The British in Banjarmasin: An Abortive Attempt at Settlement 1700-1707

Author(s): R. Suntharalingam
Source: Journal of Southeast Asian History , Sep., 1963, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Sep., 1963), pp. 33-
50
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History,
National University of Singapore

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 THE BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN:
AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT AT SETTLEMENT
1700 ? 1707
R. SUNTHARALINGAM

Early in July 1698 the royal assent was received to an Act of

Parliament which sanctioned the formation of a corporation,
called the General Society, whose subscribers were vested with
exclusive rights to trade in the East. The 'New' Company obtain
ed its Royal Charter in September 1698 under the name of 'The
English Company Trading to the Indies' and it was to supercede
the 'Old' Company which was given a three-year grace to wind
up its business. The 'Old' Company was expected to liquidate
its East Indian assets, dismantle its Asian factories and recall its
servants by September 1701.1
The 'New' Company was seeking profitable trading connexions
in the East and immediately its attention became focused on the
China trade. It was generally believed that China was a huge
market, capable of absorbing large quantities of British manu
factures. Moreover, China was expected to furnish a variety of
goods in which the Company could profitably invest. These
hopes compelled the directors of the 'New' Company to consider
the establishment of permanent factories in China, and in 1699,
a China Presidency was formally constituted.
The desire to develop trade with China elevated Borneo to a
position of importance to the Company. A half-way station be
tween India and China became a necessity, and Borneo, partly
by virtue of its geographical position but largely on account of
it being on the periphery of Dutch interest, became the obvious
choice. In April 1699 Henry Watson and Captain Cotesworth
were furnished with instructions to establish a factory at Banjar
masin, a mission successfully accomplished in the following year.2
It is with the fortunes of this factory that this paper is primarily
concerned.

1. The dismantling of the 'Old' Company's establishments in the East, however,

never took place. In 1702, discussions led to a fusion of the 'Old' and the
'New' Company and the union became operative in 1709. See Harihar Das,
The Norris Embassy to Aurangzib (1699-1702), (Calcutta, 1959), pp. 40-57.
2. Johannes Willi of Gais, The Early Relations of England with Borneo to 1805,
(Langensalza, 1922), p. 11.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN
I

The Sultanate of Banjarmasin, one of the several coastal king

doms of Borneo, was located on the southeast of the island and
it exercised varying degrees of political control over the neighbour
ing potentates of Sambas, Sukadana, Landak, Kota Waringin,
Pasir and Kutei.3 It is difficult to conjecture when Banjarmasin
first emerged as an organised political entity, although in the four
teenth century it was listed as one of the dependencies of the
Majapahit empire. Its conversion to Islam took place in the
middle of the sixteenth century, inspired perhaps by Demak, to
which state it sent tribute as a sign of its vassalage.4 Despite the
scarcity of evidence, there is little doubt that Javanese influence
was preponderant in Borneo from very early times. According to
the Negarakertagama (1365) Landak, Sambas, Brunei, Sukadana
and Banjarmasin were recognised as dependencies of Majapahit,5
and with the collapse of the Majapahit, the powerful Javanese
coastal principalities seemed to have exercised sway over Borneo.
Demak became the inheritor of Majapahit power in Borneo, but
following its downfall, Javanese authority over Borneo appeared
somewhat tenuous. Pajang, which was fast replacing Demak in
central Java in the middle of the sixteenth century, received no
tribute from Banjarmasin. In 1615, the Javanese coastal state of
Tuban endeavoured to reimpose Javanese hegemony over Banjar
masin, a task which proved protracted and demanded the active
assistance of Madura. In 1619, Tuban itself succumbed to the
rising power of Mataram6 and it was now left to Sultan Agung
of Mataram (1613-1645) to revive Javanese hegemony in Borneo.
Javanese supremacy over Borneo was founded partly on econo
mic factors. Although Borneo was blessed with natural resources,
ranging from diamonds to dragon's blood, it was less capable of
attaining self-sufficiency in rice, the staple food of the Malay
world. In Borneo rice was mainly cultivated by the Dyaks of
the interior but their wasteful methods of cultivation left little
surplus for the coastal population. Java was the reputed rice
granary of the region and it largely met the demands of the coastal

3. Dr. C. Nagtegaal argues that in 1636 the authority of Banjarmasin spread over
Landak, Sambas, Sukadana, Kota Waringin and the whole east coast. See his
De Voormalige Zelfbesturende en Gouvernements-landschappen in Zuid-Oost
Borneo, (Utrecht, 1939), p. 4.
4. H. J. de Graaf, Geschiedenis van Indon?sie, (The Hague/Bandung, 1949),
p. 318.
5. B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part I, (The Hague/Bandung, 1955),
pp. 30-1.
6. H . J. de Graaf, De Regering van Sultan Agung, Vorst van Mataram 1613-1645.
En die van zijn Voorganger Panembahan Seda-Ing-Krapjak 1601-1613 (The
Hague, 1958), p. 279.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

states of Borneo. At the beginning of the seventeenth century

Japara was the leading outlet for rice in Java, although substan
tial quantities of rice were also shipped out from Tuban, Grise,
Demak, Tegal and Cheribon. The importance of rice as a poli
tical weapon was grasped by the Javanese rulers, who by judicious
control of rice exports, were able to enforce their hegemony over
Borneo. Attempts by the coastal states of Borneo to defy the
Javanese, or even irregularity in payment of tribute, would
provoke the Javanese to impose a ban on rice exports and thereby
bring the Borneo dependencies to their knees.7 Javanese posi
tion in Borneo was further strengthened by colonization. In the
beginning, these Javanese colonies were strung along the west
coast of Borneo, while Banjarmasin and the other southeast
potentates were largely neglected.8 However, with Mataram's
expansion over the Javanese ports in the early decades of the
seventeenth century, southeast Borneo also came within the orbit
of Javanese colonization. These colonies became focal points
for the radiation of Javanese culture and contributed towards
the establishment of Javanese influence in Borneo.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Banjarmasin was
gradually asserting its autonomy from Java, but this was strongly
resisted by Mataram. Having successfully subdued the Javanese
coastal states of Japara, Cheribon, Tuban and Grise Sultan Agung
turned towards Borneo. In 1622, he released his naval forces
against Sukadana which easily crumbled. Banjarmasin was the
next target and rumours were rife in 1631 of a projected Javanese
invasion and the Sultan of Banjarmasin was sufficiently alarmed
to accept a Dutch alliance in 1635. However, in 1637 Banjar
masin concluded peace with Mataram and agreed to pay tribute.9
Both Banjarmasin and Sukadana continued to acknowledge their
vassalage to Mataram for some years, but during the late 1650's,
tribute payments ceased and in 1661 Sukadana sought a defensive
and offensive alliance with Banjarmasin against Mataram. A
retaliation by Mataram was awaited in 1668 but it came to
nothing.10 During the 1670's Mataram became involved in the
first of its many civil wars and this ended whatever ambitions she
had of overseas expansion. Banjarmasin's independence from Java,
henceforth, was undisputed.
While the rulers of Banjarmasin were endeavouring to free
themselves from Javanese control, developments elsewhere accord
7. Such economic sanctions were also applied against the Dutch. See Schrieke,
op. cit., p. 75.
8. Schrieke, op.cit., p. 29.
9. H. J. de Graaf, De Regering van Sultan Agung, p. 279.
10. H. J. de Graaf, De Regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, Vorst
van Mataram 1646-1677, (The Hague, 1961), pp. 67-8.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

ed to this port a new status in the commercial world of South

east Asia. The annihilation of the Javanese harbour principali
ties by Mataram and its repressive commercial policies precipitat
ed Javanese migration to the neighbouring islands. A consider
able number of Javanese traders flocked to Borneo, and Banjar
masin received an increasing share of these Javanese refugees
after 1625.11 Equally important was the advent of Chinese traders
to Banjarmasin to purchase pepper. Patani and Bantam had
supplied the bulk of Chinese pepper demands, but in the early
decades of the seventeenth century, the Chinese found it increas
ingly difficult to secure regular pepper cargoes in these ports. In
Patani, pepper supplies dried up when the Ach?nese destroyed
the pepper gardens of Malaya, while Jambi, its other supplier,
found ready buyers in Dutch and English traders.12 In Bantam,
Dutch blockades seriously affected pepper supplies: in 1620-28,
the continuous Dutch blockade saw the Bantamese abandoning
pepper cultivation for subsistence farming. These events stimu
lated pepper production in Banjarmasin, where not only Chinese
but also Dutch, English, Portuguese, Danes, Javanese and Macas
sarese began to gravitate in increasing numbers. A combination
of fortuitous circumstances then elevated Banjarmasin to a posi
tion of an important emporium in the Malay Archipelago by the
middle of the seventeenth century.
European contact with Borneo began with the arrival of the
Portuguese in the sixteenth century. Portuguese trade with
Borneo was mainly confined to the west coast, from where they
shipped annually camphor, diamonds and bezoar stones.13 When
the Dutch and English traders arrived in Borneo, it was Sukadana
rather than Banjarmasin that first attracted their attention. At
this time, Sukadana enjoyed a reputation of yielding a 'great
store of diamonds', and it had become the sole outlet for the dia
mond mines of west Borneo. Here, the Chinese merchants played
a dominant role in the diamond trade, a situation that evoked
repeated complaints from the Dutch and the English traders. The
Chinese travelled to the diamond mines at Landak to purchase
the stones and sold them in Sukadana at arbitrary rates. The
Dutch opened a factory at Sukadana in 1608 and the British
factors arrived there in 1612. Competition was keen, especially
for the diamonds, and neither Company fared well. The Chinese
maintained their position as middlemen in the diamond trade
despite the efforts of the Europeans to by-pass them. In 1614,
11. A. Cense, De Kroniek van Bandjarmasin, (Santpoort, 1928), p. 117.
12. Schrieke, op.cit., pp. 54-5.
13. J. K. J. de Jonge, De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie (1595
1610), Part III, (Amsterdam, 1865), p. 158.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

the English attempted to open direct trade with Landak, but on

two occasions experienced failure.14 The culmination to their ill
fortunes came in 1622 when Sukadana was ravaged by Mataram.
The Dutch and English traders suffered heavy losses, and were
compelled to liquidate their factories.15
Although Sukadana was the centre of early attraction, Banjar
masin was not totally ignored. The Dutch had attempted to
establish commercial relations with Banjarmasin in 1606 but the
venture miscarried and a Dutch factor was murdered. The Ban
jarese conduct provoked the Dutch to take punitive measures and
in 1612 a Dutch fleet destroyed the Sultan's capital and compelled
him to establish a new one further up-river at Martapura.16
Understandably, relations between the Dutch and the Banjarese
remained unsatisfactory during the next few decades, until in
1635, when the fear of Mataram served to bring about a V.O.C.
? Banjarmasin rapprochement. A contract17 was signed between
the two parties, and Banjarmasin conceded the pepper monopoly
to the Dutch. The Dutch, in their turn, undertook to re-establish
the Sultan's suzerainty over the east coast states of Kutei and
Pasir. A Dutch expedition was immediately despatched to these
ports to enforce the Sultan's wishes. In November 1635, the
ruler of Kutei agreed to Dutch proposals of accepting Banjar
masin's suzerainty and denying trade to all except the Dutch and
the Banjarese.18 These promises were never kept and Kutei con
tinued to welcome Macassarese and Javanese traders. In Banjar
masin itself, the Dutch had failed to wTork out satisfactory rela
tions with the people. The main reason for Dutch-Banjarese
friction was the Dutch determination to enforce the monopoly
contract of 1635. The Banjarese, on the other hand, were reluct
ant to forego their lucrative trading connexions with European
and Asian traders and continued to offer their pepper to all buy
ers. This perhaps explains why the British came to occupy an
influential position in the court of Banjarmasin after 1635. The
Banjarese were hoping on British support in the event of a war
with the Dutch, and after 1637, Banjarese position vis a vis the?
Dutch further improved with the conclusion of peace with Mata
ram. The raison d'etre for a Dutch alliance was now lost, and a

14. Willi, op.cit., pp. 2-7.

15. It must be pointed out here that the decision to close the British factory at
Sukadana was already taken prior to the attack by Mataram. I am indebted
to Dr. D. K. Bassett for this reference.
16. Nagtegaal, op.cit., p. 4.
17. J. E. Heeres, 'Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum', Part I, (1596-1650),
Bijdragen tot de Taal-,Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie, (BKI).
57, 1907, pp. 270-1.
18. C. A. Mees, De Kroniek van Koetai, (Santpoort, 1935), p. 14.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

Banjarese-Dutch conflict appeared inevitable. Early in 1638 the

Dutch factories in Banjarmasin and Kota Waringin were attacked
and plundered, and the Company suffered losses estimated at
160,000 guilders. The Batavian government sought revenge and
imposed a series of blockades in an attempt to seal off Banjar
masin from the outside world. The blockades were unsuccessful
as the Banjarese found other ways to maintain relations with
foreign traders and eventually the blockades were lifted. Rela
tions remained strained for some years, and it was not until Dec
ember 1660, that a new agreement was signed between Banjar
masin and the Dutch. The Dutch again opened a factory at
Banjarmasin, and in May 1661 and September 1664 the monopoly
treaties19 were reasserted, though they appear to have conferred
few benefits upon the Dutch Company. The readiness on the
part of the Banjarmasin rulers to accept these monopoly contracts
could only be attributed to the fear of another Mataram attack,
but with the passing of that danger, they were happy to revert
to the old policy of opening Banjarmasin to all traders. In 1666
the Dutch factory at Banjarmasin was withdrawn when the Sultan
promised to send all pepper to Batavia.20
The English had first established a factory in Banjarmasin in
1615, but it probably went into liquidation soon after the out
break of Anglo-Dutch war in 1618.21 The Dutch blockade of
Bantam (1620-28), and the increasing importance of Banjarmasin
as a source of pepper, revived British interest in this quarter and
in 1635 the British again opened a factory. This step, however,
did not prove a crowning success. On the contrary, the English
factors contracted high debts, while competition from European
and Asian traders tended to hamper commercial operations. In
October 1650, the Court of Committees recommended the dis
solution of the factory, although it wished that an occasional vessel
be sent there to secure pepper.22 Their wishes were complied with
in 1651 when the Banjarmasin establishment was dismantled.23
19. For texts of these agreements see J. E. Heeres, 'Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando
Indicum', Pt. II, (1650-1675), BKL, 87, 1931, pp. 181-2, 186-8, 285-7.
20. For a concise account of Dutch-Banjarese relations in this period see J. C.
Noorlander, Bandjarmasin en de Compagnie in de Tweede Helft der 18de Eeuw,
(Leiden, 1935), pp. 3-12.
21. In 1618, the Banjarmasin factory was described as one of 'the needless factories'
W. Noel Sainsbury (Ed.), Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies,
China and Japan, 1617-1621 (London, 1870), p. 107.
22. Willi, op.cit., p. 8.
23. D. K. Bassett, 'The "Amboyna Massacre" of 1623', Journal Southeast Asian
History, I (2), September, 1960, p. 13.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN
II

The 'New' Company's settlement at Banjarmasin was conceived

primarily to facilitate the China trade. The 'Old' Company, had
shown a somewhat belated interest in the Far East,24 but the
sponsors of the 'New* Company were determined to develop a
more vigorous trade with China. Hopes were entertained of
establishing permanent factories in the leading Chinese ports,
while Cambodia and Tonkin were considered worthy of investiga
tion. In China, the directors wished to invest in silk, both raw
and finished, tea, porcelain, copper, silver and gold, a wide range
of goods which had a ready demand both in Asian and European
markets. Banjarmasin, on account of its geographical position,
was expected to be the intermediary station where the China
bound vessels would call for water and provisions and take shelter
in period of bad weather. Equally vital was Banjarmasin's ability
to supply suitable commodities for the China market. As Euro
pean manufactures had only limited demand in China, payments
for Chinese goods presented a problem. It was now anticipated
that Borneo products, namely pepper, dragon's blood, canes etc.
would resolve the problem, at least partially, and China-bound
vessels were expected to complete their cargo at Banjarmasin.
The directors of the 'New' Company, however, did not assess
the importance of Banjarmasin solely in the context of the
Company's China trade. They were equally anxious that this
factory should also serve the needs of the Company's Southeast
Asian trade. Located in the heart of the region, the directors
were confident that Banjarmasin would become an important
commercial centre. The European demand for pepper had re
mained remarkably stable throughout the seventeenth century,
and the directors wished to engross the entire produce of Banjar
masin, a determination which was reflected in the repeated orders
to their factors to sign a monopoly contract with the Sultan.25
Banjarmasin also offered a wide range of other products which
could be profitably sold in Europe and Asia. Of some significance
was the Chinese junk trade with Banjarmasin. The Chinese
made seasonal voyages, and at Banjarmasin they exchanged Chi
nese silk, copper and tea for Borneo products. The directors had
reservations about British participation in this trade, in view of
the direct trade with China, although orders were given to the
factors to purchase the Chinese goods when rates were reason

24. D. K. Bassett, 'The Trade of the English East India Company in the Far East,
1623-1684/ The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1960, pp. 32-47, 145-57.
25. Company to Council at Banjarmasin, 21 August, 1701. Java Factory Records,
(JFR), VIB, No. 31.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

able.26 The directors, however, appeared uncertain of the trade

in the lesser known commodities of the region, and were content
to give their factors a free hand to invest in any goods that the
latter thought profitable. Sugar and indigo were the two com
modities that caught the directors' interest, but as they were only
available in Dutch controlled Java, the English factors were
cautioned against any direct transaction. As regards the sales that
the Company hoped to make in Southeast Asia, the directors
appeared to be well informed. They placed little reliance upon
European manufactures, but sought to introduce Indian goods as
far as possible. The traditional demand for Indian piece goods
in the Malay world made it a safe investment for the Company,
and the Banjarmasin factory was instructed to keep the Company's
Indian factories aware of its demands. The directors appeared
keen to experiment in Indian opium, a commodity reputed to
have a growing demand in Southeast Asia.27 The importance of
finding suitable goods to barter for local produce was repeatedly
emphasised to the Banjarmasin factors, as the directors were re
luctant to make payments in bullion.
Henry Watson and Captain Cotesworth, commissioned by the
Company to establish the new factory, arrived at Banjarmasin in
April 1700. They had some difficulty in establishing contact with
the Banjarese authorities, and over a month passed before a meet
ing was arranged with the Sultan.28 In the negotiations that
followed the British sought permission to trade and erect a factory.
The Sultan was agreeable on condition that the Company paid
regular port charges. The port duty was fixed at $350/- per
vessel, and the Sultan consented to the British request to raise a
bamboo house which was to serve as their factory. As regards
the pepper trade, the British settlers expressed confidence in soon
persuading the Sultan to give the Company a complete mono
poly.29
The early months, though eventful, did not advance the inter
est of the Company at Banjarmasin. Henry Watson, who had
been made Chief of the Banjarmasin establishment, became a
source of embarrassment to the directors as he had fomented
differences among the English factors on board the ship and had
also "made himself a Laughing Stock to ye Dutch."30 In August
1701, Sylvanus Landen was appointed Chief, but he encountered

26. Instructions given by Thomas Rodgett to Capt. Stacy, 13 January 1702. JFR,
VIB, No. 22.
27. Company to Council at Banjarmasin, 21 August 1701. JFR, VIB, No. 31.
28. Willi, op.cit., p. 11.
29. Company to Council at Banjarmasin, 29 August 1701. JFR, VIB, No. 34.
30. Company to Council at Banjarmasin, 21 August 1701. JFR, VIB, No. 31

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

difficulties with his Council. Landen instituted proceedings

against some members of the Council "for debts and intercep
tions" and the members of the Council, in their turn, levelled
counter-charges against Landen for arbitrary conduct. These
differences culminated in the confinement of some members of
the Council and Landen thus had a free hand to difect affairs
of the Banjarmasin factory.
Relations with the Banjarmasin rulers proved unsatisfactory.
The available documents do not shed much light as to why the
Banjarese turned hostile to the British factors, except for the fact
that the Sultan objected to the British employing a large number
of Macassarese soldiers to guard their factory. Open hostilities
broke out in the late months of 1701, and the fighting continued
intermittently for four months. Banjarmasin town was destroyed
by the Banjarese themselves, while Tatas, lying six miles further
up-river, also went up in flames. The Sultan retired with his
followers to Kota Tinggi, his last stronghold, but its seizure by
the British forced him to sue for peace. The Company was in a
position to dictate terms, and the Sultan conceded its demands
in a new treaty which he signed. The Sultan agreed to compens
ate the Company for the loss of its warehouse, and undertook
to pay the debts contracted by his brother. The British were
allowed to re-establish their factory and were accorded full rights
to conduct trade so long as they paid the port charges.31 But the
British triumph was short-lived. Soon after the conclusion of
peace, the Banjarese gathered their forces, and launched an attack
upon one of the Company's ships in the harbour. Fearing a full
scale Banjarese onslaught, Landen decided in March 1702 to dis
mantle the Banjarmasin factory and withdraw to Batavia.32 Thus
ended the first phase in British-Banjarese relations during the
period under review.
In April 1702, the Macclesfield Frigate arrived at Batavia from
London on its way to Banjarmasin. The Chusan Council under
President Catchpoole, which at this time was holding temporary
residence in Batavia,33 was unable to verify the events at Banjar
masin, and it was resolved that the Macclesfield Frigate should
proceed to Banjarmasin as instructed by the directors. Henry
Rouse and Robert Master, of the Chusan Council, were to accom

31. Willi, op.cit., pp. 12-3.

32. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 21 July 1702. JFR, VIB, No. 56.
33. Allen Catchpoole was appointed President of the 'New' Company's China Presi
dency in 1699. He endeavoured to establish his headquarters at Chusan, but
experienced great difficulties, and in January 1702 he was ordered to leave
Chusan. He retired to Batavia, and it was under his express instructions that
Banjarmasin was resettled. James Bromley Eames, The English in China,
(London, 1909), pp. 51-4.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

pany the vessel to facilitate the settlement of affairs at Banjar

masin. They were instructed to re-establish the Banjarmasin
factory if the previous one had indeed been "broak up", but if
that was not possible, they were to procure a suitable cargo for
the speedy return of Macclesfield Frigate to England.34 Early in
May, the vessel sailed for Banjarmasin and on the way it ran into
the ship Borneo which was carrying Landen and his party to
Batavia. Landen "could not be prevailed with to return" to
Banjarmasin, and the Macclesfield Frigate continued its voyage
to Borneo. Banjarmasin was reached early in June, and the
Banjarese accorded the new arrivals a cold reception. After some
persuasion, the Sultan consented to British trading at Banjarma
sin. For the privilege, however, he demanded $1,000/- per vessel
as port charges, and also made demands of compensation for arms
allegedly seized by Landen.35 After much argument, the port
duty was fixed at $500/- per vessel36 and the Sultan dropped his
demands for compensation. Permission was obtained to build
a few sheds to store fresh water and goods, but no attempt was
made to erect a permanent factory. Loading of the Macclesfield
Frigate started in August, and in December 1702, it left for Bata
via on the first leg of its journey to England carrying a pepper
cargo of 280 tons.37
With the departure of the Macclesfield Frigate, Thomas Tooly
assumed charge of the British factory at Banjarmasin. Tooly had
been a member of Landend Council, and was among those found
guilty by Landen on charges of financial duplicity. The directors,
however, reversed Landen's judgment, cleared Tooly, and appoint
ed him Chief of Banjarmasin factory. He arrived at Banjarmasin
in August 1702 on the Panther, but Rouse and Master refused
to acknowledge him as Chief. After some discussion, Tooly
agreed not to "Insist on any Superiority", but to discharge res
ponsibility jointly with Rouse and Master.38 Friction, however,
was unavoidable, especially as rival ship commanders competed
for pepper. Rouse and Master were determined to despatch the
Macclesfield Frigate at the earliest juncture and had requested
Tooly to refrain from purchasing pepper for the Panther. Tooly
ignored the request, and instructed Captain Robinson of the
Panther to start purchasing pepper.39 The arrival of another
34. Consultation held by Council of Chusan at Batavia, 25 April 1702. JFR,
VIB, No. 6.
35. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 21 July 1702. JFR, VIB, No. 56.
36. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 3 August 1702. JFR, VIB, No. 68.
37. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 25 November 1702. Sumatra Factory
Records, (SFR), VI.
38. Tooly to Rouse and Master, 11 September 1702. JFR, VIB, No. 94.
39. Rouse and Master to Tooly, 21 October 1702. JFR, VIB, No. 138.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

English vessel, the Frederick in November 1702, intensified com

petition among the English traders. In 1703, the Dutch showed
an interest in Banjarmasin pepper when they instructed their
agents to purchase what was available. Moreover, Chinese junks
began to resort to Banjarmasin in increasing numbers, and the
growing competition only tended to raise the price of pepper.40
Relations between the Banjarese and the British were cordial
for a while. Despite Landend behaviour, the Sultan showed little
animosity towards the British traders. Indeed, he appeared anxi
ous that the English should continue trading in his dominions,
as he realised that foreign trade was vital for the prosperity of
the state. The Banjarmasin rulers adopted the policy of trying
to encourage as many foreign nations to trade at Banjarmasin
as possible, provided they did so peacefully. After 1702, the Bri
tish factors were careful not to alienate the Banjarese by any act
of aggression, and through the judicious distribution of presents,41
they hoped to achieve security of life and property and maximum
profits. Tact, moderation and presents secured for the British
certain commercial privileges, such as the right to expand their
factory42 or to go into the interior districts to purchase pepper.
In January 1705, Thomas Joyner became Acting Chief of
Banjarmasin factory, and immediately relations with the Banjarese
took a turn for the worse. Joyner was ruthless and dishonest in
his dealings with the local traders, and showed contempt for the
laws of the land. He openly encouraged the Macassarese soldiers
to commit thefts and plunder. When charges were levelled against
the Company's soldiers, Joyner preferred to ignore them. Even
more provoking was the protection that Joyner gave to certain
pirates, notably a Macassarese prince, who made vague claims to
the throne of Banjarmasin. Chinese junks passing the Company's
factory were interrupted by Joyner to levy tolls. He also showed
little restraint in his desire for women, and he engaged agents to
procure them for his growing harem.43 Such acts only incited
Banjarese hostility, and in May 1705, Joyner reported a Malay
design to attack the British factory.44 A further indication of
Banjarese hostility was the gradual severance of commercial
transactions with the British factors, and soon supplies of pepper
and other goods to the Company began to diminish.45 These
40. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 23 December 1703. SFR, VII, f.7.
41. In March 1704, the Banjarmasin Council resolved to present the Old Sultan
a clock and the Young Sultan a bridle and a saddle. Banjarmasin Council
to company, 23 March 1704. SFR, VII, f.2.
42. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 30 September 1704. SFR, VII, f.13.
43. William Griffith to Company, 30 August 1705. SFR, VII, ff. 23-4.
44. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 28 May 1705. SFR, VII, f. 16.
45. Henry Barre to Company, 4 February 1706. SFR, VII, ?. 26.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

events drove Joyner to a state of desperation. In August

1705, he addressed an urgent plea to the directors to send more
men and supplies to strengthen Banjarmasin factory against any
attack.46 Fortunately for the Company, Henry Barre arrived in
Banjarmasin in September to assume command of the British
factory, and it fell upon him to restore harmonious relations be
tween the British and the Banjarese.
Barre's immediate attention, on assuming charge of the Banjar
masin factory, was devoted to conciliating the Sultan and restoring
Banjarese confidence in the Company. The first approach was
made towards the Sultan, who was asked to persuade his subjects
to bring pepper to the Company's warehouse. The response was
not immediately favourable, and except for vague promises, the
"dilatory" attitude continued to characterise the Sultan's policy
towards the British.47 But Barre was not easily discouraged, and
by resorting to presents and flattery, the Sultan and his subjects
were gradually won over. Within three months after his arrival
at Banjarmasin, the Company's pepper trade was restored, and
the suspicions of the Banjarese allayed. Barre also distrusted the
Macassarese soldiers, and exercised strict control over their activ
ities.48 Joyner, now a member of the Banjarmasin Council, conti
nued to be a source of embarrassment for the Company, and Barre
described his harem as 'a Scandal thro out India.'49
The desire to stabilise the Company's position in Banjarmasin
compelled Barre to decide on the fortification of the British
factory. For some time following Landen's withdrawal from
Banjarmasin, little had been done to erect a permanent or strong
factory. The Company's servants had relied mainly on temporary
sheds, erected to store goods and water, while the Company's ser
vants were housed in the vessels anchored in the Banjarmasin
river. The need for a permanent factory, however, was soon felt
and in 1704 Tomborneo50 was selected to be the site of the Com
pany's new establishment. Tomborneo was a sparsely populated
island, but commanded the entrance to the Banjarmasin river and
had adequate quantities of fish, cattle and timber to meet the re
quirements of the Company.51 However, there was one severe
handicap in settling at Tomborneo, as the island was liable to
flood at high tide. The construction of a wharf by the British
46. Thomas Joyner to Company, 30 August 1705. SFR, VII, f. 30.
47. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 8 October 1705. SFR, VII, f. 24.
48. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 31 January 1706. SFR, VII, f. 25.
49. Barre to Company, 4 February, 1706. SFR, VII, f. 27.
50. Willi (op.cit.f p. 17) tends to think that Tomborneo (or Tongborneo) meant
a bar which lay at the entrance to the Banjarmasin river, but in actuality, it
referred to an island located close to the bar.
51. Banjarmasin Council (at Batavia) to Company, 5 March 1708. SFR, VII, f. 53.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

offered a partial solution against perennial flooding.52 Swampy

areas had to be drained, while piles were driven into the soft
ground to provide a stable foundation. Work on the factory
began in 1704, but progress was slow and at the time of Barre's
arrival only the warehouse had been completed.
The idea of a fort at Banjarmasin was first mooted in February
1704 largely as a measure to attract Chinese settlers to Tom
borneo.53 Perhaps, owing to lack of funds, the idea was shelved
and the English factors were content to build a factory of brick
and timber. Barre revived the idea of a fort, not so much for
reasons of security, but rather to employ it as an instrument to
coerce the Sultan and his subjects. He firmly believed that "force
prevails more then Arguments'' in Banjarmasin, and based his
assumption upon the Banjarese fear of the Dutch on account of
the latter's military and naval power. Moreover, Barre reasoned
that a stone fort would prove more durable than a factory of
brick and timber. Permission was sought from the Sultan for the
construction of the fort, and plans for its building were complet
ed early in 1706.54 Part of the new building programme was the
conversion of the timber warehouse into a brick one. The ware
house was estimated to hold 600 tons of pepper at a time and was
to be ready by the end of the year. Work on a two storey bar
racks began in April 1706 and it was ready for occupation in
November. Separate buildings were also erected for housing the
Company's livestock and other stores. These buildings were to
be enclosed by a solid stone wall which was expected to withstand
any Banjarese assault. To guard the fort, Barre wished to recruit
a strong European force.55
Although the barracks and the warehouse were completed in
time, the rest of the building project was indefinitely prolonged.
Fortification raised many problems which the factors on the spot
were unable to resolve. Bricklayers, carpenters and blacksmiths
were few, and their life span in Banjarmasin was short. Heavy
reliance was placed on slaves imported from Africa and India,
but death took a heavy toll, while others found opportunities to
escape. Another handicap was the difficulty of obtaining timber,
the bulk of which came from Java in Chinese junks. In 1707
Barre complained of Dutch interference in the form of severe
restrictions which had been placed on the export of timber from
Java. Work on the fort was also hampered by the rains, which
often held up operations for long periods of the year. In March
52. Barre to Company, 23 November 1706. SFR, VII, f. 34.
53. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 24 February 1704, SFR, VII, f. 5.
54. Barre to Company, 23 March 1706. SFRA VII, f. 29.
55. Barre to Company, 23 November 1706. SFR, VII, f. 34.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

1706 Barre estimated that the whole project would be completed

within twenty months; in November, he announced that it would
take at least two years. The costs of fortification also kept mount
ing: by November 1706, a sum of $21,000/- had been spent, and
it was estimated that the total costs would amount to $48,000/-.56
Despite the time and energy that was devoted to the construc
tion of the fort from the time of Barre's arrival, the interest of
the Company in Banjarmasin remained predominantly commerc
ial. Pepper was the main commodity of interest and in Banjar
masin market, three varieties of black pepper were offered for
sale, namely Molucca (or Lout), Caytongee and Negarree pepper.
Negarree pepper was the commonest variety, but it was also the
most inferior, being small and full of dust. Molucca pepper was
available in smaller quantities, but was larger and cleaner, and
consequently more expensive, while Caytongee pepper represent
ed the intermediate variety. The pepper areas were scattered
in the interior, largely because of the shifting method of cultiva
tion. Harvesting began in August and was completed by the
end of March.57 Once the pepper was gathered, it was purchased
by the Banjarese middlemen and transported to the coastal towns
by water. Pepper sales in the port towns began in October, but
it was customary among the pepper dealers to delay sales until
the arrival of the Chinese junks in February.58 Long pepper was
also available in Banjarmasin, but it was grown elsewhere, and
was only brought there for sale. White pepper was available in
small quantities and at rather expensive rates.
The British wished to devise their own system of purchasing
pepper, but they could not discard the long established indigen
ous methods. Buying was done by a system of advances, made to
local middlemen, who went into the pepper districts of the in
terior to purchase pepper. The system involved some risks, and
in the beginning, the British factors were reluctant to adopt this
practice. However, in August 1701, the directors sanctioned the
practice so as to ensure a regular supply of pepper.59 The British
factors disliked Chinese participation in the pepper trade, as the
Banjarese demand for Chinese goods led to the sale of pepper to
Chinese junks. For some time, the British factors entertained
hopes of persuading the Sultan to grant them a monopoly of the
pepper trade, but their pleas and presents brought no success.
56. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 23 November 1706; Barre to Company,
30 January 1707. SFR, VII, ff. 34, 42.
57. Rodgett's Instructions to Capt. Stacy, 13 January 1702; Edward Arnold's
Instructions pertaining to Trade at Banjar, n.d., JFR, VIB, Nos. 22, 23.
58. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 29 November 1706. SFR, VII, ff. 37-8.
59. Company to Banjarmasin Council, 21 August 1701. JFR, VIB, No. 31.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

In February 1706, Barre argued that a wholesale purchase of

Chinese cargoes would lead to the elimination of Chinese competi
tion for Banjarmasin pepper,60 but the proposal was found im
practical. In March, a new plan was devised to contain Chinese
competition, whereby Chinese junks were persuaded to wait at
Tomborneo for their pepper instead of going to Tatas. The
British were determined to attract all Banjarese middlemen to
bring pepper to the Company's warehouse at Tomborneo where
a fixed price was to be paid. When buying was completed, the
Chinese jujnks were to receive a share.61 The experiment was short
lived, as the Banjarese and Chinese traders were not inclined to
allow the British to manipulate the pepper market.
Although the Company failed to monopolise trade at Banjar
masin, it did succeed in purchasing sizeable quantities of pepper
in the open market. During the period 1701-1706 inclusive,
British vessels exported from Banjarmasin a total of 3,421 tons
of pepper either to China, India or Europe. The bulk of the
remaining pepper fell into Chinese hands, and it was estimated
that Chinese junks shipped out of Banjarmasin 2,590 tons during
the above period, while a total of 400 tons was exported by other
traders. On the basis of these calculations, it can be estimated
that the annual pepper exports of Banjarmasin averaged over
1,060 tons.62
The trade in other commodities was of secondary importance
to the Company, and such goods as canes, dragon's blood, bird's
nests and gold were procured when prices were reasonable. These
goods were bought primarily for the Asian market, but on occa
sions, they were also shipped to Europe. Of greater importance
were the Chinese goods imported into Banjarmasin, namely raw
silk, copper and tea. The main demand for Chinese goods came
from the Banjarese themselves, who were prepared to pay for
them in pepper and gold. The directors appeared less keen in
purchasing Chinese goods at Banjarmasin, but the British factors
on the spot were convinced of the great advantages in such an
investment. Obviously, the Banjarmasin factors were thinking
of the gradual abandonment of the China voyages and of the
Company ultimately depending upon Banjarmasin for its Chinese
60. Barre to Company, 4 February 1706. SFR, VII, f. 26.
61. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 29 November 1706. SFR, VII, f. 38.
62. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 25 November 1706. SFR, VI. It should
be pointed out here that the above figures have been mistakingly cited as
representing the pepper exports of British factories in West Sumatra. See A.
Wright and T. H. Read, The Malay Peninsula: A Record of British Progress
in the Middle East, (London, 1912), p. 41; John Bastin, 'The Changing Balance
of the Early Southeast Asian Pepper Trade', Papers on Southeast Asian Sub
jects, No. 1, (Kuala Lumpur, I960), p. 42.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

goods. Barre was a firm advocate of this idea and adopted the
policy of attracting the China trade to Banjarmasin 'by degrees'.63
Investment in Javanese goods was only a last resort, especially
when it was not possible to complete the cargoes of Europe-bound
vessels in Banjarmasin. Under such circumstances, it became
customary to send ships to Batavia to purchase sugar, indigo and
woods.
The Company imported a wide range of goods for sale in Ban
jarmasin. European manufactures, however, found little demand
except for lead, iron and military stores. The Chinese showed
a certain preference for European lead, which was usually ex
changed for Chinese copper. Of greater importance to the
Company was the sale of Indian products, notably piece goods
and opium. In 1706, it was estimated that $15,000/- worth of
Indian cloth could be sold annually in Banjarmasin,64 and some
hopes were placed on the Chinese demand for Indian piece goods.
Indian opium was of increasing importance in the Malay world,
and the directors were eager to exploit this demand. Investment in
this commodity, however, remained small and supplies were usually
obtained from Bengal.65
Ill

In March 1707, Henry Barre died rather suddenly66 and

Thomas Joyner again assumed charge of the Banjarmasin factory.
This event proved to be the turning point in the Company's rela
tions with Banjarmasin. On the one hand, Barre's death inter
rupted work on the fort, as Joyner confessed his inability to
direct building operations and sent an urgent appeal to the
directors for skilled workmen.67 However, it was Joyner's tact
lessness that swiftly led the Company to ruin. Neither Banjarese
susceptibilities nor the interests of the Company seemed to have
deterred Joyner from reverting to his former malpractices. Joyner
had a deep distrust of the Chinese and was determined to cripple
their trade in Banjarmasin. He entered into dubious transactions
with Chinese traders for the purchase of pepper, and at the return
of the Chinese junks to Tomborneo, he ordered the seizure of
their pepper cargoes, an act which in one instance "almost occa
63. Barre to Company, 23 March 1706. SFR, VII, f. 28.
64. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 25 November 1706. SFR, VI.
65. D. Beeckman says that the Banjarese 'are the greatest Lovers of Opium imagin
able'. See D. Beeckman, A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo in the
East Indies, (London, 1718), p. 87.
66. The Banjarmasin Council reported that Barre was taken ill suddenly and
died within a few days. The Banjarese confessed subsequently that they
poisoned Barre. See Beeckman, opxit., pp. 101-2.
67. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 22 March 1707. SFR, VII, f. 43.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

sioned Bloodshed".68 Further, Chinese junks passing the Com

pany's factory were stopped for the collection of arbitrary duties.
Joyner's oppression also extended to the Banjarese traders. Ban
jarese prows wrecked on the bay were plundered at Joyner's
instructions; other boats were forcibly deprived of their cargoes.69
Joyner's Imprudence' was founded on the belief that the British
were strong enough to challenge the power of Banjarmasin. In
view of this attitude, it is not surprising that Joyner took every
opportunity to display British might before the Banjarese rulers.70
Joyner was relieved of his charge on 10 June 1707 when Cun
ningham71 arrived as the new Chief of the Banjarmasin factory.
It was unfortunate, from the Company's viewpoint, that Cunning
ham possessed few of the qualities of Barre, and he certainly fail
ed to detect the explosive situation at Banjarmasin. Instead of
attempting to allay the fears of the Banjarmasin rulers, Cunning
ham devoted much of his time "contemplating on the Nature,
Shape, and Qualities of a Butterfly or a Shellfish."72 On 27 June
1707, the Banjarese launched a full scale attack on the British,
and the latter, fearing disaster, resolved to leave Banjarmasin and
retire to Batavia.73 Losses were estimated at $50,000/- and thus
closed yet another chapter in the annals of British relations with
Borneo.74
The Banjarmasin Council was at a loss to explain the reasons
for the Banjarese attack, but ventured to suggest that it was pro
bably born out of Banjarmasin's "fear of being brought into Sub
jection".75 Cunningham, in a private letter to the directors, ela
borated further on the incident. He harped briefly open Barre's
death and referred to Joyner's "ill conduct", but he was convinced
that the main reason for the attack was that the Banjarese were
"naturally treacherous and averse to Europeans" while the Com
pany's decision to fortify its factory made them "Jealous of their
liberty".76 Cunningham also laid part of the blame upon the
68. J. Casby and W. Griffith to Company, 2 June 1707, SFR, VII, f. 46.
69. Griffith to Company, 25 February 1708. SFR, VII, f. 51.
70. Capt. Edwards to Company, 7 March 1708. SFR, VII, f. 53.
71. Cunningham, 'bred a Surgeon', had served in the Pulo Condore establishment
prior to its destruction in March 1705. He was held prisoner for sometime,
and on his release was given the Banjarmasin appointment. Willi, op.cit. p. 14.
72. Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, Vol. II, Ed. by Sir
William Foster, (London, 1930), p. 77.
73. For a brief account of the fighting see A. Hamilton, op.cit., p. 78.
74. Some effort was made at re-establishing the British factory at Banjarmasin. In
March 1708, the Anna was despatched to Banjarmasin but it failed to effect a
settlement. The directors were not easily discouraged, and in 1713, they
renewed their efforts at Banjarmasin by sending two vessels, which however,
did not succeed in establishing a permanent factory. Willi, op.cit., pp. 16-7.
75. Banjarmasin Council to Company, 24 July 1707. SFR, VII, f. 32.
76. Cunningham to Company, 26 July 1707. SFR, VII, f. 47.

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 BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN

Chinese. He contended that fortification aroused fears among the

Chinese of a possible British domination of the pepper trade, and
this prompted the Chinese to instigate the Banjarese attack upon
the British.77 William Griffith, a member of the Banjarmasin
Council, interpreted the Banjarese attack as the logical reaction
to Joyner's conduct. A subsidiary factor, in Griffith's mind, was
the Banjarese suspicion of a permanent British settlement at Ban
jarmasin, which they feared would lead to ultimate European
domination.78
It is evident that the Banjarese attack of 1707 was motivated
by considerations of self-preservation. During the seventeenth
century, Banjarmasin had struggled courageously to attain free
dom from Javanese control. The ambitions of the European
Powers aroused Banjarese suspicions, and events in the Malay
Archipelago during the seventeenth century tended to confirm
Banjarese fears. Economic considerations, however, demanded a
policy of tolerance to European trade, and it was for this reason
that the British were allowed to establish a factory in 1700.
Initially, the Banjarmasin rulers took care to specify the terms
under which the British could settle, and it was emphasised that
no cannons or other armaments should be mounted in the factory.79
For some time, the British acted according to the terms of settle
ment, but with Barre's arrival, British-Banjarese relations began
to assume a new character. The decision to fortify the British
factory threatened to alter the balance of power in favour of the
Company, and Joyner's conduct gave early indications of this
change. The Banjarese were quick to grasp the gravity of the
situation, and the attack was successful largely on account of the
delay in the completion of the fort. Barre's doctrine that "nothing
but power will make the Place beneficial"80 sowed seeds of
self-destruction, and Banjarmasin was now able to enjoy a fresh
lease of independent existence.81

77. Willi, op.cit., p. 15.

78. Griffith to Company, 25 February 1708. SFR, VII, f. 51.
79. Company to Banjarmasin Council, 21 August 1701. JFR, VIB, No. 31.
80. Barre to Company, 23 March 1706. SFR, VII, f. 29.
81. I wish to acknowledge the criticism and advice received from Dr. D. K. Bassett
in the writing of this article.

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