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This Product is Licensed to M.NAGASHYAM KIRAN, ADVOCATE, ANANTAPURAMU

2005 5 ALT 509; 2005 3 LS 225; 2005 0 Supreme(AP) 619;

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Judges : P.S.NARAYANA
Akkala Durga Rao - Appellant
Versus
Manikonda Durga Anjaneyulu - Respondent
C.R.P.Nos.3095&2321/01 and 2322/02
Decided On : 07-13-05
Advocates Appeared :
Mr.A. Ramakrishna, M/s.V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, M.V. Suresh Kumar

AP BUILDINGS (LEASE, RENT AND EVICTION) CONTROL ACT, 1960, Secs10(2)(i) & 8(5) - Wilful
default in payment of rent - Rent Controller dismissing eviction petition, filed by landlord, on
ground of wilful default in payment of rents by tenant - Appellate Authority reversed said order
In this case, landlord categorically deposed about default committed by tenant in payment of
rent for 1991 and even after 1991 also rents were not sent regularly - Landlord also took specific
stand that counter-foil of cheques filed before Court are only created for purpose of resisting
eviction petition and in fact cheques not encashed - Tenant failed to discharge burden relating to
payment of rents in time by adducing relevant evidence
Finding of Appellate Authority that granting of permission by Rent Controller to managing
partner of firm to deposit rent in individual capacity by filing Application u/Sec8(5) of Act cannot
be maintained, confirmed
Taking over all facts and circumstances and conduct of parties finding of Appellate Authority
that tenant committed wilful default, Justified - Appeals, dismissed

Cases referred:

Abdul Rahim Vs Srinivasa Dyeing Works , 1993 ALT 1 232

Adapa Santharam, Petitioners Vs Sait Nathmal Manik Chand , 1995 ALT 3 853
Kamala Bai Vs E.Rajeswari , 1997 ALT 1 797
C.Hanumantha Rao Vs M.Prem Sudhakar Rao , 1998 ALT 1 754
Hari Prasad Badruka Vs Tellukunta Laxmi , 2000 ALT 1 551
Singumahanthi Jagannadha Rao Vs Putchala Surya Prakasa Rao , 2002 ALD Supp1 67
Bansilal Vs Mohmood Ahmed , 2002 AndhWR 1 183
B.Rama Swamy Vs B.Ranga Swamy , 2004 ArbLR 2 323

ANDHRA PRADESH BUILDINGS LEASE, RENT AND EVICTION CONTROL ACT : S.10(2)(i), S.8(5)
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( 1 ) THE unsuccessful tenant, being aggrieved of the reversing orders, filed these C. R. Ps. C. R. P. No.
3095/2001 is filed by Akkala Durga rao and no doubt, it is stated that Akkala durga Rao in his individual
capacity cannot pray for permission to deposit rents inasmuch as M/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel Traders,
rep. by its managing partner Sri Akkala Durga Rao is the tenant. The other 2 C. R. Ps. , are filed by m/s.
Suvarna Iron and Steel Traders, rep. by its managing partner Sri Akkala Durga Rao. Akkala Durga Rao
in his individual capacity filed R. C. C. No. 111/93 on the file of Rent controller, Vijayawada, praying for
permission to deposit rents from March, 1993 onwards into Court and before the learned rent Controller
none of the parties were examined but however the learned Rent controller allowed the petition granting
permission to the petitioner to deposit rents @ Rs. 300/- per month without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the parties and also directed the parties to bear their own costs. Respondent in the said
R. C. C. , the landlord, carried the matter by way of appeal r. C. C. M. A. NO. 27/95 on the file of
Principal senior Civil Judge-cum-Appellate Authority under A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction)
Control Act, Vijayawada, and before the Appellate Authority Ex. A-1 and Exs. B-1 to B-7 were marked
and the appeal was allowed on the ground that Akkala Durga rao is not the tenant and hence, he cannot
file a petition under Section 8 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act (here-in-after
referred to as the Act , in short, for the purpose of convenience ). Aggrieved by the same, C. R. P. No.
3095/2001 was filed by Akkala Durga Rao in his individual capacity.
( 2 ) THE landlord filed old R. C. C. No. 74/93 renumbered as R. C. C. No. 173/96, on the file of
Rent Controller, Vijayawada. praying for eviction of the tenant M/s. Suvarna Iron and steel Traders, rep.
by its managing partner sri Akkala Durga Rao on the ground of wilful default and likewise, the landlord
filed old r. C. C. No. 128/94, renumbered as R. C. C. No. 249/96 on the file of Rent Controller,
vijayawada, praying for eviction on the ground of wilful default for subsequent period as against the
tenant M/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel traders, rep. by its managing partner sri Akkala durga Rao. The
landlord was unsuccessful before the learned Rent controller and aggrieved by the same, he had carried
the matter by way of appeals r. C. C. M. A. N0. 5/98 and R. C. C. M. A. No. 135/97 on the file of
Principal Senior Civil judge-cum-Appellate Authority underthe Act at Vijayawada, and the aforesaid
orders made in the R. C. Cs. , had been reversed and aggrieved by the same, M/s. Suvarna Iron and
steel Traders, rep. by its managing partner sri Akkala Durga Rao preferred C. R. P. No. 2321/2002 and
C. R. P. No. 2322/2002, respectively.
( 3 ) SRI Ramakrishna, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner in all the c. R. Ps. ,
had taken this court through the reasons recorded by the learned Rant controller and would contend that
in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no default much less wilful default since the tenant
has been prompt in payment of rents and the landlord had avoided the receipt of rents so as to make it a
ground of eviction and the tenant had invoked the jurisdiction of the learned Rent Controller under
Section 8 (5) of the Act and has been depositing the rents and, hence, there is no wilful default, at all.
The learned counsel also explained about the issuance of bearer cheques and the evidence available on
record and also the conduct of the parties. The learned Counsel also pointed out to the periods of
default wherein the tenant is said to have committed default and had explained the facts and
circumstances and would contend that even if there was some delay, the same was due to conduct of
the landlord and hence, the same cannot be styled as wilful default. The learned Counsel also pointed
out to certain portions of the evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1 as well.
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( 4 ) PER contra, Sri Anjaneyulu, the learned counsel representing the landlord would contend that
Durga Rao is not the tenant but the firm is the tenant and hence, the said durga Rao invoking the
jurisdiction of the rent Controller under Section 8 (5) of the Act is not tenable in Law. The learned
Counsel also pointed out to the conduct of the parties and had drawn the attention of this Court to the
findings recorded by the Appellate authority in relation to bearer Cheques. The learned Counsel also
explained the periods of default on the strength of which the R. C. Cs. , were filed and how the matter
had been dealt with by the learned Rent Controller and the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority
while reversing the said findings. The Counsel would maintain that in the facts and circumstances, the
default committed can be said to be only wilful default and nothing else and hence, insasmuch as the
orders made by the Appellate Authority are well-reasoned orders and there is no perversity involved in
the reasoning while recording the findings by the Appellate Authority, the C. R. Ps. , are liable to be
dismissed. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions in this regard.
( 5 ) HEARD the Counsel.
( 6 ) C. R. P. NO. 3095 of 2001:- As already referred to supra, the application under section 8 (5) of
the Act was filed by Akkala durga Rao. Before the Appellate Authority ex. A-1, dated 11-12-1996,
deposition of r. W. 1 in R. C. C. No. 173/96 (old R. C. C. No. 74/93) was marked. Exs. B-1 to B-3 the
letters, Ex. B-4 the postal cover, Ex. B-5- legal notice issued by the Advocate for m/s. Suvarna Iron and
Steel Traders had been marked. The specific case of the landlord is that M/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel
Traders, is the tenant and this is clear from R. C. C. No. 173/96 (old R. C. C. No. 74/93) before the rent
Controller and Ex. A. 1 is the certified copy of the deposition. Exs. B-1, B-2, B-4, b-5, B-7 also establish
the same. Akkala durga Rao may be the managing partner of m/s. Suvarna Iron and Steel Traders, and
at the best, he can represent the firm but definitely not in his individual capacity. Ex. B-5 discloses that
notice was issued on behalf of the firm. In the light of the documentary evidence available on record, the
Appellate Authority recorded a finding that inasmuch as the firm is the tenant, in the individual capacity
this application under Section 8 (5) of the Act cannot be maintained and on that ground the appeal was
allowed. Apart from this aspect of the matter, in the light of the tenant as shown in the other 2 Rent
Control proceedings, there cannot be any serious controversy that the firm is the tenant, may be
represented by the managing partner, and, hence, in view of the same, the order made by the Appellate
Authority in this regard cannot be found fault and accordingly, the same is hereby confirmed.
( 7 ) C. R. P. NOS. 2321 and 2322 of 2002:- as already referred to supra these 2 C. R. Ps. , are filed
by the tenant M/s. Suvarna Iron and steel Traders, rep. by its managing partner sri Akkala Durga Rao,
being aggrieved of the common reversing order made in r. C. C. M. A. NOS. 5/98 and 135/97. Both the
r. C. Cs. were filed by the landlord on the ground of wilful default. It is the case of the landlord that the
tenant was paying rent at rs. 100/- per month and by the date of the filing of the petition, the tenant was
paying rs. 900/- per month, but however, the landlord was issuing receipts for Rs. 300/- only. The tenant
committed default in payment of rents from October, 1991, but however, tenant sent a cheque for Rs.
600/- urging monthly rent as Rs. 300/- claiming to be the rent for the months of March and April, 1993
and the same was denied by the landlord. It is the specific stand by the landlord that rs. 900/- per month,
the tenant is in arrears of rs. 19. 800/- and thus, committed willful default. The tenant had taken a
specific stand that monthly rent is only Rs. 300/- since december, 1985 and he has been regular in
payment of rents on landlord visiting his shop till November, 1991, and from December, 1991 onwards
he has been paying the rents monthly by way of cheques drawn on Punjab national Bank up to
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February, 1993 and the landlord enacted those cheques and the landlord did not turn up to collect the
rents for the month of March, 1993 and he waited till the end of April, 1993 and sent two cheques for Rs.
300/- each representing rent for the months of march and April, 1993, by registered letter, dated 1-5-
1993, and the same was received by the landlord but reply was sent with false allegations and a
rejoinder was also issued. Further stand was taken that the tenant filed R. C. C. No. 111/93 to permit
him to deposit rents since the landlord was evading to receive the rents. The landlord agreed to sell the
petition scheduled property in favour of Smt. Akkala Kumar, W/o Durga rao for a consideration of Rs.
4,00,000/- in presence of elders on 30-6-1991 and received some advance on different dates and the
landlord failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement and hence, his wife got issued
a notice dated 26-7-1993, demanding the landlord to receive the balance sale consideration and execute
the sale deed and his wife filed O. S. No. 898/93 for specific performance and only with a view to evict
his from the premises with a mala fide intention, the eviction petition is filed. Yet another R. C. C. was
filed on the ground that the tenant committed default in payment of rents for the subsequent period. The
same was also resisted. There is nothing on record to show that the rent payable is Rs. 900/- per month
and the case of the tenant is that the rent is only Rs. 300/- per month. In R. C. C. No. 173/96, P. Ws. 1
and 2 were examined and R. W. 1 was examined, Exs. A-1 to A-11 and Exs. B-1 to B-48 were marked.
In r. C. C. No. 249/96 (old R. C. C. No. 128/94) p. W. 1 and R. W. 1, the landlord and the managing part
of the firm-the tenant, alone were examined, Ex. A-1 and Exs. B-1 to B-4 were marked. The Appellate
Authority had disposed of both the appeals by common order. P. W. 1 categorically deposed about the
default committed by the tenant in payment of rents from September, 1991. Even after September,
1991, the rents were not sent regularly by cheques. P. W. 1 also deposed that since he has been
running a work shop and he has been maintaining accounts and whenever he receives rents, he will be
entering the same in the accounts book. No doubt, on the strength of the rent receipts Exs. B-1 to B-35,
a finding had been recorded that the rent is only Rs. 300/- per month. As per Ex. B-6, marked through R.
W. 1, rent of Rs. 300/- is shown to have been paid on 4-1-1980. The learned judge also discussed at
length the practice of issuance of cheques by R. W. 1 for the default period. The evidence of R. W. 1 is
that these all are bearer cheques and having issued cheques to P. W. 1 for 22 months, he had not
obtained receipts from P. W. 1 But, however, the evidence of R. W. 1 is that he had received the
receipts from the part-time accountant of p. W. 1, who was also accountant of the tenant for sometime.
Further finding had been recorded relating to Ex. B-41, marked in r. C. C. No. 173/96 and the relevant
Pass book relating to Punjab National Bank also had not been filed. A further finding had been recorded
in relation to Exs. B-1 to B-32 which do not disclose any exhibit seal of R. C. C. No. 111/93. It is also in
the evidence of R. W. 1 that though R. C. C. No. 111/93 was filed paying permission to deposit rents into
Court, he could not deposit rents from the day he filed petition on the ground that he was not permitted
to do so in view of the fact that an order granting permission had not been specifically made by the
Court. A further finding had been recorded in relation to ex. B-48, the Ledger Extract in R. C. C. No.
111/93, relating to deposit of Rs. 5,400/- and a further finding had been recorded in relation to Ex. A-6
the certified copy of the challan relating to R. C. C. No. 74/93. The contradictory document and the non-
explanation relating thereto also had been taken note of. It is also pertinent to note that the landlord had
taken the specific stand that the counter-foil of the cheques filed before the Court are only created for
the purpose of resisting the eviction petitions and in fact, the cheques were not encashed. The burden
could have been discharged by the tenant, by adducing the relevant evidence. The evidence of P. W. 1
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and R. W. 1, and Exs. A-1 to A-11 and Exs. B-1 to B-48 in R. C. C. No. 173/96, and also the evidence of
P. W. 1 and R. W. 1 and Ex. A-1 and Exs. B-1 to B-4 in r. C. C. No. 249/96 (old R. C. C. No. 128/94) had
been taken into consideration and ultimately, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the tenant
failed to discharge the burden relating to the payment of rents in time. It is, no doubt, true that whether in
individual capacity or otherwise, an attempt was made on the part of the tenant to deposit rents before
the Court by invoking the provisions of section 8 (5) of the Act.
( 8 ) IN Hari Prasad Badruka v. Tellukunta laxmi and others it was held:-" Deposit of rent by a tenant
into Court, as per the provisions of Section 8 of the act, is for the benefit of the landlord, so that the
landlord can withdraw the amount immediately after it is deposited. If the tenant who makes a deposit
does not file the challans evidencing the deposit into the Bank into Court, the landlord cannot have the
benefit of amount deposited by the tenant, and therefore it is as good as the tenant not paying the
money to the landlord. Though Rule 5 of the Rules does not stipulate any time within which the tenant
should file the challans evidencing the deposit of money in the Bank into the court, by necessary
implication it should be taken that he should file the challans into the Court within a reasonable time from
the date of deposit. It is well known that where no time is stipulated for performing an obligation the
person who has to perform the obligation has to perform it within a reasonable time. The tenant who
deposits money into Bank, as per the order of the Court under sections 8, 9 and 11 is under and
obligation to file the challans evidencing deposit of money in Bank, into the Court as per Rule 5 (3) of the
Rules. Rule 5 (4) of the Rules contemplates notice of deposit being given to the person (s) concerned
within seven days of delivery of the challan by the tenant. If the tenant himself gives a notice to the
landlord, or if the landlord is appearing through a counsel to the Counsel for the landlord, there is no
further need for the Rent controller to serve notice of deposit on the landlord. If no such notice is given,
the tenant has to deposit process fee for the Court to serve the notice of deposit on the person (s)
concerned. If process fee is not deposited, the Court cannot serve notice of deposit on the landlord. In
this case, admittedly notice of deposit was not given to the landlord or his Counsel and it is not even the
case of the tenant that process fee was deposited, as per Rule 16 for sending notice of deposit to the
landlord. Thus it is clear that the tenant has not complied with the provisions of Rule 5 (4) read with Rule
16 of the Rules, for the Rent controller taking steps for service of notice of deposit on the landlord,
because without the tenant depositing the process fee for service on notice, court cannot cause service
of notice of deposit on the landlord. When a tenant takes recourse to section 8 of the Act for deposit of
rents into the Court, he has to follow the procedure prescribed therein. If he fails to deposit challans into
Court and give notice of deposit or fails to deposit process fee to enable the Court to cause service of
notice of deposit on landlord for a considerably long time, it cannot, but be held that he becomes a wilful
defaulter, thereby creating a right in the landlord seeking his eviction from the demises premises on the
ground of wilful default. "in C. Hanumantha Rao and anotherv. M. Prem sudhakar Rao it was held:-"i
have gone through the record and also through the orders passed by the principal Subordinate Judge. It
is not the case of the tenant that he had paid the rents. His case, however, is that landlord refused to
receive the rent for number of years and he deposited the rent in a Bank account opened by him in his
won name. It is nowhere shown that the Landlord was ever communicated that a Bank account had
been opened in which the rent was being deposited. The Andhra Pradesh building (Lease, rent and
Eviction) Control Act (XV of 1960) is a complete code governing he relationship of landlord and tenants.
The tenants have been given protection against eviction. A Landlord can only be able to evict a tenant if
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any of the grounds laid down in Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Act become available to such a Landlord.
Therefore, I am of the view that the provisions of the A. P. Rent control Act need to be interpreted in
such a way that whenever a right accrues to a Landlord for evicting the tenant the eviction should follow.
It has been stated that the Landlord in this case very cleverly carved out a ground for eviction of the
tenant by refusing to accept the rent. One would have believed this argument bur for Section 8 of the A.
P. Rent Control Act. The legislature was conscious of such situations and therefore a detailed
mechanism has been laid down in section 8 which is supposed to be followed by tenants in case there is
refusal of acceptance of rent by a landlord. After all what was the impediment for the tenant for number
of years to go to the Rent Controller and deposit the rent. It is admitted fact that for number of years the
Landlord did not receive the rent. It was received by him only after the suit was instituted and there was
nothing on record to show that the tenant ever went to the Rent controller. On this question the finding of
both the Courts below is concurrent and in the revisional jurisdiction this court would not like to re-
appreciate the evidence, but the legal aspect of the issue involved has been considered and in my view
of a tenant fails to deposit the rent for number of years in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of
the A. P. Rent Control Act he is clearly a willful defaulter. In the present case the petitioner had
deposited the rent in a Bank Account in his own name and therefore there was nothing which could stop
the tenant from withdrawing this amount. It was only a plan created to defeat the rights of landlord. Had
the tenant been really interested in paying the rents he would have followed the mandate of Section 8 of
the Act. Since Section 8 of the Act has not been followed by the petitioner, there is no way out but to
hold that the tenant in this case was a wilful defaulter. "in Bansilal v. Mohmood Ahmed it was held:-"
Sub-section (5) of Section 8 does not contemplate that any specific order has to be passed by the Rent
Controller before the tenant deposits the rent. The right of the tenant under sub-section (5) is subject to
the fulfillment of the condition that the landlord has refused to receive the rent sent to him by money
order under sub-section (4 ). A reading of the entire provisions of section 8 of the Act would disclose that
after the landlord refused to receive the rent sent by way of money order, the tenant while exercising the
right under sub-section (5) has to deposit the rent refused by the landlord before the Rent controller
along with the application therefor and shall continue to deposit any rent which may subsequently
become due. As noticed hereinbefore, a finding a fact has been arrived at by the learned appellate
Judge to the effect that although such application was filed in 1985 subsequent to the refusal of the
landlord to receive the rent sent by money order in September, 1985, the tenant actually deposited the
rent only in February, 1986. In view of the admitted fact that the petitioner has failed to deposit the rent
even after filing of the petition to deposit the rent, it cannot be said that the learned appellate Court has
committed any jurisdictional error in setting aside the order the learned rent Controllerand ordering
foreviction of the petitioner. "in Adapa Santharam and another v. Sait nathmal Manik Chand it was held:-
"this part of the case has been specifically considered by both the courts below. Both the Courts below
rejected the contention of the tenant regarding his case that he sent Money orders under Exs. B-2 and
B-3 to the land-lord and Exs. B-4 and B-5 are the money order coupons showing the refusal. I have also
verified Exs. B-2, b-3, B-4 and B-5 from the original records. Money Order coupons dated 8-11-1982
show the name of S. Nathmal manik Chand, but the name of the landlord is Sait Nathmal Manik Chand.
Apart from that, from Exs. B-2 and B-3, it is clear that the full address of the landlord is not shown.
Moreover, the alleged M. O. coupons said to have been refused do not bear any postal endorsement or
postal seal. The lower appellate Court specifically noted that if the correct address were to be given in
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exs. B-2 and B-3, the same should have reached the landlord. After all the landlord resides in the
upstairs of the same building. Exs. B-4 and B-5 did not contain any endorsement of the postal authority
nor seal of the postal department in order to hold that they were refused and returned by the landlord
and in this view of the matter, reliance was not placed on these documents, having regard to this
evidence on record on the part of the tenant, both the courts below held that the tenant did not tender
the rent to the landlord as contended by him in the months of September, October and november, 1982,
either in person or through the alleged money orders. It was open to the tenant to tender the rent to the
landlord immediately after he received Ex. A-2 reply notice, dated 29-11-1982 sent by the landlord to his
telegraphic notice vide Ex. A-1. In ex. A-2, the landlord specifically stated that he never refused to
receive the rent from the tenant. On receipt of Ex. A-2 at least the tenant should have sent the rent either
by Demand draftor by cheque at least through the counsel of the land-lord, who issued Ex. A-2. Instead
of that, he filed R. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 before the rent Controller, under Section 8 (5) of the Act seeking
the permission of the court to deposit the rent into the Court. Moreover, as noticed by both the Courts
below, the said petition in R. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 was filed on 30-12-1983. It was returned to the tenant
by the office with certain objection on 31-12-1982. The tenant has presented the same after complying
with the office objections on 25-1-1983 and it has been taken on file on 21-2-1983. Thereafter, the
tenant has deposited a total amount of rs. 4,550/- vide challan No. 1363 on 30-3-1983 towards the rent
from september, 1982 to March, 1983 for a period of seven months, from this material on record, it is
clear that even after filing R. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 on 31-12-1982 under Section 8 (5) of the act, he was
not diligent in prosecuting the said petition and depositing the rent immediately. Mere filing an
application under Section 8 (5) of the Act could not by itself be sufficient, but he must deposit the rent
immediately on that application seeking the permission of the court. Moreover, the said application in r.
C. C. No. 10 of 1983 has been filed without complying the other requirements of Section 8 of the Act. As
per Section 8 (2) of the Rent Control Act, if the landlord refuses to receive or accept the rent, then the
tenant may by notice require the landlord to specify within 10 days from the date of receipt of the notice
the Bank into which the rent may be deposited. Under clause (4) of the Act, if the landlord does not
specify such a bank for depositing the rent, the tenant should sent the rent to the landlord by money
order and if the landlord refused to receive the rent remitted by money order under sub-section (4), then
the tenant may deposit the rent before the authority. From these provisions, it is clear that in order in
invoke the jurisdiction of the court seeking permission to deposit the rent, the tenant must fulfil these
other conditions of that section. As noted above, the money orders alleged to have been sent vide Exs.
B-2 and B-3 were not sent on the correct address of the landlord. The alleged money order coupons
Exs. B-4 and B-5 do not bear any endorsement of the postal authority noting refusal nor bear the seal of
the postal department. On the other hand, there is illegal statement on those coupons Ex. B-5 "no such
Addressee". In those circumstance, as held by both the Courts below, there was no tender of rent by the
tenant to the landlord by money order, not here was any refusal of the money order by the landlords.
From these circumstances, it is clear that by filing an application in r. C. C. No. 10 of 1983 of the Act
seeking permission of the Court to deposit the arrears of rent, the tenant cannot plead that there was no
default on his part. As held by this Court in (1) 1985 (2) alt. 169, Section 8 of the Act is only directory and
not mandatory. From this, it follows that the tenant may resort to Section 8 and may not resort to Section
8. After the arrears of rent have fallen due, without following the mandatory provisions of that Section, if
he invokes Section 8 (5), such application cannot come to the aid of the tenant to show his bona fides in
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not paying the rent in time. Moreover, even after filing of that petition on 30-12-1982, actually the rent
was not deposited till 30th march, 1983. From these circumstances, it is clear that the tenant was a wilful
defaulter right from the month of September 1982 till march, 1983. Nevertheless, in this case, it is an
admitted fact by the tenant himself in his evidence as R. W. 1 that the rent was payable at the end of
every month with grace period of 10 days thereafter. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that
both the Courts below rightly held that the tenant was wilful defaulter in the payment of rent to the
landlord. "however, the learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in view of the
admissions made by the landlord s P. W. 1 that the tenant deposited rs. 3,000/- with him, the landlord
should have adjusted the same towards arrears of rent, even this aspect of the case has been
specifically considered by the lower Appellate Court in paragraph 15 of its judgment. As per the
provisions of section 7 of the Act, the landlord shall not claim, receive or stipulate for the payment of any
premium, an amount not exceeding one month s rent by way of advance. On that basis, it is calculated
that after deducing one month s rent as advance out of Rs. 3,000/- the amount that would be in excess
of that one month s rent come to Rs. 2,350/ -. Even if this amount is adjusted towards arrears of rent for
the period of five months from september, 1982 to January, 1983, even then, there would be default on
the part of the tenant, because, the arrears would be more than the amount in deposit. In view of the
rejection of the case of the tenant, regarding Exs. B-2 to b-5 there cannot be any explanation on the part
of the tenant for not tendering the arrears of rent. However, the learned counsel for the landlord
contended that if the tenant had requested the landlord, the landlord should have adjusted the arrears of
rent out of the amount in deposit. It is only on the basis of evidence for the first time it appears an
argument was developed in the lower appellate court in this behalf and the lower appellate Court has
rejected the same, holding that even after such adjustment, still the tenant would be in arrears. The
learned counsel for the landlord further contended that such an adjustment, the tenant shod necessarily
plead in the case and it is not an automatic adjustment. He further contended that there is no agreement
for such adjustment towards the rent between the parties. In support of his contention, he relied upon
the ruling the Supreme court reported in (2) AIR 1993 Supreme court 1948. In para 20 of the judgment,
the Hon ble supreme Court has held as under:-" We are in broad agreement with the view of the Full
Bench of the Patna high Court and the Madras High court on the question of automatic adjustment and
hold that a tenant cannot save himself from the consequences of eviction under the act on the ground of
default in the payment of rent by claiming automatic adjustment of any excess rent paid consequent
upon mutual enhancement of rent, even if illegal unless there is an agreement between the parties for
such an adjustment. The tenant may also in a given case seek adjustment of the excess rent in the
hands of the landlord against the arrears by specifically asking the landlord for such an adjustment
before filing of the suit or in response to the notice to quit and even in the written statement by way of set
off within the period of limitation and by following the procedure for claiming such a set off, while
resisting the claim for eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent but he cannot claim
automatic adjustment . "on the other hand, the learned counsel forthe petitioner- tenant relied upon the
ruling of the Supreme Court reported in (3) AIR 1989 SC 1510. That was a case in which their Lordships
of the Supreme court were interpreting Section 7 of the a. P. (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act. In
that case, it was argued that the landlord had an amount of Rs. 6,500/- as advance and after deduction
one month s rent from out of the advance amount, the balance amount of rs. 5,000/- was with him in
deposit and section 7 (2) (a) prohibited payment of any sum exceeding one month s rent by way of
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advance further sub-section (3) declared the stipulation for payment of rent in advance beyond that of
one month as null and void. From the facts of that case, it is revealed that the payment in deposit with
the landlord was more than the alleged arrears of rent payable by the tenant. Considering a similar
contention the Honourable supreme Court held as under:"in M/s. Sarwan Kumar Onkar Nath v. Subhas
Kumar Agarwalla (1987) 4 SCC 546: (AIR 1987 SC 2302), salimuddin s case came for consideration.
This was also dispute under the Bihar Act where tow month s rent had been paid in advance by the
tenant to the landlord on the stipulation that the advance amount would be liable be adjusted towards
arrears of rent, whenever necessary or required. The Court held that the tenant could not be evicted on
the ground of default in the payment of rent for two months even if the tenant failed to ask the landlord to
make adjustment of the advance amount in the absence of any agreement requiring the tenant to inform
the landlord as to when such adjustment is to be made. This court said that when the Rent Act
prohibited the landlord to claim such advance payment, the tenant couldnot be considered to be a
defaulter and the doctrine of paridelic to was not attracted to such a fact-situation. Mr. Rao building upon
the ratio of these two decisions rightly contended before us that when the landlord had Rs. 5,000/- on
tenant s account with him which he was holding for years without paying interest and against the clear
statutory bar, there could be no justificastion for granting a decree of eviction on the plea of arrears of
rent. In view of the fact that the stipulation that the amount would be refundable at the end of the
tenancy is null and void under Section 7 (3) of the Act, the amount became payable to the tenant
immediately and the landlord with Rs. 5, 000/- of the tenant with him could not contend that the tenant
was in default for a small amount by not paying the rent for some months. "in the light of the latter
decision, the learned counsel forthe tenant-petitioner contended that the landlord should have adjusted
the arrears of rent from out of the amount in deposit with the landlord whether the tenant requests for
such adjustment or not or whether there is an agreement to that effect or not and such adjustment
should necessarily be automatic. In Kama/a Bai and others v. E. Rajeswan it was held:-"to sum up,
when landlord refuses to receive rent for any month, it is open to tenant to opt for Section 8 which is not
mandatory but only directory. But having opted for section, by issuing notice under Section 8 (2), the
tenant has to follow diligently the steps stated in section 8 (3) to Section 8 (5) namely, if landlord refused
to nominate the Bank, he has to sent the rent by M. O. deducing the M. O. commission and continue
remit in the same manner till landlord expresses his willingness to accept the rent or specifies the Bank.
If the landlord refuses to receive rent so sent by M. O. , the tenant has to deposit it in Court by filing
application under Section 8 (5 ). But mere filing of application does not absolve the tenant from
obligation to remit the rent before the due date. He has to obtain order from the Court for immediate
deposit or deposit the rent in a separate bank account in order to show his bona fides. The question
whether in case the tenant does not opt for Section 8, he is bound to continue to remit rent by M. O.
every month or he can stop paying rents subsequently, does not arise in this case. Applying these
principles to the facts of the case, ex. B-1 and Ex. B-3 are not proved as true and the tenants have
deposited the rents for the period from November, 1991, only on 20-10-1992. Even assuming that Exs.
B-1, Ex. B-3 and ex. B-4 are true, the tenants having opted for Section 8 and issued notice contemplated
in sub-section (2) failed to remit the rents in accordance with the procedure mentioned in sub- sections
(3) to (5 ). Thus, it has to be held that the tenants has committed wilful default in payment of rents for the
period from November, 1991 to August, 1992. "in Singumahanthi Jagannadha Rao v. Putchala Surya
Prakasa Rao, it was held that the tenant made irregular payment of rents and the Appellate Authority
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while reversing the decision of the Rent controller found that it constitutes wilful default and when the
finding is not a perverse finding, order of the Appellate authority not liable to be interfered with in
Revision. In n. D. Thandani (Dead) by Lrs. v. Arnavaz rustom Printer and another the Apex Court held:-
"the case at hand projects a picture where in spite of the leaning of the law in favour of the tenant, if
anyone deserves sympathy it is the landlord and not the tenant. As already noticed, this is the third
round of litigation complaining of default in payment of rent by. the tenant. In the first round of litigation
the rate of rent was alleged by the landlord to be Rs. 160/- per month which was denied by the tenant
who pleaded the rate of rent to be Rs. 80/- per month only. In the litigation which ended in the apex
Court, the rate of rent was finally adjudged to have been rs. 160/- per month and not Rs. 80/- as written
statement pleaded by the tenant. Not only does the law itself require the tenant to pay or tender the rent
month to month, the order of this Court mandated the tenant to clear all the arrears of rent within two
months and thereafter to deposit the rent month by month and strictly observe compliance with the
orders of the Supreme Court. The tenant did not even thereafter comply with the provisions of Rule 5.
Huge amount of arrears accumulated, which were cleared in one go. Even other deposits were not
regularly made. The tenant did not keep the landlords informed of the deposits either directly or by
complying with provisions of the Rule. The obligation of the tenant to pay or tender the rent cannot be
said to have been discharged unless and until the landlords were posted with the information along with
particulars enabling them to withdraw the amount. The legal notices served by the landlords were not
responded to in the desired manner so as to put an end to their grievance. A claim for eviction founded
on the simple ground of default in payment remained pending for years, obviously because of the
reluctance and the procrastinating tactics of the tenant. If this is not wilful default then what else can it
be? we are clearly of the opinion thatthe High Court has rightly held the tenant to be a chronic wilful
defaulter. The decree for eviction is fully justified. "reliance was also placed on the decision abdul
Raheem by G. P. A. , Mohd. Phirozeali v. M/s. Srinivasa Dyeing Works, Vijayawada, rep. by its Partner,
V. V. Subba Rao and others.
( 9 ) ON a careful analysis of the evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by the
learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority, this Court is of the considered opinion that
taking the over-all facts and circumstances and also the conduct of the parties, the Appellate authority is
well-justified in recording a finding that the tenant committed wilful default and hence, the said finding
recorded by the learned Judge need not be disturbed by this revisional Court since there is no illegality
or perversity in arriving at such a conclusion. Hence, the said findings are hereby confirmed. It is
needless to say that all the c. R. Ps. , are devoid of merit and accordingly, the same shall stand
dismissed. The tenant however is granted three months time to vacate the premises on filing an
undertaking before this court within a period of four weeks. In default, the landlord is at liberty to put the
eviction orders into execution. It is needless to say that the tenant to pay the rents for this period also.
( 10 ) THE C. R. Ps. , are accordingly dismissed with costs.

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