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Dear CLAT PG Aspirants,
As you embark on the journey to crack one of the most prestigious law entrance
exams in India, the CLAT PG, I want to take a moment to acknowledge your
dedication, hard work, and passion for the legal profession. The path to success in
this examination is not just about rote learning, but about understanding the
nuances and intricacies of the legal world, especially the recent developments.
The legal landscape is ever-evolving, with judgments being pronounced that shape
the very fabric of our legal system. Being aware of these judgments, understanding
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aspirant. This is where our e-book, "Important Recent Judgments for CLAT PG 2024
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At RostrumLegal, we understand the challenges faced by CLAT PG aspirants. With

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Important Recent Judgments for CLAT PG 2024
1. Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India

COURT: The Supreme Court of India
CORAM: Justices S Abdul Nazeer, BR Gavai, AS Bopanna and V Ramasubramanian, B V Nagarathna
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 2nd January 2023
FACTS
The petitioners contended that the people of India were exposed to undue hardships owing to the
lack of financial resources and had to undergo not only a severe financial crunch, but were also
exposed to other socio-economic and psychological hardships.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether it was reason enough to hold the exercise illegal, merely because some citizens suffered
hardships due to demonetization?
JUDGEMENT
The Top Court observed that “The Court must therefore adjudge the constitutionality of such
legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities or by the
possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse come
to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the
essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex
economic issues.”
The Supreme Court held that “As such, the contention that the impugned notification is liable to be
set aside on the ground that it caused hardship to individual/citizens will hold no water. The
individual interests must yield to the larger public interest sought to be achieved by impugned
Notification.”
Four of the five judges on the Bench - Justices S Abdul Nazeer, BR Gavai, AS Bopanna and V
Ramasubramanian - upheld the legality of the Central government's 2016 demonetization exercise,
while Justice BV Nagarathna deemed it illegal in her dissenting opinion.
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2. Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.

CORAM: Justices S Abdul Nazeer, BR Gavai, AS Bopanna and V Ramasubramanian, B V Nagarathna
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 3rd January 2023
FACTS
In this case, petitions were filed relating to the scope of freedom of speech of public functionaries,
where they raised an issue, whether greater restrictions can be imposed on their right in the greater
interest of citizens and their right to life and personal liberty.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the restrictions on freedom of speech of public functionaries go beyond what is prescribed
under Article 19(2) of the Constitution?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "A mere statement by a minister inconsistent with the rights of citizen
does not form to be a constitutional tort but if it leads to omission or commission of offence by a
public official then it is a constitutional tort.”
The Supreme Court said that "The role envisaged in the Constitutional scheme for the Court, is to be
a gate-keeper (and a conscience keeper) to check strictly the entry of restrictions, into the temple of
fundamental rights. The role of the Court is to protect fundamental rights limited by lawful
restrictions and not to protect restrictions and make the rights residual privileges. Clause (2) of
Article 19 saves (i) the operation of any existing law; and (ii) the making of any law by the State.
Therefore, it is not for us to add one or more restrictions than what is already found.”
The Supreme Court held that “law imposing any restriction in terms of clause (2) of Article 19 can
only be made by the State and not by the Court.”
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3. K.C. Cinema v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir

CORAM: Chief Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice PS Narasimha
FACTS
In this case, The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh had passed directions to allow outside
food in cinema halls after noting that the rules framed by Jammu and Kashmir did not prohibit movie
goers from carrying their own food or water bottle inside the hall.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the owner of a cinema hall has the right to regulate movies goers from carrying food and
beverage from outside into the movie hall?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "A cinema hall is a private property. What goes in is for the owner of the
property to decide subject to statutory rules. So, saying that arms are not allowed or no
discrimination on basis of caste or gender can be there is fine. But how can the High Court say that
they can bring any food inside cinema halls.
The Supreme Court held that "The property of cinema hall is the private property of the owner of the
hall. The owner is entitled to set terms and conditions so long as such terms and conditions are not
contrary to public interest, safety, and welfare. The owner is entitled to set terms for sale of food and
beverages. Movie goer has the choice to not purchase the same. High Court transgressed the limits
on the exercise of its jurisdiction. Absent is statutory rules to that effect. The imposition of such
directions would affect the legitimate rights of theatre owner."
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4. M/s Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corporation

Ltd. v. Kerala Ayurvedic Co-operative Society Ltd. &
Others
CORAM: (CJI) DY Chandrachud and Justice Hima Kohli
FACTS
An order was issued by Uttar Pradesh government to purchase Ayurvedic medicines from the
appellant, Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corporation Limited (IMPCL), on a nomination basis
without a tender process.
The Kerala Ayurvedic Co-operative Society Limited (respondent) that had previously moved the
Allahabad High Court challenging the said order. The High Court had allowed the plea and directed
the State government to purchase Ayurvedic medicines by adopting a transparent process after
inviting tenders.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether inviting tenders and conducting public auctions are preferred methods for awarding
government contracts?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that it has already held in a host of previous judgments that government
contracts must be awarded by a transparent process, and the process of inviting tenders ensures a
level playing field for competing entities. Moreover, any departure from the tender process must not
be unreasonable or discriminatory.
The Supreme Court held that "Government contracts involve expenditure out of the public
exchequer. Since they involve payment out of the public exchequer, the moneys expended must not
be spent arbitrarily. The State does not have absolute discretion while spending public money. All
government actions including government contracts awarded by the State must be tested on the
touchstone of Article 14.
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5. State of Rajasthan v. Komal Lodhas

CORAM: Justice M R Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 6th January 2023
FACTS
The State of Rajasthan had moved the top court against a May 11, 2022 High Court order. The
Rajasthan High Court, on finding that the death-row prisoner was wrongly convicted, had directed
the Jhalawar Superintendent of Police to reopen investigation into a case arising from the rape and
murder of a seven-year-old.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether High Court has authority to make comments upon the investigation and/or on merits of the
case once the conviction was confirmed by Supreme Court?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "When this Court earlier confirmed the conviction of the accused for the
offence under Section 302 IPC and that too after hearing learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the accused, thereafter, it was not open for the High Court to make comments upon the
investigation and/or on merits of the case
The Supreme Court while setting aside the High Court’s order said that "Judicial discipline requires
that once the conviction was confirmed by this Court that too after hearing the accused, the High
Court should not have thereafter made any comment on the merits of the case, more particularly,
when the conviction was specifically confirmed by this Court
6. Sunita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others

CORAM: Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 4th January 2023
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Apex Court by a wife challenging the decision of the Allahabad High
Court which had quashed the criminal proceedings for demand of dowry against her husband on the
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ground that the wife was suffering from AIDS and that a divorce petition was also stated to be pending
between the parties.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the criminal proceedings for demand of dowry can be quashed merely because of pendency
of divorce petition between the husband and wife?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that “Merely because the wife was suffering from the disease AIDS
and/or divorce petition was pending, it cannot be said that the allegations of demand of dowry were
highly/inherently improbable and the said proceedings can be said to be bogus proceedings.
Therefore, the reasoning given by the High Court while quashing the criminal proceedings are not
germane.”
The Supreme Court while setting aside the High Court’s judgement held that "Once the charge sheet
was filed after the investigation having been found prima facie case, it cannot be said that the
prosecution was bogus. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court quashing the criminal proceedings is unsustainable.”
7. BV Seshiah v. State of Telangana and Another

CORAM: Justice Krishna Murari and Justice V. Ramasubramanian
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 1st February 2023
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the order of the Telangana High Court which
had confirmed the conviction of the appellant in a cheque dishonor case under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, thereby, overriding the agreement between the parties to compound the
offence. The appellant was convicted by the trial court and a revision petition was filed before the
High Court. However, during the pendency of the revision plea, the parties to litigation entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding to settle the dispute among themselves.
ISSUES RAISED
The principle issue is whether a person can be convicted in a cheque dishonour case under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, thereby, overriding the agreement between the parties to
compound the offence?
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JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that "In our view, the terms and conditions of the settlement entered
into by the parties binds them to settle the dispute amicably, or through an arbitration as has been
stated in clause 8 of the Memorandum of Understanding. In such a circumstance, the Appellants
cannot be convicted on the basis of the orders passed by the courts below, as the settlement is nothing
but a compounding of the offence.”
The Top Court referred the case of M/S Meters and Instruments Private Limited & Another v.
Kanchan Mehta (2018), it was held that the nature of offence under Section 138 is primarily related
to a civil wrong and has been specifically made a compoundable offence.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices Krishna Murari and V Ramasubramanian while allowing the
appeal held that "When such a step (of compounding) has been taken by the parties, and the law very
clearly allows them to do the same, the High Court then cannot override such compounding and
impose its will.”
8. M/S Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. The Excise and Taxation

Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and Others
CORAM: Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Dutta
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 1st February 2023
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Apex Court against a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
which had dismissed the writ petition of the present appellant on the ground that he had failed to
first exhaust the alternative remedy available to him.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision would by itself oust the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and render a writ petition not maintainable?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under
Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not
entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the
same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or
revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not
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pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition 'not
maintainable'.”
The Supreme Court observed that “where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve
disputed questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the high court
instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Dutta while allowing the appeal
held that “Dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed
the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out
for such entertainment would not be proper.”
9. Vibhuti Shankar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh

and Others
CORAM: Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 8th February 2023
FACTS
In the year 1980, the appellant was engaged as a supervisor, on daily rated basis, under a project of
State Water Resources Department. He had sought regularization to the post of supervisor/ time
keeper, but the minimum qualification for the said post at that time was matriculation with
mathematics, which the appellant didn't possess.
Later on, the government relaxed such requirement of qualification and thereafter, the appellant
again sought regularization since he was qualified for the post and had been working on daily wage
basis for a long period of time. But again, the claim was rejected by the authorities by considering the
fact that the appellant was never appointed against any post.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether a daily rated employee cannot claim regularization of employment when his initial
appointment was not done by a competent authority?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that as per its decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi and
Others (2006), there are two pre-conditions that are to be fulfilled in order to claim regularization
of employment, which are:
- initial appointment must be done by the competent authority; and
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- there must be a sanctioned post on which the daily rated employee must be working.
The Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal said that “initial appointment must be done by the
competent authority and there must be a sanctioned post on which the daily rated employee must be
working. These two conditions were clearly missing in the case of the present appellant. The Division
Bench of the High Court therefore has to our mind rightly allowed the appeal and set aside the order
dated June 27, 2019.”
10. M/S Gas Authority of India Limited v. M/S Indian

Petrochemicals Corporation Limited and Others
CORAM: Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Abhay S Oka
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 8th February 2023
FACTS
IPCL and GAIL had entered into a gas supply contract in 2001, wherein IPCL was required to lay down
the pipelines for the gas supply. While so, GAIL also levied a charge under the head ‘loss of
transportation charges’ in the contract. IPCL was a public undertaking until 2002. On March 9, 2006,
5 years after the contract was entered into, IPCL challenged the levy of 'loss of transportation charges'
before the High Court and sought a refund of all such charges paid to GAIL. The High Court ruled in
IPCL's favour.
The appellant contended that the matter was purely contractual in nature and that there was no
violation of any fundamental right. He emphasised that a public law element was necessary for a
Court to intervene in the case through the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 can be exercised in contractual
dealings, if the government fails to exercise a fairness or practices discrimination.
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that “At the time of entering into contract, GAIL was enjoying a
monopolistic position with respect to the supply of natural gas in the country. IPCL, having incurred
a significant expense in setting up the appropriate infrastructure, had no choice but to enter into
agreement with GAIL. Thus, there was a clear public element involved in the dealings between the
parties.”
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The Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Abhay S Oka while rejecting the appeal
said that “writ jurisdiction can be exercised when the State, even in its contractual dealings, fails to
exercise a degree of fairness or practices any discrimination.”
11. C Yamini and Others v. High Court of Andhra Pradesh

at Amaravathi and anr
CORAM: Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Bela M Trivedi
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 23rd February 2023
FACTS
The judicial officers (petitioners) had been appointed initially as ad-hoc Judges for Fast Track Trial
Courts in 2003. They were appointed as regular Judges in 2013. They filed a petition before the
Supreme Court for relief after the High Court Collegium did not consider them for elevation to the
High Court as they had not completed ten years of regular judicial service, as required under Article
217 (2) (a) of the Constitution. The petitioners contended that this criterion (of ten years judicial
service) would be met if their tenure as ad-hoc judges were also taken into account.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the time served by a judicial officer as an ad-hoc judge will be considered to determine
seniority?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that the issue was settled in the case of Kum C. Yamini v. The State of
Andhra Pradesh & Anr. In that judgment, the Supreme Court had held that judicial officers are not
entitled to claim the benefit of seniority from the date of their initial appointment as ad hoc judges.
The Supreme Court while dismissing the plea said that "Since the services rendered by the petitioners
as Fast Track Court Judges have not been recognized by this Court for the purpose of seniority except
for pensionary and other retiral benefits, the plea raised by the petitioners to consider their service
rendered as fast track court judges as a judicial service for the purpose of Article 217(2)(a) of the
Constitution, in light of the judgment of this Court what being prayed for, is not legally sustainable.”
10
12. State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh

CORAM: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Dipankar Datta
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 1st March 2023
FACTS
The State government filed an appeal against a husband-wife duo after the High Court quashed the
FIR. Appellants counsel argued that the High Court had committed an error by transgressing the legal
bounds for quashing the FIR on the ground that it was based on “probabilities”. He further highlighted
that the preliminary enquiry carried out prior to registering the FIR revealed disproportionate assets
to the tune of 20 per cent of one of the respondent's incomes. Hence, this was not an appropriate case
where the power to quash an FIR should have been exercised. themselves.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether and to what extent would a Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution or
section 482 of the CrPC, 1973 be justified to quash a FIR registered under section 13 of the P.C. Act
while the police embark on an investigation against a public servant?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "We quite appreciate that there could be cases of innocent public
servants being entangled in investigations arising out of motivated complaints and the consequent
mental agony, emotional pain and social stigma that they would have to encounter in the process, but
this small price has to be paid if there is to be a society governed by the rule of law.”
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court’s order said that
"Increase in the assets of such a public servant tantamount to constitutionally impermissible conduct
and such conduct is liable to be put under the scanner of the P.C. Act.”
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13. Nand Lal v. State of Chhattisgarh

CORAM: Justice BR Gavai, Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sanjay Karol
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 14th of March 2023
FACTS
The appellants, along with others, were accused of entering the house of the deceased armed with
deadly weapons, having formed an unlawful assembly and assaulting him, which led to his death. The
appellants argued that their names had not been mentioned in any of the documents such as the merg
panchnama, inquest panchnama and spot panchnama whereas the names of other accused were
mentioned. They also highlighted that the inordinate delay in registering the First Information
Report (FIR) had not been explained by the prosecution.
The appellant also contended that the conviction was purely on the basis of interested witnesses
whose testimony was not trustworthy and therefore, was not sustainable unless there was
corroboration of their testimony.
The prosecution contended that merely because the witnesses were interested witnesses cannot be
ground to discard their testimonies as long as their evidence was found to be trustworthy, reliable
and cogent. The argument as to delay in lodging the FIR was also rebutted by the prosecution which
said that it was not a strong ground since their case had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether conviction of accused purely based on the oral testimony of interested witnesses, without
sufficient corroboration, would be sustainable?
JUDGEMENT
The Top Court said that “Taking into consideration the delay in lodging the FIR, with the circumstance
of their names not being mentioned in the contemporaneous documents, the possibility of the said
accused being falsely implicated cannot be ruled out.”
The Supreme Court said that in cases where evidence from witnesses is partly reliable and partly
unreliable, the Court is required to be circumspect and separate the chaff from the grain to seek
further corroboration from reliable testimony. Considering the lack of corroboration in the case at
hand, the court set aside the decision of the High Court as well as the trial court and acquitted the
appellants.
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14. Rajendra Kumar Shrivas v. State of Madhya Pradesh

and Others
CORAM: Justice MR Shah and Justice CT Ravikumar
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 13th of March 2023
FACTS
a petition was moved before the Madhya Pradesh High Court stating that even though the Supreme
Court in the case of All India Judges’ Association had directed all the High Courts to fill up the posts
in the higher judiciary by reserving only 10 per cent seats to be filled up by departmental competitive
examination, the Madhya Pradesh High Court exceeded the limit and filled up the posts in the higher
judiciary beyond 10 percent quota.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the High Courts while filling up posts in the higher judiciary, can reserve only 10 percent
seats to be filled up by limited departmental competitive examination?
JUDGEMENT
The top court noted that in the case of All India Judges’ Association, it had directed that there shall be
25 percent seats for direct recruitment from the Bar, 65 percent of seats to be filled up by regular
promotion of Civil Judge (Senior Division) and 10 per cent seats by limited departmental competitive
examination.
The Supreme Court directed that if candidates are not available for 10 percent seats, or are not able
to qualify in the examination, then vacant posts are to be filled up by regular promotion in accordance
with the service rules applicable.
The Supreme Court had further directed that all the High Courts should take steps to see that existing
service rules be amended positively with effect from January 1, 2011. This Court had also said that if
the rules are not suitably amended, the said order shall prevail and further recruitment from January
1, 2011 shall be as per the directions in that judgment.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar while allowing the appeal directed
the High Court to examine if the 10 percent quota was breached in any recruitment subsequent to
January 1, 2011, and if such breach has occurred, to adjust such posts in future recruitments.
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15. Arnab Roy v. Consortium of NLUs and anr

CORAM: CJI DY Chandrachud and Justices PS Narasimha and JB Pardiwala
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 17th March 2023
FACTS
A petition was filed before the Top Court by advocate and disability-rights activist Arnab Roy
challenging the recently introduced rules on scribes for CLAT 2023. The petitioner had raised
grievance regarding the need for candidates to have benchmark disability to avail scribes, as well as
the rule that the scribe must be a student of 11th standard or lower grade and not enrolled with any
coaching centre.
The petitioner argued that this excluded those disabled persons who have genuine difficulties in
writing. He challenged the rules as being excessive and arbitrary, and said that they make it
impossible for specially-abled persons to find a suitable scribe. They added that the rule about the
scribe not being enrolled in any coaching centre effectively eliminates most students in the 10th and
11th grade.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the recently introduced rules on scribes for CLAT 2023 by the Consortium is
constitutionally valid?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that “It would not be appropriate to ignore the genuine concerns which
have been set up on behalf of Consortium to maintain integrity of the exam process. It is from this
perspective the Consortium has in its guidelines required that scribes should not be above 11th
standard, and not be attending a coaching centre. At the highest, a candidate could have a grievance
if no such scribe is available...The candidate can bring their own scribe or request the Consortium to
provide one, and the same is made available.”
The Supreme Court Bench of Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justices PS Narasimha and
JB Pardiwala said that "We direct that for the future guidelines which will be applicable to PwD
[Persons-with-disabilities] candidates should be in public domain much earlier, during
advertisement of the exam, and reasonable accommodation can be made available to them to ensure
they are not left in uncertainty...The nature and content of the guidelines cannot be frozen for the
future and the Consortium is at liberty to modify the guidelines keeping in mind the evolving nature
of rights of the PwD candidates, and in case of any more difficulty consortium may be approached for
remedies.”
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16. Mah Adiwasi Thakur Jamat Swarakshan Samiti v.

State of Maharashtra and Others
CORAM: Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Abhay S. Oka and Manoj Misra
FACTS
In the order dated March 24, 2022, a bench of the Supreme Court noted that there was a conflict of
views expressed in two decisions of coordinate Benches of the apex court. The first case was of
Vijakumar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. and the second case was Anand v. Committee for
Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims & Ors.
In Vijakumar, it was held that if a candidate fails the affinity test at any stage, a caste validity
certificate cannot be granted to him. In the case of Anand, it was held that the affinity test is not the
only criteria for deciding a caste claim based on a caste certificate issued by a Competent Authority.
Hence, the matter was referred to a three-judge bench to settle the issue.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether an affinity test is a conclusive test to decide caste claim and is an essential part of the
verification process of the caste/tribe claims?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Abhay S Oka and Manoj Misra said that “The
Vigilance Cell, while conducting an affinity test, verifies the knowledge of the applicant about deities
of the community, customs, rituals, mode of marriage, death ceremonies etc. in respect of that
particular Scheduled Tribe. By its very nature, such an affinity test can never be conclusive. If the
applicant has stayed in bigger urban areas along with his family for decades or if his family has stayed
in such urban areas for decades, the applicant may not have knowledge of the aforesaid facts.”
The Top Court added that “It is true that the Vigilance Cell can also question the parents of the
applicant. But in a given case, even the parents may be unaware for the reason that for several years
they have been staying in bigger urban areas. On the other hand, a person may not belong to the
particular tribe, but he may have a good knowledge about the aforesaid aspects.”
The Supreme Court further said that "Affinity test is not a litmus test to decide a caste claim and is
not an essential part in the process of the determination of correctness of a caste or tribe claim in
every case. Affinity test cannot be conclusive and when an affinity test is conducted, the result 5 of
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the test along with all other material on record having probative value will have to be taken into
consideration for deciding the caste validity claim.”
17. State Bank of India and Others v. Rajesh Agarwal and

Others
CORAM: CJI DY Chandrachud and Justice Hima Kohli
FACTS
A batch of appeals filed before the Top Court by banks and the Reserve Bank of India against a
Telangana High Court order reading principles of natural justice (hearing the other side primarily)
into the 2016 Reserve Bank of India (Frauds Classification and Reporting by Commercial Banks and
Select FIs) Directions.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether an opportunity of hearing should be given to borrower by a bank before classifying a

borrower's account as fraudulent?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that “the principles of natural justice are not mere legal formalities. They
constitute substantive obligations that need to be followed by decision-making and adjudicating
authorities. The principles of natural justice act as a guarantee against arbitrary action, both in terms
of procedure and substance, by judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative authorities.”
The Top Court further said that "A reasoned order allows an aggrieved party to demonstrate that the
reasons which persuaded the authority to pass an adverse order against the interests of the aggrieved
party are extraneous or perverse; and ... the obligation to record reasons acts as a check on the
arbitrary exercise of the powers. The reasons to be recorded need not be placed on the same pedestal
as a judgment of a court.”
The Supreme Court bench of Chief Justice of India (CJI) DY Chandrachud and Justice Hima Kohli while
upholding the order of the Telangana High Court held that “Decision classifying borrower account as
fraudulent must be with reasoned order. Rule of ‘Audi alteram partem’ has to be read into it and
hearing is required before borrower accounts are barred.”
16
18. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Vikas Mishra

CORAM: Justice M R Shah and Justice C T Ravikumar
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 10th April 2023
FACTS
CBI filed an appeal against the Calcutta High Court order that had granted statutory/default bail to a
public servant accused of corruption. A special CBI judge had granted a week's time in police remand.
However, the investigating agency could not interrogate the respondent as he was in hospital at the
time.
The High Court had granted bail as the chargesheet had not been filed within 90 days. The Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had moved the top court in appeal, arguing that the accused had
frustrated the remand order by getting hospitalized on some pretext or the other.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether a person can be detained in police custody after the expiry of fifteen days from their initial
arrest in a case?
JUDGEMENT
The Top Court said that "No accused can be permitted to play with the investigation and/or the
court’s process. No accused can be permitted to frustrate the judicial process by his conduct. It cannot
be disputed that the right of custodial interrogation/investigation is also a very important right in
favour of the investigating agency to unearth the truth, which the accused has purposely and
successfully tried to frustrate.”
The Supreme Court while allowing the CBI four days custody of the accused said that "It is true that
in the case of Anupam J. Kulkarni (supra), this Court observed that there cannot be any police custody
beyond 15 days from the date of arrest. In our opinion, the view taken by this Court in the case of
Anupam J. Kulkarni (supra) requires re-consideration.”
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19. The Director (Admn. and HR) KPTCL and Others v. CP

Mundinamani and Others
FACTS
The appellant-employer had denied annual increments to the respondent-employees on the ground
that they had retired the very next day of the increment becoming due. The appellants had relied
upon Regulation 40(1) of the Karnataka Electricity Board Employees Service Regulations 1997,
which provides that an increment accrues from the day after it is earned. Therefore, the appellant
had denied the annual increment on the ground that on the day on which the increment accrued, the
employees were not in service.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether Government servants can be denied their annual increment merely because they retired the
very next day after earning the same?
JUDGEMENT
The Top Court observed that "The entitlement to receive increment therefore crystallizes when the
government servant completes requisite length of service with good conduct and becomes payable
on the succeeding day. In the present case the word “accrue” should be understood liberally and
would mean payable on the succeeding day.”
The Apex Court said that "Therefore, the moment a government servant has rendered service for a
specified period with good conduct, in a time scale, he is entitled to the annual increment...Therefore,
as such, he is entitled to the benefit of the annual increment on the eventuality of having served for a
specified period (one year) with good conduct efficiently...”
The Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal held that "Merely because, the government servant
has retired on the very next day, how can he be denied the annual increment which he has earned
and/or is entitled to for rendering the service with good conduct and efficiently in the preceding one
year.”
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20. State of Maharashtra v. Renuka and Others

FACTS
The two sisters were convicted in 2001 by the Sessions Court at Kolhapur for kidnapping thirteen
children and murdering five of them. They were sentenced to death by the Sessions Court which was
confirmed by the High Court in 2004 and thereafter by the Supreme Court in 2006.
The convicts approached the Governor in 2008 with mercy petition which came to be rejected in
2012-13. After this, the convicts filed mercy plea before the President which was also rejected in
2014. The convicts moved the High Court in 2014, seeking relief on grounds of the delay in deciding
their mercy petitions. The State undertook not to execute them till the pendency of the case before
the High Court, which eventually commuted their sentence.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether an inordinate delay in disposal of the mercy petitions can help the accused for undue
advantage?
JUDGEMENT
The top court noted that the gravity of the offence can be a relevant consideration while commuting
the death sentence to life imprisonment. However, an inordinate delay in disposal of the mercy
petitions can also be said to be a relevant consideration in this regard.
The Supreme Court directed that "We observe and direct all the States/appropriate authorities
before whom the mercy petitions are to be filed and/or who are required to decide the mercy
petitions against the death sentence, such mercy petitions are decided at the earliest so that the
benefit of delay in not deciding the mercy petitions is not accrued to the accused and the accused are
not benefited by such an inordinate delay and the accused may not take the disadvantage of such
inordinate delay.”
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21. M/s. South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip

CORAM: Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice M. M. Sundresh
FACTS
The South Indian Bank, challenging the judgment of the Kerala High Court that had allowed deferred
payment schedules for bank borrowers even as the bank had initiated SARFAESI proceedings. The
appellant bank claimed that interference by a constitutional court to decide on private contractual
disputes between lenders and borrowers seriously prejudiced the banks in Kerala.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether High Courts can exercise their writ jurisdiction when an alternative remedy under the
Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest
(SARFAESI) Act is available?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "...we are conscious of the fact that the powers conferred under Article
226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary
circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so
in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a
specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.”
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal said that "Approaching the High Court for the
consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by this Court...More circumspection
is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the
purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an
attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by a writ court.”
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22. NN Global Mercantile Pvt Ltd v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd

& Others
CORAM: Justice K.M. Joseph, Justice Ajay Rastogi, Justice Aniruddha Bose, Justice Hrishikesh Roy and
Justice C.T. Ravikumar
FACTS
The parties in the original matter had entered into a sub-contract that had contained an arbitration
clause. The respondent had later invoked the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner, leading to
a suit.
The respondent then filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and
sought resolution of the dispute through arbitration, which a commercial court had rejected. The
Bombay High Court had subsequently held that the application was maintainable, leading to the
present appeal before the top court.
The matter was listed before the constitution bench of Justices KM Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha
Bose, Hrishikesh Roy and CT Ravikumar. While Justices Joseph, Bose and Ravikumar wrote the
majority opinion, Justices Rastogi and Roy dissented, opining that unstamped arbitration agreements
are valid at the pre-referral stage.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether unstamped arbitration agreements are valid in law?
JUDGEMENT
Majority opinion held that "Court is duly empowered to act under the Stamp Act if a document is not
stamped...Arbitration agreement not validated by Stamp Act would stand non est in law.”
Justice Rastogi in his dissenting opinion said that "Such examination should not open the door wide
open for judicial examination...Existence of certified copy of Arbitration agreement whether
unstamped or not is enforceable for appointment of arbitrator...All the preliminary maintainability
issues of the document are referrable to the arbitrator.”
Justice Roy in his dissenting opinion said that “Objective behind 1996 Act was to inter alia avoid
procedural complexity and litigation between courts. Impounding and stamping will frustrate the
same, as enforcement will be stalled when it can be solved at a later stage. But issue is much too
important to leave it lingering for clarification by a larger bench. I appeal to the legislature to revisit
amendments necessary in the Stamp Act to efface inconsistencies. I am of the considered opinion that
21
statutory schemes have to be interplayed in a constructive manner if India is to become a centre for
arbitration.”
23. Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan

CORAM: Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, Abhay S. Oka, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 1st May 2023
FACTS
A batch of petitions concerning the use of the top court's plenary powers to dissolve a marriage
between consenting parties without referral to family courts to wait for the mandatory period
prescribed under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the Supreme Court could exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to
dissolve a marriage?
Whether the invocation of the said power was allowed in the absence of the mutual consent of the
parties?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court outlined some of the factors that can be taken into consideration which would
indicate irretrievable breakdown of marriage, so as to grant divorce between consenting parties
under Article 142 of the Constitution.
The factors listed in the judgment are:
1. The period of time the parties had cohabited after marriage;
2. When the parties had last cohabited;
3. The nature of allegations made by the parties against each other and their family members;
4. The orders passed in the legal proceedings from time to time, and their cumulative impact on the
personal relationship;
5. Whether, and how many attempts were made to settle the disputes by intervention of the court or
through mediation, and when the last attempt was made, etc.
22
6. The period of separation should be sufficiently long, and anything above six years or more will be
a relevant factor.
24. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Others. v. M/S.

Sathyanarayana Service Station & Another
CORAM: Justice K M Joseph and Justice B V Nagarathna
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 9th May 2023
FACTS
A dealership dispute between Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) and the respondent. In 2003, IOC entered
into a petrol/hsd pump dealer agreement with the respondent, but a subsequent disagreement led
to the termination of the agreement. The matter was then referred to arbitration, where the sole
arbitrator ruled in favor of IOC, stating that the respondent’s withdrawal was not in accordance with
the law and that the appointment of a new dealer was valid.
The respondent filed an appeal before the High Court against the order of the Arbitrator. After
scrutinizing the terms of the agreement, reversed the order. Impugned by the judgment, appellant
filed appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether once an arbitral award has been set aside, the court can proceed to modify the award or
grant further relief?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court found that the High Court had erred by interfering with the arbitrator’s finding.
The termination clause in the agreement allowed either party to prematurely end the contract, and
the arbitrator’s decision, though debatable, did not constitute patent illegality.
The Supreme Court further noted that the High Court had acted unlawfully by intervening in the
arbitrator’s finding and overturning a decision previously accepted by the District Judge.
Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and
restored the original arbitral award
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25. KB Tea Product Pvt Ltd & Another v. Commercial Tax

Officer, Siliguri and Others
CORAM: Justice M R Shah and Justice Krishna Murari
FACTS
Appeals filed before the Top Court against a Calcutta High Court order that had upheld the removal
of exemption of the petitioners from sales tax payments based on a 1994 that was amended by the
2001 West Bengal Finance Act. As a result of the latter, the appellants were denied benefits of the tax
exemption that they had enjoyed for two years
ISSUES RAISED
Whether amendments to tax exemption statutes can be challenged based on the doctrine of
legitimate expectation?
JUDGEMENT
Justice MR Shah opined that "As per the settled position of law, nobody can claim the exemption as a
matter of right. The exemption is always on the fulfilment of the conditions for availing the exemption
and the same can be withdrawn by the State. To grant the exemption and/or to continue and/or
withdraw the exemption is always within the domain of the State Government and it falls within the
policy decision and as per the settled position of law, unless withdrawal is found to be so arbitrary,
the Court would be reluctant to interfere with such a policy decision.”
Justice Murari in their dissenting opinion said that "If the public authority fails to do so [fulfil its
legitimate expectations], the individual or group has a right to challenge the decision and seek a
remedy, such as an order to enforce the legitimate expectation, as is the situation in the case at hand.”
Justice Murari concluded that "For a democratic state to function on the principles of equality and
justice, the state must be ruled, not by its ruler, but by the law. In such a circumstance, to prevent
such a contamination of the rule of law, the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation
becomes most important. If a state is allowed to make promises, and rescind the same without
justification or explanation, it would lead to a situation wherein every action of the state would be
bereft of accountability, and every person governed by the laws of this country would live in a state
of fear and unrest, causing a chilling effect on the civil liberties of the people.”
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26. Dil Afza v. Hamdard Foundation

CORAM: Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justices PS Narasimha and JB Pardiwala
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Top Court against a Delhi High Court order which restrained the
manufacturers of a sharbat named ‘Dil Afza’ from selling the product after Hamdard Foundation filed
a trademark infringement suit alleging that it was deceptively similar to its ‘Rooh Afza’ product.
Hamdard Foundation had moved the Delhi High Court arguing that the sale of another sharbat by the
name Dil Afza (manufactured by Sadar Laboratories) is deceptively similar to Rooh Afza and that the
defendants have infringed on its trademark since the words ‘Dil’ and ‘Rooh’ have similar meanings.
It was also stated that the bottles in which the two products are being sold are similar.
The Counsel appearing for the Hamdard foundation said that "This drink is century-old and it has
acquired a character...a structural phonetic and visual mark has to be compared as a whole...Division
Bench [of High Court] has found circular rings in bottle which gives away dishonest intentions...They
are selling since 2020 and we are selling since 1907...this looks like a variant of Rooh Afza...They are
riding on my goodwill.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the words ‘Dil’ and ‘Rooh’ have similar meanings and the name Dil Afza (manufactured by
Sadar Laboratories) is deceptively similar to Rooh Afza?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court Bench of Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justices PS Narasimha and
JB Pardiwala held that "Rooh Afza has a well-established reputation across India and suddenly you
sell some medicines and in 2020 you start selling some Sharbat...Division Bench has held
correctly...We will not interfere. Dismissed.
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27. Animal Welfare Board of India and Others v. Union of

India and Others
CORAM: Justices KM Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy and CT Ravikumar
FACTS
The Supreme Court had in May 2014 held that Jallikattu, popular in Tamil Nadu, was violative of the
rights of the animals involved as well as the Prevention of Cruelty (PCA) Act. Therefore, the Tamil
Nadu Jallikattu Regulation Act of 2009 (TNJR Act), which regulated the practice, was struck down.
In January 2016, the Central government issued a new notification carving out an exception for
Jallikkattu and bullock cart races from the scope of the PCA Act. That notification came to be
challenged in the Supreme Court. Later, The State government enacted the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act of 2017.
The Counsel for the petitioner contended that Jallikattu causes unnecessary pain and suffering to
bulls merely for entertainment purpose and hence, the amendments in law should be held to be
unreasonable and arbitrary.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether court will venture into judicial adventurism to bring bulls within the ambit of Article 21 of
the Constitution which guarantees right to life?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "For instance, while other means of carriage of goods are available, why
should bulls be permitted to undertake such activities - which are apparently involuntary and subject
these sentient bovine species to pain and suffering? Horse racing is allowed under Performing
Animals (Registration) Rules, 2001. Horse is also a sentient animal. But the fact remains that by
making them perform in races, some element of pain and suffering must be caused to horses. Here,
the focus shifts from causing pain and suffering to the degree of pain and suffering to which a sentient
animal is subjected to while being compelled to undertake certain activities for the benefit of human
beings.”
The Supreme Court five-judge constitution bench of the Supreme Court of Justices KM Joseph, Ajay
Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy and CT Ravikumar upheld the validity of amendments made
by Tamil Nadu held that "While the protection under Article 21 has been conferred on person as
opposed to a citizen, which is the case in Article 19 of the Constitution, we do not think it will be
26
prudent for us to venture into a judicial adventurism to bring bulls within the said protected
mechanism.”
28. Bar Council of India v. Rabi Sahu and Another

CORAM: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sanjay Kumar
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 9th June 2023
FACTS
an appeal was filed before the Top Court by the BCI against an order of the Orissa High Court that
had directed the respondent in the case to be enrolled as an advocate even though he had graduated
from the Vivekananda Law College at Angul which was an unrecognized institute.
ISSUES RAISED
whether the BCI has the power to regulate matters regarding the educational qualifications of
advocates prior to their enrolment?
JUDGEMENT
The top court observed that the Orissa High Court had relied on the dictum in V. Sudeer vs. Bar
Council of India & Anr. However, the constitution bench judgment passed earlier this year had held
that the judgment in V. Sudeer was not good law. The Constitution bench judgment held that the BCI
has wide-ranging pre-enrolment powers.
The Supreme Court said that "The Constitution Bench held that the BCI’s role prior to enrolment
cannot be ousted and the ratio decidendi in V. Sudeer (supra), that it was not one of the statutory
functions of BCI to frame rules imposing pre-enrolment conditions, was erroneous. It was
categorically held that Section 49 read with Section 24(3)(d) of the Act of 1961 vested BCI with the
power to prescribe the norms for entitlement to be enrolled as an Advocate... Viewed thus, the rule
framed by BCI requiring a candidate for enrolment as an Advocate to have completed his law course
from a college recognized/ approved by BCI cannot be said to be invalid, as was held in the impugned
order.”
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal held that "We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding
that the Division Bench was not justified in directing the enrolment of respondent No. 1 as an
Advocate, despite the fact that he secured his law degree from a college which was not recognized or
approved by BCI.
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29. Aish Mohammed v. State of Haryana and Others

CORAM: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
FACTS
An appeal was filed against the order of the high court which had given the green signal to a
constable's dismissal from service. The appellant joined as Constable in Haryana Police on
15.01.1973 and promoted as Head Constable on 06.12.1993. One Assistant Sub-Inspector Basant Pal
made a complaint against the appellant. This led to a departmental enquiry, where the appellant was
held guilty and ordered to be reverted from Head Constable to Constable.
The Inspector General of Police (IGP) of the Gurgaon Range, however, in 2005 expunged all the
remarks in question. This was in review of and contrary to the decision of his predecessor. In 2006,
a show-cause notice was served on the constable by the Haryana DGP, which stated that undue
benefit had been given to him, and an order of compulsory retirement was in order rather than
further promotions.
Aggrieved by the order dated 30.10.2006, the appellant filed Civil Writ Petition before the High Court.
A single-judge of the High Court quashed the retiral order but a division bench restored the same
leading to the present appeal.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the DG of Police, Haryana have the power to review as per the Punjab Police Rules,1934?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "As such, the Director General of Police had rightly show-caused the
appellant and taken subsequent action thereupon. Considering the chain of events, the consequential
action, in our considered view, cannot be said to be arbitrary or shocking the conscience of the Court,
so as to warrant interference. For a person in uniformed service, like the police, adverse entry
relating to his/her integrity and conduct is to be adjudged by the superior authority(ies) who record
and approve such entry.”
The Top Court noted that the Rules referred to the authority of the Inspector General (IG) as the
highest, which was the case at the time of its enactment during colonial rule. However, today the said
position is held by the Director General of Police (DGP).
The Supreme Court bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah said that “Indubitably,
the Rules, for better or for worse have not kept pace with the times. We do not appreciate why the
28
authorities concerned are unable to update/amend the Rules with at least the correct official
description of posts to obviate confusion.”
30. Coal India Limited and Another v. Competition

Commission of India and Another
CORAM: Justice KM Joseph, Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
FACTS
A batch of appeals, the lead plea of which was one by Coal India challenging a December 2016 ruling
of the erstwhile Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT). The CCI had found the public-sector coal
company guilty of abuse of dominance in terms of the production and supply of non-coking coal to
thermal producers, in violation of the Competition Act. Pertinently, CCI had directed Coal India to
'cease such anti-competitive conduct'.
The thermal companies alleged that CIL had delayed the execution of fuel sales agreements it had
compelled them to sign, even as it effectively enjoyed a monopoly. Further, these agreements were
anti-competitive as the instant respondents had no bargaining or negotiating power. The thermal
companies stated that Coal India had increased the price of coal from ₹1,631 per metric ton to ₹2,177
per metric ton without any justification and had imposed discriminatory pricing on buyers.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the Competition Act is applicable to Coal India Limited?
JUDGEMENT
The Top Court said that "No nation can remain unaffected by the changes in the state of the world
economy. Policies, which are suitable at a given point of time, are not cast in stone. Each generation
of people have the right as also the duty to revisit economic policies which found favour with the
past. The present cannot put posterity in chains. Equally, the past cannot hold the present hostage to
ideas which would then degenerate into what was once original and suitable into dogma which no
longer can serve the people.”
The Supreme Court while rejecting Coal India's contention that the Competition Act does not apply
to them because of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act said that "Section 54 of the [Competition] Act
gives power to the Central Government to exempt from the application of the Act or any provision
and for any period, which is specified in the Notification. The ground for exemption can be security
of the State or even public interest. It is not as if the appellants, if there was a genuine case made out
29
for being taken outside the purview of the Act in public interest, the Government would be powerless.
We say no more.”
31. Station Superintendent and Another v. Surender

Bhola
CORAM: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
FACTS
The respondent raised a claim before the District Consumer Forum stating that while he was
travelling in a train and was carrying Rs.1 lakh in cash in a belt tied around his waist, the same got
stolen and as such the Railways should reimburse the said loss.
The District Consumer Forum allowed the same by awarding Rs.1 lakh to be paid by the appellant(s).
The State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission dismissed the appeal(s). Impugned by the order an appeal was filed before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether theft occurring during train rides amount to a deficiency in service by the Railways?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that “We fail to understand as to how the theft could be said to be in any way
a deficiency in service by the Railways. If the passenger is not able to protect his own belongings, the
Railways cannot be held responsible.”
The Supreme Court bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah held that
“Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission and the District Consumer
Forum.”
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32. Ghanshyam v. Yogendra Rathi

CORAM: Justices Dipankar Datta and Justice Pankaj Mithal
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 2nd June 2023
FACTS
The respondent instituted a suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit premises and for mesne
profits, on the averment that he is the owner of the said property by virtue of an agreement to sell,
power of attorney, a memo of possession and a receipt of payment of sale consideration as well as a
“will” of the appellant bequeathing the said property in his favour.
The appellant contested the suit on the ground that the aforesaid documents have been manipulated
on blank papers but did not dispute the execution of any of them or that the possession memo was
not executed or that the sale consideration as per the agreement was not paid.
The Trial Court held that there is no evidence to prove that any of the above documents were
obtained by misrepresentation, manipulation or by playing fraud upon the appellant. The respondent
has proved his right over the property. Since the licence of the appellant stands determined, he is
entitled to a decree of eviction and payment of mesne profits though not at the rate claimed by the
respondent, but at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per month for the use and occupation of the premises in
dispute.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the power of attorney, the will, the agreement to sell, coupled with possession memo and
the receipt of payment of sale consideration would confer any title upon the respondent to entitle
him to a decree of eviction and mesne profits?
JUDGEMENT
The Court after viewing Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, said that the agreement to
sell is not a document of title or a deed of transfer of property by sale and as such, may not confer
absolute title upon the respondent over the suit property. Further, the agreement to sell, the payment
of entire sale consideration as mentioned in the agreement itself and corroborated by the receipt of
its payment and the fact that the respondent was in possession of the suit property in accordance
with law as is also established by the possession memo on record, proved that the respondent is
having possessory rights over the suit property in part performance of the agreement to sell.
This possessory right of the respondent is not liable to be disturbed by the transferer, i.e., the
appellant. The entry of the appellant over part of the suit property subsequently is simply as a
licencee of the respondent. He does not continue to occupy it in the capacity of the owner.
31
The Supreme Court said that the ‘will’ executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent is
meaningless, as the will, if any, comes into effect only after the death of the executant and not before
it. It has no force till the testator or the person making it dies. The said stage has not arrived in the
present case and, therefore, even the ‘will’ in no way confers any right upon the respondent.
Further, the Supreme Court said that the practice, if any, prevalent in any State or the High Court
recognizing power of attorney and will to be documents of title or documents conferring right in any
immovable property is in violation of the statutory law. Any such practice or tradition prevalent
would not override the specific provisions of law which require execution of a document of title or
transfer and its registration to confer right and title in an immovable property of over Rs. 100/- in
value.
33. Krishna Kumar Raghuvanshi v. High Court of Madhya

Pradesh at Jabalpur through Registrar General
CORAM: Justice Bela M Trivedi and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 1st June 2023
FACTS
The appellant was managed a small temple in Raisen district, Madhya Pradesh. The appeal was filed
before the Top Court challenging the contempt proceedings initiated against him by the Madhya
Pradesh High Court for maligning the judiciary through a WhatsApp message. On May 15, the High
Court had sentenced him to 10 days' simple imprisonment with a fine of ₹2,000.
The appellant and other party were having a dispute related to the management of a temple trust.
The Civil Court divided the trust equally which were challenged before the Court of ADJ, but he did
not hear the appeal for years, the parties reached a settlement. Further, the ADJ allowed the appeal.
Through this order, additional conditions were imposed on the appellant. The appellant then once
again approached the High Court, which stayed the lower court's order.
Subsequently, the appellant filed a complaint with the High Court's Vigilance Registrar against the
ADJ, claiming that the order amounted to an abuse of his office. The complaint was inadvertently
shared over WhatsApp and even sent to the State government. Meanwhile, the complaint was
rejected after an inquiry was conducted
ISSUES RAISED
The independence of the judiciary lay not just in being free from executive pressures, but also in
being free from external forces
32
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "You have casted allegations against a judicial officer? You deserve to
learn hard lessons. An independent judiciary is not only independence from the executive but also
independent of external forces. Justice cannot be bought like this. Judges of lower courts have to
decide cases freely. Of course, imprisonment is warranted. How can he malign the image of judicial
officer on social media?”
The Supreme Court while rejecting the appeal said that "Not at all. He should be taken into
imprisonment if not done yet. He circulated 4 WhatsApp messages etc. We are here to impart justice
and not show mercy! Even a small person has to learn some hard lessons.”
34. Ramesh Chand v. Management of Delhi Transport

Corporation
CORAM: Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Rajesh Bindal
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 5th July 2023
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by a retired bus conductor. He was terminated from
service by the Delhi Transport Corporation in 1996 for allegedly not issuing tickets to two passengers
despite collecting ₹4 for the same in 1992.
In 2009, he was reinstated by a Labour Court. However, the Labour Court also ruled that he was not
entitled to be paid back wages for the time when he was not working for the Delhi Transport
Corporation. The Delhi High Court also upheld the Labour Court ruling. Aggrieved, the bus conductor
moved an appeal before the Supreme Court in 2016. He retired from service in 2020.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether an order to reinstate an employee back to service mean that the reinstated employee would
also be automatically entitled to back wages?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "The law is very well-settled. Even if Court passes an order of
reinstatement in service, an order of payment of back wages is not automatic. It all depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. An employee so reinstated would have to prove that he was not
gainfully employed during the relevant period in order to claim back wages.”
33
The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal after considering that the appellant could not find
alternative employment for about a year after his termination in 1996. Taking note of his current and
past salary, the Apex Court modified the Labour Court award to include back wages of ₹3 lakh.
35. P Yuvaprakash v. State Rep by Inspector of Police

CORAM: Justice S Ravindra Bhatt and Justice Arvind Kumar
FACTS
An appeal was filed by the accused against the High Court’s judgment. The complaint was filed in
2015, after the family of the minor accused the appellant and his aides of kidnapping the girl and
forcibly marrying her off after repeated sexual assault. The girl told the Magistrate that she had run
away on her own free will with her lover and the sexual acts were consensual. However, she retracted
her statement during the trial.
The trial court convicted the appellant under the POCSO Act, Prohibition of Child Marriage Act as well
as Section 366 of the IPC. The Madras High Court had upheld the conviction under the POCSO Act as
well the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, but set aside the conviction of the present petitioner under
Section 366 IPC.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the school transfer certificate cannot be the basis to determine age of a person under the
Juvenile Justice Act?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that "The medical evidence indicated that the victim had a ruptured
hymen; there was no external injury at her private parts, and no evidence to show that she had sexual
assault ... It is only when there is penetrative sexual assault, which implies sexual contact with or
without consent of the minor victim, that the offences under the POCSO Act are committed.”
The Supreme Court said that as per Section 94 of the JJ Act, wherever the dispute with respect to the
age of a person arises in the context of her or him being a victim under the POCSO Act, the following
documents have to be relied upon:
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the
concerned examination Board;
34
(ii) in the absence of (i), the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat;
(iii) in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other
latest medical age determination test.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Madras High Court was wrong in relying on a school transfer
certificate and rejecting a doctor's opinion that the minor was 19 years old at the time of the incident.
Therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant booked for the sexual assault of a
minor girl and for allegedly abetting their child marriage.
36. State of Gujarat v. Choodamani Parmeshwaran Iyer

and Another
CORAM: Justice J B Pardiwala and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
FACTS
An appeal was filed challenging a decision of the Gujarat High Court which had allowed the writ
applications of the respondents. On October 31, 2018, summons came to be issued to the respondents
calling upon them to remain present for interrogation in connection with an inquiry against M/s Iyer
Enterprise Mundra Kutch.
The authority concerned under the GST Act wanted to interrogate the respondents with regard to
the alleged evasion of Goods and Service Tax Liability/Contravention of the Provision of the Finance
Act 1994 and CGST Act. Upon receipt of summons, the respondents apprehended arrest and moved
two applications before the High Court, which disposed of the same by putting certain conditions on
the authority with regard to interrogation in the matter.
The State argued that as many as 14 summons were issued to one of the respondents but he appeared
for interrogation only once. Inquiry started five years ago and it is only after the respondents are
interrogated that the authority will be able to ascertain whether there was any evasion or not.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the power of officers under the GST Act to arrest a person could be termed as statutory in
character?
35
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court while agreeing with the contentions of the State said that the respondents have
to honor the summons and appear before the authority for the purpose of interrogation. The power
of arrest of officers under GST Act have a statutory character and writ courts should not generally
interfere with the same.
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal said that "The position of law is that if any person is
summoned under Section 69 of the CGST Act, 2017 for the purpose of recording of his statement, the
provisions of Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1908 cannot be invoked. We say so as no First
Information Report gets registered before the power of arrest under Section 69(1) of the CGST Act,
2017 is invoked and in such circumstances, the person summoned cannot invoke Section 438 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure for anticipatory bail.”
37. Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil v. K Madan Mohan Rao

and Others
CORAM: Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice Aravind Kumar
FACTS
An election petition by Congress leader K Madan Mohan Rao, who lost the 2019 Lok Sabha elections
from Zahirabad to Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) leader Bhim Rao Patil by 6,299 votes. Rao had
alleged that Patil violated norms by disclosing false information in his election affidavit, particularly
with respect to criminal cases filed against him.
The High Court allowed the filing of the election petition after the order of the Supreme Court, which
asked the High Court to decide the matter afresh, while keeping all contentions open during trial.
This led the appellant to file an appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the right to vote has been recognised as a fundamental right in India?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court bench of Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice Aravind Kumar while dismissing the
appeal held that "The right to vote, based on an informed choice, is a crucial component of the essence
of democracy. This right is precious and was the result of a long and arduous fight for freedom, for
Swaraj, where the citizen has an inalienable right to exercise her or his right to franchise...Democracy
has been held to be a part of one of the essential features of the Constitution. Yet, somewhat
36
paradoxically, the right to vote has not been recognized as a Fundamental Right yet; it was termed as
a “mere” statutory right.”
38. Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh v. M/s. Jet

Airways Ltd
CORAM: Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Sanjay Karol
FACTS
An appeal was filed against the orders of the Bombay High Court and the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal (CGIT) that had rejected the demand of 169 workmen of the Bharatiya Kamgar
Karmachari Mahasangh (appellants) for reinstatement with full back wages.
The appellants were treated as temporary loader-cum-cleaners, drivers, and operators by Jet
Airways despite completing over 240 days of regular work. Disputes arose after their fixed-term
contracts were not renewed. The Mahasangh moved to the CGIT for relief. The tribunal, relying on
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that it was not a case of retrenchment since a non-
renewal of fixed-term contracts did not amount to retrenchment.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether a beneficial law like the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, can be
overridden by employers through settlements or contracts which effectively curtail workers' rights
and dues?
JUDGEMENT
The Top Court observed that "A workman who has worked for 240 days in an establishment would
be entitled to be made permanent, and no contract/settlement which abridges such a right can be
agreed upon, let alone be binding. The Act being the beneficial legislation provides that any
agreement/contract/settlement wherein the rights of the employees are waived off would not
override the Standing Orders.”
The Supreme Court bench of Justice Abhay S Oka and Sanjay Karol held that "We have no hesitation
in saying that it is a special Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule-enumerated
conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments ... Any settlement, the employee Union
enters into with the Employer would not override the Model Standing Order, unless it is more
beneficial to the employees.”
37
39. State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police v. S. Subbegowda

CORAM: Justice Aniruddha Bose and Justice Bela M Trivedi
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 3rd August, 2023
FACTS
An executive engineer at the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board, Mandya Division,
S Subbegowda stood accused of corruption. Trial proceedings in the case began in 2011 after the
State government gave its sanction for prosecution. The High Court allowed the discharge application
on the ground that it should have been the Water Supply and Drainage Board and not the government
that ought to have granted sanction.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether a discharge application in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act can be entertained
if it is filed in the middle of trial after the trial court has taken cognizance of the matter and framed
charges?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court explained the only stages of proceedings when an accused can raise the issue of
sanction are: (a) when the Court takes cognisance of the offence, (b) when the charges are to be
framed or (c) when the trial is complete.
The Top Court said that “The findings recorded by the Special Judge could not have been and should
not have been reversed or altered by the High Court in the petition filed by the respondent
challenging the said order of the Special Judge, in view of the specific bar contained in sub-section (3)
of Section 19, and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure of justice had in fact
been occasioned to the respondent-accused as contemplated in the said sub-section (3).”
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal held that “As a matter of fact, such an interlocutory
application seeking discharge in the midst of trial would also not be maintainable. Once the
cognizance was taken by the Special Judge and the charge was framed against the accused, the trial
could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in the midst of it in view of Section 19(3) of the said Act
38
40. V. Senthil Balaji v. The State Represented by Deputy

Director and Others
CORAM: Justice A S Bopanna and Justice M M Sundresh
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 7th August 2023
FACTS
A petition was filed before the High Court by the Tamil Nadu Minister Senthil Balaji challenging his
custody by the ED in a money laundering case.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the term “custody” under Section 167 of the CrPC includes custody by other investigating
agencies, such as the Enforcement Directorate (ED), and not just the police?
JUDGEMENT
The Top Court emphasized that the purpose of this provision is to safeguard the accused’s liberty,
which is considered by an independent authority, i.e., the Magistrate.
The Supreme Court said that Magistrate has broad discretion in authorizing the detention of an
accused, as per Section 167(2) of the CrPC, 1973. They can decide whether the custody should be
given to the police, the investigating agency, or any other entity in a specific case.
The Supreme Court while rejecting the plea held that Section 167 aims to protect a person’s liberty
and ensure a fair investigation. The discretion exercised by the Magistrate is expected to strike a
balance between these objectives
41. Salib v. State of U.P. & Others.

CORAM: Justice BR Gavai and Justice JB Pardiwala
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 8th August, 2023
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Top Court to quash the FIR and challenging the judgment passed by
the Allahabad High Court in a case registered under Section 506 of the IPC. An FIR was lodged for the
39
offences punishable under Sections 376D, 323, 120B, 354A and 452 resply of the IPC and under
Sections 7 and 8 resply of the POCSO Act, 2012.
While the investigation of the FIR was going on, the accused persons had telephonically as well as in
person threatened the victim saying that they are the associates of main accused and that if she would
not withdraw the said FIR, then she as well as her family members would be killed. Further the FIR
was filed against the accused under section 195A and 506 of IPC. The appellant went before the High
Court by way of filing the Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition to quash the FIR lodged against him
which was declined.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether threatening a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle the dispute would attract
Section 195A of the IPC?
JUDGEMENT
The Top Court observed that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under
Section 195A of the IPC are disclosed, on plain reading of the FIR and the further statement of the
first informant including the statement of the so-called eye witness. The allegation in the FIR is that
the accused persons threatened and pressurized the first informant to withdraw her first FIR
registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376D, 323, 120B, 354A and 452 resply of the
IPC. There is nothing to indicate that the accused persons threatened the first informant with the
intent that the first informant gives false evidence before the Court of law.
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal held that it will not be just enough for the Court to look
into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious
proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from
the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection
try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is
empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of
the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation.
40
42. Kamal v. State (NCT of Delhi)

CORAM: Justice B R Gavai and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
FACTS
On September 10, 2009, the complainant Surat Singh discovered the deceased Hoshiyar Singh lying
dead on a cot. The prosecution had initially suspected Prem Singh, the deceased’s son, due to a
property dispute. The accused, Kamal Kishore and Manoj, were subsequently apprehended, leading
to their conviction by the trial court under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860.
The Appellant counsel argued that the prosecution had not established an unbroken link of
circumstances, rendering the conviction based on circumstantial evidence impermissible. They
contested the validity of the witnesses’ statements and the Call Detail Records (CDRs) that were
presented as evidence. The Prosecution said that the High Court and trial court had meticulously
considered the evidence and appropriately convicted the appellants.
ISSUES RAISED
In ‘Circumstantial Evidence’ necessity of fully established circumstances that exclude any reasonable
alternative hypothesis of innocence.
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court referred the landmark Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra case,
the judgment emphasized the necessity of fully established circumstances that exclude any
reasonable alternative hypothesis of innocence. The Supreme Court said that circumstances should
be conclusive and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought
to be proved.
The Supreme Court while acquitting the accused held that “We find that the prosecution has utterly
failed to prove the case as they need to prove the incriminating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt.
41
43. Dev Gupta v. PEC University of Technology and Others

CORAM: Justice S Ravindra Bhatt and Justice Arvind Kumar
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 9th August, 2023
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Top Court against the order of Punjab and Haryana High Court that
had dismissed a challenge to the 75 percent benchmark eligibility criterion. Three days after the
criterion was announced, the appellant had, on June 27 this year, written to the concerned authorities
stating that the 75 percent cut-off was too high. However, he did not get any relief prompting him to
approach the High Court.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether prescribing a high minimum percentage of marks in board examinations for availing
reservation under the sports quota would defeat the very purpose of such quotas?
JUDGEMENT
The Apex Court noted that the objective of sports quota is to promote and encourage those who have
excelled and gained a certain degree of prescribed proficiency and achievement in defined
competitive sports.
The Supreme Court said that "For instance, it is quite possible that a sportsperson, who has and
continues to represent the country in international Olympic sports, and gained such excellence as to
have bagged a medal or two, in say, wrestling, would be altogether excluded in the eventuality of a
wrestler, of the same category (but who has never reached the national level) securing 80% marks
in the qualifying examination. It is exactly this consequence which this court had warned would be
the “unequal application” of a uniform criterion, a wooden equality without regard to the inherent
differences, which Article 14 frowns upon, and forbids.”
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal said that "The imposition of the minimum 75%
eligibility condition ... does not subserve the object of introducing the sports quota, but is, rather
destructive of it; the criterion, in that sense subverted the object and is discriminatory; it therefore,
falls afoul of the equality clause, in Article 14 of the Constitution.”
42
44. Smt. Shiramabai v. The Captain, Record Officer for

O.I.C. Records
CORAM: Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Rajesh Bindal
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Apex Court challenging the order passed by the Karnataka High Court.
Late Subedar Bhave was enrolled in the Army in the year 1960. Thereafter, the deceased got married
to one Smt. Anusuya. During the subsistence of his marriage with Anusuya, he married the appellant
no.1.
On 15th November 1990, the deceased and Anusuya were granted a decree of divorce by mutual
consent. Thereafter, the deceased approached respondent No. 2 for deleting the name of Anusuya
and endorsing the name of appellant No 1 in the PPO.
In 2005, the appellants instituted a civil suit for declaration praying inter alia for issuing directions
to the respondents to disburse the pensionary benefits payable on the demise of the deceased,
Subedar Bhave. As noticed above, the trial Court decreed the said suit in favour of the appellants. But
the said order was dismissed by the High Court on the appeal of respondents. ISSUES RAISED
Whether presumption of marriage under law arises when man and woman cohabit for long time?
JUDGEMENT
Supreme Court observed that the law infers a presumption in favour of a marriage when a man and
woman have continuously cohabitated for a long spell. No doubt, the said presumption is rebuttable
and can be rebutted by leading unimpeachable evidence. When there is any circumstance that
weakens such a presumption, courts ought not to ignore the same. The burden lies heavily on the
party who seeks to question cohabitation and to deprive the relationship of a legal sanctity.
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal held that if the period up to the year 1990 was to be
excluded as the marriage between Late Subedar Bhave and Anusuya had got dissolved only on 15th
November 1990, the fact remains that even thereafter, the deceased had continued to cohabit with
the appellant No. 1 for eleven long years, till his demise in the year 2001
43
45. Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana and Others

CORAM: Justice Surya Kant and Justice Dipankar Dutta
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 4th September 2023
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Top Court against the order of the Telangana High Court which refused
to set aside the detention order issued by The Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City against the
Detenu (appellant’s husband).
ISSUES RAISED
What are the measures taken by the authorities before issuing preventive detention orders?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court while quashing the detention order observed that "It requires no serious debate
that preventive detention, conceived as an extraordinary measure by the framers of our Constitution,
has been rendered ordinary with its reckless invocation over the years as if it were available for use
even in the ordinary course of proceedings. To unchain the shackles of preventive detention, it is
important that the safeguards enshrined in our Constitution, particularly under the ‘golden triangle’
formed by Articles 14, 19 and 21, are diligently enforced.”
The Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines for constitutional courts to consider when
deciding on the legality of preventive detention orders: -
1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such
satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of
the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being
satisfied;
2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant
circumstances and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the
statute;
3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised
for an improper purpose, not authorized by the statute, and is therefore ultra vires;
4. The detaining authority has acted independently, not under the dictation of another body;
5. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate link
between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him;
6. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests is not vague but are precise,
pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the
detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation.
44
46. Harilal v. State of Chhattisgarh

CORAM: Justice J B Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Mishra
FACTS
Appeals were filed before the Top Court against a 2010 Chhattisgarh High Court order that had
upheld a 1991 trial court conviction of the two persons accused. The accused were convicted and
sentenced by the Trail Court to imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the IPC, 1860. Further it
was affirmed by the High Court.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether a conviction can be awarded in the delayed FIR and in also absence of proper explanation?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court noted that the courts below had ignored the fact that there were no clear-cut
motives attributable to the accused. The top court also noted that there was no explanation as to why
the dead body of the alleged murder victim lay three hundred feet away from the alleged site of the
murder, or why a lathi was found beside the corpse.
The Top Court observed that "The fact that it was a delayed FIR cannot be ignored. When an FIR is
delayed, in absence of proper explanation, the courts must be on guard and test the evidence
meticulously to rule out possibility of embellishments in the prosecution story, inasmuch as delay
gives opportunity for deliberation and guess work. More so, in a case where probability of no one
witnessing the incident is high, such as in a case of night occurrence in an open place or a public
street.”
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal said that the prosecution had not been able to
convincingly prove the genesis of the crime or the circumstances behind the murder. The accused
were entitled to the benefit of doubt in the absence of clinching circumstances warranting their
conviction.
45
47. NHPC Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh Secretary &

Others
CORAM: Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Top Court against the order of the High Court. The Himachal Pradesh
Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1955, was amended by the Amendment and Validation Act of
1997. NHPC Ltd had contested assessments made under the Act for providing free transport facilities
to its employees and their children.
The Division Bench of the High Court had previously ruled in NHPC’s favor, stating that the Act did
not apply to the company. However, the Amendment and Validation Act of 1997 brought substantial
changes to the Act, including amendments to the definitions of various terms and the introduction of
Section 3(1-A) to equate non-fare paying passengers with fare-paying passengers for tax purposes.
Which resulted in dismissal of writ petition by the High Court.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether legislature can directly set aside a judicial decision?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that the defects identified by the Division Bench had been rectified
through the Amendment and Validation Act of 1997, thus validating the taxation of NHPC Ltd.’s
activities. The Top Court said that in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the
appellants should be made liable to pay the tax w.e.f. 01.04.2023, the current financial year onwards
and not for the period prior thereto.
The Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal said that “What follows from the aforesaid judicial
precedent is, a legislature cannot directly set aside a judicial decision. However, when a competent
legislature retrospectively removes the substratum or foundation of a judgment to make the decision
ineffective, the same is a valid legislative exercise provided it does not transgress on any other
constitutional limitation. Such a legislative device which removes the vice in the previous legislation
which has been declared unconstitutional is not considered to be an encroachment on judicial power
but an instance of abrogation recognised under the Constitution of India.”
46
48. Purushottam Bagh Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. v. Sri

Shobhan Pal Singh and Another etc
CORAM: Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Pankaj Mithal
FACTS
Appellantt is a society formed in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act,
1965. In the said society, the late Krishna Pal Singh(respondent), the predecessor-in-interest of the
respondents was one of the members. The said society developed a residential colony wherein a plot
was allotted in favour of Krishna Pal Singh and a sale deed in his favour was executed on 14.07.1983.
Under the bye-laws of the society, a residential plot could be allotted to a member only if he lives or
wishes to live in the area of operation of the society provided, he or his family member does not own
any building or plot in the area of operation of the society. Krishna Pal Singh gave an undertaking on
an affidavit that he does not possess any building or plot in the area of operation of the society and
probably in light of such an undertaking, the aforesaid plot was allotted to him and the sale deed was
executed.
After about 26 years, the society referred the matter to the sole arbitrator alleging that Krishna Pal
Singh had a personal house wherein he resided and that he does not require the plot in question and
that he has purchased the same from the society in order to sell it to third party on higher rate. The
arbitrator declared the sale deed to be null and void. Against which a writ petition was filed before
the High Court and High Court allowed the petition which said aside the award.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether mere living in a particular house by itself would mean that the said house is under
ownership of the person living therein?
JUDGEMENT
Supreme Court noted that the appellant is alleging violation of the Bye Laws as aforesaid therefore it
is upon it to prove the same. In this context, the writ court has returned a specific finding that the
society had failed to furnish any evidence before the arbitrator to substantiate its allegation that the
petitioners are having land or a house in Agra and that Krishna Pal Singh or his successors have
violated any of the conditions of the sale deed or of the byelaws of the society.
47
The Supreme Court while rejecting the appeal held that mere living in a particular house by itself
would not mean that the said house is under ownership of the person living therein in his individual
capacity or even that it is within the area of operation of the society.
49. CBI v. RR Kishore

CORAM: Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, Abhay S Oka, Vikram Nath, and JK Maheshwari
FACTS
The accused was arrested while accepting a bribe. The accused had challenged the prosecution for
want of sanction. The Delhi High Court had earlier directed the central agency to get the necessary
approvals and restart the probe. The appeal against the High Court decision was pending before the
top court, the 2014 decision in the Subramanian Swamy case was delivered.
In 2014, the Supreme Court in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs Director CBI, struck down Section
6A (1) on the ground that it was violative of Article 14 (right to equality) of the Constitution of India.
The top court had held that there cannot be a distinction between officials based on their status and
rank. However, in the said judgment, the Supreme Court not clarified what would happen to existing
cases being probed by the central agency. A constitution bench was, therefore, constituted to examine
whether the 2014 decision would affect existing corruption cases.
Section 6A had provided that prior Central government sanction was mandatory before the CBI could
conduct investigations in corruption cases against Union government bureaucrats from the rank of
Joint-Secretary onwards.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the declaration of Section 6A (1) of the DSPE Act to be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution would have retrospective effect or it would apply prospectively?
JUDGEMENT
The Constitutional bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, Abhay S Oka, Vikram Nath,
and JK Maheshwari said that "Once a law is declared to be unconstitutional, being violative of Part-
III of the Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab initio, still born, unenforceable and non-est
in view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its interpretation by authoritative pronouncements.
Thus, the declaration made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) will
have retrospective operation.”
48
50. Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and

Others
CORAM: Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Sanjay Karol
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 21st September 2023
FACTS
An appeal was filed before the Top Court challenging an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court,
which had refused to entertain allegations of forgery and illegality in relation to a will. The plea
challenging the will was moved by the former wife of the will's maker (testator). The High Court had
upheld an order of a Jabalpur civil court in a succession case, which had issued letters of
administration in favour of the testator's second wife and her kin.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the allegations of second marriage and bigamy is a relevant factor in deciding the validity
of the Will?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court said that "Since the testator/testatrix, at the time of testing the document for its
validity, would not be available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the Will came to be
executed, stringent requisites for the proof thereof have been statutorily enjoined to rule out the
possibility of any manipulation.”
The Supreme Court observed that "It is evident that the Will was duly executed by the testator in the
presence of witnesses out of his free Will in a sound disposing state of mind ... As far as the allegations
of second marriage and bigamy are concerned, we refrain from entertaining such submissions as the
same is not a relevant factor in deciding the main list, which is confined to the validity of the Will.”
The Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal held that there was no evidence to conclude that the
deceased man, was unfit or in an unstable mental condition, or under undue influence or suspicious
circumstances, when the will was executed.
49
DREAM.
BELIEVE.
DO.
REPEAT.
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1. Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India

CORAM: Justices S Abdul Nazeer, BR Gavai, AS Bopanna and V Ramasubramanian, B V Nagarathna

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 2nd January 2023

2. Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.

CORAM: Justices S Abdul Nazeer, BR Gavai, AS Bopanna and V Ramasubramanian, B V Nagarathna

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 3rd January 2023

3. K.C. Cinema v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir

CORAM: Chief Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice PS Narasimha

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 3rd January 2023

4. M/s Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corporation

CORAM: (CJI) DY Chandrachud and Justice Hima Kohli

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 3rd January 2023

5. State of Rajasthan v. Komal Lodhas

CORAM: Justice M R Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 6th January 2023

6. Sunita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others

CORAM: Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 4th January 2023

7. BV Seshiah v. State of Telangana and Another

CORAM: Justice Krishna Murari and Justice V. Ramasubramanian

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 1st February 2023

8. M/S Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. The Excise and Taxation

CORAM: Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Dutta

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 1st February 2023

9. Vibhuti Shankar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh

CORAM: Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 8th February 2023

- initial appointment must be done by the competent authority; and

10. M/S Gas Authority of India Limited v. M/S Indian

CORAM: Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Abhay S Oka

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 8th February 2023

11. C Yamini and Others v. High Court of Andhra Pradesh

CORAM: Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Bela M Trivedi

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 23rd February 2023

12. State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh

CORAM: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Dipankar Datta

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 1st March 2023

13. Nand Lal v. State of Chhattisgarh

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 14th of March 2023

14. Rajendra Kumar Shrivas v. State of Madhya Pradesh

CORAM: Justice MR Shah and Justice CT Ravikumar

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 13th of March 2023

15. Arnab Roy v. Consortium of NLUs and anr

CORAM: CJI DY Chandrachud and Justices PS Narasimha and JB Pardiwala

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 17th March 2023

16. Mah Adiwasi Thakur Jamat Swarakshan Samiti v.

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 26th March 2023

17. State Bank of India and Others v. Rajesh Agarwal and

CORAM: CJI DY Chandrachud and Justice Hima Kohli

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 27th March 2023

Whether an opportunity of hearing should be given to borrower by a bank before classifying a

18. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Vikas Mishra

CORAM: Justice M R Shah and Justice C T Ravikumar

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 10th April 2023

19. The Director (Admn. and HR) KPTCL and Others v. CP

CORAM: Justice M R Shah and Justice C T Ravikumar