
Ibid., 492.
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Chapter 8
THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PP

In Chapter Eighteen Lessius tackles thirteen theological arguments

adduced by Davila in support of PP, and then proceeds to refute them: I chose to
describe only the ones I consider to be most clear and incisive.

First argument. Davila argued that the type of help Dominicans are upholding is
efficacious in itself, as we gather from the words of the Lord: “Everyone who has
heard the Father and learned from him comes to me” (Jn 6:45). A moral help is
not enough to produce such an effect, since it first awaits for the consent of the
human will; a moral help is not pre-moving and pre-determining the will, since
the will allegedly determines and moves itself out of its own strength and power.
In this case then, the divine help’s efficacy does not depend not on grace, but on a
contingent event: but how can we reconcile this with Jesus’ words: “Without me
you can do nothing”; and Paul’s: “What do you have that you have not received?”?
Lessius replied that from Jn 6:45 we cannot conclude that there is a PP grace
at work, since the text does not say: “Everyone who has heard the Father comes
to me,” but rather “Everyone who has heard the Father and learned from him
comes to me.” Just “to hear” from God does not automatically mean that a
determining grace is at work, since we read in the Ps 94: “Today, if only you
would hear his voice, do not harden your hearts…,” words that imply the human
ability to resist God’s calling grace. Thus, the words “heard from him” refer to
prevenient help and inner vocation, while “and learned from him” refer to our
assenting and believing. Lessius agrees that the efficacy of grace does not merely
consist in the moral helps God offers us; however, Davila is wrong for attributing
to the Jesuits beliefs they do not hold. In other words, Jesuits do no claim that the
will determines itself out of its own natural power, apart from the influence and
presence of God’s grace. The efficacy of grace depends partly on the will’s own
nature, and partly on the help of grace (habet partim a natura sua, partim ab auxilio
gratiae).75

Third argument. According to Davila, God converts the human heart from being
evil and hardened, to being good and pliable (see Ez 11:19). However, on the basis
of a merely moral help, it would not be God who transforms our hearts, but we
ourselves. Jesuits make that obvious when they say that of two men receiving the
same kind of moral help, one converts and the other does not: isn’t that a proof

75
Ibid., 496.
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that the cause of one’s conversion and of another’s hardening resides in their
respective natural will powers?
Lessius claims that Davila is wrong for claiming that “I will give them an
undivided heart and put a new spirit in them; I will remove from them their heart of stone
and give them a heart of flesh” is caused by God’s PP. Instead, this sentence refers to
what God will do as we cooperate through our free will with his prevenient,
moral helps. As far as the example of the two men is concerned, Lessius says that
the first man converts not out of his mere unaided will, but thanks to and through
God’s prevenient help; and that the second man isn’t converted because of the
power of his free will to reject God’s aids. In conclusion: our free will is not the
whole reason, or even the main reason for one’s conversion, but rather the partial
and least important one.

Fourth argument. Davila said that when Jesuits want to prove the ability of
human free will they will quote Jesus’ words: “Ask and it will be given to you;
seek and you will find; knock and it will be opened to you” (Mt 7:7). However, all
this verse proves is that Jesus wanted us to be prayerful so as to be able to receive
God’s blessings: this is what Esther 14 and Lam 5:21 suggest.
Lessius’ response: “I leave it up to the readers to determine whether this is a
nodum in scirpo quaerere.76 For who has ever denied that conversion, good works
and perseverance are indeed God’s gifts? Or that with the help of grace we must
not be exhorted and helped to pursue them?”77

Fifth argument. Trent VI, chapter V describes how we are urged on by the
efficacious grace of prevenient help:

It is furthermore declared that in adults the beginning of that justification must proceed from
the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his vocation, whereby,
without any merits on their part, they are called; that they who by sin had been cut off from
God, may be disposed through his exciting and helping grace to convert themselves to their
own justification by freely assenting to and cooperating with that grace; so that, while God
touches the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Ghost, man himself neither
does absolutely nothing while receiving that inspiration, since he can also reject it, nor yet is
he able by his own free will and without the grace of God to move himself to justice in his
sight.

From such text Davila concludes that this grace does not exercise a merely
moral influence.

76
Literally “to seek a knot in a bulrush,” meaning to find a difficulty where there is none.
77
De gratia, 498.
 184

In response to that, Lessius claims that this conciliar text does not help the
Dominicans’ view at all: rather, it refutes the idea of determining grace on three
accounts:
1) The text mentions prevenient grace and vocation as being equivalent; since
God’s vocation does not determine the will, neither does prevenient grace.
2) The text says that God’s exciting and helping grace (words that refer to
and include prevenient grace) predisposes man so that he may be converted, and
that man freely assents and cooperates with it. However, according to
Dominicans, the moment grace is infused in a man’s will, it is instantaneously
determined and man is suddenly converted without any need for deliberation;
such view cannot be reconciled with Trent’s text.
3) The text says that man can reject grace, resist it, and refuse to obey to it:
thus no determining irresistible grace should be postulated.

Sixth argument. Christ ordered us to pray: “Your will be done on earth as it is in

heaven.” However, without God’s help and protection we cannot do this; thus, we
pray that God may give us the strength to do his will and obey his
commandments. Such view is confirmed by the prayer over the gifts of the 4th
Saturday of Lent: “Lord, having received our prayers, we beseech you to be
placated. Being well disposed towards us, compel our wills, even when rebellious,
to turn to you;” and also by the prayer actiones nostras: “Direct, we beg Thee, O
Lord, our prayers and our actions by Thy holy inspirations and carry them on by
Thy gracious assistance, so that every work of ours may always begin with Thee,
and through Thee come to completion;” and finally by the adsumus prayer:

We have come, O God the Holy Spirit, we have come before you, hampered indeed by our
many and grievous sins, but for a special purpose gathered together in your name. Come to
us and be with us and enter our hearts. Teach us what we are to do and where we ought to
tend; show us what we must accomplish, in order that, with your help, we may be able to
please you in all things. Be you alone the author and the finisher of our judgments, you who
alone with God the Father and his Son possesses a glorious name…But unite us to You
efficaciously by the gift of your grace alone, that we may be one in You and never forsake
the truth.

Lessius gladly conceded that we cannot do God’s will without his help.
Indeed he makes it possible for us to follow his will and obey his commandments,
though without PP. In regard to the first prayer, God makes us do things but not
through an ironclad predetermination which no one can resist, but through
warnings and feelings of dread. In regard to the second prayer, God accomplishes
that not by determining us, but by inspiring us as to what and how we are to act in
each situation. In regard to the third prayer, “efficaciously” does not refer to PP
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(As Davila suggested), but rather to that way of divine inspiration out of which an
effect is bound to follow.78

Seventh argument. Davila pointed out that according to Jesuits God offers his
grace to everybody, good and bad people alike; the only reason why one person
accepts it and another rejects it lies in the fact that the former dissents from the
grace that is calling and moving him, while the latter gives his consent out of his
innate freedom. However, Davila added, to claim that man can perform any work
with the powers of nature and infallibly receive God’s grace, was a Pelagian view,
as Augustine pointed out in his The Grace of Christ, 23.
Lessius replies indignantly that such charge is false and based on distortions.
Who among Jesuits ever claimed that that action by which a sinner is converted
is the result of free will alone? Or that man disposes himself to receive grace with
his mere natural powers? Or that the consent to God’s grace stemming from free
will is due to the power of nature, or that it anticipates grace?
Now, we can safely say that a person who accepts grace while another rejects
it, does so out of free will alone, as long as we clarify what is meant by that. It
does not mean that if he accepts it, he does so out of free will alone, but because
the difference between the two persons arises from free will alone and not from
two types of grace given to them (i.e., one is given efficacious grace, while the
other ineffective grace); again, to say “free will alone” does not exclude the
cooperation of grace, but only the difference in the grace being given. The whole
cause (integra causa) of a person’s consent consist in two partial components: free
will and prevenient grace. Thus, the fact that one person says yes to grace while
another says no, does not lie in the qualitative different graces being offered. The
contribution of grace to the whole cause of a person’s decision is that it is
supernatural in essence; the contribution of free will consists in deciding whether
to accept grace or not.

Eight argument. According to Davila, to deny PP and to uphold a mere divine

moral influence amounts not only to depart from ancient sound Church teachings,
but from basic philosophical principles laid out by Aristotle. Isn’t it a well-
established fact that everything that is moved is moved by something else, in a
chain stretching back all the way to an Unmoved Mover, the Cause of All Causes,
namely God? In one of his texts Aristotle (Physics, VIII, 33) explained the
difference between primary and secondary causes, and that secondary causes are
determined by first causes, and not vice versa (e.g., a stick that does not move
without a hand causing it to move). To suggest that God does not move our wills,

78
Ibid., 499.
 186

but that he waits for our wills before acting upon them was Cassian’s
Semipelagian doctrine.
Lessius remains un-perturbed. According to him such an argument is a
mixture of wrong and distorted perspectives. First of all, the Church never
condemned the idea of divine moral influence. Second, the Aristotelian principle
mentioned by Davila does not apply to everything, but only to bodily movement.
Third, there is no need to postulate a new physical influence for each and every
single motion, as supporters of PP claim. Fourth, Aristotle apparently did not
contemplate the possibility of the First Cause’s simultaneous concurrence with
secondary causes. Therefore, it is frivolous to invoke Aristotelian view of motion
to suggest that God effectively determines each and every motion of ours when
talking about inner, intrinsic motions; or that God uses all causes as instruments to
achieve his will.79

Tenth argument. Davila argues that the fact that God is the author of every
bodily and spiritual activity, since he is their first and moving agent is amply
witnessed by Wis 11:24: “For you love all things that exist, and detest none of the
things that you have made, for you would not have made anything if you had
hated it;” Is 26:12: “Lord, you establish peace for us; all that we have accomplished
you have done for us;” Jn 15:5: “Apart from me you can do nothing;” Phil 2:13:
“for it is God who works in you to will and to act in order to fulfill his good
purpose.” Jesuits err in boosting the efficacy and power of God’s moral help when
it is his effective PP that truly counts.
Lessius dismisses Davila’s claim that such verses clearly establish God’s PP;
all they do is to point out that he is the main cause for our actions. Moreover,
nothing in these verses excludes the cooperation of our free will or establishes
that it has been previously determined in an irresistible fashion.
As Davila claimed: “It is difficult to understand how God could really act
upon our will in an omnipotent manner if our freedom remains free to choose any
of two options (i.e., to accept or reject his grace).”80 By saying this, Davila only
admitted the indifference of judgment. Lessius countered by saying that
indifference of judgement is not enough to safeguard freedom of the will; what is
also and mostly needed is the indifference of the will, which stand in direct
contrast with PP.

Twelfth argument. “All that we have accomplished you have done for us” (Is
26:12); “Apart from me you can do nothing” (Jn 15:5); “I t is God who works in
you to will and to act in order to fulfill his good purpose” (Phil 2:13). According

79
Idem.
80
Ibid., 502.
 187

to Davila, these verses support the theological notion of PP; a merely moral
influence is not a sufficient explanation for how they would be the case.
Lessius denies that these verses support the idea that God is behind all
physical and spiritual motion; at most, they suggest that God is behind all good
deeds (not the evil ones as well, as supporters of PP claim). Without mincing
words, Lessius says that PP supporters oppose the Jesuits’ view with false
interpretations and principles (pravis interpretationibus et principiis). Jesuits agree
that God is behind all motions, but deny that such influence predetermines the
human will, and that it cannot be resisted.

Thirteenth argument. Davila claimed that no one can resist the divine purpose,
or avert the divine predeterminations. God’s omnipotence cannot be thwarted by
the human will’s decisions; a mere moral influence can be resisted and rejected by
sinful human beings. Thus, in order for God’s will to be done infallibly and
absolutely, PP is required.
Lessius refers his readers to previous chapters in which he discussed the
conciliar and scriptural passages upholding that a) God’s grace can be resisted;
and b) God’s grace consists in moral influences and not in PP decrees.
Lessius goes on to state that there are three ways to uphold the notion of
God’s absolute power, the first two being unacceptable: 1) Before any
foreknowledge of the determination of secondary causes; 2) Presupposing
conditional foreknowledge; 3) Presupposing absolute foreknowledge of that
determination. There are indeed situations in which God wills in the first sense,
such as in Ps 115: 3: “He does whatever pleases him;” Esther 13:11: “There is
none that can resist your majesty.” However, Lessius denies that free human
choices fall in this category of predetermined things. Thus, human conversion is
not to be thought of as predetermined, nor are the divine helps to be thought of as
predetermining the will. The second case is unlikely as well, since “conditional”
presupposes indifference to opposite outcomes (indifferentia ad utrumlibet) as well
as the ability to be resisted; God does not move our wills other than because he
knows we will consent to be moved. The third case is more likely, because the
ensuing motion is determining the will, not previously but concomitantly and
freely.81

In concluding his treatise Lessius appealed to his educated readers to

acknowledge three things:
1) The Jesuit views about the efficacy of grace; providence; freedom of the
will; and conditional foreknowledge are neither new and naïve, nor do they
rely on merely philosophical arguments – rather, they are ancient and fully

81
Ibid., 503.
 188

consistent with the views of the holy fathers and the doctors of the Church,
the Scriptures, the decrees of past councils and very distant from the errors
of Pelagians and Semipelagians.
2) The criticisms leveled against the Jesuit views are hardly incisive, and are
replete with false, corrupt principles, and misunderstood testimonies.
3) The attempt to overturn the Jesuit views is plagued with errors and runs
into severe difficulties; on the contrary, the Jesuit view obviate any of them.
Moreover, the latter is more in agreement with Augustine’s; the definitions
of the Council of Trent; and biblical passages than the Dominican view.

Lessius ended his work with these words:

I pray that the divine light that shines on everyone, and in honor of which I
have written my treatise, may shine on the minds of my readers, so that in
all the most difficult and important issues it may help them to clearly
discern the truth; and that once they acknowledge the presence of this
light, if they felt differently before reading my work, they may set aside any
spirit of contention, and humbly embrace it. I humbly submit everything I
have written in this and in any other of my works to the judgement of the
Apostolic See. 82

82
Ibid., 511.
 189

PART THREE

Lessius’ Annex De praedestinatione

190
 191

Chapter 1
Lessius’ De praedestinatione et reprobatione angelorum et hominum
disputatio (Disputation concerning the predestination and reprobation of angels
and human beings)

Lessius begins his treatise by saying that there are people who consider
predestination as a mere theoretical issue shrouded in mystery, with no practical
applications. Some go as far as saying that they are greatly encouraged at the
thought of God’s predefinitions, since they rather rest their fate in God’s hands
than in their own. Others (i.e., Molinists) instead find refuge and comfort by
believing in God’s conditional foreknowledge. However, a lot of people, including
those who lack theological acumen or education, are greatly upset and
discouraged at the thought that God has already decided their fate. These people
claim that if: 1) It has already been decided for us what shall come to pass, even
before any divine foreknowledge of what we will do; 2) The number of the saved
has already been unchangingly fixed, so that it cannot be increased or decreased;
3) The number of the saved is set before any consideration of our works – then,
any motivation for living in a righteous manner has been de facto taken away,
since if one is part of the saved, nothing he/she can do will cause him/her to slip
away, just as if he/she is not part of the saved, nothing he/she can do will make
any difference.
As we know, the Church has not adjudicated yet on this issue the way it has
on other doctrines such as the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Eucharist.
Lessius is of the opinion that what we need is a solution that does not confuse
the mind but reassures it instead and that does not foster discouragement and
spiritual laziness, but rather promotes motivation and vigilance. Thus, Lessius
declares his intention to find a solution that brings together the teachings of the
Fathers (patrum communis doctrina) and scriptural evidence.1
Lessius’ work is divided into seven parts:
PART ONE - Preliminary observations about predestination: does it falls under
the merit of the person who is predestined?
PART TWO - Examination of the status quaestionis. The need to uphold the more
probable view and refute the opposite one through scriptural and patristic
passages; and ten theological arguments.
PART THREE - Scriptural arguments adduced by Dominicans and their
subsequent refutation.
PART FOUR - Arguments from Church fathers that are used by Dominicans,
and Lessius’ response.

1
De praedestinatione, 513.
 192

PART FIVE - Logical arguments advanced by Dominicans, and Lessius’

response.
PART SIX - Detailed exposition of the topic of predestination and reprobation.
PART SEVEN - Prayerful conclusion and appeal to the readers.

PART ONE

Predestination is an expression of divine providence (i.e., the choice of the

means used to convert people’s hearts) and mercy (i.e., the human resolve to avail
itself of the various means to its disposal is stirred by God’s goodness).
Some say that predestination is an act of the divine intellect; others uphold
the more suitable view, namely that it is an act of the divine will. In fact, to
(pre)destine is, practically speaking, to will something, but it is also an act of the
intellect in the sense of choosing a destination, a purpose – thus, both aspects are
involved. Reprobation is a part of both divine providence and justice as well.
When it comes to predestination, by this term we mean: 1) things that God
decided he would do either directly or indirectly, through his creatures; 2) the
eternal (both temporally and causally) destination of a rational creature to heaven.
We also need to distinguish between complete (i.e., the beatific vision attained in
heaven) and incomplete, which is to say “potential” (in semine contineatur)
predestination (i.e., the grace of justification attained in baptism).2 This is why all
the just in the Scripture are called “predestined,” “elect,” “beloved from all
eternity;” because they have been predestined to justice, and consequently, as far
as God is concerned, to all the other things that are necessary to attain salvation.
At this point Lessius introduces a quote from Augustine’s The Gift of
Perseverance 14, which he intends to use to bolster his distinction: “This
predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and the
preparation of the benefits of God by which he most certainly sets free whoever
are set free.” Next, he introduces the readers to his interpretation of this text.
The predestined are not set free in virtue of the intrinsic power of the divine
aids or benefits, but in virtue of the infallible certainty of God’s actual knowledge
of the free acts we will actually perform in this life, as well as of the conditional
foreknowledge of those acts that will remain in the state of mere potential choices
(i.e., “futuribles”). At this point, Lessius suggests that rather than speaking of
“conditional foreknowledge,” we should speak of God’s absolute foreknowledge of

2
Ibid., 514. Lessius also specifies that complete predestination applies to the whole series of
means by which man pursues salvation; incomplete predestination refers only to the series of
benefits by which man aspires to salvation, all the way to the grace of justification. According to
him, in the NT those who are called “predestined,” “elect,” and “beloved from all eternity” are
the justified, and not those whom God chose with an absolute decree from all eternity
irrespectively of his foreknowledge.
 193

conditionals (though not in the Pelagian sense, whereby God is a mere spectator
and a detached “referee” of human conduct); in other words, of scientia media.
Summing it up, no one can ever be said to earn his predestination, not even ex
congruo, because we cannot possibly attain the first calling or illumination by God
to elevate us to the supernatural order, which is and will forever be a purely
gratuitous gift of God; eventually, all of our good works stem from this gift. The
Fathers (especially Augustine) emphasized this point, namely that we cannot earn
God’s elevating us to the supernatural order, nor can we merit predestination:
this is certum fidei proximum. Lessius claims that predestination does not fall under
the merits of a predestined person, considering that external conditions which
eventually lead to inner means of justification do not stem from us, e.g.: a) being
born instead of dying in utero; b) being born in a Christian family; c) being raised
in a Christian environment; d) learning about the Christian faith; e) being shown
the errors of infidels and heretics.

PART TWO

The question before us, says Lessius, is this: did God predestine all those who
are going to be saved and assign to each of them a predefined degree of heavenly
glory with an absolute and efficacious will, before any and all foreknowledge of
their merits, and predetermine as well all their good works; OR does God’s
predestination take place in another manner?
According to Dominicans, there are four instances or rational moments in
God’s mind (signa rationis in mente divina). In the first instance, God, beholding
with simple intelligence all angels and human beings who will be born after his
creation, before any knowledge of future events (including the Fall) chose a
certain number from them all and decided with an absolute will to confer eternal
glory upon them as well as a certain degree of holiness; rather than positively
ordaining the damnation of all others, he simply passed them by. In the second
instance, he pre-defined all the good works and the specific circumstances in
which they will unfold in the future (including their final perseverance), and then
decided to bestow on them congruous graces: to all others he gave sufficient
grace, so that they could be saved if they wanted to. In the third instance, he
foresaw the elect’ perseverance and everybody else’s death in state of sin. In the
fourth, he resolved to give glory to the elect as a reward for their good works,
and eternal punishment to the non-elect either because of personal sins, or as a
consequence of Original Sin.
Lessius records his displeasure at such view, and claims that many learned
scholars, theologians, Church father sand saints opposed it as well; however, he
noted, there is another view of predestination, which is more coherent with truth
 194

and piety, according to which neither predestination nor damnation take place in
God’s mind irrespective of his foreknowledge of human good works or sins.3
The first order of the day, in Lessius’ agenda, is to introduce nine scriptural
passages; several quotes from Church Fathers, scholastics, modern theologians,
and from the great Augustine himself; and finally ten theological arguments – all
in order to critique the Dominicans’ view of predestination based on God’s
absolute will, irrespective of his foreknowledge.
Let us begin with the comments he made about nine scriptural passages:

1) In the parable of the Wedding Banquet Jesus said: “Many are called but few
are chosen” (Mt 22:14).
According to Lessius, the chosen are said to be few because most people in
the parable refused the invitation: thus, to call is up to God, but to be chosen is up
to us.

2) In the parable about the separation of the sheep and the goats, Jesus said:
“Come you who are blessed by my Father: take your inheritance, the kingdom
prepared for you since the creation of the world” (Mt 25: 34).
Lessius claims that the reward (i.e., “the kingdom”) has been prepared (or
predestined) because of the foreseen good works mentioned specifically in verses
34 and 35, just as the eternal punishment has been prepared for the devil and his
angels on account of their foreseen demerits. This point is also confirmed in Mt
20:23, where Jesus says: “To sit at my right or left is not for me to grant. These
places belong to those for whom they have been prepared by my Father.” Lessius
claims that many Church fathers (e.g., Epiphanius, Cyril, Ambrose,
Theophylactus, and Chrysostom) interpreted this preparation to be based on
foreseen merits (ex praevisis meritis).

3) “For those God foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the

likeness of his Son” (Rom 8:29).
Lessius points out that Origen, Cyril, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theophylactus
and Sedulius upheld the view that predestination mentioned in this text stems
from divine foreknowledge of good human deeds.

4) “Consider therefore the kindness and severity of God: severity to those who
fell, but kindness to you, provided that you continue in his kindness” (Rom 11:22).
According to Lessius, these words clearly suggest that there is no such thing
as an absolute decision of God concerning people’s final destiny, but only a
conditional decision, entirely dependent on how we live.

3
Ibid., 516.
 195

5) “God wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth” (1
Tim 2: 4).
Lessius believes that all the Fathers and theologians read the expression “all
men” to mean “without exception,” otherwise how would God want to “truly and
sincerely” want to save all men if he only chose a few and excluded an immense
number of them? And how would God be fair if he gave to the un-saved only an
incongruous grace? It would be like the organizer of a race who selected ten
athletes out of all competitors to award a medal to, and then helped them win in
various hidden ways: how could he be said to impartially want anyone to win?

6) The parable of the workers in the vineyard (Mt 20:1-16).

Lessius points out that no landowner would give a reward unless he first saw
the work produced by his workers: we should think the same about God.

7) “Be all the more eager to make your calling and election sure” (2 Pt 1:10).
According to Lessius, divine election can be frustrated by our bad works and
choices, and is not “set in stone.” Therefore, we should work assiduously to make
our election steadier and more secure.

8) “Hold on to what you have, so that no one will take your crown” (Rev 3:11).
Since one can lose his/her crown, it follows that God has not made an
absolute choice of who will be saved, but rather a conditional one, based on his
foreknowledge of how we will end our days.

9) “But you have mercy on all, because you can do all things; and you overlook
sins for the sake of repentance. You love all that exists, you hold nothing of what
you have made in abhorrence. You spare all things because all things are yours,
Lord, lover of life” (Wis 11:23-26).
According to Lessius, God would indeed show little mercy or any at all if
before foreknowledge of sins he decided to exclude people from his kingdom, and
not to prepare grace for all people.

Next, Lessius devotes two pages to quote some favorite Greek fathers,
namely Clement, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Cyril, Damascene, Origen,
Theophylactus, and the Latin Ambrose, Jerome and Arnobius (i.e., his Commentary
on the Psalms 90, 91, 108, 117). All these fathers based the absolute election to
glory of individuals on God’s foreknowledge of merits and rejection of others on
his foreknowledge of demerits: then Lessius points out that they were never
censored for their views (neque unquam ob hoc praecise dogma reprehensi leguntur).4

4
Ibid., 518.
 196

Lessius goes on to quote the following scholastic authors: Alexander of

Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Thomas Argentina,
William Ockham, Gabriel Biel, and also the recent theologians Pighius, Sadoletus,
Eck, Stapletonius, John of Bologna, Molina, Gregory of Valencia,5 and Vasquez,
to the effect that these authors upheld absolute election to glory issuing from
God’s foreknowledge of good works performed through the help of grace.
As far as Augustine is concerned, Lessius attempts to show that he did not
depart from the understanding of predestination upheld by the great African
bishop, who allegedly made an important distinction between election to glory on
the basis of God’s foreknowledge of our good works (which are nonetheless his
gifts) and election to grace (which cannot be earned). Lessius insists that it is the
latter and not the former that Augustine upheld against the Semipelagians, as we
can read in The Gift of Perseverance 14.35: “This predestination of the saints is
nothing other than the foreknowledge and the preparation of the benefits of God
by which he most certainly sets free whoever are set free.”
Prosper wrote:

5
Fellow-Jesuit Gregory of Valencia, who was called to Rome to defend Molina’s views in the
first set of congregations before Pope Clement VIII, published a four volumes theological
commentary on Aquinas’ Summa (Ingolstadt, 1591) in which he advanced the standard Jesuit
view of predestination post praevisa merita. After stating that predestination must be attributed
only to gratuitous will of God (in solam gratuitam Dei voluntatem referri debet) and
unequivocally stating that “neither the cooperation of a predestination person, nor any of his
works are the reason, the condition or the cause of predestination taken as a whole,” Valencia
went on to say that God ordinarily does not predestine adults without a correlation of his
foreknowledge with their persevering cooperation, a cooperation due to the exercise of their free
will under the influence of grace. Thus, Valencia concluded that we cannot say that God
predestines people because he foreknew from all eternity that they would cooperate, but that he
predestines those he foreknew (“non dico quia, sed quos videt”). To summarize his views,
Valencia wrote: “ 1st God knew from all eternity through his knowledge of vision (scientia
visionis) not only the natures, but even the individual sins of all human beings who were ever
going to be born; 2nd Since human beings were unable to properly rectify the offense committed
against God’s majesty, God prepared for them a redeemer by predestining Christ; 3rd God, in
anticipation and as a consequence of the merits of Christ intended to confer upon all human
beings sufficient and abundant helps, by resorting to which everybody could attain salvation
through the mediation of Christ the Redeemer; from this we may conclude that he really intended
from all eternity, as far as he was concerned, that everyone would be saved; 4th God mercifully
predestined those he foreknew would end their lives in a state of grace, either through their
personal cooperation with grace or through the bestowal of baptism; he also rightfully declined
to predestine all the others who either did not cooperate with grace, or did not receive baptism,
and rightly reprobated them either because of their actual sins or original sin, in which he
foreknew from all eternity they would die.” Quoted in Le Bachelet, 16.
 197

Those of whom it is said: ‘They went out of us but they were not of us. For if they had been
of us, they would no doubt have remained with us’ (1 Jn 2:19), went away of their own
choosing, they fell through their own fault. And because God foresaw that they would fall,
they were not predestined. They would have been of the predestined, should they have come
back to God and persevered in holiness and truth. And so we conclude that the
predestination of God is for many the reason of their perseverance in grace and for none is
the reason of their fall.6

Lessius pointed out that Prosper is unequivocally saying that the reason why
people have not been predestined is that they had been foreknown to fall; had they
wanted to persevere they would have, with the help of God’s grace. Lessius went
on to quote Augustine, who in his Letter to Simplician on Various Questions I, 2, 6,
had this to say:

The divine decree does not stand firm because of election, but rather election depends on
God’s decree; in other words God’s decree of justification does not stand firm because he
finds good works in the people he chooses, but, having decided to justify believers, he found
good works which he chose for them to perform, thus leading them to heaven. In fact, if there
was no election, there would be no elect and we could not reasonably say with Paul: ‘Who
will accuse God’s elect?’ (Rom 8:33). Thus, election does not precede justification, but
justification election. No one, in fact, is chosen unless he is first set aside from those who
have been rejected. For I do not see how this can be said without foreknowledge: ‘God chose
us before the foundation of the world’ (Eph 1:4).

Lessius concluded from this text that according to Augustine election stems
from foreknown merits performed after justification; he also added that Augustine
never retracted this view.
Thus, Lessius concluded that these two views can be held simultaneously: a)
“God elected some people in absolute manner on the basis of their foreseen
merits;” and b) “God did not elect some people to grace on the basis of foreseen
demerits.” He also claimed that Augustine upheld both views and never retracted
them, nor did such views conflict with others outlined in the rest of his works.
According to Lessius, this can be proven with the following five reasons:
1) Augustine never quarreled with Pelagians about election to glory on the
basis of merits performed through grace, but rather about election and
preparation of grace (which we call “predestination”), and about election to
glory on the basis of works of nature (i.e., whether we can earn heaven,
justification, faith and graces of various helps).
2) In The Gift of Perseverance 19 Augustine quoted Cyprian and Ambrose to
the effect that they too upheld that the beginning of faith, faith itself and all

6
Prosper, Answers to the Vincentian Articles, 12.
 198

good works are gifts of God and not of free will alone, and that no man
should glory in himself.
3) Augustine claimed that his doctrine of predestination must be upheld with
sure faith;7 he was talking here about predestination of grace which does not
depend on works. However, to say that glory is not predestined on the
basis of foreseen merits is not a certain doctrine, but rather an untrue or
false doctrine. Lessius does not mince words: “They are greatly mistaken
those who believe this to be the very teaching of Augustine.”8
4) In The Gift of Perseverance 14, Augustine rejected the criticism that the
doctrine of predestination is an obstacle to preaching, exhortations and
precepts, and claimed that predestination is nothing else but the
foreknowledge by which God foreknew to whom he would bestow his gifts
(on the basis of how people would use them).
5) Augustine did not talk in his works about immediate and absolute election
to glory, nor did he intend to oppose the view of predestination on the basis
of foreseen merits. Rather, by “predestination” he always meant preparation
of grace, which is NOT based on merits. Again, Lessius insists, these two
views can be perfectly reconciled.

Having made his point about the Fathers’ view on the matter, Lessius turned
to ten theological arguments to criticize the Dominicans’ understanding of
predestination:

1. The unpalatable consequence of the Dominicans’ view of election, in which

the order of intention precedes the choice of means and the will to carry it out, is
that the reprobates are excluded not only negatively, but positively as well (a
view that echoes Calvin’s own). To defend such view, Dominicans have used the
following examples (which according to Lessius further illustrate how un-
defensible such view is): a) God wants to establish a kingdom of the saints
according to the size he has envisioned; thus, he has chosen the number of beings
who fit his “blueprint,” no more, no less: the remaining human beings are
excluded; b) The choice of the elect is like the choice of stones which will make up
his “palace:” God as supreme architect has chosen which stones to use and what
role they will play in it.
Lessius wonders: how can anyone fail to see that the not-chosen are de facto
rejected and excluded?

7
Augustine, The Gift of Perseverance 19, 48: “No one has been able to dispute, except
erroneously, against that predestination which I am maintaining in accordance with the Holy
Scriptures.”
8
De praedestinatione, 519.
 199

2. Their view is neither consistent with God’s sincere will to save all, nor
with his love. Why would he decide to pick so few and leave out so many, without
even foreseeing their sins? Why would he give them an incongruous grace he
decrees they will not respond to? What kind of “sufficient” grace is that? A
feigned and insincere one!
Dominicans, however, object that conditional foreknowledge upheld by
Lessius also implies a non-serious salvific will, since God knows that the non-
elect will not respond. However, Lessius retorts that this is not the same thing!9
Foreknowledge depends in a certain measure on the way things unfold; but
absolute election does not at all, because it anticipates all the foreseen events.
Moreover, just as man can honestly desire something and pursue something he
knows is not going to happen, so can God. If God’s foreknowledge does not
depend in any way, shape, form or degree on the way things unfold, I do not see,
Lessius argues, how can God seriously call a man to conversion whom he
foreknows will not follow his grace.

3. God’s promises and threats are conditional, and predicated upon a human
response (see Trent VI, canon 20), but in the Dominicans’ system they ring
hollow; moreover, they would be quite pointless if God has already determined
who will be saved and who will not!

4. The Dominicans’ view is not consistent with divine mercy and justice, since
God does not decree anything that is useless or harmful or conducive to
perdition. God’s negative reprobation by which people are excluded from election,
and the preparation of incongruous graces are “useless and harmful to creatures,
and aim at their ruin.”10This, however, contradicts what Jesus said about having
come to save souls and not lose them. Consider also the legitimate complaint that
people who have been passed over may utter: “We have been excluded from that
decree. Congruous grace was denied to us through no fault of our own; only
incongruous grace was prepared for us. No good deeds were decreed for us to
perform. God led us astray: he undermined our salvation and made it impossible
for us to attain it.”11
However, when Dominicans object that God allowed something harmful such
as the Fall of angels and man, Lessius objects that allowing it is not the same
thing as ordering it! The Dominicans’ view’s logical conclusion is that the
overwhelming majority of people has been predestined to evil and created unto

9
Ibid., 521.
10
Ibid., 522.
11
Idem.
 200

damnation: however, according to Lessius, such idea is a “great evil” (ingens

malum).

5. The Dominicans’ view removes the solicitude to perform good works and
to attain salvation, since it engenders a passive attitude: if I am in the number of
the elect, I most certainly will perform the works God has set up for me to do;
and if not, why bother? When Dominicans argue that the non-elect have the
potential to be saved, of what use is potentiality if separated from actuality?
Though the Dominicans’ view differs from the Reformers’ insofar as they admit
and uphold intrinsic freedom of the will (which Calvin and Luther had
vehemently denied), nonetheless from a practical and affective point of view, it
hardly does.12 The same is true of the distinction they claim exists between
positive and negative reprobation, since in both cases damnation is the certain
outcome, as God gives the non-elect his incongruous graces.

6. Lessius claims his opponents’ view undermines the zeal to evangelize and
to care for souls, since why should I be concerned about another person’s
salvation? If God has already determined he/she is going to be in the number of
the elect, they will be saved; if not, then they will surely be damned, regardless of
my efforts.

7. This view does not fit with the natural order of things and the way the
universe is run by Providence. According to Lessius’ opponents, the number of
the elect; the specific individuals making up this group; their good works and
their degree of glory have all been pre-established in an absolute manner by God
before the foreseen Fall, and they do not depend on any future conditions. Lessius
objects that this is hardly believable on account of the following two reasons:
a) What if Adam had not sinned? Would God have selected only some sinless
people and leave the rest out? b) Christ would not have come in the flesh had
Adam not sinned [pace Scotus]: thus, neither the Incarnation, nor his passion
were pre-ordained before the foreseen Fall; However, most of the good works of
the NT’s just people presuppose Christ and his teachings: this suggests that the
works of the just according to their kind and objects have NOT been efficaciously
predetermined before the foreknowledge of sin, and much less so according to
their specific circumstances!

8. The consequence of absolute predestination is that the mutual dependence

of good works and merits is rescinded, since Dominicans claim that such

12
Ibid., 523.
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dependence belongs to the order of execution, which comes after the order of
intention.
Lessius goes on to criticize this view with seven further points:
1) Such view is not consistent with our understanding of freedom, since it
disposes of an essential aspect of it, namely its indifference to choices (i.e., it is not
determined).
2) It does not harmonize with Sirach 15:11-20:

Don't blame the Lord for your sin; the Lord does not cause what he hates. Don't
claim that he has misled you; he doesn't need the help of sinners to accomplish
his purposes. The Lord hates evil in all its forms, and those who fear the Lord
find nothing attractive in evil. When, in the beginning, the Lord created human
beings, he left them free to do as they wished. If you want to, you can keep the
Lord's commands. You can decide whether you will be loyal to him or not. He
has placed fire and water before you; reach out and take whichever you want.
You have a choice between life and death; you will get whichever you choose.
The Lord's wisdom and power are great and he sees everything. He is aware of
everything a person does, and he takes care of those who fear him. He has never
commanded anyone to be wicked or given anyone permission to sin.

3) It does not harmonize with the Fathers’ teaching that God’s foreknowledge
does not impose necessity on human beings’ actions (i.e., they are not going to
happen because God foresaw they would happen, but God knows them because
they will take place). Jerome, Augustine (The City of God V, 10; On Free Will, 4),
John Damascene, and Cyril said this much. Calvin, however, and Dominicans as
well, rejected this patristic view. Calvin even boldly claimed:

If God merely foresaw human events, and did not also arrange and dispose of
them at his pleasure, there might be room for agitating the question, how far
his foreknowledge amounts to necessity; but since he foresees the things which
are to happen, simply because he has decreed that they are so to happen, it is
vain to debate about prescience, while it is clear that all events take place by his
sovereign appointment (Institutes of the Christian Religion III, 23, 6).

4) It follows that not just the deeds that humans perform, but the
circumstances in which they do them are also predetermined by divine decree –
which is absurd. Sometimes we do things in a lukewarm manner (like praying a
few minutes every few days, or giving a little money as alms): to say that God
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determined such half-hearted good deeds is preposterous, since Jesus said: “Be
perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Mt 5:48).13
5) Most of the good works of the NT’s just people presuppose Christ and his
teachings, but according to the prevalent theological view Christ would not have
come in the flesh had Adam not sinned; thus, the works of the just according to
their objects and kind have not been efficaciously predetermined before the
foreknowledge of sin, and much less so according to their circumstances.
6) Just as every one of our good works were decreed before our foreseen
cooperation, likewise all the particles of the bodies of the elect must allegedly be
predefined before the foreknowledge of the course of future events; this super-
miracle of convergence of particles over centuries, irrespective of people’s
freedom, is extremely unlikely.
7) We believe that the following events (for instance) were not decreed before
God’s foreknowledge of their circumstances:
a) The sufferings of Christ, before the foreknown malice of the Jews living at
that time.
b) The martyrdom of the saints, before the malice of the tyrants.
c) David’s appointment to kingship, before Saul’s sin (1 Sam 13: 13,14).
d) Joseph’s rising in the Egyptian court, before the attempted murder at his
brothers’ hands (Gen 37).
e) The fall of Jerusalem, before Zedekiah’s hardening (Jer 38).

Lessius analyzes the counter-objections marshalled by Dominicans against

these instances, and then offers his response.14

9. The Dominicans’ view is not useful for salvation. Not only such view fails
to bring peace and reassurance to troubled souls: it brings affliction and doubt.
Lessius claims that he knew of some people who fell into despair, and of other
learned men who were critical of predestination because they felt it encouraged
licentiousness. Predestination based on foreknowledge of future works, however,
does not impose necessity, as Anselm aptly pointed out in his first chapter of De
Concordia and Aquinas in his Summa III, q. 1, art. 3, Responsio ad 4.15

10. The Dominicans’ doctrine differs from Augustine’s on several accounts:

13
Ibid., 526.
14
Ibid., 527-30.
15
I outlined Anselm’s view of predestination in my God’s Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic
Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance (Xlibris, 2009): 425-431.
 203

a) Augustine said that the perseverance of angels and of Adam was based on
their free will assisted by common grace, not on God’s absolute decree irrespective
of foreknowledge:

We confess in a most salutary manner what we believe with complete correctness, namely,
that the God and Lord of all things who created all things very good, who foreknew that
evils would arise from good, and who knew that it pertains to his omnipotent good ness to
make good use of evils rather than not to allow evils to exist, ordered the life of angels and
human beings in such a way that he might, first of all, show in their lives what their free
choice could do and then what the benefit of his grace and judgment of his justice could do.
In fact, some angels, whose leader is called the devil, became runaways from the Lord God
by their free choice. In fleeing from his goodness by which they were happy, they,
nonetheless, could not escape his judgement by which they became completely wretched. But
the rest remained standing in truth by their free choice, and they merited to know as a most
certain truth that they would never fall (On Rebuke and Grace 10, 27).16

Lessius points out that in the next chapter Augustine also wrote:

But the fact that Adam did not will to remain in it, is of course his fault, as it
would have been his merit if he had willed to remain in it, as the holy angels
did. When the other angels fell through free choice, the holy angels remained
standing through the same free choice and merited to receive the reward due to
their remaining, namely, the fullness of happiness by which they are absolutely
certain that they will remain in it forever (On Rebuke and Grace 11, 32) .

b) The Dominicans say that absolute election would have subsisted even if
Adam had persevered in a state of innocence: not so Augustine!
c) Davila said that predestination and election were decreed before the
foreknowledge of the Fall; Augustine, Richard and Driedo, on the contrary, based
the beginning of predestination on the separation of some from the massa
damnata, after the Fall.
d) The Dominicans place the election of Christ before God’s foreknowledge of
future events, unlike what Aquinas (De veritate q.6, art.3), Gregory of Valencia
and Gabriel Vasquez repeatedly pointed out.

Lessius says that he is not arguing that good works and faith are not gifts of
God or that they were not pre-assigned to some people from all eternity, but only
that they were not predestined by an absolute decree irrespective of and before their
foreseen cooperation. Dominicans insist that in our fallen condition, due to our
feebleness and inconsistency, we cannot do what is good and persevere in it.
16
Augustine, Answer to the Pelagians IV, trans. Roland Teske, S.J., (New York City Press,
1999), 127.
 204

Agreed, says Lessius, who goes on to say that with God’s assistance foreknown
aids are given to men, who retain their freedom to do good or not, to persevere or
not, not any differently than the angels or Adam, as Trent said in session VI,
canons 5 and 6.
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Chapter 2
PART THREE

In this section Lessius takes head on nine scriptural passages used by

Dominicans. According to him, not only these verses represent a questionable
proof of the truth of their view: they can actually be used to support Lessius’ view
itself! (I will first quote the verse employed by Dominicans, followed by Lessius’
response)

1)“If those days had not been cut short, no one would survive, but for the sake of
the elect those days will be shortened…for false Christs and false prophets will
appear and perform great signs and miracles to deceive even the elect – if that
were possible” (Mt 24: 22, 24).
This passage actually supports our own view, said Lessius; it does not
support the view of an absolute election irrespective of foreknowledge of future
events. But what about Jn 13:18 (“I know those whom I will choose”), wonder the
Dominicans? Lessius replies that the verse refers to election to apostolate and that
even if we were to follow the minority view upheld by Augustine and Bede, which
claims that this text refers to election to eternal life, this passage too supports our
position (i.e., Judas’ foreknown betrayal was the cause of his reprobation).

2) “Do not be afraid, little flock, for your Father has been pleased to give you the
kingdom” (Lk 12:32).
The bestowal of the kingdom is not an absolute, but a conditional event (“if
you persevere”) as Trent VI, canon 20 said.
a) These words apply not only to the apostles, but also to all the disciples.
b) Jesus wanted to point out to his disciples the good will of the Father.
c) Jesus wanted to encourage his disciples to do good works. God wanted to
give these things not with an absolute, but with a conditional will.

3)“For the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus
our Lord” (Rom 6:23).
This verse does not really help our opponents, since it merely says that
these things have been freely decreed.

4)“We know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him,
who have been called according to his purpose” (Rom 8:28).
The expression “according to his purpose” (secundum propositum) does not
refer to the absolute election of those who will be saved, but rather to the
gratuitous good will of God. Moreover:
 206

a) Besides the apostles, all the faithful are elected and called according to his
will; this divine good will is rooted in foreknowledge (1 Pt 1; Rom 8:29; Rom 11).
b) The good will which applies to all disciples is opposed to human works.
c) This text not only applies to the predestined, but is also an exhortation to
the faithful in Rome to endure with patience during persecution.
In essence, Rom 8:28 applies to all the justified, who are called “elected and
predestined,” not in reference to absolute predestination, but to election to the
grace of justification; not in reference to complete predestination, but to divine
love which requires our cooperation to be fulfilled. Moreover, when Paul says “I
am certain that…” (Rom 8:38), in Greek that expression means estimation,
confidence, and not absolute certainty: what Paul is emphasizing is God’s
unshaking love, and not absolute predestination.

5) “Yet, before the twins were born or had done anything good or bad—in order
that God’s purpose in election might stand not by works but by him who calls—
she was told, ‘The older will serve the younger.’ Just as it is written: “Jacob I
loved, but Esau I hated” (Rom 9:11,12).
From all this we can exclude that God looks at our past works to give grace,
but not that he does not look at future works to be done by us thanks to his grace;
some people even talk of election to the benefits (both temporal and spiritual) of
this life. The purpose of this passage in Romans is not to emphasize God’s
unconditional election at the exclusion of good works, but with the inclusion of
the works stemming from faith and love for God and his Christ, which are placed
in our hearts by divine grace.
Lessius goes on to exegete the Esau and Jacob passage and the meaning of
“God hated Esau.” Moreover, “God has mercy on who he wants and hardens who
he wants” must not be understood absolutely, but rather as in the case of
Pharaoh’s hardening.

6) “For who makes you different from anyone else? What do you have that you
did not receive? And if you did receive it, why do you boast as though you did
not?” (1 Cor 4:7).
The passage used by the Dominicans does not prove their point, as if God
elected a person to glory, giving him grace, and did not choose another by not
giving him grace. In my mind, says Lessius, the situation described by Paul is like
a king offering two paupers a million coins each: if one accepts it and the other
rejects it, the fact remains that it was the king’s offer that made possible the
distinction, though the different responses sealed the difference between the two
paupers. According to this example, Paul simply emphasizes that the one who
accepted the king’s offer cannot glory in himself.
 207

7) “For he chose us in him before the creation of the world to be holy and
blameless in his sight. In love he predestined us for adoption to sonship through
Jesus Christ, in accordance with his pleasure and will” (Eph1: 4,5).
Lessius claims that this text does not speak of absolute predestination to
glory or of predestination alone, but of the election to faith in Christ and to the
grace of justification which is common to all the justified (which can be lost by
one’s behavior and subsequent life choices). Proofs of this are:
a) Paul seemed to be unaware of who had ultimately been elected, as well as
whether he himself had been, as he implied in 1 Cor 9:27: “I strike a blow to my
body and make it my slave so that after I have preached to others, I myself will
not be disqualified for the prize.”
b) If by “us” Paul meant all Christians, namely those who had been justified
(rather than all the recipients of absolute predestination or predestination to
glory), it follows and flows from that that the next sentence “who predestined us
to the adoption of children” applies to all the justified. Otherwise, if we take the
“us” to be applied to those who are finally and fully elected and predestined, the
two sentences in Paul’s prayer are disconnected (nulla esset connexio orationis)17 and
offer little encouragement and help to the Christians in Ephesus. What Paul is
talking about here is incomplete predestination and election, directly to the grace
of justification (or adoption to God’s children), and secondarily to the perfection
of life, to perseverance and glory. Justification is like the intrinsic and immediate
terminus of this election/predestination: the other things are not applied to us
absolutely, without our presupposed cooperation or merits proceeding from the
grace of justification.
According to Lessius, the word “elect” applies to all the faithful (Rom 16; 1
Cor 1; Col 3; 2 Thess 2; Titus 1; 1 Pt 1). Paul’s purpose was to teach the faithful,
and mostly the Jews, that justice is not conferred by previous works, but by God’s
gratuitous good will; he refers to them with the words “election,”
“predestination,” “God’s pleasure:” however, these terms do not refer to glory,
which is a doctrine that not only cannot be taught to God’s people, but is actually
harmful to them.

8) “And when the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and glorified the word of
the Lord: and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed” (Acts 13:48).
Lessius pointed out that this text was used by Calvin to uphold his views on
predestination and reprobation. However:
a) It does not say that they were predestined absolutely before foreseen good
deeds.

17
Ibid., 539.
 208

b) It is probably a reference to incomplete predestination, namely to

predestination to justification.
c) It is not credible that in the town of Antioch there were no other
predestined people besides these people who believed. The word in Greek is “well
disposed,” having a desire for salvation. This text simply means that at that time
some were ready to believe, that’s all: Stapleton upheld the same point.

9) The “Book of Life” in Revelation 20 suggests that some people have been
predestined by God’s absolute decree.
Just as we distinguish between complete and incomplete
election/predestination, likewise the fact that one’s name is written in the Book of
Life can either be a temporary or a final condition; those whose names are on it
can still be taken off it (Ex 32; Ps 38; Rev 3; Lk 10). As far as Luke 10:20 is
concerned, it does not seem likely that the Lord wanted to reveal to the seventy-
two disciples their complete predestination: rather, that expression “but rejoice
that your names are written in heaven” applied to that particular moment (pro quo
tempore iusti sunt) and to the condition of human cooperation/obedience.
Moreover, the expression “dati filio a patre”(given to the Son by the Father) does
not apply just to the elect to glory, but to all those who have been justified.

PART FOUR

In this part Lessius critically assesses the Dominicans’ use of Augustine’s

writings.

In his De correptione et gratia 7,13, Augustine wrote:

There is no doubt that, for any who have been set apart from that original condemnation by
the generosity of God’s grace, God disposes that it is arranged for them to hear the Gospel.
And when they hear it, they believe it and they persevere in the faith which works through
love (Gal 5:6) up to the end; and if at some point they ‘backslide’, they are corrected once
they have been rebuked.

Further on, Augustine wrote: “God accomplishes all these things in them
who he made to be vessels of mercy and who he also chose in his Son before the
creation of the world (Eph 1:4) through the election of grace. ‘But if it was done
by grace, it is not because of works, otherwise grace is no longer grace.’” (Rom
11:6). He then added that these people “have been chosen to reign with Christ,
and none of them will perish because God is not mistaken, nor is he defeated by
human sinfulness” (De correptione et gratia 7, 14).
After acknowledging that these words of Augustine’s could indeed be
construed to support election ante praevisa merita (before foreseen merits), Lessius
 209

tries solve the difficulty by putting them in the context of Augustine’s train of
thought, namely “to teach that all good works as well as our perseverance do not
stem from ourselves (i.e., from our unaided natural powers), but from God’s grace,
and as such they are his gifts.”18 Likewise, separation from the massa damnata and
election to the grace of justification and to glory are not due to our good works,
but to God’s grace and mercy. Thus, when Paul and Augustine insist that these
things “do not stem from works,” they do not mean works stemming from grace,
but refer only and exclusively to works performed before and without the
bestowal of grace.19
Lessius defends his interpretation of Augustine’s text with three arguments:
1) Augustine was arguing against Pelagians and Semipelagians who believed
that repentance, faith and the decision to believe were human achievements: he
did not mean to exclude the works of grace, precisely because they are not mere
human works, nor stemming from unaided free will. Thus, the saints’ separation
from the massa damnata does not completely occur before divinely foreseen human
cooperation and perseverance (though such cooperation and perseverance, which
is up to us, does not earn this separation).
2) Augustine is not just talking about the “order of intention,” but also of the
“order of execution,” as Paul did. This means that foreseen works done out of
grace are not to be excluded: only those done out of the strength of our unaided
free will, are.
3) According to Pelagians, people are elected to the kingdom of God directly
through the works of nature, and this kingdom is predestined for them due to the
good deeds accomplished by unaided human will power. Semipelagians, on their
part, claimed that grace, by which humans deserve to attain heaven, is
nonetheless directly predestined thanks to human deeds. This is what we learn
from Prosper’s and Hilary’s letters to Augustine.
Lessius’ conclusion:

It is certain that Augustine never felt that it is of the essence of the faith to believe that
absolute election to glory occurs without God’s consideration of our merits stemming from
grace; what is also certain is that such election is not deserved by our unaided moral efforts,
but on the contrary the works done by grace are worthy of glory and such glory is decreed
for us due to our divinely inspired merits.20

Lessius goes on to admit that there are many other passages in Augustine’s
writings that appear to lend support to the Dominicans’ view and thus led many
of his careful readers to the wrong conclusion (e.g. The Grace of Christ, chapters 13

18
Ibid., 541.
19
Idem.
20
Ibid., 542.
 210

and 47; Rebuke and Grace, chapters 10-12; Epistle 107), namely that after the Fall
our free will has been so weakened that in order to perform a single good work
we need physically predetermining grace, and that the only sufficient grace is
such grace. Lessius also pointed out the standard Dominican reply, namely that
had Augustine simply excluded natural works he would not have said anything
different than what previous fathers had said: however, Prosper’s letter to
Augustine says that he, Augustine, was accused of departing from the consensus
patrum.
Lessius’ response is that Augustine had to use a strict and uncompromising
way to deny Pelagians any opportunity to claim that natural works win us favor
with God, and that not even foreseen good works can do that: Ruardus Tapper
(professor at Louvain and chief papal inquisitor) and others had said this much in
their attempt to reconcile Augustine with the rest of the Fathers.21
At this point, Lessius goes on to tackle another Augustinian text often
quoted by Dominicans, taken from The Gift of Perseverance 8:

From two little ones equally bound by original sin, why is the one adopted but the other left?
And from two non-believers who are already adults, why is this one called so that he follows
the one who calls him, but that one is either not called or not called in that way? These are
God’s inscrutable judgments. But from two believers why is perseverance up to the end
given to this one and not given to that one? These are judgments of God that are even more
inscrutable” (9,21).This nonetheless ought to be absolutely certain for the faithful, namely
that the former person belongs among the predestined, while the latter does not, ‘for if they
belonged with us – as John, one of the predestined said, who had drunk this secret at the
Lord’s heart – they would of course remained with us… ‘(1 Jn 2:19) They did not belong to
them because they were not called according to God’s design (Rm 8:28); they were not
chosen in Christ before the creation of the world (Eph 1:4); they had not obtained their lot in
him; they were not predestined according to the plan of him who accomplishes all things
(Eph 1:11).

Lessius is undeterred and claims that this passage, if correctly understood,

does not rebuff his view, nor does it uphold absolute predestination and
reprobation.
To begin with, Lessius remarks that according to Augustine (who echoes
Paul) the reason for reprobation and predestination in the case of a child who was
not baptized and one who was, are the “inscrutable judgments of God,” when he
could have said apertis verbis that it was an absolute decision on the part of God
before he had knowledge of future events. But why did Augustine say
“inscrutable?” Because of factors such as: a) those that are not due to children’s

21
These scholars claimed that Augustine had in mind immediate election to grace, which does
not depend on foreseen works (as Pelagians claimed); the Fathers instead were talking about
immediate election to glory, which is based on foreseen merits performed through grace.
 211

natural merits and demerits (as Pelagians claimed); b) prayers of other people
(e.g., family and friends); c) God’s permissive will, allowing things to unfold in a
natural way; d) God’s good pleasure.
In the case of an adult who is called and one is not, there could be multiple
reasons. First, because God foreknew that the one called has fewer obstacles to
overcome, while the ones not called have several ties holding them back; second,
because some people are naturally quick to grasp what is at stake, making this
vocation easier to accept; third, because of the prayers and merits of family and
friends; fourth, because of having committed fewer, lesser sins and for doing good
works under grace’s influence before the call to believe; fifth, because God
distributes his gifts unequally, as he sees fit.
As far as final perseverance is concerned, Lessius says: “I understand, in
agreement with Augustine, that such a gift consists in a series of helps/aids
through which God foreknew that once given to a person, he/she would
persevere.”22 As to why some individuals follow up on God’s call and others do
not, and why some persevere to the end and others do not, the reason, according
to Lessius, is not inscrutable: it is a matter of free will, of a person’s free decision
to either make God’s grace efficacious or render it inefficient. God, prior to
distributing his graces, already foreknew which ones would be efficacious and
which ones would not. But why does he give people inefficacious graces? Lessius
says that “we cannot know the specific reason with any degree of certainty,”23
though we can be confident that he still gave everyone sufficient grace oriented to
salvation, a grace that people could have easily welcomed. Therefore, we cannot
use the diversity and difference of graces as an argument to uphold absolute
election and reprobation. The difference of effects produced by God’s grace is
dependent upon the response of our free will instructed by grace (a libertate
arbitrii divino auxilio instructi), and not upon the difference of the aids per se.
So, while predestination may be said to be the cause of perseverance due to
the prevenient divine aids, reprobation is not the cause of damnation, since our
free will is.
The last Dominican argument Lessius entertains in this part is that the
predestined are called according to God’s purpose, while the reprobate are called,
though not according to God’s purpose. This view seems to logically flow from
the idea of absolute and un-mediated predestination and reprobation: Lessius
denies that it does, and claims instead that it designates the absolute election and
purpose that God conceived after having foreseen and taken into account our
cooperation and perseverance.24

22
De praedestinatione, 543.
23
Idem.
24
Ibid., 544.
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Chapter 3

PART FIVE

Lessius critically reviews eight arguments marshalled by Dominicans in

support of their view of predestination against the Jesuits’ own:

FIRST ARGUMENT: The Jesuit view of predestination post praevisa merita or

ex praevisis meritis resembles the view of the Massilians that was condemned and
rejected by Prosper and Augustine. Prosper, in fact, reporting to Augustine the
Massilians’ view of predestination, wrote:

God has foreknown before the creation of the world why they are who will accept the faith
and with the help of further grace persevere in it. He has predestined for his kingdom those
who, called without any merit of their own, he foreknew would be worthy of their election
and depart from this life by a good death. Accordingly, every man is urged by the teachings
of Holy Scripture to believe and to work, and no one should despair of attaining eternal life,
the reward prepared for those who serve God freely.

Lessius replied that the Semipelagians’ error did not consist in believing in
predestination ex praevisis operibus per se, but in believing that those works (e.g.,
faith, spontaneous devotion, and the desire to believe) stemmed from unaided free
will. They also believed that man could be saved through natural law and that
approaching baptism and becoming children of God were merely a matter of
human choice; thus, according to them, God predestined those he knew would
believe one day. Lessius points out that this is clear in Prosper’s Letter to
Augustine:

The whole meaning of the call to grace they reduce to this: God has decreed not to admit
anyone into his kingdom except through the sacrament of regeneration and to call to this
gift of salvation all men in general, either by means of the natural law or of the written law
or of the preaching of the Gospel. Hence, any who so desire [Lessius added: “through free
will] can become sons of God. Those who refuse the faith have no excuse, and God’s justice
is manifested in the loss of unbelievers. His goodness shines out in this, that he discards no
one from eternal life but impartially wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge
of truth….Accordingly, they say, on God’s part eternal life is prepared for all men; but on the
part of human freedom those only attain to eternal life who of themselves believe in God and
through the merit of their faith obtain the help of graces.25

25
Prosper of Aquitaine, Defense of Saint Augustine, trans. P. De Letter, S.J., (Newman Press,
1963), 39.
 213

Hilary made a similar point when writing to Augustine about the Massilians’
deviant ideas:

God does not therefore in his foreknowledge choose the works of anyone which he himself is
going to give, but he chooses in his foreknowledge faith so that he chooses one whom he
foreknows will believe to whom he gives the Holy Spirit in order that by doing good works
he may also attain eternal life…But they insist that God’s foreknowledge, predestination, or
plan means only that God foreknew, predestined or planned to choose those who were going
to believe and that one cannot say with regard to this faith: ‘What do you have that you have
not received?’ since the ability to believe has remained in the same nature, though damaged,
which was originally given as healthy and whole.26

Lessius says that he and his party unequivocally reject as an “error in the
faith”27 the view that faith that deserves the first grace of God stems from us; he
also denies that according to Jesuits we may have the will and resolve to do good
works by which we deserve to receive the grace to carry them out jut in virtue of
natural strength (viribus naturae).

SECOND ARGUMENT: Operating in a most orderly fashion, God first intends

an end rather than the means to attain it: more specifically, once he decided to
save a set number of people and to bestow glory on them, he prepared the means
by which they would attain it. These means infallibly lead to salvation, as
Augustine taught in several of his works. Thus, God’s election proceeds from an
absolute intention of such end.
Lessius replies that if this logic is true, then it follows that God cannot
choose any other way, because he cannot proceed but in a most orderly fashion:
yet, this seems absurd and alien to God’s freedom and authority.28 Instead, it is
better to assume that as God intended in a most orderly way to bring about
something good in the guise of reward or wage, he did not decide in an absolute
manner to whom he would give it other than by first foreknowing those who
would deserve it or be worthy of it. More specifically, God decided to bestow his
heavenly kingdom as a reward or wage, rather than in an absolutely gratuitous
fashion; therefore, he did not decide in an absolute manner who he would give it
to, other than by foreseeing men’s merits.
Lessius concludes that his opponents major premise (i.e., in order for God to
proceed in an orderly fashion he must absolutely and efficaciously first intend an
end, namely glory of single individuals, before deciding what means he is going to
use) needs to be rejected.

26
Augustine, Answer to Pelagians IV, 62.
27
De praedestinatione, 544.
28
Ibid., 545.
 214

Lessius goes on to suggest that if we have to talk about an absolute and

efficacious will of God, we should refer it to his decision to bestow a crown of
justice (i.e., glory)29 rather than to arbitrarily give glory to specific individuals;
individuals will receive it conditionally, in other words, as long as they prove
themselves worthy of it by availing themselves of the means God will provide for
them.30
At this point, Dominicans will object that God does not act haphazardly,
meaning that as his first intention he absolutely and efficaciously chooses some
people on whom to bestow predestination, and also assigns to them a degree of
glory.
Lessius replies that it is absurd to say that God assigns a degree of glory to
people before foreseeing their works. He accepts the idea that God provides
efficacious means (and they are indeed efficacious only because human beings
accept them); according to him, God in distributing graces does not look at
whether they will have an effect or not, namely graces that will have an effect for
the elect alone, and other graces that will not have effect on the non-elect (the
way Congruism envisioned it): “I do not think that such distinction and
distribution of graces should be admitted.”31 He then produces four reasons for his
claim:
1) God is the author and enabler of the salvation of the elect, and yet he does
not jeopardize and undermine the salvation of the reprobate; however, according
to Congruism God does so by assigning only to the elect efficacious graces. How
is that not undermining the reprobates’ salvation?
2) This difference in the bestowal of graces before any foreknowledge of
human cooperation engenders torpor in the elect spiritual and desperation and a
sense of giving up in the reprobate.
3) The emphasis of Congruism is on the quantity and quality of grace per se,
not on our cooperation. On the contrary, according to Lessius, more and better
grace was bestowed on Judas who betrayed Jesus than what is found in the
sacrament of marriage in which good Christians are saved.
4) The distinction between congruous and incongruous graces presupposes
that God predestined all good things with an absolute decree before foreseeing
our predispositions and inclinations.

Lessius says he sees no problem with the idea that even though God wants
sincerely everybody to be saved and offers sufficient aids to all, he does not love
29
After all, God could have decided to reward his faithful in any other way, or even in no way at
all!
30
Just like the organizers of a tournament decide to reward the winner as well as second and third
place, on condition that the competitors attain such placements.
31
De praedestinatione, 545.
 215

everybody equally, but some more, some less, according to his good pleasure;
thus, for some he prepared greater aids in order that they may attain a better
crown.
A congruous grace is nothing else than a grace bearing an effect; an
incongruous grace is lacking an effect and is of no avail, if not downright harmful
(like one hundred coins one possesses or puts to good use are better and more
desirable than a million coins that are either missing or put to evil use): one ought
to prefer a congruous than an incongruous grace. This is a false dilemma, says
Lessius: a million coins given out of love by a donor are not to be trifled with.
An objection arises: if God did not bestow congruous graces because they are
efficacious in and of themselves, it then follows that grace would not be efficacious
out of God’s own intention. Lessius replies that this is not true. God always and
anywhere intends them to be efficacious, but they are rendered inefficacious
against his holy will by man’s choice. However, God’s intention is not absolute
before the foreseen determination of our will (ante praevisa merita): thus, the
efficacy of grace depends neither on God’s intention alone, nor on our free will
alone, but rather simultaneously on both God’s intention and our freedom going
along with it; conversely, the inefficacy of grace depends only on man’s refusal of
grace.
Next, Lessius discusses Augustine’s view of congruous grace. I agree, he says,
that according to Augustine God calls people by appealing to their feelings at
specific favorable circumstances, and that the non-elect are not given grace by
which they can persevere; what I deny, Lessius says, is that according to
Augustine people are predestined or reprobated before their foreseen merits or
demerits:

Complete predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of many things that are in our
power, first among them our consent and cooperation. Thus, it is no wonder if God gives the
predestined a grace that has an effect, because this grace presupposes foreseen
cooperation…Likewise, in the reprobates’ case grace is not given to them by which they may
be converted, because what is presupposed is their foreseen perseverance in doing evil, due to
which they are reprobated.32

If we understand Augustine in this fashion, Lessius says, we will be pleased

to realize that:
1) His view harmonizes with the rest of the fathers (the differences with them
arise because he was involved in anti-Pelagian polemics).
2) This way of understanding his view of the reprobates avoids making him
the promoter of a most harsh and uncompromising view that was condemned at

32
Ibid., 547.
 216

Orange II, can. 25 (namely that some people have been positively predestined to
be evil by an absolute decree before any foreknowledge of their evil works).
3) This view easily harmonizes with the way Lessius suggested Augustine’s
teaching on predestination needs to be understood.
Moreover, the scriptural passage: “He was snatched away, lest wickedness
pervert his mind or deceit beguile his soul” (Wis 4:11) is not an issue, since it does
not presuppose absolute election taking place before foreknowledge of such
person’s works.

THIRD ARGUMENT: Good works are gifts of God, and therefore in God the
decision to give them precedes his foreknowledge (if we have to talk about
foreknowledge at all, we can say that he foreknew them because he decided to give
them to the elect). Moreover, good works are gifts which he gave to people with
their glory in mind: thus, the intention to confer glory precedes God’s bestowal of
grace.
Lessius objected that divine grace is like a seed planted in human beings
through which he works good things in our lives. But this grace is only a partial
cause of our glorification: it requires our free will’s cooperation to form with it a
total and complete cause. God does not absolutely plant good works in us before
our consent and cooperation in order that we would passively perform them:
moreover, God gives us good gifts with people’s glory in mind, but his is not an
absolute, but rather a conditional will.
A human example will help clarify matters. When somebody tells another
person he will do something at a given condition, such will is conditional; when
such condition is fulfilled, the will becomes absolute and generates an envisioned
and pre-announced course of action. We need to think in this fashion about God’s
will to give us good works to do, though, unlike human beings, he doesn’t need to
wait until a condition is fulfilled since he foresees that it will be from all eternity.
Thus, Lessius concludes that in God conditional foreknowledge becomes absolute
in the very act in which he imagines a hypothesis; once the condition is in place, a
new act of approval and compliance is conceived in his mind, but this does not
flow in the work itself yet, since God is only supposing it. Lessius envisions
between foreknowledge and the decision to give grace upon the fulfillment of the
condition (i.e., man’s decision to accept grace) not an order of priority, but a
correlation, “which amounts to mutual dependence” (quia nulla est alterius ab altero
dependentia),33 meaning that God does not will absolutely before his
foreknowledge of the decision stemming from man’s free will.
Dominicans will object that such decision stemming from man’s free will is
the gift of God and the effect of predestination, and therefore it must have been

33
Ibid., 548.
 217

predestined and predefined by God; even so, Lessius wonders, was it predestined
by God absolutely, or under condition and with a vehement desire? God, in fact,
wishes to see our cooperation but not absolutely, if we don’t want freely.

FOURTH ARGUMENT: God elected some people to glory (e.g., the Virgin
Mary, John the Baptist, the apostles, and other remarkable saints) before any
foreknowledge of future events; there is no reason to think it is any different in
the case of all the elect.
Lessius replies that with the exception of the Virgin Mary, this is far from
certain (nulla ratio urget cur de caeteris concedamus),34as we can see in the Scriptures
and the works of the Fathers. Paul did not think of himself as having been
absolutely chosen (1 Cor 4: 3 ; 1 Cor 9: 27).
As far as saints like John the Baptist and Catherine of Siena are concerned, there
is no sufficient evidence of their absolute election, but only of peculiar favor and
love bestowed on them by God; even in the absence of such absolute election God
can still love some people more, and bestow on them greater gifts.
But, Dominicans insist, what about the case of infants who die before
attaining baptism? Doesn’t the fact that some did not receive it despite the best
efforts of their parents, while others received it providentially, without much
human solicitousness, clearly establish their absolute election/reprobation? Not
at all, according to Lessius! We don’t have to exclude foreknowledge of future
works from such election/reprobation. For instance, such outcomes could depend
on favorable/unfavorable circumstances that God allows, or on the
prayers/merits (or lack of) issuing from parents, family, or friends.

FIFTH ARGUMENT: The number of the saved is “set in stone” by God’s direct
and absolute intention. All theologians agree that history will end when the
number of the elect will be reached.
Lessius agrees, but that does not mean that such decision occurred before
God’s foreknowledge of future events. Before specific foreknowledge of future
events God has a universal salvific will and desire to give everyone sufficient
grace.

SIXTH ARGUMENT: According to the argument from the perfection of

Providence, we must attribute to God what is more perfect and fitting his
majesty. Now, such perfection of Providence can either be flowing from God’s
absolute decree to the effects that stem from it; or from order and congruity to
the effects that are governed by it.

34
Ibid., 549.
 218

In the first perspective, followed by Dominicans, God must predetermine in

an absolute manner not only good works, but also everything that is not evil (e.g.,
motions, events, animals’ behaviors) before foreknowing the future, thus
determining the outcome of secondary causes as well. Lessius says that he offered
several reasons why he rejected this view of providence in a treatise he had
previously written.35
In the second perspective, upheld by Congruists, God, before any free
decision on his part, among many other infinite orders of things and ways to
exercise his providence, conceived the one in which we now live (which is
inhabited by all angels and human beings), as well as the precise way to rule over
it. Next, he also foreknew through conditional foreknowledge, and still before any
free decision on his part, all the things that are now and will be in the future, in a
merely hypothetically way (in case he really wanted to make them), as well as the
way in which he would providentially manage them. Once this most clear and
distinct knowledge was in his mind, God was able, as a first reasonable move on
his part (even before making any decision as to what means to employ), to choose
all the people whom he hypothetically foreknew were going to be saved; he also
foreknew the degrees of glory and all the good works performed through his
remarkable providence by every single person. Moreover, he foreknew all those
people who were going to be damned, and decided not to elect them and not to
give them his congruous grace
However, Lessius points out that the second perspective is another way to
uphold God’s most perfect providence, one which is very congruent with the
human condition and worthy of a perfect ruler of the world, in which he beholds
the fallen state of humankind and the natural flow of things and events. What
need is there for God to predetermine everything when he can still perfectly
control the universe? According to the principle of conditional foreknowledge
God can still produce this or that work through his prevenient grace, without
imposing any necessity.
While it is true that God brings about the number, size, position and energy
of all the stars with an absolute and direct will (it could not be otherwise as far as
inanimate objects are concerned), when it comes to the works of human beings
and their way, manner of execution, place and order, God makes them happen
through the instrument of free will36 - which cannot be said about the rigor and
efficacy of an absolute decree contemplated by Dominicans.
Lessius declares that while it is logically possible for God to do things in an
absolute manner without regard of future events, it is not congruous with the
goodness and love he has for his creatures, nor with the justice that punishes sin;

35
Ibid., 551.
36
Idem.
 219

nor with the possibility of saving the reprobate; nor with human freedom and
liability to change; nor with various passages of Scripture. Thus, that conditional
foreknowledge which Congruists seem to apply to all things, makes it possible for
God to carry out anything he wants, while at the same time safeguarding human
free will.
Having said that, Lessius suggests that Congruism is still plagued by some
serious difficulties:
a) God’s decrees are not any milder as far as the distinction between the elect
and the non-elect is concerned.
b) God’s decrees are not thought of as liable to be blocked by our free will.
c) The things that God did not decree cannot happen.
This means that:
1) A person who is not elected is automatically not elected, and God’s
providence will ensure that such person will never be part of the blessed in
heaven; thus, conditional foreknowledge does not mitigate, but rather compounds
this problem.
2) According to conditional foreknowledge, the number of the reprobate and
the degree of their punishment are as determined and unchangeable as the
number of the saved and their degree of glory.

In Lessius’ view there is not much difference between positive and negative
reprobation, since in both of them the outcome of damnation is inevitable and
infallible. According to Congruism, even though there is admittedly no intrinsic
predetermination of the human will, since God’s will is absolute and efficacious (i.e.,
omnipotent) it is absolutely necessary for something that was predefined by God
to occur, and no creature can stop it from happening.
The fact that God foreknew that in such a moment/circumstance I would do
something freely (meaning, I could have also done otherwise) does not matter
much after all, if he inclines me to do it. Once God’s absolute predestination
touches something it changes its object, and what is touched is infused with a
certain objective necessity, making it impossible to act otherwise. Lessius
concludes: “The predetermination of an action is logically prior to the choice of
means by which God ensures such an action takes place, and therefore is not
dependent on the efficacy of this or that means.”37
However, things are different in case of election that comes after
foreknowledge of merits. When Congruists reply that those predefinitions
suppose that all things will happen hypothetically in a totally free way, meaning
that they may easily have not happened at all, and thus presupposing no
necessity, Lessius replies that this may be true in a state of suspended hypothesis,

37
Ibid., 552.
 220

but once a predefinition is applied, it is no longer the case, since such

predestination ensures that things no longer are able to change or be stopped
from happening.
When all is said and done, according to Lessius the outcome of Congruism is
the same as PP: it takes away zeal for good actions, since why should we strive to
be good if all things have already been set up to happen? Why strive to do
anything, since our efforts will not attain their goals, since only what is
predefined will?

SEVENTH ARGUMENT: God, before any foreknowledge of our works, choses

and predestines a person to justification, which cannot be attained without our
consent. Likewise, it can be said that God elects someone to glory, even though
we cannot attain it other than through our cooperation and merits. Repentance
comes from accomplished faith, which merits for us ex congruo the grace of
justification.
Lessius replies that the example is asymmetrical: there are no merits
preceding justification due to which God chooses a person to receive this grace,
but there are many merits that precede glory due to which glory is bestowed on a
person; nor does it matter that faith, hope and repentance precede justification,
because these are greatly imperfect means, and because they do not proceed from
a congruous calling (by ‘congruous’ Lessius means a previous congruity which
consists in a peculiar conformity with the mind and inclinations of a given person
– not merely a subsequent congruity stemming from the ensuing effect of divine
grace). Thus, faith, hope, and repentance do not merit justification, nor are they
its causes; rather, this congruity (i.e., grace together with human cooperation) is
the cause of those acts.
The reason for election to justice and glory are not the same at all. Lessius
denies that justification is decreed absolutely before foreknowledge of our merits
and faith, because God did not decide to instill in us hope and repentance in an
absolute manner and to accept us as his adopted children other than by our
foreseen consent, which is freely determined by our free will response, and not
determined by divine fiat.
According to Lessius, we can agree with a certain sense in which Augustine
and some biblical passages say that we are elected freely and not because of our
works: 1) because no unaided human work procures for us salvation and glory; 2)
because free election does not exclude a series of human dispositions by which we
are elevated to and prepared for glory.

EIGHT ARGUMENT: Unless God assigned efficacious grace to those who will
be saved, predestination is emptied of its meaning, since in that case the
distinction between elect and reprobate does not issue from God, but from human
 221

beings. In this case God would act in an indifferent manner and in the same way
towards everybody. Thus, the end result would be that the reason why some
behave well and others in does not stem from God’s predestination, but from
human cooperation- which is absurd and opposed to the mind of the great
Augustine.
Lessius denies that he is emptying predestination per se of its meaning;
rather, he is trying to disprove a certain way of understanding predestination (i.e.,
before foreseen merits; absolute; complete; un-mediated predestination) and to
uphold predestination that issues not only from God but at the same time from
human free will. According to him, the distinction between elect and reprobate
comes neither from free will alone, nor only from grace-based predestination, but
from both free will and grace at the same time (simul).38Likewise, good works and
perseverance that distinguish the saved from the damned depend on
predestination because they depend on grace, as Augustine said in The
Predestination of the Saints 10, 19: “Predestination is the preparation of grace;
grace is the gift itself.”

38
Ibid., 553.
 222

Chapter 4

PART SIX

Summing things up, Lessius goes on to make six claims (assertio) concerning
predestination and reprobation.

FIRST CLAIM

After the Fall God did not abandon us to our fate but sent his Son to die for
our sins, so that thanks to his merits all human beings would receive sufficient
help and be saved; however, God foreknew that a lot of people would not avail
themselves of such opportunity, either because of natural causes or out of their
free choice, and he truly regrets that, though he does not cause it to happen. We
may compare this situation to that of a Ruler who ordered a shelter to be built,
capable of accommodating all the poor and homeless in his country, wishing they
would all be fed there; even though such king knew that due to the negligence of
some of his ministers some people would starve to death or be kept from coming,
we cannot in good conscience say that he did not offer sufficient help to all.
However, someone could object: “But if God is the author of this providential
arrangement and if he knew some would not obey him, he is responsible for their
refusal and did not really want to apply his help to them.” Lessius replies that
God is indeed the author of this providential arrangement, but he did not wish
this per se: this arrangement arises as a triage or “field hospital” in response to a
crisis situation stemming from the Fall: God did not intend this as his first ideal
scenario.39
At this point Lessius introduces a few scriptural passages to support his
assertion:
1) Wis 11: 23, 24: “But you have mercy on all, because you can do all things;
and you overlook sins for the sake of repentance. For you love all things that are
and loathe nothing that you have made; for you would not fashion what you hate.”
These words clearly illustrate God’s paternal love for us and cannot be
reconciled with absolute election; negative reprobation; denial of sufficient grace;
and preparation of non-congruous grace.
2) Wis 12: 10: “For these were enemies of your servants, doomed to death;
yet, while you punished them with such solicitude and indulgence, granting time
and opportunity to abandon wickedness, with what exactitude you judged your
children, to whose ancestors you gave the sworn covenants of goodly promise.”

39
De praedestinatione, 554.
 223

This text suggests that Pharaoh and the Egyptians, who were said to be
hardened, received sufficient grace to repent.
3) Pr 1: 20, 23 : “Out in the open wisdom calls aloud, she raises her voice in
the public square; on top of the wall she cries out, at the city gate she makes her
speech: ‘Repent at my rebuke! Then I will pour out my thoughts to you, I will
make known to you my teachings.’”
Lessius concludes that sufficient grace is given to all, so that all may heed
God’s call.
4) Mt 28: 19: “Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them
in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching
them to obey everything I have commanded you.”
Jesus made no exceptions to his mandate to baptize: as far as he was
concerned, he wanted to bestow the grace of baptism to everyone, and to all
baptized believers he promised salvation.
5) 1 Tim 2: 4, 5: “This is good, and pleases God our Savior, who wants all
people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. For there is one God
and one mediator between God and mankind, the man Christ Jesus, who gave
himself as a ransom for all people.”
This means that in God there is a sincere desire to lead everybody to
salvation. However, this divine love and desire cannot be upheld in the absence of
the will to give everyone sufficient help/grace: for how could God really want to
save everyone and yet not to give to some people (or, worse yet: to most people)
the necessary assistance? Paul could not have been clearer about this. Lessius
goes on to quote Prosper, Augustine and John Damascene to this effect (who
distinguished between God’s antecedent will/predestination from a consequent
will that takes into account our sinfulness and refusal to accept his grace).
6) 2 Pt 3: 9: “The Lord is not slow in keeping his promise, as some understand
slowness. Instead he is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but
everyone to come to repentance.”
People do not perish necessarily, nor are kept from repenting. God would not
wait for people to repent if he knew they could not. Scripture is filled with
exhortations to all people to repent, which would not be possible for them
without sufficient grace’s help.

SECOND CLAIM

By the previous assertion Lessius says that he does not mean to suggest that
God gives everybody in a secondary actuality such help which is immediately
sufficient to engender faith or repentance (no theologian has ever unskillfully
thought so): what he means is that God gives everybody a certain beginning, or
better, a certain inspiration, and if a person follows it, he/she will be further
 224

helped; thus, by responding to further inspirations, a person will attain faith and
justification. This is eminently true of people who live in Christian lands, where
the Gospel is preached and the Church is present, though in the case of pagan
nations or of the un-evangelized, it is indeed more difficult to explain how
sufficient help is prepared for them.
God has many ways to reach these people, as we learn in the cases of the
eunuch, Cornelius, and others who received extraordinary providential assistance.
Lessius claims that God’s inspiration is sufficient to incline a person’s will to want
to understand what pertains to our faith, and to pray; at the same time our natural
reason tells him/her to obey and not to withdraw from what God proposes. Once
a person obeys, he is disposed to receive even more inspiration, and at the same
time is helped by God to remain consistent and to pursue these matters. These
inspirations which precede the confession of faith almost belong to the natural
order in their substance, though they must be regarded as supernatural
considered in their way and under God’s direction.
After analyzing the content of faith, a person may come to the rational
conclusion that it is credible and to be believed as stemming from God. Such
inner deliberations precede a firm intellectual assent; also, they do not happen
without divine assistance, due to the fickleness of the human mind and the lies of
the devil. However, Lessius makes this important distinction: “This conclusion is
not quite believing yet, nor does it lead necessarily to faith. It is one thing to
believe, and quite another to believe something is to be believed.”40 For instance,
when one arrives at the conclusion that God is to be loved above all things, this
does not necessarily imply he/she does or will: in order to actually believe, there
first needs to be a will or a choice to do so. However, this is actually difficult and
beyond mere human perseverance; thus, in order to want to believe and to
actually believe, it is first necessary to receive the help of grace.41
Next, Lessius analyzes six steps in the process of believing. His conclusion is
that the intellect is not determined to assent in virtue of the power of the
proposition being considered: the human will does that. The same reasoning
applies to external works. For instance, to want to do almsgiving comes before
the act of giving itself. So, we distinguish two phases or acts: one of the will, the
other of the mind, both of them belonging to the natural order, which is in no way
sufficient to be a foundation for salvation (ullo modo sufficiens ut salutis sit
fundamentum).42
Lessius goes on to explain how God wants everybody to be saved and how he
prepares sufficient help in various ways for all people. He lists seven examples:
40
Ibid., 556.
41
Augustine’s and Prosper’s works, as well as Orange II, made this point abundantly clear and
firmly established it in Catholic theology.
42
De praedestinatione, 557.
 225

Adam before the Fall; Adam after the Fall; Noah; pious people among all nations
(e.g., Job, Melchizedek, Abraham); the witness of Creation available to all people;
the presence of the Church in the world; and private inspirations.
He then wrote:

God could certainly have forced human beings to be good by his express will, through the
ministry of the angels, by external pressure, by inner determination or by sheer necessity. He
also could have anticipated them in many elucidations so that they could not but have
embraced the good and shunned evil. However, none of these measures were necessary to
procure salvation, nor consistent with human nature, nor with the congruity of the excellent
heavenly reward awaiting us. As a matter of fact, the nature of virtue and the dignity of such
heavenly reward require that full freedom be given to man, so that he may really choose
what he wants in a totally free fashion.43

God does not intend, he went on to say, for our natural powers to be idle and
remain passive towards grace, almost as if they were unable to activate
themselves unless grace intervened, being totally dependent on grace’s action;
rather, he found it fitting that our human nature equipped with sufficient grace be
always solicitous and cooperating with his subsequent grace (2 Tim 1:6: “For this
reason I remind you to kindle anew the gift of God, which is in you by the laying
on of my hands;” 2 Cor 6:1: “As God’s co-workers we urge you not to receive
God's grace in vain”).

THIRD CLAIM

Every help that God bestows is efficacious in the first actuality (in actu primo)
because it has the power to bring about what it was meant for; however, whether
it efficaciously brings about the results God wished for or is turned down and
remains sterile in the secondary actuality (in actu secundo), is up to man’s free will,
which is the faculty to choose opposites (facultas oppositorum).44This is the case
because grace is not the total but the partial cause of man’s works, the other cause
being man’s diligent application and cooperation. Grace does not determine free
will, but supplies it with necessary power people may or may not avail themselves
of. Grace is the causa sine qua non: we cannot say that free will precedes it or that
grace follows it; or that the help of grace is added to the effort of the human will.
There is no priority of nature over grace, but rather mutual dependence.

FOURTH CLAIM

43
Ibid., 558.
44
Idem.
 226

God does not love everybody equally, but loves some people more and others
less, as he sees fit; on some people he bestows more frequent and powerful graces,
which is a sign of his unequal predilection. To love is to want someone’s good,
and where more good is bestowed on a person, the greater the love for him/her
is; for instance, we do find inequality and different degrees of excellence in the
stars, angels, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, earthly kingdoms, in a prince’s court,
and in each city government. An example Lessius uses to convey the idea that
God loves everyone and bestows on all sufficient prevenient grace, is that of a
father who has many children: he loves them all and wants their good, but not in
the same way or degree. This does not mean that God chooses people to be saved
before any foreknowledge of their works, but rather that he does not want their
glory absolutely, but conditionally (i.e., that they cooperate with the grace he
prepared for them) instead.

FIFTH CLAIM

All of the justified are elected and predestined to glory according to what
Scripture says, though in an incomplete way; to bring it fully about, our free will’s
cooperation is required as a condition on our part.
To back up the first part of his claim, Lessius quoted several scriptural
passages. For instance, in Rom 11: 6 (“So too, at the present time there is a
remnant chosen by grace”) Paul talks about salvation to be understood as that
provisional salvation stemming from justification, not as the final salvation that
results in glory, considering that Scripture rarely mentions complete and final
election and predestination (which does not depend only on God, but also on the
merits of our good works and perseverance). Moreover, we cannot invoke the
principle of “order of intention” as distinct from “order of execution,” because
what we are dealing with here is unequivocally the latter.
In 1 Cor 1: 26-29 we read: “Think of what you were when you were called.
Not many of you were wise by human standards; not many were influential; not
many were of noble birth. But God chose the foolish things of the world to shame
the wise; God chose the weak things of the world to shame the strong. God chose
the lowly things of this world and the despised things—and the things that are
not—to nullify the things that are, so that no one may boast before him.”
Lessius makes the point that the “calling” mentioned here (as well as in Eph
1; 2 Tim 1:9; and 1 Pt 1: 1,2) is to faith in Christ and to justification.
In conclusion, why does Scripture call the justified with the terms “elect” and
“predestined” or “enrolled in the Book of Life?” First, to proclaim the greatness of
God’s benefit and that all our salvation is contained in it: all the justified have to
do, is to consent to it. Second, to point out that this benefit does not stem from
our merits, but from God’s free decision.
 227

As far as the second part of his claim is concerned (i.e., our cooperation is
required to bring about final predestination is concerned) Lessius points out the
following texts:
1) Orange II’ s Conclusion: “According to the Catholic faith we also
believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all baptized
persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor
faithfully, to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of
essential importance in regard to the salvation of their soul.”
2) Trent VI, ch. 11: “For God does not forsake those who have been once
justified by his grace, unless he be first forsaken by them.”
3) Trent VI, ch. 13: “With regard to the gift of perseverance… let no one
promise himself herein something as certain with an absolute certainty,
though all ought to place and repose the firmest hope in God’s help. For
God, unless men themselves fail in his grace, as he has begun a good
work, so will he perfect it, working to will and to accomplish.”
4) 2 Pt 1: 10: “Make every effort to confirm your calling and election.”
5) God has prepared for all the justified all the helps and benefits they need
to be saved, though the condition specified by Scripture and the
Councils is “as long as they do not neglect God’s grace;” only then the
conditional will of God concerning their predestination becomes
absolute.

However, Lessius noted that the following objection is usually formulated by

Dominicans: predestination and election are complete in God from all eternity,
and therefore man cannot be the cause of its fulfillment through the good that he
does, because what is temporal cannot be the cause of what is eternal. According
to Lessius, this objection is too broad and could also be made against reprobation;
most important yet, we must deny its conclusion. While it is true that the
temporal is not the material or efficient cause of eternity, it may still be an
objective or moral cause.
Lessius finally draws SIX CONCLUSIONS from all this:
1) “If you are not predestined, act in a way that you will be,” is an ancient
saying (incorrectly attributed to Augustine). This saying is false if by that we
mean that one can be the cause of the preparation of the first grace (which is
instead a free gift of God); conversely, it is true, if by that we mean that one can
be the cause of the bringing God’s plan to completion – a cause without which
predestination remains incomplete. In support of his view, Lessius recalled the
Church’s “Prayer over the Gifts” for the first Sunday of Lent (in the Tridentine
rite): “Almighty and eternal God, who alone knows the number of the elect to be
admitted to the happiness of heaven, grant we beseech You, that through the
intercession of all your saints, the names of all who have been recommend to our
 228

prayers and of all the faithful may be inscribed in the book of blessed
predestination.” He also quoted Prosper’s Reply to Vincentian Articles 12; Answers to
the Lying Gauls resp 7 ad 3; and Fulgentius’ Ad Monimum 24.
2) It is easy for Lessius to respond to the objection called “the lazy argument”
(see Augustine’s The Gift of Perseverance 15), while, on the contrary, supporters of
absolute predestination have a hard time to put at ease consciences that are
troubled. Moreover, Lessius says that his view puts a person before his/her
responsibilities, exhorting him/her to strive for good, but the view of absolute
predestination instils fear and resignation.45
3) Lessius’ opponents accuse him of saying that predestination is not the cause
of our cooperation, but its effect. He denies it: through predestination we have the
strength and help sine quo non we cannot cooperate to do what is good. However,
our cooperation has not been absolutely decreed before being foreseen.
4) Even though all the good situations and means by which the predestined
are directed directly to salvation are known and absolutely decreed by God, they
are not such without a complete divine foreknowledge of the cooperation of their
free will. Eventually, later means were chosen by God after he foreknew people’s
cooperation with the earlier means he gave them. Therefore, conditionally speaking,
God wills to give his means and helps to everybody before any foreknowledge on
his part; absolutely speaking, he does so after foreseeing our cooperation.
5) We should not try hard to determine what good works are the effect of
predestination and which ones are not: all of them are the effect of established
predestination (which John Damascene called “previous”), because they proceed
from God’s sincere love and affection for all people.
6) The number of the saved is known to God not merely in virtue of the
power of his mere foreknowledge (as Pelagians claimed by denying the need for
God’s ongoing grace), but in virtue of the power of his predestination. This
predestination, however, is not based on a decree, preordination or will that
precede any and all foreknowledge of future events, since God did not pick
arbitrarily a number of people to be saved, excluding all others. Thus, if people
are not predestined it’s not because they have been passed over by God’s grace,
but rather, it is due to their negligence, laziness, as they preferred the inane
pleasures of this world, as Jesus told us in the Gospel. Lessius wrote: “Let us
dispense with this way of thinking according to which God, before any and all
foreknowledge resolved out of his sheer will to establish a certain measure of his
kingdom by choosing a set number of angels and people (which cannot grow or
diminish) to dwell in it, excluding everybody else!”46

45
Ibid., 561.
46
Ibid., 562.
 229

SIXTH CLAIM

No one is reprobated by God’s absolute will before foreknowledge of their

death in a state of impenitent mortal sin. God always encourages people, yearning
for their salvation, providing means in accordance with their needs and ability to
respond. The number of reprobates is certain due to the power of mere
foreknowledge (and not of divine decree). Moreover, the consequence of believing
that God chooses only a certain number to be saved by giving them congruous
graces is that the number of the damned is determined not by God’s
foreknowledge, but by his negative decree. Lessius ponders: “Why would God,
whose nature is goodness, whose virtue is omnipotence, the Father of all mercies
and the God of all consolations, allow such an immense number of wretched
mortals to perish in hell when it would be easy to prevent it either by his direct
decree or by the ministry of angels and humans?”47

PART SEVEN

This part consists of a beautiful prayer summing up all the previous points.
In order to most certainly be saved and fulfil our predestination, according to
Lessius we need to do the following things to the best of our ability:
1) Practicing assiduous prayer, and requesting God’s assistance and grace.
2) Feeling an ongoing solicitousness about doing God’s will.
3) Considering the moment of our death.

Lessius ended his Annex with these words: “To You, immortal and invisible
King of the ages; our Father of all mercies, Creator, Redeemer and Savior; author
of all our good deeds, be glory, honor, blessings and thanksgiving from every
creature in every generation for ever and ever, Amen!”48

Summing up Lessius’ views expounded in his Annex, we may conclude:

WHAT HE REJECTED

 Absolute predestination ante praevisa merita

 Reprobation, either positive or negative, without foreseen demerits
 Intrinsically efficacious grace

47
Idem.
48
Ibid., 563.
 230

 Difference or distinction between congruous and non-congruous grace

without foreseen merits and demerits
 Absolute predestination of some people merely out of God’s good pleasure
 Divine grace is the total and sufficient cause of our salvation

WHAT HE UPHELD

 Predestination based on post praevisa merita or ex praevisis meritis

 Reprobation based on foreseen demerits
 Sufficient grace given to everybody (predestined and non- predestined
alike)
 Our cooperation or lack of, makes grace efficacious or inefficacious
 Difference between complete and incomplete predestination: predestination
not to glory but to the grace of justification
 Conditional predestination
 Divine grace is the partial cause of our salvation: it also requires free will
and its cooperation
 Before specific foreknowledge of future events God has a universal salvific
will and the desire to give everyone sufficient grace
 Neither grace alone, nor free will alone, but these two joint together and
coalesced into one integral cause of our predestination
 231

PART FOUR

Lemos’ Rebuttal: Brevis tractatus

232
 233

Chapter 1

Lemos’ Rebuttal: Brevis tractatus

Tomas of Lemos’ treatise Brevis tractatus adversus sententiam quae dicit
praedestinationem fieri nec secundum Dei propositum, nec secundum scientiam
conditionalum, sed secundum praescientiam Dei absolutam [Short treatise against the
view that claims that predestination does not happen according to God’s will, nor
according to knowledge of futuribles, but rather according to God’s absolute
foreknowledge] is found at the end of Book II of his The Armor of God (Panoplia).
In this treatise Lemos articulated a detailed response to Lessius’ Annex on
predestination.
The treatise, consisting of eighty-four pages in double columns, is divided
into nine chapters:
1) Lessius’ view is introduced and refuted (pp. 1-13)
2) Lessius’ six assertions and their rebuttal by Lemos (pp. 13-20)
3) Lessius’ biblical support from nine passages, and Lemos’ response (pp. 20-
30)
4) Lessius’ patristic support from four sources, and Lemos’ response (pp. 30-
32)
5) Lessius’ support from scholastics, recent authors and Augustine (p. 33)
6) Lessius’ rebuttal of ten views (pp. 33-66)
7) Lessius’ use of various patristic sources against immediate election (pp. 66-
68)
8) Lessius’ use of rational arguments against immediate election to glory (pp.
68-76)
9) Lessius’ use of rational arguments to claim that the efficacy of grace
depends on free will (pp. 76-84)

From the very beginning of his treatise Lemos makes it clear that his self-
appointed job is to refute, crush and condemn Lessius’ views on predestination.
There is no attempt to set a conversation or a dialogue: Lemos’ treatise is not an
irenic theological work like Lessius’,1 but rather a highly polemical work, bent on
refuting a heresy and upholding “The Truth.” It is difficult to transition from
Lessius’ calm and lucid tone to the fiery attacks of Lemos: the musical equivalent
would be to shift from Beethoven’s Moonlight sonata to an AC/DC song played
at high volume.

1
I say “irenic” in a relative way. Fellow-Jesuit Eudemon-Joannes pointed out seventeen (!)
somewhat harsh comments found throughout his text. See Le Bachelet, 110-111.
 234

In an opening sniping comment, Lemos says that Lessius expounded with

“commonplace and deleterious clarity” (vulgari et perniciosa claritate)2 the sacred
mystery of predestination, leaving nothing to the mysterious and transcendent
will of God, but placing everything in the hands of man’s free will. Lemos
declares his intention to refute Lessius’ view (adding “provided it is even worthy
of a rebuttal, since it denies any real predestination”) the way Prosper did with
Cassian (which, incidentally, was not irenic, but polemical as well), paragraph by
paragraph.

Chapter One

Lessius introduced a view of predestination that is not based on God’s

absolute and unchanging antecedent will, nor on scientia media ’s conditional
foreknowledge; as a matter of fact, he rejected both because they allegedly remove
zeal for good works; foster laziness; and present a harsh and uncompromising
view of God’s attitude towards people; what he upheld instead is a view of
predestination based on absolute foreknowledge of future merits (ex praevisis
meritis). Lemos intends to show, just as Prosper, Hilary and Augustine did before
him, that Lessius’ view is exactly the same (ipsissimam) as the view that used to be
upheld by Faustus, Cassian, and others who were labeled “Semipelagians.”
After setting up three brief parallels between what Faustus and Lessius
rejected and six similarities of what they believed, Lemos decries that Lessius’
view of predestination according to foreknowledge is entirely (totum esse) akin to
Faustus’.3 For instance, Lemos quotes from Prosper’s Letter to Augustine, 3: “God,
however, foreknew prior to the creation of the world those who are going to
believe or who are going to continue in that faith which after its reception needs
the help of grace, and he predestined for his kingdom those whom he foresaw
would, after having been gratuitously called, be worthy of election and would
leave this life by a good death;”4 and also from Hilary’s Letter to Augustine, 4:

But they insist that God’s foreknowledge, predestination or plan means only that God
foreknew, predestined, or planned to choose those who were going to believe…From this
there also comes the idea which they equally do not admit, that is, they reject the claim that
the number of those who will be chosen and of those who will be condemned is fixed, and
they do not accept as an explanation of this view what you set forth; rather, they hold that

2
Brevis tractatus, 1.
3
Ibid., 2.
4
Augustine, Answer to Pelagians , IV, trans. by Roland Teske, S.J. (New York City Press,
1999), 55.
 235

God wills that all human beings be saved, and not just those who pertain to the number of
the saints, but absolutely all human beings without any exception.5

In summary, Lemos feels that Lessius’ view is adequately similar to that of

Semipelagians, and inadequately similar, in many parts, to Pelagius’ own. Lemos
also mentioned Lessius’ claim that his doctrine differed from Pelagius and
Semipelagians on two main accounts:
1) Pelagians rooted predestination in absolute foreknowledge of good works
and merits performed out of free will alone, and not from grace; Lessius,
however, rooted it in absolute foreknowledge of good works and merits
performed out of grace.
2) Pelagians attributed initial merits to nature (e.g., faith or other imperfect
acts of charity); because of such merits God gave his grace, which they
regarded as the first effect of predestination. Accordingly, if people used
grace well, God would continue to give it to them to the very end; thus,
they placed the whole predestination on human merits.
Lessius, however, denied that this first effect of predestination was given
because of a person’s natural merits (i.e., faith and other imperfect works of
charity) and claimed that had Semipelagians said that faith and desire to believe
were gifts of God and stemmed from grace, they would have remained Catholics:
however, it was not heretical of them to believe that people are predestined to
heaven on the basis of God’s foreknowledge of acts stemming from free will,
though they erred by saying that it was people’s faith and devotion that caused
them to persevere and fulfil the commandments.
Lemos found fault with these two alleged differences claimed by Lessius. In
regard to the first difference, Lemos stated that while it is true that Pelagians
upheld that predestination is based on God’s foreknowledge of good deeds
performed out of one’s natural inclination and dispositions, Lessius conveniently
forgot to mention that according to Semipelagians people can make their wills
persevere through habitual grace, as we can read in Prosper’s Letter to Augustine,
8:

One finds one and the same view in the case of nearly all of them, that is, they have accepted
the plan and predestination of God as based on foreknowledge so that God made some into
vessels of honor and others into vessels of dishonor precisely because he foresaw the end of
each person and knew in advance his future willing and action even under the help of grace
(uniuscujusque praeviderit, et sub ipso gratiae adjutorio in qua futurus esset voluntate et actione
praescierit).6

5
Ibid., 64.
6
Ibid., 59.
 236

Lemos makes much of the last sentence in Prosper’s quote, whereby

Semipelagians talked about good deeds performed under the help of grace, which
according to Lemos amounts to “habitual grace.” Thus, he inexorably concludes
that Lessius’ exculpation or declaration of an alleged difference between his view
and that of Pelagians is apparently sound but in reality self-serving and
ultimately unconvincing.
In regard to the second difference maintained by Lessius, according to the
Dominican theologians the Jesuit appears to be incoherent since he defended
(together with other Jesuits) the axiom of facienti quod est in se, according to which
God gives prevenient grace to those who do what they can with only natural
powers: thus, Lessius, and before him the Massilians, place the beginning of
salvation and merits de congruo in us human beings. However, Lemos remarks,
prevenient grace conceived in this fashion amounts to only a moral influence
which enlightens, shows the way, and arouses the will; but even Pelagius
admitted this much, though Lessius differs slightly from him in that he upheld the
need for habitual grace, while Pelagius did not.
Lemos goes on to say that for Lessius to claim that man’s will makes grace
efficacious or inefficacious amounts to attributing the cause of predestination to
man’s decision, because if man is the cause of the first of all the effects of
predestination, it logically follows that he is the cause of the rest of them as well.
Paul and Augustine, on the contrary, emphasized the idea of vocation according
to God’s propositum: God, not man, is the cause of the first effect of predestination,
namely the calling to faith. Augustine wrote in De perseverantia 21, 54:

Because if we say that the beginning of faith is of ourselves, so that by it we deserve to

receive other gifts of God, the Pelagians conclude that God's grace is given according to our
merits. And this the catholic faith held in such dread, that Pelagius himself, in fear of
condemnation, condemned it. And, moreover, if we say that our perseverance is of ourselves,
not of God, they answer that we have the beginning of our faith of ourselves in such wise as
the end, thus arguing that we have that beginning of ourselves much more, if of ourselves we
have the continuance unto the end, since to perfect is much greater than to begin…

The theory of predestination according to God’s absolute foreknowledge

upheld by Lessius is incompatible with definitions laid out in Celestine’s letter to
Gaul’s bishops; Orange II; Pope Hormidas’s letter; various NT passages; the
sayings of some OT prophets (i.e., Ezekiel and Jeremiah); the prayer “Our Father”
(how ridiculous, remarks Lemos, to ask God for things he doesn’t give but we can
do ourselves!); and the Church’s liturgical prayers (as attested by Augustine and
Celestine). Augustine wrote in Against Two Letters of the Pelagians II, 10,23: “Since
these things are so, I see that nothing is commanded to man by the Lord in the
Holy Scriptures, for the sake of trying his free will, which is not found either to
begin by his goodness, or to be asked in order to demonstrate the aid of grace.”
 237

If belief in predestination being caused by men’s naturally performed good

deeds is not a viable and even a downright heretical option, not even
predestination based on God’s foreknowledge will do, as Augustine said in his
letter 194 to Pope Sixtus, criticizing the Pelagians’ understanding of
predestination:

‘Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his
judgments and how inscrutable his ways!’ (Rom 11:33) Therefore, let them not continue to
oppose the merciful gift of the grace of God with senseless obstinacy and let them allow the
Son of Man to seek and save in every age that which was lost: let them not dare to judge the
inscrutable plans of God, wondering why his mercy was bestowed on one, but his retributive
justice on the other, even though they were both found in one and the same predicament.
Who are they to argue against God? For God, when Rebekah had conceived twins by one
man, our forefather Isaac, though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good
or bad—in other words, in conformity with the gratuitous choice of his benevolence rather
than with what is naturally due, namely the choice in virtue of which he makes people
deserving to be called without finding them to be such, not the because of works, but because
of the sheer goodness of the Electing God – told her, ‘The older will serve the younger.’ As
he upheld this point, Paul used the witness of the prophet Malachi, who lived long after the
twins: ‘As it is written, ‘Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated’ (Rom 9:13), in order to explain what
was due to grace in God’s predestination, before the twins were born.7

Lemos claimed that in order to avoid taking the Apostle’s clear statement in
Rom 9:11 (“before they had done anything good or bad”) at face value, according
to which predestination is based on God’s propositum, Lessius proposes four
alternative explanations (as we shall see, according to Lemos they are rehashed
Semipelagian arguments):
1) Other people before Augustine had a better explanation for Paul’s words.
They claimed that this passage does not refer to predestination, but to the
election to the benefits of this life (both temporal and spiritual).
Lemos countered by saying that this interpretation is contrary to the
letter and context of the Pauline passage. Moreover, how can Augustine’s
predecessors have had a better insight about it than him, whose view on
predestination is the same as the Church’s?8
2) The expression “not because of works” applies to the works of the law, not
to good works performed from grace.
Lemos replied that this view had been upheld by Faustus and that it
was condemned: why is Lessius attempting to revive it?
3) This election refers to justifying grace, not to the gratuitous election to
glory.

7
Augustine, Letter to Sixtus (194), 7,33-8,34.
8
Brevis tractatus, 7.
 238

Lemos disagreed.
4) The expression “because of works” refers to already performed deeds, not
to foreseen future works.
Lemos pointed out that this view was not upheld by the majority of the
Latin and Greek Fathers.

Next, Lemos lists three reasons why Lessius’ argument that the “works”
mentioned by Paul exclude those done by grace is invalid:
1) Those works do not draw their origin, virtue, power and efficacy from
grace, but once we posit a general universal grace (as a sine qua condition),
it is human free will that out of its own innate freedom determines and
renders grace efficacious, as Lessius himself said:

The fact that out of two people who have similarly been called one accepts the offer of
grace while the other rejects it, may rightly be said to originate from free will alone; not
because he who accepts it does so out of his unaided free will, but because the difference
between the two arises from free will alone and not from a difference in the types of
prevenient aids offered to them. Thus, to say ‘free will alone’ does not exclude the
cooperation of grace, but only the difference in the types of prevenient grace being
offered to them.9

Moreover, Lemos says the words of the Apostle “Who distinguishes you?” (1
Cor 4:7) rule out Lessius’ interpretation.

2) The Pelagian bishop Julian and Semipelagians admitted the need for grace.

3) St. Thomas refuted the view of predestination based on absolute

foreknowledge:

Hence, it seems difficult to reconcile the infallibility of predestination with freedom of

choice; for we cannot say that predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence
except the certitude of foreknowledge, because this would be to say that God orders one
who is predestined to his salvation as he orders any other person, with this difference,
that, in the case of the predestined, God knows he will not fail to be saved. According to
this position, one predestined would not differ in ordination from one not predestined;
he would differ only with respect to God’s foreknowledge of the outcome. Consequently,
foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not take
place by the choice of him who predestines. This, however, is contrary to the authority
of the Scriptures and the sayings of the saints. Thus, the ordering of predestination has

9
Lessius, De gratia efficaci, 499. See PART THREE of my book, where in Chapter 8 I
summarized Lessius’ chapter 18. Lemos says that in Book IV of his Panoplia he will deal more
accurately with Lessius’ “frivolous excuses, by which he pretends not to place human will first
and God’s grace as following,” Brevis tractatus, 8.
 239

an infallible certitude of its own, over and above the certitude of foreknowledge.
Nevertheless, the proximate cause of salvation, free choice, is related to predestination
contingently, not necessarily.10

Lessius said that a predestined person differs from a non-predestined person

only on the part of the foreseen event, and not on the part of the order of things:
however, St. Thomas claimed that such view makes foreknowledge to be the
cause of predestination rather than the will of God, and declared it to be in
opposition to Scripture and the consensus of the Fathers.
Lessius went on to say that the certainty of predestination does not stem
from prevenient grace alone, but from helping grace as well, with which man must
cooperate to be saved. It doesn’t matter, replies Lemos: to deny that
predestination flows only from effects of prevenient grace alone (even though
there is concomitant and subsequent grace at work too) and from God’s will,
amounts to go against Scripture and the Fathers (“Says Thomas, not I,” added
Lemos).11
Lemos points out that Aquinas’ argument against absolute foreknowledge
applies to conditional foreknowledge (the type proposed by Molina’s scientia
media) as well. In fact, if God foreknows certe, immutabiliter et infallibiter that some
will be saved and others not, it will indeed be so: why then wouldn’t people
become demotivated and discouraged, losing zeal and resign themselves, as they
allegedly would in the case of predestination based on God’s will?12
Ah! Say the Jesuits! – but in that case our final destination will be a
consequence of our own free will’s choices! God foreknows what we are going to
decide to do, rather than he himself decreeing it! Thus, it is in our power to be
saved! Same thing! replies Lemos. In the end, the fact remains that people could
still become discouraged by such view of predestination based on God’s
foreknowledge of good use of free will, as Augustine related in The Gift of
Perseverance 38, 15:

There was a man in our monastery, who, when the brethren rebuked him for doing some
things that ought not to be done, and for not doing some things that ought to be done,
replied, ‘Whatever I may now be, I shall be such as God has foreknown that I shall be.’ And
this man certainly both said what was true, and was not profited by this truth for good, but
so far made way in evil as to desert the society of the monastery, and become a dog returned
to his vomit; and, nevertheless, it is uncertain what he is yet to become. For the sake of souls
of this kind, then, is the truth which is spoken about God's foreknowledge either to be denied
or to be kept back—at such times, for instance, when, if it is not spoken, other errors are
incurred?

10
Aquinas, De veritate 6, art.3.
11
Brevis tractatus, 10.
12
Ibid., 11.
 240

It is regrettable, concludes Lemos, that Lessius put so much “harmful” effort

in writing his treatise so as to assuage the fears and apprehensions a lot of people
have expressed in regard to the doctrine of predestination based on God’s will,
when Augustine twelve centuries ago related how predestination based on God’s
foreknowledge can engender the same type of anxieties!
Prosper (Letter to Augustine 3), related to Augustine how the Massilians felt
about his view of predestination:

This plan, however, of God’s calling which is said to have separated those who would be chosen
and those who would be rejected, either before the beginning of the world or at creation of the
human race, so that in accord with the decision of the Creator some were created as vessels of
honor and others as vessels of dishonor, both removes from those who have fallen any concern
to rise up and offers to the saints an occasion of tepidity. For in both cases toil is useless if one
who has been rejected cannot enter the kingdom by any effort and if one who has chosen cannot
fall away by any negligence. For, however they act, nothing else can happen in their regard
than what God has determined, and when hope is uncertain, one cannot hold to a consistent
course because, if the choice of God who predestines one is different, the intention of the human
being who makes an effort is meaningless. And, therefore, all effort is removed, and all the
virtues are destroyed if God’s decision comes before human willing. Under this term
‘predestination’ a necessity due to fate is introduced, and God is said to be the creator of
different natures, if no one can be other than he was created.13

Then Prosper added (Letter to Augustine 6): “Nor do they accept the view that
the predestined number of the elect can be neither increased nor decreased for
fear that the stings of exhortations would have no place in the lives of those who
do not believe or who are negligent and that the imposition of activity or of labor
would be useless for one whose striving is going to be frustrated because he is not
among the elect.”
Hilary also wrote (Letter to Augustine 1): “These, therefore, are the ideas that
are being discussed at Marseilles as well as in other places in Gaul, namely that it
is a new idea and one opposed to the usefulness of preaching that it is said that
some people will be chosen according to God’s plan in such a way that they can
neither acquire this election nor hold on to it unless they have been given the will
to believe.”
How can Lessius fail to see that these objections are the same he expressed at
the beginning of his treatise of predestination? Yet we know what Augustine
replied to his friends:

But they say, as you write: That no one can be aroused by the incentives of rebuke if it be
said in the assembly of the Church to the multitude of hearers: The definite meaning of God's
will concerning predestination stands in such wise, that some of you will receive the will to
obey and will come out of unbelief unto faith, or will receive perseverance and abide in the
13
Teske, 55.
 241

faith; but others who are lingering in the delight of sins have not yet arisen, for the reason
that the aid of pitying grace has not yet indeed raised you up. But yet, if there are any whom
by his grace he has predestinated to be chosen, who are not yet called, you shall receive that
grace by which you may will and be chosen; and if any obey, if you are predestinated to be
rejected, the strength to obey shall be withdrawn from you, so that you may cease to obey.
Although these things may be said, they ought not so to deter us from confessing the true
grace of God—that is, the grace which is not given to us in respect of our merits,— and from
confessing the predestination of the saints in accordance therewith, even as we are not
deterred from confessing God's foreknowledge, although one should thus speak to the people
concerning it, and say: Whether you are now living righteously or unrighteously, you shall
be such by and by as the Lord has foreknown that you will be—either good, if he has
foreknown you as good, or bad, if he has foreknown you as bad. For if on the hearing of this
some should be turned to torpor and slothfulness, and from striving should go headlong to
lust after their own desires, is it therefore to be counted that what has been said about the
foreknowledge of God is false? If God has foreknown that they will be good, will they not be
good, whatever be the depth of evil in which they are now engaged? And if he has foreknown
them evil, will they not be evil, whatever goodness may now be discerned in them?14

Lemos concludes that this is not good enough reason to depart from the
traditional view: rather, if people want to be really humble, let them put all their
trust in the mercy and goodness of God. To make his point he used the following
anecdote.
There was a preacher belonging to the order of St. Dominic, whom Lemos
declines to identify by name, who used to free people from such anxieties
stemming from the doctrine of predestination, by telling a story. There was once
an Army officer who opened his heart to a monk renowned for his knowledge and
wisdom. As they walked side by side the officer said to the monk that if God
decreed that he would die on the battlefield, he most certainly would; conversely,
if God decreed that his life would be spared, he would live to tell the story of his
adventures. Likewise, when it comes to the Christian lifestyle, the officer
continued, if God wants me to be saved, he will give me plenty of opportunities to
perform good works; otherwise, he will not: but in that latter case I will be lost!
The Dominican friar replied first by saying that he should not indulge thoughts
like that because they could lead him into sins; rather, he should resist them and
hope and trust in God’s goodness that made him a Christian: “You have the
Gospel and the Faith that say to you that if you will observe the commandments
you will inherit eternal life; do this and do not worry about what God has
decreed, since it is pretentious for man to pretend to understand God’s hidden
counsels.”
The friar then proceeded to ask him what role he played in the king’s army.
Being told that in two or three months a war would break out and that he would
lead the troops into battle, the Dominican asked the officer whether he would
14
Augustine, The Gift of Perseverance 15, 38.
 242

consider showing up on the battlefield without weapons and charge unarmed

straight into the enemy’s lines. “What are you suggesting?” replied the officer.
The friar said: “You see, if God determined that you will emerge victorious, you
will not be harmed; but if he determined that you will perish, even though you
will carry the best weapons with you, you will still die.” The officer then said: “No
matter what the outcome, I still want to go into the battle with excellent
weapons.” To which the friar replied: “The same then applies to spiritual warfare:
always take care to engage in good works, which are our weapons against the
devil, and be instructed by God’s Word: do not worry about what God decreed.
It’s none of your business, anyway.” He then asked the officer whether he believed
that what the prophets predicted in the Scripture will come true and that God
knows all the things that will come to pass. “Most definitely,” said the officer. The
friar said: “Very well, then. If God knows whether you are going to die in a state
of grace or sin, and whether you will live or die in battle, such outcome will
certainly take place, since God’s knowledge cannot fail. However, despite the fact
that God’s knowledge cannot be wrong you still must prepare yourself as best as
you can for the battle and for your salvation.”15
Lemos went on to say that Aquinas in Contra gentes III, 96, addressing the
topic “That some prayers are not granted by God,” wrote:

It is apparent, then, from the foregoing that the cause of some things that are done by God is
prayers and holy desires. But we showed above that divine providence does not exclude other
causes; rather, it orders them so that the order which providence has determined within itself
may be imposed on things. And thus, secondary causes are not incompatible with providence;
instead, they carry out the effect of providence. In this way, then, prayers are efficacious
before God, yet they do not destroy the immutable order of divine providence, because this
individual request that is granted to a certain petitioner falls under the order of divine
providence. So, it is the same thing to say that we should not pray in order to obtain
something from God, because the order of His providence is immutable, as to say that we
should not walk in order to get to a place, or eat in order to be nourished; all of which are
clearly absurd.

In other words, divine providence does not exclude, but on the contrary
includes, the means through which it is carried out, becoming attached to
secondary causes. God did not just determine the end, but the means as well: so
he did not determine that a warrior would win other than through the use of his
weapons and his courage; nor that one would become a learned man other than
through hard study; nor that a farmer would reap without sowing. This is why
one ought not to become discouraged at the thought that God’s predestination is
based on his absolute decree, nor fear to be excluded from it.

15
Brevis tractatus, 12.
 243

Chapter 2

Chapter Two

In this chapter Lemos goes after six views upheld by Lessius throughout his
Annex.

First View by Lessius:

Scripture talks about two types of salvation; two types of predestination; and
two types of predestination in reference to the objects they extend to. The two
types are complete and incomplete. Complete salvation is the enjoyment of the
beatific vision in heaven; incomplete salvation is life on earth as a justified
believer. Incomplete predestination refers to the just here on earth, who are called
“predestined,” “elect,” “beloved of God from all eternity;” complete predestination
refers to the saints in heaven who have fulfilled (i.e., individually appropriated)
God’s general plan of salvation extended to all human beings. Complete
predestination in reference to the objects it extends itself to is the series of means
by which man pursues salvation; incomplete predestination is merely the series of
means by which man aspires to salvation especially up to the grace of justification.

Lemos’ response:
Lessius mixes together true and false statements; the result is a harmful and
false doctrine. For instance, the distinction between complete and incomplete
salvation and predestination is accurate and acceptable from a chronological
unfolding of events, but unacceptable, to be rejected and detestable (intolerabilis,
neganda and detestanda) in its conclusions.16 The reason why this view must be
rejected is that Lessius claims that God predestines everybody equally at first,
without excluding anyone (he labeled such divine decision “incomplete
predestination”): then, when people use well the aids given to them by God’s
grace, they make predestination complete, or fulfilled. Thus, Lessius does not
hesitate to say that the general and universal vocation extending to all people is
the first effect of predestination, even before the grace of justification is attained. In
reality, predestination is incomplete after it includes the grace of justification.

Second View by Lessius:

In regard to complete predestination, Lessius quoted Augustine’s The Gift of
Perseverance 14: “This predestination of the saints is nothing other than the
foreknowledge and the preparation of the benefits of God by which he most

16
Brevis tractatus, 13.
 244

certainly sets free whoever are set free.” According to Lessius, through his
foreknowledge God knows what the human will is going to do with the aids he
dispensed: after these choices narrow down from the hypothetical to real, God’s
foreknowledge from conditional becomes absolute.

Lemos’ response:
There are no objections to Augustine’s view quoted by Lessius, but plenty of
problems with Lessius’ reductive interpretation! After quoting Augustine,
Prosper, Fulgentius and the University of Douai’s condemnation of such view,
Lemos concludes that it is wrong to regard predestination to glory only as a
reward for good works freely performed by human beings, rather than as a
gracious donation that God bestows on his elect. Moreover, God foreknows what
He is going to do, not just that we will make good use of his grace.

Prosper in Answer to the Extracts of the Genoese 8, wrote:

Let us then follow true wisdom and godliness and confess that God in his unchanging
prescience has foreknown to whom he would give to believe or whom he would give to his
Son that he might lose no one of them, and that, if he foreknew this, he also foreknew by
what gifts he would deign to work our salvation; that the predestination of the saints is
nothing else but the foreknowledge and the preparation of God’s grace by which he saves
them without fail.17

And in Letter to Rufinus 11:

From this profession of faith in God’s grace some draw back for fear lest, if they accept the
doctrine on grace as shown in Holy Scripture and manifested by the effects of its power, they
be compelled to admit also that of all men born in the course of the centuries the number of
the predestined, chosen according to the design of God’s call, is fixed and definite with God.
But it is as much against holy religion to deny this as it is to gainsay grace itself.18

And again in Answers to the Extracts of the Genoese 9:

For though he [Augustine] never spoke to the Christian people in such a foolish manner and
abhorred the clumsy elucubrations of his detractors, yet he always maintained with piety and
firmness alike that it is necessary to preach to the Church both about predestination which is
the preparation of grace and about grace which is the effect of predestination, and also about
the prescience of God who foreknew from all eternity on whom he would bestow the gifts of
his grace. Whosoever opposes the preaching of this doctrine is an open supporter of the
Pelagian heresy.19
17
DeLetter, S.J., Prosper of Aquitaine: Defense of St. Augustine (Newman Press,1963), 63.
18
Ibid., 29, 30.
19
Ibid., 68.
 245

Lessius argued that there are two inconvenient conclusions stemming from
the Dominicans’ view of grace: a) The effects of the aids of divine grace, if they
truly depend entirely on God, do not depend on the concurrence of free will; b)
Divine grace cannot be impeded (thus taking free will away, as Luther and Calvin
did in their respective systems).
Lemos replied that the first conclusion is not problematic because the good
use of free will does not depend only or ultimately on free will alone, but on free
will moved efficaciously by God.20 The second conclusion is not an issue either, as
Lemos re-proposes the distinction between divided and composite sense. In a
divided sense, free will retains the power to dissent (potentiam habet ad
impediendum illum); however, in a composite sense, free will cannot render God’s
grace inefficacious.
Lemos also points out an inconsistency on Lessius’ part. Lessius said that the
certainty of events unfolding depends on middle knowledge (or knowledge of
conditionals, or futuribles); however, when it comes to predestination, he rejects
the middle knowledge view of it (namely that God places men in a particular
order of things in which they are foreseen to act well and persevere) and
promotes instead the notion of ante praevisa merita as its basis.

Third View by Lessius:

Lessius attempted to enlist Augustine in support of his understanding of
predestination based on foreknowledge of conditionals, by which God knows
what order and types of prevenient graces would bring salvation to people if they
followed him.

Lemos’ response:
Unfortunately for Lessius, Augustine says that foreknowledge on the part of God
is foreknowledge of what He is going to do: if Augustine had in mind that
conditional foreknowledge attributed to him by Lessius, he should have said that
God knew what man would have done if he had a certain series of graces at his
disposal; in this case such conditional foreknowledge should not be called
“absolute foreknowledge;” it should be called “knowledge of conditionals,” rather
than “conditional foreknowledge.”
Lemos argues that Augustine did not talk about conditional foreknowledge in
his definition of predestination (as Lessius correctly pointed out to his fellow
Jesuits); nor did he talk about absolute foreknowledge preceding gratuitous
election of some and the preparation of certain means, either. Rather, Augustine
talked about absolute foreknowledge following the efficacious preparation of

20
Brevis tractatus, 15. Lemos added that he will further discuss this idea in Book IV of
Panoplia.
 246

means/benefits to bestow on some people. Thus, according to Lemos, Lessius’

view is introduced in a sense that is alien and contrary to the truth.21
In fact, Lessius’ claims that such definition of Augustine’s only targeted
Pelagians (who said that God merely foreknows the works we will do without any
preparation or assistance from him) but not the Semipelagian view which included
God’s foreknowledge of the good works we will do with his grace (and which they
claimed is necessary). However, Augustine really did target Semipelagians in two
works of his (i.e., The Predestination of the Saints and The Gift of Perseverance), in
which his abovementioned definition is found. Thus, some people rightly began to
wonder (suspicio apud aliquos non sine fundamento crescit) whether Lessius believed
that either the Semipelagian view about grace and predestination was wrongly
condemned, or not properly understood by the Fathers who followed Augustine.
However, now it is clear for everyone to see: Lessius openly claimed that they did
not err!22 In this case, this understanding of the preparation of God’s benefits that
Augustine talked about should fall under God’s providence rather than under
God’s predestination.

Fourth View by Lessius:

We do not deserve predestination because no one can deserve God’s first
calling or illumination by which he first begins to elevate us to a supernatural
status, because if we were able to earn this grace with our unaided powers, we
would deserve the entire predestination as well: all of our good works stem from
such calling, and thus we can say that this calling is the first effect of
predestination.

Lemos’ response:
Lemos says that he agrees with such view. What Lessius says is undoubtedly
true (haec certa omnia vera sunt et veram continent circam praedestinationem et gratiam
doctrinam).23 So, what is the problem? Unfortunately Lessius says exactly the
opposite in his teaching on grace and predestination! Why? Because he agrees
with the Massilians that predestination is not God’s entirely free gift, but that it
stems from foreseen good works. Thus, Lessius ends up basing predestination
partially on merits de congruo (insofar as predestination is the first effect of
foreknowledge) and partially on merits de condigno (insofar as the following
graces are concerned, and especially the gift of final perseverance).
21
Ibid., 16.
22
Idem. Not only Lemos does not provide a direct quote from Lessius to this effect, but he also
neglects to mention where in his work Lessius allegedly said so. What Lessius actually said is
found in his first rebuttal of eight Dominican arguments in support of their view of
predestination (see Chapter 3 in my PART THREE, pp. 156, ff).
23
Ibid., 18.
 247

Lessius contradicts his original claim that the first calling cannot be deserved
de congruo and that moral deeds we do before it is bestowed have no bearing on its
being bestowed because he upholds the medieval axiom facienti quod est in se in a
very questionable fashion (just as Cassian and Faustus once did). Even though
Lessius does not uphold a Pelagian understanding of this axiom, he nonetheless
says that sufficient grace can be rendered efficacious by the freedom of our will
when it concurs with God’s grace; by saying this, he virtually makes the first
calling not absolute and powerful in itself, but contingent upon free will. Since
God’s general calling and illumination extends to everybody, it is not properly part
of predestination, but of general providence. Lessius calls the first calling “divine
illumination” (illustrationem divinam), thus basing the former on the latter.
However, the illumination of the mind, notes Lemos, is only a part of God’s first
calling, and not the whole of it; there is more to this calling, says Lemos, namely
the grace that gives power to the will. According to Lessius, this prevenient grace
only excites and exhorts the will with a moral influence, and thus cannot be
considered efficacious as Augustine envisioned it to be; according to Lemos, this
is not acceptable.

Fifth View by Lessius:

Lessius noted that Semipelagians erred because they believed that through
our faith we deserve the first grace of God, and subsequently election and
predestination. But if someone deserves the bestowal of grace, he deserves the
preparation of grace as well; however, this view is unacceptable, as the Fathers
have argued, as they established the denial of such view to be de fide or at least
fidei proximum.

Lemos’ response:
Lemos agrees with this assessment of Lessius, however he notes that the
more Lessius says this, the more he incriminates himself because he eventually
ends up contradicting this view.
Lemos agrees with what Prosper said to Cassian, namely that there is
nothing we can do out of un-aided natural powers, to merit supernatural grace:

How do you not see that when you assert that men themselves take the initiative of their
good works and because of that are given grace, you fall into an error that was condemned
and willy-nilly appear to say that the grace of God is given in answer to our merits? For the
faith of those who ask and the devotion of those who seek and the perseverance of those who
knock are not meritorious, especially since all these people are said to receive, and to find,
and to enter (Against Cassian 3, 1).

Augustine also added: “For if without God’s grace the desire of good begins
with ourselves, merit itself will have begun— to which, as if of debt, comes the
 248

assistance of grace; and thus God's grace will not be bestowed freely, but will be
given according to our merit” (Against Two Letters of Pelagians II, 8, 18).
Thus, if God gives the first grace to one who does what is in in him out of
mere un-aided natural power, such person is indeed the meritorious cause (de
congruo) of that grace, and thus ends up deserving election and the whole of
predestination.24 In fact, if man can be the meritorious cause of the first effect of
predestination, he could also be of all the following ones, all the way to the last
one (i.e., final perseverance).
Lessius used two texts of St. Augustine, one saying that predestination is the
preparation of grace (The Gift of Perseverance), and the other saying that
predestination is the foreknowledge of it (The Predestination of the Saints).
However, Lemos countered that Augustine did not essentially and formally base
predestination in God’s foreknowledge, but rather in the preparation of grace:
foreknowledge derives its certainty from preparation of grace, and not
preparation of grace from foreknowledge. Moreover, by “preparation of grace”
Augustine intended preparation of efficacious grace and its bestowal; the
preparation of sufficient help envisioned by Lessius, giving man the general
ability (posse) to do what is good, rather than the efficacy of wanting and doing, is
not predestination, but Providence, which is common to good and bad people.
Such view, notes Lemos, runs counter to Augustine and can be labeled
“Semipelagian.”

Sixth View by Lessius:

Lessius said that he rejected the idea of absolute predestination whether to
glory or to damnation ante praevisa merita as many Church fathers, doctors and
even recent scholastics and theologians did.

Lemos’ response:
To deny absolute, gratuitous predestination ante praevisa merita amounts to
deny the traditional view of the Church on the matter, as he demonstrated in
Book II of his Panoplia. Lessius is just re-hashing the old Massilian views;
moreover, it is false to say that many theologians in the past have rejected the
traditional view.

Chapter Three

In this chapter Lemos addresses seven of the nine scriptural passages used by
Lessius to bolster his view of predestination.

24
Ibid., 19.
 249

First passage used by Lessius: Mt 22: 1-14. He claimed that the parable of the
wedding banquet refers to heaven. He also said that to call is up to God, but to be
an elect is up to us and to our free will response. Thus, if only few people were
chosen it was because the others refused the invitation, as even Theophilactus and
other Church Fathers taught.

Lemos’ response:
“From the twisted exegesis of this passage and the theological consequences he
draws from it, it is clear that further suggestions are improperly adduced by him
on this subject matter.”25
Lessius suggested that this banquet referred to heavenly glory or to the
beatific vision. However, Lemos disagrees because in the parable the servants go
into the streets and invite both good and evil people (Mt 22:10) and points out
that there is even a mention of a person who lacks the proper “dress” and is
therefore expelled into the darkness. How can this logically fit with heaven?
According to Lemos, this parable of the wedding banquet refers instead to
the wedding of God’s Son (Mt 22:2) to the Church. The Father invited many (i.e.,
the Jewish people through the prophets) who did not want to come. Later on,
others (i.e., the Gentiles) were invited, who began to fill the universal church with
new members: among the good there are some bad ones, who will eventually be
denied admission to heaven on Judgement Day. Thus, Lemos, claims, the calling
or invitation refers to the general appeal to place faith in Christ, and not to
heaven. Also, Jesus in this parable did not say that many were called and out of
them few were chosen because most people refused to come, but rather that of all
those called people who received faith in Christ, not all have a “wedding dress,”
and thus are not admitted to heaven. Another way to look at it (and consistent
with what Augustine taught) suggested Lemos, is that many were efficaciously
called and received into the Church, but not chosen to enter heaven (e.g., Judas).
As far as “earning” our election is concerned, there is a right way to
understand this, and a wrong one as well. The right way, is to see our cooperation
with and obedience to God’s election and predestination as rewardable; the wrong
one, is to see them as ourselves initiating and motivating God’s choice to bestow
glory on us.26
If someone suggested that the banquet story of Lk 14:16-24 is the same as Mt
22:1-14, and that therefore it too refers to heavenly glory, two objections may be
raised. First, the Mt parable talks about a lunch taking place around noon, and it
refers to the wedding of the Incarnate Word to his Church; the Lk story is about
a dinner and it does indeed refer to heavenly glory.

25
Ibid., 20.
26
I do not ever recall Lessius saying or suggesting this. Quite the contrary!
 250

As far as Lessius approvingly referring to Origen and other Fathers is

concerned, we need to remember that the latter was the father of Pelagianism, as
Jerome reminded us. Moreover, Origen talked about grace as the help sine quo no,
simply giving us the power to do what is good, but not actually making us doing
it;27 Theophylactus should be taken cum grano salis; and Cyril does not deny that
there is no gratuitous election and predestination to glory, but only says that it is
based on foreseen merits.

Fourth passage used by Lessius: Rom 11: 22: “Consider the kindness and
sternness of God: sternness to those who fell, but kindness to you, provided that
you continue in his kindness.”

Lemos’ response:
“If God decreed that some people would remain in the faith, they will indeed (by
freely obeying his will): nothing in this passage goes against the notion of
absolute predestination and the intrinsic efficacy of grace. Augustine said: ‘Man is
not good if he doesn’t want to be, but he is helped by grace in order to be such’
(see also The Predestination of the Saints 11).”28
Lemos wonders why can’t Lessius accept that what is commanded and what
is given are both a gift of God? Augustine wrote in The Predestination of the Saints
11, 22:

‘But, say they, when it is said, ‘If you believe, you shall be saved,’ one of these things is
required; the other is offered. What is required is in man's power; what is offered is in God's.’
Why are not both in God's, as well what he commands as what he offers? For he is asked to
give what he commands. Believers ask that their faith may be increased; they ask on behalf of
those who do not believe, that faith may be given to them… But it is said thus: ‘If you
believe, you shall be saved,’ in the same way that it is said, ‘If by the Spirit you shall mortify
the deeds of the flesh, you shall live’ (Romans 8:13). For in this case also, of these two things

27
Lemos mentioned a passage from Aquinas’ Contra gentiles III, 89: “Some people, as a matter
of fact, not understanding how God could cause a movement of the will in us without prejudice
to freedom of will, have tried to explain these texts in a wrong way. That is, they would say that
God causes willing and accomplishing within us in the sense that he causes in us the power of
willing, but not in such a way that he makes us will this or that. Thus does Origen, in his
Principles, explain free choice, defending it against the texts above… Besides, God not only
gives powers to things but, beyond that, nothing can act by its own power unless it acts through
his power, as we showed above. So, man cannot use the power of will that has been given him
except in so far as he acts through the power of God. Now, the being through whose power the
agent acts is the cause not only of the power, but also of the act. This is apparent in the case of an
artist through whose power an instrument works, even though it does not get its own form from
this artist, but is merely applied to action by this man. Therefore, God is for us the cause not only
of our will, but also of our act of willing.”
28
Brevis tractatus, 22.
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one is required, the other is offered. It is said, ‘If by the Spirit you shall mortify the deeds of
the flesh, you shall live.’ Therefore, that we mortify the deeds of the flesh is required, but that
we may live is offered. Is it, then, fitting for us to say, that to mortify the deeds of the flesh is
not a gift of God, and not to confess it to be a gift of God, because we hear it required of us,
with the offer of life as a reward if we shall do it?

And in Against Two Letters of the Pelagians II, 10, 23, Augustine said:

Since these things are so, I see that nothing is commanded to man by the Lord in the Holy
Scriptures, for the sake of trying his free will, which is not found either to begin by his
goodness, or to be asked in order to demonstrate the aid of grace; nor does man at all
begin to be changed by the beginning of faith from evil to good, unless the unbought and
gratuitous mercy of God effects this in him.

Aquinas wrote in Contra gentes III, 90:

However, certain passages in Sacred Scripture appear to be consonant with the

aforementioned view. It is said in fact (Sirach 15:14): “God made man from the beginning,
and left him in the hand of his own counsel”; and later: “He has set water and fire before you;
stretch forth your hand to whichever you wish. Before man is life and death, good and evil;
that which he chooses shall be given him” (Sir 15:14, 17-18). And also: “Consider that I have
set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand death and evil” (Dt 30:15). But
these words are brought forward to show that man is possessed of free choice, not that his
choices are placed outside divine providence.

In Lemos’ words: “Passages such as these are given to us to show that men
have free will, and not to subtract their action from God’s providence and
predetermination.”29
Even though God’s absolute predestination is certissimum, we do not know
whether we are predestined or not: hence, we are to attend to our salvation with
“trembling and fear:” in other words, we are not to take it for granted.
Lessius concluded that to fulfil that condition is only up to us (as Paul said,
“provided that you continue in kindness”). However, the consequence of this way
of looking at this verse is that if everything that pertains to the goal of salvation
depends on such condition, we are indeed the direct cause of our cooperation with
grace. On the contrary, Augustine wrote in The Gift of Perseverance 6,12: “We live,
therefore, more securely if we give up the whole to God, and do not entrust
ourselves partly to him and partly to ourselves.”

Fifth passage used by Lessius: 1 Tim 2:4: “God wants all men to be saved and to
come to knowledge of the truth.” How is this true, wondered Lessius, if God

29
Ibid., 24.
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excluded “an immense number” from his predestining decree and only prepared
incongruous graces for them?

Lemos’ response:
In 1586 Lessius said the same things at Louvain, but both the Louvain and Douai
faculties issued a censorship saying that Lessius was following Catharinus’ and
Erasmus’ view. Lemos takes exception to Lessius’ claim that when of two just
people one attains heaven and the other backslides, the cause of this is certainly
freedom of the will.30 In Lemos’ view, this amounts to deny that predestination is
an inscrutable mystery, as both Paul and Augustine emphasized. Moreover, when
the Fathers and the scholastics talked about God’s universal salvific will they
referred to his antecedent and inefficacious will (applied to humankind before the
Fall), not to his consequent, efficacious and absolute will (applied to humankind
after the Fall). Thomas Aquinas in particular showed how these two wills are
related in his Summa theologiae Ia, q.19, art. 6.
Also, Prosper in The Calling of All Nations 12, argued against Semipelagians
in favor of efficacy of divine grace by which God works in us to will and to
achieve, which is without a doubt an effect of predestination according to the
absolute will of God:

When devotees of sophistical wranglings read or hear this, they will object that our
arguments contradict and fullness, we mean to take nothing from the context the Apostle
who teaches that God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the
truth. We accept this brief sentence of the Apostle in its entirety preceding it or following it.
Let us leave aside all other testimonies of the inspired writings. This one passage will do to
refute their slanderous objection and to defend what they impiously deny. Now, then, the
Apostle Paul, teacher of the Gentiles, writing to Timothy, says: “Desire, therefore, first of all,
that supplications, intercessions, thanksgivings be made for all men, for kings and for all that
are in high station: that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all piety and chastity. For
this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who will have all men to be saved
and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God and one Mediator of God
and men, the man Christ Jesus who gave Himself a redemption for all” For the universal
Church this constitutes a fundamental norm of the Apostle's teaching. Let us, then, seek the
mind of the universal Church about it in order not to understand it by relying on our own
judgment. There can be no doubt about what is enjoined, if the efforts made by all those who
obey are the same. The Apostle commands, rather, the Lord speaking through the Apostle
commands through him that supplications and intercessions, thanksgivings be made for all
men, for kings and for all that are in high station. All priests and all the faithful, adhere
unanimously to this norm of supplication in their devotions. There is no part of the world in
which Christian peoples do not offer up these prayers. The Church, then, pleads before God
everywhere, not only for the saints and those regenerated in Christ, but also for all infidels
and all enemies of the Cross of Christ, for all worshippers of idols, for all who persecute
Christ in his members, for the Jews whose blindness does not see the light of the gospel, for
30
Ibid., 25.
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heretics and schismatics who are alien to the unity of faith and charity. But what does she
beg for them if not that they leave their errors and be converted to God, that they accept the
faith, accept charity, that they be freed from the shadows of ignorance and come to the
knowledge of the truth? They cannot do this by themselves: they are struggling under the
weight of vicious habits and are ensnared by the bonds of Satan. They are powerless before
their own deceptions; so stubbornly do they cling to them that they love falsehood in the
measure truth should be loved. Hence the merciful and just Lord wishes that prayers be
offered him for all men. When we see countless souls drawn out of such deep misery, we
should have no doubt that God is granting a prayerful request. While thanking him for those
who are saved, we should hopefully pray that the same divine grace may deliver from the
power of darkness those who are still without light and conduct them into the kingdom of
God before they depart this life.

Lemos upholds the Augustinian understanding of “all” as in “all kinds of

people.” Paul, and subsequently the Church and individual Christians, asks us to
pray for all men (even though we do not know who are those who will be saved),
so that the elect may be converted. But the unintended consequence of Lessius’
view of predestination based on absolute foreknowledge is that God should not be
prayed to bestow salvation because men can attain it by their free will (albeit with
the help of grace).31
Aquinas in Contra gentiles III, 149 pointed out that prevenient grace is
necessary (though Lessius could argue that in this passage Thomas is not saying
that God gives it only to some). God sincerely wills all people to be saved unless
they place an obstacle to salvation, though they will of course, after the Fall
(Summa Ia IIae, q.112, art. 3: “The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part;
but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's according to Hosea 13:9:
‘Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me’”).
The example of the organizer of the race adduced by Lessius does not address
the same thing as what Paul had envisioned: some athletes out of their own
laziness do not want run, so it is fair to say the organizer originally wants all to
win, but some more than others (i.e., the athletes who are not lazy): thus, Lessius
argument fails and can only appeal to less educated people.32

Sixth passage used by Lessius, Mt 20: 1-16. God is like the owner of a vineyard
who rewards his laborers with wages, but does not reward the absence of work.

Lemos’ response:
This parable most certainly does not apply to the gratuitous act of election and
predestination to glory, but to the calling to be part of the Church and to the

31
Ibid., 26. Lemos says that he will discuss this argument further in the fourth book of his
Panoplia.
32
Ibid., 27.
 254

working in it, whereby eternal life is given as a reward for it: it proceeds as an
effect or execution of predestination, as the words “went out early in the
morning” refer to God going out in time to call people to become part of the
Church.
Even though this parable refers explicitly to workers and their wages, why
should we exclude that it also refers to the last effect of absolute predestination
without foreseen merits, also considering that everybody gets the same pay,
namely eternal life?

Seventh passage used by Lessius, “Be all the more eager to make your calling
and election sure” (2 Pt 1:10).

Lemos’ response:
This passage does not suggest that God’s predestination per se is not absolute,
but uncertain and conditional until our free will resolves to embrace God’s
universal calling to salvation by doing good works and living as we should;
rather, it suggests that our awareness of being predestined will increase when and
if we engage in doing God’s work.
In support of his contention Lemos quoted a passage from The Predestination
of the Saints 11, 22: “For we are commanded to do these actions, and they are
shown to be gifts of God in order that we might understand both that we do them
and that God makes us do them, as he says most clearly through the prophet
Ezekiel. For what could be clearer than when he says: ‘I shall make you do it’ (Ez
36:27)?”33 And for good measure Lemos also added a quote from Thomas’ Summa
Ia, q.23, art.8:

So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to
bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the
salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person
towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or
those of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to
salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because
through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said:
‘Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election’ (2 Peter 1:10).

Eight passage used by Lessius: “Hold on to what you have, so that no one will
take your crown” (Rev 3:11).

33
The text goes on in italics to say (giving the reader the impression that these are still
Augustine’s words): “and our most certain predestination depends on his efficacious will and not
on our merits.” Was this an un-intentional mistake by the typist? I cannot bring myself to believe
that Lemos would have intentionally misled his readers with a spurious quote.
 255

Lemos’ response:
Lessius is guilty of erroneous exegesis of this passage (falsa intelligentia) since it
does NOT suggest that anyone could actually loose the crown of glory that was
bestowed on him by divine predestination; NOR that the bestowal of such crown
is uncertain on the part of God’s predestination, whereby a person either may lose
it by falling into sin, or be confirmed in it by persevering. Rather, there is double
legitimate meaning of this passage in the Book of Revelation. The first meaning
was advocated by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Ia, q.23, art. 6 , Reply to Objection
1:

The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and
thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain
way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that
crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to
fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: ‘He shall break in pieces many and
innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead.’ Thus men are substituted in the place
of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in
the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at
the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself
or by others.

The second meaning was advocated by Augustine in On Rebuke and Grace

13, 39:

I speak thus of those who are predestinated to the kingdom of God, whose number is so
certain that one can neither be added to them nor taken from them; not of those who, when
He had announced and spoken, were multiplied beyond number. For they may be said to be
called but not chosen, because they are not called according to the purpose. But that the
number of the elect is certain, and neither to be increased nor diminished—although it is
signified by John the Baptist when he says, Bring forth, therefore, fruits meet for repentance:
and think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for God is able of
these stones to raise up children to Abraham, Matthew 3:8-9 to show that they were in such
wise to be cut off if they did not produce fruit, that the number which was promised to
Abraham would not be wanting—is yet more plainly declared in the Apocalypse: Hold fast
that which you have, lest another take your crown. Revelation 3:11 For if another would not
receive unless one should have lost, the number is fixed.

Thus, it appears that Lessius reversed the order established by Augustine,

who said that the predestination is certain out of God’s decree, and that number
of elect is fixed before any and all foreknowledge of merits.
Augustine (On Rebuke and Grace 13, 40) had this to say in regard to the crown
given to those who are predestined:
 256

But, moreover, that such things as these are so spoken to saints who will persevere, as if it
were reckoned uncertain whether they will persevere, is a reason that they ought not
otherwise to hear these things, since it is well for them not to be high-minded, but to fear.
Romans 11:20 For who of the multitude of believers can presume, so long as he is living in
this mortal state, that he is in the number of the predestinated? Because it is necessary that
in this condition that should be kept hidden; since here we have to beware so much of pride,
that even so great an apostle was buffeted by a messenger of Satan, lest he should be lifted
up. 2 Corinthians 12:7 Hence it was said to the apostles, If you abide in me; John 15:7 and
this he said who knew for a certainty that they would abide; and through the prophet, If you
shall be willing, and will hear me, Isaiah 1:19 although he knew in whom he would work to
will also. And many similar things are said. For on account of the usefulness of this secrecy,
lest, perchance, any one should be lifted up, but that all, even although they are running
well, should fear, in that it is not known who may attain—on account of the usefulness of
this secrecy, it must be believed that some of the children of perdition, who have not
received the gift of perseverance to the end, begin to live in the faith which works by love,
and live for some time faithfully and righteously, and afterwards fall away, and are not taken
away from this life before this happens to them. If this had happened to none of these, men
would have that very wholesome fear, by which the sin of presumption is kept down, only so
long as until they should attain to the grace of Christ by which to live piously, and
afterwards would for time to come be secure that they would never fall away from him. And
such presumption in this condition of trials is not fitting, where there is so great weakness,
that security may engender pride. Finally, this also shall be the case; but it shall be at that
time, in men also as it already is in the angels, when there cannot be any pride. Therefore
the number of the saints, by God's grace predestinated to God's kingdom, with the gift of
perseverance to the end bestowed on them, shall be guided there in its completeness, and
there shall be at length without end preserved in its fullest completeness, most blessed, the
mercy of their Savior still cleaving to them, whether in their conversion, in their conflict, or
in their crown!

Lemos concludes that this passage is meant to teach humility to the elect and
NOT that one confirms his election through his free will, as Lessius would have
it. Also, this passage seems to have a practical application in the instance of
Matthias, who was chosen in an absolute manner to replace Judas, who was
allowed in an equally absolute manner to fall from grace.

Ninth passage used by Lessius: “But you have mercy on all, because you can do
all things; and you overlook sins for the sake of repentance. You love all that
exists, you hold nothing of what you have made in abhorrence. You spare all
things because all things are yours, Lord, lover of life” (Wis 11:23-26). He then
concluded that God’s mercy would really be small if he excluded souls from
heaven without resorting to his foreknowledge of their deeds.

Lemos’ response:
Aquinas put it best when he said: “God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch
as he wishes them all some good; but he does not wish every good to them all. So
 257

far, therefore, as he does not wish this particular good--namely, eternal life--he is
said to hate or reprobated them.” (Summa Ia, q. 23, art. 3, Reply to Objection 1).
Thus, God loves all his creatures, but out of the mass of sinful humankind he
selected some to partake of eternal life, thus displaying great mercy indeed, since
he could have rightfully reprobated everyone. This, we may recall, is the
traditional Catholic view espoused by Augustine and Aquinas. Augustine in his
On Grace and Free Will 4.6 suggested: “There is a danger however, namely that all
these divine testimonies in support of free will, as well as many others, which are
without a doubt most numerous, could be understood in such a way as to leave no
room to the help and grace of God, which are necessary to lead a pious life and to
carry out good deeds which will earn us eternal life.”
Moreover, Lemos accuses Lessius of a bad interpretation of this text (prava
huius loci intelligentia),34 for it could go along the lines of what Origen believed,
namely that eventually even Satan and the demons will be restored to heaven by
God’s mercy.

34
Ibid., 30.
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Chapter 3

Chapter Four

As far as Lessius’ use of the testimony of several ecclesiastical writers (both

ancient and modern) is concerned, Lemos dismisses it in a few pages.35

a) Fathers. What they said must be taken in context and explained in a

better way than Lessius did.
b) Recent Scholastics. In his Panoplia Bk II, Treatise 3, ch. 4, Lemos made
the following distinction:36
1) Some authors should not even be cited because they were either
“illustrious nobodies” (minoris notae sunt) who had no authority, or
because they seriously lapsed into doctrinal errors (e.g., Ambrosius
Catharinus,37 Gabriel Biel, Henry of Ghent, Durandus, Ockham).
2) Some, like Bellarmine and Stapleton, upheld middle knowledge and not
Lessius’ view of predestination post praevisa merita.
3) Some like Driedo and Ruardus did not really say what Lessius makes
them say: quite the contrary!
c) Older Scholastics. They did not uphold predestination based on God’s
absolute foreknowledge of human beings’ good use of free will. Worse yet,
Lessius is guilty of providing incomplete and truncated quotes and giving
to their statements a meaning they did not originally carry.38

Chapter Five

The Importance of Augustine’s View.39

35
Brevis tractatus, 30-34.
36
Panoplia II, pp. 239, 240.
37
Baptized with the name of Lancillotto Politi, he joined the Dominican order and was later
ordained archbishop. In his book De Praedestinatione Dei he suggested that most people are
simply praesciti, or foreknown to go to heaven on the basis of their foreseen good works; he also
postulated a second category or people who have been absolutely predestined by God to be in
heaven (e.g. Mary, the mother of Jesus, John the Baptist). To learn more about this controversial
figure, see Giorgio Caravale, Beyond the Inquisition: Ambrogio Catarino Politi And the Origins
of the Counter-Reformation, trans. by Donald Wenstein (2007).
38
“Unde quod Objector opponit in hoc puncto omnium pene doctrorum consensus haberi, a
veritate est alienum, vel enim eos falso inducit, ut ibidem ostensum fuit, vel truncate omissis
eorum aliis verbis quibus se declarant, vel in alieno sensu ab eo quem intendunt,” Brevis
tractatus, 34.
39
Ibid., 34-44.
 259

Lessius mistakenly attributed to Augustine a quote from Prosper’s Reply to the

Vincentians Articles 12:

Those of whom it is said: “They went out of us but they were not of us. For if they had been
of us, they would no doubt have remained with us”(1 Jn 2:19), went away of their own
choosing, they fell through their own fault. And because [quia] God foresaw that they
would fall, they were not predestined. They would have been of the predestined, should they
have come back to God and persevered in holiness and truth. And so we conclude that the
predestination of God is for many the reason of their perseverance in grace and for none is
the reason of their fall.

Lemos corrects this error (how convenient it would have been for Lessius had
Augustine really said that!) and goes on to exegete this text. Lemos points out
that the preposition “because” (quia) is not to be understood in a causative, a
priori fashion (causa essendi), but rather in a posteriori fashion, as an effect or
consequence (causa consequentiae). As an example of what he is saying, Lemos
quoted Jesus’s saying to his disciples: “The Father himself loves you because you
have loved me” (Jn 16:27), and what Thomas Aquinas wrote in Summa Ia q.14,
art.8, reply to Objection 1:

Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not
belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above. But when he says the reason why God
foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the
cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the
future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why
God knows them.

But what about the passage from Augustine’s Letter to Simplician, quoted by
Lessius in support of his view of predestination based on foreseen merits?40
Lemos acknowledges the impact of this text, but tends to minimize its scope by
making three points:

1) Lemos points out a certain discrepancy between the earlier and later, more
mature Augustine, who went at great length in his last works against Pelagians

40
Augustine wrote: “The divine decree does not stand firm because of election, but rather
election depends on God’s decree; in other words God’s decree of justification does not stand
firm because he finds good works in the people he chooses, but, having decided to justify
believers, he found good works which he chose for them to perform, thus leading them to
heaven. In fact, if there was no election, there would be no elect and we could not reasonably say
with Paul: ‘Who will accuse God’s elect?’ (Rom 8:33). Thus, election does not precede
justification, but justification election. No one, in fact, is chosen unless he is first set aside from
those who have been rejected. For I do not see how this can be said without foreknowledge:
‘God chose us before the foundation of the world’ (Eph 1:4).”
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and Semipelagians, in which he constantly talked about the election of grace.41

For instance, Augustine wrote in The Gift of Perseverance 21, 55: “For I am now
writing treatises in which I have undertaken to retract my smaller works, for the
purpose of demonstrating that even I myself have not in all things followed
myself; but I think that, with God's mercy, I have written progressively, and not
begun from perfection;” and in 20, 51: “And this I began more fully to apprehend
in that disputation which I wrote to Simplicianus, the bishop of the Church of
Milan, of blessed memory, in the beginning of my episcopate, when, moreover, I
both perceived and asserted that the beginning of faith is God's gift.”
2) Augustine proposed this view more in a speculative than in a definitive way
(magis speculative quam resolutive): thus, Lessius makes too much out of this text.
3) Even distinguished Jesuits like Bellarmine found issue with the idea that God
decided to elect people ex praevisis meritis only after the grace of justification was
bestowed on them, and went on to suggest in his De gratia et libero arbitrio that
this was the thought of younger Augustine and that the doctrine of free will and
predestination cannot be determined on the basis of an isolated text such as Ad
Simplicianum.

But what about the five proofs given by Lessius that Augustine never
changed his mind about what he claimed in his Letter to Simplician, namely that
election is based on justification? (refer to my page 145).
Lemos addresses each of those reasons in turn.
Response to Lessius’ first reason. The main bone of contention between
Augustine and Pelagius was not so much or exclusively whether we can deserve
glory on the basis of merely natural works, but whether our will needs the
support of grace to choose what is good. Also, against the Semipelagians,
Augustine resolved that without grace we cannot either begin to believe or to
persevere to the end.

Response to Lessius’ second reason. If it is true as Lessius and Jesuits claim,

that predestination is according to the foreknowledge of the good use of free will
that a person makes of the gifts or grace (good use that makes the grace of God
efficacious), it follows that such good use is not predestined. Consequently,
neither are all our good works predestined, among which we should especially
include such good use on our part; nor can we say that God’s gifts have been
prepared by God for us to do. Moreover, how could one not glory in himself if it’s
true what Lessius claims, namely that we can indeed render God’s grace
efficacious through the innate freedom of our will?

41
Brevis tractatus, 37. Lemos proceeds in the next few pages to quote from several works of
Augustine to support his point.
 261

Response to Lessius’ third reason. Lessius is certainly right to say that the
predestination of grace cannot be merited because it is the absolute favor of God,
but unfortunately he does not go far enough and stops short of saying that
predestination of everything else is predicated upon God’s good will and not his
foreknowledge, thus ending up developing a view that must be rejected.
As Augustine wrote in On Grace and Free Will 6, 15:

But Pelagians say that the only grace that is not given according to our merits is that by
which men’ sins are forgiven; however, that which is given at the end, namely eternal life, is
bestowed on the basis of our preceding merits. I will reply to them that if they conceived our
merits by acknowledging that these very gifts are gifts of God, their view should not be
rejected; however, since they exalt human merits to the point where they claim that man
owns them of himself, the apostle Paul rightly replies to them: “For who makes you different
from anyone else? What do you have that you did not receive? And if you did receive it, why
do you boast as though you did not?” (1 Cor 4:7)

Response to Lessius’ fourth reason. Lessius is right to suggest (as Augustine

did) that it is useful to preach and talk about predestination. However, he fails to
recognize that the predestination Augustine was defending against the
Semipelagians’ objections was one based on God’s will and NOT on his absolute
foreknowledge of man’s use of free will. Lessius’ (and Molina’s) denial that the
contribution of man’s free will is itself an effect of prevenient grace or of
predestination is moderated, in Lessius’ Annex on predestination, by the claim that
it is concomitant with the action of grace; however, this will not do either because
Lessius denies that man’s decisions are an effect of predestination. Augustine
wrote in The Gift of Perseverance 17, 46:

I, however, am loth to exaggerate the case with my words, but I rather leave it to them to
consider, and see what it is of which they have persuaded themselves— to wit, that by the
preaching of predestination, more of despair than of exhortation is impressed upon the
hearers. For this is to say that a man then despairs of his salvation when he has learned to
place his hope not in himself, but in God, although the prophet cries, ‘Cursed is he who has
his hope in man’ (Jer 17:5).

Response to Lessius’ fifth reason. It is foolish talk to suggest (as Lessius does)
that through works done under the guidance of grace, which in themselves are
the means and the effects of God’s intended end, a person can earn that end (or,
put differently, that the choice of efficacious means precedes God’s intention to
bestow them). According to Lemos, there are four distinct logical phases in God’s
predestination. First, there is an efficacious intention, meaning the election of
some people to glory in virtue of a gratuitous gift. Second, there is the preparation
of the efficacious means or benefits through which God leads people to glory.
Third, there is the distribution over one’s lifespan of such means. Fourth, the
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bestowal of glory as a reward and wage for good works performed. According to
Lemos, Augustine regarded the first three as gratuitous, and the last one as
falling under human merit. Lessius fails to recognize the difference, thus
engendering “dangerous equivocations and erroneous consequences.”42

In conclusion, Lessius seriously misrepresents the thought of Augustine

concerning predestination (falsam et errantem intelligentiam): it is not that God
foreknew what we were going to do, but rather: “He foreknew the remnant which
he should make so, according to the election of grace. That is, therefore, he
predestinated them; for without doubt he foreknew if he predestinated; but to
have predestinated is to have foreknown that which he should do” (The Gift of
Perseverance, 18, 48).

Chapter Six

Next, Lemos addresses the ten claims made by Lessius against the Dominican
doctrine of predestination (see my pages 198-204).

1) The reprobate are excluded not only negatively but positively as well.

RESPONSE:
Faustus of Rietz’s teachings about grace and predestination (which Lemos
described in detail in Panoplia I, tract. 5, 1) emphasize that predestination is based
on God’s foreknowledge of the good use man makes of his will, and not on God’s
absolute decree. Since Faustus’ teachings were condemned by several Popes,
Lessius’ view should be rejected as well, since it echoes the Gallic bishop’s.
When Lessius rejects the idea that reprobates are rejected before the
foreknowledge of their demerits, he ought to be reminded of Rom 9:11, 12:
“Before they were born or done anything good or bad….not by works, but by him
who works, it was said that the older will serve the younger.”
It is true that the not-elect are excluded positively, but not in the sense
Lessius envisions and condemns: the reprobation of the non-elect before the
foreknowledge of actual sins occurred after the foreknowledge of Original Sin. It
is because of the Fall that people are fairly excluded from God’s kingdom and the
elect are mercifully subtracted from the “mass of perdition” (as Augustine and
Aquinas both upheld, when they expounded Paul’s Letter to the Romans): what is
the problem with this view?
Lessius’ claim that the Dominican view of reprobation before the
foreknowledge of actual sins echoes the Calvinist view is unfounded. Calvinists

42
Ibid., 44.
 263

say that such reprobation is brought about in an absolute manner by a God who
imposes necessity on man’s free will, which is thereby taken away; that sin is the
effect of reprobation; and that reprobation truly (vere) causes sin. Such views, says
Lemos, have been consistently condemned by Dominicans (as well as by Orange
II and Trent).

2) God’s universal salvific will is not sincere, nor is his love consistent if he
gives the non-elect incongruous graces.

RESPONSE
According to Lemos, Paul’s testimony in Rom 9:10 (“It is not of him who
wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy”), and the the gravity of
Original Sin – show us that God doesn’t owe anything to anyone. He also
brought up a passage from Augustine’s Against Julian, in which the African bishop
criticized the Pelagian understanding of the expression “God wants all men to be
saved” (1 Tim 2:14), as he tried to show that Lessius’ objection was formulated in
the past by Faustus and Julian (and refuted by Augustine):

But you bring up the Apostle’s testimony, and claim that God opens the door to those who
knock, as he wants all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. You wish
us to believe in your teaching according to which not everybody is saved and comes to the
truth because they do not want to ask when God wants to give, and do not want to knock
when God wants to open the door …
The way of thinking you uphold is refuted by the silence of infants, who do not ask, do not
seek and do not knock, and who, on the contrary, scream, cry, push away when they are
being baptized, and yet receive, find, and to whom the door of the kingdom of heaven is
opened: in it they find eternal salvation and knowledge of the truth. However, there are more
babies who do not receive the adoption of this grace from the One who wants all men to be
saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth…
Do you think that they are not men or that they are not included in the expression “all men?”
Or can we really say that God wants them to, but they do not, when they are still babies
unable to either want or not want?...For what reason does God, who wants all men to be
saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, allow so many people not to arrive in the
kingdom of heaven where there is knowledge of truth, even though as babies they do not
oppose any resistance to his will? Thus, the expression “God wants all men to be saved and
to come to the knowledge of the truth” must be understood the way we understand the
words of another Pauline text: “Even so, by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon
all men unto justification of life” (Rom 5:18). If you believe that in the latter text the term
“all” referred to those who are justified in Christ really means “many” – since many others
are NOT made alive in Christ – then you can be told that in the former text too “all men”
refers to “many.”43

43
Augustine, Against Julian IV, 8, 42.
 264

Thus, Lessius comment is very foolish (nihil insipientius possit affirmari).44

In summary, Paul’s testimony; the fact that some children die unbaptized; and the
expression “all” meaning “all those who are saved” – are enough to dismiss
Lessius’ concerns.
In his Letter to Vitalis (Letter 217), Augustine wrote:

How can one say that all human beings would receive grace if those to whom it is not given
would not reject it by their own will, because God wills that all human beings be saved (1 Tim
2:14), since it not given to many infants? For very many die without it who do not have a
will opposed to it, and at times their parents desire it and hasten to it, and the ministers are
also willing and ready. But, because God does not will it, it is not given, when the infant
suddenly dies before the sacrament is given to which his parents had hastened so that he
might receive it. Hence it is obvious that those who resist this truth, which is so clear, do
not at all understand the sense in which it was said that God wills that all human beings be
saved, though so many are not saved, not because they do not will it, but because God does
not will it, which is perfectly clear in the case of infants. But just as the statement, All will be
brought to life in Christ (1 Cor 15:22), though so many are punished with eternal death, was
said in the sense that all who receive eternal life receive it only in Christ, so the statement,
God wills all human beings be saved, though he does not will that so many will be saved, was
said in the sense that all who are saved are saved only by his will. And if these words of the
apostle can be understood in any other way, they still cannot contradict this absolutely
obvious truth by which we see that so many are not saved because God does not will this,
though human beings do.

We should also remember, Lemos concludes, that Pauls’ words in 1 Tim 2:4
refer to God’s antecedent and inefficacious will that can perfectly co-exist with his
consequent and efficacious will to save some people with an absolute will before
any foreknowledge of their merits. See for instance Aquinas’ analogy in Summa Ia,
q. 19, art. 6:

But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill
him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he
wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God
antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His
justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch
as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by
willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a
murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a
man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is
clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may
not take place.

44
Brevis tractatus, 46.
 265

3) Lessius’ objection to the Dominicans that God’s promises and threats are
conditional, and predicated upon a human response,45 can be broken down
into the following parts:
a) The promise of eternal life is conditional upon observing his
commandments;
b) The divine warnings and threats do not make sense if God has already
absolutely decreed the salvation of some; conversely, a warning to a
non-elect would be vain;
c) If God’s predefinition is the cause of a person’s perseverance, another’s
lack of perseverance is also caused by God’s predefinition.
Lessius concluded that contrary to the Dominicans’ view, though the
allotment of heaven and hell depends on God as the principal cause or the
cause sine qua non, the fulfillment of the condition and the heeding to the
warning is up to us.

RESPONSE:
The efficacy of grace, election and predestination are not rooted in the
fulfillment of the commandments: rather, the Semipelagian error denounced by
Prosper and Hilary (and stigmatized by Augustine in his The Predestination of the
Saints and The Gift of Perseverance) consisted in denying that they are the
unconditional gift of God.
Lemos goes on to address Lessius’ points in greater detail:

a) Even though God’s promises are conditional and their fulfillment is placed
in man’s free will, it does not mean that God is not the one who makes their
fulfilment occur. Lemos refers to two Augustinian texts:

When, therefore, he commands us in the words, ‘Turn to me, and I will turn to you,’
(Zechariah 1:3) and we say to him, ‘Turn us, O God of our salvation,’ and again, ‘Turn us, O
God of hosts;’ what else do we say than, ‘Give what you command?’ When he commands us,
saying, ‘Understand now, you simple among the people,’ and we say to him, ‘Give me
understanding, that I may learn your commandments;’ what else do we say than, ‘Give what
you command?’ When he commands us, saying, ‘Go not after your lusts,’ (Sirach 18:30) and
we say to him, ‘We know that no man can be continent, except God gives it to him’ (Wisdom
8:21); what else do we say than, ‘Give what you command?’ When he commands us, saying,
‘Do justice’ (Isaiah 56:1), and we say, ‘Teach me your judgments, O Lord;’ what else do we
say than, ‘Give what you command?’ (On Merit and the Forgiveness of Sins II, 5, 5)

45
Trent VI, Canon 20: “If anyone says that a man who is justified and however perfect is not
bound to observe the commandments of God and the Church, but only to believe, as if the
Gospel were a bare and absolute promise of eternal life without the condition of observing the
commandments, let him be anathema.”
 266

And also:

It is to the free will of man that the words are addressed: ‘My son, remove not yourself
from the chastening of the Lord’ (Pr 3:11). And the Lord said: ‘I have prayed for you,
Peter, that your faith fail not’ (Lk 22:32). So that a man is assisted by grace, in order that
his will may not be uselessly commanded… Then, again, there is the Scripture contained
in the second book of the Chronicles: ‘The Lord is with you when you are with him: and if
you shall seek him you shall find him; but if you forsake him, he also will forsake you (2
Chronicles 15:2). This passage, no doubt, clearly manifests the choice of the will (On Grace
and Free Will 5, 11).

Moreover, against Celestius, Augustine argued:

He, however, thought he had discovered a great support for his cause in the prophet
Isaiah; because by him God said: ‘If you be willing, and hearken unto me, you shall eat the
good of the land; but if you be not willing, and hearken not to me, the sword shall devour
you: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken this’ (Isaiah 1:19-20). As if the entire law were
not full of conditions of this sort; or as if its commandments had been given to proud men
for any other reason than that ‘the law was added because of transgression, until the seed
should come to whom the promise was made’ (Gal 3:19). It entered, therefore, ‘that the
offense might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound’ (Romans
5:20). In other words that man might receive commandments, trusting as he did in his
own resources, and that, failing in these and becoming a transgressor, he might ask for a
deliverer and a savior; and that the fear of the law might humble him, and bring him, as a
schoolmaster, to faith and grace (On Grace and Free Will 19, 42).

In these passages Augustine is saying that God’s laws and commandments

are not fulfilled through the law or free will in and of themselves, but rather
through the help of God’s efficient grace.

Every man, however, is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed
(James 1:14) not to observe and keep these holy precepts of chastity. If he should say in
respect of these commandments, ‘I wish to keep them, but am mastered by my
concupiscence,’ then the Scripture responds to his free will, as I have already said: ‘Be not
overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good’ (Romans 12:21). In order, however, that
this victory may be gained, grace renders its help; and were not this help given, then the
law would be nothing but the strength of sin. For concupiscence is increased and receives
greater energies from the prohibition of the law, unless the spirit of grace helps. (On Grace
and Free Will 4, 8)

Lemos adds that the voluntas signi in God is not literal but metaphorical
(Summa Ia, q. 19, art. 12),46 meaning that the “conditional salvific will” does not
exclude God’s absolute decree, but only that his absolute decree includes the
fulfillment of commandments brought about by our free will, which is moved,
46
Brevis tractatus, 49.
 267

excited and anticipated by God’s efficacious grace. Thus, in virtue of his absolute
and unconditional decree God infallibly foreknows that his elect will perform
meritorious deeds and attain eternal life.

b) As far as this point made by Lessius is concerned, warnings and threats do

indeed make sense within the paradigm of predestination based on absolute
decree, as Augustine made clear in Rebuke and Grace 13, 40:

But, moreover, that such things as these are so spoken to saints who will persevere, as if
it were reckoned uncertain whether they will persevere, is a reason that they ought not
otherwise to hear these things, since it is well for them not to be high-minded, but to
fear (Romans 11:20). For who of the multitude of believers can presume, so long as he is
living in this mortal state, that he is in the number of the predestinated? Because it is
necessary that in this condition that should be kept hidden; since here we have to
beware so much of pride, that even so great an apostle was buffeted by a messenger of
Satan, lest he should be lifted up (2 Corinthians 12:7). Hence it was said to the apostles,
‘If you abide in me’ (John 15:7) and this he said who knew for a certainty that they
would abide; and through the prophet, ‘If you shall be willing, and will hear me,’ (Is
1:19), although he knew in whom he would work to will also. And many similar things
are said. For on account of the usefulness of this secrecy, lest, perchance, any one should
be lifted up, but that all, even although they are running well, should fear, in that it is
not known who may attain—on account of the usefulness of this secrecy, it must be
believed that some of the children of perdition, who have not received the gift of
perseverance to the end, begin to live in the faith which works by love, and live for some
time faithfully and righteously, and afterwards fall away, and are not taken away from
this life before this happens to them. If this had happened to none of these, men would
have that very wholesome fear, by which the sin of presumption is kept down, only so
long as until they should attain to the grace of Christ by which to live piously, and
afterwards would for time to come be secure that they would never fall away from him.

c) It is indeed true that God’s predefinition is the cause of a man’s

perseverance - and that is so, not according to God’s foreknowledge, but
rather to his good will and pleasure; Lemos however does not reply here to
Lessius’ contention that a person’s lack of perseverance is caused by God’s
predefinition (such claim had already been made elsewhere and addressed
by Lemos).

4) According to Lessius, it is not consistent with God’s goodness and mercy

to exclude people from heaven if we exclude his foreknowledge of actual
sins that people will commit.

RESPONSE
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Lessius talks as if Dominicans upheld predestination before Original Sin: we

do not!, says Lemos. He then goes on to articulate the traditional view of
predestination:

After foreseeing original sin and before foreseeing actual sins God chose out of his mercy
those whom he wanted to be freed from the mass of perdition, having abandoned the others
in such mass. He did so in order to show the riches of his mercy in the former, and his wrath
and justice in the latter, and in order to show the elect and predestined what they would have
incurred if the gratuitous mercy had not intervened.47

Lemos goes on to make four points:

a) As far as being unfair to the non-elect is concerned, Lemos reminds Lessius

that God doesn’t owe anything to anyone: “Glory and grace are not owed to
them.” God uses mercy to the non-elect by giving them helps and grace by which
they would attain eternal life if they so wished (though they did not); by not
allowing them to be as evil as they could be; and by punishing them short of what
they truly deserve.48
47
Ibid., 51.
48
Aquinas, Summa I, q.23, art. 5, ad 3: “The reason for the predestination of some, and
reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made
all things through his goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now
it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in
many ways in his creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of
God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of
being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of
grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never
happen, as was said above (I:22:2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we
consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest his goodness in men; in respect to those
whom he predestines, by means of his mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he
reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some
and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): ‘What if God, willing to
show his wrath [that is, the vengeance of his justice], and to make his power known, endured
[that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that he might
show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared unto glory’ and (2
Timothy 2:20): ‘But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of
wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor.’ Yet why he chooses
some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine
says (Tractatus xxvi. in Joannes.): ‘Why he draws one, and another he draws not, seek not to
judge, if thou dost not wish to err.’ Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned,
since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the
beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity
of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form,
and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the
 269

b) Though his efficacious grace is not given to everyone (because it is not owed,
but a gratuitous gift), this is neither useless nor harmful, as Lessius suggested.
Just as God allowed angels to rebel and be lost, likewise he allowed Adam and
Eve to do the same, with the consequence that hell became populated with angels
and human beings. Lessius makes the mistake of envisioning God’s will not to
give people and angels glory before he foreknew their Fall.

c) There seems to be more fairness if God based his predestination on his

foreknowledge of merits and demerits, said Lessius. Lemos replied that
reprobation (i.e., exclusion from God’s kingdom) is not damnation, but merely the
will NOT to give glory to those to whom it is not owed. Augustine rebuffed the
Semipelagians’ claim that this doctrine made God an acceptor of persons.

d)It seems that the majority of people were created to perish.

Prosper replied to this charge in Reply to the Laying Gauls Obj. 6, 6 and Reply to
Vincentian Articles, Obj. 12. He said that predestination is only unto good, not evil,
which God merely permits. God foresees and allows sins, but does not predestine
them; what he does predestine are the punishments. To say that God predestines
sin is a “most false and harmful view.”49
The cause of damnation is not God’s will but man’s evil will.

5) Lessius said that the “lazy argument” dooms predestination based on

absolute will.

RESPONSE
The “lazy argument” Lessius used to dispose of the doctrine of predestination
based on God’s absolute will was also advocated by Massilians, as St. Prosper
related in his Letter to Augustine,3: “To teach that the decree of God anticipates the
will of man amounts to cast aside all diligence and give up the effort for virtue.”

artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan
requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account
can there be said to be injustice in God, if he prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This
would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted
as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or
less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of
justice. This is what the master of the house said: ‘Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not
lawful for me to do what I will?’ (Matthew 20:14-15).”
49
Brevis tractatus, 53.
 270

According to Lemos, this lazy argument and the conclusions based on it are
“without a doubt most harmful, as it tells both ignorant and learned people how
to rationalize their alleged damnation.”50
Lemos insists that the doctrine of predestination based on absolute
foreknowledge has the same demoralizing effect, for if I am foreknown to perish,
why should I bother to be good? And if I am foreknown to end up in heaven, why
bother striving for holiness? Augustine mentioned the outcome of this twisted
logic, as he told the story of a monk who left the community and returned to the
world, discouraged and disillusioned (The Gift of Perseverance 15, 38).
He also quoted Aquinas, Contra Gentiles 96: “So, it is the same thing to say
that we should not pray in order to obtain something from God, because the
order of his providence is immutable, as to say that we should not walk in order
to get to a place, or eat in order to be nourished; all of which are clearly absurd.”

6) Lessius said that the Dominican view discourages zeal for God.

RESPONSE
Prosper, in his Letter to Augustine 6, reported Semipelagians as saying:

For they refuse to admit this, and they fear to ascribe to the work of God the merits of the
saints. Nor do they accept the view that the predestined number of the elect can be neither
increased nor decreased for fear that the sting of exhortations would have no place in the
lives of those who do not believe or who are negligent and that the imposition of activity or
of labor would be useless for one whose striving is going to be frustrated because he is not
among the elect.51

Hilary also wrote: “For if people are predestined, they say, to each side so
that no one can move from one side to the other, what good does such insistence
upon rebukes from someone else do?”52
Augustine replied to his friends in The Gift of Perseverance 15, 38:

But they say, as you write, that no one can be aroused by the incentives of rebuke if it be said
in the assembly of the Church to the multitude of hearers’: ‘This is the definite meaning of
God's will concerning predestination.’… When they say this: ‘They are unwilling that it
should be declared to men, that coming to the faith and abiding in the faith are God’s gifts,
lest despair rather than encouragement should appear to be suggested, inasmuch as they who
hear think that it is uncertain to human ignorance on whom God bestows, or on whom he

50
Idem. Lemos goes on to characterize this view as “most impious, stupid, harmful, and
damnable.”
51
Roland Teske, Answer to the Pelagians IV, 58.
52
Ibid., 63.
 271

does not bestow, these gifts.’ Why, then, do they themselves also preach with us that wisdom
and continence are God's gifts? But if, when these things are declared to be God's gifts, there
is no hindrance of the exhortation with which we exhort men to be wise and continent; what
is after all the reason for their thinking that the exhortation is hindered wherewith we
exhort men to come to the faith, and to abide in it to the end, if these also are said to be God's
gifts, as is proved by the Scriptures, which are his witnesses?

In Rebuke and Grace 2, 5, and 6 Augustine showed how predestination based

on God’s absolute will is compatible with exhortations and rebukes:

Certainly the apostle asked for this inspiration of good will and work on behalf of those to
whom he said, ‘Now we pray to God that you do no evil, not that we should appear approved,
but that you should do that which is good’ (2 Corinthians 13:7). Who can hear this and not
awake and confess that we have it from the Lord God that we turn aside from evil and do
good? since the apostle indeed says not, ‘We admonish, we teach, we exhort, we rebuke;’ but
he says, ‘We pray to God that you do no evil, but that you should do that which is good’ (2
Corinthians 13:7). And yet he was also in the habit of speaking to them, and doing all those
things which I have mentioned—he admonished, he taught, he exhorted, he rebuked. But he
knew that all these things which he was doing in the way of planting and watering openly
were of no avail unless he who gives the increase in secret should give heed to his prayer on
their behalf. Because, as the same teacher of the Gentiles says, ‘Neither is he that plants
anything, neither he that waters, but God that gives the increase’ (1 Corinthians 3:7).

According to Lemos, far from being right, Lessius fails to see that according
to Augustine zeal for souls is preserved. Augustine also added in the same text:

For it is your fault that you are evil; and it is a greater fault to be unwilling to be rebuked
because you are evil, as if faults should either be praised, or regarded with indifference so as
neither to be praised nor blamed, or as if, indeed, the dread, or the shame, or the
mortification of the rebuked man were of no avail, or were of any other avail in healthfully
stimulating, except to cause that he who is good may be besought, and so out of evil men
who are rebuked may make good men who may be praised… For what he who will not be
rebuked desires to be done for him, when he says, Pray for me rather,— he must be rebuked
for that very reason that he may himself also do for himself; because that mortification with
which he is dissatisfied with himself when he feels the sting of rebuke, stirs him up to a desire
for more earnest prayer, that, by God's mercy, he may be aided by the increase of love, and
cease to do things which are shameful and mortifying, and do things praiseworthy and
gladdening. This is the benefit of rebuke that is wholesomely applied, sometimes with
greater, sometimes with less severity, in accordance with the diversity of sins; and it is then
wholesome when the supreme Physician looks….L et, then, the damnable source be rebuked,
that from the mortification of rebuke may spring the will of regeneration—if, indeed, he who
is rebuked is a child of promise—in order that, by the noise of the rebuke sounding and
lashing from without, God may by his hidden inspiration work in him from within to will
also.
 272

Finally, look at Paul, says Lemos: though uncertain of his own predestination, he
wasn’t anxious nor did he lose heart, but still managed to preach predestination
and have zeal for souls!

7) Lessius said that according to Dominicans God’s predestination precedes

foreknowledge of the Fall.

RESPONSE
Lemos denies this is the case at all: it is others (e.g., Calvinists, some Jesuits)
who claim so, and it is up to those people to reply to this objection.

8) Lessius said that the consequence of absolute predestination upheld by

Dominicans is that the mutual dependence of good works and merits is
rescinded, since they claim that such dependence belongs to the order of
execution, which comes after the order of intention. Lessius defended his claim
with seven points (refer to my pages 201-202).

RESPONSE
Lemos tackles the seven points made by Lessius:
1) The “new” claim that the idea of absolute predestination removes human
freedom is really an old one: countless Fathers dismissed it in the past,
including Augustine. Since Lemos addressed it and refuted in Panoplia I
and II, there is no need to debate this further.
2) Lessius’ suggestion that absolute predestination contradicts Sirach 15:11-
20 was dismissed by Augustine and Aquinas, who suggested that this text
could be taken as either referring to the state of humankind before the Fall,
in which man was not enslaved to sin and thus able not to sin; or to what
man can do after the Fall with the help of grace (Summa Ia IIae, q. 109, art.
8).53

53
Augustine in On Man’s Perfection in Righteousness 19, 41, said: “Or, when the Scripture says
in Deuteronomy, Life and death has He set before man and good and evil, and admonishes him
to choose life; as if, forsooth, this very admonition did not come from God's mercy, or as if there
were any advantage in choosing life, unless God inspired love to make such a choice, and gave
the possession of it when chosen, concerning which it is said: For anger is in His indignation,
and in His pleasure is life. Or again, because it is said, The commandments, if you will, shall
save you, Sirach 15:15 — as if a man ought not to thank God, because he has a will to keep the
commandments, since, if he wholly lacked the light of truth, it would not be possible for him to
possess such a will.”
 273

3) Lemos refers his readers to his Panoplia I in which he discussed in what

sense the Fathers said that God’s foreknowledge does not impose necessity.
4) Augustine, in his The Gift of Perseverance 19,49, said:

Moreover, the blessed Ambrose, when he was expounding the passage where the
Evangelist Luke says, ‘It seemed good to me also,’ (Lk 1:3) says, ‘What he declares to
have seemed good to himself cannot have seemed good to him alone. For not alone by
human will did it seem good, but as it pleased him who speaks in me, Christ, who effects
that that which is good may also seem good to us: for whom he has mercy on he also
calls. And therefore he who follows Christ may answer, when he is asked why he wished
to become a Christian, ‘It seemed good to me also.’ And when he says this, he does not
deny that it seemed good to God; for the will of men is prepared by God. For it is God's
grace that God should be honored by the saint.’

And Aquinas in Contra Gentes III, 97, wrote:

And so, when we ask the reason why,” in regard to a natural effect, we can give a reason
based on a proximate cause; provided, of course, that we trace back all things to the
divine will as a first cause. Thus, if the question is asked: “Why is wood heated in the
presence of fire?” it is answered: “Because heating is the natural action, of fire”; and this
is so “because heat is its proper accident.” But this is the result of its proper form, and so
on, until we come to the divine will. Hence, if a person answers someone who asks why
wood is heated: “Because God willed it,” he is answering it appropriately, provided he
intends to take the question back to a first cause; but not appropriately, if he means to
exclude all other causes.

5) Lemos heartily agrees with Lessius, so, no problem here: I leave it to

others, he said, to discern what the objection is all about.54
6) As difficult as it may be, nothing is impossible for the infinite providence of
God: Jesus even told us that the number of our hair is known to God.
7) Some events described in the Bible were not decreed before God’s
foreknowledge of their circumstances.

God pre-arranged with an absolute and efficacious will those events that are
going to happen and then allowed the other bad events by permission, not by
decree.

9) Lessius argued that predestination is based on God’s foreknowledge of our

good use of free will: to suggest that it is based on God’s sheer will
irrespective of our choices engenders anxiety in many people.

RESPONSE
54
Brevis tractatus, 59.
 274

Augustine commented on Rom 9 in his Against Two Letters of the Pelagians

II, 7,15:

On which account you are certainly foolish who, when the Truth declares, ‘Not of works, but
of him that calls,’ it was said, say that Jacob was loved on account of future works which God
foreknew that he would do, and thus contradict the apostle when he says, ‘Not of works;’ as
if he could not have said, ‘Not of present, but of future works.’ But he says, ‘Not of works,
that he might commend grace; but if of grace, now is it no more of works, otherwise grace is
no more grace.’ For grace, not due, but free, precedes, that by it good works may be done;
but if good works should precede, grace should be repaid, as it were, to works, and thus
grace should be no more grace.

Lemos quipped: “This is my response to Lessius, as well.”55

Lemos keeps insisting on Augustine’s election to glory ante praevisa merita
and on denying that in such election a) there is injustice with God; b) God is an
acceptor of persons; c) is not consonant with God’s goodness; d) there is
something harmful, or even offensive to souls; e) promotes laziness.
Moreover, such doctrine of predestination to heaven ante praevisa merita of
some people through pre-established means is the same as Augustine’s, and the
Church after approving it made it its own: it is not clear how an explanation
opposite to it can be safely defended!
As far as people getting upset with this doctrine is concerned, Augustine
referred to the example of a monk who fell into despair about predestination
based on absolute foreknowledge as well. As far as Anselm’s and Aquinas’ views
mentioned by Lessius are concerned, Lemos refers his readers to Panoplia I.

10) Lessius had claimed that the Dominicans’ views differs from
Augustine’s on four counts:

a) Good angels were predestined with an absolute decree, instead of being

given common grace and left free to choose whether they were going to
serve God or not.
b) The Dominicans say that absolute election would have subsisted even if
Adam had persevered in a state of innocence: not so Augustine.
c) Davila said that predestination and election were decreed before the
foreknowledge of the Fall. On the contrary, Augustine, Richard, and
Driedo based the beginning of predestination on the separation of some
from the massa damnata after the Fall.
d) The Dominicans place the election of Christ before God’s foreknowledge
of future

55
Ibid., 61.
 275

events, unlike what Aquinas (De veritate q.6, art.3), Gregory of Valencia,
and Gabriel Vasquez repeatedly pointed out.

RESPONSE
a) Lemos said that he discussed this view in Panoplia IV. He claimed that God
prepared the gift of eternal life for them from all eternity before
foreknowing their choice, and gave it to them in time. According to him, it
makes no sense to say that they received common grace to merely assist
their free will. Augustine said:

If both types of angels were created equally good, the one sort fell through their evil will,
while the others had greater help to enable them to attain to the fullness of bliss with the
complete assurance that they will never fall away… But if they could not by themselves have
impressed upon the work of the best possible Creator, then clearly they could have only
gained possession of a good will, by which they would be improved, by the assistance of the
Creator’s activity.56

Lemos dismisses Lessius’ claim that the Dominicans would thereby eliminate
the difference between angels and men while Augustine instead recognize it, and
concluded: “The angels’ will was not helped so that it would want, but it was
helped because it wanted.”57
According to Lemos, the real difference between the angels and men lies in
the different reasons why they respectively received efficacious help towards
perseverance and the type of grace they received: men needed it because their will
after the Fall was ill and weak: general or common grace in this case would not
have been enough. On the contrary, the angels’ nature was wholesome but weak:
all they needed was habitual grace.

b) Lemos’ response consists in quoting four biblical texts (Ex 33:19; Rom
9:11, 15, 16) and concluding that they apply to man in either state
(wholesome or fallen), though unfortunately he failed to quote any
Augustinian text in reply to Lessius’ charge.

c) Lemos says that Dominicans believe the same thing and therefore this
charge is groundless.

56
Augustine, The City of God XII, 9.
57
Brevis tractatus, 63.
 276

d) Lemos denies that Dominicans claim that; they believe that the election of
Christ presupposes God’s foreknowledge of the Fall and that Christ would
be its remedy.
 277

Chapter 4

Chapter Seven
In the fourth part of his Annex on Predestination, Lessius quoted and exegeted
some patristic texts that allegedly support the Dominican view of predestination
based on God’s absolute will, in an attempt to show that they really do not.
Lemos replied by saying that in Panoplia IV he will tackle Lessius’ view
according to which Augustine’s understanding of perseverance is a series of helps
through which God foreknows that a man will persevere if God decides to bestow
them on him.58
Lessius’ three arguments in support of his understanding of Augustine
basically amount to saying that the reason why a man is called efficaciously and
another is not consists in man’s good use of free will rather than on God’s
inscrutable good pleasure: however, Lemos remarks, doesn’t this contradict
Lessius’ original claim that the grace of God’s calling cannot be earned or
deserved, not even de congruo?
Addressing Lessius directly, Lemos says: “If God’s calling is the first effect of
predestination and cannot be ascribed to man’s merit (not even de congruo) as you
said earlier, why in the world did you attribute the reason of that calling and of
the first effect of predestination to man himself?”59
As Prosper wrote in Against Cassian 14, 2:

When then, one considers all these statements of yours, it is evident how far you have
strayed from your first sound principle. In it, against your inner conviction, you loudly
declared what must be attributed to grace, with the intention of finding favor with Catholic
readers, who, reassured by the orthodox appearance of your initial confession, would as
easily admit your later statements as they approved of your first teaching.

Then, Lemos produced three quotes from Augustine:

a) Ad Simplicianum I, 2, 22:

If I am allowed to express an opinion in the analysis of God’s choice, I cannot detect other
reasons in his choice to bestow salvific grace on some people besides either a greater innate
quality, or less guilt, or both on their part. Let us also add, if you will, a fruitful and honest
exposure to good teachings. Thus, it appears the grace’s choice may fall on one who has
only been guilty of lesser sins (and who’s free of them?); is of remarkable intelligence; or is
well versed in the liberal arts. However, after establishing these conditions, God, who has
chosen the weak of this world to confound the strong, and the fools to confound the wise,
58
Brevis tractatus, 67.
59
Idem.
 278

will laugh at me so that I may end up mocking many people, such as chaste people rather
than sinners, and fishermen rather than skilled orators.

b) The Predestination of the Saints 6, 11:

Many hear the word of truth; but some believe, while others contradict. Therefore, the
former will to believe; the latter do not will. Who does not know this? Who can deny
this? But since in some the will is prepared by the Lord, in others it is not prepared, we
must assuredly be able to distinguish what comes from God's mercy, and what from his
judgment.” And commenting on Romans 9:12: “But of him that calls, not with any sort of
calling whatever, but with that calling wherewith a man is made a believer” (16, 32).

c) Ad Simpicianum 2, 13:“

‘Many are called, but few are chosen’ (Mt 20:16; 22:14). If this is true and the person who
is called does not obey, because it is in the power of his free will not to obey, we can
reasonably say that it does not depend on God who uses mercy, but on man who wants
and runs, since God’s mercy is insufficient if the obedience of the person who is called
does not ensue.

Lemos concludes: “Nothing more evident can be said against

Lessius.”60Lemos’ compliant against Lessius is that predestination is to be
regarded as God’s inscrutable mystery; no reason, explanation or cause can be
given for his election of people. And yet Lessius expounds this mystery and sheds
light on it by saying that it is ultimately the choice of man’s free will, who wants
to accept the call and persevere, which seals God’s choice. Consequently, either
Paul and Augustine were wrong for saying that it is a mystery, or Lessius has
made it clear for us all!

Chapter Eight

In Part Five of his Annex (see my pages 156-162), Lessius criticized eight
arguments used by Dominicans to uphold predestination based on gratuitous
election to glory (rather than on foreseen merits). Lemos dismissed his reasons
and accused him of clouding the issues with his usual sophistry. Lemos took
particular exception to the idea that God before foreknowing people’s merits and
demerits does not have any specific will towards the predestined, but rather the
same salvific will that he extends to both predestined and reprobate alike;
unfortunately, through such view predestination is emptied of its meaning (per
quod tota praedestinatione enervetur). Moreover, Augustine rejected this common

60
Ibid., 68
 279

and indifferent will of God in both The Predestination of the Saints and The Gift of
Perseverance.
Lemos goes on to say that this view totally contradicts what Paul said in
Rom 9: 11-13: “Yet, before the twins were born or had done anything good or
bad, in order that God’s purpose in election might stand, not by works but by him
who calls, she was told, ‘The older will serve the younger.’ Just as it is written:
‘Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.’” Moreover, Lessius also contradicts Romans
9:16: (“It does not, therefore, depend on human desire or effort, but on God’s
mercy”), since in his view of predestination God’s extension of mercy depends on
man, who out of his innate freedom alone (ex sola innata libertate)61 decides to want
or to act. In fact, Lemos adds, what ever happened to 1 Cor 4:7: “What do you
have that distinguishes you from another?” In Lessius’ view, what distinguishes a
man from another is his cooperation, good choice, good influx and use of his free
will, by which he makes the grace of predestination effective and different from
the grace given to another man, who is reprobated, thus making grace ineffective.
But how does this view differ from the Semipelagians’, who by admitting exciting
grace unto supernatural works and even cooperating grace, claimed that the
influx of the will comes from ourselves?
In Lemos’ words:

That such free determination of the will does not derive from cooperating grace is made
abundantly clear when they say that grace cooperates with the will, meaning that the will
determines itself before grace cooperates with it: if, logically speaking, this determination
comes before cooperating grace (insofar as it cooperates) it is obvious that this determination
and the influx of the will does not derive from such grace. The determination of the will does
not derive from exciting grace either (which in their system is variously referred to as ‘pre-
existent habit of faith;’ or ‘habit of grace and love’), or from actual persuasion and excitement,
because such grace merely gives the ability (namely the possibility) to operate, but not the
operating per se; nor does it follow that he who can operate in fact does so, unless it is
determined to operate by something else. In the way of thinking of these Jesuits, only the
will determines itself on its own, and thus this actual determination of the will does not stem
from habit but from the will’s innate freedom, because we display habits when we want and
because we want. Much less so, this determination derives from persuasion or excitement
arousing the will, since it neither gives the will strength to help it determine itself, nor does
it make it determine itself. Therefore, it is necessary that such determination of the will, if it
must be attributed to God, be attributed to him insofar as he gives the possibility of the will
(which is what Pelagians claimed); or whatever other possibility, even if supernatural (which
Semipelagians did not deny).62

In regard to the seventh arguments marshalled by Dominicans and rebuffed

by Lessius is concerned, Lemos says that Lessius merges the idea that

61
Ibid., 69.
62
Ibid., 69.
 280

justification does not stem from good works performed out the mere strength of
nature with his own take of the medieval axiom facienti quod est in se. As to why
God calls one and not another, or calls one in an ineffective way, Lessius says
there are multiple reasons.

Chapter Nine

In Part Six’s “Third Claim” (refer to my page 225), Lessius said that “Free
will is the indirect cause of that influx of grace (when considered in itself), and the
direct cause of its determination,” adding that “if the influx and efficacy of grace
were not subordinated [emphasis mine] to the power of our free will, a good work
would not be performed freely.”63
Even though Lemos said that he will discuss this view in greater detail in
book IV of his Panoplia, he raised a few preliminary objections. Lessius, the
readers may recall, claimed that it is up to our free will to make grace efficacious
or inefficacious in the secondary act and that God’s grace is the instrument of the
will which we use when we want, and thus its use is up to our decision. Lemos
counters that the Fathers of the Church believed the opposite to be the case: it is
free will which is used by the gift of grace as its instrument. Therefore, it is a
damnable statement to say that the beginning, determination, influx and
cooperation of our will (which is from us and not from grace) stems from our
innate freedom alone!64 To say that the power to render grace efficacious stems
from our innate freedom of the will amounts to say that God cooperates with us
responding to our choice as a debt owed to such prior merit and beginning of
ours, and therefore it amounts to subordinate grace to merit!
Such view was openly contradicted by Prosper’s, Letter to Augustine 4: “And
they think that it follows that, because a transgressor is said not to have obeyed
because he did not will to, a believer is also without a doubt said to have been
devout because he will to be;”65 and by St. Thomas: “The first cause of the defect
of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God’s
according to Hosea 13:9: ‘Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in
Me.’”66
In conclusion, says Lemos, who has ever claimed that a creature is the direct
cause of God’s concurrence? Ancient Greeks would have rejected this idea from a
philosophical point of view!

63
Lessius, De gratia, 558.
64
Brevis tractatus, 71.
65
Roland Teske, 56.
66
Summa Ia IIae q. 112, ad. 2.
 281

Lemos argued that because of Original Sin our free will has been so wounded and
weakened and diminished that it doesn’t have the strength to determine itself and
to perform the least good work. Our predicament is similar to that of the paralytic
healed by Jesus at Bethesda: no encouragement, moral support or exhortation
would suffice for him to get up and enter the pool, since, as he explained to Jesus,
“I have no one to help me (Jn 5:7).” Rather, what such man needed were strong
hands and arms to lift him, carry him, up and immerse him in the pool.

In his “Fifth Claim” (refer to my pages 226-28), Lessius talked about the
difference between complete and incomplete predestination.
Lemos retorted that there is a double election mentioned in Scripture: one to
justification in this life, the other to eternal predestination, as even St. Thomas in
his commentary to the Letter to the Ephesians (Lecture 2) made clear. As an
example of this difference, Lemos quoted Jn 6:70: “Then Jesus replied, ‘Have I not
chosen you, the Twelve? Yet one of you is a devil!’” and concluded that not all
those who are called according to the first type of election are called according to
the second type, as Lessius improperly suggested (Jesus said in Mt 22:14: “Many
are called but few are chosen”). Thus, according to Lemos, Lessius’ distinction
between complete and incomplete predestination is novel, unheard of, and less
conformed to the teachings of Scripture (nova, inaudita et minus Scripturis Sanctis
conformis),67 and of St. Thomas’ De veritate 6, q. 3 “Is Predestination Certain?”
As far as Lessius’ claim that it is in our power to fulfil or not to fulfil God’s
predestination is concerned, Lemos said that it can be admitted, but with two
qualifications: first, as long as we are talking about predestination in the order of
execution, not in the order of intention or preparation; second, as long as we
understand that we have the power of fulfilling God’s predestination after such
power has been granted and constituted by God.68
To back his claim that all the justified are elected and predestined to glory,
Lessius used several scriptural passages. Lemos devoted three pages to critique
Lessius’ exegesis of these passages.
1) Rom 8:29,30: “For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed
to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many
brothers and sisters. And those he predestined, he also called; those he
called, he also justified; those he justified, he also glorified.”
Lemos says that this entire sequence or “golden chain of salvation” applies
only to those who are going to be in heaven (i.e., who have been

67
Brevis tractatus, 73.
68
Aquinas, De potentia, q. 3, art. 7 “Does God work in operations of nature?”; and Summa I, q.
23 and 83.
 282

predestined to glory) and not to those who have been justified.69Moreover,

to suggest as Lessius does that predestination is conditional upon man’s
will, is to do violence to the biblical text, which previously says that they
“have been called according to his purpose” (Rom 8:28).
2) Rom 11:6: “So too at the present time there is a remnant chosen by grace.”
Lessius says that this remnant consists of the justified. On the contrary,
according to Lemos, Aquinas and Augustine70 applied this verse to the
predestined to glory.
3) 1 Cor 1:26-29. Lessius made the case that this passage refers to the calling
to faith in Christ; Lemos replied that it applies to those who have been
immediately called to the apostolate.
4) Eph 1. Lessius said that this text refers to conditional predestination.
Lemos rejected this explanation and said that according to Augustine and
Aquinas it applies to those who have been predestined to glory.

Lessius claimed that it is up to man to fulfil God’s predestination by

submitting the grace being offered to the assent of his free will. However, this
amounts to mistaking God’s certain predestination for his common Providence,
whereby he offers general helps to all men, predestined and reprobates alike. Such
view, Lemos claims, contradicts both Scripture and Patristic traditional thought.
Lemos said:

[According to Lessius] God did not choose a predestined person out of his own freedom and
good pleasure, but rather as a result of the choice of a person who first chose him, thus
deserving to be chosen by him. The Lord taught with open words against this type of
election (as Augustine never tired to repeat): “You did not choose me, but I have chosen you”
(Jn 15:16). By these words it was clearly shown that men cannot bring it about to be chosen
for glory and that glory be allotted to them. In fact, if men are able to bring it about to be
chosen for glory by ensuring that grace be efficacious in the secondary act out of their mere
free will, so that it may cooperate with it and persevere, it then most certainly follows that
they are chosen because they want, and not because God wants; and more specifically, that
they are chosen for glory because they wanted to. Thus, we may conclude that out of their
mere freedom they give something to God so that he would recompense them; that they
choose God before he chose them; and that Jesus’ words are wrong after all.71

69
Lemos claims that Augustine, Prosper, Hilary, Fulgentius, Aquinas, Ambrose, Gregory the
Great, the Council of Valence were of this opinion as well.
70
Augustine, The Gift of Perseverance 18, 47: “When the apostle says, God has not cast away
his people whom he foreknew, he intended to signify predestination.” And The Predestination of
the Saints 16, 33: “As concerning this election, the Israelites were beloved for the sake of their
fathers. For they were not called with that calling of which it is said, ‘Many are called,’ but with
that whereby the chosen are called.”
71
Brevis tractatus, 76.
 283

Lemos also made the same criticism against Lessius’ view he made against
middle knowledge, namely that they both suggest that God derives his infallible
knowledge from things rather than from himself. In the last part of his Fifth
Claim, Lessius used five witnesses (three from church councils and two from
Scripture) to bolster his claim that our cooperation is required to bring about final
predestination. Here I will summarize three responses by Lemos:
1) Orange II.
Lemos countered by saying that the sentence taken from the Conclusion
(which was quoted by Lessius) does not and could not possibly contradict
what canon 9 said: “for as often as we do good, God is at work in us and
with us, in order that we may do so.” Therefore, when believers do those
things that pertain to their salvation, God works in them so that they may
work. Having accepted the grace of baptism, believers have at their disposal
the general grace which is denied to no one, by which they can and must
fulfil the requirements of salvation: in conclusion, a defect of grace is due to
us, but the beginning of any good work is up to God who operates in us.
Moreover, the words in the Conclusion of Orange II “if they desire to labor
faithfully with the help and cooperation of Christ” should not cause
consternation or confusion; these words do not mean what Lessius implies
they mean, namely that out of our own free will alone man makes grace
efficacious.

2) Trent VI, chapter 11.

Lessius makes it sound that it is up to us to make sure God does not
abandon us by not abandoning him. On the contrary, according to Catholic
doctrine (catholica veritas) even though we have sufficient grace by which
we can remain faithful to God we end up sinning and resisting such grace;
thus, it is up to God’s efficient grace bestowed on some people to ensure we
ultimately do not abandon him.

3) Trent VI, chapter 13.

Lessius used a part of Chapter 13 of Trent VI to argue that it is in the
power of the justified to make God’s grace efficacious, since God’s
predestination is conditional and not absolute: “With regard to the gift of
perseverance…let no one promise himself herein something as certain with
an absolute certainty, though all ought to place and repose the firmest hope
in God's help. For God, unless men themselves fail in his grace, as he has
begun a good work, so will he perfect it, working to will and to
accomplish.”
Lemos at this point accuses Lessius of taking the words of the Council out
of their context by omitting an important sentence in the first part of said
 284

chapter, on which the Lessius’ quote depends; he also accused Lessius of

doing so not for brevity’s but for convenience’s sake. For the readers’
benefit,I added in bold the words following “With regard to the gift of
perseverance” that Lessius conveniently failed to include in his quote: “He
that shall persevere to the end shall be saved, which cannot be
obtained from anyone except from Him who is able to make him stand
who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to raise him who
falls.” Such words, argues Lemos, clearly show that perseverance is a gift;
but if a gift, it is not first and originally derived from us: in other words, it
is not in our, but in God’s power to ensure we persevere. Lemos laments:
“Why then does Lessius insist that it is entirely in our power to persevere,
and that perseverance originates from us, when the Council clearly stated
the opposite?”72
Moreover, Lemos concludes that the sense Lessius gave to the words of the
Council, namely that perseverance is a gift of God because the Lord gives
the grace through we which we are able to persevere (posse perseverare), is
wrong and reminiscent of Pelagian and Semipelagian (i.e., Faustus’ and
Cassian’s) views; rather, says Lemos, God gives the persevering itself,
ensuring that a man will persevere to the very end.

At the end of his “brief” treatise against Lessius, Lemos tackled some of the
SIX CONCLUSIONS found at the end of Lessius’ Fifth Claim (refer to my pages
227-28).

1) “If you are not predestined, act in a way that you will be” – by that old
adage Lessius meant that we need to fulfil our potential, conditional and
incomplete predestination by cooperating with God’s common grace.
Lemos declared this to be a non-starter, unworthy of the name
“predestination” (nulla praedestinatio sit) and declined to offer a detailed
reply since he does not want to repeat himself. However, he criticized
Lessius’ understanding of the Prayer over the Gifts for the First Sunday of
Lent, and set forward what he considers to be an authentic one, namely:

That God may fulfil the execution of what he decreed by his eternal
predestination, and that those whom he efficaciously enrolled in the Book of
Life may be directed and led to the attainment of heaven through certain
means, in such a way that the predestined’ names may be found inscribed in

72
Ibid., 78.
 285

it (as God disposed from all eternity that through such means and prayers
of the Church they may attain heaven).73

2) Lessius said that his view is not threatened by the “lazy argument” the way
the Dominicans’ is. Quite the contrary, replied Lemos! The episode recalled
by Augustine in The Gift of Perseverance 18 shows that predestination based
on absolute foreknowledge may also cause distress among some people.

3) The view may not be Pelagian, but it surely smacks of Semipelagianism (it
totally agrees with Faustus’ mind). Semipelagians admitted the need for
grace to perform salutary deeds (though they denied it is needed for initial
and imperfect deeds), and claimed that grace is bestowed out of merit de
congruo, or according to a person’s piety.

Lemos ended his treatise in a rather anti-climactic manner by saying that he

will further develop and articulate a proper and traditional view of predestination
in the fourth book of his Panoplia.

73
Ibid., 80.
286
 287

PART FIVE
Lemos’ Treatise De Praedestinatione
 288

Lemos’ Tractatus de Praedestinatione

In order to accurately articulate Lemos’ view of predestination, found in Book
II of his Panoplia, I will summarize the contents of each chapter.

Chapter 1. The term “predestination” and its various meanings.

Lemos does not offer any original thoughts concerning the definition of the
term, but rather relies on the definitions given by Aquinas and Augustine.
Predestination is an act of the divine practical intellect, consisting in three
logically (that is, not sequentially) distinct acts: the predilection by which God
loves in a particular way some of his creatures, wishing for them the highest
good, namely the glory of heaven; the election, by which God chooses for glory the
future inhabitants of heaven; and finally, predestination, in which God prepares for
his elect certain means through which he leads them to heaven.1
Predestination concerns three things: persons, grace (and the means it uses)
and heavenly glory, which is the terminus of God’s free, immanent, and eternal act
(without which a person would never reach it). As far as the etymology of the
term is concerned, “to destine” means to direct, decide, discern, and determine
people to a given end; “pre” refers to an eternal rather than temporal decision of
God. Lemos adds that the purpose of his treatise is to show that the prefix “pre”
underscores the fact that predestination comes before foreknowledge of merits
and of future cooperation of human free will as well.
Predestination is an act that concerns only one of the two possible final
eschatological outcomes of God’s judgement, namely heaven: it does not apply to
sin, guilt and hell. Church Fathers such as Prosper, Augustine and Fulgentius,
and Church councils such as Orange II, Valence and Trent have made it clear that
God only predestines the punishment of hell, and not specific people to end up
there (pace Calvin).
Unlike what theologians such as Ockham, Biel, and Catharinus have argued,
predestination not only includes glory, which is its terminus, but also grace, which
is the means through which glory is attained; thus, Durandus too was wrong for
including grace but excluding glory from predestination. Lemos suggests that to
wonder whether predestination is essentially an act of God’s will (Scotus) or of
God’s practical intellect (Aquinas) is a metaphysical question that needs not
detain us here; in any event, Augustine’s two definitions of it can salvage both
views.

Chapter 2. Predestination to grace and glory is one, and not many.

1
Aquinas placed predilection before election in De veritate art. 1; q. 23, art 4.
 289

Next, Lemos tackles the issue whether predestination is single or double.

Other Jesuits, such as Spanish polemicist and scholar Francisco Torres, and
Cornelius a Lapide, a Flemish Jesuit and erudite biblical exegete, had argued that
there are two predestinations, one to grace and the other to glory; Lessius further
developed this idea in support of his view of predestination. Lemos rejected the
Jesuits’ view, and claimed that predestination is one and that it includes all the
means through which a predestined person is efficaciously led to eternal life (i.e.,
glory).
Torres had even suggested that predestination is triple: one to glory, one to
incomplete grace, and the last one to complete, or efficacious grace. He used Eph
1 to argue that Paul calls all the faithful “elect,” and “predestined,” even though
not all of them were predestined to glory, but only to grace and faith. He pointed
out that Aquinas described the “Book of Life” as applying mainly to grace and not
to glory (because names could be taken off or added). He also appealed to the
Collect of the fourth week of Lent (usually attributed to Augustine), in which we
pray that the names of all the faithful may be retained in the book of blessed
predestination.
Lemos argued that such views contradict Thomas Aquinas’ and cannot be
reconciled with the “golden chain” of Rom 8:29-30, which upholds the unitary
nature of predestination.
When it comes to the relationship between grace and predestination, Lemos
briefly concludes on the basis of Augustine’s and Aquinas’ teachings that grace is
the effect of predestination. Just as God’s general providence is the cause of the
effects through which he rules the universe, likewise predestination is the eternal
cause and preparation of grace in space and time.

Chapter 3. What is predestination to grace?

When it comes to the certainty of predestination, Lemos says that no one

(including Pelagians and Semipelagians) ever doubted that predestination is
certain and that it is indissolubly connected with foreknowledge; what needs to be
established is to what this certainty applies (i.e., persons, grace, glory), and the
root cause of this certainty. Pelagians and Semipelagians erred by claiming that
the number of the predestined is certain formally but not materially (e.g. the total
number, but not the specific identity of the individuals who are predestined); they
(as well as some scholastics) also erred by identifying divine foreknowledge as the
only root of that certainty. However, there is no doubt, according to Lemos, that
predestination applies to all three elements of persons, grace and glory, and that
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its root is not merely foreknowledge, but God’s causation (i.e., predefined decree)
as well.2
Someone may object that there are passages in Scripture that seem to imply
that the number of the saved is not fixed and certain, but liable to be increased or
decreased (e.g.: Dt 1:11: “May the Lord, the God of your ancestors, increase you a
thousand times”; and Rev 3:11: “Hold on to what you have, so that no one will
take your crown”). Lemos replies that Moses was referring to the number of those
who have been marked beforehand for the present justice, not to the number of
people who have been predestined to glory in the future. Augustine answered in
similar fashion concerning the text of Revelation 2:10, saying that such crown
referred to the crown of present justice, not to the crown of everlasting glory.3

Chapter 4. Some remarks about the “Book of Life.”

Chapter 5. Comparison of predestination with the “Book of Life.”

Chapter 6. Predestination is certain.

There are two things about which all Catholics and even heretics agree:
predestination is certain and it is always connected with foreknowledge:
controversy arises in regard to whom it applies and on what this certainty is
based. For instance, Semipelagians used to say that the number of the
predestined is certain and fixed in a formal, though not material way (i.e., their
identities are certainly known only by God’s foreknowledge of their good use of
free will). Recent theologians (i.e., Biel, Ockham, Catharinus and Jesuits) have
claimed that the certainty of predestination does not depend on the intrinsic
power of God’s intention and means used, but on middle (fore)knowledge.
Against these two erroneous views, Lemos remarks (not surprisingly to the
readers by now!) that: a) Predestination is certain on account of God’s intention
and intrinsic power of the means grace employs to bring it about; b) The number
of predestined is certain and fixed both formally and materially.

Chapter 7. Predestination is always accompanied by foreknowledge.

Predestination is always conjoined with foreknowledge: orthodox authors

(such as Augustine and Aquinas) and heretics agree on that much: what they
disagree about is in what way. The orthodox understanding is that predestination
flows from an act of divine love, which is itself a result of God’s choice; choice, in

2
See Aquinas, De veritate, q. 6, art 3.
3
See also Augustine’s On Rebuke and Grace 13, 39.
 291

turn, presupposes the will or decision on God’s part to bestow eternal life on
some people. According to Lemos, such decision is always conjoined with
foreknowledge of simple intelligence and not of scientia media.
Since there is so much disagreement about foreknowledge and what it entails,
and in order to eliminate any possible equivocation, Lemos resolves to outline its
multiple meanings.
The first, and the broadest meaning of the term is that God knows for
certain, through his simple intelligence, the nature and efficacy of his will, which
is always fulfilled. The second, similar to the first, is that God knows, if he
wanted to predestine some people, what are the most certain and efficacious
means to make it happen. Through his simple knowledge God knows that man
will make good use of his free will if he was to bestow efficacious help on him,
thus there is no need to postulate yet a different type of conditional
foreknowledge (i.e., middle knowledge). The third type of foreknowledge is the
absolute foreknowledge by which God knows the specific identity and essence of
the people he intends to save. Some Fathers talked about predestination
preceding foreknowledge (which is true in the order of final cause), while others
talked about foreknowledge preceding predestination (which is true in order of
material cause).4 But no matter from what perspective one looks at it, God’s
foreknowledge of man’s good use of free will cannot precede either eternal
predilection, or election or predestination of those individuals God decided to
predestine, because foreseen good use is the effect of predestination, and not the
other way around! The fourth type is that by which God, after predilection and
election of some people to receive eternal glory before the formal act of
predestination, foreknows they will infallibly attain it: this type is essentially
foreknowledge of his own approbation. The fifth type is that which is usually
referred to by the term of “foreknowledge,” namely that by which God absolutely
foreknows the future good use of man’s free will.

Chapter 8. What does foreknowledge accompanied by predestination

consist of?

Augustine wrote: “God foreknew by predestination those things which he

was about to do, whence it was said, ‘He made those things that shall be’ (Isaiah
45:11)”(The Predestination of the Saints 10.19); and “To whomsoever, therefore,
God gives his gifts, beyond a doubt he has foreknown that he will bestow them on
them, and in his foreknowledge he has prepared them for them” (The Gift of
Perseverance17.41).

4
Tractatus, 168.
 292

Lemos noted that these passages have been hotly disputed and reinterpreted
by Jesuits such as Fonseca, Molina and Suarez, who claimed that predestination
1) is not according to God’s absolute intention prior to his conditional
foreknowledge of man’s good use of free will; 2) is according to foreknowledge of
such good use; 3) is not the gratuitous gift given only to some people, but is
commonly offered to all; 4) is according to common providence. Unfortunately,
says Lemos, Semipelagians too upheld the same exact views.

Chapter 9. Predestination is not firstly and originally certain thanks to the

foreknowledge of the good use of free will.

To say that efficacious election to glory happens out of foreknowledge of

merits can refer to five things: 1) Foreknowledge of merely natural works
preceding any and all gifts of grace; thus, such works are worthy of election de
condigno; 2) These natural works are worthy of such election de congruo; 3) It is
due to man’s innate freedom that the divine helps, thanks to which man attains
glory, are rendered efficacious; 4) Election to glory stems from foreknowledge of
merits performed thanks to the help of grace; however, this is just an effect of
general providence; 5) The efficacious election to glory stems from foreknowledge
of merits to be accrued thanks to the efficacious help of God, which in reality is an
effect of predestination.
Lemos noted that the first three views were upheld by Pelagians, and
arguably the fourth as well. The fifth view, though not doctrinally erroneous,
goes against the view upheld by Aquinas and is not very conformed to the
teaching of Scripture. Generally speaking, all five views claim the foreknown
good works are the cause of election to glory, which is to say, of election in
general.
The conclusion we then must draw is that: 1) These foreknown works are
believed to be the cause of predestination, and consequently they are not its effect;
2) To say that foreseen merits are the cause or reason for predestination amounts
to say that grace is given due to our merits, and that its bestowal depends on us, a
view rejected by Aquinas in his commentary to the Letter to the Romans.
According to Aquinas: 1) We cannot say that election based on foreknowledge of
merits is entirely gratuitous; 2) It can be reasonably claimed, when talking about
predestination to glory (which it is the last effect of predestination) that it is such
in the order of execution (not of intention); 3) It can also be reasonably claimed
that election in the order of execution presupposes the foreknowledge of merits;
4) Such election based on merits cannot be attributed to predestination per se,
because if predestination is based on foreknowledge (rather than on God’s decree),
it would follow that the beginning of good works stems from us and that grace is
given due to our merits – a view that is utterly Pelagian.
 293

Chapter 10. Predestination does not occur according to the foreknowledge

of future good use of free will.
The way Jesuits (e.g., Fonseca, Molina, Suarez and Lessius) envision
predestination runs contrary to the traditional perspective. According to them:
1) Predestination is not based on God’s firm and absolute will prior to any
conditional foreknowledge of man’s good use of his free will.
2) The certainty of predestination rests on God’s foreknowledge of such good
use.
3) Predestination is not gratuitously reserved for a selected few, but it is at
first commonly extended to everyone according to God’s universal salvific
will.
4) Because of such foreknowledge of good use of free will, predestination is
distinct from general providence.
Next, Lemos tries to show how these four points were also upheld by
Semipelagians.
1) Semipelagians thought that predestination according to God’s decree
establishes a fatalistic necessity.
2) Prosper had written to Augustine: “God, they say, made some vessels of
honor and others vessels of dishonor because he foreknew in what state
each of them would die and foreknew what each would, with the help of
grace, desire and do” (Letter to Augustine 8). Earlier in that section of his
letter Prosper asked Augustine for some elucidations:

And explain whether the foreknowledge of God remains in accord with God’s plan so
that those things which he has planned should be accepted as foreknown or whether
these vary in accord with the kinds of situations and categories of persons, that is,
because the calls to salvation are different. In the little ones who are saved, though they
are not going to do any action, it seems as if God’s plan alone is involved, but in people
who are going to do some good actions, God’s plan can follow upon his foreknowledge.
Or is the situation the same in both cases so that foreknowledge is subject to God’s plan
in some order, though one cannot by a temporal distinction divide foreknowledge from
God’s plan?

3) Prosper had written to Augustine about the Semipelagians’ understanding

of 1 Tim 2:14:

All human beings without exception have, nonetheless, been offered the reconciliation
which is present in the mystery of the blood of Christ so that whoever chooses to come
to the faith and to baptism can be saved…And so, insofar as it pertains to God, eternal
life is prepared for all, but insofar as it pertains to the freedom of choice, eternal life is
attained by those who have freely believed in God and have received the help of grace
by the merit of their belief.
 294

4) Writing about Semipelagians, Prosper relates that “one finds one and the
same view in the case of nearly all of them, that is, they have accepted the
plan and predestination of God as based on foreknowledge…”

Lemos’ inexorable conclusion: these Semipelagians views are to be found in

Molina’s and in his defenders’ articulation of the doctrine of predestination.5
Moreover, Molina’s claim to have introduced a “new understanding,” is severely
rebuffed by Lemos as contrary to Paul’s warnings about false and new doctrines
being introduced in the body of Christ (1 Tim 6: 20,21): how ridiculous of him to
claim to have discovered a new way, when none of the Latin and Greek fathers,
Pontiffs, church councils and scholastics ever did! What an unheard vanity on his
part (inaudita hominis vanitas)!
Lemos goes on to list some of Molina’s claims:
 Augustine was right to argue against Pelagians that grace is bestowed
freely and not according to foreseen good use of free will.
 Augustine developed his doctrine on predestination while “in the dark”
about some aspects of predestination. “Good God!” exclaimed Lemos:
Augustine walked in the dark, where only Molina saw a solution! Truly,
as Molina re-elaborated Cassian and Faustus’ doctrines, he departed
from the great saint’s orthodox understanding.
 Augustine and Thomas Aquinas did not uphold predestination
according to foreseen good use of free will. Lemos added: “Let his
disciples quit saying otherwise, since they stand condemned by their
teachers’ own words.”

As Cardinal Bellarmine himself said, the teachings of Augustine concerning

predestination and grace “are not the opinion of some theologian, but must be
said to be the faith of the Church.”6
In defense of Molina’s view of middle knowledge, some Jesuits argue that his
view of predestination differs from Semipelagians’ because the latter said that
predestination is due to (propter) foreknowledge of good use of free will, and stems
from foreseen good works (ex praevisis operibus); on the contrary, Molina simply
said that predestination does not occur without such conditional foreknowledge.
Lemos rejects such explanation on account of the following reasons:
1) Regardless of and contrary to such explanation, the fact remains that
ultimately Jesuits re-introduce from the window that propter, which was put
out of the door by Molina!

5
Ibid., 175.
6
Ibid., 177.
 295

2) These authors openly say in their works that predestination depends on the
foreseen good use of free will, and that consequently it is up to a person to
be predestined or not.
3) Even though it is up to God to choose what is ultimately going to be the
world he decides to actualize, the fact remains that even in such world (as
well as in other hypothetical ones) human beings’ foreseen decisions are the
cause why predestination is going to be bestowed.
4) Conditional foreknowledge is essentially constituted as absolute in regard
to its end.
5) Such conditional middle knowledge eventually becomes absolute.

At this point Jesuits are used to reply that their view differs indeed from that
of Semipelagians, on this account: the latter claimed that predestination is based
on God’s foreknowledge of their faith arising when inspired by external means
such as preaching; Jesuits, on the contrary, claim that it is based on God’s
foreknowledge of faith arising when people are confronted with grace’s inner
stirrings. Lemos is un-impressed, firstly because there is a difference between
certainty of predestination and certainty of reception of faith: in fact, though
many receive faith, they are nonetheless non-predestined. Secondly, there is no
difference between both views because according to them, God calls to faith
through preaching those he foreknows will believe out of their own inner
freedom.

Chapter 11. If predestination was firstly and originally certain due to the
foreknowledge of any good use of free will, such foreknown use would be
the cause of predestination.

Lemos argues that Jesuits (i.e., Molina, Suarez, Lessius) strive to make a
distinction in their writings between predestination according (secundum) to
foreknowledge and predestination due to (propter) foreknowledge; these authors
claim that such distinction is legitimate and that Semipelagians erred by
upholding the former, while they uphold the latter.
Lemos disagrees, claiming that the distinction is illusory and insubstantial;
according to him Aquinas (De veritate 6, art. 3) disposed of this alleged difference:

For we cannot say that predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence except the
certitude of foreknowledge, because this would be to say that God orders one who is
predestined to his salvation as he orders any other person, with this difference, that, in the
case of the predestined, God knows he will not fail to be saved. According to this position,
one predestined would not differ in ordination from one not predestined; he would differ
only with respect to [God’s] foreknowledge of the outcome. Consequently, foreknowledge
would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not take place by the choice
 296

of him who predestines. This, however, is contrary to the authority of the Scriptures” and
the sayings of the saints. Thus, the ordering of predestination has an infallible certitude of
its own—over and above the certitude of foreknowledge.

Molina (Lemos quotes two passages from his Concordia) suggested that
Aquinas’ objection applies only to absolute foreknowledge, but not to conditional
foreknowledge, which is the essence of scientia media. Lemos denies that: “St.
Thomas pointed out the unacceptable conclusions that stem from basing on any
kind of foreknowledge, whether absolute or conditional, the certainty of
predestination.” 7 Moreover, according to Jesuits, conditional foreknowledge
turns into absolute foreknowledge once a condition is fulfilled (namely a choice
stemming from human beings’ response to God’s free offer of grace). Even
Lessius’ view of absolute foreknowledge, which he promoted in his 1610 De gratia,
falls under Aquinas’ condemnation, because he denied that the certainty of
predestination derives from the means of grace per se, and that predestination
stems from God’s will alone.
When it comes to the object of God’s foreknowledge, namely human merits
accrued in the presence of grace, Jesuits like Suarez argue that predestination
does not occur because of (propter) them, but through (per) them. Lemos rejects
this view, because he claims that such merits stem as an effect of predestination,
and they are not the reason for it: in other words, the good use of free will has also
been predestined by God, and not merely foreseen. According to Lemos there is a
“great contrast and a very famous difference between the views of good use of free
will foreseen with God’s middle knowledge, and good use of free will foreseen
with God’s predetermining and efficacious help.”8

Chapter 12. If predestination was certain according to the foreknowledge

of good use of free will, it would not occur through the gratuitous election
of God.

Lemos quoted Molina, understanding the Jesuit to say that: 1) Conditional

foreknowledge (i.e., scientia media) is not free in God, but anticipates any free act
stemming from his will; 2) Such foreknowledge establishes a formal reason for
predestination; 3) In the act of predestination, a main factor in God’s decision to
create this actual world order is his comparison and evaluation of man’s free will’s
choices available to him in all possible world orders. Lemos concludes that this
view contradicts Aquinas’ view according to which predestination is an act of
God’s free and unaffected will. The rest of the chapter is devoted to undermine

7
Ibid., 182.
8
Ibid., 183.
 297

Suarez’ attempt to exempt Molina’s view from Aquinas’ criticism mentioned in

the previous chapter.

Chapter 13. Is such foreknowledge the meritorious cause, at least de

congruo, of predestination?

Lemos says that if we are willing to admit that man is the dispositional cause
of his own predestination through his good deeds, we may as well say that he is
somewhat its meritorious cause, at least de congruo, or according to God’s mercy,
though the same cannot be said about de condigno, which is to say, according to
what man truly deserves according to God’s justice. Jesuits deny that they have
established willy-nilly a connection between foreknowledge and meritorious
cause; they only say that foreknowledge is the condition sine qua non for
predestination. Lessius offered the example of two paupers being offered alms: if
one accepts it and the other rejects it, the fact remains that the outstretched hand
receiving the alms is not the meritorious cause of the offer. Lemos was
unimpressed:

If a person offered a pauper some money on condition that the pauper stretch out his hand, in
this case such gesture can be said to be the condition sine qua non the pauper would receive
the gift. It would be incorrect to say that the gesture is the meritorious cause or the de
congruo merit due to which the gift was made; truthfully, such gift is freely given. Likewise,
the Jesuits say, without foreseen good use of free will, a man’s specific predestination would
not exist, but would remain in the realm of common providence, as God’s well-meaning wish.
This is not say, however, that such foreseen good use is the meritorious cause of
predestination, not even de congruo: it is rather its conditio sine qua non…In summary these
authors [Jesuits] are used to say that predestination does not happen without foreknowledge,
and not because of it. 9

Lemos noted that this example is not new. It was made way prior to Lessius
by Henry of Ghent, Johannis of Bologna, Bartholomew Camera, and by the first
Jesuit to ever have been made cardinal, Franciscus de Toledo (d. 1596).
Chapter 14. Can such foreseen good use of free will be not only the
condition, but the real meritorious cause of predestination in any way?

Lemos says that such distinction is un-convincing. Even if we say that good
use of free will is only a condition without which predestination does not exist, we
are still placing something in man’s power. On the contrary, predestination
depends exclusively on God’s will, absent any condition on man’s part.
Semipelagians said the same thing about God’s foreknowledge of man’s good use

9
Ibid., 187. See also Lessius’ example on my page 151.
 298

of free will and were condemned for it. Again, the real question and issue at hand
are not sophisticated logical distinctions, but whether predestination is certain
out of God’s firm and stable decree; the way Jesuits would have it, it is certain out
of man’s free will’s choices. Such view was condemned by one of their own: Lemos
approvingly quotes Cardinal Bellarmine (De gratia et libero arbitrio II, 9) to this
effect:

I say that no reason can be assigned on man’s part, and thus we exclude not only merits,
strictly speaking, but also foreseen good use of free will, or of grace, or of both at the same
time. As a matter of fact, in the same way we should not even claim that merit, though only
de congruo, is not the cause of predestination, but merely the condition without which a
person is predestined.

The “illustrious cardinal,” Lemos says, proved this statement with scriptural
passages. In chapter 11 he even said that this truth was upheld by the Fathers
against Pelagians as a truth de fide!
Now, Molina said in his Concordia that the reason or condition sine qua non for
God’s foreknowledge is that man, out of his innate freedom, will cooperate with
grace. Even though he did NOT say that about predestination, the logical train of
thought that Lemos outlines is as follows:

Therefore, just as predestination depends on the good use of free will, in order for a man to
be predestined, so does middle knowledge depend on such use, as Molina said in very clear
terms in his Eight Conclusion; likewise, middle knowledge depends on such good use of free
will as its condition and reason, as he openly premised in his Seventh Conclusion. Thus,
Molina concluded that man’s predestination depends on such good use as its condition and
reason, in order for his predestination to exist. It is therefore obvious that Molina established
the foreseen good use of free will not only as the condition, but also as the true reason or
cause, on which a man’s predestination depends. It is also clear that he placed on man not
only the condition but the true reason and cause of his predestination. Therefore, let Jesuits
desist from claiming foreknowledge as the mere condition sine qua non, and not as its reason
and cause, considering that they attribute both of them to man’s part concerning his
predestination.10

Lemos reminds his readers that the Jesuit Gabriel Vasquez (1549-1606) went
as far criticizing his confrere Enrique Henríquez (1536-1608), a theologian who
opposed middle knowledge, for saying that man’s good use of free will is merely
the condition sine qua non, rather than the true and real cause why God’s calling is
efficacious! In conclusion, Lemos urges the Jesuits to “cease and desist” from
splitting hair, as they pretend that foreseen good use is merely a condition sine

10
Ibid., 188.
 299

qua non, considering that the consequences of their reasoning amounts to much
more than that (i.e., to a real meritorious cause).
Although Jesuits argue consistently that free will is not the cause of the
efficacy of grace, nor of predestination, they do claim that it is the cause of its own
consent to grace’s calling; thus, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that free
will, through its own consent, deserves God’s cooperation, and that
foreknowledge of such good use of free will earns the merit that man may be
predestined and not just left to God’s general providence. Perhaps, Lemos
suggests, this is the reason why they appear to talk out of both sides of their
mouth.
Going back to the equivalency that the Jesuits seek to establish between the
pauper who extends his hand in regard to the almsgiving on the one hand, and
God’s foreseen good use of free will in regard to predestination, on the other
hand, Lemos says that it is unconvincing on several accounts. First of all, the
pauper’s stretching out his hand is not infallibly related to the bestowal of
almsgiving (the way Jesuits claim foreknowledge is infallibly related to
predestination), since everything depends on the graciousness of the donor, who
may as well decide not to give his money away. Secondly, we all know from
experience that in real life many paupers can be so persistent as to
induce/motivate people to donate them money: thus they indeed are the
meritorious de congruo cause of the lavish giving, just as the foreseen good use of
free will acts the same way Jesuits conceive predestination.

Chapter 15. Continued….

Suarez,in his De causa praedestinationis, 2o, came to the defense of Molina’s

view by saying that, even though not absolutely speaking, there is a certain cause,
reason or condition for man’s predestination.11 After unpacking and criticizing
Suarez’s arguments, Lemos tackled a theological point that had been made three
centuries beforehand by Peter Aureol (1280-1322) in his Scriptum super primum
sententiarum (his theological commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences).
Commenting on Distinction 40, Question 66 “Whether the Predestined are saved
irrevocably,” Aureol suggested that there is a positive cause in the reprobates,
namely the placing of a final obstacle to grace, as it has been foreknown; however,
there is a negative cause of predestination on the part of man, namely the absence
of such obstacle (obex) in the soul of the predestined.12

11
The logical and linguistic nut of the next two pages (pp. 190-191) proved too hard for me to
crack. I resumed my analysis of the chapter on the text’s page 192.
12
See my God’s Eternal Gift, 503-13, where I outlined Aureol’s view in greater detail.
 300

This point had been recently picked up and upheld by Suarez, so it is no

surprise that Lemos went after it with a vengeance, as he suggested that we could
compare man’s non-resistance to grace with a state of sleep: how does that
amount to a reason for the bestowal of predestination? Therefore, those like
Suarez who uphold this idea must say at the very least that this non-resistance is
willed indirectly; however, in this case as well, the conclusion we must draw is
that this is the cause why a man’s predestination becomes certain. Lemos objects
that it is impossible that not resisting grace stems only from free will and not
from grace. As Aquinas said: “This very fact, that someone does not place an
obstacle to grace, stems from grace” (hoc ipsum quod aliquis non ponit obstaculum ex
gratia procedit).13
Yet Suarez attempts to circumvent this objection by incorporating non-
resistance to grace in middle knowledge. Lemos tells his readers that he will
tackle at great length such view in the fourth book of his Panoplia and argue with
Augustine’s and Aquinas’ texts that man does not resist grace thanks to
efficacious grace.
Continuing his criticism of non-resistance to grace as the cause, on man’s
part, why predestination becomes certain, Lemos says that such non-resistance is
either a prior reason and cause than man’s active cooperation and the influx of
efficacious grace; or concomitant; or subsequent. Obviously it cannot be
subsequent, because after man’s cooperation with grace’s activity, there is no
negative non-resistance to grace to speak of, but rather a positive assent that
excludes it. Moreover, it cannot be concomitant, because in such case as well the
human will is already actively cooperating with God’s grace; thus, we cannot
speak of negative or privative cause of predestination either. The only logical
possibility therefore is that such non-resistance is prior to man’s active
cooperation: however, this is either due to man’s free will which refrains from
placing an obstacle to grace, or to grace itself. In the first case, it is an utterly
Pelagian thing to say that non-resistance carried out of merely natural strength is
the cause of predestination; in the second case, it is either due to efficacious grace
(thus invalidating the premise that there is a cause on the part of man in his
predestination); or to non-efficacious grace. However, this grace is necessarily
concomitant, and Lemos says he just disposed of that possibility.

Chapter 16. Proof that the lack of resistance to God’s calling is not the
reason of predestination.

Jesuits are fond of saying that they deny, absolutely speaking, that there is
any reason, condition or cause on man’s part for God’s predestination and that

13
Thomas Aquinas, Lecture on the Letter to the Hebrews, c.12, lect. 3 (#689).
 301

they agree with Church fathers and ancient scholastics on this matter. However,
according to Lemos, this is mere evasion tactics: ancient theologians never upheld
predestination based on God’s foreknowledge the way Jesuits do.
First, Lemos blames Jesuits for saying that foreknowledge of good use of free
will is necessary to predestination and that only God’s decree to constitute man in
THIS world order is to be attributed to God’s free will. Secondly, according to
them, even though there is no reason or cause on man’s part for God to choose to
actualize THIS order of things, the fact remains that in it there is still a certain
cause, reason or condition why man is predestined, namely that his good use of
free will has been eternally foreknown by God. Thirdly, even though God chooses
THIS word order, he does so because he foresees that in it the predestined will use
well their free will. Don’t these three things show that Jesuits attribute
predestination to man’s choices, which is exactly what Semipelagians claimed?

Chapter 17. Not found in the text

Chapter 18. This is shown from other supporters of this view.

In order to lessen the impact of the charge that God chooses THIS world
order because he knows men will make good use of their free will, Suarez argued in
his De praedestinatione 5 and 20 that such foreseen good use of free will is not a
merit, not even de congruo, stemming from man’s part, but rather the proximate
end due to which (finem proximum propter quem) God wanted to create him in it.14
Lemos firmly rejects such distinction: “This new explanation, which some people
regard as plausible, must not and cannot be excused.”15
To begin with, Lemos warns his readers that Suarez claimed that foreseen
good use of free will is the final cause of the certainty of predestination, in other
words, that a man constituted in THIS order of things is predestined, and also
that it is the final and proximate cause why God constituted him in THIS order
rather than in another. Lemos concludes that this amounts to say that there is
indeed a merit de congruo, on man’s part, for his predestination. He then adds for
good measure that such view had been espoused by Semipelagians. In vain does
Suarez attempts to distance the Jesuits’ view from Semipelagians’ by claiming
that the latter erred because they spoke of God’s foreknowledge of good use of
free will carried out through mere natural strength, while the Jesuits talk about
God’s foreknowledge of good use of free will with the help of grace. Lemos
remind his readers what Prosper wrote to Augustine: “God, they say, made some
vessels of honor and others vessels of dishonor because he foreknew in what state

14
Tractatus, 196.
15
Idem.
 302

each of them would die and foreknew what each would, with the help of grace,
desire and do” (Letter to Augustine, 8). At this point Jesuits would reply by quoting
St. Thomas: “And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination
are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to
a person, and pre-ordains that he will give it, because he knows beforehand that
he will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier
because he knows he will make good use of it” (Summa I q. 23, art. 5). Aquinas,
Jesuits say, went after Pelagians, and not Semipelagians, for saying that.
However, Lemos retorts, Aquinas added in the following sentence: “But these
seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that
which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both,” which
was the Semipelagian view of seeing free will and grace as partial causes. Lemos
remarked that Aquinas ended up condemning this view as well, anyway.

Chapter 19. Recent theologians base not only the foreseen end, but also the
merit of predestination on the conditional good use of free will.

Even though Semipelagians did not claim they placed merit in the foreseen
good use of free will, they were refuted anyway. Prosper, for instance, wrote:
“Moreover, how do you not see that when you assert that men themselves take
the initiative of their good works and because of that are given grace, you fall into
the error that was condemned and willy-nilly appear to say that ‘the grace of God
is given in answer to our merits?’”(Against Cassian 3, 1). Jesuits protest that
Prosper here is rebuffing those merely human efforts that precede the bestowal of
grace, thanks to which Cassian said that we are given grace (see Conference XIII),
and not the good use of free will with the help of grace, since such good use
presupposes grace (non convincere contra bonum usum arbitrii utentis gratia, cum ille
bonus usus gratiam supponat).16
Lemos says that it is easy to dispose of this objection. Such foreseen good use
of free will is foreseen to stem not from grace, but from man, prior to any
predestination and conferral of grace. Thus, if God predestines people because of
it, such foreseen use is the merit of predestination; likewise, if God wants to
constitute man in THIS order of things, it is indeed a merit in virtue of which
God wanted to do so. No matter how you look at it, says Lemos, all this amounts
to say that something stems from man alone, due to which grace and
predestination are said to ensue.
In conclusion, Lemos claims that the consequence of the Jesuits’ view,
whether they like it or not, is that foreseen good use of free will is not just the
dispositional cause, but the constitutive, or efficient, or formal, or meritorious

16
Ibid., 198.
 303

cause of predestination: but this is unacceptable to any theologian! When the

ancient Fathers denied that there is any cause for predestination (whether
meritorious, efficient, formal or final) on the part of man, they ended up
attributing everything to God’s free good pleasure and will. Aquinas too denied
that there is any final cause moving God to bestow predestination besides his will
in De veritate 6, art. 2: “Consequently, the fact that God wishes to give grace and
glory to some (alicui) is due simply to his generosity. The reason for his willing
these things that arise simply from his generosity is the overflowing love of his
will for his end-object, in which the perfection of his goodness is found. The cause
of predestination, therefore, is nothing other than God’s goodness.” And further
on (solutio ad 1): “Consequently, it is impossible for foreknowledge of this right
use of grace to be the cause that moves God to give grace.”

Chapter 20. Response to opposite arguments.

Foreknowledge of man’s merits can never thought of as a cause motivating

God to bestow grace and predestination (both Scripture and the Fathers firmly
denied such view); since they are not the final cause for such bestowal, God’s will
is. Aquinas wrote (De veritate, q.6, art. 2):

Now, the end-object of the divine will is God’s own goodness, which does not depend on
anything else. God needs nothing to help him possess it. Consequently, his will is inclined
first to make something freely, not something due, inasmuch as it is his goodness that is
manifested in his works. But, supposing that God wishes to make something, it follows as
something due from the supposition of his liberality that he make those things also without
which those that he has first willed cannot be had. For example, if he wills to make a man, he
must give him an intellect.

Then, Lemos points out how Aquinas went on to say:

But if there is anything which is not necessary for that which God wills, then that thing
comes from God, not as something due, but simply as a result of his generosity. Now, the
perfection of grace and glory are goods of this kind, because nature can exist without them
inasmuch as they surpass the limits of natural powers. Consequently, the fact that God
wishes to give grace and glory to some is due simply to his generosity. The reason for his
willing these things that arise simply from his generosity is the overflowing love of his will
for his end-object, in which the perfection of his goodness is found. The cause of
predestination, therefore, is nothing other than God’s goodness.

Lemos laments the fact that despite all the evidence to the contrary, Jesuits
claim that the good use of free will is not predestined but merely foreknown; nor
is it brought about by predestination in a proper and true sense, but rather by our
innate freedom of the will, which on its own makes good use of the help of and
 304

excitement of grace. Such good use moves and inclines God’s benevolent will to
predestine us and to give us the first gifts of grace. Augustine, Aquinas and all
other scholastics, on the contrary, argued exactly the opposite, namely that the
foreknown good use of man’s free will is an effect, not a cause of predestination.

Chapter 21. Further inconveniences stemming from predestination

according to foreknowledge.

Jesuits are used to distinguish between what comes from grace and what
comes from free will, seeing in them two partial causes of God’s foreknowledge of
good use of free will. Molina said that “such use should not be regarded as an
effect of predestination, but rather is what depends on the predestined, as
something God requires of him.”17
Lemos rejects “such intolerable view,” just as Aquinas did four centuries
prior:

But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that
which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however,
manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as
the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if
anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination.
Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination;
as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause.
For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as
was above shown (q.22, art. 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of
predestination (Summa I q. 23, art.5).

Lemos argues that after Augustine, all African councils against Pelagius;
Orange II; and several pontiffs rejected such view as well, claiming instead that
good use of free will is an effect of predestination. If predestination is according to
foreknowledge, Lemos wonders, which source does God draw his knowledge of
what will happen from? From the fact that God will make a man do it? From a
necessary connection between God’s calling and man’s obedience, so that one may
infallibly follow the other even before God’s decision as to which one comes first?
From the fact that God foreknew the propensity and affection of the human will
and that out of its own power it inclined itself to obey God’s grace?
If we say from the first case, then we are in agreement, says Lemos:
predestination happens according to God’s firm and unchanging decree, since
God knows what he is going to do. If we say from the second case, such necessary
connection will take away the very freedom that middle knowledge is trying to
safeguard. This leaves us with the third option, which is the one endorsed by
17
Ibid., 202.
 305

Jesuits. Lemos recalls that the “very learned” Louvain faculty remarked that the
will placed in THIS order of things, in which it is foreseen to make good choices,
does not do so in virtue of the intrinsic efficacy of the aids of grace, but out of its
own innate freedom: hence a necessary connection with those aids bestowed on
that occasion; hence the will is determined and not free. The reason for arriving
at such conclusion is as follows: if God’s foreknowledge is certain and necessary,
even its object must be certain and necessary; however, its object is that human
free will placed in such circumstances will operate in a certain manner. But if this
object is certain and necessary, it must be necessary either out of previous
conditions, or simply necessary. But since it is not necessary out of previous
conditions, whether human or divine, it is simply and absolutely necessary, thus
removing its freedom.
Next, Lemos wishes to turn the tables on the standard Jesuit critique that the
Dominican view of predestination implies that God predestines sins and people to
sin. We may as well say that the Jesuit view is also guilty of such consequence.
Why? Since they see a necessary connection between foreknowledge and
predestination, it should also follow in their view that the sins that God foresees,
he also predestines.18 However, Lemos says that Prosper disposed of such an
objection his Answers to the Gauls XV, responsio:

If you make no distinction whatever between God’s foreknowledge and his predestination,
then you endeavor to attribute to God with regard to evil what must be ascribed to him with
regard to what is good. But since what is good must be ascribed to God as to its author and
helper, and what is evil to the willful wickedness of the rational creature, it is beyond doubt
that God both foreknew and predestined at one and the same moment (dubium non est sine ulla
temporalis differentia deum praescisse et simul praedestinasse) the good that would be done and of
which he would be the author, or the just punishment which he would render to evil merits.
But he only foreknew and did not predestine those actions of which he would not be the
author in any way.

Moreover, Lemos says: if God foreknew that by actualizing THIS order of

things some people who would have been saved in ANOTHER ONE will not
cooperate with his grace and thus end up lost, doesn’t this amount to saying that
God predestined them to be damned? Again, if God created THIS order with an
efficacious intention and purpose, doesn’t it follow that he intended to create some
people for salvation and others for damnation?
Last but not least, Lemos claims that yet another difficulty the Jesuit view
runs into is that without God’s efficacious help human beings cannot operate

18
Why do I have the impression that here Lemos is trying to do some verbal jujitsu, if not
grasping at straws?
 306

what is good, since the will does not have in itself the strength to use well the
aids of God’s grace.19

Chapter 22. These authors do not view predestination according to

foreknowledge as necessary, meaning that a person is not justified and
saved in an absolute manner.

According to Lemos, though no Jesuit dares to deny that predestination is

necessary, they do deny that its effects are absolutely necessary. Lemos on the
contrary argues that the effects of predestination are indeed necessary: to come to
Christ is impossible without having been foreordained to do so: Augustine clearly
taught this in The Gift of Perseverance 14, 35: “No one nevertheless comes to
Christ unless it were given him, and that it is given to those who are chosen in
him before the foundation of the world, he confesses beyond a doubt who hears
the divine utterance, not with the deaf ears of the flesh, but with the ears of the
heart.” And further on (The Gift of Perseverance 17, 47):

These gifts, therefore, of God, which are given to the elect who are called according to God's
purpose, among which gifts is both the beginning of belief and perseverance in the faith to
the termination of this life, as I have proved by such a concurrent testimony of reasons and
authorities,— these gifts of God, I say, if there is no such predestination as I am maintaining,
are not foreknown by God. But they are foreknown. This, therefore, is the predestination
which I maintain.

Without predestination based on God’s will, concludes Lemos, there would

be no absolute foreknowledge of its effects.

Chapter 23. Further refutation of the view according to which the effects of
predestination may ensue in virtue of God’s foreknowledge BUT not in
virtue of God’s will.

Someone could argue that the effects of predestination (i.e., vocation,

justification, sanctification, final perseverance, salvation, and final glory in
heaven) may occur without God’s predestination at all. According to this
implausible theory, God merely foreknows that such effects will ensue after he
makes his common grace available to human beings.
Even though no Jesuit has dared to openly say that, Lemos still attacks such
view as an extreme consequence of middle knowledge, and wants to make it
completely unavailable to future theologians, pointing out that it is a dead end.
First of all, Aquinas clearly argued that just as an arrow, unless it is placed in a

19
Tractatus, 204.
 307

bow and released by an archer, will never reach its target, likewise predestination
is necessary for man to attain his goal, namely eternal life with God: without it, it
would not happen. Secondly, if we remove predestination we may as well remove
God’s foreknowledge as well, since the two are strictly related. We may also deny
that God has a universal salvific will at all; if men attain salvation they would do
so totally on their own, without God’s deliberate intention. Thirdly, since it is
impossible that things work out the way they do without common providence
ordering all things to their end, and since predestination is a specific part of that
providence, we might as well deny providence altogether. These are the
absurdities that such view would lead us into. Finally, to say that man could
attain glory on his own, without predestination, and merely through the aid of
common grace, is to revive the dreaded Pelagian heresy.

Chapter 24. If predestination was according to God’s foreknowledge of the

good use of free will, it would really be up to human beings’ decision.

Such view amounts to say that man can be saved by his own works, which
totally contradicts Pauls’ statement “not by works but by him who calls” (Rom
9:12). Fernando Infantas (d. 1610), a Spanish theologian and controversialist,
wrote a treatise titled On Predestination, 20 in which he argued such view.
According to him, in Rom 8:28: “And we know that all things work together for
good to those who love God, to those who are the called according to the
purpose,” such purpose (propositum) stands for the human being’s, rather than
God’s resolve. Paolo Beni, a one time Jesuit from the Italian town of Gubbio,
wrote a treatise In what way we could put an end to the contemporary controversy
between some Catholics concerning the efficacy of God’s help and free will (1603) in
which he argued the same thing.
Lemos reminds his readers that the view according to which election and
predestination happen thanks to man’s resolve and purpose used to be upheld by
Pelagians and Semipelagians and was rebuffed in Jerome’s Letter 133 to Ctesiphon,
1: “Can there be greater presumption than to claim not likeness to God but
equality with him, and so to compress into a few words the poisonous doctrines of
all the heretics?”
Again, this view was revived by Faustus of Riez and expounded by the
French Jesuit Jacques Sirmond (1559-1651), who also promoted the study of the
works of yet another Semipelagian, Arnobius the Younger.21
20
The complete title is: Tractatus de praedestinatione secundum Scripturam sacram et veram
evangelicam lucem ... ab idiota Ferdinando de Las Infantas, ... compositus (1601).
21
This is puzzling to me. Sirmond published Arnobius the Younger’s Predestinatus in 143.
Lemos died in 1629. How would he have known this? Unless, of course, someone else (i.e.,
Quesnel) edited Lemos’ text, adding this comment.
 308

Chapter 25. The Apostle Paul and Augustine supported the view that the
predestination of the elect happens according to God’s decree.

Admittedly, there is an unbreakable link connecting Paul and Augustine,

whereby the latter built upon and expounded the Apostle’s teachings.
Paul taught that faith, grace, predestination and final perseverance have their
certainty neither in man’s free will, nor in its foreseen good use, but in grace, in
the divine decree, and in the power of God, who being mighty firmly brings to
fulfilment whatever he promises. Lemos says: “This is the unchanging truth of
predestination and grace, which the Church of Christ, the pillar and foundation of
truth, claimed perpetually against Pelagians and Semipelagians.”22
Augustine fought for years against Pelagians and Semipelagians, and argued
that since Paul clearly taught that grace is not bestowed according to human will
and choices (lest grace is no longer grace), how could predestination, which is an
effect of God’s grace, be based on foreseen good use of free will? On the contrary,
Augustine taught that predestination is based upon God’s firm decree (firmum et
stabile propositum Dei).
In Two Letters against the Pelagians II, 10, 22 Augustine wrote:

They so say this as if man of himself, without God's assistance, has a good purpose and a
desire of virtue; and this precedent merit is worthy of being assisted by the subsequent grace
of God. For they think, perchance, that the apostle thus said: ‘For we know that he works all
things for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to the purpose,’
(Rom 8:28) so as to wish the purpose of man to be understood, which purpose, as a good
merit, the mercy of the God that calls might follow; being ignorant that it is said, ‘Who are
called according to the purpose,’ so that there may be understood the purpose of God, not
man, whereby those whom he foreknew and predestinated as conformed to the image of his
Son, he elected before the foundation of the world. For not all the called are called according
to purpose, since many are called, few are chosen (Mat 20:16) They, therefore, are called
according to the purpose, who were elected before the foundation of the world. Of this
purpose of God, that also was said which I have already mentioned concerning the twins
Esau and Jacob, ‘That according to the election the purpose of God might remain, not of
works, but of him that calls; it was said, that the elder shall serve the younger’ (Rom 9:11).
This purpose of God is also mentioned in that place where, writing to Timothy, he says,
‘Labor with the gospel according to the power of God, who saves us and calls us with this
holy calling; not according to our works, but according to his purpose and grace, which was
given to us in Christ Jesus before the eternal ages, but is now made manifest by the coming
of our Savior Jesus Christ’ (2 Timothy 1:8).

And in On Rebuke and Grace 7, 13,14:

22
Tractatus, 210.
 309

For they were not so called as not to be elected, in respect of which it is said, For many are
called but few are elected (Mt 20:16) but because they were called according to the purpose,
they are of a certainty also elected by the election, as it is said, of grace, not of any precedent
merits of theirs, because to them grace is all merit. Of such says the apostle: ‘We know that
to those that love God he works together all things for good, to them who are called
according to his purpose; because those whom he before foreknew, he also did predestinate to
be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren.
Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also
justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified’ (Rom 8:29). Of these no one perishes,
because all are elected. And they are elected because they were called according to the
purpose— the purpose, however, not their own, but God's; of which he elsewhere says: ‘That
the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calls, it
was said unto her that the elder shall serve the younger (Rom 9:11). And in another place he
says: ‘Not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace’ (2 Tim 1:9).

Chapter 26. Other Fathers’ views and theological reasons are brought in
support of the abovementioned view.

Following in Augustine’s footsteps, Prosper, Hilary, Fulgentius, and Deacon

Peter argued against Semipelagians that predestination is according to God’s
propositum. This term, found in Romans 8:28 (“And we know that in all things
God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to
the purpose (propositum)” has been traditionally attributed to God, not to human
beings. Lemos provides plenty of references in support of this, including the
Syriac translation of the New Testament, which even used an equivalent of the
Latin term praeordinationem.23
According to Lemos, such propositum allegedly does not include
foreknowledge of human deeds. Three theological reasons are used to back this
claim: 1) Christ was not predestined on account of his foreseen good use of free
will; consequently, neither are we, who are part of his body. Molina was wrong
for claiming otherwise, and for contradicting Augustine who made this point 2)
Children who die after baptism were predestined for salvation without any
foreknowledge of their future works. Augustine made this point to refute the
Pelagian claim that God has to look at future deeds before predestining people,
lest he be found an acceptor of persons: “But when we come to the case of infants,
and to the mediator between God and man himself, the man Christ Jesus, there is
wanting all assertion of human merits that precede the grace of God, because the
former are not distinguished from others by any preceding good merits that they
should belong to the deliverer of men; any more than he himself being himself a
man, was made the deliverer of men by virtue of any precedent human merits”
(The Predestination of the Saints 12, 23). 3) If predestination does not stem from

23
Ibid., 211.
 310

God’s firm purpose, but from his foreknowledge of the good use of free will, it
follows that the grace of God is bestowed according to our merits, which amounts
to the Pelagian heresy.

Chapter 27. Rebuttal of some objections made against the above mentioned
view.

Jesuits argue that divine foreknowledge is not a mere spectating, but that it
rather presupposes the presence and operating power of exciting grace, to which
the human free will is foreseen to consent.
Lemos is un-impressed. First of all, he complains that according to Jesuits
such exciting grace is bestowed based on the foreseen good use of free will about
what man can first do on his own (facienti quod est in se); but in this case such grace
would be given as a debt, or as a proportionate reward (ex condigno). Secondly,
even in the presence of such exciting grace, God foresees what man will do out of
his own deliberations, and not because of this grace acting in his mind and heart.
Finally, according to Jesuits, as man decides to give in to such exciting grace,
cooperating grace is bestowed on him, in order to help him do what he decided to
do; however, we need to take notice that such cooperating grace is given
according to the merits of man, who makes good use of exciting grace.
At this point, Jesuits clamor that they do not say that such foreseen good use
of free will is the cause of predestination, but only the condition sine qua non for it
(in other words, the two stand in a relationship of correlation, not causation).
Lemos replies that the philosophical distinction between “cause” and “reason,” or
“condition” does not alter the fact that predestination ends up depending on man
and on his (foreseen) good use of free will rather than on God’s firm purpose: this
is to fall right back into the Pelagian heresy! Moreover, there have
been some authors (Lemos unfortunately does not name them, thus making it
impossible for us to verify his assertion) who went as far as dispensing with this
distinction altogether, saying that such foreseen good use is not only the
condition or reason, but the cause itself of predestination; in their view man ends
up being the cause of the first effect of predestination, namely God’s vocation
being effective in us. It doesn’t take a theological genius, concludes Lemos, to
recognize that claiming that man is the cause of the first effect of predestination
amounts to say that he is the cause of all its effects, and therefore of
predestination in its totality.
Among Jesuits, those who say that good use of free will is just a condition of
or a general disposition for predestination, speak of it as being its efficient or
physical cause; others who say that such good use is the proper cause, qualify it as
meritorious or moral cause. According to Lemos, the end result is the same: the
 311

efficacy of grace given to us ultimately depends on our free will, a view that
contradicts Augustine’s and the Church’s view.

Chapter 28. Recent theologians’ use of scriptural arguments supportive of

predestination according to foreknowledge.

Lemos considers five scriptural texts adduced by Jesuits:

1) Mt 25: 34: “Then the King will say to those on his right, ‘Come, you who
are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for
you since the creation of the world.” The next verses list six meritorious
actions that are associated with their inclusion in the kingdom.
Lemos questions the alleged causation between “kingdom prepared”
(paratum regnum) and meritorious actions: the text does not say that the
kingdom was prepared because the blessed people’s foreseen meritorious
actions. Rather a connection should be established between “For I was
hungry” and “inherit the kingdom;” in other words, God prepared the
kingdom of heaven without any human merits in mind, though there is an
undeniable connection between merits and inheritance of the kingdom due
to attending to Jesus’ needs in the person of the disfranchised, poor and
persecuted.
2) Mt 20: 23: “But to sit on my right hand and on my left is not mine to give,
but it is for those for whom it is prepared by my Father.” Jesuits say that
such allotment depends on foreseen merits.
Lemos argues that the allotment is based on the gratuitous choice of God,
not on human works
3) Rom 8: 28: “Those he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the
image of his Son…” According to Jesuits this text clearly teaches that those
who have been foreknown to use well their free will are also predestined.
Lemos counters by saying that there are four Catholic ways to
understand this verse and two heretical ones, advocated by Pelagians and
Semipelagians. The first heretical view claims that foreknowledge of merits is
the cause of predestination: against such view Augustine, Prosper, Hilary
and Thomas Aquinas spilled rivers of ink. The second view says that
foreknowledge of good use of free will under the influence of merely exciting grace
is the cause of predestination: this view was championed by Semipelagians.
In either case, Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary to Paul’s Letter to
the Romans caput 8, lectio 6 wrote: “To claim that any merit on our part is
presupposed, the foreknowledge of which is the reason for predestination,
amounts to nothing else than claiming that grace is given on the basis of
our own merits, and that the beginning of good works stems from us,
though their fulfilment depends on God” (Unde ponere quod aliquod meritum
 312

ex parte nostra praesupponatur, cuius praescientia sit ratio praedestinationis, nihil

est aliud quam gratiam ponere dari ex meritis nostris, et quod principium bonorum
operum est ex nobis, et consummatio est ex Deo). Jesuits are divided over what
type of foreknowledge is involved here. Molina and his supporters claim
that the text hints at conditional foreknowledge (scientia media); others,
such as Lessius, claim that it is absolute foreknowledge: in either view, it is
up to man and to his free will’s choices to make grace, and thereby
predestination, efficacious. Such conclusion is unacceptable, according to
Lemos.
Coming to the four Catholic views, the first one is that the term
“foreknowledge” conveys approbation or predilection (i.e., “Those whom
God approved of, or loved, he also predestined…”). The second view does
not take foreknowledge as the literal first logical step in God’s mind, but
rather sees it as a consequence of his predestination (i.e., when Jesus said in
Jn 13:18: “I know those whom I have chosen”). The third view sees
foreknowledge as strictly connected (i.e., simultaneous) with
predestination. In other words, since Paul did not say: “Those whom God
foreknew would be conformed to the image of his Son out of a good use of
their free wills, he also predestined…” (in which case we could legitimately
talk of foreknowledge of merits) it may be concluded that foreknowledge
and predestination are part of the same purpose (propositum) in God’s mind:
in other words God foreknew because he predestined the conformity of some
people to the image of his Son (quam proinde conformitatem non propterea
praedestinavit quia praescivit, sed potius ideo praescivit, quia praedestinavit)!24
The fourth view sees foreknowledge as the plan in God’s mind before the
foundation of the world to bestow predestination on some people (i.e., Eph
1; Fulgentius’ Letter XVII to deacon Peter).
4) Rom 11: 22: “Therefore consider the goodness and severity of God: on
those who fell, severity; but toward you, goodness, if you continue in his
goodness. Otherwise you also will be cut off.” From this text Jesuits infer
that our end is not absolutely, but conditionally decreed.
Lemos’ response is that this text does not refer to the predestined alone,
but to all who have been admitted to faith in Christ, Gentiles and Jews
alike. Therefore, while it is true that if the faithful do not persevere in faith
they will fall out of the Church, and that if they do not persevere in a state
of grace they will not be saved, it is also true that God has decreed with an
absolute and firm purpose that those whom he has predestined will
persevere in faith and love to the end of their lives. Jesuits like Lessius
argue that the whole business of salvation ultimately rests on our free will’s

24
Ibid., 215.
 313

conditional response to God’s calling: on the contrary, says Lemos, it

ultimately depends on God’s good will, as Augustine made abundantly
clear!
5) 1 Tim 2: 4: “God desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge
of the truth.”
Jesuits use this text to suggest that that God’s salvific will is truly and
sincerely universal, thus excluding particularistic predestination of some
individuals.
Lemos replies that this text has already been exegeted countless times
by those who have followed Augustine’s understanding of predestination,
as they referred it to God’s antecedent and inefficacious will rather than to
his consequent and absolute will. Moreover, the Jesuit objection (“But how
is such will truly universal if the predestined are so few and the number of
the non-predestined is so immense?”) needs not be addressed here, since
Lemos says he will deal with it later on.

Chapter 29. Recent theologians’ use of patristic quotes to support the view
of predestination based on foreknowledge of good use of free will.

Lemos warns his readers that there are several apocryphal text attributed to
Church Fathers that are being used by contemporary theologians (Lemos does
not identify them by name) to uphold the Jesuit view of predestination: such texts
should never be referred to in a debate. Among them are:
- Jerome’s Commentary to Romans
- Ambrose’s Commentary to Romans
- Augustine’s Letter to Demetrias (written by Pelagius)
- Augustine’s Of Church Doctrine (written by the Semipelagian presbyter
Gennadius)
- Augustine’ On Predestination and Grace

Chapter 30. Authors whose opinion on this matter needs to be rejected out
of hand.
The works of the following authors; Gennadius, Cassian, Arnobius, Origen,
Theodoretus, Theophilactus and Oecomenius, should not be used to discuss
predestination and grace because they contain many views that were advocated
by Pelagians and Semipelagians.

Chapter 31. Ancient Church Fathers did not support predestination

according to foreknown good use of free will.
 314

Lemos claims at the beginning of this chapter that none of the “holy fathers”
taught against predestination based on God’s will; when they talked about
predestination to glory based on God’s foreknowledge, they did so in reference to
the order of execution of God’s decree (since glory is the last effect of
predestination, it is connected to what comes before it, namely the performance of
good works according to human beings’ good use of free will), and not to the order
of intention.
Lemos proceeds to criticize the Jesuits’ use of some texts by Clement,
Dionysius, Iraeneus, Cyril,25 Clement of Alexandria, and Damascene. Summing up
the essence of his critique, after quoting Aquinas’ objection in De veritate q. 12,
art. 10: “As Augustine says, predestination concerns goods connected with
salvation. But our merits, also, which depend on free choice, are numbered among
these goods. Therefore, our free choice is involved in prophecy of predestination.
Thus, Jerome made a poor division,” Lemos quoted Aquinas’ response to such
objection: “Our merit is from grace and from free will. However, it belongs to
predestination only in so far as it comes from grace, which is from God alone.
Hence, that which is from our free will is said to belong to predestination for
some extrinsic reason.”

Chapter 32. Not found in the text.

Chapter 33. Recent theologians quote Chrysostom in support of their view.

Chapter 34. Chrysostom did not say what they claim he said.
Chapter 35. A closer look at and explanation of what Chrysostom really
taught on this matter.

Lemos devoted from Chapter 32 (not found in the text) to Chapter 35 (pp.
221-224) to put to rest the view that Chrysostom upheld the view that is now
advocated by Jesuits, namely predestination based on God’s foreknowledge.

Chapter 36. Saint Jerome did not support the view of predestination based
on foreknowledge of good use of free will.

In two and a half pages Lemos dis-allows the use of Jerome made by Jesuits,
who claimed that this Church father, on the basis of some of his writings, would
have supported the theory of middle knowledge. Lemos implacably deconstructs
the Jesuit exegesis of such texts.

25
Lemos goes as far as claiming that, in his opinion, “among the Greek fathers, Cyril is the least
to be used to justify the Jesuits’ view.” Ibid., 220.
 315

Chapter 37. Neither Ambrose nor Anselm supported such view.

Lemos does the same thing with Ambrose’s and Anselm’s texts quoted by
Jesuits in support of their view.

Chapter 38. Augustine did not support such view in any way or form.

In this chapter Lemos devotes four pages to argue that Augustine could not
have possibly upheld either middle knowledge or predestination based on God’s
absolute foreknowledge (advocated by Lessius), but that on the contrary he
always opposed such views against Pelagians and Semipelagians.
Molina and his followers, as they claim that predestination consists in the
conditional foreknowledge of human merits, are fond of quoting The Gift of
Perseverance 14, 35: “This is the predestination of the saints—nothing else; to wit,
the foreknowledge and the preparation of God's benefits, whereby they are most
certainly delivered, whoever they are that are delivered.” Even though in this
sentence the term “foreknowledge” appears before “preparation,” giving the
readers the impression that it comes first in God’s mind, Lemos argues that it is
the preparation that comes first as a decision of his will; consequently God has
foreknowledge of what he, not human beings, is going to do.26 Moreover, Jesuits
take this quote out of context, conveniently omitting the previous sentence in the
text: “Will any man dare to say that God did not foreknow those to whom he
would give to believe, or whom he would give to his Son, that of them he should
lose none? (John 18:9) And certainly, if he foreknew these things, he as certainly
foreknew his own kindnesses, wherewith he condescends to deliver us.”
Lemos concludes:

Augustine clearly teaches that predestination consists essentially in the preparation of grace
and of his benefits, and that foreknowledge ensues such preparation…Predestination is the
foreknowledge of those things that God himself is going to do, and not foreknowledge of the
good use of free will, as the theory of middle knowledge incorrectly claims against the clear
teaching of St. Augustine, who wrote: ‘The Church prays that the unbelieving may believe;
therefore God converts to the faith. It prays that believers may persevere; therefore God
gives perseverance to the end. God foreknew that he would do this. This is the very
predestination of the saints’ (The Gift of Perseverance 7, 14); and also: ‘For the ordering of his

26
Lemos quotes two text of Augustine in support of his claim: “He promised what he himself
would do, not what men would do. Because, although men do those good things which pertain to
God's worship, he himself makes them to do what he has commanded; it is not they that cause
him to do what he has promised. Otherwise the fulfilment of God's promises would not be in the
power of God, but in that of men,” The Predestination of the Saints 10, 19; “To whomsoever,
therefore, God gives his gifts, beyond a doubt he has foreknown that he will bestow them on
them, and in his foreknowledge he has prepared them for them,” The Gift of Perseverance 17,
41.
 316

future works in his foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived and changed, is absolute, and is
nothing but, predestination’ (Ibid., 17, 41). 27

As Jesuits insist that in Romans 8:29 (“For those God foreknew he also
predestined”) the term “foreknowledge” precedes “predestination” to validate their
view, Lemos sets up an example. If one said: “I have a lot of money that my has
work has earned,” even though in the sentence (in situ) “I have a lot of money”
comes first, the true meaning of the sentence (in sensu) is that wealth comes after,
not before hard work: the same is true of Romans 8:29!
Lastly, Lemos takes a shot at Jesuits’ view of this Augustinian text: “Those,
then, are elected, as has often been said, who are called according to the purpose,
who also are predestinated and foreknown. If any one of these perishes, God is
mistaken; but none of them perishes, because God is not mistaken” (On Rebuke
And Grace 7,14). Jesuits argued that according to this text the certainty of
predestination is rooted in God’s middle knowledge, and not in the intrinsic
efficacy of the helps and benefits prepared by God’s will. Lemos begged to differ:
he points out that the first part of this text upholds election according to God’s
purpose (and not according to foreknowledge of human beings’ good use of free
will). Moreover, Lemos
reminds his readers what follows in the text: “If any one of these perish, God is
overcome by human sin; but none of them perishes, because God is overcome by
nothing.” In other words, predestination is rooted in the undefeatable will of God.

Chapter 39. Prosper, Hilary, and Fulgentius did not support such view.

Lemos made the point that Prosper, Hilary and Fulgentius were adamantly
opposed to predestination based on God’s foreknowledge, and produced several
quotes from Prosper’s works (especially from his letter to Augustine) to this
effect. Among them, one stands out: “They [the Massilians] have accepted the
plan and predestination of God based on foreknowledge so that God made some
into vessels of honor and other onto vessels of dishonor precisely because he
foresaw the end of each person and knew in advance his future willing and action
even under the help of grace [emphasis mine].”28
Lemos shows how preposterous it is to argue that Prosper’s view is the same
as the Jesuits’: Prosper was a consistent opponent/critic (perpertuus expugnator) of
predestination based on God’s foreknowledge. However, Jesuits are fond of
quoting this other text of Prosper’s (Answers to the Vincentian Articles, 12):

27
Tractatus, 231.
28
“Et sub ispo adjutorio gratiae in qua futurum esset voluntate et actione praescierit.”
 317

Those of whom it is said: ‘They went from us but they were not of us. For if they had been of
us, they would no doubt have remained with us,’ (1 Jn 2:19) went away of their own
choosing, they fell through their own fault. And because (quia) God foresaw that they
would fall, they were not predestined [emphasis mine]. They would have been the
predestined, should they have come back to God and persevered in holiness and truth.

Lemos remained undeterred and accused the Jesuits of quoting this text out
of context. In fact, the very beginning of this chapter reads: “Though the
predestination of God is always uncertain and hidden from us as long as we live
among the perils of life, yet it remains unchanged for him who has already
accomplished [emphasis mine]what for us is still to come” (notice how Prosper
did not say here, or anywhere else, for that matter, that predestination is
unchanged on the basis of what he foresaw!)
Lemos went on to say that IF the “because” (Latin quia) is to be taken as the
“prior cause of what is” (causa essendi), Jesuits may have a point; unfortunately for
them, however, everything in Prosper’s texts suggest that by “because” Prosper
merely meant an “a posteriori cause of consequence.”29 Take for instance what
Jesus said: “The Father loves you because you love me” (Jn 16:27): such “because”
can only mean a cause of consequence, lest we incur the Pelagian heresy.
As far as Hilary is concerned, his whole letter to Augustine pointed out the
Massilians’ qualms concerning predestination according to God’s will and their
upholding it according to God’s foreknowledge:

But when we ask them why the gospel is preached or not preached to some people and in
some places and why the gospel is now preached to almost all peoples, though it was
previously not, just as it is now not preached to some people, they say that it pertains to the
foreknowledge of God that the truth has been preached or is preached to those people at the
time and in the place when and where he foreknew that it would be believed.30

As far as Fulgentius is concerned, in vain do Jesuits quote from his To

Monimus to justify their view of predestination according to foreseen good use of
free will, since the holy bishop clearly said about the elect that “God gratuitously

29
Tractatus, 236. Lemos quoted Aquinas on the distinction between the two: “Origen spoke in
reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the
will is joined to it, as is said above. But when he says the reason why God foreknows some
things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of
consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows
that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them,”
Summa I, q. 14, art. 8, ad. 1.
30
Hilary, Letter to Augustine, 3. Jesuits will argue that their view differs from Semipelagians
because the latter believed that faith can be produced by man without the help of God’s grace,
while they believe that it cannot.
 318

chose them in Christ and predestined them to the kingdom before the foundation
of the world”(On the Incarnation and Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ): “gratuitously,”
Lemos points out, excludes merits or the foreknowledge of merits!

Chapter 40. Aquinas never did either.

The next two and a half pages are devoted to refute the Jesuits’ attempt to
claim Aquinas’ view was on their side. Lemos takes to task the Jesuit exegesis of
five texts of Aquinas’. According to Lemos, Jesuits are ‘almost triumphantly’
deducing some conclusions from Summa IIa IIae, q. 174, art. 1:

Secondly, God foreknows certain things in themselves--either as to be accomplished by

himself, and of such things is the prophecy of ‘predestination,’ since, according to Damascene
(De Fide Orth. ii, 30), ‘God predestines things which are not in our power’--or as to be
accomplished through man's free will, and of such is the prophecy of ‘foreknowledge.’ This
may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination, since
the latter regards good alone.

The conclusions arrived at by Jesuits are that the good use of free will is not
from God alone, but from our free will as well; that such use is not known to God
through predestination but only through foreknowledge; and that consequently it
is not predestined but merely foreknown.31
Lemos is un-impressed. It is “frivolous” to deny that man’s good use of free
will is predestined. Aquinas wrote a possible objection in Quaestiones disputate de
veritate 12, 10: “As Augustine says, predestination concerns goods connected with
salvation. But our merits, also, which depend on free choice, are numbered among
these goods. Therefore, our free choice is involved in prophecy of predestination.
Thus, Jerome made a poor division.” But then he went on to reply to this
objection: “Our merit is from grace and from free will. However, it belongs to
predestination only in so far as it comes from grace, which is from God alone.
Hence, that which is from our free will is said to belong to predestination for
some extrinsic reason.”

Chapter 41. Scholastics did not teach this view of predestination based on
foreknowledge.

Jesuits are fond of quoting in support of predestination according to middle

knowledge a great number of both ancient and recent Scholastics; however, this
number is highly inflated. For instance, several recent scholastics should be
excluded from such list because they either held un-orthodox opinions (e.g.,

31
Tractatus, 237.
 319

Ockham, Ambrosius Cataharinus); or did not really uphold what Jesuits do; or
they were intellectual “featherweights.”
What about ancient scholastics? Lemos stated unequivocally that they did
not support predestination according to foreseen good use of free will.
Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales did not uphold middle
knowledge or its equivalent, nor the Semipelagian doctrine.32 Lemos suggests
that what Augustine wrote in The Gift of Perseverance 19, 48 may well apply to
them:

What, therefore, prevents us from understanding the same predestination, when in some
commentators on the word of God we read of the foreknowledge of God where they are
dealing with the calling of the elect? For on this topic they perhaps preferred to use this term
which is more easily understood and does not conflict with the truth, but is, rather, in
harmony with the truth which is preached concerning the predestination of grace. This I
know: No one could have argued against this predestination which we defend in accord with
the Holy Scriptures without being in error.

Chapter 42. Reasons adduced by those who support predestination

according to middle knowledge.

It is a very familiar argument (as a matter of fact by some considered to be

the strongest) that our freedom is taken away if indeed God predestines people
according to just his will. This argument in the past was upheld by both
Pelagians and Semipelagians against Augustine. This criticism can be condensed
in these six points:
1) It is not fair that God, before foreknowing through his middle knowledge
the good or bad use of our free will, decides to predestine some people and
reprobate the others.
2) This idea is opposed to Sacred Scripture, which claims that God wants all
men to be saved and none to perish.
3) God cannot lament the fact that the non-predestined are not behaving well,
considering that they have not been given efficacious grace to overcome
their sins.
4) If predestination occurs on the basis of God’s decree, irrespective of middle
knowledge, his invitations and exhortations to repent and turn to him are
fictitious and insincere as far as the non-predestined are concerned.
5) This view promotes despondency, sloth, passive resignation among the
faithful.
6) Man is not free to operate if he has been predestined.

32
I documented the views of these three great scholastics in my God’s Eternal Gift, 457-81.
 320

Chapter 43. These reasons are rejected by the authors Jesuits are fond of
quoting from.

Don’t’ the Jesuits see that these very arguments can be turned against the
idea of predestination based on God’s foreknowledge?
1) Is it fair that some people created in THIS order of things are damned,
when they could have been saved in OTHER world orders that God could
have actualized?
2) Could not the reprobates in THIS order of things legitimately complain
that God does not seem to want all men to be saved and none to perish?
3) The same applies in this case: God cannot legitimately lament people’s
disobedience, considering he could have created another order of things in
which THESE reprobates could have behaved well and be saved.
4) If God already knows that in THIS order of things that he has actualized
some people will not be saved, aren’t his exhortations to repent pointless?
5) Will not this view of predestination be liable to the same charge that
Jesuits leveled against Dominicans, namely that it is discouraging?
Consider what Augustine wrote in The Gift of Perseverance 15, 38:

Although these things may be said, they ought not so to deter us from confessing the
true grace of God—that is, the grace which is not given to us in respect of our merits,—
and from confessing the predestination of the saints in accordance therewith, even as we
are not deterred from confessing God's foreknowledge, although one should thus speak
to the people concerning it, and say: Whether you are now living righteously or un-
righteously, you shall be such by and by as the Lord has foreknown that you will be—
either good, if He has foreknown you as good, or bad, if He has foreknown you as bad.
For if on the hearing of this some should be turned to torpor and slothfulness, and from
striving should go headlong to lust after their own desires, is it therefore to be counted
that what has been said about the foreknowledge of God is false? If God has foreknown
that they will be good, will they not be good, whatever be the depth of evil in which
they are now engaged? And if He has foreknown them evil, will they not be evil,
whatever goodness may now be discerned in them? There was a man in our monastery,
who, when the brethren rebuked him for doing some things that ought not to be done,
and for not doing some things that ought to be done, replied: ‘Whatever I may now be,
I shall be such as God has foreknown that I shall be.’ And this man certainly both said
what was true, and was not profited by this truth for good, but so far made way in evil
as to desert the society of the monastery, and become a dog returned to his vomit; and,
nevertheless, it is uncertain what he is yet to become.
6) According to God’s foreknowledge a man will do what he is foreknown to
do: there can be no variation the ‘theme’. How is man free then?

Now, Jesuits will argue that this is not the same thing, because in their view
of predestination according to God’s foreknowledge it is man who is responsible
for deciding what he will do, not God. However, according to Lemos this
 321

explanation will not do as far as practical consequences are concerned. Thus, even
Lessius in his new book De gratia after rejecting predestination based on God’s
decree, also rejected predestination based on God’s conditional foreknowledge
because according to him the reprobation of the non-elect in Molina’s system is
not any “fairer” than in the Dominican’s view.

Chapter 44. The arguments adduced in favor of predestination based on

foreknowledge of good use of free will were first articulated by Pelagians
and Semipelagians.

Pelagians and Semipelagians made the same six objections to predestination

according to God’s decree. Lemos gives instances for each one of them and
suggests that Prosper in his Answers to Vincentian Articles and Answers to the Gauls
properly disposed of them.

Chapter 45. Refutation of these arguments.

Lemos sets out to refute these six objections, starting with the first,
according to which God by playing favorites would be an acceptor of person.
Augustine properly disposed of this charge in his Letter 194 7.31, 7.32 addressed
to Sixtus, and in his Two Letters Against the Pelagians II, 7.13:

But if anyone have two debtors, and he choose to remit the debt to the one, to require it of
the other, he gives to whom he will and defrauds nobody; nor is this to be called acceptance
of persons, since there is no injustice. The acceptance of persons may seem otherwise to those
who are of small understanding, where the lord of the vineyard gave to those laborers who
had done work therein for one hour as much as to those who had borne the burden and heat
of the day, making them equal in wages in the labor of whom there had been such a
difference. But what did he reply to those who murmured against the good man of the house
concerning this, as it were, acceptance of persons? Friend, said he, I do you no wrong. Have
you not agreed with me for a denarius? Take what is yours, and go; but I choose to give to
this last as to you. Is it not lawful to me to do what I will? Is your eye evil because I am
good? Here, forsooth, is the entire justice: I choose this. To you, he says, I have repaid; on
him I have bestowed; nor have I taken anything away from you to bestow it on him; nor have
I either diminished or denied what I owed to you. May I not do what I will? Is your eye evil
because I am good? As, therefore, here there is no acceptance of persons, because one is
honored freely in such wise as that another is not defrauded of what is due to him: so also
when, according to the purpose of God, one is called, another is not called, a gratuitous
benefit is bestowed on the one that is called, of which benefit the calling itself is the
beginning—an evil is repaid to him that is not called, because all are guilty, from the fact that
by one man sin entered into the world.

In other words, how can Jesuits suggest that, considering that the whole
human race is a massa damnata after the Fall, none of us deserving any grace and
 322

much less, eternal life? So why would God be an acceptor of persons if he decided
to have mercy on some? All humans beings sin freely and gladly out of their own
malice, and yet God, out of his mercy, decides to rescue some and allows the rest
to perish, and deservedly so.
As far as the second objection is concerned (i.e. taking 1 Tim 2 literally), it
rests on a bad exegesis of the biblical text. Augustine repeatedly explained that
the omnes is not an unqualified “all,” but rather refers to all kinds of people. Also,
Chrysostom explained that this text refers to God’s antecedent and inefficacious
wish.

Chapter 46. Refutation of other objections to predestination based on God’s

decree, especially of that which says that God would be unfair.

The third objection was that if predestination happens according to God’s

decree, God cannot bemoan the fact that non-predestined people cannot be
corrected, repent, and seek eternal life. The reason why this objection fizzles was
given by Augustine in On Correction and Rebuke 2, 4, and 5:

To this we answer: Whoever you are that do not the commandments of God that are already
known to you, and do not wish to be rebuked, you must be rebuked even for that very reason
that you do not wish to be rebuked. For you do not wish that your faults should be pointed
out to you; you do not wish that they should be touched, and that such a useful pain should
be caused you that you may seek the Physician; you do not desire to be shown to yourself,
that, when you see yourself to be deformed, you may wish for the Reformer, and may
supplicate Him that you may not continue in that repulsiveness. For it is your fault that you
are evil; and it is a greater fault to be unwilling to be rebuked because you are evil, as if faults
should either be praised, or regarded with indifference so as neither to be praised nor blamed,
or as if, indeed, the dread, or the shame, or the mortification of the rebuked man were of no
avail, or were of any other avail in healthfully stimulating, except to cause that He who is
good may be besought, and so out of evil men who are rebuked may make good men who
may be praised.

In other words: people sin because they are evil: they are not determined by
God to do so.
The fourth objection was that if God decrees predestination of some people
on the basis of his will alone, the admonitions and warnings he gives in the
Scripture are a joke and not real. Again, says Lemos, God’s desire that all people
live sinless lives is real and based on his antecedent will; in his consequent will (after
the Fall) he exhorts and admonishes all, though such admonitions are only
effective in the case of the predestined. Moreover, how can we call a “joke” God’s
general help and sufficient grace that is provided to all people? In virtue of them
people could repent, though in reality, due to their ill will, they do not. As
Prosper wrote in The Call of All Nations II, 36:
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Therefore, though it is impossible that God’s decree would not come true, yet it does not do
away with the practice of prayer, nor does the design of the election diminish the effort of
man’s free will. God rather preordained the effect he intended in such a way that he desires
man’s merit to grow through the labor of good works, through perseverance in supplications,
through the practice of virtues. He wants to crown the good works of men not only
according to his own plan, but also according to their merits. And clearly it is for this reason
that he hides the preordination of their election in a secrecy inaccessible to human
knowledge.

Again, presses Lemos, how can Jesuits call these admonitions superfluous,
insincere, or even a “joke”?
As far as the fifth objection is concerned, according to which predestination
based on God’s decree promotes slothfulness, despondency and even despair,
Lemos says it is nonsense. Had God revealed to his predestined that they are
predestined and to the others that they are not, the objection would be
meaningful. The fact is: we do not know whether we are predestined or not! This
is why we must attend to our salvation with fear and respect, as Paul encourages
us to do. But what about the potential despair Molina and Lessius suggested
would afflict some people? Against such view Augustine had much to say: “I
marvel that men would rather entrust themselves to their own weakness, than to
the strength of God's promise. But do you say, God's will concerning myself is to
me uncertain? What then? Is your own will concerning yourself certain to you?
And do you not fear?” (The Predestination of the Saints 11.21). And also in The Gift
of Perseverance 17.46:

I, however, am loth to exaggerate the case with my words, but I rather leave it to them to
consider, and see what it is of which they have persuaded themselves— to wit, that by the
preaching of predestination, more of despair than of exhortation is impressed upon the
hearers. For this is to say that a man then despairs of his salvation when he has learned to
place his hope not in himself, but in God, although the prophet cries, ‘Cursed is he who has
his hope in man.’ (Jeremiah 17:5)

And in On Rebuke And Grace 4.6:

Allow me a little, my brethren, not as against you whose heart is right with God, but as
against those who mind earthly things, or as against those human modes of thinking
themselves, to contend for the truth, of the heavenly and divine grace. For they who say this
are such as in their wicked works are unwilling to be rebuked by those who proclaim this
grace…Whoever you are that do not the commandments of God that are already known to
you, and do not wish to be rebuked, you must be rebuked even for that very reason that you
do not wish to be rebuked. For you do not wish that your faults should be pointed out to you;
you do not wish that they should be touched, and that such a useful pain should be caused
you that you may seek the Physician; you do not desire to be shown to yourself, that, when
you see yourself to be deformed, you may wish for the Reformer, and may supplicate Him
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that you may not continue in that repulsiveness. For it is your fault that you are evil; and it is
a greater fault to be unwilling to be rebuked because you are evil.

In other words: people should not despair of their salvation because their
perdition is only their own fault, according to the old biblical adage: “Deserunt et
deserentur.”33

Chapter 47. The argument that predestination based on God’s decree

removes human freedom is refuted from the teachings of the Fathers.

Lemos goes after the sixth objection (predestination according to God’s

decree removes our freedom of choice) with a few quotes from Jerome’s,
Augustine’s and Prosper’s works. Prosper, for instance, wrote: “For we are little
troubled by the foolish grievance of those proud people who assert that free will is
set aside if we say that the beginning and the progress and final perseverance in
virtue are all gifts from God. Rather, divine grace helps by strengthening the
human will” (Against Cassian 18).
Lemos concludes that the view that predestination removes free will, a view
condemned by the Fathers, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, should be ascribed to
Lutherans, not to Dominicans.

Chapter 48. Refutation of the same argument from the writings of

Scholastics.

Jesuits say that they do not see how freedom of the will can possibly be
reconciled with predestination based on God’s decree. Lemos retorts that just
because they do not see it, does not mean it should be denied, for Jesuits say that
if predestination and grace are not in my power, and once they are placed in me
by God I cannot fail to receive it, it follows that I am not free; on the contrary,
says Lemos, if predestination is up to me, or if when it is placed in me I can act
differently, then my freedom is safeguarded.
Lemos wrote: “When we hear them say that they do not see how, let us pray
the Lord that he may find it worthy to open their eyes so that they may see and
admit this most certain truth and not oppose it.”34 As a matter of fact the HOW is
forever hidden from us: it is a mystery, indeed!
Lemos re-proposed the scholastic distinction between the composite and the
divided senses, following Aquinas’ qualification: “Although it is possible for one
who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not
possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed that he is predestinated. Whence it
33
Tractatus, 249.
34
Ibid., 251.
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does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect” (Summa Ia, q. 23, ad.
2). He also resorted to the First Cause argument, in which our created free will
does not move itself first and directly, but secondly and in dependence on the
First Mover. As Jerome wrote in his Letter to Ctesiphon:

You fancy that a wrong is inflicted on you and your freedom of choice is
destroyed if you are forced to fall back on God as the moving cause of all your
actions, if you are made dependent on his will, and if you have to echo the
psalmist’s words: ‘My eyes are ever toward the Lord: for it is he that shall pluck
my feet out of the net.’ And so you presume rashly to maintain that each
individual is governed by his own choice. But if he is governed by his own
choice, what becomes of God’s help? If he does not need Christ to rule him, why
does Jeremiah write: the way of man is not in himself (Jer 10:23) and the Lord
directs his steps (Pr 16:9).

Chapter 49. No adult will attain salvation without exercising free will.

This last chapter sees Lemos’ treatise end in a rather anti-climactic fashion; in
it, he takes issue with three views found in one of Gregory of Valentia’s book, the
third one being that before grace’s influence one can deserve to obtain such grace
by one’s works according to the principle facienti quod est in se.
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CONCLUSION

This book is the fifth installment in my history of the Catholic doctrine of

predestination, which overall is the only attempt (so far) in the English language
to produce a comprehensive, detailed presentation of the way the doctrine has
been understood and received in the Catholic Church. I have worked for two
decades on primary sources, mostly Latin, but also French, Spanish and Italian
(regrettably, I do not know German at all). In the process of outlining useful
summaries of the difficult and at times repetitive material I had to wade through,
I endeavored not to adjudicate the truthfulness of any particular view, nor to
endorse one school of thought over another: as a matter of fact, I find it laughable
the way many Evangelicals (i.e., Calvinists and Arminians) dismiss each other’s
views, at times with a condescending tone, at other times with an axe to grind
against the opposite party.
Nothing is “obvious” about this doctrine; no special pleading is to be had (e.g.,
“The Bible says…”). If this doctrine was a clear and defined matter, it would not
have been the object of controversy for more than twelve centuries: twelve
centuries of reflection, speculation, conflicting interpretations!
This book, as well as all my other ones on the subject of predestination, is not
going to be used as a textbook, or peer-reviewed any time soon. Why? Because I
am an illustrious nobody, un-affiliated with any University, Seminary or Church.
I do not belong to any professional organization, do not attend any conferences,
and do not deliver any public lectures. I have a Ph.D. in Historical Theology from
St. Louis University (2003), a teaching experience of over twenty years, and
currently teach part time at a local college, but I have never been published by a
prestigious Publishing House or University Press, despite my repeated attempts.
In another life I may get the recognition that my herculean effort deserves,
but for now I am content and grateful that you, the reader, have decided to take
time to engage my research. At this time, after examining a voluminous body of
literature, I wish to set forth some tentative conclusions; I emphasize tentative.
Let us begin with the importance of the doctrines of grace and predestination
and their architectonic place in the edifice of Christian theology. We both need to
lament the general lack of interest in these topics among contemporary scholars
and theologians, but also not be confounded by the omnipresence of impermanent
fads and trends that are here today and gone tomorrow. Authors, books, schools
of thoughts that may have caused an uproar and made waves at one time or
another are destined to become mere footnotes in history; on the contrary,
theological and philosophical themes, ideas, doctrines and articles of faith will
always be part of Christian tradition. By contributing my book to the study of the
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history of the doctrine of predestination I intend it to become part of the slow but
ongoing conversation on this subject.1
Karl Barth probably put it best when he wrote: “The truth which must now
occupy us, the truth of the doctrine of predestination, is first and last and in all
circumstances the sum of the Gospel, no matter how it may be understood in
detail, no matter what apparently contradictory aspects or moments it may
present to us. It is itself evangel: glad tidings; news which comforts and
sustains.”2
A few words are now in order concerning the sources I have used. Nowadays,
there should no longer be any doubts concerning the legitimacy of Lemos’ Acta
and Panoplia. I have defended their use in a preliminary manner in Part One,
Chapter 1. Here I just want to recall an old article written by the Dominican
Aelred Whitaker,3 who responded to the criticisms he received from James
Brodrick, S.J., author of Robert Bellarmine: Saint and Scholar (first edition, 1928).
Whitaker defended with solid arguments the validity of Serry’s History of the
Congregation de auxiliis, and the authenticity of Lemos’ works against any and all
Jesuit attempts to discredit him. Marie Dominique Chenu, the prolific Dominican
scholar, endorsed his confrere’s stand in an appendix to the article. Last but not
least, the parallels between Acts and Panoplia; the consistency of style and the use
of the same Augustinian texts in both works; and finally, Lemos’ own claim: “I
have all the acts of the debates I had with the Jesuits, and I hope to publish them
once I obtain the authorization from the Holy See” - should dispel any and all
doubts that these texts were indeed the legitimate literary production of Tomas
de Lemos. Thus, I consider this matter closed.
Moving along, readers who were perplexed (if not downright bored or vexed)
about the style of argumentation typical of both Lemos and Lessius, ought to
remember that proof-texting (i.e., using Scripture, Church Fathers’ writings,
conciliar decrees, and Scholastics’ works) was Scholasticism’s preferred way to
vindicate one’s cause, since it produced much needed evidence in the process of
debating an adversary; contemporary theologians no longer write this way.
Having said that, we must also recognize that both Lemos and Lessius did not
limit themselves to stockpile arguments, but also engaged in a comprehensive and
detailed refutation of each other’s interpretations of various texts; in other words,
they engaged in a hermeneutical struggle to refute each other’s views.

1
See for instance, Matthew Levering’s Predestination: Biblical And Theological Paths (Oxford
University Press, 2011), and Steve Long, ed., Thomism and Predestination: Principles and
Disputations (Sapientia Press, 2016).
2
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II.2: The Doctrine of God, trans. G.W. Bromiley et alii (T&T
Clark, 1957), 12.
3
Aelred Whitaker, “A Saint among Theologians,” New Blackfriars 9 (1928): 418-35.
 328

In regard to such views, I wish to single out four points of contention that
struck a chord in me, leaving me somewhat baffled, and unable to reach solid
conclusions: the legacy of Saint Augustine; the real nature of Semipelagian errors;
the charge of Semipelagianism; and what was actually said and what it was taken
to mean in the controversy between Lemos and Lessius.

THE LEGACY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE

Let us begin with the first issue. Both Dominicans and Jesuits vied to claim
better “guardianship” of Augustine’s legacy. More specifically: which of the two
parties was more in agreement with what the great Hypponate actually taught
about grace and predestination?
As the reader may recall, the first congregation held on September 20th, 1605
before the newly elected Paul V focused on the proper understanding of
Augustine’s views. In my personal opinion, the Dominicans can reasonably claim
that their view of grace and predestination is more faithful to and coherent with
what Augustine taught than the Jesuits’ theory of middle knowledge. Moreover,
it was the consensus of several distinguished Jesuit theologians that Lessius’ view
ran contrary to Augustine’s teachings on grace and predestination: for instance,
Bellarmine, Andre’ Eudemon-Joannes, Acquaviva and Vitelleschi thought that
Lessius’ view did not harmonize with Augustine’s and Aquinas’. Bellarmine even
suggested that the view of predestination ex praevisis meritis was harmful to the
Society of Jesus because it caused them to clash with Dominicans, Franciscans
and Augustinians. Lessius was deeply hurt when his superiors expressed their
displeasure with his views, and hastened to reply that predestination based on
foreseen merits out grace (ex praevisis meritis gratiae) was not harmful but useful to
the Church, truthful, and faithful to Scripture and to the teachings of the Fathers;
it brought great consolation to people’ consciences, instilling in them a zeal for
good works and a yearning for salvation; and it was fit to fight the “heresies of
our times” (i.e., Calvin’s doctrine of predestination and Luther’s denial of free
will).
One of Lessius’ critics, Eudemon-Joannes, S.J., pointed out four claims found
in Lessius’ view of predestination which he regarded as problematic:
1) Efficacious and sufficient grace, stemming from God’s initiative, are
differentiated only ab eventu, in other words only after man determines his will
and acts either for the better or the worse.
2) The circumstances in which man could find himself in all the possible
hypothetical scenarios stemming from his choices, do not originate from God’s
initiative but merely from the order of natural causes.
3) It is not the prevenient benefit and gift of God that a man may persevere
unlike another who does not, since it does not come from God that a man may
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find himself in circumstances in which he will consent to such grace: it is just a

consequence of the natural order of things.
4) We cannot say that it is due to grace that a man assents, cooperates and
perseveres in his walk with God, other than meaning that without it (sine qua non)
he cannot do any of those things.

After saying that these views should not be condemned in an absolute

manner (after all, they were previously upheld without serious consequences by
Ambrosius Catharinus and John of Bologna (1518-1564), the author of De aeterna
dei praedestinatione et reprobatione sententia, 1555), Eudemon claimed that
nonetheless they were in stark contrast with Augustine’s views: he cited over
twenty passages from Augustine’s works to make his point.4
But what about Dominicans? Could they rightly claim to be the faithful
guardians of Augustine’s teachings on grace and predestination? More than six
decades ago, Jesuits scholar C. Crevola wrote an impressive article in which he
argued that Lemos’ use of Augustine’s texts in the course of the congregations de
auxiliis was flawed, imprecise and inconclusive.5 Moreover, the Dominicans’ claim
that Augustine indirectly supported the notion of Physical Premotion was firmly
rejected not only by Jesuits (see for instance Lievin de Meyer’s De mente S.
Augustini circa gratiam physice praedeterminantem, 1715), but also by none other
than Jansenius, a theologian who more than anyone else had read and studied
Augustine’s works.6
In conclusion, we must note the following points.
First, the view upheld in the past by various saints and theologians and by
Dominicans at the time of this controversy, that any teaching of Augustine on

4
Eudemon went on to say that Lessius did not quote any passages from Thomas Aquinas or from
Thomist writers to back his view, either. To suggest that the reason why a person is predestined
while another is not is to be ultimately ascribed to our free will or natural causes was utterly
foreign to Aquinas, who said in Summa I, q. 23, art. 5 ad tertium that such reason is to be found
in God’s will to show mercy in the former and justice in the latter: Eudemon introduced six more
passages from the Summa to support his claim.
5
C. Crevola, S.J., “La interpretacion dada a san Agustin en las disputas ‘De Auxiliis,’”Archivo
teologico granadino 13 (1950): 15. According to him, Lemos’ charge that Molina was guilty of
Pelagianism and Semipelagianism in regard to the topics of the powers of free will, the
distribution of grace, God’s foreknowledge and divine predestination, were purely gratuitous.
Crevola did not hesitate to characterize as “false” (p. 171) Lemos’ claim that Molina denied that
predestination depends on a free and gratuitous divine decree.
6
See Jansenius’ Augustinus, Tome 3, Bk III, ch. 2. Jansenius said that while it is true that God’s
grace ‘determines’ the will to do good, PP is something external, accidental, foreign, and
passively received by us; on the contrary, Augustine saw God moving in the soul by producing
an ineffable delectation and suavity (delectatio victrix); moreover, while PP always prevails,
Augustine made room for little graces that can be resisted.
 330

grace or predestination must be considered as a dogma of the Catholic Church

was rejected during the Jansenist controversy: the Magisterium concluded that it
is the Church (not individual theologians) who has the right to interpret and
utilize Augustine’s teachings in a proper fashion. In this regard, Thomas Aquinas
wrote: “The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be
jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of Catholic Doctors
derives its authority from the Church. Hence, we ought to abide by the authority
of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any Doctor
whatever” (Summa IIa IIae, q. 10, art. 12). In other words: so what that Augustine
taught what he did about grace and predestination? The Church has the authority
to re-interpret those teachings or to set them aside, if it so chooses! This view was
officially stated in the condemnation by1690 Decree of the Holy Office: “When
someone finds a teaching that is clearly upheld by Augustine, such teaching can
be held and taught in an absolute manner, without regard for any Pope’s
Bull”(Denzinger # 2332).
Second, there are contemporary theologians who have not hesitated to say
apertis verbis that Augustine erred in what he taught about predestination!7 Others
even deny that he taught a rigid predestinationism, and that he was
misunderstood instead!8
Third, since Augustine’s teaching on predestination rested so heavily on the
doctrine of original sin understood as the literal Fall of Adam and Eve described
in Genesis, how can we still make sense of it in light of the dominant theory of
evolution?

THE NATURE OF SEMIPELAGIAN ERRORS

In the ongoing debate between Dominicans and Jesuits the topic of Pelagian
and Semipelagian heresies and doctrinal errors was often brought to the
forefront. The Dominicans insisted that Jesuits were guilty of such errors; Jesuits
countered by denying the charge and accusing Dominicans of revisiting Calvinist
heresies that were condemned at the Council of Trent.

7
See for instance, Donato Ogliari O.S.B., Gratia et certamen: The Relationship between Grace
and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the So-called Semipelagians (2004). Ogliari
takes issue with Augustine on the following accounts: a) Faulty biblical exegesis; b) Betrayal of
the established theological tradition; c) Exceedingly negative anthropology; and d) Unbalanced
and unwarranted emphasis on divine sovereignty at the expense of free will.
8
Reacting against this new “politically correct” way of thinking, Gaetano Lettieri wrote his
L’altro Agostino. Ermeneutica e retorica della grazia dalla crisi alla metamorfosi del De
doctrina chrstiana (Brescia, 2001). Lettieri vigorously documented the strong predestinarian
shift that Augustine underwent later in his life. Needless to say, his book met with some
resistance: e.g., the scathing review by Nello Cipriani, O.S.A., “L’ altro Agostino di G. Lettieri,”
Revue des Etudes Augustiniannes 48 (2002): 249-65.
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In order to pinpoint the nature of such errors, authors on both sides

attempted to set the record straight; see for instance Thomas Lemos Book I, Part
I of his Panoplia (refer to my page 22); Juan Gonzales de Leon, O.P. (Regent of
the Minerva College in Rome in the 1630s) Controversiae inter defensores libertatis et
praedicatores gratiae de auxiliis divinae gratiae (1635, but published in 1708); and
Lievin de Meyer, De Pelagianorum et Massiliensium contra fidem erroribus dissertatio
IV (1715).
Personally, I find that the thorough analysis in Jansenius’ Augustinus (Tome I,
consisting of eight books, in 271 pages) satisfactorily settles the question.9

THE CHARGE OF SEMIPELAGIANISM

As he articulated the Dominicans’ view of the Jesuits’ understanding of grace
and predestination, Lemos denounced Molina’s Concordia in the debates before
the Congregation de auxiliis by saying:

Molina in his whole Concordia, from the first page to the last, and in a consistent manner
throughout it all, doesn’t do anything else but establish foundations, principles and
conclusions that were typical of Pelagians, in order to set up an apparatus of proud human
free will against divine grace. For instance, he laid down the very same foundations that
Semipelagians did: he uses the same principles; reaches the same conclusions; employs the
same biblical passages; and claims the same excuses they did. And despite all this, the Jesuits
claim that their doctrine is not Pelagian, after all.10

In 1607, the Dominican Diego Alvarez submitted to Paul V a censure of

twelve propositions found in Lessius’ De gratia: six concerned predestination, and
the other six, grace and free will. The main thrust of these censures was that
Lessius’ views echoed Semipelagians tenets. Among these were:

1) Semipelagians said that predestination occurs as God foresaw human

merits stemming from grace (ex praevisis meritis gratiae). As Prosper wrote
to Augustine: “God foreknew prior to the creation of the world those who
are going to believe or who are going to continue in that faith which after
its reception needs the help of grace, and he predestined for his kingdom
those whom he foresaw would, after having been gratuitously called, be
worthy of election and would leave this life by a good death.”11
2) Semipelagians were adamant that God’s universal salvific will (i.e., the
desire to predestine everyone to heaven) extends to all human beings
without exception. Hilary wrote to Augustine: “They reject the claim that

9
See my The Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Luther to Jansenius (2014), 220-27.
10
Acta, 578.
11
Prosper, Letter to Augustine, 3.
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the number of those who will be chosen and of those who will be
condemned is fixed, and they do not accept as an explanation of this view
what you set forth; rather, they hold that God wills that all human beings
be saved, and not just those who pertain to the number of the saints, but
absolutely all human beings without any exception.”12
3) Semipelagians thought that all people need is God’s inviting and
persuading grace, since it is in our power to consent to such grace.
4) Semipelagians taught that our free will is directly the cause of God’s acting
in our good works through his gifts rather than God’s grace being the
cause why our free will acts.

In regard to these charges, the Jesuit scholar Le Bachelet remarked: “These

criticisms were patently outrageous, and yet they had a certain effect on the spirit
of Paul V.”13
Years later, Alvarez further articulated this charge against Lessius in his own
masterpiece, De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus (1610), and in the
detailed Responsionum ad objectiones adversus concordiam liberi arbitrii cum divina
praescientia, providentia et praedestinatione (1622).
On their part, Jesuits countered by saying that their views were not the same
as Semipelagians’, since the latter claimed that not only the beginning of faith, but
also the desire to attain other virtues was to be attributed to man’s natural effort.
Moreover, Semipelagians were never condemned for failing to uphold physically
predetermining grace, so why should Jesuits be now?14
In regard to the scholastic axiom facienti quod est in se, deus non denegat
gratiam, the Dominicans said that it must be understood to imply: “To the one
who does what is in his power from the grace he already has received, God does
not deny further grace.” They went on to argue that conversely to say “to the one
who does what is in his power before the bestowal of grace, God does not deny
prevenient grace” is a Pelagian heretical statement.

WHAT WAS ACTUALLY SAID, AND WHAT IT WAS TAKEN TO MEAN

In the previous chapters I have documented how Lessius and before him
Molina15 stated their opposition to Pelagian and Semipelagian views on grace and
predestination in clear and precise terms. Here I will re-state Lessius’ views as
outlined in his Feb 1611 letter to Bellarmine:
12
Hilary, Letter to Augustine, 7.
13
Le Bachelet, 141.
14
See Lievin de Meyer, De Pelagianorum et Massiliensium contra fidem erroribus (1709): 141,
ff.
15
I documented in great detail Molina’s views in my Chapter Four of The Catholic Doctrine of
Predestination from Luther to Jansenius (2014), 79-141.
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 No one can earn their predestination, not even de congruo.

 Predestination does not depend in an absolute manner on divine
foreknowledge of human good works; having said that, we cannot deny that
the reason for complete predestination depends on how well humans use the
gifts/helps of grace ((Molina, Vasquez and Valentia said this much), as
long as the terms are properly understood (si termini bene intelligantur).
 Predestination involves and presupposes foreknowledge.
 The later gifts of grace (i.e., sanctification and final perseverance) are
bestowed according to or because of God’s foreknowledge of a human
being’s good use of earlier gifts, as well of such later gifts. This good use
does not depend on PP, which could not be harmonized with free will, but
with the deliberations of free will conducted in the presence of divine grace.
 There is no need for predetermining grace to be bestowed for the
performance of each and every good work; sufficient grace in which people
are immersed suffices for that.
 According to Augustine, predestination (i.e., glory and the whole series of
graces by which man attains heaven) is not established gratuitously and
absolutely out of God’s pure will (nudo beneplacito) before the
foreknowledge of works done out of grace; what the Hypponate fiercely
opposed is the view according to which glory is predestined out of the
works of unaided free will (as Pelagians and somewhat Semipelagians
taught).
 What Augustine denied is that grace and its gifts per se are bestowed on
account of foreseen good works. Moreover, even though Augustine never
expressly taught that predestination is based on the foreknowledge of
works done out of grace (ex meritis gratiae), he never denied it, but rather
often and openly suggested it: and if that is not the case, how could some of
the most learned Jesuits (e.g., Valentia, Vasquez and Molina) fail to
recognize it, opposed as they were to the notion of absolute election
irrespective of any foreseen human merits?
 When Augustine (e.g., The Predestination of the Saints, 10 and other
chapters) denied that predestination is based on merits or on
foreknowledge of merits, he meant merits performed out of mere free will,
unaided by grace. When Augustine said that the elect are not separated
from the reprobate thanks to merits (e.g., On Rebuke and Grace, 7 and 12) he
was not upholding an absolute election to glory prior to foreseen merits
performed out of grace.
 There is no doubt that what Augustine taught about predestination is a
dogma of faith and that no one should depart from his view. However the
real question is: what did he actually teach (quaenam sit haec doctrina)?
 334

According to Lessius, when opposing Pelagians and Semipelagians

Augustine did not deny that people are chosen out merits performed out
grace, claiming instead that they are predestined based on God’s absolute
decree irrespective of foreknowledge; rather, he denied that men are elected
to grace and glory out of merits performed out of free will alone.
 The gratuitousness or the divine generosity of predestination does not
suggest that it is bestowed out of God’s arbitrary and absolute decree, but
rather to the fact that God graciously decided to bestow on us the
disproportionate and unbelievable gift of eternal life (instead of, say,
thousands of years on a tropical island, or the ability to do all the things
that angels can do, followed by annihilation of the human soul).

If this is what Lessius and other Jesuits actually said, why did the
Dominicans claim that Jesuits, including Lessius, upheld Semipelagian views? I
conclude that it was because of the following reasons:
 Jesuits said that according to Pelagians and Semipelagians predestination is
based on foreknowledge of works done without the aid of grace (in the
case of Pelagians) or on foreknowledge of works done after a man comes
to the faith or experiences an increase of it on his own initiative (in the
case of Semipelagians). Jesuits denied upholding such views. Dominicans
found such claim to be unfounded. By quoting from Prosper’s and Hilary’s
letters to Augustine, they showed that Semipelagians, just like Jesuits,
believed that good works are done in the presence of grace, and that
predestination is based on divine foreknowledge of such good works done
with and thanks to such grace.
 Jesuits, like Semipelagians, admitted gratia sine qua non, the sufficient grace
that enables a man to do God’s will (posse), but not gratia qua, the efficient
grace that makes man’s will actually want and carry out God’s will (velle).
 Jesuits say that what distinguishes a reprobate from an elect person is the
use of free will: thus cooperation of the will (man’s work) and not the grace
of God is ultimately responsible for his salvation.16

16
Jesuits would reply: sure, why not?! To quote Lessius: “This does not mean at all that grace is
not present; in fact, if grace did not simultaneously help free will to consent, the latter would
never be able to do so in a salvific manner.” Quoted in Le Bachelet, 196. Similarly, De Meyer
will say: “Reginaldus incorrectly concludes that use of grace, namely a good consent of the will,
does not stem from grace, but from free will alone. As a matter of fact, even though God
foreknew that I would consent to such grace if he gave it to me in certain circumstances, he still
did not foreknow I would consent merely out of the natural power of my free will, but mainly out
of the power of this grace, by which the natural faculty of the will, anticipated, increased and
strengthened, is going to produce its consent. Thus, it is false for Reginaldus to say that the use
 335

 Jesuits speak from both sides of their mouths: they produce either
contradictory or confusing statements throughout their works. What
people read on one page is rephrased on another.
 Jesuits propose a different interpretation of traditional texts from Scripture,
councils, Church Fathers, conciliar decrees to show that they are in
compliance with orthodox, ecclesial beliefs about grace and predestination.

How are we then to make sense of these divergent understandings of what

was said and what was meant by it? I propose we take a look at this picture, as a
way of example.

British cartoonist W. E. Hill published this picture in a magazine in 1915.

When you first look at the picture above, what do you see? A young lady, or an
old lady? What if some people, like my step-daughter, are utterly unable to see

of grace does not stem from grace but merely from one’s natural powers.” De Meyer, De mente
S. Concilii Tridentini circa gratiam physice praedeterminantem Dissertatio II (1708), 28.
 336

the old lady? I gave her pointers, but her mind was locked on seeing the young
lady, and no matter what, it took her a long while to finally say in delight: “Now I
see her!”
I suggest that this was the predicament Lemos and Lessius found themselves
in: either they were unable to see the other person’s perspective, or they had such
“tunnel vision” zeroed in on their own Weltanschauung that nothing the other
person ever said made the slightest difference or sense.
Now, I am not saying that every single time we are confronted by a polarity
of views we should adopt this Gestalt model;17 such view would engender a
conciliatio oppositorum that is not warranted by the biblical text, ecclesiastical
Tradition, and the sensum fidelium . What I am saying is that while in the past two
millennia there was enough evidence to rule in favor of orthodox views against
what eventually became heresies, in this particular case the Magisterium
suspended judgement: by adopting an agnostic stance (i.e., by deciding not to
decide in favor of either view) it preserved the Church’s unity and allowed two
possible explanations of what in its essence remains the unfathomable mystery of
God’s predestination.
The “suspended state” of papal pronouncement on this topic is exemplified by
the following two statements by two different pontiffs.
Pope Clement XII, on October 2, 1733, issued the papal bull Apostolicae
providentiae officio, in which he declared,

Knowing full well the perspective of our predecessors (i.e., Clement XI and Benedict XIII) I
do not want, in virtue of the praises heaped upon the Thomist school (which I approve of and
re-confirm) by myself or by them, that something be subtracted from other Catholic schools
of thought, whose views on the efficacy of divine grace differ from it. This Holy See
recognizes the merits of their views; therefore, let them continue to openly, freely and
anywhere uphold the opinions that until now they have taught and defended, even in this
glorious city (i.e., Rome). For this reason, I forbid these opposing schools either in writing,
or speaking or disputation or on any other occasion to dare impose any theological note or
censure on the opposite school of thought or to attack their rivals in offensive or insulting
language.18

Fifteen years later, Benedict XIV, in his July 31st, 1748 letter Dum praeterito
to the Great Inquisitor of Spain, charted the course to be followed:

17
For more information about Gestalt shifts, see this interesting website:
http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/gestalt-shift.html
18
Denzinger # 2509, 2510. It seems to me that Matava was imprecise for saying that this Bull
“affirms the freedom to teach, essentially, the Dominican point of view in questions related to
the Controversy de auxiliis.” Matava, 6, fn. 15. I gather from the text that the Pope, if anything,
upheld the freedom of non-Dominican schools of thought to teach their understanding of
predestination and grace.
 337

As you already know, there are several opinions held in various schools of thought
concerning the much discussed issues of predestination, divine grace and the way to reconcile
human freedom with God’s omnipotence. The Thomists are accused of destroying human
freedom and of following not only Jansenius, but Calvin as well, However, considering that
Thomists reply extremely well to the objections presented to them, and that their views
were never criticized by the Apostolic See, let them continue upholding them with impunity;
also make sure, all things being equal, that no ecclesiastical authority forces them to retract
their views. Likewise, the Augustinians are accused of being followers of Baius and Jansenius.
They reply that they uphold human freedom and powerfully refute objections levelled
against them. Considering that their views until now have never been condemned by the
Apostolic See, it is obvious that no one should expect them to forfeit them. The followers of
Molina and Suarez are accused by their opponents of being Semipelagians. No Pope has so
far passed any judgement about Molina’s system; thus, Molinists follow and indeed are
allowed to follow Molina’s views. To put it briefly: bishops and inquisitors must not take into
account the criticisms and comments that theologians of these schools hurl at each other, but
rather pay attention as to whether such comments have been disapproved by the Apostolic
See. This Holy See endorses the freedom these schools enjoy and until now it has not
reproved any of the proposed ways to reconcile human freedom with divine omnipotence. Let
bishops and inquisitors, when a situation arises, behave in like manner, even if as private
individuals they endorse one rather than another school of thought’s views. We ourselves,
even though as private theologians favor this or that view, nonetheless as Popes do not
disapprove of the opposite views, nor do we allow that they be reproved by others.19

So, here we are, four centuries later, enjoying the freedom, as Catholics, to
believe either way about the eternally deep and unfathomable topic of
predestination.

19
Denzinger # 2564-2565.
 338

APPENDIX A

MEMBERS OF THE CONGREGATION DE AUXILIIS UNDER PAUL V

According to Serry (1700 edition, col. 602), the Congregatio de auxiliis in

attendance at the beginning of the ten congregations presided by Paul V on
September 14, 1605, consisted of the following people:

Cardinals Inquisitors:

Domenico Pinelli (1541-1611)

University of Padua – Law

Girolamo Bernerio, O.P. (1540-1611)

Also known as “Asculanus” because he was bishop of Ascoli from 1586 to 1605.
Studied literas humaniores, Liberal Arts, Philosophy and Theology. Obtained the
title of Magister

Anne d’ Escars de Givry, O.S.B. (1546-1612)

Abbot and a bishop

Lorenzo Bianchetti (1545-1612)

University of Bologna – Law

Francisco de Avila (1548?- January 20, 1606)

University of Salamanca – Studied Ancient Roman Law (more specifically Ius
Caesareum); also attained Bachelor degree in Theology.

Anselmo Marzato, O.F.M. Cap. (1543- Aug. 17, 1607)

Also known as Cardinal Monopoli, because he was appointed to the church of St.
Peter in Montorio (Rome)
Theologian, philosopher and Apostolic Preacher.

Pietro Aldobrandini (1571-1621)

Rome – utroque iure (i.e., canon and civil law)

Pompeio Arrigoni (1552-1616)

University of Padua – utroque iure

Roberto Bellarmino, S.J. (1542-1621)

Studied at the Collegio Romano, University of Padua and University of Louvain
 339

Named in 1931 “Doctor of the Church” by Pius XI.

Jacques Davy Du Perron (1556-1618)

Home schooled and self-taught. Converted in 1577.

Innocenzo Del Bufalo-Cancellieri (1566-1610) [not mentioned in Coronel’s list]

Rome – Law

Ferdinando Taverna (1558-1619) [not mentioned in Coronel’s list]

Milan - utroque iure

Antonio Zapata y Cisneros (1550-1635) [not mentioned in Coronel’s list]

University of Salamanca – canon law

Paolo Emilio Sfondrati (1560-1618) [not mentioned in Coronel’s list]

Studied Law privately . Received the cardinal hat and the title “S. Cecilia” in 1591.

Consulting Bishops:

Archbishop Peter Lombard – Primate of Spain

Juan de Rada –Procurator General O.F.M. Obs. and Archbishop of Trani
Giulio Santucci – O.F.M. Conv., bishop of Sant’Agatha (d. 1607)
Girolamo Pallantieri – O.F.M. Conv. professor at the University of Padua, and
Bishop of Bitonto
Lelio Nandi from Sesse – theologian of cardinal Caraffa and later Bishop of Nardo

Theologians censors

Giovanni Battista da Piombino (Procurator General O.S.A.) [not in Coronel’s

list]
Anastasio of Carpenedolo (O.S.B.)
Gregorio Coronel (O.S.A.)
Jacob Le Bossu (O.S.B.)
Antonio Bovio (Carmelitan)
 340

APPENDIX B

LESSIUS’ STATEMENTS CENSORED BY THE THEOLOGY FACULTY

OF LOUVAIN20

1. Augustine defined predestination as “the foreknowledge and the preparation of

those gifts of God whereby they who are delivered are most certainly delivered”
(The Gift of Perseverance, 14). This definition is very fitting if it is referred to the
predestination of men, which presupposes enslavement to sin, and to certainty
stemming from foreknowledge, rather than from mere pre-ordination.
2. God, after foreseeing original sin, willed to give to Adam and his posterity
sufficient means to fight sin, as well as aids to attain eternal life; therefore, he
gives people sufficient help for them to return to him.
3. All of Scripture is filled with precepts and exhortations for sinners to return to
God; since God does not command the impossible, he gives people sufficient
means for them to be converted.
4. Some people say that God calls everybody to repent, but not according to his
purpose or without that calling which is without repentance. I reply that this
seems alien to God’s goodness, since to call someone without the intention to
have them repent is not a serious calling but a fictitious one. Augustine seems to
understand God’s purpose as that which he knows will come to pass.
5. Everybody is required to be baptized, therefore God, as far as he is concerned,
wants to give to everybody the grace of baptism.
6. It seems that Augustine did not understand Paul’s saying “God wants
everybody to be saved” (1 Tim 2:14) according to the intention of the Apostle,
and opposed it with six fully developed arguments.
7. God wants to offer Christ’s redemption to everybody, without exception, and
therefore he prepared through him sufficient remedies for everybody.
Consequently, since Christ is everybody’s Redeemer, through him sufficient aids
are given, by which people are able to repent of their sins. If these aids were not
given, it would not be the case that Jesus is their Redeemer, in regard to either
the sufficiency or efficacy of redemption.
8. In order for a sinner to be able to be converted, it is not necessary for him to
receive both helps (i.e., prevenient and concurrent) in the second actuality [a
faculty is a ‘first actuality’; a ‘secondary actuality’ is its exercise, or function];
rather, it is enough for him to receive prevenient help in the second actuality in
order to truly have sufficient help and an actual conversion.
9. Concomitant special/supernatural concurrence is prepared by God in such a
way for a sinner, just as natural and general concurrence is prepared for man’s

20
This is my translation of the document found at the end of Schneemann’s work, 359-62.
 341

natural power. Moreover, in the created order, God does not give us good works
other than to the degree he gives us sufficient help through his prevenient grace,
and is prepared to give his concurrence to the concomitant grace in the second
actuality, if we so will.
10. Wherever Augustine says that not only we act in virtue of the grace by which
we can, but also by which we do, he should be understood to refer to the above
mentioned concomitant concurrence, because, as we all know, we cannot act
without the help of concomitant grace; otherwise his saying is not universally
true. In fact, in order to us to act, an efficacious excitement to infallibly determine
the will is not required, the kind that maybe was required to turn around Paul or
Mary Magdalene, or a few other people. All is needed to elicit our fullest freedom
is another, much smaller excitement.
11. Augustine’s claim about the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, “If by the more
profound judgment of God some people are not set apart from the mass of
perdition by the predestination of grace, they are not presented with those divine
words or deeds by which they could have believed if they heard or saw such
things” (The Gift of Perseverance, 14) must be taken with a grain of salt; these
people must be thought not to receive in the secondary act those aids with which
God knew they would have converted for sure, which is most certainly the case of
all those who do not convert.
12. In regard to what Augustine says in The Predestination of the Saints, 6
whereby a person did not want to believe because his will was not prepared by the
Lord (which was necessary for him to want to believe), I reply that it is
improperly claimed that a person to whom faith was sufficiently offered did not
want to believe because his will was not prepared by the Lord.
13. There is a certain gift of perseverance, consisting in a special aid and
protection, by which God protects and equips some people so that they may
persevere in grace infallibly and without wavering up to their death, which is
given to them, as in the case of the apostles after they received the Holy Spirit
(people such as these are called “confirmed in grace”). But there is another gift of
perseverance, which consists in a certain help and protection by which God
ensures that they may persevere in grace if they so will; such gift is necessary for
salvation and is given to all the just immediately, in the first actuality.
14. Those who are hardened or blinded are given by God sufficient help to be
converted. Moreover, those who do not believe have always and everywhere been
given sufficient help unto salvation.
15. All the passages of Scripture that suggest that it is impossible for some to be
converted, must be understood to refer to their will unaided by grace.
16. Little children have from God a sufficient remedy against sin, especially in the
new covenant. For Christ died for everybody, and instituted the sacrament for
 342

everybody without exception, as a remedy for sins, as we clearly read, for

instance, in Cyprian’s Letter 59.
17. That the application of such remedy to some people (i.e. baptism) becomes
impossible due to certain arising impediments, should not be attributed to God,
since he does not decree that it may not be applied, or that these impediments will
occur, but merely allows it in the ordinary course of events, just as he allows sins.
18. All those who do not believe have always and everywhere sufficient help from
God or in the first actuality. For if they did what is in themselves and what they
could according to the present natural or supernatural disposition which they
have in themselves, God would enlighten them so that they may believe and be
converted.
19. He who does not have faith due to invincible circumstances, and abides by
natural precepts (which is to say, by the Decalogue), has thereby a moral
sufficient help to carry them out, since God does not require the impossible of
anyone. Otherwise, it seems we would agree with the view of heretics, who claim
that due to original sin we have lost free will to do what is good.
20. The view that says that those who are saved are not elected efficaciously to
glory before foreseen good works or before the application of the remedy against
sin, seems to be the most probable. All of the Greek fathers upheld this view,
which is why it is commonly referred to as “the Greeks’ view.” Note: although a
different view is attributed to Augustine, I do not believe it to be his. In fact,
where he talks about it, he does not explain whether he is talking about an
immediate election to glory, or a mediated election to grace; or similarly, whether
he is talking about absolute and efficacious election or a conditional one (in other
words, if people will cooperate with it the way the Council of Trent’s session VI
teaches divine promises must be understood). But if this is indeed the view of
Augustine, it should not matter that much.
21. Henceforth, it is proven from Rev 3:11: “Hold on to what you have, so that no
one will take your crown” that the crown can indeed be lost. To which Augustine
replied in On Rebuke and Grace 13: “Scripture speaks thus not because the crown
may be lost, but so that people may be fearful.”
22. In the state of innocence (i.e., before the Fall) grace unto salvation was a
sufficient grace, by which Adam was able to persevere if he so wished.
23. If election is to a certain degree of glory, it follows that all the works of the
just must be preordained by the absolute will of God; neither can it be otherwise,
nor can it be done any differently than what has been already pre-ordained by
God—which, however, runs counter to the idea of free will.
24. The martyrdom and afflictions of the saints, which they suffer at the hands of
the unrighteous, are most excellent means unto their salvation, and thus they too
were foreordained before any divine foreknowledge. However, this view is false
because God is not the author of sin.
 343

25. When we read in Ezekiel: “I will move you to follow my decrees and be
careful to keep my laws” (Ez 36:27), I claim it means that God will give a more
abundant grace in the new covenant than in the old one, causing more people to
walk in his Law: therefore, it does not refer to that mode of providence through
which they will all infallibly follow God’s precepts.
26. It is not the absolute will of the Father that all those whom he gives to his
Son be absolutely saved, as it can be seen in Jn 17, where Jesus says that out of all
those the Father gave him, the son of perdition will perish, who wanted to perish
himself; and yet, the will of the Father is that all may have sufficient aids, and it
does not depend on him that fewer will be saved.
27. The statement by Paul: “And we know that in all things God works for the
good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose,”
(Rom 8:28) refers in general to those who love God, and not just to those who
have been predestined.
28. In the scriptural passage “I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau,” the term
“loved” does not refer to an efficacious ordination to glory, but to greater gifts of
grace, which did not stem from foreseen merits. And since Jesus descended from
Jacob, God wanted to show great signs to Jacob and his posterity, which he did
not show his brother Esau. Thus, when comparing Jacob and the Israelites on the
one hand, and Esau and the Edomites, on the other hand, the latter may appear to
be “hated.”
29. If God, having foreseen original sin, decided with an absolute will to exclude a
certain person from his kingdom or to admit another before any foreknowledge of
his works, it thereby follows that no good or bad works of theirs could possibly
alter what has been decreed; for this supposition of the divine will is made
independently of human free will. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that this
man will be damned, considering that God will reproach him and be obliged to
ensure, though his special providence, that he may die in his sins.
30. The number of the predestined is not certain due to a predetermination that
precedes any foreknowledge of their good works.
31. This view of predestination and reprobation [which I uphold] is most
consistent with divine goodness, the authority of Scripture, the witness of the
Fathers, and fairness/reasonableness. It does not favor at all Pelagius and it
radically distances itself from the views of Luther and Calvin and all the heretics
of our day and age. Conversely, the opposite view [of mine] can hardly be
differentiated from their views and arguments.
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APPENDIX C

Franciscus Davila, O.P., De auxiliis divinae gratiae (1599)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 Arguments advanced by our opponents

Chapter 2 The human excellence stemming from free will
Chapter 3 What is free will?
Chapter 4 After the Fall, free will remains in man, though damaged and fragile
Chapter 5 Man is unable to be restored from sin to grace through the mere powers of nature,
unless the grace of Christ the Savior helps him
Chapter 6 Besides habitual grace, man needs a special help
Chapter 7 The special divine help concerning supernatural things is threefold
Chapter 8 What did God give man sufficient grace for?
Chapter 9 Without the help of efficacious grace man can never be converted to God
Chapter 10 The necessity of efficacious help is attested by Sacred Scripture
Chapter 11 The need for efficacious help is shown through the definitions of Church Councils
Chapter 12 The necessity of efficacious help is established through the common view of the
Saints
Chapter 13 The necessity of efficacious help is confirmed with the testimony of other
holy Fathers
Chapter 14 Efficacious grace is sanctioned by the agreement of other saints
Chapter 15 Efficacious help is sanctioned by other saints
Chapter 16 The same need of efficacious grace is confirmed by other testimonies of the saints
Chapter 17 The fact that God moves man’s wills efficaciously is established by the testimony
of Thomas Aquinas
Chapter 18 Efficacious prevenient help is established thus far by the testimony of yet more
saints
Chapter 19 The view advocating moral efficacy is explained and its foundations undermined
Chapter 20 Proof that it is impossible for God to know man’s decisions without them being his
own
Chapter 21 Only God moves man’s will efficaciously, yet without taking away its freedom
but on the contrary, fulfilling it
Chapter 22 The testimony of scriptural passages showing that God works in us the works of
conversion through his efficacious and physical grace
Chapter 23 Through the decrees of sacred councils the efficacy of moral help is excluded, but
the efficacy of efficacious and physical help is established
Chapter 24 The need for efficacious and physical help is confirmed with the witness of the
saints
Chapter 25 The physical efficacy of efficacious and physical help is confirmed with the witness
of other Fathers
Chapter 26 The physical efficacy of divine help is shown through theological arguments
Chapter 27 The arguments used against our view are refuted
 345

APPENDIX D

WHAT DID TRENT TEACH ABOUT GRACE?

The answer to this question depends on who you are asking it to. Not
surprisingly Dominicans and Jesuits were divided over this matter. Take for
instance the Dominican Antoninus Reginaldus (1605-1676), the pen name of
Antoine Ravaille, who joined the Dominican order in Avignon, France, in 1624.
After an intense course of studies, he was appointed professor of Philosophy in
various schools of his order. During the years 1639-49 and 1671-76 he taught
Theology at the University of Toulouse. From 1653-57 he was Provincial of
Occitania, a region in southwestern France. Reginaldus was a zealous Thomist,
who focused on the Augustinian-Thomist doctrine of grace, authoring several
works on that subject. His masterpiece, De mente Concilii Tridentini circa gratiam
seipsa efficacem was published posthumously in Antwerp, in 1706. Other works of
his include: Opusculum de vero sensu composito et diviso (Paris, 1638); Quaestio
theologica, historica et iuris pontificii. Quae fuerit mens Concilii Tridentini circa gratiam
efficacem et scientiam mediam (Toulouse, 1644); Dissertatio de Catechismi romani
auctoritate (Toulouse, 1648); and Doctrinae Divi Thomas tria principia cum suis
consequentiis (Toulouse, 1670).
Let us now look in greater detail at two of these works.

Quaestio theologica, historica, etc. (1644)

This short essay (18 pages) is a summary of the congregations de auxiliis ;

Reginaldus devoted the last five pages to sketch what he believed Trent taught
about efficacious grace and middle knowledge, concluding that he will hopefully
write at greater length on this subject as he awaits to acquire original
manuscripts on this matter. Here are the main points he made:
 When Trent condemned the idea that free will, moved and excited by God
cannot dissent, it had Calvin’s view in mind, not what Dominicans will later
define as PP.
 Trent said that free will moved by God in a physically predetermining way
can still dissent and remain free (something that Molinists deny).
 Either Trent admitted that PP does not remove freedom, or it admitted
middle knowledge. The Jesuit Suarez upheld the latter. Reginaldus claims
that since in 1547 the doctrine promoted by Molina and Fonseca had not
yet been articulated, PP is the only way to understand what Trent taught.
 346

 Three Jesuits who were present at Trent’s deliberations (i.e., Francisco de

Toledo, Enrique Henríquez, Azorius) never endorsed the idea of middle
knowledge.
 The Catechism of the Council of Trent stated: “Not only does God protect
and govern all things by His Providence, but He also by an internal power
impels to motion and action whatever moves and acts, and this in such a
manner that, although He excludes not, He yet precedes the agency of
secondary causes. For His invisible influence extends to all things, and, as
the Wise Man says, reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things
sweetly.”21

De mente S. Concilii Tridentini circa gratiam se ipsa efficacem (1706)

This massive tome of 815 pages (two columns per page, totaling1630
columns) is divided into two parts. The First Part consists of 62 chapters, written
in 608 columns (304 pages); the Second Part consists of 89 chapters, written in
1,022 columns (511 pages).
In the First Part, Reginaldus utilized four main arguments to uphold the
idea that the Council of Trent supported the idea of efficacious grace:

1) He used the “Grimani Affair”22 to demonstrate that a doctrinal precedent had

been set: the traditional Augustinian and Thomist views of grace and
predestination echoed by the Patriarch of Venice were validated at Trent, though
not in the council’s official documents. This cause celebre was utilized by
Reginaldus to make the following two points:
a) Even though the Patriarch’s letter on the topic of predestination, addressed
to his Vicar, as well as his Apologia in eight points, written in defense of the views
found in said letter, after a careful scrutiny of a commission of eleven theologians
(including the Jesuit General, Laynez), were declared to contain scandalous views
and errors in August 1561, the Patriarch was nonetheless cleared of the more
serious charge of heresy; in other words, his views on predestination and grace
were not officially condemned.
b) More significantly yet, both the Patriarch’s letter and its Apologia were
closely scrutinized again by a commission of twenty-six[!] prelates (including
theologians, archbishops, bishops, and high ranking members of the Dominican,
Augustinian, and Benedictine orders) at the Council of Trent, on July 31st, 1563.
After a six hour long discussion, this commission ruled that the Patriarch’s views

21
Article I, paragraph “God Preserves, Rules And Moves All Created Things.”
22
I documented this controversy in my The Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Luther to
Jansenius (Xlibris, 2014): 71-78.
 347

were indeed orthodox. In the official sentence, published on September 29, 1563,
we read that “…The views expressed in the Patriarch’s letter and its Apologia are
not heretical, nor in odor of heresy, and must not be regarded as scandalous.” The
sentence, however, added this caveat: “Nonetheless the contents of both texts
should not be disseminated due to some difficult points in them that are dealt
with and explained with less exactness.”

2) He suggested that the prayer Adsumus, which the conciliar Fathers recited at
the beginning of every session and each individual congregation at the Council of
Trent, envisions grace exercising more than a mere moral influence on us, but
rather a real physical motion. The expressions in the prayer that Reginaldus
singled out were: “Unite us to You efficaciously by the gift of your grace alone;”
“Show us what we are made to do;” and “May You alone be the initiator and
maker of our decisions.” He then went on to use quotes from Augustine’s works,
supporting the idea of efficacious grace.

3) He argued that the Council Fathers did not envision middle knowledge, but
rather grace efficacious in and of itself (see Reginaldus’ Chapter 10).

4) He utilized quotes taken from Trent’s Session VI, chapters 1 (Reginaldus’

chapters 13-20); 2 (Reginaldus’ chapters 21-23); 3 (Reginaldus’ chapters 24-25); 4
(Reginaldus’ chapter 25); and 5 (Reginaldus’ chapters 26-33). In his chapter 28,
Reginaldus emphasized that the expression “no pre-existing merits” found in
Trent’s Session VI, chapter 5, can be used against Molina, and in support of
efficacious grace. He also used excerpts from Session VI, chapters 9, 12, 13, 14
and 16, as well as canons 3 and 4 (Reginaldus’ chapters 40-62).

In the Second Part of his work, Reginaldus employs the following reasons in
support of his contention that grace is efficacious in itself:

1) The Roman Catechism implies it (see Reginaldus’ chapters 1-11), especially

as it teaches us that we ought to pray for unbelievers.
2) The conversion of the world and the successful evangelization of the
nations can be better explained with the principle of grace efficacious per se
(Reginaldus’ chapters 12-18), and so can the overcoming of temptations and the
growing in virtue.
3) The views of Augustine on grace (especially those in chapters eleven and
twelve of his On Rebuke and Grace) are backed up by Scriptures, by other Church
Fathers, and philosophers.
4) The principles of secondary causes, divine pre-definitions, ante praevisa
merita, predestination and efficacious grace are ancillary doctrines to grace
 348

efficacious in and of itself; however, if these principles did not support the
intrinsic efficacy of grace, we would not be able to make much sense of them.
5) Grimani’s views, as they were vindicated at Trent, can be used to support
the idea of efficacious grace (Reginaldus’ chapters 54-58).
6) The views of various bishops and theologians, such as Seripando, Soto,
Cano, Tapper, and even the Jesuit Canisius and Salmeron seemed to uphold the
notion of actual grace.

Antoninus Reginaldus’ views were challenged right after their publication by

the famous Jesuit controversialist theologian Lievin de Meyer (1655-1730),
considered to be one of the best Belgian poets who ever lived. Writing in 1708
and the following year under the pseudonym of Liberius Gratianus, the learned
Jesuit wrote two books (De mente sacri concilii tridentini circa gratiam physice
determinantem, Dissertatio I, and II) attacking Reginaldus’ understanding of
Trent’s views concerning grace and predestination.
De Meyer’s train of thought in the seventeen chapters of his Dissertatio I ran
like this:
a) Trent condemned Calvin’s understanding of grace; of how God destines
people to perform evil deeds; of the difference between composite and divided
sense.
b) The Dominicans’ understanding of these things does not differ in its
consequences from Calvin’s views.
c) Conciliar statements like “God does not order us to do what is impossible”
oppose the view of efficacious grace.
d) Sufficient grace envisioned by Dominicans is such by name only.

In his Dissertatio II, de Meyer argued that Reginaldus’ exegesis is faulty and
flawed. The following are few points he made.
The words from the Council of Trent’s Session 6, ch 11: “God in his
command counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask his aid in
what you cannot do, and aids you so that you may be able to do it” (Augustine, On
Nature and Grace 43, 50) would be “ridiculous and pointless” (otiosum et
irrisorium)23 if PP was necessary for doing and asking. Meyer argues that either
God predetermines me to do or to ask for something, or he does not. If he does
not predetermine me, why would the Council say that he in his command
counsels me to determine myself to ask for or do something, when such thing
would be impossible for me (since I was not predetermined)? Why would he
terrify me and threaten me for not being able to do what he commands? On the
other hand, Meyer adds, if God predetermined me to do or to ask for something,

23
De Meyer, De mente …Dissertatio II, 36.
 349

it would be impossible for me NOT to do it or ask for it; such encouragement on

God’s part would be redundant.
In regard to canon 4 (“If any one says that man’s free will moved and excited
by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, nowise co-operates towards
disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of Justification; that it
cannot refuse its consent, if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does
nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.”), De Meyer
severely criticized the Dominicans claim that the free will “motion” mentioned
there is a predetermining one and claimed that “their interpretation of this canon
not only distorts, but completely reverses the mind and the words of the
Council.”24 De Meyer went on to say that as free will is moved by God’s
congruous grace, it will infallibly cooperate not out of PP, but out of that middle
knowledge which is God’s conditional foreknowledge of futuribles; by excluding
this foreknowledge, the Dominicans’ view of PP falls into the condemnation of
the second part of this canon.

24
Ibid., 103.
 350

APPENDIX E

A JESUIT MEMORANDUM25

A theological summary of the controversy de auxiliis submitted by the Jesuits to

Pope Paul V.

Propositions both parties agree upon

1. Free will, as a consequence of original sin, was deprived of free gifts and
wounded in its natural abilities.
2. Free will, having thus been wounded, is no longer able to do in every good
work (even natural) what it was able to do before, while in the state of
wholesomeness.
3. Without the grace of God, free will is not able to do through its own mere
efforts any of those things that church councils call “pious and fit for
salvation.”
4. Free will is unable to love God, who is the end of all things, with an
efficacious love, through its mere natural powers.
5. Free will, in virtue of its own mere strength, is unable to produce an act of
attrition, contrition, love, or anything of this sort towards God, who is the
supernatural end or the purpose of our faith.
6. Free will, in virtue of its mere natural strength is unable to overcome a
serious temptation, not only at any given moment, but also through the
entire time the temptation lasts: in other words, it cannot resist in an
absolute manner.
7. Out of all the works that free will can produce by itself (no matter what
they are) none has any merit or carries a commensurate disposition towards
grace or a supernatural end: on the contrary, all those works have no value
or power to attain grace.
8. The first prevenient grace is always given in an entirely free way: nothing
precedes it, nor does God bestow it by expecting anything on our part.
9. The call to faith does not depend on free will as if it were a meritorious
cause.
10. God does not usually (i.e., according to ordinary custom) bestow a
supernatural, inner vocation to faith other than by previously informing
human beings about the things that are to be believed.

25
Antonio Astrain, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la asistencia de España, v. 4 (1916),
799-804.
 351

11. Nothing issues from free will which may be construed as the cause, or the
condition sine qua non for predestination or any and all of its effects.
12. The good use of the helps of grace is the effect of predestination and also of
free will.
13. In the case of justification (in which grace and free will necessarily concur),
grace is the principal and preponderant cause; man has nothing in his
justification that he may glory about, as if he did not receive it from grace.
14. Man receives not only the sufficient help of grace, but also the efficacious
one, with which free will co-exists in the most optimal manner.
15. Through this efficacious help God not only gives us the ability but also the
willingness to do what is good; he makes us do it; converts our wills; and
turns us from unwilling to willing.
16. In order to attain salvation, the exciting and enlightening grace of God is
not enough; we also need his cooperating and helping grace.
17. Grace is not only needed to assist the mind, but the will as well; in both
these faculties it operates even without our cooperation.
18. God gives efficacious help to those he wants, merely according to his good
pleasure; the reasons why he gives it to these but not to those belong to his
un-comprehensible judgements.
19. It is certain and infallible that no one has ever been converted without
efficacious grace; likewise, it is certain and infallible that all those to whom
God bestows his efficacious grace are indeed converted.
20. The gift of perseverance necessarily involves efficacious help.
21. The decree of predestination has to be absolute and not conditional.
22. Predestination is certain and infallible.
23. Future conditional contingents are known by God with infallible
knowledge.

Propositions whose truth and certainty are an object of dispute between the two parties

1. The Dominicans claim that free will is so wounded in its natural powers
that even the soul’s potential is qualitatively inferior to what man enjoyed
before the Fall. On the contrary, we Jesuits claim that man’s natural powers
have remained intact and identical to those man enjoyed before the Fall.
We believe that no natural powers have been diminished in man by sin
other than the fact that he now lacks the gift of original justice, which used
to override his natural limitations.
2. The Dominicans claim that free will is so wounded that it can never, in any
circumstance, produce a good moral act that qualifies as virtuous. We
Jesuits concede the fact that man can produce , in any circumstance, out of
 352

his mere strength, a good moral act that qualifies as virtuous, though only
in regard to a natural (i.e., not supernatural) end.
3. We Jesuits claim that it is a probable opinion that an act of faith, hope and
charity may be produced by man out of his natural strength, though such
an act is not adequate for salvation, but is a good act merely in regard to its
substance. The Dominicans say that such view deserves a severe censure.
4. We Jesuits say that it is a probable opinion that man can resist any severe
temptation against natural law out of his mere natural strength at
individual moments in which this temptation persists (i.e., but not to
overcome it in the end). The Dominicans condemn this opinion.
5. We Jesuits say that free will can strive, out of its own strength, towards
supernatural matters once they have been proposed to our human
attention, though only inefficaciously and imperfectly. The Dominicans
deny this.
6. We Jesuits say that the inner vocation to faith and the sinner’s desire to
repent depend on the free will of the person who is called, just like the
vague feelings and information on gathers about things that pertain to the
faith depend on the one who embraces them (without which God usually
does not call people to believe). Dominicans deny even such dependence.
7. We Jesuits claim that it is a probable opinion that God never denies his
prevenient grace to a person who does what he is capable of merely
through his natural strength, and that this is indeed an infallible law based
on Christ’s merits. The Dominicans say that this opinion is erroneous and
contend that just in virtue of original sin sometimes sufficient help is
denied to adult unbelievers who do everything that is in their power out of
mere natural strength.
8. The Dominicans claim that efficacious help, by which God gives not only
the ability to operate but the operating itself, predetermines the will to act
in a physical manner. We Jesuits say that even when efficacious help is at
work, free will always remains un-determined and indifferent, and that to
claim the opposite goes against the principles of our faith.
9. The Dominicans claim that free will cannot dissent from God’s physically
pre-determining grace in a composite sense, and that the Council of Trent’s
canons must be understood in a divided sense. On the contrary, we Jesuits
claim that Trent spoke in a composite sense: in other words, free will may
dissent even in a composite sense with the efficacious grace of God,
considered in its entity.
10. The Dominicans say that any grace to which free will consents or dissents
with as it wishes, is a grace that only gives the ability to do (posse) and not a
grace that gives the doing itself (facere). We Jesuits say that even in the
case of a prevenient grace that gives the doing itself, free will is able to
 353

consent or dissent as it wishes, and that to say the contrary goes against
the faith.
11. The Dominicans affirm that every grace besides the physically
predetermining one amount to the law and doctrine, and that PP alone is
the true grace of Christ. We Jesuits contend that this is clearly an error in
faith.
12. The Dominicans affirm that previous necessity, arisen from efficacious
prevenient grace, does not compromise human free will. We Jesuits say
that this previous necessity cannot co-exist with the freedom of the will.
13. The Dominicans affirm that physically predetermining grace is so
indispensable that the human will has to be predetermined not only for all
supernatural acts but also for all natural acts, including all the things by
which the malice of sin becomes attached to. We Jesuits believe that this
cannot be affirmed without incurring a most grievous error.
14. The Dominicans affirm that the efficaciousness or non-efficaciousness of the
helps of grace stem only from them as such. We Jesuits deny this; in other
words, we deny that they can either be efficacious or non-efficacious apart
from free will.
15. The Dominicans affirm that one who is converted always receives a greater
prevenient grace than one who is not converted, not only in regard to the
type of gift but also in regard to the entity of the gift itself. We Jesuits say that
this is not necessary, though it is the case that of two people who are
anticipated by an equal (in regard to its entity) help of grace, one converts
but the other does not.
16. The Dominicans contend that physically predetermining efficacious help is
the last complement of the first divine act and simply necessary for the
human will to operate. We Jesuits say that the human will is perfectly
constituted in the first act (so that it may operate) merely through sufficient
help (if it is truly sufficient).
17. Consequently, the Dominicans affirm that the will cannot do what is good
without efficacious help. We Jesuits say that man’s free will which
practically speaking will never do what is good without efficacious help, still
has the capability to do good without it.
18. The Dominicans say that things will happen because they are known by
God to happen. We Jesuits, on the contrary, say that God knows they will
happen because they will indeed; to claim otherwise about sins is a manifest
error.
19. The Dominicans claim that conditional futuribles, which are known by God
with absolute certainty, are known by him before the mere absolute decree
of his will, but not before the absolute decree which they call “of conditional
 354

objects.” On the contrary, we claim that they are not known before any
decree of this sort.
20. The Dominicans claim that the certainty of predestination rests on
physically predetermining grace that is efficacious in and of itself. We
Jesuits say that predestination is certain because God decided to give
people the helps with which he foresaw that people would be saved if they
received them.
21. The Dominicans claim that man, through the gift of perseverance becomes
sin-free. We on the contrary say that man can still sin and to say otherwise
is an error.
22. The Dominicans uphold that our justification needs to be attributed to God
in such a way that neither before the reception of grace, nor in the
reception itself, nor in its increase there is any praise or room for free will.
On the contrary, we say that free will has always room to act, both before
the reception of grace as well as after it and its increase.
23. We Jesuits say efficacious help consists in congruous vocation, most
evidently in the illumination of the intellect and in the inspiration of the
will which God bestows to man when he knows he will not reject them.
The Dominicans say that this view is Pelagian and that it does not
safeguard the essence of truly efficacious grace.
24. The Dominicans say that efficacious help is the only and adequate cause of
a man’s conversion, and that its denial, which is due to God alone, is the
only and adequate cause of a man’s failure to convert. On the contrary, we
affirm that even though conversion should not be attributed to man alone,
since it mostly depends on God and on his grace, it should not be attributed
to grace alone either, but also to free will, and that it depends on it
inasmuch as without its free consent, grace does not accomplish anything.

Propositions about which we differ, even though we both agree to condemn them.

1. The Dominicans say that Pelagius admitted the existence of a sufficient

grace necessary to perform supernatural acts, both on the part of the
intellect and of the will; and that he was not condemned by Augustine and
various councils other than due the fact that he denied PP grace. We on
the contrary say that Pelagius did not admit a grace that was simply
necessary, but a grace that made supernatural acts easier to perform; and
that a controversy with him and his followers arose, not about the efficacy
of grace but about the necessity of grace operating inwardly.
2. The Dominicans say that Calvin did not err or was condemned because he
said that grace is so efficacious in and of itself that free will cannot dissent
with it; rather, he was condemned because, besides believing this, which
 355

they believe to be most true, he claimed that efficacious grace completely

removes free will. We say that Calvin’s error consists in upholding
efficacious grace in and of itself and that he was condemned at Trent for it.
3. The Dominicans say that according to Molina free will was as healthy in
its post-lapsarian as it was in its pre-lapsarian status, as far as the
performance of morally good acts is concerned. We deny that he did.
4. The Dominicans say that Molina actually attributed to free will the power
to perform acts that are fit for salvation (e.g., faith, hope, charity, attrition
and contrition). We on the contrary say that Molina both denied and
anathemized such view.
5. The Dominicans say that Molina placed such value and strength in natural
actions, that because of them or because of their imminent emergence God
bestowed his prevenient grace. We say that Molina taught exactly the
opposite.
6. The Dominicans assert that Molina placed the cause of predestination and
of all of its effects on the part of the predestined person; we say that
Molina condemned such view a thousand times over.
7. The Dominicans say that according to Molina’s system of thought, some
people are anticipated by God’s grace, while others do indeed anticipate
themselves God’s grace. We completely deny that Molina ever said this.
8. The Dominicans say it is one of Molina’s views that nobody is anticipated
by the grace of God unless he first does what is in his power to do with his
mere natural strength. We deny Molina ever said this, but claim that he
stated the exact opposite.
9. The Dominicans say that in Molina’s system, and more specifically in his
view of congruous grace, we begin our justification, as its inception is not
from God but from ourselves. We deny that either Molina or any of our
theologians claimed this.
10. The Dominicans say that according to Molina man disposes himself to
receive grace by doing through natural strength what is up to him. We say
that this view was far Molina’s mind and words.
11. The Dominicans say that Molina attributed to free will, without the grace
of God, the power to have a perfect and efficacious love of God above all
things as one’s goal and end, a love that completely excludes sin. We claim
that Molina spoke only of man’s imperfect and inefficacious love of God
that could still co-exist without mortal sin.
12. The Dominicans jump to the conclusion that it is a view of Molina’s that
we begin our justification merely with our natural powers, and that
justification is only helped by God’s grace in its progression. We say that
Molina never claimed this.
 356

13. The Dominicans conclude that it is Molina’s view that grace and free will
are such partial causes of the same action in such a way that grace remains
neutral, simply giving the power to act to the will, and that a part of the
action is up to grace and the other part to the will. We say that Molina
never claimed this.
14. The Dominicans say that the only grace that Molina knew and admitted
was that which Pelagius admitted as well. We say that he upheld all the
graces that the Council of Trent taught were necessary.
15. They say that Molina’s view is such that the grace of God is
predetermined by free will. We deny Molina ever said something like this.
16. They say that according to Molina God does not have an absolute will to
save the predestined, but only a general will, according to which he wants
all men to be saved. We deny this is Molina’s view.
17. They say that in Molina’s view man does not have the gift of perseverance
from God, but from free will alone. We deny Molina ever said this.
18. They say that according to Molina’s view God knows through his middle
knowledge and more specifically, through the absolute science of vision,
those things that man will do on his own, without his grace. We say this is
incorrectly attributed to Molina.
19. They say that according to Molina’s view the gift of perseverance includes
only habitual grace and sufficient help. We deny this is Molina’s view.
20. They say that in Molina’s system the good use of the helps of grace
stemming from free will is not the effect of predestination. We say that in
his system the good use of the helps of grace is the effect of predestination
stemming ALSO from free will; and not in the sense that such good use
happens because of free will, but because it is a gift of grace.
 357

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