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The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2014

Science, Badgers, Politics: Advocacy Coalitions and

Policy Change in Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain
Martin Lodge and Kira Matus

Badgers represent one of the most controversial and hotly debated environmental issues in modern
Britain. This paper advances the study of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by examining the
limited extent to which extensive scientific research over a 15-year period changed the basic composition
and argumentation of different advocacy coalitions in a highly adversarial setting. Based on coding of
the media coverage over the period 1986–2013, this paper analyzes the composition of the advocacy
coalitions, their stability over time, and the limited extent to which learning took place in response to
scientific disputes. It also highlights how coalitions between actors with similar policy beliefs did not
form, highlighting the importance of the ACF and other policy processes to consider dynamics that go
beyond the individual subsystem under investigation.
KEY WORDS: advocacy coalitions, science, bovine TB, random control trial

Introduction

Badgers, a subspecies of the weasel family, represent one of the most-studied

environmental issues in modern Britain (Nature, October 16, 2012). The reason for
this extensive attention over the past two decades has been the suspected link
between badgers and tuberculosis (TB) in cattle. Scientific trials over a 10-year period
have cost approximately £50 million (and ended the life of roughly 11,000 badgers),
parliamentary debates and radio programs have regularly featured the badger, and
badgers also repeatedly “trend” on the UK Government’s e-petition system. For
example, at 10 p.m. on March 22, 2013, the “stop the badger cull” petition had
received 95 signatures over the previous hour.1 Debates about badgers involve
scientific disputes, conflicts between wildlife and farming interests, as well as con-
tributions by prominent individuals, such as Brian May from the rock band Queen
(himself an astrophysicist) and Princess Anne, the daughter of the real Queen
(herself a rare breed cattle farmer).
The politics of the badger centers on definitional battles over whether a system-
atic culling of badgers is likely to bring about a meaningful reduction of bovine TB.
Science has been utilized to inform the fate of the badger in multiple ways. A 10-year
trial and ongoing scientific studies have been conducted, scientists have fallen out

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368 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

over the interpretation of research findings, and politicians of different party colors
have justified their pet solutions by referring to “science.” Policy design utilized
scientific findings. Furthermore, policy change has occurred, following a change in
government in 2010.
Badgers therefore offer an ideal setting to consider the relationship between
science and policy through the perspective of the “advocacy coalition framework”
(ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Evolving advocacy over nearly 30 years
included intensive scientific activity that allowed for knowledge utilization at dis-
tinct moments of time, and regular recurrences of high salience politics. For some,
the call for “sound science” in policymaking represents an appeal to enhanced
rationality in decision making. For others (and the ACF), utilization of knowledge,
scientific and other, is part and parcel of the political game. After all, scientists are
political actors, different disciplines (and schools) have competing views as to causes
and potential solutions, and policymaking is about conflict over values. The
adversarial conflict between advocacy coalitions is said to illustrate how knowledge
is updated, how core beliefs shape arguments about policy approaches, and how
policy change comes about.
This paper explores the limited extent to which advocacy coalitions changed
regardless of the inputs of science at distinct moments. It does so by focusing on
public debate, as represented in the main UK print media, over the period 1986 (the
completion of a scientific study that condemned the then approach toward badger
culling) and March 2013 (the announcement that culling would start in June 2013).
This paper progresses in five steps. The next section sets out the key questions
underlying this paper. Then, the paper briefly introduces the badger policy domain.
The fourth section contains the methodology and empirical analysis, followed by an
analysis of the data in terms of the central hypotheses of the ACF. The conclusion
considers this paper’s wider implications.

Values, Science, and Advocacy Coalitions

As noted, badger politics in the UK provides a unique example of high politics

and animals. Unlike other animal-related policy areas where public attention peaks
due to anxieties about technological innovations (“Frankenstein foods”) or due to
primal fear of monsters and beasts (dangerous dogs), badgers involve the suspected
link to the spread of disease. This disease, bovine TB, affects the economic interests
of one well-organized group, farmers. Such a constellation resembles more general
wildlife–human conflicts over damage caused by wildlife. Although overall losses
may be relatively small, damage tends to be concentrated on a minority of farmers,
and, therefore, the potential for any given farmer can be catastrophic (Thirgood,
Woodroffe, & Rabinowitz, 2005, p. 26). Local resentment over these concentrated
losses has the potential to overshadow discussions of all other environmental con-
cerns. In recent years, the conservation-related restrictions on the ability to retaliate,
and alleviate, the conflict through the use of lethal force is said to have transformed
the competition between people and wildlife into a competition between people
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 369

and the institutions of environmental protection (Treves, Wallace, Naughton-Treves,

& Morales, 2006). Thus, the conflict between farmers in areas of the UK struggling
with the impacts of TB infections in their herds and the legal and societal institutions
charged with protecting the badger population has become highly contentious and
adversarial (Enticott, 2001; Fisher, 2013).
What role, then, does science play in influencing policy and politics in these
venues of high political contestation? As scientific findings emerge, how do actors in
the world of science, affected constituencies, politics, and bureaucracy respond?
Such questions are at the heart of the ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Of the
major models in the study of public policy, it, more than others (such as “multiple
streams” or “punctuated equilibrium” frameworks), has explicitly included science
in its model (Weible, 2008). Advocacy coalitions contain actors drawn from diverse
institutional settings (politics, bureaucracy, various scientific disciplines, journalists,
affected constituencies). These actors share an interest in a particular policy subsys-
tem, based on shared beliefs. Individuals are assumed to be boundedly rational,
updating their knowledge in a way that seeks to confirm basic beliefs or values,
unless disappointment or surprise experiences challenge existing belief systems.
Beliefs are said to consist of three tiers: core beliefs, core policy beliefs, and second-
ary beliefs. Secondary policy beliefs are updated in the light of new information.
Policy core beliefs may change in the light of new information that refutes earlier
assumptions. Core beliefs rarely, if ever, change.
Policy reflects the underlying assumptions of dominant advocacy coalitions.
Policy change occurs in the face of exogenous events (change in government, in
socioeconomic conditions, in public mood, or externalities arising from other sub-
systems), and endogenous developments, such as “new” knowledge, disappoint-
ment with existing practices, and successful conflict resolution (Weible, 2008). In
particular, degrees of conflict and the existence of particular fora are seen as critical
in explaining the likelihood of different advocacy coalitions coming to some form of
agreement. Others have noted the importance of “brokers” and “entrepreneurs” in
resolving conflict (Ingold & Verone, 2012; Mintrom, 2013; Nohrstedt, 2013).
Such brokers and entrepreneurs do not just perform boundary-spanning work
between coalitions, they also encourage collective action within advocacy coalitions
(see also Nowlin, 2011, p. 46; Szarka, 2010, pp. 837–40). After all, shared beliefs do not
necessarily imply coordinated action (Schlager, 1995). Accordingly, ACF-informed
work defines advocacy coalitions as requiring “non-trivial co-operation,” otherwise
the existence of shared beliefs are defined as “ally networks” (Weible & Sabatier,
2005, p. 183; see also Matti & Sandström, 2011).
ACF’s treatment of science in informing policy change links to wider debates
about the politics of expertise, especially how (social) research is incorporated in the
policy process where scientific knowledge has to compete with other forms of
knowledge (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979; Van Kerkhoff & Lebel, 2006) and where
different interpretations of knowledge utilization exist (Jasanoff, 1987; Weiss, 1989).
Critical attention has been drawn to the nature of scientific consensus as to what
qualifies as “evidence” and appropriate methodologies. Others emphasize different
self-perceptions of the appropriate relationship between politics and science (Ezrahi,
370 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

1980; Jasanoff, 1987; Pielke, 2007). In the context of the ACF-related literature, the
role of scientists in policymaking is said to vary depending on whether the policy
context is centralized, collaborative, or adversarial (Weible, 2008).
This paper explores an adversarial policy context, a context that is conventionally
identified with competing coalitions, fragmented authority, attempts at venue shop-
ping, and policies that assign clear winners and losers. Scientists are assumed to
associate themselves explicitly with particular coalitions rather than take on a
“brokering” or “neutral” role. British badger politics have taken place in an
adversarial context. However, in contrast to the ACF-related specifications, this
adversarial context is characterized by the concentration of governmental authority
in one ministry, thereby preventing venue shopping (regardless of its high politics
status), and by overall uncertainty over costs and benefits, given controversy over
policy options and underlying assumptions. The decision-making process has also
provided structures for the involvement of many different actors in a variety of
consultative and advisory roles, which may impact on the degree of formal coordi-
nation required for different positions to have influence in the policymaking process.
This paper thereby contributes to discussions about science and policy in general
and the development of the ACF more particularly in a number of ways (Nohrstedt,
2010; Weible, 2008; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). First, it explores three key
claims made in the ACF-related literature, namely (i) regarding the stability of
positions over time and the nature of knowledge utilization when scientific insights
become available; (ii) the question about whether policy change requires external
perturbation (such as a change in government); and (iii) about the way in which
actual coalitions coordinate or not (for overview of the evolving collection of ACF-
based hypotheses, see Weible & Sabatier, 2009; Weible, Heikkila, de Leon, & Sabatier,
2012). Before enquiring into these questions, the next section sets out the underlying
issues and changes in scientific knowledge. These changes form the bases for the
evolving argumentative contests between actors.

TB, Cattle, and Badgers

TB is caused by a bacterium (Mycobacterium). The variant Mycobacterium bovis

largely affects cattle, but can also infect other species, such as humans, llamas, deer,
and badgers. Traditionally, the risk to humans from contracting TB resulted from
poor animal husbandry and the consumption of unpasteurized milk. Estimates
suggested that TB caused by Mycobacterium bovis caused an annual 2,500 deaths and
50,000 new infections among humans in the UK during the early twentieth century
(Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs [DEFRA], 2010, p. 11; overall
UK death rates from TB fell since the 1920s).2 Pasteurization and the systematic
culling of TB-infected cattle reduced the occurrence of TB in livestock. By 1960, TB
had been largely eradicated, with numbers of infected cattle having been reduced to
0.2 percent from 40 percent in 1932 (Zuckerman, 1980, p. 2). However, it persisted in
the southwest of the UK and reemerged in the late twentieth century. By the late
2000s, 14.3 percent of herds in the South West were diagnosed with TB (6.4 percent
in the rest of England), costing government £63m (excluding research and develop-
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 371

ment) and requiring the slaughter of more than 25,000 cattle per year. DEFRA
estimates that the cost of TB control in England would rise to total £1 billion over the
following decade.3
Badgers are native to the UK and, population-wise, particularly prominent in the
southwest of Britain. Four to seven badgers form social groups, and live in setts
(underground tunnels). Badgers are nocturnal and poorly sighted. There is little
certainty about actual badger numbers. A survey in 1990 estimated the presence of
about 250,000 badgers in Britain; a later study in 1997 suggested a rise to 296,000
badgers. A different analysis based on “badger activity levels” suggested a growth in
population to 442,500 badgers (cf. DEFRA, 2005a). Uncertainty also exists regarding
the number of TB-infected badgers, whether TB-infection spread between setts or
not, and whether estimates offered reliable measures. Some estimates noted an
average of 16.6 percent of the total badger population that was TB-infected in areas
where bovine TB was said to be endemic. Later studies using more extensive post-
mortem examinations doubled that particular estimate (DEFRA, 2010, p. 26).
Badgers enjoy special legal protection, largely in response to accusations of
farmer cruelty and badger baiting activities (fights between dogs and badgers that
were originally outlawed in the UK under the 1835 Cruelty to Animals Act) (for
cultural history, see Barkham, 2013). Consolidating legislation of 1992 (the Protection
of Badgers Act), prohibited the killing, injuring, or taking of badgers, as well as the
interference of badger setts, and any cruel ill-treatment of badgers. The Ministry was
granted licensing powers for the exercise of exempt powers.4 Badgers were also
covered by the Bern Convention on Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural
Habitat that required governments to justify targeted eradication programs. In addi-
tion, TB-related European legal provisions informed policy, in particular regarding
the prohibition of the sale of TB-vaccinated cattle.5
Apart from its privileged legal status, the policy image of badgers is informed by
their prominent place in fiction literature. The generally benevolent character of the
“good badger” (Cassidy, 2012) has been established most famously in Kenneth
Grahame’s famous The Wind in the Willows, where the reclusive “Mr. Badger” is
associated with wisdom and bravery. This widely positive image required ministe-
rial officials to refer to TB-carrying “rogue badgers,” as noted by Wyn Grant in his
research on ministerial files (see Grant, 2009, pp. 563–64).
The debate about the contribution of badgers to the presence of TB in cattle
emerged in 1971 when a deceased TB-infected badger from a TB-affected dairy
farm was taken to the then Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF)’s
Animal Health Office in Gloucester (Zuckerman, 1980, p. 3). This incident gave
credence to the argument that TB was not just a matter of cattle-to-cattle transmis-
sion, but one where the wider wildlife “reservoir” seemed to matter. Farmers, in
particular, have long regarded badgers as TB carriers and have conducted their
own killing activities. The actual transmission mechanism has, however, remained
a matter of controversy.
Concern about inhumane killing methods led to the passing of the Badgers Act
1973. It granted MAFF the power to issue licenses to kill badgers. At this time, the
first “badger protection societies” are said to have emerged (Zuckerman, 1980, p. 7).
372 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

Later legislation, the 1975 “Conservation of Wild Creatures and Wild Plants Act,”
granted MAFF staff (or delegated parties) the exclusive power to kill badgers in
control areas, as specified by the Badgers (Control Areas) Order 1977. Official
culling, which began in 1975, was conducted by gassing setts once the existence of TB
in badgers had been identified (see Stuart & Wilesmith, 1988, p. 932).
Continued debate about whether badgers should be blamed for the spread of TB
and whether gassing was an inhumane culling method led to the first scientific
review by Lord Zuckerman in 1979.6 This review (Badgers, Cattle and Tuberculosis)
considered how transmission of TB between badger and cattle might occur
(Zuckerman, 1980, p. 94). Participants of that review reported that they had con-
cluded that 300,000 tubercle bacilli were present in 1 cc of badger urine and that one
mouthful of grass was likely to represent an infective dose (The Times, February 6,
1999). The review identified badgers as a likely source of bovine TB. Continued
gassing was recommended. The review’s findings attracted immediate criticism and
were seen as representing little else than a reconfirmation of MAFF’s preferred
policy option (New Scientist, 1980, p. 619). Criticism was not so much centered on
whether badgers were responsible for transmitting TB. Instead, it was disputed that
the review had actually proven transmission (i.e., whether it constituted scientifically
acceptable findings), and whether the advocated solution, a return to gassing, was, in
fact, increasing the number of infections. Gassing was said to have had no noticeable
effect in terms of an overall decline in TB in cattle across Britain (i.e., there was said
to be no measurable difference in relative herd incidence rates between gassing and
non-gassing areas). Moreover, it was argued that badger TB had declined before
MAFF had started its gassing policy.
In 1982, gassing was discontinued in favor of live cage trapping and shooting as
levels of hydrogen cyanide were said to be too low to cull badgers humanely in their
setts (Stuart & Wilesmith, 1988, p. 932). Instead, a “clean ring strategy” was operated
in which badgers were trapped and examined, with trapping being extended until
only uninfected groups could be found. A subsequent review led by Professor
Dunnet advocated “some form of badger control” as an “interim strategy” until
sufficient data and a live diagnostic test for badger TB was available (Dunnet &
McInerney, 1986, para. 108–11). Thereafter, culling was restricted to areas where TB
incidents in farms had occurred and where badgers were suspected to be the
primary cause of transmission. This “interim strategy” lasted from 1987 to 1997.
Subsequently, TB in cattle increased and spread. A trial with a live badger diagnostic
test was abandoned in 1996.
In the face of growing claims, especially from farmers, that TB-infected cattle
represented a serious problem and an increasing burden on government resources,
the then Conservative government established a policy review, chaired by Professor
John Krebs (a zoologist), in 1996. This group recommended that the link between TB
in cattle and badgers should be established “scientifically” through randomized
culling trials (DEFRA, 1997; Krebs, 1997). More promising, according to the Krebs
Report, however, was to invest in the development of a vaccine for cattle and to
advance husbandry methods. An “Independent Scientific Group on Cattle TB” (ISG)
was established to supervise the conduct of the trials (labeled the “Randomised
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 373

Badger Culling Trial” [RBCT]). The group contained a number of scientists that had
participated in the Krebs review.
The subsequent trials covered 30 areas and initially involved reactive and pro-
active culling strategies, as well as a “control” group. They took nearly 10 years, cost
£50 million, and were marred by a number of problems. The first was that the trials
were rolled out over time rather than introduced simultaneously, as the Krebs Report
had suggested. The second problem occurred when the outbreak of foot and mouth
disease in 2001 led to a suspension of trials and monitoring attempts. Bovine-TB
cases increased substantially following the foot and mouth outbreak. The third
problem required the suspension of the reactive culling trial, as reactive culling areas
witnessed an increase in cattle TB outbreaks by 27 percent. This increase was seen as
evidence of the so-called perturbation effect. This effect suggests that badgers, as
social animals, are disturbed when parts of their sett are being exterminated. In
response, badgers migrate and intermingle with different badger setts, contributing
to a suspected increase in TB transmission among badgers.
The interim results of the trials noted that proactive culling was associated with
a reduction of 19 percent of bovine TB in the cull area, but with a 29 percent increase
in the immediate neighbouring area (up to 2 km outside the cull area) (Donnelly
et al., 2003). The interim conclusion of the scientific experts, therefore, was that an
effective culling strategy would require a sustained culling program over large
territories with effective natural boundaries (such as large roads and bodies of
water). It was argued that such an approach lacked feasibility. In response, “pro-
badger” groups argued that the trials had proven that culling was not an effective
strategy in reducing TB in cattle. In contrast, farmers and veterinarians argued that
the trials offered conclusive proof that culling, if conducted properly, should be
facilitated. In 2005, a further study, the Godfray Review, noted that the trial should be
continued as, despite the interruption due to the foot and mouth outbreak, scientific
findings were still feasible and that the findings from the reactive culling trial should
be discarded (DEFRA, 2005a, 2005b).
The final conclusions, published in 2007 by the ISG, stressed the significance of
the perturbation effect (Donnelly et al., 2006). Proactive culling had reduced TB
incidents by 23.2 percent, but increased TB in the “2 km ring” outside the culling
area by 24.5 percent. Badgers were identified as one source of transmitting TB to
cattle. However, “[the] overall conclusion is that after careful consideration of all the
RBCT and other data presented in this report, including an economic assessment,
that badger culling cannot meaningfully contribute to the control of cattle TB in
Britain” (ISG, 2007, p. 181, 10.92). Instead, key resources were to be channeled into
researching and reducing cattle-to-cattle transmission (ISG, 2007). This recommen-
dation proved controversial, in terms of the definition of “meaningfully,” in terms of
whether the findings of the trials were actually supporting this conclusion (especially
given the significance attached to, and the quality of, the “economic assessment”),
and whether scientists should take such a proactive stance rather than leave policy
recommendations to politicians.
Unknown to the ISG, the chief scientific advisor to the government, Professor
David King (a chemist), convened another group of scientists. His conclusions,
374 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

based on the trials’ results, contradicted those of the ISG’s concluding report
(King, 2007). He argued that badger “removal,” in addition to other methods,
should be pursued, but only in areas of sufficient scale, and where it could be
ensured that culling could be continued on a sustained basis. The chair of the ISG,
Professor John Bourne, criticized, in a parliamentary select committee hearing,
King’s response as “hastily written,” “superficial,” and “selective” (Guardian,
October 25, 2007). Furthermore, Bourne et al. (2007, ISG4) noted that the King
review’s remit had not included “practical” issues, and also identified “a large
number of scientific problems with their report, which have led them to draw
conclusions from our work which are not consistent with the data available.”
King’s conclusions were also criticized in a leader in Nature (November 1, 2007,
pp. 1–2). King responded, highlighting that his position had emerged in consulta-
tion with other scientists and did not reflect political or interest group pressure
(Nature, November 15, 2007, p. 346). It was said that King’s response was triggered
by unease about the strength of the policy conclusions. A later review of that and
subsequent research, published in 2011, suggested that if 70 percent of badgers in
a large area could be killed, then bovine TB could be reduced by up to 16 percent.
This figure was seen by some, such as the Badger Trust, as evidence that culling
was not effective. The National Farmers’ Union (NFU), in contrast, regarded a
reduction of 16 percent as significant (DEFRA, 2011c).
The responsible Labour minister, Hilary Benn, decided, in 2008, to establish a
new advisory group, and not to pursue a culling policy regarding badgers. This
governmental decision noted that the practicalities of a culling program were too
problematic in the light of the uncertain outcome. Instead, development of vaccines
was to be encouraged. This decision was criticized by the NFU, but welcomed by the
Badger Trust and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(RSPCA).
Policy change occurred after the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government
had taken office in 2010. It announced, in May 2010, that a “carefully managed and
science-led policy of badger control” should be introduced after further consultation
(HM Government, 2010, p. 18; also FERA, 2010). This proposal was backed by
DEFRA’s chief scientific advisor (Boyd & Gibbens, 2012). It suggested that farmers
should cull badgers at their own expense, in areas of at least 150 km2. Licenses would
be issued that would allow for cage-trapping and the shooting of “free-running”
badgers (DEFRA, 2011a, 2011b). These proposals were supported by the NFU and
the British Veterinary Association. Questions were raised about the viability of
relying on a shoot-to-kill policy and the need to maintain a regular culling program
over time to achieve at least a 70 percent reduction in badger numbers. A further
consultation was launched.
Science remained divided. David King continued his support for a culling
strategy. In contrast, John Krebs argued that culling was not effective (Nature,
October 16, 2012). Other academics wrote a letter to the Observer, arguing that it
was impossible to know badger numbers in advance. This made the 70 percent
target highly problematic (Observer, October 14, 2011). The government announced
its intention to allow for culling to commence in December 2011. To be granted the
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 375

right to cull, farmers were required to fulfill enhanced husbandry control provi-
sions, the areas were to cover 150 km2, and the cull was to be conducted over 4
years. Further guidance was issued regarding, for example, shooting (DEFRA,
2012a). Continued criticism regarding the scientific basis of the culling decision
was raised, although government scientists argued that the government’s approach
had the backing of “15 years of intensive research” (see Farmers Guardian, October
18, 2012).
In the meantime, the Welsh Labour-Plaid Cymru government in 2008
announced a TB eradication program that would have included a limited badger
cull. This program was, however, stopped in a Court of Appeal hearing. The subse-
quent 2011 Assembly election victory of the Labour Party led to a single-party
government and the establishment of a scientific policy review. Subsequently, the
culling program in Wales was, on the basis of a “science led approach,” replaced by
a “trapping and vaccination” policy (Farmers Guardian, March 2012). This, in turn, led
to the resignation of one (former Welsh chief) scientist, Professor Chris Pollock, from
the Welsh TB eradication board as he supported a mixed approach including culling
instead of the reliance on an “untested” vaccination only approach.7 The NFU, the
former Plaid Cymru minister, the Welsh Conservatives, as well as the President of
the British Veterinary Association expressed their opposition to this announcement.
The UK government’s culling policy witnessed equal delay. UK agriculture
minister Owen Patterson (who as shadow spokesperson had already spearheaded
his own campaign in favor of badger culling) announced in October 2012 that culling
had to be postponed until 2013. Key problems were the uncertain number of badgers
and the anticipated policing numbers required to police badger culling. Farmers
argued that actual numbers of badgers had proven to be much higher than earlier
estimates, therefore requiring far more extensive culling than had been initially
assumed. Furthermore, police resources had been over-employed already (the
Olympics/Paralympics), and poor weather required farmers’ attention. Subse-
quently, two regions witnessed 6-week culling-by-shooting trials, beginning in Sep-
tember 2013. These trials ran into further difficulties as fewer badgers than planned
were shot, leading to ministerial statements that badgers had “moved the goal-
posts,”8 and the decision to extend the trial by a further 8 weeks. The conclusion of
these trials led to a further ministerial statement in April 2014 that the “cull by
shooting” trials would not be extended to further regions as they had proven
ineffective and generated concern about their humaneness. Vaccination surrounding
“high TB incidence” areas was to be commenced. However, the existing trials were
to be continued—without oversight.9 Princess Anne, in turn, advocated the return to
gassing.10
In sum, therefore, the debate involved a number of recurring dimensions. One
was whether badgers were actively spreading bovine TB (as a “reservoir”) or
whether they were contracting bovine TB from cattle without returning “the favor”
at a later point.11 Related was the debate as to whether the contribution of the badger
to spreading bovine TB was outweighed by cattle-to-cattle transmission. This then
led to a further dimension of the debate, namely which measures should be taken to
address the spread of bovine TB, and, therefore, whether, and if so, how, badgers
376 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

should be culled, or whether more emphasis should be placed on cattle surveillance.

There was, however, also some enhanced knowledge, mostly about the perturbation
effect. Disputes have continued over the policy implications of the perturbation
effect, as well as its long-term effect.

Methodology and Empirical Analysis

Exploring Advocacy Coalitions

To assess the way in which science has been utilized in policy debates and actual
policy, ACF offers an insightful framework to explore learning across time, espe-
cially in the light of highly contested, value-driven disputes. Badgers should offer an
ideal example, after all, it represents an area where there have been regular updates
of scientific knowledge, at a level, i.e., a 10-year trial that costs approximately £50m,
that is, to our knowledge, unique in the contexts of studies interested in the inter-
action between science and public policy.
Following on from our earlier discussion of ACF, we are therefore interested in
these three central questions
1. Do advocacy coalitions remain stable over time, as ACF would predict? Further-
more, do new insights emerging from scientific knowledge get utilized in sec-
ondary policy arguments rather than in changes in core policy beliefs?
2. Do advocacy coalitions in terms of “nontrivial” collective action emerge or does
advocacy remain at the level of “ally networks”?
3. Does policy change seem to be informed by the utilization of science over time,
or is it a consequence of a change in government without evidence of an impact
in a change in scientific knowledge?
We explore these questions by looking at the constellations of advocacy coalitions
across a 27-year period, between April 1986 and March 2013. The chosen time period
offers maximum insights into learning over time. It begins with the “interim strat-
egy” in 1986, and it concludes with the announcement of the commencement of the
badger culling program in 2013. We used Nexis UK and accessed UK broadsheet
newspapers’ coverage on the search terms “badgers AND bovine TB” (Guardian,
Times, Independent, Daily Telegraph, and their Sunday equivalents: Observer, Sunday
Times, Independent on Sunday, and Sunday Telegraph). These newspapers reflect the
political spectrum, and they also capture the range of biases in the badger debate.
Our coding of the data resulted in 854 “Actor Arguments,” from a total of 728 articles
from April 1986 through April 2013. These emerged from a process in which the two
coauthors independently read the articles and extracted claims made by different
actors from them. The claims were entered into a spreadsheet, involving the actual
claim, the actor, the source, and the date of the claim. The claims were then inde-
pendently coded according to categories set out below. Coding was conducted
iteratively, which allowed for regular comparison and discussion in order to ensure
consistent coding across the sample. In addition, we conducted a series of interviews
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 377

with departmental civil servants, ministers, interest representatives, and scientists

involved in cattle TB and badger research to advance our understanding of the
underlying decision-making process and the scientific approaches taken to explore
bovine TB transmission.

Data

As Figure 1 shows, the badger cull increased in salience significantly over the
time period. This is particularly evident post-2010, which coincides with the change
of government in the UK from Labour to the Conservative-Liberal Democrat
Coalition.
Within each article, we extracted the actors and their arguments. We did not
code for generic actors such as “supporters” or “opponents,” nor did we record
journalists’ summaries of key facts.12 For each actor, we were interested in two sets
of arguments (Table 1):
1. Support or opposition for badger culls (representing core policy beliefs).
2. If opposed, the justification for the opposition (indicating core and secondary
policy beliefs).
We also aggregated the actors into 13 “Actor Groups” (see Table 2). The number of
observations in these groups varied in size from 3 (Welsh Labour Government) to 186
(Animal Rights Activists). The latter include the highly active “Badger Trust.”
“Farmers” include individual contributions by farmers, as well as, and more signifi-

Figure 1. Time Distribution of Arguments.

378 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

Table 1. Categories of Variables

Support Cull? Justifications for Opposition

(Policy Core Belief) (Core/Secondary Policy Belief)
Support Inefficiency
Oppose Welfare
Perturbation

Table 2. Actor Groups

Actor Group Observations

Animal Rights Activists 186
DEFRA 38
Environmental Advocates 16
Farmers 120
Government-Conservative 106
Government-Labour 73
Government-Wales-Conservative 7
Government-Wales-Labour 3
Government Scientists 54
Independent Scientists 143
Media 62
Parliament 4
Other 42

cantly, the NFU. Government-Conservative and Government-Labour also includes

statements by politicians from these parties while they were in opposition. Some-
what surprisingly, Liberal Democrats hardly feature in these debates.
Finally, in order to see whether arguments and/or actor coalitions have shifted
over time in response to scientific interventions, we divided the period into four time
sets. The time set is based on the RBCT, and has four periods: the Pre-RBCT (1986–
1997), Early RBCT (1997–2001), Late RBCT (2001–2008), and Post RBCT (2009–2012).
We chose 2001 as a break point because the severe outbreak of foot and mouth that
year disrupted the trial and had severe impacts on the UK cattle industry (which has
shaped much of the debate around cattle policy since then).

Analysis and Discussion

Our analysis has three parts: establishing whether coalitions have remained
stable over time, determining whether secondary policy beliefs changed to reflect
changes in the science, and whether policy change seems to be informed by the
utilization of science, or instead as a consequence of changes in party (or minister) in
government. We consider the wider implications of our analysis, in particular regard-
ing the role of scientists in adversarial policy settings, in the conclusion.
Question 1: Do coalitions remain stable over time, and do new insights emerging
from scientific knowledge get utilized in secondary policy arguments rather than in
changes in core policy beliefs?
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 379

Figure 2. Cull Support by Actor Groups.

On the overall issue of whether actors change from support to opposition, the
picture is largely one of stability. The major exception to this is the Labour Govern-
ment, which switched from being marginally supportive of the cull in the early part
of the RBCT trial period, to being against the cull during the later phases of the trials,
and the periods after the findings were released. This reflects statements from par-
ticular Labour ministers (i.e., the shift does not just represent a different set of
Labour politicians). We have plotted the proportional support and opposition for the
cull on the parts of the largest actor groups according to the scientifically based time
periods (see Figure 2). It should be noted that for many of the groups, there are
members advocating differing positions. Even members of the Conservative Party,
which have very little variation in the data set, did demonstrate some amount of
internal dissent by voting (and in some cases arguing) against the cull in the October
2012 Parliamentary vote. But other than the media (which is nearly evenly balanced
in all periods), each group displays a majority opinion. If anything, actor groups
(excluding the media) have become increasingly polarized in the latest time period,
converging in relative terms on either supportive or opposition positions. Overall,
therefore, the core coalitions have remained stable over time. New groups have
become active during the period of study. For example, independent scientists (i.e.,
scientists not directly employed by government) were largely quiet in early periods,
but became increasingly vocal, and increasingly in opposition to culling plans, at the
end, and after, the RBCT. The two sides that most epitomize the debate—the animal
rights advocates and the farmers—have remained stable in their overriding position
on badger culling policies. The expectation of ACF, namely that the lineup of actors
remains stable, is therefore confirmed.
380 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

The badger cull debate was not simply about whether or not to cull. There were
a variety of secondary policy elements present in the debate. One way to gauge how
knowledge was utilized at the secondary level is to look at the justifications for
opposing the cull. There are three main lines of argument. The first is the “ethical”
discourse—that culling of badgers is inhumane, and bad for animal welfare. The
second is a “rational choice” discourse, which centers on the efficiency—including
effectiveness and cost—of badger culling. The third argument is the “risk” discourse,
which emphasizes that certain types of culling can actually create a perturbation
effect that increases levels of TB in the areas surrounding the cull.
If there has been some amount of “updating” in light of scientific findings as a
result of the trial, then this should be picked up by both the efficiency argument, but
even more so if there is the emergence of a strong argument about the risks of
perturbation. In this case, many of the critiques are centered not around the cull per
se, but about potential side effects. Therefore, these critiques are about the method of
the cull, in this case, the size and types of areas, the percentage of the badger
population culled, and the cull’s duration. In other words, the risk of culling, and the
difficulty in setting and implementing the right parameters, are reasons for opposi-
tion, regardless of positions on animal welfare. This argument focuses on very
specific policy details. It is also an example of a coalition in an adversarial policy
subsystem using arguments about risk to boost their case by linking actions to
potentially negative outcomes (Weible, 2008). It allows certain actors to move beyond
the ethical arguments about whose welfare should be prioritized (badgers? cattle?
farmers?) and to focus on policy details and expected impacts. This is also the case
with efficiency arguments, which encompass debates about how to weigh the costs
of culls and the costs of TB outbreaks, in monetary and quality of life terms, and how
best to invest limited government resources.
Figure 3 gives some degree of support to the idea that secondary policy beliefs
are updated after the conclusion of the RBCT. The efficiency argument gains
strength toward the end of the RBCT and as its results are released. Perturbation
as an issue only emerged in 2003, in the midst of the trial (as would be expected,
as the result was unexpected prior to that point). As a ratio of justifications given
for opposing the cull, perturbation arguments increased from 8 percent at the end
of the RBCT, to 23 percent in 2010 and 2011, and 36 percent in 2012 (the last full
year in the data set). All three justifications show clear increases in the post-2010
period, and especially in 2011–2012, as the issue gained media salience and the
number of overall dissenting arguments increased. Some of this may be a result of
the overall increase in attention to the issue by the press. But it also supports
arguments largely driven by politics. Arguments using the perturbation effect
increased to 14 percent in 2008, after the RBCT results were released, and then
went back to 0 in 2009, once the Labour policy of no-culling was confirmed. They
only increased again (and quickly) once the government signaled its intention to
introduce a culling policy in 2010 and 2011. So the increase in that argument, as
well as a similar uptick in inefficiency arguments, could very well be part of an
overall strategy to mobilize scientific findings to support a position. Notably, very
few of the arguments actually suggested specific changes to the policy that would
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 381

Figure 3. Justifications for Opposing the Cull.

overcome the potential perturbation effect (though there were a handful, such as
the use of barriers).
One other interesting observation is that the argument about animal welfare has
increased even more than the perturbation. In many cases, it is deployed in tandem
with efficiency arguments. For example, Brian May and “Team Badger” have used
this combined argument to gain traction with the British public. Their February 27,
2013 statement is indicative of this approach:

The Government’s determination to go ahead with the badger cull this

summer once again proves how misguided and out of step with scientific
fact and public opinion it is on this issue. Culling badgers is not the answer
to eradicating bovine TB. Not only is the practice inhumane and impractical.
It is also proven to be ineffective in tackling the disease, as has been made
repeatedly clear by all the leading scientific experts.13

The data about justifications for opposing culling are not definitively supportive of
secondary learning on its own. However, the justifications that support culling,
especially by DEFRA and the Coalition Government, do provide an indication that
they have responded to some of the major findings of the RBCT. First, DEFRA,
reporting from a meeting with nine independent scientists, suggested that the per-
turbation effect disappears in the long term, and emphasized the effectiveness of
culls that take place over large regions, for at least four years, targeting 70 percent or
382 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

more of the badger population (DEFRA, 2011c). DEFRA subsequently made it clear
that their policy was following these guidelines, and the “U-turn” in October 2012
was, at least according to DEFRA spokespeople, the result of rapidly increasing
population estimates and concerns on the part of the NFU that it would not be able
to ensure that a large enough population could be culled before the onset of winter
(DEFRA, 2012b). The focus on these features of the cull demonstrates some amount
of policy learning, though DEFRA has not taken on board the recommendations of
the importance of trap-and-shoot culls to minimize cruelty and disruption, and to
ensure that animals were actually culled.
Question 2: Do advocacy coalitions in terms of “non-trivial” collective action
emerge or does advocacy remain at the level of “ally networks”?
A case covering a period of decades has the potential to shed light on the nature of
interaction between advocates of the same (or different) positions. One could
hypothesize that as contentious issues gain political salience as areas of active policy
implementation, actors may have incentives to move from the casual alignment of
ally networks and to engage in more organized collective action. In this case, this
could also include the explicit alignment of scientists with particular actor groups,
such as the anti-culling animal welfare groups, or actively working in concert with,
and support of, the National Farmer’s Union.
In the case of badger culling policy in the UK, there is limited evidence that
allied actor groups organized themselves in more formal ways to engage in collective
action. At least in terms of the media record, different actor groups continued to
pursue their own activities. Within particular actor groups, there has been some
consolidation, such as the creation of the Badger Trust, which acts as an umbrella for
many of the smaller, locally based anti-culling groups. There are also umbrella
organizations, such as Wildlife and Countryside Link, which have active members
from animal welfare, as well as environmental activist groups. More specifically,
Team Badger14 has similarly linked animal rights and environmental activists to
lobby politicians, increase public support (such as signing the anti-cull e-petition),
and similar activities. But this is the largest example, and it is unclear as to whether
it is, at this moment in time, more than a formalized ally network. Campaigns by
different actors (such as the RSPCA) remain largely separate operationally, and there
is not, as of yet, much in the way of evidence that these groups are sharing significant
financial resources or capacities. In the case of scientists, a number of academics have
spoken out against the pilot culls. However, they have not actively associated with
different groups opposed to the cull, even when they have come forward as a group
to voice an opinion on policy proposals and actions. Similarly, those independent
scientists and veterinarians in support of the cull have voiced support in terms of the
science to back given policies, but have not engaged in joint actions with any other
actor groups.
Given the length of the time over which different actors have been arguing over
this particular issue, the fact that more collective action has not emerged is somewhat
puzzling. There are, however, a number of explanations that could explain the
continuation of a structure of loose allies, as opposed to denser collaborations. One
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 383

explanation is the nature of policy decision making. First, this is a case of adminis-
trative policymaking—not legislation. In such cases, the target for each group is
clear—the Minister of the Environment (and the civil service below him or her).
There is no need to lobby individual MPs, which leaves actor groups free to concen-
trate their resources on a relatively concentrated target within DEFRA. Furthermore,
throughout the decision-making process, DEFRA has had structures in place to
actively bring the positions of different actors into the ministry’s decision making.
There have been traditional consultations, scientific advisory panels (such as the
Bovine TB Eradication Group for England), and during the RCBT, an advisory group
that included a variety of experts and interests including the NFU, NGOs, and
scientists. In other words, access to DEFRA has been relatively low cost for many
organizations, and there have been a multitude of opportunities for engagement.
The departmental nature of this issue may therefore have reduced the incentives
to organize in more formal ways, since there would be little expected pay-off from
formal structures to pool resources and capacity. There is also a secondary issue, in
that the actors in the cattle TB controversy do not interact solely within this particular
subsystem. DEFRA and the NFU interact over a range of policy actors, and farmers
have been shown to have a general distrust of DEFRA (Fisher, 2013). Similarly, other
groups that may agree around support or opposition to the cull may have notable
policy disagreements in other areas. As such, actors must consider not just this
particular issue, but the wider constellation of issues in which they are working.
Formal alliances that would have some amount of pay-off in this system may have
significant drawbacks, reputationally and otherwise, in other venues. For example,
for scientists, there is the prospect of negative professional repercussions if they are
seen as being actively engaged with interest groups, as opposed to supporting (or
opposing) a particular policy based on the strength of their scientific expertise and
familiarity with the knowledge base.
Question 3: Is policy change the result of changes in scientific knowledge or changes
of government?
On first glance, the change in government from Labour to the Coalition had a major
impact on the policy—from a ban on culling to the establishment of a pilot cull.
Similarly, in Wales, the change from a Labour/Plaid Cymru coalition (with a Plaid
Cymru minister in charge of the [badger-covering] environment portfolio) to a
Labour single-party government resulted in the reverse: cancellation of pilot culls,
and the establishment of a pilot badger vaccination program. In neither case did the
underlying science change to any appreciable measure, nor did any new alternatives
(i.e., a legal cattle vaccine or an oral badger vaccine) become available. The major
change in both cases followed a change in government following an election. Fur-
thermore, in the case of policy in England, the decision to go forward with pilot culls
came despite an increasingly vocal group of independent scientists—the same ones
who ran the RBCT, who very loudly opposed plans to cull. Despite the weight of
scientific opinion, as well as increasing opposition on the part of the public, it
appears that the coalition government was most concerned with the opinions of the
NFU.
384 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

Despite the very clear case for politics as the underlying driver of policy change,
there is an interesting caveat that comes from careful inspection of the Labour era.
The Labour government supported the original RBCT, though they banned any
culling for the duration of the trials. Once results emerged, Labour moved forward
with a set of measures that did not include culling, concluding that it was not
effective enough to proceed. So there was no policy change in that sense. But before
the RBCT, Labour was at least willing to entertain the possibility of a cull. The
arguments do show that during the period of the RBCT, Labour supported the cull
by a small margin. However, since the release of the Krebs report, Labour has been
clearly opposed. This may be at least partial evidence of some amount of policy
shaped by scientific learning, though it is far from clear-cut.

Conclusions

The debate surrounding badger culls and the control of bovine TB illustrates the
challenges of science-based policy in highly political venues; it demonstrates the
limits of continually doing more research, and the degree to which uncertainty about
the impacts of interventions is not resolved, and may even grow, with increasing
knowledge (Gross, 2010). In the case of British badgers, the science has not been
without impact. But, as the ACF framework would predict, this impact has led to
some changes seen on secondary rather than core policy beliefs. Furthermore, over
the 27-year period of this study, which has included the development of a body of
scientific knowledge and changes in government, the coalitions of actors have
remained remarkably stable. This includes very little change on the part of farmers—
the group who bears the most concentrated impacts of the policy, and thus the
highest interest in an effective TB reduction program. This has important implica-
tions for other areas of environmental policy. The calculus of policy decisions at the
highest levels, despite professions of the importance of science-based policy by
successive UK governments, is weighted toward the political. The impacts of this are
likely to be especially pronounced in areas of high uncertainty, where the science
(and the uncertainty surrounding it), can be used to support a multitude of positions.
Even if the science were able to give more precise estimates of the impacts of
large-scale culling, it would be unable to answer the fundamental issue as to whether
a 16 percent (or 9 percent or 25 percent) reduction in cattle TB, with its benefits for
the well-being of cows and the livelihoods of farmers, justifies the costs of the policy,
in pounds, in badgers, in other approaches forgone, and in the public mind-set.
The badger case also contributes to the study of the ACF. First of all, in line with
expectations, we find that core policy beliefs remain stable among actor groups.
There is only one group—the Labour Party—that becomes more uniformly skeptical
about culling. In the UK policy case, this was particularly expressed by opposition to
the “free shooting” approach chosen by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition.
Disagreement and utilization of knowledge largely take place at the secondary policy
belief level, namely when it comes to justifying why culling should not be conducted
(“perturbation effect”) or in terms of justifying why culling may be justified (“16
percent”). The state of badger culling policies shows that there is some amount of
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 385

integration of scientific findings into policy at a secondary level. This is evident in the
attention being paid to some of the details of the pilot cull design (though not the
actual method of killing), as well as through complementary policies, including
stricter testing requirements and movement controls, especially in infected areas,
and some amount of investment into cattle vaccines.
Second, exogenous change leads to policy shift. In both the cases of the UK and
the Welsh governments, it is a change of party in government and ministerial office
that led to policy change. These changes made reference to science, but there was no
emergence of particular sources of knowledge that delegitimized one position rather
than others. These are examples of policy shifts based on a calculation that puts
some, but not all, of the weight on the scientific evidence.
Third, the badger case also contributes to discussions about coalitions and the
role of scientists within them (Weible, 2008). Against expectation that adversarial
settings should see scientists play an active role among the rival coalitions, the
badger case displayed contestation among scientists, but this did not involve the
joining of activist groups on either side. More generally, it might be argued that actor
group constellations, while stable, do not indicate the existence of “non-trivial
co-operation.” From a traditional ACF perspective, the badger case might be said to
be all about rival ally networks, but not about actual coalitions. There were no
noticeable entrepreneurs or brokers that sought to join up different groups.
In response, the badger case suggests that a parsimonious distinction between
coordination and thus the presence of advocacy coalitions on the one hand, and the
mere presence of ally networks on the other, requires modification. The absence of
“non-trivial co-ordination” in the badger case can be explained by departmental
politics. The badger case remained within one venue that was structured through the
processes organized by the relevant ministerial department (DEFRA). This meant
that actor groups were granted access to government without requiring organized
collective action in terms of coalition-building. The one exception was the formation
of “Team Badger,” a set of animal rights groups (such as the League against Cruel
Sports and the RSPCA). Farmers were well-represented. However, the NFU did not
create a coalition, partly due to its privileged access within government (Smith, 1993).
At the same time, the farmers also showed remarkable skepticism about cooperating
with any other party, including DEFRA. This distrust is said to have arisen from
other badger-unrelated issues (Fisher, 2013). Thus, the focus on subsystem
(“badger”) politics, as advocated by ACF and other policy frameworks, may be
missing an important dimension: conflicts on other issues and in other subsystems
may lead to a reluctance of actors to form coalitions. In other words, while focusing
on subsystems does indicate “where the action is” it comes at the potential disad-
vantage of missing out on important related battles and relationships that influence
decisions to form actual coalitions. Actors are involved in iterative relationships
across subsystems, and therefore are not engaged in “subsystem” politics only.
In addition, scientists did not join these actor groups: Scientists had access
through the trial and, subsequently, through consultation and other working groups.
Farmers (through the NFU) and animal organizations (the Badger Trust) also
enjoyed access to working groups. In other words, the resources granted to different
386 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

actors meant that they were well-represented without having to form coalitions.
Their participation went therefore beyond that of an ally network, without display-
ing “non-trivial co-operation”: They were coordinated through governmental pro-
cedures and processes.
Furthermore, the lack of “non-trivial co-operation” involving scientists can also
be explained by the position of “science” itself. Scientists disagreed on some aspects
of the conduct of the trial. However, the main source of disagreement was about
interpreting (evolving) findings, and on the policy recommendations, not the scien-
tific merit of the trial itself. Science was not a unitary actor. There was little disagree-
ment, post RCBT, on the fact whether badgers were somehow involved in the
transmission of TB to cattle; there was, however, disagreement on whether culling
was an effective strategy. They were, again, not involved in debates regarding culling
methods. Thus, apart from being well-represented in decision making in govern-
ment, the level of agreement on the scientific merit of the trial meant that scientists
showed little interest in committing to one coalition or the other. Furthermore, there
was also an issue about role perception. Across scientists, interviews revealed a
tendency to argue that “science” was to offer information for political choices, but
that “science” was not supposed to establish clear policy recommendations. This
reflected, therefore, a view of the “detached” scientists who would offer evidence
and knowledge, but who would also expect that other political issue to be taken into
consideration.
In short, the absence of coalitions can be explained by the presence of politics
that go beyond the specifics of the subsystem, by the privileged access enjoyed by
actor groups that reduced the incentive to coordinate behavior, and by the self-
perception of scientists in not wishing to appear as political actors (in terms of taking
positions that would go beyond those justified by the “science”).
This study cannot claim to be exhaustive in its findings: Its evidence base is
limited to that of the extensive media coverage on the badger issue. Statements in the
media bring with them their own biases, and, by focusing primarily on established
actors and associations, it reduces the likely heterogeneity of views among actors.
Media opinion is also no substitute to wider public opinion polling, which did not
exist on a systematic basis over time (one NFU-sponsored yougov poll of May 2013
found that 34 percent were opposed, 29 percent in support of culling, and 37 percent
“indifferent”). Both sides of the argument claimed that the poll revealed that they
had majority backing for their preferred option.15
In short, the badger case offers considerable insights for the study of advocacy
coalitions: it provides a unique setting of a policy issue that has been discussed for
nearly three decades, with regular “interventions” by science, stable coalitions, and
some policy learning. However, it also highlights controversy among scientists and
policy change that seems to be largely based on government change. At the time of
writing, the fate of the badgers and the cows remained to be seen. Rates of TB have
been stable and dropping. The culls that began on June 1, 2013 and had to be
prolonged as badger killings remained below target were accompanied by protest-
ing animal rights groups and celebrities that sought to disrupt the culls (by playing
heavy metal music, in particular “Slayer,” as one advocate promised16). The results of
Lodge/Matus: Bovine Tuberculosis Policy in Britain 387

these culls seems to have put an end to extending the “shoot by sight” method;
however, the call for “vaccination” and, by Princess Anne and others, for gassing as
a “much nicer way of doing it,”17 suggests that the issue is far from settled.

Martin Lodge is professor of political science and public policy, Department of

Government and Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of
Economics and Political Science.
Kira Matus is assistant professor in public policy and management, Department of
Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Notes

1. Parts of this paper were drafted during that particular Friday night. A total of 180,983 signatures had
been received at the Web site at that particular time (http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk). This was also the
second badger-related petition to garner enough signatures to trigger a mandatory nonbinding
Parliamentary debate and vote on October 25, 2012, where MPs voted 147 to 28 to abandon the cull.
2. http://www.hpa.org.uk/Topics/InfectiousDiseases/InfectionsAZ/Tuberculosis/
TBUKSurveillanceData/TuberculosisMortality/TBMortality01trend/ (last accessed June 11, 2014).
3. http://www.defra.gov.uk/animal-diseases/a-z/bovine-tb/ (last accessed June 11, 2014).
4. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/51/contents (last accessed June 11, 2014).
5. 78/52/EC applying to national animal-related TB eradication policies, 64/432/EEC on trade of
diseased cattle and swine, and 853/2004 on food hygiene.
6. Zuckerman was a former chief scientific advisor to the government. He was seen as key actor in
reorganizing the UK government’s approach toward the environment, especially pollution (see Lowe,
1975).
7. “Top scientist resigns over Welsh badger cull U-turn,” Farmers Guardian, April 27, 2012, http://
www.farmersguardian.com/home/livestock/top-scientist-resigns-over-welsh-badger-cull-u-turn/
46570.article, last accessed October 7, 2013.
8. “Badgers ‘moved goalposts’ says Owen Paterson,” BBC News, October 9, 2013, http://www.bbc.co
.uk/news/uk-england-24459424; last accessed October 27, 2013.
9. “Badger cull expansion after the trial failure,” BBC News, April 3, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
science-environment-26868650, last accessed April 7, 2014.
10. “Princess Anne: Gassing badgers is the most humane way to kill,” BBC News, April 5, 2014, http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-26888406, last accessed June 11, 2014.
11. The latest research suggested that badgers were responsible for 38–54 percent of all cattle TB;
however, that direct badger to cattle transmission occurred in 5.7 percent of all cases—the rest being
caused by further cattle-to-cattle transmission (see Donnelly & Nouvellet, 2013).
12. All “Media” arguments are either from media figures quoted in an article, or from op-ed columns to
which a particular position can clearly be attributed to the author.
13. http://www.teambadger.org.uk/, accessed March 30, 2013.
14. Organizations that are part of Team Badger include: RSPCA, League Against Cruel Sports, Humane
Society International/UK, Save Me, Stroud 100, Gloucestershire Against Badger Shooting, Animal
Aid, Network for Animals, IFAW, The David Shepherd Wildlife Foundation, Blue Badger (Conserva-
tives against the Badger Cull), Born Free, Care for the Wild, International Animal Rescue, and PETA.
http://www.teambadger.org.uk/about_teambadger.html. Accessed December 29, 2013.
15. http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/xfmldpkgmt/YG-Archive-NFU
-results-100513-badger-cull.pdf (last accessed June 3, 2013).
16. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/27/badger-cull-bovine-tuberculosis (last
accessed June 3, 2013).
388 Policy Studies Journal, 42:3

17. “Princess Anne: Gassing badgers is most humane way to cull,” BBC News, April 5, 2014, http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-26888406, last accessed June 11, 2014. DEFRA was considering gassing in
light of suggested scientific advances regarding anoxic rather than cyanide gasses. Critics pointed to
the intricate sett design that prevented a measured application of gassing.

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