Professional Documents
Culture Documents
GLENN
HUBBARD
ANTHONY PATRICK
O’BRIEN
MICROECONOMICS
FIFTH EDITION
GLOBAL EDITION
© Pearson Education Limited 2015
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
Government-imposed barriers
• Governments might grant exclusive rights to some industry to one
or a small number of firms.
• Examples: Occupational licensing for dentists and doctors
Patents
Tariffs and quotas imposed on foreign companies
Patent: The exclusive right to a product for a period of 20 years from
the date the patent is filed with the government.
© Pearson Education Limited 2015 9 of 34
Using Game Theory to Analyze Oligopoly
Collusion is against the law in the United States, but you can see
why firms might be tempted to collude: their profits could be
substantially higher.
Dell is deciding
whether to offer $20
or $30 per copy for
TruImage’s software.
Then TruImage will
have the opportunity
to accept or reject Figure 14.7
the offer. The decision tree for a bargaining game
Dell will look ahead, and realize that TruImage is better off
accepting Dell’s offer, no matter what price Dell offers.
Therefore Dell should offer the low price, anticipating that TruImage
will accept the offer.
But Dell shouldn’t believe the threat; it is not credible, since it would
involve TruImage hurting itself with no opportunity for redemption.
Only the original outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium: a Nash
equilibrium in which no player can improve their outcome by changing
their decision at any decision node.
1. Existing firms
Example: Educational Testing Service administers the SAT ($51) and
GRE ($150) tests. The SAT has competition from the ACT, helping
keep its price low. The GRE has no similar competitor.
HUBBARD
ANTHONY PATRICK
O’BRIEN
MICROECONOMICS
FIFTH EDITION
GLOBAL EDITION
© Pearson Education Limited 2015
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
Monopolistic Competition:
13 The Competitive Model in
a More Realistic Setting
Chapter Outline and
Learning Objectives
13.1 Demand and Marginal Revenue for a
Firm in a Monopolistically
Competitive Market
13.2 How a Monopolistically Competitive
Firm Maximizes Profit in the Short
Run
13.3 What Happens to Profits in the Long
Run?
13.4 Comparing Monopolistic
Competition and Perfect Competition
13.5 How Marketing Differentiates
Products
13.6 What Makes a Firm Successful?
© Pearson Education Limited 2015 2 of 36
Perfect Competition vs. Monopolistic Competition
The perfectly competitive markets in the previous chapter had the
following three features:
1. Many firms
2. Firms sell identical products
3. No barriers to entry to new firms entering the industry
The first two features implied a horizontal demand curve for individual
firms, while the third implied zero long-run profit.
Monopolistically competitive firms share features 1. and 3.; but their
products are not identical to their competitors’.
So we expect monopolistically competitive firms to have zero long-run
profit, but not to face a horizontal demand curve.
0 $6.00 $0.00 ― ―
1 5.50 5.50 $5.50 $5.50
2 5.00 10.00 5.00 4.50
3 4.50 13.50 4.50 3.50
4 4.00 16.00 4.00 2.50
5 3.50 17.50 3.50 1.50
6 3.00 18.00 3.00 0.50
7 2.50 17.50 2.50 –0.50
8 2.00 16.00 2.00 –1.50
9 1.50 13.50 1.50 –2.50
10 1.00 10.00 1.00 –3.50
The first two columns show the Table 13.1 Demand and marginal
demand schedule for Starbucks. revenue at a Starbucks
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th caffè lattes Figure 13.4 Maximizing profit in a
monopolistically
each increase profit: MC < MR. competitive market
Table 13.2a The short run and the long run for a
monopolistically competitive firm
Table 13.2b The short run and the long run for a
monopolistically competitive firm
Table 13.2c The short run and the long run for a
monopolistically competitive firm
Although our model predicts zero economic profit in the long run, the
long run might be delayed indefinitely by innovative firms.
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Chapter 12
Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly
CHAPTER OUTLINE LIST OF EXAMPLES
12.1 Monopolistic Competition 12.1 Monopolistic Competition in the
12.2 Oligopoly Markets for Colas and Coffee
12.3 Price Competition 12.2 A Pricing Problem for Procter &
12.4 Competition versus Collusion: Gamble
The Prisoners’ Dilemma 12.3 Procter & Gamble in a Prisoners’
12.5 Implications of the Prisoners’ Dilemma
Dilemma for Oligopolistic 12.4 Price Leadership and Price Rigidity in
Pricing Commercial Banking
12.6 Cartels 12.5 The Prices of College Textbooks
12.6 The Authors Debate the Cartelization
of Intercollegiate Athletics
12.7 The Auto Parts Cartel
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Monopolistic Competition and
Oligopoly
Monopolistic competition Market in which firms can enter
freely, each producing its own brand or version of a
differentiated product.
Oligopoly Market in which only a few firms compete with
one another, and entry by new firms is impeded.
cartel Market in which some or all firms explicitly collude,
coordinating prices and output levels to maximize joint
profits.
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12.1 Monopolistic Competition (1 of 6)
The Makings of Monopolistic Competition
A monopolistically competitive market has two key
characteristics:
1. Firms compete by selling differentiated products that are
highly substitutable for one another but not perfect
substitutes. In other words, the cross-price elasticities of
demand are large but not infinite.
2. There is free entry and exit: It is relatively easy for new
firms to enter the market with their own brands and for
existing firms to leave if their products become
unprofitable.
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12.1 Monopolistic Competition (2 of 6)
Equilibrium in the Short Run and the Long Run
Figure 12.1 (1 of 2)
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12.1 Monopolistic Competition (3 of 6)
Equilibrium in the Short Run and the Long Run
Figure 12.1 (2 of 2)
A MONOPOLISTICALLY
COMPETITIVE FIRM IN THE
SHORT AND LONG RUN
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12.1 Monopolistic Competition (4 of 6)
Monopolistic Competition and Economic Efficiency
Figure 12.2 (1 of 2)
COMPARISON OF MONOPOLISTICALLY
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND
PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
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12.1 Monopolistic Competition (5 of 6)
Monopolistic Competition and Economic Efficiency
Figure 12.2 (2 of 2)
COMPARISON OF
MONOPOLISTICALLY
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND
PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIUM
Under monopolistic competition, price
exceeds marginal cost.
Thus there is a deadweight loss, as
shown by the yellow-shaded area.
The demand curve is downward-
sloping, so the zero profit point is to
the left of the point of minimum
average cost.
In both types of markets, entry occurs
until profits are driven to zero.
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12.1 Monopolistic Competition (6 of 6)
Is monopolistic competition then a socially undesirable market structure that should be
regulated? The answer—for two reasons—is probably no:
Usually enough firms compete, with brands that are sufficiently substitutable, so that no
single firm has much monopoly power. Any resulting deadweight loss will therefore be
small. And because firms’ demand curves will be fairly elastic, average cost will be close to
the minimum.
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EXAMPLE 12.1
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN THE MARKETS FOR COLAS AND COFFEE
The markets for soft drinks and coffee illustrate the characteristics
of monopolistic competition. Each market has a variety of brands
that differ slightly but are close substitutes for one another.
Blank
BRAND ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
Colas RC Cola − 2.4
minus 2.4
Blank
Blank
Blank
With the exception of RC Cola and Chock Full o’ Nuts, all the colas and coffees are quite
price elastic. With elasticities on the order of − 4 to − 8, each brand has only limited
monopoly power. This is typical of monopolistic competition.
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12.2 Oligopoly (1 of 11)
In oligopolistic markets, the products may or may not be
differentiated.
What matters is that only a few firms account for most or all
of total production.
In some oligopolistic markets, some or all firms earn
substantial profits over the long run because barriers to entry
make it difficult or impossible for new firms to enter.
Oligopoly is a prevalent form of market structure. Examples
of oligopolistic industries include automobiles, steel,
aluminum, petrochemicals, electrical equipment, and
computers.
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12.2 Oligopoly (2 of 11)
Scale economies may make it unprofitable for more than a
few firms to coexist in the market; patents or access to a
technology may exclude potential competitors; and the need
to spend money for name recognition and market reputation
may discourage entry by new firms. These are “natural”
entry barriers—they are basic to the structure of the
particular market. In addition, incumbent firms may take
strategic actions to deter entry.
Managing an oligopolistic firm is complicated because
pricing, output, advertising, and investment decisions involve
important strategic considerations, which can be highly
complex.
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12.2 Oligopoly (3 of 11)
Equilibrium in an Oligopolistic Market
In an oligopolistic market, however, a firm sets price or
output based partly on strategic considerations regarding the
behavior of its competitors. With some modification, the
underlying principle to describe an equilibrium when firms
make decisions that explicitly take each other’s behavior into
account is the same as the equilibrium in competitive and
monopolistic markets: When a market is in equilibrium, firms
are doing the best they can and have no reason to change
their price or output.
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12.2 Oligopoly (4 of 11)
Equilibrium in an Oligopolistic Market
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Nash equilibrium Set of strategies or actions in which each firm does
the best it can given its competitors’ actions.
Nash Equilibrium: Each firm is doing the best it can given what its
competitors are doing.
duopoly Market in which two firms compete with each other.
The Cournot Model
Cournot model Oligopoly model in which firms produce a homogeneous
good, each firm treats the output of its competitors as fixed, and all firms
decide simultaneously how much to produce.
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12.2 Oligopoly (5 of 11)
Figure 12.3
FIRM 1’S OUTPUT DECISION
Firm 1’s profit-maximizing output depends on how
much it thinks that Firm 2 will produce.
If it thinks Firm 2 will produce nothing, its demand
curve, labeled D1 ( 0 ) , is the market demand curve.
The corresponding marginal revenue curve, labeled
MR1 ( 0 ) , intersects Firm 1’s marginal cost curve
MC1 at an output of 50 units.
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12.2 Oligopoly (6 of 11)
REACTION CURVES
reaction curve Relationship between a firm’s profit-maximizing output and the amount it
thinks its competitor will produce.
Figure 12.4
REACTION CURVES AND COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM
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12.2 Oligopoly (7 of 11)
COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM
Cournot equilibrium Equilibrium in the Cournot model in which each
firm correctly assumes how much its competitor will produce and sets its
own production level accordingly.
Cournot equilibrium is an example of a Nash equilibrium (and thus it is
sometimes called a Cournot-Nash equilibrium).
In a Nash equilibrium, each firm is doing the best it can given what its
competitors are doing.
As a result, no firm would individually want to change its behavior. In the
Cournot equilibrium, each firm is producing an amount that maximizes its
profit given what its competitor is producing, so neither would want to
change its output.
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12.2 Oligopoly (8 of 11)
The Linear Demand Curve—An Example
Two identical firms face the following market demand curve P =30 −Q
Also MC =MC =0
1 2
then MR = ΔR ΔQ = 30 − 2Q −Q
1 1 1 1 2
Setting MR1=0 (the firm’s marginal cost) and solving for Q1, we find
Firm 1’s reaction curve: Q = 15 − 1Q
1 2 (12.1)
2
By the same calculation, Firm 2’s reaction curve. Q 2 = 15 − 1Q 2 (12.2)
2
Cournot equilibrium: Q = Q =10
1 2
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12.2 Oligopoly (9 of 11)
The Linear Demand Curve—An Example
If the two firms collude, then the total profit-maximizing quantity is:
then MR1 = ΔR / ΔQ = 30 – 2Q
Setting MR = 0 (the firm’s marginal cost) we find that total profit is maximized at
Q = 15.
If the firms agree to share profits equally, each will produce half of the total
output:
Q1 = Q 2 =7.5
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12.2 Oligopoly (10 of 11)
Figure 12.5
DUOPOLY EXAMPLE
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12.2 Oligopoly (11 of 11)
First Mover Advantage—The Stackelberg Model
Stackelberg model Oligopoly model in which one firm sets its output before other firms do.
Suppose Firm 1 sets its output first and then Firm 2, after observing Firm 1’s output, makes
its output decision. In setting output, Firm 1 must therefore consider how Firm 2 will react.
P = 30 – Q
Also, MC1 = MC2 = 0
Firm 2’s reaction curve: Q =15 − 21Q
2 1 (12.2)
We conclude that Firm 1 produces twice as much as Firm 2 and makes twice as much
profit. Going first gives Firm 1 an advantage.
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12.3 Price Competition (1 of 5)
Price Competition with Homogeneous Products—The Bertrand
Model
Bertrand model Oligopoly model in which firms produce a
homogeneous good, each firm treats the price of its competitors as fixed,
and all firms decide simultaneously what price to charge.
Let’s return to the duopoly example of the last section.
P = 30 – Q
MC1 = MC 2 =$3
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12.3 Price Competition (2 of 5)
Price Competition with Homogeneous Products—The
Bertrand Model
Now suppose that these two duopolists compete by
simultaneously choosing a price instead of a quantity.
Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand model results in both firms
setting price equal to marginal cost: P1 = P2 = $3. Then industry
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12.3 Price Competition (3 of 5)
Price Competition with Differentiated Products
Suppose each of two duopolists has fixed costs of $20 but zero
variable costs, and that they face the same demand curves:
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12.3 Price Competition (4 of 5)
Price Competition with Differentiated Products
CHOOSING PRICES
Firm 1’s profit: Π1 = P 1Q1 − 20 =12P 1 − 2P12 − 20
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12.3 Price Competition (5 of 5)
Figure 12.6
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EXAMPLE 12.2
A PRICING PROBLEM FOR PROCTER & GAMBLE
P&G’s demand curve for monthly sales: Q = 3375 P −3.5 (PU ) .25 (PK ) .25
Assuming that P&G’s competitors face the same demand conditions, with what price
should you enter the market, and how much profit should you expect to earn?
Table 12.2: P&G’S PROFIT (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS PER MONTH)
COMPETITORS (EQUAL) PRICES ($)
COMPETITORS (EQUAL) PRICES ($)
P& G’s
Price ($) 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80
1.10 − 226
minus 226
− 215
minus 215
− 204
minus 204
− 194
minus 194
− 183
minus 183
− 174
minus 174
− 165
minus 165
− 155
minus 155
1.20 − 106
minus 106
− 89
minus 89
− 73
minus 73
− 58
minus 58
− 43
minus 43
− 28
minus 28
− 15
minus 15
−2minus 2
1.30 − 56
minus 56
− 37
minus 37
− 19
minus 19
2 15 31 47 62
1.40 − 44
minus 44
− 25
minus 25
−6minus 6
12 29 46 62 78
1.50 − 52
minus 52
− 32
minus 32
− 15
minus 15
3 20 34 52 68
1.60 − 70
minus 70
− 51
minus 51
−34
minus 34
− 18
minus 18
−1minus 1
14 30 44
1.70 − 93
minus 93
− 76
minus 76
− 59
minus 59
− 44
minus 44
− 28
Minus 28
− 13
minus 13
1 15
1.80 − 118
minus 118
− 102
minus 102
− 87
minus 87
− 72
minus 72
− 57
minus 57
− 44
minus 44
− 30
minus 30
− 17
minus 17
$1.40 is the price at which your competitors are doing the best they can, so it is a Nash
equilibrium. As the table shows, in this equilibrium you and your competitors each make a
profit of $12,000 per month. If you could collude with your competitors, you could make a
larger profit. You would all agree to charge $1.50, and each of you would earn $20,000.
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12.4 Competition versus Collusion:
The Prisoners’ Dilemma (1 of 3)
In our example, there are two firms, each of which has fixed costs of $20 and zero variable
costs. They face the same demand curves:
Firm 1’s demand: Q1 =12 − 2P1 + P2
We found that in Nash equilibrium each firm will charge a price of $4 and earn a profit of
$12, whereas if the firms collude, they will charge a price of $6 and earn a profit of $16.
Π2 = P 2Q 2 − 20 = (4)[(12 − (2)(4) + 6] − 20 = $20
So if Firm 1 charges $6 and Firm 2 charges only $4, Firm 2’s profit will increase to $20.
And it will do so at the expense of Firm 1’s profit, which will fall to $4.
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12.4 Competition versus Collusion:
The Prisoners’ Dilemma (2 of 3)
PAYOFF MATRIX
payoff matrix Table showing profit (or payoff) to each firm given its decision and the
decision of its competitor.
Blank Blank
FIRM 2 FIRM 2
Blank Blank
Charge $4 Charge $6
Firm 1 Charge $4 $12, $12 $20, $4
Firm 1 Charge $6 $4, $20 $16, $16
prisoners’ dilemma Game theory example in which two prisoners must decide separately
whether to confess to a crime; if a prisoner confesses, he will receive a lighter sentence
and his accomplice will receive a heavier one, but if neither confesses, sentences will be
lighter than if both confess.
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12.4 Competition versus Collusion:
The Prisoners’ Dilemma (3 of 3)
Table 12.4 PAYOFF MATRIX FOR PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
Blank Blank
PRISONER B PRISONER B
Blank Blank
Prisoner A Confess
− 10, − 1 − 2, − 2
minus 10, minus 1 minus 2, minus 2
If Prisoner A does not confess, he risks being taken advantage of by his former
accomplice. After all, no matter what Prisoner A does, Prisoner B comes out
ahead by confessing. Likewise, Prisoner A always comes out ahead by
confessing, so Prisoner B must worry that by not confessing, she will be taken
advantage of. Therefore, both prisoners will probably confess and go to jail for
five years. Oligopolistic firms often find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma.
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EXAMPLE 12.3
PROCTER & GAMBLE IN A PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
We argued that P&G should expect its competitors to charge a price of $1.40 and should
do the same. But P&G would be better off if it and its competitors all charged a price of
$1.50.
Since these firms are in a prisoners’ dilemma, it doesn’t matter what Unilever and Kao do.
P&G makes more money by charging $1.40.
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12.5 Implications of the Prisoners’
Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing (1 of 4)
Does the prisoners’ dilemma doom oligopolistic firms to aggressive
competition and low profits? Not necessarily. Although our imaginary
prisoners have only one opportunity to confess, most firms set output
and price over and over again, continually observing their competitors’
behavior and adjusting their own accordingly. This allows firms to
develop reputations from which trust can arise. As a result, oligopolistic
coordination and cooperation can sometimes prevail.
Price Rigidity
price rigidity Characteristic of oligopolistic markets by which firms are
reluctant to change prices even if costs or demands change.
kinked demand curve model Oligopoly model in which each firm faces
a demand curve kinked at the currently prevailing price: at higher prices
demand is very elastic, whereas at lower prices it is inelastic.
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12.5 Implications of the Prisoners’
Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing (2 of 4)
Figure 12.7
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12.5 Implications of the Prisoners’
Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing (3 of 4)
Price Signaling and Price Leadership
price signaling Form of implicit collusion in which a firm
announces a price increase in the hope that other firms will follow
suit.
price leadership Pattern of pricing in which one firm regularly
announces price changes that other firms then match.
In some industries, a large firm might naturally emerge as a
leader, with the other firms deciding that they are best off just
matching the leader’s prices, rather than trying to undercut the
leader or each other.
Price leadership can also serve as a way for oligopolistic firms to
deal with the reluctance to change prices, a reluctance that arises
out of the fear of being undercut or “rocking the boat.”
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EXAMPLE 12.4
PRICE LEADERSHIP AND PRICE RIGIDITY IN COMMERCIAL BANKING
Figure 12.8
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EXAMPLE 12.5
THE PRICES OF COLLEGE TEXTBOOKS
Most textbooks sold in the United States have retail prices in the
$200 to $300 range. In fact even other microeconomics
textbooks—which are clearly inferior to this one—sell for nearly
$300. Publishing companies set the prices of their textbooks, so
should we expect competition among publishers to drive down
prices? Partly because of mergers and acquisitions over the last
decade or so, college textbook publishing is an oligopoly.
These publishers have an incentive to avoid a price war that could drive prices down. The
best way to avoid a price war is to avoid discounting and to increase prices in lockstep on a
regular basis. The retail bookstore industry is also highly concentrated, and the retail
markup on textbooks is around 30 percent. Thus a $300 retail price implies that the
publisher is receiving a net (wholesale) price of about $200. The elasticity of demand is low,
because the instructor chooses the textbook, often disregarding the price. On the other
hand, if the price is too high, some students will buy a used book or decide not to buy the
book at all. In fact, it might be the case that publishers could earn more money by lowering
textbook prices. So why don’t they do that? First, that might lead to a dreaded price war.
Second, publishers might not have read this book!
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12.5 Implications of the Prisoners’
Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing (4 of 4)
The Dominant Firm Model
dominant firm Firm with a large share of total sales that sets price to maximize profits,
taking into account the supply response of smaller firms.
Figure 12.9
PRICE SETTING BY A DOMINANT FIRM
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12.6 Cartels (3 of 5)
ANALYZING OPEC
Figure 12.10
THE OPEC OIL CARTEL
TD is the total world demand curve for oil, and SC is the
competitive (non-O PEC) supply curve.
O PEC’s demand D O PE C is the difference between the
two.
Because both total demand and competitive supply are
inelastic, O PE C’s demand is inelastic.
O PEC’s profit-maximizing quantity QOPEC is found at the
intersection of its marginal revenue and marginal cost
curves; at this quantity, O PE C charges price P*.
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12.6 Cartels (4 of 5)
ANALYZING CIPEC
Figure 12.11
THE CIPEC COPPER CARTEL
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12.6 Cartels (5 of 5)
As the examples of OPEC and CIPEC illustrate, successful
cartelization requires two things:
First, the total demand for the good must not be very price
elastic.
Second, either the cartel must control nearly all the world’s
supply or, if it does not, the supply of noncartel producers
must not be price elastic.
Most international commodity cartels have failed because
few world markets meet both conditions.
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EXAMPLE 12.6 (1 of 2)
THE AUTHORS DEBATE THE CARTELIZATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
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EXAMPLE 12.7
THE AUTO PARTS CARTEL
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R. GLENN
HUBBARD
ANTHONY PATRICK
O’BRIEN
MICROECONOMICS
FIFTH EDITION
GLOBAL EDITION
© Pearson Education Limited 2015
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
15 Monopoly and
Antitrust Policy
Chapter Outline and
Learning Objectives
This is often because of high fixed costs; in this example, the cost of
erecting power lines and transformers, for example.
the operation of several Clayton Act 1914 Prohibited firms from buying stock
in competitors and from having
firms in an industry, directors serve on the boards of
and enforced collusive competing firms.
agreements. Federal 1914 Established the Federal Trade
Trade Commission (FTC) to help
This helped prompt Commission administer antitrust laws.
Act
U.S. antitrust laws,
Robinson- 1936 Prohibited firms from charging
aimed at eliminating Patman Act buyers different prices if the result
collusion and would reduce competition.
promoting competition Cellar- 1950 Toughened restrictions on mergers
among firms. The most Kefauver by prohibiting any mergers that
Act would reduce competition.
important of these laws
are detailed here. Table 15.1 Important U.S. antitrust
laws
© Pearson Education Limited 2015 31 of 41
Making
the Did Apple’s e-Book Pricing Violate the Law?
Connection
When Apple introduced the iPad in 2010,
the prices of new e-books and bestsellers
increased from $9.99 to $12.99 or $14.99.
• The Justice Department claimed that
Apple had organized an agreement with
five large book publishers to raise the
price of e-books: “an old-fashioned,
straight-forward price-fixing agreement.”
At trial, Apple defended its pricing by
claiming it was using an agency-pricing
model similar to their iTunes store: allowing
publishers to set the price, and keeping
30% of the sales revenue.
• In the end, the judge sided with the
DOJ: Apple did indeed conspire with
publishers to raise e-book prices.
© Pearson Education Limited 2015 32 of 41
Mergers without Efficiency Gains
The Federal government is
particularly concerned about
horizontal mergers: mergers
between firms in the same
industry, as opposed to vertical
mergers between two firms at
different stages of the production
process.
• Such mergers are likely
enhance firms’ market power.
The graph shows such a merger,
increasing the price from the
competitive price (PC) to the
monopoly price (PM), and
resulting in deadweight loss.
Figure 15.6 A merger that makes
consumers better off
© Pearson Education Limited 2015 33 of 41
Mergers with Efficiency Gains
Firms seeking to merge typically
argue that the resulting larger
firm will have lower costs, and
hence be able to produce more
efficiently.
• Then even if they charge the
(new) monopoly price, the
result is an improvement for
consumers.
However, costs may not
decrease by as much as the
firms claim, resulting in
consumers being worse off.
• Economists with the FTC and
Department of Justice review Figure 15.6 A merger that makes
potential mergers one-by-one. consumers better off
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DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines
Economists and lawyers at the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission developed guidelines for themselves and firms to
use in evaluating whether potential merger was acceptable.
These include:
1. Market definition
2. Measure of concentration
3. Merger standards
Increase in HHI
Post-merger
HHI < 100 100 – 200 > 200
< 1,500 Challenge unlikely Challenge unlikely Challenge unlikely
But that raises the question: what price should the regulators choose?
• A price that makes the monopoly make zero profit?
• The efficient price that would maximize consumer welfare?
HUBBARD
ANTHONY PATRICK
O’BRIEN
MICROECONOMICS
FIFTH EDITION
GLOBAL EDITION
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CHAPTER
CHAPTER
12 Firms in Perfectly
Competitive Markets
Chapter Outline and
Learning Objectives
Market Structure
Perfect Monopolistic
Characteristic Competition Competition Oligopoly Monopoly
Number of firms Many Many Few One
Type of product Identical Differentiated Identical or Unique
differentiated
Ease of entry High High Low Entry blocked
Examples of • Growing • Clothing • Manufacturing • First-class
industries wheat stores computers mail delivery
• Growing • Restaurants • Manufacturing • Tap water
apples automobiles
The first and second conditions imply that perfectly competitive firms
are price-takers: they are unable to affect the market price. This is
because they are tiny relative to the market, and sell exactly the same
product as everyone else.
… or 15,000 bushels of
wheat, you receive the same
price per bushel: you are too Figure 12.1 A perfectly competitive
firm faces a horizontal
small to affect the market demand curve
price.
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How Is the Firm’s Demand Curve Determined?
Recall that
Marginal revenue: the change in total revenue from selling one more
unit of a product.
Marginal revenue is
constant and equal to price
for the perfectly
competitive firm.
It turns out that MC=MR is still the correct rule to use; it will guide us
to the loss-minimizing level of output.
1. Continue to produce, or
If the firm shuts down, it will still need to pay its fixed costs. The firm
needs to decide whether to incur only its fixed costs, or to produce
and incur some variable costs, but obtain some revenue.
The firm’s fixed costs should be treated as sunk costs, costs that
have already been paid and cannot be recovered, because even if
they haven’t literally been paid yet, the firm is still obliged to pay
them.
(P x Q) < VC
P < AVC
Additional firms will enter the market, attracted by the profit. Perhaps:
Price is $10 per box, and carrot farmers are breaking even.
Then demand for carrots falls. Price falls to $7 per box.
Sacha can no longer make a profit; she makes the smallest loss
possible by producing 5000 carrots: where MC = MR.
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The Effect of Economic Losses—continued
Since the long-run average cost curve shows the lowest cost at which
a firm is able to produce a given quantity of output in the long run, we
expect price to be driven down to the minimum point on the typical
firm’s long-run average cost curve.
In this chapter there are many supply curves described: the individual
firm’s supply curve, the market short-run supply curve, the market
long-run supply curve; do not confuse these.
The reasons for shutting down in the short run and exiting the market
in the long run are different: P<AVC for the short run, P<ATC for the
long run.