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E-BOOK: 50 IMPORTANT JUDGMENT FOR CLAT PG 2023 Pg. 1
1. A.PERIYAKARUPPAN V. THE PRINCIPAL

SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
COURT: Madras High Court
CORAM: Justice S. Srimathy
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19 April 2022
FACTS
The petitioner, Tahsildar, had spent 35 years working for the Revenue Department. In 2006,
he reached superannuation but was prevented from retiring due to ongoing disciplinary
actions and later was suspended. The petitioner contended that he was merely following
orders from his superiors, who went unpunished. However, the respondent argued that the
petitioner illegally granted pattas to classified “Forest Poramboke Land.”
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the petitioner can depend on the reliefs granted to the the co-delinquent ?
JUDGEMENT
The Court stated that because the facts in each case are different and there is some difference
in each case, the petitioner cannot depend on the reliefs given to the other officials involved
in the patta procedures.
Invoking the doctrine of “parens patriae jurisdiction,” the Court in its landmark
judgment, declared “Mother Nature” to be a living being having the status of a legal entity
and conferred corresponding rights, liabilities, and duties.
The Court said that Mother Nature needs to be safeguarded and preserved and laid down
that “Indiscriminate destruction or change is leading to several complications in the
ecosystem, ultimately is endangering the very existence of the animals, flora and fauna,
forests, rivers, lakes, water bodies, mountains, glaciers, air and of course human. Strangely
the destruction is carried on by few humans.”
2. ABHAY JAIN V. HIGH COURT OF

JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS
COURT: Supreme Court of India
CORAM: Vineet Saran, Aniruddha Bose
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15 March 2022
FACTS
The appellant, Mr. Abhay Jain joined as a judicial officer in 2013. He had been appointed as
a District Judge in 2013 after clearing the District Judge Examination, 2013.
He was initially appointed on probation for 2 years. Thereafter, he was appointed as the
Additional District & Sessions Judge No.2, Bharatpur. Subsequently, he was appointed as
Presiding Officer of a Labour Tribunal and then as Sessions Judge of the Anti-Corruption
Department of Bharatpur. It was during his time as Session Judge, Anti-Corruption
Department has the incident for this case has taken place.
In a case regarding bribery under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, three individuals were
arrested, namely K KJalia (who was the Chairman of the Municipal Corporation, alleged to
take bribe of 5 Lakhs), Alimuddin (who was the Chairman of the Municipal Corporation,
alleged to take a bribe of Rs 10 Lakhs) and Irfan (was a non-official also alleged to be
involved in the case). The predecessor of the appellant dismissed both K KJalia and
Alimuddin’s bail on 03-02-2015. Charge sheet was filed against all the three accused on
23.02.2015.
K KJalia moved for 2nd bail application in the appellants Court and he was granted bail on
27-04-2015.
The appellant had been called upon by the High Court to submit his comments on the bail
order of K. K. Jalia, one of the co-accused on 27-04-2015. The appellant had granted bail
even though the bail had been dismissed by the High Court.
In his reasons, the appellant stated that the High court's order has not been produced before
him which led him to believe that there must have been a change in circumstances. The
appellant also stated that the two other co-accused whom he had denied bail, had been
granted bail by the High Court.
After considering the explanation, departmental enquiry was directed by the Chief Justice of
the Rajasthan High Court.
Subsequently, the enquiry against the appellant was closed on 02.05.2016. However, the
department reserved the right to reopen the same.
On 05.05.2016, the High Court also closed the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the
appellant. Aggrieved by the order dated 27.01.2016, the appellant filed a Writ Petition before
the Rajasthan High Court on 18.05.2016
By an Order dated 21.10.2019, the Rajasthan High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by
the Appellant against the order dated 27.01.2016.
Aggrieved by the abovementioned High Court Order dated 21.10.2019, this appeal has been
filed by the appellant by way of Special Leave Petition.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the Judicial Officer could be held liable for misconduct or not?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court noted that disciplinary proceedings cannot be commenced against a
judicial officer merely on the grounds that he passed a wrong order. The Bench categorically
stated that mere negligence cannot amount to misconduct. The Bench observed that the
ACRs had not been communicated to the Judicial Officer within reasonable time and relied
on the judgment of Sukhdev Singh vs Union of India [(2013) 9 SCC 566]. The Court noted
that every ACR entry must be communicated to a Judicial Officer within reasonable period of
time. The Court further observed that a judicial officer, in the initial stages of his service,
may make certain errors which would be reduced as he gains more experience. What needs
to be noted in such cases is whether the Officer had any corrupt intention. The Court noted
that the appellant was terminated as punishment. The Court observed that while the Officer
may be guilty of negligence, such negligence would not amount to misconduct. Mere
negligence cannot be treated as misconduct. Lastly, the Bench noted that there was nothing
on record to show that the appellant was liable for unsatisfactory performance as stipulated
under the Rule 45 as well as 46 of Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010.The Court noted
that the appellant was entitled to the protection envisaged under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution. No verifiable complaint had been filed against the appellant either.
3. ASHISH SHELAR V. MAHARASHTRA

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
CORAM: Justices AM Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari and CT Ravikumar
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28 January 2022
FACTS
12 BJP MLAs were suspended by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly for one year for
indisciplined and unbecoming behavior. The house passed a resolution which read “Due to
the indisciplined and unbecoming behavior resulting in maligning the
dignity of the House, this House resolves to suspend the membership of …… for
a period of one year. Similarly, during the period of suspension they may be
restrained from entering into the premises of Vidhan Bhawan at Mumbai and
Nagpur.”
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the parliamentary resolution suspending 12 MLA’s from the Maharashtra

Legislative Assembly for a year violates the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Rules.
JUDGEMENT
Supreme Court stated that ‘Suspension For One Year Worse Than Expulsion’ and Quasheed
Maharashtra Assembly’s Resolution To Suspend 12 BJP MLAs. The Hon’ble Court held that
the resolution passed by the House was “unconstitutional,” “illegal,” and “beyond the powers
of the assembly.” The court ruled that the suspension by the House was “irrational” because
it should only have applied to the current session. The bench noted that a suspension for one
full year was even worse than expulsion. The court cited Article 190(4), which states that a
member’s seat may be declared vacant by the House if they are gone for 60 days without
permission. The assembly had not complied with this constitutional mandate.
4. ASSET RECONSTRUCTION CO. (INDIA) LTD.

V. S.P. VELAYUTHAM
CORAM: Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 4 May 2022
FACTS
In 1992, Indian Bank sanctioned certain loan facilities to M.V.R. Group of Industries. The
borrower gave a mortgage on an immovable asset as Collateral Security for financial facilities
the bank granted. When defaulted, the bank allocated the debt and collateral security to the
Appellant. The Appellant issued a Sale Notice based on the Assignment. The original Owners
registered a Power of Attorney in the first Respondent's name that forbade the Agent from
encumbering any real estate. The Agent was granted the power of sale by executing a second
deed of power, but it was not recorded. The Respondent sold the property to his son under
the terms of the first registered power of attorney. Appellant filed a Writ Petition for
declaring the act of the Sub-Registrar, in registering the Sale Deed executed by Respondent
in favor of his son, null & void as the Registrar failed to verify the (1st) Power Document
before registering the sale on that basis. The Writ Petition was allowed, but it was reversed
by the Division Bench on the ground that the Appellant ought to have filed a Civil Suit.
Hence, the appeal is before the supreme court.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court by the appellant was right,
especially when civil suits at the instance of third parties are pending and when this Court
had already directed the appellant, in proceedings arising under section 145 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, to move the civil Court?
JUDGEMENT
“A declaration that a document is null and void, is exclusively within the

domain of the civil court, but it does not mean that the High Court cannot
examine the question whether or not the Registering Authority performed his
statutory duties in the manner prescribed by law.”
The Court held that pronouncing a document to be null and void is solely the purview of the
civil court, but this does not preclude the High Court from considering whether or not the
Registering Authority fulfilled its legal obligations.
5. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA V. TWINKLE

RAHUL MANGONKAR AND OTHERS
CORAM: Sanjay Kishankaul J, and M.M Sundresh J
FACTS
An appeal was filed by BCI challenging the Gujarat High Court verdict where it has allowed
persons with other employment, to enrol as advocates without resigning from their jobs. The
BCI had previously filed a detailed affidavit in response to a Court order dated March 15
requesting a response from the BCI. According to the affidavit, the AIBE was a post-
enrolment exam, and an advocate was not permitted to engage in any profession or job
under the Rules of the Bar Council of India or the Advocates’ Act. According to the BCI, this
Rule ensured that persons in jobs did not receive benefits from the Advocates’ Welfare Fund
and were not on the voter list for Bar elections.Despite these submissions, the BCI stated
that it had formed a high-level committee comprised of many senior advocates and former
judges to investigate the issues and submit a report.
JUDGMENT
The bench taking note of the submissions of the Parties remarked, “We are inclined to accept
the plea of the Amicus that the BCI may adopt the aforesaid process by giving provisional
enrolment to enter in a B register with the appropriate undertaking that such enrolment
would not be interpreted as a right to practice in the intervening period. This act of balancing
would be in accord with the doctrine of proportionality as elucidated in the previous hearings
by the Ld. Amicus and would not be in contradiction to the decision in V. Sudeer case…
If a person continues to be in employment, then they would have the requirement of taking
the Bar examination again at the appropriate stage when they seek to give up employment
and enroll themselves at the Bar. The period of six months suggested by the amicus is good
enough for a person to take a call whether they want to be in employment or continue with
the profession in law”. The bench clarified that it should not be a case where a person takes
the examination and continues in employment for a period of time says 10 years and
thereafter seeks seniority based on the exam taken years ago.
6. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO V.

UGANDATHE 2022 REPARATIONS JUDGMENT
COURT: International Court of Justice
CORAM: Joan E. Donoghue
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 9 February 2022
FACTS
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) requested that the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) commence legal proceedings against the Republic of Uganda for acts of armed
aggression committed on DRC territory on June 23, 1999. The DRC said this was in violation
of the UN Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. DRC claimed that
Uganda had invaded its territory, while Uganda countered that its presence there was
legitimate. Through its 2005 judgement the ICJ found Uganda was in violation of many
different international principles with its sustained military actions in the DRC. In 2015, the
DRC had requested the Court reopen proceedings to determine the question of reparations?
ISSUE RAISED
The court determined the questions of reparations in this case.
JUDGEMENT
After the negotiations between the DRC and Uganda failed the ICJ took up the matter and
awarded the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) the global sum of US$330 Million as
total compensation for damage caused by Uganda’s violations of international human rights
law as found in the 2005 judgement. While doing do the Court maintained the Chorzow
Factory standard of full reparation for injury caused by internationally wrongful acts.
The court saidthat “The reparation awarded to the DRC for damage to persons and to
property reflects the harm suffered by individuals and communities as a result of Uganda’s
breach of its international obligations.”
Judgment is doctrinally significant since the Court developed its own technique for
computing compensatory reparations for widespread violations of human rights and
humanitarian law.
7. DR N KARTHIKEYAN & OTHERS V. STATE

OF TAMILNADU & OTHERS
COURT: The Supreme Court of India
CORAM:Hon’ble Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai
DATE OF JUDGMENT:16 March 2022
FACTS
The current writ petition challenged a government order dated November 7, 2020,
issued by the Tamil Nadu Government's Health and Family Welfare Department,
which provided for the reservation of 50% Super Specialty seats (Doctorate of
Medicine / Master of Chirurgiae) for in-service candidates in Government Medical
Colleges in the state. The Supreme Court vide an interim order dated November 27,
2020 stated that Counseling for admission to Super Specialty Medical Courses for
the academic year 2020-21 will be conducted without reservations for in-service
doctors. In this case, the writ petitioners and appellants argued that the Court should
keep the aforementioned interim order in place for the academic year 2021-22.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the government order dated November 7, 2020 was valid under 7 Schedule
th
of the Constitution of India?
Whether the interim injunction by the Supreme Court should be continued for the
academic year 2021-22?
JUDGEMENT
The Honourable Bench noted that in issuing the interim order on November 27,
2020, the court took into account the fact that the government order was issued on
November 7, which was after the admission process had started. The goal was to
ensure that rules were not modified once the admissions process had begun. It was
made clear that the court had not given a judgement on the legality of the
Government Order in question. It was also emphasised that the directive will only be
in effect for the academic year 2020-21. Undoubtedly, the stated directive was
notified prior to the start of the admission procedure for the said courses for the
academic year 2021-22.
The minimal qualifying marks for general category applicants were 45 percent in the
case of Dr.Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P. &ors. However, for candidates in the
reserved category, the requirement was reduced to 20%. In this context, it was
believed that it would be difficult for reserved category applicants to achieve parity
with general category candidates during their postgraduate studies. As a result, it was
not possible to lower the qualifying standards for reserved category applicants,
resulting in a significant gap in qualifying marks between a general category
candidate and a reserved category candidate.
In the case of Dr.Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P., the Court for medan opinion that
the subject of whether a reservation or a distinct route for admission can be offered
to in-service candidates did not fall for consideration. The facts in this case were
considerably more similar to the facts in Tamil Nadu Medical Officers Association v.
Union of India &ors. The Bench for meda prima facie found that the facts in
Dr.Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P. &ors were not the same as those in the current
case.
As a result, the Bench was guided by the judgement of the Constitution Bench in the
case of Tamil Nadu Medical Officers Association v. Union of India rather than the
judgement in the case of Dr.Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P &Ors, taking into
account the principles of judicial discipline and judicial propriety. It was decided that
maintaining interim protection, which had been granted for the academic year 2020-
21, was pointless, and the petition was dismissed.
8. DR. P. MAHALINGAM V. MUTHOOT

FINCROP LIMITED
COURT: National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench: New Delhi
CORAM: Justice M. Venugopal
FACTS
In this case the appellant took an undertaking to pay an amount of 57.50 Crores to the M/s
Muthoot Fincorp Ltd but has failed to do within the 60 days. Upon which the Committee of
Creditors has taken a decision for liquidation of the company. The Adjudicating Authority
NCLT, Chennai ordered the liquidation of the corporate debtors via order dated 4.12.19 and
the legality and correctness of the impugned order has been challenged by the appellant. The
appellant has argued that the given order completely negates the Spirit of the provisions of
IBC, 2016 and hence, is bad in law.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the order by the Adjudicating Authority is in contrast with the essence of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code?
JUDGEMENT
The Company Appeal (AT)(Ins) No.146/2020 is dismissed without cost. The appellant
argued that the Adjudicating Authority should make it so that corporate applicant be a going
concern, which is of prime importance, without which the pending debts would possibly turn
bad. The Appellate Tribunal said that the arguments raised by the appellant do not stand
true to the actions taken by them. As there were hardly any operations being carried out by
the appellant and hence, they can’t take a plea and take to be restored to a position of ‘going
concern’.
9. ELLORA PAPER MILLS LIMITED V. THE

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
CORAM: Mr.M.R.Shah and Mrs Nagarathna
DATE OF JUDGMENT:4 January 2022
FACTS
For the years 1993-1994, the Respondent launched a tender for the supply of cream woe
paper and duplicating paper. The appellant in this case took part in the tender procedure and
was granted the contract by supply order dated September 22, 1993. The appellant and the
Respondent had a disagreement. The Respondent's officers made up the Arbitral tribunal,
which was dubbed the stationary buying committee.
On September 12, 2000, the appellant filed its objections to the formation of the Arbitral
Tribunal/stationery procurement committee. By filing an application under Section 13 of the
Arbitration Act of 1996, the appellant in this case also disputed its jurisdiction. The above-
mentioned Application was denied by the Arbitral Tribunal in an order dated February 2,
2001. Following that, the appellant filed the current application in the High Court under
Section 14 read with Sections 11 & 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to
terminate the mandate of the originally constituted Arbitral Tribunal- Stationery Purchase
Committee, which was made up of officers of the Respondent, and heavily relied on Section
12(5) of the Act. However, the High Court did not agree with the Appellant's arguments and
held that the Amendment Act, 2015 will take effect on October 23, 2015, and that it will not
apply retrospectively to arbitration proceedings that have already begun unless the parties
agree otherwise. In the present case, the arbitration tribunal tribunal was established long
before the Amendment Act, 2015 took effect, and the arbitration tribunal had already begun
its proceedings therefore the Amendment Act, 2015 - Section 12(5)of the Arbitration
Act,1996 shall not be applicable.
The High Court denied the application filed under Section 14 read with Sections 11 and 15 of
the Arbitration Act, 1996, prompting the appellant to file a petition with the Supreme Court
of India.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the tribunal members who had initiated the arbitration had lost their mandate
post-2015 Amendments because of Section 12 (5) Arbitration And Concilliation Act, 1996?
JUDGEMENT
In light of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule of the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court
of India held that the arbitrator's mandate can be challenged at any moment during the
proceedings.
The Supreme Court of India overturned the judgement of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, which held that the Amendment Act, 2015 will take effect on October 23, 2015, and
that it will not apply retrospectively to arbitration proceedings already in progress unless the
parties agree otherwise. In the present case, the arbitral tribunal was established long before
the Amendment Act, 2015, and its proceedings had already begun.
As a result, in the absence of an express written agreement entered into after the disputes
arose between them, waiving the applicability of the Section, specifically referring to a
person who is interdicted by the seventh Schedule of the 1996 Act, an ineligible arbitrator
can be challenged, even in a pre-2015 case and even in an ongoing arbitration.
10. G.T. GIRISH V. Y. SUBBA RAJU
CORAM: Justice K.M. Joseph and Justice P.S. Narasimha
FACTS
The Bangalore Development Authority allocated the scheduled property to the first
defendant and later engaged in a lease cum sale agreement on 4.4.1979. On 17.11.1982, the
first defendant signed a deal with the appellant to perform the sale of the given property. On
08.05.1984, the defendant intimated that the agreement was in breach and forfeited the
deposit. The appellant sued, requesting specific performance. In the meantime, the first
defendant, who has since passed away, and his son executed a sale deed in the second
defendant's favor. The High Court determined that the provisions of Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applied to the alienation effected on behalf of the second
defendant.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the transfer of property is considered void only because it is made when the suit is
pending?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act stipulates is that
any transfers of the property undertaken while a lawsuit is still pending is not void or invalid
and would be subject to the final verdict of the Court. A transfer which is made lis pendens
create rights as between the parties to the sale.
The Lis Pendens doctrine is based on the principle 'pendente lite nihil
innovetur,' which denotes ‘pending litigation, nothing new should be
introduced’.
11. GARMENT CRAFT V. PRAKASH CHAND

GOEL
CORAM: Bench Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi
FACTS
In this case, the appellant was in judicial custody in Jaipur, and as a result, he was unable to
appear before the Delhi High Court in another civil matter filed against him. The joint
registrar of the Delhi High Court ordered the closure of defence evidence in the civil suit and
moved the case to the court of the Additional District Judge on the basis of pecuniary
jurisdiction. The Additional District Judge recalled the high court's order requiring the
closure of defence material, and the appellant was allowed to testify before issuing a
production warrant. However, Jaipur's jail superintendent refused to comply, instead
seeking confirmation from the court as to whether the detenu was on bail in that particular
civil case.
The Additional District Judge subsequently denied the motion for clarification, noting that
he should have been presented. In light of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division, and
Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015, the claim was re-transferred to the
High Court. However, in an order dated August 10, 2016, the complaint was renumbered and
assigned to the Addl. Dist. Judge, Tis Hazari. The appellant's counsel did not arrive,
therefore the court closed the defence evidence and later heard concluding arguments before
issuing an ex parte decision.
Following his release from central jail, the appellant filed an application before Addl. Dist.
Judge Tis hazari for the recall of the order of closure of defence evidence, as well as an
application under Order IX Rule 13 for the setting aside of the exparte decision. The request
was approved. Later, the Delhi High Court, acting under Article 227 of the Indian
Constitution, overturned the District Judge's ruling granting the motion. The defendant then
moved to the Supreme Court, where the case was finally heard.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the judgement passed by the High Court of Delhi is erroneous in nature?
Whether there is deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercisable by the high court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India?
JUDGEMENT
The supreme court indicated that the high court's ruling is contrary to law and cannot be
sustained for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is the deviation from the high
court's limited authority under Article 227 of the Indian Constitution.
"The High Court is not to substitute its own judgement on facts and conclusion for that of the
lesser court or tribunal," it was ruled. The exercised jurisdiction is of the type of correctional
jurisdiction used to address grave dereliction of duty or egregious abuse, as well as violations
of fundamental principles of law or justice. Article 227 power must be used carefully and
only in proper instances. Such discretionary relief must be used to guarantee that no
injustice occurs."
The supreme court further concluded that the discretion used by the Addl. Dist. Judge in
awarding relief was not marred by any error on the face of the record or a perverse finding.
As a result, the Addl. Dist. Judge's reasoned and justified decision, after considering relevant
facts, did not merit any interference by the high court exercising revisional authority under
Article 227 of the Indian Constitution.
12. HARBHAJAN SINGH V. STATE OF

HARYANA
CORAM: Justices Hemant Gupta and Vikram Nath
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20 September 2022
FACTS
The present writ petition has challenged the constitutional validity of the Haryana Sikh
Gurdwara (Management) Act, 2014. It is alleged that the State Legislature of Haryana lacked
the authority to establish a body for Gurudwara management since the power is reserved for
the Parliament.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the Haryana Sikh Gurdwara (Management) Act, 2014 is constitutionally valid?
JUDGEMENT
The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Haryana Sikh
Gurudwara (Management) Act,2014 and held that that Haryana State legislature is
competent to enact the the Haryana Act falls under Entry 32, List II of the Seventh Schedule.
It further stated that the Act does not infringe Sikhs’ rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution. Since the affairs of the Sikh minority in the State are to be governed only by
Sikhs, it cannot be considered to be a violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
“ incorporation of a statutory body falls in Entry 32 of List II, as also

unincorporated religious and other societies. Therefore, the Haryana Act falls
within the legislative competence of the State.”
13. I-PAY CLEARING SERVICES PVT. LTD. V.

ICICI BANK LTD.
CORAM: Justice R. Subhash Reddy Justice Hrishikesh Roy
FACTS
I-Pay Clearing Services entered into an agreement with the ICICI Bank to develop software
application packages for the management of Smart Card based loyalty programs (“Service
Provider Agreement”) for one of the Appellant’s clients, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. (“HPCL”). In furtherance to this, the Appellant and the Respondent entered into
another agreement, to develop a post-paid Smart Card Loyalty Program akin to a credit card,
under the name Drive Smart Software (“Drive Smart Agreement”). The Respondent sent a
letter terminating the first Service Provider Agreement and requesting that the Appellant
construct a Drive Track Fleet Card for the fleet industry, which would be viewed as an
extension of the Drive Smart Agreement. Drive Track Program was the name given to it.
The legal process in this case began when the Appellant filed a petition in the Hon'ble
Bombay High Court, alleging that the Respondent had abruptly terminated the Service
Provider Agreement, causing the Appellant to lose a total of INR 95 crores. The Hon'ble
court referred this issue to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 ("Act") because the stated agreement had an arbitration clause, and the arbitration
proceedings were thereafter initiated before a Sole Arbitrator.
Following the conclusion of the arbitration procedures, the Arbitrator issued an award
ordering the Respondent to pay the Appellant a sum of Indian Rupees Fifty Crores plus
interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum. The Tribunal further awarded the Appellant a
cost award of Indian Rupees 50,000 to the Appellant.
Dissatisfied with the award, the Respondent filed an application under Section 34(1) of the
Act to set aside the award on the grounds that the parties had reached an agreement and
satisfaction by letter dated 1 June 2010 and that the parties' contractual responsibilities had
therefore been settled. While the Section 34 proceedings were ongoing, the Appellant filed a
Notice of Motion under Section 34(4) of the Act, requesting that the proceedings be
adjourned for three months and that the matters be reconsidered by the Arbitral Tribunal.
The Hon'ble High Court dismissed this Notice of Motion. Appellant, who was aggrieved by it,
filed this appeal with the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether an arbitral award can be remitted to the Arbitrator if no findings on the contentious
issues are provided in the Award?
Whether the court has power to set aside the award when an application is filed under
Section 34(4) to remit the matter to the Arbitrator?
JUDGMENT
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that remission under Section 34(4) of the Act is
inadmissible when the Respondent in the arbitration procedures received no decision on a
specific claim. The court explained that Section 34(4) of the Act, which allows the Award to
be relegated for reconsideration before the same Arbitral Tribunal, can only be used to
record reasons for prior judgments or to fill up gaps in the Award's rationale.
In the absence of a specific finding of the Arbitral Tribunal in its Award, as pleaded by the
Respondent, the relevant letter and evidence produced before the Arbitrator to prove 'accord
and satisfaction' between the parties were not considered, and this approach, in essence,
amounts to patent illegality. Such considerations necessitate the use of a judicial mind and
must be evaluated by the Court itself.
In light of the cited cases, the court clarified the difference between "Finding" and "Reasons."
"Finding" means "decision on an issue," whereas "Reasons" means "connections between the
materials that specific conclusions are founded on and the actual findings." The court agreed
with the respondents that there are no findings on Point No. 1 and that the issue of
presenting more reasons, as requested by the appellants, does not arise. If there are no
findings on the challenged issues in the award, it cannot be remitted to the Arbitrator under
the guise of additional explanations and filling in the holes in the rationale.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without interfering with the order of the
Hon'ble Bombay High Court, citing J. Ashoka v. University of Agricultural Sciences and Ors.
14. INDIA MEDIA SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED

V. SBPL INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITEDAND
OTHERS
COURT: Telangana High Court
CORAM: Hon'ble Sri Justice P. Naveen Rao, Hon’ble Sri Justice Sambasivarao Naidu
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09 June 2022
FACTS
Disputes emerged between two parties over a negotiating agreement signed on December 5,
2005, and the petitioner, India Media Services Pvt. Ltd., invoked the arbitration clause in a
letter dated October 24, 2011. The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court appointed Hon’ble Justice
Jayanta Kumar Biswas as arbitrator under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (“Act”) in response to a plea filed by the petitioner. Respondent submitted an
application with the Hon'ble court for the appointment of an arbitrator after the judge
recused himself. The Hon'ble Justice Baskar Bhattacharya was subsequently appointed as an
arbitrator with a deadline of August 2020 to conclude the proceedings which eventually
concluded on August 9, 2020. The petitioner filed a petition under section 34 of the Act
before the Hon'ble court, challenging the award which was passed on October 27, 2020.
On the file of the IX Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court in Hyderabad (“IX ACJ, CCC,
Hyderabad”), the respondent filed an execution petition under section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). It is also obvious that respondent filed an Arbitration
Application under Section 9 and that an appeal is pending before the Hon’ble Court against
the orders in that application. It is worth noting that the Arbitrator's decision is being
challenged in a Calcutta High Court suit filed under Section 34. In the State of West Bengal,
applications regarding Section 9 have also been filed. While this is true, on the grounds that
the property is located in Hyderabad, the arbitrator's ruling is being enforced in the state of
West Bengal.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the Hyderabad Civil Courts lack jurisdiction to entertain Execution Petition No. 191
of 2021?
JUDGMENT
The relevant provisions of the Act that have an effect on the matter in this revision, according
to the Hon'ble Court, are Section 2(1)(e), Section 93, Section 344, Section 365, and Section
42. Section 42 applies despite any other provision in Part I of the Act or any other legislation
on the topic that conflicts with the provision. As a result, it sweeps all other regulations
dealing with the implementation of an award under the rug, despite the fact that it is
equivalent as a "decree in fiction" by a Civil Court. The judgements in Sundaram Finance
Limited (above) and Cheran Properties Limited (above) were considered in order to
comprehend the arguments presented by the respondents' counsel.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the decisions of various High Courts, as well as
relevant provisions of the Act and the Civil Procedure Code, and concluded that an award
can be enforced anywhere in the country without the need for a transfer of the decree from
the court with jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. It is significant to mention that
Section 42 does not address the situation that the Hon'ble Supreme Court addressed. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court did not take into account the opinion of a three-judge bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Associated Contractors (supra). The mere mention of the
Supreme Court's decision in Associated Contractors (above) does not imply that the decision
is overturned. As a result, the Associated Contractors ruling still holds the field today.
The view of a learned single judge of the Calcutta High Court that because the parties
consented to the High Court's jurisdiction, the High Court alone has jurisdiction to hear
future motions for award enforcement. Looking back to the circumstances of the case, it is
clear that an application under Section 9 has been brought before the Calcutta High Court,
based on the provisions of Section 42 and the law put down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Associated Contractors. Even a Section 34 application appears to have been filed in the
Calcutta High Court. As a result, an application for execution of the award can only be heard
by the Calcutta High Court.
As a result, the IX ACJ, CCC, Hyderabad in the state of Telangana has no jurisdiction to hear
Execution Petition No. 191 of 2021, which seeks to enforce an arbitrator's award dated March
8, 2021 under Section 36 of the Act. The Hon’ble Court permitted the Civil Revision Petition
and closed any pending miscellaneous petitions.
15. INDIAN EX SERVICEMEN MOVEMENT &

ORS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS (2022)
BENCH: Hon’ble Dr.Chandrachud, Surya Kant
FACTS
The current petition deals with the challenges aroused from “One Rank One Pension”
(OROP) policy for ex-servicemen of defence forces has been implemented by the first
respondent2 through a letter dated 7 November 2015 issued to the Chiefs of three defence
forces.
OROP is defined as the payment of uniform pension to armed services personnel retiring in
the same rank with the same length of service, irrespective of the date of retirement. It aims
to bridge the gap between the rate of pension of current and past pensioners at periodic
intervals.
On 17 February 2014, the Finance Minister announced in his Budget Speech that the Union
Government had in principle accepted OROP and it would be implemented prospectively
from financial year 2014-15On 10 July 2014 in his Budget Speech for the year 2014-2015, the
Finance Minister reaffirmed the Union Government’s commitment to implement OROP and
a further sum of Rs 1000 crores was set apart to meet the requirement.
Salient features of the OROP:
Pension of the past pensioners would be re- fixed on the basis of pension of retirees of
calendar year 2013 and the benefit will be effective with effect from 1.7.2014
Pension will be re-fixed for all pensioners on the basis of the average of minimum and
maximum pension of personnel retired in 2013 in the same rank and with the same length of
service.
Pension for these drawing above the average shall be protected.
Arrears will be paid in four equal half yearly instalments.

The above definition of OROP was also adopted by the first respondent while implementing
OROP by its notification dated 14 November 2015. The rates of pension were now to be
revised every five years.
The first respondent issued a letter to the Chiefs of the three defence forces on 3 February
2016 regarding the implementation of OROP.
Personnel who opt to get discharged henceforth on their own request under Rule
13(3)1(i)(b), Rules 13(3)1(iv) or Rule 16B of the Army Rule 1954 or equivalent Navy or Air
Force Rules will not be entitled to the benefits of OROP
Arrears will be paid in four half-yearly instalments. However, all the family pensioners
including those in receipt of Special/Liberalized family pension and Gallantry award winners
shall be paid arrears in one instalment
Implementation of this new definition of OROP defeats the very principle of OPOP by
creating a class within a class of the same officers, which in practice tantamount to one rank
different pensions
Another fallacy in the new definition of OROP which detracts from the principle of OROP is
Pension Equalization every five years would result in the grave disadvantage to the past
retirees
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the revision of the definition of OROP and its implementation in the present form,
is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution or not?
JUDGMENT
The Apex Court had held that theyfind no constitutional infirmity in the OROP principle as
defined by the communication dated 7 November 2015 for the following reasons:
The definition of OROP is uniformly applicable to all the pensioners irrespective of the date
of retirement. It is not the case of the petitioners that the pension is reviewed ‘automatically’
to a class of the pensioners and ‘periodically’ to another class of the pensioners
The cut-off date is used only for the purpose of determining the base salary for the
calculation of pension. While for those who retired after 2014, the last drawn salary is used
to calculate pension, for those who retired prior to 2013, the average salary drawn in 2013 is
used
While no legal or constitutional mandate of OROP can be read into the decisions in D S
Nakara v. Union of India (1983) and Union of India v. SPS Vains (2008), varying pension
payable to officers of the same rank retiring before and after 1 July 2014 either due to MACP
or the different base salary used for the calculation of pension cannot be held arbitrary; and
Since the OROP definition is not arbitrary, it is not necessary for us to undertake the exercise
of determining if the financial implications of the scheme are negligible or enormous
The SC had accordingly order and direct that in terms of the communication dated 7
November 2015, a re-fixation exercise shall be carried out from 1 July 2019, upon the expiry
of five years. Arrears payable to all eligible pensioners of the armed forces shall be computed
and paid over accordingly within a period of three months and held that the petition is
disposed in above terms.
16. JAYASHREE VERSUS THE DIRECTOR

COLLEGIATE EDUCATION
CORAM: Justice K.M. Josephand Hrishikesh Roy
FACTS
The respondent terminated the services of the appellant on the grounds that she did not
belong to the Scheduled Tribe community which she claimed during the appointment. The
High court gave its accent to the termination and ordered the appellant to pay the amount
which she received during the period of her service.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the termination was valid?
Whether the appellant is required to pay the whole sum she has earned as a result of her
appointment?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court observed that “the appointments to the reserved vacancies are meant
only for those who are deserving by being members of reserved community alone.” Since
the appellant didn’t belong to the reserved category, the termination is valid. Answering the
question that the appellant wasn’t provided an opportunity per the principles of natural
justice, the court said that the exception of the principle would apply in the instant case. It
would be entirely futile to provide an opportunity to the appellant as the appellant’s
certificate did not show that she belonged to the ST community.
While answering the second question, the SC said that the appellant had been paid a salary
for the number of days she had worked, no less, no more. Therefore, SC ordered not to
recover the same in the interest of justice.
17. Kailash Kumar vs State Of Rajasthan, 2022
COURT: Rajasthan State Pollution Control Board
CORAM: Sheo Kumar Singh, Arun Kumar Verma
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11 May 2022
FACTS
This particular case is dealing with The issue of management and disposal of biomedical
waste. The Applicant has approached the National Green Tribunal To direct the Respondent
Authorities to find an alternate solution for disposal of the Bio-medical waste generated in
Udaipur, Dongarpur, Chitorgarh, Rajsamand, Pratapgarh and Banswara
The Applicant had stated that the Respondent No:4, En-Vision Enviro Engineer Pvt. Ltd. Is
violating Bio-Medical Waste (BMW) guidelines on the ground that they have been operating
a Common Bio-medical Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility (CBWTF) at RNT MEDICAL
COLLEGE, Udaipur wherein more than half of the waste is not being treated and is being
dumped at Balicha Dumping Ground, Udaipur, which is owned by Udaipur Municipal
Corporation.
This intolerant act of respondent no.4 is being done since year 2006 and the Dumping
Ground is actually an open place and said plant was initially installed for treating the Bio-
Medical waste generated specifically from RNT Medical College only.
The incinerators that were installed are static, having capacity to treat not more than 50KGs
of biomedical waste per hour, and RNT Medical College itself is having 2000 beds (approx.)
and the Medical waste would be 800 Kgs.
Since the RNT Medical College is having 2000 beds (approx.) they got its own bio-medical
waste treatment plant which was operated by Respondent no.4. The unit of Respondent no.4
is declared a CBWTF by Respondent No.2 without acknowledging the fact that the
incinerators installed in their unit do not have the capacity to treat any further Bio-medical
waste.
The matter was taken up on 27th September, 2021 and a Committee consisting
representative of CPCB, representative of Rajasthan Pollution Control Board and Chief
Medical Officer, Udaipur, Rajasthan was constituted with a direction to submit the factual
and action taken report.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether there is any illegal operation of CBWTF at RNT college campus and
mismanagement of BMW?
Whether there is dumping of BMW at Balicha trenching ground?
Is IWs En-vision Enviro Ltd. (CBWTF) not complying the BMW guidelines or not?
JUDGEMENT
The Tribunal has decided that in the view of the facts, previous judgements like Shailesh
Singh, v. Sheela Hospital & Trauma Centre, Shahjahanpur &Ors., Rajiv
Narayan v. Union of India &Ors., and Central Pollution Control Board v. State
of Andaman & Nicobar, and affidavit submitted by the SPCB, the Bio Medical Waste
Management Rules, 2016 are strictly complied with and nothing has been reported by the
State Pollution Control Board and Municipal Corporation about the violation of the rules. So
far as alternate arrangement for disposal of Bio Medical Waste generated in Udaipur,
Dongarpur, Chitorgarh and other areas are concerned, it is for the State Pollution Control
Board to consider at relevant point of time when required.
The Tribunal has also given directions such as
The respondents are directed to follow the guidelines issued by the SPCB which was
communicated vide order dated 21.07.2020 and strict action should be initiated for non-
compliance of the guidelines with reference to disposal of materials collected, used and
thrown in COVID-19.
The Rajasthan State Pollution Control Board is directed to have a strict vigil to ensure the
compliance of the Bio-Medical Waste Rules and in case it is found that there is a violation of
the rules, strict action should be initiated including calculation of environmental
compensation and its recovery according to law.
18. KERALA STATE BEVERAGES

MANUFACTURING & MARKETING
CORPORATION LIMITED V. THE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CIRCLE 1 (1)
CORAM:R. Subhash Reddy, J.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:3 January 2022
FACTS
The appellant, a Stateowned Undertaking, Kerala State Beverages Manufacturing &

Marketing Corporation Ltd., a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, engaged
in the wholesale and retail trade of beverages, it’s income was finalised under Section 143(3)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short, 'the Act') for the assessment year 2014–2015 by the
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 2(1), Thiruvananthapuram via Assessment
Order dated 14.12.2016. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Thiruvananthapuram,
has exercised the power of revision provided by Section 263 of the Act and set aside the order
of assessment on the ground that it is erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue's interests, to
the extent that it failed to disallow the assessee's debits in the Profit & Loss Account with
respect to the amount of surcharge on sales tax and turnover tax paid to the State
Government, which should have been disallowed under S. 40 (a)(iib).
The appellant first filed an appeal against this order in the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
twice and aggrieved by their order which was against him, he approached the High Court of
Kerala.
Later it has filed these appeals, aggrieved by the common judgement and order dated
30.04.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in I.T.A. No.135; 146 and 313
of 2019. The assessee has filed a Civil Appeal originating from S.L.P.(C)No.12859 of 2020,
whereas the revenue has preferred the other three appeals.
ISSUE
Whether surcharge on sales tax is liable to be disallowed u/s 40(a)(iib) of Income-tax

Act,1961.
JUDGEMENT
The Hon'ble Court decided, after hearing the parties, that the gallonage fee, licence fee, and
shop rental (kist) with respect to the appellant's FL9 and FL1 licences will fall squarely
within the purview of Section 40(a)(iib) of the Incometax Act, 1961. The surcharge on sales
tax and turnover tax is not a fee or charge falling within the meaning of Section 40(a)(iib)(A)
or 40(a)(iib)(B), as such it is not an amount that can be excused under the abovementioned
provision, and the disallowance is rightfully set aside by the High Court. As a result, the
assessee's civil appeal is dismissed, and the revenue's civil appeals were partly authorised. As
a result, the assessments made against the assessee in the assessment years 2014-2015 and
2015-2016 have been set aside. After computing the liability in line with the above-
mentioned directions, the assessing officer must issue updated orders. Due to the fact that
the disagreement concerns assessment years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, the assessing officer
must issue appropriate instructions within two months of receiving this judgement.
19. LOOP TELECOM AND TRADING LIMITED V.

UNION OF INDIA
CORAM: Justices Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Surya Kant and Vikram Nath
FACTS:
In 2007, Loop Telecom had applied for grant of Unified Access Service License (USAL) for
twenty-one service areas by paying an entry fee of Rs. 1.1 crores. And an year later, the
telecom company entered into UASL agreements with the union government.
On February 2, 2012, the Supreme Court, in the 2G spectrum case, ruled that the policy of
the union government for allocation of 2G spectrum on a first come first serve basis was
illegal. The judgement resulted in quashing of the UASLs granted by the Union. Twenty one
of the company’s licences were among the 122 licences which were quashed by the Supreme
Court.
After the 2012 verdict, the telecom company approached Telecom Disputes Settlement and
Appellate Tribunal [TDSAT] seeking refund of entry fee Rs.1454.94 crore, but the same was
rejected in 2015.
Loop Telecom moved a subsequent refund claim before TDSAT after its promoters were
acquitted in a criminal case by a Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI] Special court in 2017.
In 2018, TDSAT dismissed this claim by stating that the claim for restitution under Section
65 would be governed by the principle of in pari delicto potio rest condition defendentis (in
equal fault, better is the condition of the possessor.
Aggrieved by this the company filed this petition before the SC.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the plea of appellant for the refund of entry fee made is maintainable or not?
JUDGEMENT
The Court inter-alia held that the UASLs were in the nature of a contract between the parties
as stated in case Union of India v. AUSPI, (2011) and therefore the provisions of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872 were applicable
The Apex Court relied on the principles laid down in the judgment of Anmani Appa Rao
v. GollapalliRamalingamurthi, wherein a three-judge Bench held that where both the
parties before the Court are confederates in the fraud, the Court must lean in favour of the
approach which would be less injurious to public interest. Reliance was also placed on
KujuCollieries Ltd. V. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. Wherein it was categorically held that if
both the transferor and transferee are in pari delicto (in wrong) the courts do not assist
them.
It was further observed that Section 65 had to be limited to those cases were the party
claiming restitution itself was not in pari delicto. However, when the party claiming
restitution is equally or more responsible for the illegality of a contract, they are considered
in pari delicto. If the party claiming restitution was equally or more responsible for the
illegality (in comparison to the defendant), there shall be no cause for restitution which
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Applying the said principles and observations, in the present case, the Bench concluded that
the appellant was in pari delicto with Department of Telecommunications and the then
officials of the Union government. Hence, as a beneficiary and confederate of fraud, the
appellant could not be lent the assistance of this Court for obtaining the refund of the Entry
Fee. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
20. MS. X V. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND AND

ANOTHER
CORAM: Justices Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Surya Kant
FACTS
The prosecutrix alleged that the second respondent took her to a residential hotel during the
relevant time when she was a juvenile and engaged in sexual activity with her under the
promise of marrying her. Later, the second respondent refused to wed her and sent her
father her illicit videos. On February 18, 2021, the Special Judge, POCSO, Ranchi, denied the
second respondent’s request for anticipatory bail. On April 3, 2021, the second respondent
turned himself in and requested bail. The Jharkhand High Court’s Single Judge has granted
the request for bail.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether High Court was right in allowing the bail?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court stated that the high court erred in allowing the application for bail. The
Court stated that it is clear from the material placed before the Court that the appellant was
barely thirteen years of age on the date when the alleged offense took place. Therefore, the
arguments that "there was a love affair" between the appellant and the second respondent
and the apparent refusal to marry(which are circumstances) will not have any bearing on the
grant of bail.
“Having regard to the age of the prosecutrix and the nature and gravity of the
crime, no case for the grant of bail was established.”
21. M/S ADVANCE ENGINEERING SERVICES V.

THE BARODA RAYON CORPORATION
COURT: National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench: New Delhi
CORAM: Ashok Bhushan (Judicial Member), Dr. Alok Srivastava (Technical Member)
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13May 2022
FACTS
That the Appellant, which is a sole proprietorship firm carrying on its business in
engineering sector. The work order for the job under question was issued by the respondent
company vide letter dated 12.07.2004. The Appellant completed the assigned work and was
made some payments by the respondent.
The respondent company acknowledged the operational debt due to the Appellant on
numerous occasions through numerous fax message and hand written acknowledgements on
its letters requesting payment of the operational debt.
Upon not receiving the due Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 222 of 2021 & I.A. No.
1819 of 2021 amount, the Appellant gave a demand notice under section 8 of the IBC and
thereafter filed company petition IB No.555/9/NCLT/ AHM/2018.
The said application was contested by the Respondent company, inter alia, raising the
ground that the application was barred by limitation and the Adjudicating Authority vide the
Order dated 27.1.2021 rejected the section 9 Application.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the Adjudicating Authority was right in rejecting the application of the Appellants
or not?
JUDGEMENT
The Tribunal on the basis of facts, submissions by the parties and previous judgements like
State Bank of India vs. Kanahiya Lal &Anr (2016), Asset Reconstruction
Company Ltd. Vs. Bishal Jaiswal &Anr. 2021 SCC online 321, had come to the
conclusion that that the appellant has not been able to establish the extension of limitation
as required under Section 18 of the Limitation Act on the basis of Company Appeal (AT)
(Insolvency) No. 222 of 2021 & I.A. No. 1819 of 2021 valid acknowledgments provided by the
corporate debtor to the operational debt, which is in default from June, 2006. And the
Appellant was not part of the scheme of rehabilitation and therefore he is not entitled to
claim exclusion of any period when its legal right of redressal was suspended. We, therefore,
are of the view that the Adjudicating Authority did not commit any error in holding that
section 9 application of Appellant was barred by limitation.
22. M/S RAVI RANJAN DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD

V. ADITYA KUMAR CHATTERJEE
CORAM : Justice Indira Banerjee, Justice AS Bopanna
FACTS
M/s Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. ("Appellant") and Aditya Kumar Chatterjee
("Respondent") entered into a Development Agreement for the development of the property
in Muzaffarpur, Bihar, on June 15, 2015. The contract said that any disputes would be
resolved through Arbitration. The Arbitral Proceedings were to be conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the tribunal's sitting
would be in Kolkata, according to the Agreement.
A dispute emerged between the parties as a result of significant differences, and on April 24,
2019, the Respondent terminated the Agreement; however, the Appellant rejected this
termination. As a result, the Respondent served notice on the Appellant, using the
Agreement's Arbitration Clause.
The Respondent filed a petition in the Calcutta High Court for the appointment of an
Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
The Calcutta High Court appointed a sole Arbitrator entirely disregarding the Appellant's
affidavit objecting to the Court's geographical jurisdiction. The Appellant then filed a review
petition against the impugned order, which the Calcutta High Court later dismissed in an
order dated October 4, 2021. Aggrieved by the decision Appellant filed an appeal in the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES RAISED:
Whether the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the
Respondent and appoint an Arbitrator?
JUDGMENT:
The Supreme Court observed that the development agreement was admittedly executed and
registered outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, and it pertains to the
development of property in Bihar, which is again outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta
High Court. Furthermore, no party conducts business within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta
High Court. The Supreme Court also dismissed Chhatterjee's argument that the Calcutta
High Court had geographical jurisdiction to select the Arbitrator because the seat was in
Calcutta (Kolkata). The Supreme Court noted that Calcutta (Kolkata) was only intended to be
the 'venue' for arbitration sittings. The Supreme Court also noted that Respondent had
previously sought interim protection under the Arbitration Act from the District Court in
Muzaffarpur, Bihar, rather than a court in Kolkata, and is thus barred from claiming that the
parties had agreed to give the Calcutta High Court exclusive jurisdiction. As a result, the SC
ruled that the Calcutta HC lacked authority to appoint an arbitrator, therefore the HC
decision was quashed and a new arbitrator was appointed.
23. M/S SHIVANAND REAL ESTATE PVT LTD V.

THE STATE OF HARYANA &OTHERS
CORAM:Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, Justice Vikram Nath
DATE OF JUDGMENT:14 March 2022
FACTS
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has issued an order directing all reference courts to
accept the amount of land acquisition compensation awarded by the state of Haryana.
In a writ case filed by a landowner seeking compensation for property acquisition, the High
Court issued the ruling.
Several claims for compensation release were allegedly made against the state of Haryana
and the Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran (HSVP) in various procedures, including
execution cases for land acquisition by the state of Haryana. In order to satisfy such claims,
the Chief Administrator, HSVP presented a so-called payment plan to the High Court in the
aforementioned writ petition, which included proposals for extended payment schedules,
with proposed compliance dates extending to August 15, 2022, October 15, 2022, and
December 31, 2022.
After taking note of the abovementioned plan for releasing the amount of compensation, the
High Court ordered that all Executing Courts in Haryana refrain from employing coercive
measures, and that the Reference Court accept the amount of compensation as
recommended by the respondent state.
Aggrieved by the orders the petitioners approached the Supreme Court through a SLP.
ISSUES
Whether the High Court was justified in giving broad directions applicable to all execution
matters pending in Haryana while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India?
Whether the High Court was justified in issuing the impugned directives without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to be heard?
JUDGEMENT
The matter required consideration, according to a bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and
Vikram Nath, who looked into the form and meaning of the assailed order.
The Court, in issuing a notice to the respondents, directed that, in the meanwhile and until
future orders, the impugned order's operation and effect shall be delayed qua the petitioner,
and the petitioner shall be free to take whatever legal steps are necessary to recover the sum
of compensation.
24. M/S. DURGA WELDING WORKS V. CHIEF

ENGINEER, RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION,
ALLAHABAD AND ANOTHER
CORAM:Justice Ajay Rastogi, Justice Abhay S. Oka
FACTS
Brief facts of the case are that that the Appellant’s i.e., M/S. Durga Welding Works tender
was accepted, and a contract agreement was established between the parties. Because there
were unresolved claims, the appellant served a legal notice for the appointment of an
Arbitrator and the settlement of claims. It was said that because the respondents neglected
to appoint an arbitrator, an Arbitration Petition was filed in the High Court of Orissa seeking
the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. However, shortly after submitting the arbitration petition, the appellant utterly forgot
to take any action in furtherance thereof, and the respondents were never made aware of
such petition being filed because no notice was issued at any time. Meanwhile, in response to
the appellant's letter, the respondents instructed the appellant to choose two names from a
panel of four people. Immediately following that, a Miscellaneous Case was filed seeking an
order restraining the respondents from appointing an Arbitrator, and that application, too,
remained pending, and the appellant took no action to pursue either the Arbitration Petition
or the Miscellaneous Case before the High Court.The appellant chose two officers from the
panel proposed by the respondents, and the respondents formed an Arbitration Tribunal in
response. Following that, the appellant went before the Arbitral Tribunal and filed an
application claiming that the Tribunal was not nominated within the time limit, that the
Arbitral Tribunal's constitution is invalid, and that the Tribunal should not proceed with the
arbitration procedures. However, the Tribunal continued with the arbitration processes, and
because the appellant did not participate despite being given the option, an ex-parte award
was issued. Finally, the High Court sent notifications to the respondents in 2016, over three
years after the ex-parte award was issued.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the High court of Orissa was justified in dismissing the arbitration petition in the
present case?
JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court determined that after filing an arbitration petition in the High Court's
Registry on October 23, 2009, the appellant entirely slept on the matter and the respondents
were never provided with any notice of the Arbitration Petition filed before the High Court of
Orissa. When the respondents asked the appellant to suggest and select two names from a
panel of four for the formation of the Arbitral Tribunal, the appellant chose two officers from
the panel suggested by the respondents.
The Apex Court noted that, as a result, the respondents established the Arbitral Tribunal,
and the appellant came before the Arbitral Tribunal and presented his statement of claim,
and respondents presented their statement of defence. As a result, the High Court declined
to use its jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act to appoint an Arbitrator and dismissed
the case, leaving the appellant free to file objections to the ex parte award, said the Supreme
Court. As a result, the Top Court dismissed the petition and held that the High Court made
no error in dismissing the petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Act for the appointment of
an Arbitrator.
25. M/S TRIMURTHI FRAGRANCES (P) LTD. V.

GOVT.OF N.C.T OF DELHI
CORAM: Justices Indira Banerjee, Hemant Gupta, Surya Kant, M.M. Sundresh and
Sudhanshu Dhulia.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:19 September 2022
FACTS
The matter came up before a 5-Judge Constitution Bench, from an earlier observation in
Shanti Fragrances v. Union of India (2018) 11 SCC 305, wherein it was opined that there is a
direct conflict between Kothari Products Ltd. v. State of AP, (2000) 9 SCC 263, State of
Orissa v. Radheshyam (2018) 11 SCC 505, Reliance Trading Co. v. State of Kerala (2011) 15
SCC 762 on the one hand, and, CST v. Agra Belting Works (1987) 3 SCC 140 on the other.
ISSUE RAISED
What should be the proper guidelines for overruling an earlier decision of the Supreme Court
and to what extent should the Courts be guided by the propositions in
NingappaRamappaKurbar v. Emperor, the observations of Justice Lokur in SC-AOR Assn. v.
Union of India and the judgment in Court of Appeal in Harper v. National Coal Board?
JUDGEMENT
In the present case, the Supreme Court emphasised and restated that a decision by the
Larger Bench shall be applicable both horizontally and vertically, regardless of the strength
of the judges comprising the Majority.
“It is settled that the majority decision of a Bench of larger strength would prevail over the
decision of a Bench of lesser strength, irrespective of the number of Judges constituting the
majority.”
The Court further pointed out that in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. AP Jaswal, (2001) 1
SCC 748, it was held that “Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of Justice. It
is consistency which creates confidence in the system and this consistency can never be
achieved without respect to the rule of finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in
judicial pronouncements, the courts have evolved the rule of precedents, principle of stare
decisis etc. These rules and principles are based on public policy.”
26. MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT

CORPORATION V. DILIP UTTAM JAYABHAY
CORAM: Justices M.R. Shah and B.V.Nagarathna.
FACTS
In 1992, the respondent, a bus driver, was involved in an accident with a jeep traveling in the
other direction. Four passengers lost their lives, and six others suffered critical injuries in
this accident. The respondent driver was dismissed from his job following a departmental
investigation. In addition, he was prosecuted under Sections 279 and 304(a) of the Indian
Penal Code, which resulted in his acquittal since the prosecution could not prove that the
driver was solely to blame for the rash and careless driving because of hostile witnesses.
After the acquittal, the respondent challenged his termination before the industrial tribunal,
which allowed his reinstatement.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether an acquittal in a criminal trial has any bearing or relevance on the disciplinary
proceedings?
JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court held that the order of the Industrial Tribunal was bad in law and the
termination based on the departmental investigation was valid. The Court said that the
Industrial Tribunal has failed to appreciate the difference between the disciplinary inquiry
and the criminal proceeding. The Respondent-Driver was acquitted of the charges under the
IPC because the case was sought to be of contributory negligence and but this does not mean
the driver was not negligent at all.
The Court highlighted that “As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal
trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof
in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with
different objectives.”
27. MILLENNIUM EDUCATION V. EDUCOMP

INFRASTRUCTURE
CORAM: Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 13 May 2022
FACTS
On 20.10.2014, Millennium Education Foundation (“Petitioner”) and

EducompInfrastructure and School Management Limited (“Respondent”) entered into a
collaboration agreement (“Agreement”).
That certain disputes have arisen between the Petitioner and Respondent in respect of
payments to be made as per the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, on 31.12.2021 a
demand notice/letter was issued by the Respondent, demanding the payment of certain
operational dues from the Petitioner.
The Petitioner vide its reply-cum-notice of dispute dated 13.01.2021 disputed the claim of
Respondent and demanded payment of Rs. 1,97,70,192/- from the Respondent. The
Petitioner also contended that the disputes had arisen between the parties and consequently
proceeded to appoint an Arbitrator under clause 17 of the Agreement. However, considering
the view taken in the judgement of Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC Vs.
HSCC (India) Ltd.[1] the Petitioner moved subject petition under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”).
The Respondent has filed a petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
(“IBC”) and the same was pending before the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”).
The Petitioner has filed subject petition under section 11 of the Arbitration Act during the
pendency of petition under section 9 of IBC.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether court has power to decide petition under section 11 of Arbitration Act during the
pendency of petition under section 9 of the IBC?
JUDGEMENT
The Court observed that there is no dispute in regards to execution of the Agreement or in
respect of arbitration clause in the agreement. The court also opined from the perusal of
demand notice/letter and reply to the same, it is clear that there are disputes between the
Petitioner and Respondent.
The court was of the view that reliance placed on Indus Biotech by the Respondent is
misplaced as the Hon’ble Apex Court in said judgment has held that the proceedings under
IBC will take precedence and the NCLT is required to adjudicate the petition filed before it
on its merits without being influenced by the pendency of the application filed under section
8 of Arbitration Act.
Finally, relying upon the apex court judgement in Indus Biotech, the Hon’ble high court held
that if the petition under IBC is admitted by the NCLT, then automatically moratorium will
come into play and accordingly, proceedings under Arbitration Act will be suspended during
the moratorium. However, mere pendency of a petition which has not been admitted and no
moratorium has been issued, no embargo can be placed on the proceedings under the
Arbitration Act and the Petitioner can seek reference of disputes and appointment of
Arbitrator.
28. MONIRUL MOLLA V. STATE OF WEST

BENGAL
CORAM: JusticesJoymalyaBagchi and BivasPattanayak
FACTS
On November 11, 2011, an FIR was filed against MonirulMolla and another person under the
Arms Act. The appellants were then charged under Sections 326/302/34 of the IPC and
Sections 25(1A) and 1B of the Arms Act. They declared their innocence and demanded a trial.
Following the trial, the trial judge found the appellants guilty and punished them in the
impugned judgment and order dated 25.08.2014 and 26.08.2014. Hence, the present appeal
before the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the trial courts may sentence the accused to life imprisonment till death or without
remission.
JUDGEMENT
The Hon’ble Court disposed of the appeal and held that trial courts might only
sentence the accused to life imprisonment in rape cases and no other
circumstances.
The High Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State
of Maharashtra. It stated that the trial court erred in sentencing Monirul to life
imprisonment without remission. Therefore, the Court changed Monirul’s sentence and
ordered that he serve a life term under Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code, read with
Section 45.
29. MUKIS V. STATE OF U.P.
COURT: High Court of Delhi
CORAM: Hon'ble Shekhar Kumar Yadav,J.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19 May, 2022
FACTS
The revisionist has filed this application in revision against an order dated 16.11.2021 issued
by the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, Court No. 01, Aligarh in Case No. 707 of
2017 (SmtHasinBano and others Vs Mukis), under Section 125 Cr.P.C., P.S. Akrabad, District
Aligarh, ordering the revisionist to pay Rs. 3,000 to opposite party no. 2 and Rs. 2000 to her
son from the date of application.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether section 125 of the Crpc is within the ambit of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39
of the Constitution?
JUDGEMENT
Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav pointed out, this provision gives effect to a man's natural and
fundamental duty to provide for his wife, children, and parents while they are unable to
provide for themselves. The bench made this observation while dismissing a criminal
revision petition filed by one Mukis challenging an order issued by Addl. Principal Judge,
Family Court, Aligarh in November 2021 under Section 125 Cr.P.C. ordering him to pay Rs.
3,000 to his wife and Rs. 2000 to her son as maintenance from the date of filing the
application for maintenance. The Court noted, based on the facts and arguments presented
in the case, that the wife is unable to support herself and that the revisionist had turned her
wife against her will due to non-payment of dowry demands. The Court went on to say that
there is enough evidence on the record to show that the revisionist's wife has no independent
income, so the revisionist is obligated to help the respondent no. 2 financially (wife).
In terms of the sum, the Court stated that the family court had awarded the wife a minimal,
and that if the wife had been living with the revisionist, he would have had to pay at least as
much on her. As a result, the Court concluded that the concerned court could not be deemed
to have granted an excessive amount. The Court, however, ordered the revisionist to deposit
the total sum due against him in three equal monthly instalments within three months, as
well as pay regular monthly maintenance of Rs. 5000/-.
30. N. RAJENDRAN V. S. VALLI
COURT: Madras High Court
CORAM: K.M. Joseph, J. Hrishikesh Roy, J.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 3 February 2022.
FACTS
In this instance, the HC overturned a couple's decision to dissolve their marriage. The
husband's petition for divorce based on cruelty had previously been approved by the Family
Court. The aggrieved appellant married the respondent in accordance with Hindu laws and
ceremonies, as well as appropriate customs. And, according to the appellant, there were
some disagreements between his sister and the respondent's brother, who were allegedly
married, which eventually led to the appellant's sister returning to her parents' home. She
was apprehensive to return to her husband's home and accused them of maltreatment, so on
March 3, 2001, she filed a divorce petition seeking to dissolve the marriage. Following that,
on July 23, 2004, the family court granted the petition. As a result, the respondent filed an
appeal with the Madras High Court on September 9, 2004, under Section 19 of the Family
Courts Act, 1984.
Aggrieved by the order of the HC, the appellants filed the present appeal.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the period spent for obtaining a certified copy of the decree can be exhausted from
the limitation period?
Whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act, which excludes time spent for obtaining a certified
copy of the decree from the limitation period, will apply to a matrimonial appeal?
JUDGEMENT
The Hon'ble Supreme Court stated that the appellant's arguments for reversing the family
court's decision lack validity. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that the petition
was filed less than two years after the marriage. Brutality can take many different forms,
including both physical and emotional abuse. It's a question that has to be answered based
on the specific facts of each case. We are convinced, however, that the appellant's argument
was without value by any standard. The Hon'ble Court further held that the High Court.
31. NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF

INDIA V. M/S ABHIJEET ANGUL SAMBALPUR
TOLL ROAD LIMITED
COURT: High Court of Delhi
CORAM: C. Hari Shankar, J.
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 28 February 2022
FACTS
The Petitioner filed petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter ‘the act’). The petition was passed by the majority of learned Arbitral Tribunal,
which consisted of three member, whereby the learned tribunal held that it would not
entertain or adjudicate any of the counter-claims raised by the petitioner NHAI vide its
application dated 4th February, 2020 except the counter claim for Rs. 12.2 crores.
The above-said petition was filed after the impugned order of 24th September, 2019 wherein
the tribunal held that respondent NHAI’s prayer cannot be accepted. The Claimant filed an
application before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi seeking stay on encashment of the bank
guarantee (bid security) of Rs. 12.2 crores available with the Respondent. The Hon'ble High
Court stayed the invocation of bank guarantee till final orders. The High Court decided on
22.8.2013 to get the money deposited in the court. On the money being deposited with the
Registry of the Court, the Registry will invest the same in an interest bearing fixed deposit.
The final orders of the Hon'ble High Court were passed on 16.09.2013subject to the
conditions: (i) The Concessionaire would keep the bank guarantee alive during the pendency
of the Petition and to invoke arbitration within 10 days. (ii) The captioned petition will be
placed before the Arbitrator who will treat the same as an application u/s 17of the Act and
decide the same in accordance with law. (iii) Both parties are free to prefer their claim and
counter claims if any. (iv)The money deposited in the court will abide by the order of the
Arbitrator (v) The arbitrator will be at liberty to pass an appropriate order in accordance
with qua the application u/s 17 of the Act (vi) In case the Respondent is aggrieved by any acts
of commission or omission of the Petitioner and in that behalf seeks to exercise its right
under the agreement, the Respondent will be free to do so.
The tribunal had certain findings- that interim measure granted by court is already in place
and will continue till adjudication of matter by the arbitral tribunal. That AT finds that the
prayer of the Respondent is not for any interim measure of protection but to allow the
Respondent to withdraw the amount deposited with the Court. And finally the AT held that
prayer made by respondent cannot be accepted. The respondent NHAI was also allowed to
file a counter claim if so desired.
After this the petition under section 34 was filed before arbitral tribunal, the order was
passed on 26th August, 2020. The appeal of which has been sought before this Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether counter claim can be filed by party after grant of interim award? If yes, can the
Arbitral Tribunal decline the entertainment of such counter claim? If yes, then what is the
scope of those limitations?
JUDGMENT
The hon’ble judge relying on the judgment by Supreme Court in Indian Farmers
Fertiliser Cooperative ltd v. Bhadra Products, the hon’ble judge observed “The
impugned order dated 26th August 2020, of the learned Arbitral Tribunal has effectively
rejected the counterclaims filed by the petitioner by stating that it “refused to entertain” the
said claims. The reason for such rejection is, as is apparent from the impugned paragraph
from the order dated 26th August, 2020, that the claims were not maintainable in view of the
limited liberty granted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal vide its earlier order dated 24th
September, 2019. A decision that the counter-claim is not maintainable and is, therefore,
liable to be rejected, is a decision which an Arbitral Tribunal can certainly take at the final
stage of the proceedings, especially in view of the power conferred on the Arbitral Tribunal,
by Section 16 of the 1996 Act, to rule on its own jurisdiction especially in view of the power
conferred on the Arbitral Tribunal by Section 16 of the 1996 Act, to rule on its own
jurisdiction. Being, therefore, in the nature of a decision which could be taken at the final
stage of the proceedings, i.e. in the final award which the Arbitral Tribunal would pass, such
a decision, when taken at an interlocutory stage, would, in my view, certainly constitute an
“interim award” within the meaning of the 1996 Act, in view of the law laid down in IFFCO.”
Further differing to the judgment of High Court of Calcutta in the case of Lindsay
International pvt. ltd v. IFGL Refectories ltd, the hon’ble judge observed, “It is seen,
from the aforesaid decision of the High Court of Calcutta, that the High Court has not
alluded to the authority of the Arbitral Tribunal, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
16 of the 1996 Act, to rule on its own jurisdiction, which would include the power to reject a
claim or counter-claim as being beyond the scope of the reference made before it. Viewed
thus, any decision to the said effect, taken at the interim stage, would, in my view, constitute
an “interim award” and would, therefore, be amenable to challenge under Section 34. I
respectfully regret my inability to subscribe to the view, expressed by the Calcutta High
Court, that a decision of the Arbitral Tribunal to reject counter-claims as beyond the scope of
reference is not an “interim award” amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.”
Accordingly, the impugned decision of the learned Arbitral Tribunal, whereby it has declined
to entertain the counter claims of the NHAI, as preferred by its application dated 4th
February, 2020, save and except the counterclaim for ₹12.2 crores, cannot sustain in law. It
is, accordingly, quashed and set aside. The petition is, accordingly, allowed with
consequential relief to NHAI with no order as to costs. All pending applications also stand
disposed of.
32. NOEL HARPER V. UNION OF INDIA
CORAM: A. M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 8 April 2022
FACTS
Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the revisions to the provisions of the
Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 made by the Foreign Contribution (Regulation)
Amendment Act, 2020, under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.
The petitioner argued that Sections 7, 12(1A), 12A, and 17(1) were obviously arbitrary and
unreasonable, infringing on the petitioners' fundamental rights as provided by Articles 14,
19, and 21 of the Constitution.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether of the revisions to the provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act,
2010 made by the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Act are Constitutionally
valid?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court concluded that Sections 7, 12(1A), 12A, and 17 of the 2010 Act are intra
vires the Constitution and the Principal Act, upholding the constitutional legitimacy of the
FCRA 2020 Amendments (FCRA, 2010). The Supreme Court praised the Parliament for
using corrective dispensation to put an end to the calamity, which no sovereign country can
afford.
The Court stated that just because a registered association is required to open an FCRA
account in a designated bank at a centralised location for the receipt/inflow of foreign
contributions from foreign sources, this condition is not plainly arbitrary or irrational.
It is a one-time activity to be completed in order to obtain approval from the Central

Government to be a certified association or individual given permission to receive foreign
contributions as a precondition under the Act. As a result, sections 12(1A) and 17 of the
Constitution do not violate Articles 14, 19, or 21.
The modified Section 7 of the FCRA makes it illegal to transfer foreign contributions to
anyone else, even if they have a certificate of registration under the Act. In other words, a
person who has been awarded a certificate or has secured prior authorisation under the Act
to receive foreign contributions will be compelled to use the funds "itself" rather than via
anybody else.
The legislative objective is to establish strict dispensation for the beneficiary of a foreign
contribution to use the same "itself" for the purposes for which it has been approved by the
Central Government under the Act's certificate of registration or licence.
33. OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION

LTD. V. M/S DISCOVERY ENTERPRISES PVT.
LTD.
CORAM: Dr.Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, J.
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 27 April 2022
FACTS
The appeal arises from a judgment dated 27 June 2012 of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay by which an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
has been dismissed. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited instituted an appeal against an
interim award dated 27 October 2010 of the Arbitral Tribunal holding that the second
respondent – Jindal Drilling and Industries Limited was not a party to the arbitration
agreement and must be deleted from the array of parties. The interim award was challenged
in an appeal which was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the non-signatory company can be impleaded under arbitral proceedings?
JUDGMENT
The Hon'ble Supreme Court while taking assistance of the precedents from its judgement in
Indowind Energy Ltd. v. Wescare (I) Ltd. &Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 306; Chloro Controls India
Pvt. Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. &Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 641; Cheran Properties
Ltd. v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. &Ors., (2018) 16 SCC 413, MTNL v. Canara Bank &Ors., (2020) 12
SCC 767; AmeetLalchand Shah &Ors. v. Rishabh Enterprises &Anr, (2018) 15 SCC 678;
DuroFelguera v. Gangavaram Port Limited, (2017) 9 SCC 729 and Reckitt Benckiser (India)
P Ltd. v. Reynders Label Printing, (2019) 7 SCC 62 noted as follows:
26. In deciding whether a company within a group of companies which is not a signatory
to arbitration agreement would nonetheless be bound by it, the law considers the following
factors:
(i) the mutual intent of the parties;

(ii) the relationship of a non-signatory to a party which is a signatory to the agreement;
(iii) the commonality of the subject matter;
(iv) the composite nature of the transaction; and
(v) the performance of the contract.
Based on the above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that ONGC's attempt at the joinder of
JDIL to the proceedings was rejected without adjudication of its application for discovery
and inspection of documents to prove the necessity for such a joinder. The Supreme Court of
India expounded on the group of companies doctrine in the present case deriving from the
ratio held in Chloro case (supra).
In regards the power of a court to review the interim award especially where the Arbitral
Tribunal holds that it lacks jurisdiction in an application under Section 16 of the A&C Act,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted as follows:
In the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, the court must have due deference to the
grounds which have weighed with the tribunal in holding that it lacks jurisdiction having
regard to the object and spirit underlying the statute which entrusts the arbitral tribunal
with the power to rule on its own jurisdiction. The decision of the tribunal that it lacks
jurisdiction is not conclusive because it is subject to an appellate remedy under Section
37(2)(a). However, in the exercise of this appellate power, the court must be mindful of the
fact that the statute has entrusted the arbitral tribunal with the power to rule on its own
jurisdiction with the purpose of facilitating the efficacy of arbitration as an institutional
mechanism for the resolution of disputes.
Thereafter, in toto, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the present matter primarily noted that
the Arbitral Tribunal's decision to defer the application filed by ONGC for discovery and
inspection till the disposal of application filed by JDIL under Section 16 of the A&C Act was
erroneous as ONGC's application was intended to facilitate them in its plea that there existed
functional, financial, and economic unity between the two companies.
In view of the aforesaid, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the interim award dated 27
July 2010; and also set aside the subsequent judgment of the Single Judge of the Bombay
High Court dated 27 June 2012 dismissing ONGC's appeal under Section 37 against the said
interim award. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further remitted the matter back to the Arbitral
Tribunal which is to be re-constituted. As far as the transferred cases in regards the arbitral
proceedings initiated by JDIL again ONGC were concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme court
remitted them back to the Hon'ble Bombay High Court where they will be held in abeyance
and remain adjourned sine die until the Arbitral Tribunal which is reconstituted to decide its
jurisdiction in reference to the plea of JDIL in the arbitral proceedings initiated by ONGC
decides the said question. In effect, the appeal of ONGC in the aforesaid special leave
petition was allowed as per the above directions.
34. PAHWA PLASTICS PVT. LTD & ANR. V.

DASTAK NGO & ORS
CORAM: Justice Ms. Banerjee, Justice A.S. Bopanna
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 25 March 2022
FACTS
Appellants Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. (Appellant No. 1) and Apcolite Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
(Appellant No. 2) operated in Haryana, manufacturing and selling basic organic compounds
such as formaldehyde.
The Appellants had applied for and received Consent to Establish and Operate qua their
Units from the Haryana State Pollution Control Board (CTE, CTO, and HSPCB, respectively),
but had not received an EC from the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change
(MoEF) in accordance with the Environmental Impact Assessment Notifications dated
January 27, 1994 and September 14, 2006. (1994 EIA and 2006 EIA, respectively).
On March 14, 2017, the MoEF published a notification (2017 Notification) in the same vein
as the 1994 EIA and 2006 EIA, which allowed organisations to apply for an ex – post facto
EC if they had started, continued, or completed a project without first getting an EC.
Following that, on March 23, 2020, the MoEF issued a draught notification (2020 Draft
Notification) proposing that cases of violation be assessed by an Appraisal Committee with
the goal of determining whether the project was built or operated on a site that was
permissible under current laws and could be run sustainably under environmental norms
with adequate environmental safeguards.
If the Appraisal Committee's conclusions were negative, closure was to be recommended. If

the Appraisal Committee determines that such a unit has been operating sustainably while
adhering to environmental standards and providing adequate environmental safeguards, the
unit will be given appropriate Terms of Reference (TOR), after which the procedure for
obtaining an EC will be followed.
Following that, on November 10, 2020, the Haryana Government's Department of

Environment and Climate Change (Haryana Govt.) issued an order (HSPCB Order), stating
that the HSPCB had discovered that industries (such as the Appellants) had been operating
solely on the basis of CTEs and CTOs, when in fact, they also required ECs. As a result, the
HSPCB revoked the earlier consents given to these industries. After such affected industries
approached the Haryana Govt. and explained their problems, the Haryana Govt., through the
HSPCB Order, allowed them to continue operating for another six months on the condition
that they apply for ECs immediately.
Following that, the Appellants applied for ECs under the 2020 Order.
Dastak (Respondent No. 1), an NGO, filed O.A. No. 287 of 2020 with the NGT, appealing the
HSPCB Order and requesting that the Appellants' units be closed.
The NGT held in an order and judgement dated July 3, 2021 that the Appellants'
manufacturing units that lacked prior EC could not be allowed to operate, and that the
Haryana government had no authority to waive the requirement for prior EC or to allow the
units to operate without EC in exchange for compensation.
It's worth noting that the MoEF released an office memorandum (2021 OM) on July 7, 2021,
outlining the standard operating procedure for identifying and managing cases involving
violations of the 2006 EIA, such as failing to obtain an EC prior to starting operations.
According to the OM for 2021, any request for EC would be evaluated on its own merits, with
prospective effect, using proportionality principles and the premise that the polluter pays
and is liable for the expenses of corrective measures.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether an industry employing approximately 8000 people that was set up with consent to
establish and consent to operate from the relevant statutory authority and that has applied
for ex post facto Environmental Clearance (EC) can be closed pending issuance of EC, even
though the industry may not cause pollution and/or may be found to comply with the
required pollution norms.
JUDGEMENT
The Court based its decision on the findings in Electrosteel Steels Limited v. Union of
India (Electrosteel Judgment), which stated that an industry that contributed significantly to
the economy and created jobs should not be closed due to technicalities relating to obtaining
ECs, and that the EP Act did not prohibit the issuance of ex – post facto ECs.
The Court did agree, that ex – post facto ECs should only be given in extraordinary
circumstances, taking into account all relevant environmental conditions. When the negative
consequences of refusing to grant ex – post facto approval outweigh the benefits of granting
it, and the industry otherwise complies with its environmental obligations, such ex – post
facto approval should be granted strictly and in accordance with the applicable Rules,
Regulations, and/or Notifications.
Furthermore, the Court decided that any industry seeking post-facto EC could face a penalty
based on the concept that the polluter pays and is liable for remedial costs.
In light of the foregoing, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that a unit that was
contributing to the country's economy and providing livelihood to hundreds of people should
not be closed down due to a technical irregularity of lack of prior environmental clearance,
pending the issuance of an ex – post facto EC. Some concessions, including the provision of
ex – post facto EC, are authorised under the law. However, such ex – post facto EC should
not be granted in most cases, and it should not be assumed that it is available for the asking.
At the same time, regardless of the repercussions of discontinuing operations, ex – post facto
cannot be refused with pedantic insistence.
35. PRABHA TYAGI V. KAMLESH DEVI
CORAM: Justice BV Nagarathna
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 12 March 2022
FACTS
The appellant married Kuldeep Tyagi ( deceased) on 18.6.2005 as per Hindu rites and
rituals. Following the wedding, the appellant resided with his family members at her
husband’s ancestral house. On 15.7.2005, her husband met a car accident and scummed to
his injuries. As a result of mistreatment and abuse by her matrimonial family after her
husband’s death, she relocated to Dehradun. The appellant approached the SJM under
section 12 to protect her right over her husband’s property and to seek compensation under
the D.V. Act.
ISSUES RAISED
While bringing the substantive provisions of Sections 18 to 20 and 22 of the Domestic

Violence Act, 2005, is it necessary to consider the Domestic Incidence Report?
Whether the aggrieved and the person against whom the relief is sought should be in a
subsisting domestic relationship?
JUDGEMENT
Judgment passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand and Ad. Sessions Judge is set aside. The
appeal is allowed. The Hon’ble Apex Court lays down that under the terms Section 12 of the
D.V. Act, a Magistrate is qualified to issue an ex-parte, interim, or a final order even in the
absence of a Domestic Incident Report and a woman, who suffers or has suffered domestic
abuse, can seek remedies under the D.V. Act, including the enforcement of her right to live in
a shared home, if she has the right to do so under Section 17 of the D.V. Act. Furthermore,
the Hon’ble Court has interpreted the subsisting ‘domestic relationship’ broadly and
expansively and stated that a domestic relationship doesn’t have to exist when an aggrieved
person files an application under section 12 of the D.V. act.
36. R. MUTHUKUMAR V. THE CHAIRMAN AND

MANAGING DIRECTOR TANGEDCO
CORAM: Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.
DATE OF JUDGEMENT : 07 February 2022
FACTS
The advertisement or notification, calling for eligible candidates, to apply for the post of
Helper/trainee was issued in 2012. The first round of litigation, as it were, was initiated on
the ground that TANGEDCO wrongly denied relaxation of upper age limit (to apply, for the
candidates). This grievance was held to be justified; the High Court directed grant of such
exemption, which TANGEDCO in turn, complied. When the recruitment process started,
TANGEDCO clarified that it would conduct an interview, for which it proposed to grant 15%
weightage. Candidates including the present appellants, and respondent applicants,
participated. Those eligible, and found to be suitable on a combined assessment of the marks
obtained and the viva voce, were appointed.
Some unsuccessful candidates approached the High Court. The single judge rejected their
writ petitions. In appeal, Division Bench, by its compromise order dated 14.10.2015, purely
based on the compromise terms between the aggrieved candidates and TANGEDCO, directed
appointment of 84 persons. The compromise order was not based on the merits, nor based
on an independent assessment of the merits of the case.
The present aggrieved candidates and several others sought piggyback on the basis of the
compromise order, arguing that they were similarly situated. They approached the High
Court, from 2016 onwards. These aggrieved candidates’ petitions were rejected, and their
claim for parity was turned down.
ISSUES
The Hon’ble apex court dealt mainly with the issue- Whether appellants who are also
aggrieved candidates situated similarly to the candidates who filed writ petition and appeal
in Madras High Court, can seek recruitment through the benefit of parity under the garb of
A.14 of the Constitution of India?
Sub-issues under this main issue were-
i) Whether a court can adjudicate on the basis of compromise between the parties rather
than merits of the case?
ii) And whether the said adjudication would be precedential value to other aggrieved
persons?
JUDGMENT
The Court took note of the fact that the Division Bench, in its compromise order, proceeded
to accept the terms proposed by the parties. The court did not examine the merits of the case,
and why such proposal was justified in the facts of the case.
The Court explained,
“It is one thing for a public employer, to concede in the course of proceedings, to an
argument, which it had hitherto clung to, but was untenable. Fairness demands that public
bodies, as model employers, do not pursue untenable submissions. In such cases, a
concession, which is based on law, and accords to a just interpretation of the concerned law
and/or rules, is sustainable. However, it is altogether another thing for a public employer,
whose conduct is questioned, and who has succeeded on the merits of the case before the
lower forum (in this case, the single judge) to voluntarily agree, in an unreasoned manner, to
a compromise. The harm and deleterious effect of such conduct is to prioritize the claim of
those before the court, when it is apparent that a large body of others, waiting with a similar
grievance (and some of whom probably have a better or legitimate claim on merits to be
appointed) are not parties to the proceedings. In such cases, a compromise is not only
unjustified, it is contrary to law and public interest.”
The Court observed that in the present case, there is no question of any finality to the
compromise order: it cannot be treated, by any stretch of the imagination, as an order in
rem, or as a binding precedent. Also, the candidates did not approach the court in time. They
woke up after the compromise order, claiming parity, and filed petitions in the court. Clearly,
therefore, they cannot claim any benefit from the compromise order.
The Court said,
“A principle, axiomatic in this country’s constitutional lore is that there is no

negative equality. In other words, if there has been a benefit or advantage
conferred on one or a set of people, without legal basis or justification, that

benefit cannot multiply, or be relied upon as a principle of parity or equality.”
Hence, it was held that the candidates could not claim the benefit of parity; their writ
petitions were founded on the compromise order, which cannot be justified in law.
37. S K NAUSAD RAHMAN & ORS. V. UNION OF

INDIA & ORS. (2022)
CORAM: Dr Dhanjaya Y Chandrachud; Vikram Nath, JJ
DATE OF JUDGEMENT : 10 March 2022
FACTS
The appellants are inspectors of the Central Excise and Land Customs or, as the case may be,
Goods and Services Tax Administration, who were allocated to different Cadre Controlling
Authority. Sec.4 of the Customs Act 1962 as well as Sec. 4 of the GST Act and the Revenue
Act, 1963 contains provisions that provides that the Central Boards stated in these Acts may
appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be officers of customs.
Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rule, 2016 states “Each Cadre Controlling Authority (CCA) shall
have its own separate cadre, unless otherwise directed by the Central Board of Excise and
Customs.” In which an express provision for Inter-Commissionerate Transfers (ICTs) are not
incorporated as compared to Rule 4(ii) of the Recruitment Rule 2002, which was substituted
by Recruitment Rule 2016.
On 20 September 2018, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) issued a
circular stating that since Recruitment Rule 2016 do not contain any provision for
recruitment by absorption, no application for ICTs could be considered after the
enforcement of those rules. And on the basis of this circular this case has been arisen.
The validity of the circular dated 20 September 2018 was challenged before the Central
Administrative Tribunal. The challenge was upheld by the Tribunal. The High Court, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, reversed the decision of the Tribunal
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the Circular dated 20-09-2018, by the CBIC is valid or not?

JUDGEMENT
The SC while upholding the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, left it
open to the Respondents to revisit the policy to accommodate posting of spouses, the needs
of the disabled and compassionate grounds.
The Bench recommended formulation of a policy by the Respondents for its employees such
that the importance of protecting family life as an element of the dignity of the person and a
postulate of privacy is given due consideration while upholding basic constitutional values
such as Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty). The Bench called for considering
the posting of spouses, the needs of the disabled and compassionate grounds, responding to
the challenge against the circular based on gender equality and the need for equal treatment
of disabled persons. The Bench further stated that the policy has to fulfil the test of
legitimacy, suitability, necessity and of balancing the values which underlie a decision-
making process informed by constitutional values.
Citing previous judgement Lt. Col. Nitisha and Others v. Union of India (2021), the
Bench emphasized the need to ensure substantive equality of opportunity through policy.
Further, it noted that Article 15(3) of the Constitution calls for adopting special provisions
for women and children, and spousal posting should also be considered in this manner. With
respect to persons with disabilities, the policy must ensure their right to live with dignity as
stated in case Akshay N. Patel v. Reserve Bank of India (2021). It also stated that the
interference of the State in the rights of privacy, dignity, and family life of persons must be
proportional.
38. SATYAJIT KUMAR & ORS. V. THE STATE OF

JHARKHAND & ORS
CORAM: Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 2 August 2022
FACTS
The Jharkhand government published a notification dated July 14, 2016, inviting
applications for the positions of Trained Graduate Teachers in Government Secondary
Schools, with a 100% reservation for local candidates and residents of the state's thirteen
Scheduled Areas. The given notification was challenged before the court.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether in exercise of powers conferred under paragraph 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the
Constitution of India, whether, the Governor can provide for 100% reservation contrary to
Part III of the Constitution of India, more particularly, guaranteed under Article 16(1) and
(2)?
JUDGEMENT
“The citizens have equal rights, and the total exclusion of others by creating
an opportunity for one class is not contemplated by the founding fathers of the
Constitution of India.”
The Court held that the 100 percent reservation for one community is impermissible and
discriminatory. It will defeat the whole purpose behind reservation, which is only
permissible by protective mode. The Court further held that public employment is not
exclusive to only a selected section of society, and equal opportunity should be given to all.
The Court heavily relied upon Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao &Ors. Vs. State of A.P.
&Ors (2021), where it was held that “the power of Governor under Para 5(1) of Schedule V
of the Constitution is restricted to modifying or not to apply, Acts of the Parliament or
Legislature of the State. Thus, Rules could not have been amended in the exercise of the
powers conferred under Para 5(1) of Schedule V. It is further observed and held that the
Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution cannot be said to be an
enactment by the State Legislature.”
39. SHAFIYA KHAN @ SHAKUNTALA

PRAJAPATI V. STATE OF UP
CORAM: Ajay Rastogi, Abhay S. Oka
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 10 February 2022
FACTS
At the age of 17, the appellant married Shiv Gobind Prajapati, with whom she never stayed.
In Gobind's divorce petition, it was admitted that the marriage was never consummated and
that the marriage was dissolved through Village Panchayat in 2014. He then married another
woman, Suman Prajapati, and this marriage was dissolved and annulled by the families of
appellant and Shiv Gobind Prajapati because it was voidable under Section 5 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, and Section 3 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.
The appellant, who considered her marriage to be annulled for all practical reasons, met
Mohd. Shameem Khan while studying in Lucknow, and they married under Sharia law in
front of her late husband's entire family, including the second respondent/complainant,
despite her family's wishes. The appellant had a son as a result of this marriage.
Unfortunately, her husband died, and after obtaining a succession certificate in her name
and no protest from her mother-in-law to Mohd. Shameem Khan's employer, she was hired
as an Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (A.N.M.) at King George Medical University in Lucknow on
humanitarian grounds.
Her late husband's whole gratuity payment of Rs.4,60,000/- was sent to her mother-in-bank
law's account. She was later ejected from her matrimonial home, where she had an eleven-
month-old kid. An FIR was filed against the appellant for offences under sections 494, 495,
416, 420, 504 & 506 IPC after more than a year, at the request of the second respondent. The
appellant was given anticipatory bail, and when the charge-sheet was issued, the Trial Judge
took notice of it and summoned the appellant, who then petitioned the High Court u/s 482
CrPC for quashing of the proceedings, which was denied. As a result, the current appeal.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant can be quashed under Section 482
Cr.P.C.?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court after hearing the contentions of the parties held that the law on the
subject of exercising the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the
inherent power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is well settled, and to the
best of their knowledge, this Court has defined sufficiently channelled guidelines to provide
an exhaustive list of the various types of cases in which such power should be exercised.
The ability to quash criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with caution, and
only in the most exceptional of circumstances, according to the Court, and such inherent
rights do not impose any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims and
fancies.
Justice Rastogi noted that the complainant had not provided any evidence to support the
bald claims made in the complaint, on the basis of which a FIR was filed.
The documentary evidence on record clearly shows that the Appellant's Nikah Nama was
properly registered and issued by a competent body, and the charge sheet submitted against
her does not prima facie reveal how the marriage certificate was falsified, the Bench
remarked.
As a result, the Supreme Court granted the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings
against the appellant based on the FIR.
40. SHIV DEVELOPERS THROUGH ITS

PARTNER V. AKSHARAY DEVELOPERS
CORAM: Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath
FACTS
Shiv Developers, an unregistered partnership entity ("Firm"), sued the Respondent

developer to obtain a permanent injunction and the declaration that a sale transaction was
void. The Respondents applied to dismiss the complaint as legally barred based on Section
69(2) of the Act. The trial court denied the application, but the Gujarat High Court
overturned that order and rejected the plaint. A SLP was filed before the SC by the Firm.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether Section 69(2) of the Act bars all suits filed by an unregistered firm?
JUDGEMENT
The supreme Court noted that the current case involved the sale of the firm’s share in a
property, the transaction at issue did not relate to the firm’s business and that the lawsuit
was brought to seek remedies under the Specific Relief Act of 1963 and the Transfer of
Property Act of 1882 rather than to enforce a contractual right. As a result, section 69(2) of
the Act’s prohibition will not apply to the current suit. Further, the Court laid down that
provision’s objective was for a third party doing business with a company to be aware of the
names of the individuals they are dealing with, which is not the case when a right is being
sought to be enforced.
The Court reiterated Haldiram Bhujiawala and Anr. v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar and Anr
[(2000) 3 SCC 250], wherein it was held that “Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 is not a bar to
a suit filed by an unregistered firm if the same is for enforcement of a statutory right or a
common law right.”
Hence, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the impugned judgment of the High Court.
41. SIDBI / SMALL INDUSTRIES

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF INDIA V. SIBCO
INVESTMENT PRIVATE LIMITED
COURT: TheSupreme Court of India
CORAM: JusticeSubhash Reddy, Justice Hrishikesh Roy
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 3 January 2022.
FACTS
The Bonds were purchased by plaintiff SIBCO in the form of promissory notes issued by
respondent SIDBI. SIDBI Bonds 2003 (4th Series) with a 13.50 percent interest rate and
SIDBI Bonds 2004 (5th Series) with a 12.50 percent interest rate were issued by one Shankar
Lal Saraf on July 1, 1998. The interest is paid on a semi-annual basis. The Bonds can be
traded freely in the market. On July 1, 1998, M/s. SIBCO purchased Bonds with a face value
of ten lakhs each for an aggregate sum of Rs. 3.69 crores from the said, Shankar Lal Saraf.On
July 2, 1998, the Bonds were placed with M/s. SIDBI (defendant) with the request that the
Plaintiff-name purchaser's be endorsed on the Bonds. On the defendant's reluctance to
register and/or record the SIBCO's name on the grounds that CRB Capital had been placed
in involuntary liquidation at the RBI's request. Plaintiff first petitioned the Calcutta High
Court for a mandamus order compelling the defendant to transfer the aforementioned Bonds
to the plaintiff and pay the accrued interest. The High Court reversed the Trial Court’s
decision of dismissing the case and the appellants aggrieved by the order of the High Court
approached this Hon’ble Court.
ISSUE RAISED
The issue in this case was whether the plaintiff had made a valid claim based on the
defendant's Bonds, or if it was a case like Shylock's trial in Shakespeare's Merchant of
Venice, where Shylock is claiming the promised pound of flesh in the form of interest on
delayed payment on the plaintiff's Bonds.
JUDGEMENT
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has broad supervisory powers over financial institutions
such as the Small Industries Development Bank of India, according to a division bench
comprising Justice Subhash Reddy and Justice Hrishikesh Roy (SIDBI). As a result, any
direction issued by it is legally obligatory if it is based on the RBI Act or the Banking
Regulation (BR) Act.
The bench noted that, first, the defendant was justified in delaying payment because they
were under RBI's direction to do so; second, the defendant did not gain any undue benefit
from their action; and third, the plaintiffs were immediately paid when the court settled their
rights. Furthermore, the transactions in question occurred during the "suspicious spell."
As a result, the court concluded that the defendant acted in good faith and that there was no
undue delay in remitting the dues.
42. SMT RESHAM V. STATE OF KARNATAKA

AND OTHERS
COURT: The Karnataka High Court
CORAM: Chief Justice Ritu Raj Awasthi and Justices Krishna Dixit and J.M. Khazi
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 15March2022.
FACTS
On February 5th, 2022, the Karnataka government issued an order prohibiting students
from wearing the hijab at state educational institutions with a dress code. The Karnataka
High Court was then asked to review the order. On February 11th, the Court issued an
Interim Order prohibiting the wearing of all religious insignia in schools, including hijabs
and saffron shawls.
ISSUES RAISED
Is the Right to Freedom of Conscience Protective of Hijab Wearing?
Is Wearing the Hijab an Essential Religious Practice under Islam?
Is the Hijab Ban in Classrooms a Violation of the Right to Freedom of Expression and
Privacy?
Is the ostensibly anti-hijab government order valid?
JUDGEMENT
After hearing the parties the Court decided:
The Court made a contrast between 'Conscience Freedom' and 'Religious Expression' in the
judgment, noting that while conscience is an internal belief, religious display is an outward
expression of that belief. The hijab must pass the Essential Religious Practices test since it is
a form of religious expression.
Wearing the headscarf is not an essential religious practice, according to the Court. It was
not entitled to protection under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution of 1950. The hijab is not
a religious practise, according to the Court. It is, rather, a cultural activity. The hijab
developed as a means of ensuring women's safety, and it had a connection to the socio-
cultural conditions that existed at the time the Quran was written. It cannot be considered a
fundamental part of religion.
Furthermore, even if the Court agreed that wearing the hijab constitutes an Essential
Religious Practice, the Court ruled that the practise would only be protected by the
Constitution if it did not interfere with constitutional principles like as equality and dignity.
A threshold requirement for constitutional protection is that a practise must be an Essential
Religious Practice. The practise of wearing the hijab, on the other hand, does not breach this
line in this circumstance.
The Court ruled that the hijab prohibition in public schools did not infringe their
constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The Court
cited a worldwide agreement that uniforms and dress regulations can be enforced in
educational institutions. Because it is ‘religion-neutral' and 'universally applicable' to all
students, the State government's enforcement of a clothing code is a legitimate restriction
that does not violate constitutionally protected rights. It was pointed out that the dress code
really encourages secularism. The Muslim students were also claiming a breach of their
'derivative rights,' not their ‘substantive rights,' according to the Court.
The right to select what one wears is an element of one's autonomy and expression,
according to the Court. This, however, must be subject to reasonable limitations. In certain
public spaces, such as schools, freedom may be limited in order to maintain order and
decorum.
The Court rejected the argument that pupils should be allowed to wear a headscarf that
matched their uniform in colour and pattern. This is due to the fact that if it is permitted,
"the school uniform ceases to be uniform."
The State government's Order, which was issued on February 5th, was affirmed by the Court.
The Order was made in accordance with the Karnataka Education Act, 1983, according to the
court. Under § 133(2) of the Act, which allowed the government to give effect to the Act's
aims by making Orders and constituting bodies like the College Development Committees,
the government has the ability to prescribe a dress code.
The Court declined to order a disciplinary investigation of the principal and teachers of the
Government PU College, where students were originally forbidden from wearing the hijab.
The petition demanding that the Court direct an investigation into the involvement of
Islamic organisations in the rallies against the hijab ban was dismissed by the Court.
43. SMT. SNEHA V. TARUN PANDIT.
COURT: Allahabad High Court
CORAM: Hon'ble Syed Aftab Husain Rizvi,J.
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 6 January 2022
FACTS
This criminal revision is in response to the Additional Special Judge, Family Court's ruling
and order dated 4.3.2021. The learned court below, by the impugned judgement, has granted
Smt. Sneha Pandit's maintenance plea under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and has given her Rs.
25,000/- per month as maintenance from the date of filing the application.
Smt. Sneha Pandit filed a claim for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. against
revisionist Tarun Pandit, alleging that her marriage was solemnised on November 22, 2009,
with the opposing party, and that she fulfilled her marital obligations after the marriage.
After a while, the other party's behaviour toward her became hostile, and he began to
mentally and physically torture her. Other allegations included that the opposing party had
abandoned her at her maternal home and that she has been living with her father since
November 30, 2013.
The opposing party is disregarding her, failing to retain her, and is unwilling to keep her with
him, abandoning her. She has no source of income, whilst the opposing party is a Squadron
Leader in the Air Force with a monthly salary of Rs. 80,000/-. She claimed Rs. 40,000/- per
month in maintenance allowance on the aforementioned grounds.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether the maintenance provided by the Family Court is maintainable?
JUDGEMENT
The Court in this case held that the revisionist’s arguments had no force as there is no error
in the Trial Court’s order. According to the challenged ruling, any amount of maintenance
paid by the opposing party to the applicant will be adjusted, and the remaining amount will
be paid in two months. It is undeniable that O.P. No. 2 was paid Rs. 18,900/- in maintenance
from the revisionist's income until March of 2018. After the divorce decree was signed, the
revisionist deposited the amount of permanent alimony in the trial court, and the amount of
maintenance that was being paid from the revisionist's salary was halted. The sum of
alimony has not been withdrawn by the O.P. No. 2, and it is deposited at the court below
because the O.P. No. 2 is appealing the divorce order. The revisionist does not pay any
maintenance after March of 2018. The amount of maintenance previously paid has already
been adjusted by the trial court. In this case, there is no illegality or infirmity.
As a result, it is evident that the contested order is free of any flaws or violations. It isn't even
perverse. There is insufficient reason to overturn the contested order. The revision is liable to
be rejected.
44. SOUVENIR DEVELOPERS (I) PVT. LTD. V.

UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
COURT: Bombay High Court
CORAM: R.D. Dhanuka, S.G. Mehare, JJ.
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 06May 2022.
FACTS
The relevant assessment year is 2009-2010 and financial year is 2008-2009. The appellant
is a domestic company and derives income from business.
The appellant is dealing in collection of Toll fees in the name and style “M/s. Souvenir
Developer (India), Pvt. Ltd., Dhule”. The appellant is also carrying business of shares and
derivatives. The return of income declaring total income of Rs. 85,43,220/- was submitted
electronically by assessee on 30th September 2009. The same was processed on 28th March
2011 under section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by accepting the return of income.
Subsequently the case of the appellant was picked up for scrutiny. The statutory notice under
section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was issued on 28th September 2010. The
appellant was granted an opportunity of being heard by the assessing officer. The appellant
produced the information called as per questionnaire before the assessing officer. The
assessing officer passed order on 29th December 2011 assessing the Income of the appellant
as Rs. 90,79,092/-.
In the said assessment order, the assessing officer made addition of the income to the extent
of Rs. 5,35,872/- under three different heads. The assessing officer refused to consider the
loss suffered by the assessee on transaction in derivatives while computing net taxable
income. The application for rectification under section 154 made by the appellant was
rejected by order dated 14th May 2012. On 4th June 2012 the appellant preferred an appeal
before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) against the assessment order. The
appellant did not challenge the additions made by the Assessing Officer.
On 27th February 2014, the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) passed order refusing to
consider the loss suffered by the appellant on transaction in derivatives while computing the
net income of the appellant. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) was of the view that
the appellant would not be entitled to set-off loss suffered from transactions in securities
because of the provisions of section 73. The Commissioner held that as provided under
section 73, the loss suffered by the assessee would be a loss from speculative business and as
such the appellant would not be entitled to claim setoff against the income from a non-
speculative business.
Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal on 2nd July 2014. On 31st October 2017 the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal dismissed the said appeal. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was of the view that
the appellant would not be entitled to claim set-off in view of the provisions of Section 73.
Being aggrieved by the said decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the appellant has
preferred this appeal under section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in
confirming any addition on transaction in derivatives on recognised stock exchange as
defined under Section 43(5)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 with reference to explanation
given to Section 73 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which is applicable to speculative
transactions.
Whether loss suffered by the appellant on the transactions in respect of trading in derivatives
referred to in clause (ac) of Section 2 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956
carried out in a recognised stock exchange by the appellant could have been set off against
the income of the appellant arisen out of infrastructure business carried on by the appellant
under Section 70 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
JUDGMENT
The hon’ble apex court, relying on the judgment of Supreme Court in Snowtex
Investment Limited v. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Supra) and
interpreting provisions under taxation laws Act 1975, Chapter IV and S. 73 (1) and (4) of
Income Tax Act 1961, and S. 43 (5) of Finance Act of of 2005 and S. 73 of Finance Act of
2014, held that,
“the transactions in respect of trading in derivatives referred to in Clause (ac) of Section 2 of

Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 carried in a recognized stock exchange are
excluded from the definition of “speculation transaction” described under Section 43 (5) of
the Income Tax Act, 1961. In our view, the respondents thus, cannot be allowed to contend
that the appellant had claimed any set off of the losses suffered by the appellant in respect of
the speculation business carried on by the assessed against the profits and gains, if any, of
another speculation business.”
“In our view, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal could not have confirmed any addition on
transaction in derivatives on recognized stock exchange as defined in Section 43 (5) (d) of
the Income Tax Act, 1961 with reference to explanation given to Section 73 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 which is applicable to speculative transaction. By virtue of insertion of clause (d) to
the proviso to Section 43 (5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the transactions in respect of the
trading in derivatives as prescribed in clause (d) inserted in proviso to Section 43(5) would
not be a speculative transaction.
The appellant was thus entitled to claim set off of the loss suffered by the appellant in the
said transactions in derivatives against 29 the business income of the appellant from
infrastructure business under Section 70 of the Income Tax Act 1961.
Substantial question of law No. 1 fell for consideration is answered in negative and in favour
of the assessee.
Substantial question No. 2 is answered in affirmative and in favour of the assessee.”

45. THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF

KERALA, IRRIGATION DEPT. & ORS. V. JAMES
VARGHESE & ORS.
COURT: High Court of Kerala
CORAM: Justices L. Nageswara Rao and B.R. Gavai
FACTS
By the challenged judgement dated 9th July 2013 delivered in O.P. No.4206 of 1998 and
companion issues, the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam has ruled the State Act of Kerala
Revocation of Arbitration Clauses and Reopening of Awards Act, 1998 to be beyond the
legislative competence of the Kerala State Legislature and hence unconstitutional. The High
Court further ruled that the State Act has the effect of nullifying the arbitrators' awards as
well as the courts' judgements and decrees. As a result, it was determined that the State Act
infringes on the State's judicial power. As a result of this, the State of Kerala has filed several
appeals with this Court.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the Kerala state legislature was competent to enact the 1998 Act?
Whether the Kerala state legislature encroached on judicial powers?
JUDGEMENT
The Kerala state government relied on G.C Kanungo, in which the Supreme Court stated that
decrees made by courts to make an award "law of court" are only for enforceability and
cannot be considered judgments and decrees passed in the exercise of judicial power.
However, the Kanungo judgement finally ruled that the Arbitration (Orissa Second
Amendment) Act, 1991 was unconstitutional since it invalidated awards made by Special
Arbitration Tribunals in the exercise of judicial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court held that verdicts and decrees issued by civil courts may only be
overturned by higher courts, not by legislation.
The Court held that the 1998 Act, which has the power to annul awards that have become
'rules of court,' encroaches on judicial powers and thus violates the doctrine of separation of
powers, after applying the three-fold test elucidated by a five-judge Constitution bench of the
Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu versus State of Kerala (2014).
As a result, the court reached the following conclusions:
The ruling in G.C. Kanungo that the powers exercised by courts in delivering judgments and
decrees for making arbitration awards "rule of court" is not an exercise of judicial power and
violates the 1940 Act per incuriam.
The Kerala High Court is correct in law in holding that the 1998 Act infringes on the judicial
power of the state and is thus liable to be declared unconstitutional.
46. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. V. MANJU ARORA

AND ANOTHER
CORAM: HrishikeshRoy
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 3January2022
FACTS
Kanta Suri and Veena Arora, the respondents in question, were likewise promoted to Senior
Translator (Hindi) at Air Headquarters. Both Kanta Suri and Veena Arora were offered
promotion to the post of Translation Officer (Hindi) on an officiating basis instead of regular
promotion, with the stipulation that the promotes are subject to reversion if their seniors
who are on deputation to other offices/posts return to their current cadre in the Air Force or
due to any administrative reasons.
It should also be noted that the decision in favour of the employees, which stated that their
refusal to be promoted would only affect their second upgradation, was based on the
common judgement dated 21.11.2007 of the Delhi High Court Division Bench in the case of
Suman Lata Bhatia and Manju Arora, which happened prior to this appeal. The OM dated
9.8.1999 guaranteeing Assured Career Progression for Civilian Employees of the Central
Government was meant as a "safety net" to address the issue of true stagnation and hardship
suffered by employees due to a lack of suitable promotional options. The government
implemented the ACP Scheme after making necessary changes in response to the Fifth
Central Pay Commission's recommendations.
It was agreed under the Scheme that the first financial upgradation would be granted after 12
years of regular service, and the second one would be granted after 12 years of regular service
from the date of the first financial upgradation, subject to the fulfilment of defined
conditions.
“The ACP Scheme's financial upgradation benefit would be available only if an employee has
been unable to obtain regular promotion at the prescribed intervals of 12 and 24 years.”
While this condition is obvious to this effect, the Division Bench pointed to condition No. 10,
which states that an employee is only entitled for a second upgradation if he accepts his
promotion, in order to rule in favour of employees who have turned down promotions. The
Court determined that the employees in question are entitled to one financial up gradation,
even if they decline a promotion offer, because refusing such a promotion would only affect
their second up gradation.Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the respondents are entitled to be given ACP Scheme’s benefit?
Whether the employees’ refusing promotion can be called as stagnant employees?
JUDGEMENT
In light of the foregoing, the court believed that the appellants' arguments have merit. As a
result, employees who have declined a routine promotion offer are considered no longer
eligible for the financial upgradation advantages outlined in the O.M. dated 9.8.1999. The
Court applied the Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate in this situation which says in
instances when the doctrine applies, the person in question has a choice of two rights, either
of which he may exercise, but not both. However, the two respondent workers Kanta Suri
and Veena were not awarded regular promotion but conditional promotion on an officiating
basis subject to reversion by the decree dated 29.12.1988. Because these two employees
cannot be deemed to have had a choice between alternatives, the preceding Principle does
not apply to them, and their unwillingness to accept the officiating promotion cannot be used
against them. The two employees, Kanta Suri and Veena Arora, would continue to be eligible
for benefits under the ACP Scheme despite their denial of the promotion given in the
communication of December 29, 1988. As such, it was declared by the court.
Since the respondents have reached the age of superannuation in the interim, the Court
stated that the consequential relief under this order should be made available to the two
qualified employees (if not granted) within three months of the order's date.
47.UNION OF INDIA V. ASHISH AGARWAL
CORAM: M.R. Shah, B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.
FACTS
The Parliament introduced reformative changes to Sections 147 to 151 of the Income Tax Act,
1961 governing reassessment proceedings by way of the Finance Act, 2021 which was passed
on 28th March, 2021.
Under the substituted provisions of the Income Tax Act vide Finance Act, 2021, no notice
under section 148 of the Income Tax Act can be issued without following the procedure
prescribed under section 148-A of the Income Tax Act. Along with the notice under section
148 of the Income Tax Act, the assessing officer (A) is required to serve the order passed
under section 148-A of the Income Tax Act. Section 148-A of the Income Tax Act is a new
provision which is in the nature of a condition precedent. Introduction of section 148-A of
the Income Tax Act can thus be said to be a game changer with an aim to achieve the
ultimate object of simplifying the tax administration, ease compliance and reduce litigation.
But prior to pre-finance Act, 2021, while reopening an assessment, the procedure of giving
the reasons for reopening and an opportunity to the assessee and the decision the objectives
were required to be followed as per the ruling in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd, v.
Income Tax Officer, (2003) 1 SCC 72 Despite the substituted sections 147 to 151 of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 2021 coming into force on 1st April, 2021, the
Revenue issued approximately 90,000 reassessment notices to the respective assesses under
the erstwhile sections 148 to 151 thereof by relying on explanations in the Notifications dated
31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021. Approximately 90,000 such reassessment notices
under section 148 of the unamended income Tax Act were issued by the Revenue after
01.04.2021, which were the subject matter of more than 9000 writ petitions before various
High Courts across the country and by different judgments and orders, the High Courts have
taken a similar view as that of the Allahabad High Court and have set aside the respective
reassessment notices issued under section 148 on similar grounds.
Union of India being addressed as ‘revenue’ by the hon’ble court.The respondent is being
addressed as ‘assessee’.
ISSUES RAISED
The hon’ble court was presented with the following issue-
Whether the various High Courts across the country were right in quashing several
reassessment notices issued by the Revenue, issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act,
1961, on the ground that the same are bad in law in view of the amendment by the Finance
Act, 2021 which has amended Income Tax Act by introducing new provisions i.e. sections 147
to 151 w.e.f. 1st April 2021?
JUDGMENT
While the Revenue was contemplating to prefer appeals against the similar judgments and
orders passed by various High Courts, the Court passed PAN INDIA order and observed that
the Revenue need not file separate individual appeals which may be more than 9000 in
numbers.
The Supreme Court observed that the new provisions substituted by the Finance Act, 2021
being remedial and benevolent in nature and substituted with a specific aim and object to
protect the rights and interest of the assessee as well as and the same being in public interest,
the respective High Courts have rightly held that the benefit of new provisions shall be made
available even in respect of the proceedings relating to past assessment years, provided
section 148 notice has been
However, at the same time, it was conscious of the fact that the judgments of the several
High Courts would result in no reassessment proceedings at all, even if the same are
permissible under the Finance Act. 2021 and as per substituted sections 147 to 151 of the Act.
Observing that the Revenue cannot be made remediless and the object and purpose of
reassessment proceedings cannot be frustrated, the Court noticed-
“It is true that due to a bonafide mistake and in view of subsequent extension of time vide
various notifications, the Revenue issued the impugned notices under section 148 after the
amendment was enforced w.e.f. 01.04.2021, under the unamended section 148. In our view
the same ought not to have been issued under the unamended Act and ought to have been
issued under the substituted provisions of sections 147 to 151 of the Income Tax Act as per
the Finance Act, 2021. There appears to be genuine non-application of the amendments as
the officers of the Revenue may have been under a bonafide belief that the amendments
may not yet have been enforced.
Therefore, in order to strike a balance between the rights of the Revenue as well as the
respective assesses as because of a bonafide belief of the officers of the Revenue in issuing
approximately 90000 such notices, the Revenue may not suffer as ultimately it is the public
exchequer which would suffer, the court modified the order of the High Court to the
following extent:
(i) the impugned section 148 notices issued to the respective assessees which were issued
under unamended section 148 of the Income Tax Act. which were the subject matter of writ
petitions before the various respective High Courts shall be deemed to have been issued
under section 148-A of the Income Tax Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 and
construed or treated to be show-cause notices in terms of section 148-A(b). The assessing
officer shall, within thirty days the date of order provide to the respective assesses
information and material relied upon by the Revenue, so that the assessees can reply to the
show-cause notices within two weeks thereafter;
(ii) The requirement of conducting any enquiry, if required, with the prior approval of
specified authority under section 148-A(a) is hereby dispensed with as a one-time measure
vis-a-vis those notices which have been issued under section 148 of the unamended Act
from 01.04.2021 till date, including those which have been quashed by the High Courts.
Even otherwise as observed herein-above holding any enquiry with the prior approval of
specified authority is not mandatory but it is for the concerned Assessing Officers to hold
any enquiry, if required;
(iii)The assessing officers Shall thereafter pass orders in terms of section 148-A (a) in
respect of each of the concerned assessees: Thereafter after following the procedure as
required under section 148A may issue notice under section 148 (as substituted);
(iv) All defences which may be available to the assesses including those available under
section 149 of the Income Act and all rights and contentions which may be available to the
concerned assesses and Revenue under the Finance Act 2021 and in law shall Continue to
be available.”
The Court clarified that the present order shall be applicable PAN INDIA and all judgments
and orders passed by different High Courts on the issue and under which similar notices
which were issued after 01.04. 2021 issued under section 148 of the Act are set aside and
shall be governed by the present order and shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The
present order will also govern the pending writ petitions, pending before various High
Courts in which similar notices under Section 148 of the Act issued after 01.04.2021 are
under challenge.
48. UNION OF INDIA VS MUKESH KUMAR

MEENA
COURT: The Supreme Court
CORAM: Justice M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna,
DATE OF JUDGEMENT:28 April 2022
FACTS
The original petitioner, who belonged to the Scheduled Tribes (ST) category, was employed
by the Department of Income Tax as a lower division clerk. He eventually attained the
positions of Senior Tax Assistant. The competent authority introduced amended regulations
for Departmental Examination for Income Tax Inspectors - 1998 in order to govern the
departmental examination for Income Tax Inspectors. According to the changes, a candidate
might be judged successful if they received at least 45% in five courses, excluding Hindi. The
required minimum score for members of SCs and STs was 40%.
Additionally, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) implemented the policy of providing
grace marks in order to help applicants who narrowly missed securing the minimum marks,
regardless of their category, on failing to pass up to five marks.
In the instance of the initial applicant, he had received more than 45% marks in all subjects
except than "Other Taxes." In light of the fact that he was qualified under the category of
Scheduled Tribes, he was thus entitled to grace marks in the topic of "Other Taxes," but the
same were not awarded to him. The candidate claimed that if he had been awarded two grace
marks for "Other Taxes," where he had received 43, he would have been considered qualified
for promotion against general vacancies.
JUDGMENT
Observing that the CBDT had introduced the grace marks policy with the purpose of
enabling the marginally failing candidates to pass in the examination, the Court opined that
once the respondent – original applicant passed in his own category, there was no question
of allowing/granting him any further grace marks.
The Court explained that only in a case where any candidate belonging to any category is
marginally failing to pass the examination, he is/was to be allowed the grace marks so as to
allow him to obtain the minimum passing marks required and that too by allowing up to five
grace marks.
Before the Apex Court, the Union of India contended that the grace marks policy introduced
by CBDT was not applicable in favour of a person, who has passed in his own category. On
the other hand, the respondent supported the judgment relying on a judgment in Rajesh
Kumar Daria Vs. Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 785. The
court observed that the judgment in Rajesh Kumar Daria (supra) followed by the High Court
is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand as the specific grace marks policy was
introduced by the CBDT, which was for marginally failing candidates so as to enable them to
pass the examination.
49. VISHAL ASHWIN PATEL V. ASSISTANT

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
COURT: High Court of Bombay
CORAM: M.R. Shah, B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 28 March 2022.
FACTS
The appellants feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned orders passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petitions Nos. 3209/2019, 3150/2019,
3208/2019 and 3137/2019, by which the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the
said writ petitions in which the appellants herein - original writ petitioners challenged the
reopening of the assessment/re-assessment proceedings, the original writ petitioners have
preferred the present appeals.
“The order dated 11.01.2022 reads as under:—
“1. We are not inclined to entertain this petition. At the same time, the Assessing Officer
who will be different from the officer who had pass the order dated 10th October, 2019
rejecting the objections filed by petitioner for re-opening under Section 148 of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 (the Act) shall permit petitioner to file further documents and case laws if
advised and also grant a personal hearing before passing the assessment order. The
assessment order to be passed within 12 weeks from the date this order is uploaded.
Petitioner shall be given at least seven days advance notice about the date and time of the
personal hearing.
2. The Assessing Officer shall deal with all the submissions made by petitioner including
those raised in his objections to the re-opening and pass detailed order in accordance with
law.” From the writ petitions produced on record, it appears that the reopening of the
assessment under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act has been challenged on a number of
grounds. None of the grounds raised in the writ petitions has been dealt with and/or
considered by the High Court on merits. There is no discussion at all on any of the grounds
raised in the writ petitions. The Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the writ
petitions in a most casual manner which is unsustainable. Except stating that ‘we are not
inclined to entertain writ petition’, nothing further has been stated by the High Court
giving reasons for the disinclination to entertain the writ petitions.”
ISSUE RAISED
The issue before hon’ble apex court was- Whether the hon’ble High Court of Bombay was
right in dismissing writ petition filed u/a 226 of COI for re-opening of matter u/s 148 of the
Income Tax Act?
JUDGMENT
The manner in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the writ petitions
without passing any reasoned order is not appreciated by this Court. When a number of
issues/grounds were raised in the writ petitions, it was the duty cast upon the court to deal
with the same and thereafter, to pass a reasoned order. When the Constitution confers on the
High Courts the power to give relief it becomes the duty of the Courts to give such relief in
appropriate cases and the Courts would be failing to perform their duty if relief is refused
without adequate reasons.
The High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was
required to have independently considered whether the question of reopening of the
assessment could be raised in a writ petition and if so, whether it was justified or not.
Applying the law laid by the Apex Court inCentral Board of Trustees v. Indore
Composite Private limited, (2018) 8 SCC 443, and Union Public Service
Commission v. Bibhu Prasad Sarangi, (2021) 4 SCC 516,the held the following
“to the facts of the case on hand and the manner in which the High Court has disposed of
the writ petitions, in the interest of sobriety, we may only note that the orders are bereft of
reasoning as diverse grounds were urged/raised by the parties which ought to have been
examined by the High Court in the first place and a clear finding was required to be
recorded upon analysing the relevant documents.
Since we cannot countenance the manner in which the orders have been passed by the High
Court which has compelled us to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the writ
petitions afresh on merits, we do so in light of the aforesaid observations.”
The hon’ble apex court remanded the matter to the Division Bench of the the High Court.
50.YASHPAL SINGH V. STATE OF

UTTARPRADESH & ANOTHER
CORAM: Justices M.R. Shah and Krishna Murari
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15 September 2022.
FACTS
There was a long lasting enmity between the informant and the second respondent because
of a land dispute. That one night, respondent no.2 and his men ran over the tractor on the
standing crop, and the accused persons tried to take over the possession. When he was
opposed, the respondent fired a gunshot, killing the brother of the informant and injuring
others. An FIR was lodged against respondent no. 2 under sections 147, 148, 307, 302, and
other offenses of IPC, and further were arrested on the same grounds. The respondent
applied for bail before the trial court, which was rejected; hence they moved to the High
Court, which allowed the bail without giving any cogent reason. Therefore, this appeal.
ISSUE RAISED
Whether a Court give bail in serious offenses without any cogent reasoning?
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court quashed the Allahabad High Court order and stated that when an
accused is being tried for very serious offenses under the Indian Penal Code; the High Court
should have provided compelling justifications before releasing him on bail. The Bench
concluded that the High Court's impugned judgment and an order directing the release of
the accused was unjust and deserved to be quashed because the nature of the allegations, the
seriousness, and gravity of the offenses under Sections 147, 148, 307, 302 and other offenses
of IPC had not even been considered by the High Court, and no justification of any kind had
been given by the High Court while releasing the accused on bail.
DREAM.
BELIEVE.
DO.
REPEAT.
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