Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Song Dynasty
Timeline
- Before Song
- Territorial fracturing - aftermath of the fall of Tang
- Five Dynasties Ten Kingdoms period
- Founding 960
- New Policies 1069-1076, Wang Anshi (see also: fractionalization)
- North to South, 1127
- Fin. 1271; the start of Yuan
Economy
The dynasty is often considered an era of remarkable economic growth. (P.J. Smith 2004)
- From its early stages, expansion into south China stimulated surpluses in food
production and advances in rice agriculture, which broke the cycle of agrarian
self-sufficiency and allowed producers to specialize in market-oriented crops and
handicrafts.
- As landowners and peasants throughout China were drawn into the production
and trade of daily necessities as well as luxury goods for the rich, trading
networks expanded beyond regulated urban centers of distribution and
consumption into rural markets and intermediate towns. (Policies behind this?)
New Policies
- Only success: the tea-and-horse trade (see: foreign conflict)
- Failures
- While the activist economic policies of Wang and his successors generated
huge cash reserves for the state, the redistributive rationale (state activism)
that animated the reform economic measures was quickly subverted by the
court’s inexhaustible hunger for revenues to be stockpiled in preparation
for its irredentist wars.
- The New Policies fiscal reforms were transformed from a collective effort
to liberate the productive resources of peasants, small merchants,
middling landowners, and consumers into an interlinked set of new taxes
and fees, all collected by agents of the state energized by an
action-oriented incentive system that rewarded the most draconian
fulfillment of their tasks. Wang Anshi’s experiment in economic activism
degenerated into confiscatory taxation, creating a legacy of levies and
extractive mechanisms that turned the late-Northern and Southern Song
states into economic predators.
Military
Technological advancement (What were the policies behind this?)
- Development of permanently stationed navy
- Incendiary devices, gunpowder-powered projectiles
Military impotence (& resilience?)
(see also: external conflict)
- For the sake of centralization, the Song court had systematically excluded men of
military specialty and experience from strategic decision making, replaced regular
troops and effective generals with local militia, and transferred military authority
or even field command from generals to top-ranking civilian officials. Although
the general staff was not dismantled, it was transformed into a bureaucratized
and subordinate appendage of the civilian-dominated state. (P.J. Smith 2004) (see:
bureaucracy)
- It was also an expansion of the scope of government activity to
accommodate surplus of available personnel (see: examination system)
- Even with advances in technology, the Song were unable to effectively deploy
them due to:
- Arbitrary governance. It undermined the court’s ability to reach
broad-based, well-considered decisions about issues of war and peace and
paralyzed the Song policy-making apparatus at the very moment that the
dynasty confronted its greatest threat. Resulting in:
- Increasingly timid and indecisive frontier policy from 1200 onwards.
- As Peterson shows (how?? pp.301-2), the court was too fearful of
provoking even a deteriorating Jin regime into war to give support
to anti-Jurchen rebels in Shandong or even to undertake military
preparations of its own. From 1217 to 1224 Song forces fared well
against a series of attacks launched by Jurchen armies made
desperate by Mongol assaults further north; but the court’s
ambivalence towards the Shandong rebels eventually pushed the
most powerful of them into the hands of the Mongols in 1226, quite
possibly depriving the Song of “a golden opportunity to strengthen its
position in the northeast and even to lay the basis for the occupation of
parts of [Henan, Jiangsu, and Shandong]”. (P.J. Smith 2004, pp.301-2)
- Failure of the New Policies to strengthen weakened military & national defense
(for war details see: foreign conflict)
- How?
- Navy. The southern Song government created a powerful navy and strengthened
its fortified city walls; largely due to these new systems of defense, the Song
dynasty survived for a century and a half beyond the fall of North China. Yet
again, advantage is offset by military impotence, since without cavalry horses
(see: tea-horse trade, foreign conflict) the declining dynasty had no chance of
projecting power beyond what could only be passive defense, and hence had no
means to recreate a new environment in developing bureaucratic power and
marketing capacity. (P.J. Smith 1991?? Should’ve done proper referencing bc now
this is coming back & biting me in the ass)
- How was it used?
- Does this imply that after the fall of the North the fall of the dynasty was
inevitable?
- Keep in mind that eventually it was the navy that made the last (major)
stand & was defeated by the Mongols
Royal authority
Centralization of power
- Emperor; bureaucracy (literati);
The Song emperors (esp. Taizu) were eager to recentralize power from the military
governors whose autonomy and authority had precipitated the collapse of the Tang, to
the apparatus of a bureaucratic state, at the center of which lay the supremacy of the emperor.
- Taizu peacefully demobilized his general staff, severing personalized links
between commanders and their troops that made the ‘praetorian coups’ - which
were so common in the post-Tang era that Taizu himself was brought to power
by one of them - possible.
- Neutralizing the power-brokering role of great generals: The military was
subordinated to bureaucratic control under the unchallenged authority of the
emperor, while the military governors as a ruling elite were dismantled alongside
their territorial jurisdictions, and replaced by civilian officials chosen from an
expanded imperial examination system, also directly under the authority of the
capital.
- A new class of litero-centric political elites (see: literati) & royal authority
Taizu adapted Tang and Five Dynasties precedents to recreate a network of
county, prefectural and circuit officials that implanted imperial authority
throughout the empire through a growing bureaucratic apparatus increasingly
staffed by graduates of an expanded examination system.
The literati possessed little of the independent wealth or hereditary official status
of their Tang aristocratic predecessors, thus posing less of a challenge to the
absolutist inclinations of the Song emperors. (P.J. Smith 2004)
Literati & bureaucracy
The Shanyuan settlement coincided with the transition from battle-hardened dynastic
founders to court-nurtured successors, precipitating a shift in political power from an
absolutist throne to an increasingly complex and self-confident bureaucracy. (Weerdt
2020)
Imperial examination system
- Opportunity for greater social mobility; path to serve the state
- Generated excess personnel to fill a limited number of positions. Thus producing:
Semi-autonomous class of landed elites (independent from bureaucracy)
The increasing ratio of degree-holders to government positions made entry into the
civil service progressively remote and turned the examination system into as much a
mechanism for acquiring status and connections as a ladder to official success. Thus
although official position probably remained the quickest route to power and fortune
throughout the late-imperial era, for any given lineage the downward slide out of the
civil service was far more predictable than entry into it.
Under the circumstances, elite mobility strategies gradually clustered around the control
of land, commerce, and credit, supplemented by the widespread pursuit of the social and cultural
rather than the official rewards of education. As elites came to focus on mobility strategies
that were independent of the state, the autonomous state of the eleventh century gave
way to the autonomous elite of the late-imperial era… The growing localism and
independence from government service of the gentry as a class fostered a preference for
minimalist, non-interventionist, provisioning economic policies on the part of
individual gentrymen when they did serve as members of the government. (P.J. Smith
2004)
Bureaucracy organization
- (P.J. Smith 2004, pp.292-3) In the decades that followed the Shanyuan settlement
the shidafu bureaucratic elite was still relatively small and cohesive and the
still-evolving bureaucratic apparatus relatively robust. As a result, the arbitrary
exercise of state power was restrained by the constitutional division of authority
over civil affairs under the Secretariat-Chancellery, military matters under the
Bureau of Military Affairs, and economic administration under the Finance
Commission, while an institutionally embedded system of checks and balances
prevented a single chief councilor from dominating the Council of State and
subjected all the state councilors to independent oversight by a fully-developed
system of policy critics and censors.
- At the same time, governance was characterized by a relatively conciliar
approach to decision-making, exemplified most graphically by the reliance on
broadly staffed interagency ad hoc committees to advise the emperor on
important policy issues.
Loyalism
- Major reinforcement of emperor’s central authority
- (Weerdt 2020, pp.423-4) Loyalty was commemorated as a form of filial piety and
masculine virtue, an ideology that was deeply ingrained even before the Song; in
the Song court, men who had proven their loyalty were conferred honorary
names, given burials equivalent to that accorded to those of the highest ranking
in the court, and transcribed into narratives of Song dynastic history. (example?)
- (Weerdt 2020, pp.419-20) The emergence of two major powers (Liao and Song) in
the late tenth century resulted in a hardening of attitudes against those who
valued personal loyalties over loyalty to one court or one emperor. This new
model of loyalty was justified not only in philosophical discourse but also in
critical histories of tenth-century courts and biographies of political and military
elites. We could interpret the painter Hu Quan’s assertion that suicide was
preferable to the acceptance of Jurchen demands as an example of the impact of
the eleventh-century redefinition of loyalty. His letters, however, suggest that
loyalty was determined by other overarching values. Loyalty was due to an
emperor and a court that defended Song sovereignty over the realm and all its
territories. (see also: irredentist ambitions) The Song emperor therefore had to
insist at all cost on governing ‘the realm’ (tianxia) rather than ‘the area south of
the Yangzi River’. An emperor’s failure to do so required that officials and
commoners alike demonstrated loyal protest even to the point of self-sacrifice.
Constitution & checks on power
“Ancestors’ Instructions” (Deng & Lamouroux 2005)
A set of principles entailing behavioral norms, teachings of ancestors and principles of
governing that the emperors could not ignore - seen as filial patrimony
- Shared values, not departed from:
In 976, Taizong declared, ‘the previous emperor launched an enterprise for
almost twenty years: he took preventive measures for every wrongdoing. Once
the basic principles and codes were fixed, every being was put on a firm basis. We
must make efforts to respect this legacy without any transgression.’
This willingness to strictly and fully apply the previous regulations was likewise
present in the texts of many literati, who frequently lamented the lack of family
rules, who explained that ‘to serve one’s sovereign with loyalty is to serve one’s
parents with filial piety’.
- The emperor was charged with respecting this dynastic patrimony, and
conversely, the legitimacy and power of the Song bureaucracy was grounded in
its ability to hold the emperor accountable. Reference to the ‘Ancestors’
Instructions’ appeared when the sovereign and his ministers perceived abuses
they wished to eradicate. In search of some general principles of good governance,
they considered the ‘Ancestors’ Instructions’ to be a means for resolving
problems within the court and the administration.
Examples:
- Renzong once criticized the premier, Li Di, for his appointment of
censors: ‘The Ancestors’ Instructions cannot be violated. If the premier
could himself appoint censors, no one would dare to speak of his faults.’
- After the military’s defeat in Shaanxi by Tangut Xi Xia, the emperor
Shenzong ordered the execution of the responsible officer. But the premier
and his colleagues refused to obey, giving as their reason that ‘since
ancestral times, there has not yet been a punishment like the execution of
a literati-official. Let us not begin with Your Majesty.’ - keep in mind this
might not have functioned in all cases
- Me (ha): Royal prerogative and the bureaucracy worked in tandem to create a
centralized state that excluded the threat of autonomous military leaders, and
promoted a literary elite who were able to balance the emperor’s decisions with
ancestral principles, and whose cohesion and allegiance were guaranteed by
loyalism.
Division of the realm (R. Mostern 2011)
- According to the nineteenth century political reformer Kang Youwei (bias?
Involvement in Qing politics?) the Song bureaucracy had been one of the most
effective in China’s history because ‘prefectures were small’: the Song organized
the realm into ‘discrete, contiguous and observable jurisdictions that formed the
basis for governance’, rearranging administration, revenue collection, census
taking and war according to the organization of territories deemed most
appropriate and politically viable.
“Tacit complicity” of localities (see too: centralization of authority): (S. Chen 2017)
The interests of court officials and local informants often coincided and thus enabled
them to cooperate in court procedures.
- Give examples?? Specific locality?
Fractionalization
- Irredentist ambitions leading to state activism, leading to the New Policies
- New Policies (Xin fa), advocated & proposed by Wang Anshi and staunchly
supported by Shenzong (because of its promise to secure resources to sustain the
emperor’s territorial revanchist aims & irredentist adventurism)
- What were they?
- (P.J. Smith 2004) The New Policies advocated by Wang Anshi
represented the epitome of state activism in the imperial era, and
dominated the political agenda for the last half-century of the
Northern Song. Under the banner of enriching the state without
emisserating the people, Wang recruited young, ambitious
‘bureaucratic entrepreneurs’ to staff a bevy of new, reform-specific
agencies.
- How exactly did this work? How are policies which primarily focus on
peasant labor and urban markets mean to achieve these military aims?
- How successful was it? - factionalization of the court
Inherent flaws in the bureaucracy (Weerdt 2020)
- The bureaucracy was staffed by men from different parts of the empire, with
potentially conflicting political views, interests and affiliations; it drew on a pool
of examination graduates that grew faster than the number of available posts,
even as entry into government became the most prized avenue of social mobility.
Irreconcilable policy differences and intense competition for office would
eventually fracture the solidarity of the bureaucratic elite under the weight of
factionalism and the concentration of power in increasingly hegemonic
ministerial regimes.
How it happened (P.J. Smith 2004)
- Dissent against the New Policies remained silenced for the duration of Shenzong’s
reign. After the enthronement of Zhezong, despite the transfer of power to
prudent, conservative men, political culture had been too thoroughly transformed
by the heated partisanship of Shenzong’s reign for a return to the relative
collegiality of the post-Shanyuan decades.
- The subsequent period was one of fluctuation and bitterly hostile factional
infighting. While Wang Anshi’s political enemies moved to reverse his policies,
they emulated Wang’s techniques of capturing the Council of State and monopolizing
the censorate and remonstrance offices. On the other hand, the Yuanyou partisans
(so named for the Restoration reign period from 1086 to 1094) suppressed
opponents with a sweeping counter-purge of New Policies adherents, only to be
ousted from office in 1094 when Zhezong brought back his father’s reform
measures and proponents.
- Partisanship/Factionalism & irredentist ambition
- Undermining constitution; arbitrary exercise of state power - loss of power of the
bureaucracy
From this point on, Northern Song political culture was engulfed in a virulent
factionalism that reached its peak around 1102, when Zhezong’s brother and
successor Huizong authorized his chief councilor Cai Jing (1047-1126) to
proscribe all members of the “Yuanyou party” and extirpate their political and
literary legacies. As Huizong asserted in 1108, it was Cai Jing’s suppression of
policy opponents that enabled the emperor to fulfill his father’s goal of annexing
the Tibetan domains centered on Qingtang, intended to be the first step in
Shenzong’s irredentist war with the Tanguts: ‘If he had not banished the doubting
multitudes then how could we have fully realized our forebear’s ambition to spread our
majesty among the caitiffs beyond the borders?’ Through the reigns of Shenzong and
his sons, then, irredentist ambition and imperial support for the chief councilors
and statist policies that could help bring that ambition to pass had irreversibly
undermined the constitutional division of authority that checked the arbitrary
exercise of state power (see: early bureaucracy). The Song political system from
the New Policies through the very end of the Southern Song saw a growing
consolidation of executive authority in the inner court comprised above all of the
sovereign and his long-reigning chief councilors.
- Thus from the New Policies onwards, purges, suppressions and
irreconcilable policy differences fractured the solidarity of the
bureaucratic elite, eventually driving a wedge between the inner court and
the ministerial political apparatus that commanded the bureaucracy as a
whole.
- (But didn’t this bureaucracy still have a common education and a
sense of shared purpose/loyalty to hold them together?)
- Monarchical autocracy gave way once more to ministerial domination
when Xiaozong’s abdication in 1189 deprived the Southern Song of its last
effective sovereign. Yet the onset of a protracted era of weak emperors did
nothing to reconstitute the relatively conciliar, professionalized
governance that had evolved under the passive rule of the post-Shanyuan
rulers. Instead, the vacuum created by imperial withdrawal was quickly
filled by palace favorites and powerful chief councilors, who either
muzzled their civil service critics through heavy-handed purges or
neutralized tem through more cunning tactics of manipulation and
cooptation.
External conflict
The Song Empire faced the rise of great steppe polities including the Khitan Liao,
Tangut Xi Xia, the Jurchen Jin, and later the Mongol Empire, whose militarization and
rapid evolution of statecraft required far greater economic resources than pastoral
society could provide, stimulating the demand for invasions of wealthier sedentary
regions, such as China, to secure predictable supplies of external resources.
- Early shift from military expansion to diplomacy
- Why? In 979 Taizong launched an invasion of Northern Han that Liao
forces were unable to repel, bringing the break-away Shansi region back
under centralized control for the first time since 951. But this was as far as
the Song could get towards restoring control over north China. For the
entire duration of the northern dynasty the Song were unable to recover
the Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun, a region that was previously a
crucial natural barricade against peoples further north and without it the
Song dynasty was exposed and vulnerable to attack.
- Great humiliation for contemporaries, but a mark of flexibility & resilience
- (Weerdt 2020) The Song signed the Shanyuan Treaty in 1005, in which it
agreed to make annual payments (200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 taels of
silver) to the Khitan and disavow any claim to the Sixteen Prefectures of
the Yanyun region. This suggests a recognition by the Song court that the
territorial and financial costs of a diplomatic parity and a purchased peace
were far less burdensome than the costs of mobilizing the country for a
protracted irredentist war that exposed the empire’s military shortcomings
and seemed increasingly unlikely to be successful. The result was a period
of peace and political stability that lasted half a century.
- For successive generations the post-Shanyuan decades became a point of
reference: they tried to recapture the peace and equilibrium. This meant:
- carving out a safe haven for the regime in the rebellious south
- suppressing demands for a reconquest of the north, instead opting
to secure peace through rapprochement with the Jurchen Jin.
- Military impotence
- Diplomacy inconsistent
- Ineffective strategic planning
Example: Song reluctance to extend appropriate diplomatic recognition to the new Xia
emperor instigated a four-year war (1038-1042) that highlighted Song deficiencies in
strategic planning, tactical execution, and troop battle-fitness, forcing the court to sign
a treaty in 1044 that brought the same kind of indemnified peace with which it placated
the Liao.
- Song’s irredentist ambitions & revanchist territorial concerns
- Why? Especially when it’s so draining & impractical, an expensive
distraction from the formulation of other policies?
- see: loyalism
- Status in wider geographical sphere: The rapid evolution of Inner Asian
statecraft in the tenth to thirteenth centuries allowed states on the
northern frontier to support formidable armies that offset agrarian China’s
advantages in wealth and numbers, thereby blocking Song from assuming
a position of supremacy at the center of a China-dominated world order
and relegating it to a position of equal participant in a multi-state East
Asian system. (P.J. Smith 1991)
- A series of inconclusive confrontations & decisive defeats
- (see also: military, failure of New Policies) Wang Zengyu argues that
almost all campaigns in the 1080s and the first two decades of the 1100s
were either outright disasters or time-consuming, costly stalemates,
without ever unseating the Tanguts from their commanding position in
the Ordos, or regaining the vital Yanyun prefectures that were
geographically significant in the defense against the north.
- (P.J. Smith 1991) The only exception (the only strategic & military success of
the New Policies), Wang Shao’s preemptive invasion of the three
easternmost prefectures of Xihe (when was this?), were critical in opening
supply lines to the major Qinghai pastures and enabling the Tea and
Horse Agency to wield its bureaucratic authority to supply Song armies
with horses to fight northern cavalries.
The tea and horse trade testifies to the Song’s adaptability and resilience as well as its
inability to fully utilize the advantage - the Song generals and their large, ineffective
armies failed to capitalize on the first reliable supply of horses to stabilize the frontier,
eventually dooming the trade. Once the Jin conquered North China in 1126 and severed
the dynasty’s access to the last good Asian pastures, the cavalry lost their supply of
horses.
Historical records of the Song
[How do we know about them?]
Communication; shared intellectual ideas among the elite; common literate culture
Crusades
What the hell are they
A manifestation of the Christian Holy War, fought against ‘infidels’ in the Levant, in
Spain and in the Baltic region, and against heretics, schismatics and Christian lay
opponents of the Church, as a defensive measure or for the recovery of property and
land.
- Chronology
- First Crusade - against Muslim control of Jerusalem (later crusaders draw
on the ‘successes’ of the First Crusade to help them define their own
purpose and roles)
- Second Crusade - the loss of Edessa and the vulnerability of Antioch
provoked the preaching and sending of the Second Crusade in 1147-8
under the command of Conrad III, the German emperor, and Louis VII,
the French king. This Crusade was a fiasco. It made for Damascus and
conducted an unsuccessful siege of the city. The Crusade then fizzled out,
without recapturing Edessa or stemming the mounting power of Nur
al-Din.
- Third Crusade - the defeat at Hattin and the fall of Jerusalem (Saladin,
1187) triggered a new Crusading enterprise: the three most powerful
monarchs of western Europe, Frederick Barbarossa of the HRE, Phillip of
France and Richard the Lionheart, embarked on the Third Crusade. It
ended with a truce in 1192; it was agreed that the Franks should hold most
of the coastal strip whilst Jerusalem remained in Muslim hands.
- Fourth Crusade - after Saladin’s death, from 1193 onwards, the Crusaders
focused much more attention on attacking Egypt, believing that it held the
key to reconquering Jerusalem (called for by Pope Innocent III). Egypt was
the ostensible target of the Fourth Crusade in 1202. However, this
notorious Crusade did not fight Muslims but instead ended with the
conquest of Constantinople (1204) and the establishment of the Latin
empire of Constantinople.
- Why? The leaders of the crusade commissioned the Venetians to build a
fleet to transport 30,000 fighting men to the Levant, but could only recruit
a third of that anticipated number, which meant they did not need (and
did not have) the financial resources to pay for the ships Venice had built.
Venice faced financial ruin. However, a Byzantine prince, Alexios, the son
of the deposed Emperor Isaac II Angelos, offered to finance the entire
expedition to the Holy Land and contribute no less than 10,000 Byzantine
troops to the crusade, provided the fighting men first deposed the
usurper, who had murdered his father and seized the Imperial throne.
At this point, many of the crusaders refused to take part in the attack on
Constantinople. (Among those who refused was Simon de Montfort, later
famous for his crusade against the Albigensians in Southern France.)
Furthermore, Pope Innocent III vehemently condemned the diversion of the
crusading force to an attack on the Christian city of Constantinople. This
means that the attack on Constantinople no-longer had papal sanction
and was, therefore, not a legitimate crusade at all.
Initially the French/Venetian forces that took Constantinople in 1203 did
not sack or damage the city. Instead, they put Prince Alexios back on the
throne of the Eastern Empire, and remained encamped outside, waiting
for him to fulfill his promises to them for payment and troops. Instead,
Alexios was murdered, anti-Latin forces came to power and the crusaders
realized they were not going to get paid (oho, clowns). The new Greek
emperor appeared to be preparing to attack them, and they had no funds
to pay their own troops any more, so they initiated their own attack.
- Popes (urgh)
Why
Justification & rhetoric
Meritorious war
Traditional theory of just war
1. NOT synonymous with Holy War
- For Just War theorists force of arms is intrinsically evil, for Holy War
apologists violence is morally neutral and draws moral coloring from the
intentions of the perpetrators
- “Injuries to be avenged” (in just war theory) could include any violation of
righteousness, God’s laws or Christian doctrine.
- As late as the thirteenth century Hostiensis seems to have believed that
Christendom had an intrinsic right to extend its sovereignty over all those who
did not recognize the rule of the Roman Church or the Roman Empire.
2. NOT inherently a war of conversion
- Although there remained an undercurrent of the belief in the missionary
crusade, Pope Innocent IV authoritatively restated the conventional views
in the middle of the thirteenth century. He asserted that infidels had rights
in natural law and that a war of conversion was illegitimate; but he also
argued that the Holy Land was rightfully Christian property.
3. What is a just war?
- Must have a just cause: a past or present aggression or injurious action by
another.
- Must have the right intention: participants must have pure motives and
war must be the only apparently practicable means of achieving the
justifiable purpose for which it was to be fought.
- Must be proclaimed by legitimate authority.
*Traditional narrative still a major part of the new narrative:
1. Holy land
It must be defensive, fought to avenge injuries inflicted by others including violation of
God’s laws or Christian doctrine. It is in this case that the Fifth Commandment (divine
prohibition against homicide) can be set aside.
Pope Urban II preaching the First Crusade: called for a war of “liberation”
- Liberation of people, the baptized members of the eastern churches, especially
the church of Jerusalem, from Muslim domination and tyranny
- Liberation of place, the city of Jerusalem consecrated by Christ’s blood and the
focus of God’s interventions in this world
Examples.
*Rumors of the sixth Fatimid caliph, al-Hakim, persecuting the Christians within his
realm and destroying the Church of the holy Sepulchre, contributed to the growing
desire in Christian Europe to launch the First Crusade and rescue what were perceived
as the endangered holy places of Christendom.
*Pope Innocent IV (r. 1243-54) argued that the Holy Land was rightfully Christian
property, thus justifying the idea that the expeditions to the East were merely
recovering territory that rightfully belonged to Christians.
2. Within Europe
Heretics, infidels, pagans (difference?)
- The pope could proclaim a crusade against a pagan ruler, not because he was
pagan but because he posed a threat to Christians or had sinned by, for instance,
refusing to allow Christian missionaries to operate in his territories.
Examples.
*The premise for the reconquest of Spain, for instance, was that it had once been
Christian land but great parts were ‘subjected to infidels’. (why? Hasn’t this been the
case for centuries? What changed?)
*Surviving evidence for the Albigensian Crusade (aka the Cathar crusade) suggests that
the vow was made to war against the heretics and enemies of faith in Languedoc.
What was new about the crusades?
Newness (example): writing in 1108, Guibert of Nogent, a learned monk, approvingly
called the crusade ‘a new means of attaining salvation’
New links were being made, starting in the late eleventh century:
- 1. meritorious war to the needs of a universal Christendom, to the Church or to
Christ himself, rather than to those of a particular nation or region. (It was not
the property of the Byzantine Empire or of the Kingdom of Jerusalem that was
liberated or defended by the crusades to the East, but territory belonging by right
to Christendomm or to Christ.) - overarching narrative, common cause
- Underlying philosophy: (quite literally “Kingdom of Heaven”)
Christendom was not merely a society of Christians but a universal state,
the Christian Republic, transcendental in that it existed at the same time
in heaven and on earth. The leaders of the First Crusade could write of the
spreading of “the kingdom of Christ and the Church”.
- Later notion (esp. Innocent III & IV, though not necessarily everyone that
participated; earlier notion likely rather undefined) that Christendom was
a universal and the crusade was its army
- 2. between the convention of just war and the penitential devotion of pilgrimage
(Blake 1970 ‘The Formation of the Crusade Idea’)
The theory of just war and the military campaign against infidels, when fused to the
‘most charismatic of all traditional penances’, pilgrimage to Jerusalem, produced an idea
of fighting for the remission of sins which was likely unprecedented in the early 1080s.
This produced a distinctive form of meritorious violence, moving towards an articulate
conception of the ‘crusade’ as penitential warfare, with the objective of delivering
Christians in the empire of Constantinople from the ‘infidel’ and to restore the Church
to unity.
- When Pope Urban II preached the First Crusade, the dangers of war were
said to give added value to the penitential merit gained by a pilgrim, and
that crusading, the superlative, most dangerous form of pilgrimage,
merited a full remission of sin.
- Terminology used:
Contemporaries began using in relation to the military campaign of the crusade phrases
that had previously applied only to monks - the knighthood of Christ, the way of the
cross, a journey to the heavenly Jerusalem, spiritual warfare - while in monastic
commentaries, the association between penance and war was given coherence and
intellectual validity. (Riley-Smith 1977)
*How closely did it resemble pilgrimage?
- There was a very close relationship between the vows of crusaders and pilgrims.
Canon lawyers made little differentiation between them and it was only around
the year 1200 that they mentioned the crusaders’ vows independently.
- The obligation of a crusader was to make what was regarded as a kind of
pilgrimage and many of his privileges had previously been enjoyed by
pilgrims; the rites with taking the cross were associated with those for
making pilgrimages.
*Why was it so attractive to contemporaries?
- Glory
- Faith: the holy land specifically occupied an exalted position in the medieval
imagination - Holy Sepulchre, etc. (see below: economic circumstances)
- Remission of sin, means to salvation
- Death, they were told in sermons, tracts and chronicles, was martyrdom.
The prospect of immediate entry into paradise was constantly held before
them by propagandists like St Bernard.
[Thus creating a new identity: the warrior pilgrim]
- The new rhetoric created a distinctive morale, a group experience and identity, centered on the
theme of penance, piety and deliverance of Holy Places that came to be unique to the warrior
pilgrim.
- New status & prestige for a warrior aristocracy as well
Other historians: Tyerman’s argument (that there had been no crusades in the twelfth century, &
were merely the continuation of already existing ideas and practices, only really coming into being with
the crusade programme of Pope Innocent III) won little support. Many historians have
emphasized the changing quality and different stages of crusading, and several
emphasize the innovations seen in Innocent III’s pontificate. This study
(Fonnesberg-Schmidt 2007) of how the Baltic wars became crusades offers a contribution to
the ongoing discussion about the validity of definitions of crusades in general and about
the weaknesses of the pluralist definition (Riley-Smith: penitential warfare + defensive war in
the name of a universal Christendom + papal sanction) in particular, adding to the
suggestions that this definition really only applies with respect to the thirteenth
century, in the case of the Baltic crusades from the pontificate of Honorius III.
- Alongside crusades there existed other forms of penitential warfare. The popes had at their
disposal a series of measures which could be employed to motivate the faithful to take up warfare
in defense of the Church. These included the indulgence, partial or plenary, and temporal
privileges such as papal protection of the participants. Eugenius’s successors appear to have
regarded these as something that could be mixed and matched in whatever way would be
expedient and appropriate for the cause in question, reflecting the importance and priority they
ascribed to it.
- The picture drawn here underlines a weakness in the pluralist definition of the crusades.
Pluralists define crusading so strictly that their model is relevant only for the thirteenth century.
Only then was the concept to be found being consistently applied in a number of theaters of war,
in the case of the Baltic from the pontificate of Honorius III. Before him, the penitential wars
authorized by the papacy in the Baltic region were not on a par with those launched towards the
Holy Land. They show that in some instances some of the instruments associated with crusades
could be used to promote a campaign while others were not employed. (Fonnesberg-Schmidt
2007)
*****
Major themes
Empire (Mongol & Song)
- Autocracy
- Patrimony
- Military
The disruption of traditional, semi-egalitarian political relations was characterized by ‘a
replacement of the clan nobility with a much more powerful, hieratic, and autocratic
form of authority where collegial decisions were restricted to a small group of people.
Political authority was in turn supported by the increased militarization of society into
permanent fighting units placed under the direct control of the khan. But this
conjoining of permanent militarization and political centralization within an
aristocratic class required far greater economic resources than pastoral society could
provide, stimulating the demand for invasions of wealthier sedentary regions to secure
1
predictable supplies of external resources.
Education
Heresy
1
P. J. Smith, ‘Eurasian Transformations of the Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries: The View from Song China,
960-1279’, Medieval Encounters 10:1-3 (2004), p.289.