2017

I.

(a) Distinguish antichresis from usufruct? (3%)

(b) Distinguish commodatum from mutuum. (3%)

Answer:

(a) Antichresis vs. Usufruct

Antichresis Usufruct
always a contract need not arise from a contract
because it may also
be constituted by law or
by other acts inter vivos,
such as donation, or in
a last will and
testament, or by
prescription
The subject matter of the subject matter of
antichresis is always a usufruct may either be real
real property property or personal
property
Antichresis is an accessory usufruct is a real right.
contract or contract of
security
antichretic creditor has While in both, the fruits do
the obligation to apply not pertain to the owner,
the fruits to the payment of the usufructuary is
the interest, if owing, entitled to enjoy the fruits
and therefatre to the
 principal of the credit.

(b) Commodatum vs. Mutuum

Commodatum Mutuum
As to subject matter: The the subject matter of
subject matter of mutuum is either money or
commodatum is ordinarily non- consumable
consumable
As to compensation: mutuum may be gratuitous or
Commodatum is essentially with a stipulation to pay
gratuitous interest
As to right in subject In mutuum, the borrower
matter: In commodatum, acquires ownership of the
there is no transmission of thing borrowed.
ownership of the thing loaned
As to duty of borrower: in mutuum, the borrower
In commodatum, the same discharges himself, not by
thing borrowed is required returning the identical thing
to be returned. loaned, but by paying
its equivalent in kind, quality
and quantity. [Discussed
in pp. 725-726, Vol. 1,
Rabuya’s Civil Law
Reviewer]

II.
Jacob has owned a farm land in Ramos, Tarlac. In 2012, Liz surreptitiously entered and
cultivated the property. In 2014, Jacob discovered Liz's presence in and cultivation of
the property. Due to his being busy attending to his business in Cebu, he tolerated Liz's
cultivation of the property. Subsequently, in December 2016, Jacob wanted to regain
possession of the property; hence, he sent a letter to Liz demanding that she vacate the
property. Liz did not vacate despite the demand.

Jacob comes to enlist your legal assistance to bring an action against Liz to recover the
possession of the property.

What remedies are available to Jacob to recover possession of his property under the
circumstances? Explain your answer. (4%)

Answer: The remedy available to Jacob is accion

publiciana, or an action for the recovery of the
better right of possession. It also refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year from accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding
of possession of the realty. Sincethe entry made by Liz
is through stealth, Jacob could have filed an actionfor
forcible entry. Ordinarily, the one-year period within
which to bring an actionfor forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except
that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period
is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
Here, since more than one year had elapsed since Jacob
learned of the entry made by Liz through stealth, the
action that may be filed by Jacob is no longer
forcible entry, but an accion publiciana. [Basis: Canlasv.
Tubil, 601 SCRA 147 (2009); Valdez v. CA, 489 SCRA 369
(2006); discussed in pp. 353-354, Vol. 1, Rabuya’s Civil Law
Reviewer]
 III.

Tyler owns a lot that is enclosed by the lots of Riley to the North and East, of Dylan to
the South, and of Reece to the West. The current route to the public highway is a
kilometer's walk through the northern lot of Riley, but the route is a rough road that gets
muddy during the rainy season, and is inconvenient because it is only 2.5 meters wide.
Tyler's nearest access to the public highway would be through the southern lot of Dylan.
May Dylan be legally required to afford to Tyler a right of way through his property?
Explain your answer. (4%)

Answer: No, Dylan is not entitled to a grant of compulsory

right of way because he has an adequate outlet going to the
publichighway. One of the requisites for a compulsory grant
of right of way is that the estate of the claimant of a
right of way must be isolated and without adequate
outlet to a public highway. The true standard
for the grant of compulsory right of way is “adequacy”
of outlet going to a public highway and not
the convenience of the dominant estate. In the case
at bar, there is already an existing adquate outlet from
the dominant estate to a public highway. Even if said outlet
be incovenient, the need to open up another servitude
is entirely unjustified. [Basis: Article 649, Civil Code;
Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos, 647 SCRA 495 (2011);
Costabella Corp. v. CA, 193 SCRA 333 (1991); discussed
in pp. 559-561, Vol. 1, Rabuya’s Civil Law Reviewer]

IV.

TRUE or FALSE - Explain your answers.

(a) All rights are considered as property. (2%)

 (b) A lessee cannot bring a case for quieting of title respecting the property that
he leases. (2%)

(c) Only the city or municipal mayor can file a civil action to abate a public
nuisance. (2%)

(d) Possession of a movable property is lost when the location of the said
movable is unknown to the owner. (2%)

(e) Continuous non-apparent easements can be acquired either through title or

by prescription. (2%)

Answer:

(a) False, because rights which are not

patrimonial in nature, such as the right to liberty,
the right to honor, family rights, etc., cannot be
considered as property. [Basis: II Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, 1992 ed., pp. 4-5]
(b) False, because the action may be filed by anyone
who has legal or equitable title to, or interest in,
the property which is the subject matter
of the action. Hence, any holder of interest
to the property or right to possession of the land,
including the interest of a lessee, may bring
an action for quieting of title. [Basis:
Article 477, Civil Code]
(c) False, because under the law it is the district
health officer and not the chief executive of the
local government who has been authorized to file a
civil action to abate a public nuisance. [Basis:
Article 700, in relation to Article 699, Civil
Code; Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc., 778
 SCRA 385 (2016), discussed in p. 601, Vol. 1,
Rabuya’s Civil Law Reviewer].
(d) False, because possession of movables is not
deemed lost so long as they remain under the
control of the possessor, even though for the time being
he may not know their whereabouts. [Basis: Article
556, Civil Code; discussed in pp. 485-486, Vol.
1, Rabuya’s Civil Law Reviewer]
(e) False, because only continuous and apparent easements
can be acquired either by virtue of a
title or by prescription. [Basis: Article 620,
Civil Code; discussed in p. 533, Vol. 1, Rabuya’s Civil
Law Reviewer]

V.

Plutarco owned land that borders on a river. After several years, the action of the water
of the river caused the deposit of soil, and increased the area of Plutarco's property by
200 square meters.

(a) If Plutarco wants to own the increase in area, what will be his legal basis for doing
so? Explain your answer. (2%)

(b) On the other hand, if the river dries up, may Plutarco validly claim a right of
ownership of the dried-up river bed? Explain your answer. (2%)

Answer:

(a) Plutarco acquires ownership over the increased area by

virtue of accession. According to the Civil Code,
the accretion gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters shall belong to the
ownerof the lands adjoining the banks of rivers. In
order for the above rule to apply, however, the
 following requisites must be present: (1) that the
deposit of soil be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be made through the effects of the
current of the waters; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the
rivers. All foregoing requirements are present in this
case. Hence, Plutarco aquires ownership over the increased
area by operation of law. [Basis: Article 457,
Civil Code; Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514 (1984);
discussed in pp. 402-405, Vol. 1, Rabuya’s Civil
Law Reviewer]

(b) No, because the dried-up river bed shall continue to

belong to the State as its property of public
dominion. As such, it is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Therefore,
Plutarco may not validly claim a right of
ownership of the dried-up river bed. [Republic v.
Santos III, 685 SCRA 51 (2012); Celestial v.
Cachopero, 431 SCRA 469 (2003); 657 SCRA 499
(2011); discussed in p. 409, Vol. 1, Rabuya’s
Civil Law Reviewer]