CoupEventNarratives Americas

The Colpus Dataset: Case Narratives for Candidate
Coup Events in the Americas, 1946-2020 ∗

John Chin Joseph Wright David Carter
May 12, 2021
∗
Emails: jjchin@andrew.cmu.edu, josephgwright@gmail.com, davidcarter@wustl.edu
Contents
1 Dataset Acronyms 1
2 Coup Attempts, 1946-2020 2

2.1 Americas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1.1 2: United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1.2 40: Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.3 41: Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1.4 42: Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.1.5 70: Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.1.6 90: Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.1.7 91: Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
2.1.8 92: El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
2.1.9 93: Nicaragua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2.1.10 94: Costa Rica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
2.1.11 95: Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.1.12 100: Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
2.1.13 101: Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
2.1.14 130: Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
2.1.15 135: Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
2.1.16 140: Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
2.1.17 145: Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
2.1.18 150: Paraguay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
2.1.19 155: Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
2.1.20 160: Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
2.1.21 165: Uruguay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
3 References 456
i
1 Dataset Acronyms
Archigos – Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009)
Beeri – Be’eri (1970) and Be’eri (1982)
BR – Bjørnskov and Rode (2019)
EPR – Ethnic Power Relations Dataset of Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) and Girardin
et al. (2015)
PT – Powell and Thyne (2011)
CSP – Center for Systemic Policy / Polity IV (Marshall and Marshall 2018)
CCD – Cline Center for Democracy (Nardulli et al. 2013)
CHISOLS – Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura (2016)
COW – Correlates of War Project
De Bruin – De Bruin (2019)
Fossum – Fossum (1967)
GWF – Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018)
LPL – Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán (2014)
Luttwak – Luttwak (2016)
Miller – M. K. Miller (2020)
McGowan – McGowan (2007)
Morrison – Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden (1989)
Roessler – Roessler (2011) and Roessler (2016)
Singh – Singh (2014)
Svolik – Svolik (2012)
Thompson – W. R. Thompson (1973)
WHIV – World Handbook of Political Indicators (Jenkins et al. 2012)
1
2 Coup Attempts, 1946-2020
2.1 Americas
2.1.1 2: United States
Table 1: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in the United States

ID GWF Regime Leader Name Our Coding
2-1992-1-16 USA 1871-NA Bush, George H.W. not exist

2-1998-10-8 USA 1871-NA Clinton legal
2-2017-5-16 USA 1871-NA Trump not exist
2-2019-9-24 USA 1871-NA Trump legal
• # 2-1992-1-16: United States, George H.W. Bush

Category: not exist
Other Datasets: Not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, Singh, Luttwak; coup attempt
- WHIV; Archigos codes George H.W. Bush as leader from January 20, 1989, until
January 20, 1993, entering and exiting by “regular” means; GWF code a democracy
(USA 1871-NA) since 1871; EPR codes Whites as the dominant ethnic group in the
United States from 1966 to 2008.
Event: On January 8, 1992, President George H.W. Bush, while visiting Japan, fell ill,
vomited, and collapsed at a state dinner. He had a quick recovery and there was no
evidence of foul play (Wines 1992). By January 15, 1992, President Bush was back in
the United States and gave a campaign speech at Exeter Town Hall. On January 16,
1992, there were no major political headlines concerning political unrest in Washington,
DC. George H.W. Bush continued as president. On this date, government and rebel
leaders in El Salvador signed a pact in Mexico City to bring their civil war to an end.
President Bush gave his State of the Union Speech in late January 1992 and made no
reference to a plot let alone attempt to depose him by force (New York Times 1992).
Coding rationale: Following a search of Proquest database and Google, we can find no
evidence of a coup attempt in the United States on this date. Given that Bill Clinton
won free and fair elections in the fall of 1992 and would only take office in January
1993 (as Archigos confirms), and we can find no evidence of plotting or other coup-like
behavior on this date, we code this event as not exist.
• # 2-1998-10-8: United States, Bill Clinton

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Singh, and PT; Archigos codes Bill
Clinton as the leader of the United States from January 20, 1993, until January 20,
2001; GWF code a democracy (USA 1871-NA) since 1871.
2
Event: On October 8, 1998, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to launch an im-
peachment inquiry against President Bill Clinton about whether he committed “high
crimes and misdemeanors” by lying under oath and obstructing justice to cover up an
affair with a White House intern, Monica S. Lewinsky (Baker and Eilperin 1998c). A
number of Democrats in Congress, including then-Senator Joseph Biden, likened an
impeachment inquiry to a “political lynching” (Russo 2019).1 By December 12, 1998,
the House Judiciary Committee had approved four articles of impeachment against
Clinton, and rejected an alternative resolution of censure preferred by Democrats (Ap-
ple Jr. 1998). Democrats on the committee likened the impeachment process to a
“Third World ‘coup’ negating two elections and contravening the public will” (Baker
and Eilperin 1998b). On December 19, the House approved two articles of impeach-
ment against President Clinton (Baker and Eilperin 1998a). On February 12, 1999,
the Senate acquitted Clinton of both articles of impeachment (perjury and obstruction
of justice). Afterwards, the lead prosecutor, Representative Henry J. Hyde, said that
Kenneth Starr should not indict Clinton (Alvarez 1999).
As a result, President Clinton remained in office until the end of his term in January
2001. Some observers denounced the impeachment as a political witch hunt and even
a parliamentary coup attempt (e.g. Merkl 2001). According to a review essay of sev-
eral books on the Clinton impeachment by Bose (2001), Merkl’s account is the most
critical of the Kenneth Starr investigation and the impeachment inquiry, going so far
as to call it “an attempted coup” and part of a “vast right-wing” partisan conspiracy
to undermine Clinton’s presidency. For a detailed summary of the arguments about
whether Bill Clinton warranted removal from office, see Matheson (2002, ch. 4).
Coding rationale: No prior major coup datasets identify this event as a coup attempt;
however, we consider it because some of our historical sources make reference to it.
Impeachment, although a concrete legislative action (one that is political and often
partisan), is not unconstitutional in the United States. Article I of the Constitution
clearly states that the House of Representatives “shall have the sole Power of Impeach-
ment” and that the Senate “shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” This
case was the second time in U.S. history that a sitting president had been impeached by
the U.S. House of Representatives. The first time occurred in 1868 because President
Andrew Johnson was said to have committed a “high misdemeanor” for thwarting
Congress on Reconstruction and in firing Edwin Stanton as secretary of war (Mil-
bank 2019). The U.S. House of Representatives had initiated an impeachment inquiry
against President Richard Nixon in October 1973, but Nixon resigned in August 1974
preemptively in expectation of impeachment.
For recent historical and constitutional analyses of the impeachment process, see
Michael J Gerhardt (2019a) and Tribe and Matz (2018). Notwithstanding ambiguities
arising from the some of the unsettled aspects of constitutional law of impeachment
(for other reviews of various political and legal issues, see Whittington (2000) and
Kassop (2000)), we find no evidence that legislators overstepped their constitutional
1. President Donald Trump would be criticized by Biden and others for using similar language in reference
to the impeachment inquiry he faced in 2019 (see 2-2019-9-24).
3
authority in 1998-1999 to launch or carry out an impeachment inquiry of a sitting
president, nor are we aware of any legal cases that challenged the constitutionality of
Clinton’s impeachment’s in federal court. We therefore code this Clinton’s impeach-
ment as a “legal” (Rae and Campbell 2004). This coding is consistent with our coding
of the impeachment inquiry recently launched against President Donald Trump in 2019
(see 2-2019-9-24). This is not to say that the impeachment process was not a highly
political and partisan process, for it was.
• # 2-2017-5-16: United States, Donald Trump

Category: not exist
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CSP and PT; Archigos does not yet code leaders
after 2015; GWF code a democracy (USA 1871-NA) since 1871.
Event: In September 2018, the New York Times published an op-ed by an anonymous
senior Trump administration official under the headline “I Am Part of the Resistance
Inside the Trump Administration.” In this controversial piece, which dozens of cabinet
officials publicly denied penning, the author wrote, “Given the instability many wit-
nessed, there were early whispers within the cabinet of invoking the 25th Amendment,
which would start a complex process for removing the president. But no one wanted
to precipitate a constitutional crisis” (Anonymous 2018). A few weeks later, the New
York Times reported that Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein had raised the
idea of recording talks with President Donald Trump in May 2017 in the wake of the
firing of James Comey as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) on
May 9 and the disclosure of classified intelligence to Russians in the White House.
According to anonymous sources, Rosenstein felt he had been used when, in firing
Comey, Trump cited his memo critical of Comey’s treatment of the investigation into
Hillary Clinton’s e-mails. According to memos written by then acting FBI Director
Andrew G. McCabe, Rosenstein at one point had even discussed with other Justice
Department and FBI officials the possibility of recruiting cabinet members such as At-
torney General Jeff Sessions and then-Secretary of Homeland Security John F Kelley
to invoke the 25th Amendment to remove Trump from office for being unfit (Goldman
and Schmidt 2018).
According to McCabe’s notes, most of the key discussions with Rosenstein on recording
the president and the 25th amendment took place on May 16, 2017. Barrett and
Zapotosky (2018) reported that “McCabe’s senior counsel, FBI lawyer Lisa Page, also
took notes of the discussions that largely track McCabe’s in sequence and import but
are more detailed” and that did not mention the 25th amendment. In response to these
reports, Senator Lindsey Graham said he believed a “bureaucratic coup” was taking
place against Trump within the Justice Department and asked for a special counsel to
investigate (Hamburger 2018). In October 2018, James A. Baker, the FBI’s general
counsel, reportedly said in private testimony to congressional officials that Rosenstein’s
offer to record Trump in May 2017 seemed serious but that FBI officials dismissed the
idea within days as “too risky and unlikely to deliver meaningful information”; Baker
reportedly never did a formal legal analysis of the idea (Fandos and Goldman 2018).
4
The dueling accounts of Rosenstein and McCabe are complicated by the fact that days
after May 16, 2017, the two men feuded in front of Robert Mueller urging each other
to recuse themselves from the Trump-Russia probe (Zapotosky and Barrett 2018).
Debate on the alleged discussions of May 2017 were revived in February 2019 when
Andrew McCabe, who was fired by Attorney General Jeff Sessions a day before he was
set to retire in March 2018, confirmed the New York Times report from the previous
September in a televised interview for “60 Minutes” given to promote his new memoir,
“The Threat: How the F.B.I. Protects America in the Age of Terror and Trump.”
According to Goldman and Haag (2019), McCabe claimed that Rosenstein said he had
looked into the issue of invoking the 25th amendment and he would need a “majority
or eight of the 15 cabinet officials.” They also reported that Scott Pelley had said
on CBS television, “They were not asking cabinet members whether they would vote
for or against removing the president, but they were speculating, ‘This person would
be with us, this person would not be,’ and they were counting noses in that effort.”
They added that Rosenstein again denied the allegations just as he had in September
2018 (Goldman and Haag 2019). A spokeswoman for McCabe said that there were no
“extended discussions” but that Rosenstein broached the idea in the context of a wider
discussion in which the latter expressed concern over Trump’s “capacity” (Zapotosky
2019d).
In response to the revived claims, Trump quoted Alan Dershowitz speaking on Fox
news in a tweet that read, “Trying to use the 25th Amendment to try and circumvent
the Election is a despicable act of unconstitutional power grabbing ... which happens
in third world countries. You have to obey the law. This is an attack on our system &
Constitution” (Zapotosky 2019d). Senator Lindsey Graham said the Senate Judiciary
Committee would investigate McCabe’s claims, calling the alleged discussions “beyond
stunning” and an “administrative coup” (Sonmez and Zapotosky 2019). Senator Chris
Coons, a Democratic member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, responded to Gra-
ham on “Face the Nation.” He said, “I don’t think that this frankly rises to the level
of some deep state conspiracy or a serious attempt at what Senator Graham called
an administrative coup” (Stolberg 2019). Trump also tweeted that it appeared Mc-
Cabe and Rosenstein were “planning a very illegal act, and got caught ... This was
the illegal and treasonous ’insurance policy’ in full action!” Quoting a Fox News host,
Trump later called the idea of using the 25th amendment a coup attempt (Zapotosky
2019g; Rucker and Zapotosky 2019). He also tweeted out that it amounted to “Trea-
son!” (Zapotosky 2019f). Trump also used McCabe’s book “to advance a case that
he is the victim of a corrupt ‘deep state’ plotting an administrative coup.” Kellyanne
Conway, Trump’s counselor, told MSNBC that McCabe’s “assertions about the 25th
Amendment discussions were tantamount to a failed coup attempt.” She told CNN
that “Andrew McCabe tried to overthrow a democratically elected president” (Zapo-
tosky 2019b).
The most concrete rhetorical claims of a “coup attempt” by Trump supporters appear
5
to center around the alleged discussions to invoke the 25th amendment in May 2017
that occurred immediately prior to the launch of the Trump-Russia probe known as the
Mueller investigation (for more on coup claims related to the latter, see 2-2017-5-17).
In this entry, we discuss the claims about alleged coup plotting between May 9-May
16, 2017.
Rosenstein vehemently denied the allegations he had ever plotted against Trump. In
any case, a contemporaneous account stated, “None of Mr. Rosenstein’s proposals
apparently came to fruition. It is not clear how determined he was about seeing them
through.” One spokeswoman said that Rosenstein had made his offer to wear a wire
only sarcastically (Goldman and Schmidt 2018). Baker (2018) stated that there was
no evidence that Mike Pence “or any cabinet members ever seriously contemplated
the idea.” McCabe himself clarified in February 2019 that when Rosenstein allegedly
broached the issue of using the 25th amendment, “I at no time got the impression that
he’d actually sought support, or talked to those people about it, or asked people, you
know, ‘Would you support this?’ or ‘Would you not.’ It was simply Rod thinking off
the top of his head” (Zapotosky 2019e). Thus, even in McCabe’s account, there was
no concrete action targeting Trump let alone a bona fide organized coup attempt.
Whether or not the alleged discussions surrounding invoking the 25th amendment
amounted to a coup plot is ambiguous. Invocation of the 25th amendment would pre-
sumably be constitutional if in fact the president were “unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office.” According to Rivkin and Casey (2019), “The amendment can
be lawfully invoked only if the president, by reason of some physical or mental disorder,
literally cannot do his job... The examples its framers offered were the disability of
President James A. Garfield during the 80 days he lingered in feverish agony after the
gunshot wound that finally killed him; the period during which President Woodrow
Wilson was unable to perform his duties after suffering a stroke; and President Dwight
D. Eisenhower’s similar (although shorter) disabilities after suffering a heart attack and
a stroke while in office.” Evidence of collusion with Russia or obstruction of justice
would not qualify to invoke the 25th amendment; the constitutional process covering
such offenses would call for impeachment (see 2-2019-9-24). Interestingly, President’s
mental fitness was first publicly called into question by some mental health profession-
als around this time (Glass, Lee, and Fisher 2019).
There is no unambiguous evidence that Rosenstein or anyone else sought to bend or
break the constitutional process and remove Trump regardless of whether he were
incapacitated or not. For such a process to violate the law and thus rise to the level
of a coup, it would have to look something like what happened in the “medical coup”
in Tunisia in November 1987 (see 616-1987-11-7). Given the limited and admittedly
ambiguous and even contradictory evidence, we code the alleged discussions that took
place on May 16, 2017, as either non-existent (if Rosenstein is to be believed) or legal
if highly unusual passing references that did not rise to the level of an organized plot
to seize power. At no point were any cabinet members being used as a disingenuous
cover to get the president removed from office or questioned to explore the feasibility
of a plot. We therefore code the alleged coup plot as “not exist” for lack of evidence
of organized plotting. Were the 25th amendment discussions more advanced than
6
McCabe claims (something that we may never know), a coup plot coding could be
warranted. AMBIGUOUS.

Category: legal
after 2015; GWF code a democracy (USA 1871-NA) since 1871.
Event: In July 2016, the FBI launched an investigation, codenamed Crossfire Hurri-
cane, “after receiving information from the Australian government that” a campaign
adviser to presidential candidate Donald Trump “had been approached with an offer
of stolen emails that could damage Hillary Clinton’s campaign” (Benner and Goldman
2019). Around this time, George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy adviser to the Trump
campaign, claimed to have a contact with “thousands of emails” of “dirt” on Clinton
(Zapotosky 2019a). Given that stolen Democratic emails had recently been released,
this event, “along with ties between other Trump advisers and Russia, set off fears
that the Trump campaign was conspiring with Russia’s interference” into the 2016
presidential election (Benner and Goldman 2019). Papadopoulos later claimed that
his contact, a European professor Joseph Mifsud, was “an Italian intelligence asset
who the CIA weaponized” (Zapotosky 2019c).
In the wake of the firing of James Comey as director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tions (FBI) on May 9, 2017, and growing concerns about potential collusion between
the White House and Russians related to the 2016 presidential election, officials at
the Justice Department and FBI held discussions on how to proceed (see 2-2017-5-
17). As a result of the discussions, on May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller III, a highly respected former FBI director,
as special counsel to investigate the Trump-Russia connection and other matters that
“may arise directly from the investigation.” This was only the second time the Jus-
tice Department had ever appointed a special counsel pursuant to the 1999 statutory
provisions for special counsel, with the first time being in 1999 after a botched federal
raid on a compound in Waco, Texas (Ruiz and Landler 2017). Mueller took over an
FBI investigation that had actually opened
Although the White House initially accepted the legality of the appointment of Mueller
as special counsel, in August 2017 President Donald Trump tweeted, “You are witness-
ing the single greatest WITCH HUNT in American political history-led by some very
bad and conflicted people.” Around the same time, Rush Limbaugh, the influential
right-wing radio personality, told his radio audience, “These people are trying to take
this president out” in what amounted to a “silent coup” against Trump. Pat Buchanan
likewise called the appointment of Mueller part of a “deep state-media coup.” Several
right-wing commentators began making statements that Trump’s ouster would lead
to a civil war (King 2017). In December 2017, Mounk (2017) published a New York
Times op-ed under the headline “The Real Coup Plot Is Trump’s” in which he claimed
that the chorus of denunciations by Trump and his allies of the Mueller probe were
the real threat to democracy. As one example of harmful rhetoric, he notes how Fox
7
News host Jesse Waters told viewers, “We have a coup on our hands” in the Mueller
investigation that aimed to destroy Trump’s presidency “for partisan political purposes
and to disenfranchise millions of American voters.”
In 2018, two district court judges in Washington, D.C., upheld the constitutionality
of Mueller’s appointment against legal challenges brought by Andrew Miller, an asso-
ciate of long-time Trump advisor Roger Stone, who was trying to block a grand jury
subpoena from Mueller. In July 2018, “Chief U.S. District Judge Beryl A. Howell
wrote that the ‘scope of the Special Counsel’s power falls well within the boundaries
the Constitution permits,’ in part because he is supervised by an official, in this case
Rosenstein, ‘who is himself accountable to the elected President.’ ” In November
2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit began to hear Miller’s appeal
that “Mueller was named unlawfully, in violation of the appointments clause of the
Constitution.” Miller’s attorney argued that Mueller was a “principal officer” that
had to be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate (Marimow 2018).
In February 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected Miller’s ap-
peal and affirmed the validity of Mueller’s appointment. The appeals court agreed that
Mueller is an “inferior officer” and thus that Rod Rosenstein had the constitutional
authority to appoint Mueller in May 2017 (Marimow 2019).
In March 2019, Attorney General William P. Barr (Jeff Sessions having been fired as
Attorney General the previous fall), released a summary of the Mueller investigation
report. In April 2019, President Trump described the Mueller investigation as “il-
legal” and an “attempted coup.” On the eve of the report’s public release, Trump
said Mueller’s report was a “complete and total exoneration” (Parker 2019b). Echo-
ing Miller’s legal case, Trump told reporters that the Mueller investigation had been
“started illegally. “Everything about it was crooked,” Trump said. “This was an at-
tempted coup.” Around the same time, William Barr publicly said he believed U.S.
intelligence agents spied on the Trump campaign in 2016. Though he did not claim
any laws had been violated, the comments pleased “those who have branded the Rus-
sia investigation an illegitimate attempt to derail Trump’s presidency” (Devlin and
Demirjian 2019).
A campaign to discredit the Mueller investigation continued. In late April 2019, Trump
re-tweeted a year-old tweet from a Republican congressman saying Mueller was “placed
in a position to attempt to legalize a coup against a lawfully-elected President” (Baker
2019a). In early May 2019, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) de-
nounced the anti-Trump bias that influenced the origins of the Mueller investigation,
saying “Their actions are a coup. I do not believe they were abiding by the rule of
law” (Bade, DeBonis, and Wagner 2019). Around this time, a statement issued by the
White House counsel described the Mueller report as “legally defective.” Meanwhile,
Trump referred to a “Deep State coup effort” in a tweet (Milbank 2019). Soon after
Trump also shared a tweet by Jerry Falwell Jr., president of Liberty University, which
concluded, “Trump should have 2 yrs added to his 1st term as pay back for time stolen
by this corrupt failed coup” (Parker 2019c).
On May 10, 2019, former FBI general counsel James Baker, in an interview at the
8
Brookings Institution, defended the Mueller probe. He said, “There was no attempted
coup. There was no way in hell that I was going to allow some coup or coup attempt to
take place on my watch.” Baker insisted: “It would have been a dereliction of our duty
not to investigate” after the FBI received a tip concerning George Papadopoulos in the
summer of 2016 (Zapotosky 2019a). In late July 2019, Mueller testified before Congress
on his investigation and report. Beforehand, Trump tweeted that it was the ”Greatest
Witch Hunt in U.S. history.” Apparently watching on television, he later retweeted
Tom Fitton, the president of the conservative group Judicial Watch: “No collusion. No
obstruction, No impeachment. Shut the coup cabal down!” After Mueller’s testimony
had ended, Trump claimed vindication and victory over Democrats (Shear and Fadulu
2019).
On October 24, 2019, news broke that Attorney General William P. Barr had autho-
rized the Justice Department to conduct a “criminal inquiry” into the Mueller probe.
The inquiry was being led by John H. Durham, the U.S. attorney in Connecticut. Barr
travelled to Italy in hopes of “running down an unfounded conspiracy that is at the
heart of conservatives’ attacks on the Russia investigation – that the Italian government
helped set up the Trump campaign adviser who was told in 2016 that the Russians
had damaging information that could hurt Clinton’s campaign. But Italy’s intelligence
services told Mr. Barr that they played no such role” (Benner and Goldman 2019).
When Durham was first tapped by Barr to look into the origins of the Mueller probe
in May 2019, it was first framed as an “administrative” rather than “criminal” inves-
tigation. Barr has traveled to Great Britain to make overtures to British intelligence
officials to cooperate with the Durham probe. President Trump also reportedly asked
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison for help as well. At the time of writing,
an investigation by Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz into the
Russia probe has been completed and is being vetted for what can be publicly released
(Zapotosky 2019c).
President Trump repeatedly claimed that the Mueller investigation was a political
witch hunt. According to some observers, “Trump is a true believer in a truly balmy
theory. He is convinced that Australian and U.S. spies - working with other elements
of the U.S. deep state, and somehow with Britain and Ukraine - laid the fraudulent
groundwork for the Mueller investigation in the hope of overturning the result of the
2016 election” (Gerson 2019). We find no evidence supporting this conspiracy theory
that predates Mueller’s appointment. Even if there were any such conspiracy or plot
against Donald Trump prior to his election in November 2016, the alleged plot would
not constitute a coup attempt because Trump was not yet the presumptive regime
leader (any such a plot would therefore qualify as “not regime leader” in our cate-
gorization). More to the point, because the courts have upheld the legality of the
appointment of Mueller as a special counsel, we code the subsequent 22-month probe
as “legal.”
9
Category: legal
after 2015. GWF code the U.S. as a democracy (USA 1871-NA) since 1871.
Event: On Tuesday, September 24, 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced that
the House of Representatives would initiate a formal impeachment inquiry of President
Donald Trump (Fandos 2019). In the preceding days, opposition calls for impeachment
grew after revelations of a whistleblower report claiming that in a July 2019 phone call,
President Trump pressed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate cor-
ruption that would be damaging to one of his political rivals and presidential candidate
in the 2020 elections, former vice president Joe Biden (Rucker, Costa, and Bade 2019).
The core issue under investigation was whether the president “allowed his personal
attorney Rudolph W. Giuliani to circumvent the State Department and the National
Security Council to run a shadow operation” and set up a “quid pro quo” to make for-
eign aid to Ukraine contingent on opening up an investigation into Hunter Biden, Joe
Biden’s son (Balz 2019). On his radio program, right-wing political personality Rush
Limbaugh denounced the whistleblower report, saying, “The coup actually is ongoing;
it hasn’t stopped” (Rucker, Costa, and Bade 2019).
President Trump immediately denounced the allegations against him as “more breaking
news Witch Hunt garbage” (Baker 2019b). As the impeachment inquiry progressed,
President Trump stepped up his condemnations of the inquiry. As early as June 2019,
it was reported that Trump had become fixated on fears that he could be impeached
(Parker 2019a). As early as Wednesday, September 25, when the White House released
a memo that summarized the Trump-Zelensky phone call, the right-wing website Bre-
itbart called the whistle-blower report “another deep-state coup” (Roose 2019). By
September 30, a Trump’s re-election campaign official said, “We are not on the defense
for impeachment. We are on offense to show the American people this is a coup d’état
by elitist bureaucrats and Democrats” (Olorunnipa and Parker 2019). On Tuesday,
October 1, Fandos and Jakes (2019) reported, “During an appearance on Fox Busi-
ness Network, Peter Navarro, Mr. Trump’s trade adviser, compared the Democrats
to Soviet-era secret police and their effort to an ‘attempted coup d’état.’ ” Ronna
McDaniel, the Republican National Committee Chair, also accused House Democrats
of attempting a “legislative coup d’état” (DeYoung et al. 2019). That night, Trump
tweeted out the following: “As I learn more and more each day, I am coming to the
conclusion that what is taking place is not an impeachment, it is a COUP, intended to
take away the Power of the People, their VOTE, their Freedoms, their Second Amend-
ment, Religion, Military, Border Wall, and their God-given rights as a Citizen of the
United States of America!” (Davey and Corasaniti 2019).
On Wednesday, October 2, Trump tweeted out a “ready-for-TV video made by his
reelection campaign, repeating the ‘coup’ claim against a backdrop of grainy shots of
House Democrats and Joseph R. Biden Jr.” That afternoon, the Trump campaign
announced that it would run a pair of advertisements on cable television and digital
platforms (Davey and Corasaniti 2019). One of the Trump advertisements included the
claim that “Democrats are trying to undo the election regardless of facts. It’s nothing
10
short of a coup and it must be stopped” (Bade and Dawsey 2019). By October 3, House
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R) joined in Trump’s coup allegations (Gerson
2019). Media response to Trump’s coup claims was not uniform. CNN refused to
run Trump campaign ads including the “demonstrably false” coup claims (Knowles
2019). By contrast, in the week after Trump’s initial coup tweet, over a dozen Fox
News hosts and guests backed Trump’s claims that the impeachment inquiry was an
unconstitutional coup (Rieger 2019). Certain right-wing elements charged the House
Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam B. Schiff and other Democratic congressmen
of “corrupting” the impeachment process (Costa and Rucker 2019).
On Tuesday, October 8, President Trump tweeted that the impeachment inquiry was a
“kangaroo court” and said that he had directed Gordon Sondland, the ambassador to
the European Union, not to testify before the House Intelligence Committee (Marriotti
2019). Soon after, White House counsel Pat Cipollone sent an eight-page letter to
Nancy Pelosi and other top House Democrats arguing that the impeachment inquiry
was an “illegitimate” and “unconstitutional” because the House of Representatives had
not formally voted to launch the process as had occurred in the three prior impeachment
inquiries in U.S. history against Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton (see
2-1998-10-8). Pelosi responded by insisting that no House vote was required under
the constitution to launch an impeachment inquiry. Cipollone further argued that
President Trump had been “denied basic due process rights, such as to cross-examine
witnesses, call witnesses to testify, receive transcripts of testimony, and have access to
evidence.” Cipollone claimed that Trump should be able to identify and cross-examine
the whistleblower (Holland 2019). The letter further said the impeachment inquiry was
an effort to “overturn the democratic processes” of the 2016 election that Trump won
and preempt the rightful power of the people to determine who should be president in
the upcoming 2020 election (Marriotti 2019).
Partisan politics and rhetoric surrounding the impeachment inquiry continued over the
subsequent weeks. On October 9, Fox Host Sean Hannity said “he would only refer
to the impeachment inquiry as an ‘attempted coup’ ” (Rieger 2019). President Trump
“tweeted that the Democratic-led inquiry was tainted with political bias and should
be terminated “for the good of the Country.” ” Meanwhile, former Vice President Joe
Biden responded by calling for Trump’s impeachment (Wootson and Sonmez 2019).
On October 10, President Trump told a rally in Minneapolis that the impeachment
inquiry was “a brazen attempt to overthrow our government” (Balz 2019). On October
11, President Trump condemned an “unholy alliance of corrupt Democrat politicians,
deep-state bureaucrats and the fake news media.” Speaking at a rally in Lousisiana,
Trump said, “The radical Democrats’ policies are crazy. Their politicians are corrupt.
Their candidates are terrible. And they know they can’t win on Election Day so they’re
pursuing an illegal, invalid and unconstitutional bullshit impeachment” (Rogers 2019a).
On Saturday, October 19, President Trump tweeted “#StopTheCoup” in reference to
the impeachment inquiry (Papenfuss 2019).
In response to Cipollone’s letter of October 8, conservative attorney George Conway
– the husband of Trump Counselor Kellyanne Conway but ironically a sharp critic of
Trump since at least 2018 – tweeted, “I cannot fathom how any self-respecting mem-
11
ber of the bar could affix his name to this letter . . . . [I]t disgraces the profession” ”
(Rudalevige 2019). Other lawyers also weighed in and generally dismissed the argu-
ments in the Cipollone letter. What’s more, the White House’s refusal to cooperate
with the impeachment inquiry could itself be grounds for impeachment, Michael Ger-
hardt claimed, noting that “in 1974, a House committee approved articles of impeach-
ment against President Nixon based in part on his refusal to comply with congressional
subpoenas” (Savage 2019b). Gerhardt contended in an op-ed in the Washington Post a
few days later that “Trump’s impeachment defense boils down to this: Treat me like a
king.” But, he notes, the impeachment power as intended by the framers was precisely
that the U.S. president would not be like “the King of Great Britain” for whom “there
is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can
be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution” (Michael J. Gerhardt
2019b).
On October 25, the Federal District Court in Washington issued an opinion ruling that
the House’s impeachment inquiry was legal. Chief Judge Beryl A. Howl rejected the
argument that an impeachment inquiry is unconstitutional if there is no formal vote
to launch it, writing “Even in cases of presidential impeachment, a House resolution
has never, in fact, been required to begin an impeachment inquiry.” Furthermore,
the district court ruled that the House Judiciary Committee was entitled to see secret
grand jury evidence from the Mueller investigation as part of its impeachment inquiry
(Savage and Cochrane 2019). On December 17, in anticipation of an expected House
vote on impeachment, President Trump wrote a six-page letter to Speaker Nancy
Pelosi denouncing the impeachment process. Among other claims, the letter repeated
the coup claim: “This is nothing more than an illegal, partisan attempted coup that
will, based on recent sentiment, badly fail at the voting booth” (Shear 2019). On
Wednesday, December 18, after nearly 12 hours of debate, the House of Representatives
voted to approve two articles of impeachment against President Trump in mostly party-
line votes. The first article of impeachment on abuse of power passed 230-197-1. The
second article of impeachment on obstruction of justice passed 229-198-1 (Itkowitz et
al. 2019). At the time of writing it is unclear exactly when the articles of impeachment
may be sent to the Senate. A Senate trial could come as early as January 2020.
however, we consider it because some of our historical sources make reference to it. In
contrast to previous alleged plotting against Trump that relate to alleged discussions to
invoke the 25th amendment (see 2-2017-5-16) or surrounding the origins of the Mueller
investigation (see 2-2017-5-17), the impeachment inquiry launched in late September
2019 is the most recent and the most concrete of the all the incidents undermining
Trump. In addition to calling the impeachment inquiry a coup attempt, President
Trump has called it a “witch hunt” (Holland 2019) and “lynching” (Bennett 2019).
Impeachment, although a concrete legislative action, is not unconstitutional in the
United States. Article I, section 2 of the Constitution clearly states that the House
of Representatives “shall have the sole Power of Impeachment” and that the Senate
“shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” What’s more, Article I, section
12
5 says that Article I, Section 5 sets out that “Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings”, which constitutionally includes impeachment. In legal terms set in
Baker v. Carr over what may constitute a “political question” not subject to judicial
review, there is a “textual commitment” in the Constitution to grant the power of
impeachment to a “coordinate political department” (Congress). To date, we find no
evidence that legislators have overstepped their constitutional authority to launch an
impeachment inquiry of a sitting president. The only court to rule on the matter, the
Federal District Court of Washington, ruled that the inquiry was legal. We therefore
code this alleged coup event as “legal.” This coding is consistent with our coding of
the impeachment of President Bill Clinton (see 2-1998-10-8).
However, it is worth nothing that Article II, section 3 of the Constitution also states
that “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” According to Tribe and Matz (2018), impeachable
offenses involve a deliberate “betrayal of the nation, corruption of the office, or grave
abuse of power.” Rather that requiring criminal conduct, the offense must “ “pose a
risk of serious harm to the nation and suggest that the president will remain a threat”
and “render the president unviable as the leader of a democracy premised on the rule of
law.” The backers of Trump’s coup claims argue that nothing Trump has done rises to
this standard of an impeachable offense (e.g. Rives 2019). Other legal experts disagree.
For example, Michael Gerhardt, a law professor at the University of North Carolina and
expert on impeachment (e.g. Michael J Gerhardt 2019a), argued that “Impeachable
misconduct entails a president’s serious abuse of power and a serious abuse of public
trust.” He says, “President Trump’s call did both of those things. It was an abuse of
power because he used his position to benefit himself and not the country. It was a
breach of trust because Americans trust their president not to engage in self-dealing,
either through steering businesses to line their own pockets or through conspiring with
or coordinating with foreign powers to intervene in American elections.” In his view,
“For a president to urge a foreign leader to investigate a political rival is a clear instance
of impeachable misconduct. The framers believed such self-dealing was the essence of
corruption and invented impeachment to get rid of it” (Savage 2019a). The debate on
what constitute an impeachable offense s will surely continue.
One might reasonably ask what it might take for an impeachment inquiry against
Trump (or any U.S. president for that matter) to constitute a coup under our definition.
The simple answer is that the Congress would have to violate the constitution in its
pursuit of impeachment. Perhaps the most obvious way this could occur is if the
legislature ousts the incumbent president despite not having the requisite two-thirds
majority vote called for in the constitution (some argue that this was the case in the
legislative ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, see 369-
2014-2-22). This answer, however, invites the secondary and admittedly more complex
question of who gets to decide on the constitutionality of presidential impeachment.
On most issues, the Supreme Court gets the final say to determine an act or law’s
constitutionality under the doctrine of judicial review first asserted in Marbury v.
Madison in 1803. Indeed, in April 2019, President Trump tweeted that if Democrats
13
ever tried to impeach him, he would take the case to the Supreme Court (Jurecic 2019).
On October 9, 2019, Trump said this “probably ends up being a Supreme Court case”
(Savage 2019b). Some observers, such as Dershowitz (2018), have made a constitutional
case against Trump’s impeachment. Hypothetically, if the Supreme Court ruled that
an impeachment was unconstitutional (e.g. asserting the president were not guilty of
“high crimes and misdemeanors” that would constitute an impeachable offense), but
the Congress chose to ignore the ruling to oust the president anyways, then this would
constitute a coup.
However, it questionable whether the Supreme Court would rule on presidential im-
peachment in the first place. The reason is because the court could likely see impeach-
ment as a “political matter” rather than a legal one. Indeed, the Supreme Court ruled
in Nixon v. United States in 1993 that Congress’ 1989 impeachment of a district court
judge was non-justiciable. In the opinion for that case, then-Chief Justice William
Rehnquist wrote “the whole of the impeachment power is divided between the two
legislative bodies, with the House given the right to accuse and the Senate given the
right to judge.” Moreover, he stressed, “opening the door of judicial review to the pro-
cedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would expose the political life of
the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos. This lack of finality would manifest
itself most dramatically if the President were impeached” (Biskupic 2019). For earlier
review of the legal issues of the “political questions” doctrine and non-justiciability of
impeachment, see Michael J Gerhardt (1994) and Wasby (1994).
14
2.1.2 40: Cuba
Table 2: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Cuba

40-1952-3-10 Cuba 44-52 Prı́o Socorrás, Carlos Anti-Dem. Coup (S)

40-1953-7-26 Cuba 52-59 Batista, Fulgencio prior defection
40-1956-4-4 Cuba 52-59 Batista, Fulgencio coup plot
40-1957-9-5 Cuba 52-59 Batista, Fulgencio Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
40-1961-4-17 Cuba 59-NA Castro, Fidel prior defection
• # 40-1952-3-10: Cuba, Carlos Prı́o Socorrás

Category: successful anti-democratic coup
Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup - PT, Svolik,
CSP, Singh, Luttwak, Thompson, and Fossum; Archigos codes Prı́o Socorrás as exiting
on this date by military actors without foreign support; GWF code the collapse of a
democracy (Cuba 44-52) on this date in a military coup; EPR codes Whites as the
dominant ethnic group in Cuba from 1946 to 1959.
Event: In August 1951, Eduardo Chibás, the leader of the Orthodox Party, commit-
ted suicide, shocking saddening the masses. “It also created a leadership vacuum”
and produced a rift in the Orthodox Party. The government of Carlos Prı́o Socorrás,
elected president in 1948, enjoyed little prestige and the “failure of this democratic
reformist” government contributed to plotting (Suchlicki 2002, 55). “In late 1951 a
number of junior officers, impatient with the state of affairs in Cuba and disillusioned
with civilian authorities, banded together to plot the overthrow of the Auténtico order.
The conspirators planned to install in office a military junta long enough to restore or-
der and convoke national elections to return power to responsible civilian authorities.”
After first considering installing Colonel Barquin, they invited Batista to head the
movement, which they believed would help broaden the movement’s base of support
(L. A. Pérez 1976, 126-127). For his part, Batista agreed as he was “convinced that
he could not win the election scheduled for June 1952.” The military coup ousting
the democratic regime had no civilian plotters, was bloodless, and swiftly executed. It
“caught the Cuban population, as well as Prio and his followers, by surprise” (Suchlicki
2002, 55).
On March 10, 1952, “With the cooperation of Captain Damaso Sogo, officer of the day,
Batista gained entrance to Camp Columbia. Garrison commanders were immediately
arrested. Troops were aroused and assembled to listen to the promises and harangue of
the former president. Another group led by retired General Francisco Tabernilla, in a
similar fashion, secured control of the general’s former command of La Cabaña. Retired
naval Captain Jose E. Rodriguez Calderón entered and quickly dominated Castillo de
la Punta, the island’s most important naval station and seat of the navy command.
15
Finally, Lieutenant Rafael Salas Cañizares of the Havana National Police, captured the
motorized section of the capital police force and seized control of the radio dispatch
center. By 2:30 A.M., insurgent military units had secured control of the capital’s
armed forces garrisons” (L. A. Pérez 1976, 128), including army headquarters at Camp
Columbia, where a new junta was formed. Rebel officers then went about seizing all
the strategic positions in Havana that morning.
Around 6:30 a.m., gunfire broke out at the presidential palace, leading to the death of
a sergeant and another soldier of the palace guard. About 7 a.m., Prı́o Socorrás issued
a statement that he had been informed the coupmakers had seized Camp Columbia.
By 8:30 a.m., Prı́o Socorrás fled the palace, shortly after meeting with students of
the University of Havana, who pledged their support. Before noon, a crowd outside
the palace was dispersed as tanks, infantrymen, and police surrounded the building
(R. Hart Phillips 1952a). “From Castillo de la Punta, the new navy chief, José E.
Rodriguez Calderón announced possession of the naval service and ordered navy units
throughout the island to endorse the junta. Rafael Salas Cañizares, the new chief of
the national police, directed officers, noncommissioned personnel, and patrolmen to
enforce order,” assuring police that the new junta would fully back them (L. A. Pérez
1976, 129-130). The success of the coup was announced early in the afternoon (R.
Hart Phillips 1952a).
General Batista, who became head of state and supreme commander of the armed
forces, suspended all constitutional guarantees for 45 days and dissolved Congress.
General Tabernilla was named army chief of staff. In one of his first administrative
acts, Batista raised the salaries for all members of the armed forces. Addressing “a
wildly enthusiastic crowd of civilians and Army men”, Batista promised to “wipe out
gangsterism” and restore public order, respect international agreements, and professed
that he had no “ambition for power” and that his regime would only rule “long enough
to establish public peace and cordiality among Cubans” (R. Hart Phillips 1952a).
Batista justified the coup in part by decrying the “lack of guarantees for soldiers and
the police” in ending disorder, and the corruption of Auténtico government (L. A.
Pérez 1976, 132).
There was some initial resistance to the coup. Shortly after the junta was declared, em-
ployees of the Rancho Boyeros airport just outside Havana announced a protest strike.
Soldiers took over the airport. Police also seized the headquarters of the Confederation
of Cuban Workers and arrested some of its leaders (R. Hart Phillips 1952a). “Batista
quickly consolidated his position by replacing dissenting army officers with his own
loyal men, exiling or arresting key Prio supporters, and taking temporary control over
the mass media. Prio himself sought asylum in the Mexican Embassy” (Suchlicki 2002,
55-56). By March 11, the country slowly returned to normal as a new cabinet was in-
stalled, although troops continued to patrol the capital (R. Hart Phillips 1952b). On
March 12, Batista assumed the premiership as well in front of cheering crowds outside
of the presidential palace (New York Times 1952a). On March 13, Prio Socarras flew
to exile with two cabinet me in Mexico City (New York Times 1952d).
Within days, the new junta “ordered the “reorganization” of all political parties” (L. A.
16
Pérez 1976, 129-130). The Auténtico party, Cuba’s largest and best-organized party
at the time, opposed the coup. Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredo, president of the
Senate, tried to summon congressional opposition to Batista’s coup to no avail. The
party led non-violent opposition to Batista, but the terms of Congressmen expired
in September 1952 (Ameringer 1985). The United States recognized Batista’s rule in
late March 1958 (New York Times 1952c). In early April 1952, a new constitution was
approved, Batista was sworn in as “provisional” president, and the suspension of rights
was extended another 45 days. At Havana University, students held a mock funeral
for the 1940 constitution (New York Times 1952b). Batista’s rule relied on the army,
police, and navy, only ending in the 1959 revolution led by Fidel Castro.
Coding rationale: Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this
event as a successful anti-democratic coup.
• # 40-1953-7-26: Cuba, Fulgencio Batista

Category: prior defection
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Batista
as the leader of Cuba from March 10, 1952, until January 1, 1959; GWF code a personal
regime (Cuba 52-59) from March 10, 1952, until January 1, 1959.
Event: Fulgencio Batista’s 1952 coup (see 40-1952-3-10) engendered violent opposition
from certain sectors, including a small faction within the ortodoxos including Fidel
Castro, who had received a law degree from the University of Havana in 1950. Castro
“was nominated to run as an ortodoxo candidate to the House of Representatives in the
aborted 1952 election. Batista’s coup thwarted Castro’s ambitions for a parliamentary
career, and Castro began organizing a small group of followers for his ill-fated attack
on the Moncada military barracks in Oriente Province on July 26, 1953. Expecting
army discipline to be low, Castro and his group planned a surprise attack to capture
the Moncada barracks. The attack would coincide with a vigorous publicity campaign
projecting the movement as an ortodoxo uprising supported by pro-ortodoxo army
officers. Castro hoped for sufficient confusion to paralyze the army and thus prevent
it from reacting against the rebels. Batista would then be forced to resign, and the
ortodoxos would be catapulted into power with Castro as the party’s undisputed leader.
In reality, the party was not consulted, and its leaders were informed of Castro’s plans
only the day before the Moncada assault.
Castro’s Moncada attack ended in disaster. The garrison’s discipline was not relaxed,
and the army fought back the attack. Some of the attackers failed even to enter
the military barracks. Those who did were massacred. Castro himself escaped to
the mountains, only to be captured and sentenced to prison. In “History Will Absolve
Me,” his speech before the tribunal that sentenced him, Castro outlined” a mainstream
political program and betrayed none of the communist ideological principles which he
would come to espouse in later years (Suchlicki 2002, 57-58). After being released
from jail in 1956 and briefly going into exile, he launched another assault on power
that succeeded by 1959 (see 40-1959-1-1).
17
Coding rationale: No major prior coup datasets include this event. However, because
at least one coup dataset includes Fidel Castro’s entry in 1959 as a coup (see 40-1959-1-
1), we also consider this event, which Paul et al. (2013, 104) identifies as an historical
antecedent or preamble to Castro’s subsequent insurgency of 1956-1969. However,
because there is no evidence that current, active members of the military participated
in planning or executing the Moncada attacks in July 1953, we code this event as a
case of prior defection.
Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; failed coup attempt
- Luttwak; Archigos codes Batista as the leader of Cuba from March 10, 1952, until
January 1, 1959; GWF code a personal regime (Cuba 52-59) from March 10, 1952,
until January 1, 1959.
Event: In April 1956, Batista’s regime was rocked by student riots, which it met
harsh repression (Suchlicki 2002, 59). Meanwhile, a “far-flung army conspiracy” was
discovered in April 1956. Led by Colonel Ramón Barquı́n, the military attaché in
Washington, “with the collaboration of civilian opposition sectors, the plot implicated
the most distinguished professional officers,” including Captain José Ramos Avila, Lt.
Col. Manuel Varela (commander of the army tank battalion), Comandante Enrique
Borbonet (paratroop commander), Comandante Jose J. W. Orihuela (a leading artillery
expert), Lt. Manuel A. Villafaña, Lt. René Traviesa Pla, and Lt. José Planes de la
Torre. “In all, some two hundred twenty officers and men were implicated in the
planned overthrow of the government” (L. A. Pérez 1976, 147-8).
Barquin’s coup was organized “by officers who were sympathetic to the Auténtico po-
litical faction (the officers were called Puros) was only foiled when one Puro betrayed
the rest” (Ciment 2015, 501). The coup was supported by Justo Carrillo’s Montecristo
movement. “If successful, Carrillo was to become president” (Thomas M Leonard 2004,
32). Barquin believed “that Batista was bringing dishonor to the armed forces and
wishing to restore constitutional authority, planned a military coup for early April. His
action was betrayed by another [puro] officer on April 3, and Batista moved first, seiz-
ing the opportunity to purge the army of all officer whom he did not trust” (Ameringer
1985, 344). “As a result, Barquı́n went off to prison and Carrillo came to support Cas-
tro’s cause” (Thomas M Leonard 2004, 32). Batista responded by court martialing the
conspirators and retiring or dismissing many top professional soldiers, thus weakening
the army on the eve of Fidel Castro’s challenge to his regime (L. A. Pérez 1976, 149).
Coding rationale: Among major prior coup datasets, only Luttwak codes this event
as a coup. However, most sources indicate that the conspiracy was discovered be-
fore it was executed. Because we can find no evidence that Barquin’s conspiracy was
executed, we code this event as a coup plot.
18
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, and Singh; rebel - PT; failed
coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Batista as the leader of Cuba from March
10, 1952, until January 1, 1959; GWF code a personal regime (Cuba 52-59) from March
10, 1952, until January 1, 1959.
Event: On April 29, 1956, an armed group “belonging to Prio’s Authentic Organi-
zation (Organizacion Autentica), unsuccessfully attacked the Goicuria army barracks
in Matanza Province” (Suchlicki 2002, 59-60). The attack involved about 30 men led
by Reynald Garcı́a, a young revolutionary. “Armed with old and useless rifles, the
attackers planned to take over the military camp and distribute arms to the people.
Army General Pilar Garcı́a–later Chief of National Police–was aware of the group’s ac-
tivities, and the camp’s defense was ready. When the attackers entered the camp the
troops were waiting for them. There were no survivors. The disaster was particularly
significant, for the remaining years of the insurrection no more isolated groups would
attempt such Moncada-like attacks” (Bonachea and San Martin 1974).
Coding rationale: Among major prior datasets, only Thompson codes this event as a
coup. However, evidence implicates “an insurgent Auténtico group” (L. A. Pérez 1976,
144), not current and active members of the military. We therefore concur with PT
and code this event as a case of prior defection.

Category: failed regime change coup
Other Datasets: failed military coup and popular revolt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP
and Singh; failed coup attempt - PT; Archigos codes Fulgencio Batista as the leader
of Cuba from March 10, 1952 to January 1, 1959. GWF code a personal regime (Cuba
52-59) from March 10, 1952, to January 1, 1959, which was led by Batista. EPR codes
Whites as the dominant ethnic group in Cuba from 1946 to 1959.
Event: Early in the morning on Thursday, September 5, 1957, over 100 naval officers
and sailors seized the naval post at Cayo Loco, Cienfuegos. The “naval rebels threw
the base open to collaborating units” of Fidel Castro’s rebel Twenty-Sixth of July
movement “and the armed wing of the Auténticos, which distributed arms to civilian
participants. Insurgent naval contingents, revolutionary groups, and armed civilians
moved on Cienfuegos attempting to capture the city. All the important objectives
except the local military detachment passed under rebel control. Within hours, the
Las Villas port was under the sway of revolutionary forces” (149). At 8 a.m., the rebels
seized the headquarters of the Maritime Police and the National Police at Cienfuegos.
But loyal army troops from Havana and Santa Clara bombarded the rebel locations,
forcing the rebels to flee after five or more hours of fighting (New York Times 1957m,
1957h; Associated Press 1957d).
According to L. A. Pérez (1976, 150), “Subsequent government investigation into the
naval uprising uncovered a conspiratorial network of far-reaching proportions, impli-
cating every branch of the armed forces. Cayo Loco represented only one dimension of
a far-flung conspiracy in which naval stations throughout the island, including bases
19
in the cities of Pinar del Rı́o, Mariel, Havana, and Santiago de Cuba, planned a con-
certed strike against the regime. The original plot called for seizing vessels anchored
in Havana and training naval guns on key army installations in the capital to force
the government to relinquish power. A last moment suspension of plans, however, the
news of which never reached Cayo Loco, halted the nationwide conspiracy.” The revolt
failed because the rebels at Cienfuegos had thus moved prematurely (New York Times
1957l). A failure of coordination doomed the mutiny-cum-coup, which envisioned at-
tacks on the presidential palace. The Cienfuegos uprising had been timed to catch the
military by surprise, as it began the morning after the military-wide annual celebra-
tions of the 1933 “Sergeants’ Revolt,” which brought Fulgencia Batista to power in on
September 4, 1933 (Bonachea and San Martin 1974, 147).
Coding rationale: The government concluded the Cienfuegos revolt was “part of an
island-wide plan involving other units of the navy, Señor Castro’s followers and adher-
ents of ex-President Carlos Prio Socarras,” who had been ousted by Batista in a 1952
coup New York Times (1957k). Although Prı́o denied the allegation from his exile
in Miami (New York Times 1957h), the government accused Antonio A. de Varona,
former President of the Senate, of serving as a liaison between the Prı́o and mutineers
New York Times (1957g). Whether or not Prı́o was aware of the plot, historical sources
do implicate militants of the Organización Auténtico (OA) in the uprising (Bonachea
and San Martin 1974, 147).
Key architects of the plot appear to have been Armando Hart and Faustino Pérez,
leaders of the Fidel Castro’s July 26 movement in Havana. After the failed assassina-
tion attempt against Batista in March 1957, they began talks with dissident navy and
army officers who were contemplating an anti-Batista coup, with the goal of “forming a
mixed Junta between the army, navy, and 26th of July” (Sweig 2009, 51). The M-26-7
mutiny’s chief operational leaders were Julio Camacho and Miguel Merino (Bonachea
and San Martin 1974, 148). The key military leader of the Cienfuegos mutiny, Navy
Lieut. José San Roman Toledo, was a “self-styled colonel of the movement support-
ing Señor Castro,” who was reportedly shot and killed during the revolt New York
Times (1957j) and Associated Press (1957d). The government court-martialled 42 mil-
itary men for participating in the navy revolt. Seventeen other military officers were
sentenced for plotting a simultaneous uprising (Associated Press 1957a).
News reports characterized the event as the first sign of military defection since Fidel
Castro launched his guerilla war against the Batista regime from the Sierra Maestra of
Oriente Province in December 1956 (e.g. R. H. Phillips 1957). Although the military
had initially displayed “monolithic unity” as the only real pillar of the Batista regime
after 1952 (L. A. Pérez 1976, 132-134), the military became split between professional
army officers, the puros, and Batista’s political appointees, the septembristas. The
former grew disillusioned with the latter’s nepotism and corruption; that discontent had
earlier manifested itself in the discovery of an army coup plot in April 1956 led by puro
officer Colonel Ramón Barquı́n (145-147). Overall, the Cienfuegos mutiny included a
fractious anti-Batista “negative coalition.” The M-26-7 feared a reformist coup which
would exclude them from a post-Batista junta. Had the mutiny succeeded and “a
20
bastiano government without Batista” emerged, the M-26-7 participants planned to
“denounce the Havana regime and form a revolutionary government in Santiago.” In
the event, “the Cienfuegos mutiny liberated the [July 26th] movement from the risk
of being marginalized by a coup” and allowed them to focus their efforts on a guerilla
strike plan without any insider military involvement (Sweig 2009, 51-53).
Based on this evidence, we code this a failed regime change coup, on the assumption
that the rebel troops sought to topple the Batista regime and install Fidel Castro and
other excluded regime opposition (e.g. Auténticos) in power. GWF code a regime
change in 1959 when Fidel Castro’s M-26-7 forces finally succeeded in toppling the
Batista regime.

Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; rebel coup - CCD; not a candidate -
CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Fulgencio Batista as the leader of Cuba from
March 10, 1952 until exiting on this date through “irregular” means by rebels without
foreign support. Svolik codes the exit of Batista on this date to due a revolt; GWF code
the collapse of Batista’s personal regime (Cuba 52-59) on this date due to insurgency.
EPR codes Whites as the dominant ethnic group in Cuba from 1946 to 1959.
Event: After leading an attack on the Moncada barracks on July 26, 1953 (see 40-
1953-7-26), Fidel Castro was jailed and eventually released in 1956. He then “traveled
to the United States seeking funds for the revolutionary cause and organizing his
followers into the Twenty-Sixth of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio [M-26-7]),
an organization named after his ill-fated Moncada attack. In December 1956, Castro
and a group of more than eighty young revolutionaries, including his brother Raul and
an Argentine physician, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, left from Mexico in the small yacht
Granma and landed in Oriente Province. There, underground commando groups had
attacked several military installations, touching off a wave of sabotage throughout the
province. Terrorism flared, and bombs exploded. Underground cells derailed trains
and sabotaged power lines, blacking out entire towns. By the time that Fidel Castro
landed on December 2, however, the uprising was well on its way to being crushed,”
and most of the M-26-7 leaders were killed or jailed (Suchlicki 2002, 60). Castro and
the other 12 survivors of the initial invasion retreated to Sierra Maestra mountains
where they regrouped and continued to “pursue a socialist revolutionary dream” (Paul
et al. 2013). “Throughout his stay in the mountains, Castro opposed a military coup,
the assassination of Batista, or any other violent act by a group not” directed by
M-26-7 (Suchlicki 2002, 61).
As of early 1958, Castro’s 26th of July Movement still only “controlled six columns of
50 to 100 guerrillas each (or a total of 900 men and women) in the Sierra Maestra”
(Dixon and Sarkees 2015). However, the insurgency would gain momentum throughout
1958. In March 1958, the U.S. publicly announced an arms embargo, which many
Cubans saw as U.S. withdrawal of support for the Batista regime (Suchlicki 2002,
62). On May 24, 1958, Batista’s forces launched Operation Verano, which failed to
21
rout Castro’s forces despite superior numbers and firepower (Paul et al. 2013, 104-
110). “The government offensive collapsed through defections, desertions, and a simple
unwillingness among large numbers of officers to continue supporting Havana in the
field. After the failure of the spring offensive, the army virtually ceased to resist the
drives of the rebel counteroffensive” (L. A. Pérez 1976, 154). By October 1958, “total
rebel forces in the countryside numbered 7,000 in twenty columns and were able to
mount raids against towns and cities” (Dixon and Sarkees 2015). In November 1958,
in a failed bid to re-win American support, Batista held rigged elections “in which
Batista’s hand-picked candidate, Andres Rivero Aguero, won the presidency for a new
four-year term” (Suchlicki 2002, 63-64). The move backfired. On December 10, 1958,
the U.S. withdrew recognition, accelerating regime collapse (Paul et al. 2013, 104-110).
The army refusal “to continue fighting dealt the final blow to a crumbling regime”
(Suchlicki 2002, 64). By late fall of 1958, coup plots within the armed forces prolif-
erated. “In November, the administration uncovered an antigovernment plot based in
Camp Columbia. Led by General Martin Diaz Tamayo, chief of army operations, the
conspiracy involved some thirty officers. Several weeks later, another plot implicating
important naval chieftains, including Commodore Joaquin Pablo Varela, chief of the
navy air corps, was uncovered. In December, Chief of Staff Tabernilla, his brother-
in-law General Alberto del Rio Chaviano, and his son Carlos Tabernilla, paid a visit
to the American Embassy” to gauge U.S. receptivity to their proposal to replace the
Batista regime with “a military junta composed of senior army and Navy comman-
ders.” In a separate plot at the same time, “General Eulogio Cantillo, chief of army
operations in Oriente, General Carlos Cantillo, commander of the Matanzas regiment,
Colonel Jose M. Rego Rubido, chief of the Santiago regiment, and Colonel Florentino
Rosell Leyva, chief of the army corps of engineers, banded together to establish a junta
in order to ‘guarantee stability and public order.’ The conspiracy collapsed when un-
covered by government agents forcing a number of key officers to flee into exile.” Then
on December 28, General Eulogio Cantillo entered into negotiations with the M-26-7
command, “promising to arrest Batista and relinquish power to the guerrilla leader.
Castro received Cantillo’s assurances that the Santiago regiment would unite with the
Rebel Army after which Castro expressed hope that the remaining army units would
support the guerrillas” (L. A. Pérez 1976, 164-165).
“Diplomatic, political, and military pressure, culminating in the Cantillo-Castro pact,
forced Batista to flee on January 1, 1959” (165). Early that morning, Batista sum-
moned his military chiefs to army headquarters at Camp Columbia. According to a
statement that Batista issued from his exile in the Dominican Republic on July 9, his
military chiefs “told him that it was not possible to maintain order or control of their
commands.” They appealed to Batista “to resign out of patriotism and love for the
people,” saying “his resignation would make feasible the constitution of a government
consisting of representative figures” (Lissner 1959a). So pressured, Batista agreed to
resign “to prevent further bloodshed” (R. H. Phillips 1959b). Batista left a military
junta in charge to try to salvage the situation. General Cantillo took over as army
chief from General Francisco Tabernilla (Dubois 1959). Rather than surrender to M-
26-7, Cantillo was now “determined to continue the war effort under the presidency
22
of Supreme Court Justice Carlos Piedra. The insurgent leadership repudiated the po-
litical machinations in Havana and, pledging to continue the struggle, exhorted the
population to join the revolution and organize a general strike” (L. A. Pérez 1976,
165). With Castro rejecting Piedra appointment and demanding that Manuel Urrutia,
a former judge, be installed as provisional president, the Supreme Court refused to
administer the oath of office to Piedra (R. H. Phillips 1959b).
With news of Batista’s flight, army units throughout the island simply ceased to resist
the rebel advances” (L. A. Pérez 1976, 165). Late on June 1, Castro’s forces took
over the Moncada barracks in Santiage de Cuba without firing a shot after its 5,000
troops surrendered (R. H. Phillips 1959b). Air Force officers rebelled and declared their
support for Castro (Dubois 1959). “Cantillo complained to the American Embassy
that he had inherited the command of a “dead army.” Seeking to reanimate the
moribund government war effort, Cantillo summoned the imprisoned Colonel Barquin
and relinquished command of the army to the puro officer” (L. A. Pérez 1976, 165). At
1 a.m. on January 2, Castro declared Urrutia as provisional president from Santiago
de Cuba. Castro also criticized General Cantillo of aiding the Batista regime “just at
the time my insurgents were preparing to take the capital city of Havana by force of
arms” and announced that Col. José Rego Rubido would replace him as chief of staff of
the army. Havana was paralyzed by a general strike as rebel forces led by Raul Castro
closed in on Havana and University students began to seize police stations (R. H.
Phillips 1959c). Barquin soon “ordered a cease-fire, saluted the insurgent “Army of
Liberation,” and surrendered command of Camp Columbia and La Cabaña to Camilo
Cienfuegos and Ernesto Che Guevara” (L. A. Pérez 1976, 165).
On January 3, Manuel Urrutia, whom Castro had proclaimed as provisional President
but whom had not been sworn in by the Supreme Court, “delegated” his power to
Fidel Castro – en route to Havana from Santiago de Cuba – as commander in chief of
the armed forces. He also swore in most of a new rebel cabinet in Santiago de Cuba.
Meanwhile, General Cantillo was arrested as a “war criminal” for allowing Batista and
members of his regime to escape (R. H. Phillips 1959a). It was revealed that his crime
was to go back on the secret deal he had struck on December 28. On January 4, Castro
called an end to the general strike that had paralyzed the country (H. Matthews 1959).
On January 5, Urrutia took up his duties in Havana and named José Miro Cardona,
dean of the Havana Bar Association, as premier (R. H. Phillips 1959g). The U.S. State
Department denied persistent rebel claims that U.S. Ambassador Earl Smith “had been
working with General Cantillo and Manuel Cardinal Arteaga y Betancourt, Primate
of Cuba, to prevent the Castro movement from taking power” (Dale Jr. 1959).
On January 7, Urrutio dissolved the Congress and formally proclaimed that Batista
and his government had been removed from office (R. H. Phillips 1959f). On January
8, a triumphant Castro finally entered Havana unopposed (R. H. Phillips 1959e). On
January 13, 1959, “the provisional revolutionary government ordered the reorganiza-
tion of the armed forces” (L. A. Pérez 1976, 165). On February 16, 1959, Final Castro
took the post of premier for himself (R. H. Phillips 1959d).
Coding rationale: The fall of Batista and entry of Fidel Castro is the culmination of
23
a years-long rebel insurgency and civil war, implicating Castro’s “Rebel Army.” Al-
though there were security force defections and desertions and coup plots in the context
of Castro’s insurgency in late 1958, these do not necessarily amount to a coup attempt
by current, active members of the military. Whether this event qualifies as a coup
attempt or only a case of prior defection depends on how one assesses the actions of
General Cantillo and the abortive military junta that attempted to take command in
Havana following Batista’s departure for the Dominican Republic. Immediately after
his departure, Batista claimed that he voluntarily chose to resign to avoid bloodshed
(Lissner 1959b). But a week later, he claimed he had been forced to resign by Cantillo
and his military chiefs. Some speculated his changed tune was an attempt to help
Cantillo, who had by then been arrested (Lissner 1959a). On the one hand, most ac-
counts seem to indicate that Cantillo advised and requested that Batista resign, but
did not force him to resign. Indeed, Cantillo was allegedly arrested by Castro precisely
because he reneged on his promise to arrest Batista and refuse any post in his regime.
On the other hand, accounts by scholars such as L. A. Pérez (1976) suggest that Can-
tillo and his abortive junta tried and failed (within a matter of hours) to keep power
for themselves and deny victory to Castro’s forces. Because most observers conclude
that Batista was pressured to flee mainly the threat of imminent rebel victory of ap-
proaching rebel forces and knowledge that Cantillo and others were plotting against
him (New York Times 1959e), we code this event as a case of prior defection. Had
we uncovered clear evidence of concrete actions by Cantillo forcing Batista to resign,
we would code this event as a successful regime change coup. The fact that Cantillo
formed a military junta after Batista’s departure is not in itself evidence of a coup.
“Under Cuba’s constitution, the army takes over in the absence of an elected president.
The army is empowered to name a provisional president” (Dubois 1959). The forma-
tion of Cantillo’s junta can therefore be seen as legal. Either way, the general strike
that Castro called on January 1 prevented Cantillo’s military junta from consolidating
control and secured rebel victory after a day.
• # 40-1961-4-17: Cuba, Fidel Castro

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; failed coup attempt -
Luttwak; Archigos codes Fidel Castro as the leader of Cuba from January 2, 1959,
until February 24, 2008; GWF code a regime (Cuba 59-NA) since January 1, 1959.
Event: On April 17, 1961, a Cuban exile force landed at the Bay of Pigs in what
the CIA had codenamed “Operation Zapata.” The rebel force “fought bravely but
was outnumbered and overwhelmed by Castro’s forces. In the end, 114 of its men
died and more than 1,000 were captured. Castro proclaimed victory over American
imperialism; Kennedy was humiliated” (Smith and Davis 2017, 52). “The purpose of
the invasion was to encourage a popular uprising on the island...However, the operation
failed totally, largely because of inadequate preparations, insufficient political backing,
faulty assumptions about what the Cuban population thought of the Castro regime
and what it might do in the wake of the invasion, last-minute refusal by the president
24
to allow air support, and “reckless’ expert opinion about its outcome” (Turner 2014,
29).
Coding rationale: Among major prior coup datasets, only Luttwak codes this event as
a coup, with the main party listed as a “foreign-supported army faction.” However,
the CIA-sponsored rebel force was not composed of current, active members of the
military. Instead, Planning was based on “intelligence from upper- and middle-class
exiles” living in south Florida, and in May 1960 the CIA established the “Cuban
Democratic Revolutionary Front” headquartered in Miami (Olson 1999, 41-42). The
CIA also “set up a base in Guatemala where it recruited and trained a small army
of Cuban exiles and opponents of Castro” (Smith and Davis 2017, 52) beginning in
August 1960. “By early February 1961 there were about 1,400 exiles in training in
Guatemala. They called themselves Brigade 2506” (Olson 1999, 42). By contrast, we
find no evidence of informants or participants within the Cuban military. We therefore
code this event as a case of prior defection.
25
2.1.3 41: Haiti
Table 3: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Haiti

41-1946-1-11 Haiti 41-46 Lescot, Élie Reg. Ch. Coup (S)

41-1950-5-10 Haiti 46-50 Estimé, Dumarsais Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
41-1950-12-6 Haiti 50-56 Magloire, Paul legal
41-1956-12-12 Haiti 50-56 Magloire, Paul protest
41-1957-2-3 Haiti 56-57 Pierre-Louis, Joseph Nemours legal
41-1957-3-31 Haiti 56-57 Sylvain, Franck Autogolpe (F)
41-1957-4-2 Haiti 56-57 Sylvain, Franck Anti-Prov. Coup (S)
41-1957-5-20 Haiti 56-57 Executive Government Council (CEG) Anti-Prov. Coup (F)
41-1957-5-25 Haiti 56-57 Cantave, Léon combined
41-1957-5-26 Haiti 56-57 Cantave, Léon legal
41-1957-6-14 Haiti 56-57 Fignolé, Daniel Anti-Prov. Coup (S)
41-1958-7-29 Haiti 57-86 Duvalier, François prior defection
41-1962-8-8 Haiti 57-86 Duvalier, François coup plot
41-1970-4-24 Haiti 57-86 Duvalier, François Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
41-1986-2-7 Haiti 57-86 Duvalier, Jean-Claude Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
41-1988-6-17 Haiti 86-88 Namphy, Henri Reshuffle Coup (F)
41-1988-6-20 Haiti 86-88 Namphy, Henri Autogolpe (S)
41-1988-9-17 Haiti 86-88 Namphy, Henri Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
41-1988-10-16 Haiti 88-90 Avril, Prosper coup plot
41-1989-4-2 Haiti 88-90 Avril, Prosper Reshuffle Coup (F)
41-1989-4-5 Haiti 88-90 Avril, Prosper Reshuffle Coup (F)
41-1990-3-10 Haiti 88-90 Avril, Prosper Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
41-1991-1-6 Haiti 90-91 Pascal-Troillet, Ertha Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
41-1991-9-30 Haiti 90-91 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
41-1994-9-19 Haiti 91-94 Cédras, Raoul foreign
41-2000-10-16 Haiti 99-04 Preval, Rene Garcia coup plot
41-2001-12-17 Haiti 99-04 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand prior defection
41-2004-2-1 Haiti 99-04 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand combined
41-2004-2-29 Haiti 99-04 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand prior defection
41-2004-8-30 Haiti 04-06 Alexandre, Boniface not exist
41-2004-11-16 Haiti 04-06 Alexandre, Boniface not exist
• # 41-1946-1-11: Haiti, Elie Lescot

Category: successful regime change coup
Other Datasets: successful military coup and popular revolt - CCD; successful coup -
CSP and Singh; Archigos codes Lescot as leader from May 15, 1941, until exiting on this
date in a military coup; Svolik codes Lescot’s exit on this date due to a revolt. GWF
code the collapse of a personal regime (Haiti 41-46) on this date in a popular uprising.
EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Haiti since 1946 with the entire population being
“Haitian.”
Event: “On 1 January 1946, La Ruche published an article critical of Élie Lescot’s
government. Two days later, the government responded by detaining the newspaper’s
26
editors and suspending publication for an indefinite period. This action led to a strike
on 7 January organized by high school and university students. Within two days, the
strikers were joined by civil servants and transportation workers” (Hall 2012, 151). On
Thursday, January 10, in the face of growing protest, Lescot agreed to dissolve the
cabinet (Associated Press 1946f), but refused to resign. Events came to a head later
that night.
“In a private audience with Colonel Lavaud, the head of the Garde, a desperate Lescot
ordered Lavaud to use all necessary force to break up the mobs. Lavaud refused and
Lescot ordered his immediate arrest. The second ranking officer of the Garde, Colonel
Antoine Levelt [director of the military academy], instead counseled with Lavaud and
U.S. Ambassador Wilson to decide the best course of action. In conjunction with
the embassy they formed that evening a Conseil Exécutif Militaire (CEM), which
demanded and successfully obtained Lescot’s resignation...The three-man junta that
headed the CEM, which included Paul Magloire [commander of the national palace
military househould], Levelt, and Lavaud, put Lescot under house arrest. At three
o’clock on the morning of 11 January, Élie Lescot and his family huddled in the back
of a police car drove to Bowen field, then boarded a waiting plane to Miami, becoming
the republic’s first exiled president since the occupation” (M. J. Smith 2009, 80-81).
The CEM justified the coup by saying Lescot was unable to form a new cabinet that
could include all parties to face the country’s “exceptionally tragic situation.” They
promised free elections, imposed censorship, and said the military would step down in
favor of whoever the people elected. “Wild demonstrations took place in the streets”
celebrating Lescot’s ouster (United Press 1946e). By January 13, order had been
restored after anti-Lescot celebrations led to some looting and property damage. A
curfew was imposed (Associated Press 1946d). Franck Lavaud, CEM chairman, be-
came provisional president until August 16, 1946, when Dumarsais Estimé was elected
president (Hall 2012, 156).
Coding rationale: Although demonstrators played a key role in the “Haitian revolu-
tion of 1946,” we disagree with Svolik that there was no military coup implicated in
the ouster of Lescot. Active military officers took concrete actions to oust the regime
leader. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code a successful regime
change coup. By contrast, CHISOLS codes no SOLS change.2
• # 41-1950-5-10: Haiti, Dumarsais Estimé
Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; successful military coup, popular re-
volt, and forced resignation - CCD; PT, Svolik, CSP, Singh, Luttwak, Thompson, and
Fossum code as a successful coup event. Archigos codes Estime as exiting on this date
by military actors without foreign support; GWF code a democracy (Haiti 46-50) from
1946 until collapsing this date in a military coup; EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in
Haiti since 1946 with the entire population being “Haitian.”
2. “The transition from Lescot to Lavaud is not coded as a SOLS change on account of the fact that this
junta was intended to be (and served as) a temporary government.
27
Event: Dumarsais Estimé, Haiti’s first black president, “encouraged social reforms and
promoted blacks to high official positions, which angered the mulatto elite” (Hall 2012,
168). “Dumarsais Estimé was anti-elitist and therefore regarded as anti-mulatto.”
Though initially enjoying broad support, he “alienated the elites by purging mulatto
officials from his administration and pursuing an agenda that encouraged labor unions
and forced people to pay income tax for the first time. Although Estime was a prac-
ticing Roman Catholic, he disturbed Catholics and the church with his endorsement
of voodoo. Finally, even some blacks deserted him, characterizing the regime as inef-
fectual” (Greene 2001, 285). In January 1950, elections created “a lower house in the
National Assembly wholly subservient to the president. With this support, on 3 April
Estimists pushed through a revision of provision 81 of the constitution that barred
reelection. The provision was unanimously approved in the Chamber of Deputies and,
given the color divisions in the Senate, was expected to have a similar hearing there as
well.” On April 18, to the surprise of the Estimé and many others, the Senate “voted
against the passage of the bill” on 18 April. Leading the opposing senators was Emile
St. Lôt.” The defeat of the bill “created a fierce three-week crisis that shattered the
hold of the noiristes on the state” as allegations of corruption erupted and debates
took on a “clear class bias” (M. J. Smith 2009, 144-145).
“President Estime had sought the support of the Garde by turning it into the Haitian
army, but when he attempted to amend the constitution in 1950 to prolong his pres-
idency” (Greene 2001, 285), the mulatto elite convinced Paul Magloire, the man who
led the 1946 coup that facilitated the elections that empowered Estimé four years prior,
to oust Estimé (Hall 2012, 168). “On 21 April, showing signs of increasing weakness,
Estimé requested that the United States ambassador approve a proposal he drafted for
a U.S. army mission to reorganize the Armée d’Haiti” in hopes that the U.S. would
“support him in the case of a coup d’état.” As Estimë lost support in Congress, “The
president realized that the survival of his regime lay in his ability to weaken the army
high command. He offered Major Prosper money and a political position if he incited
a sergeants’ revolt against Magloire. Recognizing Estimé’s desperation and the futility
of fighting the dominant Magloire, Prosper refused” (M. J. Smith 2009, 145). Magloire
then turned to Léon Bordes, who organized a pro-Estimé counter-demonstration on
May 6 which turned into a violent mob assault on the Senate. On May 8, a newly con-
fident Estimé “unconstitutionally dissolved the cabinet and the Senate” (146). That
night, a crowd of 30,000 lower-class Haitians and peasants gathered in support of the
president (ANP 1950a). On May 9, he announced a new cabinet and praised marchers
on the Senate as defenders of democracy (M. J. Smith 2009, 146).
In response, Magloire threatened to “resign his post in order to protect the senators.
Lavaud on the president’s orders prepared to arrest Magloire that evening. The in-
fluential police chief Prosper supported Magloire and threatened a violent retaliation
against his pro-Estimé colleagues if the orders were carried out. Summoned to a pri-
vate meeting at the Cassernes Dessalines, Lavaud and Levelt capitulated. A military
committee, formed for the protection of the senators, guarded the National Assem-
bly and reportedly uncovered lists of senators who were to be assassinated. Lavaud
personally went to the government printing office that night and stopped the printing
28
of the decree dissolving the senate.” By this point, Estimé pledged to withdraw his
proposal to extend his term, but by this point he had no support left (M. J. Smith
2009, 147).
On the morning of May 10, confronted with a military coup, and unsuccessfully asked
for the intervention of the U.S. and Mexican embassies to save his government. When
he was denied, “Estimé signed the resignation letter Lavaud had prepared for him.”
Thus was the noiriste or black nationalist democracy toppled (147). The junta dis-
solved parliament but issued a proclamation that it would “maintain democratic prac-
tices” (Associated Press 1950b). The army sent Estimé “to exile in Jamaica, with the
tacit support of the elite and little public opposition” (Greene 2001, 285). The junta,
which had presided over the transfer of power from Lescot to Estimé four years before,
called for new elections (285). Franck Lavaud, “once again chairman of the Military
Executive Committee, served as interim president from 10 May 1950 to 6 December
1950, when Magloire assumed the office of president” (Hall 2012, 156).
• # 41-1950-12-6: Haiti, Paul E. Magloire

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Paul
Magloire as leader from May 10, 1950, until December 12, 1956; citing an earlier
version of Archigos, Svolik codes Lavaud as leader from May 10, 1950, until exiting on
this date by a military coup; GWF code a personal regime (Haiti 50-56) from May 10,
1950, until December 12, 1956, which was led by Magloire.
Event: Paul Magloire, the organizer of the May coup (see 41-1950-5-10), resigned
from the ruling junta to run in the presidential elections. Magloire’s candidacy had
“the blessings of the military and the elite” (Greene 2001, 284) When elections were
held on October 8, 1950, the junta announced that Magloire won with 99 percent
of the vote, and announced a constitutional committee for November to draft a new
constitution before Magloire’s inauguration (Christian Science Monitor 1950). Paul
Magloire took office as president on December 6, 1950. After Magloire took office, he
appointed Lavaud as ambassador to France, while the third junta member, Colonel
Antoine Levelt, took over his position as army chief of staff (Spraggs 1950). Rather
than express dismay at his transfer abroad, Gen. Lavaud publicly “expressed his joy
at the return of constitutional government to Haiti” and his “great confidence” in
Magloire (ANP 1950b).
Coding rationale: There are two reasons for excluding this event as a coup. First, we
consider Paul Magloire to be the regime leader since May 10, 1950, with Gen. Lavaud
being the nominal executive. Second, we find no evidence that Lavaud was forcefully
removed from office or that Lavaud sought to block Magloire’s run for president prior
to the October 1950 elections. Based on the available evidence, we assume that the
transfer of power was both constitutional (or at least “regular”) and consensual, and
29
we therefore code this event as legal. Had we found any evidence that Magloire had
ousted Lavaud by force, we would have considered such an action an autogolpe carried
out against the nominal executive, not the regime leader.
• # 41-1956-12-12: Haiti, Paul E. Magloire

Category: protest
Other Datasets: successful coup, popular revolt, and forced resignation involving non-
governmental political actors, organized labor, and ordinary citizens - CCD; Forced
leadership change not considered coup détat (resignation of executive due to poor per-
formance/loss of legitimacy) - CSP; successful coup - PT; not a candidate - Singh;
Archigos codes Magloire as being removed on this date through “irregular” means by
domestic military actors without foreign support; Svolik codes Magloire’s exit on this
date by a military coup; GWF code the collapse of a personalist regime (Haiti 50-56)
on this date in a popular uprising.
Event: President Paul Magloire’s attempted autogolpe on December 6, 1950, exacer-
bated a political crisis over his desire to extend his term as president.3 By December
10, a general strike had brought Port-au-Prince to a near standstill (Paul P. Kennedy
1956). On the third day of the strike, December 12, Magloire resigned as the pro-
visional chief of state. In the same broadcast announcing the decision, Brig. Gen.
Levelt declared that Justice Pierre-Louis had accepted the provisional presidency, that
the army would follow his orders, and stated that the army staff had unanimously
decided in a conference to transfer power from Magloire to Pierre-Louis in light of the
worsening political crisis (New York Times 1956f).4 But with the strikers refusing to
quit until Magloire was removed from the army as well, the next day, December 13,
the radio announced that Army officers and enlisted men had demanded that Gen.
Magloire resign as commander of the army (Associated Press 1956g). Magloire then
flew into exile later that afternoon (Associated Press 1956i).
Coding rationale: According to news reports, the armed forces “requested” the depar-
ture of Magloire in order to prevent a rebellion and resolve the political crisis that
had surrounded his continuation in office beyond six years (Associated Press 1956i).
Although Levelt was clearly sympathetic to Magloire’s continuation in office, many
lower-ranking officers were loyal to either Duvalier or to Fignolé (M. J. Smith 2009).
Our interpretation of army actions in the crisis is that the army had initially supported
Magloire’s attempted autogolpe on December 6, but in the face of the general strike
withdrew support by December 12 (Associated Press 1956g).5 The main obstacle to
3. The constitution barring the president from succeeding himself was effectively suspended on December
6, thus allowing Magloire to continue in office beyond his constitutionally six-year term limit (Paul P.
Kennedy 1956).
4. In reality, the army appears to have been split. Fighting was reported on the 12th “between opposing
factions in the Casernes Dessalines, headquarters of the Palace Guard. The anti-Magloire group prepared
to attack the former President’s mansion in Turgeau, an exclusive residential section. The attack was called
off when the group was promised that General Magloire would leave the country” (New York Times 1956e).
5. Col. Paul Corvington, Director of the Haitian Military Academy since 1951, once a Magloire crony
as late as 1954, had by 1956 been drawn to the opposition, and just prior to Magloire’s resignation he was
30
Magloire’s continued rule after December 6 was the general strike. For Magloire to end
the strike, as Archigos notes (citing Heinl, Heinl, and Heinl (1996)), the army would
have to use force to restore order. The military, evidently, chose to remain quartered.
We interpret the military intervention here as more of a passive withdrawal of support
than an active seizure of power. Thus, a PT coding of “protest” seems appropriate6 ,
as would a coding of “No overt” since the army’s role in removing Magloire played
out behind the scenes. However, one could instead argue that the stage-managed
broadcast announcing Magloire’s resignation did constitute a concrete action by the
military ousting the regime leader.7
However, we do not view military actions on December 12 urging (or forcing) Magloire
to resign as unconstitutional. To the contrary, the army facilitated the constitutional
succession to Justice Pierre-Louis; the army did not seize power to install a military
regime or to pass power to an unconstitutional successor.8 Thus, siding with CSP
coding, we attribute Magloire’s ouster primarily to the general strike, and thus code
the event as a protest. Had we interpreted military intervention as unconstitutional,
we would have coded this a regime change coup, consistent with Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz (2014) coding. Although he himself was black, Gen. Magloire was the last
of a line of Haitian leaders to be “simply managed by the lighter-skinned [mulatto]”
elite (Ballard 1998, 32). Thus, Magloire’s ouster marked a change in the ethnic power
balance empowering the black majority.
• # 41-1957-2-3: Haiti, Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis

Category: legal
Other Datasets: no coup - CCD and CSP; legal - PT; Archigos codes Pierre-Louis as
the leader of Haiti from December 12, 1956, until this date, when he was removed
through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support. Svolik does not
code a leader in this period. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code a provisional
regime (Haiti 56-57) from December 13, 1956, until June 14, 1957; EPR codes ethnicity
as irrelevant since 1946.
“known to have stood up against Magloire” (U.S. State Department 1962, 24-25).
6. Trouillot (1990, 144), for example, emphasizes that Magloire was “forced out by a strike” in December
1956, not a military coup. Malik (2001, 368) similarly observes that after Magloire’s attempt to remain in
office, “labor leaders and thousands of other Haitians took to the streets and forced him to flee to Jamaica,
leaving the task of restoring order to the army.”
7. In subsequent presidential campaign speeches, Duvalier “praised the army for having liberated the
country from ‘a system of slavery’ instituted by Magloire” and pledged pay raises for the army’s lower ranks
(Nicholls 1996, 211). This implies that the army took concrete actions to oust Magloire. However, Duvalier’s
statements must be understood in the context of a candidate courting military support and seeking to assuage
military fears of reprisals.
8. According to a newly declassified report on the Haitian opposition (U.S. State Department 1962, 12),
during the crisis, Quartermaster General Léon Cantave had proposed a military junta led by himself and
Magloire’s choice for president in the 1957 elections, Clement Jumelle, then the Finance Minister. When
Jumelle took this proposal to Magloire, Cantave was placed under house arrest. Following Magloire’s ouster,
he was then promoted to brigadier general and made Chief of Staff, replacing Levelt, but his plan for a
military junta was not attempted at this time. In the April-May 1957 crisis, Cantave seized power briefly,
contravening his initial pledges to keep the army out of politics (Associated Press 1956f).
31
Event: After the ouster of Col. Paul Magloire in December 1956, Joseph Nemours
Pierre-Louis, chief justice of Haiti’s Supreme Court, became interim president and
was to preside over new elections initially set for April. However, “the anti-Magloire
factions, including seven rival candidates for the Presidency, wanted Pierre-Louis to
clean out what they called “Magloirism.” They pointed out that the Assembly was
dominated by Magloire men, that the election law was drafted in such a way as to favor
their return, and they demanded that Pierre-Louis take extra-Constitutional action to
get rid of both. Pierre-Louis refused” (New York Times 1957t). The anti-Magoire
campaign was also tied directly to the succession struggle. Opposition politicians
sought to target presidential candidate Clement Jumelle, who was Minister of Finance
under Magloire (New York Times 1957s).
On Friday, February 1, 1957, Mr. Pierre-Louis’s cabinet resigned (Associated Pres
1957). The president’s cabinet was made up largely of supporters of rival presidential
candidates Senator Louis Dejoie, a wealthy agriculturalist, and Dr. Francois Duvalier, a
physician (New York Times 1957s). Many suspected that Pierre-Louis “made a move
in favor of Jumelle by supporting the resignation of the provisional cabinet” (M. J.
Smith 2009, 175). On Sunday, February 3, Dejoie and Duvalier called for a general
strike the next day to force the resignation of Pierre-Louis. By 6 p.m. on February 3,
Pierre-Louis resigned, as announced in a broadcast at 10 p.m. by Charles Fombrun,
President of the Senate. That night, army leaders asked all the presidential candidates
to confer at Army headquarters. On the morning of February 4, the meeting adjourned
“after Senator Dejoie refused to attend and another candidate could not be reached.”
The general strike began on schedule, as news of Pierre-Louis’s resignation evidently
had not been made public. “After a conference with General Cantave, six candidates–
Dr. Duvalier, M. Jumelle, Franck Sylvain, Alfred Viau, Daniel Fignole and Julio
Jean Pierre Audain–signed a declaration” calling an end to the general strike while
they negotiated forming a temporary government (New York Times 1957s). Evidently,
“threat of a general strike” led Pierre-Louis to resign (New York Times 1957y).
Publicly, the army sought to appear neutral in who would succeed Pierre-Louis. “Under
Article 81 of the Constitution, a Presidential vacancy is to be filled by justices in order
of seniority,” but the “next two ranking justices–Rodolphe Barau and Lilio Vilgrain–
had taken ministers’ posts in the Cabinet which resigned last week. Justice Cineas
is fourth on the court ladder.” On the evening of February 4, Brig. Gen. Leon
Cantave, Army Chief of Staff, declared that “the Army was neutral and had no opinion
concerning Article 81,” contradicting an Army spokesman who earlier called the clause
obsolete. On the morning of February 5, hundreds of Duvalier and Fignole supporters
ran through the streets shouting “Down with Article 81!” and “Down with Dejoie!”
“At one point, the mob found General Cantave touring the city and members hoisted
him gleefully to their shoulders. This followed a broadcast in which the Chief of Staff
had promised that the Army would guarantee peace and security and safeguard the
people’s rights” (New York Times 1957y). On Wednesday, February 6, a mass protest
opposed the ascension of Cineas, as a special Parliamentary Commission studied the
question of Article 81 (Paul P. Kennedy 1957j). On Thursday, February 7, Franck
Sylvain assumed the office of Provisional President, following election at a joint session
32
of the Legislature. He was endorsed by five other presidential candidates (all but
Dejoie) (New York Times 1957aa). In return, Sylvain, an ex-judge, promised not
to run for a full term as president and vowed to be more aggressive in investigating
corruption of the Magloire regime (Paul P. Kennedy 1957e).
Coding rationale: We find no evidence that military actors, including chief of staff
Cantave, took any concrete action to force Pierre-Louis to resign. Instead, sources
seem to converge on the notion that the a general strike–of the kind that had ousted
Paul Magloire in December–forced Pierre-Louis to step aside voluntarily. As M. J.
Smith (2009, 175) put it, the “Déjoists succeeded in bringing business to a halt and
forcing Pierre-Louis’s resignation.” What’s more, neither Archigos nor Svolik code the
entry of Pierre-Louis’s provisional successor, Franck Sylvain, as either “irregular” or
unconstitutional. One could argue that Cineas was the constitutional successor, in
which case Sylvain’s election was “irregular.” Yet because the National Assembly took
these actions, this would constitute at most a “non-military coup.” Because Sylvain
was the consensus choice at the time, however, we defer to the Archigos and Svolik
coding of a legal transfer.
• # 41-1957-3-31: Haiti, Franck Sylvain

Category: failed autogolpe
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; autogolpe - PT; Archigos codes
Sylvain as the leader of Haiti from February 7, 1957 (entering by “regular” means),
until April 2, 1957, when he was removed through “irregular” means by military actors
without foreign support. Svolik similarly codes Sylvain as entering as a constitutional
interim leader (with military involvement) on February 7 and exiting on this date in
a military coup.Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code a provisional regime (Haiti
56-57) from December 13, 1956, until June 14, 1957.
Event: On March 19, 1957, provisional President Sylvain issued a broadcast reaffirming
his pledge that the elections then scheduled for April 28 would be free, and rejected
charges by Clement Jumelle that he “was using his position to influence the elections in
favor of Dr. François Duvalier” (New York Times 1957p). At night-long conference on
March 27, eight of Haiti’s nine presidential candidates demanded Sylvain “reorganize
the government.” On March 28, Sylvain “decreed the death penalty for subversive
activities” and announced that all the members of his cabinet would resign (Associated
Press 1957g). Sylvain then called for a political conference including all presidential
candidates, the Senate, all party leaders, and trade unions that demanded the cabinet’s
resignation. Sylvain “made it plain that he retained his right to veto any candidate
unsuitable to him” (New York Times 1957i).
On March 29, six presidential candidates called for the resignation of Sylvain’s cabinet
under threat of calling a general strike, claiming that all the current ministers favored
Duvalier as president. They said they would only agree to Sylvain’s political conference
after the cabinet had resigned; they also demanded that the voter registration that had
just begun be voided because it was being carried out by officials that were partial to
Duvalier (United Press 1957e). On the night of March 29, Sylvain dissolved the Senate
33
and the Chamber of Deputies, and ordered the arrest of Clement Jumelle on corruption
charges (New York Times 1957u). He also “attempted to arrest Fignolé, claiming that
his popular radio broadcasts were illegal” (M. J. Smith 2009, 176).
During the vicious presidential campaign, internal army cleavages widened: “Among
the lower-ranking officers there was a strong allegiance to Fignolé. The army superiors
for the most part supported Duvalier, whom they say as the most malleable of the
four. A minority of the milat officers backed Déjoie. Sylvain was pro-Duvlaier and
made it clear that Jumelle, Fignolé, and Déjoie would not have fair representation
in the caretaker cabinet he set up. For the next month, Sylvain and the army high
command barely managed to keep up a profile of neutrality as they systematically
worked to install the mechanism to ensure Duvalier’s victory. As tensions built in the
city, Sylvain revealed his true colors” on March 29 (176).
Coding rationale: We agree with the PT coding of Sylvain’s dismissal of Congress
as an autogolpe. However, the dating of the event is wrong. The dismissal actually
took place on the night of March 29, even though reports did not surface in U.S.
newspapers until March 31. Because Sylvain was ousted from office several days later
(see 41-1957-4-2), we code this as a failed autogolpe.
• # 41-1957-4-2: Haiti, Franck Sylvain

Category: successful provisional coup
Other Datasets: successful military coup and popular revolt - CCD; not a candidate -
CSP; successful coup - PT, Thompson; Archigos codes Sylvain as the leader of Haiti
from February 7, 1957 (entering by “regular” means), until this date, when he was
removed through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support. Svolik
similarly codes Sylvain as entering as a constitutional interim leader (with military
involvement) on February 7 and exiting on this date in a military coup. Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014) code a provisional regime (Haiti 56-57) from December 13,
1956, until June 14, 1957; EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Haiti since 1946 with
the entire population being “Haitian.”
Event: In the midst of Sylvain’s attempted autogolpe (see 41-1957-3-31), “His fatal
move was to use voter registration in the provinces as a means of instituting the
electoral machinery for a Duvalier victory. Not surprisingly, the Déjoie strongholds in
the south launched riots and Fignolé’s supporters in the capital followed suit. Along
the wharf, a popular movement to overthrow Sylvain was threatening to erupt. On 1
April, a Fignolé-Déjoie led strike brought Port-au-Prince to a standstill. When a cache
of homemade bombs and Molotov cocktails was uncovered the following day, Sylvain
was among several Duvalier sympathizers implicated. The embarrassing affair left the
chief of the army, Léon Cantave, with little choice but to force Sylvain’s resignation
on the grounds that he was an accessory to civil unrest” (M. J. Smith 2009, 176). On
April 2, after resigning, Sylvain was “being held under guard” under “palace arrest”
(New York Times 1957q). Cantave became provisional president until a replacement
was found (Paul P. Kennedy 1957h).
34
On April 6, Cantave relinquished power to the Executive Government Council (CEG)
(Hall 2012, 52). Given intractable partisan tensions, the army “determined the only
solution was to form a civilian governing committee, a Conseil Exécutif Gouvernement
(CEG) comprising thirteen representatives of the six principal candidates,” which was
entrusted with restoring stability and setting a new election date (which would have
to be postponed due to the fraudulent voter registration under Sylvain) (M. J. Smith
2009, 176-177). General Cantave, asked about whether the military had thoughts of a
military junta upon relinquishing power to the CEG, responded “The Army of Haiti
is formally determined to remain outside of all political activities” (Paul P. Kennedy
1957h).
Coding rationale: On April 2, 1957, Sylvain was overthrown in a military coup orches-
trated by Léon Cantave (Hall 2012, 246). Even though Cantave did not remain in office
for one week, his exit on April 6 appears voluntary and “regular,” if not constitutional
(per Article 51 of the 1950 constitution which had already been set aside), and not due
to a counter-coup. We therefore code this event as a successful and not failed coup
against the provisional regime, even though the event does not entail the collapse of
the provisional regime according to Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014).
• # 41-1957-5-20: Haiti, Executive council

Category: failed provisional coup
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR; successful military coup - BR;
successful military coup and popular revolt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP; successful
coup - PT and Singh; failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes the Executive
Council as the leader of Haiti from April 6, 1957, until this date, when it was removed
through “regular” means. Svolik codes the exit of the Executive Council on this date
through a military coup. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code a provisional regime
(Haiti 56-57) from December 13, 1956, until June 14, 1957; EPR codes ethnicity as
irrelevant in Haiti since 1946 with the entire population being “Haitian.”
Event: Just three weeks after the CEG took power, Duvalier withdrew his supporters
from the CEG and claimed the other candidates were plotting against his candidacy
(M. J. Smith 2009, 177-178). “Cantave then was asked to set up a military junta.
Instead, he asked the Supreme Court to rule on the Council’s legality and upheld the
court’s 5-to-2 opinion that the Council was the legal government” (McCarthy 1957).
The CEG continued without Duvalier’s supporters, which undermined its legitimacy.
After elections were set for June 16, Duvalier strongholds refused cooperation. Voter
registration was plagued by violence across the country. By mid-May, “it was clear
that Haiti was perilously descending into full-fledged anarchy.” A bloody battle on
Flag Day, May 18, “ended only when soldiers fired into a crowd carrying the blue and
red flag in front of the Cathedral” brought matters to a head (M. J. Smith 2009, 177-
178). On May 19, the CEG and Brig. General Cantave went to St. Marc, a stronghold
of Duvalier and Jumelle controlled by a rebel “committee of public safety,” as a test
of authority and lost. The CEG – backed by Dejoie and Fignole – was denied entry
but Cantave was not; the crowds cried “Long Live the Army” and “Down with the
35
Government” (Associated Press 1957e).
On May 20, the CEG – reportedly upset Cantave had refused to use its troops to
force entry into St. Marc the day before – ordered Cantave to give up his post as
army chief to Col. Pierre Armand, the Chief of Police. Cantave refused (Associated
Press 1957f). That night, Cantave broadcast a declaration dissolving the seven-man
CEG and imposing a curfew and press censorship. He also said he planned to call a
convention of delegates to name a new Provisional President to facilitate free elections
(Paul P. Kennedy 1957a; New York Times 1957f). Thus “Cantave resumed his position
as interim president on 20 May 1957” (Hall 2012, 52). The army takeover was bloodless
and without any shots fired; CEG members were released (Paul P. Kennedy 1957a).
“Since Cantave was among the members of the army hierarchy with leanings towards
the Duvalier camp, the move was read as a further attempt to block the democratic
process and secure a Duvalier presidency” (M. J. Smith 2009, 177-178). “Supporters of
the rival presidential candidates to Duvalier “responded emphatically to their leaders’
call for a general strike” (178), which shut down Port-au-Prince on May 21 (Paul P.
Kennedy 1957a). Meanwhile, Déjoie “capitalized on the divisions among soldiers and
garnered support from various allies in the army to support the appointment of police
chief Armand, who was also favored by the U.S. embassy as Cantave’s replacement.
Cantave, however, was unwilling to give up power. With the dissolution of the CEG
and the rivalry between Cantave and Armand, Haiti was literally without a government
or a unified military” (M. J. Smith 2009, 178).
On May 22, Cantave, though in de facto control after declaring martial law, said
he did not consider himself head of state and that he had no political ambitions.
Col. Pierre Armand and several other officers tried to resign in protest after Cantave
seized power (Paul P. Kennedy 1957d). However, because their was no government
to accept their resignation, their status was in doubt. By May 23, the strike had
crippled the economy; Cantave threatened action if stores did not reopen. He said
the next provisional president would be chosen by two delegates from each electoral
district (Paul P. Kennedy 1957g). On May 24, the CEG met and issued a communique
declaring General Cantave to be in “open rebellion against the state” (Paul P. Kennedy
1957c).
That night, Lt. Col. Pierre Armand, the police chief, who reportedly refused the army
chief post on May 20, changed his mind (Associated Press 1957c). Meanwhile, Col.
Pierre Vertus, in charge of the Palace Guard, reportedly negotiated with the CEG
over a formula for Cantave to step down but retain his pension (Paul P. Kennedy
1957i). Early on the morning of May 25, Radio Caribe broadcast appeals for the
public “to go to the public square Champ de Mars to witness a ceremony investing”
Lt. Colonel Armand as Army Chief of Staff. Lt. Col. Pierre Armand tried to seize army
headquarters. “It seemed virtually certain that Colonel Armand would immediately
reinstate” the CEG “if he were installed as Army Chief” (Paul P. Kennedy 1957i;
McCarthy 1957).
“Brig. Gen. Leon Cantave, surrounded by hundreds of soldiers at near-by Dessalines
Barracks, refused to give in. Port-au-Prince’s airport was closed, and Colonel Armand
36
was stationed there with a force of Coast Guardsmen armed with submachine guns and
rifles.” Cantave broadcast a call to troops in the provinces to oppose Armand’s forces
who took over Port-au-Prince. He accused Senator Dejoi of “‘plunging the country into
civil war.” Planes flew over Dessalines barracks dropping leaflets demanding Cantave
to leave the barracks and promising his safety if he did so (Associated Press 1957c).
Junior officers backing Armand “broadcast an ultimatum to Cantave calling for an
immediate end to his four-day-old military regime” (McCarthy 1957) and ordering
Pierre Virtus, the second-ranking officer in the Dessalines Barracks, to arrest Cantave,
though it is unknown if he attempted to do so (McCarthy 1957). In the battle outside
the Casernes Dessalines, “Over a dozen civilians were killed and scores fatally wounded
in the shooting. A contingent of Armand’s soldiers form the Air Force attacked the
Casernes and in one instance dropped a bomb (which miraculously did not detonate)
in the heavily crowded street adjacent to the Casernes.” Civilian partisan violence also
flared” (M. J. Smith 2009, 178).
The “three black candidates held an emergency meeting under heavy gunfire in the
Casernes that resulted in the official resignation of Cantave and Armand and the
appointment of General Antonio Kébreau, then making secret deals with Duvalier,
as the army’s new leader... The standoff between the army and civilian leadership
reached its climax on 25 May. It was the first of two crucial victories for Duvalier.
Déjoie’s desperate attempt to turn the tide of the campaign in favor of the bourgeoisie
was exposed by his participation in the bombing of the Casernes. That a member of
the elite was willing to resort to such measures and exploit an already fragile situation
discredited his campaign significantly. The alliance among the black candidates against
Armand and Déjoie brought the class issue out into the open.” But on May 25,
“Jumelle and Duvalier, acting on the advice of Emile St. Lôt, that “in the interest of
the country and the people,” ” agreed to make Daniel Fignolé provisional president”
(178-179).
On May 26, “Daniel Fignolé, the most popular political figure in the country, and the
only candidate with enough influence to stabilize the worsening situation, was sworn in
as provincial president of the republic” (178-179). Both General Cantave and Lt. Col.
Pierre Armand were present at Fignolé’s swearing-in ceremony. Fignolé was joined in a
coalition with Clement Jumelle and François Duvalier. Brig. Gen. Cantave submitted
his resignation as army chief of staff (McCarthy 1957). “It was virtually certain that
the decision to install M. Fignole was made with General Cantave’s consent. It was
reported that Colonel Armand had also agreed to the formula that broke the political
stalemate” (Paul P. Kennedy 1957b).
Coding rationale: Although General Cantave successfully ousted power from the Ex-
ecutive Council, he failed to keep power for at least seven days. See 41-1957-5-25 and
41-1957-5-26.
• # 41-1957-5-25: Haiti, Léon Cantave

Category: combined
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP, PT; suc-
37
cessful coup - Singh; Archigos codes Cantave as the leader of Haiti from May 20, 1957,
until this May 26, when he was removed through “irregular” means by military actors
without foreign support. Svolik codes Cantave as entering office through a military
coup on May 20 and exiting on May 26 through a revolt with military participation.
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code a provisional regime (Haiti 56-57) from De-
cember 13, 1956, until June 14, 1957.
Event: On the political-military crisis caused by Cantave’s seizure of power on May
20 and its resolution, see 41-1957-5-20. Cantave “relinquished power to Daniel Fignolé
on 25 May 1957 after a compromise was reached between civilian politicians in the
National Assembly and military officials” (Hall 2012, 52).
Coding rationale: Armand’s forces were current active members of the armed forces,
even if one were to argue that Armand had resigned on May 20 (though that resignation
apparently was not accepted). We do not code Armand’s attempt to oust Cantave as
an independent coup attempt because Armand’s counter-coup was designed to restore
the CEG. In the end, Fignole became the third provisional president, and Kebreau was
appointed chief of staff of the army. Though the CEG as a whole was not restored as a
result of the counter-coup (mainly because it was discredited by sponsoring a bombing
in the capital), an acceptable civilian was re-installed via negotiations. To the extent
that Cantave did not consider himself head of state but only army chief, one could also
plausibly argue that Haiti did not have a regime leader at this time, and Armand’s
targeting of Cantave qualifies as “not regime leader.” In any of these interpretations,
the event involving Armand-led military forces does not qualify as a coup attempt.
• # 41-1957-5-26: Haiti, Léon Cantave

Category: legal
Other Datasets: successful military coup and popular revolt - CCD; not a candidate -
CSP; legal - PT; Archigos codes Cantave as the leader of Haiti from May 20, 1957 until
this date, when he was removed through “irregular” means by military actors without
foreign support. Svolik does not code a leader in this period. Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz (2014) code a provisional regime (Haiti 56-57) from December 13, 1956, until
June 14, 1957.
Event: See 41-1957-5-25.
Coding rationale: Evidence does not indicate that military actors took concrete “ir-
regular” actions to bring Fignolé to power beyond those discussed previously. Rather,
on the brink of a civil war between the Cantave-Armand factions of the armed forces,
a political solution was found acceptable to key political elites. Whether one considers
this a non-military coup or legal transfer of power back to a civilian depends on one’s
interpretation of constitutionality. Because Fignole appears to have been a consensus
choice that could avert civil war, we consider Fignole’s entry as effectively “regular”
or legal transfer from the executive council to Fignole (interrupted by the military
interventions of Cantave and Armand in the intermediate five day period).
38
• # 41-1957-6-14: Haiti, Daniel Fignole
Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup - CSP, PT,
Singh, Luttwak, Thompson, and Fossum; Archigos codes Fignole as exiting on this
date through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support. Svolik
codes Fignole’s exit on this date due to a military coup. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
(2014) code a provisional regime (Haiti 56-57) from December 13, 1956, until June 14,
1957; EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Haiti since 1946 with the entire population
being “Haitian.”
Event: Daniel Fignolé, installed as provisional president on May 26 (see 41-1957-5-
20), distrusted the powerful leaders of the armed force and soon moved to neutralize
them so as to remain in office. “On 12 June, he attempted to weaken the military
by ordering the dismissal of police and the addition of three hundred civilians, all of
whom were his partisans. The palace guard troops were also disarmed and the lower
rank and file officers who were devoted to him were promoted to key posts. These
orders created a serious problem between him and the new Chief of Staff of the Army,
[Antonio] Kébreau. Fignole’s obvious plan was to reduce the threat of the army by
undermining its leadership. What he did not know was that the army leaders, with
U.S. knowledge, were already plotting to remove him from office. Two days later the
plan was executed” (M. J. Smith 2009, 180-181).
“Kébreau gave the pro-Fignolé lower-ranking officers the night off, making sure they
were disarmed before leaving the barracks. At an emergency cabinet meeting, a small
contingent of army officers broke into the president’s chambers, kidnapped Fignolé,
forced him at gunpoint to sign a resignation letter, and rushed him into a waiting car,
sending him into what would become a thirty-year exile. The army high command gave
as the reason for the overthrow Fignolé’s intention to take advantage of his position
and weaken the army” (181). At 10:30 a.m. on June 14, General Kebreau announced
from the Dessalines Barracks that the army had taken power. A three-man junta,
lead by Kebreau and also including Col. Emile Zamor and Col. Adrien Valculle, was
formed. The army declared a state of emergency and arrested Fignolé supporters. An
all-military cabinet was named (New York Times 1957r). Army repression of protests
by Fignolé’s supporters over the next few days left at least 50 dead (New York Times
1957b) and hundreds wounded (Paul P. Kennedy 1957f). From New York, Fignolé said
supporters of François Duvalier engineered his ouster (New York Times 1957b).
Haiti “lapsed into a state of controlled terror. A reunified army was again at the helm
under a three-man junta, the Conseil Militaire de Gourvernement (CMG) headed by
Kébreau... Although Kébreau wavered, there was little chance that any other civilian
candidate was able to challenge Duvalier after mid-June. He had the support, no
matter how uncertain, of the army” (M. J. Smith 2009, 181). Duvalier was elected in
September 1957.
event a successful against the provisional regime, marking a return to autocratic rule.
39
• # 41-1958-7-29: Haiti, François Duvalier
Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; failed military coup attempt - CCD; failed
coup attempt - CSP; invasion - PT; not a candidate - Singh; Archigos codes François
Duvalier as the leader of Haiti from October 15, 1957 to April 2, 1971. GWF code a
personal regime (Haiti 57-86) from June 14, 1957, until February 7, 1986, which was
led by François Duvalier until 1971.
Event: On the night of July 28-29, 1958, a small invasion force of eight men led by
former army Captains Alix Pasquet, Philippe Dominique, and Lt. Henri Perpignan
sailed from Florida onboard a small yacht, the Molly C, and landed at Montrouis forty
miles northwest of Port-au-Prince (Girard 2010, 101). “After a few short skirmishes
with soldiers that guarded a few posts at the entrance of Port-au-Prince, they stole
a top-top” (Dumay 2011, 39). The stolen army jeep “quickly broke down. Switching
to one Haiti’s brightly painted buses, the invaders reached the capital’s main barracks
in the middle of the night; the guards were so surprised by the colorful equipage that
they let Pasquet in and soon found themselves his prisoners” (Girard 2010, 101). Just
after midnight, Pasquet and 7 armed men seized the Dessalines army barracks (Dumay
2011, 39), after killing two guards at the gate and taking the remaining forty men on
duty prisoners (New York Times 1958h). Five American citizens had been hired to
escort the rebels in what media called a coup attempt. The five Americans were former
Dade County deputy sheriffs Arthur Payne and Danny Edward Jones as well as Robert
Francis Hickey of Miami and Joseph Daniel Walker and Levant Kersten of Buffalo, NY
(Paul P. Kennedy 1958).
“From the office of the commander, Captain Pasket placed numerous phone calls to
different military commanders in Port-au-prince seeking their support, which he antic-
ipated before his invasion. Nonetheless, he miscalculated. He did not get the support
that he thought he was going to receive.” In calls to the president’s office, he allegedly
bluffed that he was in control of 800 troops. “Although one of his close Aids, the
Colonel Gracia Jacques, reportedly convinced him to stay, the president was panicked
and was about to seek asylum in a nearby embassy. Duvalier feared death in a poten-
tial revolution.” Rumor has it that Duvalier only discovered the small size of the rebel
force after Perpignan, who was dying for a cigarette, asked a sentry to go buy him a
pack. Instead, the chauffeur to Duvalier’s wife Madam Simone rushed to the president
to denounce the invaders (Dumay 2011, 39-40). At 5:30 a.m., the palace garrison led
by President Duvalier and Brig. Gen. Maurice Flambert counter-attacked; by 9:20
a.m., all of the rebels were killed (New York Times 1958h).
On July 30, a dozen former army officers were taken into custody (New York Times
1958h). At the end of August, police killed Ducasse Jumelle, Interior Minister under
Paul Magloire, and his brother Charles in a gunfight; the two men were wanted for
alleged complicity in the July 29 uprising (New York Times 1958j). Following this
event, Duvalier moved to assert control over the army. “The decree of 4 August 1958
reiterated not only that the appointed head of the army serves at the pleasure of
40
the president but also that the president is the effective chief of the army” (Laguerre
1993, 107). “The decree of 9 January 1959 restructured the leadership of the army,
undermined the authority of the chief of the general staff, incorporated the heads of
the military services as part of the leadership of the army, maintained administrative
centralization and decreased leadership centralization. This decree provided the piv-
otal basis for weakening the power of the army, created competitive units with which
the government deal on a one-on-one basis with army, and hindered the ability of the
general staff to concoct safely any successful coup détat” (108). “After surviving a mil-
itary coup attempt in 1958, [Duvalier] created the Tonton Macoutes to crush political
opposition” in July 1959 (Hall 2012, 89). A presidential guard was created by decree
on December 17, 1959, loyal exclusively to Duvalier (Laguerre 1993, 111).
Coding rationale: Deputy President M. Blanchet said the three ex-Haitian army in-
vaders had been trusted officers of the Magloire regime. Both Alix Pasquet and his
brother-in-law Philippe Dominique had been living in exile in Miami since December
1957. A Haitian official said both men had been arrested for an attempted coup in
favor of the defeated presidential candidate Louis Déjoie on May 25, 1957, but were
later freed in an amnesty. Payne had also been expelled from Haiti in May 1957 on
charges of being an intermediary between Pasquet and army officers in Haiti plotting on
behalf of Déjoie. The Haitian government accused Magloire and Déjoie of sponsoring
the invasion in concert with communist elements, but both men denied the allegations
(New York Times 1958i). Since we found no evidence that any current active members
of the military participated in the invasion, we code this as a case of prior defection.

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes François
Duvalier as the leader of Haiti from October 15, 1957, until April 22, 1971; GWF code
a personal regime (Haiti 57-86) from June 14, 1957, until February 7, 1986.
Event: On July 20, 1962, Marine Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., an advisor to Haiti’s
military, wrote a confidential memo to the Haitian army chief of staff, Gen. Jean René
Boucicaut. The memo called for the dissolution of the Civil Militia (colloquially known
as the Ton Ton Macoutes) since it had subordinated the army. As Heinl’s memo secretly
spread, a potential crisis brewed as Boucicaut, Duvalier’s godson, allegedly “sounded
out his fellow officers for support in establishing the proper position of the army, or
even overthrowing the president” (Ives 1962). In early August 1962, “signs that a coup
to overthrow Duvalier might be at hand set off a policy debate in Washington.” On
August 2, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Thurston “cabled that a pro-American group of
Haitian military and civilian officials represented the “most comprehensive and effective
challenge to Duvalier that has come to our attention.” Although both State and the
CIA agreed that Thurston had probably exaggerated the capabilities of this group,
the agencies disagreed over what to about it.” The CIA’s deputy director for plans,
Richard Helms, believed there was little the U.S. could do to assist anti-Duvalier groups
in the short run, whereas Edwin Martin of the State Department sought more CIA
41
involvement. Before President Kennedy could meet with his advisors on the issue, the
nascent internal opposition to Duvalier was thwarted (Naftali, Zelikow, and May 2001,
289).
On August 8, 1962, Duvalier “foiled a coup attempt” by Boucicaut (289). Boucicaut
met with Duvalier at the palace, then immediately went “to gather his wife and four
children” to flee (Ives 1962). “Within hours of reporting his intentions to Colonel
Robert Heinl, the head of the U.S. Naval Mission in the Haitian capital of Port-au-
Prince, Boucicaut had sought asylum at the Venezuelan Embassy. For the State De-
partment this was especially ominous news. Boucicaut had been considered Duvalier’s
most serious opponent” (Naftali, Zelikow, and May 2001, 289-290). “The general’s
action reflected increased military concern about the growing strength of their Tonton
Macoute rivals. Duvalier called all members of the Tonton Macoute to the capital to
defend his palace, and the embassy asked for fleet units to be available for evacuation
purposes. But, to the disappointment of opposition leaders, there was no follow-up by
the army” (Martin 1981, 67). Officially, Boucicaut’s was said to had retired after 25
years of service and was being replaced by Col. Gerard Constant, the army quarter-
master (New York Times 1962j).
Coding rationale: No prior major coup datasets code this event as a coup attempt.
However, we consider it because some of our historical sources make reference to it.
Boucicaut had been army chief of staff since only September 1961 (Avril 1999, 64), and
until then had been believed to be a “quiet, pro-Duvalier career officer” (New York
Times 1962j). In the event, we find no event that any concrete actions by Boucicaut or
other plotters were ever taken. We therefore code this event as at most a preempted
coup plot.

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR (June 1963); not a candidate -
CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes François Duvalier as the leader of Haiti
from October 15, 1957, until April 22, 1971; GWF code a personal regime (Haiti 57-
86) from June 14, 1957, until February 7, 1986.
Event: In mid-1962, U.S. Marine Colonel Heinl and the CIA station chief began to reach
out to senior officers with offers of help in staging a coup against President François
Duvalier. General Gerard Constant, who had been made army chief of staff in August
1962, rejected U.S. entreaties. Other officers, all formerly Duvalierists who had since
become disillusioned, did begin plotting a coup, believing they had would be able to
secure U.S. arms. In early April 1963, some of these plotters tried to recruit General
Contstant for a coup planned for April 11. He refused. On April 10, the plot fell
apart when the plotters realized they could not gain weapons from the U.S. Embassy.
They asked for a key from the Dessalines barracks; word quickly got back to Duvalier;
several ringleaders fled to the Brazilian embassy. Duvalier thereupon committed to an
army purge (Abbott 2011).
42
On Friday, April 26, 1963, unknown assailants – believed to have been led by former
Tonton Macoutes leader Clement Barbot – attempted to kidnap François Duvalier’s two
teenage children. “They shot and killed four of the children’s bodyguards.” The attack
set off a wave of repression and violence (Tad Szulc 1963c). On Tuesday, April 30, a
30 minute gunfight and bombing in the Beau Bouef section of the capital occurred as
loyal militiamen and a Barbot group fought, leaving at least 12 wounded. That attack
prompted Duvalier to impose martial law in Port-au-Prince on the night of May 2 (Eder
1963f, 1963a). On May 5, Barbot’s family fled to refuge in the Argentine embassy as a
manhunt was underway (Eder 1963d). On May 20, prior to ceremonies marking a new
presidential term for Duvalier, the capital was rocked by a series of bombings believed
to have been orchestrated by Barbot (Tad Szulc 1963a). In an interview with U.S.
journalists from a hideout, Barbot expressed confidence he would kill and overthrow
Duvalier and that many in the army secretly sided with him. If successeful, he promised
to hold elections within six months and to stand as a candidate if the people wanted
it (Associated Press 1963b). On July 14, Clement Barbot, his brother Harry, and an
accomplice named Seguin Cantave were reportedly killed in a clash with militiamen
(United Press International 1963d).
Coding rationale: Regardless of when one dates the exact events in question between
April 26 and July 14, there is no evidence that current and active members of the
military had participated in Barbot’s attacks. Because Barbot had defected from the
regime at a prior date, we code this event as a case of prior defection.

- Luttwak; Archigos codes François Duvalier as the leader of Haiti from October 15,
1957, until April 22, 1971; GWF code a personal regime (Haiti 57-86) from June 14,
1957, until February 7, 1986.
Event: On the morning of August 5, 1963, about 250 “exiled Haitian army officers and
soldiers” led by Gen. Leon Cantave landed in the Bay of Liberté in northern Haiti and
took Fort Liberté, Derac, and Phaeton, a spokesmen for the rebel force said. Radio
broadcasts in Cap Haı̈tien appealed to supporters of President Duvalier to repel the
invading force. The invaders evidently sought to seize on unrest after Duvalier “ignored
the May 15 expiration date of his six-year term in office” (New York Times 1963d).
By August 6, the exile force led by Gen. Leon Cantave were believed to have been
heading southwest and had met little or no resistance, while Duvalier was reported to
be “concentrating his force in the capital and is not being lured out to fight in the
north” (New York Times 1963c). By August 7, however, Haiti announced that the
invasion force had been dispersed, several rebels were killed or captured, while most
of the rebels, including Cantave, fled to the Dominican Republic (Raymont 1963a).
The rebel force never reached the capital, which was unaffected by the invasion (Eder
1963b).
Renewed fighting with rebels was reported in a border town on August 16 (New York
43
Times 1963g). On August 17, Haitian units attacked a rebel stronghold in the moun-
tains near the border with the Dominican Republic (Eder 1963h). On August 18,
Haiti reported a second rebel invasion attempt (Raymont 1963b), which was expelled
by August 24 (Eder 1963e). On September 22, 1963, Léon Cantave launched a final
attack on the regime of Fançois Duvalier “with weapons provided by the United States.
His attack on the border town of Ounaminthe, however, was stymied by forces loyal to
Duvalier” (Hall 2012, 52).
a coup, which he codes the main party as an “armed political faction.” However, there
is no evidence that current, active members of the military were part of the invading
force or complicit in the invasion. Gen. Cantave had been chief of Haiti’s army in
December 1956, but resigned in May 1957 and briefly was provisional president before
going into exile in 1957 after Duvalier came to power. Prior to this event, he had
been in exile in Lebanon, the Congo, and finally New York (New York Times 1963f).
Other leaders of the rebel force were reported to be Pierre Rigaud and Col. René
Leon, the latter known for leading resistance to a Cuban invasion force in 1960 but
who fled Haiti in April 1963 (New York Times 1963d). “Many of General Cantave’s
officers were recently exiled Haitian army officers. They were living in the Dominican
Republic until 48 hours before the invasion” (New York Times 1963c). Though the
invaders reportedly had “been picking up Haitian army deserters as reinforcements,”
such deserters would not constitute participation of the current, active military (New
York Times 1963c). Based on this evidence, we therefore code this event as a case of
prior defection.

Other Datasets: rebel coup attempt - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP; not a candidate
- PT and Singh; Archigos codes François Duvalier as the leader of Haiti from October
15, 1957 to April 2, 1971. GWF code a personal regime (Haiti 57-86) from June 14,
1957, until February 7, 1986.
Event: According to Kurlansky (2005, 255), on Monday, May 20, 1968, “the eighth
coup d’état attempt against Dr. Duvalier began with a B-25 flying over the capital,
Port-au-Prince, and dropping an explosive, which blew one more hold in an eroded
road. Then a package of leaflets was dropped, which did not scatter because the
invaders had not untied the bundle before dropping it. Then another explosive was
dropped in the direction of the gleaming white National Palace, but it failed to explode.
Port-au-Prince supposedly thus secured, the invasion began in the northern city of Cap
Haitien, where a Cessna landed with men opening tommy-gun fire at the unmanned
control tower.” Evidently, the invaders had the element of surprise, initially encounter-
ing no government resistance. According to Le Nouveau Monde, the invaders started
along the road from the airport toward Cap-Haitien, and encountered a car containing
Lieut. Col. Prosper Mora, the military commandant of the Northern Department, an
orderly, and Jean Théard, the Haitian Vice Consul in Miami. Not aware of anything
44
was going on, the invaders took Mora prisoner and killed the other passengers. Later
in the day, two military companies, a coast guard boat, and a Tonton Macoute leader
Zacharie Delva were dispatched to the area to surround and shell the invaders and
prevent an uprising by the population (Giniger 1968e). By May 22, the government
had killed 10 and captured 16 of the 35 invaders, while the remainder fled to the hills
(Associated Press 1968e). On May 23, government troops “mopped up” the remnants
of the invasion force in a village 25 miles east of Cap-Haitien (Giniger 1968d).
On May 21, Haitian ambassador Arthur Bonhomme reported that Duvalier had iden-
tified one of the invaders as Raymond Montreuil, a nephew by marriage to former
Haitian president Paul E. Magloire, then living in New York. Duvalier also identified
Raymond Cassagnol, another anti-Duvalier exile who had been living in the United
States (Welles 1968b). By May 22, Haiti called for a U.N. Security Council meeting
on the invasion threat and blamed the Haitian Coalition based in New York City with
fomenting the invasion. Raymond Joseph, secretary general of the Haitian Coalition,
acknowledged his organization knew of the invasion but said it had not directed it.
Raymond also ridiculed Haitian reports that Cassagnol, a former Haitian Air Force
officer, was among the invaders since he was in Washington (J. d. Onis 1968b). The
government claimed that Montreuil, Cassagnol, and four American pilots deserted by
plane when the invasion attempt faltered (Giniger 1968e). They also accused the U.S.
of complicity, noting that one of the three planes used in the invasion, a World War II
B-25, had taken off from Melbourne, Florida (New York Times 1968b).
In June, the ten surviving invaders, all from the lower class, were put on trial before a
military tribunal. However, Duvalier insisted that they were not the “real guilty par-
ties” but instead pinned the blame on an elite conspiracy (Giniger 1968a). On August
7, the ten invaders were sentenced to death, but Duvalier extended them executive
clemency the next day because the men “were just dupes or tools of evil, antipatriotic
people” (Associated Press 1968d).9 Meanwhile, Duvalier arrested a number of high-
profile industrialists and a British subject. Observers saw the arrests as an effort to
“shake down” Haiti’s business class for cash, punish a group seen as sympathetic to the
Haitian Coalition, and frame the invasion as a product of British and U.S. imperialism
(Giniger 1968b, 1968c; New York Times 1968c).10
Coding rationale: We find no evidence of military involvement in planning or execut-
9. The ten men were identified as Jean Eland, Raymond Toussaint, Gérard Pierre, Lebrun Leblanc,
Maurice Ambroise Magloire, Wesley Jean Dens, Wesley Lamant, Joe Elan, Carnot Henri, and Philippe
Briette (Reuters 1968a).
10. On June 20, military police arrested two men, Oswald Brandt (76) and his son Clifford Brandt (44), for
allegedly financing the invasion with $150,000 to exiles in New York and Montreal. The two men, who denied
the allegations, were Jamaica’s Consul and Vice Consul in Haiti, with the elder an industrialist who amassed
a fortune in textiles, sugar, and vegetable oils throughout the Caribbean and had significant interests in
Haiti (Associated Press 1968g, 1968h). The authorities also arrested George and Jean Claude Leger, lawyers
who represented most of the major American interests in Haiti (Giniger 1968b, 1968c), as well as Donald
Lungwitz, a plantation owner (New York Times 1968c). In August, David Knox, director of Government
information in the Bahamas, was convicted on espionage charges and helping plan the invasion (Reuters
1968c; Associated Press 1968f), but in September his death sentence was commuted and he was released to
Britain (United Press International 1968b).
45
ing the invasion by Haitian exiles. During the invasion, there was no sign Duvalier
“had lost control of the military or political situation throughout the country” (Welles
1968a). The only mention of military personnel being involved was that of Cassagnol,
a former Haitian Air Force officer, whose involvement was put in doubt and who in
any case was a prior defector, not a current member of the military. Marshall and
Marshall (2018) describes the coup as an “invasion by exile group.” Duvalier had said
this was the eighth invasion in the eleven years of his rule (Associated Press 1968c). We
assume all these prior invasion attempts similarly did not involve current military men,
and thus would not characterize this event, as some do, as the “eighth coup attempt”
against Duvalier.

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR; failed military coup involving mil-
itary actors and ordinary citizens - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP and PT; not a
candidate - Singh; Archigos codes François Duvalier as the leader of Haiti from Octo-
ber 15, 1957 to April 2, 1971. GWF code a personal regime (Haiti 57-86) from June
14, 1957, until February 7, 1986. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Haiti since 1946
with the entire population being “Haitian.”
Event: Starting just before noon on Friday, April 24, 1970, three Coast Guard cutters
led by Colonel Octave Cayard – the Coast Guard Commander since 1963 (Horne 1970)
– began sporadically shelling the National Palace in Port-au-Prince. The ships repre-
sented all the operable ships in Haiti’s Coast Guard of five ships; Haiti had no navy.
The shelling continued until the morning of April 25. Two people were reportedly killed
and 34 injured by the shelling that blew out some windows and scarred the façade of
the palace (Associated Press 1970c). After failing to incite a larger rebellion against
François Duvalier and with scores of arrests being made of rebel family members, the
three ships with 118 crewmen sailed to Guantanamo Naval Base on April 26 (New
York Times 1970a). All but one of the crewmen sought and obtained asylum in the
United States.
The coup’s timing appears to have been driven at least in part by fears by Cayard that
he and his military friends would soon be eliminated. Earlier in April 1970, over 60
regime elites were detained or questioned on suspicion of a military-civilian plot led by
Col. Kesener Blain, the Haitian Army Quartermaster (R. M. Smith 1970). On April 20,
two of Cayard’s men in the Coast Guard were summoned to the Dessalines Barracks to
answer to a Commission of Inquiry into the plot. As their commander, Cayard feared
that he would be connected to the plot and decided to rebel. In a radio speech on
April 26, Duvalier decried the shelling as part of a communist plot (Associated Press
1970c). The allegations of communist involvement were not credible, however, given
Duvalier often tried to tarnish all opponents with the communist label, and especially
in this case given that Colonel Cayard was also known to be a “well-to-do” dairy farmer
(News Wire 1970). After going into exile, Cayard tried to appeal to the OAS to aid
the anti-Duvalier forces and restore democracy in Haiti (Cayard 1971).
46
Coding rationale: A White House assessment noted that “Cayard has been a politically
ambitious officer and was involved in contingency planning last summer to take control
of the Government when Duvalier was incapacitated by a heart attack” (Vaky 1970).
Some of the contemporaneous news reporting noted that Cayard had been decorated
by Duvalier the previous year for putting down another coup attempt (News Wire
1970). Others claimed the Duvalier and Cayard were close friends, which might imply
a defensive reshuffling motive by a regime insider.
We code this case as a regime change coup attempt because the apparent leader of
the coup, Colonel Octave Cayard, was a relatively junior officer from a branch of the
military (the Coast Guard, later named as the Navy) that was completely sidelined
by the Duvalier regime. Prior branch military commanders had been exiled (see, e.g.,
41-1962-8-8); the most powerful security forces of the regime were outside of the formal
military command structure;11 and François Duvalier had destroyed the independent
organizational capacity of the formal military (Delince 1979, 89-93). Further, when
the Duvalier regime fell in 1986, a military officer became the de facto head of state,
marking a regime transition in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Together, we use
this evidence to assume that had Cayard succeeded in his coup attempt, the new
government would have excluded the Duvalier family and thus changed the group from
which leaders could be selected, which would indicate a regime change.
• # 41-1986-2-7: Haiti, Jean-Claude Duvalier

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; popular revolt involving ordinary cit-
izens - CCD; forced leadership change not considered coup détat (resignation of ex-
ecutive due to poor performance/loss of legitimacy) - CSP; successful coup - PT; not
a candidate - Singh; Archigos codes Duvalier as being removed on this date through
“irregular” means domestic military actors without foreign support. Svolik codes the
exit of Jean-Claude Duvalier on this date by revolt. GWF code the collapse of a per-
sonalist regime (Haiti 57-86) from 1957 on this date in a popular uprising. EPR codes
ethnicity as irrelevant in Haiti since 1946 with the entire population being “Haitian.”
Event: In November 1985, troops opened fire and killed a number of high school stu-
dents who had joined food riots in Gonaı̈ves. “This was the match which ignited
protests throughout the provinces. The demonstrations became explicitly political
and called for the downfall of Duvalier, urging the army to take over; banners pro-
11. A 1977 U.S. embassy assessment of the Haitian security forces states that “[t]he Army is the largest
element with approximately 5,800 men. The Navy has a strength of about 400 men and the Air Corps
consists of a 200 man force... Each of the special departments takes orders direct from the President and
they are considered the most powerful of Haitian forces. Of these departments, the Presidential Guard is the
most influential. It is responsible for the personal protection of the President and senior members holding
key positions in all other major commands including the General Staff” (E. W. Brooke 1977, 35). The
regular military units (i.e. not special security departments) were “so atomized, so ill equipped and so ill
trained, that they are considered impotent as a fighting force.” By comparison the private militia of the
President, the Tonton Macoutes (later renamed the VSN under Jean-Claude Duvalier) was “the National
Security Volunteers (VSN), a force of some 5,000 to 7,000 irregulars.”
47
claimed ‘Vive l’armée’ ” (Nicholls 1986, 1244). The Catholic Church condemned the
killings, and it’s Radio Soleil became a principal channel for criticizing the government
and spreading news of the provincial demonstrations (1245). The provincial cities of
Gonaı̈ves and Petit-Goâe became centers of a national revolt (Bellegarde-Smith 2013,
283). This movement, which led to Duvalier’s flight in February 1986, “originated
in the peasantry and provincial centers with little visible support from other social
groups or foreign governments” (275). By the end of January, demonstrations spread
to Duvalier’s stronghold in Port-au-Prince as well.
At this point, the U.S. government privately “petitioned Duvalier to abandon the
Haitian presidency. Unwilling to offer Duvalier asylum, the U.S. government offered
to facilitate Duvalier’s flight into exile in France” (Hall 2012, 91). Publicly, the U.S.
announced a suspension of $26 million in scheduled aid on January 29 to protest Du-
valier’s repression of popular protests. Beginning on Sunday, February 2, negotiations
with the U.S. on Duvalier’s exile were conducted quietly through the Jamaican prime
minister, Edward Seaga (Gwertzman 1986). According to diplomatic sources, televised
comments by Secretary of State George Schultz on Monday, February 3, convinced Du-
valier the U.S. wanted him out of power and would not support him. According to a
Haitian official that was with Duvalier, he was also shaken by the abduction of six nuns
by the Ton-Ton Macoutes on Wednesday, February 5, which he saw as indicating that
“he could not remain as president for life without ugly repression that would blacken
his name in history.” According to these sources, Duvalier asked for asylum in France
and transportation from the U.S. on the afternoon of Thursday, February 6. In this
version, only then a palace official “reminded Duvalier that he should also provide some
sort of authority after his departure. According to an involved informant, the dictator
at that point sat down at a desk and, with a pen, began a list of those he wanted on
the ruling council that would follow him. Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy...was first on the
list” (Cody 1986b).
However, alternate accounts indicate that the military in fact took concrete actions
to oust Duvalier. Snyder (1992, 389) reports that as popular pressure mounted, army
officers led by army chief-of-staff Namphy “began sounding out fellow officers, so that
a core of key men could be counted on to assist in a bloodless ouster and not take
up arms in final defense of the President.” Meanwhile, “The U.S. helped the military
conspirators by promising concessions to those who assisted in the dictator’s removal.
General Namphy and his coconspirators used this U.S. guarantee as a bargaining chip
to persuade the Macoutes’ leadership to abandon Jean-Claude” (390). This evidence,
by itself, only indicates that Namphy and the army chose to remain quartered rather
than join repression of protests, which would support Svolik’s coding of exit by revolt.
However, some sources indicate Duvalier’s decision to go into exile was not voluntary:
“At this point, the military conspirators took direct action. Namphy, Regala, and
others confronted the Duvaliers and demanded their departure” (Greene 2001). The
account of Heinl, Heinl, and Heinl (1996, 701) of a confrontation at the National Palace
is as follows: “Namphy and Regala showed their hand to the Duvaliers in the president’s
office. As the outlines of what had really taken place became clear, Michèlle Bennet
began to scream hysterically. Here was a moment of supreme danger. The Palace was
48
full of macoutes still unaware of the drama that was unfolding. Prosper Avril, restored
to the Army and promoted to full Colonel only the week before, delivered a stunning
left hook to the First lady, temporarily knocking her out. The time for niceties was
over. As Michelle Duvalier came to, whimpering, arrangements for the transfer of
power were quickly finalized.”
“Left with no bases of support, Jean-Claude consented. After hastily naming a Na-
tional Council of Government (Conseil National de Gouvernement–CNG) made up
of Namphy, Regala, and three civilians, Jean-Claude and Michèle Duvalier departed
from Haiti on February 7, 1986” (Greene 2001). That morning, the public learned of
Duvalier’s departure in a videotaped message, after which was broadcast the national
anthem and a communique from Lt. Gen. Namphy announcing that a junta had taken
over power. Namphy said he “had acted with Haiti nearly paralyzed and the “specter
of civil war rising” (Treaster 1986). Nevertheless, within hours, the junta suspended
the constitution (which had named Duvalier president for life), “dissolved the legisla-
ture and asserted the right to rule by decree” in order to restore public order (Cody
1986a).
Coding rationale: In retrospect, all sources appear to agree that the fundamental
causes of Duvalier’s flight were “political turmoil and the loss of U.S. support” (Hall
2012, 91). The exact role of military intervention in this case has been debated. Ac-
cording to Nicholls (1986, 1247-1258), even though “the army was manifestly the only
body which could assume the government of the country,” it was initially unwilling
to do so. “Despite the drift towards disorder in January 1986, the army leaders were
clearly unwilling to act independently to take over the country...General Namphy’s
eventual agreement to head a junta was the result of persuasion by the US Embassy,
by some Haitian politicians and by Jean-Claude Duvalier himself.” Meanwhile disil-
lusionment had grown among the tonton macoutes by November 1985, when many in
the Volontaires de la Securité Nationale (VSN) resented the dismissal of the Minister
of the Interior Roger Lafontant. As a result, the VSN did little to defend Duvalier
prior to his flight (1248). Although there were no overt moves by the military to oust
Duvalier, there may have been covert moves.
As in the removal of Magloire in 1956 (see 41-1956-12-12), protests played a key role in
Duvalier’s exit, and a case can be made that a PT coding of “Protest” or “No overt”
could be warranted given that the army intervention took place behind the scenes.
Aksoy, Carter, and Wright (2015) code Duvalier as being ousted by regime outsiders
when he fled amidst popular protests, but note that this “could possibly be coded as
a coup by Namphy.” According to our definition, a coding of protests and a military
coup are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the protesters were calling for a military coup!
We agree with Archigos that Namphy and the army participated in Duvalier’s ouster
even if it looked like Duvalier resigned due to public protest on the surface. Unlike
Magloire’s ouster, Duvalier’s exile did not lead to power being passed to a constitutional
successor, but to a military junta. Thus, we code this as a successful regime change
coup d’état excluding Duvalier from the ruling coalition. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 41-1988-6-17: Haiti, Henry Namphy
49
Category: failed reshuffling coup attempt
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes
Manigat as exiting on June 6, 1988 by military actors without foreign support; GWF
code a military regime (Haiti 86-88) from February 2, 1986 to September 17, 1988;
EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant since 1946.
Event: In 1988, a power struggle broke out over control of military promotions. Colonel
Jean-Claude Paul, thankful to Manigat for shielding him from the U.S. over drug run-
ning charges, arrested nine troops who were Namphy supporters on accusations they
were undermining the civilian government (Ferguson 1988, 37-38). On Monday, June
13, Lt. Gen. Namphy ordered Col. Paul to transfer from command of the powerful
Dessalines battalion to “an ignominious desk job” at army headquarters (Lundahl 1989,
7). On Wednesday, June 15, Manigat countermanded the transfer and promotions or-
der, which he had not been consulted on nor had approved. By doing so, Manigat
later claimed that “I was not siding with Colonel Paul against General Namphy; I was
defending the sacrosanct democratic principle of the supremacy of civilian power over
the military institution. On this, Paul sided with me as the constitutional president
and head of the armed forces” (Manigat 1988, 170). In other accounts, Manigat was
simply attempting to exploit the army split to gain control over the army. That after-
noon, Manigat had a tense meeting with Namphy and Williams Regala, the Duvalierist
Defense Secretary. Afterwards, “the army leadership issued a statement saying they
had undone the plans in dispute, and that they pledged loyalty to the chief executive”
(Laguerre 1993, 182).
On the evening of Friday, June 17, General Namphy and two generals on his staff were
relieved of duty for insubordination (182). Namphy was “placed under house arrest,
his post as commander-in-chief being offered to Colonel Paul,” who declined the job
given his lack of support in the military (Ferguson 1988, 37-38). On the afternoon of
Sunday, June 19, Manigat transferred and promoted 37 officers to achieve “strategic
and operational control over the leadership of the army.” That morning, an officer of
the presidential guard had already put in motion a coup. By the evening, “a handful of
palace soldiers with their tanks, seconded by the tactical Leopard Battalion, liberated
Namphy. Before re-entering the palace with Namphy [at 8:30pm], they shut down the
city power plant, causing a black-out of about fifteen minutes in the Port-au-Prince
metropolitan area, and fired in the air, surprising the Casernes Dessalines soldiers
still loyal to Manigat” (Laguerre 1993, 182,186). General Namphy responded to these
events with a coup of his own toppling Manigat on June 20 (see 41-1988-6-20).
Coding rationale: Whether or not one codes this event as a coup attempt or not regime
leader depends on whether one considers Manigat (Archigos) or Namphy (GWF) as
regime leader. As explained in the appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we consider
Namphy to be regime leader at this time. We therefore code the June 17 (-20) event as
a failed reshuffling coup attempt to oust General Namphy as commander-in-chief of the
military and assert civilian control over the military leader.. Paul and Manigat (the
nominal executive) were on the same “team” during this period. Paul orchestrated the
massacre in 1987 that led to the cancelling of the open and free elections. The 1988
50
elections were boycotted by almost all opposition parties. Namphy certainly acquiesced
to the crushing of a free election and appeared to want continued military rule (with a
civilian nominal head) afterwards, a reshuffling motive since they were all part of the
same elite circle that wanted continued military rule (either direct or indirect). The
coup attempt clearly failed because the success of putting Namphy in jail did not last
seven days.

Category: successful autogolpe
Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup - CSP,
Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Manigat as exiting on this date through
“irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code a military
regime (Haiti 86-88) from February 2, 1986 to September 17, 1988; EPR codes ethnic-
ity as irrelevant since 1946.
Event: In response to a coup attempt backed by President Leslie Manigat on June 17,
1988, (see 41-1988-6-17) General Namphy “personally supervised the almost bloodless
overthrow of the president. After some gunfire, several explosions and the appearance
of a tank at the presidential palace, Manigat was led away and flown into exile to
the Dominican Republic” (Ferguson 1988, 37-38). According to Manigat, his residence
“was assaulted with tanks and armored cars, which shot at the house as if it were a
fortress. I, with my family and some friends, surrendered without resistance follow-
ing my formal orders, which explains that we are still alive” (Manigat 1988, 171). It
took several hours for Namphy to negotiate with dissenting officers of the Dessalines
battalion before he announced a military takeover on state television at 12:30 a.m. on
Monday, June 20 (Laguerre 1993, 185). During his speech, Namphy was flanked by
Col. Paul and Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril (Treaster 1988a; Reuters 1988a).
Namphy thereby “overthrew Manigat and Célestin, suspended the 1987 constitution,
and established a military government” (Hall 2012, xxx, 7, 181). Namphy dissolved the
National Assembly and appointed an 11-man government of senior officers (Treaster
1988c). Because “he felt the country was not ready for elections or democracy,” Nam-
phy declared himself president (Greene 2001, 297). The constitution was partially
reinstated in March 1989 and only fully reinstated in October 1994 (Hall 2012, 70).
Coding rationale: This is a consensus coup according to all the major datasets that we
consulted. Whether or not this event is a coup or an autogolpe depends on whether
one considers Manigat or Namphy as the regime leader at this time and the nature of
the regime.
If one agreed with Archigos and considers Manigat to be the de facto regime leader at
this time, then, consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we would code this
event as a successful reshuffling coup. There is some evidence of regime continuation
over the course of these events: from the CNG “to Leslie Manigat and back to Henri
Namphy, the leadership structure of the army was not altered” (Laguerre 1993, 190).
According to Laguerre (1993, 187-189), “the overriding motivation for the coup was
51
personal and clique interests” of “hard-core Duvalierists,” not any larger or transforma-
tive political agenda. The coup’s timing also prevented Jean-Claude Duvalier’s court
appearance scheduled for June 27, in which he was feared to name co-conspirators
still in the regime. Manigat threatened the army’s corporate interests by considering
creation of a separate police force. Manigat also “revealed himself a true democrat,
not the fellow the army was looking for” when it tapped him to lead (Laguerre 1993,
174-176).
An alternative interpretation of this event would view the end of the post-1986 mil-
itary regime via a “regular” or legal transition in January 1988, following the rigged
elections, after which point the military formally retreated to the barracks but retained
veto power over personnel selection. In this view, at the time of this event, Namphy
was the regime leader and Manigat was the nominal executive of an indirect military
regime (which only lasted for the four months of Manigat’s tenure in office). Per our
coding rules, we would not exclude a coup event targeting the nominal executive of
an indirect military regime. However, in this interpretation, the Namphy coup would
be a successful regime change coup ousting the civilian executive and reimposing di-
rect military rule. One could reasonably question whether Manigat had control over
personnel, for he was ousted only a matter of days after attempting to do so.
Our final interpretation, following Laguerre (1993, 190) and others, views Manigat
as an overly ambitious civilian figurehead for a military regime. As detailed in the
appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we follow Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) in
coding Namphy (top military officer) rather than Manigat (a civilian politician) as
regime leader of a post-1986 military regime, even after Manigat’s election. Namphy’s
removal of Maginat on June 20, the potential coup event, is therefore an autogolpe.
AMBIGUOUS (regime leader).

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Namphy as exiting on September 17, 1988
through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code the
collapse of a military regime (Haiti 86-88) on September 17, 1988 in a military coup;
“Haitian.”
Event: After he took power again (see 41-1988-6-20), “Namphy was supported by the
army as president of the new military government, but divisions existed in the army
command, and each faction vied for control of the presidency. As a consequence of his
lack of support within the military hierarchy, Namphy sought additional support out-
side, from henchmen of the Duvalier regime and former makout. To intimidate civilian
resistance, Namphy unleashed a campaign of terror” (Greene 2001, 298), which cul-
minated with the Saint-Jean-Bosco massacre on September 11, 1988, killing 11 and
wounding 70. The massacre by the Tonton Macoutes targeted the church of Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, a leading anti-Duvalierist opposition leader, and it lasted a full
52
three hours even though the Church was across the street from an army barracks (Hall
2012, 230).
On Saturday, September 17, 1988, a group of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) over-
threw, detained, and eventually deported Namphy to the Dominican Republic. The
young officers were “outraged by Namphy’s failure to condemn the Tonton Macoutes”
behind the Saint-Jean-Bosco massacre (181). The coup involved 10 hours of sporadic
fighting at the Presidential Palace and in Port-au-Prince, killing at least four people.
“Soldiers in the Dessalines Barracks directly across from the Presidential Palace, did
not intervene on the President’s behalf.” At 2 a.m on Sunday, September 18, “in a
brief prepared announcement read in the name of the Presidential Guard, a soldier
who identified himself as Sgt. Joseph Hebreux explained the coup as an attempt by
noncommissioned officers to restore honor to Haiti’s armed forces” (Howard W French
1988c). On September 19, Avril announced a 12-member cabinet composed of civilians
(other than the Defense Minister) to replace the all-military cabinet under Namphy
(Howard W French 1988a).
“This coup was different from previous ones. The [NCOs] had more in common with
most Haitians than their officers. Excluded from perquisites and poorly paid, they
issued a list of demands that called for restoration of the 1987 constitution, legisla-
tive and presidential elections, respect for human rights, removal of makout from the
army, the disarming of paramilitary gangs, separation of the army from the police,
and an end to political brutality. Inexplicably, the noncommissioned officers turned
over control of the government to Brigadier General Prosper Avril,” former comman-
der of Duvalier’s presidential guard (Greene 2001, 298). The move was “inexplicable”
because Avril was reported to have been a central figure behind the June 1988 coup
re-installing Namphy in power (Treaster 1988a). For his part, Avril shared the NCO’s
concern that “the resurgence of the Tonton Macoutes might eclipse the power of the
Haitian military as had been the case during the Duvalierist dictatorship” (Hall 2012,
29). Avril consolidated his control in December 1988 after dismissing the NCO leaders
for coup plotting, but he was eased from office himself under U.S. pressure in March
1990 (Greene 2001, 298-299).
consulted. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event as a
successful regime change coup. The new president, Avril, was described by diplomats
as “an “eminence grise” and key power broker in several previous regimes, including
General Namphy’s” (Howard W French 1988c). Maj. Gen. Hérard Abraham, Nam-
phy’s Foreign Secretary, became the new armed forces commander (Howard W French
1988b). Some regime insiders therefore persisted in the new regime.
However, the coup was led by sergeants and corporals in the presidential guard, who
initially seemed to have a “joint role in governing.” Sgt. Hebreux, a 27-year old medic,
initially shared an office with Prosper Avril, joined all his calls, and was almost always
at Avril’s side in meetings (Howard W French 1988b; Treaster 1988b). The sergeants
also had Carmen Cristophe appointed mayor of Port-au-Prince over Avril’s objections.
Avril also was forced to retire eight generals, including Williams Regala, Namphy’s
53
second-in-command (Howard W French 1988a). However, there was no similar shakeup
in the Dessalines battalion led by Col. Jean-Claude Paul. During the coup, the NCOs
had reportedly wanted Paul to be new army commander, but the U.S. ambassador
vetoed the idea given that Col. Paul had been indicted in the U.S. on drug charges
(Treaster 1988d). The NCOs “called for about 20 reforms, mainly limited in scope and
dealing with benefit and working conditions within the armed forces. They range from
a request for a mess hall and infirmary at the general headquarters to provisions for
credit at the post exchange and increases in living expenses. The soldiers also want
more freedom to travel abroad” (Treaster 1988b). By contrast, CHISOLS codes no
SOLS change.
• # 41-1988-10-16: Haiti, Prosper Avril

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR; not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT,
and Singh; Archigos codes Prosper Avril as the leader of Haiti from September 17,
1998, to March 10, 1990. GWF code a military-personal regime (Haiti 88-90) from
September 17, 1988, until March 10, 1990.
Event: On October 17, 1988, Prosper Avril’s military government announced that
Sgt. Patrick Frantz Bochard and former Col. Samuel Jeremie had been arrested
early Sunday, October 16, after they “had maneuvered to stage a coup” the prior day
(Associated Press 1988b). According to military officers, on Saturday October 15, “the
plotters tried to take control of the arms depot at the presidential palace” (Reuters
1988c). On Wednesday, October 19, government spokesman Bernard Desgraffes said
that Jeremie, a former henchman under Jean-Claude Duvalier who had been in jail for
murder since 1986, was behind events. He was said to bribe Sgt. Bochard to release
him from jail following the coup the prior month that ousted Henry Namphy (see
41-1988-9-17) (Frank 1988).
Bochard (Bauchard) was first reported to be head of the national lottery (Associated
Press 1988b), but later said to have participated in the September 1988 coup and
rewarded by being named head of military justice for the capital (Frank 1988). In
December 1988, Jean-Bertrand Aristide “joined opposition calls for the release from
prison of 14 leaders of the “little soldiers” revolt which put Gen Avril in power. The
14 officers, headed by Sergeant Patrick Bauchard, were accused of plotting a coup, a
charge few believe, and have gone on hunger strike” to back a list of 19 demands for
reform, including “free elections, punishment of the Duvalierist thugs and army democ-
racy.” Their reform demands were ignored and Avril shelved the sergeants’ 30-man
advisory council (Chamberlain 1989). Observers viewed the charges against Bauchard
in October 1988 as a “move against the democratic forces in the military,” followed
by an announcement would not be held for at least two years. With none of the 15
soldiers arrested in October having been heard from since, many feared they had been
executed (Frank 1989).
Coding rationale: Because the only allegations of a coup attempt came from the gov-
ernment after the dates of the alleged event, and most independent observers cast
54
doubt on the authenticity of government claims, we code this event as a coup plot, one
which was most likely staged to discredit the NCOs who had demanded reforms and a
role on policymaking in Avril’s new regime. STAGED. AMBIGUOUS.

Category: failed leader reshuffling coup
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP, PT,
September 17, 1988, until March 10, 1990. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Haiti
since 1946 with the entire population being “Haitian.”
Event: By April 1989, there was a latent schism within the military over the role of
officers from different generations (Preston 1989c). Then, Avril arrested four top army
officers accused of being involved in the drug trade and after he restored part of the
1987 Constitution, which included a provision barring elites from the Duvalier regime
from holding office (Associated Press 1989b).
Between 4-5 a.m. on Sunday, April 2, 1989, four junior officers – Lt. Col. Leonce Qualo
(age 35), Col. Philippe Biamby (age 36), Lt. Col. Himmler Rebu (age 38), and Col.
Guy François – orchestrated the kidnapping of Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril at his mansion
as he returned home from a party. According to U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Susan
Clyde, the rebel soldiers drove Avril to the airport to be deported, where instead he was
rescued by his presidential guardsmen and escorted back to the National Palace. The
attempt collapsed when Maj. Gen. Herard Abraham, who had been Foreign Minister
under the previous Namphy-led regime, refused the rebels’ offer for the presidency.
On Tuesday, April 4, three rebels were deported to the Dominican Republic and flew
to Miami on April 5, where they applied for asylum in the United States (Howell 1989).
The coup perpetrators came from the Dessalines barracks, which “had long been a nest
for officers sympathetic to the Duvalierists’ tenacious campaign to stage a comeback”
(Preston 1989a, A26). Col. Guy François would not be deported, as he convinced
Avril to let him keep his post, only to immediately lead his Dessalines Battalion in
another attempted coup only days later (see 41-1989-4-5) (Bohning 1989).
Coding rationale: This appears to be a coup attempt aimed at replacing the Presi-
dent, himself a military officer, with another military officer. One source states that
“[o]rdinary people believed that the co-authors of the putsch intended to remove pres-
ident Avril and transfer power to Major General Herard-Abraham that would have
to lead a military junta composed of himself, Himmler Rebu and Philippe Biamby.
That junta was to assume power for 120 days during which it would implement the
full restoration of the 1987 constitution abolished under the Henry Namphy regime”
(Dumay 2011, 269). This source also notes that General Abraham, who was the head
of the military at the time, declined the offer to lead the junta and the coup leaders
decided to transfer power to the chief justice of the supreme court, Gilbert Austin.
An internal struggle within the military over officer appointments and promotions
55
does not constitute a regime change because the group from which the regime leader
is chosen remains the same. However, if the coup plotters aimed to bring back Jean-
Claude Duvalier to reconstitute the Duvalier regime (e.g. heavily reliant on private
militias rather than the military for security), then this case would be coded as a
regime change coup attempt. But under the assumption that the coup plotters were
officers who wanted to gain control of the regime in order to promote their personal
interests and to restore some formerly deposed officers – all while keeping the regime
in the hands of the military – we code this case as a reshuffling coup attempt.

September 17, 1988, until March 10, 1990. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Haiti
since 1946 with the entire population being “Haitian.”
Event: Spokesmen for the Dessalines Battalion, the second largest military unit in
Haiti, issued a statement over the independent Radio Metropole at about 9:30 a.m.
on Wednesday, April 5, mandating the ouster of Prosper Avril, threatening bloodshed
if he did not resign and leave the country by the end of the day. In response, the
Ministry of Interior declared a state of emergency; the government imposed a curfew
(Bohning 1989). An armed standoff between 1,100-strong Presidential Guardsmen and
rebel Dessalines troops at the National Palace continued for several days. On Friday
evening, the Presidential Guardsmen sought to intimidate the Dessalines troops by
firing on them. Scared, most Dessalines troops fled the Barracks that night. However,
fighting continued through the next day. The 22-hour engagement was the first time
Haitian troops had fired on each other since 1957. In a communique released Satur-
day, April 8, the Avril government announced it had retaken the Dessalines Battalion
Barracks (Preston 1989b). At this point, the Leopards Battalion said it was willing
to negotiate with Avril to end the rebellion, but insisted there be no reprisals and for
the unit to remain intact (Treaster 1989). On Sunday, the Leopards Battalion ended
the mutiny with the assurance there would be no reprisals (Preston 1989c). Avril re-
asserted control.
Coding rationale: This event is part of the prior event (April 2) because one of the
coup plotters in the prior event, Col. Guy François, was retained by Avril, only to
attempt another coup a few days later (April 5) (Preston 1989c). Also see 41-1989-4-2.

Prosper Avril as exiting on this date through “irregular” means by popular protests
without foreign support; GWF code the collapse of a military-personal regime (Haiti
56
88-90) on this date because a transitional government was empowered to hold elections.
“Haitian.”
Event: Though he had planned national elections in July and August 1990, in January
1990 large anti-government protests led Gen. Prosper Avril to proclaim “a 30-day state
of siege, coupled with various other restrictions on political activity. The outcry that
followed compelled Avril to lift the state of siege and all other restrictions within days.
This humiliation further weakened his already shaky authority. The final push towards
Avril’s exit from the political stage came with renewed domestic opposition, combined
with pressure from the US and other western and OAS countries” (Geldenhuys 2016,
228). “The death of an eleven-year old girl during an antigovernment rally on 5 March
1990 and the ensuing mass demonstrations during her funeral ended the Avril regime”
(Frederking 2007, 83).
Shortly after 3 p.m. on Saturday, March 10, 1990, Maj. Gen. Hérard Abraham, the
acting chief of staff of the army, announced the resignation of Gen. Prosper Avril
over national television. Abraham said the army’s mission was “to re-establish peace
and order within 72 hours in order to hand over power to a provisional Government
that conforms with the spirit of the Constitution and will have the task of organizing
elections.” It was reported that General Avril had worked out a plan in which a
justice of the Supreme Court would be named to lead the new government. “Haiti’s
Constitution calls for the chief of the Supreme Court to replace the President when a
vacancy develops.” Avril reportedly revealed his decision to resign “in meetings with
the Vatican and American ambassadors.” Haitian politicians and diplomats “said
they believed General Avril had decided to step down” to avoid further bloodshed
and unrest from ordering repression of the demonstrations. Prior to the resignation
announcement, around noon anti-Avril mobs sacked two government offices, but were
dispersed by tear gas fired by police. A group of 12 political leaders committed to not
oppose or attack members of the military (Treaster 1990d).
“Abraham served as interim president for three days before voluntarily turning power
over to Ertha Pascal-Trouillot on 13 March 1990. As such, he was the only Haitian
military leader to surrender political power on his own initiative during the 20th cen-
tury” (Hall 2012, 11). However, a constitutional standoff broke out on March 11, as
Avril had not yet left the country and Gilbert Austin claimed that he had a right
to succession (Treaster 1990b). Austin “extracted a pledge from the 11 other court
members that they would not accept the nomination over him” (Treaster 1990c). The
political opposition opposed Austin’s selection because of his close ties to Avril and
threatened to nominate a member of the bar association and to form a council of state
that could weld veto power. The political opposition threatened a general strike for
the next day (Monday) if Avril did not leave the country. Meanwhile, a “quiet law-
lessness” prevailed with few street protestors on the streets for the most part but “at
unexpected movements, crowds have suddenly swelled and attacked homes and officers
of people who are close to General Avril” (Treaster 1990b). “Several fires burned in
the capital, destroying a pro-Avril radio station” (Hockstader 1990d).
57
On March 12, after talking with the American Ambassador, Alvin P. Adams, Prosper
Avril agreed to leave Haiti. Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, the only woman on the Supreme
Court and its most junior member, broke her pledge to Mr. Austin and accepted the
nomination to head the transitional government Gen. Abraham quartered the Presi-
dential Guard to the palace barracks “to diminish the threat of their intervention” and
accepted Pascal-Troullot’s nomination. Crowds gathered in the streets, but “there was
little celebration” (Treaster 1990c). Avril’s resignation averted the threatened general
strike (Hockstader 1990a). On March 13, Ertha Pascal-Troillot was sworn in as provi-
sional president before thousands of cheering Haitians that crowded streets (Treaster
1990a).
Coding rationale: According to Ballard (1998, 44), Avril was overthrown by a coup
“led by General Hérard Abraham and supported by the United States.” But according
to Hall (2012, 11), “A series of street demonstrations forced Prosper Avril to relinquish
power on 10 March 1990.” Aksoy, Carter, and Wright (2015) code Avril as being ousted
by regime outsiders. Whether or not one considers this a coup or not depends on two
questions: did Abraham or other military actors take concrete actions to (1) oust Avril
or (2) prevent Gilbert Austin from acceding to the presidency, as specified in the con-
stitution. Although we do not have overt evidence of the first type (although most
historical sources claim his resignation was forced and not voluntary), we do have evi-
dence that Abraham’s temporary seizure of power enabled him to engineer a popular
but unconstitutional takeover by a different supreme court justice. This event tar-
geted the presumptive regime leader, and constitutes a military coup. Consistent with
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event as a successful regime change
coup, even though Abraham did not maintain power for a week (but his consensual
successor, Pascal-Troullot, did).
• # 41-1991-1-6: Haiti, Ertha Pascal-Troillot

Category: failed anti-democratic coup
coup attempt - CSP (June 6), PT, Singh, and Luttwak; Archigos codes Pascal-Troillot
as leader from March 13, 1990, until February 7, 1991; GWF code a democracy (Haiti
90-91) from March 11, 1990, until September 30, 1991; EPR codes ethnicity as irrele-
vant in Haiti since 1946 with the entire population being “Haitian.”
Event: Determined to keep President-Elect Jean-Bertrand Aristide from taking office,
at 10 p.m. on Sunday, January 6, 1991, Roger Lafontant, a Duvalierist, lured Pro-
visional President Ertha Pascal-Trouillot “to the National Palace and forced her to
resign” (Hall 2012, 151). Heavy gunfire was heard near the palace as the “Tontons
Macoutes moved around in armored vehicles, firing shots to intimidate the people”
(Inter-American commission on Human Rights 1991). Pascal-Trouillot announced her
resignation on national radio at 12:40 a.m. on January 7 (Howard W. French 1991).
“Lafontant promptly proclaimed himself provisional president on national radio and
declared that he had the support of the military” (Hall 2012, 151). Lafontant, who
in actuality only appeared to have the support of non-commissioned officers of the
58
Presidential Guard, said that Aristide, who was scheduled to take office on February
7, would never be allowed to become president. Duvalier escaped (Howard W. French
1991).
“Although Aristide was elected by the people, the bond that connected him to the
masses was of a religious and charismatic kind. This was evident when the masses rose
up to protest the attempted coup against him in January 1991” (R. Pastor 1997, 121).
Before dawn on January 7, “tens of thousands of protesters poured into the streets
of the capital, erecting barricades of wrecked cars and burning tires throughout the
city. By 9:30 a.m., when the army assaulted the palace, the crowds were estimated by
foreign diplomats to number in the hundreds of thousands” (Schanche 1991). Anti-
Duvalierists “erected barricades and blocked access to the airport, attacked Lafontant’s
headquarters and killed many of his supporters” and “severely damaged businesses
owned by individuals with ties to Lafontant. The mobs also ransacked the papal
nuncio’s residence and burned the historic cathedral of Port-au-Prince and the residence
of the Conference of Catholic Bishops. The attacks on Church properties were in
response to a January 1 homily by the pro-Duvalierist archbishop of Port-au-Prince,
Msgr. Francois Wolff Ligonde, who many people thought encouraged” Lafontant to
act (Dupuy 2006, 102-103). Protesters’ “goal was to block the former Duvalierist
militia from circulating and to demand that the outcome of the elections be respected”
(Inter-American commission on Human Rights 1991). Some 75 people died in the mob
violence (Hall 2012, 151-152), some as a result of “necklacing” (burning tires placed
around their necks) (Hockstader 1991).
Faced with this uprising, “General Herard Abraham, the army’s commander-in-chief,
ordered the army to crush the coup and arrest Lafontant and his collaborators. But
Abraham did not make his move until twelve hours after the attempted coup began,
and only after the U.S. and Venezuelan ambassadors, among others, pressed him to do
so. They made it clear to him that, unless the army intervened, the masses might turn
against him and the army” (Dupuy 2006, 102-103). On 7 January, the Army “declared
its allegiance to the constitution, stormed the National Palace, captured Lafontant and
15 of his accomplices, freed Pascal-Trouillot, and restored her as provisional president.”
“For his part, Jean Bertrand Aristide appealed for restraint among his followers and
the general public, so that calm could be restored. He regretted the violence that had
been inflicted upon religious establishments” (Inter-American commission on Human
Rights 1991). The speech by Aristide on January 9 seemed to endorse his support-
ers’ mob violence against Lafontant associates and Duvalierists, however (Dupuy 2006,
103). Rumors of a coup attempt on January 27 by Lafontant “provoked a violent re-
sponse” (103). At least 12 reportedly died (Reuters 1991). “Abraham’s actions allowed
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to take office in February 1991” (Hall 2012, 11). “After tak-
ing office, Aristide accused Pascal-Trouillot of complicity in Lafontant’s coup attempt
and arrested her. President George H.W. Bush, however, convinced Aristide to allow
Pascal-Trouillot to go into exile in the United States” (198-199). On 31 July 1991,
“Lafontant was sentenced to life in prison, the maximum sentence allowed since the
1987 constitution abolished the death penalty, for his coup attempt. On 29 September
1991, during the early hours of the coup that overthrew Aristide, Lafontant was shot
59
by unidentified assailants in his prison cell” (Hall 2012, 151-152).
event as a failed anti-democratic coup. This was a “veto coup” attempting to prevent
Aristide, the democratically elected leader, from taking office.
• # 41-1991-9-30: Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup - PT, CSP,
Singh, Luttwak; Archigos codes Aristide as being removed on this date through “irregu-
lar” means by military without foreign support; GWF code the collapse of a democracy
(Haiti 90-91) on this date in a coup; EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Haiti since
1946 with the entire population being “Haitian.”
Event: “On February 4, 1991–three days before his inauguration–Aristide announced
the replacement of the ”Lavalas Operation” with the ”Lavalas Organization.” ” in a
bid to “build an independent political structure around the mass mobilization of the
people” (Aristide and Richardson 1994). Once in office, “Aritistide’s bold and populist
reforms rankled the neo-Duvalierists—those sympathetic to the recently ousted dic-
tatorial regime of the Duvalier family—especially the powerful military” (Kohn 2007,
223).
On September 30, 1991, “backed by the FAd’H high command, army mutineers stormed
the National Palace at 5:30 p.m., capturing Aristide and his contingent... After initially
proposing to hang Aristide on the spot, the captured president was moved under tight
guard to the FAd’H headquarters nearby. At 10:30 p.m., after tense negotiations with
local embassies, Aristide was flown on a Venezuelan air force plane out of Port-au-
Prince to Caracas” (Sprague 2012, 62). Raoul Cedras assumed control of the radio
and television and established and headed a three-man ruling junta (Kohn 2007, 223)
including FAd’H General Philippe Biamby and police chief Lt. Col. Michel François.
“Former commanders of the National Intelligence Service (SIN, the counter-narcotics
unit within Haiti’s police that had been facilitated by the CIA), such as Col. Ernst
Prudhomme, Col. Diderot Sylvain, and Col. Leopold Clerjeune, were also key leaders
behind the 1991 coup. Some have alleged (but not proved) CIA support for the coup
(Sprague 2012, 62).
Compared to January 1991, “there was silence when the military overthrew” Aris-
tide in September 1991 as anti-coup protests were not nearly as large, indicating that
Aristide’s popularity even among his supporters had waned during his time in office
(R. Pastor 1997, 121). Nevertheless, on September 30 bus loads of troops “mowed
down hundreds of demonstrators with machine guns” (Sprague 2012, 64). “In the days
immediately following the overthrow of Haiti’s constitutional authorities, the Fad’H
unleashed a wave of repression against Lavalas supporters, who turned out in large
numbers protesting the coup” (Sprague 2012). “The military violently suppressed all
street protests and enforced strict curfews. Within weeks of the coup, about 500 peo-
ple had been killed in armed confrontations” (Kohn 2007, 223). “Defying massive
60
state violence, anti-coup protesters gathered in solidarity around the country. Tens
of thousands poured out from Haiti’s slums into the Champs de Mars and up Port-
au-Prince’s major boulevards; popular organizations opposing the coup appeared in
some of the remotest parts of the countryside. The de facto regime responded merci-
lessly” (Sprague 2012, 65). One of the primary objectives of the Cedras coup “was to
destroy the popular movement and drive the masses away from the political arena.”
The popular movement that brought Aristide to power in February 1991 was driven
underground(Aristide and Richardson 1994).
The international community condemned the coup. On the evening of 30 September,
the OAS Permanent Council met to discuss the crisis and unanimously condemned the
coup, “demanded the reinstatement of Aristide and the restoration of constitutional
order, and invoked Resolution 1080, calling for an ad hoc meeting of ministers of foreign
affairs. This meeting, attended by Aristide himself, was held two days later. Among the
results of this meeting were resolutions calling for the diplomatic isolation of Haiti and
the suspension of commercial relations and nonhumanitarian aid. It further proposed
a series of missions to Haiti, led by the OAS secretary general (Dieguez 1998). The
United Nations then got involved, and technically all UN member states were to honor
the embargo against Haiti. The UN also named a special envoy, former foreign minister
of Argentina Dante Caputo, who was then adopted, after some initial reluctance, by the
OAS. Yet the Cédras government maintained its hold on power” (Levitt 2006, 102).
One reason was that “Economic sanctions were fraught with defections” (103). On
October 8, 1991, “Cédras convinced the National Assembly to appoint Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Nérette as provisional president” (Hall 2012, 55). The junta remained
in power for three years until U.S. intervention ultimately restored Aristide to power
in 1994 (see 41-1994-9-19).
• # 41-1994-9-19: Haiti, Raoul Cédras

Category: foreign
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and - Singh; successful coup -
Luttwak; Archigos codes Cedras as leader of Haiti from September 30, 1991, until
October 10, 1991, when he was removed through “irregular” means by the threat of
foreign force; Svolik code Cedras’ exit on October 14 as foreign; GWF code a military
regime (Haiti 91-94) from September 30, 1991, until October 10, 1994 (October 12).
Event: “By July 1994, the United States had begun to exhibit a firmer resolve to end
the crisis, despite the misgivings of some members of Congress. An increasing flood
of Haitian refugees to its shores had persuaded the United States to threaten the use
of force, under UN cover, against Haiti. Some OAS members, such as Mexico, Brazil,
and Colombia, were wary of involving the UN and, in particular, resisted defining the
Haitian crisis as an international security issue, which might set a precedent for future
armed interventions by the United States or other world powers. Yet it was precisely
this threat of force that eventually restored Aristide to power (Schnably 2000)” (Levitt
61
2006, 103).
On September 15, 1994, “President Clinton addressed the United States public, justi-
fying the need for an invasion [of Haiti] by citing the terrorism of the military regime.
The next day, Clinton made a final effort to avoid a military invasion of Haiti by
sending former president Jimmy Carter, former chair of the United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to Haiti to arrange
a peaceful departure of the junta” (Greene 2001, 307). On September 18, the U.S.
delegation, “part of Operation Uphold Democracy, convinced Cédras to resign or face
the possibility of a U.S. military intervention” (Hall 2012, 8,56).
On September 19, “the U.S.-led multinational force, composed of over 20,000 American
troops and over 2,000 troops from other countries, was deployed peacefully” (194).
“Haitians greeted the United States forces warmly but cautiously, fearing reprisals
from the Haitian military... On October 4, former police chief Joseph Michel François
fled to the Dominican Republic. On October 10, General Cedras resigned in a brief
ceremony in which he had to be protected from jeering crowds, and on October 13,
generals Cedras and Biamby left for exile in Panama” (Greene 2001, 307). Cédras was
given “a generous stipend from the United States, and Aristide returned to rule Haiti
on 15 October 1994” (Hall 2012, 8).
Coding rationale: Among major prior coup datasets, only Luttwak includes this event
as a coup, though he notes that the main party is a “foreign-led faction.” Because
this event marks a foreign occupation by U.S.-led forces, we code this event as foreign.
What’s more, Cedras does not actually step down until October 10, so it is not clear
ex ante that there is any leadership change on this date to mark a “successful” coup
event.
• # 41-2000-10-16: Haiti, Rene Garcia Preval

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed coup attempt with no evidence of military involvement - CCD;
failed coup attempt - CSP; failed coup attempt - Luttwak (October 10); no overt
military force - PT; not a candidate - Singh; Archigos codes Preval as the leader of
Haiti from February 7, 1996, to February 7, 2001; GWF code a personal regime (Haiti
99-04) from January 12, 1999, until February 29, 2004.
Event: On October 2, 2000, the populist former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
declared his candidacy for president in upcoming elections, and the next day a rally by
his Fanmi Lavalas (FL) supporters led to a standoff when Delmas police chief Jacky
Nau roughed one Lavalas demonstrator (chimères) (Sprague 2012, 101-102). Nau was
“almost killed by necklacing” in the physical altercation (BBC Monitoring Americas
2000a). Infuriated that the chimères was not punished, Nau began to meet with another
police commissioner, Guy Philippe, and some other dissident police chiefs (all of which
were “rightist” ex-military) to plan a “preventive coup” to oust Renal before Aristide
could be inaugurated in February 2001. Planning attacks for November 2000, the
plotters met with U.S. embassy officials presumably to seek their support on October
62
8th and 11th. They planned to install a new government headed by Olivier Nadal, the
former president of the Chamber of Commerce; Léon Mamus, CEP president living in
the United States; Guy Philippe; and Jean-Claude Fignolé, a historian and friend of
the plotters. News of Philippe’s coup plot was leaked in the press in mid-October 2000,
and the U.S. officials betrayed the plot by telling the authorities about the meetings
with the police chiefs (Sprague 2012, 102-105).
Upon being informed, national police director General Pierre Denizé summoned police
chiefs to a meeting, where the plotters denied any knowledge of the meetings with
the U.S. officials. But after large police movements were reported in the mountains
above Port-au-Prince, Denizé summoned the police chiefs again. Fearing arrest, on
the night of October 17, 2000, six police chiefs, including Guy Philippe, Jacky Nau,
and Gilbert Dragon (police chief in Croix-des-Bouquets), and an unknown number of
dissident police officers fled across the Dominican border (105-106). On October 18,
Haitian authorities confirmed rumors of an abortive coup and said that the Dominican
army had arrested some policemen on the Haitian Dominican border (BBC Monitoring
Americas 2000d). President Preval said dismissed the plot as the activities “some
desperadoes in the police wanted to carry out” (BBC Monitoring Americas 2000c).
Other implicated police chiefs included Huguens Andre in Carrefour and Jean-Marie
Milla in Petion-Ville (BBC Monitoring Americas 2000a). Haiti demanded that the
police chiefs be extradited, but instead the Dominican Republic decided to send them
to Ecuador, who would grant them political asylum (Sprague 2012, 107).
Coding rationale: Although Aristide had demobilized the military in 1995, making
most of these police-chiefs ex-military, we would not dismiss this event as prior defection
because the police still represented an official state security force and the police chiefs
were active duty policemen at the time they fled. Whether or not this event is a
coup attempt or plot depends on how one assesses evidence of concrete actions taken
by the police chiefs. The opposition claimed that the coup was “self-inflicted” by
Lavalas to justify attacks on the opposition (BBC Monitoring Americas 2000b). The
six policemen arrested in the Dominican Republic denied participating in a coup (BBC
Monitoring Americas 2000a). Although subsequent evidence does indicate that there
was an advanced coup plot, we can find no evidence that the dissident police were able
to execute any part of the attempt before being discovered and fleeing the authorities.
We therefore code this event as a coup plot. STAGED.
• # 41-2001-12-17: Haiti, Rene Garcia Preval

Luttwak; Archigos codes Preval as the leader of Haiti from February 7, 1996, until
February 7, 2001; GWF code a personal regime (Haiti 99-04) from January 12, 1999,
until February 29, 2004.
Event: After their coup plot was discovered in October 2000 (see 41-2000-10-16), the
ex-police chiefs went back to the Dominican Republic in early 2001 and linked up with
“a motley group of ex-military and Duvalierist criminals who had also just fled Haiti.”
63
With the support of Dominican officials, they formed the right-wing paramilitary group
known as the FLRN, which they initially dubbed the Armée sans maman (the mother-
less army). In December 2001, the FLRN launched “their most daring coup attempt”
(Sprague 2012, 107-110). At 2 a.m. on Monday, December 17, about 30 FLRN rebels
in pickup trucks wearing “the khaki uniforms of Haiti’s army” unsuccessfully tried to
enter the National Penitentiary and then stormed and briefly occupied a wing of the
presidential palace and its radio system. They battled police with automatic weapons
for several hours in the palace before being defeated. Seven of the rebels were arrested,
while others escaped (D. Gonzalez 2001; Reuters 2001). By December 20, authorities
had arrested former Col. Guy François in connection with the coup attempt (Associ-
ated Press 2001).
a coup, with the main party listed as an “ex-army faction.” The opposition claimed
again that the coup attempt was staged and Guy Philippe again denied any involve-
ment(Reuters 2001), but later evidence indicates that the FLRN and Philippe had
indeed been behind the attack. Because the assault was led by FLRN rebels who had
defected the previous year, we code this event as a case of prior defection.

Category: combined
Other Datasets: failed coup attempt - WHIV; not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and
Singh; Archigos codes Aristide as the leader of Haiti from February 8, 2001, until
being removed on February 29, 2004, through “irregular” means by rebel actors without
foreign support; GWF code the collapse of a personal regime (Haiti 99-04) on February
29, 2004, by insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants in a civil war.
Event: On January 12, 2004, Haiti’s parliament ceased to operate as most legislator’s
terms expired, thus escalating a political crisis between Aristide’s supporters and the
opposition. Beginning in January 2004, opposition paramilitary forces began to cross
the border, staging themselves for an attack (Sprague 2012). By Friday, January 30,
President Aristide was defiant in the face of anti-government protest, saying he would
not resign, but he also implored citizens to end the violence (Brown 2004).
Coding rationale: WHIV is the only major dataset to code a coup attempt on this date.
We find no evidence of a military coup attempt on this date. We assume that WHIV
marks this date as the start of a rebel invasion which succeeded later this month (see
41-2004-2-29). We thus code this event as “combined” with the latter “prior defection”
event.

Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; not a candidate - CCD and PT; mass
protest - CSP; successful coup - Luttwak; not a candidate - PT; uprising - Singh;
Archigos codes Aristide’s exit on this date by “irregular” means by rebel actors with-
64
out foreign support; Svolik codes Aristide’s exit on this date in a non-military coup;
GWF code the collapse of a personal regime (Haiti 99-04) on this date by insurgents,
revolutionaries, or combatants in a civil war.
Event: After anti-Aristide protests broke out in January 2004, Haiti “lost control of
the Dominican border, allowing former army officers to enter the country and organize
an insurgency” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 176). “On 5 February 2004, the Front pour
la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales (FLRN)/ Front for National Liberation
and Reconstruction took control of Gonaı̈ves, Haiti’es third-largest metropolitan area.
By 22 February 2004, the rebels had taken control of Cap-Haı̈tien, the nation’s second-
largest city” (Hall 2012, 8). “By 25 February, the FLRN, which controlled virtually
all of northern Haiti, was poised on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince” (121). Shorn of
support, Aristide fled Haiti on February 29. The chief justice of the Supreme Court,
Boniface Alexandre, became acting president, and requested a United Nations peace-
keeping force (121). By the end of the day, 1,000 U.S. marines landed in Haiti Hall
(2012, 114). “Aristide has claimed subsequently that U.S. ambassador to Haiti James
B. Foley forced him to resign and exiled him from Haiti” (8).
Coding rationale: Luttwak is the only major prior dataset that codes this event as
a coup, and he codes the main party as a “foreign-supported political faction.” The
GWF codebook states: “Aristide fled in response to a popular uprising led by a former
police chief and criminal gang leaders (Erickson 2005, 86; Hall 2012, 272).” As Hall
(2012, 114) observed, the nucleus of FLRN was the Cannibal Army, led by Buteur
Métayer, who held Aristide responsible for the assassination of his brother Amiot in
September 2003. The group gained support from “disgruntled former soldiers who lost
their jobs when Aristide disbanded the Army in 1995.” There were of course a wave
of security force defections. In fact, the rebels “did not fight a single battle. The
police simply changed out of their uniforms, grabbed bottles of rum, and headed for
the hills” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 177). Because the FLRN rebels were former army
and policemen, and not current active members of the military (which had in fact been
disbanded many years before), we code this event as a case of prior defection.
• # 41-2004-8-30: Haiti, Boniface Alexandre

Category: not exist
- WHIV; Archigos codes Boniface Alexandre as leader from February 29, 2004, until
May 14, 2006; GWF code a provisional regime (Haiti 04-06) from March 1, 2004, until
May 13, 2006; EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant since 1946.
Event: In June 2004, “UN troops, led by a Brazilian general, took over security duties
from U.S. troops.” In September, Hurricane Jeanne hit Haiti (Hall 2012, xxxii).
Coding rationale: We could find no evidence of a coup on this date following a search
of the Proquest database and a general internet search. We therefore code this event
as not exist.
65
• # 41-2004-11-16: Haiti, Boniface Alexandre
Category: not exist
- WHIV; Archigos codes Boniface Alexandre as leader from February 29, 2004, until
May 14, 2006; GWF code a provisional regime (Haiti 04-06) from March 1, 2004, until
May 13, 2006; EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant since 1946.
Event: On 1 December 2004, “US secretary of state Colin Powell visited Haiti” (Hall
2012, xxxii).
Coding rationale: We could find no evidence of a coup on this date following a search
of the Proquest database and a general internet search. We therefore code this event
as not exist.
66
2.1.4 42: Dominican Republic
Table 4: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in the Dominican Republic

42-1961-5-30 Dominican Rep 30-62 Trujillo, Rafael Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
42-1961-7-15 Dominican Rep 30-62 Trujillo, Ramfis mutiny
42-1961-11-15 Dominican Rep 30-62 Balaguer, Joaquı́n coup plot
42-1962-1-16 Dominican Rep 30-62 Balaguer, Joaquı́n Reshuffle Coup (F)
42-1962-1-18 Dominican Rep 30-62 Echavarrı́a, Rodrı́guez Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
42-1963-9-25 Dominican Rep 62-63 Bosch, Juan Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
42-1965-4-25 Dominican Rep 63-65 Wessin y Wessin, Elı́as Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
42-1965-4-27 Dominican Rep 65-66 Molina Ureña, José Rafael combined
42-1965-11-22 Dominican Rep 65-66 Garcı́a Godoy, Héctor prior defection
42-1973-2-15 Dominican Rep 66-78 Balaguer, Joaquı́n prior defection
• # 42-1961-5-30: Dominican Republic, Rafael L. Trujillo

Other Datasets: failed military coup and foreign coup - CCD; failed coup attempt -
CSP; no executive - PT; assassination - Singh; Archigos codes Trujillo as being removed
through “irregular” means by domestic military actors without foreign support on
this date. However, Goemens, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009, 70) also notes that the
assassination by a band of military officers “could also be labeled as exit by rebel force,
as the officers act by themselves and do not make use of the units they command”;
Svolik codes Trujillo’s exit on this date as an assassination; GWF code a personal
regime (Dominican Rep 30-62) from 1930 until January 16, 1962, which was led by
Trujillo until this date. O’Rourke (2013, 306) lists Rafael Trujillo as the target of a
successful U.S-backed coup in 1961. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Dominican
Republic since 1946 with the entire population being “Dominican.”
Event: On Tuesday, May 30, 1961, seven men ambushed longtime dictator Rafael
Trujillo on a dark highway, blocked his car, and engaged in an exchange of fire which
left “El Jefe” dead. On June 2, the government identified the seven assassins: First
Lieut. Amado Garcı́a Guerrero, on active duty with the Presidential Aide de Camp;
Huáscar Antonio Tejeda Pimentel, a civilian engineer; Pedro Livio Cedeño, a former
army captain; Roberto Pastoriza, a civilian engineer; Antonio de la Maza Vasquez;
Luis Salvador Estrella Sadalha, son of Gen. Pedro Estrella and brother of Brig. Gen.
Guarionex Estrella; and Antonio Imbert Barreras (New York Times 1961h; Brewer
1961b).12
12. On June 2, Garcı́a Guerrero was killed resisting arrest. On June 4, Gen. Tomas Dı́az and Antonio de la
Maza were also killed resisting arrest (Brewer 1961c). On November 18, on the orders of Ramfis Trujillo in
one of his last acts before leaving the country, four of the surviving assassins in prison were killed: Roberto
Pastoriza, Pedro Livio Cedeña, Huáscar Tejeda, and Salvador Estrella. Two other accomplices, Luis Manuel
Cáceres Michel and Modesto E. Dı́az Quezada, were also assassinated in custody (New York Times 1961h,
1961m; Berrellez 1961). Antonio Imbert survived by hiding at the Italian consul in Santo Domingo for six
months (BBC 2011).
67
The leader of the “Political Group” in the plot, although not part of the ambush, was
Brig. Gen. Juan Tomás Dı́az, who was allegedly motivated by revenge at his forced
retirement the previous year (Khiss 1961b). Trujillo’s slain body was later found in the
garage at Gen. Dı́az’s house (Kihss 1961a). On June 8, Pedro Livio, while in custody,
issued a statement that the plotters intended to kidnap and force Trujillo’s resignation,
saying the shooting only began after Trujillo defended himself. According to Livio, the
plotters intended to install a General “X,” not identifying him but saying only it was
not Tomás Dı́az (Brewer 1961g). However, by that time, Pedro Livio, Huáscar Tejeda,
and Modesto Dı́az had all told authorities that Maj. Gen. José “Pupo” René Román
was involved (Diederich 1990, 142,175). On June 8, Gen. Román was quietly dismissed
as Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Brewer 1961f), which had placed him as
next in constitutional line for the presidency. On June 11, Román allegedly confessed
to complicity in the assassination (Brewer 1961d). On June 17, Román was court
martialled for plotting to seize the government (Diederich 1990, 233). By July, Pupo
had been sentenced to 30 years in prison (Associated Press 1961m). On August 3,
an additional 29 civilians were charged with plotting to overthrow the government
(Diederich 1990, 218).
Coding rationale: Powell-Thyne exclude Trujillo’s assassination as a coup attempt
because Rafael Trujillo was not then the nominal executive of the Dominican Republic.
As detailed in our Colpus regime leaders appendix, we concur with Archigos that
Trujillo was regime leader at this time.
However, we disagree with the Archigos coding of no foreign support for Trujillo’s as-
sassination. In fact, the United States was implicated in it. The U.S. began distancing
itself from Trujillo following the Cuban revolution and instead began supporting social
democratic reformers such as Venezuelan president Rómulo Betancourt. On January
3, 1961, President Eisenhower ordered U.S. support for action to rid the Dominican
Republic of Trujillo (Rabe 1999, 36). Trujillo’s botched 1960 assassination attempt
against Betancourt also led President Kennedy to support OAS sanctions against Tru-
jillo (Crandall 2006, 47-48) and Eisenhower’s proposed anti-Trujillo covert operations.
As a result, in early 1961, the U.S. Consul General Henry Dearborn passed pistols and
carbines to Dominican dissidents. After hesitating due to the Bay of Pigs in April
1961, in a secret memo dated May 29, 1961, Kennedy authorized a plan to assist in
Trujillo’s removal (even if not assassination). When Trujillo was killed the next day,
the assassins had used the CIA-supplied guns (Rabe 1999, 36-39). U.S. support, how-
ever ambiguous, suggests that the plot sought to cause regime change by removing the
dictator and prevent a familial succession.
Finally, we agree with Archigos’ interpretation of this assassination as part of a military
coup attempt, rather than simply being an “unsupported” assassination. Most of the
ambushers were civilians or non-active military members. One of the coup leaders, Gen.
Juan Tomas Dı́az, retired early in September 1960 (Diederich 1990, 59).13 Antonio
13. On June 3, Ramfis Trujillo, the dictator’s son, denied that there had been any armed forces involved in
the plot, saying that it was “impossible” that Gen. Dı́az had hoped to overthrow the regime because he had
no following in the military (Brewer 1961e; Ediger 1961b). This is precisely the reason the plotters recruited
68
Imbert, a concrete factory manager and the former governor of Puerto Plata, was given
an honorary rank of general only in 1962 after the Trujillo regime’s demise as a reward
so that he could draw a state pension (BBC 2011). Pedro Livio Cedeño had been
discharged from the army in 1946 (Diederich 1990, 78). Antonio de la Maza had left
the Corps of Military Aides as a lieutenant in 1943 (25), and in 1959 he was made “an
honorary major in the Foreign Legion” for constructing barracks on a Trujillo contract
(28). Had they acted alone, we would not code any active military participation.
However, two of the known plotters were active military members, namely Lt. Amado
Garcı́a Guerrero and Maj. Gen. Pupo Román (Brewer 1961a). Even though Gen.
Román did not overtly carry out a coup as planned on the night of May 30, Amado
Garcı́a took concrete actions to oust and replace Trujillo.
The next question concerns whether the assassins and coup plotters sought regime
change. On the one hand, most of the plotters had personal grievances against the
dictator, which would suggest more of a revenge motive than any political program
(Rabe 1999, 39).14 The plotters were mainly conservative, anti-communist, and bound
together by familial ties. “ Above all they wanted to beat the leftists to the punch” to
replace the aging dictator (Diederich 1990, 63). On the other hand, their grievances
stemmed from the concentration of power within the Trujillo family, and the plotters
evidently sought to prevent a father-son succession to Ramfis. The coup plan, as
developed by Modesto Diaz, was as follows: “Once Trujillo is dead, Pupo Román
and Juan Tomás Dı́az will head a civilian-military junta with Antonia de la Maza as
secretary of the armed forces; all members of the Trujillo family will be arrested. Some
will be permitted to leave and others will be brought to justice...President Balaguer will
be taken to the National Palace where he will be obliged to sign the decrees establishing
the junta” (173). Balaguer would continue as a puppet president until elections were
held in 1962 (62).
Gen. “Pupo” Román Fernandez’s conditional acceptance in February 1961 to lead
the coup, if the assassins brought him Trujillo’s corpse, “elevated the conspiracy from
a personal vendetta to a coup d’état” (62). Of all of the conspirators, Román was
the only regime insider. As secretary of the armed forces, he could direct troops. He
was also the husband of Trujillo’s niece Mireya (30), making him an in-law but not a
blood relative. Also, Pupo “was no friend” of Ramfis Trujillo, fearing that if Ramfis
succeeded his father he would “end up at the bottom of the ladder again.” Earlier in
1960, Trujillo had promoted Pupo to armed forces secretary over Ramfis’ friend Gen.
Tunti Sanchez, prompting Ramfis to leave the country in protest (66). Pupo would not
have supported Ramfis’ return to the Dominican Republic to take power. However,
on the night Trujillo was killed, the “Action Group” was never able to show Pupo
the body. In the first moments when Pupo learned an attack had occurred, he was
Gen. Pupo Román.
14. Two brothers of slain Octavio de la Maza, for example, were implicated in the plot. “The de la Maza
family is reported to have been bitter over the regime’s contention that Octavio had killed Gerald Lester
Murphy, an American pilot, and had then hanged himself in a prison cell. Murphy has been believed by
United States Government quarters to have been involved in the disappearance in March, 1956, of Dr. Jesus
Maria de la Galendize, a Trujillo enemy then living in New York” (Khiss 1961a).
69
in the presence of General Arturo Espaillat, the first head of the SIM, and Pupo was
powerless to communicate with anyone in private to instigate the coup plan (Diederich
1990, 136). Pupo soon called President Balaguer and Hector Trujillo, El Jefe’s brother,
and requested they come to conference with him at his headquarters at the 18th of
December base. They demurred, and fearing a trap Johnney Abbés, the de facto SIM
chief, ordered SIM agents not to let them go (140-141). Pupo also called his brother-
in-law Virgilio Garcia Trujillo, commander of the San Isidro air base, and ordered him
to dispatch tanks and troops to the 18th of December base. He also refused on the
advice of another brother-in-law that Trujillo might not be dead but trying to find out
who his real friends were. With this “feeble bid” to rally troops and take Balaguer
and Hector Trujillo prisoner, Pupo quickly and “prudently changed back to his role
as a loyal member of the Trujillo family and military commander and displayed more
initiative in tracking down Trujillo’s body and assassins” (138).
Based on the evidence, we assume the plotters sought to prevent personalization of
the regime. Thus, we code this as a failed regime change coup; it succeeded in killing
Trujillo but did not lead to his replacement or the collapse of his regime at this time as
intended. For more on this case, see the book-length treatment by Diederich (1990).
Also, we consider the assassination against Trujillo by the “Action Group” as the first
stage of the planned coup attempt, and the failure Román and the “Political Group”
to act to seize power the unrealized second stage of the coup attempt. However, one
could also reasonably argue that the assassination was a prerequite for the start of the
actual coup attempt to be led by Gen. Román. On May 31, when it was officially
announced that Trujillo was dead, “There was no call to arms, no communiqué from a
civil or military junta declaring finis to the Trujillo era” (173). Thus, one could argue
that this was a successful assassination and aborted coup plot rather than an executed
coup attempt. AMBIGUOUS (regime leader,seize).
• # 42-1961-7-15: Dominican Republic, Joaquı́n Balaguer

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, and Singh; no overt - PT;
failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Balaguer as the leader of the Domini-
can Republic from May 30, 1961, until January 16, 1962; GWF code a personal regime
(Dominican Rep 30-62) from 1930 until January 16, 1962.
Event: Ever since Trujillo’s assassination (see 42-1961-5-30), “Balaguer was contin-
uously attacked by emerging political groups” hoping for political change (Crandall
2006, 48). In June 1961, free elections were promised for May 1962 (Kihss 1961b).
On July 2, 1961, “all but one Cabinet member resigned to give Preisdent Balaguer
a free hand “in most effectively carrying out the heritage of Trujillo” (Hilton 1961).
On July 5, 1961, after Balaguer invited exiles to return, three leaders of the small
“moderate leftist” Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) – Angel Miolan, Ramon
Castillo, and Nicolas Silfa – returned to the country (Gleijeses 1978, 38). The PRD,
led by Juan bosch, became “the first opposition group to establish a headquarters
in the Dominican Republic” on Calle El Conde (Roorda 2016, 224). On July 7, a
70
PRD-led anti-government protest march turned violent, a mob burned down Radio
Caribe, and police opened fire after protesters hurled stones at them (Ediger 1961a).
On July 16, the Union Civica Nacional (UCN), the main opposition movement in the
year ahead, was announced; it pledged itself to peaceful action to contest the upcoming
elections (U.S. State Department 1961). On July 30, the Political Group of 14th of
June (IJ4) was formed as a new anti-Trujilloist party with Castroist leanings (Gleijeses
1978, 39-40).
For its part, the military “was no longer the monolithic force that it had once been
under the elder Trujillo. The opposition to the dictatorship which had developed in
the armed forces during Trujillo’s last two years had not ended with the death of the
dictator. Now this opposition surfaced more frequently” (Howard J Wiarda 1975, 291).
As a result, “Rumblings from within the armed forces were also heard; in July 1961, for
example, an air force uprising against Ramfis Trujillo was put down (Gleijeses 1978,
39-40; Wiarda 1975, 1:291)” (Hartlyn 1998, 74). “Several military rebellions erupted,
including one at the San Isidro Air Force Base, the center of Ramfis’s operations”
(Peguero 2004, 130). “There were also reports of a small rebellion by Air Force officers
at San Isidro Air Force Base, but it was subsequently put down and the rebels purged.
Several dead were reported. On the following day, Army tanks were in evidence on
the streets of Ciudad Trujillo, an unusual military activity. The presence of the tanks
was associated with the San Isidro revolt” (Hilton 1961). “Other rumblings of military
discontent were occasionally heard in the late summer and fall of 1961, and it soon be-
came clear that many of the military personnel were increasingly opposed to continued
Trujillo rule and sympathetic to the emerging opposition.” One observer concluded
“that except for the most die-hard assassins from the Trujillo era, it was likely that
most of the armed forces officers sympathized with” the opposition (Howard J Wiarda
1975, 291).
coup. Thompson’s original source, which is the same one cited by Peguero, is Hilton
(1961). Although cited by Hartyln as evidence of an air force uprising in July 1961,
Gleijeses (1978, 39-40) in fact only refers to “the peril continually invoked by Ramfis
and Balaguer of a coup d’etat by powerful military groups dissatisfied with a democ-
ratization that threatened their privileges.” He does not claim there was an air force
uprising in July 1961, only that the potential for one existed. The specter of a coup
was a weapon that the Ramfis-Balaguer pair used to try to persuade the U.S. to lift
sanctions; their coup fear is not evidence of a concrete action.
None of the sources that do refer to reports of this alleged air force uprising give any
specifics on a date in July or the names of specific air force officers involved. This
event allegedly targeted Ramfis Trujillo, though it is unclear if the alleged rebels were
allied with one of the “Wicked Uncles” or were aligned with the emergent opposition
groups that sought to end the Trujiilo regime and promote democracy. If one agreed
with Archigos that Balaguer was the leader after the death of Rafael Trujillo, then one
could dismiss this event as a mutiny or “not regime leader.” However, we contest the
Archigos leader coding, and instead code Ramfis Trujillo as regime leader at this time
71
and Balaguer as the nominal executive (see the regime leaders appendix for coding
justification).
We therefore do not dismiss this alleged air force rebellion against Ramfis Trujillo as
“not regime leader.” However, because we cannot confirm that any concrete actions
were designed to oust Ramfis (as opposed to seeking policy concessions, for example),
we code this alleged uprising as a mutiny. AMBIGUOUS (regime leader, action, target,
seize).
Category: coup plot
Balaguer as the leader of the Dominican Republic from May 30, 1961, until January 16,
1962; GWF code a personal regime (Dominican Rep 30-62) from 1930 until January
16, 1962.
Event: After Rafael Trujillo’s assassination in May 1961 (see 42-1961-5-30), his son
Rafael Jr, nicknamed Ramfis, was recalled from Paris to head the regime (Johansson
1962d). Ramfis Trujillo was commander in chief of the armed forces from early June
1961 to 14 November 1961. “Ramfis and the Trujillo family struggled for control of
the government with President Joaquı́n Balaguer. Ramfis led a bloody purge against
enemies of his father’s regime. The government faced growing opposition in the country
and pressure from the United States to institute democratic reforms” (Lentz 1994,
1312). In October 1961, as a concession to the opposition leaders of the National Civic
Union (UCN), two of the long-time dictator’s brothers, Héctor Bienvenido ‘Negro’
Trujillo Molina and General José Arismendi Trujillo Molina (the “Wicked Uncles”),
were pressured to leave the country and go to Jamaica (Roorda 2016, 321).
On November 14, 1961, Ramfis “abandoned the effort to maintain control” (292) and
“resigned as leader of the armed forces and the police” (Lentz 1994, 1312). Ramfis’
resignation caught most observers by surprise given that “conditions were propitious
for staying in power and seeking to ‘liberalise’ the dictatorship and present a ‘new
face’ of Tujillismo, as the Americans, momentarily, seemed ready to accept.” The real
reasons why Ramfis chose to resign were unclear. He claimed “personal reasons and
said that his uncle Hector would remain in the country but outside the armed forces,
“as a symbol of continuity of the Trujillo name.” In any event, once Ramfis resigned,
“all forces vying for power made an effort to turn unsettled matters in their favour”
(Torrijos 2008, 51). Some believed that Ramfis, used to the life of a playboy, simply
“refused to stand up to his uncles” in the ongoing power struggle (New York Times
1961b). The subsequent power struggle was largely three-sided, involving the Trujillo
family, Balaguer, and democratic opposition.
On November 15, the Wicked Uncles returned to Santo Domingo (Roorda 2016, 292)
“from their “vacations” abroad” (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 125). They went “to San
Isidro Air Force Base, where their military supporters were concentrated” (Roorda
2016, 321). “Meanwhile without consulting the nominal president, Balaguer, Héctor
and Arismendi began to issue directives to Police and armed forces units and were
72
openly plotting with their old cronies in the military to resume total control” (Howard
J Wiarda 1975, 292-293). They “attempted to recapture power for the Trujillo family
by ousting Balaguer from the presidency. They planned to carry out a national cam-
paign of violence against opposition forces” (Liberato 2013, 66). Meanwhile, “Balaguer
threatened to resign if the Trujillo brothers did not leave” and the “opposition took
the streets and demanded that all the Trujillos part” (Torrijos 2008, 51). Then, on
November 17, Ramfis left for a life in exile in Spain (Lentz 1994, 1312). “During that
uncertain interval the “Wicked Uncles” had their one chance to act. But they failed
to do so. Entrenched in the powerful military base at San Isidro, which their parti-
sans controlled, the uncles tried in vain to obtain Balaguer’s submission and to rally
the support of the military units stationed in the interior. Time was running short,”
however (Gleijeses 1978, 47).
“U.S. president John F. Kennedy responded by sending a naval force to the Dominican
Republic, threatening an invasion if the Wicked Uncles seized power” (Roorda 2016,
292). On November 17-18, U.S. ships carrying 1,500 marines moved near Dominican
waters to deter a coup against Balaguer by the Wicked Uncles (J. d. Onis 1961c). “At
a press conference on 18 November, Secretary Rusk bluntly stated that the United
States would not permit the Trujillo family to regain power and was considering “fur-
ther measures” to safeguard recent Dominican progress toward democracy.” The U.S.
flotilla “approached within three miles of the Dominican coast, in view of the capital”
(Atkins and Wilson 1998, 125-126). “The State Department reassured Balaguer of
US support” and “US Consul Hill demanded Hector and Arismendi to leave, threat-
ening military intervention to assure that the Dominican Republic does not “fall into
Casto-Communist hands”” (Torrijos 2008, 52).
Under domestic and US pressure, “certain military elements opposed to a Trujillo
takeover rallied behind Balaguer” (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 126). “Soon after Ramfis
departed on 17 November, Dominican Air Force officers led by Major General Pedro
Rafael Rodrı́guez Echavarrı́a succeeded in concentrating in Santiago all aircraft and
pilots” (Torrijos 2008, 52) at the country’s second largest air base. Planes out of Santi-
ago “swept over the capital dropping tracts signed” by General Rodrı́guez Echavarrı́a,
commander of the Santiago air base, and other air force officers (Gleijeses 1978, 48).
“The top general in the air force also announced that his forces, based in Santiago,
would oppose a return to power of the Trujillos” (Roorda 2016, 321). Declaring loyalty
to Balaguer, his forces bombed the Trujillo stronghold, the air force base of San Isidro
near the capital (Torrijos 2008, 52; Liberato 2013, 66). Echavarrı́a coordinated “some
of his groups actions with an American Navy Officer serving at the US Consulate”; his
actions were instrumental in enabling an isolated Balaguer to prevail over the Trujillos
(Torrijos 2008, 52). The navy followed the air force’s lead in declaring for Balaguer
(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1961).
Late on November 18, “Hector and Arismendi Trujillo, apparently taken aback by the
firmness of the US position and possibly by an inability to line up sufficient support
within the military, told Balaguer” that “they “had no thought” of a coup. Balaguer,
skeptical, “chuckled” when he told US Consul General Hill of this.” On November
19, Balaguer declared himself in supreme command of the armed forces and declared
73
a state of emergency (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1961). Within hours, the
“Wicked Uncles” left the country and returned to exile (Roorda 2016, 292) along with
27 “other members of the Trujillo family and a number of associates” (Atkins and
Wilson 1998, 126), including Gen. Fernando A. Sanchez, the pro-Trujillo air force
chief, as well as Gen. Jose Garcia Trujillo and ex-army commandant Virgilio Trujillo
(United Press International 1961f).
For his role in thwarting a Trujillo family counter-coup and backing Balaguer as pres-
ident (J. d. Onis 1961c), air force General Pedro Rafael Rodrı́guez Echavarrı́a was
named Secretary of the Armed Forces. (Pedro Rafael’s brother, Col. Pedro Santiago
Rodrı́guez Echavarrı́a, was named as the new air force chief at the same time (Associ-
ated Press 1961f).) Echavarrı́a’s career benefitted from a friendship he had developed
with Ramfis, who had commanded the air force until his exile (New York Times 1961b).
The general was extremely popular for several weeks, though that waned as it became
clear he was still supporting President Balaguer, who had been associated with the
Trujillo regime for three decades (Johansson 1962a). The public, for its support, had
supported the ouster of the Trujillos, but did not back Balaguer staying in office. Anti-
regime disturbances led Balaguer to declare a state of emergency. “At this time the
removal began of virtually all statues of the slain dictator throughout the country.
The capital was renamed Santo Domingo (its name until 1936). Trujillo’s body was
removed from Santo Domingo and flown to Ramfis in Paris for burial” (Atkins and
Wilson 1998, 126).
Coding rationale: No prior coup datasets we consulted included this event. However,
we consider it because some of the historical sources we consulted refer to a potential
failed Trujilloist coup attempt in November 1961. Between November 15-19, some
accounts state the Wicked Uncles “launched an abortive coup attempt to gain control
of the country for the Trujillo family” (Lentz 1994, 1312). By contrast, other reports
claimed that “the coup attempt that had been feared never was attempted” (J. d. Onis
1961c).
As we noted in the prior case (see 42-1961-7-15), we consider Ramfis Trujillo as regime
leader until his resignation on November 14. His sudden resignation was the spark for
the power struggle that broke out between November 15-19 between Balaguer loyalists
and those loyal to the “Wicked Uncles.” Although the former used force to defeat
the latter, we find no evidence that the Wicked Uncles took any concrete actions
(aside from the initial act of returning to the country in the first place and attempting
to secure the support of military officers in the country) against Balaguer, although
clearly they were plotting a coup at this time. We therefore code this event as a
coup plot whose defeat cemented the leadership of Balaguer over a dying regime that
after this point represented Trujilloism without Trujillos. Had one actually considered
the “Wicked Uncles” as the presumptive regime leaders following Ramfis’ resignation,
then this event could alternatively be interpreted as a successful reshuffling coup led by
Balguer and backed by elements of the armed forces (including Rodrı́guez Echavarrı́a)
and the United States.
74
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR; successful military coup - CCD;
failed coup attempt - CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Balaguer as being removed
on January 17 through “irregular” means by domestic military actors (civil-military
junta under leadership of Gen. Pedro Rodriguez Echavarrı́a) without foreign support.
Goemens, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009, 70) notes that “Since coup leader is a mili-
tary figure, coded as military coup”; Svolik codes Balaguer’s exit (on January 17) as a
military coup; GWF code the collapse of Trujillo’s personalist regime (Dominican Rep
30-62) on this date in a military coup. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Dominican
Republic since 1946 with the entire population being “Dominican.”
Event: After the power struggle with the Trujillo family was won by forces loyal to
Balaguer (see 42-1961-11-15), “the OAS subcommittee returned to the Dominican Re-
public for a third visit, from 20 to 26 November. Their subsequent report recommended
that the sanctions be lifted” (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 126). In late November 1961,
the UCN called a general strike to force Balaguer’s resignation. “Negotiations between
Balaguer and the UCN [National Civic Union] started and continued as the strike went
on, mediated by US Consul Hill and Undersecretary of State Morales Carrion (who
moved into the US Embassy)” (Torrijos 2008, 53). General Pedro Rafael Rodrı́guez
Echavarrı́a soon “emerged as the strong man behind Balaguer.” In early December, “a
group of thirteen Air Force officers led by Lt. Col. Raimundo Polanco Alegrı́a, com-
mander of the Barahona Air Force base, and Lt. Col. José Nelson González, deputy
chief of staff of the Air Force, asked Balaguer to replace Rodrı́guez in order to prevent
the establishment of what they terms “a new military dictatorship.” They claimed
Rodrı́guez “had betrayed the ideals of the Air Force” and that they “wanted to be
on the side of the people. Shortly thereafter another base commander, Brig. Gen.
Andrés A. Rodrı́guez Méndez, resigned in protest against the policies of the armed
forces secretary” (Howard J Wiarda 1975, 296).
“The Americans virtually took over the negotiations” as the military, suspicious of
the UCN, sided with Balaguer and “disagreed with the opposition’s effort to force
their way into power” (Torrijos 2008, 53). Antagonism between the military and the
UCN hardened (J. d. Onis 1961e) and negotiations broke down on December 10 after
Gen. Rodrı́guez refused demands for President Balaguer’s resignation and rejected the
UCN’s list of presidential candidates for an interim Council of State (R. H. Phillips
1961). If Balaguer were no longer in charge, the military threatened to install “a seven-
man military junta headed by General Rodrı́guez Echavarrı́a.” At this time the U.S.
also did not give in to UCN demands that Balaguer resign immediately as it refused
to be party to such a coup (Torrijos 2008, 53).
To break the impasse, the U.S. “persuaded Balaguer to share power with a seven-person
Council of State” (Crandall 2006, 48), which would fuse together both executive and
legislative branches of government (Torrijos 2008, 53). On December 17, Balaguer
“agreed that when the OAS terminated its sanctions he would resign from the council
and that another member, Dr. Rafael Francisco Bonnelly, would become president.
General elections were promised by late 1962” (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 126). On
75
January 1, 1962, “the Council of State took office. In addition to Balaguer, who
remained head of state, the council was made of members of the private sector, the
Catholic Church, and the two surviving assassins of Trujillo: Luis Amiama Tió and
Antonio Imbert Barrerra” (Crandall 2006, 48). The U.S. had insisted on the latter two’s
inclusion “believing that their ‘hero’ status would attract the population’s respect for
the new regime” (Torrijos 2008, 53). On 4 January 1962, 17 months after they had
been imposed, “the OAS terminated all sanctions. On 6 January the United States
resumed bilateral diplomatic relations, and on 11 January the two governments signed
an agreement providing for economic aid and a Peace Corps mission” (Atkins and
Wilson 1998, 127).
Meanwhile, the UCN charged the armed forces secretary of fabricating “subversive
plots.” On January 8, “Rodrı́guez had detected a “Castro-inspired conspiracy” at the
San Isidro base where three pilots had resigned after accusing Rodrı́guez of aspiring
to become a dictator. A few days later another “plot” was uncovered, this time in the
Navy and allegedly aimed at restoring the Trujillos to power... The UCN denounced
what it called the “poorly-disguised totalitarian ambitions” of the armed forces chief.
The Navy officers involved in the supposed conspiracy publicly called their superior’s
accusations “absurd.” Five cabinet members threatened to resign, and UCN supporters
staged a demonstration outside their headquarters in downtown Santo Domingo. Even
President Balaguer admitted that the plot was “of no real significance.” Balaguer’s
implied criticism of his own armed forces secretary was apparently the final straw”
(Howard J Wiarda 1975, 297).
On Tuesday, January 16, 1962, hundreds of protesters gathered in downtown Santo
Domingo demanding the resignation of both Balaguer and Rodrı́guez. Political oppo-
sition led by the UCN accused Balaguer of going back on his promise to resign after the
OAS lifted sanctions. They also charged Echavarrı́a of attempting to set up a Castro-
style dictatorship after he expropriated several Trujillo properties and redistributed
2-acre plots to peasants without any technical assistance (Johansson 1962a). Air Force
tanks fired on the crowds, killing several protesters. That night, Echavarrı́a announced
that both Balaguer and most of the Council of State had resigned (Johansson 1962b).
Apparently a main goal of the coup was to get rid of the UCN, which was represented
on the Council of State (Washington Post 1962c). Had Balaguer resigned in favor
of Vice President Bonnelly, the UCN would have gained the constitutional power to
replace Echavarrı́a as Secretary of the Armed Forces (R. H. Phillips 1961).
To preempt that threat, by Wednesday, 17 January, Echavarrı́a had imprisoned the
deposed UCN members of the Council of State and arrested UCN leaders, including its
president Viriato Fiallo (Johansson 1962c). He appointed Humberto Bogaert, a Trujillo
era civilian official, to head a new seven-man civil-military junta (Johansson 1962d).
The only holdovers from the Council of State were the non-UCN civilians Antonio
Imbert Barrera and Luis Amiamo Tio (Washington Post 1962c). The junta faced
continued civil protest (Washington Post 1962c), opposition-sparked riots (Geyelin
1962), general strikes and walkouts (Torrijos 2008, 54). Street fighting broke out
between rebel youth gangs and police and army patrols (McReynolds 1962a).
76
Signaling its displeasure with the coup, the United States threatened to withdraw
diplomatic recognition until constitutional rule was restored (Kenworthy 1962). U.S.
officials told reporters they would leverage the sugar quota and renewal of U.S. aid
to prod the junta to allow free elections (Geyelin 1962). However, the U.S. did not
dispatch a fleet to Dominican waters as it had in November 1961. “No OAS action
was proposed, although the organization did halt its steps toward renewal of aid and
trade” (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 127). Nevertheless, a counter-coup reversed this coup
two days later (see 42-1962-1-18).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we assume that Rodrı́guez Echavarrı́a sought
to prevent the UCN from taking power and prevent a democratic transition. This
implies Echavarrı́a sought to force the resignation of Balaguer as an attempt to preserve
the regime in the face of growing civil protest, a regime reshuffling motive. Slater
(1964, 280) says this “reactionary” coup failed due to lack of U.S. support. Prior to
his coup, Echavarrı́a not only prevented the return of the Trujillos, but also began
“placing relatives in key positions” and “discovering “plots” which were invisible to
any other eyes” (Howard J. Wiarda 1965, 476). We find no evidence that Echavarrı́a
sought to prevent ethnic narrowing or rule in conjunction with the opposition. Because
Echavarrı́a ruled for less than a week (and also failed in preventing UCN from entering
the ruling coalition), we code this event as a failed leader reshuffling coup even though
it succeeded in ousting Balaguer. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code the collapse
of the Trujillo regime on this date as the start of the regime collapse event that lasts
until June 18, as the evidence indicates the collapse of the Trujillo regime was not
complete until January 18 (see 42-1962-1-18 below).
• # 42-1962-1-18: Dominican Republic, Pedro Echevarrı́a

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD; forced leadership change not considered coup
détat (resignation of executive due to poor performance/loss of legitimacy) - CSP; legal
- PT; not a coup - Singh; Archigos codes Echevarrı́a as entering office through “irreg-
ular” means on January 17, 1962 (ousting Balaguer), and being removed on January
19 through “irregular” means by domestic military actors without foreign support;
Following an earlier version of Archigos, Svolik codes the Dominican Republic’s leader
under the civil-military junta installed on January 16 as Huberto Bogaert, and he codes
him as being removed by a military coup on January 19; GWF code the collapse of
Trujillo’s personalist regime (Dominican Rep 30-62) on January 16, 1962. GWF do not
code an autocratic regime for the Dominican Republic from January 16, 1962, until
September 26, 1963. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Dominican Republic since
1946 with the entire population being “Dominican.”
Event: Late on January 18, 1962, two days after being forced to resign (see 42-
1962-1-16) and following a naval show of force by the United States, rising domestic
protest, and regime defections15 , a counter-coup led by Capt. Elı́as Wessin y Wessin
15. Echavarrı́a’s junta was hurt when two holdover civilians, Imbert and Tio, withdrew from the junta and
sought asylum (Associated Press 1962d).
77
(Crandall 2006, 49) restored the Council of State to power. Four junta members and
Echavarrı́a were imprisoned by young Air Force officers, who released the imprisoned
Council of State members (Johansson 1962c) at San Isidro air base around 8 p.m.
The government-operated Radio Caribe said that Air Force Gen. Andres Rodriguez
Mendez, commander of the Barahona base, had been appointed new armed force chief
and said that the Dominican navy had declared its support for the Council of State.
Santo Domingo’s populace was “jubilant” at the Council’s return to power. Church
bells rang and cheering crowds went into the streets shouting “Liberty! Liberty!” (As-
sociated Press 1962d). US state department officials were privately “elated” at news of
the counter-coup and prepared to extend support to the new regime (New York Times
1962g).
The reinstated Council of State’s first act was to accept the resignation of Joaquı́n
Balaguer. Rafael Bonnelly, a UCN adherent and until January 16 the First Vice
President of the Council of State, became President. On January 19, Echavarrı́a’s
deputy, Army Col. Victor Elvys Vinas Roman, was named armed forces secretary
(Berrellez 1962). Col. Miguel Atila Luna Perez, one of the counter-coup leaders, was
promoted to brigadier general and named the new air force chief (Associated Press
1962f). On January 19, the United States formally welcomed the change and announced
preparation of a $20 million loan (New York Times 1962q). Bonnelly presented himself
as a “liberal in the truly democratic sense” who pledged to carry out a transition to a
“government of law” (Associated Press 1962e).
By January 20, Bonnelly announced that the Council of State was in full control with
the backing of the armed forces and the United States (McReynolds 1962b). Bonnelly
called his government “left of center” but not extreme. The previous night, police ar-
rested some mobs that were looting stores and houses of Trujillo backers. On January
20, Gen. Rodriguez Mendes, in exile in Puerto Rico since November, returned to the
country (United Press International 1962a). On January 21, Balaguer sought and was
granted political asylum by the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo. Meanwhile, Bonnelly
named Col. Marcos Jorge Moreno as army chief and promoted him to brigadier gen-
eral. Capt. Francisco Javier Riveras Caminero was appointed the new navy chief with
the rank of commodore (R. H. Phillips 1962). Both Echavarrı́a and Balaguer soon went
into exile. A month later, the U.S. agreed to a new aid package for the Dominican
Republic. “The council of state served as the provisional government until February
1963” and presided over new elections in December 1962 that were easily won by Juan
Bosch of the PRD over the UCN candidate Viriato Alberto Fiallo (Atkins and Wilson
1998, 127-128).
Coding rationale: This coup marks the end of the regime collapse event for the Trujillo
regime (led by Balaguer at this point) and also prevented the consolidation of power
by Echevarrı́a. It therefore cleared the way for a democratic transition. However, we
do not consider this a constitutional action as Echevarrı́a’s ouster, Balaguer’s “resig-
nation,” and Bonnelly’s succession was achieved not through “regular” means but by
military force. A genuinely constitutional or legal counter-coup would have restored
Balaguer rather than promote Bonnelly in his place. Instead, Balaguer was forced to
78
resign and forced into exile (Howard J. Wiarda 1965, 476). We therefore code this
event a successful regime change coup. Also see 42-1962-1-16.
• # 42-1963-9-25: Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup - CSP, Perez,
PT, Luttwak, Singh, and Thompson; failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes
Bosch as the leader of Dominican Republic from February 27, 1963, until September
25, 1963; GWF code a democracy (Dominican Rep 62-63) as collapsing on this date.
EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Dominican Republic since 1946 with the entire
population being “Dominican.”
Event: The democratically-elected government of Juan Bosch, the founder of the Do-
minican Revolutionary Party (PRD), was politically liberal and “concerned for the
welfare of all Dominicans. The 1963 constitution separated church and state, guaran-
teed civil and individual rights, and endorsed civilian control of the military. These
and other changes, such as land reform, struck conservative landholders and military
officers as radical and threatening. The hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church also
resented the secular nature of the new constitution, in particular its provision for legal-
ized divorce. The hierarchy, along with the military leadership and the economic elite,
also feared communist influence in the republic, and they warned of the potential for
“another Cuba” ” (Hartlyn 2001, 44). In fist months in office, Bosch, fearing a coup,
went out of his way not to tamper with the armed forces or reduce their budget. Yet,
“The issue that united all those military officers who opposed Bosch for various reasons
was the alleged growing Communist influences in his government” (Howard J. Wiarda
1965, 480). In July, the military leadership was embarrassed and angered when the
President demanded and secured the resignation of officers who had criticized “Com-
munist infiltration” in government and had demanded action or even Bosh’s ouster
(481).
Only seven months into his term, “With rumors of a coup circulating throughout Santo
Domingo, on September 24, 1963, a desperate Bosch asked [U.S.] Ambassador Martin
to request immediate military assistance from Washington” to save his government,
but the U.S. rejected the request (Crandall 2006, 52). The next day, “conservative
forces coalesced with political, military, and church figures to overthrow President
Bosch (Hartlyn 2001, 44) in a bloodless coup. At 7:30 a.m., the military issued a
communique – signed by Gen. Victor Elby Viñas Román, the armed forces minister –
announcing the takeover and declaring a state of siege. Santo Domingo Radio broadcast
that “Castro Communism has been crushed.” In their first act, the military dissolved
both chambers of Congress, annulled the 1963 constitution (reinstituting the pre-Bosch
constitution), and outlawed all Marxist-Leninist or Castroist-inspired political parties.
parties (New York Times 1963e). “One of the chief architects of the coup was once
again General [Elias] Wessin y Wessin, who commanded the Armed Forces Training
Center located the San Isidro air base outside Santo Domingo” (Crandall 2006, 52).
Several dozen other officers signed the coup communique, including senior officers such
79
as Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera (Lowenthal 1973, 358-359) and Colonel Neit Nivar
Seijas (Bosch 2007, 20). “Bosch fled into exile in Puerto Rico” (Crandall 2006, 52).
Cuba denounced the coup and called the Dominican military “guerillas” enemies of
“progressive Dominicans” (United Press International 1963b).
A day and half later, a civilian junta known as the Triumvirate, dominated by the
UCN and headed by Emilio de los Santos, was formed (Hartlyn 2001, 44). The military
“advised” the Triumvirate. “In the days that followed many were exiled or jailed and
many organizations-labor, peasant, political parties-which had worked closely with the
Bosch government were raided and closed by the Police” (Howard J. Wiarda 1965,
482). By the time of the coup, U.S. support for Bosh’s government had weakened
(Hartlyn 2001, 44), though the U.S. suspended diplomatic relations and aid through
the Alliance for Progress in protest of the coup (United Press International 1963b).
But “middle-sector and popular-sector groups remained” too weak and unorganized
to oppose the coup (Hartlyn 2001, 44). Protests against the coup only emerged on
October 6 calling for the restoration of the constitutional government, but the anti-
coup protestsnever gathered more than 700 people in the Plaza Cervantes (Tad Szulc
1963b). At the end of October, Britain defied U.S. wishes and became the fifth state
to recognize the junta (United Press International 1963a).
Ironically, the 1963 coup right-wing strengthened the weak radical left “and the coun-
try experienced further polarization over the next several years. Following the coup, a
civilian junta known as the Triumvirate, dominated by the UCN and headed by Emilio
de los Santos, was formed (Hartlyn 2001, 44). The Kennedy administration initially
withheld recognition of the new regime, but relented to reality and did so on December
14, 1963 with an agreement it would hold elections in 1965 (Crandall 2006, 52). On
December 23, Santos resigned “and was replaced by Donald Reid Cabral, who increas-
ingly became the dominant figure” (Hartlyn 2001, 44). The Triumvirate would remain
in power until the Dominican Civil War of 1965 prompted U.S. military intervention.
Coding rationale: This is a consensus coup among major prior datasets. Consistent
with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event as a successful anti-
democratic coup.
• # 42-1965-4-25: Dominican Republic, Reid Cabral

Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; successful military coup and popular
revolt - CCD; successful coup - CSP and PT; failed coup attempt - Singh; Archigos
codes Reid Cabral as being removed on this date through “irregular” means by domes-
tic military actors without foreign support; Svolik codes the exit of the Triumvirate as
a non-military coup on this date; Singh codes a coup attempt on this date that was
unresolved for more than one month and that led to a civil war; GWF code the col-
lapse of a military regime (Dominican Rep 63-65), which was led by Wessin Y Wessin
since September 1963, on this date in a civil war. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in
Dominican Republic since 1946 with the entire population being “Dominican.”
80
Event: By the fall of 1964, plotting against the military Triumvirate government that
was backed by General Elı́as Wessin y Wessin, the powerful director of the Centro de
Enseñanza de las Fuerzas Amadas (Armed Forces Training Center, CEFA), was rife.
16
In an effort to neutralize Balaguer supporters in the armed forces, in October 1964
Reid Cabral, backed by Wessin y Wessin, re-assigned Neit Nivar Seijas and other of-
ficers associated with the so-called San Cristobal Group of Trujillista officers (Bosch
2007, 16). Other threats remained. In January 1965, a group of liberal (“Constitu-
tionalist) officers who favored the return of Juan Bosch, the founder of the Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PRD) whose removal as president in a military coup in Septem-
ber 1963 marked the end of the Dominican Republic’s nascent democratic regime (see
42-1963-9-25) (Crandall 2006, 55-56), organized a conspiracy of their own to topple
the military Triumvirate (Roorda 2016, 83). Early plotters included Lt. Col. Miguel
Angel Hernando Ramı́rez (head of army training) and Captain Héctor Lachapelle Dı́az
(a CEFA officer cashiered in 1963) (Bosch 2007, 19-20).
On April 25, 1965, the coup attempt began when about 1,000 troops from “two Army
units west of the capital–the Juan Pablo Duarte and Francisco del Rosario Sánchez –
rose up” in rebellion (18). The military leader of the rebellion was initially Lt. Col.
Miguel Angel Hernando Ramı́rez (20). Colonel Camaaño Deñó quickly joined the
Constitutionalist rebellion, seized the presidential palace, arrested Reid Cabral, and
affirmed his support for the return of Juan Bosch. The so-called Constitutionalists
took the capital without a fight and announced their support for PRD leader José
Molina Ureña, who declared himself “provisional constitutional president.” On the
afternoon of April 25, “it appeared as though Bosch’s triumphant return to power was
only a question of time” (Crandall 2006, 55-56). Hernando Ramı́rez became the first
minister of armed forces in the Constitutionalist government (Bosch 2007, 20)
Constitutionalist forces were soon augmented “with other Army units from within
Santo Domingo and from the light artillery element at Libertad Military Camp, with
sailors and frogmen from Las Calderas Naval Base, and with a small number of Air
Force and National Police officers. The total is estimated to be less than 3,000” (18).
Pro-PRD civilians, including communists, also began arming, and law and order broke
down. By April 26, “Several elements of the military–many of whom had passively
stood by as Cabral was being removed–reacted with horror to the now openly pro-
Bosch and seemingly pro-leftist and Communist revolt.” General Wessin y Wessin and
“the air force’s Juan de los Santos Céspedes responded with alacrity in an effort to
prevent an outcome that would lead to Bosch’s return as president.” Loyalist [anti-
Constitutionalist] commanders ordered Dominican air force F-51 planes to strafe the
presidential palace, where Molina Ureña was serving as the disputed provisional pres-
ident. Gen. Wessin y Wessin immediately requested U.S. support but was initially
denied (Crandall 2006, 56-57).
On April 27, CEFA units crossed the Duarte Bridge in an attempted counter-coup.
“The lead tanks, however, moved faster than the infantry could follow; consequently,
16. CEFA, based at San Isidro, “housed a total of 4,000 troops, all the tanks in the armed forces, and
almost all of the air force” (Crandall 2006, 96).
81
the armor arrived on the opposite side of the river unprotected. Initially, the rebels,
who were mostly civilians, were stunned and ready to flee when they abruptly faced
the tanks. This situation rapidly changed, however, when a small group of braver
insurgents attacked the AMX-13s with Molotov cocktails. With no CEFA infantry
available, the tankers were overwhelmed and the crowd realized they had more power
than expected. From that point on, the rebels set up a determined defense around
the wavering CEFA bridgehead on the Santo Domingo side of the river, which led to
the collapse of the armored forces. The once potent CEFA withdrew to the San Isidro
bank of the Ozama” (Bosch 2007, 13). That afternoon, Constitutionalist officers led by
Ureña went to the U.S. embassy to put an end to loyalist air attacks but were refused.
Ureña accepted U.S. Ambassador William Tapley Bennett’s request to resign since his
government had allegedly permitted communists to exploit the revolt. Angered by
the U.S. response, Colonel Caamaño Deñó left the embassy for the front” (Crandall
2006, 57-59). Meanwhile, Hernando Ramı́rez took asylum in the Ecuadorian Embassy
(Bosch 2007, 20) The Constitutionalists gained momentum and Caamaño immediately
took over as minister of the armed forces in the Constitutionalist government that
controlled Santo Domingo (18). Loyalist troop strength collapsed from 30,000 to 2,400
in the next few days(Roorda 2016, 83-84).
On April 28, Loyalist commanders formed an alternative junta under the head of
Colonel Pedro Bartolomé Benoit that worked out of the San Isidro base. That morn-
ing, Constitutionalists went on the offensive and attacked the arm’s cache at the Ozama
fortress. With a Loyalist defeat looking imminent, the U.S. militarily intervened, send-
ing the Marines in late on April 28, and the 82nd Airborne on April 30. Fearing “an-
other Cuba,” their goal was not to reinstall Cabral but to preempt a Constitutionalist
or communist takeover (Crandall 2006, 57-59). The U.S. intervention, dubbed Opera-
tion Power Pack, led to a year-long occupation of Santo Domingo beginning April 30
that contained the Constitutionalists into the inner city of Santo Domingo (Roorda
2016, 82-84). On May 15, some 2,000 loyalist troops under the command Col. En-
rique Pérez y Pérez and others launched Operación Limpieza to recapture Radio Santo
Domingo (Bosch 2007, 84).
On May 24, Caamaño took over as Constitutionalist president (18). On June 12, 1965,
Hernando Ramı́rez rejoined the Constitutionalist army, but was wounded five days
later. He regained his health in July 1965, but by this point was disillusioned with
“the leftist nature of the movmement he had helped start” and decided to go into
self-imposed exile (20). In late August 1965, Caamaño agreed to resign and leave the
country as part of a deal with U.S. negotiators to end the occupation. In September
1965, Héctor Garcı́a Godoy was installed as president of a provisional government,
ending the Constitutionalist Revolt (Roorda 2016, 82-84). Presidential elections were
held in 1966 that brought Joaquı́n Balaguer back to power (82-84).
Coding rationale: The fact that Archigos and GWF disagree on the leader at this time
is irrelevant to our coding because the coup makers targeted both Cabral and Wessin
y Wessin. On April 25, Cabral was ousted, and a civil war was initiated. However, we
do not exclude this event as a case of prior defection because the “constitutionalist”
82
rebels were in fact current and active members of the military at this time.
Coding success or failure is ambiguous. From April 25 to April 27, the loyalist military
regime appeared to collapse with the Constitutionalists in power. However, from April
28, there were dual power centers after Loyalists reconstituted a military regime under
Bartolomé Benoit. After April 30, these two power centers continued to claim power,
but with U.S. occupation, the success of the Constitutionalists appeared out of reach.
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) date the collapse of the military regime to April
25, marking the beginning rather than end of an intra-military struggle for power.
We code Cabral’s ouster as a successful coup attempt because the coup ousted the
incumbent Cabral-led military regime. However, due to the U.S. occupation on April
30, the Constitutionalist forces did not hold on to power (uncontested) for at least
seven days or achieve their desired return to civilian rule).
• # 42-1965-4-27: Dominican Republic, José Molina Ureña
Category: combined
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, Singh; failed coup attempt -
Luttwak; Archigos codes Molina Urena as exiting on this date; GWF code the Do-
minican Republic (Dominican Rep 65-66) as foreign occupied from April 26, 1965,
until May 31, 1966.
Event: See 42-1965-4-25
Coding rationale: We code this event as combined with the coup event on April 25, as
it occurs within seven days of the prior coup event and is part of the same outbreak
of civil war which prompted U.S. intervention and occupation.
• # 42-1965-11-22: Dominican Republic, Héctor Garcı́a-Godoy
Other Datasets: failed coup attempt - CCD, CSP, PT, Luttwak (November 26); no
military involvement - Singh; failed coup attempt - WHIV; Archigos codes Boniface
Alexandre as leader from February 29, 2004, until May 14, 2006; GWF code the
Dominican Republic (Dominican Rep 65-66) as foreign occupied from April 26, 1965,
until May 31, 1966; EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant since 1946.
Event: On September 3, 1965, a provisional government led by Héctor Garcı́a-Godoy
was installed following an “Act of Reconciliation” between Constitutionalists and the
military and its rule was backed by the IAPF. Under the agreement, general elections
were to be held within nine months (Crandall 2006, 86-87). On September 4, 1965,
Garcı́a-Godoy abolished the Centro de Enseñanza de las Fuerzas Amadas (Armed
Forces Training Center, CEFA) that had been commanded by loyalist Brigadier General
Elı́as Wessin y Wessin, and redesignated it the 4th Brigade (Bosch 2007, 14). On
September 9, the ultra conservative Brig. Gen. Wessin y Wessin, whom many saw as
anti-democratic, was forced to retire, turn over his command, and leave the country by
the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) (John M Goshko 1965). On September
25, Juan Bosch returned to the country (Crandall 2006, 88), making “it clear that the
83
Ad Hoc Committee and Garcia-Godoy meant what they said about free elections.”
Thereafter,“ the military moved into a state of permanent revolt.” “Garcia-Godoy
stayed in power only with major OAS support. “Only the rapid deployment of IAPF
troops prevented several coup attempts from succeeding and made it possible for the
elections to be held on schedule” (Slater 1969, 67).
On October 1, Wessin y Wessin told American lawmakers Héctor Garcı́a-Godoy had
packed his cabinet with communists and was “the leader of the Dominican communists”
himself. His remarks were made public on November 18 (John M Goshko 1965). By
then, rumors of an imminent right-wing coup began circulating, either intending to
create a civil-military junta or lead to the return of Brig. Gen. Wessin y Wessin from
his exile in the United States. On November 16, the armed forces were ordered to
remain in their barracks (New York Times 1965c). On November 21, trying to deter
the feared rightist coup, Garcı́a-Godoy requested half a company of the IAPF’s 82nd
Airborne Division to occupy the Santiago Air Force base and civilian airport; U.S.
troops were also deployed to Barahona on the south coast (New York Times 1965b).
At 1 a.m. on November 22, 1965, a rebel broadcast from a small private radio station
at Tamboril, a town 10 miles northwest of Santiago, announced that a “revolutionary
democratic government” had been set up under a new president Alcibiades Espinosa,
a physician from the Dominican Republic’s Southeast and an activist in the National
Civic Union (UCN). The broadcast also said that UCN leader José Tapia Brea had
been appointed foreign minister. Before dawn, no more than 300 men, “mostly peas-
ants armed with machetes, baseball bats and a few rifles” who had been gathering at
a hotel on the outskirts of Santiago, tried to establish roadblocks on the national high-
ways leading to Santiago (Hoffman 1965). The rebels called Garcı́a-Godoy an extreme
leftist (Hoffman 1965), and a rightist leader admitted participation in the movement
(Natanson 1965). “Imbert and other well-known rightists were apparently involved”
(Palmer Jr 2015, 125). Army troops and police were alerted and by 5:30 a.m. had
the situation under control. They persuaded most insurgents to return to their homes
without any fighting. Some 38 people were detained, including Espinosa (Associated
Press 1965a).
In an indication of Garcı́a-Godoy’s “growing legitimacy, a November 21 right-wing
coup attempt against him was put down by the military, not the IAPF” (Crandall
2006, 87-88). Armed Forces Secretary Fancisco J. Rivera Caminero initially said that
no active troops were involved in the plot (Associated Press 1965a). But the next
day a “well-informed military source” claimed that senior military officers under the
influence of exiled Brig. Gen. Wessin y Wessin – unhappy with Rivera Caminero for
his support of the provisional government – had in fact been involved in the plot (New
York Times 1965a). However, in December Garcı́a-Godoy himself insisted that there
was no evidence that Wessin y Wessin organized the plot, only that the plotters had
summoned him to return to the country during their abortive uprising (Associated
Press 1965b).
Coding rationale: Whether this event is a coup attempt depends on whether there
is evidence that current, active members of the military were involved. We find no
84
unambiguous evidence that current members of the military were involved in planning
or executing the uprising (though coup plot rumors were swirling at the time). Even if
Wessin y Wessin was involved, he was a prior defector that was exiled in the U.S. We
therefore code this event as a case of “prior defection” led by disgruntled right-wing
civilian elements. Had we assumed current military involvement, we would consider
this a failed provisional coup; its main goal appears to have been to prevent new leftist
groups from being included in the government.

Other Datasets: failed coup attempt involving military actors, non-military govern-
ment actors, and ordinary citizens - CCD (no day); not a candidate - CSP, PT, and
Singh; Archigos codes Balaguer as leader from July 1, 1966, to July 1, 1978; Svolik
codes Balaguer as leader from July 1, 1966, to August 16, 1978; GWF code a personal
regime (Dominican Rep 66-78) from June 1, 1966, to May 16, 1978, which was led by
Balaguer.
Event: Col. Francisco Caamaño Deñó, the leader of the failed Constitutionalist coup
of April 1965 (see 42-1965-4-25), “traveled from England to Cuba in 1967, where he
organized a group of insurgents to overthrow the government of Joaqı́n Balaguer, who
had become president at the end of the U.S. occupation in 1966 and initiated a period
of political repression known at the Twelve years. In early 1973, Camaaño and his band
of nine commandos left Cuba by sea and landed near Azua, escaping into the Central
Mountains. He was wounded, captured, and summarily executed by government forces
on 16 February 1973” (Roorda 2016, xxxiv,63). Juan Bosch was detained after the
invasion, prompting him to publicly deny any involvement in the invasion (59).
Coding rationale: Because we find no evidence that current active members of the
military were complicit in the invasion, which was led by a “band of uniformed gueril-
las” (United Press International 1973a, 1973b), we code this event as a case of prior
defection.
85
2.1.5 70: Mexico
Table 5: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Mexico

70-1994-1-16 Mexico 15-00 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos not exist
• # 70-1994-1-16: Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gortari

Category: not exist
Singh; Archigos codes Salinas de Gortari as the leader of Mexico from December 1,
1988, until being removed on November 30, 1994, through “regular” means; GWF code
a single-party regime (Mexico 15-00) from August 2, 1915, until November 3, 2000.
Event: On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came
into effect. In response, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN, Ejército
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional ), led by Rafael Guillen and based in Chiapas, declared
an armed rebellion in Chiapas (Golden 1994). After nearly two weeks of fighting,
President Salinas ordered a unilateral ceasefire on Wednesday, January 12, though
skirmishes continued on Friday. On January 16, human rights activists uncovered at
least five bodies in a grave in Ocosingo believed to have been victims of the fighting
(DePalma 1994). That day, President Salinas offered the rebels amnesty, but there
were no takers by month’s end (Associated Press 1994).
Coding rationale: WHIV is the only major dataset to code a coup attempt on this
date. We find no evidence of a coup attempt targeting President Salinas on this date;
rather, actions by rebels and the President were taken in the context of an ongoing
insurgency. We therefore code this event as “not exist,” and otherwise assume that
WHIV was coding actions as part of the “prior defection” by the EZLN earlier in the
month.
86
2.1.6 90: Guatemala
Table 6: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Guatemala

90-1946-6-26 Guatemala 44-54 Arévalo, Juan José coup plot

90-1949-7-18 Guatemala 44-54 Arévalo, Juan José Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
90-1950-11-6 Guatemala 44-54 Arévalo, Juan José prior defection
90-1953-3-29 Guatemala 44-54 Árbenz Guzman, Jacobo Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
90-1954-6-27 Guatemala 44-54 Árbenz Guzman, Jacobo Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
90-1954-6-29 Guatemala 54-54 (new) Dı́az, Carlos Enrique Reshuffle Coup (S)
90-1954-7-8 Guatemala 54-54 (new) Monzón, Elfego Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
90-1954-8-2 Guatemala 54-58 Castillo Armas, Carlos Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
90-1955-1-20 Guatemala 54-58 Castillo Armas, Carlos Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
90-1955-5-20 Guatemala 54-58 Castillo Armas, Carlos coup plot
90-1957-10-24 Guatemala 54-58 González López, Luis Arturo Reshuffle Coup (S)
90-1957-10-27 Guatemala 54-58 Mendoza Azurdia, Óscar legal
90-1960-7-18 Guatemala 58-63 Ydı́goras Fuentes, Miguel Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
90-1960-11-13 Guatemala 58-63 Ydı́goras Fuentes, Miguel Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
90-1962-11-25 Guatemala 58-63 Ydı́goras Fuentes, Miguel Reshuffle Coup (F)
90-1963-3-30 Guatemala 58-63 Ydı́goras Fuentes, Miguel Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
90-1982-3-23 Guatemala 70-85 Lucas Garcı́a, Fernando Romeo Reshuffle Coup (S)
90-1982-8-14 Guatemala 70-85 Rı́os Montt, José Efraı́n coup plot
90-1982-10-20 Guatemala 70-85 Rı́os Montt, José Efraı́n coup plot
90-1983-6-27 Guatemala 70-85 Rı́os Montt, José Efraı́n Reshuffle Coup (F)
90-1983-8-8 Guatemala 70-85 Rı́os Montt, José Efraı́n Reshuffle Coup (S)
90-1988-5-11 Guatemala 85-95 Gramajo Morales, Héctor Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
90-1989-5-9 Guatemala 85-95 Gramajo Morales, Héctor Reshuffle Coup (F)
90-1993-5-25 Guatemala 85-95 Garcı́a Samayoa, José D. Autogolpe (F)
90-1993-6-1 Guatemala 85-95 Garcı́a Samayoa, José D. Reshuffle Coup (S)
• # 90-1946-6-26: Guatemala, Juan José Arévalo

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP and Singh;
Archigos codes Arevalo as the leader of Guatemala from March 15, 1945, until March
1, 1951; GWF code a democracy (Guatemala 44-54) from January 1, 1945, until June
27, 1954.
Event: On June 26, 1946, the government announced that a number of army troops
were among those arrested on charges of plotting to overthrow the government. An
uprising was “scheduled to break last night” (Associated Press 1946e). On July 14,
1946, Sgts. Juan Pablo Aguilar and Samuel Marroquin were sentenced to 10 years in
prison for participating in a plot the previous month to overthrow the government.
Sgt. Jesus Aldana was acquitted for lack of evidence (New York Times 1946b).
Coding rationale: Fry (2018) does not record any coup attempt in 1946. Because we
can find no evidence of concrete actions in connection with this event, we code this
event as a coup plot.
87
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD (July 9); not a candidate - CSP;
failed coup attempt - Singh, Luttwak (July 9), and Thompson; Archigos codes Arevalo
as the leader of Guatemala from March 15, 1945, until March 1, 1951; GWF code a
democracy (Guatemala 44-54) from January 1, 1945, until June 27, 1954. EPR codes
Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: General Francisco Javier Arana, head of the armed forces, “became critical
toward what he perceived as Arévalo’s leniency toward Communists. He pressured
President Arévalo to close the Escuela Claridad, which many considered to be a center
for Communist indoctrination. On 17 July 1949, he demanded that the president install
a new cabinet consisting of people chosen by the high command. He also demanded
that the president turn over to him a shipment of arms in the Chalet El Morlón in
Amratitlán, which were given to the Caribbean Legion to overthrow Dominican Rafael
Leonidas Trujiilo. In response, Arévalo called the minister of defense, Jacobo Arbenz,
and together they decided to arrest Arana for insubordination and ask Congress to
dismiss him; however, that plan was never carried out. On 18 July 1949, Arana led
a small contingent of troops to seize the arms at the Chalet El Morlón and, on the
way back, was intercepted at the Puente La Gloria in Amatitlán by Major Enrique
Blanco, who was accompanied by a group of armed men. A violent skirmish broke out.
Arana, his assistant, as well as Blanco, were killed” (Fry 2018, 45-46). At the time of
his death, Aran “had been plotting a coup” (Schirmer 1998, 12-13).
“Upon learning of the incident, the Guardia de Honor revolted with support from
various civilian political leaders, including some who had played important roles in the
Revolution of 1944, for example, Mario Méndez Montenegro. The Guardia de Honor
bombarded and damaged several strategic military installations in Guatemala City.
Nonetheless, the regular forces, loyal to Arévalo and Arbenz, came to dominate them”
(Fry 2018, 46). “By dawn on July 19, the government was winning. The presidential
palace and the police headquarters, the main targets of the rebels’ attacks the previous
day, were in government hands. Government hands were now firmly in control of the
Base Military. The air force was also loyal... By late morning soldiers from the Base
Militar and armed civilians began to attack the Guardia de Honor.” Air force planes
strafed the rebel barracks. Demoralized, the rebels sued for peace at 1 p.m. through
the Nuncio. After the government demanded complete surrender, fighting resumed,
until the Guardia de Honor raised the white flag at 5 p.m. A total of 150 people died
and over 200 were wounded Gleijeses (1992, 68-69).
The Guardia de Honor rebellion was “the most serious of the many military coups
attempted against Arévalo” (Fry 2018, xxxic). The rebels were led by Col. Fernan-
dez Ilivares (Associated Press 1949h). (Associated Press 1949i). “Nevertheless, the
General Staff of the Armed Forces remained intact as an institutional force and in
direct competition for political power with the civilian president” (Schirmer 1998, 13).
“After the rebels’ defeat senior officers loyal to Arana were deported; others were re-
88
tired, like Castillo Armas, or were shifted to positions of little importance. Men loyal
to Jacobo Arbenz now held the key military posts. On July 25, 1949, at Arbenz’s
request, Congress chose thirty-one-year old Paz Tejada as chief of the armed forces”
(Gleijeses 1992, 72). Even though Col. Castillo Armas “had failed to join the revolt
of his friends” in July 1949, he would continue plotting against Arévalo and Arbenz in
subsequent years (82).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event as a failed anti-democratic
coup. Informed sources said if the rebels who attacked the palace succeeded, “Arevalo’s
resignation will be demanded and a military junta probably will emerge as the ruling
group” (Associated Press 1949j). We therefore do not exclude the rebellion as only a
mutiny.

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD (no month and no day); not a
candidate - CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Arevalo as the leader of Guatemala
from March 15, 1945, until March 1, 1951; GWF code a democracy (Guatemala 44-54)
from January 1, 1945, until June 27, 1954.
Event: Starting in January 1950 and throughout the, the CIA reported on reports
that Col. Carlos Castillo Armas was in the initial stages of plotting a coup (Gleijeses
1992, 82). “In 1950, Castillo Armas joined other military officers in opposition to the
government of Jacobo Arbenz in a conspiracy to attack and seize the La Aurora military
base” (Fry 2018, 97). On November 5, five days before the presidential elections,
Castillo Armas struck. “With seventy men he attacked the Base Militar in the capital,
confident that the element of surprise and the complicity of a few junior officers within
the barracks would guarantee his success. (Castillo Armas, Marroquı́n Rojas later
wrote, was “sure that the Base Military would be his, as if it were a seat he had
reserved at the theater.”) His initial victory, he believed, would spark a revolt in the
army–a most bizarre proposition, since loyalist officers were in command of the troops”
(Gleijeses 1992, 82). “As late as November 4, Lieutenant Montenegro, one of Castillo
Armas’ followers, had tried “to reason with him.” The revolt, he argued, was hopeless
even if they could seize Base Militar. But Castillo Armas didn’t even seize the base.
One of his accomplices betrayed him; the attackers were met with heavy fire and swiftly
routed” (83). The attack reportedly involved “a group of seventy civilians and three
former military men.” Some 16 men were killed and seven wounded in the fighting
(New York Times 1950). They were reportedly repulsed by government troops from
Fort San Jose after an hour battle(Associated Press 1950a).
“But the plot failed, and he and the other conspirators were arrested and jailed” (Fry
2018, 97). “Castillo Armas was wounded and captured; after spending some weeks in
the military hospital, he was sent to the penitentiary to await trial.” But on June 12,
1951, he escaped prison and sought asylum in the Colombian Embassy. On July 3, he
left for exile in Bogotá (Gleijeses 1992, 83). Lt. Manuel Pedrosa was also reported to
have escaped prison with Castillo Armas (United Press 1951a).
89
Coding rationale: Based on the historical evidence, I assume that CCD is picking up
the events of November 6, 1950 (CCD does not provide a month or day for the coup
attempt). However, this event was plotted and largely executed by prior defectors, as
Castillo Armas had already been eased into retirement following the July 1949 uprising
by his Aranista friends. This leads us to code the event as a case of prior defection.
However, during the plotting stage, Castillo Armas evidently banked on the “complicity
of a few junior officers within the barracks” for his coup to succeed. However, we have
no definitive evidence that contacts were successfully made or that current and active
members of the military participated in the attack. Had we found such evidence, we
would have coded this event as a failed anti-democratic coup.
• # 90-1953-3-29: Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP and
Singh; rebellion - PT; failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Arbenz as the
leader of Guatemala from March 1, 1951, until June 27, 1954; GWF code a democracy
(Guatemala 44-54) from January 1, 1945, until June 27, 1954. EPR codes Ladinos as
the monopoly ethnic group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On the night of March 29, 1953, undergraduate army cadets led an 18 hour
uprising by 300 armed men in lower Verapaz province; they seized the provincial gov-
ernor, Col. Abundio Maldonado and others. The military clashed and retook the city;
the military was put on alert afterwards (Associated Press 1953h). The army chief,
Col. Carlos Enrique Diaz, said the rebels – “led by junior and retired army officers”
wearing khaki uniforms “different from those of the regular army” – had been defeated
by 7 p.m. and the rebels fled toward Rabinal with government forces in pursuit (United
Press 1953h). On March 30, Col. Diaz said that – given five white landing targets had
been painted at the airport near the provincial capital of Salama – he believed that
“foreign airplanes” failed to come to the aid of the “former army officers” who orches-
trated the rebellion and hoped to foment a full scale revolt against the government
(Associated Press 1953e).
In early April, authorities arrested Juan Cordova Cerna, a prominent lawyer, on charges
of being a principle conspirator (New York Times 1953a). On April 6, three of nine
leaders of the revolt – Manuel J. Juarez, Julio S. Escobar, and Florencio A. Mejia –
reached the Mexican Embassy and were granted asylum (United Press 1953b) and left
for Mexico on April 9 (New York Times 1953c). On April 7, Guatemala withdrew from
the Organization of Central American States (New York Times 1953d). By April 8,
over 100 people had been arrested for complicity in the revolt (New York Times 1953b).
On April 25, Guatemala accused its four Central American neighbors with supporting
the Salama uprising (Associated Press 1953d). Had the revolt succeeded, Juan Cordova
Cerna – who by then was taken to Honduras – would allegedly have become president
(FBIS 1953b). Retired Colonels Guillermo Flores Avendao and Herlindo Solorzano,
known as staunch anti-communists, were charged with leading the revolt, but were
later released on medical parole (United Press 1953i). On October 10, Col. Solorzano,
90
then 70 years old, departed for exile in Nicaragua (New York Times 1953e). Some
speculated that the government used a case of local banditry to target government
opposition; some critics of the government went to far as to speculate that government
provocateurs were in fact to blame (Ives 1953).
Coding rationale: Most of the implicated or alleged instigators were civilians or retired
army officers. However, multiple reports indicate that current and active army cadets
participated in the abortive “revolutionary action.” We therefore do not exclude this
event as a case of prior defection. Even though the event began on the periphery, most
“sober people” believed the revolutionaries sought to start a national revolt that would
topple the government (Ives 1953). Based on the evidence, we code this event a failed
anti-democratic coup. STAGED.
• # 90-1954-6-27: Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; expatriate rebel coup, dissident action
with support of foreign government - CCD; successful coup - CSP; no coup - PT (codes
coup on June 29); Archigos codes Arbenz Guzman as being removed on this date by
“irregular” means by military actors with foreign support; Svolik does not code an
autocratic leader in Guatemala on this date. GWF code the collapse of democracy
(Guatemala 44-54) on this date. EPR codes Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Guatemala from 1946 to 1995 with Maya as powerless through 1954 and discriminated
since 1955.
Event: The regime of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz since 1951 was deeply anti-Marxist yet
also “initiated Populist and nationalistic reforms designed to” modernize the econ-
omy and break Guatemala’s dependency on the United States (Mazzella 1988, 145).
“Arbenz’ regime was a serious threat to the Guatemalan economic oligarchy and their
foreign allies.” Arbenz’ populism and “the presence of some Communists in the govern-
ment fueled strong opposition among several groups that included the Catholic Church,
the United States, the coffee growers, and urban industrialists” (146-147). During his
land reform program (Decree 900), between “January 1953 and June 1954, over half
a million hectares of land were expropriated and distributed to roughly 100,000 peas-
ant families” (Schirmer 1998, 13-14). This program “enraged wealthy planters” and
the United Fruit Company (Streeter 2000a, 61), Guatemala’s single largest landowner
(Trefzger 2001, 81). In response, they “spread propaganda tagging Arbenz as a Com-
munist” (Streeter 2000a, 61). “It is usually argued that the government’s determination
to apply the agrarian reform law to the extensive lands of the United Fruit Company
was most important in prompting” subsequent American intervention (Handy 1986,
390).
In 1954, “Arbenz antagonized the older and more traditional officers (and wealthy
landowners) with his attempt to create a civilian militia to protect this agrarian re-
form process” (Schirmer 1998, 13-14). Arbenz thus “usurped the military’s authority
to maintain order. Furthermore, yielding to pressures from leftist cabinet members,
he transferred and discharged officers who disagreed” (Trefzger 2001, 81). Fearful
91
of a U.S. invasion, Arbenz also “secretly contracted for a shipment of weapons from
Czechoslovakia. This shipment was discovered, fraying die already tenuous bond be-
tween the President and his army” (Schirmer 1998, 13-14). U.S. pressure “played an
important role in the erosion of support for Arbenz among key military groups” which
“became evident in June 1954 when the Consejo Superior of the National Defense, the
top deliberative organ of the armed forces, requested an interview in which the chiefs
confronted president Arbenz on a number of issues ranging from Communism to the
internal crisis of the country. The meeting failed to allay the doubts of the military
chiefs and a conspiracy to undermine the regime began to emerge” (Mazzella 1988,
147).
Then on June 17, “a motley group of 150 émigrés and mercenaries, the self-styled
liberacionista army, under the nominal control of the fugitive Castillo Armas, aided
and equipped by the CIA, invaded Guatemala” (Schirmer 1998, 14) from their base in
Honduras (Mazzella 1988, 147). Castillo Armas’ rebel force was supported with CIA
operation PBSUCCESS (Streeter 2000a, 61). “Armed with antiquated weapons and
poorly organized, the “Liberation” forces offered little threat to the vastly superior
Guatemalan military” and their advance made little progress in the first few days
of the invasion (Trefzger 2001, 82). On June 25, the “insurgents’ clandestine radio
appealed to the Guatemalan Army to set up a junta and to seize Colonel Arbenz
as conditions for a cease-fire” (Bracker 1954a). “Fearful that resistance would bring
repercussions from the United States, the army high command acquiesced” (Schirmer
1998, 14) and “refused to repel the invaders” at Zacapa on June 25 (Mazzella 1988,
147). “ The high command refused the president’s order to arm the civilian militias,
and instead demanded that he step down” (Streeter 2000a, 62). Thus, the invasion
provided a pretext for an internal coup (Schirmer 1998, 14). The most important
reason that military command acted against Arbenz was the fact that they were losing
the near decade-long battle “they had waged with peasant and rural labour organizer”
for control of the countryside (Handy 1986, 391).
At 11 a.m. on June 27, U.S. ambassador John E. Peurifoy was summoned to the
national palace by Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello. Asked whether the U.S. would
help end the bloodshed if a military junta took power, Peurifoy prevaricated. From
12:30-3:15 p.m., Peurifoy attended a meeting of the five ranking Army colonels at the
home of Col. Carlos Enrique Diaz, the Army Chief of Staff. At 4 p.m., three colonels–
Lieut. Col. Carlos Sarti, head of the Supreme Council of Defense; Col. Enrique
Parinello; and Col. Diaz–went to the National Palace and forced Arbenz to agree to
step down (Paul P. Kennedy 1954b). At 9 p.m., the president broadcast his resignation
to the nation, turning power over to Col. Diaz. He blamed the U.S. for using the
spectre of communism to destroy his regime on behalf of the United fruit Company,
but asserted confidence that the army would repel the invading force. Diaz’s first act as
president was to suspend the constitution (Bracker 1954a). Diaz was a popular career
officer and anti-communist (New York Times 1954a).
On June 28, a military junta led by provisional president Col. Diaz outlawed the
communist party. The other members of the junta were Col. José Angel Sanchez, the
Minister of Defense, and Col. Elfego Monzon, Minister without Portfolio. The insur-
92
gents, however, demanded the unconditional surrender of the new junta. The rebels
reportedly captured Zacapa as planes strafed the capital. Evidently the inability of the
government to counter rebel air power was decisive in the decision to force Arbenz to
resign (Paul P. Kennedy 1954d). The headquarters of rebel leader Col. Castillo Armas
called Diaz an “usurper” whose entry to power was unconstitutional (Bracker 1954c).
Diaz, for his part, said he would continue the revolutionary policy of his predecessor
and would expel “the invaders” (Reuters 1954).
Coding rationale: This event was led by a current active member of the military, Diaz,
and not the prior defector Castillo Armas (contrary to the CSP coding of Castillo
Armas as the coup leader on June 27). Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
(2014), we code the ouster of Arbenz Guzman as a successful anti-democratic coup,
even though Diaz failed to remain in office for one week, because this event marked the
end of the democratic regime. Some have argued that ”Diaz acted with constitutional
license” because the 1945 Constitution authorized the military to check “arbitrary acts
by the Executive” (Trefzger 2001, 82). To the extent Arbenz’s order to arm civilian
militias was “arbitrary,” one could argue that forcing his ouster was “legal” or con-
stitutional. However, in light of the military insubordination at the front at Zacapa
on June 25 in the face of a rebel invasion force, we side with the vast majority of
historical sources and coup datasets which view Diaz’s move as “irregular” or un-
constitutional. For a popular mainstream history CIA involvement, see Schlesinger
and Kinzer (2005). For a critique of that account and analysis of the historiography
on this coup attempt, see Streeter (2000a). For the CIA’s classified account of U.S.
intervention in Guatemala, see Cullather (2006).
• # 90-1954-6-29: Guatemala, Carlos Enrique Diaz

Category: successful leader reshuffling coup
Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; not a candidate - CSP (only codes
a successful coup against Arbenz on June 27, 1954); successful coup - PT (combined
with events of June 27, 1954) and Singh; Archigos codes Diaz as leader from June 27 to
June 29, 1954, when he was removed through “irregular” means by domestic military
actors without foreign support. GWF code the collapse of democracy (Guatemala 44-
54) on June 27, 1954, and a personal regime (Guatemala 54-58) from June 27, 1954,
until February 2, 1958. O’Rourke (2013, 306) lists Jacobo Arbenz, Carlos Enrique
Diaz, and Elfegio Monzon as targets of U.S.-backed coups from 1953-54. EPR codes
Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995 with Maya as
powerless through 1954 and discriminated since 1955.
Event: On June 29, 1954, Col. Elfego Monzon ousted Col. Diaz in a bloodless coup,
though the change in power was forced “at the point of sub-machine guns” (Bracker
1954d).17 A second military junta led by Col. Monzon – and now including Col.
17. Diaz met with U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy on the morning of June 29, during which Peurifoy told Diaz
that he should make Monzon the president; Diaz responded that he should step down from the ruling junta
along with the third member, Sanchez. “At this point, Monzon, who had been waiting outside, joined
the meeting. His armed guard escorted Diaz from the room. Monzon followed them out, announcing ‘My
93
Mauricia Dubois and Jose Luis Cruz Salazar – then reached a cease-fire agreement
with the rebels led by Col. Castillo Armas and began a purge of communists. It
was then announced that Col. Castillo Armas and Col. Monzon would meet in El
Salvador to discuss a peace settlement (United Press 1954d). Monzon, known as an
anti-communist, reportedly had the support of junior officers in light of the prior
junta’s inability to obtain a cease-fire, which was blamed on a lag in cracking down
on communists. It was clear at the time that Castillo Armas would soon gain power
in some fashion via negotiation. Both Arbenz and Diaz gained asylum in the Mexican
Embassy (Paul P. Kennedy 1954a).
Coding rationale: Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code the collapse of democracy
with the ouster of Arbenz in a coup led by Col. Diaz on June 27. Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz (2014) also code a new personalist regime beginning on June 27. However, the
evidence indicates that Castillo Armas did not officially initiate his new regime until
a week later on July 8. Diaz and Monzon were military leaders under Arbenz, not
Castillo Armas. We therefore code the ouster of Diaz as a successful reshuffling coup
in a post-Arbenz but pre-Castillo Armas military regime (GWF would not code such
a regime because it did not last until January 1 of the next year). This coup was led
by a regime insider – a member of the three-man junta, Monzon – and not Castillo
Armas, who was a prior defector and regime outsider at this time. However, this leader
reshuffling coup by Monzon was merely a stepping stone towards the rise of Castillo
Armas to power within the next week. See 90-1954-7-8 below.
• # 90-1954-7-8: Guatemala, Elfego Monzon
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes the
ouster of Monzon on this date through “irregular” means in a military power strug-
gle short of a coup. Svolik codes Monzon’s exit on this date as a consensus; GWF
code a personal regime (Guatemala 54-58) from June 27, 1954, until February 2, 1958.
O’Rourke (2013, 306) lists Jacobo Arbenz, Carlos Enrique Diaz, and Elfegio Monzon
as targets of successful U.S.-backed coups from 1953-54. EPR codes Ladinos as the
monopoly ethnic group from 1946 to 1995 with Maya as powerless through 1954 and
discriminated since 1955.
Event: Although CIA Operation PBSUCCESS did not bring Castillo Armas to power
on either June 27, 1954, or June 29, it finally did on July 8. On July 1, the war-
ring parties signed the San Salvador Pact ending the two-week old civil war, which
formed a new junta including Col. Castillo Armas (Bracker 1954b). On July 7, in the
jockeying between supporters of Monzon and Castillo Armas, the latter visited troops
at Chiquimula as rumors spread that Monzon would resist Castillo Armas’ election.
But on July 8, Col. Castillo Armas was unanimously elected president of a governing
junta. Col. Luis Cruz Salazar and Mauricio Dubois resigned from the junta, reducing
the junta from five back down to three people. Col. Monzon and Maj. Enrique Oliva,
a Castillo Armas follower, remained on the junta (Paul P. Kennedy 1954c).
colleague Diaz has decided to resign. I am replacing him.”’ (Immerman 1982, 175).
94
Coding rationale: According to Olson (2000, 116), “CIA operatives began training
an insurgent Guatemalan army in the jungles of Nicaragua and Honduras. The CIA-
trained army, which totaled only 400 men, also enjoyed air support in the form of seven
fighter aircraft flown by CIA pilot.” The forces led by Col. Castillo Armas were clearly
regime outsiders prior to the San Salvador Pact. However, after the pact of July 1,
1954, we consider Castillo Armas to de facto be re-integrated into the military and to
be a current active member of the military as he was one of five junta members after
July 1. We therefore do not exclude this event as a case of prior defection, which it
would have been had Castillo Armas’s rebel forces succeeded in taking power before
the July 1 pact.
Although Svolik codes a consensus or “regular” exit here, this was only so because
Castillo Armas could credibly threaten to take power by force if it was not granted by
negotiation (thus his trip to his former rebel stronghold the day before the election).
In this sense, we cannot consider Monzon’s ouster as a “regular” constitutional exit
(the constitution having been scrapped by this point). Although Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz (2014) code regime change as of June 27, the evidence suggests that regime
change empowering Castillo Armas was not fully achieved until July 8. We therefore
code the ouster of Monzon a successful regime change coup, which finally brought to
power Castillo Armas, a prior defector and regime outsider until only just over a week
before.
• # 90-1954-8-2: Guatemala, Carlos Castillo Armas

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Castillo
Armas as the leader of Guatemala from July 8, 1954, to July 20, 1957; GWF code a
personal regime (Guatemala 54-58) from June 27, 1954, until February 2, 1958. EPR
codes Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On August 1, 1954, “Liberation Army” troops marched at the Army Parade
grounds, where many received decorations for valor in the recent “revolution” which
helped bring President Castillo Armas to power in June. Resentment by some Army
regulars was openly visible despite friendly addresses by Junta members Col. Castillo
and Col. Elfego Monzon praising Liberation troops and the regular Army (New York
Times 1954e).
At dawn on Monday, August 2, fighting broke out between 120 military cadets and
Liberation Army troops. Regular Army troops from the Aurora air base joined the
cadets in their standoff with the anti-communist irregulars, and tank and mortar fire
soon engulfed the area outside the capital around Roosevelt Hospital, the liberacionista
encampment. The cadets “called on Colonel Monzon, still a member of the ruling junta,
to support them. At this point, [U.S.] Ambassador Peurifoy intervened, telling Monzon
that he did not have the backing of the Americans. Monzon passed the news along to
the cadets, declining their appeal, and the Guatemalan press praised him as “military
loyalty personified”” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 2005, 223). Publicly, U.S. officials stated
their support for Castillo’s continued rule, noting concern that Col. Monzon, the army
95
representative on the junta, saying that although he was not a Communist himself, he
was viewed as being “tolerant of the former Communist-tinged regime in which he had
held office” (New York Times 1954g).
The army protected the cadets: “When Castillo Armas ordered the Guatemalan Air
Force to strafe the cadets, the Army intervened and seized control of the airport”
(Trefzger 2001, 84). A ceasefire was negotiated in which Castillo (a) agreed that all
700 Liberation Army troops would surrender their arms to Regular Army officers and
return to their homes and (b) promised no government reprisals or punishment against
the rebel military cadets. In exchange, the Army promised complete loyalty to the
ruling junta. The negotiation was headed by Catholic Archbishop Mariano Rossell
Arellano and included the U.S. Ambassador, John E. Peurifoy. At 5 p.m., the army
announced the ceasefire agreement had been signed by Maj. Enrique Oliva, the third
member of the ruling junta; Col. Enrique Close, Defense Minister; and Col. J. Paiz,
Under Secretary of Defense (Associated Press 1954e).
However, fighting persisted at the Aurora air base, where the garrison commander
refused to accept the ceasefire (New York Times 1954d). The United States played a
crucial role supporting Castillo Armas. “During the final hours of the battle, Castillo
Armas told Ambassador Peurifoy the he intended to leave Guatemala City that evening
for Zacapa with one hundred loyal army officers to defend the Liberation. According
to this plan, two members of the junta would remain behind to prevent asylees from
escaping from the embassies. When Peurifoy learned that members of the junta were
plotting against the president, he persuaded Castillo Armas to remain in the capital.
The colonel then ordered the Guatemalan Air Force to bomb the military base in the
capital if the coup attempt proceeded. Peurifoy also threatened to call on U.S. troops
stationed in Panama if the Guatemalan military did not support the government. The
threats succeeded” (Streeter 2000b, 42). The junta sent units of the President’s honor
guard to block all roads to the base and threatened to attack the rebels if they did not
yield. Planes flew over the capital in a show of force (Associated Press 1954c).
By the evening of Tuesday, August 3, Castillo announced that the rebels had surren-
dered under pressure of the ultimatum; the Aurora garrison commander was arrested
(Associated Press 1954c). “In return, the junta promised to disband the Liberation
army and not to prosecute the cadets” (Streeter 2000b, 42). Twenty three people
were killed and about 100 wounded in the fighting (New York Times 1954b). Popular
support for Castillo and anger at the army following the revolt led to a movement
dissolve the Junta and make Castillo sole ruler (New York Times 1954b), which oc-
curred within a month. “Castillo Armas closed the Escuela Politécna for a year and
sent many of the rebellion’s conspirators into exile, while the cadets escaped relatively
unscathed.” Nevertheless, Castillo Armas did go through with demobilization of the
Liberation Army “and the 1956 Constitution prohibited him from ever organizing it
again” (Streeter 2000b, 42).
Coding rationale: Although no major datasets consulted had included this event, we
code it here because our historical sources made reference to it. The revolt had its
roots in the San Salvador pact ending the civil war. In general, Castillo Armas “was
96
perceived within the officer corps as a traitor. He had deserted both the military and
his country to pursue power. Even worse, he had willingly conspired with a foreign
power against the sovereignty and interests of the Guatemalan nation” (Trefzger 2001,
83). What’s more, the pact between Castillo and Monzon, under which Castillo’s
“Liberation army” was integrated with the regular army, “so far as the latter’s officers
corps was concerned, represented a humiliating defeat at the hands of the straw-hat,
barefoot revolutionary peasant force.” Integration of the irregular forces “inevitably
meant a purge of the officer corps” (New York Times 1954b). As Schirmer (1998, 14)
has summarized, “In response, cadets and younger officers vowed never again to be
humiliated: on 2 August a coup was attempted and failed.”
There is no evidence the Army High Command orchestrated the revolt. Instead, it
appears “The cadets were alone at first, having marched from the military school to
avenge the indignity suffered by three of their corps, who had been forced to dance
naked in a brothel by some irregulars. However, this was just an excuse for fighting. If
it had not been this incident, observers felt, another would have been found.” When
the fighting broke out, the Army High Command backed the cadets’ efforts to avenge
insults to their “honor and dignity,” but denied that the attack had been Communist-
inspired (Sydney Gruson 1954a).
Blame was officially pinned on Communists for inspiring the cadets. Castillo described
the rebellion which almost toppled his administration “one of the most audacious and
criminal plans” ever hatched by the Communists (Sydney Gruson 1954a). However,
few observers believed the plot was hatched by the Communists who had taken refuge
in various embassies. Instead, close friends of Arbenz were seen at the Aurora air
base during the rebellion, including Col. Adolfo Garcia Montenegro, the ousted presi-
dent’s ambassador to Cuba. Major René Valenzuela, Arbenz’s military attaché in San
Salvador, was also unofficially accused of playing a prominent part in the Aurora re-
volt. Such Arbenz loyalists “are believed to have stirred up the base” (Sydney Gruson
1954b, 1954a). Though Liberationists accused apolitical military officers under Arbenz
of being “soft on communism,” regular army officers were also generally known to be
anti-Communist (Bowen 1984, 172-173). We therefore do not assume the rebels sought
to empower the excluded Communist opposition.
Because the rebel cadets and officers were junior officers with connections to the former
Arbenz regime, we assume that their victory would have prevented consolidation of
a personalist regime around Castillo and would have led to a military regime (led
by Monzon) that would have reinstated former regime elites under Arbenz, though
presumably not Arbenz himself (who was not acceptable to the Americans). That
is, we assume the rebels sought to reinstate an “Arbenz regime without Arbenz.”
Although Monzon was a junta member, he too was purged at the end of August
despite his apparent loyalty during the revolt. We therefore code this cadets’ revolt as
a failed regime change coup.

97
and Singh; Archigos codes Castillo Armas as the leader of Guatemala from July 8,
1954, to July 20, 1957; GWF code a personal regime (Guatemala 54-58) from June
27, 1954, until February 2, 1958. EPR codes Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On Thursday, January 20, 1955, about 150 armed civilian and military rebels
reportedly tried to take the Aurora Air Force base outside the capital of Guatemala
City. President Castillo Armas said 10 people were killed in a brief clash at the airport
(New York Times 1955i). The government swiftly imposed a state of seige, which was
not lifted until February 17 (Associated Press 1955d). In all, more than 400 people
were arrested in connection with the alleged uprising. On February 2, a captain and
corporal were sentenced to death, while seven other officers and two civilians were
acquitted (New York Times 1955g).
Castillo said the plotters included high-placed military officers in the Arbenz regime
who had been demoted after Castillo came to power (Associated Press 1955b), adding
that the plotters had been meeting for some time and also planned to capture the
Guardia de Honor Barracks (Associated Press 1955f). Castillo identified the coup
leader as Col. Francisco Cosenza, former head of the Air Force and an Ambassador
to Mexico and Italy under the regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Castillo said the
communist-inspired plot was aided by military groups connected to the Arbenz regime,
with the plotters allegedly communicating with exiles in Mexico (New York Times
1955i). Cosenza admitted to participating in the plot but denied leading it (Paul P.
Kennedy 1955b). On January 21, Col. José Serra, Under Secretary of Defense under
Arbenz, was arrested. Capt. Francisco Berrios was also sought as another plot leader
(New York Times 1955h). Col. Elfego Monzon, who had headed the military junta
after the overthrow of Arbenz but had left the junta when Armas became President
September 1, was suspected of supporting the plot and forced to accept a foreign post
(Paul P. Kennedy 1955c). On February 10, Cosenza and two other alleged plotters,
Jorge Micheo and Cadet Jose Hernandez, were allowed to leave for exile in El Salvador
Coding rationale: According to Bowen (1984, 173), the January 1955 uprising paral-
leled the events of August 2-3, 1954 (see 90-1954-8-2) in that “armed battles in the
capital found anti-Castillo officers killing Liberationists, and vice versa.” But in con-
trast to official accounts blaming Communists, many attribute the plot to right-wing
elements and associates of the Arbenz regime. According to John D Martz (1959, 63-
64), “Castillo was faced by hostile elements, notably ambitious right-wing landowners
envisioning a return to the days of conservative dictatorship. On January 22, 1955, with
the moral support of these men, a small band of conspirators attempted to overthrow
the government. Gathering at Aurora field, some hundred men attacked through the
main gate, only to be confronted by two tanks and government forces, which opened
fire. The Interior Ministry later announced that the government had known of the con-
spiracy for several days and had preferred to stop the rebels in the very act of revolt.
Some half-dozen men were killed and several others wounded before the conspirators
98
surrendered. Ringleader of the attempt was Colonel Francisco Cosenza, former am-
bassador to Italy and one of numerous arbencistas still in Guatemala. A long-time
friend of the deposed president, he planned the attack and, when it failed, fled to the
Salvadoran Embassy for diplomatic asylum. Castillo’s popularity wore well, and the
arbencistas and other dissident groups were without widespread support...Perhaps the
most startling development was the implied involvement of Colonel Monzón,” whom
the government said was “a focal point of dissension” even though not officially impli-
cated.
Earlier, U.S. Embassy officials doubted there was a coup attempt as officially reported,
instead viewing the event as a preempted coup plot. On January 21, the Embassy re-
ported that “it appears that some attempt against the Government was scheduled, to
be kicked off in the near future, and the incident yesterday may have been precipitated
by the Government in order to test the strength of its opponents.” John Calvin Hill,
Jr., Second Secretary of the Embassy, cabled again on January 25 that: “It now appears
to be generally accepted that there was no actual attack on the airport or Base Militar
and the general impression among informed people is that the government learned a
plot was about to break out and simply moved first by seizing those responsible and
executing them.” A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate in July (Central Intelligence
Agency 1955b) summarized events this way: “Strife between regular and Liberation
army officers again erupted in January 1955 when the government announced discovery
of a “pseudo-Communist plot” involving dissident regular army officers. The govern-
ment took strong and summary action to suppress the alleged plot. Six officers and
men were summarily executed, several leading regular officers including Col. Monzon
were banished, and additional Liberation officers were appointed to key military posi-
tions. In taking these actions, Castillo temporarily acceded to the persistent pressure
of the Liberation elements for a through cleanup of potential dissidents.”
Based on the evidence, we assume the army plotters had similar motivations as the
cadets did the previous August, and sought a counter-coup of sorts to unseat Castillo
and restore elites of former Arbenz regime. We thus also code this as a failed regime
change coup. Although U.S. embassy staff doubted the existence of the attack at
Aurora air base, we assume the government’s trap was laid after the coup plot was
in motion. Had we assumed that attack been preempted, we would have coded this a
coup plot, not a coup attempt. AMBIGUOUS.

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup, dissident action, and conspiracy involving mil-
itary actors, security forces, and political ideologues - CCD; not a candidate - CSP,
PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Castillo Armas as the leader of Guatemala from July
8, 1954, to July 20, 1957; GWF code a personal regime (Guatemala 54-58) from June
27, 1954, until February 2, 1958.
Event: According to CCD’s codebook, “A former military officer and former leftist gov-
ernment employees were accused of plotting to overthrow the military regime. They
99
were tried.”
Coding rationale: We can find no independent evidence to validate a coup attempt on
this date. Based on the CCD summary, we assume that no concrete actions were taken
and code this event as an alleged coup plot. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 90-1957-10-24: Guatemala, Luis Arturo Gonzalez Lopez

Luttwak PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Gonzalez Lopez as exiting on this date through
“irregular” means by military actors without foreign support. Archigos codes Mendoza
Azurdia as leader of Guatemala from October 24, until October 27, 1954, when he
exited through “irregular” means by domestic military actors with foreign support.
Archigos codes Flores Avendano as leader of Guatemala from October 27, 1957, until
March 2, 1958, when he exited by “regular means”; Svolik codes Gonzalez Lopez as
exiting on this date in a military coup; GWF code a personal regime (Guatemala 54-
58) from June 27, 1954, until February 2, 1958. EPR codes Ladinos as the monopoly
ethnic group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On Sunday, October 20, 1957, presidential elections were held in which Miguel
Artiz Passarella, the candidate of the late Castillo Armas government’s Nationalist
Democratic Movement (MDN), was declared the winner (United Press 1957d). Tre-
fzger (2001, 85) claims that Ydı́goras won but “the MDN threw out the results and
seized power” through electoral fraud or “electoral coup.” However, the rightist oppo-
sition candidate, retired Gen. Miguel Ydı́goras Fuentes, of the National Democratic
Reconciliation Party, claimed fraud and called for an invalidation of the election. Ri-
ots and protests by Ydı́goras supporters broke out (Associated Press 1957b). Ydı́goras
threatened “a military-backed coup d’état” if his demands were denied (Trefzger 2001,
85).
On October 22, the government declared a 30-day state of siege directed by Defense
Minister Col. Juan Francisco Oliva (Associated Press 1957b). On October 23, Oliva
said the army was “willing” to order new elections to settle the political crisis, and
with the support of the army apparently forced acting president Gonzalez Lopez to
send a resolution to Congress asking for new elections (News Dispatches 1957). Oliva’s
subordinates took more forceful action into their hands. Before dawn on Thursday,
October 24, three colonels–Óscar Mendoza Azurdia (the deputy defense minister),
Gonzalez Yurrita Novoa (an air force officer), and Roberto Lorenzana (head of the
fifth military district)–seized power following a meeting of hundreds of military officers
demanding a junta. Around noon, Col. Mendoza addressed “an angry and unfriendly”
crowd of about 5,000 who continued to demand Ydı́goras be installed. The crowds
were not content with a promise of new elections. Later in the day, the junta deployed
army units and tanks to restore order (United Press 1957b; New York Times 1957d).
But Ydı́goras himself addressed large crowds that defied the 9 p.m. curfew
On the afternoon of October 25, amidst a paralyzed capital with protestors overturning
100
busses and cars and forcing businesses to close, negotiations between the junta and
Ydı́goras were mediated by a pair of U.S. military officers. The junta agreed to annul
Sunday’s election and called for new elections. For his part, Ydı́goras called on his
supporters to stop demonstrating to give the junta 24 hours to solve the political
crisis. Police and army did not move to end the demonstrations; instead the junta
lifted the state of siege the recently deposed government had imposed (Massock 1957b;
New York Times 1957a).
On October 26, the two-day old junta agreed to hand power back over to retired Col.
Guillermo Flores Avendaño, the second vice president, in what was a concession to
Ydı́goras, who had threatened violence if they did not do so and whose supporters
remained mobilized in the capital (United Press 1957f). Congress, meeting in a mem-
ber’s home to avoid demonstrations, duly designated Flores as the man to lead the
country until the new elections (Massock 1957a). Ydı́goras said he would accept the
junta’s decision, confident he would win any election (New York Times 1957n). The
junta was dissolved automatically. By October 27, calm was restored after policemen
fired on a crowd of workers, dispersing them (New York Times 1957o). In the new
elections held on January 19, 1958, Ydı́goras won a plurality of the vote and was later
elected president by the Guatemalan legislature” (Sloan 1970, 83).
Coding rationale: This is a consensus successful coup among major prior coup datasets.
However, the first post-coup leader Mendoza Azurdia is only coded by Archigos as re-
maining in power until October 27, 1957, leading us to investigate whether this case
failed due to the one week rule. Archigos codes Mendoza Azurdia as being ousted on
October 27, 1947, implying that his October 24 coup had in fact failed. However, as
we explain more fully below (see 90-1957-10-27), we consider Mendoza Azurdia’s exit
on October 27 to be “regular,” consensual, or legal. We therefore retain the consensus
coding of success despite the fact that the first post-coup leader did not remain in office
a week, namely because the officer to whom he turned over power voluntarily remained
in office more than a week. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we
code this event a successful reshuffling coup.
Had we coded Mendoza Azurdia’s ouster as “irregular,” then we would have considered
this a failed coup attempt as the junta failed to stay in power a week. There is
no evidence that the coup makers had ethnic grievances or sought to prevent ethnic
narrowing of the regime. They appear to have sought to resolve the political crisis and
threat of a coup or civil war led by Ydigoras had they not intervened on his behalf.
His party was in opposition, but was not banned at the time. Consistent with Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014), we would have code this event a failed reshuffling coup,
although it paved the way for a new Ydigoras-led regime to come to power.
• # 90-1957-10-27: Guatemala, Óscar Mendoza Azurdia

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh (only code coup on Octo-
ber 24, 1957); Archigos codes Mendoza Azurdia’s entry into office through “irregular”
means on October 24, 1957 (ousting Luis Arturo Gonzalez Lopez, who had taken power
101
in July following the assassination of Carlos Castillo Armas), and his exit on this date
through “irregular” means by domestic military actors with foreign support; Svolik
codes Mendoza Azurdia’s exit on this date by consensus; GWF code a personal regime
(Guatemala 54-58) from June 27, 1954, until February 2, 1958.
Event: For a description of events that broke out after the October 20 elections, see
the case above (90-1957-10-24).
Coding rationale: Flores Avendaño stressed that the crisis had been resolved consti-
tutionally. As second vice president under Castillo Armas, he was next in line to
succeed provisional President Gonzalez Lopez. Thus it appeared “the nation’s 1956
Constitution had been saved despite the Army’s overthrow of the previous Provisional
Government” (New York Times 1957o). Because the military junta appears to have
given up power voluntarily and legally (via Congressional resolution), we do not con-
sider the installation of Flores Avendaño as provisional President a military coup. The
decision was set against the threat of largely civilian violence by supporters of Gen.
Ydı́goras, who retired from the military in August to run for the presidency and thus
was not an active member of the military (New York Times 1957c). Similarly, neither
was Flores Avendaño an active member of the military, and he was thus installed as
president in a constitutional succession as a civilian Vice President. We thus disagree
with Archigos’ coding of Mendoza Azurdia as exiting through “irregular” means at all;
instead we consider his a “regular” exit, consistent with Guatemala’s 1956 constitu-
tion. Congress justified promoting Flores rather than reinstalling Gonzalez Lopez on
constitutional grounds as the latter left the country without Congress’ sanction (New
York Times 1957n). There was no overt use of military force to oust the military junta.
• # 90-1960-7-18: Guatemala, Miguel Ydı́goras Fuentes

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Ydı́goras
Fuentes as the leader of Guatemala from March 2, 1958, to March 31, 1963; GWF code
a personal regime (Guatemala 58-63) from February 2, 1958, to March 30, 1963. EPR
codes Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On the evening of July 18, 1960, a government communique reported that
“twelve to fourteen persons armed with machine guns” attempted but failed to capture
the military base in Coban, capital of the northern province of Alta Verapaz. Earlier
that morning, the national police said that the telephone and telegraph lines between
the capital and Coban had been cut. High government officials said the attack was
inspired by left-wing “revolutionary elements” (New York Times 1960k). Evidently,
an army Lieutenant at the Coban garrison “opened the gates to a group of left-wingers
and started distributing arms. Loyal troops routed the attackers, but only the officer
and one leftist were captured. Fifty or 100 others fled to the mountains” (New York
Times 1960m; Associated Press 1960e). That evening, a movie theater in the capital
was also bombed, continuing a string of terrorist attacks (New York Times 1960k). On
July 19, the government imposed a thirty-day state of siege to put down the continuing
102
agitation which it attributed to leftists and Communists being aided by Fidel Castro’s
regime in Cuba. The government said the attack at the Coban military base which left
15 attackers dead was “linked to other subversive measures throughout the country”
(New York Times 1960r). Left-wing students and workers in the capital immediately
took to the streets protesting the state of siege and shouting “Long live Arbenz! Long
live Arevalo!” (Associated Press 1960h).
Coding rationale: Although none of the previous major datasets consulted had in-
cluded this event, we code it here because our historical sources made reference to it.
Although most news reports labelled the event a “rebel attack,” we consider the event
a coup attempt rather than a case of prior defection since at least one current active
military member partook in the military assault targeting the regime. Schirmer (1998,
14) also calls the attack a coup attempt, identifying its leader as a young Lieutenant,
Guillermo Lavagnino, whom she calls the “insurrectionary precursor” to Lieutenant
Yon Sosa, who would lead a guerrilla movement following a larger insurrection later in
November 1960 (see 90-1960-11-13). Based on Lavagnino identity as a left-wing junior
officer and the parallels between this attack and the November uprising, we assume
that he sought to install left-wing opposition parties that had been banned after 1954.
We therefore code this as a failed regime change coup. Also see 90-1960-11-13.

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR and CCD; failed coup attempt -
CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Ydı́goras Fuentes as the leader of Guatemala from
March 2, 1958, to March 31, 1963; GWF code a personal regime (Guatemala 58-63)
from February 2, 1958, to March 30, 1963. EPR codes Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic
group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On Sunday November 13, 1960, a group of disaffected officers under arrest at
Fort Matamoros in the capital killed a colonel and captain and escaped. They fled with
more than 200 armed troops and tanks to the Zacapa military base, some 95 miles to
the northeast. Loyal air force planes bombed the base; these rebels gathered more
recruits and joined an uprising that broke out at the military base in Puerto Barrios
150 miles northeast of the capital. The rebels captured a radio station at Puerto
Matias de Galvez about 7 miles from Puerto Barrios. About noon, official radio began
broadcasting warnings that 3,000 troops would move against the rebels if they did
not surrender. Air Force planes attacked rebel positions, including the Puerto Barrios
military airfield, reportedly to prevent Cuban supply planes from landing (New York
Times 1960j; United Press International 1960d).
On November 14, Guatemala appealed to the Organization of American States to take
action, saying it had proof that Fidel Castro’s government was behind the uprising
(New York Times 1960l). President Fuente said that “documents seized from the rebels
showed they had orders to capture the military airport at Puerto Barrios to enable
the Castro regime to fly in reinforcements and supplies” (United Press International
1960f). On November 16, rebels fell in Gualan about 75 miles south of Puerto Barrios
103
(Associated Press 1960f). The revolt ended on November 17, after rebels fled a last
stronghold in Puerto Barrios (New York Times 1960o) and the U.S. met appeals for aid
by sending warships and air units to defend Guatemala from any third-party (Cuban)
attack (Scali 1960).
According to Trefzger (2001, 85-86), the November 13, 1960 coup attempt “misfired for
several reasons. First, although those plotting to overthrow Ydı́goras had planned to
strike at various locations throughout the country, only the participants in Zacapa actu-
ally revolted. Second, the military officers involved in the coup rejected the support of
some eight hundred peasants who showed up “requesting arms to support the revolt.”
For the coup instigators, the operation had nothing to do with peasant concerns–it
was strictly a military matter. Finally, pro-Ydı́goras forces, backed by CIA pilots and
Cuban exiles, attacked rebel positions and drove the insurgents into the highlands. In
spite of his apparent success, Ydı́goras’s reliance on CIA forces to thwart the coup
further undermined military support for his regime.” Thus, Brockett (2002, 117) notes
this coup attempt “started a leftist guerilla movement in 1960,” as the surviving rebel
officers went into hiding and in April 1961 formed the Revolutionary Movement 13th
November (MR13Nov, led by former Lieutenant Marco Antonio Yon Sosa).
Coding rationale: A government communiqué identified the leaders of the Fort Mata-
moros attack as Capt. Arturo Chuc del Cid and Capt. Rafael Sessan Pereira, and
junior officers who acted in concert with disaffected communist and left-wing elements.
The communiqué also charged the leader of the left-wing Revolutionary party, Mario
Mendez Montenegro, with preparing the plot (New York Times 1960j; United Press
International 1960d; Associated Press 1960f). President Fuente later credited the U.S.
naval-air watch with preventing Cuban forces from giving support to a “revolutionary
movement” (Associated Press 1960g). Bowen (1984, 177) attributed the coup attempt
to a radical faction of the Logia del Nio Jesus (Lodge of the Baby Jesus), a secret
group of some 400 senior and junior officers formed to overthrow the president. The
U.S. naval blockade “assisted moderate lodge members in efforts to dissuade the bulk
of the army from joining the radicals’ uprising.”
According to Schirmer (1998, 15), “some 120 left-leaning junior officers attempted a
coup in the name of “social justice, a just distribution of national wealth” and against
los gringos imperialistas.” Motivations included the fact that younger officers hated
the older officers “because of the High Command’s betrayal of Arbenz, because of
the rampant corruption within the upper ranks of the army, because of older officers’
reluctance to embrace the new irregular warfare combat training younger officers were
receiving in the United States in 1959..., and because of the “efficient clandestine
activity of the Asociació del Niño Dios” made up of officers who opposed the presence
of the antifidelista Brigade 2506 on Guatemalan soil.” Navy Captain Cifuentes said
the latter unit was resented because the Guatemalan soldiers hired by the CIA to
train Cuban troops for the Bay of Pigs Invasion received far higher salaries when other
salaries were not paid for two months.
Because the plotters were left-leaning and radical junior officers who evidently sought
to empower an excluded opposition party (e.g. the radial Communist Party or the
104
more moderate Revolutionary Party), we code this as a failed regime change coup.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; failed coup attempt - PT and
Singh; Archigos codes Ydı́goras Fuente as the leader of Guatemala from March 2, 1958,
to March 31, 1963; GWF code a personal regime (Guatemala 58-63) from February
2, 1958, to March 30, 1963. EPR codes Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: After 8 a.m. on Sunday November 25, 1962, Air Force jets from the Aurora Air
Force base outside the capital of Guatemala City took off and began strafing military
barracks, police headquarters, and the presidential palace. While his residence was
being fired on, President Ydı́goras called his Chief of the Air Force, Col. José Luis
Lemus, who told the president that rebel units were holding him at gunpoint (New York
Times 1962i). President Ydı́goras took control of the situation, accompanying aides to
the nearby Guardia de Honor barracks and then personally directing a counter-attack
on the Aurora airfield (Paul P Kennedy 1962a). The strafing continued until at least
noon, when loyalists surrounded and shelled the airfield until the rebels surrendered
(New York Times 1962i). Three of the air force colonels who led the revolt–Carlos
Marroquin, Marco Antonio Asturias Sobral, and José Gonzales Batres–fled the country
along with an army colonel who took part, said President Ydigoras (Washington Post
1962a). The other leader, Col. Gustavo Adolfo Bucaro, was arrested (Associated Press
1962a).
Coding rationale: The initial goal of the air force attacks appears to have been to kill
the President and then seize the capital’s two defense barracks, Mariscal Zavala and
Guardia de Honor. The coup attempt evidently failed because certain army elements
withdrew commitments to the air force (Paul P Kennedy 1962a). Ydı́goras said the
revolt had “Castro-Communist” financing and origin, similar to the 1960 revolt. But
other evidence casts doubt on that theory, pointing instead to a rightist conspiracy.
For example, Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States Carlos Alejos said the
revolt “might have been triggered by the adoption of an income-tax law on November
24 following 72 hours of debate” (New York Times 1962i), which angered the extreme
right. In addition, the entire 500-man air force was placed under arrest November 26
(Associated Press 1962g; New York Times 1962h), indicating the plot was not isolated
to pro-Castro groups but involved much of the air force. Also, both civilian charged
with leading the revolt, Oscar Giron and Eduardo Taracena, were strong supporters of
former president Carlos Castillo Armas, who was a strong anti-communist. Taracena
was a former National Deputy and member of Armas’ National Liberation Movement
(Paul P Kennedy 1962b).
In addition, some observers believe the attack was opposed not so much against
Ydı́goras as against former president Arevalo, who announced his candidacy for pres-
ident the previous week in elections scheduled for December 1963 (Washington Post
1962b). According to Bowen (1984, 182-183), “former MLN official Eduardo Taracena
105
de la Cerda led an unsuccessful uprising of mid-level air force officers on 25 November,
known to the [U.S.] embassy, however, two weeks prior. From the American point
of view this “coup attempt to get rid of Ydı́goras for purposes...to prevent return
Arévalo” was in total harmony with U.S. objectives... Lacking army participation,
however, the air force coup failed. Despite the setback, buoyed U.S. officials were
thoroughly convinced–by years of biographical intelligence–that Ydı́goras’ charges of
Castro-Communist influence in the air force were “entirely baseless.”” The coup failed,
evidently, due to the obstruction of Defense Minister Enrique Peralta de Azurdia,
widely respected in the army, who also evidently shared the desire to prevent Arevalo’s
return.
Trefzger (2001, 86) also observes a right-wing conspiracy: “in October the regime
passed its controversial income tax and further alienated Guatemala’s coffee oligarchy,
which responded by conspiring to assassinate the president. When the attempt failed,
the elite did the next best thing and aligned themselves with the student protesters.”
Based on this evidence, we assume the plotters were motivated by policy differences
with the president and the desire to prevent excluded leftists from taking power in
elections. As such, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup - CSP, Fos-
sum, Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Ydigoras as exiting on
March 30, 1963 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support;
GWF code the collapse of a personal regime (Guatemala 58-63) on March 30, 1963 in
a military coup; EPR codes Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in Guatemala from
1946 to 1995.
Event: Since taking power in 1958, President Ydı́goras had alienated the country’s
coffee oligarchy by passing an income tax in October 1962 (to offset the loss of revenue
caused by falling world coffee prices). He also alienated the military, which was initially
upset that he had allowed “CIA operatives and exiled Cubans to train in Guatemalan
territory for the Bay of Pigs invasion. The military already resented the CIA’s partic-
ipation in the 1954 coup. Hence, a renewed U.S. and CIA presence was perceived as
a violation of Guatemalan sovereignty.” Ydı́goras’ reliance on CIA pilots and Cuban
exiles to thwart a coup attempt in November 1960 further undermined his support in
the military. Although it tolerated his corruption, the military high command frowned
upon Ydı́goras’ decision not to prevent the return of leftist former president Juan José
Arévalo to run in the 1963 presidential elections (85-87).
On March 26, 1963, the military declared a state of seige banning all political activity
and suspending the constitutional right of assembly. On March 29, Col. Enrique
Peralta Azurdia, the Minister of Defense since April 1962, announced the closing of the
national airport and the prohibition of all public meetings. Furthermore, he announced
“military maneuvers” would be conducted in and around Guatemala City during the
weekend of March 30-31 (Weaver 1969b, 127). That night, leftist supporters of Arévalo,
106
fearing an impending army crackdown, cancelled a big political rally that was scheduled
that weekend (New York Times 1963b).
On the night of March 30, the army launched a bloodless coup that “unfolded like a
well-planned military exercise” (Weaver 1969b, 127). That evening, army tanks sur-
rounded the presidential residence, Casa Crema. An Army tank smashed open the
gates around 10:15 p.m. (Paul P. Kennedy 1963a). “Entering the building without re-
sistance, the officers confronted President Miguel Ydı́goras Fuentes with an ultimatum
that he resign” in favor of a military junta. “After a brief pause to allow the President
to collect his personal belongings, Ydı́goras was escorted to a waiting Air Force plane
and was quickly on his way to exile” (Weaver 1969a, 63). “The officers sent to the
palace found the President’s luggage already packed” (Weaver 1969b, 127).
Early on March 31, the army declared that Colonel Peralta Azurdia had taken over
as chief of state. Peralta’s first orders were to suspend the constitution and dissolve
the legislature. An army bulletin justified the coup by saying the country was “on the
brink of an internal conflict as a result of the subversion that has been promoted by
pro-Communist sectors, and because of the infiltration of communism that has become
more alarming each day.” The army would not let the government return to “anti-
democratic elements.” Peralta said that the military had no intention to remain in
power, but when political activity was restored, leftist parties would be prohibited. He
promised to lift the state of seige and curfew if there were no protests. Right-wing
politicians welcomed the coup (Paul P. Kennedy 1963a). On April 17, the United
States reluctantly recognized the new junta after it promised to hold elections in 1965
(Frankel 1963).
consulted. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event as
a successful regime change coup. Although the military intervention was justified on
constitutional grounds (Article 180) (Trefzger 2001, 87), the coup was clearly highly
“irregular.” A goal of the coup was to prevent the election of Arévalo and thus prevent
the broadening of the political elite (Mazzella 1988, 149). But the coup also “marked
the beginning of a new era in Guatemalan civil-military relations” in which the military
dominated the government (even after officially withdrawing from power and imposing
a “puppet regime” in 1966) (Trefzger 2001, 77). As Schirmer (1998, 17) affirms, with
this coup “the army moved from being a determinant presence within the civilian state
structure to assuming control of the State itself.”
• # 90-1982-3-23: Guatemala, Romeo Lucas Garcia

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Lucas Garcia as exiting on March 23, 1982
through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code a
military regime (Guatemala 70-85) from July 1, 1970 to January 16, 1986; EPR codes
107
Event: On March 7, 1982, Defense Minister General Angel Anı́bal Guevara, the regime
candidate selected by President Romeo Lucas Garcı́a after several civilians turned him
down, was declared winner of presidential elections, leading three opposition candidates
to protest electoral fraud and be jailed and beaten (Schirmer 1998, 19-20). By then,
junior officers were disillusioned with the increasingly kleptocratic and violent regime.
“Making Guevara the official candidate, and thereby following a recent tradition of
moving the defense minister up to the presidency via election fraud, meant for many
junior officers more corruption, more violence and a continuation of the slide away
from military professional values.” By the third week of March, about five partially
distinct groups of coup plotters were identified. Romeo Lucas was briefed on several
threats in advance, but he dismissed them (Demarest 2002, 147-148).
Two lieutenants (only 20-21 years old) approached Second “Captain Rodolfo Muñoz
Pilona, G-2 officer of the Mariscal Zavala Brigade in Guatemala City, the day the
presidential candidates were physically beaten by luquista forces. Within a week, most
of the lieutenants and second lieutenants at the Grupo Táctico of La Aurora air base,
all the lieutenants at the military school Adolfo Hall, and a captain at the Guardia
de Honor (Honor Guard) were behind the coup” (Schirmer 1998, 20-21). Muñoz “was
the senior officer involved until the operation began in earnest and started to attract
more support” (Demarest 2002, 151-153). “General Rı́os Montt agreed to participate.
Also, National Liberation Movement (MLN) party leader, Mario Sandoval Alarcón,
together with the MLN Vice Presidential candidate Leonel Sisniega Otero (who spoke
on the radio during the coup just as he had for Radio Liberacion in 1954), and journalist
Danilo Roca, were actively organizing against Lucas” (Schirmer 1998, 20-21). “Tuesday
23 March was chosen as the day for the attempt because rules for the normal rotation
of officers allowed as many as a third to return late from weekends on Monday or early
Tuesday to their units. The idea was to have the coup units at full strength with as
many favorable officers present as possible” (Demarest 2002, 151-153).
Around 9:30 a.m. on March 23, Capt. Muñoz began to move his units with the
support of one battalion commander, Lt. Colonel Mario René Enrı́quez Morales, who
later became Minister of Defense (151-153). In one account, “Captain Muñoz, with the
backing of senior and retired air force officers, moved in tanks to surround the National
Palace” (Schirmer 1998, 20-21). Yet according to the most detailed reconstruction of
events, “The first officer of any rank to find Muñoz was a Colonel Alvarez, who was in
charge of GUATEL, the national phone company. Apparently he asked Muñoz what
he could do to help, which was to cut off telephone communication to the palace for a
while. By now, it still was not much past 1000 and the coup was essentially over mili-
tarily. Other units would weigh in later, but there was to be no mentionable military
opposition. The rest was some tense negotiating, bluffing and a lot of opportunism.
Three soldiers, however, had died in related, clumsy confrontations” (Demarest 2002,
153-154).
At 9:45 a.m., President Lucas sent word that he wished to talk with Muñoz, who out
of fear sent another lieutenant. Neither side yielded in that meeting. By 11:30 a.m.,
Muñoz declined an offer of amnesty from Defense Minister Mendoza, recognizing that
“the Rubicon had indeed been crossed.” Muñoz gave Lucas a deadline of 4 p.m. to
108
resign. Around 1:30pm, the opportunistic General Rı́os Montt found Muñoz and “the
first thing he did was ask three times who was going to be in charge, Muñoz or himself.”
Only at this point did Muñoz subordinate himself to Rı́os; a senior officer joined the
coup group (Demarest 2002, 155). After hours of negotiations “Lucas agreed to step
down as long as his successor was a general” (Schirmer 1998, 20-21).
“General Rios Montt was asked to head a military junta that initially consisted of the
young officers who had engineered the coup: Colonel Victor Manuel Argueta Villalta,
Lieutenant Colonel Mario René Enrı́quez, Maj. Angel Arturo Sánchez Gudiel, and
Captain Muñoz. Several hours later, the second “junta” included Rı́os Montt, Gen-
eral Horacio Maldonado Schaad (a close friend of President Lucas and Honor Guard
Commander), and Colonel Luis Gordillo Martı́nez (another close friend of President
Lucas and Commander of the Cuartel General). Gordillo served as the liaison officer
between the army hardliners and the ultraconservative latifundistas. Air Force Captain
Mario Rivas Garcı́a Rı́os and Second Lieutenant Héctor Mauricio López Bonilla were
added to the original four “golpistas” in the Young Officers Advisory Group (Grupo
Asesor), known derisively by more senior officers as “La Juntita” or the “Little Junta””
(20-21). Schaad and Gordillo were able to muscle their way into the junta that was
announced at 9:45 p.m. mainly because of “immediate power maths.” They were
included not because they had led the coup, but to block further open conflict and
possible counter-coups (Demarest 2002, 158).
On Wednesday, March 24, the junta dissolved congress, suspended the constitution,
and banned political party activity (Armendáriz 1986, 34). Rios Montt, though the
junior coup leaders had hoped would only be a figurehead, appeared in control with
senior officers and became the minister of defense. The junta did not make any promises
around elections, even though the junior officers had hoped to see presidential elections
within 60 days, a ban on military candidates, and commitment to anti-corruption
(Bonner 1982c). On March 26, a rally was scheduled to hail the coup but not the junta,
saying they supported Lucas’ ouster but wanted to see a return to democracy. Some
50,000 people were predicted to join the demonstration (Bonner 1982b). Guatemala’s
main rebel groups vowed to keep fighting (Riding 1982).
a successful reshuffling coup.
According to most accounts, the coup involved “a young officers’ revolt,” and perhaps
a “MLN conspiracy” (of the right-wing National Liberation Movement), both of which
may have been backed by the CIA (Schirmer 1998, 20-21). MLN deputy Leonel Sisniego
Otero claimed to have talked to Rios Montt and other generals in the preceding weeks
to support a coup and find a potential new head of state (Penyak 1989, 136). The
MLN, which represented the interests of the landed aristocracy, began to split with
the generals in 1978 when it fielded its own presidential candidate, and collaborated
with the junior officers in 1982 (Armendáriz 1986, 30-31). However, neither the MLN
nor the Christian Democrats benefitted from Rios Montt’s rule and their call for new
elections within six months were ignored (34).
109
This coup also blocked Guevara’s assumption of the presidency after the March 1982
elections. The coup thus broke the pattern that held from 1970-1982 in which ““Elected”
military officials, each of whom had served as Defense Minister for the previous presi-
dent, ruled Guatemala” (Penyak 1989, 135). Rios Montt, who had converted to evan-
gelical Protestantism, was a senior officer but a political outsider, having lost the rigged
1974 presidential elections as a Christian Democrat due to fraud. Although still on
active duty, he had not had a military appointment since returning to Guatemala as
military attaché in Madrid in 1977 (137). There is some disagreement over the extent
to which the coup empowered a new military elite. According to Armendáriz (1986,
34-35), the six junior officers who formed the La Juntita “remained a constant armed
presence within the presidential palace” under Rios Montt. Mazzella (1988, 154) says
that under “one-man rule,” Rı́os Montt’s “key policy-makers were a group of young
officers who demanded absolute control over economic policies and counterinsurgency
measures.” Others claim that the military hierarchy continued to dominate politics
after the coup (Penyak 1989, 136). In this alternative view, “The lieutenants and cap-
tains took the personal, hazardous initiative, but they did so under the cynical gaze
of older men who knew full well they would be able to rob the prize” (Demarest 2002,
160-161).
The coup was led by 19 “reformist” junior officers (Armendáriz 1986, 30). “The blood-
less palace revolt was carried out by younger officers of lower and middle ranks in the
army and air force. The decision to replace General Guevara with General Rios Montt
was an attempt to restore confidence among the dominant ruling groups and break the
international isolation of Guatemala... The coup was stimulated by the rigged electoral
process the isolation of the country, and the continuous assassinations. The objectives
set by the new government were: “reconciliation of the Guatemalan family individual
security and respect for human rights, recovery of national dignity, and the economy
under a free enterprise system a new reformist nationalist development concept, politi-
cal participation in a true democracy, and the establishment of constitutionality within
a short time.” The business, landed oligarchy, and all political parties backed the coup
and promised collaboration. The programmatic statement issued by the Junta was
an attempt to reconcile diverse policy preferences among civilian groups and military
factions” (Mazzella 1988, 154).
Despite the fact that the coup was initially organized by junior officers (“juntita”), in
collaboration with leaders of an extremist right-wing party (MLN), Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz (2014) do not code a regime change because a senior officer (Rios Montt)
led what Schirmer (1998, 21) calls a “second ‘junta’ ,” comprised of other senior officers
(another general and a colonel, both close friends of the coup target), in a reshuffling
of the military leadership. Further, the leader of the MLN who collaborated with
the junior officers in plotting the coup was immediately sidelined when Rios Montt
came on the scene (Bonner 1982a). Handy (1986, 402) argues that “ ‘[t]he coup was
essentially an internal military matter aimed at removing the commander of the armed
forces and inaugurating a new regime that would pursue the guerrilla war with more
vigour, and refrain from those pursuits that had seriously divided the military during
the last twelve years.” We therefore keep the coding consistent with Geddes, Wright,
110
and Frantz (2014) and code this event as a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 90-1982-8-14: Guatemala, Efraı́n Rı́os Montt

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; failed non-military coup attempt - CCD;
failed coup attempt - CSP; No overt military force - PT; not a candidate - Singh;
Archigos codes Rı́os Montt as the leader of Guatemala from March 23, 1982, to Au-
gust 8, 1983; GWF code a military regime (Guatemala 70-85) from March 1, 1970,
until December 8, 1985.
Event: On Saturday, August 14, 1982, the Guatemalan government announced that it
had arrested eight leaders from the country’s three main right-wing political parties,
and said that its security forces were hunting other civilian leaders still at large, in-
cluding Leonel Sisniega Otero, a leader of the National Liberation Movement (MLN)
and an early supporter of the March 23 coup which brought Rı́os Montt to power.
The government said the men had violated “laws in force” and were connected with
a “rightist plot” to overthrow Rı́os Montt. “In Guatemala City, the local press linked
the arrests to a speech two weeks ago by Rı́os Montt, in which he said the government
had discovered plans to overthrow his government this month.” Three of the arrested
men were from the MLN, “a powerful group that has its own armed paramilitary force
of several thousand men and is considered to be well connected in the military.” Evi-
dently, Sisniega and the MLN, “which hoped to hold the levers of power with General
Rı́os Montt as figurehead, found themselves elbowed out of the way when the new
President assumed full power [in June]. They are highly suspicious of some of his plans
for mild reform” (Dinges 1982; Los Angeles Times 1982; Rottie 1982). On Tuesday,
August 17, it was reported that Sisniega had fled to Honduras (United Press Interna-
tional 1982c). On August 31, Interior Minister Ricardo Mendez Ruiz reported that the
National Police had arrested Enrique Ma See, a businessmen, for joining the MLN in
“organizing themselves to try to overthrow” the Rı́os Montt government. Mendez de-
nied rumors that army officers Col. Francisco Gordillo Mendez and Second Lieutenant
Lopez Lara were involved in the coup plot (Prensa Libre 1982).
U.S. State Department (1982) summarized the August 1982 events this way: “The
most recent threat to Rı́os Montt was an attempted coup or assassination plot engi-
neered by Leonel Sisniega Otero, former vice presidential candidate of the far right-wing
National Liberation Movement (MLN). Sisniega was upset because he did not receive
an important post in the new government following the 23 March coup, in which he
was involved and which brought Rı́os Montt to power. Many reports of Sisniega’s re-
newed coup plotting were received prior to the arrest of eight of his cohorts on August
13. Sisniega eluded arrest during this episode and went underground. According to
recent reports, if a coup does not occur by August 28, Sisniega will flee the country.”
Evidently, the MLN, having placed second in the March 7 elections that were annulled,
believed they would win if and when new elections were called and the MLN feared
that Rioss Montt was determined to stay in office (U.S. State Department 1982).
Coding rationale: According to Schirmer (1998, 26), after Rı́os Montt ousted Gen.
111
Lucas Garcia and came to power in March 1982, “a fissure within the officer corps
developed: those associated with Lucas were sent into field commands, while those
who backed Rı́os took the choice Defense Ministry and Army General Staff positions.
This fissure meant that Rı́os Montt’s first year saw several coup attempts: one in
August involving Sisniega and others of the extreme right-wing with a small but loyal
following among hardline junior officers who had enjoyed immense power between 1970
and 1982; another coup attempt in October involved Colonel Gordillo, who was ar-
rested and discharged from the army.” According to Anderson (1988, 56), “Many felt
that Rios would extend his rule as long as two or three years, and therefore sought
to terminate it in the same manner as it had begun. In August 1982, there was an
abortive coup that was blamed on the MLN’s inciting of certain junior officers. Several
MLN stalwarts were arrested, and Leonel Sisniega went into hiding, although Sandoval
Alarcón denied any knowledge of the plan.”
Based on the evidence, we assume there was a right-wing coup plot in August 1982,
but not necessarily a coup attempt. We assume that Marshall and Marshall (2018)
code a coup attempt based on news reports stating that a “coup attempt” had taken
place. However, some news reports, such as Keesing’s World News Archive (1983a),
which use language that a “coup attempt was discovered ” in August 1982 [emphasis
added], actually uses language more consistent with what we consider a plot; after
all, attempts are carried out, not discovered. The secondary histories stating a “coup
attempt” occurred (e.g. Schirmer) provide no evidence documenting concrete actions
by active military members targeting the regime leader. Had officers actually tried to
oust Rı́os Montt on behalf of the MLN (we have no names or sources that document
such actions), we would have coded this as a failed reshuffling coup on the assumption
that a more pliant military figurehead would have been installed that could call for
new elections (which the MLN believed it could win and thus constitutionally take
power). However, because we cannot know when such elections would have been held,
if ever, and we do not assume the MLN would have taken direct control of the regime,
we have no basis to assume a regime change would have occurred during the dates of
the coup event. AMBIGUOUS.

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP; no
overt military force - PT; not a candidate - Singh; Archigos codes Rı́os Montt as the
leader of Guatemala from March 23, 1982, to August 8, 1983; GWF code a military
regime (Guatemala 70-85) from March 1, 1970, until December 8, 1985.
Event: On October 21, 1982, the local press picked up rumors of a foiled coup plot,
which the Rı́os Montt government initially denied (Cadena de Emisoras Unidas 1982).
On October 29, Defense Minister Oscar Humberto Mejı́a Victores confirmed that the
state had “uncovered a new plot to overthrow” the government; the plotters allegedly
included soldiers and civilians (Associated Press 1982c). Several military officers were
arrested for the “attempted plot,” including some colonels (Cadena de Emisoras Unidas
112
1982). On November 5, it was confirmed that Col. Luı́s Gordillo Martinez, a mem-
ber of the three-man junta that was dissolved on June 9, 1982, was under arrest and
charged with leading the coup attempt; at the time Gordillo was still serving as Com-
munications Minister (ACAN 1982a). However, in September 1983, after Rı́os Montt
was deposed in a successful coup, a civilian court cleared Col. Gordillo of plotting a
coup in October 1982 for lack of evidence (Associated Press 1983b).
According to Keesing’s World News Archive (1983a), after the August 1982 plot, “An-
other coup attempt was apparently forestalled by the arrest on Oct. 20 of a number
of politicians and army officers said to be discontented over the slow progress of the
counterinsurgency programme. Those accused of involvement included Sr Edgardo
Ponciano, a former Minister of Agriculture (from 1978 to 1981, see 29148 B; 31113
A), and Col. Francisco Luis Gordillo Martinez, formerly a co-member with Gen. Rı́os
Montt in the junta which had held power in March-June 1982 (when he had also held
ministerial office... Col. Gordillo Martinez was later freed and then discharged from
the Army for “expressing political opinions contrary to service regulations” when he
tried to take legal action to clear his name.”
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we assume there was a coup plot in October
1982, but not necessarily a coup attempt. Like the August 1982 coup plot (see 90-
1982-8-14), the plot appears to have been foiled or preempted by government arrests
before it materialized. Had we found evidence of concrete actions, we assume that Col.
Gordillo, a regime insider, would have sought to reassume power within the military
junta. We would have therefore coded this as a failed reshuffling coup. AMBIGUOUS.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CSP and Singh; no overt military force - PT; failed
coup attempt - Singh; Archigos codes Rı́os Montt as the leader of Guatemala from
March 23, 1982, to August 8, 1983; GWF code a military regime (Guatemala 70-85)
from March 1, 1970, until December 8, 1985. EPR codes Ladinos as the monopoly
ethnic group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On Monday, June 27, 1983, an attempted coup reportedly began “when the
commander of the Quetzaltenango garrison refused to obey a presidential order, and
other army garrisons and units of the Air Force took similar action” (Keesing’s World
News Archive 1983b). According to another account, “The attempt began Tuesday
morning, when commanders of five provincial garrisons mobilized for a rebellion, ac-
cording to military and diplomatic sources. By the end of the day the loyalties of
nine garrisons were briefly in doubt, but no shots were fired” (Preston 1983). A
third account from opposition sources stated that army officers “led by four provincial
commanders–at least one of whom contemplated armed rebellion–told Rios Montt he
would either have to change his policies or leave office” (Montalbano 1983). Others
said the officers were only “demanding a change in style and substance to end the
dissent” throughout the country and the military. The officers “were especially up-
set over allegations that six officers seconded as advisers in the national palace were
113
taking bribes and disrupting the military chain of command by handing out orders to
superior officers outside the palace” (Cody 1983). Other “reliable sources” also said
some officers demanded Rı́os Montt’s resignation and “were threatening to lead their
troops into armed revolt from bases in the countryside” (Cody 1983).
On Tuesday, June 28, Aqui El Mundo aired a taped interview with Col. Francisco
Gordillo Martinez, a member of the three-man junta in power from March to June
1982, in which he declared that we was going underground to oppose General Rı́os
Montt. Gordillo alleged the government of offering him $50,000 to leave the country
and foreswear opposition activity (Crossette 1983). Gordillo, who had been briefly
imprisoned after the October 1982 coup plot, suggested that Guatemalan Army officers
are sworn to protect the nation, not the president (Cody 1982). He called Rios Montt
a “traitor” for reneging on his promise to call elections for a national constituent
assembly. “I am asking for the resignation of Rios Montt, before this produces an
outbreak of blood,” Gordillo said in the interview (United Press International 1983a).
Later in the same program, Leonel Sisniega Otero, the right-wing MLN politician who
was wanted in connection with leading an August 1982 coup plot (see 90-1982-8-14),
also spoke against the president (Henry and Freudenheim 1983). He called Rı́os Montt a
“traitor” to the March 1982 revolution and a “religious fanatic” (Cody 1982). “We put
Rios Montt into office, not like he says, that he has been designated by God,” Sisniega
said. With the interviews widely being seen as inviting a military coup attempt (Cody
1983), government spokesman Gonzalo Asturias issued a statement saying that “a coup
would be bloody and nefarious” (United Press International 1983a).
On Wednesday, June 29, reports surfaced stating that “traffic had been stopped for
a time and unusual troop movements were seen around the presidential palace before
dawn. Rumors of a possible coup attempt accelerated when Guatemalan radio sta-
tions joined in a national network from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m. and broadcast military music
interspersed with appeals for calm” (Cody 1982). In one early report, the unusual
activity was attributed to a group of officers who “failed in an attempt to overthrow”
Rı́os Montt (Crossette 1983). Other reports indicated that before dawn “the govern-
ment took control of all radio stations in Guatemala and announced “there has been
no coup d’état and the situation is under control and tranquil.” All radio and televi-
sion stations were later placed in a national chain and the 120 radio news broadcasts
were suspended. Afternoon newspapers continued to publish but with limited content”
(United Press International 1983a).
To respond to the military threat, by Wednesday morning, Rios Montt “was holding
secret meetings with the military leadership behind a reinforced guard at the na-
tional palace” (Cody 1983). The price for senior officers’ continued loyalty, according
to Guatemalan and diplomatic sources, was Rı́os Montt’s agreement to a number of
changes, including the sacking of the six offending junior officer advisors, as well as
the removal of “two religious advisers, Francisco Bianchi and Alvero Contreras, both
elders of the Church of the Word” Crossette (1983). Handy (1986) notes that senior
officers were upset that, as one put it, “The army is now being run by captains and
little lieutenants.” Following these negotiations, at 4 p.m. on June 29, in response
to “frank defiance of public power undertaken by the eternal nonconformists,” Rı́os
114
Montt declared a state of alert, fired the six-member advisory council composed of
junior officers that had helped install him in power in March 1982, and in a partial
concession to his opposition announced a proposal for elections in July 1984 for a con-
stituent assembly, which would convene in September 1984 to draft a new constitution
(Cody 1982). He sought to remain in power through 1986. The government denied a
coup attempt, but on July 1 Rı́os Montt dismissed 50 officers from government posts
and ordered them back to the barracks (Keesing’s World News Archive 1983b).
Coding rationale: This coup event followed a growing period of public disaffection
with Rı́os Montt among civilians and within the military. Catholic officers were un-
comfortable with his weekly sermons on army radio given his Protestant moralizing.
Business elites were also upset with Rı́os Montt’s plans to impose a 10% value-added
tax (a condition of a World Bank aid program) and were reported to have reached
out to army officers to finance a coup. Political parties had meanwhile been calling
for early elections and for Rı́os Montt to fulfill his promise to return to constitutional
rule. Splintering in the military became public in early June when reserve Brig. Gen.
Jose Guillermo Echeverria Vielman, the country’s most senior active officer, published
a letter criticizing the president for mixing religion and politics, abusing power, and
undermining the military’s professionalism by not setting elections and withdrawing
to the barracks (Cody 1983).
We do not consider this a case of prior defection. Both Vielman and Col. Gordillo had
been “retired from the army for political activity,” and a court-martial on charges of
plotting was pending against Gordillo (Associated Press 1983a). As such, Vielman and
Gordillo were prior defectors, not active military, at this time. Thus, whether or not
to code a coup attempt in this case depends on whether the active provincial officers
went on strike only, or took concrete actions to oust Rı́os Montt. On this point, Jorge
Serrano, president of the Council of State, stated that “Yes, there was a coup attempt.
No guns were fired or drawn, but yes, some (military) units were moved” (Nordland
1983). Similarly, a now declassified July 1983 U.S. Embassy assessment states that
“It is now clear that the threat to the president on June 28/29 came from active
duty officers...Up to 70 percent of the officer corps may support the confrontation.
Minister of Defense Mejia may have been responsible for Rı́os Montt remaining in
office by declining to lead a junta to replace the president” (U.S. State Department
1983). Based on this evidence, we assume that the provincial commanders did in fact
mobilize their troops to make an assault on the capital. This would explain the heavy
patrols on June 29 in the Capital and the government attempts to prevent a coup
announcement by taking control of radio and television. We thus assume that there
was a coup attempt, not simply a preempted coup plot as in August and October 1982.
H. A. G. Morales (1997, 121) characterizes the event as “an ill-planned and poorly
executed coup attempt,” which “Some had the impression that this attempt sought to
test his reactions.” Anderson (1988, 57) also characterizes the event as a revolt and
“an attempted coup by Gen. Guillermo Echiverrı́a,” which “was quickly put down
by the defense minister, Gen. Oscar Mejı́a Vı́ctores, who had plans of his own.” We
similarly assume that Rı́os Montt defeated the coup attempt by provincial commanders
115
by concessions to senior leadership. Handy (1986), however, notes that “following the
military strike of June 1983 a group of senior officers, angered and emboldened by this
disobedience, attempted to overthrow Rı́os Montt.” We have no evidence that senior
leaders in the Capital sought to target Rı́os Mont. Regardless of exactly who moved
against the president, “while he was able to survive this test...This was the harbinger
of his defeat; on 8 August, Generals Mejia Victores and Lopez Fuentes, supported by
the bulk of the senior command, forced him from office.”
Based on this evidence, we code this event as a failed leader reshuffling coup. Given that
“Some had the impression that this attempt sought to test his reactions” (H. A. G.
Morales 1997, 121) and was a harbinger of the August 1983 coup, we assume that
the outcomes of the late June 1983 coup attempt would have been similar to those
that actually occurred following early August coup, which led to a continuation of the
military regime (but on an accelerated electoral calendar). AMBIGUOUS.

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Rios Montt as exiting on August 8, 1983
military regime (Guatemala 70-85) from July 1, 1970 to January 16, 1986; EPR codes
Event: On June 9, 1982, within three months of the March 1982 coup (see 90-1982-
3-23), General Rı́os Montt dismissed the other two junta members (General Horacio
Maldonado Schaad and Colonel Francisco Gordillo Martı́nez) and declared himself
President (Penyak 1989, 138-139). Although he initially improved Guatemala’s image
by ending the worst violence in the capital, Rı́os alienated the traditional business
establishment in 1983 by proposing a World Bank mandated ten percent value-added
tax. He alienated the military establishment by favoring junior officers who had in-
stalled him in power. In June 1983, “he refused to honor a request by José Echeverrı́a,
retired army general and defense minister, who published an open letter in which he
requested a diminution in the status of non-senior military advisors in Rı́os Montt’s
government.” Disgruntled officers also felt Montt gave too much power to members
of his church, from whom he frequently sought political advice (142-143). “Finally, in
the last week of June, representatives of the military Old Guard approached President
Rios with five demands: one, that he establish the electoral tribunal before mentioned
and set an early date for elections; two, that his six junior officer special advisors
resign; three, that his two coreligionists advisors resign; four, that the proposed, un-
popular value-added tax be cancelled; and, five, the removal of army officials employed
as government bureaucrats. With the presentation of these demands, troops from five
military bases outside Guatemala City threatened military maneuvers. In the ensu-
ing days General Rios Montt acceded to most of the demands,” but not number four
(Armendáriz 1986, 47-48).
To preempt an MLN coup led by Leonel Sisniega Otero, the military decided to oust
116
Rı́os first. According to Handy, “On Aug. 6, virtually all the commanders of the
country’s armed forces gathered at the Guatemala City barracks of the Guardia de
Honor, an elite army garrison. There were impassioned arguments for and against
ousting Rios Montt, but gradually the plotters won. ... On the morning of Aug. 8,
the commanders again assembled at the Guardia de Honor barracks. Rios Montt was
asked to stop by. When the President entered the hall, he got the bad news: resign or
be ousted. Rios Montt listened and argued for 20 minutes, then agreed to quit. All he
wanted to do, he told the officers, was return to the presidential mansion to tidy up
his affairs... As soon as he arrived at his office, however, he began calling army and
security force units he thought were still loyal to him. The rebellious officers decided
to be more persuasive. Planes and helicopters buzzed the presidential palace. Soldiers
surrounding the building exchanged gunfire with members of Rios Montt’s 1,000-man
presidential guard. After a stalemate of about two hours, Rios Montt realized his cause
was lost and surrendered his post” (Armendáriz 1986, 48-49). The fighting lasted no
more than 90 minutes and seven people were killed (United Press International 1983b).
The coup was led by General Oscar Humberto Mejı́a Vı́ctores, the Defense Minister,
with the tacit support of the United States (Penyak 1989, 142-143). General Mejı́a
“declared that“the army resumed the responsibility for the return to civilian life.” The
Commanders’ Council cited four reasons for the removal of General Montt: (1) to stop
a “fanatical, religious, aggressive group... that had used and abused the means of
government for its own benefit... (2) to preserve “the principal of hierarchy and subor-
dination... in order to frustrate attempts to divide and confuse the armed institution...
(3) to guide the people along democratic and nationalistic paths... and (4) to fight by
all means available the Marxist-Leninist subversion” (Mazzella 1988, 155-156).
Coding rationale: This is a consensus coup according to all the major datasets that
we consulted. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event
as a successful reshuffling coup. Although Rios Montt’s 16-month rule is often treated
as “a deviancy from recent Guatemalan politics,” some argue that “Rı́os Montt was
Guatemala’s caudillo and a puppet of the military establishment at the same time”
(Penyak 1989, 131-132).
• # 90-1988-5-11: Guatemala, Hector Gramajo Morales

Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; failed coup attempt - CSP and PT; Archigos
codes Cerezo as the leader of Guatemala from January 14, 1986, to January 14, 1991;
GWF code an indirect military regime (Guatemala 85-95) from December 8, 1985,
until November 12, 1995, which was led by Gramajo Morales from 1987 to January
1990, implying that Cerezo was the nominal executive only at this time. EPR codes
Event: On Wednesday, May 11, 1988, the Defense Minister Gen. Hector Gramajo
announced that two army officers had led 2 of the army’s 74 bases and installations
in “acts of indiscipline” against the government, but that they had been immediately
neutralized and the officers involved arrested. Gramajo said the two ringleaders led
117
officers and enlisted men from bases in Jutiapa, 75 miles east of the capital, and Re-
talhuleu, 115 miles southwest of the capital, and led them towards Guatemala City
(Associated Press 1988a). But loyal troops intercepted the rebels on the international
highway to El Salvador and blocked passage to the capital (Reuters 1988b). After
troops in important units in the capital failed to support the rebels, senior army com-
manders convinced the mutinous troops to return to their bases without any shots fired
(LeMoyne 1988).
According to Cerezo, the traditional economic groups “went to senior army leaders
and asked them to overthrow the Government, which is what they have been used to
doing in the past. This time it did not work, so they had to find discontented officers
at lower ranks” (LeMoyne 1988). Col. Luis Arturo Isaacs Rodrı́guez, the chief military
spokesmen, stated: “the coup attempt resulted from some officers listening to those
who got rich during the years of direct military rule” (Farah 1989).
On the same day that a civilian court officially began investigating eight civilians and
three former officers for treason, Major Gustavo Dı́az López appeared on the t.v. show
Aquı́ el Mundo, owned and directed by Mario David Garcı́a, who had called on viewers
to wear red handkerchiefs to show support for the coup attempt. Dı́az López charged
the Christian Democratic government with planning to move the country towards
socialism, and he decried Gramajo’s swearing allegiance to the state on April 11 1986,
which he saw as submission to the Christian Democrats. Portillo told the press that
Christian Democracy was “a greed vehicle that transports red passengers” that sought
to destroy the army. On May 19, the government suspended channel 3’s frequency just
as the 5 civilians were preparing an Aquı́ el Mundo group appearance (Schirmer 1998,
219-20). Dı́az López and former Col. Gustavo adolfo Padilla Morales were discharged
from the army, imprisoned, but given amnesty later in 1988. In October 1989, they
were sentenced in civilian court for leading a subsequent coup attempt in May 1989,
which involved 21 army officers and had the support of 300 troops (Associated Press
1989c).
Coding rationale: The 1985-95 regime is an indirect military regime because although a
civilian Christian Democratic controlled the executive, the military (i.e. senior military
officers including General Gramajo) retained control over defense policy and prevented
the democratic left from participating in elections. We therefore do not exclude this
case as “not regime leader” just because it targeted the civilian nominal executive of
an indirect military regime as it targeted the whole regime.
Had the coup by junior officers allied with conservative civilian groups been success-
ful, we assume that military officers would have sought to rule without the Christian
Democrats (as had been the case prior to the 1985 election). As this would constitute
a change in the group from which leaders could be drawn, we code this case as a failed
regime change coup.
• # 90-1989-5-9: Guatemala, Hector Gramajo Morales
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CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Cerezo as the leader of Guatemala from January
14, 1986, to January 14, 1991; GWF code an indirect military regime (Guatemala
85-95) from December 8, 1985, until November 12, 1995, which was led by Gramajo
Morales from 1987 to January 1990, implying that Cerezo was the nominal executive
only at this time. EPR codes Ladinos as the monopoly ethnic group in Guatemala
from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On Tuesday, May 9, 1989, troops from an air force unit based at the inter-
national airport south of Guatemala City reportedly marched on both the National
Palace and the home of Gen. Hector Gramajo, the Defense Minister, but they were
turned back by loyal troops (Associated Press 1989a). Early that morning, the coup
plotters led 200-300 troops and sealed off other important locations, such as a national
radio station and national police headquarters. They were aided by helicopter gun
ships and at least one jet fighter that roared over the capital after 5 a.m., in an appar-
ent attempt to intimidate loyalist forces (Hockstader 1989). But the leaders “hopes
ended abruptly when their troops, unaware they were participating in a coup, obeyed
a Government command to return to their barracks” (Mark A. Uhlig 1989a). By 7
a.m., the coup was put down without bloodshed or shots fired (Hockstader 1989).
Cerezo initially identified Col. Cesar Ramón Quinteros Alvarado, an Israeli-trained
officer who had lost out to Gramajo for the army’s top post, as the chief plotter
(Boudreaux 1989). At a news conference, Cerezo said they had no evidence of civilian
participation from right-wing groups (as had been the case the previous May). West-
ern diplomats reported that the real target of the coup attempt was Gramajo (Larmer
1989; Chicago Tribune Wires 1989). However, Gramajo argued that the Officers of
the Mountain who had been dismissed after the May 1988 coup masterminded the
plot. Both the coup plotters (the officers of the mountain) and the Gramajo linea
were nationalistic, and both realized the need to maintain a civilian presidency (e.g.
to retain international support), but the “difference lie in how far and how much a
civilian president should be allowed to maneuver” (Schirmer 1998, 232).
Coding rationale: The 1985-95 regime is an indirect military regime because although
a civilian Christian Democratic controlled the executive, the military (i.e. senior mili-
tary officers including General Gramajo) retained control over defense policy and pre-
vented the democratic left from participating in elections. Coding this case as a failed
reshuffling coup assumes that had the coup been successful, it would have entailed the
replacement of Gramajo as defense minister but that the military would have continued
to rule alongside a Christian Democrat president. If senior military officers (but not
Gramajo) had continued to rule with PCD elites, this would not constitute a change
in the group from which leaders could be drawn.
• # 90-1993-5-25: Guatemala, José Domingo Garcia Samayoa

Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; attempted autogolpe - CCD; failed coup
attempt - CSP; successful coup - Singh; Autogolpe - PT; Archigos codes Serrano Elias
as the leader of Guatemala from January 14, 1991, to June 1, 1993; GWF code an
119
indirect military regime (Guatemala 85-95) from December 8, 1985, until November
12, 1995, which was led by Garcia Samayoa from at least 1992 to after January 1993
(June 7).
Event: At 4 a.m. on Tuesday, May 25, 1993, “the National Police placed the president
of Congress, José Lobo Dubó, and the president of the Supreme Court of Justice,
Juan José Rodı́l, under house arrest” and surrounded the location of the Ombudsman
for human rights, Ramiro de León Carpia” and Congressman Obdulio Chinchilla Vega.
Meanwhile, a military unit began to occupy the Supreme Court building and “armored
personnel carriers were positioned in the plaza in front of the building.” Police stripped
representatives of any arms and identification cards at the Legislative Palace (McCleary
1999, 107-108). At 7 a.m., President Serrano Elias appeared on television to announce
he had suspended constitutional rights and dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court,
saying he would temporarily rule by decree to stem growing protests. The move was
immediately compared to that of Alberto Fujimori the previous year in Peru (Golden
1993c).
Serrano then convened a cabinet meeting to inform them of his decision in which he was
accompanied by Vice President Gustavo Espina, Interior Minister Francisco Perdomo,
his staff, and the military high command (McCleary 1999, 108). Much of the state
apparatus conceded: “only two or three cabinet ministers resigned immediately; the
rest agreed to continue in office.” Meanwhile, in Congress, “fifty deputies–eight short
of a majority–agreed to ratify the illegal election of vice-president Espina. Like the
president of the Supreme Court and many leaders of the political parties, the deputies
were opportunistic coup participants” (Torres-Rivas 1996, 57). “Interpreting these
events as falling under the purview of Resolution 1080, the OAS secretary general
called a meeting of the Permanent Council that same afternoon. The council issued a
unanimous statement that condemned the Guatemalan autogolpe and convoked an ad
hoc meeting of ministers of foreign affairs” (Levitt 2006, 105).
On Thursday, May 27, Serrano swore in appointments for the Supreme Court at a
ceremony attended by Defense Minister Garcı́a Samayoa and Vice President Espina.
After the ceremony, Garcı́a Samayoa held a press conference saying the swearing in
of new justices was “a step forward” (McCleary 1999, 125). However, the power grab
was immediately challenged by the opposition and the constitutional court (Golden
1993e), which ruled the coup unconstitutional (Torres-Rivas 1996, 58). On May 27,
demonstrators took the streets to protest the move, while the U.S. announced the
suspension of all military aid and most economic aid (Golden 1993f). Thus, “In addition
to protests by Guatemalan citizens and interest groups, the United States and OAS
made their disapproval (and that of the international financial institutions they heavily
influenced) clear to Guatemalan political actors...The international context thereby
helped save the civilian transitional regime” and thwart Serrano (Booth 2000, 80).
After the OAS fact finding mission had arrived and began its consultations, “Sev-
eral rounds of informal bargaining followed, which included an offer, rejected both by
Guatemala’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal and by the OAS, to hold new elections for a
Constituent Assembly, as Fujimori had done in Peru” (Levitt 2006, 105). By May 30,
120
after hearing appeals from the OAS to restore democracy, military commanders began
to express public doubts about their support for Serrano (Golden 1993g). That night,
Serrano denied rumors that he would resign (Golden 1993d). On Monday, May 31,
Serrano held a press conference, again accompanied by Espina and Garcı́a Samayoa,
presenting a new plan for a return to constitutional rule (McCleary 1999, 136-137).
On June 1, Serrano was ousted from office by the military (Golden 1993b).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this case is a coup or autogolpe attempt depends on
(a) whether one views Jorge Serrano Elı́ as the regime leader or not, and (b) whether
there was military involvement or support for Serrano’s actions. Following Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014), we consider Serrano Elı́as only the nominal executive of an
indirect military regime, as regime leadership was held by Garcia Samayoa. Serrano
Elı́as, an engineer by training, had won the 1990 presidential elections.
Second, was the military involved in this event? On May 31, Serrano denied that
the military had been involved in his actions (McCleary 1999, 137). But according
to Torres-Rivas (1996, 57), “the civilian auto-coup was also a National Army coup.
The coup could not have happened independently of the army. Because of what it
did and did not do, the army simply confirmed its status as the most important el-
ement of power in the society. General José Domingo Garcı́a Samayoa and parts of
the high-ranking military officials sided with Serrano’s decision. Security forces acted
immediately to disband the other powers of the state.” It was initially unclear the
extent to which Serrano’s actions had the backing of the military, which appeared di-
vided. On May 27, Defense Minister Garcia Samayoa and Army Chief of Staff Roberto
Perussina took a “wait and see” stance and made clear they wouldn’t oust Serrano,
whereas Gen. Vı́ctor Argueta Villalta, commander of the Cobán department, Vice
Chief of Staff Gen. Mario René Enrı́quez, Director of Intelligence Col. Otto Pérez
Molina, and Col. Mario Méride expressed opposition to Serrano and called for action
(McCleary 1999, 124). Thus, there is evidence of military support for Serrano by the
regime leader, even if Garcia had not participated in planning. For a detailed narrative
of events, see McCleary (1999, 105-147).
Based on the evidence, the May 25 power grab was led by the nominal executive
(Serrano) with the support of the regime leader (Samayoa) and targeting the legislature
and the Supreme Court, which failed when the military abandoned the president a week
later. We therefore code this event as a failed autogolpe.
• # 90-1993-6-1: Guatemala, José Domingo Garcia Samayoa

Other Datasets: attempted autogolpe - CCD; not a candidate - CSP (only codes suc-
cessful coup on May 25) and PT (only codes autogolpe on May 25); successful coup
- Singh; Archigos codes Serrano Elias as being removed on this date through “ir-
regular” means by domestic military actors without foreign support; Svolik does not
code a leader after 1987, because he considers Guatemala a democracy since Mejia
Victores stepped down on January 14, 1986; GWF code an indirect military regime
(Guatemala 85-95) from December 8, 1985, until November 12, 1995, which was led
121
by Garcia Samayoa from at least 1992 to after January 1993 (June 7), implying that
Jorge Serrano Elı́as was merely the nominal executive at the time. EPR codes Ladinos
as the monopoly ethnic group in Guatemala from 1946 to 1995.
Event: On May 25, 1993, President Serrano Elı́as attempted a self-coup with the sup-
port of military leaders (see 90-1993-5-25). By May 31, opposition and business sector
resistance to the self-coup strengthened and protestors defied bans on public assembly
to demand the president’s resignation. A march led by the human rights ombudsman,
Ramiro de Leon Carpio, marched past the presidential palace (Golden 1993d). Dis-
gusted with the “wait and see” approach of Garcı́a Samayoa and top military leaders,
early on the morning of June 1, Otto Pérez Molina, the director of intelligence, along
with his junior officers decided to oust Serrano, and secured the support of Vice Chief of
Staff Mario René Enrı́quez (McCleary 1999, 142). Thus, on June 1, the military forced
the president out of office. As word of Serrano’s fall spread, hundreds gathered in plaza
outside the “pressed against the iron palace gates” chanting “Out! Out! Out!” The
military negotiated a deal with political leaders to restore constitutionality, in which
Vice President Espina would take over executive power (Golden 1993b). However, the
constitutional court rejected this plan because Espina had participated in Serrano’s
May 25 auto-coup (Torres-Rivas 1996, 57).
Early on June 2, Serrano and his family flew to exile in El Salvador and insisted that
he had been removed in a coup by a small group of military leaders (McCleary 1999,
148). The ad hoc meeting of OAS “ministers was initiated on June 3; Serrano’s self-
coup was condemned, and a second mission was immediately dispatched” (Levitt 2006,
105). Soon after, Pérez Molina learned that he and nine other officers that had forced
Serrano’s ouster were now being ordered to be dismissed for insubordination (McCleary
1999, 156). During the second OAS mission, Guatemala’s “Constitutional Court ruled
that the vice president was a coup participant, and his position was declared vacant”
(Levitt 2006, 105). On June 4, “the army asked Congress to elect a constitutional
president after an intervening period of time. The constitutional court set a twenty-
four hour deadline to do so (Torres-Rivas 1996, 57-58).
On June 5, the social organizations’ candidate, Ramiro de Leó Carpio, the country’s
human rights ombudsman (Levitt 2006, 105), “was elected constitutional president, and
the army-backed Arturo Herbruger was elected vice-president” (Torres-Rivas 1996, 57-
58). With the legislature’s selection of a new head of state, the June 6 session of the
OAS ad hoc meeting determined that constitutional rule had been reestablished, and
the proceedings pursuant to Resolution 1080 were declared officially closed” (Levitt
2006, 105). On June 7, Carpio’s first action as president was to fire Garcı́a Samayoa as
Defense Minister. Although hardliner Gen. Roberto Perussina was named to replace
him, the June 1 coup leader Otto Perez replaced Serrano supporter Gen. Francisco
Ortega Menaldo as head of the presidential military staff (Golden 1993a).
Coding rationale: Aksoy, Carter, and Wright (2015) code Serrano Elias as being ousted
by regime insiders after an “autogolpe turned into a coup when Serrano tried to use
military to abolish congress but then military ousted him.” As discussed in the prior
case (see 90-1993-5-25), we follow Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) in coding Garcia
122
Samayoa as regime leader at this time. However, we do not exclude this case as “not
regime leader” just because it targeted the nominal executive of an indirect military
regime. We therefore code this event as a successful reshuffling coup in which the
military took concrete actions to oust the nominal executive, Serrano, following his
autogolpe attempt. Although constitutional procedures appear to have been restored
after this event, the fact remains that the military took concrete and “irregular” action
to oust Serrano. Garcı́a Samayoa, the GWF regime leader, also lost his office within
seven days of this event (we combine with this event).
123
2.1.7 91: Honduras
Table 7: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Honduras

91-1954-11-15 Honduras 33-56 Galvez, Juan Manuel legal

91-1954-12-6 Honduras 33-56 Lozano Dı́az, Julio Autogolpe (S)
91-1956-8-1 Honduras 33-56 Lozano Dı́az, Julio Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
91-1956-10-21 Honduras 33-56 Lozano Dı́az, Julio Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
91-1957-7-7 Honduras 56-57 Caraccioli, Héctor Autogolpe (S)
91-1957-12-21 Honduras 57-63 Caraccioli, Héctor legal
91-1959-2-7 Honduras 57-63 Villeda Morales, Ramón prior defection
91-1959-7-12 Honduras 57-63 Villeda Morales, Ramón Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
91-1961-9-8 Honduras 57-63 Villeda Morales, Ramón coup plot
91-1963-10-3 Honduras 57-63 Villeda Morales, Ramón Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
91-1972-12-4 Honduras 71-72 Cruz, Ramón Ernesto Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
91-1975-4-22 Honduras 72-81 López Arellano, Oswaldo Reshuffle Coup (S)
91-1977-10-21 Honduras 72-81 Melgar Castro, Juan Alberto coup plot
91-1978-8-7 Honduras 72-81 Melgar Castro, Juan Alberto Reshuffle Coup (S)
91-1980-7-25 Honduras 72-81 Paz Garcı́a, Policarpo not exist
91-1999-7-30 Honduras 81-NA Flores Facusse, Carlos coup plot
91-2009-6-28 Honduras 81-NA Zelaya, Manuel Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
• # 91-1954-11-15: Honduras, Juan Manuel Galvez

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, Singh; Archigos codes Galvez as
retiring due to ill health on January 15, 1954, and Julio Lozano Diaz as entering by
“regular” means on this date; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code a party regime
(Honduras 33-56) from November 26, 1933, to October 21, 1956.
Event: On October 10, 1954, Honduras held presidential elections. Dr. Ramon Villeda
Morales of the Liberal Party (PLH), received 48% of the vote. Gen. Tiburcio Carias
Andino, the ruling Nationalist Party (PNH) candidate and former dictator from 1932-
1948, received 31% of the vote, while Gen. Abraham Williams, the candidate of the
National Reform Movement (MNR), won 21% of the vote (New York Times 1954c).
Under the constitution, unless a candidate wins a simple majority, Congress must elect
the president. But the constitution also “required, first, that two-thirds of the members
of the new legislature must be present and vote to choose a president and, second, that
the victor must receive two-thirds of the legislature’s vote” (Haggerty and Millet 1990,
35). Congress had been scheduled to meet to elect the president in at the beginning of
December (New York Times 1954c). But before this could occur, the political crisis was
confused by the fact that President Galvez “abandoned the country on 15 November,
suffering from exhaustion and an apparent heart attack” (Bowman 2002, 159). The
cabinet formally granted President Galvez a leave of absence for medical treatment in
Panama, although sources at the time were skeptical that he would return in a month
as Lozano had declared (United Press 1954b).
124
Coding rationale: Among major prior coup datasets, only Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán
(2014) codes this event (entry of Lozano Diaz) as a coup. We concur with Archigos
that Galvez appears to have effectively stepped down due to genuine health issues in
1954. Although Galvez’s leave of absence was temporary in a legal sense, news reports
indicate that Galvez voluntarily abandoned his post given the stress of the political
crisis and few expected his return in a month. Lozano Diaz’s ascension as acting
President in November was pursuant to the constitution. We therefore code this event
as “legal.”
• # 91-1954-12-6: Honduras, Julio Lozano Diaz

Other Datasets: non-military palace coup - CCD; not a coup - CSP; autogolpe - PT;
successful coup - Singh; Archigos codes Lozano Diaz as leader of Honduras from Jan-
uary 15, 1954, until October 21, 1956; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code a party
regime (Honduras 33-56) from November 26, 1933, to October 21, 1956.
Event: Julio Lozano Diaz became acting President amidst a political crisis (see 91-
1954-11-15). Pursuant to the constitution, Congress had been scheduled to meet to
elect the president in at the beginning of December. But “By keeping his supporters
and those of the third candidate out of the House, General Carias was able to prevent
a quorum and thus block election of Dr. Villeda” (New York Times 1954c). With the
new congress failing to convene, under the Constitution it fell to the supreme court to
determine the president. But “Because the court was dominated by Cárias appointees,
the PLH refused to accede to this course of action” (Thomas M Leonard 2011, 143).
Under the constitution, if Congress did not elect a new president within eight weeks,
the incumbent President could legally assume dictatorial powers as Chief of State. The
eight-week deadline passed on Saturday, December 4 (New York Times 1954c).
On Sunday, December 5, acting President Julio Lozano Diaz proclaimed himself “chief
of state,” dissolved the defunct Congress, and claimed dictatorial powers. Lozano Diaz
(presumably with Galvez’ active or tacit support) apparently used the constitutional
clause to deny Gen. Carias the presidency (New York Times 1954c). But promising to
create a council of state with representation from the three main parties, Lozano could
claim the support of all presidential candidates (New York Times 1954f). Suspiciously,
“Lozano’s ascent to the presidency was salutary for the “deathly ill” Gálvez, who was
instantly healed and returned from New York on 8 December to assume the presidency
of the Supreme Court” (Bowman 2002, 159).
Coding rationale: Although this case bears the marks of a classic autogolpe, with the
acting leader dissolving Congress and suspending the constitution, Lozano was at least
partially acting within the bounds of the law that the Constitution proscribed. One
could argue that this case was legal. We exclude this case as a military coup because the
event was led by the regime leader (since November 15, Lozano Diaz) and there is no
evidence that military actors took concrete actions. This event can also be interpreted
as targeting the presumptive regime leader, which under “regular” procedures should
have been one of the presidential candidates. Because Lozano Diaz had not stood for
125
the election, we therefore code this event as a successful autogolpe.
• # 91-1956-8-1: Honduras, Julio Lozano Dı́az

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; failed coup attempt - PT and Singh;
Archigos codes Julio Lozano Dı́az as the leader of Honduras from January 15, 1954,
to October 21, 1956; GWF code a party regime (Honduras 33-56) from November 26,
1933, to October 21, 1956. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group
in Honduras since 1946.
Event: Meyer and Meyer (1993, 564) summarizes the event as follows: “On August 1,
1956, four hundred infantry soldiers, supported by Partido Liberal partisans and many
university students (who had been on strike for a week) took over the San Francisco
barracks in Tegucigalpa, in an attempted coup. The first infantry battalion under
Colonel Armando Velásquez Cerrato remained loyal to the Lozano Diaz government
and forced the rebels back to the barracks, which were then stormed. There were 90
dead and many wounded, and a nervous government took severe security measures,
jailing many of the rebels, sentencing their leader, Santos Orsoto Paz, to death, pro-
claiming a state of emergency and imposing press censorship.” The rebellion began
around 1:30 a.m. but the rebels surrendered around 9 a.m. after three hours of bom-
bardment by loyal troops. At 10 a.m, Chief of State Lozano declared that order was
restored (New York Times 1956a; Associated Press 1956h). On August 2, Lozano Diaz
declared a state of emergency in the Department of Francisco Morazan around the
capital (New York Times 1956g). On August 8, the authorities issued arrest warrants
for student leaders in the uprising (LRX Buenos Aires 1965).
Coding rationale: Lozano Dı́az attributed the army revolt to Villedistas and Commu-
nists, the former being the supporters of Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, the leader of
the opposition Liberal party from Tegucigalpa who was exiled to Costa Rica in July.
Most of the persons questioned were Liberals (New York Times 1956g). A govern-
ment spokesman said Exequiel Escoto, a columnist for the Liberal Party newspaper
El Pueblo, and Carlos Somoza, a labor agitator, were among the leaders of the plot
(Associated Press 1956h). Lozano thus directed the arrest and exile of PLH leaders,
increasing opposition protests (Thomas M Leonard 2011, 143). Villeda Morales denied
that his supporters were involved, saying “It is likely the uprising is a trick by the
Dictator to postpone the elections and delay the return of constitutional government.”
Villeda Morales had promised to call for Constituent Assembly elections by August 7
for October 7 (New York Times 1956a). On August 10, four army officers were sen-
tenced to death for participating in the revolt, including Santos Osorto Paz, who was
allegedly bribed by Villedistas (New York Times 1956b).
Based on the evidence, we assume the plotters sought to force new elections or install
the Liberal party in power. GWF code a regime change when a military coup in
October 1956 ousted Lozano Diaz in the name of democracy. Villeda was subsequently
elected president. In short, we assume the motives of the August revolt were similar to
the grievances of the October coup makers. We therefore code this as a failed regime
126
change coup. STAGED.
• # 91-1956-10-21: Honduras, Julio Lozano Diaz
sum, Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Lozano Dı́az as exiting on
October 21, 1956 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign sup-
port; GWF code the collapse of a GWF party-personal regime (Honduras 33-56) on
October 21, 1956 in a military coup; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly
ethnic group in Honduras since 1946.
Event: “In August 1956 the chief of the Honduran armed forces, Colonel Armando
Velásquez Cerrato, recognized as a National Party sympathizer, began floating the
idea of sponsoring a military coup against” the increasingly unpopular President Julio
Lozano Diaz, who had taken power in 1954 after President Juan Manuel Gálvez left the
country to seek medical attention amidst mounting civil unrest (Euraque 1996, 72).
“Colonel Velásquez Cerrato, who was primarily responsible for initiating the coup,
claims that the idea of a military solution had never occurred to his fellow officers until
Velasquez broached the subject himself” (Ropp 1974, 515). One he had circulated his
idea, however, air force leaders began to plan a “double-coup” against both Lozano
Diaz and Velásquez Cerrato (Euraque 1996, 72).
In October 1956, President Lozano Diaz, “held one of the most fraudulent elections in
the country’s history. El Cronista announced the results under the title: “Although
You May Not Believe It: May the People Be the Judge.” Officially, the ruling National
Union Party won 370,318 votes, while the Liberals only won 2,003 votes and the Na-
tional Party won 41,724. “On 20 October, the military high command visited Lozano
to warn him they had detected a possible coup and that they would be flying air force
places around the capital in a show of support. Lozano was pleased” (Bowman 2002,
159-160).
At 8 a.m. on October 21, armed forces directed by from the military academy began
seizing strategic positions in and around the capital (New York Times 1956h). Mean-
while, air force “planes began circling the skies of Tegucigalpa and the little dictator
soon discovered they were there not to support him, but to depose him. “I have been
deceived” ” (Bowman 2002, 159-160). The military picked three technocratic civilians
to “request” Lozano Dı́az’s resignation: Gabrial A. Mejı́a, Roberto Ramı́rez, and Jorge
Bueso Arias (Euraque 1996, 72). At 2:30pm, Lozano agreed in principal to resign, but
asked for additional time “to think it over.” That evening, tired of waiting, the mil-
itary telephoned Lozano that he had been dismissed. No blood was shed (New York
Times 1956h).
“The first military coup of the century had been executed. The country was ecstatic.”
A three-man military junta was established, including Col. Héctor Caraccioli, the air
force commander, Roberto Gálvez, the son of a former president and minister of devel-
opment, and General Roque Rodrı́guez, the commander of the military academy. The
junta “gave strong signals that this was a progressive and modern military” (Bowman
127
2002, 159-160). On October 22, the junta installed a new cabinet and announced it
would decree a general political amnesty. With hundreds of armed partisans of Lozano
reportedly hiding in the mountains preparing to attack the new regime, the junta de-
clared martial law but called on them to surrender their weapons and promised not
to persecute them (New York Herald Tribune 1956). All political parties expressed
support for the coup. A “holiday spirit reign over Tegucigalpa. Enthusiastic crowds
paraded through the streets shouting approval of the junta” (New York Times 1956l).
On October 23, the junta released the 21 political prisoners who had been jailed in
connection with the failed coup in August (see 91-1956-8-1) (New York Times 1956i).
One of the junta’s first decisions was to annual the fraudulent October 7 constituent
assembly elections (New York Times 1956j).
“This coup marked a turning point in Honduran history. For the first time, the armed
forces had acted as an institution rather than as the instrument of a political party
or of an individual leader. The new rulers represented younger, more nationalistic,
and reform-minded elements in the military. They were products of the increased
professionalisation of the 1940s and 1950s. Most had received some training by United
States military advisers, either in Honduras or abroad. For decades to come, the
military would act as the final arbiter of Honduran politics” (Haggerty and Millet
1990, 36). The junta ruled for 14 months and “supervised free elections that gave the
Liberals a landslide victory in 1957” (Ruhl 1996, 36).
as a successful regime change coup. The event marked a first contemporary entry of
Honduras’ military as a direct ruler, and further represented the “ascendancy of the air
force.” By July 1957, Rodriguez had relinquished junta leadership to air force colonel
Oswaldo López Arellano (Euraque 1996, 67,72).
• # 91-1957-7-7: Honduras, Oswaldo López Arellano

Other Datasets: successful palace coup involving military actors; not a candidate -
PT, CSP, and Singh; Archigos codes Hector Caraccioli as the leader of Honduras from
October 21, 1956, until December 21, 1957, when he exited by regular means. Svolik
codes Roque Rodriguez as ruling during these dates and exiting in a non-military
coup; GWF code a provisional regime (Honduras 56-57) from October 21, 1956, until
December 20, 1957.
Event: On July 6, 1957, the ruling junta since October 1956 ousted its titular head,
Gen. Roque Rodriguez, reducing the junta to the other two members, namely Col.
Hector Caraccioli and Major Roberto Galvez Barnes. Earlier in the week, Col. Flores
Gomez and air force Col. Oswaldo López Arellano, the Defense Minister, “wrote
open letters to the newspapers... accusing General Rodriguez of having played politics
detrimental to the prestige of the armed forces” (New York Times 1957e). López
Arellano’s “pressures and machinations” forced Rodrı́guez to resigned from the junta.
“In this way the leading sector of the armed forces consolidated its power within the
128
military triumvirate. López Arellano’s control of the government and his eventual
dominance of the armed forces as a whole reflected both his personal ambition and
the historical trajectory of the air force within Honduras’ military structure” (Euraque
1996, 67). López became chairman of the junta. “The junta governed for a year
until elections for a congressional assembly were held on October 7, 1957 (Thomas M
Leonard 2011, 144).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event is a coup or an autogolpe depends on
who the regime leader is at the time. As explained in our appendix of Colpus regime
leaders, we side with Archigos over Svolik and assume that Gen. Rodriguez was the
nominal executive (by dint of his formal seniority in rank), not the regime leader, and
so we consider this an autogolpe by the dominant air force faction in the junta against
the senior army officer.
• # 91-1957-12-21: Honduras, Oswaldo López Arellano

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; successful coup - Perez;
Archigos codes Hector Caraccioli as exiting on this date by “regular” means. Svolik
codes Roque Rodriguez as exiting on this date in a non-military coup. GWF code a
provisional regime (Honduras 56-57) from October 21, 1956, until December 20, 1957.
Event: In October 1957, “the Liberal Party-controlled Constitutional Assembly con-

vened. For our purposes, only two highly related results of the assembly need be
discussed: the autonomy of the military and the selection of Ramón Villeda Morales
as president. Everyone in the country knew who would win a presidential election.
Villeda was as popular as anyone had ever been. The ruling junta had often declared
that after the Constitutional Assembly met a new election would be held to select the
president. Dr. Villeda himself wanted the legitimacy of a direct election, and scoffed
at the idea that the Constitutional Assembly could select the president (El Cronista,
24 September 1957)” (Bowman 2002, 161). On October 7, 1957, elections for a con-
gressional assembly were held. “Under a system of proportional representation, the
PLH won a majority” (Thomas M Leonard 2011, 144)
“On 14 November 1957, the ruling military junta and the Liberal Party suddenly
reversed course and decided that there should be no direct election and that Villeda
should be declared president. The armed forces decreed that “due to the difficult
circumstances that affect the country, it has not been possible to strictly comply” with
our promise to hold a second election (Oquelı́ 1981, 3)” (Bowman 2002, 161). On
November 15, the Constituent Assembly voted 37-20 to name Villeda, the Assembly’s
president, as constitutional president (Thomas M Leonard 2011, 144). “Opposition
nationalist and reformist Assemblymen disputed the election for many hours. They
contended the Assembly had lacked the authority to elect a President. The Liberals
contended the Assembly had the right since it was elected directly by the people”
(New York Times 1957w). “The Liberals publicly argued that Villeda had won the
two previous elections an that the country could not afford to have another election
129
when the outcome was already known” (Bowman 2002, 161).
On November 18, Maj. Roberto Gálvez Barnes withdrew from the ruling military
junta in protest. He was replaced by the Defense Minister, Col. Oswaldo López Ar-
relano (New York Times 1957v), “who quickly became the strong man of the armed
forces” (Bowman 2002, 161). On November 19, Foreign Minister Jorge Fidel Duron
also resigned in protest (United Press 1957a). Evidently, “A deal was made between
Villeda and the military junta, the details of which remain a shrouded mystery of secret
meetings, threats, and backroom deals. Most scholars believe that a deal involving the
U.S. State Department, the United Fruit Company, the Honduran military, and the
Liberal Party resulted in the naming of Villeda” (Bowman 2002, 162). On November
27, the Constituent Assembly approved a provision in the constitution they were craft-
ing giving complete autonomy to the armed forces over military matters, which would
be under the control of the Chief of the Armed Forces (New York Times 1957x). It
was understood this “stemmed from an agreement between Liberal party leaders and
the armed forces to insure the military’s acceptance of a Liberal party victory” (New
York Times 1957z). Villeda began his six-year term on December 21, 1957 (Thomas M
Leonard 2011, 144).
Coding rationale: Perez codes Villeda’s installation as President as the result of a coup
in 1957. They do not provide a specific date. To the extent there was a coup, it only
resulted in leader change as of December 21, although the key actions were actually
taken in mid-November. It is debatable how “democratic” Villeda’s election was, and
its constitutionality is unanswerable to the extent that the country did not have a func-
tioning constitution at the time. It was not “regular” insofar as the junta had promised
direct presidential elections, only to backtrack. Nevertheless, Villeda was selected by a
democratically-elected constituent assembly, so democratic procedures were followed.
The dispute war over direct elections – which sources indicate would have been won
by the same candidate – or indirect selection by the democratically-elected assembly.
We therefore code this event as legal.
• # 91-1959-2-7: Honduras, Ramón Villeda Morales

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; rebellion - PT; failed coup
attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Villeda Morales as leader of Honduras from
December 21, 1957, until October 3, 1963; GWF code a democracy (Honduras 57-63)
from December 21, 1957, until October 3, 1963.
Event: In early February, clandestine radio broadcasted warnings that rebel forces
under Col. Armando Velásquez Cerrato (a former army chief of staff then in exile
in Nicaragua) would soon overthrow President Villeda Morales’ government. “The
slogan used by the clandestine radio was, “First the mountains of Honduras, then
the valleys and then the capital.” On the afternoon of Saturday, February 7, 1969,
armed rebel forces – some reportedly wearing regular Honduran army uniforms and
some in civilian clothes – seized the provincial capital of Santa Barbara Province (Paul
P. Kennedy 1959e). “The rebel forces, acting apparently from within, took over the
130
provincial barracks” without firing a shot (Paul P. Kennedy 1959c). “It seems almost
certain that the rebel force... was relying on defections from the Honduran armed
forces” (Paul P. Kennedy 1959d).
At 1:30 a.m. on February 9, Santa Barbara radio broadcast that “the revolution has
begun.” But by the end of the day, government recaptured Santa Barbara as 130 rebels
were taken prisoner and the rest fled west towards the Guatemalan border. That day,
Nicaragua agreed to expel Col. Velásquez Cerrato (Paul P. Kennedy 1959e). “Gov-
ernment sources said the rebel force was commanded by Dr. Armando Rodrigues Vale
and Colonels Maximo Bejarano and Pedro Iglesias.” Radio Liberation, a clandestine
radio station, “urged Hondurans to go on a general strike and predicted that Honduran
army troops would defect to rebel forces” (Associated Press 1959g).
On February 10, the rebels confirmed that they had retreated from Santa Barbara,
though fighting continued in Copan. Villeda Morales gave an interview alleging the
Dominican Republic had helped fund the revolt and that “At least 130 members of
the National Guard stationed in barracks near the Nicaraguan border, were taken to
Nicaragua for training as the nucleus of the rebel band” (Paul P. Kennedy 1959c). On
May 11, the rebels’ clandestine radio ceased its broadcasts (New York Times 1959k).
On February 16, two bomb explosions in the capital were attributed to partisans of
Velasquez Cerrato (Associated Press 1959c). On May 12, 500 armed rebels led by
Bejarano and Iglesias attacked Gracias, a state capital in western Honduras (Associated
Press 1959h).
Coding rationale: We can find no evidence that current and active members of the
military forces plotted or participated in the revolt from the beginning, which was led by
a prior defector, Col. Velásquez Cerrato. Although some of the rebels wore Honduran
army uniforms, there is no indication that these troops were current and active as
opposed to defectors. In May, it was reported that both Bejarano and Inglesias were
“former Honduran army officers” (Associated Press 1959h). Although some Honduran
military forces defected during the course of the abortive revolution, we nevertheless
code this event as a case of prior defection.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; failed coup attempt - PT and
Thompson; Archigos codes Villeda Morales as leader of Honduras from December 21,
1957, until October 3, 1963; GWF code a democracy (Honduras 57-63) from December
21, 1957, until October 3, 1963. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic
group in Honduras since 1946.
Event: Following his abortive rebellion in February (see 91-1959-2-7), the rebel leader
Col. Armando Velásquez Cerrato, “, who in 1954 wrote so eloquently about the new,
nondeliberative, and apolitical military” (Bowman 2002, 168-169), regathered forces
and continued plotting. By early July, tensions were reported between the Honduran
military and the ruling Liberal Party over several quashed rebel attempts to invade
131
Nicaragua and topple the Somoza regime; a former Liberal party leader floated the
idea of disbanding the army (New York Times 1959c).
On Sunday, 12 July 1959, “Villeda faced his first military coup attempt. Colonel Ar-
mando Velasquez Cerratoled the rebellion—his second in two years.” Velasquez, closely
associated with the National Party, Somoza in Nicaragua, and reactionary forces, “was
supported above all by the National Police” (Bowman 2002, 168-169). Before dawn,
rebels first captured the municipal police headquarters. Velásquez Cerrato “won the
support of the police, numbering about 300, and personally took command of the
military school” (Paul P. Kennedy 1959b). Then “National Police units attacked the
presidential palace, only to be fended off by the presidential guard and armed civilians
supportive of the administration” (Thomas M Leonard 2011, 146). “The coup was
violent, leading to many dead and injured” (Bowman 2002, 168-169). One early report
said that at least 25 people were killed or hurt (Associated Press 1959i). A later report
put the total number of rebels killed at 100 and said that 600 rebels were captured
following 15 hours of heavy fighting (Associated Press 1959e).
For the first few hours of the coup, many military troops “stood on the sideline waiting
to see if the coup would gain momentum. Students and other members of the civil
society rushed to Villeda’s defense and fought valiantly against the rebels; UNAH
students saved Villeda” (Bowman 2002, 168-169). Though the rebels at one point
seized the government communications building and local power plant, rebel attempts
to seize the army barracks and presidential palace failed (Associated Press 1959e). As
the coup stalled, Col Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, the armed forces chief, “stepped in
and arranged for an end to the attempt and permitted Velasquez to flee the country”
(Bowman 2002, 168-169). On the afternoon of July 13, as the coup collapsed, Velásquez
Cerrato, who by that point had taken refuge in the military school, negotiated his
surrender. Rather than bomb the school and potentially kill cadets, the army escorted
him to the Costa Rican embassy, where he received asylum (Paul P. Kennedy 1959b).
On July 14, the army announced that it had regained control over the capital, even
though some pockets of rebel resistance reportedly continued (Paul P. Kennedy 1959a).
“The impunity of the armed forces, the coup against democracy, and the belated de-
fense of the government by the head of the military resulted in a backlash against
the armed forces” (Bowman 2002, 169). “The conservative military and the reformist
government of Ramon Villeda Morales (1957-1963) did not coexist very comfortably”
(Ruhl 1996, 36). “Only at the insistence of the armed forces did Velásquez receive per-
mission to leave the country.” This event “convinced Villeda Morales that he needed
to reorganize the nation’s security forces, which were controlled by the Minister of
Defense, Colonel Osvaldo López Arellano. Both he and the national police had close
linkage to the National Party, Villeda Morales’s political rival. For his own security,
Villeda Morales dissolved the national police force and replaced it with a 2,000 man
civil guard under the authority of the ministry of government and justice. The military
reacted negatively as it perceived the guard as a potential challenge to the military’s
institutional autonomy” (Thomas M Leonard 2011, 146). The 1959 coup attempts
involving “national police, certain elements of the military, and Nationalist militants
convinced Villeda to disband the police and create a Liberal Guardia Civil as a coun-
132
terweight to the military” (Ruhl 1996, 36).
Coding rationale: In contrast to February 1959, when we found no evidence that cur-
rent and active troops participated in the rebellion organized by Velásquez Cerrato,
the evidence indicates that the National Police did participate in this rebellion.

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; no evidence - PT; failed
coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Villeda Morales as leader of Honduras from
December 21, 1957, until October 3, 1963; GWF code a democracy (Honduras 57-63)
from December 21, 1957, until October 3, 1963.
Event: On Thursday, September 7, the government preemptively crushed a “revolu-
tionary plot.” Twelve conspirators were killed in brief fighting that broke out after
army and civil guards surprised the plotters “on the city outskirts and near the 1st
Infantry battalion” (United Press International 1961d).
Coding rationale: The little evidence in this case points to a preempted coup plot.
Although there was fighting, this appears to have been a result of resisting arrest, as
opposed to during a coup in progress.

Perez, Luttwak, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Villeda Morales as exiting
on this date through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support;
GWF code the collapse of a democracy (Honduras 57-63) on this date. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Honduras since 1946.
Event: Presidential elections in Honduras were scheduled for October 1963. As in
1954, the Liberals (PLH) confronted a divided opposition. “The PNH nominated
Ramon Ernesto Cruz, but a faction split off and ran the son of ex-president Canas.
The PLH ignored the wishes of its president and nominated Modesto Rodas Alvarado,
a charismatic, highly partisan figure believed to be to the left of Villeda Morales. All
signs pointed to an overwhelming victory for the PLH, an outcome that the military
found increasingly unpalatable” (Haggerty and Millet 1990, 37). During the campaign,
Rodas Alvarado had promised “that, if elected, he would terminate the autonomy of
the armed forces, as guaranteed by the constitution” (Ruhl 1996, 36).
“Rumors of a coup began circulating in the late summer of 1963. The United States en-
deavored to make clear its opposition to such action—even dispatching a high-ranking
officer from the United States Southern Command in the Panama Canal Zone to try
to convince the chief of the armed forces, Air Force Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano,
to call off the coup. Villeda Morales also tried to calm military fears, taking the car-
bines away from the Civil Guard and opposing plans for a constitutional amendment
133
to restore direct command of the military to the president. All these efforts failed”
(Haggerty and Millet 1990, 37). The plotters denied their intentions until the very
end. As late as October 2, Col. Lopez and Lt. Col. Armando Escalon, the air force
commander, denied any knowledge of a planned military coup against the government
(Paul P. Kennedy 1963c).
On October 3, 1963, ten days before the election (Ruhl 1996, 36), “the military un-
leashed one of the most violent coups in the history of Central America. Scores of
civil guards were killed as they slept” (Bowman 2002, 174). At 3:30 a.m., air force
planes began to fly over Tegucigalpa. Within minutes, troops deployed to the Presiden-
tial Palace and other strategic points. Overmatched, the Civil Guard was subdued in
fierce street fighting with regular army troops. At 5 a.m. the military announced over
Honduran Radio that it had seized power. They accused President Villeda Morales of
being “blind to the Communism in his midst” (Paul P. Kennedy 1963c). Before dawn,
as rebels surrounded the presidential palace, Villeda telephoned the U.S. ambassador
in Tegucigalpa to request assistance. However, the United States declined to intervene
militarily to save Villeda (New York Times 1963h).
By noon, the regular military was in total control of the capital. Most military garrisons
supported the coup. Air force planes bombed the only military holdouts in Santa
Barbara and Santa Rosa. Threatened with having the presidential palace bombed,
President Villeda Morales and Rodas agreed to leave the country. That afternoon,
they flew to exile by military plane to Costa Rica (Paul P. Kennedy 1963c). That
night, Colonel Lopez issued decrees declaring a state of siege, proclaiming himself
president, and dissolving Congress. Another decree abolished the Civil Guard and
said that the military would take over police functions until a new police force would
be formed (the national police had been abolished in 1959) (Paul P. Kennedy 1963b).
The constitution was suspended and planned elections were canceled (Haggerty and
Millet 1990, 37). At least 100 people were killed and 300-400 wounded in the coup
(Paul P. Kennedy 1963b).
Yet “violence against civilians continued for days. Attempts by students and Liberal
Party supporters to challenge the overthrow of democracy were met with brutal reac-
tions by los gloriosos” (Bowman 2002, 174-175). On October 5, anti-coup sniper fire
and street fighting led to at least eight deaths as pro-Villeda forces mobilized. Heav-
iest fighting was reported at the Law School of the University of Honduras. Amidst
reports that leftist student groups were planning an uprising, the regime announced
it was prepared to crush any resistance (Associated Press 1963d). Col. Lopez said at
least 3,000 civilians had been armed by the Liberal Party. The next day, on October 6,
the junta blamed Cuban communists for the gun battles the previous day (Associated
Press 1963e).
“In many declarations, the military claimed that the primary reason for the coup was
to protect the country from communism” (Bowman 2002, 174-175). The coup was
endorsed by the National party to “prevent the election of Rodas” (Ruhl 1996, 36)
and “represented a conservative reaction on the part of the commercial-landowning
oligarchy and the imperialist banana bourgeoisie corporations interested in curtailing
134
social participation and in stopping the increasing popular mobilization that charac-
terized the last years of the Villedista government” (Posas and Fontaine 1980, 50).
International condemnation was short-lived. On October 4, the United States broke
diplomatic relations and withdrew its aid personnel as it halted its programs under the
Alliance for Progress (Tad Szulc 1963d). Yet the coup makers had correctly gauged that
the United States’s threats were empty. On 14 December 1963, the U.S. recognized the
junta (New York Times 1963i). “The embarrassing fact was that the U.S. commitment
to democracy was secondary to U.S. support for a militarized response to real and
imagined communist threats” (Bowman 2002, 174-175).
“The 1963 coup finalized the assent of the Honduran armed forces as the dominant
political actor in the country and stymied the opportunity for political and social
progress in the country” (176). After the coup, the armed forces consolidated its
position with the absorbtion of the Civil Guard, which had been created in 1957 by
President Ramon Villeda Morales as “a para-military arm of the Liberal Party” (Ropp
1974, 517-518). “With this coup, the military became the most powerful political player
in Honduras, although it still needed civilian allies. From 1963 to 1971, the country
was ruled by General of the Air Force Oswaldo Lopez Arellano in collaboration with
National party boss Ricardo Zuniga Agustinus. A new national police force, the Cuerpo
Especialde Seguridad (CES) became the fourth branch of the armed forces and played
an important role in silencing opponents” (Ruhl 1996, 36).
event a successful anti-democratic coup.
• # 91-1972-12-4: Honduras, Ramón E. Cruz

Perez, Luttwak, and Singh; Archigos codes Cruz as exiting on this date through “ir-
regular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code the collapse
of a democracy (Honduras 71-72) on this date. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
monopoly ethnic group in Honduras since 1946.
Event: “Neither of the traditional parties offered effective representation to the various
groups - reformist labor, private sector, and peasant - that had formed during the late
1950s and 1960s.” In 1971, the Liberal Party (PLH) and National Party (PNH) struck
a pact to share power in Congress and give the tie-breaking vote to the presidential win-
ner. After winning office, a second agreement was signed, but in the summer of 1972,
President Ramón E. Cruz of the PNH renounced it (Associated Press 1972a). The
civilian government “became mired in the usual factionalism and corruption and failed
to enact anticipated social reforms” (Ruhl 1996, 37). On October 25, the PNH held
a national convention but failed to support the second bipartian agreement. Military
coup only rumors proliferated over the next month (Associated Press 1972a).
Opposition spread “to what was increasingly perceived as an ineffectual and divisive
administration.” The PLH and PNH alienated major labor and business groups given
135
their “ineffective efforts to deal with the problems of the economy. Peasant groups were
angered by the “virtual halting of agrarian reform and the killing of several peasants
by the military in the department of Olancho.” Meanwhile, the “PLH felt that its
position within the government was steadily eroding and that its agreement with the
PNH was regularly violated. In December peasant and labor organizations announced a
hunger march by 20,000 individuals to Tegucigalpa to protest the government’s agrarian
policies” (Haggerty and Millet 1990, 42). Colonel Lopez Arellano, the armed forces
commander, used this “chaotic situation” to consolidate his political position and that
of the Army (Ropp 1974, 527-528). The labor movement struck an agreement with the
military to oust the PLH-PNH coalition government led by Cruz (Haggerty and Millet
1990, 42). On December 4, 1972, the army overthrew President Cruz in a bloodless
coup and installed Lopez Arellano as president, who henceforth would govern by decree
(Associated Press 1972a).
The December 1972 coup ushered in a ‘reformist’ military regime (Sieder 1995, 101)
that aligned itself with previously unrepresented reform groups. “With its newfound
allies, the military government, headed by the formerly conservative General Lopez,
pursued a populist, nationalist program that expanded the role of the state and insti-
tuted an important agrarian reform” (Ruhl 1996, 37). The junior officers who led the
coup “took a reformist stance and responded to the needs of the bourgeoisie.” One
of the regime’s first measures was “the emission of Decreto Ley No. 8 which made
obligatory the rental of uncultivated state and private lands to the landless peasants”
(Posas and Fontaine 1980, 51). “Military rule was marked by an initial phase of rad-
icalisation which then gave way to more conservative policies. Changes were driven
primarily by shifts in the attitudes of local elites and by the intervention of external
actors (principally US capital)... The principal policy innovation of the armed forces
was to introduce the most far-reaching programme of redistributive land reform ever
attempted in Honduras” (Sieder 1995, 101).
• # 91-1975-4-22: Honduras, Oswaldo Lopez Arellano

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Lopez Arellano as being removed on this
date through “irregular” means through a power struggle within the military short of
coup. Svolik codes Lopez Arellano’s exit on this date by a military coup; GWF code
a military regime (Honduras 72-81) from December 4, 1972 to January 27, 1982; EPR
codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Honduras since 1946.
Event: On March 31, 1975, General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano “was forced to relinquish
his command of the armed forces to Colonel Juan [Alberto] Melgar Castro. A new
constituent law of the armed forces was enacted which created a collegial Consejo Su-
perior de las Fuerzas Armadas (CONSUFFAA) that was composed of 45 top-ranking
officers who had the authority to control the chief of the armed forces and to determine
136
institutional policy.” Soon after, Lopez faced charges in the so-called “Bananagate”
scandal, in which he allegedly “accepted a bribe from United Brands in return for
reducing the banana export tax (Ruhl 1996, 37). “Lopez Arellano sealed his own fate
by refusing access to his foreign bank accounts to a governmental commission set up
to investigate the allegations of foul play, and was subsequently removed from power
in an internal military coup on 22 April 1975” Sieder (1995).
The “bloodless” coup was led by Col. Melgar Castro (Lentz 1994, 362). The leader-
ship change was announced in a colorless radio broadcast without explanation (Riding
1975a). On April 23, Melgo Castro, the new head of state, announced his cabinet.
The holdovers from the previous cabinet included Defense Minister Col. Mario Chin-
chilla, the Health Minister Enrique Aguilar Paz, and the Telecommunications Minister
German Aparico Velazquez. Col. Alonso Flores Guerra, the former military attache
in Washington, was appointed minister of the interior. Capt. Armando San Martin
became Minister of the Economy (Cole 1975). The coupmakers said they needed five
to ten years to carry out economic reforms and restore democracy (Riding 1975b).
“With conservatives like Colonel Juan Melgar as president and Colonel Policarpo Paz
Garcia as chief of the armed forces, military hard-liners gradually reestablished their
control, bringing the era of military reformism to an end” (Ruhl 1996, 37). Arellano
was allowed to remain in the country and subsequently became president of an air
transportation service in Honduras.
consulted. According to Goemens, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009, 124), the military
removed Lopez Arellano, but the “move comes after young Lt. Colonels take over the
reigns in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. They actually oust Gen Lopez
from his position as Commander in Chief weeks before ousting him from his govern-
ment office. Since they retain the power structure of the Supreme Council, I code this
as power reshuffle short of military coup.” Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
(2014), we similarly code this event as a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 91-1977-10-21: Honduras, Juan Alberto Melgar Castro

Category: coup plot
coup attempt - CSP and PT; coup plot - Singh; Archigos codes Castro as the leader
of Honduras from April 22, 1975, to August 7, 1978; GWF code a military regime
(Honduras 72-81) from December 4, 1972, until November 29, 1981.
Event: On October 22, local news media alleged that a coup attempt had been crushed
the previous day, saying its leaders Luis Alberto Padilla and Jorge Enrique Padilla were
critically wounded in the process (ACAN 1977), but these reports gave no details. Af-
ter denying reports of a coup attempt for about a week, General Melgar Castro’s office
issued a communique admitting the government had indeed uncovered “a subversive
plan prepared by civilians who sought the connivance of lower echelon military officials
to generate domestic unrest and confusion in order to take over the government of the
republic.” In a media briefing, army chiefs stated that they had known of a plot prior
137
to Melgar Castro’s visit to Washington on September 8, but that they allowed it to
unfold to help identify the plotters. Originally set for October 8, the government said
mishaps delayed the attempt until the 12th and finally the 21st. However, on October
20, “the intelligence service proceeded to arrest the civilians and military personnel in-
volved” (Amador 1977). On November 7, a civilian judge issued indictments or arrest
warrants for 18 civilians implicated in the coup plot (Radio Progreso 1977). But on
December 5, the government granted amnesty to these civilians as well as 9 sergeants
implicated in the plot in the name of social harmony (FBIS 1977).
Coding rationale: Sieder (1995, 119), among others, states that there was “an abortive
right-wing coup attempt in October (allegedly linked to Nicaragua’s Somoza).” How-
ever, the initial government report on this coup event suggests that the government
moved to arrest the coup plotters before they took any concrete and observable ac-
tions to oust Melgar. The government allegedly seized various documents, including
a draft proclamation that the conspirators planned on issuing (but never did). Other
documents seized by the government purportedly showed the plotters sought to exe-
cute Melgar and install a civil-military junta. Melgar added that “if the revolt had
taken place, there would have been ‘great bloodshed”’ (Amador 1977). Similarly, the
amnesty bulletin issued in early December emphasized that the government “has con-
clusive proof that a conspiracy did exist,” but never says that an attempt took place
(FBIS 1977). The Powell-Thyne source for this coup event provides no details of con-
crete actions that document a coup attempt actually occurred (Washington Post 1977).
We interpret this evidence to mean that a coup plot existed, but that a coup attempt
did not take place.
• # 91-1978-8-7: Honduras, Juan Alberto Melgar Castro

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Castro as being removed on this date through
“irregular” means through a power struggle within the military short of a coup; Svolik
codes Castro’s exit on this date by a military coup; GWF code a military regime (Hon-
duras 72-81) from December 4, 1972 until November 29, 1981; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos
as the monopoly ethnic group in Honduras since 1946.
Event: According to Haggerty and Millet (1990, 44-45), “Melgar Castro’s hold on
power began to dissolve in 1978. Charges of government corruption and of military
links with narcotics traffic had become increasingly widespread, leading to accusations
that the government had failed to adequately defend the country. Melgar Castro’s
hold on power had weakened because he lacked support among large landowners. In
addition, the Melgar Castro government had seemed to be making little progress to-
ward promised elections, leading to suspicions that it hoped to prolong its time in
office. Right-wing political forces criticized the Melgar Castro administration’s han-
dling of the Ferrari Case, which involved drug trafficking and murder of civilians and in
which members of the military had been implicated. Unions and student organizations
correctly interpreted the right wing’s criticism as a prelude to a coup. When demon-
138
strators took to the streets to support Melgar Castro, right-wing elements within the
military charged Melgar Castro had lost control of public order and ousted him. On
August 7, 1978, Melgar Castro and his cabinet were replaced by a three-member junta.
Led by General Policarpo Paz Garcia, chief of the armed forces, and including the air
force commander and the chief of military security, the junta had close ties to the large
landowners and moved to protect the military men involved in the Ferrari Case.”
“The events that precipitated the Paz coup began in the spring of 1978. Melgar,
who had ambitions to run in elections scheduled for 1980, began pressuring his right-
wing military rivals in the newspaper La Presna. Its news pages started linking senior
officers to gold and gem smuggling” (Scott and Marshall 1998, 54). “Melgar himself
was lobbying for PN presidential nomination and his continuist ambitions, combined
with the increasingly repressive and ineffectual nature of his administration, alienated
the rest of the officer corps. The regime was eventually overthrown in a palace coup in
August 1978 led by Head of the Armed Forces, General Policarpo Paz Garcia” (Sieder
1995, 119). The bloodless move came quietly on Tuesday, August 8, 1978, when the
Superior Council, the armed forces top body, announced that it had accepted Melgar
Castro’s resignation. In addition to Gen. Policarpo Garcia, the other junta members
included Col. Amilcar Celaya, the security forces chief, and Col. Domingo Alvarez Cruz
(Reuters 1978). No troop movements were seen on the night of the coup (Christian
Science Monitor 1978).
as a successful reshuffling coup. This event is also referred to as the “cocaine coup,”
as “It appears that the key financier behind the overthrow of Melgar was Juan Ramón
Matta Ballesteros, a leader of the Mexican [cocaine] connection. The rise of Paz Garcia
cemented the power of the cocaine lords in Honduran politics and paved the way for
an alliance of the military, the drug leaders, and the CIA to support the Contras from
bases in Honduras.” Matta was the “chief of the Honduran mafia” who had been
charged with the military-implicated murders in the Ferrari case (Scott and Marshall
1998, 54).
• # 91-1980-7-25: Honduras, Policarpo Paz Garcia

Category: not exist
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, PT, and Singh; successful coup
- LPL; Archigos codes Paz Garcia as the leader of Honduras from August 7, 1978,
until January 27, 1982 (when he exited by “regular” means; GWF code a military
regime (Honduras 72-81) from December 4, 1972 until November 29, 1981; EPR codes
“Whites/Mestizos” as the monopoly ethnic group from 1975 to 1989.
Event: “From its inception, the government of Paz Garcia had promised to return
Honduras to civilian rule. In April 1980, the Honduran citizenry was summoned to the
polls to choose delegates for a new Congress. The Congress would select an interim
government and would establish procedures for presidential and congressional elections
in 1981.” In the April 1980 elections, the PLH won 35 seats, the PNH 33 seats, and
139
the Pinu 3 seats. “This result produced considerable debate over the composition
of the next government” (Haggerty and Millet 1990, 45). According to Ruhl (1996,
37-38), General Paz stayed on as chief of state in the interim government and forced
the presidential candidates of both traditional parties to agree to (1) a military veto
over cabinet appointments; (2) exclusive military control over security policy, both
internal and external; and (3) no investigations into military corruption or charges of
human rights violations.” Haggerty and Millet (1990, 45) says “There was general
agreement on naming Paz Garcia as interim president, and the disputes centered on
the composition of the cabinet. Ultimately, a PLH leader, Roberto Suazo Cordova,
was made president of the Congress, while the PLH also gained five of the seats on
the new Supreme Court of Justice. The cabinet was divided among all three parties
and the military; the armed forces received the Ministry of National Defense and
Public Security, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the PNH acquired key
economic positions.” On July 25, 1980, Paz Garcia was named provisional president
by the Constituent Assembly (Lentz 1994, 363).
(2014) codes this event (a second by Paz Garcia) as a coup. However, we agree with
Archigos and GWF that there was no leadership change in 1980, and Paz Garcia merely
changed titles from head of the military junta to provisional president in July 1980.We
find no evidence that military actors sought to oust Paz Garcia at this time. We thus
code this event as “not exist.”
• # 91-1999-7-30: Honduras, Carlos Flores Facusse

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed dissident action - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP, PT, Luttwak;
not a candidate - Singh; Archigos codes Flores Facusse as leader of Honduras from Jan-
uary 27, 1998, until January 27, 2002; GWF code a democracy (Honduras 81-NA) since
January 27, 1982.
Event: In 1999, the constitution was changed to make the civil President the com-
mander of the armed forces, endowed with the right for the first time since democracy
was restored in the 1980s to name senior military officers (Wilson 1999b). In late July,
however, the military high command made two appointments “without the consent
of Flores” or the Minister of Defense Edgardo Dumas (who was abroad at the time).
“Vice-minister of defence Roberto Lazarus (a retired general) approved the appoint-
ments, but Dumas overruled them upon his return on July 26, accusing the military of
insubordination.” On Friday, July 30, 1999, in a test of his new authority, President
Carlos “Flores dismissed four top military officers, including Lazarus and the chief of
the Armed Forces General Staff, Colonel Eugenio Romero” (Oxford Analytica 1999).
In an apparent show of political theater, Minister without portfolio Nahum Valladares
“made the announcements on a radio network – with military music playing in the
background – amid reports that attempts to stage a coup against Flores Facusse had
been made” (Notimex 1999). In early August, Col. Daniel Lopez, the head of the
presidential guard and a Flores loyalist, was sworn in as the new armed forces chief of
140
staff. Lopez called himself a ‘democrat in uniform’ committed to civilian control over
the military (Wilson 1999b). This was the first time a Honduran president named his
own armed forces chief of staff (Wilson 1999a). At the same time, “ army commander
Colonel Rodolfo Interiano was replaced with Colonel Isaias Barahona, the director of
the armed forces command and general staff school” (Oxford Analytica 1999).
Coding rationale: We find no evidence of concrete military actions (beyond some initial
allegations and local rumors). Indeed, President Flores himself “emphatically denied
media reports of an attempted coup” (Washington Post 1999). We thus code this
event as at most a coup plot. The only solid evidence indicates that the president
dismissed top military commanders to establish his authority to make senior military
appointments.
• # 91-2009-6-28: Honduras, Manuel Zelaya

Category: successful anti-democratic reshuffling coup
Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; successful coup - PT and Luttwak; mass
protest - CSP; Archigos codes Zelaya as leader of Honduras from January 27, 2006,
until exiting on this date through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign
support; GWF code a democracy (Honduras 81-NA) since January 27, 1982. EPR
codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Honduras since 1946.
Event: In the early-morning hours of Sunday, June 28, 2009, a unit of armed soldiers
stormed the presidential palace, disarmed the presidential guard, arrested President
Manuel Zelaya, and put him on a plane to Costa Rica. Zelaya was still wearing his
pajamas (Malkin 2009b). Though Honduras’ generals did have a court order from a
Supreme Court justice to detain Zelaya (Lacey 2009), “the soldiers exceeded judicial
instructions and violated Zelaya’s constitutional rights under Article 102 by exiling
him instead of bringing him before a judge as required by law” (Ruhl 2010, 103).
Zelaya’s forced ouster sent shock waves throughout Latin America. Political analysts
were stunned by “the region’s first successful military coup” since Haitian President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed in 1991 (93).
These events were the culmination of a brewing constitutional crisis over Zelaya’s
insistence on holding a “referendum” (so-labelled by his opponents) or “non-binding
poll” (so-labelled by Zelaya) on calling a constituent assembly to consider constitutional
reforms. The Attorney General, Supreme Court of Justice, and Supreme Electoral
Tribunal (TSE) all opposed the referendum as an attempt by Zelaya to circumvent his
limit of one four-year term. In early June 2009, the Supreme Court declared Zelaya’s
proposed referendum unconstitutional. A few weeks later, the Congress followed suit
(Malkin 2009b). Under Honduran law, only Congress may call a referendum and
only the TSE can conduct it. Yet President Zelaya rejected the authority of other
institutions, which were controlled by his political opponents, to stop him (Ruhl 2010,
100). He claimed that he was merely sought a “non-binding poll” of public opinion
that was not a binding referendum as his opponents claimed (Fasquelle 2011).
As general commander of the armed forces under Article 277 of the constitution, Pres-
141
ident Zelaya felt that he had a “right to order the military to provide its customary
logistical and security assistance” for the poll (Ruhl 2010, 100). However, Honduran
military officers also had “a constitutional obligation under Articles 272 and 278 to
disobey illegal or unconstitutional orders.” Moreover, many senior officers, socialized
during the Cold War, detested Zelaya’s alliance with Hugo Chávez. Moreover, “lead-
ers of the traditional political and economic elite, reportedly including former Liberal
president Carlos Flores, had put aside their usual differences and had begun to lobby
the military to join a conspiracy to oust Zelaya if he went ahead with his poll.” In late
April, with the advice of legal experts, General Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, the head
of the armed forces, warned President Zelaya “that he should refrain from instructing
the military to provide logistical support to the disputed referendum” vote that was
scheduled for Sunday, June 28. Despite this warning, on Wednesday, June 24, Zelaya
gave just such an order. “Military collaboration would have strengthened the presi-
dent’s hand by showing that he had won the soldiers to his side” (101). Thus cornered,
the armed forces were forced to choose a side (94).
When General Vásquez refused to obey the order, Zelaya fired him. “The army, navy,
and air force commanders plus the inspector-general of the armed forces all resigned
in solidarity, as did Zelaya’s own highly respected civilian defense minister, Edmundo
Orellana” (101-102). On Thursday, June 25, the Supreme Court rejected General
Vásquez’s dismissal (Reuters 2009), arguing “that a 2001 law governing the armed
forces barred the president from dismissing the military chief without legal cause de-
spite the chief executive’s apparent constitutional authority, under Article 280, to
replace the top officer “freely” (libremente). Zelaya told a crowd of cheering followers
that he would not recognize General Vásquez’s reinstatement.” Meanwhile, the “TSE
asked police to confiscate the proposed referendum’s ballots and ballot boxes, then in
storage at a Tegucigalpa air base.” Zelaya responded by personally leading a band of
several hundred supporters onto the base and compelling its commander to give him
all the referendum materials (Ruhl 2010, 102).
On Friday, June 26, the Supreme Court ordered General Vásquez to detain President
Zelaya for treason and abuse of authority (Lacey 2009). As coup fears mounted, Zelaya
invoked article 17 of the inter-American democratic charter to trigger an emergency
meeting of the permanent council of the Organization of American States (OAS). This
was the first time a head of state had invoked the so-called “self-help” clause. However,
preventive diplomacy was too little, too late (Legler 2010, 602). Senior U.S. officials
sought to hold talks with elites in Honduras to head off a coup (Malkin 2009b). The
National Congress investigated “ways to oust Zelaya despite the institution’s lack of
an explicit impeachment power under the Constitution” (Ruhl 2010, 102-103). The
army took matters in its own hands on June 28 to block the poll (Malkin 2009b).
On Sunday June 28, a military spokesman “claimed that the armed forces took this step
to prevent a violent confrontation with Zelaya’s supporters.” After Zelaya had been
whisked out of the country, “a forged resignation letter” circulated among deputies
in the National Congress, which then voted 122 to 6 to appoint its presiding officer,
Roberto Micheletti, as interim chief executive per the constitutional line of presidential
succession (Ruhl 2010, 93,102-103). The Supreme Court issued a statement supportive
142
of the military’s actions, saying they acted to defend the law against “those who had
publicly spoken out and acted against the constitution’s provisions.” Meanwhile, a
nationwide curfew was imposed as the military rounded up Zelaya’s allies. Several
thousand pro-Zelaya protesters burned tires outside the presidential palace (Malkin
2009b).
Responding to public outcry, military lawyers in Honduras denied Zelaya’s ouster was
a coup since a “coup is a political move. It requires the armed forces to assume power,”
which had not happened (Lacey 2009). Had they been golpistas, the generals said they
would have called a national emergency (G. Thompson 2009). Zelaya’s ouster had “a
veneer of constitutional legality” (Legler 2010, 612).
Much of the international community in the western hemisphere reacted by condemning
the coup and demanding Zelaya’s restoration (Romero 2009). The U.S. denied any role
or foreknowledge of the coup (Cooper and Lacey 2009). Six days after the coup, the
OAS suspended Honduras, although it stopped short of calling on members to impose
sanctions (Thompson and Lacey 2009). Many nations withdrew their ambassadors
from in Tegucigalpa (Ruhl 2010, 102-103). Economic sanctions were imposed “by
the likes of the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World
Bank, the Central American Integration System, and the Central American Bank of
Economic Integration, in addition to individual countries such as the United States.”
These efforts failed to restore Zelaya (Legler 2010, 601).
Likewise, “Street demonstrations and other protests organized by Zelaya’s National
Resistance Front Against the Coup (FNR)—a coalition of trade unions, peasant groups,
and leftist popular organizations—never became disruptive enough to dislodge the
right-wing Micheletti government during the months after the coup. An anti-Zelaya
coalition based principally in the two traditional parties, the private business sector,
and the security forces proved to be far stronger. Zelaya’s hope for a game-changing
split within the armed forces was never fulfilled” (Ruhl 2010, 94).
In September 2009, Zelaya tried to sneak back into the country, but was forced to take
up residence in the Brazilian embassy. Authorities threatened to arrest him if he left
(Malkin 2009c). Despite Zelaya’s call for a boycott, the Micheletti administration over-
saw the regularly scheduled presidential and congressional elections in November 2009
(Malkin 2009d). Zelaya was constitutionally prohibited from seeking a second term,
and “the two major parties had nominated their candidates well before the coup.” The
elections were won by the conservative National Party candidate, Porfirio Lobo Sosa
(Malkin 2009a). On December 2, 2009, Honduras’ Congress “voted overwhelmingly
against the restoration of Zelaya” to serve out the remainder of his term (Legler 2010,
601). In late January 2010, Lobo Sosa took office “with the endorsement of the United
States and a number of Latin American countries” (Ruhl 2010, 94).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event is a coup or legal depends on one’s inter-
pretation of legality. Though the military was legally empowered to arrest Zelaya, they
were not empowered to exile Zelaya and oust him from the presidency by force, a move
which should have occurred through constitutional means. Though Congress approved
Zelaya’s ouster after the military acted, they did so only by accepting a forged letter.
143
“The events of 28 June 2009 constituted neither a classic coup nor a self-coup. Yet
they did equate to a coup in the sense that an elected head of state was involuntarily,
forcefully, and physically removed, not only from office and the presidential palace but
also from the country, by elements of the military” (Legler 2010, 611). Despite the
veneer of legality, “[n]aming Micheletti as president abused a legal structure designed
to deal with a president who abandoned his duties, not one who was kidnapped and
deported” (Pitts et al. 2016). Freedom House removed Honduras from its list of elec-
toral democracies after Zelaya’s ouster (Ruhl 2010, 93). Even though the coup did
not lead to installation of a military junta (per Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014)),
we nevertheless code this event as a successful anti-democratic coup. For a critique of
arguments that the coup was constitutional, see Fasquelle (2011).
144
2.1.8 92: El Salvador
Table 8: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in El Salvador

92-1948-12-14 El Salvador 31-48 Castaneda Castro, Salvador Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
92-1949-1-6 El Salvador 48-82 Osorio, Óscar Autogolpe (S)
92-1960-10-26 El Salvador 48-82 Lemus, José Marı́a Reshuffle Coup (S)
92-1961-1-25 El Salvador 48-82 Yanes Urı́as, César Reshuffle Coup (S)
92-1972-3-25 El Salvador 48-82 Sánchez Hernández, Fidel Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
92-1979-10-15 El Salvador 48-82 Romero, Carlos Humberto Reshuffle Coup (S)
92-1980-5-10 El Salvador 48-82 Majano Ramos, Adolfo Arnaldo Reshuffle Coup (S)
92-1980-12-7 El Salvador 48-82 Gutiérrez Avendaño, Jaime Autogolpe (S)
• # 92-1948-12-14: El Salvador, Salvador Castaneda Castro

Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP, Fossum,
Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Castaneda Castro as exiting on
December 14, 1948 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign sup-
port; GWF code the collapse of a military-personal regime (El Salvador 31-48) on
December 14, 1948 in a military coup; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly
ethnic group in El Salvador from 1946 to 1994.
Event: In June 1945, a group of young military officers attempted a coup against Gen-
eral Salvador Castaneda Castro only a few months after he had come to office (following
the removal of President Maximiliano Hernández Martı́nez who had ruled the country
from 1931-1944). “In the aftermath, a number of plotters were exiled, including Major
Oscar Osorio, a key figure in the 1948 coup, who was packed off to Mexico.” Spared
from punishment, the 1945 coup plotters kept “in touch, waiting for an opportunity
to make another attempt, which came near the end of 1948. The trigger on this occa-
sion was precisely the same as in 1944: the sitting president’s intention of continuing
in office beyond the prescribed term.” On December 13, 1948, as his four-year term
was ending, Castaneda Castro called members of the legislature into session and “had
them put together a convoluted decree that called for elections within three days for
a constituent assembly to prolong his period in office until early 1951” (Williams and
Walter 1997, 38-39).
On the afternoon of December 14, “shooting broke out in downtown San Salvador be-
tween regular troops under the orders of rebellious officers and police forces loyal to
the president. In a matter of hours, after intense negotiations in which the diplomatic
corps played an intermediary role, Castaneda Castro resigned his office and was taken
prisoner” (38-39). The garrison of Zapote Fort joined a revolt of all military units led
by young officers (New York Times 1948a), who were known as the ‘Military Youth’
(Juventud Militar) (Haggerty 1990, 18). Rebels “seized police headquarters and ar-
rested the President,” who submitted his resignation and then was taken and held
145
at Zapote Fort (New York Times 1948a). A San Salvador broadcast “ended with the
words, ‘Victory to the youthful militarists who will faithfully uphold the Constitution!’
” (Associated Press 1948c).
“Once in control, the golpistas held a meeting of the entire officer corps in which three
officers and two civilians were chosen for a Revolutionary Governing Council. The vote
was held without regard to rank, with each officer having an equal vote, which favored
the more numerous junior officers. The new council forced the retirement of all officers
above the rank of lieutenant colonel, effectively eliminating all of the officers with close
ties to Martinez” (Stanley 1996, 67). “For all practical purposes, the martinato was
over” (Williams and Walter 1997, 39).
The military junta “then appointed a cabinet made up of middle-class civilian pro-
fessionals” (Stanley 1996, 67). On December 15, 1948, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel de
Jesús Córdova, who was believed to be in control (New York Times 1948a), announced
the formation of a new Revolutionary Council of Government (Consejo de Gobierno
Revolucionario, CGR). He justified the coup by stressing “Castaneda’s violation of
the constitutional norm prohibiting presidential reelection, the dissatisfaction within
the armed forces over unfair disciplinary measures, and the practice of military spying
on the officers themselves” (Williams and Walter 1997, 38-40). On December 16, the
junta lifted martial law that it imposed (United Press 1948e). Córdova was reportedly
selected as president of the new junta on December 17 (Lentz 1994, 254).
Behind the scenes, however, the ‘majors revolt’ ousting Gen. Castaneda Castro had
been led by Major Oscar Osorio (Baloyra 1982, 37), who was in exile in Mexico at
the time of the coup but soon returned to the country. Several weeks after the coup,
Major Oscar Osorio, an original member of the junta, publicly distributed the junta’s
“Fourteen Points” outlining the goals of the CGR. The guiding principles of the new
military regime included a commitment to build “an effective democracy” (Williams
and Walter 1997, 38-40).
“After the coup, which was more concerned with establishing order than implementing
reforms, the military established itself as a somewhat more independent force in politics
by distancing itself from the oligarchy. The officers’ movement also changed the army’s
own perception of its role in society by adopting new missions to uphold national law
and safeguard the country’s sovereignty. Thereafter, the military considered itself no
longer merely the oligarchy’s private army but rather the guardian of the people and
the constitution. As such, it saw itself playing a legitimate role in virtually all aspects
of government” (Haggerty 1990, 201).
a successful regime change coup.
• # 92-1949-1-6: El Salvador, Oscar Osorio

Other Datasets: successful military and palace coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP
146
and Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Osorio as the leader of El Salvador from January
4, 1949, to October 22, 1949. Archigos codes him entering and exiting by “regular”
means while Svolik codes both entry and exit as by “consensus”; GWF code a party
regime (El Salvador 48-82) from December 14, 1948, until March 28, 1982, which was
led by Osorio until 1956.
Event: On January 6, 1949, it was reported that Lt. Col. Manuel de Jesús Córdova
had resigned as head of the Revolutionary Council of Government (CGR) the previous
day (United Press 1949g).18 Cordova resigned “to equalize the civilian and military
elements” in government, according to the government (New York Times 1949d). Cor-
dova was allegedly escorted to the Honduran border “by a detachment of machine
gunners of the Salvadoran Army” (FBIS 1949a). Some observers said Cordova’s ouster
was expected as “he had not measured up to the liberal ideals” of the Council (New
York Times 1949b). One report said Cordova was ousted as he was too friendly to
Arevalistas (FBIS 1949b).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event is a coup or an autogolpe (as Singh notes
is a potential definitional issue) depends in the first place on who is the regime leader
at the time. As explained in our appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we consider Osorio
as regime leader and Cordova as nominal executive at this point. Consistent with that
coding (agreeing with Archigos but not Svolik), we code this case as an autogolpe by
the regime leader purging the nominal executive. Though Archigos code Cordova’s
ouster as “regular,” we find the evidence that Cordova was forced to leave the country
to imply that his resignation was in fact forced, and not consensual. Had we followed
the Svolik leader coding, we would have coded this event as a successful reshuffling
coup preserving the rule of the nascent junta.
• # 92-1960-10-26: El Salvador, José Marı́a Lemus

sum, Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Lemus as exiting on October
26, 1960 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF
code a GWF party-military regime (El Salvador 48-82) from December 14, 1948 to
May 2, 1982; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in El Sal-
vador from 1946 to 1994.
Event: In April 1960, members of the regime party since 1950, the Partido Revolu-
cionario de Unifación Democrático (PRUD), again won all the seats to the legislative
assembly, although some members of the opposition (the Partido de Acción Renovadora
(PAR), won several key municipalities, including San Salvador. A PRUD splinter group
led by ex-President Osorio formed (PRUD Auténtico) to contest the elections. Oppo-
sition frustration with PRUD’s rigged electoral domination led to increasing street
demonstrations “against the government, conservative newspapers, and the United
States embassy” (Williams and Walter 1997, 54-55). A broad opposition front formed
18. Lentz (1994, 254) reports the date as 4 January.
147
under the banner of the National Civic Orientation Front (FNOC) (Stanley 1996, 75).
Inspired by Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba, student groups protested the rule of
President José marı́a Lemus and demanded democracy (Haggerty 1990, 21). In Au-
gust 1960, the government suspended constitutional guarantees after it claimed to
uncover a plot. In September, police invaded the national university and beat students
and leaders, including the rector (Williams and Walter 1997, 54-55). Some political
elites felt Lemus’s repressive tactics undermined their goal of economic development
(Haggerty 1990, 21), leading to accelerate coup plotting.
The coup took place at 6 a.m. on October 26, 1960, members of the 1st Artillery
regiment fired several rounds at the presidential palace, entered the residence, and took
Lemus into custody. Lemus was later driven to the Guatemala border. The leaders
held a press conference at noon officially announcing the new junta and bloodless
coup (New York Times 1960q). Lemus was replaced by a military junta led by senior
officers Colonel César Yanes Urı́as, Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Castillo, Major Rubén
Alonso Rosales, and three civilians Doctor Rene Fortı́n Magaña, Doctor Ricardo Falla
Cáceres, and Doctor Fabio Castillo Figueroa. The civilians were from the National
University with FNOC connections (Stanley 1996, 76). On October 27, the junta
seized legislative power and lifted a state of siege that had been imposed September 5.
The junta promised free elections in 1962 and freed many prisoners (New York Times
1960p).
as a successful reshuffling coup. According to Stanley (1996, 76), the coup was led by
“a reformist movement supported by junior officers, Osorio, and the FNOC.” Williams
and Walter (1997, 55) says the coup was led by a group of senior officers loyal to ex-
President Osorio, the leader of the 1948 coup. The new junta committed to respect the
1950 constitution and organize elections in which all political parties could participate.
“Until then, the junta would exercise complete legislative and executive powers, having
discharged all deputies from their posts in the legislative assembly and having replaced
all the justices of the supreme court” (55).
A week after the coup, the junta “reiterated its commitment to electoral democracy.”
By December 1960, the junta “repealed the previous electoral law and canceled all
political parties.” It authorized the formation of new political parties and “named
an interim electoral commission charged with convening a congress to produce a new
electoral law.” However, the new Congress convened for only a day before a counter-
coup ousted the reformist junta in January 1961 Williams and Walter (1997, 55-59).
• # 92-1961-1-25: El Salvador, Cesar Yanes Urias

Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP, PT, and Singh;
Archigos and Svolik code Fabian Castillo as the leader of El Salvador from October 26,
1960, to January 25, 1961; Archigos codes him exiting by “irregular” means by military
actors without foreign support; Svolik codes his exit by a military coup; GWF code
148
a party-military regime (El Salvador 48-82) from December 14, 1948, until March 28,
1982, which was led by Yanes Urias since late 1960, implying that at this time Castillo
was the nominal executive. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group
in El Salvador from 1946 to 1994.
Event: After an October 1960 coup against Lemus (see 92-1960-10-26), “Governmental
authority again passed into the hands of a military-civilian junta. The ranking military
representative was Lieutenant Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera. Aside from Rivera, the
junta member who drew the most attention was Fabio Castillo, a university professor
and known sympathizer with the Cuban Revolution. Castillo’s presence, along with
the renewed reformist policies of the junta, convinced the elite and the conservative
military officers that the government was influenced by communism. Again, it was the
military that acted to head off this perceived threat to stability” (Haggerty 1990, 21).
On January 25, 1961, young anti-communist officers overthrew the junta and set up
their headquarters at San Carlos barracks on the eastern outskirts of the capital. For
a period, troops loyal to the old junta occupied the Zapote barracks across the street
from the government palace in San Salvador and reportedly was preparing to strike
back. Students protested in favor of the old junta, leading the new junta to arrest many
leftist and student leaders (Associated Press 1961i). The coup leaders “affirmed their
anticommunist and anti-Castro convictions, retained Rivera as part of a new junta,
and promised elections” (Haggerty 1990, 21). The regime declared martial law and
imposed a curfew (United Press International 1961e), and brutally put down anti-coup
protests over the next few days.
According to Pippin (1988, 179-180), the 1960 junta included six men. The coup makers
were army officers disgruntled at the junta’s decision to “hold free elections, embracing
all political groups.” Thus the post-January 25, 1961, junta–including Rivera, one
other colonel, and three civilians–“was considerably to the political right of the one
overthrown.” One of the members of the 1960 junta, Colonel Yánez Urı́as, backed the
junta’s attempt for the military to disengage from politics, which provoked concern
among conservative businessmen and officers and led the United States to withhold
recognition. The congress which was to begin work on a new electoral law convened
on January 23, 1961. But the new junta that seized power had “a different approach
to democracy” (Williams and Walter 1997, 56-59). “Most of the coup leaders were
majors and captains who looked to Colonel Julio Rivera (then but thirty-nine years
old) for guidance and leadership. Rivera, who became a member of the new junta, the
Directorio Cı́vico Militar, had been appointed director of the general staff school...by
the deposed junta; the other military member of the directorio, Colonel Anibal Portillo,
also had been appointed by the junta as head of the general staff. Three civilians joined
the directorio: Antonio Rodrı́guez Porth, a prominent lawyer and ideologue of the
Salvadoran Right; Feliciano Avelar, a lawyer; and Jose Francisco Valiente, a medical
doctor” (64).
Coding rationale: This is a consensus coup according to other major datasets. The fact
that Archigos and GWF code different leaders at this time–Yanes Urias or Castillo–is
irrelevant as the coup targeted both. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
149
(2014), we code this a successful reshuffling coup. A key goal of the coup was to
not expand the group from which leaders could be selected by blocking free elections
planned by the 1960 junta.
• # 92-1972-3-25: El Salvador, Fidel Sánchez Hernández

coup attempt - CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Fidel Sánchez Hernández as the
leader of El Salvador from July 1, 1967, to July 1, 1972; GWF code a party-military
regime (El Salvador 48-82) from December 14, 1948, until March 28, 1982. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in El Salvador from 1946 to 1994.
Event: Before dawn on March 25, 1972, two army barracks launched a coup against
the Fidel Sánchez government while president-elect Molina was in transit to Taiwan for
an official visit (Reuters 1970). The coup was led by a group of young army officers led
by Col. Benjamin Mejı́a, a 48-year-old artillery commander of El Zapote barracks that
face the presidential palace (Associated Press 1970d). Mejı́a and his followers seized
the presidential palace and held Sánchez and his 17-year old daughter hostage for 12
hours. Shortly after noon, José Napoleon Duarte reluctantly issued a radio broadcast
in support of the three lead rebels, Mejı́a, Col. Manuel Reyes Alvarado, and Maj.
Pedro Guardado (Associated Press 1970d). But throughout the afternoon, loyal forces
from Sonsonate and San Miguel advanced against the rebels with air support from the
air force. By the early evening, General Sánchez was released unharmed (Associated
Press 1970a).
According to Haggerty (1990), the attempted coup had the immediate goal of estab-
lishing a “revolutionary junta,” but ultimately “favored the installation of Duarte as
president.” The coup was masterminded by a minority faction of the officer corps, a
“new Military Youth,” which was disillusioned with the “blatancy of the fraud em-
ployed to maintain the PCN in power” and sought “direct action to redress the official
exploitation of a system that had until that point shown some promise of evolving in
a genuinely democratic direction.”
Coding rationale: This coup attempt followed a fraudulent election, in which the cen-
trist party (Duarte’s PDC under the United Opposition Coalition) narrowly lost to the
military candidate, Colonel Molinas. This event is coded as having regime change in-
tent on the assumption that the coup leaders would have installed Duarte as president
and he would have ruled with the civilian leaders of the Christian Democrats, thus
changing the composition of the group that could select the leader from the military
to the military in conjunction with an elected civilian party. Duarte would later be
appointed as head of a more moderate military junta in 1980 in a situation that con-
tinued the rule of senior military officers (that regime ended in 1982 with the election
of a civilian president). The reformist junta that came to power in 1979 had some
civilian allies and leaders but was there was no elected civilian party at that point.
• # 92-1979-10-15: El Salvador, Carlos Humberto Romero Mena
150
Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; successful military coup, rebel coup,
and popular revolt - CCD; successful coup - CSP, Luttwak, PT, Luttwak, and Singh;
Archigos codes Romero as being removed as leader of El Salvador on this date through
“irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; Svolik codes the exit on
Romero on this date through a military coup; GWF code a party-military regime (El
Salvador 48-82) from December 14, 1948 until March 28, 1982; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos
as the monopoly ethnic group in El Salvador from 1946 to 1994.
Event: Beginning in the summer of 1979, junior officers throughout the country formed
the Movimiento de la Juventud Military (MJM), began to plot, and became the cru-
cial source of support for the October 1979 coup ousting General Carlos Humberto
Romero. By August 1979, they had allied with crucial senior officers, particularly Lt.
Col. René Guerra y Guerra and Col. Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez (head of the military’s
maintenance department) (Reuters 1979b)), who provided a link to conservative se-
nior officers. The coordinating group included these two, air force Maj. (ret.) Salazar
Brenes, Cap. Mena Sandoval, and Cap. Román Barrerra of the artillery. A few weeks
before the coup, they recruited Col. Adolfo Arnoldo Majano, the well-respected deputy
director of the Escuela Militar. On October 7, 1979, the MJM elected Cols. Majano
and Gutiérrez as the military members of the junta that would succeed General Carlos
Humberto Romero should the coup succeed (Williams and Walter 1997, 97-98).
On October 15, 1979, Romero was overthrown in a military coup. Rebel officers in
the San Carlos barracks informed Romero that he had lost the support of the armed
forces. “Unlike in 1972, the security forces and air force did not come to the president’s
rescue” (100). The National Guard and Treasury Police joined the rebels immediately,
but the National Police, based in San Salvador, initially rejected the coup’s leadership.
Bloodshed was only avoided after their resistance yielded between 3-5 p.m. (Keogh
1984, 172). Romero accepted the ultimatum to resign. Romero and a group of aides
boarded two Guatemalan planes for exile (Williams and Walter 1997, 100).
In their first radio proclamation, the new civil-military junta announced that the
Romero regime had been overthrown, citing its failure to stop rampant guerilla vi-
olence by both left and right wing groups (Reuters 1979b). The three civilians on the
junta included the head of a Catholic college (Román Mayorga Quirós, a professor
and leader of a moderate leftist group (Guillermo Manuel Ongo), and a civil engineer
and businessman (Mario Andino). That evening, a second proclamation “laid out a
surprisingly comprehensive program of structural reforms.” Although the Carter ad-
ministration did not sponsor the coup, embassy officials were aware of the plot and the
plotters had little reason to believe that the U.S. would oppose them. On October 16,
the United States recognized the new junta (Williams and Walter 1997, 99-100).
“The military and security forces had been turned over to Colonel José Guillermo
Garcia, a senior officer, by Colonel Gutı́érrez, without consulting fellow conspirators.
A rightist and opportunist, Garcı́a had not been part of the 1979 coup” (Pippin 1988,
185). Nevertheless, according to Needler (1991, 574), under the October 1979 junta,
“the army, under Defense Minister Jos/’e Garcia, remained in control of the country.
151
Along with the other security forces, the army countered the attempts of the junta to
introduce social reforms, to restore respect for human rights, and to bring justice to
those engaged in the repression of the Romero years. It became clear that the junta was
ineffectual, and it began to be referred to as the junta of chompipes, or turkeys, who
would be cooked and eaten by Christmas. In fact, the junta lasted until the first week
of 1980; the junta gave the military leadership an ultimatum demanding that the armed
forces recognize civilian control in the issuance of orders and the making of personnel
decisions. The military rejected the ultimatum, and the government resigned.” A few
days later, on January 4, 1980, the Christian Democrats joined the new government
(Pippin 1988, 185).
as a successful reshuffling coup. The October 1979 coup largely grew out of growing
disaffection among junior officers, who felt that their opportunities had been stifled
by senior officers from prior classes of the military school. “One young officer, Maj.
Alvaro Salazar Brenes, who played a key role in the 1979 coup, retired from the armed
forces in June 1978 in the belief that the military’s system of political domination
was no longer viable.” Some junior officer who supported the coup, such as Cap.
Francisco Emilio Mena Sandoval, said they had resented the military’s role in the
electoral fraud of 1972. Other leaders of the coup said that their initial impulse had
been the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in July 1979, which convinced them that
a coup was necessary to avoid the mistakes that Somoza had made and thus avoid a
similar revolution in El Salvador (Williams and Walter 1997, 93-96). The Military Co-
ordinating Group organized by Rene Guerra (a Marxist officer who admired Nasser)
first recruited Captain Ernesto Barrera, followed by Sandoval, Brenes, and grew to 37
delegates by the fall of 1979 (Keogh 1984, 160-161).
According to Williams and Walter (1997, 99), the coup organizers did little to cultivate
civilian allies among the opposition prior to the coup, though there were frequent
contacts with some civilians such as Archbishop of San Salvador Oscar Romero. By
contrast, Keogh (1984, 160) acknowledges that “All those who formed the nuclear of the
Civilian Co-ordinating Group occupied influential and well connected positions in the
academic, professional, business and political life of El Salvador. Guillermo Quinonez
was one of the main forces,” in addition to Rodrigo and Hugo Guerra, Guillermo Diaz
Salazar, Carlos Moreno, and Ricardo Navarro.
Some scholars argue that the October 1979 coup represented a “radical break.” For
example, Pippin (1988, 185) claims that “the cycle of military regimes ruling on behalf
of the landed oligarchy ended on 15 October 1979.” However, Keogh (1984, 154) argues
that such a view is “more fantasy than historical fact.” As LeoGrande and Robbins
(1980, 1094-1095) observe, the October 1979 reformist “center-left” junta failed after
a largely ineffectual three months largely because “the progressives caved in to con-
servative resistance rather than risk a split in the armed forces.” For example, “The
pledge to investigate human rights abuses led to no arrests; the pledge to reorganize
the government’s security apparatus led only to a cosmetic reshuffling of personnel;
152
and the pledge to conduct an agrarian reform led nowhere” (LeoGrande and Robbins
1980, 1094-1095). Williams and Walter (1997, 113) note that the crises precipitating
the coup and the coup itself meant the “old power apparatus was severely shaken but
the military managed to retain its power and thus postpone more profound changes.”
• # 92-1980-5-10: El Salvador, Adolfo Majano Ramos

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos and Svolik
code Majano Ramos as leader of El Salvador from October 15, 1979, until December
7, 1980; GWF code a party-military regime (El Salvador 48-82) from December 14,
1948, until March 28, 1982, led by Majano as of January 1, 1980 and Gutierrez as
of January 1, 1981. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in El
Salvador from 1946 to 1994.
Event: By May 1, 1980, extreme right-wing officers led by ex-Major Roberto D’Aubuisson,
the National Guard’s former chief of intelligence, were in the advanced stages of plan-
ning a coup (109 Gómez 2004; LeoGrande 1998, 47). “To build support for the coup,
D’Aubuisson circulated copies of a video in which he denounced Majano as being a
member of one of the guerilla organizations and called for his removal from the junta...
The goal of D’Aubuisson and his supporters was twofold: (1) derail the reform program,
and (2) eliminate the Majanista officers’ influence within the armed forces” (Williams
and Walter 1997, 105).
On May 7, D’Aubuisson and 23 fellow officers and civilians were arrested by troops
from the First Corps and Signal Brigade–loyal to Colonel Majano–at a farm in Santa
Tecla, where documents showing coup plans were seized (105). National Guard officer
Rodolfo López Sibrián and Army captain Eduardo Ávila were among those arrested
for coup plotting (Crandall 2016, 158). Officers Jorge Adalberto Cruz Reyes, Roberto
Mauricio Staben, Alvaro Sarávia, and Victor Huga Vega Valencia were also arrested.
On the morning of May 8, “the Third Brigade in San Miguel and the Sixth Military
Detachment in Sonsonate declared that if the prisoners were not released by noon the
same day, they were prepared to attack the Presidential Palace and the First Brigade.”
Reformist officers threatened to launch a coup of their own if the prisoners were not
prosecuted (Stanley 1996, 201-203). Eight of 14 army garrison commanders voted for
the release of D’Aubuisson (LeoGrande 1998, 47).
Given the exposed split in the military and outrage among more conservative senior
officers that Majano had acted unilaterally in arresting the coup plotters (even though
he had every legal right to do so), Minister of Defense Garcia swiftly moved to curtail
Majano’s authority. On May 10, the coup plotters were released despite demands by
Majanistas that they be tried for treason. “To bolster Garcia’s position, the High
Command organized a general assembly of officials to decide which of the two military
representatives on the junta should be commander in chief of the armed forces. The
vote was 313 to 187 in favor of Gutierrez” (Williams and Walter 1997). Whereas
Majano previously shared the responsibility with Gutierrez, now only Gutierrez would
be commander-in-chief. On May 14, Gutierrérez suspended phase two of land reform.
153
“The coup attempt was foiled, but D’Aubuisson and the FAN came very close to
achieving all of their goals” (Williams and Walter 1997).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event is a coup attempt, not regime leader, or
an autogolpe depends in part on whether one considers Majano or Gutierrez as regime
leader prior to May 1980. As explained in our appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we
concur with Archigos and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) that Majano was the
regime leader in May 1980. By December 7, 1980, Majano was ousted from the junta
and went into hiding. Exactly when Majano lost his standing as regime leader over
the course of 1980 is hard to determine, as the “May crisis” was a significant blow to
Majano’s standing.
Whether or not this event is a coup attempt depends on positive answers to several
questions. The first question is: did current military actors take concrete actions to
oust Majano. D’Aubuisson had been dismissed from the Army after the 1979 coup on
account of his death squad connections (LeoGrande 1998). Still, other current active
members were also implicated in his coup plot. However, we find no evidence that
the right-wing coup attempt was actually executed. As Haggerty (1990, 38) notes,
the events of May 7 were in fact a preemptive strike by Majano, not a coup attempt.
Similarly, the threat to use force by D’Aubuisson’s supporters on May 8 appears to
have had the main goal of having the coup plotters released, but not of ousting Majano
per se. Therefore, we conclude that the only concrete actions taken against Majano
at this time was the High Command’s (i.e. Garcia’s) move to organize the General
Assembly and to demote Majano.
A second question is: was Majano’s ouster as commander-in-chief at this time legal
or “regular”? Although we have no public statements on the move, we assume that
it was not consensual. Although a vote was taken, which prima facie appears legal,
Stanley (1996, 203) notes that Majano’s demotion went “against formal military law
and custom.” We thus assume that Majano’s demotion was irregular and do not
exclude it as legal.
Finally, whether or not this coup attempt was successful or failed depends on whether
or not there was a leadership change at this time. Although Majano was removed as
commander-in-chief, he remained on the junta until December. Whether or not the
May demotion constitutes a leadership change can be debated. It was clearly “a heavy
blow to Majano’s status within the institution” of the military and that after this
point he was “left as a figurehead on the junta” (203). According to Haggerty (1990,
38), this was “the last nail in Majano’s political coffin” and the beginning of his fall
from power. Because the military was the core of the regime, we assume that effective
regime leadership did pass to Gutierrez at this time, even though Col. Majano’s status
as nominal executive on the junta remained in place until December 1980. Based on
the evidence, we thus code this event as a successful reshuffling coup in which Majano
was effectively replaced by Gutierrez.
• # 92-1980-12-7: El Salvador, Adolfo Majano Ramos

154
Other Datasets: successful military coup and autogolpe - CCD; not a candidate - CSP,
PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Majano Ramos as being removed on this date through
“irregular” means through a power struggle within the military short of a coup; Svolik
codes Majano Ramos as being removed in a military coup on this date; GWF code
a party-military regime (El Salvador 48-82) from December 14, 1948, until March 28,
1982, led by Majano as of January 1, 1980 and Gutierrez as of January 1, 1981.
Event: According to Gómez (2004, 109-110), “In December 1980, a vote from the Offi-
cer Corps voted Colonel Majano out of his position on the RGJ. It was the final straw
in an ongoing effort to strip power away from the reformist faction within the military,
which Majano had himself represented.” According to sources in Goemens, Gleditsch,
and Chiozza (2009, 148), “Army officers voted 300 to 4 against Colonel Majano’s re-
maining in the junta. The colonel said he wanted to make it clear he was not resigning,
but was being forced out.”
Coding rationale: Whether or not one consider’s this event a coup attempt or auto-
golpe depends on whether one considers Majano as the regime leader at the time. As
explained in the justification for the prior case, we assume that Majano had been re-
placed as the regime leader in May 1980 and remained only as the nominal executive
thereafter. This coding contrasts with that of Archigos. We therefore code this event
as a successful autogolpe engineered by Gutierrez and the High Command to oust the
nominal executive.
155
2.1.9 93: Nicaragua
Table 9: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Nicaragua

93-1947-5-26 Nicaragua 36-79 Somoza Garcia, Anastasio Autogolpe (S)

93-1967-1-22 Nicaragua 36-79 Somoza Debay, Luis protest
93-1978-8-28 Nicaragua 36-79 Somoza Debay, Anastasio coup plot
93-1979-7-17 Nicaragua 36-79 Somoza Debay, Anastasio prior defection
93-1980-11-17 Nicaragua 79-90 Ortega, Daniel coup plot
93-1991-10-4 Nicaragua 90-16 Chamorro, Violeta not exist
93-2005-9-9 Nicaragua 90-16 Bolaños, Enrique legal
• # 93-1947-5-26: Nicaragua, Leonardo Arguello Barreto

Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Arguello as exiting on May 26,
1947 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code
a personal regime (Nicaragua 36-79) from June 2, 1936 to July 17, 1979, which was
led by Anastasio Somoza Garcia from before January 1, 1946, until 1956; EPR codes
“Whites/Mestizos” as the monopoly ethnic group from 1946 to 1987.
Event: Dr. Leonardo Argüello was sworn in as President on May 1, 1947, though
Anastasio Somoza Garcia (the president from 1937-1947, who decided not to run for
re-election under U.S. pressure) remained chief of the National Guard and intended to
regain office again in the 1952 elections. “Argüello had no intention of being a puppet”
and in less than a month he took measures to challenge Somoza Garcia’s power (Brás
1994, 27). In his inaugural address, Argüello told a joint session of the Nicaraguan
Congress that “I will not–you can be sure of that–be a mere figurehead President.”
By May 19, Argüello had granted autonomy to the University of Managua, where stu-
dents had recently protested electoral fraud, and “had replaced the Director of Police in
Managua and had transferred a son of General Somoza from the position of Inspector
General of the Army to a job a garrison chief at Leon” (New York Times 1947h).
Early on May 26, 1947, gunfire was reported between the Presidential Guard and
troops loyal to General Somoza. By 1 a.m., Somoza’s troops arrested Argüello and
30 officers loyal to him bloodlessly (New York Times 1947h). By May 27, Benjamin
Lacayo Sacasa, President of the Chamber of Deputies and a family associate of General
Somoza, was installed as Provisional President by the Congress. Argüello and 11 loyal
officers were allowed to leave the Presidential Palace for the Mexican Embassy. Another
20 loyalist officers took up refuge in other embassies (New York Times 1947g). On
May 28, Somoza was named Minister of War, Navy, and Aviation, and National Guard
commander (United Press 1947l). On November 20, Argüello was permitted to leave for
Mexico City, where the 72-year-old died a month later (Lentz 1994, 590). The Truman
administration withheld “diplomatic recognition from the new Nicaraguan government.
156
In an effort to legitimize the new regime and win United States support, Somoza
Garcia named a Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution. The assembly then
appointed Somoza Garcia’s uncle, Victor Roman Reyes, as president” (Brás 1994, 27).
we consulted. Horwitz (2011, Table 1) lists a coup in Nicaragua in 1947. However,
whether or not this event is a coup or autogolpe depends on who considers to be regime
leader at this time. As explained in our appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we disagree
with the Archigos leader coding. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014),
we code this event as an autogolpe by the regime leader (Somoza Garcia) against the
nominal executive (Argüello).
• # 93-1967-1-22: Nicaragua, Luis Somoza Debay

Category: protest
Other Datasets: failed dissident action - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP; protest - PT;
non-military riots - Singh; Archigos codes Guerrero Gutierrez as the leader of Nicaragua
from August 4, 1966, to May 1, 1967; GWF code a personal regime (Nicaragua 36-79)
from June 2, 1936, until July 17, 1979, which was led by Luis Somoza Debay from 1956
to April 1967.
Event: On Sunday, January 22, 1967, Dr. Fernando Aguero Rocha, the presidential
candidate for the opposition Conservative Party in elections scheduled for February 5,
spoke at a rally of his supporters in the Plaza de la Republica in downtown Managua.
In his speech, he called on the National Guard, the nation’s army, “to negotiate with
the opposition–which has nothing against the army–to avoid violence and bloodshed in
Nicaragua.” Aguero then led the crowd on a parade, and in an unexpected deviation
from the approved route, he marched to the National Guard headquarters at Campo
del Marte to demand a guarantee of honest elections. Col. Gustavo Montiel, the com-
mander of the National Guard, said through a spokesman that he “had nothing to say”
to the demonstrators. When the crowd spread out throughout the city, the National
Guard mobilized to cordon off the area from the Central Bank to the Presidential
Palace. The rally soon turned into a violent and bloody riot after the loyal National
Guard troops clashed with armed civilians snipers along the Avenida Roosevelt (Asso-
ciated Press 1967b). Over the next 20 hours, a bloody rebellion engulfed the city and
left many casualties. The rebels retreated to the Gran Hotel and took hostages. After
negotiations involving Church leaders and the American ambassador, on January 23,
the oppositionists agreed to release the foreign hostages in exchange for being allowed
to leave the hotel freely (Associated Press 1967a).
On January 24, the government reiterated that it was proceeding with elections, re-
vealing its confidence in the victory of Gen. Anastasio Somoza Jr., youngest son of
the long-time dictator, former National Guard commander, and presidential candidate
of the Liberal Party. Lorenzo Guerrero Gutierrez, the vice president who became pro-
visional president when the figurehead René Schick died in 1966 (Meyer 1972, 187),
accused Aguero of attempting to overthrow the Somoza regime (Giniger 1967c). On
157
January 25, fighting flared up again between armed civilian Aguero supporters and the
National Guard. That day, Dr. Aguero also gave an interview with foreign reporters
in which he admitted to having led a demonstration in an effort to get the National
Guard and police to join him in “setting up a provisional civilian-military junta. The
purpose of the junta would have been to organize “honest” elections of a kind now
impossible in Nicaragua, he said.” He said he felt compelled to stage a coup when his
recommendation was rejected to delay elections by a year for a technical assistance
team from the Organization of American States to reform the electoral system. So-
moza, meanwhile, said Communist youth groups trained in Cuba had also joined the
attack on the army (Giniger 1967a). On January 26, the government arrested Pedro
Joaquin Chamorro, published of the main opposition newspaper La Prensa, alleging
that they had found a “master plan” in his building calling for attacks on the city and
the assassination of General Somoza and other members of the regime (Giniger 1967b).
Coding rationale: We found no evidence that indicates that current active members
of the military had helped plan Aguero’s demonstration or had defected to his side
after he had sought to negotiate with the National Guard. We therefore code this as
a protest.
• # 93-1978-8-28: Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza Debayle

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP;
protest - PT; coup plot - Singh; Archigos codes Anastasio Somoza as the leader of
Nicaragua from May 1, 1967, to July 17, 1979; GWF code a personal regime (Nicaragua
36-79) from June 2, 1936, until July 17, 1979.
Event: On August 22, 1978, rebel Sandinistas led by Eden Pastoro Gomez stormed the
National Palace and held everyone hostage. To secure their release, Somoza met several
rebel demands, including broadcasting a communique calling for the Guard to rebel
and the release of prisoners (R. A. Pastor 1987, 71). According to Keesing’s World
News Archive (1978), on August 28, “an attempted coup by conservative members of
the National Guard who were angered that President Somoza had met the demands
of the guerrillas who stormed the National Palace [see above] was put down without
bloodshed. A statement from the National Guard said that “elements of the Army
and civilians” (who were reported by other sources to number about 85, including
12 senior officers) had been arrested for plotting to overthrow the Government, while
a National Guard spokesman later disclosed that the attempt had been led by Lt.-
Colonel Bernardino Larios, a Brazilian- trained engineer, and by Lt.-Colonel Eduardo
Montalba, commander of the northern Ocotal region; it was stated that both men were
under arrest.”
News reports provide no evidence of any concrete actions taken by the plotters prior
to their arrest, in which no fighting or casualties were reported (Greenwoord 1978,
e.g.). Rather, “The military communique indicated that Somoza loyalists had moved
against the alleged coup leaders before they could make their move to oust the pres-
158
ident. “Through investigations begun some time back by military authorities, it was
learned that a conspiracy was being prepared by military and civilian elements against
the legitimate government...Authorities believed it was prudent to proceed with the de-
tention of the suspects,” the communique said” (News Services 1978). Others similarly
reported that “The Somoza family’s intelligence apparatus had spotted the incipient
rebellion months before the arrest of Colonel Larios and three dozen other guard per-
sonnel. There is some speculation that General Somoza brought the rebellion issue up
at this time to warn other guard elements” (Goodsell 1978).
In January 1979, the 25 officers and soldiers arrested for allegedly plotting against the
government were granted amnesty. Larios then “wrote a letter to the opposition daily,
La Prensa, complaining mainly about the poor living condition of the Guard rank and
file,” sparking similar letters of dissent by other officers, including Lt. Col. Guillermo
Mendieta (Riding 1979). On July 3, 1979, Larios, Mendieta and three other exiled
National Guard officers held a press conference in Costa Rica publicly backing the
Sandinistas and calling on the National Guard to stop defending the Somoza regime
(Hoge 1979a). Before arrest, Larios had been assigned to the National Light and Power
Company, where he worked with the civilian plotters. According to the account Major
Somoza, the president’s son, gave to U.S. Embassy personnel, “none of the people di-
rectly involved were regular army, but rather technicians and technocrats. The leader,
he said, had been talking to oppositionists and his intent was to establish himself as
the head of the Guardia after the opposition took over” (U.S. Embassy, Nicaragua
1978). The U.S. had no advanced knowledge of the plot (R. A. Pastor 1987, 72).
Coding rationale: Although the lead plotters later admitted to having conspired against
Somoza upon joining the Sandinistas (FSLN) (Hoge 1979a), initially some were specu-
lated over whether the plot was by leftist supporters of the FSLN, rightists who thought
Somoza was being too moderate, or instead “may have been fostered by Gen. Somoza
in an attempt to make himself appear more moderate” (Huey 1978). Officially, the
Sandinistas accused the National Guard’s senior leaders “of preparing a feigned coup
against Somoza with the hidden purpose of reinforcing his position” (Agence France-
Presse 1978). If the plot was staged by Somoza, ironically this evidently would have
played into the hands of the Sandinista’s strategy. According to R. A. Pastor (1987,
72), “Humberto Ortega later said the real reason for the palace takeover [on August 22]
was to prevent a coup against Somoza by the National Guard: “The Sandinistas knew
that Somoza was the key to their victory; if the Guard replaced him, the Sandinistas
would lose much of their popular support. The purpose of the raid was to preempt and
thus prevent a coup against Somoza.” Based on the evidence, we assume that there
was an actual coup plot brewing, which was preempted before it could be attempted.
STAGED.
• # 93-1979-7-17: Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza Debayle

Other Datasets: rebel coup and forced resignation - CCD,; rebel ouster - CSP; not
a candidate - PT; civil war - Singh; successful coup - Luttwak (July 19); Archigos
159
codes Somoza Debayle’s exit on this date by “irregular” means by rebels with foreign
support; Svolik codes Somoza Debayle’s exit on this date by a civil war; GWF code
the collapse of a personal regime (Nicaragua 36-79) on this date in civil war.
Event: The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a Marxist rebel group, was
established in 1961 and launched a guerilla war intermittently since December 1974,
which intensified after the various FSLN factions reunified in March 1979. “On June
18, a provisional Nicaraguan government in exile, consisting of a five-member junta,
was organized in Costa Rica...By the end of June, most of Nicaragua was under FSLN
control, with the exception of the capital...By the second week of July, President So-
moza had agreed to resign and hand over power to Francisco Maliano Urcuyo, who
would in turn transfer the government to the Revolutionary Junta. According to the
agreement, a cease-fire would follow, and defense responsibilities would be shared by
elements of the National Guard and the FSLN. On July 17, 1979, Somoza Debayle
resigned, handed over power to Urcuyo, and fled to Miami. The former Nicaraguan
dictator then established residence in Paraguay, where he lived until September 1980,
when he was murdered... After President Somoza left Nicaragua in 1979, many mem-
bers of the National Guard also fled the country, seeking asylum in neighboring coun-
tries, particularly in Honduras and Guatemala. Others turned themselves in to the
new authorities after the FSLN took power, on promises of amnesty. They were sub-
sequently tried and many served jail terms. The five-member junta arrived in the city
of Leon on July 18, a day after Somoza’s departure from the capital. Urcuyo tried
to ignore the agreement transferring power, but in less than two days, domestic and
international pressure drove him to exile in Guatemala. On July 19, the FSLN army
entered Managua, ending the Nicaraguan revolution” (Brás 1994, 32-38).
Coding rationale: Among major coup datasets, only Luttwak includes this event as a
coup, though even he notes that the main party was a “rebel army faction.” Because
the FSLN was a rebel group fighting a civil war, and we find no evidence that current
active members of the military participated in Somoza Debayle’s ouster, we code this
event as a case of prior defection.
• # 93-1980-11-17: Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed non-military coup plot - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP; no
evidence - PT; Archigos codes Ortega as the leader of Nicaragua from July 18, 1979,
to April 25, 1990; GWF code party regime (Nicaragua 79-90) under the Sandinistas
from July 17, 1979 until February 25, 1990.
Event: On Tuesday, November 17, 1980, the Nicaraguan government announced that
security forces had discovered a counterrevolutionary plot allegedly involving prominent
businessmen and exiled former members of Somoza’s National Guard to overthrow the
Sandinista regime, which had taken power by force the previous July. They announced
the arrest of some businessmen and further alleged that Jorge Salazar Arguello, the
president of the Nicaraguan Coffee Grower’s Association, resisted arrest and was killed
160
by security forces in a shootout (J. d. Onis 1980). According to the official version,
Salazar was meeting with an Interior Ministry official, Ernesto Montada, at a gas
station in El Crucero when security agents surprised them. Although Salazar was
unarmed, after Montada allegedly pulled a pistol and fired at the agents, an agent
returned fire and accidentally killed Salazar rather than Montada. Salazar was shot
seven times. Later, it was claimed six automatic rifles were found in the back of
Salazar’s car, allegedly to be used in their planned coup.
On November 22, chief of state security Lenin Cerna claimed that three alleged conspir-
ators confessed to working with Salazar to get arms and recruit for a coup. Leonardo
Somarriba, an influential businessman, allegedly confessed that he and Salazar “ar-
ranged meetings with some of Somoza’s former commanders as well as with the foreign
minister of El Salvador, Fidel Chavez Mena, and Salvadoran junta member Jaime Ab-
dul Gutierrez in unsuccessful attempts to generate support for a coup. The attempt
would have included an invasion by pro-Somoza exiles and an internal uprising, Cerna
said” (Dickey 1980). Other moderate businessmen arrested for their role in the plot
included Mario Hanon Talavera, president of the National Rice Producers Association
(Kinzer 1980). According to Cerna, an investigation of Salazar began, because when
the defector Bernardino Larios was arrested for the counter-revolutionary activity of
his Democratic Armed Forces (FAD), he said that he had cooperated with Salazar
(Managua Domestic Service 1980). According to Cerna, Salazar had charged Nestor
Moncada with recruiting members in the armed forces to form a “Sandinista Demo-
cratic Army” (EDS) which would help carry out a coup and assassinate the FSLN
National Directorate and junta (Managua Domestic Service 1980). Moncada, a mem-
ber of the armed forces, was a nephew to the plotter Dora Maria Lau de Lacay. His
involvement allegedly allowed army agents to infiltrate the plot (Radio Sandino 1980a),
with his friend Commander Alvaro Baltadano informing on plotters’ activity (Radio
Sandino 1980b).
Private sector leaders were resentful of the allegations and called Salazar’s killing “a
political crime” (Dickey 1980), arguing that he could have been taken alive even if
he had been plotting (Riding 1980). In response, the Government imposed a news
blackout on the coup Keesing’s World News Archive (1981). Reynaldo Hernandez,
president of the Chamber of Commerce, cast doubt on the allegations that Salazar
had joined forces with Somoza loyalists, pointing to his record as a longtime opponent
of Somoza (Associated Press 1980c). Some independent observers suggested that the
election of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president had prompted a Sandinista crackdown on
opponents (Kinzer 1980). On December 11, eight people, mainly businessmen, were
convicted for plotting against the junta and given prison sentences up to nine years.
According to the judge, the men had med frequently met to plot and finance a coup
attempt, “which they were unable to execute because they were discovered by state
security authorities” (Radio Corporacion 1980).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we assume that there was a civilian-led plot
against the regime in November 1980 (including one member of the armed forces,
Moncada), which was preempted before it could be attempted. We therefore code a
161
coup plot. STAGED.
• # 93-1991-10-4: Nicaragua, Violeta Chamorro

Category: not exist
WHIV; Archigos codes Violeta Chamorro as the leader of Nicaragua from April 25,
1990, until January 10, 1997; GWF code a democracy (Nicaragua 90-NA) since April
26, 1990.
Event: N/A.
Coding rationale: Among major prior datasets, only WHIV codes this event as a coup.
We can find no evidence of a coup attempt on this date in either Proquest database
or a general internet search.
• # 93-2005-9-9: Nicaragua, Enrique Bolaños

Category: legal
Luttwak; Archigos codes Enrique Bolanos as the leader of Nicaragua from January 11,
2002, until January 10, 2007; GWF code a democracy (Nicaragua 90-NA) since April
26, 1990.
Event: In the summer of 2005, the National Assembly, which by then was under the
control of opposition forces of the Liberal Party, passed a law taking away authority of
President Enrique Bolaños over government ministries. In September, the Sandinistas
led by Daniel Ortega stripped several top presidential aides of their immunity. The
moves by the legislature and courts – which charged campaign finance irregularities
in the 2002 elections in which Bolaños defeated Ortega – seemed design to unseat the
president. Late in the month, the courts released ex-president Arnoldo Alemán from
house arrest; he had been serving a 20-year sentence since 2002 for embezzling $100
million from the state. Bolaños, previously the vice president under Aleman, tried to
rally support, saying he was the victim of a “rolling coup d’état. On October 4, 2005,
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick went to Nicaragua in a bid to rally
support for President Enrique Bolaños against what he called a “creeping coup” by
the Ortega-Alemán alliance. The United States threatened to withhold foreign aid if
the “corrupt pacto” managed to take power (Brinkley 2005a). The Ortega-Alemán
backed off threats to impeach Bolaños (New York Times 2005). Bolaños managed to
stay in office through the next elections that were held in November 2006, though with
Sandinistas in control of the national electoral commission, electoral manipulation was
feared (Brinkley 2005b).
Coding rationale: Among major prior datasets, only Luttwak codes this event as a
coup. Luttwak codes the main party as a “political faction.” We find no evidence
of a coup attempt on these dates. The moves of the courts and legislature – though
politically motivated – do not seem to amount to unconstitutional actions. We thus
162
code this event as “legal.” To the extent the actions fell short of directly ousting the
President, but only circumscribing his authority, a coding of “not regime leader” is
also possible. Evem of the legislative or judicial moves in September 2005 constitute a
coup attempt, they did not involve any actions by military actors.
163
2.1.10 94: Costa Rica
Table 10: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Costa Rica

94-1948-3-13 Costa Rica 48-48 (new) Picado Michalski, Teodoro prior defection
94-1948-12-11 Costa Rica 48-49 Figueres Ferrer, José prior defection
94-1949-4-2 Costa Rica 48-49 Figueres Ferrer, José Reshuffle Coup (F)
94-1955-1-11 Costa Rica 49-NA Figueres Ferrer, José prior defection
• # 94-1948-3-13: Costa Rica, Teodoro Picado Michalski

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; failed coup attempt - Singh; Archigos
codes as the leader of Costa Rica from May 8, 1944, until being removed on April 20,
1948, through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code
the collapse of democracy (Costa Rica 19-48) on March 1, 1948, and the beginning of
a personal regime (Costa Rica 38-49) on May 8, 1948.
Event: After Congress annulled presidential elections on March 1, 1948, a political crisis
raged between the supporters of Otilio Ulate, the opposition candidate and declared
winner (according to the electoral tribunal on February 28), and those of the defeated
regime candidate, Rafael Calderon Guardia. When the government briefly arrested
Ulate, Colonel Jose “Pepe” Figueres Ferrer, an Ulate supporter, fled “to his farm
outside San José,” where he “planned to build a citizen army patterned after the
minutemen of the American Revolution.” Figueres “armed them with equipment he
had stockpiled since his return from exile in 1944. While Calderón and Ulate debated
in San José, Figueres trained his followers and waited for the right movement to strike...
insurgents were driven by a passion for democracy and change, not personal greed of
power” (Longley 1997, 68).
Figueres launched a civil war “on 12 March 1948 in a brilliant move by sending Max
“Tuta” Cortes and thirty men to seize the unprotected airport at San Isidro in south-
ern Costa Rica. By noon, three TACA (Central American Air Transport) planes had
landed at San Isidro and had been hijacked. Nineteen flights shuttled between San
Isidro and Guatemala to pick up the weapons used by General Rodriguez in the failed
Cayo Confites campaign and eighteen officers, including Arguello and the very experi-
enced Rodriguez (Ameringer 1996, 70). These officers and the weapons sent by Arevalo
were keys to the victory (LaFeber 1984, 102)” (Bowman 2002, 93). Though Calderon
received assistance from Nicaragua and Honduras, Figueres led pro-Ulate forces to
victory and took control of the government and established a military junta in May
1948. The United States lent passive support to the rebel cause, in part because of
unease with communists’ military role in defending the National Republican-Vanguard
coalition (Longley 1997, 63).
Coding rationale: Although Costa Rica is not included in the Geddes, Wright, and
164
Frantz (2014) data, their codebook notes that “[t]he prior elected government had
“authoritarianized” in March 1948 when it annulled an election won by the opposition,
but it is not included in the data set because it did not last through Jan 1.” Whether
or not one considers this event a coup attempt or a case of prior defection depends on
whether the rebel forces included current and active members of the military at the
beginning of the civil war in March 1948. The evidence indicates that the rebel force
included prior defectors, but not current and active members of the military. For ex-
ample, “seven exiled Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Dominican military officers boarded
the planes for the return flight [from Guatemala]. As the fighting escalated, Figueres
was joined by additional mercenaries and idealists, a group labeled the Caribbean Le-
gion by journalists.” By the end of March, Figueres had over 700 men organized in his
civilian army (Longley 1997, 69). We therefore code the start of the 1948 Costa Rican
civil as a case of prior defection.
• # 94-1948-12-11: Costa Rica, José Figueres Ferrer

Other Datasets: failed dissident action and foreign coup - CCD; failed coup attempt
- CSP; not a candidate - Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Figueres Ferrer as leader of
Costa Rica from May 8, 1948, to November 8, 1949; GWF codes a personal regime
(Costa Rica 48-49) from May 8, 1948, to November 8, 1949.
Event: From March-April 1948, Costa Rica was wracked by a civil war between the
supporters of Otilio Ulate, the winner of the presidential elections in March, and those
of his defeated rival, Rafael Calderon Guardia. Colonel José “Pepe” Figueres Ferrer
led pro-Ulate forces to victory and took control of the government and established a
military junta in May 1948. On December 1, 1948, Figueres declared his intention to
dissolve the army. On December 8, the junta held elections for a constituent assembly
leading to drafting a new constitution. Calderon sought to seize on these developments
as auspicious for being able to spark an armed uprising (Bowman 2002, 111-112).
Somoza had given Calderonistas a secure base in Nicaragua. “The first test of Costa
Rican demilitarization came only ten days after the policy had been announced. On
December 12, 1948 a force of 800 men invaded Costa Rica from Nicaragua. They were
supporters of Calderon Guardia and called for a popular uprising against the Figueres
junta. The population did not respond, and the invasion got stuck a few kilometers
from the border. The forces from the civil war were still under arms, and as they were
willing to support the junta, the military danger was small... the whole affair ended
with the retreat of the invasion force into Nicaragua and a formal peace agreement
between the two countries” (Høivik and Aas 1981, 334-339).
Coding rationale: Although Figueres had recently announced a policy of disbanding
the army, this event appears to have been organized and led by prior defectors from
Nicaragua (United Press 1948b, 1948c). No internal uprising occurred, in part because
communists refused to support a bid sponsored by Somoza, and Ulate or Figueres’
supporters would only act if the invasion made progress (Bowman 2002, 112). Because
we find no evidence that current active members of the military helped plan or execute
165
the invasion, we code this event as a case of prior defection.

and Svolik code Figueres Ferrer as leader of Costa Rica from May 8, 1948, to November
8, 1949; GWF codes a personal regime (Costa Rica 48-49) from May 8, 1948, to
November 8, 1949. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in El
Salvador from 1946 to 1994.
Event: According to Bowman (2002, 113), “The military, however, would have its swan
song, an uprising on 2 April 1949 known as the Cardonazo. This was a very serious
attempt that ended with nine dead and thirty wounded. The plotters controlled the
majestic Bella Vista Fort, and gave a short list of demands that included a revocation
of the bank nationalization and the 10 percent tax and a purge of the leftist ministers
Martén and Núnez from the junta (La Nación, 2 April 1949). One of the grand old
names in Costa Rican politics, General Jorge Volio, hurriedly sent a message to coup
leader Cardona that he could send a large group of men to help overthrow Figueres
if Cardona would merely provide them with arms. “Volio did not request anything
in exchange for the help. What he wanted, with all his heart, was to get rid of the
governing junta and seek, perhaps, the possibility of a return to the past with Calderon
Guardia and with Picado” (Villegas Hoffineister 1986). Guillermo Villegas Hoffineister
investigated the Cardonazo for fifteen years and has concluded that the coup would
have succeeded except that the young warrior Frank Marshall betrayed his friends and
co-conspirators and saved Figueres.”
The “Junta’s Minister of Public Security, Edgard Cardona, attempted a coup on April
2 [1949]. Cardona had demanded that his friend, Max “Tuta” Cortés, be named direc-
tor of police but Figueres refused and, furthermore, asked for the resignation of Max’s
brother, Fernando, as commander of the Artillery Barracks. During the coup Cardona
asked for the reversal of two Junta decisions: Nationalization of banks and a one-time
10% tax on capital; Further he wanted the Minister of Economy and Commerce, Al-
berto Marten Chavarria, and the Minister of Labor, Father Benjamin Nunez Vargas,
to resign. Cardona and the Cortés brothers had been among the ‘original seven’ who
went into the hills with Figueres. The coup therefore reflected a power struggle within
the Junta, between the modernizers Martén and Nunez and the conservatives repre-
sented by Cardona and certain military chiefs. Because Figueres rapidly mobilized
loyal forces and volunteers, and Ulate refused to accept the offer of taking power, the
attempt failed” (Høivik and Aas 1981, 343).
Coding rationale: Although Figueres had announced his policy of disbanding the army
in December 1948, the military was only formally abolished when Article 12 of the
Costa Rican Constitution was adopted in November 1949. We therefore would not
dismiss military coup attempts as prior defections at this time.
“There were many individuals involved in the attempted coup and perhaps more than
166
one motive.” Bowman (2002, 114-115) goes on to explain at length that it is hard
to believe that “a group would attempt a coup merely over the naming of the police
chief. There were many other more important reasons. Cardona denies that the “Tuta”
affair was the major cause, instead charging that Padre Nunez, the labor minister, and
Marten were leftists and too brash (1992, chapter 11; interview 20 December 1997).
Villegas argues in the definitive study that the two principal reasons for the Cardonazo
were the 10 percent tax and the perceived communism of Martén and Núñez (1986,
37-38). Miguel Ruiz Herrera seems to have been the intellectual author of the golpe...
Ruiz himself served as a director of intelligence for the Army of National Liberation
but withdrew his support for Figueres over the nationalization of the banks and spent
three decades trying to overthrow him. Ruiz is adamant that the coup occurred for one
reason, the decrees targeting capital.” We therefore find no evidence that the plotters
sought to prevent ethnic narrowing or empower an opposition party. We therefore code
this event as a failed leader reshuffling coup driven by policy grievances.

Other Datasets: failed non-military coup and forced resignation - CCD; rebellion - PT;
failed coup attempt - CSP; not a candidate - Singh; Archigos codes Figueres Ferrer
as the leader of Costa Rica from November 8, 1953, until May 8, 1958; GWF code a
democracy (Costa Rica 49-NA) since April 26, 1949.
Event: “During 1954 an exile army of a few hundred Costa Ricans who supported
Calderon Guardia was trained in Guatemala and Nicaragua. Somoza obtained a
number of fighter aircrafts from Sweden and received military transport planes from
Venezuela” (Høivik and Aas 1981, 344). “The United States’ role in the training and
preparation of the rebel forces” of 300-500 counter-revolutionaries “is not fully known.
The United States Ambassador to Nicaragua, Tom Whelan, toured the rebel training
area in Coyutepe and reviewed the troops that were preparing to invade Costa Rica
(Ameringer 1989, 238). Whelan was a close friend of Somoza and Sumner Welles and
sympathetic to the Calderón cause (Acufia 1977, 35). Costa Rican authors claim that
the CIA was actively involved in preparing the invasion; they termed the invasion
against Guatemala ”Plan G” and that against Figueres ”Plan C” (Acufia 1977, 39;
Vargas Araya 1993, 140-43).” Others argue simply that the CIA had prior knowledge
of the attack, even if they did not aid it (Bowman 2002, 128-129).
“On January 11, 1955, the exiles crossed the border, while airplanes bombed several
Costa Rican cities. The intention was to overthrow the Figueres regime, in the same
way as Arbenz had been ousted in Guatemala” (Høivik and Aas 1981, 344). Miguel
Ruiz Herrera, Carlos Tinoco Castro, and various others started the way by capturing
the small Costa Rican city of Ciudad Quesada. The next day the other rebels invaded
from Nicaragua (La Nación, 12 and 13 January 1955). Figueres had used a very
successful propaganda ploy since 1954–a well-armed dictatorship against a defenseless
democracy” (Bowman 2002, 129-130). In the event, the “invasion by land did not
penetrate far beyond the border” and “the United States was not willing to support
167
the extreme right” as “Figueres had not moved towards socialism or communism”
(Høivik and Aas 1981, 344).
“The Organization of American States was called in,” and a security zone was set up
on both sides of the border so that the invaders could withdraw safely” (344). Without
a significant military, “The key for Costa Rica was invoking the nonagression pact of
the Rio Treaty that required the conflict to be characterized as an aggression of one
country against another. Both sides knew that. The opposition tried to demonstrate
with the seizure of Ciudad Quesada that this was an internal affair. Figueres and
his lobbyists tried fiercely to portray the war as an invasion from Nicaragua. Costa
Rica immediately asked for intervention from the OAS and combat airplanes for self-
defense (La Nación, 16 January 1955). The OAS sided with Costa Rica, invoked the
Rio Treaty, and requested that the United States provide four P-51s for Costa Rica,
which the United States sold for $1 each to the beleaguered country. Commercial pilots
were given a crash-course in flying the prop-driven warplanes and by January 17, army-
less Costa Rica had an air force flying sorties against the aggressors. “The new aerial
presence was pivotal, and within a week the rebel pilots surrendered to Nicaraguan
officials” ” (Bowman 2002, 129-130). Sergeant Roberto Valdeperas Escalante “was a
soldier during the Calderonista invasion in 1955 and died during an ambush on 21
January 1955” (Diaz-Arias, Hurtado, and Hernández 2018, 265). “After a few weeks,
the military part of the conflict was over” (Høivik and Aas 1981, 344).
Coding rationale: Among major prior datasets, only Luttwak codes this event as a
coup. Luttwak codes the main party as a “political faction.” However, evidence
implicates prior defectors who were trained outside the country and re-entered as an
invasion force. There is no evidence that current, active members of the security forces
participated in the invasion. We therefore code this event as a case of prior defection.
168
2.1.11 95: Panama
Table 11: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Panama

95-1948-10-1 Panama 45-49 Jimenez, Enrique Adolfo legal

95-1949-11-20 Panama 45-49 Chanis Pinzón, Daniel combined
95-1949-11-24 Panama 45-49 Chiari, Roberto Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
95-1951-5-7 Panama 49-51 Arias, Arnulfo Autogolpe (F)
95-1951-5-10 Panama 49-51 Arias, Arnulfo Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
95-1955-1-2 Panama 53-55 Remón, José Antonio assassination
95-1959-4-19 Panama 55-68 Guardia Jr., E. prior defection
95-1962-9-15 Panama 55-68 Chiari, Roberto prior defection
95-1968-10-11 Panama 55-68 Arias, Arnulfo Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
95-1969-3-13 Panama 68-82 Torrijos, Omar Autogolpe (S)
95-1969-12-14 Panama 68-82 Torrijos, Omar Reshuffle Coup (F)
95-1969-12-16 Panama 68-82 Torrijos, Omar combined
95-1982-3-3 Panama 68-82 Flores Aguilar, Florencio Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
95-1982-7-30 Panama 82-89 Paredes, Rubén Darı́o Autogolpe (S)
95-1984-2-13 Panama 82-89 Noriega, Manuel Autogolpe (S)
95-1985-9-25 Panama 82-89 Noriega, Manuel Reshuffle Coup (F)
95-1989-12-20 Panama 82-89 Noriega, Manuel foreign
95-1990-12-5 Panama 89-NA Endara, Guillermo mutiny
95-1995-1-11 Panama 89-NA Perez Balladares, Ernesto coup plot
• # 95-1948-10-1: Panama, Enrique Adolfo Jimenez

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; Archigos codes Jimenez as
exiting on this date through “irregular” means by other government actors without
foreign support; GWF codes a democracy (Panama 45-49) from January 1, 1946, until
November 20, 1949.
Event: Arango Enrique Adolfo Jiménez was provisional head of state from June 15,
1945 (Thomas M. Leonard 2015, 308). “Between 1948 and 1952, National Police Com-
mander Jose Antonio Remón installed and removed presidents with unencumbered
ease. Among his behind-the-scenes manipulations were the denial to Arnulfo Arias of
the presidency he apparently had won in 1948” (Black and Flores 1989, 34). The May
1948 elections “pitted former president Arnulfo Arias against the Liberal, Domingo
Diaz Arosemena, in an extremely close contest. The National Police were deployed,
reputedly to monitor the elections, but their presence was really a calculated maneu-
ver to influence the election’s outcome against Arias. Though Arias received a slim
winning margin of 1,500 votes, he was not allowed to take office. Driven by street
rioting and an intense personal hatred of Arias, the head of the National Police, José
169
Remón, made enough votes disappear to allow Diaz to edge out a win” (Harding 2006,
48). Unofficial returns gave Arias a narrow victory (Calhoun 1948c). Nevertheless,
“Domingo Diaz Arosemena was declared the victor over Arnulfo Arias, although Arias
received a majority of the votes. Arias’s supporters protested against the results”
(Lentz 1994, 615). On July 4, following clashes between police and Arias supporters,
President Jiménez declared a state of siege. Arnulfo Arias fled into the Canal Zone
(Calhoun 1948d). “Arias fled for Costa Rica, from where he tried, unsuccessfully, to
mount an invasion of Panama” (Harding 2006, 48).
On July 12, 1948, the National Assembly voted 26-25 to depose Jiménez as president
and installed the Controller General, Enrique Obarrio, in his place, to serve until
1952, thereby annulling the recent elections (reportedly in an effort to deny Arias the
presidency). Obarrio was the brother-in-law of Col. José Remón. But Jiménez insisted
the assembly lacked the legal standing to depose him, as it had earlier divested itself as
a Constitutional Congress (Calhoun 1948c). The congressional effort collapsed the next
day (Calhoun 1948b). Jiménez “remained in office with the support of Colonel José
Remón” (Lentz 1994, 615). On August 7, 1948, the national electoral jury proclaimed
Domingo Diaz Arosemena the winner of the elections, with the final vote tally 78,212
to 75,848 for Arnulfo Arias (Chicago Tribune 1948). On October 1, Diaz Arosemena
was sworn in as President. Daniel Chanis became First Vice President and Roberto
Chiari Second Vice President (Calhoun 1948a).
Coding rationale: There is no evidence of a coup attempt on this date. However,
there is some evidence that Arosemena’s electoral victory was fraudulent. The “fraud
was unacceptable to a modern sector of the bourgeoisie closely tied to an emerging
industrial class. To this sector, fraud and corruption was not conductive to political
stability, and, thus, not helpful to the maintenance of power” (O. Pérez 2011, 42). To
the extent that Col. Remon took concrete actions to deny Arias from winning the
elections, then this would qualify as an “electoral coup” carried out by current and
active members of the security forces (namely the police). However, those actions were
taken well before inauguration day on October 1. Because we do not have evidence
of concrete actions and it is impossible to know who really won the elections, we code
the transition as “legal,” consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), who only
code the initiation of an autocratic regime in November 1949.
• # 95-1949-11-20: Panama, Roberto Chiari

Category: combined
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD; successful coup - CSP, Luttwak, PT, and
Singh; successful coup - Fossum; Archigos codes Roberto Chiari as exiting on this date
through “regular” means; Svolik codes Chiari as exiting as an “interim” ruler on this
date; GWF codes the collapse of democracy (Panama 45-49) on November 20, 1949,
and its replacement with a personal regime (Panama 49-51) from November 24, 1949,
until May 10, 1951.
Event: “A temporary shift in power from the civilian aristocracy to the National Police
occurred immediately after World War II. Between 1948 and 1952, National Police
170
Commander Jose Antonio Remón installed and removed presidents with unencumbered
ease. Among his behind-the-scenes manipulations were the denial to Arnulfo Arias of
the presidency he apparently had won in 1948” and “the installation of Arias in the
presidency in 1949” (Black and Flores 1989, 34). With Diaz Arosemana extremely ill,
on July 28, 1949, Vice President Daniel Chanis was sworn in as provisional president
by the supreme court (New York Times 1949a). On August 25, after Diaz Arosemana
died, Daniel Chanis announced a new cabinet (New York Times 1949e). Dı́az’s sudden
death “pitted two sectors of the bourgeoisie against each other. As part of the conflict,
leaders of the Patriotic Front insisted that Arnulfo Arias, the “loser” of the 1948
elections, be restored to power.” Chanis “attempted to defuse the crisis by asking for
the resignation of the top police commanders” (O. Pérez 2011, 42).
Under pressure from the opposition, President Chanis “tried to break up Remón’s lu-
crative cattle-slaughtering monopoly” (Harding 2006, 48). At first, Chanis“ refused
to purge the Supreme Court for its decision against a business controlled” by Colonel
Remón, infuriating the police chief (Thomas M Leonard 2004, 73). On Saturday,
November 19, President Chanis arrested Col. Remón and two top aides – Lt. Col.
Bolivar Vallarino and Maj. Saturnino Flores – over “monopoly actions” (Calhoun
1949a). Specifically, Chanis reportedly ordered Col. Remón’s resignation because po-
lice failed “to carry out the decision of the Supreme Court holding unconstitutional”
the President Diaz’s decree “restricting the slaughter of cattle for local consumption”
(New York Times 1949f). Police also refused to allow unrestricted operation of pas-
senger buses, which they profited from. Chanis appointed Colonel Rogelio Fabrega to
replace Remón as police chief, and replaced his aides with Majors Oscar Ocana and
Manuel Palau (Calhoun 1949a). In response, upwards of 2,000 police surrounded the
presidential palace in what Chanis called “an act of rebellion.” Col. Remón issued
an ultimatum for Chanis to resign by 2 a.m. on November 20 or the police would
attack the palace (New York Times 1949f). Before the deadline, Chanis relented, and
following mediation of foreign embassies, resigned. Later that morning, Vice President
Roberto F. Chiari was sworn in as President, though Col. Remón was said to have
emerged as Panama’s “strong man” (Calhoun 1949a).
Roberto Chiari, Chaniz’s constitutional successor, was Remón’s cousin, yet his “blood-
line was not sufficient to protect him” (Harding 2006, 48) as the constitutional crisis
persisted for another week. On November 21, two cabinet ministers resigned in protest
because Remón remained in his command (Associated Press 1949o). On November 22,
Chanis withdrew his resignation, which he said was made under duress and to avoid
bloodshed, in front of an approving National Assembly and subsequently led a march
of protesters on the presidential palace. The crowds were dispersed after police fired
on protesters (New York Times 1949h). On November 23, Chiari said that Chanis’
resignation was “irrevocable” and that “I cannot accept tardy rectifications.” Police
attacked students at the National University, which had planned an anti-coup protest.
The faculty declared that they would cancel classes until the police commanders were
gone and “government by force” ceased. Chanis appealed to the Supreme Court to
decide whether he was still the constitutional president (Calhoun 1949c).
On November 24, in response to Chiari’s request for an opinion on who was the con-
171
stitutional president, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Chanis. Upon hearing the
ruling, Chiari “resigned immediately and went home,” leaving the presidency vacant.
Then “Colonel Remón went to the home” of Arnulfo Arias and recruited him to the
presidency, believing he could unify the country. Within an hour, Arnulfo Arias was
sworn in as president. The area around the presidential palace, which had previously
been cordoned off by police, was re-opened for pro-Arias supporters on the orders of
Col. Remón. In one of its first acts, the Arias government called the National Election
Jury into session to reconsider the 1948 election results (Calhoun 1949d). Remón now
was “claiming the results had been fraudulently obtained” and ordered a recount. “To
no one’s surprise, the recount gave the victory to Arnulfo Arias” (O. Pérez 2011, 42).
On November 26, former President Enrique Jimenez, Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia,
and Daniel Chanis all left Panama for asylum in the Canal Zone (Calhoun 1949b).
That day, Arias announced that he had received the resignations of Colonel Remón.
The new president reportedly threatened to withdraw from the presidency if he and
his two aides – whose attempted dismissal the week before by Chanis had initiated the
unrest – did not resign (United Press 1949k). However, that announcement appeared
designed in part to gain recognition of foreign governments. Their resignations were not
accepted and Remón retained his command of the police (Calhoun 1949b). A general
strike that had been called by the faculty of the National University collapsed by on
November 29, when business returned to normal (New York Times 1949g). Remón
eventually engineered Arias’ ouster in 1951.
Coding rationale: Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we combine this
event and subsequent installation of Arias in the presidency as a single anti-democratic
coup. Although the first post-Chanis president that Colonel Remón installed remained
in office for less than a week (four days, with Chiari resigning on November 24), Chiari’s
resignation appears to have been voluntary and Arias was Remón’s choice to succeed
him. Thus, over the course of four days, Col. Remón forced Chanis’ ouster. The
secondary “coup-within-a-coup” on November 24 prevented Chanis from re-assuming
power and thus ensured the success of the primary coup on November 20. We code the
success of the coup with the latter date, November 24, because it was only at this time
that Chanis was definitively barred from continuing in office. During the November
20-24 period, the National Assembly and then the Supreme Court recognized Chanis
as the constitutional president (even though de facto power lay in the hands of Chiari
and ultimately his guarantor, Remón). For a brief time between Chiari’s resignation
and Arias’ installation on November 24, the de facto presidency was vacant.
• # 95-1949-11-24: Panama, Roberto Chaniz Pinzon

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; successful coup - Fossum;
Archigos codes Chaniz Pinzon as leader from November 20, 1949, until exiting on this
date through “regular” means; GWF codes the collapse of democracy on November 20,
1949, and its replacement with a personal regime (Panama 49-51) from November 24,
1949, until May 10, 1951. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group
172
in Panama from 1946 to 1997.
Event: See 95-1949-11-20.
Coding rationale: See 95-1949-11-20.
• # 95-1951-5-7: Panama, Arnulfo Arias

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP and Singh; auto-
golpe - PT; Archigos codes Arias as leader from November 25, 1949, to May 10, 1951;
Svolik does not code a leader from November 25, 1949, to May 10, 1951, even though
he considers Panama a dictatorship from 1946-1952; GWF codes a personal regime
(Panama 49-51) from November 24, 1949, until May 10, 1951.
Event: On the night of Monday, May 7, 1951, in the midst of a bank run, President
Arnulfo Arias announced by radio that he had assumed dictatorial powers to com-
bat the threat of communism to the country and the Panama Canal. He dissolved
parliament, suspended the 1946 constitution, issued an executive order to restore the
more authoritarian 1941 constitution, and announced he would rule by decree until
new elections (United Press 1951b; Calhoun 1951d). On May 8, widespread demon-
strations and a general strike occurred and called on Col. José Remón, the police chief,
to defend the 1946 constitution. The Supreme Court issued a protest of Arnias’ action
as paving the road toward dictatorship (Calhoun 1951e). Arnias was ousted by May 9
(see 95-1951-5-10 below).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code Arnias’ actions on May 7 as an
autogolpe attempt that targeted the national legislature. It failed, though we code
Arias’ ouster on May 9 as a distinct event, as his autogolpe attempt could have been
defeated without necessarily removing Arias from office.

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; palace coup and forced resignation
involving other security forces; forced leadership change not considered coup détat
(resignation of executive due to poor performance/loss of legitimacy) - CSP; successful
coup - PT; not a candidate - Singh; Archigos codes Arias as being removed on this
date through “regular” means. Svolik does not code a leader between November 25,
1949, and May 10, 1951, despite his coding of Panama as a dictatorship from 1946 to
1952; GWF code the collapse of a personal regime (Panama 49-51) on this date in a
military coup. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Panama
from 1946 to 1997.
Event: On May 7, President Arias attempted a self-coup (see 95-1951-5-7). This only
heightened the political crisis. On May 8, Colonel Rémon informed Arias that his
national guard favored keeping the 1946 constitution. But Arias brought in armed
road workers to repress protestors, leading to riots. A general strike also paralyzed
173
the city. “The police were obviously on the side of the people. While they did not
attack the Government forces directly, it was easy to see that their sympathies were
with the opposition.” By May 9, the National Assembly met in special session and
voted for Arias’ impeachment, and asked the Supreme Court to order Arias’ arrest.
Clashes broke out between armed Arnulfistas outside the Patriotic Front headquarters
and unarmed opposition “Fronters.” Police intervened on behalf of the latter. At
11:40 p.m. on May 9, First Vice President Alcibiades Arosemena was sworn in as
president by the national assembly. Meanwhile, Arias was held a virtual prisoner in
the presidential palace under guard (Calhoun 1951b).
On May 10, 1951, the general strike continued. At 11:45 a.m., the Supreme Court
announced that it had upheld the National Assembly’s action the previous night as
legal. Around noon, Arosemena and a crowd left the court for the police station, where
his authority was recognized. By about 1 p.m., Major Lescano Gomez, head of the
palace guard, and Lt. Juan Flores, of the national police were shot and killed by snipers
as they ascended stairs at the presidential palace. Clashes between pro-Arias police on
the second floor and regular police who occupied the first floor of the palace continued.
By 2 p.m., police armed with rifles poured out of the station to attack the presidential
palace to the cheers of crowds outside. Police outside the station began firing in the
air to clear the street. By the evening, Arias surrendered and was arrested. At least 40
people had been wounded and three killed in the unrest of the day (Calhoun 1951a).
By the morning of May 11, the general strike was called off and people returned to
work hopeful. That afternoon, offices and buildings closed again to mark the state
funerals that were held for Maj. Gomez and Lt. Flores (Calhoun 1951c). On May
15, the national assembly voted to begin the trial to be conducted itself for deposed
president Arias on May 25. That day, Ecuador became the first foreign government to
recognize the new government (New York Times 1951b).
Coding rationale: According to Black and Flores (1989, 34), “Between 1948 and 1952,
National Police Commander Jose Antonio Remon installed and removed presidents
with unencumbered ease. Among his behind-the-scenes manipulations were the denial
to Arnulfo Arias of the presidency he apparently had won in 1948, the installation of
Arias in the presidency in 1949, and the engineering of Arias ’s removal from office in
1951.” Similarly, according to Feldman (1988, 110), “A violent clash between support-
ers of President Arias, who sought to develop a populist, nationalistic movement which
would ethnically “purify” Panama–the so-called “Panamanismo” movement–National
Police, led to a coup. After the armed forces engineered Arias overthrow for a second
time they catapulted José Antonio Remón the presidency two years later.” According
to Lentz (1994, 617), Arnias “was ousted in a coup led by the National Guard on May
10, 1951.” His actual ouster appears to have occurred on May 9. Consistent with
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event as a successful regime change
coup. Despite the Supreme Court ruling of a legal transfer to Arosemena, Arias’ ouster
was highly “irregular.”
• # 95-1955-1-2: Panama, José Antonio Remón Cantero
174
Category: assassination
Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; not a candidate - CCD and Singh; failed coup
attempt - CSP; assassination - PT; Archigos codes Cantero as the leader of Panama
from October 1, 1952, until his assassination by an unsupported individual on January
2, 1955; GWF code the collapse of a personal regime (Panama 53-55) on this date by
non-military regime insiders.
Event: At 8 p.m. on January 2, 1955, President José Antonio Remón died in an attack
by unidentified assailants armed with machine-guns while he was at the Juan Franco
racetrack outside Panama City (New York Times 1955o). No other disturbances were
reported in either the Capital or elsewhere in the country afterwards. On January 3,
the assassins were still at large and police “admitted they had no hard clues” about
their identity or motives (New York Times 1955l). By January 4, diplomats “had no
hard information about the possible motive behind the shooting,” with no organized
opposition to the regime, a growing economy, and a newly negotiated Panama Canal
Treaty with the United States. These officials said there was no indication the killing
was “part of a movement to overturn the Government or to upset the policies of his
regime” (New York Times 1955p).
Former president Arias of the Opposition party was initially suspected and held for
questioning. On January 5, two U.S. citizens, including Irving Martin Lipstein and Roy
Bettis, were arrested in connection with the investigation (Paul P. Kennedy 1955a).
On January 7, Carlos and Ruben Miro, a lawyer and gun merchant, were arrested (New
York Times 1955m). On January 14, National Guard police surrounded President José
Ramón Guizado’s home and put him under house arrest (New York Times 1955n). On
January 15, Guizado was impeached by the National Assembly for complicity, and he
was replaced by Vice President Ricardo Arias. Ruben Miro had allegedly confessed to
shooting the president and implicated Guizado and his business partner, Rodolfo Saint
Malo, in a plot. Miro said in the confession read to the Assembly that “Guizado had
promised to make him Minister of Government and Justice in his new Government so
that Miro could get money to pay off heavy gambling debts” (Syndney Gruson 1955a).
Guizado denied the charges, and many observers doubted he told the whole truth. On
January 18, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case against Guizado, as requested
by his lawyers, saying the National Assembly had jurisdiction (Syndney Gruson 1955b).
The latter indicted Guizado on February 16 (New York Times 1955j). On March 21,
the National Assembly put him on trial, and his defense attorney claimed his client
was simply being targeted because his business interests differed from those currently
in power (New York Times 1955c). On March 23, Guizado reportedly admitted to
knowing about a plot to overthrow Rémon but that he paid no attention to it, as-
suming Miro was just joking (Paul P. Kennedy 1955d). On March 29, Guizado was
convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison (New York Times 1955d). That day,
Arias ascended to the presidency and completed Rémon’s term in office that ended
October 1, 1956 (Thomas M. Leonard 2015, 34).
Coding rationale: According to Black and Flores (1989, 35), the motivation for Guizado’s
“alleged act remained unclear. Some investigators believed that the impeachment of
175
Guizado was a smokescreen to distract attention from others implicated in the assas-
sination, including United States organized crime figure “Lucky” Luciano, dissident
police officers, and both Arias families. The second vice president, Ricardo Arias (of
the aristocratic Arias family), served out the remainder of the presidential term and
dismantled many of Remon’s reforms.” A CIA report declassified in 2006 revealed that
Francisco Alvarado, the District Attorney investigating the assassination, received a
statement from Eduardo Grau on March 18, 1955. In December 1954, Grau’s friend
Ruben Miro allegedly asked him if he was interested in joining a plot which would
“significantly affect the politics of the nation.” Miro said he had the support of several
high-ranking members of the Guardia Nacional, including Lt. Col. Saturnino Flores
and Major Timoteo Melendez, the number two and three in the police hierarchy, re-
spectively (Central Intelligence Agency 1955a). However, the allegations against the
GN were never substantiated. Harding (2001, 42) says Remón’s murder was “seem-
ingly due to his attempts at halting other interests from getting into the lucrative
drug-trade.” The Luciano connection only came out with the testimony of former CIA
agent Marion Cooper to a Warren Commission investigator. Cooper claimed to have
flown a United Fruit plane carrying two hit men who worked for Lucky Luciano from
Honduras on January 2 (Vierba 2013, 355).
In the most recent and by far most thorough treatment of the assassination and public
trial, Vierba (2013, xx) notes that most Panamanians believed that “scapegoats had
been indicted in order to avoid a real investigation,” and became disillusioned with
the lack of due process. Thus, “when after three years of judicial proceedings, ap-
peals, conspiracies, killings of witnesses, and sensational revelations in the press, all of
the accused were set free, the masses went out to dance in the streets.” His account
makes clear that no coup attempt beyond the assassination took place: Once the Na-
tional Guard officers realized the president had been killed, “they moved their forces
into emergency positions, preempting the possibility of a coup – which they thought a
likely scenario. When no coup materialized, they turned their attention to stabilizing
the country” (297). Miro’s allegation was called into question even before his trial
when he smuggled a letter out of jail stating that Colonel Vallarino (First Comman-
dant) and Major Pinilla, threatened to arrest his wife and son if he did not implicate
Guizado (312). That retraction letter was not made admissible during Guizado’s trial.
Guizado’s lawyers also knew that “no information that could possibly implicate the
National Guard could be used,” including Eduardo Grau’s testimony (316). Finally,
testimony from Deputy Hugo Torrijos, which hadn’t been allowed at trial, indicated
that Father Carlos Perez Herrera was informed of the plot in November 1954 and told
both Torrijos and Commandant Vallarino. The testimony therefore indicated that Miro
had been plotting well before he met with Guizado on December 18, when Guizado
allegedly convinced Miro to shoot Remón (346).
We found no conclusive evidence that this case involved any current active military
members or even sought to install a new leader, aside from the accusation by Eduardo
Grau. Had Vice President Guizado in fact been behind the assassination, as the
official narrative would have it, we would consider this a case of a non-military coup
in the absence of evidence of military involvement. Ruben Miro was a public defender,
176
Guizado was a politician, but neither was a military member. In the event, given
Guizado was later acquitted, we assume that he was not the mastermind, and thus
simply code an assassination. This coding is consistent with the assumption of a
CIA-sponsored mob hit, as in the Marion Cooper narrative, or plotting by arnulfistas.
Guizado’s defense, meanwhile, implicated an international narcotics ring in cahoots
with some alleged Panamanian government collaborators (Vierba 2013, 356). However,
in the end, the involvement of National Guard members may never be definitively
known as a result of a flawed investigation, show trial, and potential coverup. Since
there was no overt and observable military involvement, we do not code a coup attempt.
AMBIGUOUS.
• # 95-1959-4-19: Panama, Ernesto de la Guardia Jr.

Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh;
Archigos codes Guardia Jr., E. as the leader of Panama from October 1, 1956, until
October 1, 1960; GWF code a democracy (Panama 55-68) from January 3, 1955, until
October 11, 1968.
Event: On April 19, 1959, national guardsmen in Panama were reported to be searching
for a fishing yacht (Nola) carrying Roberto Arias, son of a former president and former
ambassador to Great Britain, and a cache of weapons believed to be planned to for
an attack on several National Guard garrisons (New York Times 1959m). On April
20, Dame Margot Fonteyn, Arias’ wife and a leading ballerina of Great Britain, was
arrested on suspicion of revolutionary activity (Associated Press 1959b). On April 22,
authorities displayed evidence reportedly seized from Arias’ beach cottage in Santa
Clara, including weapons and two letters which perhaps cryptically referred to a plot
planned for May 22 for Arias’ cousin, Ruben Miro, to invade (New York Times 1959d).
Meanwhile, Fonteyn was expelled from the country after being held for 30 hours and
questioned about the activities of her husband (Asbury 1959). On April 25, Arias
received asylum from the Brazilian Embassy in Panama (New York Times 1959j).
On April 26, authorities arrested three men it said were part of an armed invasion
party of 50-60 men who had sailed from Cuba on April 19 and landed April 26. The
men named Arias as their leader and local villagers claimed the invading party, mostly
Cubans, had been sent by Fidel Castro to “liberate” Panama (New York Times 1959l).
On April 28, the Organization of American States (OAS) voted to assist Panama in
suppressing a Cuban-based rebellion against Panama (Jorden 1959). On June 25, Arias
was allowed safe conduct to leave the Brazilian embassy for exile in Brazil (New York
Times 1959b). He arrived in Rio de Janeiro June 26 (New York Times 1959a). On
June 27, Arias denied masterminding a revolutionary uprising, saying that a number
of students had spontaneously taken to the jungle before the April shooting and that
“the expeditionary force of more than 90 Cubans which landed from Cuba came over
to join the fight without any prearranged plan.” Although revolutionary forces may
have seen him as their leader, he said he did not seem himself as such (Associated
Press 1959a).
177
Coding rationale: This series of events fails to qualify as a coup attempt on two
grounds. First, the invasion plot announced on April 19 appeared to have been pre-
empted before any concrete actions could be taken (aside from gun-running in prepa-
ration), so prior to April 26 this event is no more than a coup plot. Second, Arias and
his father had split with the regime a year before and he had resigned as ambassador
at that time (New York Times 1959j), making him a prior defector. Although some
Cubans and a Panamanian civilian were arrested after their invasion party landed on
April 26, there is no evidence current, active members of the military were involved.
This is thus also a case of “foreign” invasion and “prior defection.”
• # 95-1962-9-15: Panama, Roberto Chiari

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; protest - PT; failed coup
attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Roberto Chiari as the leader of Panama from
October 1, 1960, until October 1, 1964; GWF code a democracy (Panama 55-68) from
January 3, 1955, until October 11, 1968.
Event: Following student protests in prior weeks, on August 26, Major Manuel Hur-
tado, former head of the National Guard’s public order unit who only recently returned
from Costa Rica and Nicaragua, “and an armed band of rebellious guardsmen were
hiding in the mountains near Pacora” (New York Times 1962l). On August 27, the
uprising ended after loyal guardsmen were sent to ambush the rebels; Major Hurtado
surrendered; Protesting University students denied any connection with the armed up-
rising (New York Times 1962n). The student strike at Panama University ended on
September 7 (New York Times 1962k).
coup attempt. Thomas M. Leonard (2015) does not record a coup attempt in 1962.
Though Thompson codes the event in September, I assume that he is coding the rebel
uprising by recently dismissed guardsmen in late August 1962. Because we cannot find
evidence of the participation of current officers, we code this event as a case of prior
defection.

Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Arnulfo Arias as the leader of
Panama from October 1, 1968, until exiting on this date through “irregular” means
by military actors without foreign support; GWF code the collapse of a democracy
(Panama 55-68) on this date. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic
group in Panama from 1946 to 1997.
Event: Following the May 1968 elections, military officers had been considering a move
against President-elect Arnulfo Arias as early as August 1968, but decided to hold off
until after his inauguration to see if he would fail without the need to oust him (Hard-
178
ing 2001, 83). On October 1, 1968, Arnulfo Arias became president for the third time
(Zimbalist and Weeks 1991, 30). Once in office, Arias sought to establish total control.
He “eschewed his pro-U.S. stance and demanded that Panama be given immediate
jurisdiction over the Canal Zone. Arias then planned to make the National Guard less
of a danger by firing its two most senior officers, Vallarino and Colonel José Marı́a
Pinilla, and appointing the more loyal Colonel Bolı́var Urrutia,” who had been the
Third Commandant of the National Guard since 1960, “to command the force.” Val-
larino was convinced to take “a plush position in Panama’s embassy in Washington”
(Harding 2006, 66,83). Lt. Colonel Omar Torrijos, a leader of the anti-Arias forces
(Associated Press 1968i), was ordered to El Salvador as a military attaché (Crandall
2006, 182).
These moves did not stop coup plotting within the anti-Arias military. Major Boris
Martinez, Torrijos’ former deputy and the Chiriqui province military commander,
“brought the coup forward earlier than planned, partially out of fear that Torrijos
might have second thoughts. Described as impulsive and even messianic, Martı́nez
reacted prematurely by taking the western Panamanian city of David and arresting
Arias loyalists, which forced the military’s hand and impelled other conspirators to
move against Arias” (Harding 2001, 83).
On October 11, 1968, Arias was removed from the presidency by the National Guard
for a third time in a coup “supported by a broad group of officers” (Zimbalist and
Weeks 1991, 31). The coup was “carried out without a shot” (Harding 2001, 84). “In
a near-bloodless coup, Arias loyalists were arrested, including Colonel Urrutia. But
“having been forewarned, Arias himself as well as most of his ministers and 24 National
Assembly members fled into the Canal Zone. Arias’s pleas for U.S. intervention were
unheeded” (Harding 2006, 66). Colonel Torrijos said he and Major Boris Martinez were
co-leaders of the coup and they had not decided whether to establish a junta or invite
First Vice President Raúl Arango to assume the presidency (Associated Press 1968i).
But Martinez’s arguments favoring the former “won over his colleagues” (Harding 2001,
84).
On October 12, a two-man provisional junta was installed, headed by Col. José Marı́a
Pinilla Fábrega, the Second Commandant of the National Guard, and seconded by Col.
Bolivar Urrutia (Giniger 1968f). In reality, Major Martı́nez remained “the undoubted
power behind the scenes” (Conniff 2012, 125). Though the coup leaders claimed to
act to prevent a dictatorship by Arias and spoke of a new electoral law and elections,
they “dissolved the National Assembly, suspended constitutional guarantees, closed
opposition newspapers” and radio, and imposed a de facto state of siege (Giniger
1968f). The next day, a ruling cabinet was named which “included both military and
civilian members. The five civilians, including a well-known lawyer, Roberto Alemán,
were brought in for their experience and contacts in the U.S. government to assuage the
U.S. anxiety” (Harding 2006, 66). Lt. Col. Aristides Hassan became National Guard
commandant, and Lt. Col. Omar Torrijos became the National Guard Chief of Staff
(Harding 2001, 83-84). Torrijos “and Chief of Staff Boris Marténez emerged as the
apparent leaders of the new government” (Zimbalist and Weeks 1991, 31). Meanwhile,
“Pinilla, who assumed the title of president, had declared that his government was
179
provisional and that free elections were to be scheduled” (Black and Flores 1989, 44).
On October 13, Arias called on his supporters to mobilize to resist the coup and fight.
Soon after, crowds, consisting mostly of university and high school students, gathered
in support of Arias. Shooting occurred that left two guardsmen killed and one civilian
injured (New York Times 1968a). Students protested and rioted “in some of the
slum areas of Panama City. The peasants in Chiriqui Province battled guardsmen
sporadically for several months, but the National Guard retained control” (Black and
Flores 1989, 43). Most Panamanians accepted the coup, and little resistance was
reported on October 14. No general strike materialized, though high school students
milling around outside the National Institute downtown “tried to turn over a truck and
refused to go to their classes” (New York Times 1968d). Meanwhile, the United States
rebuked Arias’ call to arms and denied a request for military assistance to overthrow
the new military regime (Gwertzman 1968a). On October 16-17, doctors went on strike
against the coup, the most serious of several scattered pro-Arias strikes (United Press
International 1968a).
“During the junta’s tenure, and under the pretext of planning the restoration of consti-
tutional government, the junta ruled by decree. Civil rights were suspended, including
the silencing of opposition to the provisional government” Thomas M. Leonard 2015,
233-234. “The civilians in the government lasted only three months. They resigned
en masse, accusing the National Guard of dictatorial practices, which included the
disbandment of the National Assembly, the closure of the University of Panama for
several months, the criminalization of opposition political parties and the ransacking
of their offices, and in a few cases, the exile of prominent businessmen” (Harding 2006,
67).
• # 95-1969-3-13: Panama, Omar Torrijos Herrera

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Singh, PT;Archigos codes Torrijos Her-
rera as the leader of Panama from October 12, 1968, to July 31, 1981; GWF code a
military-personal regime (Panama 68-82) associated with Torrijos from October 11,
1968, to March 3, 1982.
Event A month after the October 1968 coup (see 95-1968-10-11), relations between
Omar Torrijos, the National Guard commandant, and fellow coup leader and “his sup-
posed equal” Boris Martinez, “turned for the worst. Torrijos and Martinez did not see
eye-to-eye” (Harding 2001, 85). “In early March 1969, on national television Martı́nez
announced a program to implement the agrarian reform legislation of 1962 and stated
that the National Guard would no longer suppress demonstrations by Panamanians,
but Martı́nez’s moment in history was brief” (Zimbalist and Weeks 1991, 31). The
speech was “radical enough to alarm landowners and entrepreneurs” (Black and Flores
1989, 44). “Within a few days, he and three of his top supporters were sent into exile,
180
with Torrijos assuming control of government” (Zimbalist and Weeks 1991, 31). In
March 1969, “In a power struggle within the ruling military junta, Lieutenant Omar
Torrijos ousts major Boris Martinez to become head of the Panamanian military and
government” Thomas M. Leonard (2015, xxxiii). Black and Flores (1989, 44) calls
this event “a coup within the coup.” “Torrijos assumed full control, and Martinez and
three of his supporters in the military government were exiled” (44). Harding (2006,
67) says that “Martı́nez was ousted from the power-sharing arrangement...Torrijos
promoted himself to the rank of brigadier general and assumed dictatorial powers, but
retained Pinilla as the ceremonial president.” “By early 1969, Torrijos had pushed
aside any potential rivals and consolidated his firm grip on power” (Crandall 2006,
182).
Coding rationale: According to Thomas M. Leonard (2015, xxxiii), the military junta
in the wake of the October 1968 coup was initially led by Major Boris Martinez. How-
ever, both Archigos and GWF code Torrijos as regime leader at this time. We therefore
code this event as a successful purge or autogolpe launched by the regime leader (Tor-
rijos) against his principal rival for power in the armed forces. As a result, “Martı́nez
was ousted from the power-sharing arrangement” (Harding 2006, 67). Had one viewed
Martı́nez as leader or co-leader, then this event would qualify as a successful reshuffling
coup.

CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Torrijos Herrera as the leader of Panama from
October 12, 1968, to July 31, 1981; GWF code a military-personal regime (Panama
68-82) associated with Torrijos from October 11, 1968, to March 3, 1982. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Panama from 1946 to 1997.
Event: After the October 11, 1968, coup ousting Arnulfo Arias, Colonel José Maria
Pinilla Fábrega “became president of the provisional government that included Major
Boris Martinez and Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos Herrera. During the junta’s
tenure, and under the pretext of planning the restoration of constitutional government,
the junta ruled by decree. Civil rights were suspended, including the silencing of
opposition to the provisional government. Subsequently, Pinilla and Martinez tired of
Torrijos’ power grabbing and attempted to oust him on 18 December 1969” (Thomas
M. Leonard 2015, 233-234).
On Saturday, December 13, 1969, National Guard Commander and junta leader, Brig.
Gen. Omar Torrijos, left Panama to attend a horse race in Mexico City with his long-
time friend Demetrio Basilio Lakas (Harding 2006, 69). On Sunday, December 14,
the assistant commander of the National Guard, Col. Ramiro Silvera, called about 80
officers to the National Guard command headquarters to announce that he was taking
command of the National Guard (J. d. Onis 1969a). While in Mexico City, “Torrijos
received an urgent message to call Panama. Torrijos was told by three National Guard
officers, Amado Sanjur, Luis Nentzen Franco, and Ramiro Silvera, that he had been
181
overthrown” (Harding 2006, 69). In a slightly different account of the call, it was
Colonels Urrutia and Pinilla who informed Torrijos “that “...we have decided that you
should not come back home again...” and offered to pay off Torrijos from the nation’s
social security account” (Harding 2001, 87).
On Monday, December 15, an official radio broadcast named Col. Silvera as the new
National Guard commander, chief of staff Col. Amado Sanjur as the new assistant
commander, and Lt. Col. Rodrigo Garcia as the new chief of staff.19 The statement,
which said “a cult of personality had no place in a revolutionary regime and that
too much power had been concentrated in the hands of one person,” was signed by
provisional president Col. José M. Pinilla and vice president Bolivar Urrutia, both
considered figureheads since Torrijos ousted Boris Martinez earlier in the year (New
York Times 1969c).
“With money borrowed from a young employee at Panama’s embassy in Mexico, Tor-
rijos and Lakas rented an air-taxi” (Harding 2006, 69). Once in El Salvador, Torrijos
“spoke over the phone with [Lieutenant Manuel] Noriega, who pledged loyalty to the
nervous leader. Noriega then instructed Torrijos to fly to the provincial city of David”
(Crandall 2006, 182). David was in Chiriqui province in western Panama, a loyal base
where Noriega had been fighting an Arias rebellion over the past year (Ciment 2015)
and where Torrijos had been garrison commander (Kempe 1990, 69). Before dawn on
Tuesday, December 16, Torrijos flew back to David and declared that “It is better to
die fighting than to live in shame” (John M. Goshko 1969a). Word spread that Torrijos
was returning to the capital, triggering a loyalist counter-coup. Two captains arrested
Silvera and Sanjur without resistance. The National Guard also put Pinilla and Urru-
tia under arrest in the presidential palace. A broadcast of the counter-coup was issued
after 8 a.m. Torrijos returned to the capital later that day and retook command of the
5,000-man National Guard (J. d. Onis 1969b).
The three coup leaders–Sanjur, Silvera, and Col. Luis Q. Nentzen Franco–went into
exile (Black and Flores 1989). Torrijos deposed Pinilla as president for not opposing
the coup attempt and replaced him with his civilian friend Demetrio Lakas (Harding
2006, 69). “Lakas, however, was simply a symbolic president, since all decision making
now rested with Torrijos” (69). Manuel Noriega was promoted to lieutenant colonel
and appointed chief of military intelligence for helping to defeat the coup attempt
(Thomas M. Leonard 2015, 205).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event is a coup attempt or autogolpe depends
on whether or not one considers the National Guard Commander Torrijos or provi-
sional President Pinilla as regime leader at this time. Had we considered Pinilla to
be the regime leader, then this event would qualify as a failed autogolpe targeting
other regime elite. However, we follow Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), who codes
Torrijos as the regime leader as of January 1, 1969. By January 1969, “Colonel Boris
Martı́nez and Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos had risen from within the ranks to
19. Rodrigo Garcia did not participate in the coup. He remained loyal to Torrijos, fled to El Salvador to
accompany him back to the country, and was promoted to colonel and deputy commander of the National
Guard by Torrijos after (John M. Goshko 1969c).
182
hold the real power” (Harding 2006, 67). Black and Flores (1989, 44) concurs, saying
that in January 1969, “power actually rested in the hands of Omar Torrijos and Boris
Martinez, commander and chief of staff, respectively, of the National Guard.” After
Torrijos ousted Martinez in March, “Torrijos promoted himself to the rank of brigadier
general and assumed dictatorial powers, but retained Pinilla as the ceremonial presi-
dent” (Harding 2006, 67).
In an interview, Col. Sanjur explained the reasons why he and Silvera decided on
a coup: “First, the junta and the cabinet had no powers. We, the National Guard,
are meant to support the mission of the junta, not one man.” Sanjur also accused
Torrijos of admitting alleged communists as members of his cabinet (News Dispatches
1969). The plotters ousted two leftist cabinet members: Labor Minister Romulo Esco-
bar Bethancourt, and Minister of the Presidency Juan Materno Vasquez. Meanwhile,
others speculated that the coup attempt was motivated by Torrijos’ statement a few
weeks earlier saying the government would introduce compulsory unionism, which crit-
ics saw as an attempt to establish a personal power base a la Juan Perón. Critics
opposed his many references to himself as “maximum leader of the revolution” (New
York Times 1969c).
There is no evidence that the plotters sought to prevent ethnic narrowing, empower
an opposition party, restore Arias, or set a date for new presidential elections.20 Col.
Luis A. Segura, a senior staff officer, said “It was simply ambition for power that led
[Silvera and Sanjur] to such a miscalculation of their strength,” adding that they “had
not carried out consultations with any significant command officer on their move” (J.
d. Onis 1969b). Others cited Torrijos’ anti-corruption drive as the motivating factor
(New York Times 1969f). Informed military sources said Silvera and Sanjur feared
they were about to lose their jobs (J. d. Onis 1969c, 1969a). Sanjur reportedly “felt a
showdown was coming between himself and Torrijos because of personal differences”
(News Dispatches 1969).
At the time, it was reported that the United States position had been to maintain a neu-
tral stance towards what they saw as “a factional dispute within the National Guard”
(John M. Goshko 1969b). However, Ramón Lamboglia, a member of the anti-Torrijos
resistance, argues that the CIA financed the “failed counter-coup against Torrijos in
December 1969 by Colonel Amado Sanjur, although Torrijos believed that [the U.S.
Army’s Military Intelligence] Brigade 470 was behind the counter-coup” (Marcy 2010,
308). Even if the allegations are true, there is no reason to think U.S. sponsorship
would have significantly changed the group from which rulers could be selected (the
Guard). Based on this evidence, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup attempt
primarily aimed at restoring military officers’ power vis-à-vis Torrijos.

20. On Monday, while Torrijos appeared deposed, conservative business associations issued a call for the
creation of a new civilian junta, new elections in six months, and the return of party politics, which was
banned (J. d. Onis 1969a). At the time, Col. Sanjur was “believed to represent a faction of the guard that
favors the withdrawal of military from active administration of the government” (New York Times 1969a).
However, we found no evidence that a return to democracy or new elections motivated the coup attempt.
183
Category: combined
Other Datasets: successful military counter-coup - CCD v 2.0; not a candidate - CSP,
PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Torrijos Herrera as the leader of Panama from October
12, 1968, to July 31, 1981; GWF code a military-personal regime (Panama 68-82)
associated with Torrijos from October 11, 1968, to March 3, 1982.
Event: See 95-1969-12-14.
Coding rationale: Only CCD v 2.0 codes this event as a coup. Because this event
on December 16 (victory of Torrijos) occurs within seven days of the failed coup that
began on December 14, we code this event as part of the failure of that earlier coup
attempt rather than as a separate coup event.

Category: legal
Other Datasets: successful military coup led by Col. Florez Aguilar - CCD; not a
candidate - CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Torrijos Herrera as exiting
on this date from a natural death; Archigos codes the first pos-Torrijos leader, Florez
Aguilar, as entering office in an “irregular” manner on this date; Svolik codes Florez
Aguilar as entering by “consensus”; GWF code a military-personal regime (Panama
68-82) from October 11, 1968 until March 3, 1982.
Event: On July 31, 1981, National Guard Commander Brig. General Omar Torrijos
Herrera died in a plane crash in bad weather. The plane went missing at 11:15 a.m.
while Torrijos was “on a routine check of military posts” on July 31. On August 1, a
National Guard spokeman said the plane had been “found in the jungle between the
town of Penenome, 65 miles west of the capital, and the nearby village of Coclecito.”
All seven passengers on board had died (United Press International 1981b). How the
crash “happened remains a mystery, though the assumption that someone assassinated
him is popular. On the other hand, the premise that the crash was a pure accident is
equally plausible–Torrijos was reckless and frequently eschewed caution and prudence.
The weather the night of his fateful flight was stormy, and Torrijos would not have had
any reservations about flying in bad weather; it would have reinforced his machismo”
(Harding 2006, 87).
On August 1, Florencio Flores Aguilar, the Chief of Staff of the National Guard, was
appointed to succeed Torrijos (Thomas M. Leonard 2015, 126). “President Royo of-
fered his resignation to the National Guard after General Torrijos died but was given a
formal vote of confidence by the staff officers” (Riding 1981b). The ceremony honoring
Flores as the new National Guard Commander sought to “show that Torrijismo would
continue without Torrijos.” President Royo declared that “We are fortunate that Gen-
eral Torrijos’ ideas will live on in the minds and hearts of those who take his place”
(Riding 1981a).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event is a potential coup or “not regime leader”
depends on whether one considers Aristides Royo or Torrijos as regime leader at the
184
time of the latter’s death. Had we considered Royo to be the regime leader, we would
code this event as “not regime leader” as this event only entailed an internal mil-
itary reshuffle. As explained in our appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we concur
with Archigos and GWF that Torrijos, long-time National Guard commander, was the
regime leader at this time.
Popular suspicions that Torrijios had been assassinated have never been confirmed, and
we can find no concrete evidence that assassins planted a bomb with the intention of
Flores taking over. Thus, whether one considers the subsequent transition to Flores as
a “legal” transition or coup depends on what one considers the normal rules regulating
transfers of power under the regime. CCD codes a coup because, in their view, “power
was supposed to transition to civilian Royo but instead the military seized on the power
vacuum and Aguilar ascended to Torrijos’ previous position as military leader and
Royo again found himself in a puppet presidency.” After Torrijos’ death, true power
remained in the National Guard and its Commander while president Royo remained a
figurehead (Meditz and Hanratty 1989, xxviii) and the nominal executive only. GWF
code Flores leadership of the National Guard (as Torrijos’ chief of staff at the Guard,
he succeeded Torrijos) as a continuation Torrijos’ de facto rule. Key guard officers
“had stressed the continuity of the political process initiated by General Torrijos in
1968” (Riding 1981b).
Had we found any evidence that President Royo, the civilian nominal executive, at-
tempted to civilianize the regime and take power from the National Guard at this time,
and Flores had attempted to preserve the regime (i.e. prevent civilianization), then
his appointment would be a successful reshuffling coup against the presumptive regime
leader. But in the event, the civilian President simply followed the informal rules over
power that preceded Torrijos’ death. We also find no evidence that Flores’s selection
was contested either by the civilian President or the armed factions in the National
Guard. We therefore concur with Svolik that his entry was based on a normative if
quasi-legal “consensus.”
• # 95-1982-3-3: Panama, Florencio Flores Aguilar

Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; not a candidate - CSP, PT, and
Singh; Archigos codes Florez Aguilar as being removed on this date through “irregu-
lar” means through a power struggle within the military short of a coup. Svolik codes
Flores Aguilar as being removed by a military coup on this date; GWF code the col-
lapse of a military-personal regime (Panama 68-82) associated with Torrijos on this
date in a military coup and its replacement with another (Panama 82-89) associated
with Manuel Noriega. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Panama from 1946 to 1997.
Event: Early on Wednesday, March 3, 1982, National Guard units were reportedly
confined to their barracks in anticipation of changes in the National Guard command
(ACAN 1982b). It was later revealed that Lt. Col. Manuel Antonio Noriega’s UE-
SAT anti-terror forces had surrounded the Comandancia to block Flores loyalists from
185
moving (Kempe 1990, 115). Soon after, President Aristides Royo published decrees
20 and 21 announcing the retirement of National Guard Commander Florencio Flores
Aguilar and his replacement by Lt. Col. Rubén Darı́o Paredes, Flores’ Chief of Staff
who was at this time also promoted to Colonel (Televisora Nacional 1982). Royo also
announced that Lt. Col. Armando Contreras was promoted to chief of the general
staff, and Lt. Col. Manuel Antonio Noriega deputy chief (Circuito RPC Television
1982b).
Immediately, rumors spread of a coup led by Paredes, Contreras, Noriega, and Roberto
Diaz Herrera, “all connected with the high command of the intelligence services and
general staff” (ACAN 1982b). Col. Paredes stressed that the command change was
“a strictly professional process,” calling Flores a gentlemen for being “part of the
decision” to ease the succession process in the interests “of the institution and the
fatherland” (Circuito RPC Television 1982c). Royo also claimed publicly that “This is
an institutional decision. It is a natural movement within the armed forces” (Circuito
RPC Television 1982b). When he was asked by reporters afterwards why Flores was
not at his retirement ceremony, Paredes simply stated that Flores was at his residence
(Circuito RPC Television 1982a).
On March 11, La Prensa reported that the president of the opposition Christian Demo-
cratic Party, Ricardo Arias Calderon, denounced the reshuffle in the National Guard
as a coup which “reduced the president of the republic to the sad role of announcer
of changes which, according to the constitution, he should have made himself. Events
and the imagination indicate that he had barely been informed of these changes be-
fore he announced them with an obvious lack of enthusiasm” (La Prensa 1982c). On
March 14, sources close to the Assembly of Representatives said “Royo “was caught off
guard” when he was handed Florez’ retirement papers in the palace. His initial refusal
to accept the situation led to a delay of several hours before the announcement could
be made to the country.” Flores was reportedly “under custody in his home.” With
a depressed look on his face, he refused to comment on his “retirement” except to say
that it had been “unexpected” (La Prensa 1982b). On March 19, a columnist in the
opposition daily argued that Florez’ “forced retirement” had undermined the fragile
hopes for democratization in the 1984 election (La Prensa 1982a).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event is a potential coup or “not regime leader”
depends on whether one considers Flores or Aristides Royo to be the regime leader
at this time. Had we considered Royo to be the regime leader, we would code this
event as “not regime leader” as this event only entailed an internal military reshuffle.
Aristides Royo, a civilian, remained the sitting president through July 1982 (see 95-
1982-7-30). Like Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), however, we assume that since
Torrijos’ coup in 1968, whoever controlled the National Guard controlled Panama. We
therefore concur with Archigos and GWF that Flores, as National Guard commander,
was the regime leader at this time, just as Omar Torrijos had been leader before his
accidental death in 1981 (see 95-1981-7-31).
Whether or not this event is “legal” or not depends on whether Flores retirement
conformed to constitutional principles or was “forced.” Under article 164, paragraph
186
1 of the constitution, the President (Royo) did have the prerogative to appoint the
National Guard Commander. Flores was also entitled to retire at 26 years of service
(Televisora Nacional 1982). Despite this veneer of constitutionality, the evidence in-
dicates that Flores, a Torrijos loyalist, was forced to retire (Black and Flores 1989,
59) and that Flores had not consented to retirement at this time. The evidence indi-
cates that Royo, the nominal executive, was pressured to comply with Flores’ forced
removal following “consultation” and upon the “recommendation” of the senior mili-
tary plotters involved. The move against Flores was the result of “a struggle for power
among officers” (Millett 1989, 187). Both Thomas M. Leonard (2015, 225) and Marcy
(2010, 141) characterize Paredes rise to power as the result of a coup against Flores.
Paredes later revealed that he and three colonels conspired to oust Florez and wrote
a three-page plan which called for Paredes to take command of the National Guard
from 1981-83 before running for president, followed by Contreras from 1985-87, Nor-
iega from 1987-89, and Diaz Herrera from 1989. It was that agreement which led to
the “meeting room coup” of March 3, 1982 (Kempe 1990, 115). Since military actors
(and not just President Royo) took concrete actions to oust the regime leader against
his wishes, we code this event as a military coup rather than a “legal” change or a
“non-military coup.”
Because Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) use this event to code regime change, we
consider this a successful regime change coup, despite the fact that Paredes “considered
himself to be Torrijos’ s rightful successor and the embodiment of change and unity
(Torrijos had been grooming Paredes for political office since 1975)” (Black and Flores
1989, 59). Prior to his death in July 1981, Torrijos ruled through and with civilians in
the PRD and had started the process of returning the National Guard to the barracks
(Harding 2001, 140). Torrijos also had backing from multiple factions within the
National Guard. GWF code the “meeting room coup” by National Guard officers
(Paredes, Diaz Herrera, and Noriega) as a break from the Torrijos’ regime because
afterwards the leaders of the National Guard re-asserted their political control, largely
circumventing the civilian executive. For example, Dominguez (1982, 40) notes that
the March 1982 coup “establish[ed] an internal agreement that would enable the Guard
to reassert itself as the decisive power in the land. After four years of standing on the
sidelines, the National Guard, with Paredes in command, made clear that it intended to
call the shots.” In April 1982, Paredes forced a cabinet reshuffle, against the civilian
executive’s (Royo) wishes (40). Indeed, the National Guard leaders (Paredes and
Noriega) ousted the civilian (nominal) executive (Royo) a few months later (see 95-
1982-7-30). If there had been no March 1982 coup, then presumably Flores would
have continued ruling with civilians (regime continuation) or ousted civilians from the
ruling process through his own autogolpe, marking regime change. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 95-1982-7-30: Panama, Rubén Paredes

Other Datasets: autogolpe - CCD; not a candidate - CSP and PT; successful coup -
Singh; Archigos codes Paredes as leader of Panama from March 3, 1982, until August
15, 1983; GWF code the collapse of a military-personal regime (Panama 82-89) from
187
March 3, 1982, until December 20, 1989.
Event: Aristides Royo Sánchez was president from October 11, 1978, until July 31,
1982, when he was forced to resign as a result of pressure from the military (Thomas
M. Leonard 2015, 118,250,309). Before Torrijos died in July 1981, he was a unifying
force and “kept Royo in the presidency, the PRD functioning, and the National Guard
united” (Black and Flores 1989, 60). When Florencio Flores Aguilar succeeded Torrijos
as National Guard Commander, he “‘adopted a low profile and allowed President Royo
to exercise more of his constitutional authority.” However, “Royo soon alienated the
Torrijos clique, the private sector, and the National Guard’s general staff, all of whom
rejected his leadership style and his strongly nationalistic, anti-United States rhetoric.
Royo had become the leader of leftist elements within the government... The general
staff considered the National Guard to be the country’s principal guarantor of national
stability and began to challenge the president’s political authority” (59).
“Ruben Paredes, as National Guard Commander, “publicly blamed Royo for the
rapidly deteriorating economy and the pocketing of millions of dollars from the na-
tion’s social security system by government officials. In July 1982, growing labor
unrest led to an outbreak of strikes and public demonstrations against the Royo ad-
ministration. Paredes, claiming that “the people wanted change,” intervened to remove
Royo from the presidency. With National Guard backing, Paredes forced Royo and
most of his cabinet to resign on July 30, 1982, almost one year to the day after the
death of Torrijos” (60). “Paredes replaced President Royo with Vice President Ricardo
de la Espriella” allegedly for health reasons (Marcy 2010, 141). In August 1982, de
la Espriella “formed a new cabinet that included independents and members of the
Liberal Party and the PRD; Jorge Illueca Sibauste, Royo’s foreign minister, became
the new vice president. Meanwhile, Colonel Armando Contreras became chief of staff
of the National Guard. Colonel Noriega continued to hold the powerful position of
assistant chief of staff for intelligence—the Panamanian government’s only intelligence
arm” (Black and Flores 1989, 60). The constitution was changed, “giving the military
a governing role equal to that of other political institutions running Panama” (Marcy
2010, 141).
Coding rationale: Whether or not one considers this event a coup or an autogolpe
depends on whether one views Paredes or Royo as regime leader. As explained in our
appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we view Paredes as regime leader and Royo as
nominal executive, consistent with Archigos and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014).
We therefore code this event as an autogolpe by the regime leader (Paredes) targeting
the nominal executive (Royo).
• # 95-1984-2-13: Panama, Manuel Antonio Noriega

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, PT, Singh, and LPL; Archigos
codes Noriega as the leader of Panama from August 15, 1983, to January 3, 1990; GWF
code a military-personal regime (Panama 82-89) from March 3, 1982 to December 20,
1989.
188
Event: On Monday, February 13, 1984, President Ricardo de la Espriella resigned sud-
denly “without explanation” and was immediately replaced by Vice President Jorge
Illueca (Meislin 1984). Illueca claimed that De la Espriella had resigned for “personal
reasons.” However, sources reported that the president “had quarreled with officers
of the National Guard... over demands that public employees be given time off to at-
tend political rallies of Nicolas Ardito Barletta,” the Democratic Revolutionary Party
(PRD) presidential candidate favored by the military. “The National Guard had also
reportedly put pressure on De la Espriella to shake up his Cabinet, giving posts to
backers of Ardito Barletta” (Williams 1984c). On Tuesday, February 14, five cabi-
net members reportedly resigned, including the Ministers of the Presidency, Treasury,
Public Works, Health, and Commerce. Government sources said that the president
had been “forced out by military leaders” after the National Guard demanded that he
“fire at least four cabinet members” (Williams 1984a). “The military wanted ministers
who would marshal support” for Ardito Barletta. “De la Espriella, who had promised
clean elections, balked” (Williams 1984b).
De la Espriella was not seen in public for over a week after he resigned (Williams
1984b). Ricardo Arias Calderon, vice presidential running mate of the opposition can-
didate Arnulfo Arias, called De la Espriella’s dismissal a “quiet coup d’état” (Williams
1984a). Black and Flores (1989, 63) says “De la Espriella was forced out by Noriega.
De la Espriella had opposed the military’s manipulation of the election and strongly
advocated free elections for 1984. During his brief tenure, de la Espriella had failed to
institute any significant policy changes, and his presidency was lackluster.”
Coding rationale: No previous major coup datasets code this event as a coup. How-
ever, evidence indicates that Noriega took concrete actions to force de la Espriella to
resign as president. Whether or not one considers this event an autogolpe or a coup
depends on whether one views Noriega or de la Espriella as regime leader. As explained
in our appendix of Colpus regime leaders and prior cases(see 95-1981-7-31, 95-1982-3-3
and 95-1982-7-30), we assume that the head of the National Guard–now the FDP–was
regime leader.21 We therefore code this event as a successful autogolpe by the regime
leader (Noriega) targeting the civilian nominal executive (De la Espriella).

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, PT, and Singh; successful
coup - LPL; Archigos codes Noriega as leader of Panama from August 15, 1983, until
January 3, 1990; GWF code a military-personal regime (Panama 82-89) from March
3, 1982, until December 20, 1989.
Event: After “Noriega withdrew the support of the PDF from Paredes” in 1983, “the
election of 1984 boiled down to two men: Nicolás Ardito Barletta was the Partido Rev-
olucionario Democrático (PRD) and PDF candidate, as well as a former World Bank
21. The defense forces were called the Las Fuerzas de Defensa and were the successor organization to the
Panamanian National Guard, which was renamed in 1983 (Koster and Sánchez 1990, 414).
189
economist and Torrijos’s planning minister. The opposition candidate, Arnulfo Arias,
was the former three-time president of Panama prior to Torrijos and was vehemently
anti-military” (Marcy 2010, 142). On May 6, 1984, presidential elections were held.
Arnulfo Arias lost to Nicolas Barletta “by 1,713 votes out of 600,000 cast after the
Defense Force suspended the vote count while Arias was leading.” On October 12,
1984, Barletta took office. The previous night, the regime put down a 1,200-strong
opposition protest claiming that Barletta stole the election with the support of the
Defense Force (Omang 1984).
(2014) codes this event (by Nicolas Ardito Barletta) as a coup. Whether or not one
considers this event a coup, autogolpe, or “not regime leader” depends on whether
one views Noriega or the president as regime leader. As in previous cases, (see 95-
1981-7-31, 95-1982-3-3, 95-1982-7-30, and 95-1984-2-13), we assume that the head of
the National Guard–now the FDP–was regime leader and the civilian president the
nominal executive only. We thus agree with Archigos and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
(2014) that Noriega was the regime leader and exclude this event as an autogolpe.
This event appears to be an “electoral coup” preventing the apparent winner of the
1984 presidential elections (Arias) from taking office. This event therefore only con-
cerns who would be the nominal executive. Yet again, this case demonstrated the
axiom that “Constitutional reforms notwithstanding, the reality of Panamanian pol-
itics dictated that no candidate could become president without the backing of the
National Guard and, especially, its commander” (Black and Flores 1989, 61). Accord-
ing to Ratcliff (2002, 77), Noriega “illegally influenced the 1984 national elections in a
move to strengthen the military’s influence over the Panamanian government. He engi-
neered the election of President Nicolas Barletta, the military’s candidate and one who
was considered personally loyal and subservient to Noriega. Some observers believe
that the United States turned a blind eye to Noriega’s election fraud because it put in
place a government that was considered sympathetic to American interests.” Because
the National Guard led by Noriega took concrete actions to rig and steal the vote in
the 1984 presidential elections and deny Arias the presidency, we code this event as a
successful autogolpe by Noriega against the presumptive nominal executive (Arias).

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Noriega
as leader of Panama from August 15, 1983, until January 3, 1990; GWF code a military-
personal regime (Panama 82-89) from March 3, 1982, until December 20, 1989. EPR
codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Panama from 1946 to 1997.
Event: On September 13, 1985, Hugo Spadafora, a critic who had “denounced Noriega
for his suppression of democracy in Panama and his engagement in international drug
trafficking and money laundering,” entered Panama from Costa Rica, and was “seized
by forces loyal to Noriega. While detained, Spadafora fell victim to their brutal torture.
Spadafora’s mutilated body was found stuffed in a mail sack several days after his death.
190
Noriega pressured President Nicolàs Ardito Barletta not to establish an investigation
commission, an act that only increased suspicions of the military’s involvement in
Spadafora’s death” (Thomas M. Leonard 2015, 295). Outrage at Spadafora’s death
was “immediate and extensive. With the public’s outcry too loud to ignore, Panama’s
President Barletta [privately] called for Noriega to step aside as the PDF commander
while the crime was investigated” (Ratcliff 2002, 78).
Kempe (1990, 146,149) says Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera, “Noriega’s number two and a
man Langley had pegged as a communist, was trying to turn the Spadafora killing into
a military coup against Noriega.” He “furtively sought support from several officers,
each of whom said he’d go along if Diaz Herrera could co-opt certain key colonels
who controlled troops, but Noriega’s hold on the brass was firmer than Diaz Herrera
had thought.” By early October, it was reported that Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera,
a relative of Omar Torrijos Herrera and the chief of staff of the Defense Forces, “had
sought to organize an anti-Noriega movement but failed to gain enough support to make
it work,” according to “reliable sources” (Cody 1985). “Informed political analysts”
cited in other major western news wires reported that Roberto Diaz “led internal army
opposition that nearly deposed General Noriega” (LeMoyne 1985).
On Wednesday, September 25, Col. Diaz Herrera met with Vice President Eric Del-
valle “at PDF headquarters and he had commenced a coup against Noriega that had
already collapsed by the time Barletta spoke to Delvalle. Diaz Herrera had ordered the
commander of Battalion 2000, one of the few PDF units with any semblance of infantry
training, into Panama City, explaining they might be needed to quell unrest. But the
battalion had not budged. Diaz Herrerra had shown his hand–and had it slapped” (K.
Buckley 1992, 31-32). “After Diaz Herrera had successfully moved some loyal troops
to Panama City streets, a worried American general had phoned him. What are you
up to? asked General John Galvin, the head of the United States Southern Command
in Panama. What’s going on there? Diaz Herrera... worried that the Americans were
onto him. He had to cover his tracks quickly and save his job... So Diaz Herrera began
to set a trap for Barletta” (Kempe 1990, 146,149).
That night, Noriega returned from a trip to Europe “to squelch a palace coup” (LeMoyne
1985). “By late Wednesday, Noriega was back at his headquarters, listening to Diaz
Herrera’s transparently fictitious account of the coup attempt. Diaz Herrera told Nor-
iega that he had discovered a plot by Barletta against him and had been compelled
to ask for reinforcements to thwart Barletta” (K. Buckley 1992, 31-32). Noriega did
not immediately punish Diaz’s coup attempt. “As a PDF officer, Dı́az couldn’t be
murdered. That would make the other officers nervous. As Omar Torrijos’s cousin, he
was heir apparent to the fake revolution, the tapestry of lies that passed for a moral
purpose among the PDF and its henchmen in mufti” Koster and Sánchez (1990, 323).
This event also precipitated the dismissal of President Barletta only two days later (see
95-1985-9-27). Though Diaz Herrera remained the PDF’s second in command in the
aftermath of this event, “his power was basically sidelined. In June 1987, to prevent
any future threat from Diaz Herrera, Noriega forced him to retire from the PDF. Diaz
Herrera responded by confessing both his own crimes and Noriega’s to Panamanian
191
journalists” (Marcy 2010, 148-149).
Coding rationale: No major prior coup datasets include this event. Yet there is evi-
dence that Diaz Herrara took concrete actions (ordering troops into the capital) tar-
geting Noriega, though he claimed as part of his cover-up that these actions were in
defense of Noriega. The evidence is ambiguous since Diaz did not admit to it and pinned
the blame on Barletta. However, “Noriega’s trial proceedings included evidence that
Spadafora had been called back to Panama to support a coup led by Colonel Roberto
Diaz Herrera” (143).
Diaz Herrerra was one of the coup leaders with Noriega in the “meeting room coup” in
March 1982 (see 95-1982-3-3). He was therefore a senior officer and a regime insider.
There is no evidence that Diaz Herrera was motivated by ethnic grievances or sought
to rule without the National Guard. Diaz Herrera’s public split with Noriega in 1987
was attributed in part to disagreement over the appropriate distribution of profits from
the military’s various illicit income streams (Ropp 1992, 230). Based on the evidence,
we code a failed reshuffling coup by Diaz Herrara against Noriega. AMBIGUOUS.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Nor-
iega as leader of Panama from August 15, 1983, until January 3, 1990; GWF code
a military-personal regime (Panama 82-89) from March 3, 1982, until December 20,
1989.
Event: Late on Thursday night, September 26, 1985, Nicolas Barletta, who had been
in New York attending the U.N. General Assembly, was summoned back to Panama
(LeMoyne 1985). On the morning of Friday, September 27, Barletta returned to
Panama (Associated Press 1985). Barletta was met at the airport “by officers of the
Panamanian National Guard” and taken to the Guard barracks (Bailey 1985). After
an “all-day meeting with military commanders” on Friday (Long 1985), Noriega forced
Barletta to resign (Thomas M. Leonard 2015, xxxiv). At 10:30 p.m., the National
Assembly began to convene to swear in First Vice President, Eric Arturo Delvalle, as
President (Associated Press 1985), but a quorum was not present until early the next
morning. At 2:30am on Saturday, September 28, Barletta announced he was “stepping
away” in a letter noting that the military “could not work with my presidency.” At
3:30 a.m., Delvalle was sworn in (United Press International 1985). Noriega thereby
repressed “attempts to investigate or report the crime, and install[ed] a more reliable
puppet as president” (Ratcliff 2002, 78). For months after, Barletta still claimed to
be the constitutional president on the grounds that he had not permanently resigned.
“According to the Panamanian Constitution, the president can separate himself from
his tasks up to 90 days without ceasing to be president” (Bailey 1985).
Coding rationale: No major prior coup datasets include this event. However, this event
is similar to other reported events that these datasets do code as a coup (see, for ex-
ample, 95-1982-7-30, 95-1984-2-13, and 95-1985-10-12). Consistent with prior cases,
we code this event as a successful autogolpe by the regime leader and Defense Force
192
Commander (Noriega) against the civilian nominal executive (President Barletta).

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, and PT; successful coup - LPL;
non-military presidential overthrow - Singh; Archigos codes Noriega as the leader of
Panama from August 15, 1983, to January 3, 1990; GWF code a military-personal
regime (Panama 82-89) from March 3, 1982 to December 20, 1989.
Event: On February 5, 1988, grand juries in Tampa and Miami indicted Noriega on
numerous counts of drug trafficking and money laundering. Later that month, “the
Reagan administration sent Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams to Miami to
meet with President Delvalle in order to pressure him to fire Noriega” (Crandall 2006,
192). “But Noriega quickly outmaneuvered Delvalle and had him removed from office.
Noriega then had the National Assembly appoint Manuel Solis president” (192). “After
days of hesitating, President Delvalle finally fired Noriega on 25 February 1988 and
appointed Colonel Marcos Justines as the new PDF commander. But the attempt to
dismiss Noriega failed. Immediately after he was fired, Noriega restricted Delvalle to his
home, cut his telephone lines, closed the independent print and electronic media, and
ordered the PDF to disperse demonstrators. Justines remained loyal to Noriega and
refused to assume the commander position. Under Noriega’s instructions, the National
Assembly voted to oust Delvalle and replace him with the education minister” (Gilboa
1995, 547).
On February 26, Manuel “Solı́s Palma was named minister in charge of the presidency,
although General Manuel Noriega remained Panama’s de facto ruler” (Thomas M.
Leonard 2015, 264). While “originally seen as a Noriega puppet, the Reagan admin-
istration turned Delvalle into something of a symbol of democracy in Panama after
his removal. The Reagan administration responded to Delvalle’s removal by placing a
fresh round of economic sanctions against Noriega” (Crandall 2006, 193). “With U.S.
assistance, Delvalle went into hiding until the U.S. invasion of Panama in December
1989. In the United States, the Ronald Reagan administration refused to recognize
Delvalle’s successors, instead asserting that Delvalle remained the legitimate president
of Panama” (Thomas M. Leonard 2015, 104).
(2014) codes this event (by Manuel Solis Palma) as a coup. However, as in previous
cases (see 95-1982-7-30, 95-1984-2-13, 95-1985-10-12, and 95-1985-9-27), we assume
that the head of the National Guard–now the FDP–was regime leader and the civilian
president the nominal executive only. Consistent with prior cases, we code this event
as a successful autogolpe by the regime leader (Noriega) against the civilian nominal
executive (Delvalle). We exclude Delvalle’s attempt to fire as a Noriega as a legal move
or “non-military coup” as it was led by the civilian nominal executive and appears to
have not garnered any military support.
193
CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Noriega as the leader of Panama from August 15,
1983, to January 3, 1990; GWF code a military-personal regime (Panama 82-89) from
March 3, 1982 to December 20, 1989. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly
ethnic group in Panama from 1946 to 1997.
Event: On March 15, 1988, Major Fernando Quezada briefed the cabinet about the
threats to the regime from growing public unrest, a planned general strike, and threat
of a looming American invasion. While Noriega sought to paint a bleak picture to
justify more repression, “Quezada, however, was playing a different game. He was
setting the table for his coup against Noriega the next morning. He wanted cabinet
members and other officers to see that Noriega had brought the country to such danger
that his removal was the only alternative.” But Noriega seemed to know about the
plot, and therefore lied to Quezada about where he was sleeping that night (Kempe
1990, 273-275).
On Wednesday, March 16, 1988, Col. Leónidas Macı́as, the Chief of the National
Police, led a failed coup attempt against Gen. Noriega (Gilboa 1995, 547-548).22 The
attempt occurred at about 6:30 a.m. which entailed exchanges of gunfire at military
headquarters in Panama City (Branigin 1988). It was crushed by Cap. Moises Giroldi,
who was rewarded with a promotion to Major and was given command of the Urraca
Company, which served as the palace guard. He thus became a member of Noriega’s
inner circle (Caraley 1999, 104). Capt. Francisco Alvarez, a graduate of the School of
Americas, had supported the coup attempt and later fled to Miami with a group fleeing
after the 1989 coup attempt (Harding 2001, 214). After the coup attempt, Noriega
purged some senior military officers (Kempe 1990, 280-81). In April 1988, “Dignity
Battalions” made up of volunteers under PDF direction were founded to “help defend
Panama from a U.S. invasion and to combat internal subversion activities” (Thomas
M. Leonard 2015, 106).
Coding rationale: Yates (2008, 53) states: “the motives of the conspirators were mixed:
all had been passed over for promotion; some feared a U.S. invasion and the destruction
of the Panama Defense Forces as an institution if Noriega remained in command; some
were uneasy over Noriega’s growing ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya; and some
merely wanted to preempt higher-ranking officers from launching their own coup.”
Some of the coup plotters had connections with civilian opposition party leaders. Ma-
jor Aristides Valdonedo, a key plotter, had contacts with Christian Democrats. On the
morning of the coup, Major Quezada called on Guillermo Cochez, a Christian Demo-
cratic politician, and informed him that the officers would begin a coup that morning.
“Quezada wanted to ensure that the opposition would voice its support for the coup
makers, and they in turn would support democratic elections. He also wanted the Civic
Crusade to send demonstrators to the streets after the coup was announced, to help
prevent Noriega’s troops from coming to rescue him. Quezada’s only request was that
22. The Panamanian National Police were part of the defense forces (Williams 1988).
194
Delvalle not be included in the transitional government” (Kempe 1990, 276). If the
officers sought to empower the opposition, this would imply a regime change motive.
However, another source indicates that the conspirators aims were “not to restore
democracy; [but rather] to rehabilitate the PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces] in the
eyes of Washington so that it might continue in power” (Koster and Sánchez 1990, 356).
Personal and policy motives were also prominent. Quezada and Valdonedo had “feared
Noriega’s slide to the left. Most were near or already past twenty-five years of service,
at which point Noriega could retire them. All the officers involved had been passed
over for promotions. Most also had better upbringings than many in the pro-Noriega
crowd...They were Noriega’s smartest and most capable officers.” Only Colonel Macias
stood apart, and the conspirators needed him since he controlled troops (Kempe 1990,
277).
We code this case as a reshuffling coup because there is no clear evidence that the
military was likely to give up power should the coup have succeeded. Quezada had
sought the support of the opposition right before executing the coup, but there is
no evidence that civilian opposition had been part of the initial coup plotting. The
plotters had planned their coup to coincide with and seize the opportunity afforded by
the general strike (Kempe 1990), but the general strike was not called to aid the coup
attempt.

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR; failed dissident action - CCD;
failed coup attempt - CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Noriega as the leader of
Panama from August 15, 1983, to January 3, 1990; GWF code a military-personal
regime (Panama 82-89) associated with Noriega from March 3, 1982 to December 20,
1989. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Panama from
1946 to 1997. O’Rourke (2013, 306) lists Manuel Noriega as the target of a failed
U.S.-backed coup in 1989.
Event: At 7:40 a.m. on Tuesday, October 3, 1989, General Noriega was seized when
he walked into his office at his military headquarters after a brief gun battle that left
several wounded (Sciolino 1989). The rebels broadcast a communique in Panama City
at 12:10 p.m. saying Noriega had been captured and would be forced to retire (Rosen-
thal 1989). In the afternoon, troops loyal to Noriega began a bloody counterattack
that crushed the coup attempt within three hours. The coup attempt was led by Maj.
Moisés Giroldi Vega, who led the Urraca Battalion which “provided security at the
Panamanian military headquarters” (Pitts 1989a). He was joined by other close advi-
sors to Noriega, including the head of military intelligence “Col. Guillermo J. Wong
and two other members of the high command” (Mark A. Uhlig 1989b). Later it was
also learned that Giroldi had secured U.S. support for the attempt to remove Noriega
in advance. On October 1, 1989, Giroldi had a meeting with two CIA agents, where
he asked that the U.S. protect his family and provide practical support by blocking
two roads by which Noriega could bring reinforcements (K. Buckley 1992). The coup
195
evidently failed.
Coding rationale: According to Giroldi’s wife, after her husband put down the Macias
coup attempt (see 95-1988-3-16), her husband became disillusioned with the corruption
of the senior officers and misery of the enlisted men (Pitts 1989b). After months of
plotting, the last straw for Giroldi was a christening ceremony arranged by Noriega
on October 1, in which Giroldi was convinced Noriega had begun “acting more like
a king than a general,” and was surrounded by parasitic sycophants (Kempe 1990,
369-370). According to a Panamanian sergeant under Maj. Giroldi’s command, the
coup attempt was strictly an internal military affair designed to get Noriega and his
six senior aides to retire, and was not designed to kill Noriega or turn him over to the
U.S. (Pitts 1989a). Other reports also suggest that Giroldi wanted Noriega to retire
with honor and step aside, which explains American officials’ hesitation not to provide
military support to the coup plotters (Rosenthal 1989). K. Buckley (1992, 194-195)
observed that Giroldi was “a true believer in military rule and distrusted all civilian
politicians.” President Bush, in authorizing limited assistance on the day of the coup
attempt, did so on the logic that “it would be easier for civilians to promote democ-
racy with any military leader other than Noriega” (Kempe 1990, 379). We use this
evidence to assume that the coup plotters intended to retain military rule at least for
the immediate future, just without Noriega. Under this assumption, we code this case
as a failed leader reshuffling coup.

Category: foreign
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and Luttwak; foreign invasion - CSP and PT;
successful coup - LPL; non-military presidential overthrow - Singh; Archigos codes
Noriega as the leader of Panama from August 15, 1983, to January 3, 1990; GWF
code the collapse of a military-personal regime (Panama 82-89) on this date in an US
invasion.
Event: “On the evening of 20 December 1989, U.S. president George H.W. Bush an-
nounced the invasion of Panama by some 27,000 U.S. troops, half of them from the
Canal Zone and the other half reinforcements from the United States... Forty-five min-
utes prior to the start of the invasion, the victors in the May 1989 election–President
Guillermo Endara and Vice Presidents Ricardo Arias Calderón and Guillermo Ford–
were sworn into office in a private home by the head of the Panamanian Commission
on Human Rights, an event orchestrated by the de facto head of the U.S. diplomatic
mission, John Bushnell” (Thomas M. Leonard 2015).23 Noriega was captured on Jan-
uary 3, 1990, and extradited to Miami, “where he was found guilty in a federal court
of drug trafficking and money laundering” (205). On December 22, Endara “replaced
Noriega’s Defense Force with a civilian-led police force” (116-117). For detailed anal-
23. Guillermo David Endara Galimany had become the leading opposition force to the Noriega regime after
Arias died in 1988. “Exit polls on 6 May 1989 clearly indicated a forthcoming Endara victory. However, the
de facto head of state and dictator General Manuel Noriega voided the elections, a decision that paved the
road for the U.S.-sponsored Operation Just Cause” (Thomas M. Leonard 2015, 116-117).
196
ysis of the U.S. invasion, see Kempe (1990, 113-127) and Crandall (2006, chapter 4).
(2014) codes this event (by Guillermo David Endara Galimany) as a coup. However,
the evidence only implicates foreign troops in support of prior defectors (Endara). We
thus code this event a foreign invasion.
• # 95-1990-10-16: Panama, Guillermo Endara
Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; coup plot - CSP and Singh; not
a candidate - PT; Archigos codes Endara as the leader of Panama from December
20, 1989, until September 1, 1994; GWF code a democracy (Panama 89-NA) since
December 21, 1989.
Event: On February 10, 1990, the Panamanian Defense Forces were dissolved (Thomas
M. Leonard 2015, xxxiv). On October 18, Panama’s government revealed that it had
uncovered evidence of a plot to topple President Guillermo Endara which “was to
start with a takeover by rebel police units of the northwestern province of Chiriqui.”
Col. Eduardo Herrera Hassan, former national police chief who was retired in August
1990, was said to have led the plot and been arrested (Reuters 1990). Col. “Herrera
Hassan had tried to force the hand of the government by announcing the creation of a
security forces trade union in July 1990. Within a month he was ‘retired’, and shortly
afterwards the positions of security directors were filled by ‘civilians’, further eroding
the collective power of security personnel” (Caumartin 2007, 113).
Some sources the rumors of a “coup plot by disgruntled officers in an outlying province”
were unsubstantiated. In late October, the government said it was investigating some
junior officers in Chiriqui for coup plotting, but admitted that the evidence was “fuzzy.”
American officials dismissed the rumors, saying no officers had the means or opportu-
nity to execute a coup given that substantial U.S. occupation forces remained (Mark. A.
Uhlig 1990). On October 25, Herrera was formally charged with plotting to destabilize
the government a day after he surrendered to police after returning from Peru. The
arrests on October 16 of “five other policemen – his brother, a captain, a lieutenant,
a sergeant and a corporal” had “resulted from a two-month investigation, including
a legal wiretap, into a series of bomb attacks in Chiriqui province and against two”
cabinet officials. Col. Herrera said the charges were laughable given the U.S. still had
11,000 troops in Panama (J. M. McClintock 1990).
Coding rationale: Because we find no evidence of concrete actions, we code this event
a coup plot.
• # 95-1990-12-5: Panama, Guillermo Endara
Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Endara
as the leader of Panama from December 20, 1989, until September 1, 1994; GWF code
a democracy (Panama 89-NA) since December 21, 1989.
197
Event: Following his arrest and being charged with coup plotting in October (see 95-
1990-10-16), Col. Eduardo Herrera was jailed and military unrest grew. “In sharp
contrast to the Torrijos-Noriega period, where political posts had been occupied by
various ethnicities, especially Mestizos, the Endara government revived the pre-1968
rabiblanco tradition of practically all ministerial positions being held by whites. This
exclusion only increased the antagonism and resentment felt among the remnants of
the defeated PDF forces, who were largely mestizo. The majority of the new police
force was composed of former, mostly mestizo, PDF members. This tension was so high
that Endara was able to stay in office only because U.S. troops remained to counter a
PDF rebellion” (Harding 2006, 120). “The defeat, purges and sudden change in status
experienced by security staff were not easily accepted. This became apparent when
delays in the payment of wages in November 1990 sparked a protest” (Caumartin 2007,
112).
On Tuesday, December 4, 1990, “former Panamanian military officers–now designated
as police officers–broke their jailed leader, Eduardo Herrera, out of jail in a bold he-
licopter raid. They were joined in the rebellion by 100 former soldiers, creating a
situation that threatened to break apart the fragile bonds that held together the En-
dara government” (Harding 2006, 121). Capt. Jorge Bernal, who declared himself a
follower of the late Gen. Torrijos in September, engineered the jailbreak (K. Krauss
1991). By early the next morning, hundreds of officers led by Capt. Bernal and Colonel
Eduardo Herrera “occupied the police headquarters in Panama City” (Caumartin 2007,
112). Col. Herrera broadcast 11 demands, “including more low-cost housing for police
officers and their families, pay raises, increased vacation time, guaranteed retirement
benefits and Christmas bonuses” (Schmitt 1990). Later Wednesday morning, at 9:45
a.m., “Herrera and more than 100 men began a march on the National Assembly that
appeared designed to topple the government” (Hockstader 1990c). The rebels “burst
through two undermanned U.S. Army roadblocks as they began a march on the Na-
tional Assembly to present a set of hastily drawn grievances” (Hockstader 1990b).
They were “ halted and disarmed by U.S. troops” (Hockstader 1990c). The protest
ended after “authorities requested US troops to storm the building, underlining where
real power lay” (Caumartin 2007, 112). Several shots were fired, one rebel policemen
was killed and another wounded. Herrera escaped in the confusion but was captured in
a nearby building shortly after. Herrera “said he was not trying to topple the govern-
ment but to gain respect for the police” (Associated Press 1990b) However, “Endara
said it was a coup attempt” (Associated Press 1990a).
“Only the intervention of the U.S. military the following day restored order. Although
quickly put down by U.S. military forces, the uprising revealed the weakness of the
strategy of using former PDF members in the police force. Not until the following year
was the U.S. military able to withdraw its forces from Panama” (Harding 2006, 121).
“The ‘mutiny’ led to a final round of purges that completed the forceful subjugation
of the Panamanian security forces. This process constituted an essential step towards
their political neutralisation, shifting the balance of power firmly in favour of civilian
politicians and their US backers and providing the foundation for the security reform
project undertaken in the 1990s” (Caumartin 2007, 112). Bernal and 50-100 other
198
ex-PDF members went into hiding and went into open rebellion (K. Krauss 1991).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event is a coup attempt (as Endara claimed) or
only a mutiny (as Herrerra claimed) depends on whether or not evidence indicates that
Herrera and his followers ever had goals targeting Endara or seeking to seize power.
The evidence is ambiguous on this point. Some observers characterize this event as a
“protest.” Others who call it a coup attempt note that “Mr. Bernal’s band of 50 to
100 men might have sparked a revolt by the Public Force if not” for the U.S. troops (K.
Krauss 1991). “Perhaps because of the unexpectedness of his liberty, Herrera offered
a welter of confusing motives and demands during his 17 hours of freedom. At various
points, the former police chief said he was protesting unemployment, reaffirming his
patriotism, demanding better treatment for the police and fighting for an “authentic
democracy.” Endara referred to the episode as a coup attempt, but Herrera denied to
reporters he had any intention of overthrowing the government” (Hockstader 1990b).
“If this was a coup attempt, blood would have been shed,” Col. Herrera told reporters.
“Col. Herrera said that disaffected Public Force members engineered his escape from
prison so that he could act as their spokesman in airing grievances ranging from their
fellow Panamanians’ lack of respect for the Public Force to a request for food commis-
series in police barracks. “e are not buying that,” said Mr. Martinz, the president’s
spokesman” (Cordoba 1990). Some reports indicate a list of demands made by the
mutineers that does not include ousting the leader and replacing him with one of their
own. Another report suggests a motive to “topple the government.” But because none
of the public demands included the resignation of the government, we code this event
as a mutiny. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 95-1995-1-11: Panama, Ernesto Perez Balladares

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR; not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT,
and Singh; Archigos codes Balladores as the leader of Panama from September 1, 1994,
until September 1, 1999; GWF code a democracy (Panama 89-NA) since December
21, 1989.
Event: On Wednesday, January 11, 1995, Interior Minister Raul Montenegro an-
nounced that intelligence officials had uncovered and thwarted a plot by the Pana-
manian Public Force and former officers of the disbanded Panama Defense Forces
(PDF) to assassinate President Ernesto Perez Balladares and his two vice presidents
and two seize” power that was scheduled for Friday, January 13 (Wire Reports 1995).
A total of 10 police officers in the western province of Chiriqui and in Panama City
had been arrested. The plot allegedly involved killing the president when he visited
Chiriqui province (Reuters 1995).
Coding rationale: Because it appears that the plot was preempted before any concrete
actions could be taken, we code this event as a coup plot.
199
2.1.12 100: Colombia
Table 12: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Colombia

100-1953-6-13 Colombia 49-53 Gómez, Laureano Reg. Ch. Coup (S)

100-1957-5-10 Colombia 53-58 Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo Reshuffle Coup (S)
100-1958-5-2 Colombia 53-58 Parı́s Gordillo, Gabriel Reshuffle Coup (F)
100-1961-10-11 Colombia 58-NA Lleras Camargo, Alberto prior defection
• # 100-1953-6-13: Colombia, Laureano Gomez

and Singh; Archigos codes Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez as being removed on this date
through “regular” means. Archigos further codes the entry on this date of Laureano
Gomez by “regular” means but exit by “irregular” means by military actors; Svolik
codes his removal as a non-military coup; GWF code the collapse of a party-based
regime (Colombia 49-53), which had been led by Laureano Gomez since late 1950, on
this date in a military coup. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic
group in Colombia from 1946 to 1991.
Event: On June 13, 1953, Laureano Gomez Castro retook the presidency.24 In his
first act he attempted to remove the military commander, Lieutenant General Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla. Instead, Rojas took power in a bloodless coup, thus preventing Laureano
Gómez from re-assuming the presidency (Kline 2012, xxv,241,434). “Army troops
backed by ten tanks moved into the capital,” surrounded the residence of President
Gomez, and seized control of Bogotá without firing a shot (United Press 1953g).
Before dawn on June 14, former President Mariano Ospina Perez, who had moved into
opposition to Gómez, visited the Presidential Palace and conferred with General Rojas
(United Press 1953g). It appears that Ospina and conservative leaders “conspired
with the military against Gómez” (Premo 1992, 101). The coup leaders were “loyal
primarily to former President Ospina... Beneath the veneer of military nonpartisanship,
Rojas was close to the Ospinista wing of the Conservative Party” (Bushnell 1995,
44). However, with little precedent for military intervention at this time, General
“Rojas’ assumption of power was designed largely to resolve a politically stalemated,
increasingly violent confrontation between the two major parties” (Welch 1987, 157).
In fact, Rojas assumed power himself (on behalf of the military) only after both former
president’s Ospina and Urdaneta Arbelaez refused the position (159).
Thus early on Sunday, June 14, a national radio broadcast stated that Rojas has as-
sumed the presidency “with the unanimous support of the armed forces, the national
24. “On November 5, 1951, Gómez, because of his delicate health, temporarily ceded power to his minister
of government, Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez” (Bushnell 1995, 44).
200
police, the national directorate of the Conservative party, Dr. Mariano Ospina Perez,
Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez and Lucio Pabon Nunez, and representatives of both po-
litical parties” (United Press 1953g). Members of the elite factions of both political
parties welcomed the coup, with the exception of the deposed Partido Conservador
faction. Amnesty was offered to Liberal guerilla fighters who had been fighting in the
Violencia (Kline 2012, 241,434). “Repressed Liberals and all but hard-core followers
of Gómez greeted the 1953 coup with sighs of relief” (Bushnell 1995, 44). Gomez was
forced into exile (Helguera 1961, 355).
“The military clearly acted beyond the constitution in removing Gómez, but... it was
scarcely a ‘designed’ grab for power, especially when considering the circumstances
and the reluctance with which Rojas finally accepted the chief executive’s role. Most
observers have concluded that the military had no other choice. Rojas’ government was
military in name only. The armed forces at this time had neither the capability nor the
inclination to govern without civilian assistance. The National Constituent Assembly
legitimized the provisional government by naming Rojas to complete Gómez’s elected
term. Although Rojas appointed three officers to his cabinet, the principal architects
of his government from the beginning were civilians” (Premo 1992, 101), though army
leaders would occupy “most governorships” (Helguera 1961, 355). In addition, “A few
Liberals joined the government, and many Liberal guerrillas accepted Rojas’s offers of
amnesty; for a time, the level of political violence subsided” (Bushnell 1995, 44). “Ro-
jas Pinilla was, for a time, the most popular man in Colombia. He managed to bring
some semblance of a cease-fire to the eastern llanos and the Department of Tolima, the
most war-torn areas of the country. Rojas also permitted the Liberal press to function
(it had been muzzled since 1948)” (Helguera 1961, 355).
Coding rationale: We find evidence of concrete actions by active troops to seize power
from the constitutional successor, Laureano Gomez. We therefore disagree with Svo-
lik’s coding of a non-military coup, although conservative leaders, especially former
President Ospina, conspired with the military (Premo 1992, 101). Consistent with
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code a successful regime change coup.
• # 100-1957-5-10: Colombia, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; forced leadership change not
considered coup détat (resignation of executive due to poor performance/loss of legit-
imacy) - CSP; successful coup - PT and Singh; Archigos codes Rojas Pinilla as being
removed on this date through “irregular” means through a power struggle within the
military short of coup. Svolik codes Rojas Pinilla as being removed by a military coup
on this date; GWF code a military-personal regime (Colombia 53-58) from June 13,
1953, until May 10, 1958. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group
in Colombia from 1946 to 1991.
Event: By early 1957, most organized groups were opposed to Lt. Gen. Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla, trade unions launched general strikes, and a Liberal-Conservative civilian al-
liance and business elites supported his ouster (Bushnell 1995, 44-45). On Wednesday,
201
May 8, 1957, Rojas pressed a puppet National Constituent and Legislative Assem-
bly to endorse him for a second four year term (Welch 1987, 163). Anti-government
demonstrations continued but were repressed, with two students killed. On May 9, the
Catholic Church condemned the regime for the murders (Tad Szulc 1957a).
At this point, the military high command “concluded it was in its corporate interests
to dissociate themselves institutionally” from Rojas’ government (Premo 1992, 103).
Giving Rojas a face-saving way out to “voluntarily” resign (Welch 1987, 163), “On
10 May 1957, the top military leaders asked Rojas to leave the country. After his
departure, these leaders formed a caretaker military junta to govern until 7 August
1958” (Kline 2012, 435). General Gabriel Parı́s Gordillo set about supervising a re-
turn to civilian rule by 1958 (Premo 1992, 103). Other junta members included Maj.
Gen. Deogracias Fonseca, commander of the National Police; Rear Admiral Ruben
Piedrahita, Minister of Public Works; Brig. Gen. Rafael Navas Pardo, commander in
chief of the army; and Brig. Gen. Luis E. Ordonez, head of intelligence (Tad Szulc
1957b). In December 1957, a referendum ratified an agreement to lead to a coalition
government.
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we assume that the military did in fact take
concrete actions to force Rojas from office, rather than just being ousted in protests.
Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code a successful leader reshuf-
fling coup.
• # 100-1958-5-2: Colombia, Gabriel Paris Gordillo

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; failed coup attempt - PT;
Archigos codes Paris as the leader of Colombia from May 10, 1957, to August 7, 1958;
GWF code a military-personal regime (Colombia 53-58) from June 13, 1953, until May
10, 1958. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Colombia from
1946 to 1991.
Event: At 4 a.m. on May 2, 1958, former President Alberto Lleras Camargo, who was
then the leading presidential candidate, and four members of Colombia’s ruling five-
man military Junta–including Junta President Maj. Gen. Gabriel Paris, Maj. Gen
Deogracias Fonseca, Brig. Gen. Rafael Navas Pardo, and Brig. Gen. Luis Ordonez–
were kidnapped from their homes. All were held in the Caldas Battalion barracks, the
headquarters of the military police, except for Lleras who was rescued when his captors
ran into a loyal Army patrol near the Palace. Lt. Col. Hernando Forero, commander
of the military police battalion in Bogota, led the revolt, which included soldiers of
the military police and some National Police and regular army troops. Rebel police
attempted to take over Bogota radio stations. But Rear Adm. Ruben Piedrahita,
the fifth Junta member, escaped capture at home and coordinated loyal forces to
crush the rebellion. By noon, Forera was detained and the captured officers were back
in the presidential palace after soldiers surrounded the military police headquarters
(Associated Press 1958b; New York Times 1958c).
202
“Additional facts about the failed coup remain in dispute (the following details are
from Forero, interview with author, 1982). Two Conservative leaders knew at least
the outlines of the coup plot. One, Gilberto Alzate, wrote a draft proclamation of
the coup that he subsequently recovered as it appeared the coup attempt was failing.
Many members of the Constituent Assembly that had reelected Rojas in May 1957 and
had been dissolved by the junta were prepared to reconvene to provide some legitimacy
for the coup. Furthermore, Forero noted the coup was discussed with two members of
the junta, who never openly rejected it, and that one had expressed interest in serving
in a subsequent government if the coup were successful. In addition, the comman-
ders of both the army and the air force also were involved in coup discussions. At the
time, Forero accepted most of the blame for the coup, and no attempt was made to
investigate his allegations then that higher officials were involved in the coup plot. The
junta members denied any involvement, and Lleras absolved them of any responsibility
(see also Dix, 1967: 127-128; Leal, 1970; and Revista de Historia, 1977). One plausible
interpretation is that the coup was essentially the idea of ambitious middle-level officers
in conjunction with a few arch-Conservatives, and that senior officers may have listened
to their plots and in some cases acquiesced to them without seeking direct involvement.
Indeed officers in only four of the seven battalions in Bogota were involved directly in
planning the attempted coup” (Hartlyn 1984, 266).
Coding rationale: The coup attempt occurred two days before Colombia was scheduled
to hold its first constitutional election for President in a decade. While Lleras called
the coup attempt “an act of lunacy,” Piedrahita “blamed it on persons who resent the
impending re-emergence of a constitutional government” (Associated Press 1958b).
Forero told a reporter that the revolt was “a romantic movement in protest against the
junta because it is a weak government.” Reports said he had hoped to use the hostages
to bargain for the postponement of the pending elections, which the government went
on to hold (New York Times 1958c). Some observers linked the rebellion with a civilian
uprising the previous week in the city of San Gil by the supporters of ex-dictator
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who was ousted by the junta the previous May following national
protest (New York Times 1958b). Based on the evidence, we assume that Forero sought
to prevent upcoming democratic elections, which would constitute a reshuffling coup
attempt. Had Forero also sought to reinstate Rojas in power, this would not constitute
regime change, as Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) consider Rojas’ May 1957 ouster
as a regime reshuffle.
• # 100-1961-10-11: Colombia, Alberto Lleras Camargo

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; failed coup attempt - PT
and Thompson; Archigos codes Lleras Camargo as the leader of Colombia from August
7, 1958, until August 7, 1962; GWF code a democracy (Colombia 58-NA) since 1958.
Event: On October 11, 1961, a mechanized army unit led by two right-wing lieutenants
(supposedly followers of former dictator Lt. Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla) broke out
of prison, but they were captured less than 10 hours later. “They were surrounded
203
by units of a motorized column sent in pursuit.” One of lieutenants was reportedly
killed resisting arrest. It was suppressed as Alberto Lleras Camargo declared a state
of siege. Four days earlier, Rojas Pinilla was quoted as saying only a revolution ““in
which little blood would be shed” would be sufficient to re-establish social justice in
Colombia” (United Press International 1961a). By October 12, all had returned to
normal. “130 army rebels escaped from detention barracks. They and their leader, Lt.
Alberto Cendales Campuazano, held for plotting a revolution in 1958, were recaptured”
On December 22, 1961, a former army officer was sentenced to four years for leading
the “barracks mutiny.” “Ex-Lt. Alberto Cendales, who was being held at the barracks
for previous insurrectional activity when the new revolt broke out, also was fined $110.
Five other soldiers and three civilians were sentenced to one to three years for their
part in the abortive uprising which was quelled by Government troops within twelve
hours. The other leaders of the barracks revolt, Lt. Enrique Escobar, was killed when
he refused to surrender” (Associated Press 1961k).
Coding rationale: Kline (2012) does not record a coup attempt in Colombia in 1961,
nor do other major works on civil-military relations in Colombia that we consulted.
There is no evidence that the mutineers actually targeted the democratic government
of Lleras Camargo. All that is known is that some army prisoners escaped. No public
demands were issued. Although the government claimed the mutiny was part of a larger
set of plots seeking to overthrow the government, there is no evidence that the troops
involved were active members of the military (all appear to have escaped detention).
In this sense, the event amounts to little more than a jail break. Others’ coding of this
event as a coup appears to be an acceptance of government claims. But in the absence
of evidence of concrete actions targeting the regime, we code this event as a mutiny by
prior defectors.
204
2.1.13 101: Venezuela
Table 13: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Venezuela

101-1946-9-16 Venezuela 45-47 Betancourt, Rómulo Anti-Prov. Coup (F)

101-1947-7-26 Venezuela 45-47 Betancourt, Rómulo mutiny
101-1948-11-24 Venezuela 47-48 Gallegos, Rómulo Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
101-1950-11-13 Venezuela 48-58 Delgado Chalbaud, Carlos assassination
101-1952-9-29 Venezuela 48-58 Pérez Jiménez, Marcos Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
101-1952-12-2 Venezuela 48-58 Pérez Jiménez, Marcos Autogolpe (S)
101-1958-1-1 Venezuela 48-58 Pérez Jiménez, Marcos Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
101-1958-1-23 Venezuela 48-58 Pérez Jiménez, Marcos Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
101-1958-7-22 Venezuela 58-58 (new) Larrazábal, Wolfgang Anti-Prov. Coup (F)
101-1958-9-7 Venezuela 58-58 (new) Larrazábal, Wolfgang Anti-Prov. Coup (F)
101-1960-4-20 Venezuela 58-05 Betancourt, Rómulo Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
101-1960-6-24 Venezuela 58-05 Betancourt, Rómulo assassination
101-1960-12-21 Venezuela 58-05 Betancourt, Rómulo prior defection
101-1966-10-30 Venezuela 58-05 Leoni, Raúl Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
101-1992-2-4 Venezuela 58-05 Andrés Pérez, Carlos Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
101-1992-11-27 Venezuela 58-05 Andrés Pérez, Carlos Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
101-2002-4-12 Venezuela 58-05 Chávez, Hugo Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
101-2002-4-13 Venezuela 58-05 Chávez, Hugo combined
101-2004-2-5 Venezuela 58-05 Chávez, Hugo not exist
101-2019-4-30 Venezuela 05-NA Maduro Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
• # 101-1946-9-16: Venezuela, Rómulo Betancourt

codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela from October 18, 1945, until February 15,
1948; GWF code a provisional regime (Venezuela 45-47) from January 1, 1946, until
December 13, 1947.25 EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Venezuela from 1946 to
1972 with Whites/Mestizos as the largest ethnic group.
Event: Following the October 1945 coup ousting President Isaias Medina Angarita, the
anti-communist coup leaders proposed establishing a US-style democracy. “For two of
the three years that Acción Democrática governed Venezuela, it shared power with the
young officers of the UPM. Under their power-sharing arrangement, Betancourt served
as the president; Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, who attended military
25. In October 1945 a military coup that put in place a provisional regime, with the Acción Democrática
(AD) leader, Betancourt, as provisional president. Betancourt went on to win a democratic multiparty
election in December 1947.
205
school in Paris, became the minister of defense; and Marcos Pérez Jiménez served as
military chief of staff. Military budgets nearly tripled during the trienio” through
November 1948, but this did not prevent incessant military conspiracies during the
Junta Revolucionaria period (Cueva 1982, 246).
On the night of September 16, 1946, non-commissioned officers at the Ambrosio Plaza
cavalry barracks on the outskirts of the capital revolted. Sgt. Teodolindo Moret was
reported to be the rebel leader and having killed Antonio Davila Celis, captain of the
guard and commander of a cavalry battalion. Lt. Col. Enrique Rincón Calcaño, head
of the Caracas garrison, “cooly defied a sergeant with a machine gun and gained entry
to the barracks” (Associated Press 1946a). The revolt led by a 20-year-old sergeant
lasted three hours. “Seizing guns in the barracks, the rebels fought Government troops
with automatic arms until the loyalists brought up two armoured cars and poured fire
into the barracks. The mutineers gave up when Lt. Col. Rincon Calcano entered
the barracks and pleaded to them to avoid further bloodshed” (United Press 1946g).
Four people – all on the rebel side – were killed in suppressing the revolt, including
Moret. A sergeant said “that the persons participating in the uprising wanted only the
“resignation” of the present Government” (Associated Press 1946a).
Coding rationale: There is very little evidence concerning the mutineer’s goals. This
appears to have been a minor revolt, for which most observers attributed little support
or significance. One might assume this was only a mutiny given how minor the event
appears. None of the major secondary histories mention this event among the major
coup conspiracies of 1946-1947. Nevertheless, because the only source says that the
mutineers sought the resignation of the government, we code this event as a failed coup
attempt. AMBIGUOUS.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; failed coup attempt - Singh and
Thompson; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela from October 18,
1945, until February 15, 1948; GWF code a provisional regime (Venezuela 45-47)
from January 1, 1946, until December 13, 1947. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant
in Venezuela from 1946 to 1972 with Whites/Mestizos as the largest ethnic group.
Event: “Throughout the period that Rómulo Betancourt was president of the Junta
Revolucionaria, the Acción Democrática regime was faced with constant conspiracy
from hostile military elements within and outside the country. Abroad, the principal
figure working to overthrow the regime was ex-President Eleazar López Contreras,”
who from Miami “gathered around himself a substantial number of opponents to the
AD regime. These included old supporters of his as well as a number of young officers
who had participated in the revolution of October 18 but subsequently turned against
the Adecos. These latter included Colonel Celestino Velazco, Colonel Eleazar Nino,
and Maldonado Peña... López Contreras organized two efforts to mount an invasion
of Venezuela. The first was scheduled for December 1946, but was aborted when the
conspiracy of Colonel Julio César Vargas, failed in Mérida. A second effort failed a few
206
months later, when still another attempted uprising of army elements within Venezuela
was frustrated.” Meanwhile, a “coup was planned for the night of October 25, 1946, two
days before the election for the constituent assembly” involving “ex-president López
Contreras from outside and various active and retired military men within the country,
including an old Gómez general, José Antonio González.” However, “the conspirators
were discovered before they could carry out their plans” (Cueva 1982, 245-246).
On 10 December 1946, Lieutenant Colonel Rincón Calcaño, the same officer who broke
up a revolt by junior officers in September (see 101-1946-9-16), “led a particularly
serious coup attempt” in which “many of the garrisons of Caracas and Jóvito Villalba,
a leader of an opposition political party, were involved” (Trinkunas 2006, 45). Troops
at Maracay (the state capital of Aragua) led by Maj. Carlos Maldonado Peña, sub-
inspector of the Air Force, revolted and seized control of La Victoria and Valencia.
At 6 a.m. on December 11, a rebel plane flew from Maracay to Caracas to strafe
the presidential palace, but was repelled by anti-aircraft fire (New York Times 1946c).
Lieutenant Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez, army chief of staff and principal leader of
the October 1945 coup installing Betancourt, “stayed loyal to the government and
even manned a machine gun at Miraflores to defend the presidential palace against the
rebels,” despite the fact that the coup was headed by fellow junior UPM officers and
was supported by his older brother, Lt. Col. Juan Pérez Jiménez (Cueva 1982, 246).
That night, loyalist forces recaptured Valencia, “breaking the back of the rebellion.”
Maj. Maldonado fled to Colombia (New York Times 1946c). On December 12, the
regime rounded up the remaining rebels (Associated Press 1946i).
On December 14, Betancourt said the uprising was by army elements determined to
prevent the Constituent Assembly from meeting (New York Times 1946a). The British
Embassy was concerned at how close the rebels came to winning and how Venezuela
“could at any time be won by a few determined men. Ernest Bevin commented on this
report that, “The government did not triumph so easily in view of the overwhelming
support of the people as shown by the recent elections but in view of the fact that they
knew what was going to happen and nipped the revolt in the bud.” A later report
forwarded to London cites criticism of Betancourt for being unable to cure the country’s
ills. The report was written by Julio Cesar Vargas, implicated in the insurrection
of December 1946, who claimed Betancourt was ‘imposing his political party on an
unwilling country.’ To counter opposition from, especially, military quarters, AD armed
and organised their supporters into a Popular Militia” (Derham 2010, 87).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event a failed provisional coup.

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; failed coup attempt - Thomp-
son; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela from October 18, 1945, until
February 15, 1948; GWF code a provisional regime (Venezuela 45-47) from January 1,
1946, until December 13, 1947.
207
Event: “In June 1947 delegates to a constitutional convention dominated overwhelm-
ingly by Acción Democrática reaffirmed the principle of universal suffrage and women’s
right to vote” (Tinker Salas 2015, 83). Early on the morning of July 26 1947, the Paez
barracks in Maracay revolted, leading to one death (Maj. Manuel Segundo Prato
Davilo) and three wounded (including Lieut. Jose Vicente Mendoza and two privates).
“The cause apparently was dissatisfaction among certain elements with changes in the
command of the barracks” (New York Times 1947i). Calm was restored quickly and “A
spokesman at Miraflores Presidential palace said the movement was not important”
(United Press 1947m). “An authoritative government source said the rebellion was
without political significance and merely was a case of breach of discipline” (Associ-
ated Press 1947j).
Coding rationale: The little evidence that exists does not indicate that the rebellious
soldiers had political motives or grievances. We therefore code this event as a mutiny.

Thompson; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela from October 18,
1945, until February 15, 1948; GWF code a provisional regime (Venezuela 45-47)
from January 1, 1946, until December 13, 1947. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant
Event: “Former president General López Contreras sponsored two attempts to over-
throw the Venezuelan government in 1947. One of his failed plots involved U.S. citizens
who purchased and flew war-surplus B-25 bombers from the southeastern United States
to Nicaragua, from where they planned to launch an aerial attack on government in-
stallations in Caracas in coordination with a local military rebellion (Burggraff 1972,
92–93; Schaposnik 1985, 52–54; Giacopini Zárraga 1994c). At the time, it seemed that
hardly a month passed without some sort of internal conspiracy by the remnants of
the ancien régime’s supporters against the government” (Trinkunas 2006, 45). “In
September 1947 government officials and loyal military officers resorted to impromptu
tactics to defeat a coup attempt by Major Eleazar Niño” (45).
On Friday, September 12, 1947, the garrison at Puerto La Cruz revolted. After several
hours of fighting it was put down with troops from Barcelona, but only with casualties
(New York Times 1947j). The government announced that “several civilians, wearing
military uniforms, had been captured with guns and machine guns in their possession”
(Chicago Tribune 1947). A rebellion in some towns in the State of Tachira was also
quelled (New York Times 1947j). On September 13, the government reported that
three people had been killed, seven wounded, and hundreds arrested in putting down
the “counter-revolutionary coup” attempt in Tachira allegedly led by Jose Antonio
Gonzales. “The object was to take the state capital of San Cristobal and establish the
city as a base for extending operations throughout Venezuela. Tachira is considered
the center of opposition to the present government, being the native state of former
Presidents Gen. Eleazar Lopez Contreras and Gen. Isaias Medina Angarita. The
208
majority there voted against the Democratic Action Party in the elections last October”
(New York Times 1947c).
Concurrent with the revolt in Tachira, it was reported that army and police quelled
a planned coup in which some elements “had even gone into the streets to attack the
Presidential Palace” (New York Times 1947j). “In Caracas, the block in which Miraflo-
res Palace, seat of the government is located, was cordoned off by motor buses placed
at street intersections, apparently by persons implicated in the plot here” (Associated
Press 1947l). However, “No damage was done and the state of alarm subsided within
a few hours.” (New York Times 1947j).
Eighteen civilians and two former troops, including former minister José Nicomedes
Rivas (under President Eleazar Lopez Contreras), were arrested, and arms and military
uniforms were found in several households (New York Times 1947j). Also arrested
was Jose Domingo Colmenares, minister of communications under former President
Isaias Medina Angarita, Rosiendo L. Hernandez, an army medical corps officer, and
former army Capt. Leonidas Mendez (Chicago Tribune 1947). On September 24, the
interior minister Col. Mario Vargas revealed the names of the 200 still under arrested
in connection with the revolt, including “civilians, military officers” and Dr. Victor
Lopez, an official in the Ministry of Development. Vargas also said that an arrest order
had been issued for his brother, Julio Cesar Vargas (New York Times 1947a).26
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event as a failed provisional
coup, as the revolt implicated not only civilians and ex-military, but also current,
active troops in provincial garrisons.
• # 101-1948-11-24: Venezuela, Rómulo Gallegos

Luttwak, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Gallegos as the leader of Venezuela
from February 15, 1948 until exiting on this date through “irregular” means by mili-
tary actors without foreign support; GWF code the collapse of a democracy (Venezuela
47-48) on this date. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Venezuela from 1946 to 1972
with Whites/Mestizos as the largest ethnic group.
Event: In Venezuela’s first free and direct election in December 1947, Rómulo Galle-
gos, the Acción Democrática (AD) candidate, “won by a landslide. Delgado Chalbaud
retained the position of Minister of Defense” (Tinker Salas 2015, 84). Yet political
polarization only intensified after Gallegos was inaugurated as president on February
15, 1948. “At that time, Venezuela’s most renowned author, Gallegos proved less
than adroit as a politician” (Rudolph 1990, 20), whose “actions began to worry the
26. In early April 1947, Julio Cesar Vargas, then the former Inspector General of the armed forces, quit the
army and charged the government with being communist. In reply, the government charged Cesar Vargas
and two other officials with coup plotting with former President Eleazar Lopez Contreras. The government
publicized a letter from Lopez Contreras to Julio Cesar Vargas in which the former pledged the latter aid
“in the task of eliminating the Accion Democratica party from the government” (New York Times 1947b).
Cesar Vargas later fled to the Peruvian Embassy (New York Times 1947a).
209
more conservative sectors of society, including the Church and business interests. The
military demanded that AD create a bipartisan cabinet, and claimed that the party
was seeking to create its own militia and stockpile weapons. Former president López
Contreras and dictator Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic began circulating”
coup rumors (Tinker Salas 2015, 85). Gallegos signed AD’s wide-ranging land reform
bill in October 1948, pitting “the nation’s powerful landowners against him, and his
reduction of the military personnel in his cabinet and advocacy of a reduced military
budget alienated the armed forces” (Rudolph 1990, 20).
In mid-November 1948, “the UPM issued an ultimatum to the president demanding
that COPEI share political authority with AD and that Betancourt, still AD leader, be
sent into exile. Gallegos refused. On November 24, 1948, “the military overthrew him
in a nearly bloodless coup” (20). Rómulo Gallegos “was detained by army officers at his
home in Caracas” that day. “Other officers quickly arrested the AD leadership “along
with labor activists, journalists, and prominent civilian supporters of the Gallegos
government. Despite having received an impressive mandate in elections nine months
earlier, President Gallegos was deposed practically without a struggle. Moreover, the
coup was carried out by the minister of defense and chief of the General Staff, the very
same officers who had brought” AD to power in October 1945 (Trinkunas 2006, 27).
Thus the same officers who initiated the trienio democratic experiment had ended it.
Gallegos went to exile in Mexico (Tinker Salas 2015, 85). Betancourt and the rest of
the AD leadership were also exiled (Rudolph 1990, 20).
“The three-man provisional military junta that assumed control of the government
was headed by Colonel Delgado. Delgado had joined the anti-AD conspiracy only
after Gallegos had rejected the UPM ultimatum and it was clear that his fall was in-
evitable. Delgado had been a UPM coconspirator in 1945, and had served as a member
of the AD junta and as minister of defense under Gallegos The military junta’s other
two members, UPM conspirator Pérez Jiménez and Luis Felipe Llovera Paez, were
tachirenses who also held the rank of colonel” (20-21). On November 25, “Caracas
newspapers carried front-page pictures of JóvitoVillalba and Rafael Caldera, leaders of
the principal opposition parties, Unión Republicana Democrática (URD) and Comité
de Organización Polı́tica Electoral Independiente (COPEI), jovially exchanging hand-
shakes with members of the new military junta... The general public responded to
the overthrow of the democratic regime with equanimity” (Trinkunas 2006, 27). “The
junta quickly set about undoing the reforms of the AD trienio... It voided the 1947
constitution and restored the traditionalist 1936 constitution. The new military gov-
ernment outlawed AD and persecuted its militants ” (Rudolph 1990, 20-21).
“Gallegos initially blamed the United States and the oil companies for sanctioning the
coup. While the large oil companies such as Creole (Standard Oil) and the United
States embassy had nurtured relations with AD and did not especially stand to gain
much from a coup, the presence of US military attaché Colonel Edward F. Adams
and a US civilian, Robert T. Brinsmade, in the country just as the Venezuelan officers
were planning the coup suggests that they may have worked at cross-purposes from
the embassy and the oil companies. Some assert that although Betancourt had won
the confidence of the State Department and the oil companies, the Pentagon, which
210
viewed oil as a strategic reserve in any future conflict, did not trust” Betancourt or
AD and “had engineered the coup against Gallegos” (Tinker Salas 2015, 85).
There are different interpretations of the coup. Some attribute it “to civilian and
military unfamiliarity with the institutions of democratic rule, excessive levels of par-
tisanship, and military hostility to civilian attempts to politicize the armed forces”
(Burggraff 1972). Some blame “the collapse of Venezuela’s brief democratic experi-
ment on the mutual hostility generated by AD’s exclusion of opposition political groups
from policymaking and on state-church conflicts over government supervision of edu-
cation during the 1945–48 period” (Levine 1973). Some argue that “the armed forces
acted corporately to overthrow the civilian government, guided by a militarist sense of a
“manifest destiny” to rule Venezuela” (Avendaño Lugo 1982). Others, especially politi-
cians involved at the time, “placed greater emphasis on the role of the U.S. embassy
and its military attachés, who encouraged and supported a coup against Gallegos in
response to U.S. fears of Communist infiltration of the ruling party” (Trinkunas 2006,
28). The Communist Party, banned by the new military junta, “decried the coup and
organized clandestine resistance” (Tinker Salas 2015, 86).
• # 101-1950-11-13: Venezuela, Carlos Delgado Chalbaud

Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; not a candidate - CCD, CSP; assassination
- PT and Singh; failed coup attempt - Luttwak (November 11); Archigos codes Del-
gado Chalbaud as exiting on November 13, 1950, through “irregular” means by rebels
without foreign support; Svolik codes Delgado Chalbaud’s exit on November 13 in a
non-military assassination; GWF code a military-personal regime (Venezuela 48-58)
from November 24, 1948, until January 23, 1958.
Event: On November 13, 1950, Lt. Col. Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, Venezuela’s Pres-
ident and junta leader, was assassinated in an ambush by twenty armed assailants on
his way to the Presidential palace from his home. The assassins were led by Gen. (ret.)
Rafael Simon Urbina, “long a leader of Venezuelan exiles” who had returned to the
country about five months before. Capt. Delgado Chalbaud’s aid de camp Charles
Bacalao Lara, who was wounded in the ambush, said the assassins had worn civilian
clothing. A curfew and martial law was declared, and fellow junta member and Defense
Minister Lt. Col. Perez Jimenez denounced the “dastardly and cowardly act” (United
Press 1950g).
Former Gen. Simon Urbina, wounded in the leg during the attack, was apprehended
after he sought refuge in the Nicaraguan embassy with his family. On November 14,
he was shot to death reportedly after he tried to take a prison guard’s gun (Associated
Press 1950c). On November 16, a second assassin, Rafael Simón Roversi, died in the
hospital of wounds sustained in the attack (Reuters 1950b). On November 18, Osorio
de Jesus Ollavares was arrested as one of the assassins hired by Simon Urbina (United
211
Press 1950a). Other alleged assassins under arrest were Domingo J. Urbina, nephew
of the lead assassin, and Paulino Reyes, Jesus Acosta, and Pablo Ledezma (Associated
Press 1950i). On November 27, Germán Suárez Flamerich, a civilian, was named
president of the junta (United Press 1950c). In reality, Pérez Jiménez “emerged as
the driving force behind the regime.” After rigged elections he became president in
December 1952 (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 2015, 220).
a coup attempt. Based on the evidence, however, we concur with PT, Singh, and Svolik
that this event is an assassination that did not involve current, active members of the
military, and thus was also a case of prior defection. The assassination has been the
source of some controversy, as some Venezuelans and observers believe Perez Jimenez
was the hidden sponsor of the assassination (e.g. Crisp 2000, 23, Gunson, Thompson,
and Chamberlain 2015). If the rumors were true, then this assassination was part of
a successful coup from within the military. However, we have no overt evidence that
would support such a coding, and so we exclude this event as a coup, even though the
evidence is admittedly ambiguous. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 101-1952-9-29: Venezuela, Marcos Pérez Jiménez

Singh; Archigos codes Perez Jimenez as the leader of Venezuela from November 13,
1950, to January 23, 1958; GWF code a military-personal regime (Venezuela 48-48)
from November 24, 1948, to January 23, 1958. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in
Venezuela from 1946 to 1972 with Whites/Mestizos as the largest ethnic group.
Event: On Monday, September 29, 1952, a group of armed civilians attacked a National
Guard post at Turen, while another group of armed civilians seized the prefecture in
the nearby village of Bruzual. Meanwhile, Capt. Wilfred Omana and Lt. Hector
Navarro Torres “attempted to induce officers at Venezuela’s main air base at Boca
del Rio, near Maracay, to join them in rebellion, a General Staff communiqué said.
The other officers refused, it was said, and Captain Omana fled and Lieut. Navarro
Torres surrendered” (Associated Press 1952a). On October 2, the Defense Ministry
reported that ‘civilian-backed Army units under Captain Rojas and Lieutenant Mar-
tinez stormed and held the barracks for some time” in Maturin, the State capital of
Monagas in Eastern Venezuela. Meanwhile, the army pursued the initial civilian rebels
from Turen that had taken to the mountains (Reuters 1952). On October 4, the gov-
ernment announced that order had been fully restored following the two “revolutionary
attempts” (United Press International 1952).
Coding rationale: The government attributed the attempt to “a ‘group of terrorists’
made up of Communists and backers of the former Democratic Action regime.” Hal-
lett (1952) questioned whether communists participated, but said there was “probably
little doubt” that underground leftist Democratic Action (Acción Democrática, AD)
elements took part in the uprising. AD candidate Rómulo Gallegos took office in
212
February 1948 after the country’s first free and fair elections, but he was overthrown
in a coup on November 24. Gallegos was sent into exile and the AD outlawed. “AD
suffered severely during slightly more than nine years of the subsequent military dicta-
torship...and one by one its underground secretaries general were jailed or murdered or
both” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1996, 8). Indeed, on October 22, 1952, national security
police gunned down Ruiz Pineda, an AD leader who had escaped from jail (Associated
Press 1952d). GWF code the 1948 overthrow of the AD as a regime change. The 1952
plotters did not publicly issue any demands. But based on the limited evidence, we
assume the plotters desired a return to civilian rule in general and perhaps to restore
the underground AD opposition to power in particular. Either way, the junior officer’s
success would constitute a regime change.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; successful coup -
Luttwak; successful coup - Thompson (November 30); Archigos codes Perez Jimenez
as the leader of Venezuela from November 13, 1950, until January 23, 1958; GWF code
a military-personal regime (Venezuela 48-58) from November 24, 1948, until January
23, 1958.
Event: “After maneuvering for four years to sideline rivals in the military junta he
helped run, by 1952 Marcos Pérez Jiménez “looked to consolidate power and grant
his rule legitimacy” by calling for new presidential elections and a new constitutional
referendum (Velasco 2015, 35-36). In May 1951, a political party, the Frente Electoral
Independiente (FEI), was created to back Pérez Jiménez. The electoral campaign for
president began in May 1952. The junta, confident in victory, had not prepared for
electoral fraud and promised a fair election. On November 30, 1952, elections were
held with the first returns showing that the opposition URD candidate Villalba was
in the lead and the FEI was in for a defeat. Newspapers on December 1 reported the
true results (Coronil 1997, 152-153).
But Military members had overnight convened to back Pérez Jiménez and the military
staying in power. Following a “civil formula” for stealing the election, the junta resigned
and on December 2 chose Pérez Jiménez as Provisional President. (154-155). “Billed
by his supporters as a proxy referendum on Pérez Jiménez’s presidential ambitions,”
the electoral fraud fooled no one. “On December 2, a handpicked electoral board
formalized the new electoral results granting Pérez Jiménez, at last, undisputed power
over Venezuela” (Velasco 2015, 35-36). “After balloting marked by clumsy fraud on
the part of the regime, Perez had himself declared president. No longer directing affairs
from behind the scenes, Perez made no pretense of ruling democratically. Having no
political constituency, he ruled in the name of and on behalf of the military” (Haggerty
1993, 181).
a coup. Evidence indicates that this event involves electoral fraud engineered by the
regime leader to consolidate his own power and that of the military, and marks the
213
personalization of the military regime. However, this event in no way involves current
active members of the military attempting to oust the regime leader or regime (they
sought to preserve them), and therefore does not qualify as a military coup. Because
the event involves the regime leader preventing the legal succession to the opposition,
we code this event as a successful autogolpe.

Singh; Archigos codes Perez Jimenez as the leader of Venezuela from November 13,
1950, to January 23, 1958; GWF code a military-personal regime (Venezuela 48-48)
from November 24, 1948, to January 23, 1958. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in
Event: At 5 a.m. on January 1, 1958, airmen at the Maracay base rebelled and flew sor-
ties over Caracas 50 miles to the east with warplanes. The rebel-held radio in Maracay
said the presidential palace had been bombed and claimed that the state of Aragua was
under their total control (Associated Press 1958f). But the rebellion quickly collapsed,
and fifteen air force officers fled to Colombia. Gen. Hugo Fuentes, commander of the
ground forces, and Col. Jesus Maria Castro Leon, air force vice chief of staff, planned
the New Year’s uprising but were arrested on December 30. This reportedly prompted
their followers to launch the rebellion earlier than had originally been planned. The
New Years’ rebellion leaders were released after military chief of staff Gen. Romulo
Fernandes forced Jiménez under threat of a military coup on January 10 to accept a
new cabinet with Fernandes as Defense Minister. Jiménez also agreed to dismiss two of
his main backers: interior minister Leureano Vallenilla Lanz and chief of secret police
Pedro Estrada (Tad Szulc 1958e, 1958b). But on January 13, with the support of
younger army officers, Jiménez temporarily reasserted control by arresting Fernandes
and assuming the Defense portfolio for himself (Tad Szulc 1958f). But over the next
ten days, the regime struggled to suppress civilian anti-regime street protests as man-
ifestos calling for a return to democracy began to circulate (Tad Szulc 1958c, 1958a).
On January 21, a “Patriotic Junta” (La Junta Patri’otica) consisting of four banned
opposition parties called for a general strike, which led to two days of riots (New York
Times 1958a, 1958l). The crisis that began on New Year’s only ended when Jiménez
went into exile on January 23 (New York Times 1958g).
Coding rationale: Just 17 days prior to the abortive New Years rebellion, President
Gen. Marcos Pérez Jiéenez won another 5-year term in an uncontested yes-or-no
plebiscite. Political unrest emerged earlier in December when students protested
Jiménez’s decision not to hold a presidential election (Associated Press 1958f). The
New Years uprising was ascribed to opposition to the plebiscite (Tad Szulc 1958f).
According to Rudolph and Rudolph (1996, 370), the Patriotic Front (JP) had formed
in June 1957 to force a free and fair election on Jiménez. Soon after, JP Branches “ap-
peared in Maracay and Puerto La Cruz.” We therefore assume that the New Year’s
rebellion was sympathetic to the JP cause, although we have found no evidence that
214
directly links the JP to the New Year’s rebellion. Nonetheless, Rudolph (1990) notes
that the Air Force bombing gave “heart to the civilian opposition to Pérez by signaling
that they were not without allies within the military,” leading the JP to hold mass
protests. Thus, the New Year’s rebellion ignited the political crisis which resulted in
the overthrow of the Jiménez regime a few weeks later (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
2014). We thus code this event as a failed regime change coup.

Other Datasets: successful military coup, palace coup, and popular revolt - CCD;
Forced leadership change not considered coup d’état (resignation of executive due to
poor performance/loss of authority) - CSP; rebellion - PT; successful coup - Singh;
Archigos codes Pérez Jiménez as exiting on this date via “irregular means” by popular
protest without foreign support; Svolik codes the exit of Pérez Jiménez on this date
by revolt but with military involvement; GWF code the collapse of a military-personal
regime (Venezuela 48-58) on this date in a popular uprising. EPR codes ethnicity as
irrelevant in Venezuela from 1946 to 1972 with Whites/Mestizos as the largest ethnic
group.
Event: See 101-1958-1-1 for a chronology of events leading up to January 22. By then,
military conspirators had been in contact with the JP and gave notice that they would
stage a coup during the second day of the strike (New York Times 1958e). At 6 p.m.
on January 22, Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, named Navy Commander just 12 days
earlier, conferred with other officers to plan their move. Soon after, they issued Gen.
Perez Jimenez an ultimatum to resign by 10p.m. Half an out later, nine navy destroyers
left La Guair, ten miles from Caracas, and aimed its guns at Miraflores Palace. Col.
Romero, of the air force, was sent to parley after Perez Jimenez sent word that he
wanted to discuss terms (Tad Szulc 1958d).
By early January 23, 1958, when “the military refused to repress the assembled crowds,”
Perez Jimenez realized that he had lost the military’s support (Salas 2015, 91-92). At 2
a.m., Perez Jimenez agreed to resign, and rebel officers took over Miraflores Palace. At
3:08 a.m, Perez Jimenez boarded a plane for exile in Miami (New York Times 1958g;
Tad Szulc 1958d). At 3:10 a.m., Fabricio Ojeda, a 29-year journalist and member of the
Republican Democratic Union (URD), went on the radio to announce that he was the
president of the Junta Patriótica (JP), which he said was a “super-party” that would
direct politics (New York Times 1958e). For many more hours, 100 secret police who
held out at their headqurters for nine hours were routed and fled (gunfire continued in
the capital through the night) (Tad Szulc 1958d).
A seven-man “Junta de Gobierno” was formed under the leadership of Admiral Larraz-
abal (Salas 2015, 91-92). The Junta de Gobierno initially included four other military
men. These were Col. Roberto Casanova, of the army; Col. Abel Romero Villate, of
the air force; Col. Carlos Luis Araque, of the national guard; Col. Pedro José Quevedo,
of the police. The civilians, added to gain the support of the JP, were Eugenio Men-
doza, an industrialist, and Blas Lamberti, a former professor (Ted Szulc 1958). “The
215
presence of the two former military officers sympathetic to the dictator [Casanova and
Romero] on the Junta de Gobierno generated protests, however, and forced their res-
ignation and replacement by civilians” (Salas 2015, 91-92). Col. Jesus Maria Castro
Leon was named Minister of Defense (Tad Szulc 1958d).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we assume that active military personnel
did take concrete actions to oust Perez Jimenez, including supporting civilian demon-
strators and demanding his resignation. Even had the military only taken active steps
to seize power after Perez Jimenez left for exile, the seizure would still have consti-
tuted concrete actions targeting the constitutional successor. Consistent with Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014), we therefore code this event as a successful regime change
coup.
• # 101-1958-7-22: Venezuela, Wolfgang Larrazabal

Thompson; mutiny - Singh; Archigos codes Larrazabal as the leader of Venezuela from
January 23, 1958, until November 14, 1958; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela 58-05)
from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005. The interim regime in power from the
January 1958 resignation of Pérez Jiménez until the multiparty elections in December
1958 did not span a January 1 of any calendar year and is therefore not coded by GWF
as a provisional regime distinct from the post- Pérez Jiménez democratic regime. EPR
codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Venezuela from 1946 to 1972 with Whites/Mestizos as
the largest ethnic group.
Event: Following the January 1958 coup, the junta “contained personnel from all
three military services; it was led by Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, who headed the
crucial January 22 naval rebellion” (Rudolph 1990, 23). “The months between the
ouster of Pérez Jiménez and the election proved tense as rumors of possible coups
circulated frequently. Fearing the impact of Colonel Trejo on the armed forces, the
government appointed him as ambassador to Costa Rica to facilitate his departure
from the country” (Tinker Salas 2015, 93). “Under a new electoral law decreed in
May, the junta convoked elections for December 1958” (Rudolph 1990, 23). In May
1958, mob protests also disrupted an official visit by U.S. Vice President Richard
Nixon, leading the civilian members of the junta to resign when the military excluded
them from meetings to determine a diplomatic response. For his part, General Castro
León, the Minister of Defense, was “incensed by Larrazábal’s seeming support for the
crowds who participated in the mobbing of Nixon’s motorcade,” became convinced
that “democratization was bringing about a collapse in law and order,” and began to
consider military intervention (Trinkunas 2006, 92).
Meanwhile, on Monday, June 16, Caracas Governor Colonel Vicente Marchelli an-
nounced the replacement of Dr. Celso Fortoul as Municipal Engineer. Fourtoul had
endeared himself to popular sectors by hiring workers and implementing an Emergency
Plan of large construction projects in the barrios and squatter communities that had
emerged since January 1958. On June 17, after mass protests broke out in front of the
216
presidential palace, Junta president Wolfgang Larrazábal agreed to reinstate Fortoul.
That evening, Marchelli was dismissed (Velasco 2015, 77-78). This case contributed to
Castro León’s dismay at the junta’s acquiescence to popular mobilization.
“Fearing an imminent AD-led coup attempt, on 21 July 1958 General Castro León pre-
sented an ultimatum to President Larrazábal. Among his demands were (1) reshuffling
the ministerial cabinet to eliminate the influence of Acción Democrática in government
and create a national unity cabinet; (2) banning the Venezuelan Communist Party from
political life; (3) passing a new press law to restrict media criticism of the armed forces;
and (4) authorizing the Ministry of Defense to independently reorganize the armed
forces and alter its operating procedures” (Trinkunas 2006, 92-93). Addressing the
Fortoul protests, Castro León’s ultimatum said: “The Junta’s conduct and its errant
decisions in resolving the case of Col. Marchelli in his post as Governor of the Federal
District” was embarrassing and “has erased the inherent authority of the Executive”
(Velasco 2015, 82). “In effect, Castro León insisted on the exclusion of the most radical
political elements from power, including Acción Democrática” and urban supporters,
“and full autonomy for the armed forces from civilian authority. Had his demands
been accepted, it would have meant a far-reaching expansion of military jurisdictional
boundaries into the areas of public policy” and leader selection (Trinkunas 2006, 93).
But “Larrazábal and his civilian collaborators decided to resist, relying on their al-
lies in the military and their ability to mobilize mass popular support. Larrazábal
immediately departed Caracas for a seaside government residence, La Guzmania, con-
veniently located near the principal installations of the pro-democratic navy. Once he
had reached this secure location, he summoned his cabinet and began to organize mil-
itary resistance to what he saw as a veiled coup attempt. His civilian ministers voted
overwhelmingly to reject Castro León’s demands, and political activists immediately
began organizing mass mobilizations in favor of the transitional government. However,
President Larrazábal found that all major military garrisons in Caracas had responded
positively to his minister of defense’s call to insurrection. With Caracas in rebel hands,
the prospect for the survival of the Junta de Gobierno seemed grim” (93).
“In Caracas, General Castro León was stunned by the overwhelmingly negative popular
reaction to his demands, particularly since he had been assured of widespread civilian
support by one of his co-conspirators, Major Juan de Dios Moncada Vidal. Accompa-
nied by 200–300 officers who had gathered in support at the Ministry of Defense, both
witnessed crowds of tens of thousands of citizens surging around the building, vocifer-
ously supporting the junta and opposing Castro León. Leaders of the major political
parties addressed the demonstrators continuously, encouraging popular resistance at
all costs. The unions publicly declared a general strike that was widely supported by
both workers and businesspeople. Professional groups and, most important, FEDE-
CARMARAS... communicated their opposition to military intervention directly to
Castro León and his supporters... Even though every military garrison in Caracas had
joined the coup attempt, Castro León was completely paralyzed and unnerved by the
sheer volume of popular opposition” (93).
“Castro León’s confidence eroded as he faced the crowds, waiting for a response from
217
the transitional government. Then, on the evening of 22 July, Castro León was informed
that the major military garrisons of Maracay (west of Caracas) had declared for the
Junta de Gobierno. Isolated and fearing a civil war, Castro León met with Larrazábal
in Caracas and was browbeaten into presenting his resignation as minister of defense in
the early hours of 23 July. Castro León ordered the rebellious garrisons to stand down
and boarded a plane into exile (Velásquez 1995). In the end, the internal divisions in
the armed forces were revealed by the coup attempt, and the sheer size of the civilian
mass mobilization signaled to the armed forces that renewed intervention would not
be easy” (Trinkunas 2006, 94).
Prior Castro León’s uprising, “the armed forces were able to restrict civilian decision
making in the interim government at will. Officers in the junta voted or spoke publicly
on issues of government domestic policy. The military maintained a dominant role in
matters of external security and foreign policy and excluded civilians from critical de-
cisions, such as Venezuela’s diplomatic response to U.S. threats of intervention during
the attack on Vice President Nixon on his visit to Venezuela in early 1958. Moreover,
as minister of defense, Castro León was able to resist important military reform mea-
sures... In matters of internal security, the armed forces predominated as well” (94).
“Following Castro León’s exile, no single military leader was able to knit together a
sufficient number of military units and officers to credibly threaten to overthrow the
government. The more progressive wing of the officer corps, led by the navy, held the
upper hand within the military and readily supported the junta. The Castro León
coup attempt also hardened government and civilian attitudes toward military rebel-
lion. Subsequent attempts by military officers to rebel were punished with long prison
sentences, rather than exile, as had previously been the norm. These events also led
to a reform of the military code of justice, nearly doubling the penalties for rebellion”
to 25-30 years of imprisonment” (94-95).
Castro León was “dismissed as minister of defense by the Provisional Government
headed by Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal” (Robert Jackson Alexander 1982, 478). He
was replaced by Chief of the Air Force, General José Lopez Henriquez (New York Times
1958f). Subsequently Castro Leó “went abroad as air force attaché in the Venezue-
lan Embassy in London. From there in November 1959 he issued an open letter to
Betancourt in which he called upon the Venezuelan Armed Forces to overthrow the
Betancourt government. The High Command of the Armed Forces reacted strongly
to Castro León’s call for subversion by the military. They immediately recommended
to the president that General Castro León be retired “as a disciplinary measure”; the
recommendation was accepted (Robert Jackson Alexander 1982, 478).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event was a coup attempt (as PT and others
characterize it) or a mutiny (as Singh codes) depends on whether there is evidence
that the Castro Leon uprising had goals that included ousting Larrazabal or the pro-
visional government. “Castro León’s goal was the expansion of military jurisdiction
into the areas of public policy and state leadership selection, which would allow the
armed forces to supervise the political process and prevent alleged Communist infil-
tration” (Trinkunas 2006, 96). The revolt had demanded that “President Wolfgang
218
Larrazábal undertake political and military changes and appoint new members to the
board” (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 90). Castro Leon’s ultimatum on July 21
was reportedly a “prelude to a planned coup he hoped would expel left-wing sectors
from the ranks of the government” (Velasco 2015, 82). All of these initial goals fall
short of our definition of a coup attempt and would instead target other actors and
therefore qualify as a mutiny.
However, the initial reporting was ambiguous because the ultimatum had not been
made public, though some sources believed the demands included establishing a mil-
itary junta (New York Times 1958d). Some report that Castro Leon also demanded
“the formation of a new junta more to the liking of the conservative wing of the Armed
Forces. Larrazabal resisted, and most of the armed forces remained loyal, as did Euge-
nio Mendoza, who refused the presidency which Castro had offered him” (Ewell 1984,
124-125). On the assumption that Castro León would have mobilized military forces
to oust Larrazába and form a new junta (headed by Mendoza instead of Larrazábal) if
(a) Larrazábal did not accede to his demands; and (b) Larrazábal failed to signal – via
demonstrations – popular support for his position, we code this event as a failed (veto)
coup attempt against the provisional regime which sought to forestall or circumscribe
the democratization process. We code this as a coup attempt – and not a plot – be-
cause the coup attempt leader, Castro, made public demands to remove the leader and
the incumbent leader sought refuge near allied military installations.
• # 101-1958-9-7: Venezuela, Wolfgang Larrazabal

Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Larrazabal as the leader of Venezuela from
January 23, 1958, until November 14, 1958; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela 58-05)
from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005. The interim regime in power from the
January 1958 resignation of Pérez Jiménez until the multiparty elections in December
1958 did not span a January 1 of any calendar year and is therefore not coded by GWF
as a provisional regime distinct from the post- Pérez Jiménez democratic regime. EPR
codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Venezuela from 1946 to 1972 with Whites/Mestizos as
Event: After the failed coup attempt in July (see 101-1958-7-22), “Larrazábal began
to reorganize the armed forces, replacing the perezjimenista general staff with a joint
Chief of Staff. Another conservative revolt, this time headed by Lt.-Col. Juan de Dı́os
Moncada Vidal and Lt.-Col. José Hely Mendoza, broke out in September” (125). The
mid-level officers who led “a second, more violent coup against the junta government”
on the morning of September 7, 1958, had hoped “that a rash of civilian deaths would
result in a Bogotazo-like upheaval, thereby exposing the ruling junta’s weakness and,
in the ensuing chaos, open the door for its overthrow” (Velasco 2015, 83). The coup
leaders – whom had been expelled from the country the previous month – had returned
the prior week and struck while Junta President Wolfgang Larrazábal was in eastern
Venezuela in Cumana. Shortly before dawn, the rebels with the support of part of
219
the military police force and at least one battalion seized the Defense Ministry, and
surrounded the Presidential Palace (which had several cabinet members inside) with
tanks, and demanded their surrender (New York Times 1958k).
“Workers and students again supported the government and called for a general strike”
(Ewell 1984, 125). Popular sectors mobilized strongly to defend the junta. In the morn-
ing, troops fired into crowds of pro-junta protesters. For their part, armed protesters
tried to break into military police barracks and set up barricades at key sites near the
Ministry of Defense. “By afternoon, a mass rally took place in nearby El Silencio,
where residents of the 23 de Enero joined thousands of demonstrators flocking from
other Caracas popular sectors” (Velasco 2015, 83-84). “The heads of the Navy and the
National Guard rallied to the support of the Government” as did many other officers
(New York Times 1958k). “By nightfall, the coup was quashed. In all, eighteen peo-
ple had lost their lives; one hundred had been wounded” (Velasco 2015, 83-84). Col.
Moncada and conspirators fled to an embassy (New York Times 1958k).
“At the conclusion of the movement and at Acción Democrática urging, Larrazábal
took stronger measures to punish the conspirators and warned that the costs of rebellion
were going up. The unified front of civilians and the majority of the armed forces
effectively thwarted the golpistas who believed that Venezuela had rejected the person
of Pérez Jiménez, but not the option of military rule” (Ewell 1984, 125). “Rather
than eliminate individual officers, the Junta de Gobierno issued Decree 533 on 17
January 1959, which retroactively set a thirty-year service limit for all military officers,
regardless of rank. This enabled the government to remove relatively painlessly key
senior officers who had supported Pérez Jiménez, practically all of whom had spent
more than thirty years in the armed forces” (Trinkunas 2006, 100).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event as a failed provisional
coup with similar goals as the earlier Castro León uprising (see 101-1958-7-22). Indeed,
Moncada Vidal had been a co-conspirator in that previous uprising against the junta
government (93). Though the coup leaders had been expelled, it does not appear they
had been dismissed from the military, and in any case, they had the support of other
current and active troops, so this event was not a prior defection.

Category:failed anti-democratic coup
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD, CSP, and PT; failed coup at-
tempt - Singh and Thompson; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela
from February 13, 1959, until March 11, 1964; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela 58-
05) from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant
Event: The first major attempt to overthrow President Rómulo Betancourt, who was
democratically elected in December 1948, occurred on 20 April 1960 (1189). General
Jesus Maria Castro León, who led the failed coup attempt of July 1958 (see 101-1958-
7-22) and “evidently hoping to imitate the actions of General Cipriano Castro and
220
his Andean compatriots in 1899” (Trinkunas 2006, 118), “slipped across the border”
(Robert Jackson Alexander 1982, 478) “with a group of retired and exiled army offi-
cers” (Trinkunas 2006, 118) to the city of San Cristóbal. On April 17, the government
believed it had thwarted the invasion plot when it arrested Miguel Hernandez Cara-
bano, brother-in-law and former private secretary of Gen. Castro León, and others
agents of the exiled and retired general and the Dominican Republic (New York Times
1960g). Rafael Trujillo’s government denied involvement (New York Times 1960v).
This “invasion” of Táchira, a state bordering Colombia, proceeded within two days
anyways with “the support of a local military garrison” (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres
2017, 90). General Castro León and his accomplices were granted control of Fort Boli-
var, the army garrison of San Cristóbal, the by local garrison commander Col. Pedro
Francisco Lizarazo. The rebel troops seized state government buildings in San Cristóbal
and seized two radio stations. Castro León then issued several radio broadcasts calling
for President Betancourt’s resignation, declaring a nationwide martial law, and calling
for support from the armed forces. Other leaders of the revolt in Táchira were Maj.
Luis Alberto Vivas Ramirez, Col. Juan de Dios Moncada Vidal, Maj. Manuel Azuaje,
and Maj. Edgar Trujillo Echeverria (New York Times 1960v).
“The people of San Cristóbal promptly ignored the martial law decree, and several
local political and labor” groups organized anti-coup protests (Trinkunas 2006, 118).
“Rómulo Betancourt was awakened in the middle of the night and was told of the Castro
León revolt. He met with the military chiefs immediately. He called the commanders
of all the garrisons personally, alerted them, and told them that if there were any
officers in their command whom they suspected, they should arrest them immediately.
He then called the commander of the national guard in Táchira, who informed him
of the situation there. He called the governor, a Copeyano, and told him to get in
touch with Adeco leader Carlos Andrés Pérez, who was there, and to tell him not to
organize civilian resistance, but rather to leave suppression of the insurrection up to
the military. The governor had not heard what was happening. Carlos Andrés had
seized the principal local radio station, meanwhile” (Robert Jackson Alexander 1982,
478-479).
“There was no response from military elements outside of Táchira” (478). “Castro
León became increasingly nervous at the lack of support from other military garrisons
across Venezuela, even though he was under no immediate military threat.” Loyalist
troops “maintained control of an airport near San Cristóbal” (Trinkunas 2006, 118),
but “exceedingly bad weather in Maracay, the air force base, prevented planes from
taking off to bomb the rebels.” Discussing response options “with the military leaders,
Betancourt suggested that the battalion stationed in Barquisimeto be sent to Táchira
to handle the situation. He ordered the governor of the state of Lara to provide the
transport necessary to get them there. He then turned to the officers, and said that
this was an order, whereupon they stood at attention and said “Sı́, se nor Presidente.”
Thereafter, “units of the national guard and army were mobilized to march on San
Cristóbal” (Robert Jackson Alexander 1982, 479). A “column of 1,800 troops began to
move “by road from Caracas toward Táchira,” though the distance between Caracas
and San Cristóbal meant any attack on Castro León would take considerable time
221
(Trinkunas 2006, 118).
“The Governor of Lara told Betancourt that peasants had mobilized on the road to
Táchira, to block Castro León if he should get that far. So Betancourt had airplanes
sent to drop appeals signed by him to the peasants, telling them that the soldiers
who were leaving Barquisimeto were loyal, and the peasants should let them pass, and
then should go after them, to reinforce them if that became necessary. The peas-
ants conformed to this appeal.” “Meanwhile, the civilians in Táchira were mobilized
against the insurgents by the government political parties and the labor and peasant
movements. Carlos Andrés Pérez and Valmore Acevedo, Tachira deputies of Acción
Democrátoca and Copei respectively, were largely in charge of this work. Acevedo flew
from Caracas, but had to land in Mérida, since all airports in Táchira were blockaded.
He went overland to his native state and went from town to town, talking with local
military officers who had been committed to Castro León’s rebellion. After waiting
fruitlessly for twenty-four hours for support from outside Tachira, the garrison leaders
there finally turned against” General Castro León (Robert Jackson Alexander 1982,
478-479). Castro León’s erstwhile supporters in Táchira “abandoned him as the day
wore on, as they realized that the hoped-for general uprising would not materialize.
The diminished rebel forces were unable to maintain control of San Cristóbal in the
face of popular opposition” (Trinkunas 2006, 118).
Before dawn on April 21, most of the rebels fled as loyalist forces converged. Later
that morning, remaining rebels surrendered and the government retook Fort Bolivar.
Two civilians and one soldier reportedly died and a dozen were wounded during the
24-hour revolt (New York Times 1960t). With the cause lost, “Castro León attempted
to escape back across the Colombian border” (Trinkunas 2006, 118).
On April 22, Castro León and two aides – retired Lt. Cols. Jose Isabel Gutierrez
and Manuel Silva Guillen – were captured near the Colombian border by a group of
peasants and National Guardsmen (New York Times 1960s) who “handed him over
to civilian authorities.” Taking advantage of the uprising, Betancourt jailed twenty
military officers for suspected participation in the conspiracy, retired sixteen others,
and publicly promised the longest possible prison sentences for the rebels. Within a
few years of his arrest, General Castro León died in prison from illness” (Trinkunas
2006, 118-119). Among the other arrested rebels were Col. Lizarazo and Lt. Col. Dios
Moncada Vidal, said to be “chief of staff of the revolt” (New York Times 1960t).
Betancourt’s harsh policy toward the military rebels “set the pattern for his adminis-
tration. Generally, officers convicted of conspiracy were sentenced to prison terms in
excess of twenty years, and none were pardoned until the late 1960s, long after Betan-
court’s administration had ended. Furthermore, the rapid and well-organized displays
of popular support for the new regime and against the reimposition of a dictatorship,
previously uncommon in the traditionally conservative state of Táchira, reminded mili-
tary officers of the widespread civilian consensus favoring democratization” (Trinkunas
2006, 119).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event a failed anti-democratic
coup. Although the coup attempt was led by exiled and former military officers and
222
prior defectors, it also involved current and active members of the military in Táchira
from the beginning. We therefore do not exclude this as a case of prior defection.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; failed coup attempt - Luttwak;
assassination - PT and Singh; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela
from February 13, 1959, until March 11, 1964; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela
58-05) from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005.
Event: “The most serious right-wing attack on Rómulo Betancourt occurred on 24
June 1960, Venezuela’s army day. A group of former military officers and civilians, with
the technical assistance of agents of the Dominican dictator, General Rafael Trujillo,
attempted to assassinate Betancourt. They detonated a powerful car bomb via remote
control as his presidential vehicle made its way down a busy Caracas avenue toward the
Academia Militar to join official celebrations” (Trinkunas 2006, 119). The explosion
killed Colonel Ramón Armas Pérez, Betancourt’s chief military aide-de-camp instantly
(New York Times 1960e). The explosion also killed Betancourt’s chauffeur, Luis Elpidio
Rodriguez (New York Times 1960n), and wounded several others in the presidential
motorcade, including the minister of defense, General Josué López Henrique. For his
part, Betancourt suffered burns to his face and hands. Many political and military
leaders rallied to condemn the assassination attempt (New York Times 1960e).
On June 25, President Betancourt gave a radio address reassuring Venezuelans that he
was alive and recovering well, praised the loyalty of the armed forces, and expected to
finish out his term that expired in 1964. He accused Rafael Trujillo, an old friend of
Venezuelan dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez, of having a “bloody hand” in the explosion
(New York Times 1960n). On June 27, police arrested four men for the assassination
attempt: Manuel Vicente Yanes Bustamante, who borrowed the car that exploded;
Luis Cabrera, a radio technician said to have set off the explosion; Lorenzo Mercado,
an accomplice; and Capt. Eduardo Morales Luengo, a retired and recently expelled
naval officer said to have been on a Ransa Airlines cargo plane that had flown the
equipment used from the Dominican Republic (New York Times 1960a). Luengo was
allegedly the ringleader. By June 28, Juan Manuel Sanojo, alleged Dominican agent,
and others were arrested (New York Times 1960f).
Beginning in July 1960, Betancourt sought sanctions through the Organization of
American States (OAS) against the Dominican Republic (New York Times 1960h). “In
the investigations that followed the assassination attempt, Betancourt retired ten high-
ranking officers who were suspected of harboring loyalties for Pérez Jiménez. Other
officers under suspicion for sympathizing with the assassination attempt were trans-
ferred to less prominent positions within the armed forces or sent overseas as military
attachés in Venezuelan embassies” (Trinkunas 2006, 119). In August 1960, the OAS
investigation committee confirmed that evidence directly implicated the Dominican
Republic in a plot to “overthrow the government” (Associated Press 1960i). The OAS
foreign ministers approved sanctions against the Dominican Republic for what it called
223
“acts of aggression and intevention” against Venezuela (Tad Szulc 1960). For more
details on the assassination attempt and Trujillo’s involvement, see Robert Jackson
Alexander (1982, 529-532).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we do not find evidence that the assassina-
tion attempt was part of a larger bid to seize power by Eduardo Morales Luengo or
his co-conspirators. We therefore do not code this event as a coup attempt.
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; failed coup attempt - PT, Singh, and
Thompson; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela from February 13,
1959, until March 11, 1964; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela 58-05) from January
24, 1958, until December 3, 2005. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Venezuela from
1946 to 1972 with Whites/Mestizos as the largest ethnic group.
Event: At 3 a.m. on September 12, 1960, National Guard Lt. Exio de Jesus Saldivia,
“backed by a force of forty armed soldiers, took control of Radio Continente” in Caracas
without resistance. After an hour he and an accomplice (a civilian technician in military
uniform) “began to broadcast pre-recorded speeches calling for a revolution” (New
York Times 1960u). Accusing President Betancourt of communist sympathies, the
broadcast declared that “The armed forces have risen to free the country from the
present regime. A military junta had taken power.” However, the army “took no part
in Saldivia’s plot” and there was no public reaction. Saldivia said he would disclose
the names of the junta later, but never had the opportunity (Associated Press 1960j).
President Betancourt “immediately mobilized troops. In less than an hour” loyal
troops of the National Guard recaptured the station. “They fired shots into the air,
but no one was wounded.” The 40 soldiers – recent recruits bused from outside the
city – apparently “simply followed orders, having been told that they were going to
“protect” the radio station.” Reportedly, Saldivia’s actions were supposed to be part
of a plot that had been discovered and thwarted earlier, but he went ahead anyways
in hopes that the other plotters would support him. Saldivia was reportedly follower
of Gen. Jesus Maria Castro León, and the radio broadcasts were similar to those
broadcast from San Cristóbal in the April 1960 revolt (see 101-1960-4-20). Betancourt
said the incident was “of no importance” (New York Times 1960u).
coup.
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; no executive - PT; failed
coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela from
February 13, 1959, until March 11, 1964; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela 58-05)
from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005.
224
Event: On December 21, 1960, Naval Lt. Lizardo Marquez Perez, “a deserter with a
record of subversive activity,” led a pocket revolt by 21 rightists in Caracas. They seized
“a National Guard barracks at La Guaira, a port 10 miles from Caracas. The plotters
then headed by auto for Caracas.” The revolt was broken up in 50 minutes. The gov-
ernment said the plotters “planned to free military and police officials in Modelo Prison
who served under former dictator Gen. Marcos Perez Jimenez. Troops stopped the
rebels on the highway and fired when they tried to fight their way through.” Lt. Gon-
zalo Abreu Molina, “previously dismissed in disgrace from the Army,” was wounded
in this exchange of gunfire before the group was captured. Officials said “the Domini-
can Republic was in touch with the insurgents,” had given aid to the rebels, and had
three airplanes ready as reinforcements for the revolt. The revolt was reportedly mas-
terminded by former Maj. Thomas Mendoza, an exile since 1949 (Associated Press
1960k).
Coding rationale: Because the evidence implicates former and exiled officers, not cur-
rent and active officers, we code this event as a case of prior defection.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; failed coup attempt - PT,
Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela from
from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in
Event: After midnight on February 20, 1961, a small group of soldiers attempted to
capture the military police barracks. Led by a sergeant, their goal was “to free National
Guardsmen under disciplinary arrest” (Associated Press 1961j). Most of these rebel
troops were stopped by the presidential guard. Soon after a group of “four soldiers
and a few civilians, led by Maj. Teresio Contreras,” seized Radio Rumbos in Caracas
and broadcast that President Rómulo Betancourt’s government had been overthrown.
The rebels held the station for an hour before loyalist National Guard units arrived
and retook the station without firing a shot. “A revolt at the military school, led by
Lieut. Col. Edito José Ramirez, was quickly put down” (New York Times 1961n).
By February 21, 100 people – including soldiers and civilians – were arrested in con-
nection with the coup attempt, including Contreras, a former military attachè in the
Dominican Republic (New York Times 1961n), and Col. Edito José Ramirez, “a for-
mer Director of the Military School” who had been dismissed two weeks before on
suspicion of conspiracy (Irish Times 1961). By February 22, the number of people
arrested increased to over 200, and it was claimed that a civilian, Andres Rodrigues
Urdaneta, not an army officer, had actually lead the attack on the radio station. Simon
Salvatierra, former army chaplain who had been previously expelled, was also arrested
in Valencia (New York Times 1961d).
225
coup. Though a number of the revolt participants appear to have been civilians or
prior defectors, it appears at least some of the conspirators were current and active
soldiers.

Thompson; Archigos codes Betancourt as the leader of Venezuela from February 13,
Event: On June 1, 1961, General Antonio Briceno Linares, the military commander of
Caracas, announced that 21 people had been arrested and arms seized in uncovering
a plot to overthrow the regime. The plot was said to have been sponsored by Rafael
Trujillo and lead by former Lt. Col. Martin Parada, the personal Air Force pilot of
Marcos Perez Jiménez and former Lt. Col. Oscar Tamayo Suarez, head of the National
Guard under Perez Jiménez (Associated Press 1961o). Parada had led a failed coup
against Perez Jiménez on January 1, 1958 (New York Times 1961c). The two alleged
plot leaders remained at large (New York Times 1961g). On June 17, the Ministry
of Interior announced that it had arrested Parada and Tamayo Suarez, thus crushing
the alleged right-wing plot aimed at installing a military junta headed by Gen. Jesus
Maria Castro León (Associated Press 1961p), then serving prison time (New York
Times 1961l) for leading an April 1960 revolt against Betancourt (see 101-1960-4-20).
On June 23, ten civilians were arrested in connection with the plot (New York Times
1961e).
Nevertheless, all of these arrests did not prevent the “third overt attempt by Pérez
Jiménez’s supporters within the armed forces to seize power” from breaking out on 26
June 1961 (Trinkunas 2006, 119). At 4 a.m., four officers in La Guaira, a port city
seven miles north of Caracas, tried to spark a revolt (New York Times 1961l) and a
fifth officer, a sub-lieutenant of the national guard led a detachment in an attempt
to capture the power plant that supplies electricity to Caracas but were driven away
by army guards (Associated Press 1961l). “Other officers in the Guardia Nacional
and the air force attempted to seize control of installations in La Guaira and at the
international airport of Maiquetı́a, near Caracas. A group of civilians, mostly members
of URD,” also joined the uprising (Trinkunas 2006, 119).
Yet the center of gravity of the revolt was in Barcelona. At 5:30 a.m., Maj. Ruben
Masso Perdomo and Capt. Luis Alberto Vivas Ramirez, retired army officers who had
secretly re-entered the country previously, entered the garrison in Barcelona, capital
of the State of Anzoategui 150 miles east of Caracas. Some 250 members of the
marine infantry garrison joined the uprising, detained progovernment officers, and
deployed throughout Barcelona and held much of the city through 10 a.m. (New York
Times 1961l, Trinkunas 2006, 119). After seizing the local radio station and party
headquarters in Barcelona, the rebels broadcast denunciations of President Betancourt
226
for “selling the country to oil companies” until power was cut (Associated Press 1961b).
“The government had already been warned of the rebellion by officers who had been
contacted to participate in the coup d’état, but Betancourt decided to wait for the
uprising to begin so as to arrest the greatest possible number of conspirators. Gen-
eral Briceño Linares, then minister of defense, reports that pamphlets calling for the
surrender of the rebels had been printed in advance for air force pilots to drop on
insurgent military units” (Trinkunas 2006, 119). At 9 a.m., the Defense Ministry is-
sued an ultimatum demanding unconditional rebel surrender (New York Times 1961l).
When “other military garrisons rejected the calls for a general uprising, and when the
government threatened an air bombardment, the officers in control of Barcelona” sur-
rendered (Trinkunas 2006, 119) by 10 a.m. Barcelona was recaptured by loyal troops
in the city, as troops deployed from Puerto La Cruz, Cumaná, and Ciudad Bolivar had
yet to arrive (New York Times 1961l).
On June 27, the official casualty toll was put at 17 dead and 13 wounded as authori-
ties carried out a manhunt for Parada and Tamayo Suarez (New York Times 1961f).
Ex-majors Perdomo and Vivas, who had been dismissed from the army for previous
conspiracies, were arrested, as were other revolt leaders, including “junior officers of
the garrison” in Barcelona (Associated Press 1961l). The rebel officers “were sentenced
to long jail terms for treason and sedition” (Trinkunas 2006, 119).
“This uprising, popularly known as the “Barcelonazo,” marked a turning point in
the conspiratorial movements against the new democracy. Prior to the Barcelonazo,
military rebellions centered around well-known figures of the previous authoritarian
regime, such as General Castro León, Colonel Juan de Dios Moncada Vidal, or Colonel
Edito Ramı́rez. The Barcelonazo was unusual in that both low-level military officers
and leftist civilians participated in the uprising with the shared purpose of overthrowing
Betancourt. The Barcelonazo also showed that the military was willing to use force in
support of the government against rebels in their own ranks. After the Barcelonazo,
the ideological tenor of the armed attacks on the government shifted to the left as the
PCV and MIR intensified their armed struggle for power” (119-120).
Coding rationale: Although the coup attempt was led by former and exiled officers
and prior defectors, they had the support of current and active officers from the very
beginning. We therefore do not exclude this event as only a case of prior defection.
Based on the evidence, we code this event (the so-called barcelano) as a failed anti-
democratic coup.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; failed coup attempt - PT, Luttwak,
227
Event: “The left’s hopes for the participation of at least part of the Venezuelan military
in a progressive revolutionary movement were raised by the last two overt military
insurrections against the Betancourt administration at Carúpano and Puerto Cabello,
both of which featured significant collaboration between military officers and members
of the PCV/MIR insurgency” (Trinkunas 2006, 121-122).
Shortly after midnight on 4 May 1962, naval Captain Jesús Teodoro Molina Villegas
led an uprising of 440 marines (of the Third Marine Infantry Battalion) and about
50 national guardsmen in Carúpano, a city 250 miles east of Caracas. The rebels
broadcast appeals for public support to achieve “a democratic recovery” and denounced
the Betancourt government as “irresponsible, repressive and brutal” (New York Times
1962a). Ten rebels signed a proclamation demanding the resignation of President
Rómulo Betancourt (Eder 1962b). Molina Villegas was aided by Lt. Felipe Santiago
Testamark, an aide to former provisional president Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal said
to have pro-Castro leanings (New York Times 1962a). Molina Villegas was “assured of
support by fellow officers in La Guaira, and Douglas Bravo of the PCV had convinced
him that the people of Caracas would rise up against the government as well. Captain
Molina Villegas seized Carúpano without firing a shot.” Local students and professors
worked with the marines to defend the city (Trinkunas 2006, 121).
“The Betancourt government responded by mobilizing army and navy infantry and
artillery troops toward Carúpano and bombarding the rebels with Canberra bombers”
(121). A loyal force of 2,000 troops cordoned off the city, seized the airport, and closed
in. At night on May 4, President Betancourt gave the rebels until the next morning to
surrender. When they did not, loyalist troops and planes attacked. After brief fighting,
in which two army troops were killed and ten wounded, the rebels surrendered on May
5 (Eder 1962b) when they realized “that other military units had not backed the
rebellion” (Trinkunas 2006, 121). A total of 5-7 people were killed and 20 wounded
during the left-wing coup attempt (Eder 1962a).
The army arrested three rebels who had signed the coup manifesto, including Capt.
Molina, Lt. R. Enrique Monterio Monteil, and Lt. Alberto Osorio Jordan (Eder 1962b).
On May 6, with constitutional guarantees suspended, the government arrested over
100 communists and MIR members and closed down three newspapers of the “extreme
left” in Caracas. The government said it had foiled a planned uprising in Caracas that
communists had planned to coincide with the rebellion in Carúpano (New York Times
1962f). On May 7, Communist Congressman Elroy Torres was placed under house
arrest, accused of participating in the rebellion (New York Times 1962r). He had been
seized fleeing Carúpano in a launch (Eder 1962a).
“Soon after the Carúpano uprising, the PCV and MIR jointly organized an umbrella
organization to combine military and civilian dissidents into a single guerrilla army. Its
political wing was known as the Frente de Liberación Nacional (FLN), under Fabricio
Ojeda (a former URD member), and the military wing was known as the Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN). Captain Molina Villegas later escaped from
prison and joined the leftist insurgency, becoming one of the commanders of the FALN”
(Trinkunas 2006, 121-122).
228
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event (the so-called carupanazo)
as a failed anti-democratic coup.
Event: “By far the most worrisome collaboration between the military and the armed
left occurred during the insurrection” on 2 June 1962 “at the Venezuelan navy’s prin-
cipal base at Puerto Cabello” (Trinkunas 2006, 122), located 75 miles west of Caracas.
The military said the same leftist forces that sponsored the carupanazo a month ear-
lier were again responsible for what became known as the porteñazo (United Press
International 1962d).
“Captain Manuel Ponte Rodrı́guez, at the head of the Second Marine Infantry Bat-
talion, took control of the naval base and the city, freeing and arming sixty Marxist
guerrillas imprisoned in the military prison of Castillo Libertador. His appeal to the
members of the Second Battalion was explicitly revolutionary, and the marines re-
sponded enthusiastically to this message” (Trinkunas 2006, 122). Initially, Lt. Comdr.
Pedro Medina Silva, deputy commander of the Puerto Cabello base, was identified
as the rebel leader, and the base commander, Capt. Jesus Carbonel, was reportedly
imprisoned. Another revolt leader was identified as Capt. De Corbeta Victor Hugo
Morales Hernandez, and some 400 marines were following leftist orders (United Press
International 1962d).
Ponte Rodrı́guez “expected support from other navy and army units in La Guaira
and Caracas, which did not materialize, as well as the support of the PCV, several of
whose leaders did in fact participate in the uprising. Political activists took control of
the Puerto Cabello radio station and used it to broadcast revolutionary appeals. In
spite of these initial successes, other navy and Guardia Nacional units based at Puerto
Cabello did not respond to the insurrection, and one of the destroyers, the Austria,
quickly made its way to sea and, in a cold-blooded display of initiative, began firing
its five-inch guns against the rebels in the naval base of Puerto Cabello” (Trinkunas
2006, 122).
“Betancourt had already received some prior notice of a possible coup attempt, and
several officers suspected in the conspiracy had been transferred or placed on leave
in an attempt to weaken the rebel movement... When Minister of Defense Briceño
Linares received the news of the Puerto Cabello insurrection, he quickly mobilized
already alerted marine infantry and army tank and artillery units to take back control
of city as soon as possible” (122). Hard fighting forced the rebels from the naval base
and parts of the city by the end of June 2 (United Press International 1962c). But
“Due to serious tactical errors by their commanders, loyalist marine and army units
229
suffered severe losses in their first attempt to take back the city and were forced to
withdraw until the following morning” (Trinkunas 2006, 122).
On June 3, “As the government brought up more forces, the air force and navy bom-
barded Puerto Cabello with cannon and rockets. Betancourt ordered the city taken as
rapidly as possible, regardless of casualties, because he feared that prolonged resistance
would lead to further uprisings and, also, because he wanted to set a harsh example
for other conspirators and insurgents” (122). Revolt leaders Capt. Ponte Rodrı́guez
and Medina Silva were arrested on June 3 (United Press International 1962c), though
mopping up operations continued through June 4 (New York Times 1962t). Officially
the military dead in the fighting numbered 72 (Trinkunas 2006, 122). Unofficial es-
timates were as high as 400 dead and 1,000 wounded, making the coup attempt the
deadliest in Venezuela since October 1945 (New York Times 1962o).
“Approximately 500 soldiers were placed under arrest, and an even larger number of
civilians were detained by the DIGEPOL (Dirección General de Policia), the political
police. Rebellious officers received sentences ranging from sixteen to thirty years of
imprisonment, although several later escaped and joined Marxist insurgents in their
rural operating areas” (Trinkunas 2006, 122-123). Some believed that marines were
more susceptible to revolutionary appeals because the marine corps no longer received
special treatment (Tad Szulc 1962a). Communists and the MIR were again implicated
(New York Times 1962e). Constitutional guarantees were restored August 1 (New
York Times 1962s).
“The uprising at Puerto Cabello was the last one by military forces against a demo-
cratic government for thirty years, and it marked a watershed in the attitudes of the
officer corps toward the new regime. The government had responded very severely, and
the combat between army and marine units in the city had a cost in casualties that
exceeded that of previous insurrections by orders of magnitude. Both Carúpano and
Puerto Cabello also signaled a shift in the ideological center of conspiracy within the
armed forces, from the army to the more progressive navy, from the right to the left”
The enthusiasm “with which government forces attacked the insurgents is a measure of
the extent to which Betancourt had been able to extend his control over the Venezue-
lan armed forces in the years since his election in 1958. The conspiratorial core of
the armed forces had largely been expelled or imprisoned by the time of the Puerto
Cabello rebellion. The high number of casualties incurred during the suppression of
this insurrection set a precedent, making it very clear for any would-be rebel that coup
attempts would be dealt with harshly, at great potential risk to life and career. Fur-
thermore, for the high command, the Marxist insurgency and its links to junior officers
made the choice very clear: either support Betancourt and defeat the Communists, or
allow democracy to fail and possibly face revolutionary firing squads, as had Batista’s
officers in Cuba in 1959” (123).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event (the so-called porteñazo)
230
• # 101-1966-10-30: Venezuela, Raúl Leoni
Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Leoni as the leader of Venezuela from March 11,
Event: “Subversive activities quieted considerably during the Leoni administration.
By no means were they ended, however. Rumors of military plots were rife throughout
the five-year term; the most dangerous military rebellion” was the October 1966 failed
coup attempt, whose leaders were court-martialed (Rudolph 1990, 26).
On Sunday, October 30, 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Clemente Pacheco Ochoa lead a
revolt against President Leoni at the Ramo Verde National Guard Officer Training
School in Los Teques, the capital of Miranda State 15 miles east of Caracas (Associated
Press 1966b). The rebel troops reportedly sought to reinstate ex-dictator Marcos Perez
Jimenez (United Press International 1966a). Once the Defense Ministry was informed,
it jammed telephone connections to the Caracas National Guard Unit (Associated Press
1966b). After a prolonged gunfight loyal National Guardsmen at the school succeeded
in putting down the coup attempt by day’s end. Pacheco Ochoa died in the fighting
(United Press International 1966b).
Several rebels were arrested, including Maj. Antonio Peréz Hernandez, German Robles
(a student) (United Press International 1966b), Maj. Rafael Milina Franco, two air
force officers, and several National Guardsmen (Associated Press 1966b). In total, over
100 officers were arrested in connection with the coup attempt (A. S. Miller 2016, 159),
including Maj. J. Perez Poco, commander of the National Guard garrison, who was
alleged to have prior knowledge (Associated Press 1966b).
“Democratic Action deputy Carlos Canache Mata, however, stressed that the coup
attempt had done nothing to besmirch the reputation of the armed forces. Pacheco
Ochoa’s actions simply represented the lingering remnants of the perezhimenistas (fol-
lowers of Pérez Jiménez) and the despotism for which they stood. The ease with which
the coup was put down would seem to indicate that the Leoni government stayed in
the good graces of the populace and the national institutions and thus could be cau-
tiously optimistic about the prospect of preventing any more coups. The Ramo Verde
incident... was the first such coup attempt in Leoni’s two and a half years in power”
(A. S. Miller 2016, 159).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event as a failed anti-deomcratic
coup.
• # 101-1992-2-4: Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR and CCD; failed coup attempt
231
- CSP, PT, Luttwak, Singh, WHIV (March 4); Archigos codes Andres Perez as the
leader of Venezuela from February 2, 1989, until August 31, 1993; GWF code a democ-
racy (Venezuela 58-05) from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Venezuela from 1973 to 1999.
Event: “After the Caracazo (1989), many concluded that the political class was ab-
solutely corrupt and that it was necessary to establish a military government. That
the army was used to control the protests and looting of these days infuriated many
military officers. In addition, the army was one of the few institutions that maintained
its prestige in the Venezuelan political system. All of this created the conditions for”
the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200), a secrete military lodge
founded in 1982 by Lt. Colonel Hugo Chávez Frias, the commander of a paratroop
battalion – “to attempt a military coup on February 4, 1992, to oust President Carlos
Andrés Pérez” (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 95-96).
“On the evening of 3 February 1992, army troops led by members of an elite parachute
regiment attempted to take control of the government of Venezuela.” In Caracas,
soldiers under the command of Lt. Colonel Hugo Chávez “attacked the presidential
residence of La Casona, the seat of government at Miraflores palace, the Generalı́simo
Francisco Miranda air base, and the military headquarters at the Fuerte Tiuna army
barracks” (Trinkunas 2006, 156). The coup was led by “midranking army officers,
among them Francisco Arias Cárdenas, Jesús Urdaneta Hernández, Joel Acosta, and
Hugo Chávez” (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 154). The mid-level “officers, com-
manders of armored divisions, and paratroopers had attempted to capture President
Pérez, place him on trial for corruption, install a civilian/military government, and
call for a new constitutional convention” (Tinker Salas 2015, 122).
Army troops in Venezuela’s four other major cities took complete or partial control
of vital government and economic installations” (Trinkunas 2006, 156). “Rebels man-
aged to detain high-ranking officers and neutralize opposition in Valencia, Maracay,
and Maracaibo. Insurgents also had support at garrisons in Mérida, Táchira, and
several other states” (Tinker Salas 2015, 123). “Despite achieving most of their oper-
ational goals, these rebellious officers failed to overthrow” the democratically elected
Pérez government, in part because the government had been forewarned of the coup
“President Pérez, returning from Davos, Switzerland, was met at the airport by his
minister of defense, General Fernando Ochoa Antich, and warned of the imminent coup
attempt” (156-157). As a result, although the coup movement had succeeded in seizing
government buildings and military garrisons in Valencia and Maracaibo, the coup failed
in Caracas (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 154). “When paratroopers attacked
the presidential residence later in the evening, military officers who were assigned to
protect the president successfully held off the rebels, allowing Pérez to escape to a
local television station” (Trinkunas 2006, 156) using “tunnel beneath the presidential
palace” (Tinker Salas 2015, 122). “Initially defended only by the station’s security
guards and his own civilian escort, Pérez addressed the nation, calling on the rebels to
surrender” (Trinkunas 2006, 156).
232
“The capture of Pérez had been central to the insurgents’ plans.” When he escaped
and began broadcasting, “support from other military units in Caracas did not mate-
rialize” and the coup attempt unraveled (Tinker Salas 2015, 122-123). “Paralyzed by
indecision and communication failures, the rebellious military officers failed to pursue
the president or to terminate his television broadcasts. At President Pérez’s direction,
General Ochoa Antich then ordered elements of the Third Infantry Brigade, located in
Caracas, to attack rebel units at the air base and the presidential palace at Miraflores.
Loyal military units accomplished these objectives” (Trinkunas 2006, 156-157).
After negotiations, Chávez surrendered before noon on February 4. “Confronting muti-
nous troops in Maracay, authorities allowed Chávez to speak to the media and appeal
for them to surrender. Proclaiming to lead a Bolivarian movement, Chávez assumed
full responsibility for the failure of operations in Caracas, called on his colleagues to
surrender and asserted that por ahora (“for now”) the rebels had failed to achieve their
objectives. In a society in which people had endured repeated corruption scandals and
in which politicians seldom assumed responsibility for their actions, the statement cap-
tivated people and thrust Chávez onto the national stage” (Tinker Salas 2015, 123).
Allowing Chávez to address the nation thus “backfired for the government, as Venezue-
lan society saw in the young officer a savior, turning him into a highly popular figure.
His phrase, “por ahora los objetivos no han sido logrados” (for now, the objectives have
not been achieved), was understood as the promise of another insurrection” (Straka,
Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 96). “Upon hearing Chávez’s appeal for the end of hostili-
ties, rebels in other cities surrendered as well” (Trinkunas 2006, 157). The “Bolivarian”
coup attempt resulted in “many civilian and military casualties” (Straka, Mirabal, and
Cáceres 2017, 154).
“Although it was almost immediately apparent that the coup attempt had failed, the
OAS Permanent Council held a special session on the afternoon of February 4, in
which it unanimously expressed support for President Perez, condemned the uprising,
and reiterated its right to take joint action according to the ”Santiago Commitment,”
specifically Resolution 1080” (Levitt 2006, 104) “The leading conspirators were jailed
for two years” (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 154). However, a scientific 1993
opinion poll showed that 59 percent of respondents supported the February 1992 coup
attempt, and support for the coup was particularly high among those who identified
with the anti-Perez parties Causa R and Convergencia (Myers and O’Connor 1998,
198). Mass support for the coup leaders led to leniency by the subsequent government.
“Chávez remained imprisoned until President Rafael Caldera pardoned him in 1994,
with full political rights.” He went on to create the Movimiento Quinta República
(MVR) party and – riding populist rhetoric and promises to end neo-liberal economic
policies– successfully ran for president in 1998 (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017,
96). For an analysis of why the coups occurred, see Trinkunas (2006, 170-183). For an
analysis of why the February 1992 coup failed and its aftermath, see Trinkunas (2006,
183-192).
coup.
233
• # 101-1992-11-27: Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez
CSP, PT, Luttwak, and Singh; Archigos codes Andres Perez as the leader of Venezuela
from February 2, 1989, until August 31, 1993; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela
58-05) from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos
as the monopoly ethnic group in Venezuela from 1973 to 1999.
Event: On November 27, 1992, as Lt. Colonel Hugo Chávez “and his colleagues sat
in the cells in the San Carlos Presidio” for their role in leading the coup attempt
in February 1992 (see 101-1992-2-4), “the sound of airplanes over Caracas signaled
a new attempted coup. Civilian collaborators commandeered the public television
station and transmitted a poorly made video, smuggled out of the garrison, of Chávez
urging Venezuelans to revolt. Led by senior military officers, including elements of the
air force and navy, rebels took La Libertador air base in Maracay and contested for
control of La Carlota, the air force base in the center of Caracas” (Tinker Salas 2015,
125). The coup against the democratically elected President Carlos Andrés Pérez
implicated “high-ranking officers of the Air Force and navy” (Straka, Mirabal, and
Cáceres 2017, 96). The coup was led by Hernán Gruber Odremán, Luis Reyes Reyes,
Francisco Visconti, and Luis Cabrera Aguirre, and the leftist organizations Bandera
Roja and Tercer Camino. The main objective was to appoint a civil-military junta.
The movement failed, causing several civil and military casualties in Caracas, and the
leaders fled to Peru as refugees” (254).
“Civilians in several cities expressed their support by beating pots and pans and dis-
playing flags, while others protested in the streets and clashed with authorities. In
the end, coup leaders failed to capture Pérez or free Chávez from prison and form an
interim civilian/military government. Some of the coup plotters escaped by plane to
Peru where the government granted them exile” (Tinker Salas 2015, 125-126). This
“haphazard” coup attempt “was put down even more rapidly, and at a greater cost
in lives, than the one in February” (Trinkunas 2006, 157). “Though Pérez survived
another coup, his authority and prestige suffered another severe blow” (Tinker Salas
2015, 126).
The OAS “Permanent Council again convened to support President Perez and Venezue-
lan democracy. Several speakers mentioned the emerging Washington Protocols, but
no specific action was proposed. The November coup attempt, like the February crisis,
soon foundered of its own accord, and the OAS took no further diplomatic action”
(Levitt 2006, 104). The coup leaders “were tried but were released from prison during
Rafael Caldera’s administration, maintaining full political rights despite their actions
against democracy” (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 254). “Venezuela experienced
no further overt military unrest until April 2002” (Trinkunas 2006, 157). For analysis
of the November 1992 coup, see Trinkunas (2006, 192-196).
coup.
234
• # 101-2002-4-12: Venezuela, Hugo Chávez
Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; successful military coup - CCD; failed
coup attempt - CSP, PT, Luttwak, and Singh; Archigos codes Chavez as the leader
of Venezuela from February 2, 199, until March 5, 2012; GWF code a democracy
(Venezuela 58-05) from January 24, 1958, until December 3, 2005. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos
as the dominant ethnic group in Venezuela since 2000.
Event: In November 2001, a package of 49 laws – including oil legislation and agrarian
reform – was passed after President Hugo Chávez had been granted special presi-
dential powers by the National Assembly. This reinvigorated conservative opposition
that had opposed Chávez’s populist agenda (Tinker Salas 2015, 153). By 2002, Pres-
ident Chávez had lost support among the middle class, business sector, and Catholic
Church, all while the traditional political class continued to fear that the populist pres-
ident was moving Venezuela towards chaos and communism. The business association
FEDECÁMARAS (the national federation of chambers of commerce), “the workers’
unions represented by the Confederación de los Trabajadores de Venezuela, some po-
litical parties, private mass media groups, and sectors in the Catholic Church and the
armed forces started to show in public their discontent with the government. These
tensions resulted in a national strike in April 2002” against the government (Straka,
Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 97).
On 11 April 2002, the third day of the general strike, “a massive protest in the streets
of Caracas departed from one of the main offices” of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.
(PDVSA) – the state oil company – “toward the presidential palace of Miraflores, call-
ing for the president’s resignation. In the protests, 19 people were killed by gunshots
and several more were wounded, known as the masacre del 11 de abril. TV showed gov-
ernment supporters shooting from a bridge at the opposition protests. In the evening,
high-ranking officers in the army, navy, and National Guard defected from the govern-
ment and captured Chávez” (97-98). “General Efraı́n Vásquez Velasco, announced in a
nationally televised address that he would no longer obey presidential orders. General
Vásquez accused Hugo Chávez of preparing widespread repression of antigovernment
strikers and demonstrators, and he ordered military units under his command to dis-
regard further government orders and remain confined to base. High-ranking generals
and admirals soon followed Vásquez to the airwaves, expressing their solidarity with
his position and their refusal to support President Chávez” (Trinkunas 2006, 206).
“A group of military officers who had been preparing for a coup used the pretext of the
bloodshed to announce their decision to rise in arms against the president and issued
an ultimatum that he resign or they would attack the presidential palace. Intense
negotiations followed: Chávez insisted on the safety of his personnel and the right to
address the nation, which, remembering what happened in 1992, the generals leading
the coup denied. Some of Chávez’s allies advocated fighting their way out of the palace.
Without formally resigning, early in the morning of April 12, 2002, Chávez agreed to
be taken prisoner. The military faction involved in the coup eventually transferred him
235
to Fuerte Tiuna, the principal military base in Caracas, and subsequently to the island
of Orchilla, an isolated base on the coast of Venezuela” (Tinker Salas 2015, 155). “In
the early hours of 12 April 2002, the senior military officer in the Venezuelan armed
forces, General Lucas Rincón Romero, announced the resignation of President Chávez”
A few hours later, on the morning of 12 April, “a transitional government under the
leadership of Pedro Carmona Estanga, president of FEDECAMARAS,” was announced
(206). “By passing the constitutional vice-president, Diosdado Cabello, the military
announced that Pedro Carmona, the head of Fedecamaras, had assumed the presi-
dency. In a largely celebratory event, and surrounded by Catholic Church officials
and leading business and political figures, Carmona formally assumed the presidency
on the afternoon of April 12. Over four hundred leading Venezuelan opposition fig-
ures signed the now-infamous Carmona decree, formally aligning themselves with the
coup’s objectives. Almost immediately the coup government appointed a new cab-
inet and began to dismantle the Chávez-era policies,” including the 49 laws passed
in November 2001 (Tinker Salas 2015, 155). “Carmona surrounded himself with the
most conservative figures in the opposition and appointed military officers loyal to his
clique to high positions in the defense establishment, sidelining the generals who had
led the rebellion against President Chavez. Carmona also announced the closing of
all of the institutions associated with elected government under the 1999 constitution,
including the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court. This proved” a step
too far (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010, 406).
“The negative reaction to this proclamation translated into popular protests, political
leaders and union sectors announced on TV their discontent” (Straka, Mirabal, and
Cáceres 2017, 98). “Almost immediately following the coup, the Venezuelan social
movements that had backed the president began to coordinate resistance” (Tinker
Salas 2015, 156). Meanwhile, “Within the military, officers in charge of paratroopers,
armored units, and even pilots of the F-16s supplied by the United States openly
opposed the illegal break in the constitutional order and supported the president. More
importantly, they refused to concede their posts to supporters of the coup, and began to
communicate with each other and with those organizing the popular resistance” (156).
“The commander of the army who had refused to obey Chavez’s orders to repress on
April 11 demanded the restoration of the elected institutions on April 13” (Pion-Berlin
and Trinkunas 2010, 406). The U.S. failed to denounce Chavez’s ouster (Tinker Salas
2015, 157). The OAS Permanent Council reaction was inconsistent due to varying
member state positions. They excluded Venezuela’s representative on Friday evening,
but readmitted him the next day. But Carmona’s decrees met with international
criticism. On Saturday morning April 13, “U.S. Ambassador Charles Shapiro (along
with Spain’s ambassador in Venezuela) met with Carmona, reiterating a formal request
from the State Department to reopen the National Assembly and the Supreme Court”
(Levitt 2006, 112).
Meanwhile, on April 13 “tens of thousands of people surrounded the presidential palace
and the base at Fuerte Tiuna demanding the return of their president. Inside Miraflores
the young soldiers that formed the honor guard welcomed the protestors, waving the
236
Venezuelan flag” (Tinker Salas 2015, 157). By mid-day, “more and more Venezuelan
military officers began to call for Chavez’s return. Carmona attempted to placate
both his angry co-conspirators and the Venezuelan public by nullifying most of his
decrees and appointments and reinstating the National Assembly. Early that evening,
the National Assembly swore in Chavez’s vice president, Dionesio Cabello, as interim
president” (Levitt 2006, 112). But Carmona’s regime was fast unraveling.
“Officers in charge of the honor guard had established contact with several comman-
ders who had remained loyal to the constitution. Inside, the honor guard overwhelmed
the squad protecting Carmona, and the would-be president escaped out a side door”
(Tinker Salas 2015, 157). “Military forces loyal to President Chavez organized a rescue
operation to release him from captivity. Civilian loyalists mobilized and surrounded
the presidential palace. Chavez’s presidential guard—inexplicably left in place dur-
ing the coup—arrested Carmona government members” (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas
2010, 406). “Less than twenty-four hours after becoming the head of a transitional
government, Pedro Carmona was forced to flee the presidential palace to make way
for pro-Chávez civilian and military forces” leading the counter-coup (Trinkunas 2006,
206-207). Carmona resigned at 10 p.m. on April 13 (Levitt 2006, 112). “By April
14 President Chavez had returned to power” (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010, 406).
More than 60 people died during this short lived coup.
The “generals and admirals who had so recently refused to support his government
reversed their positions, many scrambling to provide explanations for their behavior
during the rebellion. Amid the celebrations of his supporters, Chávez advocated a
new policy of national reconciliation, but he also ordered the detention of high-profile
military officers associated with the events of 11 April 2002” (Trinkunas 2006, 206-
207). Afterwards, Chávez substituted the top military brass “with officers loyal to
his movement” (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, 46). Chávez thereby “invested
himself with full control over the armed forces and the oil industry and the discretional
allocation of its rents. The sharp increase in oil prices that increased fivefold from 2004
to 2008, enabling massive imports and subsidies, and a program of social interventions
with full Cuban support, took his popularity to levels unseen since the 1980s for a
Venezuelan president.” He easily won reelection in 2006 (22).
For more on the April 2002 coup attempt, see Trinkunas (2006, 217-220). Also see the
book-length treatment in Nelson (2009). For the effects on civil-military relations, see
Trinkunas (2006, 221-224).
coup.
• # 101-2002-4-13: Venezuela, Hugo Chavez
Category: combined
Singh; Archigos codes Chavez as the leader of Venezuela from February 2, 199, until
March 5, 2012; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela 58-05) from January 24, 1958, until
December 3, 2005.
237
Event: See 101-2002-4-12
Coding rationale: Because this event was part of the failure of the coup attempt from
the day before (within seven days), we code this event as combined.
• # 101-2004-2-5: Venezuela, Hugo Chavez

Category: not exist
WHIV; Archigos codes Chavez as the leader of Venezuela from February 2, 199, until
March 5, 2012; GWF code a democracy (Venezuela 58-05) from January 24, 1958, until
December 3, 2005.
Event: In August 2004, the “revoking referendum was activated against President
Chávez. It took place, and the no option was the winner. President Chávez remained
in power” (Straka, Mirabal, and Cáceres 2017, xxxi).
Coding rationale: Trinkunas (2006), who provides an authoritative history of civil-
military relations throughout this period, does not indicate a coup attempt on this
date. Nor is there any event of note on this date recorded by Straka, Mirabal, and
Cáceres (2017). We therefore code this event as not exist.
• # 101-2019-4-30: Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro

Other Datasets: not a candidate - PT; Archigos codes Maduro as the leader of Venezuela
since 5 March 2012 (still in office as of the end of 2015); GWF code a personal regime
(Venezuela 05-NA) since December 2005 (as of 2015).
Event: In January 2019, opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared he was Venezuela’s
legitimate president (Herrero 2019). The Trump administration endorsed Guaidó’s
claim to the presidency and imposed new sanctions, which Nicolás Maduro called a
U.S.-supported coup attempt and so cut all diplomatic ties to the U.S. Venezuela’s
military leaders expressed unwavering support for Maduro although some defections
among lower ranks were reported. Over the spring, the protest movement that had
rocked Venezuela on and off for years was rejuvenated under Guaidó and was fueled
by a deepening economic crisis and international isolation (Fisher 2019b). In March,
Russia deployed military advisers to support the Maduro regime while the opposi-
tion sought to encourage military actors to defect and support the opposition (Rogers
2019b).
Over several weeks in April 2019, General Manuel Christopher Figuera, Maduro’s spy
chief as head of SEBIN, and Cesar Omaña, a Miami-based Venezuelan businessman,
held secret negotiations with a reluctant Maikel Moreno, chief justice of Venezuela’s
Supreme Court, to recruit Moreno to participate in their plan to oust Maduro. The
plotters needed Moreno to issue a legal ruling to reinstate the National Assembly,
acknowledge Guaidó as interim president, and authorize new elections. Moreno’s ruling
would be the first move in the uprising, thus lending constitutional legitimacy to the
238
opposition (Faiola 2019a). Moreno’s ruling would give Gen. Vladimir Padrino, the
Defense Minister with whom the opposition was also negotiating at the time, a legal
pretense to move against Maduro rather than doing so as part of a coup (Faiola 2019b).
On April 23, Moreno proposed delaying reinstating Guaidó’s National Assembly and
instead having the Supreme Court rule until new elections, effectively offering himself
as interim leader. But the plotters balked and persuaded Moreno that only Guaidó
could unify the opposition and secure international support. But in two subsequent
meetings, the last on April 28, Moreno began to express doubts. “He insisted the
opposition show it had support from the military before the Supreme Court issued its
ruling. He also demanded from Figuera a pledge of forces to protect himself and his
family after the ruling was issued.” At 1 a.m. on April 30, Figuera sent a text “saying
he had learned he was about to be replaced as head of SEBIN,” that “Leopoldo López
- under house arrest as the nation’s most famous political prisoner, and a key player in
the effort to oust Maduro - was about to be transferred back to a prison cell,” and that
the government was about to move against Guaidó. The plotters thus hastily decided
to move forward their plans a day early rather than wait until May 1 (Faiola 2019a).
Before dawn on April 30, 2019, Guaidó broadcast a three-minute video, filmed on a
highway outside La Carlota Air Force Base at the eastern end of Caracas, in which he
urged supporters to mobilize to support the “final phase” of “Operation Freedom” to
oust Maduro (DeYoung, Dawsey, and Sonne 2019). Flanked by a number of uniformed
soldiers and armored vehicles, this was Guaidó’s “first appearance with members of
the military” (Vyas 2019). Maduro claimed to have the support of key military units
(Faiola 2019a). Guaidó was also accompanied by his mentor Leopoldo Lopez, whom he
said was “freed earlier in the day on military order.” Diosdado Cabello, a top Maduro
aide, later claimed that a dissident faction of SEBIN (under General Figuera) had
simply allowed Lopez to leave his apartment (Vyas 2019). Thousands of protesters
began to launch street protests and converge at La Carlota (DeYoung, Dawsey, and
Sonne 2019). That morning, “Soldiers backing Mr. Guaidó stood near white armored
vehicles, clutching their rifles and wearing the blue bandannas that signal support for
the opposition... ‘We’re fighting for peace,’ said one of the rebel soldiers as he effusively
greeted opposition lawmakers who arrived at the base.” According to a Maduro ally,
rebelling officers who accompanied Guaidó and Lopez included General Figuera as well
as three platoons of the National Guard led by Col. Ilich Sánchez, but had not involved
troops at any other base (Vyas 2019).
But the plotters could not get in touch with Moreno, who did not answer their calls. 90
minutes after the uprising began, Moreno, rather than backing Guaidó as the plotters
expected, instead called in to state television and said on air, “I express my strong
rejection of the illegal intention of a very small group of military and civilians who have
sought to take political power with force, going against the constitution and the laws”
(Faiola 2019a). The opposition believed Moreno’s betrayal “scared off key military and
other loyalists” so that “broader military support never materialized” (Faiola 2019a).
Defense Minister Padrino “went on national television to denounce what he called
a “coup” (Faiola 2019b). As a result, “many of the military men initially backing
Guaidó at the La Carlota military base began to drift away. Others who had pledged
239
their support never showed up” (Faiola 2019a). Maduro’s information minister said
in a tweet, “We are confronting and deactivating a small group of military traitors”
(Vyas 2019). Indeed, it was later clear that Guaidó’s video broadcast that morning
“had been closely cropped to mask the fact that there were only a handful of troops
standing with Guaidó” (Luhnow and Córdoba 2019). The regime quickly blacked out
all foreign media, including social media. Before CNN was taken off the air, it reported
on military trucks running over protesters (DeYoung, Dawsey, and Sonne 2019).
After a few hours, when key senior officials did not step forward, “key opposition figures
left the La Carlota base and headed to the city’s eastern Plaza Altamira” (Faiola
2019b). “At midday, those who had crowded into Plaza Altamira could not believe
their eyes: on top of a truck in the square, a group of rifle-toting national guardsmen
surrounded Guaidó as he again told the crowd that the regime had fallen” (Torres
et al. 2019). But it was not to be. Civilian protests turned violent as protesters and
security forces clashed, leading to at least five deaths. A large number of others were
injured and hundreds were arrested (Mogollon and McDonnell 2019). That afternoon,
according to U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Maduro was close to fleeing into
exile but Russia convinced him to stay (O’Grady 2019). “By Tuesday evening, Maduro
staged a show of unity and strength for the television cameras surrounded by a phalanx
of soldiers, with defence minister Padrino, one of the supposed defectors, at his right
shoulder” (Torres et al. 2019). Guaidó called for renewed protests on May 1, but these
were also repressed (Mogollon and McDonnell 2019).
In the days that followed, Moreno’s court issued charges of treason, conspiracy, and
rebellion against 10 opposition figures involved in “the failed effort to incite a military
uprising.” On May 8, masked intelligence police arrested National Assembly Vice
President Edgar Zambrano, the first charged opposition official taken into custody
(Gearan et al. 2019). During the rebellion, Gen. Figuera was the only senior official to
join the opposition (Luhnow and Córdoba 2019). Figuera fled the country and on May
10, Maduro gave a televised address denouncing Figuera as a CIA infiltrator, traitor,
and sell-out, and promising, “Justice is coming” (T. Phillips 2019). The U.S. lifted
sanctions on Figuera and announced that sanctions relief would also be granted to any
others senior officials who who defected from the Maduro regime (Bender 2019).
According to U.S. officials and opposition figures, high-level regime insiders who had
discussed the plot “included Defense Minister Gen. Vladimir Padrino, Supreme Court
Chief Justice Maikel Moreno and the presidential guard commander and head of mil-
itary intelligence, Gen. Iván Rafael Hernández.” But Maduro insisted this was “fake
news” (Luhnow and Córdoba 2019). Padrino and Hernández may have “negotiated”
with the opposition as double agents trying to infiltrate and thwart the plot. Padrino
admitted being approached by opposition forces and said, “They’re trying to buy us
off as if we were some kind of mercenaries,” but said this was a fool’s errand (Forero,
Córdoba, and Vyas 2019). Despite the failure of the rebellion, some reports indicate
that Maduro’s confidence in the loyalty of his inner circle was shaken. He “was report-
edly giving polygraph tests to military officers he suspected of betraying him.” Rather
than his own military, Maduro may now be more dependent on “Cuban intelligence
and enforcers – backed up by a Russia well-schooled in power politics and by Iranian
240
networks” (O’Grady 2019).
Coding rationale: First, a note on contested regime leadership. Whatever democratic
legitimacy Guaidó could claim and regardless of the dozens of foreign states that had
recognized his claim to the presidency, at the time of the event he was the opposition
leader and a prior defector. In 2017, the Supreme Court under Moreno had stripped
the National Assembly that Guaidó had headed of its powers (Faiola 2019a). Thus,
even though Maduro had only been re-elected in 2018 due to fraud, under the interpre-
tation of the Supreme Court, Guaidó could not unilaterally declare himself president
under the constitution. Maduro remained the regime leader in effective control of the
executive branch and the security forces. We therefore dismiss claims by Trump ad-
ministration officials and others claiming that this event could not possibly have been
a coup attempt because it was a legitimate order from the country’s president. This
position substitutes and conflates moral and juridical claims (e.g., We the U.S. recog-
nize Guaidó as legitimate) with actual control of the regime (Guaidó was the effective
regime leader in control of the state apparatus).
Now, whether or not this event is a coup attempt (as the Maduro regime claimed)
or only a civilian protest (as the opposition and some U.S. officials claimed) depends
on the evidence for whether current and active members of the military took concrete
actions to support Guaidó and oust Maduro during the uprising. We are well aware
that all sides have postured in this semantic struggle to try to claim the moral high
ground (Toro 2019). On the evening of April 30, the Washington Post (2019) posted
an editorial under the headline “Don’t Call it a coup. Venezuelans have a right to
replace an oppressive, toxic regime.” The next day, the Trump Administration bor-
rowed the headline in a White House e-mail. Again, such sentiments falsely assume
that a coup attempt cannot occur in the context of civilian-led protests. In any case,
there is ample evidence of the participation of a small section of the security forces in
support of the uprising, from the SEBIN operatives who freed Lopez to the National
Guardsmen who accompanied Guaidó during his video broadcast to Figuera’s public
defection. The event therefore qualifies as a military coup attempt. Because the plot-
ters sought to empower an excluded opposition party and support the pro-democracy
protest movement led by Guaidó, we code this event as a failed regime change coup.
241
2.1.14 130: Ecuador
Table 14: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Ecuador

130-1947-3-14 Ecuador 44-47 Velasco Ibarra, José Marı́a coup plot

130-1947-8-23 Ecuador 44-47 Velasco Ibarra, José Marı́a Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
130-1947-9-3 Ecuador 47-48 Mancheno Cajas, Carlos Anti-Prov. Coup (S)
130-1947-11-9 Ecuador 47-48 Arosemana Tola, Carlos Julio prior defection
130-1949-7-26 Ecuador 48-63 Plaza Lasso, Galo Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
130-1950-7-15 Ecuador 48-63 Plaza Lasso, Galo Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
130-1952-3-3 Ecuador 48-63 Plaza Lasso, Galo coup plot
130-1954-12-23 Ecuador 48-63 Velasco Ibarra, José Marı́a Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
130-1963-7-11 Ecuador 48-63 Arosemena Monroy, Carlos Julio Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
130-1966-3-29 Ecuador 63-66 Castro Jijón, Ramón Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
130-1970-6-22 Ecuador 68-70 Velasco Ibarra, José Marı́a Autogolpe (S)
130-1972-2-15 Ecuador 70-72 Velasco Ibarra, José Marı́a Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
130-1975-9-1 Ecuador 72-79 Rodrı́guez Lara, Guillermo Reshuffle Coup (F)
130-1976-1-11 Ecuador 72-79 Rodrı́guez Lara, Guillermo Reshuffle Coup (S)
130-1986-3-8 Ecuador 79-NA Febres Cordero, León mutiny
130-1986-3-13 Ecuador 79-NA Febres Cordero, León Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
130-2000-1-21 Ecuador 79-NA Mahuad, Jamil Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
130-2005-4-20 Ecuador 79-NA Gutiérrez, Lucio legal
130-2010-9-30 Ecuador 79-NA Correa, Rafael mutiny
• # 130-1947-3-14: Ecuador, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP; coup plot
- Singh; Archigos codes Velasco Ibarra as leader of Ecuador from May 31, 1944, until
August 23, 1947; GWF code a personal regime (Ecuador 44-47) from May 31, 1944,
until this date, and a provisional regime (Ecuador 47-48) from August 24, 1947, until
August 21, 1948.
Event: On March 14, 1947, the government announced that “it had put down without
bloodshed a planned pre-dawn uprising led by a former dictator, Gen. Alberto Enriquez
Gallo” in Riobamba. Eleven military leaders were arrested, and some “members of the
Liberal party and elements of the civil guard were implicated” (United Press 1947h). A
number of retired army officers were arrested, and the government “would not confirm
reports that the revolt spread to Tulcán (Associated Press 1947e). On May 26, 1947,
Major Silva, Sergeant Ruales, the communist party leader Sugundo Ramos, and a few
others were arrested in connection with a “revolutionary movement” or “conspiracy”
against the Velasco Ibarra regime, but the government did not provide additional
details (New York Times 1947d).
Coding rationale: Because we can find no evidence that any concrete actions were
taken by in the planned uprising, we code this event as a coup plot. AMBIGUOUS
242
• # 130-1947-8-23: Ecuador, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra
Other Datasets: successful palace coup - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP; successful
coup - Singh; Archigos codes Velasco Ibarra as exiting on this date through “irregular”
means by military actors without foreign support. Svolik codes the exit of Velasco
Ibarra on this date through a military coup; GWF code the collapse of a personal regime
(Ecuador 44-47) on this date in a military coup, and a provisional regime (Ecuador
47-48) from August 24, 1947, until August 21, 1948. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as
the monopoly ethnic group in Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: On the night of August 23, 1947, Col. Carlos Mancheno Cajas, the Minister
of Defense, seized power from President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra in a bloodless coup
(Clarke 1947). That night, “Troops fired a few shots into the air here to break up
a crowd that gathered around the Presidential Palace” after news spread that Dr.
Velasco Ibarra and Mancheno were conferring on “urgent problems” (United Press
1947j), perhaps referring to reports that Dr. Velasco Ibarra had planned to remove
Mancheno from his cabinet post (New York Times 1947e). It was later learned that
Mancheno had launched the coup after Velasco “harassed one of his favorite officers.”
During the coup, Velasco “rushed to a unit of the tank corps that he believed would
support him. He was arrested and forced to resign as president” (Lauderbaugh 2012,
112).
On August 24, Mancheno proclaimed himself president and head of government, as an
army plane flew Velasco Ibarra to exile in Colombia. Dr. Suarez Veintimilla, president
of the Congress and vice president, who would have legally become president after the
resignation of Velasco Ibarra, was arrested but later released. “All military garrisons
joined the movement and declared their loyalty to the new government” (United Press
1947j). On August 25, Mancheno appointed a new cabinet of Liberals and Socialists,
reflecting the majority in Congress, while retaining the post of Minister of Defense
for himself in a provisional government (New York Times 1947e). On August 28,
Mancheno declared that he would suspend the current constitution, reinstate the 1906
constitution, and rule by decree (New York Times 1947f).
Coding rationale: CCD does not code military involvement but lists the coup leader as
three defense ministers including Carlos Mancheno. We assume the former is miscoded,
as there was clear military involvement. Velasco had initially appointed Col. Mancheno
as minister of defense in 1944. After a falling out in late 1946, Mancheno retired to
civilian life on January 7, 1947, rather than be fired. “In June, Velasco decided he
needed Mancheno and called him out of retirement to once again be minister of defense.
Velasco failed to understand that Mancheno accepted not out of loyalty but because
he saw an opportunity for revenge” (Lauderbaugh 2012, 112). At the time of the coup,
Mancheno was no longer retired or a prior defector, and other active members of the
military supported him.
This case is affected by the one-week rule. Because CSP adopt a one month rule,
and Mancheno is ousted after only 9-10 days, they code this as a failed coup attempt.
243
However, because this coup marks the end of the Velasco Ibarra regime (Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz 2014), and Mancheno remained in office for at least one week, we
code this event as a successful regime change coup.
• # 130-1947-9-3: Ecuador, Carlos Mancheno

Other Datasets: successful military coup and counter-coup - CCD; not a candidate -
CSP; successful coup - PT, Luttwak, Fossum, Perez, Singh (August 31), and Thompson
(August 3); Archigos codes Mancheno as the leader of Ecuador from August 24, 1947,
until this date, when he was removed through “irregular” means by military actors
without foreign support. Svolik codes Mancheno as exiting on this date through a
military coup. GWF code a personal regime (Ecuador 44-47) from May 31, 1944, until
August 23, 1947. GWF code a provisional regime (Ecuador 47-48) from August 24,
1947, until August 21, 1948. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic
group in Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: On August 23, 1947, Col. Carlos Mancheno – a member of the Liberal Party and
Minister of Defense in the government of President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra – ousted
Velasco Ibarra in a bloodless coup after he had been threatened with dismissal from
the government. On August 28, Mancheno abolished the constitution and “declared
his intention to rule by decree” (Lentz 1994, 236).
On August 30, an army counter-coup against Mancheno led by Col. Angel Baquero
Davila broke out in Riobamba, Ecuador’s fourth largest city, and spread to army
garrisons 30 miles north in Ambato. On August 31, it spread to Guayaquil, Ecuador’s
largest city, and the town of Guaranda 25 miles southwest of Riobamba (United Press
1947k). On September 1, despite Colonel Mancheno imposing a nation-wide state
of siege, the anti-Mancheno movement continued to gain momentum and claimed to
control five key towns as a motorized unit from San Antonio garrison joined the anti-
Mancheno junior army officers in revolt in Guayaquil. Meanwhile, the garrison at
Tulcan seized that city and an army air base near the Colombian border. The rebel-
seized planes then dropped leaflets over Quito denouncing Mancheno (United Press
1947i).
By the night of September 2, following the defection of the Ricaauerte battalion,
Mancheno resigned and issued a ceasefire order to troops under his command. Mancheno
fled Quito as rebel troops approached the capital with little resistance (United Press
1947c). On September 3, two rival regimes were set up in Ecuador – a civilian regime
in Quito and a military one in Ambato. In the former, Mariano Suarez Veintimilla
became acting president and appointed a bipartisan cabinet with an equal number of
Liberals and Conservatives. “But in Guayaquil, Major Sergio Enrique Giron, com-
mander of the Second Military Zone, refused to recognize the Vientimilla regime” and
claimed that an 8-man military junta had been set up in Ambato. However, Col. Angel
Baquero Davila, a top rebel leader, began to mediate. Meanwhile, José Maria Velasco
Ibarra, ousted August 23, arrived in Peru and halted his return to Ecuador after he
was “informed that neither of the two provisional Government’s” would welcome his
244
return (United Press 1947a).
The “counter-coup” thus never restored Velasco Ibarra. An emergency Council of State
ruled that Velasco had relinquished his presidential mandate by resigning office and
abandoning Ecuador. They summoned Congress to a special session on September 15
to accept Vientimilla’s resignation and to name a successor (United Press 1947a). The
new provisional president, Mariano Suarez Veintimilla, was a member of the Conserva-
tive Party and had been vice president under Velasco Ibarra, who said the provisional
regime seized power “with little regard for law, logic, morals and the welfare of the
country” (Associated Press 1947f). Suárez “remained in office until a successor could
be selected.” Suárez relinquished office to Carlos Arosemana Tola on September 17
(Lentz 1994, 236). Presidential elections were then scheduled. “Galo Plaza Lasso,
running under a coalition of independent Liberals and socialists, narrowly defeated his
Conservative opponent in presidential elections. His inauguration in September 1948
initiated what was to become the longest period of constitutional rule since the 1912-24
heyday of the Liberal plutocracy” (Rudolph 1991, 33).
Coding rationale: The period between August 24 and September 2, 1947, was arguably
without a regime. We code the “counter-coup” of September 3, 1947, as a successful
provisional coup which installed a provisional regime. We do not combine it with the
August 24 coup because it did not restore Velasco Ibarra to power. This “counter-
coup” had two targets–ousting both the would-be dictator Mancheno and preventing
the constitutional return of Velasco Ibarra.
• # 130-1947-11-9: Ecuador, Carlos Julio Arosemana Tola
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Singh; failed coup attempt - Thompson;
Archigos codes Arosemana Tola as the leader of Ecuador from September 17, 1947,
until August 21, 1948. GWF code a provisional regime (Ecuador 47-48) from August
24, 1947, until August 21, 1948.
Event: On the night of November 8, 1947, “a group of unidentified armed persons,”
allegedly supporters of Col. Carlos Mancheno and Cmdr. Antonio Alomia (who had
recently lost Quito’s mayoral election), attacked the Vencedores barracks in central
Quito, but fled after several minutes of shooting (Associated Press 1947d). On Novem-
ber 10, President Arosemena granted Col. Mancheno safe conduct to go into exile in
Argentina (United Press 1947b). Mancheno was accused of taking party in the attack
(Associated Press 1947c).
Coding rationale: Because there is no evidence of current military participation, we
code this event as a case of prior defection. By this point, Col. Mancheno was a former
and not current, active officer.
• # 130-1949-7-26: Ecuador, Galo Plaza Lasso
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Singh; failed coup attempt - Thompson;
245
Archigos codes Plaza Lasso as the leader of Ecuador from September 1, 1948, until
September 1, 1952. GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 48-63) from September 1, 1948,
until July 11, 1963. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: In the early hours of July 26, 1949, upwards of sixty men loyal to Col. Carlos
Mancheno, who had been ousted from power in September 1947 (see 130-1947-9-3)
and granted exile in November 1947 after being implicated in another armed uprising
(see 130-1947-11-9), “broke into a civil guard station” in northern Quito “and seized
machine guns and sixty rifles.” The newly armed group composed mostly of “retired
military men” then mounted an armed attack on the Presidential Palace. However,
the civil guard had been warned and fought off the attack until police arrived to the
group (Associated Press 1949n). Among those arrested at the palace were “Capt. Abel
Manosalvas, and Julio German, a subinspector of the civil guard... accused of taking
part in an abortive plot uncovered last month at Aguas Hediondas, in Loja Province”
(Associated Press 1949f).
Meanwhile, Col. Carlos Mancheno and “some 30 retired army officers” tried to per-
suade an army tank unit in south Quito to join their revolt (Newsweek 1949). Mancheno
told the tank unit, led by Maj. Reinaldo Varea, that he had captured President Plaza,
the Vice President, and the Cabinet. “Col. Marco Bustamente, commander of the
Quito military zone, reached the barracks at that point and denounced the story as
false. Mancheno and the others were sent to the Garcia Moreno prison” (Associated
Press 1949f). There were two casualties during the brief revolt: a policeman and po-
lice driver were wounded by a rebel prisoner while driving him to police headquarters
(Associated Press 1949n).
On July 27, 14 military men and eight civilians were imprisoned for participating in
the revolt, including its leader, Col. Carlos Mancheno. “Also imprisoned were a major,
a captain, three lieutenants and two sub-lieutenants.” The Liberal, Conservative, and
Socialist Parties all denied any connection with the revolt. The latter two parties
condemned the revolt (Associated Press 1949e). Earlier in July 1949, however, the
Liberal Party and a former Army Commander (Bolivar Galvez) were implicated in
the Loja coup plot (New York Times 1949c). In September 1949, the chamber of
deputies defeated a proposal to grant amnesty to Col. Mancheno and 13 other arrested
revolutionaries (Associated Press 1949g).
Coding rationale: The evidence of the participation of current, active military troops
is ambiguous. The coup attempt was led by retired officers and a prior defector, Col.
Carlos Mancheno. After leading a failed uprising in November 1947 (see 130-1947-11-
9), Mancheno had gone into exile in Argentina but had returned to Guayaquil in April
1948 (Associated Press 1948b). A warrant for his arrest had been issued in December
1948 after he was implicated in an uncovered plot in Guayas Province (Associated
Press 1948d). Yet some news reports list officers implicated by rank, without regard to
their status. On the assumption that at least one of the rebel participants (i.e. Capt.
Abel Manosalvas) was a current officer, we do not exclude this event as a case of prior
defection but instead code this event as a failed anti-democratic coup.
246
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Singh; rebellion - PT; failed coup at-
tempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Plaza Lasso as the leader of Ecuador from Septem-
ber 1, 1948, until September 1, 1952. GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 48-63) from
September 1, 1948, until July 11, 1963. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly
ethnic group in Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: There “were several minor attempts to overthrow Plaza’s government. The
most serious threat came shortly after temporary economic difficulties, including a
balance of payments problem and a rise in the cost of living, led to a government
defeat in the 1950 congressional elections” (Fitch 1977, 40). A month later, at 5 a.m.
on July 15, 1950, Carlos Guevara Moreno, the interior minister under Velasco Ibrarra
(United Press 1950f) and “leader of the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP), a
newly formed populist party based primarily in the Guayaquil lower class, attempted
to launch a popular revolt” in Guayaquil. “With the backing of an infantry battalion,
an irregular force of civilians and members of the civil guard seized control of radio
and telephone facilities, the Guayaquil airport (Fitch 1977, 40), the State Governor’s
palace (United Press 1950f), army district headquarters, and arrested garrison chief
Lt. Col. Jorge Maldonado (Associated Press 1950f).
The rest of the “local military command remained loyal to the government, however,
and with the aid of nearby tank and cavalry units quashed the revolt” (Fitch 1977, 40)
by 10 a.m. and arrested Guevara and lieutenants, including “Rafael Coello Serrano,
Rafael Dillon Valdez, Leopoldo Amador Navarro, Enrique Jairala, Onias Pacheco, and
Fernando Ocejo. Two police captains, identified only as Jacome and Holguin, assigned
to the airport, also were held. A few civil guards and civilians supporting the revolt
also were arrested” (United Press 1950f). “The expected mass for support never ma-
terialized; press and party support for the government was unanimous” (Fitch 1977,
40).
By July 18, over 100 people in both Quito and Guayaquil had been arrested (United
Press 1950d). “Despite the opposition majority in both houses, Congress voted against
three deputies implicated in the plot, stripping hem of their legislative immunity. The
plaza government likewise insisted on stiff penalties for military insubordination; the
rebel officers were dishonorably discharged and, along with Guevara, sentenced to a
year in prison” (Fitch 1977, 40). Guevara always denied the charges of having lead the
revolt (Associated Press 1952b).
Coding rationale: Although the coup attempt was led by a prior defector and im-
plicated civilian elements, evidence indicates that current and active military troops
also supported the Guayaquil uprising. We therefore code this event as a failed anti-
democratic coup.

Category: coup plot
247
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Singh; failed coup attempt - PT and
Thompson; Archigos codes Plaza Lasso as the leader of Ecuador from September 1,
1948, until September 1, 1952. GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 48-63) from Septem-
ber 1, 1948, until July 11, 1963.
Event: “In 1952, when the lack of money for arms or maneuvers led to war academy
complaints that the country was not prepared to confront a threat from Peru, Plaza
closed the academy and sent the younger officers abroad for their general staff training.
Military resentment against the government’s “false concept of pacifism” simmered be-
low the surface” and sometimes flared (Fitch 1977, 40).
On March 3, 1952, seven naval officers and ten civilian members of the Fuerzas Pop-
ulares (Popular Forces) party led by Guayaquil mayor Carlos Guevara Moreno were
arrested after a plot for a revolt was crushed in Guayaquil (Associated Press 1952b).
Guevara had been convicted of leading an earlier failed coup attempt in Guayaquil in
July 1950 (see 130-1950-7-15). On March 5, it was reported that 20 sailors testified
that “an abortive naval revolt” in Guayaquil “had been planned to capture the local
army barracks, arm 1,000 civilians and seize the city” (United Press 1952). In May
1952, an arrest warrant was issued for Guevara, who reportedly had instructed his
followers not to make any move that could give the army an excuse to step in and
delay presidential elections (Brewer 1952).
In 1952, “none of the attempts to stir up barracks revolts managed to sway the constitu-
tionalist convictions of the younger officers. On 31 August 1952, Galo Plaza completed
his fourth year in office and turned power over to his elected successor —the first
Ecuadorian president to do so in twenty-eight years” (Fitch 1977, 40).
Coding rationale: Because the coup appears to have been preempted before any con-
crete actions were taken, we code this event as a coup plot.
• # 130-1954-12-23: Ecuador, José Maria Velasco Ibarra
Thompson; Archigos codes Velasco Ibarra as the leader of Ecuador from September
1, 1952, until September 1, 1956. GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 48-63) from
Event: On December 22, 1954, without warning, “an internal conflict erupted within
the military that almost led to the overthrow of the government. In late 1953, when
Carlos Julio Arosemena was fired as minister of defense,” President José Maria Velasco
Ibarra “decided to give that position to the subsecretary, a young army major, Reinaldo
Varea Donoso, who was promoted to lieutenant colonel and then retired. Despite an
impressive record in the Colegio Militar and advanced training in the United States,
Varea’s meteoric rise was based primarily on a close personal association with Velasco
dating back to the Revolution of 1944” (41-42).
As Varea built up a following in the military, his personal rivalry with Ponce grew. It
248
“came to a head over remarks made by Economic Minister Jaime Nebot, who ques-
tioned the wisdom of deficit spending and use of scarce foreign reserves for the military.
Sensing a weakening of his position with the president, Varea offered his resignation.
Angered by Nebot’s “anti-military” attitude, Varea’s followers demanded that Varea’s
resignation be rejected and that Ponce and Nebot be dismissed.” The next day, after
a meeting with the general staff, the high command passed on to the president a more
delicately worded petition, defending Varea’s work on behalf of the armed forces. In-
furiated at the news of the meeting, Velasco replied, “Tell them that the constitution
gives me the right to name ministers as I please.” A meeting that afternoon with
Varea ended in a shouting match. During the night, as the hard-liners moved to orga-
nize support within the Quito garrison, Velasco, forewarned by a military aide fled by
car to Guayaquil where he arrived at dawn” (Fitch 1977, 42). Military officers went
to Guayaquil with orders to arrest the President if he accepted Varea’s resignation
or failed to accept Neto’s resignation. Meanwhile, in Quito, the military seized key
communications centers (Associated Press 1954d).
But “After being called to the governor’s palace, the commander of the second zone
unexpectedly encountered the president, who explained that the minister of defense
had launched an attempt to overthrow him. Pledging his support, Lieutenant Colonel
Almeida quickly called together the officers at his command. Still ashen from his
narrow escape from Quito, Velasco commented as he entered the gathering that he had
virtually ceased to be president, and he asked only to be treated with consideration.
Showing Velasco to the presiding seat, one officer spoke for the rest as he sad, “Dr.
Velasco, you are still the constitutional president of the country” ” (Fitch 1977, 42).
“With the assurances of support from Guayaquil, attention focused on the division of
El Oro, where the bulk of the army’s forces were gathered on the Peruvian border–
commanded by a young officer who had been briefly imprisoned and discharged for
rejecting Velasco’s seizure of dictatorial powers in 1946. After receiving a telegram from
Quito denouncing the replacement of Varea as treason, Lieutenant Colonel Aulestia
convoked an assembly of battalion commanders, announcing, “I have defended the
constitution before. I defend it now, and this is our position even if we have to support
it with force.” Placing his troops on alert, Aulestia communicated to Quito Guayaquil
the division’s decision to oppose any unconstitutional political movement” (42).
“Meanwhile, Velasco’s unexpected flight to Guayaquil thoroughly confused Varea’s
supporters in Quito. Some unit commanders thought they were acting to force Velasco
to reject Varea’s resignation, while Varea’s followers on the general staff seized the
opportunity to transform the movement into a coup d’état. No one was more confused
than Varea himself, caught between the desires of his friends and supporters for a
Peronist-type coup and his own loyalties to Velasco and constitutionalist principles.
An attempt to negotiate ended with the arrest of several of the movement’s ringleaders
(43), which included the Under-Secretary of Defense, Lt. Col. Jorge Echeverria; “Maj.
Mateo Puga, and Maj. Guillermo Guerrera Varillas of the Army General Staff; Col.
Anibal Carrillo, commander of the Air Force; Col. Rafael Andreda Ochoa, an Army
Commander; Capt. Manuel Nieto Cadena, commander of the Nacy; and Col. Manuel
Mejia, Chief of the Army General Staff” (Associated Press 1954d).
249
“Varea subsequently abdicated leadership of the movement formed on his behalf and
went home, still unable to resolve his internal conflicts. While the subsecretary of
defense tried to rally the procoup forces the vice-president and a number of older officers
who had been pushed aside by the Varea group energetically worked to recapture
control of the Quito units. By the morning of the twenty-fourth the crisis was ended
and Quito submitted to the authority of” Vice President Alfredo Chiriboga” and the
new minister of defense Pedro Menendez Gilbert. There “were no public pressures for
military intervention” or unrest in the form of strikes or demonstrations (Fitch 1977,
43-44).
Many of these rebel high commanders were released on December 24 (Associated Press
1954h) but rearrested with several others on December 27 (Associated Press 1954f).
“Nebot and Ponce were soon eased out of the cabinet. Loyal constitutionalists were
promoted–assurances were given that plans to reorganize and re-equip the armed forces
would go forward with the complete support of the government” (Fitch 1977, 44).
coup.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; failed coup attempt - PT and
Thompson; Archigos codes Velasco Ibarra as the leader of Ecuador from September
1, 1952, until September 1, 1956. GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 48-63) from
Event: “In the maneuvering prior to the 1956 elections, the velasquista movement
and ARNE nominated a popular ex-mayor of Quito, but as the campaign progressed,
Velasco virtually ignored the official candidate, endorsing instead his former minister,
Camilo Ponce Enriquez. Ponce was the nominee of the Conservative party and his
own Social Christian movement (MSC), actually the more aristocratic and conservative
wing of the Ecuadorian right. Aided by a close split in the coastal provinces between
Guevara Moreno of the CFP and the candidate of the Liberal-Socialist coalition, Ponce
emerged the victor by 3,000 votes, with 29 percent of the total vote. After the electoral
tribunal rejected charges of fraud in several provinces, Liberal leaders began looking
for military backing in an attempt to” block “the first Conservative government since
1895” (44-45).
On August 7, 1956, the Portoviejo military garrison of some 200 troops revolted and
was backed by Manabi Province, a Liberal stronghold. The rebels named their garrison
commander, Lt. Col. Arturo Davila, as the new provincial leader (Associated Press
1956j). The revolt “encountered neither military nor civilian support” (Fitch 1977,
44-45). Loyalist forces strafed Portoviejo and other Manabi cities (Associated Press
1956j).
By August 8, loyalist troops had recaptured Portoviejo, whose mayor revealed that
250
José Marie Plaza – the Liberal Party’s defeated vice presidential candidate and Galo
Plaza’s brother – was the civilian leader of the rebellion. The rebellion’s military
leader, Lt. Col. Davila, withdrew his forces to Chone, a town 38 miles northeast of
Portoviejo (Associated Press 1956c). On August 9, the government said that it had
broken the back of the remaining rebels and that only three deaths – all military troops
– had occurred during the uprising (Associated Press 1956d). Col. Humberto Garces,
an army leader, was arrested for allegedly being complicit in the uprising, charges he
denied (Tad Szulc 1956c).
coup.

successful coup - CSP, PT, Fossum, Perez, Singh, and Luttwak (November 9); Archigos
codes the exit of Velasco Ibarra on this date through “irregular” means by military
actors without foreign support. GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 48-63) from Septem-
ber 1, 1948, until July 11, 1963. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic
group in Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: Rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, coupled with President Velasco’s
attempt to steer Ecuador towards a neutral and independent foreign policy (Tad Szulc
1961a), led to a split in the velasquista coalition. In July 1961, the left, led by Carlos
Julio Arosemena Monroy, the vice president and president of the Chamber of Deputies,
openly opposed the government (Rudolph 1991, 36). Arosemena defied Velasco by
going on a trip to Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw, and upon his return demanded
Ecuador establish closer ties with the communist world (Tad Szulc 1961a). By Octo-
ber, executive-congressional relations “had deteriorated to the point where legislators
and progovernment spectators engaged in a gun battle. Although dozens of bullet
holes were later found in the Chamber, no one was injured.” That month, under an
IMF arrangement, Velasco’s order of a series of new sales taxes “to raise desperately
needed revenues then sparked a general strike and a series of demonstrations and riots
in several major cities” (Rudolph 1991, 36).
On Monday, November 6, after further riots were forcefully suppressed, the cabinet
resigned to give Velasco a free hand (United Press International 1961b). A “ delega-
tion from the Federation of University Students appeared before Congress to denounce
as unconstitutional the installation of a military governor in Cuenca without con-
gressional consent. Declining the invitation to go into the streets and demonstrate,
Vice-President Arosemena explained over the nationwide radio network carrying the
special afternoon session, “In this moment when the constitution has been broken... I
must represent the law in the name of the National Parliament.” Loyal velasquista leg-
islators reported to Velasco in Guayaquil that Arosemena had openly declared himself
president. Infuriated, the president left immediately for Quito” (Fitch 1977, 49).
251
In a nationwide broadcast that evening, President Velsaco declared that he no longer
recognized Arosemena as vice president, whom he accused of seeking to become a dicta-
tor. “Dr. Velasco then read a proclamation to the armed forces in which he denounced
Señor Arosemena’s “uncalled for attitude against the Constitution of the republic.”
He told the military to “maintain and uphold the Constitution,” i.e. arrest the vice
president. Publicly, army leaders duly surrounded the Congress building (United Press
International 1961b). But privately, “All four members of the high command opposed
the decision to arrest Arosemena as a breach of the constitution that would cause seri-
ous division within the armed forces, arguing, that the end of the congressional session
was less than twenty-four hours away. Velasco insisted, declaring, “There cannot be
two presidents, one elected by 400,000 votes and another by Congress,” and threatened
to resign if the order was not carried out. Nevertheless, the president’s explanation of
the need for the arrest was coolly received during a tour of military units in Quito.
Finally the high command, with the aid of the minister of defense, convinced Velasco
to countermand the arrest order” (Fitch 1977, 49-50). But it was too late. Just after
midnight on 7 November, Arosemena and nine members of Congress were arrested as
they left the Congress building (Associated Press 1961c).
“As Arosemena awaited the deportation order in an air force plane, the president hes-
itated, acting against military advice that now his only hope was to carry out his
original plan. Visibly tired, Velasco finally ordered Arosemena’s detention in the penal
Garcı́a Moreno pending presentation of charges before the Supreme Court, conclud-
ing, “It is not the time for a dictatorship.” Meanwhile, in the engineering battalion
“Chimborazo,” which had been repeatedly employed in putting down opposition disor-
ders in Quito, the news of the vice-president’s arrest and the sudden replacement of the
unit’s commander for his opposition to the arrest order caused new discontent. Major
Jorge Valdivieso, now in command, discussed the charges against the vice-president
with the other officers. Having heard Arosemena’s speech on radio, concluded that,
while inflammatory, it in no way justified his unconstitutional arrest. With little or no
dissension, the unit decided to revolt in favor of the vice-president and in opposition
to the attempted dictatorship. During the night the barracks were fortified and a few
reinforcements recruited from the military geographic institute. Emissaries sent to seek
support from other Quito units met with little success, and transmission of the unit’s
manifesto was blocked by police occupation of radio and television stations” (Fitch
1977, 50).
At dawn on November 7, “as members of the high command arrived at the barracks
to investigate reports of suspicious activities, Army Commander General Del Pozo was
taken prisoner. Another car, containing the chief of staff, narrowly escaped capture.
While General Aulestia informed the president, Subsecretary Naranjo organized the
suppression of the insurrection, surrounding the barracks with artillery, cavalry, and
paratrooper units. At seven o’clock, when the rebels refused a negotiated surrender,
both sides opened fire. After about two hours of fighting, which killed four and ex-
hausted the battalion’s ammunition, the rebel officers decided to surrender to their
prisoner, General Del Pozo, accepting his word that there would be “neither victors
nor vanquished.” As progovernment forces departed, hostile crowds of spectators jeered
252
and threw rocks and garbage” (Fitch 1977, 50).
Two more anti-government movements emerged that morning. “Air Force Commander
Suárez, who had almost been removed for his opposition to the arrest order, refused to
order an air attack against the Chimborazo barrack and, after consulting with other
air force officers, sent a delegation to demand that the vice-president be freed. Velasco
reluctantly accepted the ultimatum, but when the agreed-upon hour passed with no
results, the conviction grew within the air force command that the dictatorship was
now a fact. Meanwhile, at the main air base at Taura near Guayaquil, the officers
decided at a general meeting not to attack the Chimborazo rebels but to support
a constitutionalist position. While gaining time through another ultimatum to the
president, General Suárez” avoided arrest, slipped out of Quito with the rest of the air
force planes, landed at Taura and took command of the constitutionalist forces (50-51).
“Manifestos began to fly from all sides. The Congress in emergency session resolved “to
remind all members of the armed forces that Article 157 of the constitution establishes
the obligation of the armed forces to maintain the constitution and that any attempt
to deny the authority of the Congress or of its president [Arosemena] constitutes a
violation of the constitution and consequently an attempt to establish a dictatorship.”
An air force communique also invoked the oath of the Ecuadorian soldier to uphold the
constitution and called for the immediate convocation of an extraordinary Congress
as the legally competent authority to rule on the constitutionality of the acts of the
president and vice-president” (51).
“The second movement against the government came from the army war academy”
(51). Gen, Gonzelo Villacis, the academy’s director, publicly urged both Velasco and
Arosemena to resign “for the good of the country” (Associated Press 1961g). A “meet-
ing of professors and students decided to issue a proclamation calling on all officers to
refuse any order to attack another unit and resolved to send a delegation headed by
the director, General Villacis, to ask Velasco to resign. In a noon meeting with the
president, the most senior of the academy’s students bluntly told him, “The country
needs peace and tranquility for progress, so that the people can work. Wherever you
go, there are arrests, disorders, and deaths.” Slumped in his chair, Velasco replied
that he was already considering resignation, but asked to be allowed to do so the next
day before the Council of State, rather than resign before a hostile Congress. Later
that afternoon Velasco abandoned the Presidential Palace for parts unknown, possibly
thinking of repeating his successful 1954 escape to Guayaquil” (Fitch 1977, 51).
Yet in Guayaquil, “the constitutionalist group at Taura was gaining support. After
receiving an air force delegation, the navy, led by its squadron commander refused to
accept any further orders from the navy commanding general in Quito and declared its
support for the constitutionalist position. Patrol boats were quickly sent to guard the
river-crossing facing the air base at Taura from possible army attack, and the rest of the
fleet was put to sea. In Guayaquil itself, despite pressure from opposition politicians,
the commander of the second army zone remained unenthusiastically loyal to the high
command. But by the night of 7 November, many of the units in his zone had begun
declaring their support for the constitutionalist cause.” That night, the powerful El
253
Oro division declared for the Taura group (Fitch 1977, 51).
“In Quito, a general meeting of all officers was called to discuss the new situation
presented by Velasco’s abandonment of power. In the discussion of possible successors,
opinions were divided, with the high command particularly opposed to the succession
of the vice-president. One group of officers proposed to designate the chief of general
staff as interim president, but when he refused to accept the position, a weak com-
promise was reached with the decision to turn power over to Dr. Camilo Gallegos
Toledo, president of the Supreme Court. The support for Gallegos came primarily
from those officers who had supported Velasco, on the argument that if Velasco had
broken the constitution by arresting the vice-president, Arosemena had done so by
his ill-concealed campaign to overthrow the government; thus only the judicial power
was left unblemished. Gallegos, who was known to many officers through six years
service on the National Defense Board, was asked by the chief of staff and the three
commanding generals to accept the presidency on an interim basis until new elections
could be called. Gallegos reluctantly accepted the position when he was told that this
was the only means to avoid civil war. With promises that the armed forces would
unite behind him, Gallegos set about forming a cabinet designating General Villacı́s
of the war academy as minister of government and General Aulestia as minister of
defense” (51-52).
“While Gallegos was busy organizing his government, the vice-president of the Senate,
retired Lieutenant Colonel Reinaldo Varea, managed to secure Arosemena’s release
from the Penal Garcia Moreno. Congress was hastily called into session despite the
troops surrounding the Legislative Palace, and at midnight, as its official mandate
expired, Congress declared Dr. Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy the constitutional
president of the Republic” (52). However, army troops backed by tanks continued to
surround the Congress, thus holding Arosemena a virtual prisoner. The army issued a
communique saying that “any action by the Congress whose term has expired, such as
naming Arosemena, lacks validity.” Col. Jacinto Ochoa, commander of the Taura Air
Base, warned the army units to recognize Arosemena as President or that his planes
would attack them (Associated Press 1961h).
On the morning of November 8, after receiving delegations from the war academy,
“the remaining provincial garrisons declared for the succession of the vice-president.
Gallegos supporters, including General Villacı́s, began defecting. Colonel Vega of the
war academy group broke the loyalists hold on the Quito garrison by winning over
the cavalry battalion “Yaguachi” and other units” (Fitch 1977, 52). Air Force jets
from Taura began to fire warning shots at army tanks at the Legislative Palace and
nearby military sites. Within minutes, Gallegos resigned (Associated Press 1961h).
Seeing resistance as futile, the loyalist commander of the first zone stood his troops
down (Fitch 1977, 52). On November 9, as Arosemena took office, Velasco maintained
from his asylum in the Mexican Embassy that he was still constitutional president and
denied that he promised to resign (Paul P. Kennedy 1961a). On November 11, Velasco
flew into exile to Argentina, he noted, unconstitutionally, “involuntarily and by force”
(Paul P. Kennedy 1961b).
254
“Among the major military participants in the 1961 crisis, the constitutional question
was again clearly the leading issue, although there was no agreement to the import of
the constitutional norm in this particular situation. The majority argued that Velasco
had broken the constitution by arresting the vice-president, while half as many officers
countered that Dr. Arosemena was equally guilty of violating the constitution. Three
officers defended Velasco as the legally constituted authority, regardless of the arrest.
Half of the respondents cited the month-long wave of civil disorders and deaths pre-
ceding government’s fall as well as public hostility toward Velasco. Again a number
of officers mentioned personal attachments to or complaints against the government,
with three members of the high command citing their personal loyalty to Velasco as
the most important factor in their decision. Others attributed Velasco’s fall wholly or
in part to the efforts of Arosemena to bring down the government” (Fitch 1977, 52-53).
coup, which differs from a majority of prior coup datasets that code this case as a
successful coup. Whatever the constitutionality of Velasco’s arrest order of his vice
president, which prompted his ouster, military actors took concrete actions to oust
the sitting President involuntarily. Military actors seeking to install Camilo Gallegos
Toledo, though politically tenable, did not comport with constitutional provisions call-
ing for the ascension of the arrested Vice President (Associated Press 1961h), who did
in fact succeed eventually thanks to congressional intervention. As a result, Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014) do not code a collapse of democracy at this time. The coup
succeeded in ousting the targeted incumbent, but the successor initially backed by the
military, Camilo Gallegos Toledo – who was the head of the Supreme Court and tapped
by the military only to be an interim head of state – did not last in office for seven
days because the Congress intervened to put the Vice President back in place. Thus,
we might have coded this case a successful coup because the incumbent was ousted.
However, the coup plotters initial hand-picked successor did not remain in office for
seven day and the coup plotters were not successful in overthrowing the regime, as the
constitutional successor, the Vice President, took power.
• # 130-1963-7-11: Ecuador, Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy

Fossum, Luttwak, Singh, Thompson, and Perez; Archigos codes Arosemena Monroy
as leader of Ecuador from November 7, 1961, until July 11, 1963; GWF code the col-
lapse of a democracy (Ecuador 48-63) on this date in a military coup. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: “The demise of the banana boom in the early 1960s would again set the stage
for military rule. A military coup in 1963 represented the first instance of institutional
intervention in the country’s history... Although responding to appeals from econom-
ically powerful sectors of society upset by the reformist course pursued by President
Carlos Julio Arosemana Monroy, the institutional coup was justified by the need to
255
defend corporate and national interests. The failure of a Congress dominated by elite
interests to approve military promotion lists in 1962 and the communist paranoia of
the era, exacerbated by Arosemena Monroy’s reluctance to dispel concerns about his
‘communist sympathies’, provided the pretext for intervention and rule by a more
professional military” (Isaacs 1993, 2-3).
“The brief appearance of a guerrilla movement in the coastal jungle and a rash of
small-scale terrorist incidents (many of which later were found to have been staged by
right-wing provocateurs) also left Arosemena open to accusations of being either unable
or unwilling to stop communist subversion. By early 1963, military conspiracy was
again afoot” (Rudolph 1991, 37). These plots were mostly in the army, around figures
such as Colonel Naranjo, Colonel Carlos Arregui, and last but not least General Vı́ctor
Aulestia and other officers who had been forced into retirement in 1961, who organized
the Nuevo Orden Nacional (NON). By June 1963, NON had successfully recruited
“Colonel Marcos Gándara, the director of the war academy, as well as members of
the general staff and lower-ranking officers scattered around the country. NON also
received a promise of instant support from the commander of the 9,000-man division
in El Oro.” All of these plots received “encouragement from the American military
attaché, Colonel Charles Pratt,” though the U.S. embassy itself was unaware of any
CIA payments and did not foment a coup (Fitch 1977, 59-60).
In June, following “a rash of small-scale terrorist incidents,” conservative outlets began
to call openly for a military takeover. By July 10, the NON was sufficiently confident
that “a revolt against the government would receive the support of those officers still
not committed to the movement. The date of the coup was set for 18 July. Colonel
Gandara was formally slated to become the new president with General Aulestia as his
minister of defense. The existing high command was to be retired, since it was thought
to be too closely associated with Arosemena. Ironically, that night that same night the
commanders of the three services were attending a state banquet given by the president
for the visiting president of Grace Lines,” in Arosemena embarrassingly “arrived late
in an advanced state of intoxication and, after the first course had been served, arose
to give an impromptu” anti-U.S. speech. “When the American ambassador attempted
to defend U.S. policies, Arosemena indicated his displeasure by turning his back and
abruptly walking out. Immediately after the dinner’s sudden end, Army commander
Cabrera, Air Commander Freile, and Navy Commander Castro met the home of the
vice-president and agreed that something had to be done, despite some hesitation
by Castro and Cabrera. After a brief discussion of various alternatives (including
elevation of the vice-president, convocation of Congress, or imposition of a military
government),” they agreed to consult a general assembly of all officers “who could
reach Quito by the next morning” (61-62).
At 9 a.m. on 11 July, “in the Ministry of Defense, several hundred officers listened
as Colonel Cabrera explained in detail what had occurred the night before. Naval
Commander Castro, presiding over the session, then called on Colonel Gándara who
spoke in favor of an immediate military takeover... Starting with Colonel Freile, one
by one the senior officers present denounced the drunken behavior of the president and
stressed the need for action against the communist threat. All called for an immediate
256
takeover by the three service commanders, warning that, if the commanders hesitated,
lower-ranking officers would not. No one stood up to defend Arosemena or oppose the
creation of a military government. News of the high command’s decision to take over
was quickly communicated to all military garrisons, who responded immediately with
declarations of support, the first being that of the El Oro division, whose commander
thought he was supporting the coup of the Nuevo Norden Nacional” (Fitch 1977, 62).
Thus, “On July 11, the high command of the armed forces decided, without dissent,
to depose Arosemena” (Rudolph 1991, 37). “At noon the military’s decision was
officially announced to the nation, and troops were dispatched to seize the Presidential
palace. A momentary delay caused by an exchange of gunfire with leftist youths outside
the Palace” (Fitch 1977, 62) left five people dead and three wounded (Associated
Press 1963c). “President Arosemena, brandishing his pistol, barricaded himself in his
apartment and refused to resign (Fitch 1977, 62). After two hours, an aide disarmed
Arosemena, who was quickly flown by military plane to Panama. On July 12, Vice
President Reynaldo Varea Donoso was flown to Panama after he tried to convene an
emergency session of Congress (Eder 1963c).
The “primary and nearly universal complaints” of the coup participants were “the scan-
dals created by the president’s excessive drinking and the feeling that the government
was condoning by inaction, if not covertly encouraging, the upsurge in pro-Castro or
“communist” activities. Many officers also cited civilian appeals for military action to
depose Arosemena. An equal number of officers mentioned the constitutional question,
although some of these were in fact questioning the government’s legitimacy. Finally, a
smaller number complained that the president’s constant drinking left the government
with no real leadership especially in the area of” socio-economic reform (Fitch 1977,
62).
The four-man military junta that seized power (Associated Press 1963c) was led by
Navy Commander Capt. Ramon Castro Jijon (Raymont 1963c) and also included
the Col. Luis Cabrera Sevilla, the army commander; Lt. Col. Manuel Freile, the
air force commander; and Col. Marcos Gandara, Secretary General of the National
Defense Council (Eder 1963c). The junta promised to give power to a President chosen
by a constituent assembly within two years (Eder 1963g). But first, it committed to
pass “basic socioeconomic reforms, which both Velasco and Arosemena had promised
but never implemented,” which had only made the lower classes “more receptive to
the lure of communism. The junta combined its reformist anticommunism with the
more traditional hard-line variety. After jailing or exiling the entire leadership of the
communist left, the new government reorganized the nation’s two leading universities
in an effort to eliminate them as sources of left-wing political activity” (Rudolph 1991,
37).
• # 130-1966-3-29: Ecuador, Ramón Castro Jijón

257
Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; popular revolt - CCD; successful coup
- CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Castro as being removed on this date through
“irregular” means by domestic protests without foreign support; Svolik codes Castro
as being removed by protests on this date; GWF code the collapse of a military regime
(Ecuador 63-66) on this date in a popular uprising. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as
the monopoly ethnic group in Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: On March 28, 1966, student demonstrators calling for an end to the military
regime and return to civilian rule were bloodily attacked at the Central University in
Quito, leading to several deaths. This triggered a crisis within the government and a
wave of resignations by officials, as the junta closeted itself in the presidential palace on
how to respond or hand over power to civilians (H. Maidenberg 1966d). “In a meeting
with the service commanders and general staff that was devoted to sharp criticism of
the junta”, Rear Admiral Ramon Castro Jijon, Army General Luis Cabrera Sevilla,
and Army General Marcos Gándara Enriques “announced their decision to accept the
opposition demands and turn power over to a civilian interim president within eight
to ten days rather than be the cause of further bloodshed. Delegations composed of
the three services were then sent to Guayaquil and to the southern garrisons to explain
the junta’s decision” (Fitch 1977, 71-72).
The next morning, March 29, “the disillusioned military reformers stepped down”
(Rudolph 1991). “When General Aguinaga reported that military units stationed in
Quito were refusing to go into the streets to oppose the students and strikers, General
Gándara hastily wrote a resignation proclamation for the junta turning power over to
General Staff Vargas. Vargas communicated the decision to the rest of the military and
to the press, and announced that the next day there would be an assembly of economic,
cultural, and political leaders to select a new president.” That afternoon, in a “care-
fully orchestrated gathering” (Fitch 1977, 71-72) at the ministry of national defense, a
small group of civilian representatives of the political parties elected Clemente Yerovi
Indaburu, a wealthy Guayaquil businessman, as provisional president (H. Maidenberg
1966c). Yerovi was “a non-partisan banana grower who had served as minister of
economy under Galo Plaza” (Rudolph 1991). Yerovi was “nominated by ex-Presidents
Plaza and Ponce and elected by acclamation. Speaking for the military, General Var-
gas accepted the decision of the assembly without reservation, leaving a carte blanche”
for the new regime (Fitch 1977, 72). Yerovi was inaugurated on March 30, taking the
oath of office on an air force plane. The air force had been “instrumental” in ousting
the junta (H. Maidenberg 1966b).
The deposed junta members either fled the country and flew to Rio de Janeiro on an
air force plane (Reuters 1966) or were placed under guard at a farm near Quito (As-
sociated Press 1966a). Yerovi’s first official act was to declare a general amnesty (H.
Maidenberg 1966b). On April 1, Yerovi forced the retirement of the three members
of the deposed junta, armed forces chief of staff Gen. Telmo Vargas, former minis-
ter of national defense Gen. Gonzalo Coba, General Segundo Morochoz, and Gen.
Augustin Mora Bowen. Six other senior generals were removed from government posi-
tions, though they were allowed to remain on the active list (Associated Press 1966a).
258
Thus did “Ecuador’s longest experiment in military rule in fifty years” come to an
unceremonious end (Fitch 1977, 72).
Coding rationale: According to Goemens, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009, 235), “Mili-
tary leadership deposes ruling junta after violent student protests and strikes. Since
the military is not taking power for itself (a civilian interim president is instituted
immediately), Could be coded, and could not be coded as a military coup.” Because
current active military members took concrete actions to expedite the end of the mil-
itary regime and ouster of Castro, we consider this a coup and not simply a protest.
The fact that the junta members were forced to flee or arrested also suggests a forced
not voluntary resignation. Had General Castro and the three-main junta been allowed
to step down voluntarily several weeks later as they had promised on March 28, we
would consider this a case of constitutional regime change that was a result of domestic
protests only, and would not have coded an accompanying coup.
Although Vargas did not remain in office for one week, his designated civilian successor
(Yerovi) did, thus satisfying the one-week rule for a successful coup. Consistent with
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code a successful regime change coup. As it
were, “when widespread civilian discontent boded ill for the continuation of government
by junta in 1966, important elements of the armed forces joined the civilian opposition
and contributed to the fall of the junta” (Rex A. Hudson 1991b, 190).

Other Datasets: autogolpe - CCD, CSP, and PT; successful coup - Singh; Archigos
codes Velasco Ibarra as leader of Ecuador from September 1, 1968, until February 15,
1972; GWF code the collapse of a democracy (Ecuador 68-70) on this date.
Event: In June 1968, José Maria Velasco Ibarra was elected president for the fifth time.
“The weakness of Velasco’s mandate—he managed only a plurality of barely one-third
of the popular vote in a crowded field of five candidates–foreshadowed political diffi-
culties that plagued him during his final term. His newly formed National Velasquista
Federation (Federación Nacional Velasquista—FNV) was far short of a majority in
either house of Congress, and a failure to build any working coalition made for a stale-
mate in the legislative process. Even Velasco ’s own vice president, a guayaquileño
Liberal named Jorge Zavala Baquerizo, turned into a strident and vocal critic. Cabi-
net ministers came and went with astonishing frequency. This political impasse soon
combined with the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, which by now had become
customary under the spendthrift habits and administrative mismanagement associated
with each of Velasco ’s terms in office, to spawn a major political crisis” (Rudolph 1991,
40).
“After sharp government losses in the June congressional elections, Velasco sent to
Congress a series” of deficit reduction measures. But “Congress, with characteristic
abandon, approved only the debt consolidation before adjourning for the summer.
Denouncing congressional irresponsibility in the harshest terms, Velasco published his
259
initial proposals as emergency decree laws without any clear legal authority to do
so. Inasmuch as the decrees included a substantial increase in import tariffs, the
Guayaquil Chamber of commerce immediately brought suit before the Supreme Court,
which ruled in mid-June that the decrees were unconstitutional. Denouncing the 1967
constitution’s new restrictions on executive powers Velasco repeatedly declared that
he would govern or resign” (Fitch 1977, 175).
“The turning point came on June 22, 1970, when Velasco, in an action known as an
autogolpe (self-seizure of power), dismissed Congress and the Supreme Court and as-
sumed dictatorial powers” (Rudolph 1991, 40). Velasco also closed universities, which
had been the center of leftist politics. President Velasco said his move sought to
avoid “economic chaos, conspiracies by the oligarchs and subversion by university stu-
dents” (H. Maidenberg 1970b). The president’s “ autogolpe and continuance in power
were possible because of support from the armed forces. Velasco ’s key ally was his
nephew and minister of defense, General Jorge Acosta Velasco, who continually reshuf-
fled the high command in order to retain velasquistas in key posts” (Rudolph 1991,
41). On June 23, Jorge Acosta Velasco, justifying the arrest of university presidents,
was necessary to prevent “further use of these institutions as fortresses of subversion
and Communism that breeds public disorder.” He said business leaders were being
detained because “Ecuador will no longer be ruled by the oligarchs,” the chamber of
commerce, and industry (New York Times 1970b).
event a successful autogolpe by the elected president with the support of the armed
forces, marking the beginning of autocratic rule.
• # 130-1972-2-15: Ecuador, José Marı́a Velasco Ibarra

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Velasco Ibarra as exiting on February 15,
1972 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF
code the collapse of a personal regime (Ecuador 70-72) on February 15, 1972 in a mili-
tary coup; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Ecuador from
1946 to 2000.
Event: At midnight on Tuesday, February 15, 1972, President José Marı́a Velasco
Ibarra was ousted in a bloodless military coup (Associated Press 1972b). There were
two key reasons that led the military to overthrow Velasco – for the third time27 – be-
fore his term expired later in the year. First, the state would soon begin to reap “vast
revenues under a 1964 petroleum concession” (Rex A. Hudson 1991b, 41). Second, in
the presidential elections scheduled for June 4 (United Press International 1972a), the
candidate greatly favored to win was Assad Bucaram, “a former street peddler who in
27. Velasco had been elected president five times from 1934 to 1972. He had been insulated from an
assertive military by his nephew, General Jorge Acosta Velasco, who was Minister of Defense. When his
nephew was forced to resign following a failed reshuffling of military leadership, Velasco was exposed to
growing civil unrest stemming from unpopular austerity measures (Rex A. Hudson 1991b, 41).
260
1960” seized leadership of the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP) from Guevara
Moreno and “had twice been an extremely popular mayor of Guayaquil. Both the mil-
itary and the business community regarded Bucaram as dangerous and unpredictable
and unfit to be president,” especially as oil revenue was expected to balloon (Rex A.
Hudson 1991b, 41). Velasco had refused military demands that he bar Bucaram from
running, claiming that it was up to Congress to determine his eligibility (United Press
The 78-year-old President was in Quito when the military hierarchy led by the army
commander Gen. Guillermo Rodriguez Lara moved against him. “He tried to escape
by air but could not take off because Quito Airport is not equipped for night opera-
tions. He then drove to Guayaquil, where he hoped to rally the country to his support
with a television broadcast.” Instead, Navy officers arrested him and held him at the
presidential residence. “Radio stations broadcast only music and the three television
stations in Guayaquil went off the air” (Associated Press 1972b). Dr. Velasco was
flown to Panama and a final exile (United Press International 1972b). On February
16, a three-man military junta proclaimed a “revolutionary and nationalist govern-
ment” and restored the 1945 constitution. The junta included Gen. Rodriguez Lara
of the army, Gen. Julio Espinosa of the air force, and Rear Adm. Anibal Valleja of
the navy. The junta’s first act was to suspend general elections scheduled for June
4 (United Press International 1972a). Bucaram and leaders of his Concentration of
Popular Forces fled into hiding (United Press International 1972b).
Initially, ranking officers “agreed to establish collective leadership through a council of
government composed of the three service commanders. This was vitiated when the
army chief claimed the presidency for himself. The navy and air force commanders,
both of whom had been senior to Rodrı́guez Lara, soon stepped aside for younger,
presumably more nationalistic officers.” Rodrı́guez Lara would be forced to constantly
reshuffle his cabinet to balance leftist and rightist factions (John D. Martz 1987, 118).
a successful regime change coup. For a detailed analysis of the coup, see Isaacs (1993,
chapter 2).
• # 130-1975-9-1: Ecuador, Guillermo Rodrı́guez Lara

CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Rodrı́guez Lara as the leader of Ecuador from
February 15, 1972, to January 11, 1976; GWF code a military regime (Ecuador 72-
79) from February 15, 1972, until April 29, 1979. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
monopoly ethnic group in Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: In 1975, President Rodriguez Lara attempted to exert Ecuador’s power inter-
nationally by joining the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
261
renegotiating several petroleum concessions to increase Ecuador’s profit from oil ex-
ports (by keeping high prices). However, these policies backfired when the Rodriguez
regime continued to push for a greater share of oil export profits from international
companies. Texaco Chevron responded by cutting back exports from Ecuador. In
August, Rodriguez Lara initiated a 60% duty on imported luxury items to make up
for lost petroleum profits, upsetting the upper class. “The measure was condemned by
the Chambers of Commerce in Quito and Guayaquil, whose constituents had grown
dependent on the sale of imports” (Rex A. Hudson 1991b, 43). Critics on the right
decried Rodriguez Lara’s high oil price policy as army elements began plotting against
him (News Dispatches 1975, (Omang 1975a), (Omang 1975b)) in a funeral parlor. Be-
cause of the location of these discussions, subsequent events are known as the “funeral
parlor revolt” (Pineo 2010, 185).
At the end of August 1975, the coup plot was discovered. Its leader, General Raúl
Gonzáles Alvear, the army chief of staff (and the second highest ranking army officer),
decided to launch the coup the next day in hopes of gaining the element of surprise,
but without knowing whether the lightning coup attempt would have sufficient support
in the military. “So hasty was the decision to bring the coup forward that one of its
three key participants was not even forewarned while another was only contacted at
the last minute. Rodriguez Lara, meanwhile, had abandoned the Palace for the greater
safety of Riobamba during the course of the preceding afternoon” (Isaacs 1993, 113).
On September 1, 1975, Gen. Gonzáles Alvear led several hundred soldiers and ten tanks
in seizing the presidential palace in Quito (United Press International 1975). “González
and his men managed to seize the building but in the process killed about one hundred
people, mostly civilians who happened to be shopping when the soldiers began firing
automatic weapons in the crowded downtown” (Pineo 2010, 185). General Gonzáles
stated in a radio communique that he had moved against the president because of
the mismanagement of the country’s oil resources (United Press International 1975).
Gonzáles Alvear promised to hold free elections within two years (Omang 1975a) and
announced one of his first acts in power would be to abolish the import tax (News
Dispatches 1975). Morning newspapers included an ad approving the coup by the civic
junta, which had prior knowledge of the plot and criticized the regime for “a candidly
demagogic...petroleum policy, traced under the vigilant influence of the Communist
Party.” (John D. Martz 1987, 147). “Gonzalez Alvear also miscalculated by deciding
to enlist the assistance of civilian politicians in an attempt to rally popular support.
Professionalist officers denounced the involvement of civilian political leaders which
they saw as confirmation of... the politicisation of large segments of the armed forces”
(Isaacs 1993, 113).
By “taking the Presidential Palace at such a high cost in lives, González had squandered
any possible support for his coup, either in the military, among leading elite groups,
or with the public” (Pineo 2010, 185). From an army base at Riobamba, Rodriguez
Lara rallied loyalist troops to join him in retaking the palace in the afternoon (News
Dispatches 1975). “Members of the Homeland Brigade and the parachute battalion
clashed with the presidential escort; the coup ended unsuccessfully with its leaders
hiding out in the Carondelet Palace” (Cheyre 2013, 16). Gonzáles sought asylum in
262
the Chilean Embassy and flew to exile in Chile on September 26 (Reuters 1975).
Coding rationale: When the armed forces toppled José Marı́a Velasco Ibarra in 1972,
they installed a self-styled “revolutionary nationalist” military regime, which under
Lara “vacillated over the extent to which it should be reformist and nationalistic or
traditionalistic in outlook” (John D. Martz 1987, 6-7). This coup attempt appears to
have been a manifestation of this policy struggle and also was “a power bid by an am-
bitious general, encouraged by dissatisfied middle- and upper-class civilian elements”
(Omang 1975a). According to Catherine M. Conaghan (1988, 102-103), the “violence
was the culmination of stormy policy conflicts between dominant-class organizations
and the government during the summer of 1975. These conflicts were rooted in the
increasing pressures of traditional bourgeois political parties for redemocratization and
the opposition of the chambers of production to the government’s policy of selective
importation enacted in the wake of a renewed balance-of-payments crisis.”
Although civilian opposition groups supported the coup, there is no evidence they
would have been included in a post-coup government. What’s more, Isaacs (1993, 114)
claims that at this time “civilian pressures stopped short of insisting on a transition
to civilian rule. For the most part, civilian opponents did not seek a change in regime
but would have been satisfied with changes in the governing strategy of the military
dictatorship.” Thus, we interpret the evidence to suggest the primary purpose of the
coup was policy change, not regime change, and that there would not have been a
change in the group from which leaders could be selected.
• # 130-1976-1-11: Ecuador, Guillermo Rodriguez Lara

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; not a candidate - LPL; Archigos codes Rodriguez Lara as
exiting on January 11, 1976 through “irregular” means by military actors without for-
eign support; GWF code a military regime (Ecuador 72-79) from February 15, 1972
to August 10, 1979; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: On January 1, 1976, General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara’s cabinet resigned. By
January 9, coup rumors were swirling as “combat troops ringed the palace” amidst
student protests and the continuing Cabinet crisis (Associated Press 1976). “General
Rodrı́guez Lara’s position continued to weaken, and the Ecuadorian Armed Forces’
Council of Generals asked him to resign” (Cheyre 2013, 16). At 4:30 a.m. on Jan-
uary 11, Rodriguez Lara resigned, reportedly in a bloodless coup led by Rear Admiral
Alfredo Poveda Burbano. By 7:30 a.m., he had left the palace, reportedly “without
bitterness” at his fate. A military triumvirate including the commanders of the three
armed forces – Vice Adm. Alfredo Poveda Burbano (navy), General Guillermo Durán
Arcentales (army), and Luis Leoro Franco (air force) – declared a state of siege and
promised a return to civilian rule at the end of 1977 (Reuters 1976).
The failed coup attempt of 1975 (see 130-1975-9-1) “triggered a process of regime ex-
263
trication. Indeed, the conditions surrounding the attempted coup publicly exposed a
bitterly divided and highly politicized armed forces, and the need to restore corporate
unity led to the decision not only to overthrow Rodriguez Lara but also to initiate a
transition to civilian rule” (Isaacs 1993, 113). Although their goals were contradictory,
“hardline elements sympathetic to General Gonzalez Alvear joined with softliners who
had opposed the attempted coup, in calling for the removal of Rodriguez Lara... The
hardliners felt frustrated by the failure of the attempt and their continued exclusion
from political power, while softliners became increasingly dismayed by the obvious
weakening of the military’s professional capacities” (115). Although they promised a
quick return to civilian rule, the military “turned its attention to replacing reform-
ers with hardliners, disciplining labor, breaking strikes, and quashing demonstrations”
(Pineo 2010, 185). The softliners “would gradually gain the ascendancy in the after-
math of Rodriguez Lara’s ouster, enabling civilian rule to be restored in August 1979”
(Isaacs 1993, 115). “In this way, the Plan to Return to Democracy was organized,
which entailed the creation of a new constituent assembly, convened by the military
junta and charged with drawing up a new constitution” (Cheyre 2013, 16).
Coding rationale: All major coup datasets except for Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán (2014)
code this event as a coup. It unclear why the latter does not consider this a coup,
though presumably it is because they consider Lara’s resignation as voluntary. How-
ever, although it was a bloodless transition, the evidence indicates the military took
concrete actions to oust Rodriguez Lara and that his resignation was forced. The mili-
tary would have no need to declare a state of siege for a “regular” leadership transition.
Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event as a successful
reshuffling coup.
As for the coup’s causes, John D. Martz (1987) explained that by 1976 “the forces
opposed to the Rodrı́guez Lara government were multiple: solid bourgeois opposition to
even the mildest of reformist measures; the general’s inability to build popular support
or organizational power; unreconciled policy differences inside the military itself; and
the disruption of petroleum income in 1975 when the multinationals prevailed over the
host government.” Many in the military also resented Rodriguez Lara for failing to
consult the military on major policy decisions and relying on civilians (Isaacs 1993,
108).
• # 130-1986-3-8: Ecuador, León Febres Cordero

Category: mutiny
Archigos codes Febres Cordaro as leader of Ecuador from August 10, 1984, until Au-
gust 10, 1988; GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 79-NA) since August 10, 1979.
Event: In March 1986, Air Force Commander, General Frank Vargas Pazzos “initiated
a denunciation of other senior officers on the grounds of corruption. Before the affair
was settled, the structure of civil-military relations, as well as the alleged institutional
unity of the Armed Forces, had been seriously questioned” (John D Martz 1988, 53).
“Vargas Pazzos had become the service commander as well as chief of the Joint Com-
264
mand of the Armed Forces. What ultimately became a major challenge to presidential
authority began when he sought the removal” of the Minister or Defense, Gen. Luis
Pineiros, and the Army Commander, Gen. Manuel Albuja “on grounds of corruption,
illegal contracts, and influence peddling. After an angry confrontation with Pineiros on
the morning of 7 March 1986, Vargas Pazzos then flew to the” (John D Martz 1988, 55)
Eloy Alfaro Air Base in Manta, 150 miles west of Quito (United Press International
1986b), to continue his cause. “Meanwhile, Febres Cordero announced that he was
replacing Vargas Pazzos, telling the nation that “aqui no pas a nada” ” (John D Martz
1988, 55).
On Friday, March 7, 1986, the president said Vargas’ declaration was “an act of in-
subordination by an officer of the armed forces.” There were reports of gunfire inside
the Defense Ministry and air force planes flew over Quito (Associated Press 1986c).
On Saturday, March 8, Vargas offered to surrender if President León Febres Cordero
agreed to discuss his corruption allegations against Minister or Defense Pineiros and
Army Commander Albuja. Meanwhile, Gen, Jorge Andrade was named to replace Gen.
Vargas as chief of staff and air force commander. Vargas professed he was not staring
a coup, stressing that “My intention is not to shake the stability of the Government.
My demand is the firing of those two.” However, Vargas vowed to resist if the air base
were attacked and said that he had the support of the air force and navy. For his part,
the president refused talks, saying “I don’t talk to insubordinates. The general has to
change his attitude.” Meanwhile, two air force generals – Edison Ruales and Armando
Durán – and 50 officers who initially backed Vargas reportedly fled Manta and flew to
Guayaquil to make amends with the president (United Press International 1986b).
On Sunday, March 9, Gen. Vargas Pazzos was given an ultimatum to leave the Manta
air base or face a military showdown. Vargas supporters who went with him to Manta
sent a telegram to the President recognizing the generals dismissal as “irreversible
and we respect your decision” but requested he “should leave with all the honors he
deserves.” Vargas himself asked to be judged “within military law” (Associated Press
1986d). “Only after Febres Cordero failed to mobilize other branches against Vargas
Pazzos did he agree to negotiate” (John D Martz 1988, 56). On Tuesday, March 11,
Generals Pineiros and Albuja submitted their resignations, though they were neither
accepted nor rejected at this time (Associated Press 1986b). That night, Vargas then
surrendered, ending his five-day standoff at Manta air base on the understanding that
he would be tried in military court that would also investigate corruption charges
against the others (Associated Press 1986a).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, the initial Vargas Pazzos affair of March 7-8
did not target the regime but the military high command. We therefore code this
event as a mutiny, which would escalate into a coup attempt by his supporters when
his policy demands were not met (see 130-1986-3-13).
• # 130-1986-3-13: Ecuador, León Febres Cordero

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and PT; failed coup attempt - Singh;
265
Archigos codes Febres Cordaro as leader of Ecuador from August 10, 1984, until Au-
gust 10, 1988; GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 79-NA) since August 10, 1979. EPR
codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Ecuador from 1946 to 2000.
Event: Only two days after the Vargas Pazzos affair had seemed to come to a peace-
ful and negotiated end on March 11 (see 130-1986-3-8), the crisis escalated. “Vargas
Pazzos returned to Quito on the understanding that the two officers he had denounced
would be replaced and that they would be investigated and tried according to his alle-
gations of corruption and influence peddling” (John D Martz 1988, 56). On Thursday,
March 13, General Vargas said President Febres Cordero had “gone back on his word”
on his surrender agreement of March 11 (United Press International 1986a). Vargas
complained that presidential advisor Carlos Pareja had promised to arrest Pineiros
and Albuja, but that instead the two army generals were “talking freely while I am
held incommunicado.” Vargas’ followers freed Vargas from house arrest (Associated
Press 1986b) and they then seized a second air force base in Quito “and demanded the
arrest of the two officials and the dismissal of the President” (United Press Interna-
tional 1986a). “Although Vargas Pazzos was backed by the air force and some of the
more junior army and naval officers, the naval command remained neutral while that
of the army sided openly with the government” (Isaacs 1993, 140). Battle lines thus
cut across service divides.
On March 14, President Febres Cordeo declared a state of emergency. About 2,000
troops backed by tanks and artillery attacked the Mariscal Sucre air base in Quito.
After a 90 minute mid-day battle, the base was re-captured by government forces.
Hours later, loyalist government forces found Gen. Vargas in one of the buildings on
the base and arrested him. Four people were killed, including two loyalist soldiers
and two civilians. Two rebel soldiers and seven other loyalist soldiers were wounded
(Associated Press 1986b). “In the months following, his case and cause became an
ongoing national controversy, serving as a political football for both the president and
congressional opposition. Civil and military Courts were involved, and the appearance
of the Armed Forces’ unquestioned probity and unity was effectively shattered” (John
D Martz 1988, 56).
Why did Vargas Pazzos earn the support of significant elements of the armed forces? In
part, Febres Cordero “created significant resentment among more professional military
officers” who were concerned “that the President’s attempts ‘to make us into servants
before soldiers’, would undermine the professionalism of the armed forces.” The rebels
thus protested “Febres Cordero’s use of the armed forces for partisan political pur-
poses and against the corruption for which Febres Cordero’s military appointees were
responsible... They were convinced that his cause was not a personal vendetta but the
expression of institutional grievances” (Isaacs 1993, 139).
“Later, the armed forces were also divided over the congressionally decreed amnesty
for the jailed Vargas Pazzos - an amnesty rejected by the Febres Cordero administra-
tion on the grounds that only the military had jurisdiction to decide whether Vargas
Pazzos should be released. Efforts to quash the subsequent revolts staged by troops
supportive of Vargas Pazzos and the 1987 paratrooper kidnapping of Febres Cordero
266
produced bloody confrontations between army and air force officers” (Isaacs 1993, 140).
“Instead of threatening civilian rule, therefore, the Vargas Pazzos rebellions served to
ensure the immediate survival of the beleaguered Febres Cordero administration. The
concern with maintaining corporate unity was such that even those within the military
who might have favoured intervention could be persuaded that, as had been the expe-
rience in the past, military rule would again be detrimental to institutional interests”
(140).
Coding rationale: There is some debate about whether these events involved a coup
attempt. Some interpret the 1986 Vargas Pazzos rebellions “as an abortive coup at-
tempt staged by a disgruntled officer rather than, as their instigator claimed, a crusade
against corruption in the administration of Febres Cordero” (137).
Based on the evidence, we code this event as a failed anti-democratic coup. Though
the Vargas Pazzos affair had begun as a mutiny on March 7 and ended as a mutiny
on March 11, the goals seem to have escalated to include the president’s dismissal on
March 13. At this point the line appears to have been crossed from a mutiny to a coup
attempt.
• # 130-2000-1-21: Ecuador, Jamil Mahaud

Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; failed military coup attempt - CCD;
failed coup attempt - CSP, PT, Singh; successful coup - Luttwak; Archigos codes Ma-
haud as exiting on this date through “irregular” means by popular protest without
foreign support; GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 79-NA) since August 10, 1979.
EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Ecuador from 1946 to
2000 and as dominant since 2001.
Event: By 2000, President Jamil Mahuad, “who had garnered only 35 percent in the
first round of the 1998 presidential race and whose party held only 35 out of 121
congressional seats, had lurched from crisis to crisis with scant support” as an eco-
nomic crisis deepened and deficit ballooned (Valenzuela 2004, 9). On January 9, 2000,
following a week of street protests, Mahuad’s cabinet resigned and the President an-
nounced a deal with Congress on several economic reforms and austerity measures. He
also announced plans to dollarize the currency, the sucre, in a bid to halt devaluation
(Associated Press 2000d). On January 11, “the Confederation of Indigenous National-
ities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and other social movements formed the Parlamento de los
Pueblos (Parliament of Peoples), calling for national protest against the government.
Groups of midlevel military officers aided in this endeavor” (Levitt 2006, 107). That
mass protest of indigenous people in Quito was scheduled for Saturday, January 15,
with the goal of seizing Congress as Mahuad delivered his State of the Union address
(Associated Press 2000c). They began what they called an indefinite campaign of civil
disobedience (Rohter 2000a). As late as January 20, Mahuad seemed to retain the
support of the military and thus a chance to stay in office. Carlos Mendoza, chief of
the armed forces joint command and interim defense minister, said “The president is
part of the democratic system, the constitution. We Ecuadorans and the military have
267
sworn to uphold that” (Washington Post 2000).
On January 21, 2000, the protests escalated when thousands of indigenous protesters
streamed into the plaza in front of the presidential palace (Associated Press 2000b).
Gen Carlos Moncayo then permitted other Indians to seize the Congress building by
withdrawing his troops (Rohter 2000c). Protesters “accompanied by military officers”
stormed the Congress and Supreme Court unopposed and announced Mahuad over-
throw. They said they were dissolving those institutions and replacing them with a
“people’s parliament” (Associated Press 2000b). “A group of more than 50 junior
military officers led by Col. Lucio Gutiérrez immediately joined the Indian group, and
other officials began arriving and adhering to the uprising, among them Col. Fausto
Cobo, commander of Ecuador’s military academy.” During the takeover of Congress,
which was televised, Antonio Vargas, the head of CONAI, announced the formation
of a three-man junta, composed of himself, Colonel Gutiérrez, and Carlos Solórzano,
a former supreme court chief justice (Rohter 2000b). By this point, the high com-
mand said that 120 officers and an unknown number of troops had joined the rebellion
(Associated Press 2000b). As “more and more colonels, major and captains in charge
of provincial units rose in rebellion, the generals were forced to reverse course, and
by mid-afternoon had issued a new statement urging the president to resign” (Rohter
2000b).
That afternoon, Mahuad remained defiant and refused a request from the high com-
mand to resign. Mahuad, addressing the high command, said in a national television
broadcast: “If you want to take power through force, gentlemen, take power through
force” (Associated Press 2000b). “The OAS secretary general, at the behest of the rep-
resentative of Ecuador, had called a meeting of the Permanent Council on the evening
of January 21. All member countries expressed support for Jamil Mahuad and for
maintaining constitutional order in Ecuador... The council passed a compromise res-
olution (OAS 2000a) that condemned the coup, supported Mahuad and democratic
institutions in Ecuador, instructed the secretary general to stay informed, and men-
tioned Resolution 1080 but did not set its mechanisms in motion” (Levitt 2006, 108).28
Despite international support, Mahuad and aides “protected” by some military officers
fled the presidential palace later that evening (Associated Press 2000b). The next day,
28. At the council meeting, “the relevance of Resolution 1080 and the degree to which the OAS should
proactively tackle this crisis proved to be contentious issues. At one extreme stood Chile and Costa Rica,
whose representatives spoke explicitly of Resolution 1080 in their initial addresses to the council. This
sentiment was later echoed by Argentina and Paraguay. The United States also insisted that the OAS do
something quickly. The representative of Ecuador himself asserted that Resolution 1080 was germane but
that the council should wait a few hours before calling an ad hoc meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, in
order to see what transpired. A statement on behalf of Peru’s president Fujimori condemned the unseating
of Mahuad but made no mention of Resolution 1080. Even further along the spectrum of opinion were
Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela. The Mexican delegate took a cautiously noninterventionist stand, repeatedly
reminding the council that it was not officially convened to discuss Resolution 1080 but rather to receive
information about the events in Ecuador. The Brazilian delegate subtly signaled that the Ecuadorian people
(and not the OAS) needed to find a solution to this crisis within the ”constitutional order.” The Venezuelan
representative was even less opaque, suggesting that if the Ecuadorian people elected Mahuad, it was they
who should decide his destiny” (Levitt 2006, 108).
268
Mahuad revealed that “a military unit took him to an air force base where he was
first threatened with arrest and then urged to flee the country.” He then escaped and
briefly took refuge in the Chilean embassy, before making his way to what he called a
“private home” in Ecuador. After Mahaud left his office, “the junta announced plans
to march on and seize the Presidential Palace a few blocks away. But the military
high command acted before it could get there, with General Mendoza and the army
commander, Gen. Telmo Sandoval, sending troops to take control of the building and
deploying tanks in the square in front of it to block the protesters’ advance” (Rohter
2000b).
CONAI’s takeover of Congress, their declaration of a junta, and military defections trig-
gered a coup against Mahuad (O’Connor 2003, 65). After several hours of negotiations
with Vargas (Rohter 2000b), the military high command struck a deal with protesters
to oust rather than restore Mahuad “in order to end the takeover” of Congress (Valen-
zuela 2004, 9). As the president hid, just before midnight, Gen. Carlos Mendoza,
the head of the joint military command and minister of defense since the previous
week, Antonio Vargas, the head of CONAI, and Carlos Solórzano, a former supreme
court justice, formed a new three-man junta to replace President Mahuad (Associated
Press 2000b). Two of three men in the junta that Vargas had declared earlier in the
day remained in this junta, but Col. Gutiérrez was replaced by the more senior Gen.
Mendoza (Rohter 2000b).
Antonio Vargas “proclaimed the coup “a bloodless revolution” that would lead to
deeper changes in national politics.” The junta’s declared “purpose was to create a new
government of “national salvation” ” (O’Connor 2003, 66). However, the Organization
of American States condemned the coup. The U.S. Embassy likewise issued a statement
urged the armed forces to back Mahuad, threatening that “Whatever regime arises from
this unconstitutional process will confront political and economic isolation” (Associated
Press 2000b). Mendoza had received the same message in three phone calls with
U.S. diplomats earlier that afternoon (S. Buckley 2000a). Before dawn on January
22, hours after it formed, Gen. Mendoza announced he was dissolving the junta in
order to “prevent the international isolation of Ecuador.” Mahuad’s vice president,
Gustavo Noboa Bejarano, took over the presidency with the support of the armed
forces, though the other two junta members opposed the move empowering another
irresponsible politician. Vargas vowed to continue protests. Mahuad condemned the
coup, saying he had been deposed and that he had not resigned or abandoned his post,
but said he would not contest Noboa’s authority (Rohter 2000b).
Was the coup successful? “Noboa planned to continue many of the policies and pro-
grams that had led to the coup in the first place” (O’Connor 2003, 66). “The coup was
both a success and a failure” insomuch as it forced Mahuad out but did not prevent
Noboa from continuing the same policies (67). More than a dozen colonels involved
in the seizure of Congress were arrested and tried for sedition. Lt. Col. Guillermo
Pacheco Pérez sought asylum in the Venezuelan Consulate in Guayaquil, and soon
penned a letter in which he identified with “the cause of Bolivarian liberation” and the
“ultra-free Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” (Rohter 2000c). By those standards, the
coup certainly fell short of its revolutionary mark.
269
Gen. Telmo Sandoval, who supported the coup, was promoted to commander of the
armed forces, “and other generals who played major roles” such as Gen. Carlos Mon-
cayo remained free. Admiral Hugo Unda Aguirre said “I will not permit a witch hunt”
(Rohter 2000c). Col. Lucio Gutiérrez, one of the coup leader’s, was jailed for four
months, but was elected President of Ecuador in 2002 (Reel 2005).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we do not code this event as only involving
a protest because evidence indicates that military actors took concrete actions to oust
Mahuad and force his resignation. It is debatable whether this coup was failed or suc-
cessful. The first and second juntas remained in power for only a few hours each, but
rather than restore Mahuad to office, the armed forces turned to the vice president,
the constitutional successor, who remained in office for more for more than seven days.
Because the coup plotters’ first post-coup leader did not remain in office for seven days,
we code this event as a failed anti-democratic coup. The coup plotters also did not
change the regime but settled for the constitutional successor to the ousted president.
Although Noboa was the constitutional successor, his ascension was highly “irregular”
and not a result of regular electoral or constitutional politics. This event therefore
does not qualify as a “legal” succession.
• # 130-2005-4-20: Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez

Category: legal
Other Datasets: successful military coup, palace coup, and popular revolt - CCD; mass
protest - CSP; not a candidate - PT; successful coup - Luttwak; not a coup - Singh;
Archigos codes Lucio Gutierrez as exiting on this date through “regular” means; GWF
code a democracy (Ecuador 79-NA) since August 10, 1979.
Event: In December 2004, President Lucio Gutiérrez (the colonel who had supported
the coup against Jamil Mahuad in 2000, see 130-2000-1-21) summoned enough con-
gressional support to remove 27 of 31 judges on the Supreme Court, which had sided
with opposition Social Christian Party in a failed impeachment bid for corruption in
November. Congress then replaced judges with government allies. Starting on April
13, protests intensified, reaching 10,000 people, and accusing the president of an “insti-
tutional coup.” Late on Friday, April 15, 2005, President Gutiérrez declared a state of
emergency. Though the head of the armed forces, Adm. Victor Hugo Rosero, said the
measure was necessary to restore order, Gen. Luis Aguas, the army chief, was notably
not present with the commanders when the President made the declaration (Forero
2005c).
On Saturday, April 16, neither military nor police took action against protest against
the state of emergency, putting the army’s loyalty into question. Gutiérrez then revoked
the state of emergency, in hopes of quelling protesters, but said the Supreme Court
would remain dissolved (Forero 2005c). On Sunday, April 17, Gutiérrez said he would
not resign and defended his efforts to reform the judiciary (Forero 2005d). On Tuesday,
April 19, security forces continued to clash with protesters, leading to two deaths
(Forero 2005a).
270
On the morning of Wednesday, April 20, opposition lawmakers, who constituted a
majority of the 100-member Congress, voted 60-2 to oust President Gutiérrez. The
vote did not take place in the legislative chamber where loyalist congressman remained,
but in an auditorium several miles away (Reel 2005). Thus the vote did not include
the full chamber and excluded Gutierrez loyalists (Forero 2005b). The rump Congress
invoked “a vague article in the Constitution that permits a president’s removal for
“abandonment of the post.” They accused the president of violating the constitution
by disbanding the Supreme Court and calling a state of emergency. Congress then
swore in Vice President Alfredo Palacio to replace Gutiérrez as president. Palacio
broadcast a speech saying, “Today, the dictatorship, the immorality, the arrogance
and the fear have ended. From today, we will restore a republic with a government of
the people” (Forero 2005a).
Gutiérrez had told reporters that he would not resign. But he could not remain in
power after “the military withdrew its support.” At a news conference, Gen. Victor
Hugo Rosero said the military could not “remain indifferent before the pronouncements
of the Ecuadorean people” (Forero 2005a). He also said that the military was “forced
to withdraw support from the president in order to ensure public safety” (Reel 2005).
Then the head of the national police force, Gen. Jorge Poveda, also resigned, saying
“I cannot continue to be a witness to the confrontation with the Ecuadorean people”
(Forero 2005a). Protesters in Quito continued surrounded the presidential palace until
President Gutiérrez had to be airlifted off the roof by helicopter early in the afternoon.
“When he attempted to flee the country at Quito’s international airport, hundreds of
demonstrators prevented his small airplane from taking off.” Meanwhile, the acting
attorney general, Cecillia Armas ordered the national police to arrest Gutiérrez for
using violence to repress demonstrations (Reel 2005).
On Thursday, April 21, Gutiérrez was granted asylum by Brazil, though he remained in
Ecuador. Meanwhile, Palacio named a new cabinet, including Rafael Correa, a leftist,
as economy minister in a bid to appeal to the poor and ameliorate protests. The
Organization of American States initially declined to recognize the new government
until it could prove the succession was constitutional (Forero 2005b). On Friday, April
22, Gutiérrez claimed his removal was unconstitutional (Forero 2005e). On Sunday,
April 24, Gutiérrez was allowed to fly to asylum in Brazil after a delay, over the wished
of protesters demand he remain in Ecuador and be investigated and tried on corruption
charges (M. Hayes 2005).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event was a protest, legal ouster, or military
or non-military coup depends on the evidence for whether Gutiérrez’s ouster was legal
or not, and if not, whether the military took any concrete actions to contribute to
the outcome. On the assumption that Congress used broadly constitutional (albeit
archaic) procedures to oust the president, we code this event as legal. Even had
Gutiérrez supporters been able to participate in the vote, it does not appear that they
could have changed the outcome.
Had one viewed the Congressional actions as illegal, then this event would qualify as a
non-military coup. Although there was evidence of military quartering in this case, we
271
find no evidence that military actors actively joined the protests or otherwise forced
Gutiérrez to resign. Military actors took actions offering support to Palacio, but this
was only after Congress had taken its actions against Gutiérrez.
• # 130-2010-9-30: Ecuador, Rafael Correa

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: failed coup attempt - CSP; not a candidate - PT; Archigos codes
Rafael Correa as leader of Ecuador from January 15, 2007, through at least the end of
2015; GWF code a democracy (Ecuador 79-NA) since August 10, 1979.
Event: On Thursday, September 30, 2010, police mutinied and trapped President
Correa in the police hospital. Mutinous police officers also occupied the National
Assembly. It was not clear whether the police officers “who were protesting a new
law that would reduce their benefits and slow salary increases, also sought control of
the government.” Some members of the air force joined the protest, blocking planes
from leaving or landing at the international airport. Military leaders declared their
loyalty to the president (Romero 2010d). On Friday, the police chief resigned. Already
divisions were growing over what had happened, with critics of the government claiming
that Correa was putting political spin in calling the uprising a coup attempt. Correa
accused ex-President Lucio Gutierrez with being behind the protest, an accusation
Gutierrez dismissed and said the police were simply protesting (Romero 2010b). At
9 p.m., loyal special operations forces assaulted the hospital and retrieved Correa.
Some five men died in the rescue operation. By October 4, debate was raging over
whether the uprising was intended to oust Correa. Officials claimed the mutinous
policemen had executed “something that went beyond a mere protest over salaries into
the realm of destabilizing the system and attempting to assassinate the president. But
it was the president’s unexpected move of going to the barracks and confronting them
that thwarted this project.” Opposition politicians by contrast claimed that “At no
time did Correa lost control of the government, nor did anyone attempt to succeed
him” (Romero 2010a). By October 10, Correa claimed to have audio evidence from
military intelligence that revealed plans by the mutinous police officers to assassinate
him (Romero 2010c). Some 13 officers – including four colonels, seven captains, a
lieutenant, and a second lieutenant – were held for indiscipline for what some reported
as a “labor protest.” Correa called the uprising a coup attempt (Associated Press
2010).
“According to the administration, the conspiracy included former president Lucio
Gutiérrez and his political party, Patriotic Society, whose membership includes many
former military and police officers; other right-wing parties; social movement organiza-
tions, including the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE);
ultraleftist parties, like the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador (PCMLE)
and its electoral front, the Democratic Popular Movement; sectors of the indigenous
party Pachakutik; the U.S. right; petty bourgeois intellectuals; and the privately owned
media... The official narrative is partially correct. Correa is right in claiming that there
was a coup attempt, in the sense that the police detained the president, perhaps think-
272
ing that their actions would inspire others to rebel. Yet it was not an ordinary coup,
since the military remained loyal to the democratically elected government; the only
military support they received came from elements of the air force who shut down
the Quito airport. The police detained the president under conditions where he was
afraid of losing his life, thereby conspiring against electoral democracy. They abused
their prerogatives, did not follow lines of command, and forgot that they are not just
any ordinary group—they are armed and in charge of security. But the problem with
the government’s narrative of a coup attempt is that its list of plotters keeps growing,
lumping the local and U.S. right wing together with leftist parties and social movement
organizations” (De la Torre 2011, 25-27). “30-S may have been a test or a prelude to
a more serious putsch” (Becker 2016, 83). “On June 27, 2012, Correa announced his
decision to pull Ecuador out of the School of the Americas, but he was never able
to provide definitive proof that Gutiérrez had conspired to overthrow his government”
(84). The U.S. had little reason to support a coup, as some alleged, and Hillary Clinton
publicly offered support to Correa during the incident (87).
Coding rationale: Because we find no evidence corroborating Correa’s claim that the
mutinous police sought to kill and replace him–no public pronouncements called on
Correa to resign or be replaced, we code this event as a mutiny. It is possible there
was an assassination plot, but it is not clear any such plot involved plans to take over
government by police. Further, if there had been an assassination plot, it is unclear
why the mutinous rebel police did not kill Correa when he confronted them in the
morning, or at any point during the 10 hours he was in the hospital. AMBIGUOUS.
273
2.1.15 135: Peru
Table 15: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Peru

135-1948-7-5 Peru 45-48 Bustamante, José Anti-Dem. Coup (F)

135-1948-10-3 Peru 45-48 Bustamante, José Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
135-1948-10-29 Peru 45-48 Bustamante, José Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
135-1950-6-14 Peru 48-56 Noriega, Zenon prior defection
135-1954-8-10 Peru 48-56 Odrı́a, Manuel A. Reshuffle Coup (F)
135-1956-2-16 Peru 48-56 Odrı́a, Manuel A. Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
135-1962-7-18 Peru 56-62 Prado Ugarteche, Manuel Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
135-1963-3-3 Peru 62-63 Pérez Godoy, Ricardo Reshuffle Coup (S)
135-1968-10-3 Peru 63-68 Belaúnde Terry, Fernando Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
135-1975-8-29 Peru 68-80 Velasco Alvarado, Juan Reshuffle Coup (S)
135-1976-7-9 Peru 68-80 Morales Bermúdez, Francisco not regime leader
135-1992-4-5 Peru 80-92 Fujimori, Alberto Autogolpe (S)
135-1992-4-11 Peru 92-00 Fujimori, Alberto combined
135-1992-11-13 Peru 92-00 Fujimori, Alberto Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
135-1992-12-11 Peru 92-00 Fujimori, Alberto combined
135-1993-5-6 Peru 92-00 Fujimori, Alberto not exist
135-2000-10-30 Peru 92-00 Fujimori, Alberto Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
• # 135-1948-7-5: Peru, José Luis Bustamante y Rivero

Thompson; Archigos codes Bustamante as the leader of Peru from July 28, 1945, until
October 29, 1948; GWF code a democracy (Peru 45-48) from 1945 until October 29,
1948. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Peru from 1946
to 1967.
Event: Although he had relied on the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americans
(APRA, Popular American Revolutionary Party) (Associated Press 1948e), to get
elected in July 1945, President José Luis Bustamente, fearing a coup d’état, early
in 1948 “denounced APRA support and formed a cabinet dominated by military offi-
cers. The oligarchy thus reached out to the armed forces for support,” as did APRA in
turn (Welch 1987, 132). “Bustamante also became embroiled in an escalating political
conflict with the Aprista-controlled Congress” (Klarén 1993, 45). Indeed, by mid-1948,
the Congress had been in recess for two years. Scheduled to meet each July 28, in 1947
“the Apra-controlled house met, but the Senate refused to assemble.” Without a func-
tioning legislature, this left President Bustamante to effectively rule by decree (Dubois
1948b).
On June 14, Bustmante’s all-military cabinet resigned in protest over President Busta-
mente’s refusal to outlaw the APRA party. Bustamante said doing so would turn Peru
into a police state (Dubois 1948b). On June 17, Bustamante appointed a majority
civilian cabinet, but an air force office, Gen. Armando Revoredo, was made premier
274
and foreign minister. Four of the five military officers in the cabinet had served in
the prior all-military cabinet (United Press 1948k). With the support of the new civil-
military cabinet, Bustamante “declared war” on APRA in a speech on June 28 (Dubois
1948b). On June 28, Bustamente also announced a proposal to rule by decree since a
“Right-Wing minority in Congress was obstructing legislation” (United Press 1948l).
On Sunday, July 4, 1948, army garrisons at Puno and Juliaca, in southern Peru,
revolted (United Press 1948d). Initially, there was no reason given for the revolt
(Associated Press 1948a). Unofficially called “a Right-Wing movement” (United Press
1948a), the rebel troops were led by Lt. Col. Alfonso Llosa of the Jaliaca garrison
(United Press 1948l), one of the “conservatives and the extreme rightist sector of the
army” alienated by the all-military cabinet’s resignation (Dubois 1948b).
On Monday, July 5, the government declared a state of siege, suspended constitutional
guarantees, and banned political meetings. Gen Frederico Hurtado, commander in
chief of the army, said the army would maintain the order. The Interior Ministry said
commanders of the Fourth Division and other garrisons had “repudiated the movement
and expressed loyalty to the legally established Government” (United Press 1948l).
Indeed, a “failure of other garrisons to rise as the rightists had hoped doomed Llosa’s
movement.” During the revolt, APRA press supported the government; conservative
press remained silent (Dubois 1948b).
By July 6, the Puno garrison surrendered to the government, claiming that it had been
deceived by Llosa (United Press 1948d). “Arcé Reina, commander of the Fifteenth
Infantry Regiment” at Puno and leader of the revolt there, was taken prisoner (United
Press 1948a). By July 7, the remaining revolt at Juliaca limped to an end as Llosa
“and seven of his henchmen fled to Bolivia just as the Government was ready to launch
a land and air attack on the rebels.” On July 9, with the revolt totally suppressed,
the state of siege was lifted (United Press 1948d). After Gen. Odrı́a launched a revolt
in Arequipa in late October, Lt. Col. Alfonso Llosa and other exiles from the Puno
revolt in July were detained in Bolivia trying to cross back into Peru (Associated Press
1948f).
Coding rationale: Although the evidence concerning the Llosa-led revolt’s political
goals is limited, it appears the rebels had hoped to instigate a general uprising of
rightist forces in the army. The main target was presumably Bustamente, whom they
held responsible for the resignation of the all-military cabinet and refusal to outlaw the
APRA Party. Western observers note that both the revolts by Llosa and the one by
anti-Aprista generals that succeeded in October 1948 were both “revolutionary actions
by the Right” (New York Times 1948c). We therefore code this event as a failed
anti-democratic coup.
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP, Singh,
Luttwak, and Thompson; Archigos codes Bustamante as the leader of Peru from July
28, 1945, until October 29, 1948; GWF code a democracy (Peru 45-48) from 1945 until
275
October 29, 1948. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Peru
from 1946 to 1967.
Event: “By mid-1948, APRA had gained scattered support among NCOs and enlistees
in various garrisons and ports, especially in the Callao naval installations” (Welch 1987,
132). On October 3, 1948, a naval revolt by petty officers erupted in Callao, the port of
Lima, which was “instigated by the APRA Party” (Klarén 2017, xxvi). Rebel sailors
took control of the fleet harbored in the Callao port (77). After 3 a.m., sailors and
armed civilians aided by the seized warships “attacked the barracks of the Thirty-
Ninth Infantry Regiment and police headquarters” in Callao and took over the Naval
Academy, Naval Armory, and Fort Royal Phillip (Real Felipe). As in July, President
Bustamente decreed a state of siege (Associated Press 1948h). The rebels main target
was the fort, where they “hoped to gain sufficient arms and ammunition to supply
civilians” (Dubois 1948c).
All troops in Lima remained loyal and began to deploy to put down the revolt (As-
sociated Press 1948h). Col. Alejandro Valderrama, an air force officer and former
aide to premier Gen. Armando Revoredo, was put in command of all loyalist forces
(Dubois 1948c). After heavy fighting, some rebel forces surrendered and hundreds were
arrested, including Commandant Jose Mosto. Rear Admiral Manuel R. Nieto, loyalist
superintendent of the naval academy, resumed command. The rebellion was directed
by Comdr. Enrique Aguila Pardo from warships (Associated Press 1948h). Late on
October 3, the government raided APRA Party headquarters in Lima and its news-
paper, La Tribuna, and began mass arrests, including Aprista legislators (Associated
Press 1948i). “However, Aprista street fighters were apparently ordered to stand down
by party leaders,” allegedly undermining the revolt (Klarén 2017, 77).
By 9 a.m. on October 4, the last naval rebels on land holed up in Fort Royal Phillip
were defeated by the army and air force. Two loyalist tanks preventing sailors at sea
from joining the rebels on land were lost after rebel warships shelled them (Dubois
1948c). Just before, rebel-held warships – led by the cruiser Almirante Grau, frigates
Ferre and Palacios, the destroyer Almirante Vilar – sailed into Callao Harbor and sur-
rendered, reportedly only after Cmdr. Enrique Aguila Pardo was killed or committed
suicide (Associated Press 1948i). A few hours later, three rebel submarines surrendered
(Dubois 1948c), bringing an end to the rebellion. By the time the rebellion was over,
the wounded crowded hospitals in Lima and Callao (Associated Press 1948i). The
death toll may have approached 400, with 700 wounded (Dubois 1948c). Bustamente
later estimated only over 50 dead (Bracker 1948b), but Gen. Odrı́a estimated 300
people were killed (Bracker 1948f).
There were some disturbances in the following days. On October 5, President Busta-
mente outlawed the APRA Party, with some 1,200 people arrested. Meanwhile, armed
civilians in the southern city of Arequipa and in Paramongo, about 110 miles north of
Lima, tried but failed to storm army barracks (Associated Press 1948e). On October 6,
infantry patrols mopped up rebel snipers who put up a “suicide stand” who feared they
would be shot without trial. Meanwhile, the army planes patrolled the skies between
Lima and Trujillo after reports that 60,000 armed civilians planned to march on Lima
276
(United Press 1948m).
On October 7, Victor Raul-Haya de la Torre, head of the APRA Party, was arrested
for complicity in the Callao revolt (United Press 1948j). Late that night, the cabinet
met in special session and decided to submit charges against Haya and 13 other APRA
leaders for court martial (Dubois 1948a) On October 13, Peru denied rumors that the
U.S. had helped inspire or organize the naval revolt (United Press 1948n). Though
the government survived this left-wing coup bid, it fell to right-wing military elements
under pressure from the oligarchy later in the month (135-1948-10-29).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this APRA-instigated naval rebellion

Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP, Singh, Luttwak,
Fossum, Perez, and Thompson; Archigos codes Bustamante as exiting on this date
collapse of a democracy (Peru 45-48) on this date. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
monopoly ethnic group in Peru from 1946 to 1967.
Event: Following the APRA-organized naval mutiny in early October (see 135-1948-
10-3), the oligarchy pressured the army for intervention (Klarén 1993, 45). On October
25 or 26, Gen. Manuel A. Odrı́a secretly left Lima for Arequipa (Bracker 1948b). On
October 27, five army regiments led by Gen. Odrı́a revolted in Arequipa. They first
seized Arequipa radio, proclaimed a “provisional government” headed by Odrı́a, and
claimed to control the southern half of the country. The rebel radio said that Busta-
mente’s government had failed to “take necessary measures to contain” leftists after
the Callao uprising and that the provisional government would “save the country from
Aprista plots” and leftist “political poisoning.” Odrı́a was hero of the 1941 war with
Ecuador (United Press 1948f). He had been Bustamente’s minister of the interior, but
“resigned along with several military colleagues when Bustamente refused to outlaw
APRA” back in June (Welch 1987, 132-133). He had remained on the General Staff
until September (United Press 1948f). He remained an army officer without assignment
(Bracker 1948b).
On October 28, the government ordered the air force to put down the army revolt
at Arequipa, claiming that army forces in northern Peru and other services remained
loyal to the government. However, the rebel radio countered that it had wide support
and that the Third and Fourth Infantry Battalions, the Third Engineer Battalions,
the Third Artillery Group, and other battalions had joined their cause (Associated
Press 1948f). On October 29, the southern rebellion spread. First, the Cuzco division
defected. Then at noon, following a meeting of the military high command with
Marshal Eloy G. Ureta, the Lima garrison joined the uprising. However, there was no
sign of any fighting in the capital. A three-hour meeting between 25 military leaders,
including the Inspector General, Gen. Federico Hurtado, and President Bustamente
277
was heated. At 3 p.m, the president still refused military demands to resign and
suggested the Supreme Court decide the matter. Instead, President Bustamente was
deposed. His palace guard was replaced by army troops as a military junta took power.
It was headed provisionally by Brig. Gen. Zenon Noriega, commander of the Second
Army Division, until Gen. Odrı́a could arrive in Lima (Associated Press 1948g).
At 10:30 p.m., General Odrı́a named president by the junta, made a broadcast to the
nation saying the new regime would “re-establish order, convoke popular elections and
eliminate the regime which spawned robbery and crime.” By 11:40 p.m., Bustamente
was escorted by army officers to an airfield and flown to exile in Argentina (United Press
1948h), accompanied only by an aide, Comdr. Carlos Benavides, and his secretary
(Bracker 1948b). Col. Miguel Llona was appointed Air Force Commander, Admiral
Roque Saldias (Bustamente’s naval minister until June) was named as the new Navy
Commander (United Press 1948h). Odrı́a said that the “revolution” that brought him
to power had been bloodless (United Press 1948g).
Though Odrı́a promised to restore civil liberties and hold elections in a year (Bracker
1948g), the coup established “an eight-year dictatorship.” The junta proscribed APRA
which went underground. On January 3, 1949, APRA Party leader Haya de la Torre
“took asylum in the Colombian embassy, evading capture” in a government crackdown
on the party. He remained there for five years (Klarén 2017, xxvi). Odrı́a “would prove
to be the last instance of an army officer reaching presidency and ruling the country
as a military caudillo. He would be the last of the trio of twentieth-century military
officers to rule dictatorially in his own name, but with the tacit acquiescence of the
armed forces and the active support of the Peruvian oligarchy” (Vásquez 1996, 344).
• # 135-1950-6-14: Peru, Zenon Noriega

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; combined - PT; failed coup attempt
- Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Noriega as the leader of Peru from June 1, 1950, to
July 28, 1950; GWF code a military-personal regime (Peru 48-56) from October 29,
1948, to June 17, 1956.
Event: On May 31, General Manuel Odria temporarily stepped down as President in
favor of Vice President Noriega so that he stand for election. On June 11, the candi-
dacy of his only opponent, General Ernesto Montagne, was ruled out by authorities,
“which alleged that his nomination papers were fraudulent” (Keesing’s World News
Archive 1950). On June 14, an attempted uprising by “an aroused citizenry,” stu-
dents, and “special revolutionary Urban Guard” at Arequipa, Peru’s second largest
city, broke out. During the revolt, Dr. Juan Francisco Mostajo, Gen. Montagne’s Vice
Presidential running mate, was named president of a Civilian Revolutionary Govern-
ment to replace “the tyranny of the Lima Military Junta” (United Press 1950e). The
Peruvian Ambassador said “the Arequipa army garrison “remains completely loyal” to
278
the Lima government” (Associated Press 1950g). “General Montagne and a number
of his leading supporters were subsequently arrested, but were released on June 27”
(Keesing’s World News Archive 1950).
Coding rationale: The refusal of Odria to risk a fair electoral fight with Montagne
sparked the civilian-led rebellion (Bracker 1950). Gen. Montagne “had held no job
under General Odria and had been previously a minister of education.” Mostajo “an-
nounced his support also included workers, chauffeurs, newspapers, and Radio Station
continental” (Associated Press 1950h). Reports do not indicate whether Montagene
was on active duty, but because he had run for president, we assume that he was re-
tired or had been dismissed at a prior date. The fact that the rebellion was civilian-led
and did not involve significant number of troops itself suggests as much. Meanwhile,
although there was some evidence of military quartering (a non-action), we find no
evidence that military actors took concrete actions to oust Noriega or Odria. We thus
code this event as prior defection.
• # 135-1954-8-10: Peru, Manuel A. Odrı́a

Other Datasets: military coup plot - CCD; not a candidate - CSP; failed coup attempt
- PT and Singh; Archigos codes Odria as the leader of Peru from July 28, 1950, to July
28, 1956; GWF code a military-personal regime (Peru 48-56) from October 29, 1948,
to June 17, 1956. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Peru
from 1946 to 1967.
Event: Before dawn on Tuesday, August 10, 1954, Brig. Gen. Ernesto Raez reportedly
took over the 7th Artillery Group in the name of Gen. Zenon Noriega. The group was
garrisoned at San Miguel, a few miles from Lima. The rebel artillery group went on to
seize the telephone central and the national radio station at San Miguel before loyal
troops, including tank units, surrounded the rebels and President Odria persuaded
them to surrender peacefully by telephone (Hallett 1954; Associated Press 1954a).
A government communique accused troops acting on orders of Gen. Zenon Noriega,
the just ousted head of the Cabinet and War Minister, of making “preparations for
subversive action.” Brig. Gen. Ernesto Raez was arrested and Noriega sent into exile
(Associated Press 1954b).
Coding rationale: The coup attempt was reportedly connected with the appointment
of a new cabinet the previous day. Initial reports also speculated on whether the
accusation against Noriega, considered a possible successor to Odria, was a setup to
maintain Odria’s control of the regime (Hallett 1954). According to Masterson (1991,
145), Noriega’s plotting was primarily motivated by his own presidential ambitions,
having been number 2 in the regime for six years. Because the coup appears to have
been driven by a desire to restore Noriega’s power within the regime (or if staged, to
weaken it), we consider this a failed reshuffling coup. STAGED
• # 135-1956-2-16: Peru, Manuel A. Odrı́a
279
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP; failed
coup attempt - PT; Archigos codes Odria as the leader of Peru from July 28, 1950, to
July 28, 1956; GWF code a military-personal regime (Peru 48-56) from October 29,
1948, to June 17, 1956. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Peru from 1946 to 1967.
Event: At 3 a.m. on February 16, 1956, an army garrison in the eastern city of Iquitos,
the capital of the Loreto Department on the Amazon River, rose up in revolt and
seized government officers and arrested local authorities. They were reportedly joined
by naval river boats based at Iquitos. The rebels repeatedly broadcast “a manifesto
demanding the end of Odria’s regime and guarantees of an honest election,” which
was said to have been read by Brig. Gen. Marcial Merino Pereira, head of the Forest
Division of 5,000 troops and leader of the revolt. The manifesto charged Odria with
“trying to convert the Army into an instrument of fear” and “impose upon the citizens
an election that will permit continuation in power of the present political regime.”
Merino served as Minister of Justice and Labor under Odria in 1948 and as military
attaché to Spain in 1949 (Associated Press 1956k; New York Times 1956d). The
government responded by arresting the political opposition, including Pedro Beltran,
a former Ambassador to the U.S. and the publisher of La Prensa. They said Beltran
was the main instigator and La Prensa was the main organizer of the Iquitos uprising.
The government also said Merino Pereira advocated policies of the National Coalition,
a group of extreme rightists. By February 17, the government said loyal naval forces
were moving in on Iquitos and had denied rumors that the revolt had spread to the
garrisons at Trujillo and Piura in Northwest Peru (New York Times 1956k; Hallett
1956).
Coding rationale: National elections had been scheduled for June 3, which had given
rise to political unrest (Associated Press 1956k). Odria had been elected President in
1950 to serve until July 1956 (New York Times 1956d). According to Masterson (1991,
145-146), Beltran had initiated a campaign to prevent the continuation of the regime
past July 1956 since July 1955. Some senior army commanders had also remained
suspicious of Odria’s assurances of holding free elections, including Pereira. Based on
the evidence, we assume that the coup-makers sought to ensure upcoming elections
and a return of civilian rule in 1956, thus constituting regime change.
• # 135-1962-7-18: Peru, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche

Singh, Luttwak, PT, Fossum, Perez, and Thompson; Archigos codes Ugarteche as
exiting on this date through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign sup-
port; GWF code the collapse of a democracy (Peru 56-62) on this date. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Peru from 1946 to 1967.
Event: In the presidential elections in June 1962, there were three major candidates:
280
the populist Acción Popular (AP, Popular Action) nominee Fernando Belaúnde Terry;
the venerable APRA party leader Haya de la Torre, who was back from some six long
years of exile, “and the former military dictator Odrı́a of the Union Nacional Odrista
(UNO). Few officers respected Odrı́a, whose actions in the 1948-56 period had discred-
ited the armed forces; most officers feared the potential repercussions of an APRA
victory; the reform proposals of architect Belaúnde attracted the widest military sup-
port” (Welch 1987, 135). In early June, even before the election, the military high
command issued a statement highlighting its fears of election fraud. For his part,
Belaúnde backed the military and said he would accept the election results “when and
if they do not differ fundamentally from the principles set by the armed forces” (J.
d. Onis 1962h). The U.S. government expressed its concern that the military would
launch a coup if Haya de la Torre won (Tad Szulc 1962b). The election was held on
June 10.
Four days after the election, the army high command said Belaúnde had won (Welch
1987, 135), but by mid-June less than a third of ballots had been counted by the
electoral board (J. d. Onis 1962o). In late June, “the electoral board ruled that Haya
de la Torre had gained the greatest number of votes” (Welch 1987, 135). In the official
count, Haya de la Torre defeated Belaúnde by less than a percentage point (Klarén
1993, 47). Belaúnde claimed electoral fraud (Vásquez 1996, 347) and asked Gen.
Alejandro Cuandro Rabines, army chief of staff, whether his troops had evidence of
irregularities. On June 28, the military claimed irregularities in the seven provinces
that Haya de la Torre won (United Press International 1962b).
The electoral crisis escalated in July. Because Haya failed to win the required one-
third vote, the selection of president under the constitution would fall to Congress
(Klarén 2017, xxvii), which was scheduled to convene for its annual session on July 28.
Members of Haya de la Torre’s APRA had won the largest bloc of seats in Congress
(J. d. Onis 1962s). On July 3, APRA called for an emergency national convention
to consider the military’s demand that Haya de la Torre withdraw as a presidential
candidate “in the national interest” (J. d. Onis 1962k). On July 4, Haya de la Torre
told the APRA convention that the armed forces had formally vetoed his candidacy
(J. d. Onis 1962s). On July 5, the APRA convention rejected the military’s veto and
insisted that Haya de la Torre remain a candidate. Haya de la Torre denied any fraud
(J. d. Onis 1962r). Set against the threat of a military coup, Haya and Odrı́a began
to forge a “constitutionalist” front insisting that Congress select the president rather
than have the election results annulled. Together, APRA and UNO had enough seats
in Congress to choose the president (J. d. Onis 1962v). On July 11, mediation efforts
to form a “national conciliation” government stalled. On July 12, Belaúnde organized
a mass protest against the Electoral Board decision to reject claims of fraud (J. d. Onis
1962g). Meanwhile, the armed forces issued a communique detailing their charges of
fraud as pro-Belaúnde crowds shouted “Revolution against the fraud” and “Soldiers
and civilians will fight together” (J. d. Onis 1962n). On July 14, the armed services
secretaries proposed that President Prado annul the election results, and install a pro-
visional regime to hold new elections. The president refused this as unconstitutional
as such authority is vested with the National Electoral Board (J. d. Onis 1962m). In
281
a meeting with Haya de la Torre, the armed forces issued an ultimatum demanding he
withdraw as presidential candidate and Manuel Soane withdraw as First Vice Presi-
dential candidate (J. d. Onis 1962d). On July 16, the cabinet resigned to protest the
armed forces’ demand for the annulment of the election results (J. d. Onis 1962l).
Amidst this political deadlock, some military sources indicated that Odrı́a would be
acceptable as president to the armed forces and ease the threat of a coup (J. d. Onis
1962u). On July 17, Haya and Odrı́a, former rivals (as Odrı́a had outlawed APRA
from 1948-1956), struck “a deal to ensure Odrı́a’s selection as president” (Klarén 2017,
xxvii). The Apristas “Machiavellian maneuvering” in Congress would deny Belaúnde
the presidency “in exchange for de facto control of the congress” under Odrı́a (Vásquez
1996, 347). The deal reportedly had the support of President Prado. But an hour after
the deal was announced, the armed forces renewed their demand for annulment of the
election in a letter to the National Electoral Board. Later that night, the electoral board
certified the results and, in a rebuke of the military, declared the electoral process valid
(J. d. Onis 1962c).
The president was warned refusal to annul the elections could lead to a coup, but the
president refused and called his cabinet and civil society and military supporters to the
palace in hopes of deterring a coup. But shortly before midnight, the Chief of Staff of
the army, Gen. Carlos Luna Ferrecio, relieved Gen. Alberto Vega Castro, the head of
the Lima Armored Division, of his command and escorted him to house arrest. At 3
a.m. on July 18, tanks of the Armored Division and a Ranger unit commanded by Col.
Gonzalo Briceno smashed through the palace gates.29 Col. Briceno was then “escorted
by President Prado’s military aides into the palace.” There was no resistance. Less
than an hour later, “President Prado was leaving the palace under armed guard for
prison” and his military aides were taken into custody (J. d. Onis 1962j). Shorn of legal
means to annul the elections, the coup ousted President Prado only 10 days before the
end of his term (Klarén 2017, xxvii).
The armed service chiefs that had signed the letter the day before demanding annul-
ment of elections formed a four-man junta headed by Maj. Gen. Ricardo Perez Godoy,
president of the joint command. The other junta members were Maj. Gen. Nicolas
Lindley, army commander; Vice Adm. Francisco Torres Matos, navy commander; and
Maj. Gen. Pedro Vargas Prada, air force commander (J. d. Onis 1962c). Each com-
mander took over his respective ministry in the new all-military cabinet and sources
said decisions would be made collectively. The new junta barred Congress from conven-
ing, suspended constitutional liberties, annulled the June 10 elections, and dissolved
the National Electoral Board. They announced that new elections would be held in
June 1963 both for a new president and Congress (J. d. Onis 1962j). On July 29,
deposed president Prado was released from his captivity on a naval ship in port off
Callao to house arrest (Associated Press 1962i). By August 2, Prado and his family
arrived in London to take up residence in exile, after being allowed to leave the country
(New York Times 1962m).
29. It was later revealed that Col. Briceno “was trained at the Ranger School of Fort Benning, Ga. After
his instruction, he returned to Peru to develop a crack anti-guerilla command unit that was a showpiece” of
the U.S. military mission (J. d. Onis 1962t).
282
“As might be expected, APRA and UNO resented the coup, while Accion Popular
accepted it” (Welch 1987, 136). On the night of July 18, APRA organized protests
against the coup that were repressed (J. d. Onis 1962j). On July 21, APRA called
for a general strike by the Peruvian Workers Confederation (J. d. Onis 1962a), but
it ended in failure by July 23 (J. d. Onis 1962b). Meanwhile, on July 22, the army
repressed demonstrations by women who were dressed in mourning for the death of
Peru’s democracy (J. d. Onis 1962a). On July 25, Gen Odria pledged support for the
junta. APRA begrudgingly accepted the junta and in turn was assured it would be on
equal footing with other parties in the June 1963 elections (J. d. Onis 1962i). By July
26, domestic resistance to the coup had ended (J. d. Onis 1962q). The junta made no
effort to court civilian allies (Welch 1987, 136).
Though nominally in defense of democracy, within hours of the coup, the United States
suspended diplomatic relations (Tad Szulc 1962c). On July 19, the junta formally re-
quested U.S. recognition and continued aid (J. d. Onis 1962p). But the U.S. suspended
economic aid through the Alliance for Progress and military aid (J. d. Onis 1962f). By
July 28, the date when Congress would have met, U.S. military attaché’s resumed some
public contacts with the leaders of Peru’s armed forces after the junta restored consti-
tutional guarantees (J. d. Onis 1962e). That day, it was also reported that the U.S.
was withholding recognition from the junta to pressure it to make further concessions
that would speed up restoration of constitutional government (Frankel 1962). On July
23, a U.S. State Department official criticized the coup as unjustified (Associated Press
1962j).
For the most part, the coup was “primarily a defensive move by officers concerned about
a possible APRA victory” (Welch 1987, 136) and prevented Haya de la Torre and the
Apristas from assuming power (Vásquez 1996, 347). This “institutional coup,” planned
and executed by the military high command, was the first of its kind in Latin America
(Kruijt and Tello 2002, 37). The 1962 coup “broke with previous traditions by installing
a Junta whose President depended upon the support of the three service ministers,
whose positions, in turn, were determined by military seniority. Authority, therefore,
was vested in the military institutions as a whole and not in any single caudillo” ”
(Vásquez 1996, 347). The coup reflected not only the armed forces’ historic antipathy
for APRA but also perceived role expansion of the military’s “new professionalism”
(Welch 1987, 136).
The “surprisingly reform-minded junta of the armed forces headed by General Ri-
cardo Perez Godoy held power for a year (1962-63)” (Klarén 1993, 48). Influenced
by the ideas flowing from the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM, the Center
of Advanced Military Studies), the junta adopted a reform program “almost indistin-
guishable from earlier Aprista platforms: “agrarian reform, social planning, economic
development, and the nationalization foreign-held property” (Vásquez 1996, 346-347).
“In the Andes region guerrilla movements were biding their time. Peasant movements,
which had confiscated property from the landowners, had announced their presence
since the beginning of the 1960s. A limited land reform was announced for southern
Peru, where Trotskyite leaders had instigated the occupation of lands. The moderniz-
ing military mind was also reflected in the founding of a National Planning Institute,
283
explicitly charged with planning for development and reform. Cabinet posts went to
reputedly progressive officers” (Kruijt and Tello 2002, 37). The 1962-63 junta there-
fore distinguished itself from prior juntas insofar as it gained some autonomy from the
oligarchy (Vásquez 1996, 348).
The author’s of the coup were skeptical of a long-term military rule, which might
tarnish the military’s reputation (Welch 1987, 136). The junta achieved its a goal of
overseeing new, honest elections in 1963 (Vásquez 1996, 347). “The new electoral law
adopted two months after the golpe indirectly benefitted Accion Popular, by raising
requirements for parties to appear on the national ballot; however, APRA was not
outlawed, and the three major parties of 1962 continued to monopolize the political
stage a year later” (Welch 1987, 136). In 1963, as promised, the junta “convoked new
elections. This time Belaúnde, in alliance with the Christian Democrats, defeated Haya
de la Torre and became president” (Klarén 1993, 48). The “armed forces returned to
the barracks without undue hesitation. Like the NLC of Ghana, the Peruvian junta of
1962-3 considered its task done” (Welch 1987, 137).
• # 135-1963-3-3: Peru, Ricardo Pérez Godoy

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; successful military and palace coup
- CCD; successful coup - CSP, Luttwak, PT, and Singh; not a candidate - Fossum;
Archigos codes Perez Godoy as being removed by on this date through “irregular”
means through a power struggle within the military short of coup; Svolik codes Pérez
Godoy as being removed by a military coup on this date; GWF code a military regime
(Peru 62-63) from July 18, 1962, until June 9, 1963. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as
the monopoly ethnic group in Peru from 1946 to 1967.
Event: “As late as 1962, when General Ricardo Pérez Godoy led a military coup to
prevent Haya de la Torre from becoming president, the military was willing to resort to
extraconstitutional means to prevent APRA from coming to power. By 1962, however,
it was evident that the military was no longer solely the preserver of elite interests, and
that it was increasingly influenced by a new military school of thought, the National
Security Doctrine, which posited that development and social reform were integral to
national security” (Graham 1993, 230). In power, “General Pérez Godoy, primus inter
pares of the presidents by virtue of his military seniority, soon incurred the displeasure
of other military leaders. From the outset, he occupied the limelight...He also pushed
through a tax increase against the wishes of the other members of the junta, particularly
Lindley López.” Pérez Godoy had also reached retirement age in February 1963 but
refused to leave the service (McAlister 1970, 65-66).
On March 3, 1963, an internal bloodless military coup forced Pérez Godoy to retire “and
reduced the junta to three members. Lindley López became first among equals” (65-
66). Lindley López said “we did not overthrow the government last July to enthrone
284
Perez Godoy as a dictator.” He insisted that elections for a government to replace
the junta would be held as scheduled on June 9. The populace was “undisturbed”
by the reshuffle; riot squads deployed in the capital to prevent disturbances were not
needed (Associated Press 1963f). On March 4, calm was reported. Pérez Godoy told
journalists he had not resigned voluntarily (United Press International 1963c). The
“surprisingly reform-minded junta... held power for a year (1962-63) and then convoked
new elections. This time Belaunde, in alliance with the Christian Democrats, defeated
Haya de la Torre and became president” (Klarén 1993, 48).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we agree with the majority of other data sets
that Pérez Godoy was ousted in a coup by the other junta members. Only Fossum
fails to code this event as a coup, and Goemens, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009, 250)
note that this was a “Reshuffle within governing Junta,” with Pérez Godoy placed
under house arrest. According to Archigos, Lindley Lopez remained in power for more
than a week, stepping down in favor of Belaunde following the latter’s election in June.
Masterson (1991, chapter 8) says that Pérez Godoy “was ousted from the presidential
palace by the other co-presidents, General Nicolás Lindley López, General Pedro Vargas
Prada, and Admiral Juan Francisco Torres Matos.” Consistent with Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz (2014), we code this event as a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 135-1968-10-3: Peru, Fernando Belaúnde

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup - CSP, Singh,
Luttwak, PT, Perez, and Thompson; Archigos codes Belaunde as exiting on this date
collapse of a democracy (Peru 63-68) on this date. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
monopoly ethnic group in Peru from 1946 to 1967 and dominant thereafter.
Event: Economic problems towards the end of his term forced President Fernando
Belaúnde to devalue the sol in 1967. Nationalists also saw him as capitulating “to
foreign capital in a final settlement in 1968 of a controversial and long-festering dis-
pute with the International Petroleum Company (IPC) over La Brea y Parinas oil
fields in northern Peru.” Public discontent grew (Klarén 1993, 49). Politics was in-
creasingly deadlocked. Not only did APRA, which dominated Congress, oppose Pres-
ident Belaúnde, but the ruling Popular Action Party was itself split, so much so that
Vice President Edgardo Seoane Corrales opposed the President (Malcolm W. Browne
1968b). On Tuesday, October 1, Premier Osvaldo Hercelles and his cabinet resigned
due to the IPC crisis. On Wednesday, October 2, the seventh cabinet of Belaúnde’s
tenure was sworn in (Associated Press 1968a).
At 2 a.m. on Thursday, October 3, army troops led by a tank column seized the
Presidential Palace, replaced presidential guards with troops and police, and deposed
President Belaúnde and placed. The military also took over radio stations, which
broadcast a communique from the armed forces communique signed by the armed
services chiefs. Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado, army chief of staff and head of the
joint chiefs, became head of a military junta (Associated Press 1968a). The military
285
accused Belaúnde of betraying Peru’s national interests in reaching a settlement over
oil concessions with IPC and of failing to significantly reform Peru’s “unjust social
and economic order” (J. d. Onis 1968a). After dawn, the military unceremoniously
put “the President on the first empty Peruvian commercial aircraft they found parked
at the airport. Mr. Belaunde was dispatched to Buenos Aires without money or a
passport” (Astiz 1988, 171).
Civil resistance to the coup emerged throughout the day after APRA leader Armando
Villanueva called for a rebellion and students reportedly fought street battles with
troops and policemen (Associated Press 1968a). The new cabinet members were im-
prisoned when they were found secretly meeting at the Foreign Ministry drafting a
communique denouncing the coup (Malcolm W. Browne 1968c). One student was
killed and 300 arrested in the coup. On October 4, shops re-opened in the capital.
The junta issued a communique abrogating Belaúnde’s two-month old oil concession
agreement with IPC (Malcolm W. Browne 1968c) and saying it would refinance Peru’s
foreign debt (New York Times 1968e).
“The military establishment had intervened decisively to set up an institutional regime
of the armed forces because a significant number of officers had come to realize that
dealing effectively with Peru’s internal security threat was beyond the capability “of
an inefficient, corrupt, and unjust middle-and-upper-class parliamentary and social
system.” Moreover, there was growing confidence that the technical and nonmilitary
training that Peruvian military officers had received had produced “a cadre of special-
ists” more capable of carrying out development programs than were the discredited
professional politicians. In plain words, the military could be trusted to do a better
job than the civilians. Additionally, there was growing concern within military circles
about the extent of Peru’s economic dependency on foreign investments and markets,
especially those of the United States,” which they feared empowered the oligarchy
(Vásquez 1996, 348).
On October 5, calm resumed in the capital as armed forces began cleaning up debris
from the palace created during the coup, including piles of mattresses used by troops.
The new junta had made no personal addresses to the nation. A press spokesman
tried to dismiss parallels to Argentina’s 1966 coup, saying the coup would “restore
health to the economic, political and social life of the country” (Malcolm W. Browne
1968a). Initially, U.S. officials deplored the coup and diplomatic relations were tem-
porarily suspended, though embassy officers remained in Lima (Gwertzman 1968b).
Meanwhile, U.S. foreign aid programs were put under review (New York Times 1968f).
On October 18, Britain recognized the new junta (Reuters 1968b). On October 25,
the U.S. followed suit, citing the fact that 13 other Latin American governments had
done so, but continued to withhold aid (United Press International 1968d).
The armed forces installed a “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces” (Vásquez
1996, 348) which “proceeded to undertake an unexpected and unprecedented series of
reforms” (Klarén 1993, 49). The junta carried out a reform program crafted by the
same CAEM intellectuals behind the 1962-63 junta, which involved “a coherent na-
tional development and anti-poverty strategy to prevent another guerrilla uprising in
286
the near future” (Kruijt and Tello 2002, 38). The military government lasted twelve
years, though the reformist period under Velasco through 1975 was followed by a
“counterrevolutionary swing under General Francisco Morales Bermúdez” in which
the regime became less progressive and more autocratic (Vásquez 1996, 348).
• # 135-1975-8-29: Peru, Juan Velasco Alvarado

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; successful military coup and palace
coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP, Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Velasco
Alvarado as exiting on August 29, 1975 through “irregular” means by military actors
without foreign support; GWF code a military regime (Peru 68-80) from October 3,
1968 to July 28, 1980; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in
Peru since 1968.
Event: Since 1968, Juan Velasco Alvarado had led a radical state capitalist modern-
ization plan designed to eliminate the landed oligarchy, redistribute land and wealth,
nationalize industry, protect labor, and reform agriculture. To finance these reforms,
Velasco Alvarado borrowed heavily from foreign governments. The economy suffered
and political opposition increased as foreign debt skyrocketed and protectionist policies
took hold. The Velasco Alvarado regime cracked down on the media and dissent. A
police strike in 1975 led to rioting in Lima. The army occupied the national capital.
Discontent with his management of the economy and concern that his deteriorating
health prevented him from performing his duties led the military to remove Velasco
Alvarado from power (Klarén 2017, 399-400).
Although “Velasco’s replacement had been agreed upon by many of the senior army
officers with political responsibility,” allegedly Gen. Francisco Morales Bermúdez “
“jumped the gun” during a drinking party of senior army officers in a restaurant lo-
cated approximately ten miles from the southern city of Tacna. After agreement was
reached on Velasco’s overthrow, all troop commanders were contacted and none in-
dicated opposition. Those supporting the change in political leadership included the
commanding officer of the tank division located near Lima, General Leonidas Ro-
driguez, who was considered ideologically and personally loyal to Velasco” (Astiz 1988,
172).
On August 29, 1975, General Velasco Alvarado was replaced by General Francisco
Morales Bermúdez – the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Commander-in-
chief of the army – in a bloodless military coup. No tanks were deployed. Instead,
Gen. Leonida Rodriguez Figeroa, the commander of the Lima military region, gave
the president “an ultimatum by telephone on behalf of the armed forces.” Velasco
Alvarado was offered honorable treatment if he stepped down immediately and without
resistance. Velasco Alvarado accepted; a resignation message in his name was broadcast
nationwide that afternoon. At 6:15 p.m., Gen. Velasco left the presidential palace in a
287
black limousine accompanied by his family and an army officer. “A statement broadcast
at frequent intervals said the coup had been initiated by the army with the support of
the other armed forces and of the police but that the deposed leader’s “revolutionary
process” would be continued” (Hoffman 1975a).
By August 30, Gen. Morales returned to Lima from Tacna, where he had directed the
coup. He was sworn in as the new President in the presence of other senior military
commanders (Hoffman 1975b). On September w, he installed a new cbinet including
nine army generals, four air force generals, three admirals, and one civilian. The
economist Luis Barua Castaneda became the first civilian named to the military junta’s
cabinet (Associated Press 1975). Morales Bermúdez rolled back his predecessor’s statist
policies in favor of more conservative economic policies and advocated for national
elections (Klarén 2017, 399-400).
successful reshuffling coup. As Astiz (1988, 172) argues, “The “palace” or “in-service”
substitution of President Velasco Alvarado in 1975 effectively replaced the leadership of
the original military takeover with what turned out to be a more conservative clique.”
• # 135-1976-7-9: Peru, Francisco Morales Bermudez

Category: not regime leader
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP, PT, and
Singh; Archigos codes Morales Bermudez as the leader of Peru from August 30, 1975,
until July 28, 1980; GWF code a military regime (Peru 68-8-) from October 3, 1968,
until May 18, 1980.
Event: “An incident interpreted by some left-wing elements as an attempted rebellion
took place on July 9 [1976] when General Carlos Bobbio Centurión, the right-wing head
of the military instruction centre at Chorrillos (on the outskirts of Lima), refused to be
prematurely retired from the armed forces, as had been ordered by General Fernández
Maldonado (one of his main antagonists). General Bobbio Centurión then barricaded
himself, together with a number of officers who supported him, in the instruction centre
for several hours, and shots were exchanged with loyal troops, although there were no
casualties General Bobbio Centurion and Isis officers subsequently surrendered, the
General being later removed from his post... According to the Neue Zürcher Zeitung
of July 20, General Fernández Maldonado had first sought to represent the incident as
a rebellion against President Morales Bermúdez and the Peruvian revolution,” but the
Prime Minister in a July 10 communique clarified that Centurión’s actions sought to
be forced into retirement and “This move was not an attempt to call into question the
Peruvian revolutionary process, nor its leader, General Francisco Morales Bermudez”
(Keesing’s World News Archive 1976).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event not regime leader, as it
targeted the prime minister, Fernández Maldonado, not the regime leader, Morales
Bermudez.
288
• # 135-1992-4-5: Peru, Alberto Fujimori
Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; not a candidate - CCD; autogolpe -
CSP and PT; successful coup - Singh; Archigos codes Fujimori as leader of Peru from
July 28, 1990, until November 21, 2000; GWF code the collapse of a democracy (Peru
80-92) on this date.
Event: In November 1991, President Alberto Fujimori submitted to Congress a mas-
sive package of 126 decrees, some of them economic reform policies (Nash 1992b).
Other proposed decrees were “anti-terrorism measures that threatened civil liberties.
Congress demurred. Not only did it repeal or water down several of the most important
decrees, it passed legislation curbing Fujimori’s power. The conflict escalated. Fujimori
accused congress of being controlled by drug traffickers, and in response, the senate
passed a motion to “vacate” the presidency because of Fujimori’s “moral incapacity.”
Although the motion fell a few votes short in the Chamber of Deputies,” the conflict
reached a point of no return (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 74-75).
On April 5, 1992, President Alberto Fujimori gave a 22-minute television address in
which he announced that he was suspending the 1970 constitution, dissolving congress,
and reshuffling the government “for an honest and efficient administration of justice.”
He said this was “the starting point of an authentic transformation to assure a le-
gitimate and effective democracy, which will permit all Peruvians to participate in
building a more just, more developed, and more respected Peru” (Associated Press
1992b). Fujimori imposed censorship, calling his actions “an offensive against rebels
and drug traffickers” (Reuters 1992b).
“That same day, the president of the Joint Command and the senior commanders of the
three branches of the Peruvian armed forces, together with the director of the National
Police, expressed their support for this autogolpe (self-administered coup). Their troops
fanned out through the capital city of Lima to arrest prominent opposition leaders and
journalists (for a few days) and seize control of key government buildings” (Costa 1993,
28). The military “sent tanks cruising through the streets to show support” (Catherine
M Conaghan 2005, 3) and troops were stationed at Congress, the judicial palace, the
attorney general’s office, and news outlet buildings (Associated Press 1992b). In the
next few days, the army tear gassed senators. Key members of the opposition, including
former President Alan Garcia, journalist Gustavo Gorriti, and businessman Samuel
Dyer were detained (Robinson 1992).
Given hyperinflation and a mounting insurgency, many Peruvians appeared to agree
with Fujimori’s characterization of the autogolpe as a necessary evil. In fact, “Fu-
jimori’s approval rating shot up to 81 percent after the coup” (Levitsky and Ziblatt
2018, 94). The United States and Latin American governments reacted by cutting off
foreign aid and freezing Peruvian assets (T. L. Friedman 1992; Nash 1992b). For a
detailed analysis of Fujimori’s “presidential coup,” see Costa (1993).
event a successful autogolpe by a democratically-elected president, marking the initi-
289
ation of autocratic rule.

Category: combined
Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Fujimori as the leader of Peru from July 28, 1990, to
November 22, 2000; GWF code the a personal regime (Peru 92-00) from April 5, 1992,
until November 22, 2000.
Event: On April 5, 1992, Fujimori “suspended the 1970 constitution, closed the na-
tional congress, and ordered a mass firing of judges and prosecutors. The military
backed the measures and sent tanks cruising through the streets to show support”
(Catherine M Conaghan 2005, 3). The army deployed tear gas against senators. Promi-
nent members of the opposition, including former President Alan Garcia, journalist
Gustavo Gorriti, and businessman Samuel Dyer were detained (Robinson 1992). Fu-
jimori also imposed censorship. The president called his actions “an offensive against
rebels and drug traffickers” (Reuters 1992b). Contemporaneous analysis pointed to
Congressional resistance to economic reform policies motivating Fujimori (Nash 1992b).
The United States and Latin American governments reacted by cutting off foreign aid
and freezing Peruvian assets (T. L. Friedman 1992; Nash 1992b).
date. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) use Fujimori’s autogolpe on April 5 to code
that start of a personal regime (Peru 92-00), which lasted until November 22, 2000.
We assume that WHIV dates this April autogolpe incorrectly (news stories on these
dates appear to cover the aftermath of the autogolpe but not a counter-coup attempt),
and thus we code this event as “combined” with the April 5 autogolpe.

CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Fujimori as the leader of Peru from July
28, 1990, to November 22, 2000; GWF code the a personal regime (Peru 92-00) from
April 5, 1992, until November 22, 2000. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant
ethnic group in Peru since 1968.
Event: On Friday, November 13, 1992, the government reported that a “minuscule”
group of about 35 army officers allegedly commanded by Major Hugo Ormeno “tried to
take over army headquarters and the government palace with the intention of capturing
the army commander in chief and killing the chief of state.” However, having been
informed about the coup in advance, President Fujimori reported afterwards that he
was not in the presidential palace when the coups started (Associated Press 1992a).
It was later revealed that Fujimori took “refuge for three hours in the residence of
the Japanese Ambassador” (J. Brooke 1992). Meanwhile, some “250 loyalist troops
and armored personnel carriers mobilized in front of the government palace during the
290
night, then withdrew at dawn. By afternoon activity on the streets of the capital was
normal.” Three retired generals were arrested – Jaime Salinas Sedo, José Pastor Vives,
and Luis Palomino Rodrı́guez – along with Comdr. Marcos Zarate Rota (Associated
Press 1992a). No shots had to be fired in suppressing the coup attempt (Nash 1992a).
On November 14, Fujimori described the event to journalists who expressed skepticism
over how “a handful of officers with no troops” could have attempted a coup. “In Mr.
Fujimori’s account, Maj. Hugo Ormeno, second in command of the battalion of military
police charged with guarding the palace, planned to enter the official residence with
five other conspirators during the change of guard to kill him. He said Major Ormeno
had failed to persuade troops of the armored division at Rı́mac, near the government
palace, to accompany him, making clear... that troops who took up positions around
the palace early Friday were loyal to the President. Mr. Fujimori said the major was
detained with other conspirators in the vicinity of the palace.” Salinas was arrested
with “documents detailing the plot as he was about to meet with other conspirators
in the capital” Reuters 1992a.
According to Rex A Hudson (1993, xlviii), “Fujimori took a risk by giving up his
constitutional legitimacy and putting himself at the disposal of the military while co-
opting the top military leadership. This fact became evident on November 13, 1992,
when three recently retired generals, including the commander of the army, led a coup
attempt that was crushed by the loyal military.” Mauceri (1997, 901-902) reports,
drawing on a 1996 interview with coup leader General Jaime Salinas Sedó, that “two
weeks before the assembly elections were held, a conspiracy involving retired and ac-
tive duty officers to remove Fujimori from office and restore the 1979 constitution was
discovered.” Afterwards, General Salinas was imprisoned “in a process that violated
many of the military’s own institutional norms” (910). In June 1995, an amnesty bill
officially “forgave” the military “dissenters” imprisoned for the failed November 1992
coup attempt and the generals indicted for insulting the armed forces – including Gen-
eral Jaime Salinas (Catherine M Conaghan 2005, 105).
Coding rationale: Initially, some doubted that there was any coup and that the pres-
ident fabricated it to gain public sympathy. Other said the event seemed “more like
a sting operation in which Mr. Fujimori’s aides lured officers who oppose him into
plotting a coup” (Nash 1992a). But revelations soon indicated there was a widespread
plot that was not staged. In a magazine interview, Salinas said of the plot: “At no time
were we thinking of establishing a military government... I wanted to return normal
democracy to my country” (Marx 1992). Salinas said that the plot sought to replace
Fujimori with “Peru’s Vice President, and to reconvene the Congress that Mr. Fuji-
mori closed last April.” In addition to the retired generals, who were known to be close
to opposition leaders, a network of junior officers known as “Comaca” (short for Com-
manders, Majors, and Captains) and civilians were also implicated. Vice President
Máximo San Román said that “The coup would have been a triumph for democracy.”
Most observers believe the military did not intend to cling to power (J. Brooke 1992).
Fujimori alleged that San Román, who was also a senator in the dissolved congress,
were informed about the impending coup plot days beforehand (Reuters 1992c).
291
Thus, evidence indicates that there was a genuine military conspiracy which reflected
“increasing unease among retired and active duty officers over the military command’s
close links to Fujimori and reforms that threatened its perceived institutional prerog-
atives” (Mauceri 1997, 901-902). The “abortive action” had a variety of motivations,
including “grievances over low salaries and promotions and Fujimori’s announced stand
to punish navy officers involved in an embezzlement scandal. Another reported reason
was his November 13 decree granting him direct authority to dismiss and assign all
military officers above the rank of lieutenant (previously, officers could be removed only
on retirement or for misconduct). Several of the coup plotters had been summarily
retired from active service by Fujimori and Montesinos. Fujimori claimed that oppo-
sition politicians were behind the coup attempt and that it was also a plot to prevent
the CCD elections” (Rex A Hudson 1993, xlviii).
According to Cameron (1997, 53-54), “many institutionalist officers felt betrayed by
the military hierarchy. They believed that General Hermoza Rios was right when he
said there was no alternative [to Fujimori’s autogolpe]. They accepted the dissolution
of Congress and the reorganization of the courts because “only that way was it pos-
sible to overcome the obstruction facing the government.” However, it later became
clear to some of them that Hermoza Rios, the minister of interior, and Montesinos had
another agenda, which one described as a “personal project” to “seize power for fifteen
to twenty years in order to satisfy their own appetites.” The split between the insti-
tutionalist officers and the coopted hierarchy resulted in an unsuccessful coup attempt
in November 1992... Much of the dissatisfaction within the army stemmed from the
fact that Commander General Hermoza Rios refused to retire and thereby blocked the
ascent of other officers, and from the belief that the autogolpe had turned out to be a
usurpation of power.”
Based on the admittedly ambiguous evidence on the events of November 13, we code
this event as a coup attempt, assuming that the coup plot was already in motion
and at least some early concrete actions were taken before the coup was crushed. It
is, however, possible that the coup was preempted before any concrete actions were
taken: no rebel troop movements were seen in the capital and no shots were fired.
On the night of the coup event, the only troop movements seen to outside observers
were loyalist troops who surrounded the palace.30 On the assumption that the coup
leaders sought at minimum to prevent personalization of the Fujimori regime, establish
a (transitional) military regime, or empower excluded civilian opposition and restore
democracy, we code this event as a failed regime change coup. AMBIGUOUS

Category: combined
30. As reported, “It wasn’t clear how far the plotters got with their plans; diplomatic sources said it
appeared the rebel officers never reached the palace” (Associated Press and Reuter 1992).
292
Event: For a narrative of related events of November 1992, see 135-1992-11-13.
date. We code a failed regime change coup in November 1992 (see 135-1992-11-13).
We assume that WHIV dates this coup incorrectly. News stories on these dates cover
the November coup attempt, not a separate coup in December, and thus we code this
event as “combined” with the earlier attempt.

Category: not exist
Event: On April 20, 1993, the Army Commander, Gen. Nicolas de Bari Hermoza, was
summoned to Congress (reseated following November 1992 elections) but refused to
respond to questions regarding potential human rights abuses by the military from the
prior July (Nash 1993b). On July 17, 1992, 10 university students and a professor,
suspected of being members of the Shining Path, had been summarily executed (Nash
1993a). On April 21-22, 1993, “tanks appeared in parts of Lima” in a show of military
force to intimate congressional investigators, reported by media as a “second coup”
for Fujimori (Nash 1993b). At the time, Gen. Rodolfo Robles Espinoza, “the third-
ranking officer in the army and in line to be its chief in 1995” (Nash 1993a), signed a
communique supporting the army.
However, on Friday, May 7, it was reported that Robles had recently asked for asylum
from the U.S. after being dismissed by the army commander the week before. From
safety, he had signed a document accusing the special intelligence carrying out the July
1992 killings with Hermoza’s knowledge. That day, the radio reported that “Robles
was leading an apparent coup” against President Fujimori. The presidential spokesman
denied the report, saying that security forces had been put on alert as a preventive
measure (Reuters 1993). After almost two days in the U.S. Embassy, Robles was flown
to exile in Argentina at night on Friday May 7. Robles said he had received “death
threats by telephone and was challenged by anonymous callers to gather the troops
under his command to try to stage a coup,” which Robles said was a ploy to have him
jailed and cover the case (Nash 1993a).
date. We find no evidence that Gen. Robles or any other military actors staged
a military coup on May 6-7, or even had plotted do so. Instead, his action is better
characterized as a defection from the regime following an army purge. The government
itself denied reports of the alleged coup attempt. As no concrete actions were taken
against Fujimori, the regime leader, we code this event as “not exist.” Although news
sources referred to the April 21-22 events as a “second coup,” these tank movements
293
targeted Congress, not Fujimori, and therefore would be coded as “not regime leader.”
November 22, 2000; GWF code a personal regime (Peru 92-00) from July 28, 1990,
until November 22, 2000. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group
in Peru since 1968.
Event: On September 14, 2000, the Fujimori regime was thrown into a political crisis
when a videotape was aired on television of Fujimori’s closest advisor and spy chief
Vladimiro Montesinos bribing an opposition politician to switch parties. Fujimori
responded to the scandal by announcing that he would disband the intelligence service
headed by Montesinos, and that he would step down from the presidency in July 2001
(1 year into his 5 year term). Montesinos then flew to Panama but after three weeks
of being refused asylum, flew back to Peru on October 24 and went into hiding” (C.
Krauss 2000b). Montesinos tried to organize a coup “but the navy and air force balked,
former senior Peruvian officials later said. Fujimori began a highly publicized manhunt
for Montesinos (C. Krauss 2000c). On October 28, Fujimori replaced commanders of
the army, navy, and air force as the manhunt for Montesinos had failed for four days
in a row (C. Krauss 2000b). All were Montesinos associates (Lewis and Harvey 2000).
In the pre-dawn hours of October 29, 2000, army lieutenant colonel Ollanta Moisés
Humala Tasso, an artillery commander in Tacna (a provincial capital near the border
with Chile) who was in command of over 50 soldiers within the army’s powerful 6th
Regional Command, mutinied and demanded Alberto Fujimori’s resignation. General
Oscar Bardales, the commanding officer at the Arrica Barracks and a Vladimiro Mon-
tesinos loyalist, was taken hostage when trying to convince his men to end the uprising.
The mutineers drove to Toquepala, a mining town at least 450 miles southeast of Lima.
Arriving at about 4 a.m., the soldiers took control and cut off access roads (Weissert
2000; Faiola 2000b).
At about 6 a.m., Humala went to the local church and interrupted the early Mass. He
grabbed a microphone and read a lengthy “address to the nation”, a copy of which
was also faxed to the press. Calling on other military units to revolt, Humala de-
clared: “I will only lay down my arms when the chain of command is legitimate and
there is a president who has been truly elected by the people to whom I would swear
’subordination and valor.’ . . . Long live Peru! Long live the new Peruvian army!”
(Faiola 2000b). Humala also decried “the generals enriched with the traffic of drugs,
contraband of arms and other businesses” (Moffett 2000). He condemned corruption
and demanded the imprisonment of Montesinos (C. Krauss 2000a). Humala’s men
confined mining families to their homes for about the next six hours. Humala, joined
by his troops and brother Antauro, a major forced to leave the military in 1998, took
their hostages towards the highlands of Puno province (Faiola 2000b, 2000a).
The new military high command in Lima immediately condemned what they called
294
a “grave situation of indiscipline.” No other military units responded to the call for
rebellion by Humala, previously unknown to most Peruvians (Moffett 2000). Analysts
called the uprising a sign of deep resentment among mid-level officers, either over
how military promotions “have depended on political connections” to Montesinos and
Fujimori (C. Krauss 2000a) or in the belief that “Fujimori and his top brass still are
secretly cooperating with Montesinos” (Faiola 2000b). Opposition politicians embraced
the mutineer’s grievances if not their methods. They said they wanted a constitutional
transition toward new presidential elections scheduled for April 2001 (C. Krauss 2000a).
Alberto Andrade, the mayor of Lima, called Humala a “great patriot” who was acting
to end corruption (Faiola 2000b).
In the event, 150 heavily armed troops were deployed to track down the army rebels.
They managed to rescue the kidnapped general and said they had rescued a number of
troops who had been forced to participate in the rebellion, though Humala remained
at large (Knox 2000). Some 100 unarmed soldiers reportedly tried to find and join
Humala in solidarity (United States Embassy Peru 2000). Yet the revolt failed to spark
a wider rebellion in other barracks nationwide, and “his force dwindled to as few as
10 followers after most of them deserted or were captured without a shot being fired”
(Associated Press 2000a). Opposition and press hailed Humala. Opposition leader
Alejandro Toledo called Humala valiant (Faiola 2000a). In a television interview on
November 1, Humala, hiding out near the border with Bolivia, dismissed the recent
military command reshuffle as cosmetic and said he was willing to negotiate. The
human rights Ombudsman went to southern Peru to mediate (United States Embassy
Peru 2000).
In mid-December 2000, Humala surrendered to authorities, well after Fujimori had
fled the country. He requested a meeting with the new interim president, Valentı́n
Paniagua, saying he was ready to face justice (C. Krauss 2000d). Soon after, Congress
granted amnesty to Humala and his followers for their uprising, enabling the soldiers
to return to their posts (Associated Press 2000a).
Accusations surfaced that this uprising, which launched Humala’s political career, had
ulterior motives. The timing of the uprising was puzzling. Humala’s statement specif-
ically criticized two senior officers close to Montesinos who had been actually been
sacked the day before the uprising: General Villanueva, former head of the joint chiefs
of staff (an ex-classmate of Montesinos), and General Luis Cubas, former commander
of the Lima army garrison, Montesinos’ brother-in-law. One analyst said this sug-
gested the uprising had been planned and put in motion before Fujimori’s military
reshuffle (Moffett 2000). Journalists looking into the uprising “argued that it had ac-
tually been a smokescreen for Montesinos’s escape from Peru” (C. McClintock 2006,
101) on October 29. Humala’s second vice-presidential running mate in the 2006 pres-
idential elections, Carlos Torres Caro, served as Montesinos’s lawyer (101). In 2006,
Montesinos charged that Humala “had collaborated in Fujimori’s fraudulent election”
(106). Yet Humala had always publicly denied rumors that his uprising had been in
support of Montesinos (United States Embassy Peru 2000).
Coding rationale: The same political crisis which generated this coup attempt also led
295
Fujimori to flee into exile in Japan in November 2000 and resign. We interpret this
evidence as suggesting the coup attempt sought the collapse of the Fujimori regime.
Its success would prevent the personalization of the regime around a consolidated
group of Fujimori loyalists following the ouster of Montesinos. An alternative inter-
pretation, never verified, suggests that Humala may have actually been a Montesinos
ally. Humala, an ultranationalist and populist leftist of mixed ethnicity, had political
ambitions. He ran and lost in the 2006 presidential elections in the second round as
candidate of the Union for Peru (UPP) coalition. (C. McClintock 2006, 96). Humala
won the presidency in 2011, defeating Keiko Fujimori, Alberto Fujimori’s daughter
(Levitsky 2011). STAGED.
296
2.1.16 140: Brazil
Table 16: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Brazil

140-1954-8-24 Brazil 45-64 Vargas, Getulio legal

140-1955-11-11 Brazil 45-64 Luz, Carlos Coimbra da Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
140-1955-11-21 Brazil 45-64 Ramos, Nereu de Oliveira Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
140-1956-2-11 Brazil 45-64 Kubitschek, Juscelino Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
140-1959-12-3 Brazil 45-64 Kubitschek, Juscelino Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
140-1961-8-25 Brazil 45-64 Quadros, Jânio legal
140-1961-8-26 Brazil 45-64 Ranieri Mazzilli, Pascoal Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
140-1961-9-7 Brazil 45-64 Ranieri Mazzilli, Pascoal combined
140-1963-9-12 Brazil 45-64 Goulart, João mutiny
140-1964-3-30 Brazil 45-64 Goulart, João combined
140-1964-4-1 Brazil 45-64 Goulart, João Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
140-1964-4-15 Brazil 64-85 Ranieri Mazzilli, Pascoal legal
140-1969-8-31 Brazil 64-85 Costa e Silva, Artur da Reshuffle Coup (S)
140-1969-10-25 Brazil 64-85 Military Junta legal
140-1977-10-12 Brazil 64-85 Geisel coup plot
140-2016-8-31 Brazil 85-NA Rousseff legal
• # 140-1954-8-24: Brazil, Getulio Vargas

Category: legal
Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; mass protest - CSP; successful coup
- Fossum, Perez, Thompson; not a candidate - PT and Singh; Archigos codes Vargas
as exiting on this date through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign
support; GWF code a democracy (Brazil 45-64) from 1945 until April 1, 1964.
Event: When Getulio Dornelles Vargas won the presidency in 1950, “the national-
ist tendency prevailed in the Military Club.” After his election, however, “Divisions
within the military elite intensified, particularly when the nationalists opposed a mili-
tary agreement with the United States and published material in the Club’s magazine
which was very critical of North American involvement in the Korean War. In 1952,
the nationalists lost control of the Military Club, a sure indication that the anti-Vargas
faction had won over the majority military opinion and were in a position to combat
President Vargas” (Coelho 1988, 150). Meanwhile, President Vargas, frustrated by for-
eign interests slow development of energy resources, “created the Brazilian Petroleum
Corporation (Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.—Petrobras) in 1953... The “Petroleum is Ours!”
campaign of the nationalists caused arguments within the military over what was best
to do. Some officers embraced the antistatist attitude that Washington was sponsoring.
The bitterly fought, emotional debate over the creation of Petrobras poisoned political
life and contributed to the subsequent military interventions” (McCann 1998, 72).
“By 1954, the economy was in serious trouble... In February 1954, a group of concerned
junior officers protested to the war minister about their low salaries. Many in this group
blamed the economic slowdown on Labor Minister João Goulart, Vargas’s deputy in
297
PTB-labor politics, who had been appointed in June 1953. Military officers feared a
continuing decrease in their economic position to satisfy labor’s never-ending cry for
higher wages and increased benefits. To assuage military discontent, Vargas dismissed
Goulart in early 1954. The president could not risk open rebellion among the officer
corps; the labor minister was a convenient and acceptable scapegoat” (Roett 1999, 107-
108). Though under relentless pressure prior to August 1954, Vargas’ “government was
still legitimate enough easily to defeat an attempted impeachment proceeding” (Stepan
1971, 89).
“Suddenly, a crisis erupted. A Presidential palace-inspired assassination attempt
against journalist Carlos Lacerda–a UDN member and muckraker who had waged war
against the Vargas administration–failed, but it did kill an air force major” (Roett
1999, 107-108). “Responsibility for the assassination attempt was traced to President
Vargas’ personal bodyguard, and numerous cases of corruption involving the presi-
dent’s closest associates were brought to light. Although Vargas himself was never
implicated, the legitimacy of the president to continue in office and as commander-in-
chief of the armed forces was seriously questioned” as support among Vargas’ own base
began to evaporate (Stepan 1971, 89-90).
For several weeks in August 1954, numerous editorials were published calling for Vargas’
resignation (90). “In a traumatic meeting at the Military Club in Rio de Janeiro on
August 14, the question of what the military should do in the crisis was debated for
hours. Finally, an emotional resolution was passed, backed largely by the junior officers,
demanding immediate resignation of the president. In a famous address, Juarez Tavora,
vice-president of the Military Club and commandant of the Superior War College,
successfully reversed this resolution, by arguing that all the legal steps open to the
military had first to be taken, and that junior officers had to leave the handling of the
crisis to their seniors in the army. He emphasized that the military should only act
slowly and unanimously” (117).
On August 22, after extensive consultations with civilian elites, 27 army generals issued
a manifesto declaring that they “judge the best road to pacify the people and maintain
the unity of the armed forces is through the resignation of the present of the Republic,
and his substitution in accordance with constitutional norms.” The signers of the
manifesto, including General Lott, acknowledged that any military intervention should
be limited “to the transfer of political power to the vice-president, according to the
constitutional ruling” (118-119). “On August 22, the president rejected an air force
demand for his resignation; the next day, the army made the same demand. On
August 24, defiantly refusing to resign, Vargas committed suicide” (Roett 1999, 108).
“His death produced considerable public sympathy, which in turn strengthened his
reputation as “father of the poor.” His influence in Brazilian politics was felt for
decades” (McCann 1998, 72).
Coding rationale: This is a near-consensus coup according to prior coup datasets.
Horwitz (2011, Table 1) lists a coup in Brazil in 1954. Although military actors called
for Vargas’ resignation, such calls (including the August 22 manifesto) seem to fall
within the bounds of regular or legal politics. Although the Military Club was plotting
298
and implicitly threatening a coup if Vargas did not resign, a coup became unnecessary
once Vargas committed suicide. It is worth noting that coding the legality of military
interventions over the entire 1945-1964 period is complicated by the fact that the 1946
constitution “stipulated that while the military was subordinate to the chief executive,
its obedience was required only when the president acted within the limits of the law.
In the final analysis, the military held the discretionary power to determined whether
the chief executive was acting within constitutional limits” (Roett 1999, 114). In this
event, we code this event as a coup plot and legal transition following Vargas’ death.
Roett (1999, 109) calls this event “an example of the military’s playing its role as
moderator.” AMBIGUOUS.
• # 140-1955-11-11: Brazil, Carlos Coimbra da Luz

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; successful palace coup and non-military
coup - CCD (misdates to November 11, 1954); successful coup - CSP, PT, Perez,
Luttwak, and Singh; Archigos codes Coimbra da Luz as leader of Brazil from Novem-
ber 8, 1955, until exiting on this date through “irregular” means by military actors
without foreign support; GWF code a democracy (Brazil 45-64) from 1945 until April
1, 1964. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Brazil from 1946 to 1977 with Whites as
Event: In the October 1955 elections, the “PSD-PTB ticket was made up of Gover-
nor Juscelino Kubitschek of Minas Gerais and former labor minister and PTB leader
Goulart. It was clearly a successor government to Vargas. The UDN nominated Gen-
eral Juarez Távora, an old tenente who had broken with Vargas in the 1930s. The
PSD-PTB victory had been won with only about one-third of the votes case... The
conservative military was furious” (109-110). On November 1, 1955, Col. Jurandyr
Mamede, speaking on behalf of the powerful “Military Club,” gave an anti-Kubitschek
speech, revealing splits in the armed forces and raising the specter of a veto coup. Lt.
Gen. Henrique Texeira Lott, the War Minister, asked that the colonel be transferred
from the Superior War College to regular army service, where he would be under his
direct authority. On November 6, Air Force Maj. Gen. Neto Reyes was relieved of
duty for speaking on political matters (in defense of the constitution) (Brewer 1955g).
Meanwhile, on Tuesday, November 8, President João Café Filho temporarily turned
over his office to Carlos Luz, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, due to ill health
and reportedly on doctor’s advice that he needed “a few more days” of complete rest
following a heart attack suffered on November 3 (Brewer 1955b). On the night of
November 10, General Lott, known as leader of the “constitutionalists” in the army,
reportedly resigned as Minister of War in protest of Carlos Luz’s refusal to take action
against Col. Mamede (Reuters 1955). Earlier, there were rumors that Lott “was being
forced out and replaced by a general who favored a military government” (Brewer
1955b). Acting President Luz, hostile to Kubitschek, nominated Gen. Alvaro de
Castro, an interventionist, to replace Lott (Reuters 1955).
“War Minister General Henrique Teixera Lott was determined to support the constitu-
299
tion and guarantee the inauguration of the PSD-PTB team. With rebellion among the
right-wing officers in the air, Lott heroically defended a constitutional transition. But
to do so, he was forced to depose an acting president of the Republic in November, who
had sided with the conservatives” (Roett 1999, 109-110). At 2 a.m. on November 11,
the army seized control of government and army troops surrounded the Presidential
Palace, Air Ministry, police headquarters, and Galeao air base. General Lott assumed
command in what he called an “anti-coup” that would return Brazil “to the normal
framework of the constitutional regime now in force” and forestall a coup by other ele-
ments which sought to prevent Kubitschek’s inauguration. He criticized Luz’s decision
to refuse to let Lott discipline Mamede was “a definite provocation to the honor of the
Army” (Brewer 1955e).
Lott long planned his move in anticipation of a coup to block the transition.31 “When
the countercoup was decided upon, it had the support of the key troop commanders
in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Immediately after the first steps of the coup were
initiated, General Lott demonstrated his awareness of the need for agreement on limits
to intervention when he called in the presidents of the Senate, the House of Deputies,
and the Supreme Court, and asked them to “provide for the legal substitution of
President Carlos Luz strictly accord with the constitution because we are not about to
assume control of civil power. This is not our objective.” ” (Stepan 1971, 119). That
afternoon, heeding General Lott’s request, Congress voted 185-72 to declare acting
President Luz as unfit for office. He was replaced by Nereu Ramos, the Speaker of the
Senate and next in line under the constitution (Brewer 1955e).
General Lott had the support of all but three army generals, namely General Fiuza
da Castro, Lt. Gen. Alcides Etchegoyen, and General Tasso Tinoco (Brewer 1955c).
However, Air Force and Navy Ministries initially issued a joint note condemning Lott’s
coup as “illegal and subversive.” Carlos Luz, who apparently had some forewarning,
left the Presidential Palace shortly before Lott put his men in motion. He apparently
then went to the port of Santos, 220 miles southwest of Rio de Janeira (and near São
Paulo), and boarded the navy cruiser Tamandare. Guns at Fort Copacabana fired
across its bow as it left the port and put to sea. That afternoon, Luz sent a radio
message to the government still claiming his office (Brewer 1955e). Luz was reportedly
accompanied by Col Mamede and Carlos Lacerdo, editor of the newspaper Tribuna
da Imprensa and “one of the chief proponents” of an anti-Kubitschek coup (Brewer
1955f). Air Force Lt. Gen. Eduardo Gomes, a leader of the National Democratic Unon
(UDN) was dismissed as Air Minister. He then flew to the Galeao Air Base near São
Paulo to oppose the army (Brewer 1955e). For a time, there were reports that Gen.
Gomes was trying to help Carlos Luz set up a new government in São Paulo (Brewer
1955c).
But that night, Air Force bases at Galeao and Santa Cruz that had opposed the coup
31. “The military plan had been tentatively formulated five months before it was actually put into operation.
Minister of War General Lott and the commander of the Vila Militar, General Odı́lio Denys, had developed
a winning coalition among those higher officers who were convinced of their duty to execute a prevention
coup against any civil—military attempt to prevent the inauguration of the victors of the election” (Stepan
1971, 119).
300
surrendered without a fight (Brewer 1955f). After army forces surrounded the bases,
“serious resistance was impossibly without civil war” (Brewer 1955c). The Galeao air
base commander, Gen. Armando Perdigao, was replaced by a Lott loyalist, Air Force
Col. Francisco Texeira. The Cumbico air base had been holding out with the support
of an armored unit led by Gen. Tasso Tinoco, a cousin of Lt. Gen. Eduardo Gomes,
until Tinoco voluntarily went to surrender at the headquarters of the Sixth Infantry
Regiment. Gomes reported again to the Air Ministry in Rio de Janeiro. Thus, by
November 12, all organized resistance to the coup had ended, reportedly after Carlos
Luz told his supporters to yield (Brewer 1955f). Naval minister Amorin do Vale also
ended resistance (Brewer 1955c).
General Lott’s constitutionalist faction represented armed forces who previously sup-
ported ex-President Vargas back in August 1954 (see 140-1954-8-24), whereas the
golpistas who opposed Kubitschek’s election were anti-Vargas (Brewer 1955c). The
Tribuna da Imprensa was closed (Brewer 1955c), and Carlos Lacerda fled to the Cuban
Embassy (Brewer 1955d). On the morning of November 13, the Tamandare, carrying
Luz and allies, returned to post in Rio de Janeiro. The three anti-coup generals were
released (Brewer 1955a). On November 14, the Chamber of Deputies accepted the res-
ignation of Carlos Luz as its speaker, effectively relinquishing his claim to the acting
presidency, though he remained a member of Congress and thus retaining his immu-
nity. Meanwhile, the new government was planning to declare a “state of siege” and
President Café was discharged from the hospital, though it was unknown if and when
he would seek to re-assume his duties (Brewer 1955d). When he did, the civil-military
crisis broke out once again (see 140-1955-11-21).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event constitutes a coup or “legal” transfer
of power is muddied by the fact that the coup makers did not take over themselves
but instead promoted the next in line in the constitutional succession. Castro (2002,
90) calls this curious event “General Lott’s ‘coup in defence of legality’. “The case
of 1955 is more complicated because it involved an unsuccessful civil—military move-
ment to block the inauguration of President-elect Kubitscheck and Vice-President-elect
Goulart. Though no actual coup was attempted, it can be called an unsuccessful coup
movement. Because there was a fear that a minority might attempt this coup, the
majority of the army officers executed a successful preventive constitutional coup to
ensure the inauguration” (Stepan 1971, 86).
Although Congress approved the coup ex-post facto by appointing a successor, Luz’s
ouster was clearly “irregular” and the result of concrete actions by the armed forces.
Lott’s “anti-coup,” even though apparently in defense of the constitution, still qual-
ifies as a coup against a sitting democratically-appointed acting president. The first
post-coup leader remained in office over 7 days. We thus code this event as a suc-
cessful anti-democratic coup, even though Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) do not
code the collapse of the democratic regime (indeed most historians argue that Lott’s
“constitutionalist coup” was necessary to preserve democracy).
• # 140-1955-11-21: Brazil, Oliveria Ramos
301
Other Datasets: successful coup - CCD (misdates to November 23, 1954), CSP, and
Singh; legal - PT; successful coup - Thompson; Archigos codes Oliveria Ramos as leader
of Brazil from November 11, 1955, until January 31, 1956; GWF code a democracy
(Brazil 45-64) from 1945 until April 1, 1964. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in
Brazil from 1946 to 1977 with Whites as the largest ethnic group.
Event: “ In 1955, the anti-Vargas group tried to prevent President-elect Juscelino Ku-
bitschek and his Vice-President João Goulart from taking office, arguing that the two
men represented the situation against which the August 1954 coup had been directed,
and that their taking office would constitute an affront to the armed forces. A coun-
tercoup led by General Lott, the War Minister, guaranteed the inauguration of the
President and Vice-President, but aggravated resentments among the officers” (Coelho
1988, 150).
On November 20, General Lott visited President João Café Filho in the hospital and
warned him not to seek to re-assume office. Lott believed he was party to the anti-
Kubitschek conspiraries that his “anti-coup” 10 days before sought to forestall (see 140-
1955-11-11). But on November 21, 1955, after a panel of physicians declared President
João Café Filho fit to resume office following his heart attack earlier in the month,
Cafë left the hospital and went to his apartment and conferred with Gen. Eduardo
Gomes, who had opposed Lott’s November 11 coup. Café announced his return to
the presidency “as of this date” in a letter to the acting President of the Chamber of
Deputies, General Flores de Cunha. That afternoon, the armed forces surrounded the
Presidential Palace and other strategic locations in a show of force to deter pro-Café
forces. After 7 p.m., military police also surrounded Café’s apartment to prevent him
from leaving (Tad Szulc 1955e).
Early on November 22, both chambers of Congress declared that Café was “prevented”
from resuming the presidency. Thereafter, Café sent two petitions to the Supreme
Court seeking injunctions against his virtual house arrest and to confirm his status
as President. That night, acting president Nereu Ramos requested a 30-day state of
siege that would block court action prevent Café from to returning to office. Ramos
cited “the imminence of subversion of public order and grave internal commotion” and
“the need to prevent and repress the subversive wave that threatens the constitutional
order.” The armed forces announced their support for Ramos in a letter signed by
General Lott, Air Minister Brig. Vasco Alves Seco, and Navy Minister Admiral Antonio
Alves Camara (Tad Szulc 1955c). At 9 a.m. on November 23, the Senate approved
the state of siege 35 to 16 (Tad Szulc 1955c). The chamber of deputies debated the
measure all-night for two days but approved it 178-91 at 2:30 a.m. on November 24
(Tad Szulc 1955d).
The UDN led opposition to the State of Siege in the Chamber of Deputies, calling the
Ramos’s administration “dictatorial and illegal” (Tad Szulc 1955d). On November 24,
the siege bill was forwarded for Acting President Ramos’s signature after the Senate
approved it 35-15. Café refused to resign as constitutional president, and he was not
impeached, so formally remained on sick leave (Tad Szulc 1955b). On November 26,
302
Café denied he or anybody in the armed forces had ever plotted a coup to reverse the
October election (Tad Szulc 1955a).
The anti-Kubitschek coup “was supported by only one of the political parties,” Lt.
Gen. Gomes’ UDN, “but the defeated standard-bearers of the party in the election
denounced the attempts of their political supporters to subvert the legal order” (Roett
1999, 108). With the state of siege in place, there was no “widespread civilian move-
ment against the president-elect. The appeals were therefore too narrowly partisan to
create the necessary winning coalition” to successful carry out a coup (Stepan 1971,
96). On December 14, 1955, the Supreme Court voted to postpone any ruling on
Café’s petitions until the state of siege ended, which effectively barred his return (New
York Times 1955b). The state of siege “only lapsed with the inauguration of President
Kubitschek” at the end of January 1956 (Roett 1999, 110). For a detailed account of
the crisis, see Dulles (1970, Book II).
Coding rationale: “Under the Brazilian Constitution, Señor Café is free to resume the
Presidency when he chooses” (Tad Szulc 1955e). Indeed, Café’s constitutional claims
were acknowledged by the government, army, and major political parties (Tad Szulc
1955c). The military took concrete actions to prevent him from doing so against his
wishes, effectively ousting the democratically-appointed president. Thus, for similar
reasons given in Lott’s ouster of acting President Carlos Luz in the “anti-coup” of
November 11, we code this event as a successful anti-democratic coup.
• # 140-1956-2-11: Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; no evidence - PT; failed coup at-
tempt - Singh and Thompson; Archigos codes Kubitschek as leader of Brazil from
January 31, 1956, until January 31, 1961; GWF code a democracy (Brazil 45-64) from
1945 until April 1, 1964. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Brazil from 1946 to 1977
with Whites as the largest ethnic group.
Event: Before dawn on Saturday, February 11, 1956, “two Air Force officers, Ma-
jor Haroldo [Coimbra] Veloso and Captain José Chaves Lameirão, used an Air Force
five-passenger Beechcraft to leave the military airfield of Campo dos Afonsos, on the
outskirts of Rio. Veloso’s rebellious mission was to take control of the Brazilian interior
and thus force an attack from the coastal regions by the troops under pro-Kubitschek
commanders. Conditions along the coast, it was felt by the conspirators, would then
become favorable for those who wanted to take up arms to bring about “an investiga-
tion of voting practices carried out in October 1955...” In 1955 Veloso served under
Air Minister Gomes (Dulles 1970, 66), who opposed the “constitutionalist” coups of
November 1955 (see 140-1955-11-11 and 140-1955-11-21).
On February 16, Air Force Major Paulo Vı́tor and twenty armed troops were sent to
Belém to arrest Veloso, but instead joined the rebellion (68). The rebels thus “joined
by two other officers, a handful of air infantry and an unspecified number of local
policemen and civilians” (New York Times 1956c). The Air Ministry could no longer
303
dismiss the episode as an act of indiscipline. By February 18, Major Veloso controlled
an airfield at Santarem, Captain Lameirão an airfield at Belterra, and unnamed rebels
controlled an airfield at Porto Moz, all in Para State (Tad Szulc 1956f). On February
20, air force pilots refused to fly army paratroopers to northern Brazil to put down
a “vest-pocket revolt.” Navy commander Edir Rocha resigned in protest after the
army requisitioned one of his ships to take army forces to expel rebels from Santarem
(Tad Szulc 1956a). On February 21, Maj. Veloso expressed confidence in rebel victory
and claimed to be able to resist government forces for three months (New York Times
1956c).
On February 22, government forces strafed the main airport at Santarem and recap-
tured it as more hundreds more loyalist forces sailed up the Amazon River. Maj.
Veloso fled (Associated Press 1956b). On February 23, the revolt was quelled “with-
out bloodshed” (Tad Szulc 1956d). By February 26, the last rebels were being chased
(Tad Szulc 1956b). By March 3, Veloso had been apprehended, and his compatriots
had flown to Bolivia and been granted asylum. President Kubitscheck, seeking “an
atmosphere of good will” proposed a full amnesty for all those “who had been charged
with “revolutionary acts” between November 10, 1955, and March 1, 1956. Congress
approved” (Dulles 1970, 73). Veloso was reinstated and even later promoted (New
York Times 1959i).
The rebels did make clear their goals at the outset. Some initially surmised that
the rebels’ goals were to force concessions from the newly inaugurated President Ku-
bitschek, including “the removal of ministers objectionable to the Air Force and a
revision of certain policies” (Tad Szulc 1956f). Some note that the young air force of-
ficers “strenuously objected to the continuation of Brigadeiro Vasco Alves Seco in the
post of Air Minister” (Dulles 1970, 66). Some believed the rebels opposed Lt. Gen.
Henrique Texeira Lott (Tad Szulc 1956a). Rocha’s resignation telegram “suggested
that serious armed conflict be avoided by dismissing War Minister Lott,” but added
the heroic rebels “show the nation the need of a complete change in the political-
military situation” (Dulles 1970, 70). On February 25, it was reported that the rebels
“hope was to spark a nation-wide Air Force rebellion against President Juscelino Ku-
bitschek” but were betrayed (Tad Szulc 1956e). In December 1959, Veloso would lead
a similar air force revolt against Kubitschek (see 140-1959-12-3).
Coding rationale: Whether or not this event was a coup attempt or only a mutiny
depends on how one interprets the goals of the air force rebels, which were cloudy at
the time. However, because a majority sources suggest that the rebellion was part of a
larger plot to overthrow President Kubitschek’s government and reverse the November
1955 coups, we code this event as a failed anti-democratic coup.
• # 140-1959-12-3: Brazil, Juscelino Kubitschek

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; no evidence - PT; failed coup attempt
- Singh and Thompson; Archigos codes Kubitschek as leader of Brazil from January
31, 1956, until January 31, 1961; GWF code a democracy (Brazil 45-64) from 1945
304
until April 1, 1964. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Brazil from 1946 to 1977 with
Whites as the largest ethnic group.
Event: On December 3, 1959, some air force officers led by Capt. Prospero Barata, a
flying instructor, seized five planes and set up a revolutionary jungle headquarters in
Aragarças, located 1,100 miles northwest of Rio de Janeiro. A manifesto by the revolt
leaders was sent to opposition leaders, including Deputy Carlos Lacerda, and though
not released, allegedly charged the government with being responsible for communist
infiltration and corruption (New York Times 1959g). On December 4, Lt. Col. Haroldo
Veloso, who had led the February 1956 Jacearacanga revolt (see 140-1956-2-11), was
said to be the leader of the revolt. Loyalist paratroopers were flown to the scene and.
Some rebels were captured (New York Times 1959h). Maj. Eber Pinto and a civilian
Charles Herve flew to Argentina on a hijacked passenger plane to seek asylum. On
December 5, the revolt came to an end after the last 2 rebel transport planes flew to
Ascuncion, Paraguay. Capt. Barata, Lt. Col. Veloso, army Col. Luis Mendes da
Silva, army Capt. Tarcisio Nunes, and two others (New York Times 1959i).
Initially, the plotters against Kubitscek after February 1956 had involved “two officers
from each branch of the military; they looked to a military junta to bring “purity” to
Brazil and relieve it of “fictitious legality.” ” The number of plotters declined over
time. The chief plotter was Lt. Col. Veloso, who persuaded “lawyer Luı́s Mendes
de Morais Neto, a forty-six-year-old retired Air Force lieutenant, to draw up a series
of pronouncements and decrees. These were to be issued when “The Revolutionary
Command,” made up of three members of the armed forces (representing the Navy,
Army, and Air Force), assumed power. Legislatures and judicial bodies would be
closed down, Brazil’s institutions would be revamped, and political rights would be
taken from all who “directly or indirectly” had been involved in making the revolution
“necessary.” ” The other officer central to the plot was Air Force Lt. Col. João Paulo
Moreira Burnier (Dulles 1970, 92). The only politician to support the rebellion was
Otávia Mangabeira, an opposition Congressman (92). For a detailed account of the
1959 Aragarcas revolt, see (93-100).
Coding rationale: This revolt involved the same leader as the one in February 1956.
The evidence in this case is clear that the rebellion had revolutionary aims and sought
to install a military junta. Based on this evidence, we code this event as a failed
anti-democratic coup.
• # 140-1961-8-25: Brazil, Jânio Quadros

Category: legal
successful coup - Fossum; failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Quadros as
exiting on this date through “regular” means; GWF code a democracy (Brazil 45-64)
from 1945 until April 1, 1964.
Event: President Jânio Quadros, despite having won elections with a strong majority in
October 1960, was frustrated as his legislative agenda – including tax and agrarian re-
305
form – was blocked by the opposition-dominated Congress. Ex-president Kubitschek’s
Social Democrat Party and the Brazilian Labor Party had supported rival presidential
candidate Henrique Texeira Lott. Congressional elections were scheduled for October
1962 (J. d. Onis 1961a).
On August 20, 1961, Carlos Lacerda, the governor of Guanabara who had supported
Senator Quadros as a presidential candidate running on an anti-communist platform,
threatened to resign in protest after the president awarded a medal to Cuba’s Minister
of Industry, Maj Ernesto Guevara (New York Times 1961i). “Quadros and Lacerda
clashed over the issue of an independent foreign policy. Such a policy, which Quadros
supported, emphasized new markets for Brazilian products and a strong stance in
favor of the developing world, while maintaining relations with the United States but
refusing to isolate Cuba. Lacerda was particularly critical of Quadros’s pro-Cuba
policy” (McCann 1998, 75). On August 22, as Lacerda led protests, Quadros instructed
his diplomats to push to conclude a trade agreement with Cuba (New York Times
1961k).
In a televised broadcast on the night of August 24, Lacerda revealed that he had been
invited to join a plot to set up a dictatorship under Quadros (New York Times 1961j).
Lacerda said “Quadros intended to close Congress, decree reforms, and get the people’s
blessing in a plebiscite” (McCann 1998, 75). On August 25, Quadros “took civilian
and military leaders by total surprise” (Roett 1999, 111) by resigning. He cited forces
of “reaction” blocking his “efforts to lead the nation along the road to true political
and economic liberation” (New York Times 1961j). Quadros had believed “that the
military would be unwilling to allow Vice President João Goulart, a populist and former
minister of labor under Vargas, to assume the presidency. Quadros hoped that his
action would shock the povo into taking to the streets to demand his reimposition and
would spur the military into pressuring Congress” (McCann 1998, 75). “In a stormy
session,” Congress accepted Quadros’ resignation. With Vice President Goulart in the
People’s Republic of China on a trade mission, Ranieri Mazzili, the speaker of the
Chamber of Deputies, was named acting president until Goulart returned to Brazil (he
was flying back from Singapore). Mazzili announced that elections would be held in
90 days (New York Times 1961j).
The historically “anti-Vargas military” thus faced the spectre of “Vargas’s heir as
president” (Roett 1999, 111). On August 26, Quadros spent the day at a military
base near São Paulo waiting “for the summons to return” (McCann 1998, 75-76). The
Soviet press agency Tass assailed the U.S., saying Quadros had been forced to resign
under U.S. pressure (Topping 1961). U.S. officials denied the charges. They claimed
to be more fearful of chaos than Quadros. Meanwhile, some observers speculated that
“military pressures” may have “pushed” Quadros to resign (Tad Szulc 1961b). Others
were unsure whether Quadros’ “confinement” at the Cumbica air base was voluntary
(Associated Press 1961n). However, the dominant view was that Quadros had gambled
for resurrection (J. d. Onis 1961d).
Quadros’ political gamble backfired. “People were shocked, but they tended to feel
betrayed by Quadros rather than believe that “terrible forces” had risen against him...
306
Instead of worrying how to restore Quadros, the politicians and military leaders focused
on Goulart’s succession” (McCann 1998, 75-76). For subsequent developments, see 140-
1961-8-26. McCann (1998, 75-76) says that August 25 marks the day that “the republic
of 1945 began its painful death” (75-76).
Coding rationale: Soviet accusations and initial rumors notwithstanding, the historical
evidence indicates that President Quadros voluntarily resigned on this date. Mazzili’s
naming as acting president also appears to have conformed to the constitution, given
Vice President Goulart was outside of the country. We therefore code this event as
legal, and not a result of concrete military actions. Thus, if there was any coup attempt
against Goulart, it came only with events after August 25. See also 140-1961-8-26.
• # 140-1961-8-26: Brazil, Ranieri Mazzilli

Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; not a candidate - CSP and PT;
successful coup - Luttwak, Singh, and Perez (September 7); Archigos codes Ranieri
Mazzilli as leader from August 25, 1961, until exiting by “regular” means on September
7, 1961; GWF code a democracy (Brazil 45-64) from 1945 until April 1, 1964. EPR
codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Brazil from 1946 to 1977 with Whites as the largest
ethnic group.
Event: After the sudden resignation of President Quadros on August 25 (see 140-1961-
8-25), “It was immediately clear that the military and civilian elites were seriously
divided” over whether Vice President João Goulart, a populist and former minister of
labor under Vargas, should be allowed to assume the presidency (Roett 1999, 111). On
August 26, with Goulart in Pakistan on a layover, War Minister General Odı́lio Denys
warned that Goulart “will be arrested as soon as he sets foot on Brazilian soil” unless
he gave up his claim to the presidency. By contrast, Marshall Henrique Teixeira Lott,
the ex-War Minister who lost the presidential election to Quadros in October 1960 on
the same Labor Party ticket of Goulart, called a press conference and appealed to the
armed forces and nation to support Goulart’s installation (United Press International
1961c).
On August 27, General Denys said it was time to choose “between communism and
Brazil.” The army also placed General Lott under house arrest for his inflamma-
tory (that is) constitutionalist statement (E. C. Burks 1961c). On August 28, Acting
President Ranieri Mazzilli informed Congress that “ “for reasons of national security”
Goulart should not return to Brazil.” On August 29, the military ministers issued a
manifesto reiterating their opposition to Goulart (Roett 1999, 111), saying his return
was “absolutely inconvenient” (E. C. Burks 1961a). This “provoked immediate and
widespread indignation. They had misjudged the depth of support for the maintenance
of the constitutional order by both civilians and military officers” (Roett 1999, 109).
Labor leaders in São Paulo called for a general strike until Goulart was inaugurated
(Associated Press 1961n). Goulart’s “brother-in-law, Leonel de Moura Brizola, the fiery
governor of Rio Grande do Sul, and the regional army commander” (McCann 1998,
307
76), General José Machado Lopes of the Third Army (E. C. Burks 1961a), “ announced
that their forces would defend the constitution” (McCann 1998, 76). Military forces
in state of Goiá also declared for Goulart, as did the Fifth Air Force, according to a
radio broadcast (E. C. Burks 1961a). An opinion poll in Rio de Janeiro showed that
91 percent of respondents “wanted Goulart to assume the presidency” (Stepan 1971,
93).
On September 1, 1961, Goulart finally returned to Brazil and was received in Porto
Alegre by Governor Leonel Brizolla and Gen. José Machado Lopes. A crowd of 100,000
people gathered to cheer him (J. d. Onis 1961b). Given the Third Army’s endorsement
of Goulart, the “threat of civil war was ominous” (McCann 1998, 76). A 16-member
congressional commission developed a compromise formula to resolve the crisis (E. C.
Burks 1961a). On September 2, Congress approved a constitutional amendment adopt-
ing a parliamentary form of government. This effectively paved the way for Goulart
to become president but with reduced powers (E. C. Burks 1961b). General Denys
accepted this compromise to avoid civil war (Roett 1999, 111).
“The vice president arrive in Brası́lia on September 5, 1961, and took the oath of office
two days later” (111). Goulart became president and Tancredo de Almeida Neves of
Minas Gerais was prime minister. “In the next months, Goulart, chafing at the at-
tempt to turn him into a figurehead, made heated appeals to the masses to mobilize in
his favor. Goulart secured victory in a 1962 plebiscite, which restored the presidential
system in January 1963” (McCann 1998, 76). By then, Goulart recovered his presi-
dential powers (Roett 1999, 112).
Coding rationale: There is some debate over whether the veto coup of Goulart was suc-
cessful or failed. “In the unsuccessful coup of 1961, the military officers attempting the
coup failed in their stated goal of blocking the vice-president from assuming the pres-
idency” (Stepan 1971, 86). However, they were successful in circumscribing Goulart’s
powers by forcing the constitutional amendment. Based on our coding rule, we code
this event as a failed anti-democratic coup, since the coup makers failed to install their
preferred leader over Goulart. The move was successful, however, in establishing some
degree of military tutelage.
• # 140-1963-9-12: Brazil, João Goulart

Category: mutiny
and Thompson; Archigos codes Goulart as leader of Brazil from September 7, 1961,
until April 1, 1964; GWF code a democracy (Brazil 45-64) from 1945 until April 1,
1964.
Event: On September 12, 1963, hundreds of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and
“enlisted men in the navy, air force, and marines revolted in Brası́lia” (Roett 1999,
112), led by First Sgt. Antonio Prestes of the Air Force. They seized the radio
transmitter of the Central Brazil Foundation and broadcast an appeal for support
NCOs throughout the country. They held the military and civilian airports for 10
308
hours before they were recaptured by tank units without resistance. They held the
telephone and telegraph centers for five hours, cutting off communications with the
rest of the country. They also held the Navy Ministry, until loyalist troops shot their
way back, leading to the death of one rebel (three others were wounded). The rebels
also held hostages, including the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Clovis Mota,
a Supreme Court justice, Victor Nunes Leal, and 40 military officers. The revolt was
over quickly (J. d. Onis 1963).
A War Ministry communique said the movement was a protest against a recent “Federal
Supreme Court decision declaring the court incompetent to rule on the eligibility of
sergeants to hold elective office,” thereby sustaining a regional court ruling in Rio
Grande do Sol that refused to certify the election of a sergeant to the state legislature
(J. d. Onis 1963). “The right to compete in elections for political office and the right to
join trade unions were important demands of the non-commissioned officers in Brazil
in the early 1960s” (Neto 1995, 90). “Without support in the legislative and in the
executive, they required the recognition of this right in the Supreme Federal Tribunal.”
The Supreme Federal Court’s denial of their case motivated the 1963 military rebellion
(130,142).
“Though quickly subdued, the incident caused widespread alarm among civilian and
military leaders” (Roett 1999, 112). Less than a week later, some NCOs reportedly
attempted but failed to take over the Natal Air Base in an incident that was said to
have been similar to the Brasilia uprising (Associated Press 1961d). Having received
the support of NCOs in the plebiscite for restoring his presidential powers, “Goulart
carried his populism too far when he backed proposals for noncommissioned officers
to hold political office and when he appeared sympathetic to rebelling sergeants in
September 1963. The officer corps believed that the president was undermining disci-
pline” (McCann 1998, 76).
On October 4, 1963, after consulting with the military service chiefs, President Goulart
asked Congress to approve a 30-day state of siege, citing a series of labor strikes and
the recent mutiny by leftist NCOs (New York Times 1963a). His request was “greeted
with widespread shock. Goulart’s own minister of justice, Abelardo Jurema, later
wrote that “from the owners to the workers union, the response was the same—protest
against the measure. From the students to the intellectuals, press or radio, no one
understood the situation and no one trusted the president to rule by decree” (Stepan
1971, 91).
Following a mutiny on March 26, 1964, the September 1963 mutineers were also
amnestied (New York Times 1964o). The officer corps believed that the president
was undermining discipline” (McCann 1998, 76). Within days of the amnesty, Goulart
was ousted in a military coup (see 140-1964-3-30).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we interpret this event as mutiny whose main
goal was to achieve a policy concession (the right of NCOs to hold elective office), and
did not seek to oust President Goulart or the government more broadly.
309
Category: combined
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; successful coup - PT and
Thompson; Archigos codes Goulart as leader of Brazil from September 7, 1961, until
April 1, 1964; GWF code a democracy (Brazil 45-64) from 1945 until April 1, 1964.
Event: See 140-1964-4-1.
Coding rationale: See 140-1964-4-1.

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup, CSP, PT,
Luttwak, Fossum, Perez, and Singh; successful coup - PT and Thompson (March 30);
Archigos codes Goulart as exiting on this date through “irregular” means by military
actors without foreign support; GWF code the collapse of a democracy (Brazil 45-64)
on this date. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Brazil from 1946 to 1977 with Whites
as the largest ethnic group. O’Rourke (2013, 306) lists Joao Goulart as the target of a
successful U.S-backed coup in 1964.
Event: In the aftermath of the September 1963 mutiny by NCOs (see 140-1963-9-12),
a large number of officers gradually became convinced that President Goulart “posed
a real threat to public order,” especially after Goulart tried to use the army to repress
some opposition in late 1963 (Roett 1999, 112).
“In the months before March 1964, the staff and student officers of the Army General
Staff School (Escola de Comando de Estado Maior do Exército—ECEME) played a key
role in convincing officers that they should support a move against Goulart. The plot
was led by the highly respected army Chief of staff, General Humberto Castelo Branco,
who “recently left his command of the Fourth Army in the Northeast” (112) and “had
served as FEB operations officer in Italy, director of studies at ECEME, and long-
time head of the War College” (McCann 1998, 77). The challenge to the neutrality,
discipline, and hierarchy of the armed forces “posed by Goulart and his cronies deeply
concerned the high command” (Roett 1999, 112). “The officers believed that rational
economic development, internal security, and institutional well-being would occur only
if economic and political structures were altered, and that the civilian leaders were
unwilling to make the necessary changes.” In the event their plot failed due to a
well-organized left, they had plans to flee Brazil. U.S. officers “had promised that
they would receive training and logistical support to return to wage a guerrilla war”
(McCann 1998, 77).
“Struggling to keep the impatient left on his side and to stave off the right, Goulart
opted for a series of public rallies to mobilize pressure for basic reforms. In a huge rally
in Rio de Janeiro on [Friday] March 13, 1964, Goulart decreed agrarian reform and rent
controls and promised more” (77), such as legalizing the communist party (New York
Times 1964e) and nationalizing oil (Roett 1999, 113). The next week, Goulart asked
Congress for some constitutional changes that would reportedly give him broad decree
310
powers (New York Times 1964e). On March 17, pro-Goulart strikes (and some riots)
broke out in the suburbs of Brasilia organized by labor elements (New York Times
1964a).
Resistance was also swift. On March 19, some half a million people joined a peace-
ful anti-Goulart counter-rally in São Paulo. At the rally, former President (1946-
51) and army marshal, Eurico Gaspar Dutra, “came out of retirement with a call to
Brazilians to uphold the Constitution in opposition to President Goulart” (New York
Times 1964e). On March 20, General Castello Branco distributed a memo to his staff
which “convinced many legalist officers that the armed forces had no alternative but
to take the offensive against Goulart. The memorandum confirmed the “historic role”
of the military as the defender of the constitutional order” (Roett 1999, 113). Castelo
Branco’s “analysis” accused Goulart’s proposal for a plebiscite and a constitutional as-
sembly as having the true goal of closing Congress and setting up a dictatorship. The
text of the memo, revealed only after April, read in part: “The armed forces are not
arms for anti-democratic undertakings. Insurrection now is a legitimate action by the
people” (E. C. Burks 1964b). The underlying fear was that Goulart sought to create
a Syndacalist Republic in which “urban labor would replace the military as principal
source of support” and Goulart was Kerensky (R. A. Hayes 1989, 212).
On the evening of March 25, Col. José Anselmo Duarte, president of the leftist Sailors
and Marines Association, gave a speech at the second anniversary celebration of the
association’s founding in which he called on Congress to support Goulart. The Navy
Minister, Admiral Silvo Borgos de Souza Mota, reportedly ordered the arrest of Duarte
and other association directors and members for insubordination. In protest, some
1,400 sailors and marines seized the building of the Metallurgical Workers Union in
downtown Rio de Janeiro. They declared support for Goulart and shouted: “We want
reforms! We are dying of hunger!” (New York Times 1964g). Some claim the mutineers
were “led by an agent provocateur of the anti-Goulart conspiracy” (McCann 1998, 77-
78). It was later “revealed that the revolting sailors and marines had been shown the
famous movie Potemkin which depicted the uprising of sailors and marines against the
officers aboard the battleship by that name as part of the l917 upheaval in Russia”
(R. A. Hayes 1989, 213).
On March 26, Adm. Mota dismissed Vice Admiral Candido Aragão, commander of the
marines. He resigned himself after he felt he did not have Goulart’s support to repress
the association (New York Times 1964g). On March 27, the mutineers surrendered
to army troops. Soon after, Goulart accepted Admiral Mota’s resignation and named
Admiral Paulo Maria da Cunha Rodrigues as Navy Minister” (New York Times 1964o).
The new navy minister “had been endorsed by the General Confederation of Labor,
an ally of the radical Left” (Roett 1999, 113). The minister’s first act was to grant the
mutineers amnesty. Two hours after their surrender, the mutineers were released (New
York Times 1964o). Goulart’s (mis)handling of the incident sparked an immediate
uproar (McCann 1998, 77-78) and was the precipitating crisis in his ouster. Having
received rumors of a coup plot, Goulart believed his military aides, General Assis Brasil
and Minister of War Ribeiro, who said that he enjoyed enough support to deal with a
coup (R. A. Hayes 1989, 213).
311
On March 28, 2,000 navy officers, including at least 30 admirals, met in closed session
at the Navy Club in downtown Rio de Janeiro. They approved two unsigned state-
ments attacking Goulart’s government for failing to punish the mutineers and pledged
that they were “ready to resist by all means within our reach attempts at communiza-
tion” (Associated Press 1964). The Navy Club also demanded that Admiral Rodrigues
remove Vice Admiral Aragão, the leftist who had been re-instated as the marine com-
mander after Admiral Mota’s resignation, and Admiral Pedro Susana. Both men had
been carried in triumph by parading mutineers after they had been released (New York
Times 1964f).
On March 29, “Rio de Janeiro’s Correio da Manhã published an unusual Easter Sunday
edition with the headline “Enough!”” (McCann 1998, 77-78). That day, Goulart met
the protesting Navy Club officers. Marshal Augusto Magesso, president of the Military
Club, the powerful army organization, published a signed declaration in support of the
Navy Club. Meanwhile, Goulart was reportedly planning a transfer of Gen. Humberto
Castelo Branco for distributing his critical analysis of Goulart (New York Times 1964k).
On March 30, Correio da Manhã published the headline “Out!” to Goulart (McCann
1998, 77-78). That day, Goulart ordered an inquiry both into the amnesty of the
mutineers and also of the Navy Club. He “urged sergeants and lower-ranking personnel
in the armed forces to support him against the “reactionaries” ” (New York Times
1964f). “On March 30, Goulart addressed a gathering of sergeants in Rio de Janeiro.
The nationally televised speech was bellicose; the president refused to separate himself
from attacks on military discipline. The armed forced acted within 24 hours” (Roett
1999, 113).
On March 31, the commander of the Fourth Military Region, Gen. Olimpio Mourão,
proclaimed Jiuz de Fora, a city in Minas Gerais state 80 miles north of Rio de Janeiro,
as “the revolutionary capital of Brazil.” In São Paulo state, Gen. Amaury Kruel,
commander of the Second Army, announced: “I am going to Rio to depose the Pres-
ident” (New York Times 1964m).32 The army revolt was supported by the civilian
(UDN) Governors of Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and Parana. Mourão claimed to have
the support of troops in Vila Military, a Rio suburb, of forces in São Paulo, the Fourth
Army based in the Northeast (Recife). Goulart had the support of the War Minister,
Gen. Jair Dantas Ribeiro, the First Army, and marines. The leftist General Workers
Command called for a general strike in support of Goulart (New York Times 1964m).
On April 1, “troops sent from Rio by Goulart to crush the rebellion” defected. Goulart’s
appeals “for popular demonstrations of support failed, and he fled from Rio to Brası́lia”
(Roett 1999, 113), where he declared that he had not resigned and would arm civilians
to remain in office. With his wife and some aides, Goulart then flew to Pôrto Alegre,
the capital of Rio Grande do Sul. As rebels closed in on the capital and it was clear he
32. General Kruel had a rocky history with Goulart. In 1953, as a colonel, he had headed a group of army
officers calling for Goulart to be dismissed as Labor Minister, assuing him of trying to build a personally-
controlled labor movement. But after 1955, the two men became friends. In 1961, Kruel had backed legalist
forces supporting Goulart’s inauguration, and was rewarded by being named chief of the Presidential military
household and then War Minister. In June 1962, he was dismissed from the Cabinet at the request of his
brother-in-law Leonel Brizola and other leftists (New York Times 1964i).
312
had lost control of the army, the War Minister, Gen. Jair Dantas Ribeiro, resigned. As
the capital fell to the rebels, Carlos Lacerda, the anti-communist governor of Guanbara,
declared victory and celebrations broke out (New York Times 1964h).
“The president of the Senate declared the presidency vacant the same night. Ranieri
Mazzili, “the president of the Chamber of Deputies, following the constitutional direc-
tive, became acting president” (Roett 1999, 113). Meanwhile, Gen. Ladario Pereira
Teles, commander of the Third Army in Rio Grande do Sul, remained loyal to Goulart.
Leonel Brizolla, Goulart’s brother-in-law and a Federal Deputy, said his forces con-
trolled the state and would be taking command of Goulart’s defense (New York Times
1964h). But “Brizola’s resistance groups proved an illusion, as did the supposed arms
caches of the unions and the readiness of favela residents to attack the wealthy. The
period of the military republic had begun” (McCann 1998, 78).
On April 2, Goulart fled to Uruguay with Leonel Brizola and a military aide, Gen. Assis
Brasil. At 4:15 a.m., Mazzilli was sworn in as acting president, and later in the day a
million-strong march cheered victory. The army began to arrest labor leaders, leftists,
and communists. Three generals who had remained loyal to Goulart, including Gen.
Pereira Telles, were also arrested (New York Times 1964j). U.S. President Johnson sent
his “warmest wishes” to Mazzilli, making clear it that the U.S. viewed his ascension
as constitutional (Tad Szulc 1964). At first, a civilian government appeared in control
(E. C. Burks 1964b). In reality, the country was in the hands of a “revolutionary
command” that directed the coup and subsequent events (Coelho 1988, 148).
By this point, “the armed forces were led by alumni of the Superior War College (Escola
Superior de Guerra, ESG), who under the influence of the doctrine of national security
(segurança nacional ), now were “convinced that they could effectively govern Brazil
themselves” (Roett 1999, 114). Under the constitution, Congress had 30 days to select
a new president (E. C. Burks 1964b). On April 4, military leaders and seven state
governors called on Congress to support Gen. Humberto Castelo Branco to serve out
the remainder of Goulart’s term (New York Times 1964l). However, the military leaders
lacked enough civilian supporters in Congress to secure Goulart’s impeachment. They
would have to “bend” the constitution to do so, but “the conservative congressional
leader balked.” The military “took matters into their own hands” (Skidmore 1999,
160). On April 9, the revolutionary command signed an “Institutional Act,” giving
the military the power to oust Congressmen and other officials to root out communism
(E. C. Burks 1964c). On April 10, 40 members of Congress were duly ousted, and
60 other notables, including Goulart, were stripped of political rights for 10 years
(E. C. Burks 1964a). On April 11, the rump Congress elected Gen. Castelo Branco as
president 361-5, while 72 members of Goulart’s Labor Party abstained (E. C. Burks
1964d). His election was largely due to UDN support (Skidmore 1999, 161).
Breaking from the “coup and exit” pattern of prior Brazilian military interventions
over the 1945-1964 period (Coelho 1988, 149), this coup inaugurated two decades of
military rule (Roett 1999, 114) and represented the first time the Brazilian military
governed in the twentieth century (Stepan 1971, 91).
Coding rationale: Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code the
313
military coup of March 30-April 1 as a successful anti-democratic coup.
• # 140-1964-4-15: Brazil, Ranieri Mazilli

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; Combined - PT; Archigos
codes Ranieri Mazilli as being removed on this date through “regular” means; Svolik
codes Castello Branco as toppling democracy and entering office in a military coup on
this date; GWF code a military regime (Brazil 64-85) from April 1, 1964, until January
15, 1985.
Event: On April 2, 1964, the day after the coup against President Goulart that brought
an end to democracy in Brazil, “the leader of the Senate declared the presidency to
be vacant [unconstitutionally], and in accord with the 1946 constitution, the leader
of the Chamber of Deputies became interim president for a maximum of 30 days,
during which time Congress was to choose a new president” (Kohut and Vilella 2016,
90). On April 2, Ranieri Mazzilli was sworn in as acting president. “The nation–
and the civilian political elite–waited. After a week of negotiation over the course of
the March 31 coup, the armed forces decided to act unilaterally” (Roett 1999, 115).
“Led by army air marshal Artur da Costa e Silva, the commanders of the army, navy,
and air forced created the Comando Supremo Revolucionáro (Supreme Revolutionary
Command), which gained power when the interim president, Ranieri Mazzilli, added
the three officers to his cabinet” (Kohut and Vilella 2016, 90). On April 9, the Comando
issued an “Institutional Act” that lacked“any constitutional justification” (Roett 1999,
115). The Act “gave the Brazilian executive extraordinary powers, such as increased
authority to gain constitutional amendments, exclusive power to propose expenditure
bills to Congress, and the power to suppress the political rights of any citizen for ten
years” (Skidmore 1999, 160). It also “required Congress to elect a new president within
two days” (Kohut and Vilella 2016, 90).
At this point, military moderates “turned to the UDN, long-time enemies of the pop-
ulists, as the political party to help them legitimize their takeover of power. Castello
Branco, coordinator of the coup and leader of the moderate military wing, was per-
sonally close to the UDN leaders and considered them the proper civilian inheritors
of power” (Skidmore 1999, 160). The Supreme Revolutionary Command “ordered the
Brazilian Congress to elect a new president to replace Acting President Ranieri Mazz-
illi.” Castello Branco, with the support of the Supreme Revolutionary Command, was
selected as president on April 11, 1964” (Lentz 1994, 108). “The military-UDN alliance
elected Castello Branco to the presidency–not an unexpected victory given that the
electorate consisted of a Congress which had already been purged of leftists elements”
(Skidmore 1999, 161). On April 13, Castello Branco “resigned from the military, and
two days after that he was sworn in as president” (Lentz 1994, 108).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we consider the two-week period from April
1 to April 15 to be a part of the consolidation of the April 1 coup led by Castello
Branco. Although the rise of Castello Branco was by no means constitutional, it ap-
pears to have been a “regular” part of the military-controlled transition under the
314
nascent military regime. One could code this event as “combined” with the coup of
April 1, as PT do. Evidence indicates that this event formalized Branco’s ascension
to the nominal executive, although we assume that as chief of the general staff of the
army that he was already the regime leader as of April 1. Castello Branco “was given
widespread support by the civilian and military coup leaders in the indirect presidential
election in Congress on April 11, 1964. Paradoxically (but predictably) much support
for Castello’s assumption of the highest political Office in the land came precisely be-
cause of his reputation for being apolitical. The military liked his excellent combat
record, his academic achievement, and his record of abstention from partisan politics.
The civilians found him attractive because of their desire to have a strong apolitical
president in charge, who could supervise the return to open elections” (Stepan 1971,
217). We thus code this event as a “regular” or legal change in nominal executive con-
firming Castello Branco’s de facto status as regime leader that he had already assumed
two weeks before.
• # 140-1969-8-31: Brazil, Arthur da Costa de Silva

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; successful coup - PT and Singh;
Archigos codes Costa de Silva as being removed on this date through “regular” means.
However, Archigos codes the entry of the “Military Junta” on this date as “irregular”;
Svolik codes Costa de Silva’s exit on this date as natural, and the Military Junta’s
entry as “interim”; GWF code a military regime (Brazil 64-85) from April 1, 1964,
until January 15, 1985. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in Brazil from 1946 to 1977
with Whites as the largest ethnic group.
Event: On August 31, 1969, President Arthur da Costa e Silva suffered a cerebral
embolism that left him unable to perform his duties (Novitski 1969a). Costa e Silva’s
stroke “occasioned a crisis in that the vice president, a civilian, should have ascended to
the position of President” (R. A. Hayes 1989, 231). However, the military “specifically
disallowed the constitutional provision that the Vice President, Pedro Aleixo, a civilian
law professor and career politician, should succeed to the Presidency in the event of
incapacity” (Novitski 1969a).
Instead, later that night, a military triumvirate announced that they had taken power
until the president could recover. The junta included General Aurelio de Lyra Tavares,
Minister of War; Admiral Augusto Hamman Rademaker Grunewald, Minister of the
Navy; and Brig. Gen. Marcio de Zouza e Mello of the Air Force. The declaration indi-
cated that planned constitutional reforms that Costa e Silva had planned to announce
the next day, presided over by Vice President Aleixo over three months in the hopes
of a return to civilian rule, would be held in abeyance until Costa e Silva returned
(Novitski 1969a). Vice President Aleixo did not attend the Cabinet meeting in the
Ministry of War approving the junta’s takeover (Novitski 1969c). On October 14, the
junta decreed that both the offices of the presidency (nominally still held by Costa e
Silva) and the vice presidency (held by Aleixo) were being vacated (Reuters 1969). The
junta thereby eased the way for the entry of Emı́lio Garrastazú Médici as president in
315
October 1969 (see 140-1969-10-25).
Coding rationale: Whether or not the entry of the military junta after Costa e Silva’s
stroke is a coup, autogolpe, or “legal” depends on who was presumptive regime leader
given Costa e Silva’s incapacitation. There is no evidence that the junta’s leadership
was contested within the military at this time, and their ascension would appear to
be by consensus and in conformity with informal regime rules. However, the junta’s
entry after Costa e Silva’s incapacitation was formally unconstitutional, as they did
not permit the vice president to succeed Costa e Silva. Costa e Silva, in contrast,
succeeded Castelo Branco according to rules set forth in the 1967 (military-backed)
Constitution. On balance, even though Pedro Aleixo was a civilian official in a mil-
itary regime, we consider him as the presumptive constitutional regime leader upon
Costa e Silva’s incapacitation. We therefore code this event as a successful reshuffling
coup, with a main cause of the coup was for the military junta to perpetuate military
dominance of the regime. Had we given precedence to informal rather than formal
succession rules in the regime, then we would have coded the junta’s entry as “legal”
but their preemption of Aleixa as president as a successful autogolpe. Regardless of
the coding, the end result would be the same: the military retained control over the
military regime, not a civilian executive.
• # 140-1969-10-25: Brazil, Military Junta

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos
codes the exit of a “Military Junta” on this date through “regular” means; GWF code
a military regime (Brazil 64-85) from April 1, 1964, until January 15, 1985.
Event: Following the military triumvirate’s emergency takeover in August 1969 (see
140-1969-8-31), “The junta was pressured on all sides to conduct a broad inquiry among
the officers, including those of intermediate rank, which would transform the armed
forces into a political party. The junta’s biggest problem was General Albuquerque
Lima, who enjoyed the preference of large sectors of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
and who mobilized this support to put pressure on the junta. In a preliminary balloting
of generals, admirals, and brigadiers, Albuquerque Lima received the largest number of
votes. It just so happened that he was only a three-star general, and in the hierarchy’s
eyes, it was inadmissable that he have authority over four-star generals. The final
solution was the institution of a system of deliberation and elimination by steps until
a final list of three candidates, produced by electoral colleges successively smaller in
size, was submitted to a group of seven four-star generals. This process resulted in the
designation of General Médici, chief of the SNI – Servicio Nacional de Informacoes –
(the federal intelligence bureau)” (Coelho 1988, 157).
On October 7, 1969, it was announced that Emı́lio Garrastazú Médici’s had been
nominated by the military to become the next president (New York Times 1969g).
He reportedly unanimously won an internal military election held the previous day,
October 6 (Novitski 1969d), beating out the other principal candidate, General Al-
fonso Augusto de Albuquerque Lima. “Medici represented the “hardliner” faction that
316
Costa e Silva had aligned with, in contrast to the more moderate ESG officers” (R. A.
Hayes 1989, 231). Thus, “the democratic mask fell off as the officer corps of the three
services consulted among themselves to pick General Garrastazu Medici for the presi-
dency. Costa e Silva and Medici represented the hard-line, antipolitics segment of the
military, which seemingly was content to hold authority as long as necessary to turn
Brazil into a great power” (McCann 1998, 80). On October 14, an executive order
vacated Costa e Silva from the presidency since he was “totally incapable to exercise
fully his duties” (Associated Press 1969b). On October 25, the Congress, which had
been closed the previous December, was reopened so as to ratify Medici as president.
The vote was 293 in favor and 76 abstentions (due to opposition boycott) (United
Press International 1969). Adm. Augusto Rademaker Grunewald was elected Vice
President (New York Times 1969d). On October 27, President-elect Medici named a
cabinet (New York Times 1969e). On October 30, Medici was sworn in as president
(New York Times 1969b).
(2014) codes this event (by Emilio Garrastazu Medici) as a coup. According to Coelho
(1988, 148), military regimes in Brazil have only rarely ruled by a collective military
junta, such as the one that took power in August 1969 (see 140-1969-8-31). Its forma-
tion was “an emergency measure of short duration” following President Costa e Silva’s
fatal illness “until a new president could be elected.” Evidence indicates that Medici’s
ascension as president followed regular procedures within the military. Indeed, Medici
was “a soldier’s soldier. He was dead set against becoming president and gave in only
on grounds of military duty. Médici became President, not because he or his military
electors thought he had the vision or the knowledge a president needed, but because
he was the only four-star general who could stop the army from tearing itself apart”
(Skidmore 1988, 105). The irregular preemption of Aleixo as president is coded earlier
in August.
• # 140-1977-10-12: Brazil, Ernesto Geisel

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, Singh; Archigos codes Geisel as
the leader of Brazil from March 15, 1974, until March 15, 1979; GWF code a military
regime (Brazil 64-85) from April 1, 1964, until January 15, 1985. EPR codes ethnicity
as irrelevant in Brazil from 1946 to 1977 with Whites as the largest ethnic group.
Event: After taking office in 1974, President Ernesto Geisel, a retired military officer,
pursued a policy of abertura or controlled and gradual liberalization. In order to prevent
hardliners from obstructing that policy, Geisel sought to personally designate his own
successor rather than defer to the Army High Command. Geisel privately favored the
chief of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), General João Batista Figueiredo, as his
successor, even though the latter “had no support inside the Army.” In January 1976,
Geisel took the unprecedented step of dismissing the commander of the Second Army
after a worker died under mysterious circumstances (presumably of torture) while in
detention at a facility of the Internal Operations Department (DOI). His move, taken
317
without consulting the Minister of the Army, Sylvio Couto Coelho da Frota, alienated
radical hardline elements (Coelho 1988, 161-162).33
“In 1977 and 1978, the succession issue caused further confrontations with the hard-
liners. Noting that Brazil was only a “relative democracy,” Geisel attempted in April
1977 to restrain the growing strength of the opposition parties by creating an electoral
college that would approve his selected replacement” (McCann 1998, 82). Meanwhile,
hardliners within the military and CIE started raise Frota’s name “as a candidate to
succeed Geisel in the presidency. Frota had endorsed the standard hard-line critiques
of Geisel’s liberalization measures and had thus entered on a collision course with
the president” (Castro 2002, 99). Although Frota led the far right by 1977 (McCann
1998, 82), he “became hard-line only after he joined the government.”34 Because
Frota had presidential aspirations and hoped to outflank the SNI chief for the job,
Frota “attempted to be the voice–and thus the candidate–of the hard-line constituency
associated with the CIE and the security community” (Stepan 1988, 42). Frota had
helped form the CIE in 1967 and used it to cultivate support for his candidacy within
the military.
From May to September 1977, Frota courted congressional support for his candidacy
to succeed Geisel (Skidmore 1988, 198). During this period, Frota “campaigned in the
name of the generals’ regime as it appeared to have been defined in 1969, and against
dictatorship by a “small group in the palace. By early October, “the minister’s dissent
reached the point of no return. The frotista group launched an offensive in Congress,
monopolizing the floor in increasingly less veiled opposition to the government. Rumors
of a manifesto signed by civilian and military figures were doing the rounds, thought to
have been masterminded by General Odı́lio Denys, General Jayme Portello de Mello,
and Admiral Rademaker, all long-standing “radicals” ” (Chirio 2018).
With his authority challenged, Geisel “told his closest staff he was going to dismiss
Frota on October 12, a holiday. With the Congress and government offices closed,
it would be difficult for the Army Minister to rally his forces. Geisel also alerted
the top regional army commanders, telling them of Frota’s impending dismissal and
replacement by General Fernando Belfort Bethlem” (Skidmore 1988, 198). “Head of
the Military Cabinet General Hugo Abreu was tasked with securing the support of
major unit commands, especially in Brası́lia and Rio’s Vila Militar” (Chirio 2018).
On Wednesday, October 12, 1977, President Geisel duly dismissed Frota for “personal
reasons” (Reuters 1977). Geisel’s firing of Frota “was an unexpected but carefully
planned manoeuvre designed to neutralize possible reactions in favour of Frota” (Castro
2002, 99)., although publicly Geisel said succession was not a factor (Vidal 1977).
In response, Frota issued an 8-page statement accusing Geisel’s government of “crimi-
nal complacency in the face of Communist infiltration” and criticizing various policies,
33. Since 1971, the DOI network “formed a parallel chain of command, one that did not necessarily end
with the president of the republic. President Geisel, a retired general, struggled to have his orders fulfilled
by the CIE [Army Intelligence Center] system” (Tollefson 1998, 360).
34. From 1972 to May 1974, Frota commanded the First Army, where “he was an indefatigable opponent
of torture, an unusual stance for a commander in that period” (Skidmore 1988, 198).
318
including “abstention by Brazil in an Organization of American States vote on ad-
mission of Cuba, Brazil’s quick recognition of the Communist-backed government of
Angola, and Brazil’s support of an anti-Zionist U.N. resolution” (Associated Press
1977b). The worst charge was the claim that Geisel “aimed at destroying the national
security structure or rendering it harmless.” The leftward drift of government, he said,
sought to “distance the Armed Forces from the county’s decision-making processes.”
Frota “urged the military masses “from the highest-ranking chief to the young recruit”
to resist this “marginalization” and the communization of the country.” Prepared in
advance, Frota’s manifesto “aimed to incite a widespread revolt of troop commanders
against the incumbent authorities” (Chirio 2018). Frota “ordered his manifesto sent to
every barracks in the country, evidently not knowing that Geisel had already commu-
nicated his dismissal to the army commands. The manifesto was never transmitted.
Frota tried another last minute gambit. He called a meeting in Brası́lia of the army
High Command (the key members were the commanders of the four regional armies)
where he would present his case. Again Geisel outmaneuvered him. Each member
of the High Command had also received orders from Geisel to come to Brası́lia but
to come directly to the Planalto. As each general arrived at the Brası́lia airport, he
found waiting for him two cars (each with officer and driver)–one from Frota and one
from the President. Every one chose the presidential car, knowing full well that Frota
had already been dismissed.” Frota thus failed to win support of active duty hard-
line officers who sought to protect their careers. Frota only found support from some
retired rightist officers “such as Marshal Odı́lio Denis, Air Force General Marcio de
Sousa Melo, and Admirals Augusto Rademaker and Silvio Heck–who were discounted
as long-time anti-castelista critics and who had little current influence in either military
or civilian circles” (Skidmore 1988, 198-199).
Within a week of Frota’s dismissal, one of his key allies, General Antonio da Silva
Campos, was dismissed as chief of CIE. Marcelo Linhares, the head of the government
Arena Party in the House of Deputies, resigned. He had been the one to announce
Frota’s presidential candidacy (IPS 1977). In January 1978, with Frota already side-
lined, Geisel finally communicated his choice of Figueiredo as his successor “to the
military ministers and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces” (Coelho 1988, 162).
Abreau, who had supported Geisel against his former commanding officer in October
1977, resigned when he realized that a successor, Figueiredo, had already been decided
upon, when all along Geisel had insisted in 1977 that this was not the case (Zirker
1986, 273).
Coding rationale: No prior major coup datasets identify this event as a coup attempt.
Stepan (1988, 29) cites “the frustrated coup attempt by the Minister of the Army,
General Sylvio Frota in 1977” as reflective of “a hard-line tendency within the mili-
tary” that existed under the military regime until 1985. Stepan (1988, 42) also says
Frota was implicated in a “near coup attempt.”
Although Frota clearly sought to mobilize military support to his cause, it is not clear
whether his actions were designed to oust Geisel or simply to force the president to
319
reinstate him to his position as Minister of the Army. His leaked manifesto was critical
of the government but stopped short of explicitly calling for a coup (even if it was
an indirect invitation). The only major troop movements in the capital were those of
troops mobilized by Geisel to preempt any coup attempt. Zirker (1986, 272) concludes
that “The successful firing of Frota in 1977 met with Frota’s active resistance in what
have might have been a successful counter-coup; Abreau’s decisive action in the affair
clearly contributed to its peaceful outcome.” Chirio (2018) concludes that “Those who
appeared to have given Frota their unfailing support declined to back his resistance.
The power grab would not take place.” The little public reporting on the event in the
weeks after claimed that an armed rebellion was “threatened” and Brazil was “on the
verge” of a coup but that no actual rebellion broke out. One newspaper said that Frota
“went so far as to order the presidential palace surrounded by troops” (United Press
International 1977). We can find no sources that claim any current troops followed
Frota’s orders since he had already been outmaneuvered and himself dismissed from
his command.
We thus code the event as a coup plot that failed to turn into an attempt for lack of
support from current officers. Had we viewed the broadcast of the manifesto or his
sending of cars to the airport as the opening act of a coup attempt, we would code the
event a failed reshuffling coup. There is no evidence that Frota sought to rule without
the military or with a new set of civilian elites. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 140-2016-8-31: Brazil, Dilma Rousseff

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CSP and PT; Archigos codes Rousseff as the leader
of Brazil from January 1, 2011, through the end of 2015; GWF code a democracy
(Brazil 85-NA) since 1985.
Event: In December 2015, impeachment proceedings were initiated against President
Dilma Rousseff, of the Workers’ Party (PT), on charges that she hid “a government
budget deficit with loans from state banks during her 2014 reelection campaign” (U.
Friedman 2016). At the time, there was “a massive corruption scandal involving all the
major parties, construction companies, and the state oil company, Petrobras. Although
Dilma was not personally implicated in the scandal, many of the most vocal supporters
of impeachment were, raising the possibility that impeachment was merely an excuse to
put a stop to corruption investigations and return to business-as-usual for the political
class” (Pitts et al. 2016). Roussef’s approval numbers had also dropped due to the
poor economy (Bevins 2016).
In March 2016, Dilma Rousseff aggravated the opposition when she appointed to her
cabinet former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, which some saw “as a way to shield
him from arrest by prosecutors” investigating him for graft. At the end of March 2016,
leaders of the Brazilian Party of the Democratic Movement (PMDB), a key member
of the of governing coalition, withdrew their support from President Rousseff. Several
PMDB cabinet ministers were asked to resign, but not Vice President Michel Temer,
a leading PMDB politician who stood to become president if Rousseff were ever im-
320
peached (Sreeharsha 2016b). As momentum began to build for an impeachment vote,
Rousseff and her supporters began to use the word ‘coup’ to protest the proceedings.
“What is impeachment without a serious crime?” Rousseff said. “It’s a coup” (Bevins
2016).
Interestingly, in early April 2016, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) requested
that Congress also consider a petition to impeach Michel Temer, who was accused
of involvement in an illegal ethanol-purchasing scheme. Days before the impeachment
vote on Rouseff in the Chamber of Deputies, a recording from Temer’s office leaked call-
ing for a government of “national salvation.” President Rousseff’s office immediately
charged: “The mask of the conspirators has fallen” (Romero 2016e). Eduardo Cunha,
the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies who led the impeachment charge, himself
faced trial at the STF “on charges that he pocketed as much as $40 million in bribes.”
The Senate leader, Renan Calheiros, had also been implicated in the Petrobas scan-
dal (Operation Car Wash) that involved kickbacks to many politicians. “Altogether,
60 percent of the 594 members of Brazil’s Congress face serious charges like bribery,
electoral fraud, illegal deforestation, kidnapping and homicide.” Rousseff’s supporters
questioned how such men could impeach a president not accused of any personal graft
herself. But a majority on the STF rejected her adminstration’s appeal to block the
vote on impeachment in the Chamber of Deputies (Romero and Sreeharsha 2016).
On April 17, 2016, the Chamber of Deputies voted 367-137 (with 7 abstentions) to
impeach Rousseff, moving proceedings to the Senate (Jacobs 2016c). Only “16 of the
367 deputies who voted in favor of impeachment mentioned fiscal pedaling,” but talked
about issues not in the formal charges (Purdy 2016). “Rousseff’s tormentor-in-chief in
the Chamber of Deputies was Jair Bolsonaro–a Rio de Janeiro congressman, potential
presidential contender, former officer under the military dictatorship... When casting
his impeachment vote, Bolsonaro managed to combine his misogyny with his fondness
for military rule. He dedicated his ballot to Carlos Alberto Ustra, whom he called, ‘the
Dread of Dilma Rousseff.’ Ustra was the colonel in charge of the notorious DOI-CODI,
the unit of the military responsible for torturing political dissidents, including Rousseff
herself, during the dictatorship” (Encarnación 2017, 88). Rousseff again claimed that
impeachment had “no legal foundation” and “all the features of a coup.” Vice President
Michel Temer, also a constitutional law scholar, said the process was constitutional (U.
Friedman 2016). On April 19, Rousseff said at a news conference, “I am the victim
of a process that is rooted in injustice, and legal and political fraud” (Jacobs 2016b).
On April 22, Rousseff denounced opponents as “coup mongers.” She told reporters,
“In the past, coups were carried out with machine guns, tanks and weapons. Today
all you need are hands that are willing to tear up the Constitution” (Jacobs 2016a).
On May 5, 2016, Eduardo Cunha, a leader of the PMDB, was forced to step down
as head of the Chamber of Deputies by the Supreme Court for corruption. Earlier in
the week, Michel Temer was fineed for violating campaign finance limits, a ruling that
ironically would make him ineligible to run for elected office for eight years (Romero
2016d). On May 9, Waldir Maranhão, the new speaker of the Chamber of Deputies
(and deputy of the Progressive Party who was also implicated in the Petrobas scandal),
said he would annul the vote to impeach Dilma Rousseff, saying that procedural rules
321
had been broken in the impeachment vote and a new vote should be held. But Senate
leaders vowed to go through with a planned vote to suspend the president (Romero
2016a). On May 10, Maranhão reversed his decision and said he would not annul the
impeachment vote (Romero 2016b). On May 11, STF justice Teori Zavascki rejected
an appeal from the Attorney General to annul the impeachment process, arguing that
the claim that Cunha had initiated impeachment for personal gain were subjective and
not proved as no evidence had been presented (BBC 2016b).
On May 12, 2016, the Senate voted to suspend Roussef’s powers for the duration
of the impeachment trial, making Temer, of the Brazilian Party of the Democratic
Movement (PMDB), acting president. Over the next four months, Temer “appointed
a cabinet made up exclusively of wealthy white men and announced measures to undo
several of the PT’s social programs” (Pitts et al. 2016). On May 23, a transcript of
audio tapes between Romero Jucá, a PMDB member in Temer’s new cabinet, and
Sergio Machado, a former executive of a Petrobas subsidiary, surfaced that showed the
two men plotting in March to push impeachment against Rousseff to deflect from the
corruption investigation that implicated both men. Jucá promptly resigned his cabinet
position and returned to the Senate (Sreeharsha 2016c).
On July 16, a federal prosecutor issued a report with an opinion that fiscal pedaling
may have been an “abuse of power” but was not a “crime of responsibility.” Yet the
legal opinion had “no bearing on the impeachment process” (Edgerton 2016). In July
2016, left-wing civil society groups convened an International Tribunal for Democracy
in Brazil and condemned the ongoing impeachment proceedings as a coup, noting that
the Public Prosecutor’s office had issued a report finding Rousseff not guilty of any
crime whereas many of the legislators who were voting for impeachment were under
investigation for corruption themselves (Shahshahani 2016). On August 10, 2016,
the Senate voted 59 to 21 to indict Rousseff on budgetary manipulation, formally
making her a defendant in a trial to be overseen by Ricardo Lewandowski, the chief
justice of the supreme court. At this point, Lewandowski reportedly had the power
to dismiss the charges if he felt they lacked minimum grounds, but he did not do so
(Sreeharsha 2016a). In late August, prosecutors moved to indict former President Luı́z
Inácio Lula da Silva on corruption charges (Pitts et al. 2016). In her defense, Rousseff
said the difference between previous right-wing coups (as in 1964) and 2016 “is that
constitutional pretexts lend the appearance of legitimacy to a government taking power
without support from the ballot box” (Encarnación 2017, 87).
On August 31, 2016, the Senate voted 61-20 to remove President Rousseff from office
(Romero 2016c). Moments later, “the Senate held a second vote and chose not to strip
her of her right to run for office for eight years- a penalty that many had thought
was inseparable from impeachment. This appeared to constitute an admission that
she had, in fact, done nothing wrong. Then, only two days after removing Dilma, the
Senate passed a law legalizing precisely the same accounting maneuvers that were the
supposed basis of the case against her” (Pitts et al. 2016). On September 9, STJ justice
Teori Zavascki rejected Rousseff’s request to annul her impeachment. “Regarding the
charges of crime of responsibility against Rousseff, Zavascki said that the legislation
describes with precision the practices that are considered harmful to the budget” (BBC
322
2016a).
The crux of the accusation that the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff was a coup rests
mainly with the view that impeachment was politically motivated and not justifiable,
legitimate, or legal. A key question surrounding the impeachment is whether or not
Congress actually followed the constitution (in letter or spirit) in dismissing Rousseff.
Under Brazil’s 1988 constitution, impeachment procedures share similarities with the
process in the United States, which should begin with an investigation and vote in the
lower chamber. The President is allowed a chance to appeal to the Supreme Federal
Tribunal (STF) before a trial begins in the upper chamber or Senate. If and when
a Senate trial begins, the president is to be suspended for 180 days and the vice
president is to become acting president. The Senate trial should be overseen by the
STF chief justice. Conviction to remove the president requires two-thirds of the vote
of 81 senators (Rousseau 2016). On the surface, this constitutional process appears to
have been followed throughout.
There was fundamental disagreement over whether Dilma Rousseff had committed
an impeachable offense. Her conviction was for pedaladas fiscais, or “pedaling fiscal”
obligations into the future, which was illegal under 2000 law “designed to end the
budgetary practices that had led to devastating bouts of hyperinflation in the 1980s,”
although governors and mayors were known to have continued the practice (Jacobs
2016b). Some claim “Brazil’s previous two presidents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso
and Lula, had engaged in the same budgetary tricks after the “anti-pedaling” law was
passed, and neither was penalized” (Encarnación 2017, 87). In April 2016, the Organi-
zation of American States issued a statement indicating that the impeachment process
against Rousseff “does not fit within the rules that govern this process.” It went on:
“There is no criminal accusation against the President; rather she has been accused of
the poor administration of public resources in 2014. This is an accusation that is po-
litical in character, and that does not merit an impeachment process” (Furigay 2016).
A “majority of legal scholars, and eventually even the Public Ministry (Brazil’s in-
dependent prosecutor’s office responsible for government oversight), all indicated that
Dilma’s questionable accounting maneuverings did not constitute a “crime of responsi-
bility,” and, thus, according to the constitution, would not justify impeachment” (Pitts
et al. 2016).
Reflecting on the initial impeachment vote in April 2016, A. E. Smith (2016) concluded
that it was not a “soft coup” (as it did not rely on “extralegal” means) but that it was
not “exactly democratic” given that legislators did not prosecute her for serious crimes
and largely ignored the formal “relatively minor” charges. Taub (2016) concluded that
the event was not a coup technically but that Rousseff’s political opponents had ex-
ploited the law “to subvert democracy.” In their report on the impeachment process,
a fact-finding delegation of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) expressed
deep concerns about the legality of the impeachment process, since there was no evi-
dence tying Rousseff directly to “fiscal pedaling,” which is a requirement under Article
323
86 of the constitution to constitute a crime of responsibility (Chalhoub et al. 2017, 36).
By contrast, others argue that fiscal pedaling indeed constituted a crime of responsi-
bility and that “calling the impeachment a coup is not only wrong, but it is also an
affront to Brazilian legal and democratic institutions, including the country’s Supreme
Court, which have followed constitutional principles and the precept of due process of
law throughout the impeachment proceedings” (Lopes 2016, 13).
Ironically, these debates were recently revived when Michel Temer, the vice president
who took over upon Rousseff’s impeachment, gave a television interview in September
2019 in which he said, “I never supported or committed to the coup,” an apparent
admission that the 2016 impeachment had been a coup all along despite his previous
denials (Associated Press 2019). Despite the ambiguities of the competing legal claims
and the partisanship (and hypocrisy) of those leading the impeachment process, we
code the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff as “legal” because the formal legal process
was followed and upheld by the Supreme Court. Had we found more unambiguous
evidence that her removal was unconstitutional, we would have coded this event as a
successful non-military (anti-democratic) coup. AMBIGUOUS.
324
2.1.17 145: Bolivia
• # 145-1946-6-13: Bolivia, Gualberto Villarroel
and Svolik code Villarroel as leader of Bolivia from December 20, 1943, to July 21,
1946; GWF code a party regime (Bolivia 43-46) from December 20, 1943, to July 21,
1946. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Bolivia from 1946
to 1952.
Event: At 6 a.m. on Thursday, June 13, 1946, forces led by Guillermo Gutierrez, a
former editor of the newspaper La Razon in La Paz, attacked the police headquarters
at the Calama barracks in La Paz in an attempt to seize power. Shots were heard
and the rebels were repelled by units led by Capt. Armando Escobar (Associated
Press 1946g). By 8 a.m., Col. Humberto Illanes led a regiment and two military field
units in seizing El Alto air base (United Press 1946c). The rebels then seized planes
and bombed the legislature and municipal building in La Paz, but the buildings were
spared because the bombs did not explode “because of faulty construction” (Associated
Press 1946b). By midday, loyalists had overwhelmed the rebels at Calama. When it
was clear the uprising would fail, Col. Illanes and the rebel pilots at El Alto fled
(United Press 1946c). A lieutenant and brigadier in the air force reportedly arrived
in Chile (Associated Press 1946g). Five people were killed and eleven wounded. A
total of 23 people were arrested, including “high officers” in the Air Force (Associated
Press 1946b). Guillermo Gutierrez reportedly was the mastermind of the revolt. He
was wounded and arrested. “Rael Zabula, an associate of Gutierrez, was killed in the
fighting” (Associated Press 1946g). On June 14, there was a second attempt mutiny
at El Alto (United Press 1946h).
Coding rationale: Relatively little is known about the plotters goals directly. The
mutiny was carried out by “a group of young civilians and army officers” (Associated
Press 1946g). The government said the revolt was “backed by plutocratic forces”
(United Press 1946c) and “oligarchs, reactionaries and discontented military elements”
who conspired to “seize the Government” and kill both the President and other officials
(Associated Press 1946b). The revolt’s civilian leader, Guillermo Gutierrez, had stood
in recent elections as an independent candidate. His success had led to an attack on La
Razon in May 1946 by the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) (Prout and
Altenberg 2011, 305). In 1951, Gutierrez would run for President as a leader of the
small conservative Civic Action Party (Keesing’s World News Archive 1951). After
Villarroel was ousted from power the next month in civilian-led protests (see 145-1946-
7-21 below), the June revolt’s military leader, Col. Illanes, returned from exile in Chile
with the intention of assuming a prominent role in government; he was joined by other
exiles Roberto Bilbao and Armando Rangel, leader of the Left Revolutionary Party
(United Press 1946f). Based on this evidence, we assume that the revolt sought to
empower excluded right-wing opposition elements and exclude the ruling MNR from
the ruling coalition. We therefore code this event as a failed regime change coup.
325
Table 17: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Bolivia
145-1946-6-13 Bolivia 43-46 Villarroel, Gualberto Reg. Ch. Coup (F)

145-1946-7-21 Bolivia 43-46 Villarroel, Gualberto protest
145-1949-8-27 Bolivia 46-51 Urriolagoitı́a Harriague, Mamerto Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
145-1950-7-22 Bolivia 46-51 Urriolagoitı́a Harriague, Mamerto Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
145-1951-5-16 Bolivia 46-51 Urriolagoitı́a Harriague, Mamerto Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
145-1952-4-11 Bolivia 51-52 Ballivián Rojas, Hugo Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
145-1953-1-6 Bolivia 52-64 Paz Estenssoro, Vı́ctor Reshuffle Coup (F)
145-1953-6-20 Bolivia 52-64 Paz Estenssoro, Vı́ctor coup plot
145-1953-11-9 Bolivia 52-64 Paz Estenssoro, Vı́ctor Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
145-1957-10-4 Bolivia 52-64 Siles Zuazo, Hernán mutiny
145-1958-5-14 Bolivia 52-64 Siles Zuazo, Hernán Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
145-1958-10-21 Bolivia 52-64 Siles Zuazo, Hernán Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
145-1959-4-19 Bolivia 52-64 Siles Zuazo, Hernán prior defection
145-1959-6-26 Bolivia 52-64 Siles Zuazo, Hernán prior defection
145-1960-3-19 Bolivia 52-64 Siles Zuazo, Hernán Reshuffle Coup (F)
145-1964-11-4 Bolivia 52-64 Paz Estenssoro, Vı́ctor Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
145-1968-8-21 Bolivia 64-69 Barrientos, René Reshuffle Coup (F)
145-1969-9-26 Bolivia 64-69 Siles Salinas, Luis Adolfo Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
145-1970-10-5 Bolivia 69-71 Ovando Candı́a, Alfredo Reshuffle Coup (F)
145-1970-10-6 Bolivia 69-71 Ovando Candı́a, Alfredo Reshuffle Coup (S)
145-1970-10-7 Bolivia 69-71 Torres, Juan José combined
145-1971-1-10 Bolivia 69-71 Torres, Juan José Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
145-1971-4-15 Bolivia 69-71 Torres, Juan José coup plot
145-1971-8-22 Bolivia 69-71 Torres, Juan José Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
145-1972-5-17 Bolivia 71-79 Banzer, Hugo not exist
145-1973-5-15 Bolivia 71-79 Banzer, Hugo coup plot
145-1973-12-1 Bolivia 71-79 Banzer, Hugo mutiny
145-1974-6-5 Bolivia 71-79 Banzer, Hugo Reshuffle Coup (F)
145-1974-11-7 Bolivia 71-79 Banzer, Hugo Reshuffle Coup (F)
145-1977-12-9 Bolivia 71-79 Banzer, Hugo coup plot
145-1978-7-21 Bolivia 71-79 Banzer, Hugo Reshuffle Coup (S)
145-1978-11-24 Bolivia 71-79 Pereda Asbún, Juan Reshuffle Coup (S)
145-1979-10-11 Bolivia 79-80 Guevara Arze, Wálter Anti-Prov. Coup (F)
145-1979-11-1 Bolivia 79-80 Guevara Arze, Wálter Anti-Prov. Coup (S)
145-1979-11-16 Bolivia 79-80 Natusch Busch, Alberto legal
145-1980-7-17 Bolivia 79-80 Gueiler Tejada, Lidia Anti-Prov. Coup (S)
145-1981-5-11 Bolivia 80-82 Garcı́a Meza, Luis Reshuffle Coup (F)
145-1981-8-4 Bolivia 80-82 Garcı́a Meza, Luis Reshuffle Coup (S)
145-1982-7-19 Bolivia 80-82 Torrelio Villa, Celso legal
145-1984-6-30 Bolivia 82-19 Siles Zuazo, Hernán Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
145-2019-11-10 Bolivia 82-19 Morales, Evo Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
326
• # 145-1946-7-21: Bolivia, Gualberto Villarroel
Category: protest
Other Datasets: popular revolt without military involvement - CCD; ouster by rebel
forces during armed conflict - CSP; successful coup - Singh; Archigos codes Villarroel
entering office on December 20, 1943, and as exiting on this date due to popular protest
without foreign support; Svolik codes Villarroel’s ouster on this date due to a revolt
without military involvement; GWF code the collapse of a party regime (Bolivia 43-46)
on this date in a popular uprising.
Event: On Saturday, July 20, 1946, after two days of a bloody revolt by students and
workers, President Villarroel announced a new cabinet composed solely of military
officers. But by Sunday, July 21, allegedly “some units of the Bolivian army joined
the revolutionary movement which had been formed from various civilian groups”
(Associated Press 1946h). After the rebels seized arms from the capital’s arsenal,
President Villarroel announced mid-day that he had resigned and turned government
over to Gen. Damaso Arenas, commander of the army. But the revolt continued into
the afternoon. With perhaps a “majority of the La Paz garrison” joining the rebels,
the rebels, “led by two tanks,” stormed the presidential palace (Keesing’s World News
Archive 1946b), where the rebels threw Villarroel over a balcony and hung his body
from a lamppost in the public square (United Press 1946b). Dr. Guillen, head of the
Supreme Court of the La Paz District, became provisional president and immediately
released political prisoners and ordered that all censorship be lifted. The chief of police,
which had remained loyal to Villarroel to the end, was arrested (United Press 1946d).
The Defense Minister, Lt. Col. José Celestino Pinto, became a fugitive, and military
units in all the garrison cities quickly pledged allegiance to the new government (United
Press 1946f).
Coding rationale: Whether or not one codes this event as a only a protest (civilian
revolution) or also involving a military coup depends on how one assesses the evidence
that military actors took concrete actions to oust Villarroel, as opposed to simply
remaining quartered during the unrest. Most accounts emphasize the army’s quartering
or passive defection. According to Rex A Hudson (1991a, 33), “the army remained
aloof in the barracks” while “mobs of students, teachers, and workers” killed Villarroel.
Charles D. Corbett (1972b, 26) likewise emphasizes that “the army failed to protect
the government buildings,” thus allowing the presidential palace to be sacked, but does
not indicate that military units participated in the sacking itself. Klein (2011, 203)
states in no uncertain terms: “without the defection of any army or police officials, the
civilians carried out an overthrow of the regime.”
By contrast, several news accounts had indicated that military units participated in
the attack on the palace, even though the military was used to repress demonstrators
only days earlier. The credibility of these initial news accounts suffers from the failure
to name specific officers that defected. There is no evidence that military actors were
leaders of the revolution, which was led initially only by civilians. The lack of a
military role on the planning of the revolution is also suggested by the fact that an
327
all-civilian cabinet was installed after July 21. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
Villarroel’s resignation in favor of Damaso Arenas on July 21 was in any way coerced
from the military leadership.Klein (1969, 382) writes: “No military leaders defected
and no troops were suborned. Rather... the anti-fascist front succeeded in turning
a mass protest movement into a revolt and on 14 July, in an unquestionably civilian
controlled and led popular affair, the Villaroel government was overthrown without
much bloodshed.” We therefore code this event as a protest involving passive military
defection with no unambiguously and verified active steps to oust Villarroel.
• # 145-1949-8-27: Bolivia, Mamerto Urriolagoitia

and Svolik code Urriolagoitia as leader of Bolivia from May 7,1949, until May 16, 1951;
GWF code a party regime (Bolivia 46-51) from July 21, 1946, to May 16, 1951. EPR
codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Bolivia from 1946 to 1952.
Event: On August 27, 1949, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) rebelled
and “with the support of the workers and some military officers it succeeded in gaining
control of most major cities except La Paz” (Wagner 1991, 34). The MNR rebellion
had “the extensive participation of young reformist officers,” most still being trained
in the military academies, and at its high point “controlled nearly half the country”
(Wagner 1986, 12-13). By August 28, rebels had seized Santa Cruz. In Cochabamba,
rebels were led by Col. Pena Y Lillo, a member of pro-Villarroell Rapeda (Associated
Press 1949c). On September 6, rebel radio in Santa Cruz announced that Victor Paz
Estenssoro, the exiled MNR leader, had been appointed president of a rebel government
(Associated Press 1949l).
By September 9, rebels were fleeing their last major stronghold in Santa Cruz (United
Press 1949b). By September 11, loyalist troops had retaken the border village of Cobija
without a fight; rebels retreated across the border to Brazil, though an air battle in
Camiri–one of two remaining rebel strongholds–indicated fighting continued (United
Press 1949a). By September 13, President Urriogoitia announced that the government
had regained air superiority that the rebels initially had (United Press 1949c). On
September 15, Gen. Froilan Calleja, the leader of the rebellion, fled Santa Cruz with
MNR leader Edmundo Roca (United Press 1949f). A failure of coordination doomed
the uprising. Purges after the rebellion weakened and demoralized the MNR (Wagner
1986, 13).
After the 1946 revolution, “Some officers went into exile with Paz and the MNR nucleus
while other sympathizers, active and discharged, planned and participated MNR coup
attempt of 1949, which assumed some aspects of a civil war. An Argentine border
police officer told the author that as a young agent in August 1949 in the Argentine
border town of La Quiaca, he was with a party that apprehended Victor Paz Estenssoro
and “about a dozen” followers who planned to capture the village of Villazon on the
Bolivian side. Included were “a few professional officers, among whom he identified
Major Clemente Inofuentes, who later held high positions in the post-revolutionary
328
army. A Bolivian officer told the author some years later that Inofuentes was in fact
paz’s military adviser during his exile. There is no doubt that many officers were
involved. General Froilan Calleja led the revolt in Santa Cruz, and, after the MNR
victory in 1952, became the first minister of defense.” Some 250-300 MNR officers were
tried and exiled out of nearly a 1,000 tried (the rest were granted a general amnesty).
Some 53 of these discharged officers were reincorporated into the military after the
MNR seized power in 1952 (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 26-27). Col. Gualberto Almos,
who was wounded in this event, commanded the presidential guard regiment staffed
by loyal MNR troops after 1952 (30).
Coding rationale: The MNR was an excluded opposition party whose leaders were
exiled, making them prior defectors. The government identified “the army officers who
led the revolt as chiefly men in retirement who had supported the former regime of
President Gualberto Villarroel.” They did acknowledge that “some army officers had
joined the rebels” (Associated Press 1949c). Evidence indicates that current active
members of the military, particularly reformist junior officers, did participate in the
uprising. Maj. Arturo Penaranda, was one rebel junior officer, was killed (United
Press 1949d). Gen. Carlos Ayaroa was identified as another rebel leader (Associated
Press 1949k). Capt. Carmelo Cuella was identified as the rebel commander at Villa
Montes (United Press 1949e). As such, we do not exclude this as purely a case of prior
defection. When the MNR’s People’s Army finally seized power in a bloody revolution
in April 1952, GWF code a regime change. Assuming that the MNR’s goals were the
same in 1949, we code this event as a failed regime change coup.
• # 145-1950-7-22: Bolivia, Mamerto Urriolagoitia

Archigos and Svolik code Urriolagoitia as the leader of Bolivia from May 7, 1949, to
May 16, 1951; GWF code a party regime (Bolivia 46-51) from July 21, 1946, to May
16, 1951. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Bolivia from
1946 to 1952.
Event: Beginning at 3:30 a.m. on July 22, 1950, groups of armed men attacked
the Defense Ministry building, police headquarters, and barracks of the Carabineros
(national police). They seized the Cochabamba airport and attempted to surround the
Sucré Palace Hotel where President Mamerto Urriolagiotia usually resides. According
to a government spokesman, the “revolutionists” included army men and members of
the right-wing Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) party. The army men involved were
from a battalion of cadets from the military academy led by a Capt. Juan Torres.
Torres evidently moved the cadets to action by telling them Urriolagoitia had been
deposed, according to a military communiqué. The attacks were quickly stopped by
police and troops once the cadets understood they had been deceived (Associated Press
1950d; United Press 1950b; Reuters 1950a).
Coding rationale: Since coming to power in August 1949, Urriolagoitia had reported
329
many coup plots against his regime, almost all allegedly directed by the leftist National
Revolutionary Movement (MNR) (Dubois 1950). On July 23, the La Paz chief of police
said that 65 leaders of the FSB and army cadets were responsible for an attempted
revolution. The Falangists were reportedly “angry at the Government’s refusal to
take strong anti-Communist measures” (United Press 1950b). Just 10 days earlier, on
July 12, the government announced that it had uncovered a plot by the FSB and the
MNR to give power to retired Gen. Froilan Calleja, a then-exiled for his participation
in the 1949 uprising (Associated Press 1950e). We assume Torres and the falangists
had a similar motive on July 22, seeking to empower excluded opposition parties (e.g.
Falangists or MNR). When the MNR’s People’s Army finally seized power in a bloody
revolution in April 1952, GWF code a regime change. We therefore code this aborted
revolution a failed regime change coup.
• # 145-1951-5-16: Bolivia, Mamertó Urriolagoitia

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; autogolpe - CCD; subversion by ruling
executive (adverse regime change) - CSP; successful coup - PT and Singh; Archigos
codes Urriolagoitia as being removed on this date through “irregular” means by domes-
tic military actors without foreign support; Svolik codes Urriolagoitia as being removed
by a military coup on this date; GWF code the collapse of an oligarchy (Bolivia 46-51)
on this date in a military coup leading to the installation of a military regime (Bolivia
51-52). EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Bolivia from
1946 to 1952.
Event: “In the presidential election of May 1951, the MNR’s Paz Estenssoro, who
remained in exile in Argentina, ran for president and Siles Zuazo ran for vice presi-
dent, both on a platform of nationalization and land reform. With the support of the
POR and the newly formed Bolivian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Boliviano,
PCB), the MNR won with a clear plurality” (Rex A Hudson 1991a, 34). However, the
MNR did not have the majority needed to prevent the election from being decided by
Congress (as it should have under the Constitution). Before Congress could act, on
May 16, 1951, President Mamerto Urriolagoitia Harriague, who had taken over from
an ailing Enrique Herzog in 1949, resigned, handed power over to a junta of three
generals and seven colonels, and flew to Chile (Associated Press 1951). According to
most accounts, Urriolagoitia did not want to take chances that the MNR candidate
could take power, and thus “persuaded the military to step in and prevent the MNR
from taking power” (Rex A Hudson 1991a, 34).
Gen. Ovidio Quiroga, head of the armed forces, named General Hugo Ballivian Rojas,
former Under Secretary of Defense, to head the new junta (Associated Press 1951).
The junta “declared that their action was not a coup, but an assumption by the
military of its duty to protest democracy from a combined Communist-Nazi menace”
(Malloy 1970, 154). The junta’s first act was to declare a state of seige and ban strikes
(Associated Press 1951). The May elections were cancelled, and no new date was set
even as Ballivian insisted army rule would be temporary (United Press 1951d). On
330
May 17, small fires spelling out the letters MNR for the National Revolutionary Party
signalled opposition to the coup (Hailey 1951b).
Coding rationale: One can easily see how the Cline Center and CSP code this as a case
of an autogolpe or subversion by regime change, because in most accounts it was a “coup
by invitation” in which Urriolagoitia sought to prevent legal or constitutional succession
of power to Paz Estenssoro, the winner of the elections. Nevertheless, this case is unlike
traditional autogolpe’s in that the actions taken by Urriolagoitia did not target other
regime insiders in an effort to hold on to office. Whether or not Urriolagoitia was
complicit in the coup, the military seizure of power was clearly unconstitutional and
targeted the presumptive regime leader. Thus, we code this as a successful regime
change coup, consistent with the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) coding. Current
active military members took concrete actions both to oust Urriolagoitia and prevent
the ascension of Paz Estenssoro.
• # 145-1952-4-11: Bolivia, Hugo Ballivian Rojas

Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; popular revolt (with no military involve-
ment) - CCD; Ouster by rebel forces during armed conflict - CSP; successful coup - PT
and Singh; Archigos codes Ballivian Rojas as being removed on this date through “ir-
regular” means by domestic rebellion without foreign support; Svolik codes Ballivian
Rojas’ exit on this date by a revolt but with military involvement; GWF use this event
to code the inauguration of a party-based regime (Bolivia 52-64) on April 9, 1952 in a
civil war. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Bolivia from
1946 to 1952 and as dominant from 1953 to 1992.
Event: After the left-wing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) was barred by
the military junta from taking office in the elections of 1951, the party began to plot
an armed seizure of power. “To achieve power, MNR members recognized they had to
work with and through segments of the military. Their original instrument was Gen-
eral Antonio Seleme Vargas; his abrupt dismissal from the cabinet (he was minister of
government, responsible for the police) on April 8, 1952 precipitated the revolt, since
Seleme’s control over the police was essential for the success of the golpe. What had
been planned as a quick, surgical strike turned into a bloody popular insurrection”
(Welch 1987, 53). Klein (2011, 207) says “The officer corps remained totally loyal to
the junta,” forcing the MNR to arm civilians and commit to a popular armed uprising.
In the fighting of April 9-11, “party militias defeated the troops of the La Paz garrison
and gained power” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 27).
News accounts note that the uprising had “the support of General Antonio Seleme
(Minister of the Interior in the Ballivian administration), the police forces, and a con-
siderable part of the Army” (Keesing’s World News Archive 1952). The first broadcast
from Illimani radio after rebels seized it on April 9 was that armed forces under Gen.
Seleme had taken control (Associated Press 1952c). According to Charles D Corbett
(1972a, 27), Seleme, “abetted the rebel victory by collusion, but developed doubts
about the outcome midway through the struggle and sought diplomatic asylum in the
331
Chilean embassy in La Paz. Thus, the MNR nucleus gained power with no debt to
the standing army.” Though the role of particular officers is unclear, the Colegio Mil-
itar and presidential guard battalion fought hard to defend the regime. Casualties
ranged from several hundred to several thousand (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 27). Paz
Estenssoro, the MNR leader, returned from exile to assume the presidency on April
16.
Coding rationale: Whether or not one codes this event as a only a case of prior defec-
tion (civilian revolution) or also involving a military coup depends on how one assesses
the evidence that military actors took concrete actions to oust Ballivian. Heath (1972,
206) argues this event was more than simply a coup and was in fact “one of the very few
truly revolutionary events in 20th-century Latin America (along with those in Mexico
and Cuba).” But unlike the 1946 revolution, we do have evidence that Gen. Seleme
was one of the initial plotters colluding with the MNR, and that he only defected when
it appeared the revolution might fail. As Kohl (1978, 242) notes, unlike the failed 1949
civil war, in 1952 the MNR “included greater popular support and enlisted military
personnel.” So even though this event empowered the MNR and was fought mainly
by armed civilians against the bulk of a loyal army, a section of the army did ap-
pear to side with the MNR. We therefore consider the event as constituting a military
coup, alongside a popular uprising and rebellion. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz (2014), we code a successful regime change coup.
• # 145-1953-1-6: Bolivia, Victor Paz Estenssoro

Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh;
failed coup attempt - PT; Archigos codes Paz Estenssoro as the leader of Bolivia from
April 17, 1952, to June 17, 1956; GWF code a party-based regime (Bolivia 52-64) from
April 9, 1952, until November 4, 1964. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant
ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
Event: Before dawn on January 6, 1953, men led by Col. Milton Delfin Cataldi,
sub-chief of the Army General Staff, and Luis Penaloza, a founder of the Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement (MNR) founder and its chief economist, seized the Miraflores
Garrison in southeast La Paz. They took Nuflo Chavez, Minister of Rural Affairs, and
Col. Miguel Ayllon, Chief of the General staff, prisoner. However, the rebels failed
to seize Minister of Mines Juan Lechin and Minister of Labor German Butron. Col.
Cataldi then went to the Army Regimental Barracks to appeal for support from the
troops, but he was placed under arrest and loyal officers then freed the two prisoners.
Meanwhile, other plotters managed to disarm the Palace Guard while President Paz
Estenssoro slept before loyal troops could intervene (Associated Press 1953a).
The revolt was over by the afternoon. The government arrested two other alleged
coup leaders: Col. Claudio Lopez, chief of staff of the Air Force, and Hugo Roberts,
former Minister of Press under Estenssoro (Associated Press 1953a; Hallett 1953). The
golpistas “had declared their aim was to forestall a Communist takeover, reverse the
power of the COB, and return to original nationalist principles” (Malloy 1970, 231). On
332
January 6, Paz Estenssoro, speaking to a crowd in Plaza Murillo, said the plotters were
“reactionaries who infiltrated the MNR” (Associated Press 1953a). State Department
officials in Washington D.C. interpreted the attempted coup as nothing more than “the
work of a dissident group of Rightists who wanted to unseat their political opponents in
the Cabinet” (New York Times 1953f). On January 7, Paz Estenssoro added weight to
that interpretation. He told a rally of tin miners who arrived to show their support that
the coup plot was the work of a right-wing group in his own party upset the government
had “opened the gate to Communists.” He defended the charge, saying “I do not believe
I can be labeled a Communist for decisively defending the workers” (Associated Press
1953f). On January 13, 18 opposition leaders were arrested and charged with being
involved in the mutiny (United Press 1953a). On January 17, Bolivia ousted 91 officers
implicated in the rebellion, including Cataldi and Capt. Israel Tellez, military aide to
the president, while some 40 opposition politicians arrested in connection with the plot
were deported to Chile United Press 1953d.
Coding rationale: The military uprising appears to have been a result of a split within
the ruling MNR between its left wing and right wing. “In 1952 the MNR was a broad
coalition of groups with different interests. Juan Oquendo Lechı́n led the left wing of
the party and had the support of the labor sector. Siles Zuazo represented the right
wing and had the backing of the middle class. Paz Estenssoro was initially the neutral
leader. Because the majority of the MNR elite wanted a moderate course and the left
wing demanded radical change, the polarization increased” (Wagner 1991, 37).
There is some uncertainty over whether the plotters had targeted Paz Estenssoro in
addition to the left-wing cabinet members. Some reports said that the revolt had
“intended to purge, if not the whole MNR regime, at least left-wing leaders within
the movement.” The primary target of the coup may have been Juan Lechin, as the
revolutionaries “thought that elimination of this powerful man in particular might
change the policy of the government” (Hallett 1953). On January 13, United Press
(1953a) reported that “the coup, led by the Chiefs of Staff of the Bolivian Army and
Air Force, was directed against members of Señor Paz Estenssoro’s Cabinet, whom
the military charged with Communist leanings. It had not been designed to oust the
President.”35 By contrast, Malloy (1970, 231) argues that the kidnappings were a
prelude to a general coup, but that when the revolt failed, “many plotters defected
and declared their loyalty to Paz.” Malloy and Thorn (1971, 129) argues that to the
right-wing, “the individuals responsible for their eclipse were Paz and Léchin, two
Machiavellians who had entered into a pact to communize the revolution.” The failure
of the right-wing plot forced Estenssoro to “enact agrarian reform that tilted toward
the radical position” (Dorn 2011, 187).
35. Some outside observers interpreted the failed revolt as an attempt by moderate MNR elements “to
hold back the pace of the revolution” and prevent the government’s capture by leftists like Minister of
Mines and Petroleum Juan Lechin (Washington Post 1953). Meanwhile, Lechin said the incident justified
his contention the government should not allow regrowth of the regular army. On October 31, 1952, Paz
Estenssoro nationalized the tin mines, which account for three-fourths of Bolivia’s exports. Lechin said
that the regular army was a tool of tin mine owners that opposed the action, although it was a matter of
speculation whether this played a role in motivating the plot (Associated Press 1953a).
333
Corporate grievances of the regular armed forces were also likely motivations for the
coup attempt. After the April 1952 revolution, the MNR “immediately formed armed
milicias populares (popular militias) composed of campesinos, miners, and factory
workers. The militias in effect replaced the army and by 1953 were the strongest
armed forces in the country” (Rex A Hudson 1991a, 226). Determined to protect
itself from counter-revolution, the military academy, “whose cadets had fought for the
junta, was closed and a purge was begun against those officers considered politically
unreliable” (Brill 1965, 80). Charles D. Corbett (1972b, 29) observes that from April
1952 to January 1953 that the MNR regime had discharged or exiled hundreds of army
officers and reduced the size of the armed forces from 20,000 to 5,000. Leftists in
the party, particularly Juan Lechin, advocated for abolishing the army, claiming the
regular army was a tool of tin mine owners (Associated Press 1953a). The event can
therefore be interpreted in part as an attempt to restore the power and prestige of the
regular armed forces.
Charles D. Corbett (1972b, 29) characterizes this event as an “abortive counter-coup,”
implying that the coup leaders sought to oust the MNR, which would constitute regime
change. However, based on the evidence, we assume that the plotters had targeted
objectionable leftist economic policies, cabinet members, and Estenssoro, as well as
harbored corporate grievances of the army at the expense of the MNR militias. One
piece of evidence indicates that coup plotters targeted the Palace Guard, which consti-
tutes a concrete observable action by members of the military that appeard to target
the regime leader (Associated Press 1953a). We therefore code this event as a failed
reshuffling coup, as it was the work of regime insiders within the ruling MNR that did
not seek to topple the party-based regime.

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, and Singh; no overt - PT;
failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Paz Estenssoro as the leader of Bo-
livia from April 17, 1952, until June 17, 1956; GWF code a party-based regime (Bolivia
52-64) from April 9, 1952, until November 4, 1964.
Event: On June 22, 1953, a dozen peioke were arrested on charges of subversive ac-
tivity, including Lieut. Col. Fidel Rojas (the La Paz police chief), Col. Victor Valdez
(the former police chief), Lieut. Col. Victor Criales, several Liberal party leaders (Car-
los, Jorge, and Hugo Ascarrunz), and leaders of the Socialist falange (Edwin Gonzalez
and Jorge Albornoz). The assistant police chief, Col. Victory Ramirez, said “Ele-
ments in the pay of the oligarchy sought to unleash a subversive movement but did not
make headway because of the determination of the people and the corp of carabineers.”
“Press reports said armed persons attempted to seize the air base outside Cochambaba
Saturday night but were repelled” (United Press 1953g). On June 25, former Foreign
Minister Javier Paz Campero was also arrested in connection with “a revolutionary
plot.” “Police said they had broken up the conspiracy before it could develop into a
widespread revolt. The only overt act reported occurred last night when an armed
334
crowd attacked a police garrison and were driven off” (Associated Press 1953b). On
June 29, more arrests followed the alleged “discovery of documents involving the plot-
ters in an abortive Socialist Falange conspiracy” (United Press 1953c).
Coding rationale: Among major prior datasets, only Thompson codes this event as
a coup. John S (2009, 136) claims that “In June 1953, pro-Rosca groupings and the
Falange launched a series of coup attempts.” However, most reportage only points to
arrests and a pre-empted conspiracy. There is a report of a single concrete action (an
attempt to seize an air base), which was not confirmed by another source, but this
action was attributed to “armed persons” and not specifically current and active mem-
bers of the military. We therefore code this event as a coup plot (likely preempted)
or potentially a case of prior defection (most of the implicated officers named were
retired and not on active duty). If we had found more evidence of concrete actions, we
would have code this event as a failed regime change coup, as it sought to empower an
excluded opposition party. AMBIGUOUS.

Other Datasets: failed military coup, popular revolt, and dissident action - CCD;
failed coup attempt - CSP and Singh; rebellion - PT; Archigos codes Paz Estenssoro
as the leader of Bolivia from April 17, 1952, to June 17, 1956; GWF code a party-
based regime (Bolivia 52-64) from April 9, 1952, until November 4, 1964. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
Event: On Monday, November 9, 1953, the government announced that it had put
down a revolt by the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB). In Cochabamba, rebels had
briefly seized a number of strategic locations. In La Paz, the rebels captured President
Victor Paz Estenssoro’s house, but he had been forewarned and was not present. The
rebels tried to seize an air base near La Paz and an airport in Santa Cruz (United Press
1953j). The rebels were driven back by “armed peasants and oil workers loyal to the
president” (Associated Press 1953g). Some 23 people died in the revolt (Associated
Press 1953c); 17 Falangists, including founder Oscar Unzaga de la Vega, sought asylum
in foreign embassies (United Press 1953f).
The President said the revolt was carried out by “irresponsibles, adolescents and former
Army officers” financed by a tin baron and large landowners (United Press 1953j). On
November 10, the police said the leaders of the revolt in La Paz were Capt. Hugo Toro,
son of former president Gen. David Toro, and Lt. Chico Maldonado (FBIS 1953a).
On November 13, the state said it would prosecute 750 people in connection with
the revolt, including twelve army officers and three former presidents (United Press
1953e). During the revolt, two airmen in Arica were reportedly arrested (Associated
Press 1953g). A partial amnesty for some 300 alleged rebels was granted in December
1953 (Brewer 1953).
Coding rationale: By all accounts, the revolt was organized by the FSB, a right-wing
party that had long stood in opposition to the MNR (Heath 1972, 96). However,
335
because we have evidence that at least some current military members (admittedly
a small percentage of the rebels) led the revolt, we do not exclude this event purely
as a case of prior defection. Based on the evidence, we assume the revolt sought to
empower an excluded opposition party. We therefore code this event as a failed regime
change coup.
• # 145-1957-10-4: Bolivia, Hernan Siles Zuazo

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, and Singh; protest - PT; failed
coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Hernan Siles as the leader of Bolivia from
June 17, 1956, to June 8, 1960; GWF code a party-based regime (Bolivia 52-64) from
April 9, 1952, until November 4, 1964.
Event: On October 4, 1957, “A vest pocket military rebellion” collapsed “without
the firing of a shot. Col. Windsor Lopez Videla, commander of the La Paz general
headquarters, had barricaded himself in Miraflores Barracks outside of the capital
with fifty-five or more officers and men to protest the appointment of Gen. Miguel
Ayllon as army commander. General Ayllon had been named last week to succeed
Gen. Clemente Inofuentes, a close friend of Colonel Lopez Videla. The colonel, half
a dozen sub-altern officers and about fifty enlisted men surrendered at the behest of
Msgr. Abel Antezana, Roman Catholic Archbishop of La Paz, and the Papal Nuncio,
Msgr. Giuseppe Mozzoni” (United Press 1957c).
a coup. However, we have no evidence that the mutineers sought to seize power for
themselves or targeted the regime leader, Paz Estenssoro. Instead, the main target
was the army leader. We therefore code this event as a mutiny.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, and Singh; combined - PT;
failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Hernan Siles as the leader of Bolivia
from June 17, 1956, to June 8, 1960; GWF code a party-based regime (Bolivia 52-
64) from April 9, 1952, until November 4, 1964. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
Event: On May 14, 1958, “revolutionists” seized the city of Santa Cruz and much of
eastern Bolivia after troops repulsed an attack on Camiri, an oil town south of Santa
Cruz (Associated Press 1958c). “Broadcasts from Santa Cruz asked police and army
to join the anti-government movement” directed by the Bolivian Socialist Falange
(Chicago Daily Tribune 1958). The government declared modified martial law and
Hernan Siles Zuazo took personal command of the campaign against the rebels. “A
government communique named Mario Gutierrez, Falangist chief in Santa Cruz, and
Carlos Valverde, Communist leader there, as leaders of a movement that had attempted
to stir a nation-wide revolt. It is said their plan had been thwarted” (Associated Press
336
1958c). On May 15, the revolt collapsed and the rebels fled to the borders with
Brazil and Argentina. Although most army units remained loyal, “One army division
supported the rebels in Santa Cruz. There was no indication of its size” (United Press
1958). On May 17, 11 officers of the fourth division stationed in the east were reportedly
dismissed in connection with the Falange revolt, including Col. Jorge Barrenchea, Lt.
Col. Angel Costa, and Lt. Col. Jose Naves Morales (FBIS 1958c).
a coup. The evidence indicates that this was a failed revolution led by the Bolivian
Socialist Falange. “The Falange – the principal Opposition party in Bolivia – had also
made two abortive attempts to seize power in 1958. In the first such attempt (May [8],
1958) they seized control for a few hours in Santa Cruz but failed to obtain any support
from the Army, the revolt collapsed when the Government ordered the Bolivian Air
Force to bomb insurgent positions” (Keesing’s World News Archive 1959). Because
some current, active military members in fact did participate in the failed revolution
(evidently from the outset), we do not exclude this event as a case of prior defection.
We assume that had the coup attempt succeeded, the rebels would have empowered
an excluded opposition party. We therefore code this event as a failed regime change
coup.

Archigos codes Hernan Siles as the leader of Bolivia from June 17, 1956, to June 8,
1960; GWF code a party-based regime (Bolivia 52-64) from April 9, 1952, until Novem-
ber 4, 1964. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from
1953 to 1992.
Event: On October 20, 1958, the Socialist Falange “created an uproar in the Chamber
of Deputies...when their members stormed out in a protest over a Government reso-
lution calling for drastic measures to preserve order. The resolution was introduced
after sporadic rioting caused by a weeklong strike of factory workers” (Associated Press
1958d). At 4:30 a.m. on October 21, 1958, rebels stormed homes in the residential
suburbs of La Paz in an apparent attempt to seize high government officials and lead-
ers of the ruling National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). They succeeded in seizing
Humberto Villar, Governor of La Paz Province, but he was later released. One group
attacked the city prison and a militia headquarters but failed to take them. Army
troops smashed the revolt (Associated Press 1958g).
Modified martial law was imposed on October 22 (United Press International 1958d).
On October 23, the police arrested 100 linked to the revolt (Associated Press 1958a).
The arrest of some leading educators and professionals sparked strikes by university
students and other professionals (United Press International 1958b, 1958c). On Oc-
tober 26, a group of 31 Bolivian exiles arrived in Argentina and denied allegations of
a plot “amounted only to an incident which occurred when the police tried to break
into a hotel where leaders of the Socialist Falange were meeting” (FBIS 1958d). On
337
November 27, the government charged 54 persons, including ex-president Hertzog, with
complicity in the revolt (Associated Press 1958e).
Coding rationale: Most reports attributed the revolt to the Falange Socialists (e.g. As-
sociated Press 1958a). Keesing’s World News Archive (1959) reports this event as the
second abortive attempt by the Falange to seize power. Minister of Government Walter
Guevara also said that other unspecified opposition parties were involved (Associated
Press 1958g). Juan Lechin, leader of left-wing MNR dissidents, attributed the revolt
to the “passiveness” of the government which emboldened “the reactionaries” and of
combated the labor movement. He ordered labor unions and militias to defend “the
social conquests of the revolution” (United Press International 1958a).
Although most of the alleged plotters were prior defectors associated with Falange So-
cialists, there is some evidence that at least a few military members may have been
involved, although it is unclear if they were on active duty. Three colonels were among
the exiles who arrived in Argentina (FBIS 1958b), though at least one of these, Lt. Col.
Manuel Aguirre Quiroga, was retired (FBIS 1958d). Among those arrested for partici-
pation were Lt. Col. Julian Guzman Gamboa, director general of the Caribineros, who
denied involvement, and Enrique Bacarreza, commander of the La Paz regiment (FBIS
1958a). On the basis of limited evidence, we assume that a few current active military
members were involved in the revolt just as they had in May 1958. It is known that
prior to the death of the party leader in 1959 (see 145-1959-4-19) that “some officers
had attachments to the Bolivian Socialist Falange” (Charles D. Corbett 1972b, 34).
On this basis, we therefore do not exclude this as only a case of prior defection. Based
on the evidence, we assume that the coup plotters sought to install a new right-wing
government backed by an excluded opposition party. We thus code this event a failed
regime change coup. However, because the Socialist Falange leaders denied a plot, we
consider the evidence as ambiguous. AMBIGUOUS.

Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; not a candidate - CCD and CSP; failed
coup attempt - PT; no military involvement - Singh; Archigos codes Hernan Siles as
the leader of Bolivia from June 17, 1956, to June 8, 1960; GWF code a party-based
regime (Bolivia 52-64) from April 9, 1952, until November 4, 1964.
Event: Just before noon on Sunday April 19, 1959, heavy shooting broke out in the
northern outskirts of the capital of La Paz. Rebels attacked the headquarters of the
Transit Police and seized the state radio station. They tried to seize the military
barracks and City Hall but were repulsed. By 5 p.m. La Paz was largely quiet again.
The government reported that “the rebels had been crushed by armed militiamen and
that there had been no need for the intervention of the regular armed forces.” State
radio said that Luis Saenz, a leader of the right-wing Bolivian Socialist Falange party
(FSB), was captured along with over 80 rebels (United Press International 1959b).
The government imposed a state of siege and press censorship that day and did not
lift them until July (FBIS 1959).
338
Coding rationale: All sources agree this event was a failed Falangist revolt. On April
20, President Siles Zuazo attributed the revolt to FSB leader Oscar Unzaga de la
Vega and Carlos Victor Aramayo, the owner of large tin mining interests that were
nationalized by the MNR in 1952. The government also announced that Unzaga and
his civilian aide Rene Gallardo had been found dead after they committed suicide after
his uprising in the capital had failed (Associated Press 1959f). Aramayo, who had been
living in New York, denied any involvement. Meanwhile, on April 25, Bolivia asked the
Organization of American States to conduct an independent investigation of the death
of the Unzaga and Gallardo, following critics charges that they had been killed by
government agents (New York Times 1959f). On May 23, authorities arrested Enrique
Acha, an FSB leader, who it accused at the time of murdering Unzaga (Associated
Press 1959d). The independent commission later persuasively declared Unzaga’s death
a result of suicide (Dunkerley 1992, 40).
Unlike prior FSB rebellions in 1958 (see 145-1958-5-14 and 145-1958-10-21), we found
no evidence that current members of the military were involved in the April 1959
rebellion. We therefore code this revolt as a prior defection. Had we found evidence
of military involvement (as we did in the prior cases), then we would have also coded
this event as a failed regime change coup as it sought to install an excluded opposition
party in power. 36

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, and Singh; combined - PT;
failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Hernan Siles as the leader of Bolivia
from June 17, 1956, to June 8, 1960; GWF code a party-based regime (Bolivia 52-64)
from April 9, 1952, until November 4, 1964.
Event: On June 26, 1959, “ an insurgent group seized partial control of the oil cen-
tre of Santa Cruz, in southeastern Bolivia, before the rebellion was suppressed by
Government forces” (Keesing’s World News Archive 1959). The government said that
an attack on a carabineer brigade by “political opponents” and “rebels” had been
“planned by the oligarchy,” an allusion to tin mining interests (United Press Interna-
tional 1959c). On June 27, the revolt led by José Gil Reyes of the Santa Cruz Youth
Movement was crushed after loyalists troops deployed against the rebel strongholds in
the city (United Press International 1959a).
coup. As in the prior case, there is no evidence that current active members of the
military had participated in this rebellion. We therefore code this event as a case of
prior defection.
36. The FSB was the only opposition party to win seats in the June 1958 parliamentary elections (United
Press International 1959b), but the FSB was not included in the executive. FSB declarations stressed the
need for a new election law that would give the opposition a greater chance of winning support in rural
areas and remove literacy requirements to establish universal suffrage for persons over 18 (New York Times
1959n).
339
Other Datasets: failed civilian coup - BR; failed military coup attempt - CCD and
CSP; failed coup attempt - PT and Singh; Archigos codes Hernan Siles as the leader of
Bolivia from June 17, 1956, to June 8, 1960; GWF code a party-based regime (Bolivia
52-64) from April 9, 1952, until November 4, 1964. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
Event: On March 19, 1960, a National Police regiment from Avelina Aliaga barracks
in the northern part of the city revolted and engaged in a five-hour battle with loyal
Bolivian troops that involved mortars and small-arms fire on the streets of La Paz. The
police soon fell back to Cavalry Hill just north of the capital, where Government forces
surrounded them. The radio said that the rebel leader was Col. Hermogenes Rios
Ledezma, head of the National Police, who escaped and took refuge in the Brazilian
Embassy before his force surrendered. Sixteen people, including the rebel second-
in-command Col. Justo Burgos Navia, died in the fighting (Associated Press 1960b,
1960a). On March 28, Col. Rios arrived in Sao Paolo (FBIS 1960a).
Coding rationale: The radio attributed the revolt to the Rightist Bolivian Socialist
Falange (FSB). Paz Estenssoro and Walter Guevara Arce, the opposition presidential
candidates in the upcoming May 22 elections, rallied behind President Siles and called
on their followers to help put down the rebellion (Associated Press 1960d). On March
21, three cabinet ministers who were presumed linked to the revolt resigned: Agri-
culture Minister Jorge Antelo, Labor Minister Anibal Anguilar, and president of the
national mining company Comibol Guillermo Bedregal (Associated Press 1960c). The
newspaper Presencia published a statement by Waldo Cerruto, a high-ranking member
of the ruling MNR party, claiming to be civilian leader of the revolt; he attacked Siles
as a “tool of communism” and was granted asylum in the Peruvian Embassy. Ledezma
similarly told Reuters he was “defending the people against communism” (United Press
Based on this evidence, rather than just attempting to empower right-wing Falange
forces, we assume that the plotters sought to prevent opposition candidates from gain-
ing power in the upcoming elections and thus sought to preserve the incumbent ruling
coalition. We therefore code this a failed reshuffling coup.

sum, Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Paz Estenssoro as exiting
on November 4, 1964 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign
support; GWF code the collapse of a party regime (Bolivia 52-64) on November 4,
1964 in a military coup; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in
Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
340
Event: The decision of President Victor Paz Estenssoro in 1963 to seek re-election
to consecutive terms split the ruling Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR). Its
“squabbling factions sought support wherever it was to be found. The prize was the
vice presidency and a share of control in top party councils, since Paz was unbeatable.
The military cell of the MNR, apparently dominated by the old “party generals,”” pro-
posed General Rene Barrientos, the air force chief, for the vice presidency (Charles D
Corbett 1972a, 39-40). Initially, “Paz did not desire such a strong-willed, independent
running mate, but had to cave in to pressures from the armed forces” (Welch 1987, 58).
Vice President Barrientos immediately began plotting upon Paz’s second inauguration
in August 1964 (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 39-40). Barrientos reportedly left La Paz
in October after a dispute with Paz (New York Times 1964p).
On November 3, 1964, the Seventh Division (including its CITE unit and schools
command, where Barrientos had ties) in Cochabamba declared itself in rebellion, after
which Barrientos called for Paz to resign (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 39-40). Rebel-held
radio said that a revolutionary committee headed by Barrientos and including military
men and students had been established in Cochabamba (New York Times 1964n). In
a radio broadcast, Barrientos offered to resign if the president did so as well. In his
speech, Barrientos justified the Cochabamba uprising because “Honest military men
rejected the action against miners and students in last week’s crisis and were imprisoned
in La Paz.” He added that “The national revolution has lacked any morals for some
time.” General Alfredo Ovando Candia, the commander in chief of the armed forces,
was reportedly briefly taken prisoner by army and air force rebels, but was released so
that he could negotiate or mediate an end to the military rebellion (New York Times
1964b). Meanwhile, the labor minister “announced that 27,000 peasants were on their
way to La Paz to defend the national revolution” (New York Times 1964n). Fighting
between army units and workers and students left 7 dead and 50 wounded (New York
Times 1964p).
A “noticeable lack of coordination among army units” and Ovando’s initial public si-
lence suggest that he had not endorsed the coup in advance. Nevertheless, after being
released, Ovando “closeted himself with the army general staff in the Miraflores head-
quarters,” which houses the military communications center. Key commanders were
polled, “a compromise was reached with the commander of the presidential guard bat-
talion,” and thus military in-fighting was avoided. “Most of the important provincial
garrisons had declared for Barrientos by the afternoon of November 4” (Charles D
Corbett 1972a, 40-41). U.S. Ambassador Douglas Henderson reportedly promised the
government equipment and even tried to persuade the generals to reverse their decision
to oust Paz, but to no avail (Raymont 1964a). Ovando emerged “to escort Paz to the
airport on his journey into exile” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 40-41). Ovando allegedly
told Paz, “I am taking you either to the cemetery or the airport” (Malcolm W. Browne
1969b). Paz and his family flew to Peru to seek asylum. Ovando officially announced
Paz’s resignation and promised free elections soon. Supporters of estranged former vice
president Juan Lechin demonstrated outside the presidential palace (New York Times
1964p).
On Thursday, November 5, “having reached an accord, Ovando and Barrientos an-
341
nounced that they would serve as co-presidents. Ovando, however, was subjected to
a cacophony of cat-calls and jeers when the two appeared together on the balcony of
the Palacio Quemado, and he withdrew as co-president” (Charles D Corbett 1972a,
40-41). Some 1,300 university students threatening to riot demanded Ovando’s resigna-
tion (Natanson 1964). An hour after the inauguration, Ovando resigned as co-president
“to help restore tranquillity to the country” (New York Times 1964c) but he remained
commander in chief of the armed forces (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 40-41). Soon after
Barrientos announced a new all-military cabinet (future coup leader Col. Hugo Banzer
was named minister of education and Col. Juan Torres was named minister of finance).
That afternoon, “air force planes strafed” a small pro-Paz/MNR militia group who re-
jected the coup; by then fighting left 40 dead and 150 wounded. Meanwhile, over 100
officials in the ousted Paz government sought refuge in foreign embassies (New York
Times 1964c).
A measure of public order was restored on November 6, after the military “cleaned out
the last pockets of resistance” by Paz supporters “in the mountains that surround”
the capital. Armed army and air force units continued to patrol La Paz. Barrientos
promised free elections “within six months or a year”, which was widely seen as a
move to court recognition of the junta from the U.S. and other foreign governments
(Raymont 1964e). Juan Lechin, the mining leader whose supporters had played a key
role in the uprising against Paz (Raymont 1964c) and who forced Ovando’s resignation,
pledged support to the Barrientos-led regime (Raymont 1964e).
On November 7, Barrientos asserted that “We are conducting a revolution to restore
the original political and social goals of the National Revolutionary Movement which
were perverted by Paz Estenssoro” (Raymont 1964d). A number of countries in the
region criticized the coup; Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations in protest (Goodsell
1963). On November 12, 26 officials in the Paz government who had taken refuge in
foreign embassies on November 3-4 were allowed safe conduct to leave the country
(New York Times 1964d). Juan Lechin sought firm commitments on quick elections,
warning publicly that “if the junta does not fulfill its promises to the people we will
resume the fight” (Raymont 1964c). On November 13, university students went on
strike (New York Times 1964q). On November 14, General Ovando predicted free
elections would be held in May 1965, leading to a civilian government by August 1965.
Barrientos, in his first national address however, gave no timetable on a return to
democracy (Raymont 1964b).
a successful regime change coup. Although Barrientos was retired, the coup involved
current, active military members. The motives for the coup are unclear, though “A
rationalization offered by some Bolivian officers is that the army withdrew support
from Paz because it was reluctant to continue its coercive role against the miners
on behalf of the MNR or any other political party. Army occupation of the mining
centers in December 1963, when some foreign technicians were held hostage at the
Catavi mine promised trouble for the future... the 1964 coup was probably pushed
342
more by pressures internal to the military than pulled by political factors external” to
it (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 41).
The extent and pacing of the political regime change is somewhat ambiguous. “Barri-
entos insisted that his assumption of power was not a counterrevolutionary move and
promised to restore the revolution to its “true path,” from which the MNR had devi-
ated during its twelve-year rule. Nevertheless, his government continued many of the
policies of the second Paz Estenssoro administration, including the IMF stabilization
plan and the Triangular Plan. The emphasis on reducing social costs remained in ef-
fect. In May 1965, the army forced Barrientos to accept Ovando as his copresident as
a sort of reward for suppressing an uprising by miners and factory workers” (Wagner
1991, 39-40). Despite continuities, neither Barrientos nor Ovando “felt loyalty to the
party of the revolution and both were willing to divide power to prevent damage to
the military” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 42). According to Charles D. Corbett (1972b,
401), the 1964 coup marked the end of the civilian-led MNR regime, even though “the
military institution did not assume the full weight of responsibility for the direction of
national policy until Barrientos was killed in a helicopter crash in April 1969.” Welch
(1987, 57) claims that “By late 1964, the Bolivian armed forces had moved from junior
partner in the MNR coalition to political arbiter.” In retrospect, we know the military
dominated politics after 1964: “Between 1964 and 1982 only three civilians governed
the country, although none were able to complete their term in office. In the same time
period, fifteen military officers took the presidential oath” (Gamarra 1988, 47).
• # 145-1968-8-21: Bolivia, Rene Barrientos Ortuno

- CSP; no overt military force - PT; assassination attempt - Singh; Archigos codes
Barrientos Ortuno as the leader of Bolivia from August 6, 1968, to April 27, 1969;
GWF code a personal regime (Bolivia 64-69) from November 4, 1964, until September
26, 1969. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from
1953 to 1992.
Event: After Gen. Marcos Vasquez Sempértegui, the army chief of staff, criticized
Gen. Ovando for openly campaigning for the presidency and called on him to resign
his post, “Ovando responded by firing Vasquez as chief of the army general staff on
August 10,” 1968 (Charles D. Corbett 1972b, 415). On the night of Tuesday, August
20, 1968, Gen. Vasquez “failed in a coup attempt that had the support of important
elements of the MNR and the FSB” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 54-55). Vazquez issued
“an appeal to revolt (Los Tiempos 1968a), which was broadcast by Radio Altiplano
(Los Tiempos 1968b). But the coup “collapsed immediately when both the military
nationalists and the FSB failed to support it, justifiably fearing that Vázquez aimed
simply to replace one dictatorial personalism with another” (Dunkerley 1984, 156).
On August 21, President Barrientos announced that the government had discovered a
plot led by Vasquez and several people had been arrested (Associated Press 1968b).
The interior minister announced that the coup attempt “drew no response and had
343
been crushed” (United Press International 1968c). He indicated “General Vazquez
had planned to assassinate both General Ovando and President Barrientos and to set
up a Communist-orientated Government.” Vasquez “fled the country after he had
alleged that General Ovando was preparing to oust President Barrientos and establish
a military dictatorship (Keesing’s World News Archive 1969).
Coding rationale: This could be what some call a “reformist” coup. “By late 1967,
the reformist trend in the armed forces had become so important that even officers of
the high command supported it. General Juan Jose Torres, the general chief of staff,
and General Marcos Vazques, chief of staff of the army, were the first high-ranking
officers to express sympathy for the reformers and criticism of Barrientos’ policies.
Although a coup attempt by General Vazquez failed, his appeals for support against
Barrientos’ “dictadura opresiva” increased the ranks of the military reformers” (Wagner
1986, 29).37 Vasquez was a recently demoted regime insider who “had been the top
graduate in his 1942 Colegio class, and was probably the most respected member of
the elite nucleus” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 54-55). In May 1969, Vasquez defended
his actions as seeking an end to the army’s politicization and a return of the army “to
their barracks with honor and dignity.” His actions “had been aimed at displacing both
Barrientos and Ovando,” with Vasquez accusing Barrientos’ “voracious ambition” as
being scandalous. “The coup attempt had the support of some oldline MNR politicians
and inactive officers, including the same Admiral Monje Roca whom Ovando had fired
as chief of the River and Lake Force in 1964. It apparently was hastily conceived,
and appeared to have been confined largely to the capital area” (54-55). The National
Revolutionary Party of the Left (PRIN) was allegedly implicated in Gen. Vasquez’s
plot (Los Tiempos 1968b).
Although all of the historical sources characterize the Vazquez affair as a coup attempt,
prior datasets could find no evidence that corroborated that Gen. Vazquez actually
took any concrete actions. By contrast, we find evidence that Vazquez had issued
a broadcast calling for a revolt, which would classify as a concrete action seeking to
oust Barrientos. We therefore assume this was indeed an attempt and not just a plot.
Although he had been dismissed from his post, Vazquez does not appear to have been
dismissed from the army. After August 10, Vazquez was assigned to “prestigious, if
unimportant” job of the Bolivian delegate to Inter-American Defense Board (Wagner
1986, 30). We therefore do not consider Vazquez to be a prior defector at this time. We
code this event a failed reshuffling coup, as it likely sought to restore Vazquez’s power
vis-à-vis the regime leader and Ovando. There is no evidence that Vazquez sought
to prevent ethnic narrowing or a planned familial transition, or install an opposition
party, which would likely explain why there was not a greater popular response to his
subversive broadcast.
• # 145-1969-9-26: Bolivia, Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas

37. Wagner says Torres did not support Vazquez’s coup.
344
Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Siles Salinas as exiting on Septem-
ber 26, 1969 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support;
Svolik codes Siles Salinas as exiting on this date in a military coup; GWF code the
collapse of a personal regime (Bolivia 64-69) on this date in a military coup; EPR
codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
Event: After Barrientos died in a helicopter crash in April 1969, Vice President Siles
Salinas became president. General Alfredo Ovando Candia (Armed Forces Comman-
der) began to court peasant leagues and provincial army supporters with an eye to
winning the next presidential elections scheduled for June 1970. His main opposition
appeared to be the retired General Armando Escobar Uria, the popular La Paz mayor
and Chaco War hero. Like the late Barrientos, Gen. Escobar was of Indian ances-
try and spoke Aymara (Malcolm W. Browne 1969b). “Siles’ attempts to replace the
[provincial] officers with civilians, Escobar’s growing popularity in La Paz, and the re-
turn from exile of many old-line party leaders probably contributed greatly to Ovando’s
decision to depose the president rather than take a chance in the June elections. The
activities of General Vasquez, whom Siles had allowed to return, were particularly wor-
risome; he continued to enjoy great favor within the army elite and spoke out strongly
in support of Siles and for a nonpolitical stance on the part of the army. The fear
of losing control of the army in the eight months remaining before the election was
probably the determining factor” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 55-56).
On September 26, 1969, General Ovando’s troops “moved into the presidential palace”
to depose the president (Malcolm W Browne 1969a). On this day, “Ovando had Siles
arrested and flown to Chile while the latter was touring in Santa Cruz... There was
no bloodshed. Ovando announced that he had taken power to avoid the dangers of
“anarchy, capitulation, and disorder.” He pledged to secure national sovereignty over
the means of production, improve the mining sector, promote heavy industry, enhance
the rights of workers, and establish a nationalist economic policy” (Charles D Cor-
bett 1972a, 55-56). The new junta’s “first act invalidated the law under which the
Bolivian Gulf Oil Company, owned by North Americans, operates.” The new cabinet
was “dominated by young military men, dissident young leftists from the Christian
Democratic and National Revolutionary parties, and independents” (Associated Press
1969d). General Escobar was reported under house arrest and the upcoming elections
were canceled (Malcolm W Browne 1969a). “Within the next few weeks, the govern-
ment announced that it would establish relations with Communist nations, including
Cuba. Relations were established with Rumania in October, and the first Bolivian am-
bassador to Moscow was dispatched in December” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 55-56).
The military backed a coup as Siles’ “weak leadership became increasingly viewed as
threatening the military establishment. Terrorist attacks on military barracks created
a climate of uncertainty, and the reemergence of the guerrilla warfare in August 1969
demanded a strong leader to deal with this threat to the institution. The allegation
by the Bolivian parliament that Ovando had received campaign contributions from
the Gulf Oil Company were also seen as damaging the military institution, and the
military closed ranks behind Ovando” (Wagner 1986, 36).
345
a successful regime change coup. Compared to the Barrientos period, “[t]he Ovando-
Torres period was characterised by attempts to mobilise the left and labour behind some
sort of national populist project” (Gamarra 1988, 51). Charles D. Corbett (1972b, 401)
concludes that “[m]ilitary support, or at least political neutrality on the part of the
army was critical to the survival of [Barrientos’] regime, but the military institution
did not assume the full weight of responsibility for the direction of national policy until
Barrientos was killed in a helicopter crash in April 1969.”
• # 145-1970-10-5: Bolivia, Alfredo Ovando Candia

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and Singh; failed coup attempt - CSP; com-
bined - PT; Archigos and Svolik code Ovando Candia as the leader of Bolivia from
September 26, 1969, to October 6, 1970; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 69-71)
from September 26, 1969, until August 22, 1971. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
Event: On September 22, 1970, retired generals asked President Ovando to resign,
“and the garrison in Las Paz followed suit on 3 October 1970” (Wagner 1986, 60). On
October 5, 1970, Gen. Rogelio Miranda, the Army Commander (and key leader of
the army’s conservative faction), launched a coup attempt but failed to seize power
for himself (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 59). “After the coup attempt by General Mi-
randa, military leaders demanded the resignation of Ovando and Miranda.” General
Juan José Torres, a leader of the military’s reformist faction then without portfo-
lio since Ovando bowed to conservative pressure and dismissed him in July 1970 as
commander-in-chief, “again encouraged Ovando to stay in power. He offered to fight
for him, to become his defense minister or his commander-in-chief” to retain power.
Declining the fight, Ovando “resigned on 6 October at 6:15 A.M. and took asylum in
the Argentine Embassy” (Wagner 1986, 55,60-61).
In the morning after Ovando’s resignation, Gen. Torres made an open push for power
and “established his headquarters in the Air Force base of the Grupo Aereo de Caza
on the outskirts of La Paz, where he could control the nearby airport and the main
access road to the capital.” At 8:45 a.m., Radio Altiplano announced that “Torres had
been proclaimed president by air force officers.” Throughout the day, “Torres repeat-
edly denounced General Miranda’s fascist coup attempt on Radio Illimani.” However,
“many officers remained undecided,” thus the threat of a “bloodbath between Torres’
and Miranda’s supporters” remained a possibility. In an attempt to avoid this civil
war, at 5:30 p.m. on 6 October 1970, “the military headquarters - at the suggestion of
Ovando - announced the formation of a triumvirate which was to rule the country for
eight to ten days until a president was designated.” “The members of the triumvirate
were army commander, Gen. Efraim Guachalla, air force commander, Gen. Fernando
Sattori, and navy commander, Adm. Alberto Albarracin (62).
When the triumvirate failed to consolidate support, Ovando threw his support to Gen.
346
Torres, and “neutralized the junta by persuading General Satorri to announce pub-
licly his withdrawal. Miranda, having access to the military communications center
at Miraflores, decided that he lacked sufficient personal support and resigned... re-
linquishing the headquarters to General Guachalla” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 59).
Torres mustered his forces at the air force garrison at El Alto, “and called upon the
entrenched Ingavi regiment to surrender and avoid a fratricidal bloodbath. Miranda’s
departure undermined the resolve of many of the junior officers, despite announced
support from the Colegio Militar, and when the presidential guard unit (Colorados)
adopted a neutral stand the garrison found itself isolated” (60).
“During the night of 6 October 1970, Torres finally won acceptance by the military
hierarchy” (Wagner 1986, 62). By the evening of October 6, “power (such as it was)
rested in the hands of Torres” (Welch 1987). At midnight on October 6, the COB
declared a general strike in support of Torres (Wagner 1986, 64). On October 7, “Gen-
eral Torres emerged as the compromise candidate and became president of Bolivia”
(Rex A Hudson 1991a, 42). “The main reason for Torres’ military backing was not
wide popularity within the armed forces but the fact that he alone could command
extensive civilian support. Leftist parties saw in Torres the only alternative to the con-
servative coup by General Miranda” (Wagner 1986, 64). By October 9, General Torres
controlled the capital. “With a few exceptions the key unit commanders pledged sup-
port to the new Torres-appointed army commander” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 60).
Coding rationale: Ovando’s reform program polarized the military. According to Rex
A Hudson (1991a, 42), “Reformist officers, concerned about the decline in popular
support for the military since the Barrientos regime, shifted their support to the more
radical General Juan Jose Torres Gonzalez (1970-71), whom Ovando had dismissed as
his commander in chief; the right backed General Rogelio Miranda. The chaos sur-
rounding the overthrow of Ovando highlighted the division in the armed forces.” Thus,
we do not combine Gen. Miranda’s coup attempt with the successful coup by Torres on
October 6, because the two men represented different military factions. The evidence
suggests that Miranda’s policies might have differed from Torres, but that the group
from which leaders could be drawn would have remained the same. We therefore code
this event as a failed leader reshuffling coup by Miranda.
• # 145-1970-10-6: Bolivia, Alfredo Ovando Candia

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR; successful military coup and forced res-
ignation - CCD; successful coup - CSP, Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos
codes Ovando Candia as exiting on this date through “irregular” means by military
actors without foreign support. Svolik codes Ovando Candia as exiting on this date by
a military coup; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 69-71) from September 26, 1969,
until August 22, 1971; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in
Event: For a summary of the confused events surrounding this successful military coup
which lead to the rise of General Juan José Torres to power by October 9, 1970, see
347
145-1970-10-5.
• # 145-1970-10-7: Bolivia, Juan José Torres

Category: combined
Other Datasets: successful military coup and counter-coup - CCD; not a candidate -
CSP and Singh; combined - PT; Archigos codes Torres as entering office by “irregular”
means on this date and remaining leader of Bolivia until August 22, 1971; Svolik codes
Juan Torres as entering office on this date by a military coup; GWF code a military
regime (Bolivia 69-71) from September 26, 1969, until August 22, 1971.
Event: For a summary of the tumultuous events from October 5 to October 7, 1970,
see 145-1970-10-5.
Coding rationale: All sources concur that Ovando was ousted in a coup on October 6,
1970, as the result of a coup attempt on October 5 led by Gen. Miranda. However,
CCD codes Ovando’s ouster at the hands of the triumvirate, and then codes Torres as
ousting the junta on October 7. Based on the evidence, we consider Miranda’s coup
bid to have failed but Torres’ coup bid to have succeeded on October 6 and formalized
on October 7. We therefore combine the formal transfer of power on October 7 with
our coding of a successful reshuffling coup dated October 6. We do not combine the
October 6 coup by Torres with the October 5 coup by Miranda, because the latter
coup was not a “counter-coup” in that Ovando was not restored to power. Had Torres
re-installed Ovando in power, we would have coded a single failed reshuffling coup on
October 5. Instead, we code two coup events in these three days.
• # 145-1971-1-10: Bolivia, Juan José Torres González

and Singh; Archigos codes Torres as the leader of Bolivia from October 7, 1970, to
August 22, 1971; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 69-71) from September 26,
1969, until August 22, 1971. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic
group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
Event: In early January 1971, Col. Hugo Bánzer Suárez and Col. Edmundo Valencia
from the Miraflores barracks were ordered to frontier posts in an apparent effort to
isolate sources of military opposition to the junta led by General Juan José Torres
(Associated Press 1971h). Surprised by the transfer orders, the coup plotters had to
act prematurely or risk losing their commands in La Paz (Wagner 1986, 150,168). On
January 10, 1971, the military right led by supporters of Gen. Miranda and Col. Bánzer
launched a “poorly organized” coup (Farcau 1994, 180). The revolt was supported by
some recent graduates of the National Military School in La Paz. Backed by officers
348
of the Ingavi regiment headquartered in La Paz, the officers took control of the army
headquarters and took the army commander Gen. Luis Reque Terán and other high
officials hostage (Associated Press 1971h). In total, three regiments joined the coup.
Early on, the rebels announced they had acted to keep Bolivia from being delivered to
“another imperialism as dismal as that of America” (News Dispatches 1971).
But the police supported Gen. Torres (Wagner 1986, 150,168). Loyal troops were
mobilized immediately. Air force fighter planes flew low over La Paz firing machine-
guns over the rebel-held locations (Associated Press 1971h). A communique from
the Interior Ministry “called on students and miners to take to the streets, and farm
workers were urged to arm themselves and come to La Paz to “defend the revolution.”
Bolivia’s national union, the Bolivian Workers’ Central, told its members to assemble
at their local headquarters to “be ready for the fight” ” (Associated Press 1971g).
“Many division commanders who had promised their support to the plotters changed
their minds when they faced the threat of a general strike by the civilian left, and the
coup remained confined to La Paz” (Wagner 1986, 150,168). “While opinion within
the military was largely favorable to the movement, too few senior officers had formally
committed themselves in advance and resented being presented with a fait accompli
by Miranda and Banzer” (Farcau 1994, 180). The coup collapsed after seven hours
when several dozen rebel officers “fled to various embassies seeking asylum” (News
Dispatches 1971). Torres was in full control “long before civilian demonstrations in
support of the government” began (Wagner 1986, 150,168).
On January 11, the Minister of Interior announced that a coup by “fascist elements”
led by Cols. Bánzer and Edmundo Valencia from the Miraflores barracks had failed
(United Press International 1971). Torres accused elements tied to sinister foreign
interests (Banzer was trained in the U.S.) of trying to impose a “dictatorship of the
right” (Associated Press 1971h). The newspaper La Paz claimed “Brazilian meddling”
was to blame and that a Brazilian military officer had provided money to finance the
coup attempt (News Dispatches 1971). Torres “purged sixteen of the most notorious
plotters, some of them senior officers, but many of them from the lower ranks” (Wagner
1986, 150,168).
Coding rationale: According to Klein (2011, 228), “agitation of the Popular Assembly
created civilian support for a military coup.” At the time, Col. Bánzer had been
dismissed from his post of commander of the Colegio Military on December 9, 1970,
but was still on active duty senior officer (Wagner 1986, 167), and therefore was not a
prior defector at the time of the coup attempt.
As a result of this event, Bánzer was exiled to Argentina, and would return to Santa
Cruz eight months later to lead a successful coup against Torres in August 1971 which
was supported by “a broad antigovernment coalition that included supporters of the
FSB, the Siles-Paz sectors of the MNR, and the anti-Torres military” (W. Q. Morales
2010, 190). Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) use this latter event to code the end
of the 1969-71 Bolivian military regime. To code whether a successful coup attempt
by Bánzer at this time would have resulted in a regime change, we assume that he
would have brought to power a different set of elites composed of a rightist faction
349
of the military and excluded political parties (i.e. MNR). Indeed, after his successful
coup attempt in August 1971, Bánzer placed formerly exiled MNR and FSB civilian
elites in his first cabinet, re-instated exiled senior military officers (e.g. Miranda), and
appointed members of his (younger) cohort of officers as the new service commanders
(Charles D. Corbett 1972b, 424-25). We therefore code this event a failed regime
change coup.
• # 145-1971-4-15: Bolivia, Juan José Torres González

Category: coup plot
assassination - PT; Archigos codes Torres as the leader of Bolivia from October 7, 1970,
to August 22, 1971; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 69-71) from September 26,
1969, until August 22, 1971.
Event: After the failure of the rightist coup attempt in January 1971 (see 145-1971-1-
10), conservative officers continued to publicly criticize and secretly plot against Torres
(Wagner 1986, 170-172). On April 5, 1971, this MNR conspiracy was discovered by
Interior Minister Gallardo Lozada, and “the plotters were arrested. Torres, fearing
that he would trigger a rightist coup, sent them into interior exile, and on 28 May
1971, he freed them altogether, supposedly because Gallardo Lozada had not provided
convincing evidence of involvement” (134-135). In August 1971, it was reported that
“a right-wing uprising four months ago was quelled” (New York Times 1971). In
August 1971, “the MNR and the FSB formed the Frente Popular Nacionalista (FPN),
which was backed by the Asociacion de Empresarios Privados and the military right
in support of a planned coup by Col. Hugo Banzer” (Wagner 1986, 135).
Coding rationale: CCD codes a coup attempt based on the single New York Times
source from four months after the alleged attempt. However, our only other source for
this event indicates that there was a coup plot discovered, but that no concrete actions
were taken. We therefore code this event a coup plot.
• # 145-1971-8-22: Bolivia, Juan José Torres

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Torres as exiting on August 22, 1971 through
“irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code the collapse
of a military regime (Bolivia 69-71) on August 22, 1971 in a military coup; EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992. O’Rourke
(2013, 306) lists Juan Jose Torres as the target of a successful U.S-backed coup in 1971.
Event: The presidency of Gen. Juan José Torres’s was marked by chaotic leadership
and failed attempts to appease powerful groups on both the left and the right. He
established a Popular Assembly in hopes of gaining public support and appeasing
communists demanding more participation in the government. However, his appeals
to the left only sparked conservative opposition, including in the business community
350
and the military. His support with the military eroded as officers grew tired with his
chaotic leadership and upset by his cutting of their budget. “The last step of institu-
tional decay was a manifesto written during the last weeks of the Torres regime by a
group of junior officers who questioned military authority. It resulted in widespread
military support for the coup on August 21, 1971, by Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez, the
former Military Academy commander whom Torres had exiled” (Wagner 1991, 43).
“Banzer’s golpe of August 1971 was confused, pitting units outside the capital against
units in La Paz that were politically aligned with Torres and the left. Despite Torres’
reliance on civilians, he was in fact politically weak; the radical groups to which Torres
hitched his political wagon enjoyed little real strength. Banzer profited from Torres’
exclusion of major parties, which swung their support to him; both the MNR and
Falange held several seats in Banzer’s first cabinet” (Welch 1987, 61). From exile in
Argentina, Banzer “chose as the focal point of his movement the eastern lowlands
province of Santa Cruz, where the economy had been drastically crippled by Gulf Oil’s
nationalization and by state takeover of private sugar mills. This region has long been
an FSB stronghold, and the commanders of the two divisions in the province apparently
were in on the plans from the beginning. The ranger regiment of Colonel Andres Selich
provided the muscle to overcome the limited opposition. (Selich was named Minister of
Interior in the new government.) Within two days after the rangers took control of the
seat to the provincial government in Santa Cruz on August 19, every important garrison
in the country had announced for the rebels and most had made overt moves to take
control of key facilities in their respective areas. The key Cochabamba garrison was
controlled by the commander of the Seventh Division, General Florentino Mendieta,
who became Defense Minister in the new government. In La paz the military academy,
the Castrillo regiment which Torres had brought in to replace the banished Ingavi, and
motorized battalion at nearby Viacha, declared for the rebels. Only the presidential
guard unit, the Colorados, remained loyal to Torres, and when the air force joined
the bandwagon his last hope was gone and he sought diplomatic asylum” (Charles D
Corbett 1972a, 62). For a detailed account of this coup and its aftermath, also see
Wagner (1986, chapter 4).
as a successful regime change coup led by a prior defector (Banzer). As Welch (1987,
61) observes, “The political pendulum swung from left to right. Banzer introduced an
authoritarian, conservative pattern of leadership in which civilians played a peripheral
part, despite their support for his seizure of control.” In a similar way, Gamarra (1988,
52-53) notes that “The fact that a colonel was able to topple higher ranking officers
was significant in and of itself. If nothing else, the coup reflected the extent to which
the military chain of command had collapsed. Disregard for hierarchy was partly due
to suggestions during the Torres period that the military would again be dismantled
and replaced by worker militias. Concern that the military would be eliminated by
the populists was shared by pre-revolutionary officers who had been recommissioned
in 1964. The August 1971 coup, therefore, appeared to be a reaction by officers who
feared for the military’s survival.” As a result, “In August 1971,the military-populist
351
interlude came to an end.”
• # 145-1972-5-17: Bolivia, 1971, Hugo Bánzer Suárez

Category: not exist
assassination - PT; Archigos and Svolik code Bánzer Suárez as the leader of Bolivia
from August 22, 1971, to July 21, 1978; GWF code a military-personal regime (Bolivia
71-79) from August 22, 1971, to July 1, 1979.
Event: N/A
Coding rationale: CCD is the only major coup dataset to include this event. However,
they provide no sources to document the case and we can find no evidence to corrob-
orate that a coup event took place on this date. We therefore code this event as not
exist.
• # 145-1973-5-15: Bolivia, 1971, Hugo Bánzer Suárez

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP and PT;
coup plot - Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Bánzer Suárez as the leader of Bolivia
from August 22, 1971, to July 21, 1978; GWF code a military-personal regime (Bolivia
71-79) from August 22, 1971, to July 1, 1979.
Event: On May 15, 1973, Bolivia’s government announced that it had uncovered a
rightist coup plot within the armed forces and that its leader, Col. Andrés Selich
Chop, the former Interior Minister, had been arrested. Selich had illegally re-entered
Bolivia and “was meeting with a group of army officers and civilians” to plot the
government’s overthrow while the President was scheduled to be traveling later in the
month. The communique said Selich was “seized by a nervous fit,” tried to flee, and
fell down the stairs at the Interior Ministry building, and died (Howe 1973a). On May
18, the Interior Minister Alfredo Arce admitted that Selich had been beaten to death
by police and not from falling downstairs. This led the Socialist Falange to call for
Arce’s resignation, which prompted Banzer to put forces on alert (Reuters 1973a).
Coding rationale: We find no evidence that Col. Selich had taken any concrete actions
to oust the government. We therefore code this event a coup plot. In addition, Selich
had been dismissed as Interior Minister in the first Cabinet reshuffle in December 1971,
sent to Paraguay as ambassador, but then in May 1972 was removed from that post and
dismissed from the active service for allegedly holding “secret meetings” with Banzer’s
political opponents. He went to exile in Argentina (Howe 1973a). This event also
therefore appears to be a case of prior defection.
• # 145-1973-12-1: Bolivia, Hugo Bánzer Suárez

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and PT; failed coup attempt - Singh;
352
Archigos and Svolik code Bánzer Suárez as the leader of Bolivia from August 22, 1971,
to July 21, 1978; GWF code a military-personal regime (Bolivia 71-79) from August
22, 1971, to July 1, 1979.
Event: Early in December 1973, “A mutiny was reported from the El Alto air base near
La Paz, and a number of officers were disciplined, among them Colonel Eloy Castillo,
who was dismissed from his post as Army Chief of Staff. At the same time a number of
followers of ex-Presidents Barrientos and Torres were arrested” (Keesing’s World News
Archive 1973).
Coding rationale: The only source we can find on this event is the same Keesing’s article
that Singh used to consider this case. However, the article does not provide evidence
of concrete actions or intentions designed to oust the president. We therefore code this
event as a military mutiny that did not target the regime leader. AMBIGUOUS.

and Singh; Archigos codes Bánzer Suárez as the leader of Bolivia from August 22, 1971,
to July 21, 1978; GWF code a military-personal regime (Bolivia 71-79) from August
22, 1971, to July 1, 1979. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group
in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
Event: On June 5, 1974, while General Bánzer was in the south on an inspection
tour, elements of the Tarapaca Armored Regiment briefly took over the presidential
palace. Lt. Col. Raúl López Leyton and Maj. Gary Prado Salmón broadcast a radio
communique claiming to be in charge of the government, saying the revolt was “strictly
military,” but they withdrew to their barracks and surrendered after the regiment
assigned to guard the palace gave them an hour to leave (Washington Post 1974b).
López was a former aide to former President Victor Paz Estenssoro and commander of
the “training center for special troops” in Cochabamba, while Prado was brother of a
former minister in Bánzer’s government and had been the commander of the Tarapaca
regiment until October 1973, after which point he became commander of the military
academy (Latin 1974a). The head of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR),
Ciro Humboldt Barrero, sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy on the day of the
coup. By June 6, it was reported that Humboldt was charged as a leader of the coup
attempt, though Humboldt denied it and said his enemies used the coup attempt as
a pretext to oust him (Radio Pirai 1974b; Agence France-Presse 1974). The coup
attempt leaders sought asylum abroad after their plot failed.
Coding rationale: The coup attempt reflected, in part, generational conflict within the
military, with Banzer representing an older generation and the coup makers a younger
generation of officers (Gamarra 1988, 56). Rex A Hudson (1991a) likewise attributes
this coup attempt to “younger officers belonging to the Generational Group (Grupo
Generacional) and led by General Gary Prado Salmón,” who demanded “that Banzer
legitimize his rule.” López and Prado would later join the cabinet of President David
353
Padilla Arancibia in November 1978.
The coup attempt leaders had demanded general elections, the removal of President
Banzer, and the installation of a military government (Reuters 1974a). On June 21, the
Interior Ministry released a statement signed by four military officers who participated
in the coup attempt calling for Bolivia’s “constitutionalization.” The statement said
that “the army must respond to the people” and that their action sought to prevent a
new monetary devaluation.38 The officers said “we object to [the Bánzer government’s
totalitarian, repressive and despotic system whose interests are diametrically opposed
to those of the people. The document adds that the armed forces are with the workers,
the university students and the peasants and that the officers share the idea of labor
freedom and of reopening the Bolivian labor unions. They state: We would not be
fulfilling our duty if we did not denounce the peasant massacre in Cochabamba.”39
The Interior Ministry said the armed forces also support university autonomy, unions,
and constitutionalization. “It is with regard to spirit, meaning, and direction that they
[the coup plotters] have different views” (Télam 1974).
The government called the coup attempt a “subversive attempt by the extreme left”
including professors at the Greater University of San Andres (Latin 1974c). The FSB
also repudiated the plot as a leftist attempt to restore the “antinational system [that]
had been (ousted) on 19 August 1971” (Radio Pirai 1974a). Although the coup leaders
were undoubtedly reformist officers, they “had no contact” with the ousted reformist
General Torres who had ruled until August 1971 (Wagner 1986, 229).
Banzer came to power in 1971 with the backing of an (ideologically odd) alliance of
the FSB and the MNR; and his support coalition soon fell apart. This coup attempt
and the next were a response to Banzer’s narrowing of his ruling coalition in 1973 and
early 1974 when he replaced civilians in his cabinet with military officers (Robert J
Alexander 1982, 110). The labor and socialist wings of the MNR split from the party
and their leaders went into exile prior to the June coup; and the popular MNR leader,
ex-President Victor Paz, also withdrew his support for Banzer and was forced into
exile in January 1974 (Reuters 1974b).
Based on this evidence, we interpret this coup attempt as an effort to require the Banzer
regime to rule with a measure of civilian (e.g. MNR) support. Had it succeeded, we
assume that a military regime would not have been led by civilians and the date for
any elections would have been uncertain. Instead, younger officers would have been
promoted and Banzer’s generation retired. Because the plotters had no contact with
the exiled reformist leader, Gen. Torres, we do not consider this a counter-coup. As
such, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

38. According to Rex A Hudson (1991a), “The government brutally suppressed a general strike against the
devaluation of the Bolivian peso in 1972.”
39. According to Rex A Hudson (1991a), “In 1974 price increases for basic goods and control of food prices
resulted in roadblocks by peasants in the Cochabamba Valley and their subsequent massacre by the military.”
354
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt and dissident action - CCD; failed coup
attempt - CSP and Singh; rebellion - PT; Archigos codes Bánzer Suárez as the leader of
Bolivia from August 22, 1971, to July 21, 1978; GWF code a military-personal regime
(Bolivia 71-79) from August 22, 1971, to July 1, 1979. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as
the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
Event: On Thursday, November 7, 1974, an army rebellion led by Carlos Valverde
Barbery, a former Minister of Health, and Gen. Julio Prado Salmon, broke out in
Santa Cruz, where rebels had briefly taken control. State radio later said that President
Hugo Banzer Suarez rallied loyal paratroopers and air force cadets in Cochabamba and
flew to the outskirts of Santa Cruz to put down the rebellion. A state of siege was
declared. “The communiqué attributed the revolt to dissident members of the 12th
Infantry Regiment and the American-trained anti-guerilla rangers. Only three years
ago they spearheaded the movement that brought General Banzer to power.” Dissident
members of both the MNR and FSB supported the rebels. Rebel broadcasts said the
revolt had the support of backers of former President Paz Estenssoro, then exiled in
Peru (United Press International 1974b).
On November 8, a communique said loyalist soldiers pursued rebel troops into the jun-
gles north of Santa Cruz and that the situation was under control. Sources in La Paz
said some rebels had holed up in an army barracks and still controlled some tanks. Two
of the three leaders of the rebellion–Gen. Julio Prado and Gen. Orlando Alvarez–were
reportedly under arrest; Valverde escaped (Associated Press 1974c). On November 9,
it was reported that Banzer had dismissed Housing Minister José Patino Ayoroa and
placed him under house arrest on charges of leading the coup attempt. The entire
cabinet resigned, and the military announced an indefinite postponement of elections
(Associated Press 1974a). The new military government suspended all of the country’s
parties in its first decree (Washington Post 1974a).
Coding rationale: Most coup datasets include this event, but PT excludes this case
as a rebellion. According to Rex A Hudson (1991a, 42), the November 7, 1974, coup
attempt “was supported by military, MNR, and FSB elements in Santa Cruz.” The re-
bellion’s leaders were indeed prior defectors at this time. Gen. Julio Prado, the former
Minister of Planning, had sought asylum in February 1974 after he was allegedly iden-
tified as part of a subversive plot (FBIS 1974). Gen. Julio Prado Montano also appears
to have been the father of Gary Prado Salmon (Latin 1974a), who had led a prior coup
attempt against Banzer (see 145-1974-6-5). For his part, Carlos Valverde Barbey had
“entered surreptitiously into Bolivia from his exile in Bolivia” (Latin 1974b). Finally,
Gen. Orlando Alvarez, according to a government communique, had been “separated
from the army several months ago due to lack of discipline and dishonesty” (La Paz
Domestic Service 1974a).
However, “some groups in the armed forces” were also reportedly involved in the re-
bellion (Latin 1974b). The Interior Minister claimed that a “group of commissioned
officers of the 2d Battalion of the Manchegos regiment lent themselves to support the
ambitions of outcast politicians” (La Paz Domestic Service 1974b). A government
communique said this uprising was “led by elements which not many months ago at-
355
tempted a similar attack which was also defeated” (La Paz Domestic Service 1974a),
presumably a reference to the June coup event (see 145-1974-6-5).
Banzer came to power in 1971 with the backing of an (ideologically odd) alliance of
the FSB and the MNR; and his support coalition soon fell apart. This coup attempt
and the next were a response to Banzer’s narrowing of his ruling coalition in 1973 and
early 1974 when he replaced civilians in his cabinet with military officers (Robert J
Alexander 1982, 110). The labor and socialist wings of the MNR split from the party
and their leaders went into exile prior to the June coup; and the popular MNR leader,
ex-President Victor Paz, also withdrew his support for Banzer and was forced into
exile in January 1974 (Reuters 1974b).
Based on this evidence, we assume that current, active members of the military also
participated in the rebellion, and we therefore do not exclude this case as prior defec-
tion. We view this attempt as similarly motivated as the attempt in June. A few days
before this rebellion, the MNR–which had supported Banzer– “announced publicly
that it would not tolerate the postponement of the presidential elections established in
principle for June 1975” (Latin 1974b), but which Banzer questioned. As in the coup
attempt the previous June, we therefore interpret this event as an attempt to force
Banzer to “legitimize his rule and hold elections in which the MNR would benefit. The
failure of these events in fact was a total setback for these goals, as Banzer banned
the political parties by November 9. We code this event a failed reshuffling coup, on
the assumption that key parts of Banzer’s initial support coalition were responding to
their loss of power within the regime.
• # 145-1977-12-9: Bolivia, Hugo Banzer Suárez
Category: coup plot
combined - PT; Archigos codes Bánzer Suárez as the leader of Bolivia from August
22, 1971, to July 21, 1978; GWF code a military-personal regime (Bolivia 71-79) from
August 22, 1971, to July 1, 1979.
Event: On December 9, 1977, Bolivian officials said two people attempted to board
the President’s private jet in the city of Santa Cruz, but were “scared off by police.”
Official “sources said the civilian-military plot was an “effort to thwart” the return to
democracy. But the sources gave no details of how the plot was to have been carried
out. There was no evidence of troop movements in the capital and the city was calm.”
A spokesman said that the plot by unidentified civilians and officers would not change
its “irreversible decision to constitutionalize the nation through elections on July 9”
or Banzer’s decision not to be a candidate. (Associated Press 1977a).
El Diario wrote a full front page story on the plot. The plan allegedly was to have
broken out in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and Oruro (Sucre Radio 1977). The military
leader was said to be Col. Jorge Echazu, reported as commander of the Tarapaca
Regiment, the country’s most powerful armored regiment. The civilian leader was
Luis Mayser of the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Alcaraz 1977). El Diario said “the
plan’s first steps had been taken: a general strike in Oruro was staged against the
356
government to demand the construction of a cement factory in that city.” However,
AFP was told that “Most of the garrisons did not know of the coup movement” (Agence
France-Presse 1977a).
However, Gen. Alsonso Villalpando, army commander-in-chief, denied the allegation
that any military officers had participated in the alleged coup. El Diario reported that
the coup was centered at, which was commanded by who led the plot. But Villalpando
pointed out that Maj. Rolando Arzabe was the actual commander of the Tarapaca
regiment. A local radio station reported that officers in the regiment were indignant at
the El Diario report, denying they were subversive and that they were playing soccer
during the alleged movement. Mayser also denied being part of any coup plot (Alcaraz
1977). By contrast, the interior minister initially announced nine military officers were
involved in the coup attempt (Radio Cruz del Sur 1977). However, five officers placed
under preventive house arrest were cleared of any involvement by December 14 (Agence
France-Presse 1977b).
Coding rationale: The evidence on this case is ambiguous as to whether any concrete
actions were taken by the alleged plotters targeting Banzer Suarez. The attempt to
board Banzer’s plan was undertaken by two unidentified men, and it is circumstantial
speculation that this event was part of the coup plot, and unclear whether military
officers were involved. Meanwhile, the general strike in Oruro had policy aims and did
not target the regime leader. Finally, although there were a number of arrests, there
were no reports of a pronunciamento nor of troop movements. We therefore assume
that there may have been a coup plot afoot, but not that a coup attempt was executed.
Had we found evidence of concrete actions, we would have coded this event a failed
reshuffling coup, as the plotters alleged goal was to prevent the upcoming elections
from taking place. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 145-1978-7-21: Bolivia, Hugo Banzer Suárez

Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Banzer as exiting on July 21, 1978 through
“irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code a military-
personal regime (Bolivia 71-79) from August 22, 1971 to August 8, 1979; EPR codes
Event: When the economic growth that had marked Colonel Hugo Banzer’s early pres-
idency faltered, his popular support did as well. His rule frayed as personal, ideological,
and generational differences within the military sowed dissension and disunity. A bru-
tal crackdown on protests from the left created major rifts in Bolivian society and a
popular backlash. Mounting pressure from civilian groups, the military, and United
States forced Banzer to set elections for 1980, which were moved to 1978 due to grow-
ing civilian unrest (Wagner 1991, 44-45). Factions in the military opposed Banzer’s
“continusimo” and “rejected the electoral plan and forced Banzer to withdraw as the
official candidate.” General Juan Pereda Asbún, a Banzer affiliate in the air force, was
chosen as the regime’s candidate (Gamarra 1988, 60).
357
According to official results, Pereda received 986,000 of the 1,972,000 votes in the
July 9, 1978, elections. International observers condemned widespread electoral fraud
(Welch 1987, 62). “Embarrassed by the affair, Banzer announced his intention of turn-
ing the government over to a military junta on 6 August 1978. Frustrated by this
announcement, Pereda broke with Banzer and the commanders of the armed forces.
Pereda felt he had been betrayed by Banzer and the armed forces command. Gen-
eral Pereda then requested the annulment of the electoral results (which the electoral
commission did) and at the same time revealed that a “subversive leftist plot” was un-
derway... Pereda retreated to eastern Bolivia where he soon discovered that he enjoyed
the support of the Cochabamba and Santa Cruz garrisons. Having established a power
base in Banzer’s own department, Pereda launched a bloodless coup” (Gamarra 1988,
64-65).
At dawn on July 21, 1978, a rebellion broke out in Santa Cruz and eastern Bolivia
and threatened the capital demanding that Banzer resign and Pereda be installed in
power. “The only indication of fighting was one radio report saying an army officer
had been killed in a tin-mining area.” Rather than fight, an emotional Banzer resigned
on national television from a presidential palace ringed by loyalists (Associated Press
1978b). On Thursday, July 23, General Pereda was sworn in as President (J. D. Onis
1978). On July 24, Pereda swore in a largely civilian cabinet and said he would rule
without a Congress initially (New York Times 1978). Pereda promised elections new
elections in six months, but did not keep that commitment (Welch 1987, 62).
• # 145-1978-11-24: Bolivia, Juan Pereda Asbun

and Singh; Archigos codes Pereda Asbun as being removed on this date through “irreg-
ular” means by domestic military actors without foreign support; Svolik codes Pereda
Asbun as being removed on this date by a non-military coup; GWF code a military-
personal regime (Bolivia 71-79) from August 22, 1971, to July 1, 1979. EPR codes
Event: According to Farcau (1994, 152-153), there was opposition to Pereda Asbun’s
seizure of power following the blatant attempt by him and Banzer to rig the July 1978
elections, with younger officers plotting a counter-coup almost immediately. “This
group, known as “the generationalists,” implying they belonged to a new generation of
technically trained, politically liberal military men, was led by a clique of field grade
officers, mostly lieutenant colonels and colonels, headed by Raul Lopez Leyton, Gary
Prado Salmon, and Guillermo Natusch Busch, with more senior leadership provided
by Generals Cespedes Espinoza and David Padilla Arrancibia. These officers belonged
to the generation which had received its commissions after the Revolution of 1952 and
thus presumably had a different outlook than those officers who had been brought
358
up under the oligarchic regime prior to that time. Although some of them had good
combat records, with Gary Prado having played a prominent role in the campaign
against Che Guevara’s guerillas in the mid-1960’s, most were engineer officers and did
not have either experience with or command of combat troops, thus diminishing their
influence within the military in regard to forming a coup. With the general distaste of
the military for the sloppy handling of Pereda’s installation in power, however, they
were able to remove him from office painlessly.”
Shortly after midnight on 24 November 1978, three trucks of army soldiers seized the
interior ministry headquarters and detained the Interior Minister, Lt. Col. Faustino
Rico Toro. An hour later, troops armed with automatic weapons marched on the
presidential palace. At 4 a.m., Gen. Pereda issued a statement resigning “to avoid
hours of pain and bloodshed for the country and the armed forces.” Thus was Pereda
ousted in a bloodless coup after only four months as president. Gen. David Padilla,
the army commander, headed a new three-man junta. Padilla announced that elections
would be held in July 1979 (Associated Press 1978a). The subsequent elections indeed
“rank among the freest and cleanest in Bolivian history” (Farcau 1994, 153).
Coding rationale: All sources except for Svolik code this event as a successful military
coup. Svolik does not code military involvement; however, we find evidence of such
involvement, not least of which is the fact that Pereda Asbun is succeeded by General
David Padilla.
• # 145-1979-10-11: Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arze

Archigos codes Guevara Arze as the leader of Bolivia from August 8, 1979, until Novem-
ber 1, 1979; Svolik codes entry of Garcia Meza Tejada on July 18, 1980 by mil. coup;
GWF code a provisional regime (Bolivia 79-80) from August 8, 1979, until July 17,
1980. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953
to 1992.
Event: When no presidential candidate gained a majority in the 1979 elections and
the Chamber of Deputies was deadlocked, the major candidates – Siles Suazo, Paz Es-
tenssoro, and Hugo Banzer – struck a deal to approve a one year interim government
pending new elections (Gamarra 1988, 67). Congress appointed former MNRA head
and President of the Senate, Walter Guevara Arze, as interim president on August
8, 1979.” This was the “first civilian regime since the brief term of Siles Salinas in
1969” (Wagner 1991, 46). However, none of the leading candidates “was willing to
take part in the regime. Consequently Guevara’s government was extremely fragile. It
had no control over Congress and could not deal effectively with the military. In short,
Guevara’s regime had no authority” (Gamarra 1988, 67). “Almost immediately every
political party in Congress, except ADN, joined the long delayed impeachment trial
against Banzer. Civilians accused General Banzer of treason, violation of human rights
and embezzlement of public funds. While Banzer was the principal target of civilians
in Congress, the trial was also directed at permanently damaging the reputation of the
359
military” (Gamarra 1988, 67).
On October 11, 1979, “there was a brief uprising by the army garrison in the remote
town of Trinidad, located in the Amazon Basin” (Farcau 1994, 156) in Beni Department
hundreds of miles northeast of La Paz. Shortly after midnight, troops of the Sixth Di-
vision seized strategic locations in Trinidad, including the radio stations (United Press
International 1979b). Col. Walter Salama “called for the dissolution of congress and
the installation of a military regime” (Associated Press 1979b), assailing Guevara’s
“weak government” (Dunkerley 1982, 7). Rebels broadcast a decree over Radio El
Dorado calling for Guevara’s immediate resignation and calling the two-month exper-
iment in democracy “useful only for insulting the armed forces and proving chaos.”
Another rebel decree said “Parliament has converted itself into a tribunal of foreign
influences.” One report identified the rebel leader as Gen. Edmundo Sanabria, com-
mander of the Sixth Division (United Press International 1979b). Sanabria said that,
while he shared other officers discontent with the government, he had nor personally
led the “movement of protest” (Reuters and Associated Press 1979).
No other major garrisons joined the uprising (J. d. Onis 1979a). The threat of the
coup spreading was averted “when the president sent Colonel Alberto Natusch, who
was from the Beni and had a tough reputation as Banzer’s minister of agriculture and
peasant affairs, to negotiate a settlement” (Dunkerley 1982, 7). Both the government
and political left assumed “this was a sign of the weakness and disorder of the military.
A series of protest strikes were organized by the COB, and the rebellious troops quickly
returned to barracks” (Farcau 1994, 156).
Military investigators said the Trinidad regime was “justly reacting against “insidious
attacks” on the armed forces by radical sectors of Congress” (J. d. Onis 1979a). “The
leaders of the revolt had clearly been angered by the celebrations of the anniversary of
the death of Che Guevara and the continuing impeachment of Banzer in Congress but
their general complaint was now recognised as common amongst officers” (Dunkerley
1982, 7). “With the benefit of hindsight, it would appear that the October 1979 coup
attempt “had actually been a trial balloon for the July 1980 coup” (see 145-1980-7-17)
(Farcau 1994, 173).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event as a failed coup attempt
against the provisional regime. The uprising was more than a mutiny or “movement
of protest” to Congress as sympathizers claimed. It clearly called for the installation
of a military regime.
• # 145-1979-11-1: Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arze

Perez, and Singh; Archigos codes Guevara Arze as exiting on this date through “irregu-
lar” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code a provisional regime
(Bolivia 79-80) from August 8, 1979, until July 17, 1980. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos
as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
360
Event: Within weeks of an abortive army uprising in Trinidad in northeastern Bolivia
(see 145-1979-10-11), the provisional government was challenged by a much more seri-
ous coup attempt in the capital involving “generationalist” officers led by the very man
who had negotiated an end to the earlier Trinidad uprising, Colonel Alberto Natusch
Busch.40 These officers plotted a military coup with “younger members of the MNR,
including its major theoretician Guillermo Bedregal Gutierrez” (Welch 1987, 63). One
prominent observer called the coup “one of the bloodiest and most confused events in
Bolivian political history” (Dunkerley 1982, 8).
“ In the early hours of 1 November, troops from “Ingavi” seized the university and the
various ministries, and armored cars from the “Tarapaca” took up positions at major
intersections around the Plaza Murillo. Cyrus Vance had left the country the previous
day after the conclusion of the formal OAS conference, but dozens of journalists and
delegates to the conference were still in the city and were trapped by the coup. It is
now apparent that Natusch did not order the launching of the coup” (Farcau 1994,
156), though he did claim leadership over it and declared himself President (Reuters
1979a). The sudden coup was not met with any significant organized armed resistance
from within the military itself (Farcau 1994, 157). However, General David Padilla,
the armed forces commander, was dismissed by Col. Natusch after he initially called
the uprising senseless. The Defense Minister, Gen. Julio Herrera, later said that all
three military services were backing Natusch and “not a single unit” opposed the coup
(Reuters 1979a).
However, “the coup appeared to have been actually badly fumbled.” Some inferred
that a rival faction of the armed forces, the so-called “gorillas” led by General Garcia
Meza who controlled the combat forces, intentionally launched the coup prematurely
and botched it in order to weaken the “generationalist” faction (Farcau 1994, 176).
Whether as a result of their ineptitude or a conscious strategy of subversion by “go-
rillas,” “Guevara escaped untouched, as did Siles, Quiroga Santa Cruz, and Lechin
Oquendo. Expecting some sort of intervention eventually, all had taken to sleeping in
the homes of friends, a different home every night, and the coup plotters had evidently
been unable to locate them. At the same time as Natusch appeared on television on the
morning of 1 November, promising early elections, Guevara was giving a clandestine
radio interview from a house under construction in the Cota Cota residential suburb of
La Paz, denouncing the coup. The Congress was still in session, and the leadership of
the COB had called a general strike.” Around 12 p.m., “demonstrators had gathered
in the Plaza of the San Francisco Cathedral and along the main avenue which runs
the length of the downtown area. They ripped up cobblestones from the streets in
40. “Born in 1930, Busch had been at the head of his academy class and had gone into the engineers. His
career took a brief sidetrack when he left the military from 1955 to 1960 (during Siles’s presidency), but he
was reinstated and built up a strong reputation as a planner and organizer. He studied mountain warfare in
Germany 1963 and did have command of an infantry regiment at one point, but most of his career was spent
in staff positions. He was named Director of the Colegio Militar in 1978 under Pereda, whence he plotted
Pereda’s overthrow and was subsequently made Director of Training for the Army General Staff. He was
generally considered apolitical and had frequently alienated his fellow officers by even refusing to take part
in political discussions, considering them unprofessional... ” (Farcau 1994, 154). Colonel Natusch had been
Agriculture Minister in a previous government (Reuters 1979a).
361
the best traditions of the Paris Commune and built makeshift barricades with burning
tires, park benches, and toppled streetlight poles. The police were nowhere to be seen.
During the course of the afternoon and evening, the armored cars of the “Tarapaca”
crashed through these barricades and dispersed the crowds with machine-gun fire. The
toll of dead and wounded (all among the demonstrators) was in the hundreds.” The vi-
olence employed was witnessed by foreign diplomats and recorded by tv crews (Farcau
1994, 157).
On November 2, Bolivia’s cities were brought to a halt by the COB-organized gen-
eral strike. What’s more, Congress voted to support President Guevara, who was
then in hiding. Facing opposition, the military declared a state of siege. Meanwhile,
Col. Natusch announced a cabinet of the “nationalist left,” including five officers and
eight civilians. Gen. Herrera was appointed Industry and Commerce Ministry (Reuters
1979c). The new cabinet “was staffed exclusively by the military and the extreme right-
wing Bolivian Socialist Falange” (Farcau 1994, 157). Natusch apparently “sought to
establish a form of bonapartist regime in which the leading civic organisation partici-
pated in an administration directed by the armed forces. In this vein he proffered an
alliance to both Congress and the COB, neither of which was outlawed for a number
of days. The pact he envisaged allowed for the maintenance of parliament and trade
union independence but ‘under the discipline of the armed forces’ ” (Dunkerley 1982,
8).
That vision foundered on near-unanimous resistance and repression. On November
2, “Natusch ordered his troops to fire into demonstrators in the streets of La Paz.
Hundreds were killed in what came to be known as the Masacre de Todos Santos (All
Saint’s Day Massacre)” (Gamarra 1988, 68). On November 4, Colonel Natusch an-
nounced on television that he had suspended Congress, imposed press censorship, and
decreed martial law (J. d. Onis 1979b). “The military reacted with arbitrary brutality,
gunning people down in the street for happening to be in front of the COB headquar-
ters (which was obviously not being used by its staff, who had gone underground) or
for violating the 9:00 P.M.-to-dawn curfew” (Farcau 1994, 157). Army troops killed
at least 70 protesters by November 5. Gen. David Padilla, the dismissed army chief,
wrote a letter to his former subordinates that the “ambitious and antipatriotic” lead-
ers of the coup were “assassinating an innocent population with false pretenses” (J. d.
Onis 1979d). The Bolivian Committee on Human Rights estimated 207 people were
killed in all (United Press International 1979d).
International condemnation was swift. The United States suspending foreign aid to
the country (Gwertzman 1979). The United States also took “diplomatic action to
prevent recognition of the Natusch government” (Wagner 1991, 46). “Venezuela, Mex-
ico, Great Britain, France, and other nations” also all “immediately suspended all
but purely humanitarian programs,” withdrew their ambassadors, or broke diplomatic
relations. “Natusch found himself trapped between unrelenting resistance by the civil-
ian population and the international community on the one hand and the treacherous
actions of his “gorilla” “allies” on the other” (Farcau 1994, 158). Hugo Banzer and
Victor Paz Estenssoro “denied any knowledge of or cooperation with Natusch,” who
“tried to salvage what he could from the wreckage by placing Gary Prado, Raul Lopez
362
Leyton, and other “generationalist” officers under arrest, allegedly for opposing the
new regime, but actually to try and distance them from the actions of the “gorillas” ”
(Farcau 1994, 157).
Over the next few days, “Guevara, Siles, Lechin, and the other civilian leaders re-
mained at liberty” (157). Major parties refused to cooperate (Welch 1987, 63). The
popular press and radio stations continued to broadcast opposition (Dunkerley 1982,
8). Campesinos rebuilt road blocks and organize resistance (8). Congress refused to ac-
cept a decree suspending its activities. The general strike continued (J. d. Onis 1979c).
“Perhaps most significant, the National Guard declared its opposition” (Welch 1987,
63). As a result, the military unity began to fracture. General David Padilla “rallied
some units, including the military academy,” to support restoration of civilian rule.
On November 4, retired Gen. Juan Ayaroa met with Col. Natusch as an intermedi-
ary and told him that, given a lack of public support, a majority in the armed forces
wanted a “democratic institutional solution” (J. d. Onis 1979c). As the high command
took control of the movement, Natusch became “a virtual prisoner in the presidential
palace” (Dunkerley 1982, 9-10).
The high command proceeded to beat “a well-guarded tactical withdrawal,” made
Colonel Natusch their scapegoat and pawn, and pinned direct blame for the coup on
Natusch himself (9). The military was “willing to relinquish power but not to see Gue-
vara reinstalled in the Palacio Quemado” (Farcau 1994, 158), “which was interpreted
as tantamount to a complete defeat” (Dunkerley 1982, 9-10). As late as November 6,
Colonel Natusch rejected a congressional proposal that he resign and allow Congress
to elect a new President. For their part, Victor Paz Estenssoro, leader of the MNR
(which was the largest party in Congress), and Hernán Siles Zuazo, leader of the Pop-
ular Democratic Union, rejected any proposal that would leave Natusch in power (J.
d. Onis 1979d). It appeared to be a political stalement.
On November 7, Col. Natusch suspended martial law and press censorship and said
that he would permit elections (Associated Press 1979a). COB leader Juan Lechin
ordered a halt the general strike to facilitate negotiations, but miners refused (Welch
1987, 63). On November 10, Colonel Natusch proposed that Congress create a three-
member junta including himself, the president of Congress, and a labor leader. But
Congress and the CGT both rejected this proposal (United Press International 1979d).
On November 11, formal talks began about ending the stalemate. Gen. Eden Castillo,
commander in chief of the armed forces, represented the military (United Press Interna-
tional 1979e). Over the next five days, “Congress, the military, and the COB negotiated
an exit from the presidency for both Guevara and Colonel Natusch” (Gamarra 1988,
68).
On November 15, 250 officers signed a manifesto calling on Colonel Natusch to resign
and return power to civilians (United Press International 1979a). Their complaint
said that “the country is being pushed to the brink of civil war by the blindness of a
few,” alluding to the coup group (United Press International 1979c). After midnight
on November 16, Defense Minister Gen. Oscar Larrain “emerged from a meeting with
congressional leaders” to announce that Natusch would resign and a new president
363
would be selected later in the day (United Press International 1979a). Under the terms
of their accord, Guiller would assembly a Cabinet evenly divided between civilians and
officers (Hoge 1979b). Natusch “slipped out of the Presidential Palace,” told reporters
he was leaving matters “in the hands of Congress,” and fled for voluntary exile. That
evening, Congress selected Lydia Gueiler Tejada, President of the Chamber of Deputies,
to be interim president to preside over elections the following May. Guieler became
Bolivia’s first female President (United Press International 1979c). “Again civilian
and military elites had engaged in an unconstitutional and temporary solution to the
nation’s problems” (Gamarra 1988, 68). The next day, the U.S. resumed foreign aid.
“Gueiler’s appointment was celebrated as a definitive popular victory, but in practice it
represented a substantial compromise on the part of the constitutionalist camp since the
golpistas were not only allowed to retreat to the barracks without retribution but also
placed under the authority of a president who was expected to - and, in fact, did - leave
them entirely undisturbed” (Dunkerley 1982, 10). On November 23, Gueiler attempted
to reshuffle the military High Command, in effect trying to reverse Natusch’s selections
“replacing institutionalists with well known “golpistas” ” (Gamarra 1988, 69). The
army commander, General Garcia Meza, leading a “syndicate of commanders” (69),
“simply refused to recognize the changes, supported by Colonels Luis Arce Gomez, who
headed Military Intelligence, and Arturo Doria Medina Palacios and Gryzbowski, who
commanded the powerful “Tarapaca” and “Ingavi” regiments, respectively” (Farcau
1994, 171-172). “Almost immediately Gueiler found herself a prisoner of the military”
(Gamarra 1988, 69). “In effect, a dual command existed for several months, with
General Ruben Rocha Patino holding the largely powerless title of army commander
while Garcia Meza actually issued the orders, until, on 9 April [1980], Garcia Meza
was formally renamed as army commander” (Farcau 1994, 171-172).
“The fall of Natusch spelled an unmitigated disaster for the “generationalist” faction of
the military and the rise of the “gorillas” under the leadership of General Luis Garcia
Meza Tejada. Although Natusch had attempted to protect the “generationalists” like
Raul Lopez Leyton and Gary Prado Salmon by placing them under house arrest for
allegedly opposing his brief regime, this did not assuage the feelings of the civilians
in view of the brutal killings by the Army of defenseless demonstrators. Since the
“gorillas,” who everyone was aware were actually responsible for the killings, were
untouchable with their domination of the army’s combat units, the civilians took out
their vengeance on the weaker “generationalists” who must still bear some of the blame
for masterminding the November 1979 coup, even if they were ultimately made dupes
by the “gorillas.” Some were dismissed from active duty, exiled, or even clapped into
jail” (171). The “gorillas” went on to oust Guiler in the “cocaine coup” in July 1980
(see 145-1980-7-17).
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we code this event as a successful coup
against the leader of the provisional regime. Although the coup leader was forced to
step after two weeks, Natusch Bush remained in power for seven days, thus constituting
a “success.” Using a longer one-month rule, as CSP does, would entail a coding of
failure.
364
• # 145-1979-11-16: Bolivia, Alberto Natusch Busch
Category: legal
Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; not a candidate - CSP and PT;
successful coup - Singh; Archigos codes Natusch Busch as exiting on this date through
“regular” means; Svolik codes Natusch Busch as exiting on this date in a military coup;
GWF code a provisional regime (Bolivia 79-80) from August 8, 1979, until July 17,
1980.
Event: See 145-1979-11-1.
Coding rationale: Whether this event is a successful coup against Natusch Busch or a
legal transition depends on how one interprets the constitutionality of the accord that
was struck between the military, Congress, and CGT. Natusch’s exit on November 16
was not the result of a classic counter-coup insofar as it did not restore Walter Guevara
to office nor did it occur within seven days of the November 1 coup. Had we adopted
a one-month rule instead of a seven-day rule, this event would simply be “combined”
as part of a failed November 1 coup. In the event, we can find no evidence that Walter
Guevara protested the accord installing Guiler. Because the leadership transition was
the result of a negotiated settlement, one in which it is not clear that Natusch himself
opposed by this point, we code this event as “legal.” Had one agreed with observers
such as Gamarra, who viewed the accord as unconstitutional, then this event would
constitute a successful coup installing a second provisional leader in Bolivia.
• # 145-1980-7-17: Bolivia, Lidia Gueiler Tejada

Perez, Luttwak, and Singh; Archigos codes Lidia Gueiler Tejada as exiting on this
date through “irregular” means by other government actors without foreign support;
GWF code the collapse of a provisional regime (Bolivia 79-80) on this date. EPR codes
Event: Although interim president Lydia Guiler’s government had the support of Paz
Estenssoro’s MNR that controlled Congress, it “had little authority to control military
factions dissatisfied with the November accord” (Gamarra 1988, 69). Thus, “Relations
between the military and the Gueiler government were always tense, but the new
president, who happened to be a distant cousin” of the army commander, General
Garcia Meza, “managed to avoid open confrontation.” Presidential elections were
scheduled for June 1980, and the military faced the troubling prospect that Siles might
win. His UDP followers “had been quite vocal in calling for responsibility trials, not
only for excesses committed by the military during the Banzer regime, but now also
for the killings during the brief Natusch government” (Farcau 1994, 172).
As the presidential elections approached on June 29, coup rumors swirled. On May 30,
1980, the U.S. ambassador, Marvin Weissman, reportedly intervened to stop a coup
(United Press International 1980a) planned by Gen. Luis Garcı́a Meza, the Army
365
Commander (Hoge 1980b). General Garcı́a Meza “was among the growing number
of officers who believed that the democratic game had gone too far. Congress was
perceived as a circus and civilian rule was viewed as disorderly, inefficient, and corrupt.
Garcı́a Meza argued that Bolivia was not yet prepared for democracy and that the
foundations of democratic rule still had to be established. Clearly, the Commander
of the Army positioned himself to strike against the civilians in and out of Congress
who were involved in the trial against Banzer that had continued despite the Natusch
coup and Garcı́a Meza’s warnings” (Gamarra 1988, 69). Weissman warned the military
plotters that the U.S. would impose full sanctions if a coup were attempted (Dunkerley
1982, 12). General Echeverria was also rumored to be plotting a pre-election coup by his
forces in Santa Cruz, but was dissuaded by the threat of an aid cutoff by international
donors (Hoge 1980b).
Weissman’s defense of Bolivia’s democratic process “unleashed a welter of condemna-
tions of ‘imperialist intervention’ from the right and the military” (Dunkerley 1982,
12). On June 8, the high command sent the Foreign Minister a letter declaring Am-
bassador Weissman persona non grata for intervening in Bolivia’s internal affairs. The
letter was signed not only by Garcı́a Meza but Gen. Armando Reyes, the armed forces
commander; Gen. Waldo Bernal, the air force commander; and Vice Adm. Ramiro
Terrazas, the Navy commander (United Press International 1980a). On June 9, Gen-
eral Hugo Echeverria, commander of the powerful Second Army Corps in Santa Cruz de
la Sierra, declared a “state of emergency” in eastern Bolivia (Associated Press 1980b)
and “threatened to march on the capital” unless Guiler expelled Weissman (Dunkerley
1982, 12). Then the high command called for a one-year postponement of the elec-
tions (Associated Press 1980b). On June 12, the armed forces dismissed U.S. State
Department charges of a coup plot “false and slanderous” (Hoge 1980a) and agreed
not to block elections (Hoge 1980b). Military plotters would wait to strike after the
elections. On June 17, 1980, “six of Bolivia’s biggest traffickers met with the military
conspirators to work out a financial deal for future protection of their trade.” The
Interior Minister, Col. Luis Arce Gomes, employed Stefano delle Chiaie, an Argentine
agent, and his foreign mercenaries to prepare for the coup (Scott and Marshall 1998,
45).
On June 29, elections were held. According to the final vote tally certified on July 11
by the national electoral court, the Democratic Unity Party (UDP) won the greatest
number of seats (57 of 157). UDP leader Siles Zuazo won nearly twice as many votes as
the nearest candidate (38 percent to 20 percent). However, because he did not garner
a majority, the selection of president would fall to Congress when it was set to convene
on August 3 (Reuters 1980). The military feared a UDP victory, for two reasons. The
first was that “the prospect of a congressional indictment against Banzer and a full
fledged impeachment trial in the Supreme Court. Second was a fear that civilians
would investigate disclosures that Garcia Meza and a number of officers close to him,
such as Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, were linked to the narcotics traffic and paramilitary
squads involved in a series of recent kidnappings and killings. The military group close
to Garcia Meza attempted to rally support around their cause by claiming that the
UDP was a Communist front that intended to establish a Marxist regime” (Gamarra
366
1988, 69-70). In secret talks, Siles refused to guarantee posts to the military high
command if inaugurated (Dunkerley 1982, 14).
On July 17, 1980, General Garcia Meza overthrew Lydia Gueiler in the so-called “co-
caine coup” and annulled the June election results “claiming that the UDP had engaged
in massive fraud” (Gamarra 1988, 70). As in October 1979 (see 145-1979-10-11), the
coup began early in the morning when troops in Trinidad seized the provincial capital
and called on the military high command to seize power (Associated Press 1980a).
“As the morning wore on, no other military units declared any support for the rising”
and the coup seemed to fizzle. Labor leaders and leftist politicians began to orga-
nize anti-coup strikes and demonstrations. But just before noon, ambulances carrying
paramilitary thugs, some from the Ministry of Interior and some “recently released
criminals in the pay of the narcotics mafia, who supported Garcia Meza” arrived.
They stormed and fired on the Bolivian Worker’s Center (COB). COB leader Juan
Lechin was taken prisoner. Siles “escaped in a hail of gunfire out the back of the build-
ing and into a waiting car.” Interim President Lidia Gueiler took “refuge in the Papal
Nunciatura, but most of the legislature were seized at the Plaza Murillo” as were party
leaders (Farcau 1994, 173-174).
“Although troops from both the “Colorados” and “Ingavi” regiments, located within
the city, and the “Tarapaca” and “Lanza” regiments farther away, quickly moved on
other major targets, such as the university and the various government ministries, the
actual seizure of the government had been accomplished before most of the uniformed
troops arrived on the scene. The newspaper offices were occupied, and the radio
and television stations went off the air, with the exception of the army-run “Radio
Colorados” which broadcast announcements of the fall of the Gueiler government.” To
prevent civilians from blocking highways or throwing stones as they had in November
1979, “the army set up a system of roving patrols which prevented the civilians from
rebuilding their barricades or even congregating” (174). During the coup, leftist leaders
were killed. The death toll “certainly ran into the hundreds” (175). For his part,
Herná Siles Zuazo escaped that fate but “spent the next several days running for his
life around Bolivia before finally managing to escape abroad” (175).
A military junta composed of the three service commanders, calling itself the Govern-
ment of National Reconstruction, assumed power (Associated Press 1980a). On June
18, Guiler went on radio and formally resigned as interim president in an emotional
broadcast. Hours later, Gen. Garcı́a Meza decreed himself president and was sworn in.
Meanwhile, the junta sent troops to subdue mining towns that were resisting the coup
and urging a general strike (United Press International 1980b). Clashes with miners
resulted in many casualties over the next few days (Associated Press 1980d). But COB
leader Juan Lechin “appeared on the government-controlled television several days af-
ter the coup, obviously heavily made-up to cover his bruises, and made an impassioned
plea for workers to return peacefully to their jobs and not to oppose the military. This
more than anything else seemed to take the heart out of the worker opposition to the
coup” (Farcau 1994, 175).
“International opposition to the coup was immediately and fervently declared. The
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American ambassador was withdrawn, and aid from Mexico, Venezuela, and the West-
ern European powers was quickly cut off. It soon began to leak out that the narcotics
mafia had provided substantial sums of money to ensure the support of key officers in
the coup and that they had lent significant physical support to the coup in the form
of their own gunmen” (Farcau 1994, 176). The coup was supported by Argentina’s
military junta led by General Videla, who “had on a number of occasions declared
that it would not tolerate prospective centres of ‘subversion’ on its borders (Dunkerley
1982, 15). Argentina “infiltrated agents into Bolivia to work with military plotters
and with Klaus Barbie, the escaped Nazi war criminal and former U.S. intelligence
agent who was their close ally.”41 Gen. (ret.) Suarez Mason, former head of army
intelligence, “and his fellow officers put an Argentine intelligence specialist in charge
of the operation. One of his key agents on the scene was an adviser at Bolivia’s mil-
itary intelligence school. In all, the Argentines had as many as two hundred military
personnel in Bolivia to coordinate the seizure of power” (Scott and Marshall 1998, 44).
“Within days of taking power, Arce Gomez, a cousin of Bolivia’s premier cocaine traf-
ficker, Roberto Suarez, began releasing convicted smugglers from prison and recruiting
them into his paramilitary squads. He went into direct partnership with some of the
biggest smugglers and taxed others for protection” (46). “Arbitrary arrest by paramil-
itary units, torture, and disappearances–with the assistance of Argentine advisers–
destroyed the opposition. Government involvement in cocaine trafficking resulted in
international isolation for Bolivia. Cocaine exports reportedly totaled US$850 million
in the 1980-81 period of the Garcia Meza regime, twice the value of official government
exports. The “coca dollars” were used to buy the silence or active support of military
officers. But Garcia Meza, who failed to gain support in the military, faced repeated
coup attempts and was pressured to resign on August 4, 1981” (Wagner 1991, 46).
The coup leaders clearly intended to “emulate the examples of Chile (1973), Uruguay
(1973) and Argentina (1976)” (Dunkerley 1982, 1).
event a successful coup against the provisional regime, marking a return to autocratic
rule.
• # 145-1981-5-11: Bolivia, Luis Garcı́a Meza

Archigos codes Garcı́a Meza as the leader of Bolivia from July 18, 1980, to August 4,
1981; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 80-82) from July 17, 1980, to October 10,
1982. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953
to 1992.
Event: On May 11, 1981, the Commander of the Center for the Instruction of Special
Troops (CITE), Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Lanza, led an uprising of paratroopers in
Cochabamba demanding Garcı́a Meza’s resignation. In a telephone interview with the
41. Klaus Barbie had been Gestapo chief in Lyons (Wagner 1991, 46).
368
Associated Press, Lanza said he “could not remain silent regarding the current situation
of nongovernment, the covering up of the narcotics traffic, the chaotic form in which
public forms are being handled and the abuse of the people in the name of the armed
forces” (Associated Press 1981e). Lanza also criticized “the military management of the
country and had pointed out that it was the opinion of many officers that Garcı́a Meza
had betrayed the confidence they had in him” (Télam 1981b). By May 12, Lanza’s
unit surrendered after General Garcı́a Meza rallied loyal troops in Cochabamba (United
Press International 1981a).
Coding rationale: This case and the following one two weeks later (see 145-1981-5-25)
were both led by Lt. Col. Emilio Lanza. He opposed the corruption and policies
of the Garcı́a Meza, but not military rule in general. According to Dunkerley (1982,
29), Lanza was known to be a follower of Banzer. The direct issue that causes this
attempt and the following one was a secret and illegal mining deal that would have
benefitted the junta. But “Lanza acted entirely on his own initiative and without great
intelligence, the only remarkable feature of the episode being that he was permitted
to go free to repeat his endeavour. However, Lanza’s actions had sufficient resonance
to break the atmosphere of control that the regime had hitherto maintained.” Had he
succeeded, we assume the military elite would have remained in power, but the junta
members simply shuffled out.
• 145-1981-5-25: Bolivia, Luis Garcı́a Meza

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD and CSP; Failed coup attempt - PT; mutiny
- Singh; Archigos codes Garcı́a Meza as the leader of Bolivia from July 18, 1980, to
August 4, 1981; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 80-82) from July 17, 1980, to
October 10, 1982. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia
from 1953 to 1992.
Event: Having escaped prison following his coup attempt of May 11, on May 25, 1981,
Lt. Col. Lanza undertook another coup attempt in Cochabamba and again called
for the resignation of General Luis Garcı́a Meza. Lanza had asserted “in a telephone
interview from Cochabamba that he had control of the city of 95,000 and the support
of the country’s naval commanders,” but Lanza gave up his position later in the day
(Associated Press 1981c). Lanza was later exiled to Ecuador along with several other
conspirators.
Coding rationale: In a telephone declaration to reporters, Lanza said that his uprising
was “purely military,” although he said he had the support of civilian nationalist forces
in Santa Cruz, particularly those connected with former President Hugo Bánzer. Lanza
also said “he wanted power handed over to whichever general “was capable of getting
the country out of its present disastrous state,” adding that he favored former President
Alberto Natusch Busch or General Banzer” (Shipp 1981b). On June 15, 1981, a letter
written by Lanza to his comrades in arms was reported, in which he stated that he
opposed those in the military who “try to perpetuate in power one who desperately
369
insists on committing the armed forces to the drug trafficking mafia, smuggling, illegal
business deals and nepotism” (Télam 1981a). Following the August 1981 coup led
by Gen. Alberto Natusch Busch unseating Garcı́a Meza, Lanza declared his support
for the new administration of Gen. Celso Torrelio Villa, saying it was not a mere
extension of the Garcı́a Meza regime, and asked to be reinstated (Agence France-Presse
1981). However, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) do code the August 1981 coup
as a reshuffling coup. Based on this precedent, we assume that had Lanza succeeded
earlier, he would also have perpetuated a purely military regime. We therefore code
this and the previous case as a failed reshuffling coup. Also see case 145-1981-5-11.
• # 145-1981-6-27: Bolivia, Luis Garcı́a Meza

and Singh; Archigos codes Garcı́a Meza as the leader of Bolivia from July 18, 1980,
to August 4, 1981; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 80-82) from July 17, 1980,
to October 10, 1982. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in
Event: In June 1981, in the wake of two coup attempts in May by Lt. Col. Lanza (see
above), Maj. Gen. Luis Garcı́a Meza Tejeda relinquished his role as Army commander-
in-chief, naming Lt. Gen. Humberto Cayoja Riart to the post. Meanwhile, Lucio Añez
Ribero was named army chief of staff. Garcia Meza agreed to step down August 6 as
president (Goodsell 1981). Two days later, “the tiny but persistently troublesome
navy officer corps demanded the removal of Garcia and succeeded in displacing its
own commander, Terrazas, who held no real power” (Dunkerley 1982, 30). A week
later, on Saturday, June 27, Añez and Cayoja launched a coup attempt of their own
(Shipp 1981a). They called a meeting of senior commanders, with the support of the
ambitious Waldo Bernal, the air force commander, in an attempt to oust Garcia. But
the meeting reached no firm decision (Dunkerley 1982, 30). The next day, Añez and
Cayoja were replaced and arrested the next day (Goodsell 1981). The coup failed “due
largely to their reliance on the support of the La Paz garrison, whose leading officers
(Doria Medina, Rico Toro, Gribowsky) deserted the movement in exchange for large
sums of money dispensed on Arce’s orders” (Dunkerley 1982, 31).
Coding rationale: According to a CIA report, “Cayoja and Anez were both considered
prime candidates to succeed Garcia Meza and reportedly acted to prevent him from
making changes in the high command that would have hurt their chances to replace
him. They also may have been reacting to the General’s recent efforts to retain power
beyond his leave of office in August.” The latter interpretation was stressed in news
reports (e.g. Shipp 1981a). We interpret this evidence as suggesting these generals
sought to forestall Garcı́a Meza from staying in power after August 6 and to bolster
their succession chances, not to topple the military regime itself. We therefore code
this event as a failed reshuffling coup.
• # 145-1981-8-4: Bolivia, Luis Garcia Meza
370
failed coup attempt - CSP; successful coup - PT and Singh; Archigos codes Meza Tejada
as being removed on this date through “irregular” means by domestic military actors
without foreign support; Svolik codes Meza Tejeda as being removed by a military
coup on this date; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 80-82) from July 17, 1980,
to October 10, 1982. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the dominant ethnic group in
Event: Under Garcia Meza, Bolivia’s international isolation grew due to human rights
abuses and ties to drug trafficking. “Officers concerned about the military’s future
role and presence in Bolivian society and politics realised that the only alternative
to a total collapse of the armed forces was to retreat to the barracks immediately.
This objective could only be achieved, however, by first eliminating Garcia Meza and
his clan. In early August 1981 several garrisons across the country demanded Garcia
Meza’s resignation. Finally a coup led by “institutionalists” launched in Santa Cruz,
forced him to resign” and turn over the government to a military junta (Gamarra 1988,
71). The coup was organized by General Alberto Natusch Busch and Gen. Lucio Anez
Rivero (Welch 1987, 63).
On August 4, Garcia Meza agreed to resign “when Waldo Bernal, the air force com-
mander, and Vice-Admiral Oscar Pammo, the navy commander, both members of the
three-man military junta, pledged their support for the rebels” (Reuters 1981). On
August 5, the three-man junta took power, but this did not end the revolt as Natusch
and Añez said they did not recognize the junta and were waiting for the junta to ne-
gotiate with them (New York Times 1981). The “rebels failed to win Cochabamba,
Oruro and La Paz, all fortified with an infusion of cocadolares at the order of Garcia,
acting in support of his appointed successors, a new junta comprising Bernal, General
Celso Torrelio (army) and Admiral Pammo. However, the coup succeeded in winning
the backing of all the southern, eastern and northern garrisons, the navy, and a large
part of the air force.” The junta was only able to defuse the crisis when the junta
convinced Natusch to “defect from the revolt just at the moment when it was at the
point of taking power” by agreeing to just one of movement demand–reincorporation
of purged officer. “Although Anez disowned Natusch, it proved impossible to hold
the revolt together, especially since Garcia was no longer president” (Dunkerley 1982,
32). By August 8, the rebellion was over after Natusch met with the junta, with an
understanding that both he and Garcia Meza would retire (Schumacher 1981).
Garcia Meza left Bolivia in September (Rex A Hudson 1991a, 230). The “continuista”
junta installed by Garcia Meza ruled for a month before turning over power to one of
its members, army commander Gen. Celso Torrelio Villa (Welch 1987, 63).
Coding rationale: CSP code this as a failed coup, probably because Natusch Busch
or Añez did not take power. However, evidence indicates that the post-coup leaders
stayed in power for at least a week, and thus we view this event as a success. In
addition, at this time both Natusch Busch and Anez Rivero were prior defectors, as
371
they had been ordered into exile by Garcia Meza earlier in the year due to their coup
plotting (Associated Press 1981d). Nevertheless, current and active members of the
military were also involved, and so we therefore do not exclude this as just a case of
prior defection. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we therefore code
this event as a successful reshuffling coup within the ruling military regime. One could
arguably also code a second failed coup event that targeted the three-man junta, but
we combine this subsequent rebellion as part of the successful coup empowering the
junta.
• # 145-1982-7-19: Bolivia, Celso Torrelio Villa
Category: legal
Singh; Archigos codes Torrelio Villa as being removed on this date through “irregular”
means though a power struggle in the military short of a coup, and Vildoso Calderon as
entering via “irregular” means on July 22; Svolik codes Torrelio Villa as being removed
by a military coup on this date; GWF code a military regime (Bolivia 80-82) from July
17, 1980, to October 10, 1982.
Event: On July 16, 1982, amidst a growing political and economic crisis in Bolivia42 ,
it was reported that Gen. Celso Torrelio had offered his resignation on July 14. Two
senior military commanders said the military chiefs would meet soon to consider the
offer (Reuters 1982a). On July 15, Torrelios had announced that elections would be
held next April to return the country to democracy and that he would turn over power
to the winner on August 6, 1983 (Associated Press 1982a).
On Sunday, July 18, the military confirmed that Torrelio offered to resign. However,
“Saturday night [July 17], the military high command rejected a bid by Col. Faustino
Rico Toro to assume the presidency.” Toro, the head of the military academy, said
Torrelio had failed to deal with Bolivia’s crisis and should go. “He said he represented
a new generation of army officers who wanted to pull the military out of politics
and return the country to democracy as soon as possible. General Torrelio’s election
announcement, he said, was forced on him by discontented officers in the army whom he
represented.” The high command said Toro’s attitude was “subversive.” The “power
struggle” in the military left Bolivia “virtually leaderless” Reuters (1982b).
The high command was scheduled to meet Monday, July 19, to consider Torrelio’s
resignation and perhaps choose a successor Reuters (1982b). Before then, the navy
commander Oscar Pammo said the decision to return to civilian rule “is irreversible
and will be carried out by whoever is president,” though “there were reports that
hard-line officers opposed to civilian rule wanted to remove Gen. Torrelio” (Associated
Press 1982b). On July 19, the high command decided to replace Torrelio and form a
junta including commanders of each service: Gen Angel Mariscal (army); Gen Natalio
Morales (air force), and Vice Admiral Oscar Pammo (navy) (United Press International
1982b). In turn, the junta appointed army chief of staff Gen. Guido Vildoso Calderon
42. Naylor (2004, 168) notes that the coup trap led bank lending to dry up, arrears grew, and “between
the cocaine coup in 1980 and September 1982, ten IMF missions came and went without real progress.
372
as president, and he was sworn in the next day July 20 (United Press International
1982a).
Coding rationale: Horwitz (2011, Table 1) lists a coup in Bolivia in 1982. According to
Wagner (1991, 46), “The ruthlessness, extreme corruption, and international isolation
of the Garcia Meza government completely demoralized and discredited the military;
many officers wanted to return to democracy. However, President General Celso Tor-
relio Villa (1981-82), who had emerged as a compromise candidate of the military after
Garcia Meza’s resignation, was reluctant to call for elections. In July 1982, after yet
another attempt by the Garcia Meza clique to return to power, he was replaced by
General Guido Vildoso Calderon (1982), who was named by the high command to
return the country to democratic rule.”
Lentz (1994, 100) makes no mention of foul play in Torrelio’s resignation, simply say-
ing “General Torrelio made plans to return Bolivia to civilian rule and resigned from
office on July 19, 1982.” Goemens, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009) similarly provides
no evidence of concrete and unconstitutional actions taken to replace Torrelio. But
Morales and Sachs (1989, 59) says that Torrelios was deposed in a coup. It is likely
that Torrelios voluntarily offered his resignation in anticipation of a coup against him.
Because we can find no evidence that the actions were actually taken to oust Torre-
lio, we code his resignation and replacement as legal or following “regular” military
procedures. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 145-1984-6-30: Bolivia, Hernán Siles Zuazo

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - BR; failed coup attempt by other se-
curity forces - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Siles
Zuazo as leader of Bolivia from October 10, 1982, until August 6, 1985; GWF code a
democracy (Bolivia 82-NA) since October 11, 1982. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as
the dominant ethnic group in Bolivia from 1953 to 1992.
Event: “The lack of progress in the coca control program prompted Bolivia’s nar-
cotics police, the Leopards, to take matters into their own hands. On June 30, 1984,
military commanders from the Leopards attempted to launch a coup” (Marcy 2010,
75). At 5:30 a.m., some 60 rightist army troops and police officers led by Lt. Celsio
Campos Pinto entered the presidential palace and kidnapped President Hernán Siles
Zuazo. They held him for 10 hours in what one official called “an attempt to cre-
ate the conditions for a military coup” (Associated Press 1984c). With the president
abducted, the Cabinet assumed control of the government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
confirmed their support for democracy, and the Bolivian Labor Federation called for
worker demonstrations to defend the President (Associated Press 1984b).
During the afternoon, military police occupied the Leopards’ headquarters and ar-
rested their commanding officer, German Linares (Associated Press 1984c), who was
implicated in the plot. The kidnappers claimed to have “received backing directly
from the Reagan administration. U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia Edwin Corr denied that
373
the United States was behind the coup and affirmed that the United States opposed
any attempt to overthrow Zuazo. Without support within Bolivia or from the United
States, the coup attempt failed to gain momentum and fell apart” (Marcy 2010, 75).
Other “Officers realised that a coup against Siles or any other civilian regime at that
point was suicidal” (Gamarra 1988, 73). President Siles was found in the Miraflo-
res neighborhood of La Paz guarded by six armed men wearing civilian clothing. As
condition for releasing Siles, the six men demanded asylum (Associated Press 1984b).
On July 1, the government identified Col. Rolando Saravia, the former head of the
Ingavi regiment who had been removed for involvement in a coup plot, was identified as
the leader of the coup attempt. The government said the plot “was aimed at installing
a rightist regime” and implicated “high-ranking officers and politicians” (Associated
Press 1984b). Unofficial reports said the kidnappers demanded the dismissal of the
Army Commander, Gen. Simon Sejas Tordoya and “the transfer of power to the
Congress, where the President’s party-the National Revolutionary Movement of the
Left (MNRI)-did not hold a majority” (Keesing’s World News Archive 1984). By
July 2, 100 right-wing officers had been arrested in connection with the coup attempt,
including Lt. Celso Campos of the military police, and Maj. Luis Ardaya, an aide
to the Vice President. The rebel leader, Col. Saravia, remained in hiding. The six
kidnappers surrendered after a country could not be found that would grant them
asylum (Associated Press 1984a). The highest ranking officer implicated in the coup
attempt was Col. Mario Oxa Bustos, the second-ranking defense official (Associated
Press 1984d). Officials reported that they had no evidence that the coup attempt was
directly linked to cocaine traffickers (Simons 1984).
coup. We interpret the kidnapping as a concrete action intended to spark a military-
wide uprising. However, because the kidnappers never publicly stated their goals, the
charge that the kidnappers goals included installing a military regime come from the
government and an “unofficial report.” However, we follow the majority of country
experts who do in fact interpret the event as a coup attempt.
• # 145-2019-11-10: Bolivia, Evo Morales

Other Datasets: Archigos codes Juan Morales as leader of Bolivia since 22 January
2006 (still in office as of the end of 2015); GWF code a democracy (Bolivia 82-NA)
since October 11, 1982. EPR codes Aymara as senior partner and Whites/Mestizos
and Quechua as junior partner ethnic groups in Bolivia from 2006 to 2017 (the last
year it codes).
Event: On Sunday, October 20, 2019, President Evo Morales stood for re-election to
a fourth term. Initially, with most but not all of the vote counted, it did not appear
that Morales had won beaten the second-place finisher, ex-President Carlos Mesa, by
at least 10 points in order to avoid a runoff (Londoño 2019c). On Monday, October 21,
updated electoral results that showed Morales with a big enough vote lead to avoid a
runoff. Election monitors from the Organization of American States (OAS) expressed
374
concerns over the count(Londoño 2019b). Protestors immediately launched protests
charging electoral fraud over the next few days. On October 23, Morales declared
victory and “asserted that he would declare a “state of emergency” to fight back
against what he characterized as a foreign-backed coup attempt” (Londoño 2019e).
On Friday, October 25, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal officially announced Morales ’
victory with 47 percent of the vote and just enough votes to avoid a runoff (Londoño
2019d), leading to even more protest.
On Wednesday, October 30, an unsigned letter purporting to represent 2,933 mid-
level officers was released. It read, “The armed forces of the state will never take
up arms against the people. Our weapons will only be raised to defend our people,
our Constitution and our laws.” The letter claimed that the constitution limited the
president to two consecutive terms and thus questioned Morales’ legitimacy (Machicao
and Londoño 2019). “This signal from the armed forces fundamentally changed the
political dynamic.” By November 1, emboldened protestors not just demanding a run-
off election but also Morales’ resignation and new elections in which neither Morales’
nor his vice president could run (Lehoucq 2020, 138-139).
Protests, involving increasingly violent clashes between Morales supporters and op-
ponents, continued through the first week of November, and left three people dead
(Machicao and Semple 2019). On Friday, November 8, “a smattering of small police
units made dramatic pronouncements that they were breaking from the government
and joining protesters” (Londoño 2019a). The first major security force defection came
November 8, when police in Cochabamba declared loyalty to the people (Lehoucq 2020,
139).
On Saturday, November 9, “Police officers in La Paz were among the first to join the
revolt. Initially, many took to the streets with bandannas or surgical masks covering
their faces, apparently fearful of being identified. But as their ranks grew, many shed
the masks and used bullhorns to address protesters. “Our duty will always be the
defense of the people,” a female officer said through tears in a televised address. “The
police are with the people!” (Londoño 2019a). Police units in at least five other major
cities (Santa Cruz, Beni, Potosı́, Sucre, and Tarija) also joined the anti-Morales protests
(Lehoucq 2020, 139). Police guards “abandoned their posts outside the presidential
palace. State television broadcast images of throngs of police, many still in uniform,
marching with protesters in La Paz” and Santa Cruz. “In La Paz, crowds of protesters
cheered the rebelling officers. Rebel police officers claimed to have taken over at least
one regional governor’s office.” Meanwhile, protestors took over government offices, and
some key Morales allies resigned. In a televised address from his traditional stronghold
of El Alto, Morales said that “A coup is underway.” Afterwards, Bolivia’s armed forces
commander, Gen. Williams Kaliman, issued a statement professing the neutrality of
the armed forces and promising to “not clash with the people.” Kaliman said, “The
country’s current problems generated in the political arena must be resolved bearing in
mind the nation’s highest interests before we reach an irreversible moment” (Londoño,
Londoño, and Machicao 2019).
On Sunday, November 10, General Kaliman said the military chiefs believed Morales
375
“should step down to restore “peace and stability and for the good of our Bolivia.”” As
the day wore on, leading figures in Morales’ Movement for Socialism (MAS) resigned,
and “the military launched operations that appeared intended to protect protesters
from armed bands of Morales supporters.” Abandoned by the generals, Morales went
on television to announce his resignation soon after. His vice president, Álvaro Garcı́a
Linera, also resigned. Both men said that they had acquiesced to avoid further blood-
shed but denied electoral fraud and said they were victims of a coup. “The coup has
been consummated,” Mr. Garcı́a said. On twitter later that night, Morales said that
the police were illegally trying to arrest him and that “violent groups” had attacked
his home. Leftist leaders in Latin America, including Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and
former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, condemned Morales’ ouster as a
coup. Right-wing Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro applauded Morales’ ouster. “The
word coup is used a lot when the left loses,” he told the newspaper O Globo. “When
they win, it’s legitimate. When they lose it’s a coup”” (Londoño 2019a).
On Monday, November 11, Morales was granted asylum in Mexico. As La Paz de-
scended into chaos, the armed forces were forced to deploy to try to restore order.
Meanwhile, there was a power vacuum since several politicians, including congressional
leaders in both houses in the line of succession, had also resigned. Protestors demanded
that parliament appoint an interim president, and legislators rushed back to the capital
to begin trying to select a caretaker government (C. Krauss 2019b). “Catholic church
leaders called an urgent meeting of the country’s main political forces... to decide
who should take the reins” (Kurmanaev and Castillo 2019). Constitutional succession
stalled, as “The MAS, which controls two-thirds of each chamber, boycotted sessions
of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies after Evo left” (Lehoucq 2020, 140)
On Tuesday, November 12, Jeanine Añez Chavez, the Senate’s second vice president
and a member of the Democratic Union Party, claimed the interim presidency (C.
Krauss 2019a). She was plucked from obscurity as “a senator from a remote tropical
region who had sat out October’s elections and was about to retire.” Her Senate posi-
tion had been “largely ceremonial” (Kurmanaev and Castillo 2019). She cited “a 2001
constitutional ruling that the executive can never be vacant. In the absence of a leg-
islative quorum, however, Añez’s presidency was a constitutionally suspect, if clever,
gambit to stabilize Bolivian politics” (Lehoucq 2020, 141). Though Morales’ support-
ers said they would hold their own legislative session to nullify her claim, Bolivia’s
constitutional court backed Añez’s claim to power as next in the line of succession.
Morales insisted via Twitter that Añez acted “without legislative quorum, surrounded
by a group of accomplices and supported by the armed forces and the police, which
repress the people” (C. Krauss 2019a).
Coding rationale: In the wake of this event, some debate arose as to whether Morales’
ouster was due to an uprising or a coup (e.g. Fisher 2019a). In his review of events,
for example, Lehoucq (2020, 132) concludes the event was a “citizen revolt” and not
a military coup as “No military officer or group of officers at any time took charge of
the state.” However, that military members seize power for themselves is not actually
a part of the Colpus dataset’s definition of a coup. It is enough for leader change to be
376
the result of unconstitutional actions by current, active security forces, even if the first
post-coup leader is an acceptable civilian figure. That is, the key definitional issue is
not who took power (civilian or military member) but how the incumbent was forced
out. Most scholars would acknowledge the existence of non-military coups that take
place without the support of current military officers, as has occurred in single-party
regimes. Obviously military officers never take control of the state in such cases, yet
coups still occur.
To reiterate, the two categories (mass protest and coup) are not mutually exclusive.
We would agree with Lehoucq and others that Morales’ ouster was only due to mass
protest only if when he had resigned current security forces had done no more than
engaged in passive military quartering (e.g. declare neutrality, refuse orders to repress).
However, we do not exclude Morales’ ouster as simply the result of mass protest by
civilians because there is clear evidence of concrete actions by current, active troops in
support of the protests. In addition to the police mutiny, there was a clear and public
threat from the military high command prior to Morales’ resignation. We therefore
consider this event as a successful military coup, even though a civilian was installed
as interim president.
Regardless of whether one thinks that Añez’s entry was legal or not, Morales’ exit
was clearly forced and “irregular.” We are forced to agree with Levitsky and Murillo
(2019), who in calling Morales’ ouster a coup note that “Many Bolivians sought Mr.
Morales’s departure. But he quit only after the police rebelled and the army chief
called for his resignation – a call made after he had conceded to new elections under
new electoral authorities, which offered a plausible way out of the crisis without military
intervention.” Note, then, that whether or not there were irregularities in the October
voting – and thus the debate over the suggestions of fraud in the OAS report – does not
really affect our coding. Obviously grievances over the election were the precipitating
cause of the protests, and whether or not there was significant election fraud is highly
important for arguments over the legitimacy of Morales’ ouster. Again, however, the
claims of fraud do not really alter the legality of anti-Morales actions. Contra Lehoucq’s
interpretation, in our view it is precisely the existence of a coup attempt (in support of
protests) that “dented the constitutional order.” This is true even if protests were the
“primary” or main cause of Morales’ exit. Our coding only implies coup was a cause.
Given that Morales was Bolivia’s first indigenous president, his ouster has implications
for ethnic power relations, and this fact suggests regime change rather than simply a
reshuffling.
377
2.1.18 150: Paraguay
Table 18: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Paraguay

150-1946-6-9 Paraguay 39-48 Morı́nigo, Higinio Autogolpe (S)

150-1947-3-7 Paraguay 39-48 Morı́nigo, Higinio Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
150-1947-4-26 Paraguay 39-48 Morı́nigo, Higinio Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
150-1948-6-3 Paraguay 39-48 Morı́nigo, Higinio Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
150-1948-10-25 Paraguay 48-54 Natalicio González, Juan Reshuffle Coup (F)
150-1949-1-30 Paraguay 48-54 Natalicio González, Juan Reshuffle Coup (S)
150-1949-2-26 Paraguay 48-54 Rolón, Raimundo Reshuffle Coup (S)
150-1949-9-10 Paraguay 48-54 Molas López, Felipe Reshuffle Coup (S)
150-1954-5-5 Paraguay 48-54 Chávez, Federico Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
150-1955-12-21 Paraguay 54-93 Stroessner, Alfredo Reshuffle Coup (F)
150-1989-2-3 Paraguay 54-93 Stroessner, Alfredo Reshuffle Coup (S)
150-1996-4-22 Paraguay 93-NA Wasmosy Monti, Juan Carlos Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
150-2000-5-18 Paraguay 93-NA González Macchi, Luis Ángel Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
150-2012-6-22 Paraguay 93-NA Fernando Lugo legal
• # 150-1946-6-9: Paraguay, Higinio Morı́nigo

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, PT, and Singh; failed coup
attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Morinigo as the leader of Paraguay from Septem-
ber 8, 1940, until June 3, 1948; GWF code a personal regime (Paraguay 39-48) from
April 30, 1939, until June 3, 1948.
Event: During World War II, the Frente de Guerra, a faction of pro-fascist (Axis)
military and police officers, exercised “considerable influence over the government of
Higinio Morı́nigo” (Nickson 2015, 254). This ultra conservative faction, sometimes
referred to as the “Grupo de Caballerı́a,” was led by “cavalry commander Colonel Vic-
toriano Benı́tez Vera, army chief of staff Colonel Bernardo Aranda Gamba, air force
chief Pablo Stagni, commander of the Concepción military region, Colonel Heriberto
Florentin, secret police chief Marcos Fuster, and chief of police Colonel Mutshuito
Villasboa” (254). The group was a pillar of the regime and was “credited with the
removal” of Foreign Minister Argaña in March 1944 (Humphreys 2016, 129).
By 1946, the Frente de Guerra officers opposed liberalization and were “capable of
subverting it by staging a coup.” However, with the Axis powers defeated, the United
States applied pressure to stamp out these fascist elements and to organize democratic
elections. In June 1946, “with the support of key officers and the minister of inte-
rior, General Amancio Pampliega, a moderate liked by officers of different political
persuasions, President Morı́nigo ousted Frente de Guerra officers from their strategic
commands, giving him and Ambassador Beaulac the freedom to pursue aggressively
the program of democratization” (Mora and Cooney 2010, 117).
On June 9, 1946, a “military movement” under U.S. pressure removed the Frente de
Guerra (Nickson 2015, 254).That day, some sort of armed clash reportedly left “two
378
officers and three enlisted men of the Paraguayan 1st Cavalry Division,” the main unit
in the military, dead. Some initial reports speculated that a coup attempt or “short-
lived revolt” may have been thwarted. In any event, Colonel Victoriano Benitez Vera
was retired as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, which had its headquarters at
Campe Grande, near Asuncion (United Press 1946a; Associated Press 1946c).
coup. Although the Frente de Guerra officers were “capable” a coup, the historical
evidence seems to indicate that it was the regime leader (Morinigo) who targeted
military actors and not vice versa. The clash that occcurs appears to have been the
result of a purge, not a coup attempt. We therefore we code this event as a successful
autogolpe rather than a failed coup attempt.

Other Datasets: failed military coup and popular revolt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP;
failed coup attempt - Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Higinio Morı́nigo as the leader
of Paraguay from September 8, 1940, until June 3, 1948; GWF code a personal regime
(Paraguay 39-48) from April 30, 1939, until June 3, 1948. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos
as the monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay since 1946.
Event: At 11 a.m. on Friday, March 7, 1947, a group of armed Febreristas attacked
police headquarters in Asunción (Nickson 2015, 86). The government said that the
attack also involved armed communists–that party having been outlawed in January–
and leading to at least six deaths (United Press 1947e). On March 8, Capt. Juan
Bartolome Araujo led junior infantry officers in a military uprising at the northern
garrison in Concepción “against the pro-Colorado military leadership in the false ex-
pectation that similar military units in Asunción would do likewise” (Nickson 2015,
46,144). By March 11, the government appealed to residents to evacuate the city before
loyal troops attacked to crush the rebellious First Division (Associated Press 1947h).
By March 11, northern Paraguay was declared a war zone (United Press 1947d). These
events led to a five month civil war. Forces in Chaco joined the rebellion and the rebel
command passed to Major César Aguire, Lt. Col. Alfredo Galeano, and then Lt. Col.
Fabián Saldı́var Villagra, but Araujo continued to play a major role. (Nickson 2015,
46,144). Morinigo retained the presidency during the civil war as the “nominal leader
of the victorious Colorados” (413). After the combined forces of Liberals, Febreristas,
and Communists were defeated in August, Araujo went to exile in Argentina (46).
Coding rationale: On January 11, 1947, the Febrerista Party withdrew from the coali-
tion government with the Colorado Party that had been formed in 1946 (10). The
party was led by Col. Rafael Franco, former president of the country, but Franco
presumably was not on active duty at this time (Associated Press 1947k). After the
insurrection started, rebels freed another Febrerista leader, Colonel Alfredo Galleano,
from prison (Keesing’s World News Archive 1946a). Thus, we consider the Febrerista
attack on March 7 to be a case of prior defection, as we find no evidence of any cur-
379
rent and active members of the military who participated in the attack on the police
headquarters that day.
By contrast, the mutineers on March 8 were not prior defectors but active members
of the military, although this event led to a civil war. In fact, the rebellion was “a
purely military movement in its initial phase. “Col. Alfredo Ramos, a leading Liberal
and Chaco War hero, had been involved in the planning of the insurrection” (Nickson
2015, 145). Thereafter, the army “split into two roughly equal groups” (54). In fact,
the Colorados won the civil war largely due to recruitment of a large peasant militia,
not because it had superior loyalty within the regular armed forces. “Military support
[for the rebels] came primarily from “institutional” career officers who had become
disaffected by the growing partisan ship of the armed forces under the government
of Higinio Morı́nigo, especially after the pro-Colorado putsch of 13 January. As such
they were fighting against the influence of political parties over the armed forces.” By
contrast, the civilian support for the rebellion from the opposition parties sought “
dismantling of the Colorado monopoly of power” (144).
Had the March 8 mutiny succeeded, we assume that the mutineers would have deposed
Morinigo, ruled with excluded opposition parties, and have excluded the Colorados.
We therefore code this event as a failed regime change coup.
Other Datasets: failed military coup and rebel coup - CCD (April 30); not a candidate
- CSP and Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Higinio Morı́nigo as the leader of Paraguay
from September 8, 1940, until June 3, 1948; GWF code a personal regime (Paraguay
39-48) from April 30, 1939, until June 3, 1948. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay since 1946.
Event: Over a month after the civil war broke out between pro-Colorado loyalist forces
and liberal, febrerista, and communist rebels, “in a separate but related incident,”
between 26-29 April, an uprising by junior ranks took place” at Asunción. “It was
organized by Colonel Carlos J. Fernández, in protest against orders to proceed to the
north in order to fight the insurgents” (145). On April 27, marines briefly seized
the central power plant in Asuncion, “plunging the city into darkness until a loyal
cavalry regiment overcame the rebels” (United Press 1947f). On April 28, the gov-
ernment claimed to have crushed the naval uprising, but then communications were
cut off (United Press 1947g). On April 29, Col. Federico Weddell Smith, the army’s
commander-in-chief, reportedly fled to Argentina after he lost confidence in victory over
the naval revolt (Associated Press 1947g). On April 30, the government announced
that it had repelled an attack by “rebelling naval units and civilians” and it was now
in control of the Puerto Sajonia naval base (Associated Press 1947a). “When a revolt
at the Asuncion Navy Yard put a strategic working-class neighborhood in rebel hands,
Stroessner’s regiment quickly reduced the area to rubble” (Sacks 1990, 40).
More than 100 people were killed in the revolt (Associated Press 1947b). On May 2,
the government declared the revolt defeated, after two Colorado party militias defeated
380
the rebels (Associated Press 1947i). “Although the uprising was not supported by the
navy high command, which was reluctant to move against Morı́nigo until the rebel-
held warships, S.S. Humaitá and S.S. Paraguay, had arrived from Buenos Aires, it was
encouraged by civilians of the seamen’s union, Liga Obrera Marı́tima. The uprising
was quelled by the pynandi, who then carried out a wave of reprisals in Asunció, where
the population was broadly sympathetic to the insurgency movement. The complicity
of Colonel Federica Wesman Smith, recently appointed commander of the government
forces, led to his forced departure into exile when the navy uprising collapsed” (Nickson
2015, 145).
Coding rationale: Although this event occurred amidst a civil war and at least in part
because of the civil war, we do not code this as a case of prior defection because it
was initiated by current, active members of the military in an effort to unseat the
government. Nor was this mutiny launched within seven days of the initial revolt in
March. At this time “nearly the entire navy” joined the rebel forces (Cooke 1990, 208).
We assume that the naval mutiny’s success would have empowered the rebels and led
to government defeat in the civil war. Assuming the navy also sought to empower the
Febreristas and excluded civilian opposition parties, we therefore code this event as a
failed regime change coup.

Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP and Singh;
Archigos codes Higinio Morı́nigo as the leader of Paraguay from September 8, 1940, to
this date, when he exited by “irregular” means by non-military actors without foreign
support; Svolik codes Higinio Morı́nigio’s ouster on this date in a military coup; GWF
code the collapse of a personal regime (Paraguay 39-48) on this date in a military coup.
EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay since 1946.
Event: Although Morı́nigo’s chosen successor to lead the Colorado Party, Juan Na-
talicio González (leader of the hardline and anti-democratic guionistas, was elected
president unopposed in February 1948, “sectors of the armed forces that supported the
guionistas feared that Morı́nigo would not keep his promise to hand over power at the
expiry of his term of office in August” (Nickson 2015, 413). Felipe Molas López, then
the Minister of Education, engineered a bloodless “coup that deposed Morı́nigo on 3
June 1948 and installed Juan Manuel Frutos as provisional president until the inau-
guration of Juan Natalicio González on 15 August 1948” (404). Alfredo Stroessner, a
decorated hero of the 1947 civil war, joined the group of officers in ousting Morı́nigo
(Kohut and Vilella 2016, 330).
On June 3, Morı́nigo’s said he yielded power at the request “of the people and the armed
forces” (Bracker 1948d). A U.S. observer said the coup was started operationally by
the First Cavalry Division, commanded by Col. Enrique Jimenez. A key conspirator
was Victor Morinigo, the hardline chief of police (unrelated to the dictator), was after
the coup promoted from Minister of the Interior to Foreign Minister (Bracker 1948c).
Another key conspirator was Liberato Rodriguez, who was promoted to chief of police
381
(Bracker 1948a). Higinio Morı́nigo went into exile and henceforth was not involved in
politics.
Coding rationale: Based on the evidence, we disagree with Archigos that there was
no active military involvement in the coup ousting Morı́nigo. Consistent with Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event as a successful regime change coup.
• # 150-1948-10-25: Paraguay, Juan Natalicio González

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP and
Singh; Archigos codes Natalicio as the leader of Paraguay from August 15, 1948, to
January 30, 1949; GWF code a party regime (Paraguay 48-54) from June 3, 1948, to
May 5, 1954. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group since 1946.
Event: On October 25, 1948, 18-19 hours of fighting and gunfire broke out when
military cadets launched an army uprising near the capital of Asunción by attacking
capturing police headquarters. The coup attempt was led by Col. Carlos Montanaro,
director of the military academy (and brother of the foreign minister, Domingo Mon-
tanaro). Maj. Narciso Campos led the loyalist police resistance to the coup at police
headquarters for six hours (Bracker 1948e). Chief of police Liberto Rodriguez spear-
headed the police’s defense of President Gonzalez (Bracker 1948h). Alfredo Stroessner
led an artillery unit in joining the rebels (Nickson 2015, 273). The tide turned when
Gonzalez drove to the Campo Grande barracks at 2:30 am and got Col. Rogelio Benitez
to move infantry units to the capital, thus neutralizing Stroessner’s rebel unit (Bracker
1948e).
When the coup failed, Alfredo Stroessner had to be driven to the Brazilian embassy
in the trunk of a car (Sacks 1990). At least 25 people died in the uprising, mostly
loyal policemen (Bracker 1948e). At least four military academy cadets died in the
uprising (United Press 1948i). Mario Mallorquin, the Minister of the Economy, was
arrested in the uprising (New York Times 1948b). On November 6, six members of the
legislature were expelled for participating in the revolt (Associated Press 1948j). Police
chief Rodriguez was subsequently promoted to Minister of the Interior, while Campos
was rewarded for his loyal service by becing the new police chief (Bracker 1948e).
Coding rationale: According to declassified records of the U.S. State Department, the
coup attempt was led by one of three factions of the Guion Rojo, a minority of the
Colorado Party then able to operate openly (the remainder being disenfranchised).
Each party faction had been seeking support of the army. Based on this evidence, we
assume that the military coup plotters were allied with regime insiders, and would have
perpetuated the Colorado-led party regime (simply led by a different faction), rather
than install a new military regime. We therefore code this event as a failed leader
reshuffling coup.
• # 150-1949-1-30: Paraguay, Juan Natalicio González

382
Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP (miscode date
to December 30, 1948); no military involvement - Singh; Archigos codes the “irregu-
lar” exit of Natalicio on this date by military actors without foreign support; Svolik
codes the exit of Natalicio on this date as a result of a non-military coup; GWF code
a party regime (Paraguay 48-54) from June 3, 1948, to May 5, 1954. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay since 1946.
Event: Juan Natalicio González “had only a weak hold on the presidency – the military
had forces him to appoint supporters of Molas López to his cabinet. In January 1949,
he was ousted in a bloodless coup” (Kohut and Vilella 2016, 267). On January 30,
Natalicio González was forced to take refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Asuncion in
a bloodless coup. Labor Minister Augusto Salvidar, one of the civilian coup leaders,
said the new government would seek peace with warring political factions (Associated
Press 1949b). Then at 7 p.m., the National Assembly met and a message was read to
them, allegedly from the deposed leader, saying he “resigned in the face of the situa-
tion.” The assembly chose General Raimundo Rolón, the Minister of Defense, to take
over as provisional president. The assembly scheduled general elections to take place
in two months (Bracker 1949). Natalicio González went into exile in Buenos Aires on
February 4 (United Press 1949h).
Coding rationale: Whether or not one codes this event as a military or non-military
coup depends on how one assesses the evidence for military involvement. Lentz (1994,
627) calls the coup ousting Gonzalez as “leftist,” “military,” and led by Rolón, but
does not provide any substantiating evidence. Sondrol (1992, 106) claims that military
factions did support the coup, but again he does not provide details. According to
Nickson (2015, 404), the coup was orchestrated by the Minister of Education, Felipe
Molas López, who obtained support from the rival democráticos, and was driven by
worries of “the divisiveness of González, who was thereby weakening the party vis-à-vis
the military.” Initial reports before Rolón took power indicated that it was unclear
whether the military had supported the coup (Associated Press 1949b).
Nickson (2015, 273) attributes the ouster of Gonzalez to “a military-civilian move-
ment.” At the time he took power, Rolón was a retired military officer, not in active
service (Associated Press 1949m), so his participation alone would not make this event
a military coup. Alfredo Stroessner was a key player just as he had been in the coup
bringing González to power, and returned to the country (Cooke 1990, 208). For his
role, Molas López rewarded Stroessner with a promotion to brigadier general (Kohut
and Vilella 2016, 330). At the time, however, Stroessner was a prior defector, having
been in exile for his role in the failed coup in November 1948. Still, Bethell (1991, 250)
notes that it was the army who turned to General Rolón to replace the president, rather
than Molas López. Had their been no active military participation in the coup, it is
unlikely that anyone other than Molas López would have ascended to power. Based on
the evidence, we code this event as a successful military coup. According to Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014), the coup entailed a leader reshuffle.
• # 150-1949-2-26: Paraguay, Raimundo Rolón
383
Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP and Singh;
Archigos codes Rolon as exiting on this date through “irregular” means by other gov-
ernment actors without foreign support; Svolik codes Rolon as exiting on this date due
to a military coup; GWF code a party regime (Paraguay 48-54) from June 3, 1948, to
May 5, 1954. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay
since 1946.
Event: On Saturday, February 26, 1949, the Paraguayan National radio announced
that a “civil and military movement” had overthrown Raimundo Rolón. He was suc-
ceeded by Minister of Education, Dr. Felipe Molas López (United Press 1949i), the
engineer of the coup the month before that had brought Rolón to power (see 150-
1949-1-30). The coup was timed to force Rolon’s resignation while most of his cabinet
was attending the wake for Archbishop Juan Sinforiano Bogardin, head of Paraguay’s
Catholic Church. “The Paraguay army’s First Cavalry Division at Campo Grande, just
outside Asuncion, and an artillery regiment at Paraguari, also near the capital, threw
support” to the coup, though “Just when the military entered the coup was not clear”
(Associated Press 1949a). On February 28, a new cabinet composed of all civilian
leaders of the Colorado party was sworn in (United Press 1949j). According to Nick-
son (2015, 404-405), Molas López organized the coup with the assistance of Epifanio
Méndez Fleitas and Colonel Alfredo Stroessner who feared “an imminent coup from
the army high command in opposition to proposed elections announced by Rolón.”
This coup “marked a peak in the ascendancy of the Colorado Party over the armed
forces. For the first time since 1936, the Cabinet, including the minister of defense,
was composed entirely of civilians.”
Coding rationale: Unlike the January 1949 coup, at this time Stroessner had returned
to active duty and was not a prior defector (as he had been for several months after
November 1948). In addition to Stroessner, “Colonel Emilia Dı́az de Viva, a regimental
commander at Campo Grande, promised to back a revolt. At the same time, Colonel
Stroessner was to slip across the border and raise his old artillery regiment. This plan
proved successful” (Bethell 1991, 250). We therefore code this as a military coup even
though it empowered the civilian politicians against a ruling general. Consistent with
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 150-1949-9-10: Paraguay, Felipe Molas López

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak PT, and Singh; Archigos codes
Molas Lopez as exiting on this date through “irregular” means by other government ac-
tors without foreign support; Svolik codes Molas Lopez as exiting on this date through
a resignation; GWF code a party-based regime (Paraguay 48-54) from June 3, 1948,
until May 5, 1954. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Paraguay since 1946.
Event: After February 1949 (see 150-1949-2-26), “President Molas López promoted
384
Stroessner to brigadier general and appointed democráticos to his cabinet” as a re-
ward for their support in bringing him to power. “Molas López then plotted to rid
his government of the democráticos. But when the conspirators presented the plot
to Stroessner, he leaked it to the democráticos, who, in September 1949, arrested the
conspirators and forced Molas López to resign” (Kohut and Vilella 2016, 267). By this
point, “The guionistas, now purged of their extremists, were a smaller group than in
November 1947, and the democráticos” quietly taken “control of the party machin-
ery. When they had achieved a majority in the Junta de Gobierno, they requested
the resignation of Molas López himself, who duly complied” (Nickson 2015, 405) on
September 10, 1949. On September 11, Congress unanimously elected its President,
the democrático leader Federico Chaves, as provisional president (Associated Press
1949d). “Following the ousting of Molas Lopéz by the democráticos in September
1949, Stroessner led the resistance to attempts by incoming President Federico Chaves
to purge guionista sympathizers from within the military” (Nickson 2015, 546).
Coding rationale: Among major prior datasets, only Archigos codes this event as a
(non-military) coup. Whether or not this transition is legal or not depends on whether
Molas Lopéz’s resignation was forced or not. Nickson (2015, 138,187) notes repeat-
edly that his resignation was forced by “the party machinery of the democráticos.”
What’s more, Molas Lopez had been elected as the sole candidate to finish Natalicio
González’s term as president on April 17. He had been inaugurated on May 14, and un-
der a “regular” transition should have served until 1953 (Associated Press 1949d). So
even though constitutional procedures were followed on the surface, we do not consider
his resignation to be legal or “regular.” Whether or not this event was a military or
non-military coup depends on how one assesses evidence that current, active military
actors took concrete actions to oust Molas Lopéz. Based on this evidence, the leading
role in the forced resignation was taken by civilian democráticos. However, as in prior
cases, the actions of Alfredo Stroessner, an active Brigadier General, played a central
role in organizing the resignation. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014),
we code this event as a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 150-1954-5-5: Paraguay, Federico Chavez

sum, Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Chavez as exiting on August
5, 1954 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF
code the collapse of a party regime (Paraguay 48-54) on August 5, 1954 in a military
coup; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay since
1946.
Event: By 1953, political support for the aging President Federico Chávez “began
to erode markedly. His decision to run for reelection disappointed younger men who
nursed political ambitions, and rumors that Chaves would strengthen the police at the
army’s expense disappointed the military. Early in 1954, recently fired Central Bank
Director Epifanio Mendez Fleitas joined forces with [Alfredo] Stroessner—at that time
385
a general and commander in chief of the armed forces—to oust Chaves. Mendez Fleitas
was unpopular with Colorado Party stalwarts and the army, who feared that he was
trying to build a following as did his hero, Juan Domingo Peron, Argentina’s president
from 1946 to 1955” (Sacks 1990, 41).
On May 3, 1954, troops loyal to Federico Chávez arrested 15 officers in the Third
Cavalry Regiment (RC3), including Captain Andrés Rodrı́guez (Nickson 2015, 508).
On May 5, 1954, Cháves tried to dismiss one of Stroessner’s subordinates. Stroessner
released the RC3 officers and ordered his troops into action against the government
(Sacks 1990, 41). A unit of the First Cavalry Division tried to seize the police head-
quarters in Asuncion (United Press 1954e). “Fierce resistance by police left almost
fifty dead” (Sacks 1990, 41), including the loyal police chief, Robert L. Petit. Coup
forces broadcast the certainty of their victory from Campo Grande outside Asuncion
as President Chavez and his cabinet reportedly took refuge in the War College, as the
navy joined the coup forces (United Press 1954e).
By May 6, Chavez was under arrest. A junta took over but said the Colorado party
remained in political control. Lt. Col. Mario B. Ortega took over as police chief
(United Press 1954c). On May 7, even though the air force, navy, and most of the
army sided with the new junta, some fighting was reported as some cavalry troops
continued to resist the coup in vain (United Press 1954a). On May 8, the national
assembly met and accepted Chavez’s resignation and elected Tomas Romero Pereira as
provisional president, a surprise since most observers assumed that Stroessner would
be chosen. A new cabinet including three military officers and several civilians as
sworn in. For the time being, Stroessner retained his command of the armed forces
(Associated Press 1954g).
Two months later, Stroessner was nominated by a divided Colorado party for president
(Sacks 1990, 41). He ran unopposed in the 1954 national elections and was inaugurated
in August 1954. Stroessner purged the Colorado party of rivals and installed supporters
of his regime in key government posts. He led a repressive military government for 35
years until he was ousted in a military coup in 1989 (Nickson 2015, 10-13).
• # 150-1955-12-21: Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner

coup attempt - PT; not a candidate - CSP and Singh; Archigos codes Stroessner as
the leader of Paraguay from July 11, 1954, to February 3, 1989; GWF code a military-
personal-party regime (Paraguay 54-93) from May 4, 1954, to May 9, 1993. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay since 1946.
Event: The overthrow of Juan Perón in September 1955 was a “severe blow” to Epi-
fanio Mendez Fleitas, the influential Central Bank President and leader of the so-called
386
epifanista faction of the ruling Colorado Party.43 Given shifts in public sentiment,
General Aramburú’s new Argentine government that came to power in November 1955
“increased pressure on Stroessner to remove” epifanistas from office. On 20 Decem-
ber 1955, Major Virgilio Candia, head of the Cavalry since August 1954, “and other
epifanista officers were dismissed and Stroessner took over direct command of the Cav-
alry” (Nickson and Kolinski 1993, 376). A Cabinet minister, Gen. Morinigo, and police
chief Col. Mario-Ortego, were also reportedly dismissed in this reshuffle. In response,
Mendez reportedly sought the support of the garrison at Campo Grande (Associated
Press 1955h).
On the evening of Wednesday, December 21, 1955, unofficial sources reported a blood-
less revolt against Gen. Alfredo Stroessner in the capital Asuncion. Stroessner was
said to have ordered the arrest of Central Bank president, Epifanio Mendez Fleitas,
on charges of plotting against the government. Mendez was a former police chief and
headed a Peronist faction of the ruling Colorado party (Associated Press 1955j). On
December 22, a communiqué by Stroessner described the incident as a “command cri-
sis” within the First Cavalry Division which began at dawn at Campo Grande, a large
cavalry post fifteen miles from the capital. Others said the Asuncion police force also
participated in an attempt to oust Gen. Stroessner. Sources said the plot failed be-
cause the whole division failed to join the plot. One informant said the rebels were
routed without a single shot fired (Associated Press 1955i). Others said that some
fighting occurred before the rebels realized they were outnumbered by loyal army and
navy forces (Associated Press 1955h).
On December 23, Méndez Fleitas resigned. In January 1956, he traveled to exile in
Uruguay (Nickson and Kolinski 1993, 376).44 A Paraguayan radio broadcast on De-
cember 23 advised the people not to take sides in the “chieftain’s quarrel” (Associated
Press 1955k).
Coding rationale: This event appears to have been motivated by a power struggle
within Stroessner’s ruling Colorado party. We find no evidence the plotters sought
to prevent ethnic narrowing or empower regime outsiders. Based on the evidence, we
code this as a failed reshuffling coup.
• # 150-1989-2-3: Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner
Luttwak, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Stroessner as exiting on February 3, 1989
personal-military-party regime (Paraguay 54-93) from May 5, 1954 to August 15, 1993;
EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay since 1946.
Event: As General Alfredo Stroessner’s health deteriorated, the Stroessner regime
43. “Mendez had played a leading role in the military revolt in 1954 toppling President Federico Chaves
and bringing Stroessner to power (Associated Press 1955h).
44. Asuncion newspapers did not report that the cabinet had accepted the resignation of Epifanio Mendez
as central bank governor until December 26 (Associated Press 1955g).
387
was under increasing international pressure to democratize, including from the United
States who was no longer willing to prop up his regime after the Cold War (Nickson
2015, 13). Meanwhile, two factions of the ruling party jockeyed for position in the suc-
cession struggle. The “militants” had for a time “seized control of the party apparatus
and most top government posts, and they wooed General Stroessner with the idea of
naming his son, Gustavo, an air force colonel, as his successor.” In February 1989,
militants tried to force General Andrés Rodrı́guez, another strong contender for the
succession and a “traditionalist,” “into retirement or into the figurehead post of De-
fense Minister.” Instead, Rodrı́guez decided to seize power (Riding 1989a). He would
be overthrown in a military putsch also known as Noche de San Blas (“The night of
San Blas”) (Nickson 2015, 548).
“On the night of February 3, 1989, the streets of Asuncion became a battleground
as forces loyal to First Corps commander Major General Andres Rodriguez staged a
coup d’état against the government of President Alfredo Stroessner Mattiauda. Tank
units of the First Cavalry Division left their Nu Guazu barracks and bombarded the
headquarters of the armed forces general staff, the police, and the Presidential Escort
Regiment. Elements of the air force’s composite squadron also reportedly joined the
rebels and carried out aerial attacks. After several hours of heavy fighting, Stroess-
ner surrendered and offered his “irrevocable resignation from the post of president
of the Republic of Paraguay and from the post of commander in chief of its armed
forces”—positions that he had held since 1954.” Estimates of the number killed in
the coup “ranged from Rodriguez’s claim of 27 to Western observers’ assertions of up
to 300. During the fighting, the First Cavalry Division seized one of Asuncion’s radio
stations and broadcast an appeal by Rodriguez to the people of Paraguay. The mil-
itary had left its barracks, the general asserted, “to defend the dignity and honor of
the armed forces, for the total and complete unification of the Colorado Party... in
government, for the initiation of democratization in Paraguay, for respect for human
rights, and for respect for our Christian, apostolic, Roman Catholic religion.” In fact,
the coup was a struggle for political control of a post-Stroessner Paraguay (Sacks 1990,
xxi).
Gen. Rodrı́guez was sworn in as provisional President and his new cabinet included
two generals (one retired) and seven civilians (Associated Press 1989d; Riding 1989b).
Stroessner was ultimately forced to fly into exile in Brazil (Riding 1989c). Gen.
Rodrı́guez sought to end Paraguay’s diplomatic isolation by initiating political lib-
eralization. Rodrı́guez purged the government and military of Stroessner loyalists and
formally lifted the state of emergency that had been in place for much of Stroess-
ner’s rule. He was formally elected president in the May 1989 elections and a new
“democratic” constitution was signed in June 1992 (Nickson 2015, 13). The May 1989
elections “formally ended the Stronato (Sondrol 1992, 113).
as a successful reshuffling coup. The coup was “a power play between Paraguay’s
top two military men.” However, a major motive for the coup was also a desire to
388
prevent personalization by blocking any father-son transition from Alfredo to Gustavo
Stroessner. As Sondrol (1992, 110) notes, “the meteoric rise to the rank of colonel of
Stroessner’s son, Gustavo, implied dynastic pretensions in the ailing strongman. The
threat of nepotism aroused resentments and cleavages within the military, threaten-
ing institutional unity, for the possible selection of Gustavo, an undistinguished air
force officer (a decidedly minor branch), was an affront to the army’s status as the
paramount service.”
• # 150-1996-4-22: Paraguay, Juan Carlos Wasmosy Monti

- CSP, Luttwak, and Singh; no overt - PT; Archigos codes Wasmosy Monti as the
leader of Paraguay from August 15, 1993, until August 15, 1998; GWF code a democ-
racy (Paraguay 93-NA) since August 15, 1993. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
monopoly ethnic group in Paraguay since 1946.
Event: On the morning of 22 April 1996, “Paraguay’s President Juan Carlos Was-
mosy tried to fire Lino César Oviedo from his post as army commander. General
Oviedo, who had inappropriately interfered with government decisions and party poli-
tics, refused to step down” (Halperin and Lomasney 1998, 138).45 Later that morning,
Wasmosy called a second meeting with armed service commanders reiterating his or-
der for Oviedo to resign. A defiant Oviedo threatened “rivers of blood.” Presidential
aides informed several embassies of General Oviedo’s insubordination though no official
statement was made. At 6:35 p.m., the U.S. Embassy in Asunción issued a statement
revealing publicly that something was amiss. It said that General Oviedo’s refusal to
accept Wasmosy’s orders “constitutes a direct challenge to the constitutional order in
Paraguay and runs counter to the democratic norms accepted by the countries of this
hemisphere.” At 7 p.m, the Brazilian Ambassador, speaking on behalf of Mercosur
countries, condemned Oviedo’s actions (Valenzuela 1997, 47-48).
Undaunted and surrounded by his troops, Oviedo now “demanded that Wasmosy him-
self resign” (Halperin and Lomasney 1998, 138). Oviedo “threatened to bomb the pres-
idential palace if Wasmosy did not resign, effectively declaring a coup d’état” (Lambert
2000, 390). “Throughout the evening, he alternated between overt threats to attack
the presidential palace and suggestions for a peaceful “compromise.” His proposal was
that he would agree to resign so long as the president and the vice-president, Angel
45. “As an unknown colonel, Oviedo allegedly played a decisive role in capturing Stroessner on the night of
the February 1989 coup. Under President Rodriguez, he rose to Commander of the First Cavalry, expanding
his wealth through illegal business operations. He entered the political arena in 1991, openly campaigning on
behalf of the Colorado Party in the December constituent elections, despite being in breach of the Electoral
Law regarding military involvement in elections. By December 1992 he was powerful enough to engineer the
fraudulent victory of Wasmosy over Luis Maria Argaña in the Colorado primaries. His political notoriety
grew dramatically when, on the eve of the 1993 elections, he stated that the Colorado Party and the armed
forces would co-govern “per secula seculorum.” Despite such flagrant violations of both the Electoral Law and
the Constitution, he was rewarded by the incoming President Wasmosy by being promoted to Commander
of the Army in 1993” (Lambert 2000, 389-390).
389
R. Seifart, also stepped down, turning the reins of government over to the president of
the Senate, who in turn would name ministers of Oviedo’s choosing to key posts. The
president and the vice-president took Oviedo’s threats seriously and feared for their
personal safety. As a result, Wasmosy and his sons took refuge in the residence of
U.S. ambassador Robert Service, conveniently located next door to the president’s res-
idence. Vice-President Seifart took refuge in a Paraguayan naval facility” (Valenzuela
1997, 48-49).
Fearing a repeat of the bloodshed of the 1989 coup, President Wasmosy “decided to
counter Oviedo’s proposal with a proposal of his own: If the general accepted his
order to leave the army command, Wasmosy would take a “leave of absence” from
office, during which Senate president Rafael Casabianca would assume the presidency
of the nation.” At 1:30 a.m. on April 23, Wasmosy’s emissaries delivered Oviedo a
hand-written statement to this effect. General Oviedo objected to a leave of absence.
Confident that the president would back down, “He then demanded that Wasmosy
sign a resignation more like the one tendered by General Stroessner on the morning of
3 February 1989.” By now Wasmosy had resolved to stay in office (49).
By dawn on April 23, “the streets were full of ordinary citizens, students, workers, and
peasants, all insisting that the president hold his ground. Unions, student groups, and
most party leaders all rallied to the president’s side. Congress, which had mustered
a quorum at 4:50 a.m., also supported the head of state” (49). Meanwhile, in Wash-
ington, the Permanent Council of the OAS met and “condemned General Oviedo’s
refusal to submit to civilian authority and called an ad hoc meeting as per Resolution
1080. That meeting was never initiated” (Levitt 2006, 105-106).46 However, “OAS
secretary general César Gaviria and diplomats from Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and
other member states of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) arrived
in Paraguay to support Wasmosy. Support also came in the form of telephone calls
from U.S. president Bill Clinton and members of the EU... These international actions
galvanized domestic support for Wasmosy, giving the president the resolve to stand
firm against” Oviedo and deter the general from any “hasty action” (Halperin and
Lomasney 1998, 138).
On Tuesday, April 23, Oviedo agreed to resign his post as army commander on the
condition that Wasmosy would appoint him as Defense Minister (New York Times
1996). That evening, Wasmosy gave a televised address detailing this arrangement.
On April 24, civil society groups criticized the deal, which would have left Ovieda
with considerable influence over military policy and budgets. Oviedo’s successor, Gen.
Óscar Rodrigo Dı́az Demás, was Oviedo’s close friend (Sims 1996a). On April 25, after
a day of mass anti-Oviedo demonstrations, Wasmosy backtracked by saying that he
would not appoint Oviedo as Defense Minister (Sims 1996b). Wasmosy forced Oviedo
“to retire from active service” (Nickson 2015, 14). Oviedo “retired his post without a
fight” (Boniface 2002, 375). Paraguay’s democratic regime survived.
46. Within the Permanent Council, “some member states were unsure that Resolution 1080 was applicable,
because arguably there had been no interruption of the constitutional order. The president, his cabinet, the
congress, and the judiciary all remained in office, notwithstanding the crisis atmosphere and the lack of
complete civilian control over the military” (Levitt 2006, 106).
390
For his part, General Oviedo denied he had ever sought the cabinet position or ever re-
belled (Sims 1996b). “The Oviedistas refused to concede that there had been any coup
attempt at all...The whole matter, they argued, was a result of Wasmosy’s alarmism
and his attempt to distract attention from his own political problems” (Zagorski 2003,
103-104). Oviedo immediately declared his presidential ambitions, which he could not
do while still an active duty military officer. “The failure of Oviedo’s attempted coup
created a new tripartite division of power within the Colorado Party:” Luis Maria
Argaña “retained control over the majority of the party; Wasmosy tried to create
a new faction and partially succeeded; and Oviedo developed a well-financed cam-
paign to propel his bid for the Colorado presidential nomination in the 1998 elections”
(Brun 1999, 95). Oviedo’s new populist conservative faction was “ironically named the
Unidad Nacional de Colorados Eticos (National Unity of Ethical Colorados, UNACE)
or éticos” (Zagorski 2003, 104).
General Oviedo had initially “faced congressional and judicial inquiries into his insub-
ordination as well as criminal charges of sedition” (Halperin and Lomasney 1998, 138).
Oviedo was jailed on June 14, 1996. However, on August 7, 1996, an appeals court freed
Oviedo “after ruling that the general did not lead an armed uprising against” Was-
mosy but instead had “voluntarily ended his insubordination.” The decision cleared
the way for Oviedo to run for the presidency in 1998 (Reuters 1996). He won Col-
orados’ nomination in September 1997 “in a surprise victory over party president Luis
Maria Argaña” (Nickson 2015, 14).
“Oviedo’s bid for the presidency was fiercely opposed by Wasmosy, who launched
a campaign to halt him. This culminated in Oviedo’s arrest in December 1997 on
charges of attempting a coup in April 1996 (14). On March 9, 1998, a special military
tribunal set up by Wasmosy sentenced “Oviedo to 10 years’ imprisonment for the
attempted coup of April 1996” (xl). “The Supreme Court confirmed this sentence in
April, rejecting his appeal. Oviedo was also barred from contesting the presidential
election in May. Raúl Cubas Grau, his running mate, took his place” and eventually
won. “Three days after being sworn in as president in August 1998, Cubas released
Oviedo. After a protracted legal battle, in January 1999, the Supreme Court gave
Cubas a 72-hour deadline to return Oviedo to jail, but he refused. Factions inside the
Colorado Party opposed to Oviedo then sided with the two main opposition parties
to impeach President Cubas, but their combined forces fell just short of the necessary
two-thirds congressional majority” (14).
“This led to a major constitutional crisis” (14), compounded by the assassination
of vice president Luis Marı́a Araña” (14). “Fearing impeachment and prosecution
for orchestrating the assassination, President Cubas and ex-general Oviedo fled the
country, and Luis Ángel González Macchi, the head of the senate, assumed the vacated
presidency” (Boniface 2002, 375).
Coding rationale: Whether this event is a coup attempt (as Wasmosy claimed) or a
case of insubordination or less (as Oviedo claimed) depends on whether Oviedo took
concrete actions to oust Wasmosy, or simply refused to resign his command. The
historical evidence indicates that Oviedo relied on the threat rather than the use of
391
armed force to coerce Wasmosy into resigning. Oviedo also reportedly tried to locate
the Vice President to prevent his installation if and when Wasmosy resigned, which
would have broken the constitutional line of succession. While Oviedo made no post-
hoc announcement that he had taken power from the President, his demand that
the civilian leader resign (a verbal threat of a coup) while surrounded by his troops
constitutes a concrete action to force an irregular ouster of the civilian leader. We thus
side with those observers who code this event as a failed anti-democratic coup.
• # 150-2000-5-18: Paraguay, Luis González Macchi

- CSP, PT, Luttwak, and Singh; Archigos codes Gonzalez Macchi as the leader of
Paraguay from March 28, 1999, until August 15, 2003; GWF code a democracy
(Paraguay 93-NA) since August 15, 1993. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly
ethnic group in Paraguay since 1946.
Event: On Thursday, 18 May 2000, army and police forces loyal to the exiled Gen.
Lino César Oviedo, implicated in the April 1996 coup attempt (see 150-1996-4-22) at-
tempted an unsuccessful coup (Nickson 2015, xli). At 8:40 p.m., “four retired military
officers loyal to fugitive former army chief Lino Oviedo entered the headquarters of
the First Army Division at Campo Grande, on the outskirts of the capital Asuncion.
Meeting no resistance, and with the help of junior officers, the men quickly mobilised
three cavalry regiments. Other rebel detachments took over the Second Cavalry Regi-
ment in Cerrito, in the Chaco region across the River Paraguay from Asuncion. At the
same time, Oviedo supporters within the police force took over its headquarters and
the specialised anti-riot police unit, FOPE. Civilian supporters seized radio stations
from where they denounced the presidency of Luis Gonzalez Macchi as illegitimate and
called for fresh elections. Others cut power lines, blacking out large sectors of the city”
(Oxford Analytica 2000).
“The rebels suffered their first setback almost immediately, when the police head-
quarters and the FOPE were retaken by pro-government forces.” At 11:30 p.m., “15
small tanks from the Cerrito barracks opened fire on the police headquarters and the
Congress building, but were forced to retreat under the threat of strafing by the air-
force, which had remained loyal to Gonzalez Macchi.” By 2 a.m. on May 19, “active
service units in the cavalry which had initially supported the coup began to switch
their allegiance, and it became clear that the government had gained the upper hand”
(Oxford Analytica 2000).
The coup “ultimately failed for reasons largely reminiscent of 1996. The OAS Perma-
nent Council “vehemently” condemned the coup, and the representatives of the United
States and Brazil warned Paraguay’s military high command that they would face
“ruinous isolation” (including expulsion from Mercosur) if” President Luis González
Macchi “were overthrown; the Paraguayan military, after some hesitation, quickly put
down the rebellion” (Boniface 2002, 375). The rebel soldiers surrendered at 2:45 a.m.
(Associated Press 2000e), after loyalist forces threatened to bomb the tanks (S. Buckley
392
2000d).
On May 19, President González gave a television address re-assuring the country that
“destabilizing and anti-democratic forces,” including three members of Congress and
12 police officers, had been detained (Associated Press 2000e). He also declared a
30-day state of emergency and began to round up suspects (Oxford Analytica 2000).
In total, some 100 officers, soldiers, police officers, and politicians were arrested in
connection with the coup attempt (S. Buckley 2000b), most had ties to Gen. Oviedo,
who had been in hiding (S. Buckley 2000c). “The chief of police, Nicolas Castro
Guillen, was fired.” Retired colonel Vladimiro Woroniecki, one of Oviedo’s staunchest
rebel supporters, “warned that there was more to come” (Oxford Analytica 2000). But
there wasn’t. On June 11, Gen. Oviedo was arrested in Brazil near the border with
Paraguay (Reuters 2000).
coup.
• # 150-2012-6-22: Paraguay, Fernando Lugo

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CSP and PT ; Archigos codes Lugo as exiting on
this date through “regular” means; GWF code Paraguay as a democracy (Paraguay
93-NA) since August 1993.
Event: In 2008, Fernando Lugo, “a Catholic bishop with strong ties to peasant orga-
nizations and left-leaning NGOs,” was elected president, “ending 60 years of rule by
the Colorado Party. Yet Lugo, a political outsider, had won in coalition with the op-
position Liberal Party, who supported him in exchange for the vice presidency. From
the beginning of Lugo’s term, rumors swirled that the Liberals were searching for an
opportunity to remove him and gain the presidency for themselves” (Pitts et al. 2016).
Such an opportunity arose in June 2012.
On June 5, 2012, President Lugo admitted to having father a second illegitimate child
while he was a Roman Catholic Bishop. In a previous paternity scandal, he had
admitted in 2008 to fathering another child before he quit the church to enter politics
(Reuters 2012). On June 15, police tried to evict about 150 landless rural farmers (or
squatters) from land owned by a politician in Curuguaty. A violent confrontation left
17 people dead (Associated Press 2012), including 11 peasants and six police officers
(Pitts et al. 2016). The interior minister and chief of police resigned, but they would
not be the only victims (Romero 2012c).
Already having weak support in the legislature, the Colorados and Liberals joined forces
to impeach President Lugo, ostensibly due to Lugo’s “failure to prevent the bloodshed”
and his handling of the crisis (Pitts et al. 2016). On June 21, the Chamber of Deputies
voted 76-1 to impeach Lugo (Associated Press 2012). They invoked “Article 225 of the
1992 Constitution, which allows impeachment in cases of “poor performance of duties”
(mal desempeño de sus funciones)” (Marsteintredet, Llanos, and Nolte 2013, 114).
Lugo faced charges of breaking the law by letting leftist parties “hold a meeting at
393
an army base. In addition, his opponents were incensed that he signed an agreement
allowing Unasur to exert pressure on any of its members if an elected leader was
overthrown” (Romero 2012c).
On June 22, the Senate rushed to initiate its public impeachment trial. The Senate
only gave President Lugo two hours to defend himself. Lugo “declined to appear,
sending lawyers to request 18 days to prepare his defense. They were rebuffed by
the Senate president, Jorge Oviedo.” The Senate then voted 39-4 to remove Lugo
from office (Romero 2012c). Lugo initially accepted the vote, but he decried the trial
as an “express coup d’etat” against not himself but Paraguay’s democracy (Romero
2012c). Consistent with the constitutional line of presidential succession, Vice Pres-
ident Federico Franco, a member of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA),
became president (Marsteintredet, Llanos, and Nolte 2013, 110).
“The international response, spearheaded by the leaders of the South American left,
was swift condemnation. Argentina’s President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner called
the events a “soft coup,” and the late Hugo Chávez of Venezuela likened them to the
coup that had deposed Honduran president Manuel Zelaya in 2009” (110-111). The
Union of South American States (UNASUR) issued a statement saying Lugo’s ouster
“did not respect due legal process” (Romero 2012c). The Inter-American Commission
for Human Rivghts said it was a “parody of justice.” On June 23, Argentina and Brazil
recalled their ambassadors from Asunción. Regional observers described Lugo’s ouster
as a “parliamentary coup,” “constitutional coup,” or even “golpeachment” (Romero
2012a). The Organization of American States (OAS) expressed concern. Paraguay was
suspended from (MERCOSUR, the South American trade bloc (Pitts et al. 2016), as
well as UNASUR (Marsteintredet, Llanos, and Nolte 2013, 110-111).
On June 25, Lugo reverse his earlier acceptance of his ouster, saying he had done
so only to avoid bloodshed. He promised to “forge a popular movement aimed at
regaining power” (Romero 2012b). Lugo told the Washington Post, “this was a coup,
a coup against democracy, a blow against the popular will. This was a parliamentary
coup, unjust because, in reality, none of my rights were respected, nor due process,
nor the right to a defense” (Forero 2012). Lugo “appealed to the Supreme Court,
citing the Paraguayan constitution’s due-process guarantee. The Court, reasoning that
impeachment is a political process under the purview of Congress, quickly rejected the
appeal” (Marsteintredet, Llanos, and Nolte 2013, 114). “Ten months later, elections
were held as scheduled, and the Colorados returned to power” (Pitts et al. 2016).
Although the PLRA had “spearheaded” Lugo’s impeachment, the PLRA’s presidential
candidate, Efrain Alegre, was badly beaten in the 2013 general election (Nickson 2015,
461). Paraguay’s membership in MERCOSUR and UNASUR was thereupon restored
(Marsteintredet, Llanos, and Nolte 2013, 111). For a political economy explanation for
opposition and removal of Lugo, see Ezquerro-Cañete and Fogel (2017).
Lugo’s impeachment was certainly partisan and thus not necessarily “fair.” After all,
Lugo had less than a week to mount a defense for his impeachment. To some, the pro-
394
impeachment legislators “presented no evidence that would have given the proceedings
even the semblance of a trial.” They rushed the impeachment to forestall any leftist
pro-Lugo mobilization (Pitts et al. 2016). The impeachment process was based on five
charges of “poor performance,” which were “striking for their lack of any reference to
serious malpractice. There was no accusation of corruption, theft, abuse of human
rights, violation of the constitution, or breach of the presidential code.” Some claim
that the rushed impeachment violated Article 17 of the 1992 constitution, “which
protects the rights of the accused to see the charges, challenge the evidence, and be
given the necessary time to prepare an adequate defense” (Nickson 2015, 17).
Others claim the impeachment process was “entirely legal” and followed the established
constitutional procedures, according to Alberto Poletti, a professor of constitutional
law at Columbia University in Paraguay (Romero 2012a). We therefore code this event
as legal, consistent with Archigos, Paraguay’s Supreme Court, and Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz (2014) coding, all of which indicate that there was no breakdown of democracy in
Paraguay in 2012. Had we coded the impeachment process as “irregular” or violating
the constitutional order, then we would have coded a successful non-military (anti-
democratic) coup, for there is no evidence that military actors took any concrete actions
during the crisis.
395
2.1.19 155: Chile
Table 19: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Chile

155-1969-10-15 Chile 32-73 Frei Montalva, Eduardo mutiny

155-1973-6-29 Chile 32-73 Allende, Salvador Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
155-1973-9-11 Chile 32-73 Allende, Salvador Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
155-1974-6-26 Chile 73-89 Pinochet, Augusto Autogolpe (S)
155-1993-12-10 Chile 89-NA Aylwin, Patricio not exist
• # 155-1969-10-15: Chile, Eduardo Frei Montalva

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD (no day); not a candidate - CSP,
PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Frei Montalva as the leader of Chile from November 3,
1964, until November 3, 1970; GWF code a democracy (Chile 32-73) from 1933 until
September 11, 1973.
Event: By the end of the 1960s, frustration was bubbling in the armed forces, which
felt did not have a voice even as new social groups were empowered. “A rift developed
between junior and senior officers. Captains and majors tended to perceive the high
command as obsequious toward civilian leaders and unwilling to raise corporate con-
cerns about low salaries and obsolete equipment. On September 18, 1969, several army
unit commanders deliberately delayed their arrival at Chile’s annual military parade
in Santiago as a sign of disrespect to the civil authorities.” Officers in each service
planned nonviolent protests (Bawden 2016, 75-76).
“In Antofogasta the army’s First Division commander,” Brig. Gen. Roberto Vi-
aux Marambo, “composed a letter expressing what he said was the shared opinion of
colonels, majors, and captains under his command. Viaux accused Frei and his pre-
decessor of keeping their salaries low compared to the pay of other professions and
noted that an experienced worker at the Chuquicamata Copper Mine could earn more
than a general of the republic, which was true. Viaux also wrote that the armed forces
required modern equipment and ought to be involved with decision making at the na-
tional level. Army commander in chief Sergio Castillo became aware of the letter as
well as of rumors about plotting in the First Division. At the beginning of October the
Defense Ministry announced Viaux’s impending retirement. Outraged, seventy officers
in the First Division signed a declaration calling for Viaux’s reinstatement. Castillo
relieved Viaux of his command on October 18 and recalled him to the capital” (76).
On the morning of October 21, two Tacna and Yungay regiments of the army’s Second
Division led by Brig. Gen. Roberto Viaux Marambo rebelled and occupied the reg-
imental headquarters in downtown Santiago. “Within hours there were reports that
other units had joined the rebellion. A group of about 50 high-ranking officers en-
tered the Tacna barracks to join the rebels and were received with cheers” (Associated
396
Press 1969a). “The School of Non-Commissioned Officers and a tank battalion arrived
thereafter to join what they were calling a movimiento gremial (union movement)”
(Bawden 2016, 76). Yungay regiment troops attempted to seize the city of San Felipe.
A shootout broke out outside the Tacna barracks after a tense standoff in which some
14 people were wounded. The government imposed a state of siege (Associated Press
1969a).
Gen. Viaux, who said he was backed by 85 percent of the army, “denied that the
uprising aimed at a military coup.” He said that his sole purpose was to gain a
hearing for the grievances of army officers, who complain chiefly about pay and a
lack of adequate equipment.” Gen. Viau contended that “a beginning copper mine
field worker got more pay than an army lieutenant colonel with 25 years of service”
(Associated Press 1969a). Gen. Viaux also called for Gen. (ret.) Tulio Marambia, the
Minister of National Defense, and Gen. Sergio Castillo, the army commander in chief,
to be replaced (Novitski 1969b). Viaux said he was “profoundly loyal to President
Frei and if the chief of state so orders me I will lay down my arms” (Associated Press
1969a).
“Eventually Frei sent to a military doctor, Patricio Silva, to negotiate. The agreement
they reached on October 22 stipulated that Viaux would accept retirement from active
duty and call off the rebellion, but he extracted major concessions from the government:
the defense minister’s resignation, a significant pay increase for all officers, and a much
larger defense budget for 1970. The outcome turned Viaux into a hero among junior
officers. The insurrection had achieved its aims” (Bawden 2016, 76). Before 5 a.m. on
October 22, the rebellion ended and Brig. Gen. Viaux surrendered satisfied that he
had succeeded (Novitski 1969b). “In surrendering, General Viaux issued a communique
restating the rebels’ “absolute loyalty” to the president and constitutional authority,
and stating that their movement had no political intent” (Associated Press 1969c).
Bawden and 40 officers were placed under house arrest and would be tried in military
courts. Gen. Alfredo Mahn was named the new regimental commander. Before noon,
President Frei also named a new of Minister of National Defense. In an eight-minute
radio address, Frei said “A general of the republic and a group of officers tried to
change our constitutional status” (Novitski 1969b). He said that the incident aroused
interest abroad by people who asked: “Can Chile lose a democratic regime. Today,
they have the answer. In Chile, the armed forces do not accept indiscipline, and the
people do not tolerate coups d’état” (Associated Press 1969c).
Both Bawden and Frei claimed victory. However, “El Tancazo, as the agreement was
dubbed, scandalized the political establishment. Chilean soldiers had not challenged
civilian authority for a very long time. The event expressed pent-up frustration and
revealed widespread sympathy in the barracks for Viaux’s demands. Finally, it should
be noted that Salvador Allende’s Socialist Party considered the demands of Viaux’s
movement legitimate, if not the form of expression” (Bawden 2016, 76-77). “Brigadier
General Augusto Pinochet did not take part in this rebellion or in the coup plotting
that followed. He was then commanding the Chilean army’s Sixth Division in Santiago,
and was considered a “constitutionalist” general” (Spooner 1999, 24).
397
Coding rationale: Bizzarro (2017) does not mention a coup attempt in Chile in 1969.
We assume that CCD is picking up the events of October 21-22. Though “Some said
it was a coup attempt,” Johnson (2018) says “clearly it is just a lower-level military
rebellion” that did not “attempt to seize executive power.” Spooner (1999, 24) charac-
terizes this rebellion as “a kind of labor stoppage.” Agüero (2002, 116) says this event
was “not a coup attempt but a ‘protest demonstration’.” Based on the evidence, which
indicates that the soldiers involved sought increased pay and other policy concessions,
we code this event as a mutiny.
• # 155-1973-6-29: Chile, Salvador Allende

CSP, PT, Luttwak, and Singh; Archigos codes Salvador Allende as the leader of Chile
from November 4, 1970, until September 11, 1973; GWF code a democracy (Chile 32-
73) from 1933 until September 11, 1973. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly
ethnic group in Chile since 1953.
Event: “By mid-1973 the economy and the government were paralyzed” (Drake 1994,
50). “In early May 1973 the CIA had reported that plotting was “probably” occurring
in “all three branches of the services,” with the air force and navy ready to “follow
any Army move.” However, at this stage, analysts accurately acknowledged that the
military was divided between constitutionalists and golpistas and that, as a member of
the former group, Chile’s commander in chief of the army, General Carlos Prats, would
block a coup. Given these circumstances, the director of central intelligence instructed
the CIA’s Santiago station on 1 May to “defer” action “designed to stimulate military
intervention.”” In early June, the CIA and State department believed any coup stood
little chance of success (Harmer 2011, 223-225).
Meanwhile, “In late May 1973 the leader of the ultra-right-wing group Fatherland and
Liberty (Patria y Libertad, or PL), Pablo Rodriguez Grez, ordered his group to make
contact with military units” who were disposed to overthrow Allende so that PL could
offer its assistance when soldiers instigated an antigovernment conspiracy.” In early
June, “Captain Sergio Rocha and Lieutenant Guillermo Gasset, both in the army’s
Second Armored Regiment of Santiago, came to Rodriguez with a bold proposition:
The essential condition for a successful military overthrow of Allende was relatively
straightforward, they said, so only one fully committed army unit had to rise up. Once
that occurred, the rest of the armed forces would join the movement.” Meanwhile,
“Rocha and Gasset wanted PL to supply gasoline for their regiment’s tanks, act as
intermediaries, and seize pro-Allende radio towers.” The PL agreed (Bawden 2016,
119-120).
On 29 June 1973, Lt. Colonel Roberto Souper Onfray, commander of the Santiago
Garrison, led the so-called Tancazo (or Tanquetazo), which was “a premature attempt
to overthrow Salvador Allende Gossens” (Bizzarro 2017, 810). That morning, “A group
of tanks and armed vehicles surrounded the La Moneda presidential palace and nearby
defense ministry, firing indiscriminately” (Spooner 1999, 29). “These were not warn-
398
ing shots. More than a thousand rounds of machine-gun fire erupted in the heart of
the capital, and twenty-two individuals died in the crossfire, including Sergeant Rafael
Veillena of the army’s Second Division. Souper hoped that mid-level officers around
the country would instantly join the mutiny” (Bawden 2016, 120). However, the coup
foundered tactically as “the insurgents made no attempt to secure radio or television
channels to broadcast” their appeal or to locate President Allende. In total, the rebels
included “less than 150 out of the 900 troops in the Second Armored Regiment” (Kan-
dell 1973a). Most officers, conscripts, and carabineros “ignored Souper’s call to join
the uprising.” “Not a single army general revolted” (Bawden 2016, 120).
Meanwhile, Generals Mario Sepúlveda and Guillermo Pickering contacted Carlos Prats
with news of the rebellion” (120). “General Prats, the army commander telephoned
military installations in the city and secured their support in putting down the uprising
within a matter of hours. Aiding him in this task was his chief of staff, General Augusto
Pinochet, who expressed indignation at the uprising” (Spooner 1999, 29). With some
troops under Colonel Julio Canessa balking at orders to shoot on the rebel troops
or defend the government, “Prats’s bold actions made the difference. He raced to the
scene and achieved the surrender of one tank by confronting the crew directly, all while
its commander had a machine gun pointed at him. Meanwhile, soldiers loyal to the
government arrived under Pinochet’s command. Before noon the remaining tanks fled,
and the revolt did not spread to the provinces” (Bawden 2016, 120).
President Allende asked Congress to authorize a state of siege (Kandell 1973a). Lt.
Col. Souper “was arrested, only to be released later 1973 when Augusto Pinochet
Ugarte staged his successful coup d’état against Allende” (Bizzarro 2017, 810). Pablo
Rodrı́guez Grez, the Fatherland and Liberty leader, fled to the Ecuadorian Embassy
(759) along with four other PL leaders and were granted safe passage to Ecuador in
July (Associated Press 1973b). In the short run, the Tancazo was a victory for Allende
and his supporters. “To the Left’s delight, and the Right’s dismay, left-wing parties
had also succeeded in distributing arms, silencing the opposition’s radio stations, and
maintaining communication between themselves and the population throughout the
event” (Harmer 2011, 225). On June 30, Cuba’s Fidel Castro wrote effusively “to
Allende congratulating him on putting down the Tanquetazo and urging him to have
faith in his ability to lead armed resistance against coup plotters” (231).
However, the Tancazo also “warned the nation that the military was getting restless”
(Drake 1994, 50) and it prompted members of the high command to begin plotting a
coup by the armed forces as a whole rather than allow junior officer to “attempt another
risky adventure” (Bawden 2016, 121). At the same time, “by proving themselves
capable and defiant, Chilean left-wing parties also gave away their evolving tactics for
resisting military intervention,” which military plotters would immediately go about
planning how to neutralize (Harmer 2011, 225). “Thereafter, the armed forces prepared
for a massive coup by stepping up raids to search for arms among Popular Unity’s
supporters” (Drake 1994, 50). President Allende would be ousted in a coup a few
months later led by General Augusto Pinochet, one the army generals who had defeated
the Tancazo (see 155-1973-9-11).
399
coup.
• # 155-1973-9-11: Chile, Salvador Allende

Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; successful coup - CSP, Perez,
PT, Luttwak, Singh, and Svolik; Archigos codes Salvador Allende as exiting on this
date through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support; GWF code
the collapse of a democracy (Chile 32-73) on this date. O’Rourke (2013, 306) lists
Salvador Allende as the target of a successful U.S-backed coup in 1973. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Chile since 1953.
Event: Plotting for a coup among the armed service chiefs began immediately following
the failure of the Tancazo (see 155-1973-6-29). At the first such meeting, General
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the army chief of staff, insisted that the officers could not
discuss politics, evidently opposing the idea of a coup at this time. In fact, Pinochet
would not attend another meeting of the “Group of Fifteen” (Spooner 1999, 29-30),
“an entity composed of five army generals, five admirals, and five air force generals”
which was formally tasked with making recommendations to the president on national
security but was really intended to facilitate inter-service contacts and secretly plotted
a coup (Bawden 2016, 122).
“In August 1973, the rightist and centrist representatives in the Chamber of Deputies
undermined the president’s legitimacy by accusing him of systematically violating the
constitution and by urging the armed forces to intervene” (Drake 1994, 50). Such
intervention was impossible so long as the constitutionalists dominated the high com-
mand. On August 9, Allende made a failed bid to forestall a coup by naming the three
armed service chiefs to a new cabinet, with Carlos Prats González (army) as defense
minister, Raúl Montero (navy) as finance minister, and César Ruiz (air force) as min-
ister of public works and transportation. On August 18, Gen. Ruiz resigned from the
cabinet. Air force generals protested when Allende refused to allow him to remain the
air force commander (Bawden 2016, 123-124). “Jets streaked out of Santiago to the
southern city of Concepción to prepare for an immediate mobilization. The coup was
postponed” (Bizzarro 2017, xlviii). Coup plotting continued within all of the armed
services.
Within the army, five or six core generals sought to remove General Prats and perhaps
his deputy, General Pinochet, who were in a position to frustrate their coup plans
(Spooner 1999, 34). The “opposition media, right-wing politicians, and army wives”
launched a vicious campaign” against General Prats. On August 19, hundreds of mil-
itary wives protested outside his residence. “Brandishing white feathers,” the women
labeled the general a “chicken” for not supporting military intervention (Harmer 2011,
227). The wives of six pro-coup army generals passed Prats’ wife a letter urging her to
persuade her husband to resign. On August 20, indignant that the generals sent their
wives on such a mission, Prats told Pinochet that he would ask the army generals to
express their support for him or he would be forced to resign. Pinochet professed his
400
loyalty and promised to do what he could to secure the other general’s support. After
the generals refused to sign a letter of support, General Prat resigned as defense min-
ister and army commander on August 23 in the name of army unity. Prats feared that
the alternative – firing the pro-coup generals – would spark the very coup he wanted
to avoid (Spooner 1999, 35).
President Allende named General Pinochet to replace Prats as the commander in chief
of the army, a more which “opened the way to an institutional military coup” (Agüero
2002, 118) after Pinochet reluctantly joined the conspiracy a few weeks later. But only
after Gen. Pinochet tried and failed to head off a coup. On August 24, “Pinochet
held a meeting of all the army generals, asking for their resignation en masse in order
to leave their new commander free to make new appointments and promotions. The
unstated plan, obviously, was to disguise as much as possible the ouster of the coup
plotters, hiding their departures in a smokescreen of new assignments and promotions.
But the other army generals refused (Spooner 1999, 36). Only the two generals who
supported Prats – Mario Sepúlveda and Guillermo Pickering – resigned (Bawden 2016,
123-124). Facing internal dissent from lower ranks in the navy, on August 28, Admiral
Raúl Montero resigned from the cabinet. Though Allende refused it on September 5,
in practice Admiral José Merino took over as the navy commander (125).
“In early September, Allende was preparing to call for a rare national plebiscite to
resolve the impasse between Popular Unity and the opposition” (Drake 1994, 51). At
the same time, “On Saturday, September 8, 1973, General Sergio Arellano Stark, one of
the coup’s backers in the army, went to Pinochet to inform him of the army’s plans for
the coup. Pinochet’s reaction was one of “surprise and irritation.” He was told he need
only approve the already drawn up plans, in order that the other military commanders
begin coordinating their actions, and that the air force commander, General Gustavo
Leigh, was waiting to hear from him.” He said he would approve but needed to reflect
on the situation. On September 9, the Navy commander, Admiral José Merino, sent a
letter to Pinochet and Leigh asking for their signatures to put the navy’s coup plans
into motion. “Leigh signed and after some hesitation so did Pinochet” (Spooner 1999,
37). Finally, plotters in all three services had the support of the commanders of all three
branches. General Leigh then “facilitated the coup’s execution by recruiting General
César Mendoza (a member of the carabinero high command) as a junta member and
thereby isolating the president from his carabinero loyalists” who might resist the
imminent coup (Bawden 2016, 130).
On September 10, the navy occupied the city of Valparaı́so, Chile’s principle port city,
and cut off communications with Santiago (Bizzarro 2017, xlviii). “All of Allende’s
supporters within the armed forces were rounded up and imprisoned.” Early in the
morning on September 11, the military seized all radio and television stations and set
up road blocks around La Moneda (244). At mid-morning Salvador Allende “made
an impassioned plea on Chilean radio in defense of democracy” (xlviii). In his final
national address, Salvador Allende said that “foreign capital and imperialism, united
with reactionary elements, created the climate for the armed forces for break with their
tradition” (Bawden 2016, 131).
401
The “battle of Santiago” that morning caused many deaths and much destruction.
President Allende was determined to make a stand at the presidential palace. He had
rejected an earlier proposal by Cuban advisors that he flee to the outskirts of Santiago
to mobilize a prolonged campaign mass resistance by the working class in the event of
a coup (Harmer 2011, 232). The “air force dispatched its Hawker Hunters to bombard
La Moneda” with rockets that hit the palace every ten minutes and “set one side of
La Moneda on fire.” Most people fled. After the strafing ended, tanks fired tear gas at
the few who remained (Spooner 1999, 41). Leftist snipers on rooftops fired on soldiers,
using guns that pro-Allende forces and Cubans had stockpiled for months (Harmer
2011, 232). But pro-Allende forces were outgunned. “Allende hopelessly tried to make
a deal of some kind with” his military chiefs. Pinochet responded, “Surrender must
be unconditional. No parliamentary negotiations!” (Bawden 2016, 130-131). Admiral
Carvahal subsequently tried to negotiate Allende’s resignation, “with the offer of a
Chilean air force plane to take him and his family out of the country. Allende angrily
refused” (Spooner 1999, 40). Allende died “with an assault rifle at his side” (Bizzarro
2017, xlviii). Some claimed to see him commit suicide, but others believed he had been
killed. Just before 2 p.m., “the military stormed the building and found Allende dead”
(Harmer 2011, 243).
By 6 p.m. on September 11, Pinochet and the other military commanders of the
navy, air force, and Carabineros “felt secure enough to leave their posts and go to the
military academy several miles away to be sworn in as a junta, the country’s new de
facto rulers” (Spooner 1999, 45). “The armed forces justified the coup as necessary
to stamp out Marxism, avert class warfare, restore order, and salvage the economy.
They enshrined the National Security Doctrine, which defined their primary task as
the defeat of domestic enemies who had infiltrated national institutions, including
schools, churches, political parties, unions, and the media. Although civilians filled
prominent economic posts, military officers took most government positions at the
national and local levels. Immediately on seizing power, the military junta... issued
a barrage of decrees to restore order on its own terms” (Drake 1994, 51-52). Its first
(unconstitutional) edict or bando on September 11 “notified the population that acts
of sabotage would be sanctioned “in the most drastic manner possible, at the very site
of the act, and with no limit beyond the assessment/decision of the authorities there”
” (Barros 2002, 44).
On September 12, the junta was formally constituted only after naval legal counsel
had hastily drafted the Acta de Constitución de la Junta de Gobierno (45). That day,
striking workers returned to work (Bizzarro 2017, xlviii). General Prats was allowed
to leave the country for Argentina (he was later killed by a bomb in Buenos Aires on
September 29, 1974 (Spooner 1999, 45-46). On September 17, supplies were restored
“with massive aid from abroad, mainly from the United States” (Bizzarro 2017, xlviii).
Though the United States welcomed the new junta, the U.S. did not mastermind the
coup (Harmer 2011, 220-21).
“Although sporadic resistance to the coup erupted, the military consolidated control
much more quickly than it had believed possible. Many Chileans had predicted that a
coup would unleash a civil war, but instead it ushered in a long period of repression”
402
(Drake 1994, 50-51). “There are few reliable” fatality estimates for September 11, but
“the death toll quickly climbed into the thousands in the next few weeks during the
coup’s bloody aftermath” (Spooner 1999, 45). Officers who refused to join the coup
or carry out the post-coup repression were arrested or retired, including Pinochet’s
personal aide, Major Osvaldo Zavala (Bawden 2016, 131). The Chilean coup seemed
to destroy the previous belief that Chile’s long history with democracy, a strong middle
class, and ‘apolitical’ military tradition would prevent a coup (Nunn 1975).
• # 155-1974-6-26: Chile, Augusto Pinochet

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and PT; successful coup and autogolpe
- Singh; Archigos and Svolik code Pinochet as the leader of Chile from September 11,
1973, to March 11, 1990; GWF code a military-personal regime (Chile 73-89) from
September 11, 1973, until December 14, 1989.
Event: On June 26, 1974, the leader of the four-man junta, army commander Augusto
Pinochet, became chief of state. “The three other members were relegated to what
was described as an advisory and legislative role.” After the September 1973 coup that
ousted Salvador Allende, “all four junta members – General Pinochet, Gen. Gustavo
Leigh of the air force, Adm. José Toribio Merino, and Gen. César Mendoza, the police
director – were supposed to share power equally. General Pinochet himself indicated
that the presidency of the junta would be rotated among its members.” This move
formalized Pinochet’s discarding of the notion of a rotating presidency (Kandell 1974a).
On June 27, a ceremony was held as Pinochet was sworn in as “supreme chief of the
nation” (Reuters 1974c).
Pinochet’s move was formalized by the Statute of the Government Junta (D.L. 527),
which also established DINA under him.“As General Leigh later complained, Pinochet
soon began to ignore other junta members in appointing ministers, ambassadors, and
other top officials. The junta also began to meet only once or twice a month rather than
on a weekly basis; outsiders were brought into the meetings, diluting their significance;
and the ministerial councils, through which the navy and the air force had controlled
economic and social policy, were dissolved. Taken together these steps established the
basis for a more hierarchical and less collegial decision-making process” (Remmer 1989,
157).
Barros’ (2002) analysis based on documents from the junta’s internal deliberations,
however, dissents from Remmer’s characterization. He argues that the junta’s early
negotiations over the rules for governing served to institutionalize checks on the power
of the president. The leaders of each of the main branches of the military had veto
power over major policy and institutional decisions. Thus while there existed few
checks on the power of the junta from the outside, the group of junta leaders themselves
presented a check on Pinochet (Barros 2002, 68-69).
403
Coding rationale: Because this coup, to the extent that it can be said to be “irregular”
(though other junta members did not protest the move) was led by the regime leader,
Pinochet, we code this event a successful autogolpe targeting the other junta members
rather than a military coup by junta members targeting the regime leader.
• # 155-1993-12-10: Chile, Patricio Aylwin

Category: not exist
WHIV; Archigos codes Salvador Aylwin as leader of Chile from March 11, 1990, until
March 11, 1994; GWF code a democracy (Chile 89-NA) since March 11, 1990.
Event: On December 10, 1993, presidential elections were held and were won by the
Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei, in a victory for the center-left coalition
that had governed since the end of military rule in 1990 (Long 1993).
Coding rationale: There is no evidence of a coup attempt or leader change on this
date, only an election. We therefore code this event as not exist (to the extent the
election would result in leadership change, it would appear to be the result of legal or
constitutional actions).
404
2.1.20 160: Argentina
Table 20: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Argentina

160-1951-9-28 Argentina 46-51 Perón, Juan Domingo Anti-Dem. Coup (F)

160-1955-6-16 Argentina 51-55 Perón, Juan Domingo Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
160-1955-9-20 Argentina 51-55 Perón, Juan Domingo Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
160-1955-11-13 Argentina 55-58 Lonardi, Eduardo Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1956-6-9 Argentina 55-58 Aramburu, Pedro Eugenio Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
160-1958-5-1 Argentina 55-58 Aramburu, Pedro Eugenio legal
160-1959-6-20 Argentina 58-66 Solanas Pacheco, Héctor Reshuffle Coup (F)
160-1959-9-4 Argentina 58-66 Anaya, Elbio Carlos Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1960-6-13 Argentina 58-66 Toranzo Montero, Carlos Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
160-1960-10-15 Argentina 58-66 Toranzo Montero, Carlos Reshuffle Coup (F)
160-1960-11-30 Argentina 58-66 Toranzo Montero, Carlos Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
160-1961-3-23 Argentina 58-66 Toranzo Montero, Carlos Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1961-8-11 Argentina 58-66 Poggi, Raúl Alejandro Reg. Ch. Coup (F)
160-1962-3-29 Argentina 58-66 Poggi, Raúl Alejandro Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1962-4-21 Argentina 58-66 Poggi, Raúl Alejandro Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1962-8-9 Argentina 58-66 Bautista Loza, Juan Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1962-9-22 Argentina 58-66 Lorio, Juan Carlos Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1962-12-12 Argentina 58-66 Onganı́a, Juan Carlos Reshuffle Coup (F)
160-1963-4-2 Argentina 58-66 Onganı́a, Juan Carlos Reshuffle Coup (F)
160-1966-6-28 Argentina 58-66 Pistarini, Juan Reg. Ch. Coup (S)
160-1970-6-8 Argentina 66-73 Ongania, Juan Carlos Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1971-3-22 Argentina 66-73 Levingston, Roberto M. Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1971-5-11 Argentina 66-73 Lanusse, Alejandro coup plot
160-1971-8-22 Argentina 66-73 Lanusse, Alejandro not exist
160-1971-10-8 Argentina 66-73 Lanusse, Alejandro Reshuffle Coup (F)
160-1973-7-13 Argentina 73-76 Cámpora, Héctor legal
160-1974-3-1 Argentina 73-76 Perón, Juan Domingo not regime leader
160-1975-12-18 Argentina 73-76 Perón, Isabel Martı́nez de Anti-Dem. Coup (F)
160-1975-12-23 Argentina 73-76 Perón, Isabel Martı́nez de prior defection
160-1976-3-24 Argentina 73-76 Perón, Isabel Martı́nez de Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
160-1981-11-20 Argentina 76-83 Viola, Roberto legal
160-1981-12-11 Argentina 76-83 Liendo, Horacio Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1982-6-17 Argentina 76-83 Galtieri, Leopoldo Reshuffle Coup (S)
160-1987-4-17 Argentina 83-NA Alfonsı́n, Raúl mutiny
160-1988-12-2 Argentina 83-NA Alfonsı́n, Raúl mutiny
160-1990-12-3 Argentina 83-NA Menem, Carlos mutiny
• # 160-1951-9-28: Argentina, Juan Domingo Peron

CSP, PT, Luttwak, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Juan Peron as the leader
of Argentina from June 4, 1946, until September 20, 1955; GWF code the collapse
of a democracy (Argentina 46-51) on this date. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since 1946.
Event: Since being democratically elected in 1946, President Juan Perón had primarily
405
relied on two pillars of support: organized labor and the armed forces. But by 1951, the
military, even those who had “earlier encouraged the program of social reform,” was
increasingly uncomfortable with this partnership. The growth of the political power of
the labor movement “under the deliberate sponsorship of Eva Perón, the unrestrained
political ambitions of this remarkable woman, and the ill-disguised corruption of some
of Peron’s closest collaborators, were the principal causes of the disaffection that spread
among the officer class and which culminated in the abortive coup of September, 1951”
(Robert A. Potash 1961, 574).
On the morning of Friday, September 28, 1951, air force jets began dropping leaflets
over Buenos Aires announcing a revolt led by retired General Benjamin Menéndez
(Hailey 1951a). Those planes had been sent by Capt. Vicente M. Baroja, commandant
of the Air-Naval Base at Punta Indio, whose planes flew low over the capital until 2
p.m. The planes never dropped their bombs because they were awaiting land action,
Baroka later revealed (United Press 1951c). On the ground, the revolt started at the
Cavalry School of Campo de Mayo (Rouquié and Veltfort 1971, 178), located west of
the capital, and involved the Eighth Cavalry Regiment (Hailey 1951a). An estimated
90 percent of the rebel troops were cavalry officers (Rouquié and Veltfort 1971, 178).
After news of the revolt broke, “the General Confederation of Labor called a general
strike and called on all its members to go into the streets to help defeat the rebels.”
Eva Perón later expressed her gratitude to descamisados (shirtless ones) for supporting
her husband throughout the day. Meanwhile, Perón sent Congress a decree declaring
a state of siege and issued orders to the armed forces to shoot any soldier joining
the revolt or refusing orders. General Angel Solari, the army commander, mobilized
loyal troops and retook Campo de Mayo. Rebel troops also fought loyalist forces at a
number of airfields. “But there was no march on the city” (Hailey 1951a). Because
General Menéndez was said to have “little standing in Army circles,” his revolt failed
to secure support from the rest of the army (Hailey 1951a). Perón also had the loyalty
of NCOs thanks to their beneficial treatment (Robert A. Potash 1961, 571).
At noon, rebel troops at El Palomar Air Base surrendered. At 2 p.m., the government
named Menéndez and another retired general, Arturo Rawson, as the revolt’s lead-
ers. An air force communique said that “two brigadier generals and a few fliers and
non-commissioned officers had been involved.” After loyalists recaptured the rebel-
controlled air base, the low-flying air flights over Buenos Aires ceased. By 7 p.m.,
Menéndez and several others were reported captured (Hailey 1951a). Meanwhile, at
least 35 officers, including Capt. Baroja, escaped to Uruguay on seven planes (United
Press 1951c). These officers, which included two brigadier generals and a navy captain,
were dishonorably discharged several days later (New York Times 1951a).
This “inopportune minority rebellion” revealed military discontent but “did not shake
the regime” (Rouquié and Veltfort 1971, 181-182). Some observers believed that Gen-
eral Perón must have known of the plot before hand but let it proceed in order to
stir up loyalty, for Gen. Menéndez had been summoned before a congressional com-
mittee investigating subversion on August 2, 1951 (Hailey 1951a). The government
conveniently used the revolt as a pretext to weaken the Armed Forces and opposition
406
before the November elections (Rouquié and Veltfort 1971, 181-182). Perón forced
officers in all three military services to retire (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 100-1). On
September 29, Admiral Enrique Garcia, the Navy Minister, resigned (New York Times
1951d). By October 1, Brig. Cesar Ojeda, the Air Minister, did likewise (New York
Times 1951c). In the army, General Eduardo Lonardi was retired for participating in
the revolt (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 103). On October 4, the Superior War Council
sentenced Gen. Menéndez to fifteen years in prison for leading the revolt. Others were
convicted for between three and six years, including Col. Rodolfo A. Larcher, Col.
Luis. C.R. Bussetti, Mar. Pio de Elia, Maj. Armando F. Repeto, Maj. Julio A. Costa
Paz, Maj. Manuel R. Raimundes, and Capt. Julio R. Alzogaray (New York Times
1951a).
Though not directly implicated in the revolt, opposition parties were banned from
holding political rallies for an indefinite period as part of a general crackdown (New
York Times 1951d). With conservative army forces neutralized, “the press gagged and
the political parties weakened by repressive laws and the imprisonment of their lead-
ers, the government of Perón seemed to be on the way to a one-party system and a
totalitarian regime” (Rouquié and Veltfort 1971, 181-182).
Coding rationale: Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code a suc-
cessful autogolpe engineered by Juan Peron on this date marking the transition to
autocratic rule. However, this autogolpe was prompted by a military coup attempt.
We therefore record a failed anti-democratic coup on this date, even though Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014) code the collapse of democracy on this date, because the
coup leader’s did not overthrow Peron. Instead, Peron purged the armed forces.
• # 160-1955-6-16: Argentina, Juan Domingo Perón

CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Juan Perón as the leader of Argentina from June
4, 1946, to September 20, 1955; GWF code a personal regime (Argentina 51-55) from
September 28, 1951, until September 20, 1955. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
Event: Planning for the June and September 1955 coup attempts against personalist
dictator Juan Perón were initiated early in 1955 within the navy, whose officers “by and
large tended to identify with the social classes that he [Perón] continually denounced as
the oligarchy.” First, a group of navy commanders and lieutenant commanders found
a leader of their revolutionary movement, Rear Admiral Samuel Toranzo Calderón. On
April 23, Calderón had a secret meeting with General León Bengoa where they agreed
to sound out other generals. The plotters made contacts with a broad range of civilian
actors. Had they succeeded, the plotters planned for Calderón to lead a civil-military
regime with a three-man civilian junta that included a radical (Miguel Angel Zavala
Ortiz), a conservative (Adolfo Vichi), and a socialist (Américo Ghioldi). The plotters
originally planned to move in July, but Calderón moved up the date to June 16 for
two reasons: (1) tension generated by a conflict between Perón and the Church broke
407
out on June 11, and (2) on June 14 Calderón learned that air force intelligence had
managed to get photos of him and fellow conspirators at his house and he therefore
feared he would soon be arrested (Robert A Potash 1980, 181-7) .
On Thursday, June 16, 1955, the Vatican excommunicated president Juan Perón and
his aides as an ongoing crisis with the Catholic church escalated (Cortesi 1955). Just a
few hours later, at 12:30 p.m., Navy planes based out of Ezeiza Airport made bombing
passes over the Plaza de Mayo and strafed the Government House (Casa Rosada),
apparently in a bid to kill the president. But Perón was able to move from the Casa
Rosada to the safety of the sub-basement of the army ministry. He relied on the
Minister of the Army, Gen. Franklin Lucero, to direct loyal army units against the
rebels (Robert A Potash 1980, 188-190). Pitched battles broke out within a six-block
radius of the Casa Rosada. About 2 p.m., loyal army tanks and gun carriers surrounded
Casa Rosada, where they returned machine-gun fire from the Ministry of Navy building,
where the rebels were based (Morrow 1955e). Within the hour, rebel light bombers and
air force jets renewed their aerial attacks on Casa Rosada (Associated Press 1955c).
The navy minister, Rear Admiral Anı́bal Olivieri, and the marine commandant, Vice
Admiral Benjamı́n Gargiulo, though not a part of the original plot, supported the
rebellion. By contrast, Perón proudly reported that not a single army officer or soldier
participated in the revolt. By late afternoon, all rebel-held bases had fallen, including
the navy ministry (Associated Press 1955l). Rebel pilots flew their aircraft into exile
in Uruguay (Brewer 1955i). Some 200 people, mostly civilians, were killed amidst the
fighting (Robert A Potash 1980, 188-190).
On June 24, the Fourth Marine Battalion and Third Naval Air Squadron were dis-
solved for participating in the revolt (New York Times 1955a). On August 11, seven
men were sentenced to life in prison in connection with the revolt, including its alleged
mastermind, Rear Admiral Samuel Toranzo Calderon (Associated Press 1955a).
Coding rationale: Despite the fact that the Navy-led rebellion coincided with the ex-
communication of Juan Perón, the Vatican denied prompting or approving the military
revolt (New York Times 1955q). Other sources concur, though secular and religious
disaffection with the regime were contributing factors (Mathews 1955b). Exiled officers
in Uruguay said the revolt was “the outgrowth of a specific movement that made two
unsuccessful efforts to stage it in 1952. They say it is a fight for general democratic
liberties and that religious freedom is simply one of those elements” (Brewer 1955h).
As Mathews (1955a) put it, “the church-state quarrel was not a cause of their revolt,
but it must have been a contributing factor.” Church opposition had grown since Perón
launched an anti-clerical campaign in November 1954 (New York Times 1955e).
Robert A Potash (1980, 180-181) argues that the fall of Perón was a result of “the
two-stage revolutionary uprising of June and September 1955.” Since GWF code the
successful second-stage September 1955 coup as a regime change installing a military
regime, we code this as a failed regime change coup with the same goals as the subse-
quent September coup.
408
sum, Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Peron as exiting on Septem-
GWF code the collapse of a personal regime (Argentina 51-55) on September 20, 1955
in a military coup; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Ar-
gentina since 1946.
Event: In November 1954, President Juan Perón began to attack the Catholic Church,
which spurred unrest and ultimately ex-communication by the Vatican in June 1955.
The unrest emboldened opposition to Perón within the armed forces. In early Septem-
ber, Perón also threatened to create a worker’s militia (H. L. Matthews 1955). By this
point, a naval conspiracy coordinated by Navy Captain Arturo Rial was well underway,
with the support of only three of 90 generals, the most senior being Major General
Pedro Aramburu, the Director of the National War College. However, after Aramburu
grew cold feet, beginning on September 11 General Eduardo Lonardi became the key
senior figure in planning a coming rebellion (Robert A Potash 1980, 197-198).
“On the night of Sept 15 to 16, word came that the provincial garrison of Cordoba–old
Spanish, aristocratic, Catholic Cordoba–had risen. Other cities followed suit, but the
decisive blow came when the entire Navy rebelled” (H. L. Matthews 1955). Units in
Curuza Cuatı́ also participated in the rebellion (Robert A. Potash 1970). Ultimately,
all three branches of the military united under the leadership of General Lonardi,
General Pedro E. Aramburu, and Admiral Isaac Rojas joined a coordinated rebellion.
After three days of fighting, on September 19, President Juan Perón resigned and took
shelter on a Paraguayan gunboat (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 100-101). Large crowds in
Buenos Aires celebrated in the streets, outnumbering the smaller number of Peronist
supporters who gathered at the Plaza de Mayo (Morrow 1955f).
A four-man junta briefly took power, including Gen. Carlos Adolfo Worth, Army
chief of staff; Gen. Emilio Forcher, commander of the Forces of the Interior; Gen.
Angel Manni, chief of the Coordination staff; and Gen. Jose Domingo Molina, army
commander in chief. The latter was made junta president. After announcing Peron’s
resignation, the Minster of the Army, Gen. Franklin Lucero, resigned. The government
junta then offered to meet with the coup leaders (Morrow 1955f). Early on September
21, 400 Peronist supporters clashed with army troops (New York Times 1955f). Later
that day, the government junta surrendered unconditionally after negotiations. Gen.
Lonardi announced that he would take over the next day as provisional president. Capt.
Real was made secretary general of the new government. Large crowds shouted anti-
Peronist slogans outside the Palace of Justice (Morrow 1955g). The junta gained U.S.
recognition on September 25 (New York Times 1955k). For a more detailed summary
of the coup campaign, see Robert A Potash (1980, 201-213).
successful regime change coup. The coup is often attributed to a growing rift between
409
Perón and the military over his seeking of personal loyalty from the military, rather than
institutional obedience. Others argue that the encroachment of his authoritarianism
on the Catholic Church was the bigger issue leading to his overthrow as it disturbed
both the military and the general population(Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 26).
• # 160-1955-11-13: Argentina, Eduardo Lonardi
Luttwak, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Lonardi as exiting on Novem-
GWF code a military regime (Argentina 55-58) from September 16, 1955 to May 1,
1958; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since
1946.
Event: After ousting Juan Peron, nationalists and liberals in the military jockeyed
for influence (Robert A Potash 1980, 218). On November 11, 1955, liberals scored
a victory by forcing the resignation of Brig. Gen. Leon Bengoa as Minister of the
Army, who had earlier been tapped by General Eduardo Lonardi for the post. This
touched off “two days and nights of feverish conferences by various military and civilian
groups” (Morrow 1955d). On November 12, Lonardi reshuffled his cabinet, leading to
discussions over Lonardi’s future and 17 of 20 members of the consultative junta to
resign (Morrow 1955c).
At 4 p.m. on November 13, 1955, the armed forces made an announcement from the
Casa Rosada claiming that they had accepted General Lonardi’s resignation. At 5 p.m.,
General Pedro E. Aramburu, Lonardi’s rival and a key leader of the September 1955
coup (see 160-1955-9-20), was sworn in as the new president. At 8 p.m., Lonardi issued
a statement objecting: “I want to make it known that it is untrue that I presented
my resignation as Provisional President or that my health had anything to do with
my departure from the Casa Rosada. This has been an act ordered exclusively by a
decision made by part of the armed forces.” The coup was bloodless despite Lonardi’s
reluctance to resign. Admiral Rojas remained vice president (Morrow 1955d).
Aramburu and his allies in the provisional government believed that Lonardi had not
done enough to purge Perón’s loyalists from the military and was too soft on Perónists
elsewhere in the country. Lonardi had made early alliances with some of the older
generals in the army, along with right wing civilian elements such as the Catholic
Nationalists. Aramburu and his hardline liberal faction decided to act (Charles D
Corbett 1972a, 103). For a more detailed account of the events leading to the coup
and factional military conflict, see Robert A Potash (1980, 218-227).
On November 14, Peronists in the General Confederation of Labor called for a general
strike to begin at midnight; the junta warned that it would prosecute instigators who
used workers for political aims and quelled a strike by transport workers in Rosario, the
country’s second largest city. Tanks and armored cars took up strategic positions in
the capital in preparation for the threatened strike (Morrow 1955b). On November 16,
marines seized the headquarters of the General Confederation of Labor, whose leaders
410
were sacked for ordering a strike, which had been “extremely effective” in shutting
basic industries for two days. The junta installed a navy captain to run the group
(Morrow 1955a).
a successful reshuffling coup within the military regime of the “Liberating Revolution”
(Robert A Potash 1980, chapter 7).
• # 160-1956-6-9: Argentina, Pedro Eugenio Aramburu

- CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Aramburu as the leader of Argentina from
November 13, 1955, to May 1, 1958; GWF code a military regime (Argentina 55-58)
from September 20, 1955, until February 23, 1958. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
Event: Between 11 p.m. and midnight on Saturday, June 9, 1956, Peronist military
rebels rose up in rebellion against the military regime of Argentina’s “liberating revo-
lution.” About 40 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) led by Capt. Walter Philipeaux,
aided by some police units, seized all of the strategic locations in Santa Rosa. Another
group of NCOs and armed civilians led by Lt. Col. Oscar Lorenzo Cogorno seized the
headquarters of the Seventh Infantry Regiment for nine hours before being bombed into
submission. NCOs at the Campo De Mayo army base 18 miles northwest of Buenos
Aires also rose up for a few hours, before being put down by loyal cavalry troops led
by Gen. Juan Carlos Lorio. Some 1,800 armed civilians attempted to capture the
Army’s arsenal at Lanus near Buenos Aires but the Army’s First Division prevented
them. Recently discharged Army NCOs and armed Peronists led by Lt. Col. Tristan
Beltran also seized guards at the Army Mechanics School, but they were soon driven
into retreat (Morrow 1956a, 1956c).
However, the rebels did gain temporary possession of radio stations in a number of
interior cities (Robert A Potash 1980, 232). They broadcast that their leaders were
Maj. Gen. Juan José Valle, former director of Army engineers, and Gen. Raúl Tanco,
former chief of the Superior War College. Both men were forced to retire when Perón
was deposed the previous September and escaped confinement a few weeks earlier.
Their broadcasts indicated they sought to establish a “government of recuperation”
returning to Perónist social doctrines. In particular, “The proclamations called for an
immediate amnesty for all political and trade-union prisoners, the restoration of trade
unions to the power they wielded under Señor Perón and general elections within 180
days” (Morrow 1956c). In Rosario, rebel broadcasts called for the people to revolt
under the slogan “Long Live Peron” (Henderson 1956).
Martial law was declared and the Vice President, Rear Admiral Isaac F. Rojas, took
charge in the capital. Aramburu was in Rosario on a trip to the interior (Morrow
1956a). In the end, “Only in La Plata were the rebels able to exploit their initial
411
success, and, with the aid of civilian supporters, to mount an attack on the headquar-
ters of the provincial police and that of the Second Infantry Division. Here, however,
with Army and Marine reinforcements brought in to supplement the police, the rebels
were forced back to the regimental barracks, where, after undergoing attacks from Air
Force and Navy planes, they surrendered at 9:00 A.M. the morning of June 10. Aerial
attacks in Santa Rosa also resulted in the surrender or dispersal of the rebels at about
the same time.” Over the next three days, 18 soldiers and 9 civilians were executed,
including Gen. Valle, before the government lifted martial law (Robert A Potash 1980,
232-235). On June 14, Gen. Tanco and six accomplices sought asylum in the Haitian
Embassy (Associated Press 1956a).
Coding rationale: A detailed historical account by Robert A Potash (1980, 230-232)
indicates Peronists began seriously plotting against the military regime led by Gen.
Aramburu in March 1956, following decrees that banned the public reference to Pero-
nist symbols (November 24, 1955) and disqualifying officials of the Perón regime from
running for elective office (March 6, 1956). A contributing factor may have been the
February 1956 decision to remove the death penalty from the military code of justice
that dated to the Perón era.47 . The plot had the support of many civilian Peronists, but
it is unclear whether it had the blessing of Perón himself. In the end, Valle and Raúl
Tanco led what they called the “Movement for National Recovery,” who believed that
“they, rather than Perón, whose name never appeared in the proclamation prepared
for the June 9 revolution, expected to be its direct political beneficiaries.”
Had they succeeded, Valle would have become President and Tanco the Vice President
(Associated Press 1956a). There is no indication they sought the return of Perón.
Rather, “If the dictator’s policies were to be revived, they were to be brought back
as “neo-Perónism” or “continuism” by new leaders” (Morrow 1956b).48 Nevertheless,
Arumburu said the plotters planned to execute him, Rojas, and the entire cabinet
(United Press 1956). There is no evidence the plotters sought to prevent personal-
ization. Based on the evidence, we assume that the plotters did not necessarily seek
to reinstall Perón in power. However, we assume that the plotters sought to replace
the entire cabinet and install excluded Peron-era officials to positions of power. We
therefore code this a failed regime change coup, as this would substantially change the
group from which leaders could be drawn. Although Valle had been recently retired,
the attempt included other current active members of the military.
• # 160-1958-5-1: Argentina, Pedro Eugenio Aramburu

Category: legal
47. Gen. Miguel Iñı́guez agreed in late March 1956 to be chief of staff of the revolution but he was arrested
a few days later after being denounced by an informer (Robert A Potash 1980, 230).
48. However, Argentine Newspapers did accuse Perón of masterminding the rebellion; they published a
letter purportedly written by Perón on June 9 saying “The hour draws near. Each one should take his post”
(Associated Press 1956e). The government initially accused Perón of being informed of the rebellion and
being asked to set the date (United Press 1956). They later accused Perón of financing the uprising (Dubois
1956).
412
Luttwak; Archigos codes as the leader of from; GWF code the collapse of a military
regime (Argentina 55-58) on this date in a military coup.
Event: On February 23, 1958, the military organized elections to return the country to
civilian rule. Although the election was relatively competitive, the largest (peronist)
party was banned by the military from participating. By courting Peronist and com-
munist support, Frondizi won the presidency and took office on May 1, 1958 (Robert A
Potash 1980, 260-271).
Coding rationale: Among major prior coup datasets, only GWF codes this event as a
coup. GWF coding rules state that “Transitions from direct to indirect military rule
are coded as coups because they are made by the military of the regime in power.”
The GWF code book, however, also states that an election is the regime collapse event:
“Election ended direct military rule. The election was competitive but the largest party,
the PJ, was banned (O’Donnell 1973, 166-92; Potash 1980, 228).” Further, elections
leading from direct to indirect military rule do not qualify as a military coup according
to the definition we use here, because the military regime leader consensually allowed
for liberalization and civilianization. In short, this election event is not unconstitu-
tional. We therefore code this event as a legal transition towards civilian rule, and the
reverse of a traditional military intervention or coup.
• # 160-1959-6-20: Argentina, Héctor Solanas Pacheco

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak, and Singh; no executive - PT;
failed coup attempt - Thompson; Archigos codes Frondizi as the leader of Argentina
from May 1, 1958, to March 29, 1962; GWF code an indirect military regime (Ar-
gentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958, until June 28, 1966, which was led by Salenas
Pacheco as of January 1, 1959, and Toranzo Montero as of January 1, 1960. EPR codes
Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since 1946.
Event: On June 15, 1959, General Solanas Pacheco relieved Generals Raúl Poggi and
Florencio Yornet, who had presented demands on behalf of their troops calling for
the ouster of Colonel Reimúndez and some other issues concerning the threat of per-
onism (306). Goldwert (2014) calls this initial event a “protest rebellion” led by the
Interventionists. In response to the arrests of the two generals, resistance “spread like
wildfire among the interior army garrisons... Having mobilized their power, “the In-
terventionists demanded the resignation of the Green Dragons, Solanas Pacheco and
Raimundes.”
On June 16, 1959, the fourth anniversary of an anti-Perón revolt, “an attempt was
made to incite a military rebellion against President Frondizi. Ex-Army Commander-
in-Chief Lieut. General (Ret.) Ossorio Arana, accompanied by Admiral (Ret.) Toranzo
Calderon and two other generals, flew to Córdoba at dawn hoping to win over the local
garrison. In the Buenos Aires area, meanwhile, Admiral (Ret.) Rial and other plotters
sought to win over Army unit commanders by conveying the impression that the Navy
stood squarely behind the rebellion. Neither in Córdoba nor in Buenos Aires, however,
413
did any Army unit move. During the night of June 15-16 and over the next 36 hours,
loyal officers worked to prevent any outbreak. The Navy Ministry for its part sent
representatives to all Army regiments in the vicinity of the capital and to the Córdoba
garrison advising their officers that the Navy was not taking part. The upshot was that
the rebellion never got off the ground, not even to the extent of issuing a proclamation.
The Army and Navy Ministries ordered the arrest of the leading participants, but the
Federal Police, possibly under orders from President Frondizi, allowed Ossorio Arana
to escape into Uruguay” (Robert A Potash 1980, 306-307). In protest, on June 22,
“the entire Frondizi cabinet resigned. Frondizi’s capitulation became complete when,
on July 1, Minister of War Solanas Pacheco turned in his resignation. The Green
Dragons had been routed by the Gorilla-Interventionists” (Goldwert 2014).
coup (although we assume his dating of June 20 post-dates the actual coup attempt by
several days). The evidence indicates that this abortive Interventionist did involve con-
crete actions even though it never progressed very far (the demand for resignations were
made, troops were put on alert and mobilized, though evidently not deployed). De-
pending on the sources, the coup leaders definitely targeted the regime leader (Solanas
Pacheco) and perhaps conspired against Frondizi himself. There is no evidence that
the rebellion sought to reimpose direct military rule per se, only that they wanted a
strong leadership that would prevent a “slide towards communism.” Szusterman (1993,
272) notes that “the June 1959 military unrest was a consequence of disquiet within
the armed forces against the president ‘because of persons such as Cúneo, Odena and
Frigerio who had Communist backgrounds and the Argentine military [had] become
very Communist conscious.”
We assume that had the abortive rebellion succeeded, the military would have contin-
ued to rule in conjunction with a civilian figurehead. There is no evidence that the
coup leaders sought to prevent ethnic narrowing or empower an excluded opposition
party (in fact quite the opposite, they wanted to keep peronists out). We therefore
code this event as a failed reshuffling coup.
• # 160-1959-9-4: Argentina, Elbio Carlos Anaya

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Frondizi
as the leader of Argentina from May 1, 1958, to March 29, 1962; GWF code an indirect
military regime (Argentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958, until June 28, 1966, which
was led by Salenas Pacheco as of January 1, 1959, and Toranzo Montero as of January
1, 1960. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since
1946.
Event: On June 30, 1959, Héctor Solanas Pacheco resigned as Army Secretary and
Army Commander-in-Chief. President Frondizi appointed retired General Elbio Anaya
as army secretary, who in turn appointed Toranzo Montero, the senior major general
on active duty and a loyal subordinate of Anaya’s as a captain years before, as army
commander-in-chief. But the latter’s insistence on appointing officers of his liking
414
upset Anaya and Frondizi. On September 2, 1959, unwilling to approve Toranzo Mon-
tero’s personnel changes, Anaya, with Frondizi’s consent, dismissed Toranzo Montero
as commander-in-chief (Robert A Potash 1980, 313-317).
But “Toranzo Montero refused to retire, and set up headquarters at the army me-
chanical school, whence he rallied the Interventionists, including fifteen generals, to
his support. As loyalist troops and tanks started moving from the Campo de Mayo
garrison toward the city of Buenos Aires, the Interventionist fourth army division in
Córdoba marshalled ten thousand troops and was also prepared to march. At this
critical juncture, Frondizi again decided to “avoid bloodshed” (Goldwert 2014, 180).
The crisis only ended after Frondizi used a mutual friend, General (Ret.) Rodolfo
Larcher, to mediate. After learning Toranzo Montero did not seek to overthrow his
cabinet, Frondizi agreed “to a solution whereby Larcher would replace Anaya as Army
Secretary and Toranzo Montero would be reinstalled as Commander-in-Chief. By late
afternoon of September 4, the respective swearing-in ceremonies had taken place” and
military units returned to their bases (Robert A Potash 1980, 313-317).
Coding rationale: Although no major prior coup dataset includes this case, historical
sources point to this event as a coup. The military junta of the “liberating revolution”
turned over formal power to president-elect Frondizi on May 1, 1958. Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz (2014) date a transition from military to indirect military rule from the
1958 general election. Archigos codes Frondizi as leader since 1958. Consistent with
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we consider Elbio Anaya to have been regime
leader at this time. This case involved Gen. Toranzo Montero targeting Gen. Anaya
(and by extension, Frondizi) over control of the military. Because the threat of force
was employed during the crisis by both sides, we consider Anaya’s ouster as highly
“irregular.” Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event a
successful reshuffling coup.
• # 160-1960-6-13: Argentina, Carlos Toranzo Montero

and Singh; Archigos codes Frondizi as the leader of Argentina from May 1, 1958, to
March 29, 1962; GWF code an indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66) from Febru-
ary 23, 1958, until June 28, 1966, which was led by Toranzo Montero since late 1959
through early 1961. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Argentina since 1946.
Event: Just after midnight on Monday, June 13, 1960, the day President Frondizi
planned to leave for a tour of Europe, the Third Army in San Luis Province, 400 miles
west of Buenos Aires, revolted. The rebels seized the police headquarters and radio
station LV-13. A rebel broadcast appealed to other army garrisons to join them in
overthrowing the Frondizi government, which was accused of being Marxist and “Trot-
skyite.” The rebel proclamation said “We want to free the country, free it of Peronists
and Communists.” It named retired Gen. Fortunato Giovannoni as provisional presi-
dent, appointed a cabinet, and declared San Luis the capital of Argentina. Martinez
415
Zemborain, a civilian leader of the “liberating revolution,” said that a military junta
was formed by Majs. Consigli and Vila and Col. Leon Santamaria, who was named
chief of police in San Luis (J. d. Onis 1960c; United Press International 1960e). Al-
though Brig. General Mauricio Gómez, the commander of the Second Army, gave
the revolt his support, the movement was “easily quashed and had few repercussions”
(Robert A Potash 1980, 323). By dawn, most of the rebels fled to Chile by cars and
trucks (J. d. Onis 1960d), while Giovannoni sought asylum in Uruguay (United Press
International 1960c).
Coding rationale: Following Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we consider Army
Commander-in-Chief Toranzo Montero to be the regime leader (of an indirect mili-
tary regime) from September 1959 (see 160-1959-9-4). Although this event targeted
Frondizi, but not necessarily Gen. Toranzo Montero, we do not exclude this case as
“not regime leader,” because it targeted the nominal executive of an indirect military
regime.
“The chief cause of the army’s unrest has been its fear of the return to power of the
Peronistas, who supported Dr. Frondizi’s election and who still hold considerable in-
fluence among Argentina’s “shirtless” masses.” In March 1960, Frondizi, responding
to military pressure, declared a national emergency and rounded up Peronist lead-
ers. Just ten days before the revolt, Frondizi announced he would oust the provincial
government of Córdoba on account of military complaints of Peronist terrorism there
(New York Times 1960d). Robert A Potash (1980, 323) claims the plot was driven
by Army elements who believed that Toranzo Montero’s doctrine of vigilance against
Peronism did not go far enough. “Such officers, under the influence of civilian elements
and of other retired anti-Peronist officers entered into plots.” In short, the revolt was
“sparked by army opponents of Peron who felt Frondizi was too soft on Peronistas and
Reds” (Bell 1960).
Based on this evidence, we assume the military plotters sought to depose the elected
civilian leader and reinstate direct military rule. We found no evidence that the plotters
sought to replace Frondizi with a different elected civilian official. Thus, we code this
a failed this as a failed regime change coup.

Other Datasets: failed candidate - CCD; not a candidate - CSP, PT, and Singh; Archi-
gos codes Frondizi as the leader of Argentina from May 1, 1958, to March 29, 1962;
GWF code an indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958, until
June 28, 1966, which was led by Toranzo Montero since late 1959 through after Jan-
uary 1, 1961. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina
since 1946.
Event: On October 10, 1960, Gen. Carlos Severo Toranzo Montero sparked a civil-
military crisis when he issued a set of three demands to President Frondizi believing
that War Secretary Larcher would back them (Szusterman 1993, 199). The demands
416
included: (1) replacing Alvaro C. Alsogaray as Minister of Economy, who was threat-
ening military expenditures, (2) eliminating the influence of former Peronist minister
of economy Roger Frigerio, and (3) replacing several governors who were too lax in
dealing with alleged communists in universities and peronist terrorism. With the sup-
port of Secretary of War Larcher (Goldwert 2014, 180-181), on October 12, President
Frondizi addressed the nation and “charged that a “minute sector” of the army was
attempting to depose him by force.” After the address, Toranzo and most army com-
manders reportedly backed down and promised to abide by the constitution (New York
Times 1960i). But on October 13, ten senior officers – including Maj. Gen. Rosendo A.
Fraga, the director of the War College and commander of the Campo de Mayo base –
resigned in protest against President Frondizi’s decision to keep Gen. Rodolfo Larcher
as Secretary of War (J. d. Onis 1960a). On October 14, the army forced Frondizi to
appoint Fraga as War Secretary. Larcher accused Toranzo of “pretensions of becoming
a dictator,” but most members of the general staff and colonels declared their support
for Toranzo (J. d. Onis 1960b). On October 15, Frondizi’s cabinet otherwise remained
intact, but he appointed a commission to consider army demands (J. d. Onis 1960e).
The crisis resulted in a draw, but revealed “the weakening position of Toranzo Montero
and the Interventionists.” Frondizi sacrificed his minister of war, General Larcher, but
his government’s policies survived intact. “The Interventionists demanded that the
Frondizi government had to follow the army’s wishes on every issue or risk being
overthrown by armed force. For the Legalists, this was dangerous golpismo, the very
negation of their dedication to civilian rule. Thus it was in the crisis of October, 1960,
the growing coalition of Legalists, spurred into action by Frondizi’s pleas, thwarted
the plans of Toranzo Montero and the Interventionists. Toranzo Montero’s plan called
for the resignation of Frondizi and for a new presidential election within ninety days.
That Toranzo Montero succeeded only in gaining the resignation of Minister of War
Larcher, revealed that in the face of rising “legalism,” his position had weakened.
Needless to say, the shrewd Frondizi adroitly manipulated these divisions within the
military” (Goldwert 2014, 181-183).
Coding rationale: According to CCD, a coup attempt in October 1960 failed and ended
with Gen. Montero’s arrest. Evidence indicates that Toranzo Montero was not arrested
(which itself could constitute a coup event, since GWF code him as the regime leader),
nor did he succeed in forcing out Frondizi, the nominal executive. Although Toranzo
Montero’s initial demands did not overtly seek either the ouster of Frondizi but only
a cabinet reshuffle, the historical evidence indicate that this was indeed one of his
goals. The reason Frondizi survived “rested in part on the expressions of support he
received from business and labor groups, but more importantly on the fact that both
the Navy and the Air Force refused to join the Army in disrupting the constitutional
order” (Robert A Potash 1980, 327). Although this event involved the regime leader
(Toranzo Montero) targeting the nominal executive (Frondizi), we do not exclude this
event as an autogolpe or not regime leader because it involved military actors targeting
the nominal executive of an indirect military regime. Because the evidence indicates
Toranzo Montero wanted to replace Frondizi with a more pliant nominal executive,
but did not seek to impose direct military rule (which would have changed the group
417
from which leaders could be drawn), we therefore code this event as a failed reshuffling
coup.

Archigos codes Frondizi as the leader of Argentina from May 1, 1958, to March 29,
1962; GWF code an indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958,
until June 28, 1966, which was led by Toranzo Montero since late 1959 through after
January 1, 1961. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Ar-
gentina since 1946.
Event: Before dawn on Wednesday, November 30, 1960, a brief rebellion broke out in
Rosario and Puerto Borghi in Santa Fé Province and Tartagal and Vespucio in Salta
Province. Ex-Brig. Gen. Miguel A. Iñı́guez led an assault on the Eleventh Infantry
garrison by Rosario, 400 miles northwest of Buenos Aires. Some 40 rebels seized the
garrison’s guardhouse, but loyalists recaptured it three hours later. One rebel, Lieut.
Col. Julio Barredo, was killed. Meanwhile, a large Peronist group attacked the San
Lorenzo arsenal 20 miles north at Puerto Borghi, but were repulsed. In Tartagal,
twenty soldiers occupied the city’s police station, local army school for mountain sol-
diers, city hall, airport, telephone exchange, and state oil fields. Troops from Salta and
Tucaman re-established order after much shooting, capturing their leader retired Col.
Escude and some of his men (New York Times 1960b; Horsey 1960).
Coding rationale: Robert A Potash (1980, 323) notes that this failed uprising was “of
Peronist inspiration.” Until Perón’s downfall in 1955, Gen. Iñı́guez had been the com-
manding officer at the Eleventh Infantry garrison near Rosario, 400 miles northwest of
Buenos Aires. He was court-martialled and discharged in January 1959 for permitting
the publication of an open letter to the President defending Perón. “In military circles,
there is a belief that the attempt at rebellion was undertaken on direct orders from
Señor Perón, who is in exile in Spain” (New York Times 1960b). The Argentine Foreign
Ministry protested to Spain for allowing Perón “to break the rules of political exile”
(New York Times 1960c). The government said labor leader “El Negro” Mendoza was
sought for complicity, having allegedly returned from a meeting with Peron in Madrid
with orders for the uprising (Horsey 1960). The government called Iñı́guez “Peron’s
direct agent” (United Press International 1960b).
The coup event appears to have been led by retired Peronist officers, namely Iñı́guez
and Escude, which would suggest a coding of prior defection. However, at least some
of the troops that supported them appear to have been current active members of the
military (FBIS 1960b).49 Based on this evidence, we assume the plotters sought to
reinstall a Perón, and therefore code this event as a failed regime change coup.

49. General Iñı́guez, for his part, claimed to have had “widespread support from officers in various interior
garrisons” (Robert A Potash 1980, 323).
418
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Luttwak PT, and Singh; Archigos codes
Frondizi as the leader of Argentina from May 1, 1958, to March 29, 1962; GWF code
an indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958, until June 28,
1966, which was led by Toranzo Montero since late 1959 through after January 1, 1961.
EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since 1946.
Event: “The decisive collision between the Legalists and the Interventionists came
in March, 1961. It was triggered by Frondizi’s offer to mediate United States-Cuban
differences. This move was distasteful to the staunchly anti-Fidelist military, opposition
being led by the new minister of war, General Rosendo Fraga” (Goldwert 2014, 183).
General Toranzo Montero, the army commander in chief, who “had not abandoned his
goal of ousting Frondizi, believed this was now the time to move against the President
since “those political sectors that shared his staunch anti-communist, anti-Peronist,
and pro-United States views” believed that strong measures were needed to prevent a
leftist takeover (Robert A Potash 1980, 328).
“However, Fraga was a moderate in political affairs and would brook none of Toranzo
Montero’s golpismo. When in last March, 1961, Commander in Chief Toranzo Montero,
strengthened by three consecutive Intransigent defeats in provincial elections, again
demanded the resignation of Frondizi, Minister of War Fraga was ready to do battle.
Marshalling all of his Legalist support, Fraga led a group of thirty-six generals in
voting to maintain Frondizi in office and to accept Toranzo Montero’s resignation. The
Legalists had achieved their first clear-cut victory. An Interventionist revolt seemed
likely when ex-Vice President Rojas, leader of the navy Gorillas, announced his public
support for Toranzo Montero. But this failed to materialize, and Frondizi emerged
from the crisis stronger than ever” Goldwert (2014, 183). Rosendo Marı́a Fraga took
over as army commander in chief from March 23, 1961, until April 1961 (Deborah Lee
Norden 1996, 116). On April 18, 1960, Gen. Toranzo Montero resigned (Szusterman
1993, 199).
Coding rationale: No major prior datasets include this as a coup event, although
the historical sources we consulted indicated that it qualifies on at least two levels.
First, Toranzo Montero’s (the regime leader) actions against Frondizi (the nominal
executive) itself qualifies as a potential coup attempt, which we would not exclude
because it targets the nominal executive of an indirect military regime. However,
according to Deborah Lee Norden (1996, 33), “in March of 1961, Toranzo Montero
offered his resignation, after failing to obtain the support of Fraga and other army
leaders for a proposed coup.” This evidence indicates that in fact Toranzo Montero
had initiated a coup plot, but not a full blown coup attempt. The plot backfired when
a military faction loyal to Frondizi removed Toranzo Montero. Although there was a
vote, it seems evident that the Legalists in fact used “irregular” means to force Toranzo
Montero out of his command of the army. We therefore code Toranzo Montero’s ouster
as a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 160-1961-8-11: Argentina, Raúl Poggi
419
and Singh; Archigos codes Frondizi as the leader of Argentina from May 1, 1958,
to March 29, 1962; GWF code an indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66) from
February 23, 1958, until June 28, 1966, which was led by Poggi since early 1961 through
after January 1, 1962. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Event: Late at night on Friday, August 11, 1961, a band of 50 armed men, most in Air
Force uniforms but some in civilian clothing, took over the central telephone exchange
building in downtown Buenos Aires. About ten blocks away, a group of nine armed men
took over the government radio station, cut off the transmission of a Verdi opera, and
repeatedly broadcast a taped revolutionary manifesto on four stations for 53 minutes.
The rebels called for the population to join in the revolution and converge at the Plaza
Italia (few did). The manifesto declared that a junta was carrying out a “profound
revolution” to free the country from “subordination to powerful economic interests”
and to carry out the “widest reforms.” It stated: “It is not one of the coup d’états
designed to replace a group of men by others and to favor changes in the handling of
some privileges. It is a profound revolution that has as its objectives in the first place
the nation itself and its sovereign personality.”
The government did not respond for two hours. The rebels at the radio station surren-
dered quickly after Air Force Under Secretary Horacio Rivara gave them an ultimatum
to surrender before his forces opened fire on them. By contrast, rebels at the telephone
exchange turned back an initial detachment of the Federal police and held out for over
four hours before artillery pieces were brought in. By 6:30 a.m., August 12, the uprising
had been put down. President Arturo Frondizi called the rebels “hotheads” (Associ-
ated Press 1961a; New York Times 1961a). The attack on the telephone exchange
was led by Commander Hilario Maldonado, a former aide to Admiral Isaac F. Rojas
when he was Vice President of the “liberating revolution” of 1955-1958. The seizure
of the radio stations was led by Oscar Vicente Corres, an officer of the frontier guard
discharged in 1953 (New York Times 1961a). Corres was identified by his brother Hec-
tor as the leader of a “vest-pocket revolt” (Kay 1961). It “was difficult to determine
the political complexion of the insurgents. One rebel said he was an anti-Communist
with no political affiliations...The broadcast said the rebels had no political ties” (Kay
1961).
Coding rationale: Although the attack appears to have been led by prior defectors,
we assume that at least a few current active members of the military were among the
rebels in air force uniforms. Despite the claim to be a “nationalist revolution,” the
brief uprising appears to have been poorly organized and had few specific political
objectives. It is not significant enough, evidently, to be mentioned by the detailed
military history of Robert A Potash (1980). We therefore lack much direct evidence
that the plotters sought to install opposition parties in power, prevent personaliza-
tion, or do anything other than replace the government leadership to change economic
policy. However, one historical source indicates this event as one of several Peronist
420
revolts (Koffman 1965, 16). We use the predominant role of prior defectors and junior
officers in the attempt to assume that, had the “revolution” succeeded, it would have
substantially changed the group from which leaders could be chosen. We thus code
this a failed regime change coup.

Other Datasets: successful civilian coup - BR; successful military coup - CCD; success-
ful coup - CSP, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos codes Arturo Frondizi as exiting
on this date through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support;
Svolik codes Guido as entering office on this date on an “interim” basis with the par-
ticipation of the military, thus bringing an end to a democratic spell; GWF code an
indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958, until June 28, 1966,
which was led by Poggi as regime leader from early 1961 until April 21, 1962. EPR
codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since 1946.
Event: In March 1962, President Frondizi decided to allow Peronists to participate in
congressional and provincial elections on March 18. The Peronists went on to win ten
of the 14 provinces where the elections were held. To block their taking power, the
military demanded that the national government intervene in seven provinces. Frondizi
partially acquiesced, placing five provinces under federal control. “Rather than amelio-
rating tensions, the apparent compromise effectively consolidated opposition. To the
hard-line anti-Peronists, it was insufficient; to the constitutionalists, it was excessive”
(Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 35). Sensing the threat, U.S. Ambassador McClintock
tried to deter a coup by making “personal calls on top military leaders to warn them
of the serious difficulties Argentina would face with the United States if President
Frondizi fell.” Those efforts did not work (Szusterman 1993, 292).
On March 29, 1962, military troops secured key buildings and Gen. Raúl Poggi,
the Army Commander-in-Chief, announced that the military had ousted President
Frondizi after the latter had refused to resign (E. Burks 1962). Poggi had the support
of the other service commanders, Admiral Agustı́n Penas and Brigadier Cayo Alsina
(Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 35). Before 8 a.m., troops of the 3rd infantry regiment
surrounded the presidential palace. The grenadier cavalry regiment on guard offered
no resistance. Frondizi was promptly arrested and rushed to be flown on an air force
plane to be imprisoned on the island of Martin Garcia on a military reservation 30
miles northeast of Buenos Aires (Associated Press 1962h). General Poggi declared
martial law (Scheina 2003). The coup was bloodless with no reports of any armed
clashes (E. Burks 1962). The capital was calm, though a few teargas bombs were
thrown downtown to disperse some crowds (Associated Press 1962h). Frondizi later
lamented that his Army Secretary, Gen. Rosendo Fraga, did not act more vigorously
in his defense and instead resigned. Fraga refused General Poggi’s invitation to join
the coup (Robert A Potash 1996, 184).
Some accounts state that some of the coup plotters hoped to install a military regime.
Before the public had even been made aware of the Frondizi’s ouster, “a group of
421
senior military, led by Generals Martijena and Reyes and Admirals Palma and Sánchez
Sañudo, met to plan for the establishment of a provisional military junta that would
govern with a civilian cabinet; they had even prepared a list of prospective cabinet
members and communicated it informally to the President of the Supreme Court.”
However, no service commander “was eager to assume the presidency” as each had
pledged to the others as late at March 28 that they would not seek the office themselves.
In his telegram to all Army units at 10:25 a.m. on March 29, Poggi stressed that “We
seek the Constitution, we attach ourselves to it as the only means of salvation for
all Argentines. We Argentine officers of today believe in civilian government. We
look to it for everything, and it is for that reason that we criticized a process that
was becoming dangerous for democracy and for the common good. In taking the
decision to bring about the ouster of the president, we believe that we are saving
the constitution and reviving faith in its principles” (Robert A Potash 1996, 10).
Thus, “an officer faction favoring continued civilian rule supported the immediate
swearing-in of Senate President José Marı́a Guido” as President in accord with the
1853 constitution (given no Vice President). Yet as Guido had initially disappeared
for hours after the coup was announced, Admiral Penas and General Poggi began to
side with those advocating a provisional junta to fill the void. By convincing Guido
to take the presidency (something he had previously refused, given he was a Frondizi
loyalist) and the Supreme Court Justices to swear in a new president (even though
Frondizi had neither resigned nor left the country), this faction – led by Minister of
Defense Rodolfo Martı́nez and Cayo Alsina, for Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force
– (11-12) prevented a military junta from claiming control and presented the hard-line
anti-Perónists with a fait accompli (Scheina 2003).
The new president, Guido, offered General Poggi the post of Army Secretary – the
position which General Fraga had resigned during the coup – but Poggi declined, as he
preferred to keep the more powerful post of Commander-in-Chief. Poggi instead sug-
gested two candidates, and Guido gave the post to one these, General (Ret.) Marino
Carreras, a confidante of Admiral Penas, the Naval Commander (Robert A Potash
1996, 20). For his part, the legalista Rofolfo Martinez headed the Ministry of Interior
after the coup (20). In the wake of the coup, the army was split between two fac-
tions. “The Golpistas, led by retired Gen. León Justo Bengoa, were moderates, having
supported Lonardi, Frondizi, and now Guido. Their military power was centered in
the Campo de Mayo garrison and among the cavalry (which included the armor and
mechanized troops). The Gorilas-democráticos, led by General Toranzo Montero, were
violently anti-Perón. Their military power was centered in the interior garrisons (par-
ticularly that at Córdoba) and the navy. Guido chose a hard-line position, setting
aside the Perónista-won elections, and set October 27, 1963, as the date for national
elections” (Scheina 2003). For a more detailed account of the fall of Frondizi, see
Robert A Potash (1980, 332-376).
Coding rationale: We do not exclude this case as “not regime leader” because it tar-
geted the nominal executive of an indirect military regime. Rather than take power
directly (re-installing direct military rule), the military installed President of the Sen-
ate Guido as President (Associated Press 1962c), thus permitting the continuation
422
of an indirect military regime formally headed by a civilian. Consistent with Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014), we therefore code this event as a successful reshuffling coup.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Singh, and PT; Archigos codes José
Maria Guido as the leader of Argentina from March 29, 1962, to October 12, 1963;
June 28, 1966, which was led by Poggi as regime leader from early 1961 until April 21,
1962. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since
1946.
Event: In the wake of the coup leading to the fall of Frondizi in late March 1962 (see
160-1962-3-29), the army was split between moderates (so-called Golpistas or legalistas)
favoring Guido and hard-line anti-Peronists (so-called Gorilas). General Poggi, the
army commander-in-chief who led the coup ousting Guido, leaned towards the Gorilas.
The new Minister of Interior, Rodolfo Martı́nez (who had played a key role in averting
a declaration of a military junta and ensuring Guido became president), favored a plan
seating Congress and holding presidential elections by May 1964. Backed by Guido
and the civilian cabinet, the Martı́nez plan would bypass a key provision of the March
29 agreement Guido had signed jointly with Poggi nullifying the recent elections. The
Martı́nez plan was “opposed most energetically by the Minister of Defense, Ing. Ernesto
Lanusse, by the Navy and Army Secretaries,” and some economic cabinet ministers
(Robert A Potash 1996, 21-22).
On April 10, 1962, endorsing the Martı́nez plan, Guido signed a decree convoking
Congress into special session (evidently believing he had the support of both the legal-
istas and General Poggi (24). But after Poggi began to back Gorila demands that he
intervene in provincial governments (effectively purging Peronists), Guido backed away
from parts of the Martı́nez plan rather than risk being ousted in a coup himself. On
April 18, Interior Minister Martı́nez submitted his resignation, and Guido was forced
to appoint Defense Minister Lanusse as interim Interior Minister, an apparent major
victory for the hard-line faction (24). On Good Friday, April 20, Economy Minister
Pinedo submitted his resignation on the grounds that preservation of legality was nec-
essary for the success of his economic program; several of his colleagues followed suit
(24).
Meanwhile, on April 19, General Enrique Rauch, Commander of the Cavalry Corps,
secured a secret meeting with President Guido, from which he emerged believing
he had approval to launch a rebellion against the army leadership that would give
Guido greater freedom of action and result in Guido naming Air Force Secretary Rojas
Sylveyra as acting Army Secretary and himself as the new interim army commander-
in-chief (25-26). On April 20, General Rauch “demanded the resignation of the anti-
Perónista War Minister, Gen. Marino Carreras, and the Commander-in-Chief of the
army, General Poggi” (Scheina 2003). “This was the first step in a plan” – supported
by General (Ret.) Pedro Aramburu and the Acting Director of the War Academy
423
Colonel Alejandro Lanusse – “designed to replace the Army leaders who ousted Fron-
dizi with officers who would support Dr. Guido in an early call for elections” (Robert A
Potash 1996, 24). On the night of April 20, Army Secretary Carreras did resign. But,
perhaps due to opposition from the Defense Minister and the Navy, Guido balked at
naming Rojas Sylveyra as Army Secretary and Rauch as the commander-in-chief. He
instead named Rauch as the new Army Secretary. However, General Poggi refused to
acknowledge Rauch’s authority, leading both sides to mobilize troops for a potential
armed confrontation (26).
“Poggi took control of the center of Buenos Aires” (Scheina 2003) and deployed “units
of the National Gendarmery and First Infantry Division to create a defensive position
at the Army Building and to seize control of radio networks” (Robert A Potash 1996,
26). Meanwhile, the legalistas under Rauch “set up their headquarters at the Military
Academy in Campo de Mayo (12 miles WNW of Buenos Aires)” and around 5 a.m. on
April 21 had “dispatched a tank column from Campo de Mayo against the positions
held by troops loyal to Poggi” (Scheina 2003). Soon after, “tank and artillery regiments
moved into the city to take up positions at the Grenadier regimental barracks near the
War Academy.” Over the next several hours, as the capital appeared on the brink
of armed conflict, Guido pursued negotiations to find a peaceful resolution (Robert A
Potash 1996, 27).
Rauch wrote five demands, chief among them “the removal of General Poggi as Commander-
in-Chief” and “the selection of a new Army Secretary, to be proposed by Rauch from
among the generals, retired or active, who had sided with him,” and “Rauch’s de-
sire to stay on as Commander of the Cavalry Corps.” A deal was reached by the
early afternoon of April 21 (27). “To avoid a bloody confrontation, President Guido
agreed to most of Rauch’s demands. At Rauch’s suggestion, the President chose Gen.
Juan Bautista Loza to become both the Minister of War and the Commander-in-
Chief” (Scheina 2003). Rauch acceded to General Poggi’s face-saving request that the
new Army Secretary relieve him of command “rather than be removed involuntarily”
(Robert A Potash 1996, 27). Despite the tense atmosphere, no shots were ever fired
(Scheina 2003).
Coding rationale: No prior major coup dataset codes this event as a coup. However, we
consider it because the historical sources we consulted discuss it as a military rebellion.
As explained in prior cases, we do not exclude this event as not regime leader because
it targets the leader of an indirect military regime (Poggi). Because Poggi was forced
out as a result of concrete actions and troop mobilizations by a rival army faction led
by Rauch, we code this event a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 160-1962-8-9: Argentina, Juan Bautista Loza

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD (August 8); not a candidate -
CSP; failed coup attempt - PT (August 8) and Singh (August 10); Archigos codes José
GWF code an indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958, un-
424
til June 28, 1966, which was led by Bautista Loza as regime leader from early 1962
until August 9, 1962. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Event: On the morning of Wednesday, August 8, 1962, Major General Federico Toranzo
Montero, the head of the Army’s IV Corps, left the Salta garrison with three colonels
and drove 70 miles to the city of Jujay in northern Argentina, where he issued a pro-
nouncement demanding the resignation of Gen. Juan Bautista Loza as Argentina’s
Secretary of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The brother of the former
Army Commander-in-Chief proclaimed himself Army Commander-in-Chief, claiming
“accordance with the opinion of a majority of generals on the active list and as com-
mander of the oldest division of the army” (New York Times 1962d). On Thursday,
August 9, after all military bases had reportedly cabled support for Toranzo Montero,
President Guido accepted Loza’s resignation and appointed Defense Secretary José
Luis Cantillo to the posts on an action basis (New York Times 1962d). Toranzo Mon-
tero agreed to accept orders from the new Army Secretary as army generals converged
on the capital to determine succession to the army posts (New York Times 1962p).
On August 10, the mutiny escalated again after president Guido named Gen. Eduardo
Señorans as War Secretary. Units loyal to Toranzo Montero took positions in Buenos
Aires and the Casa Rosada declared him in “absolute rebellion.” The moves were
evidently an attempt to force the government to name him commander-in-chief and
appoint Gen. Arturo Ossorio Arana as War Secretary (New York Times 1962b). Some
of the rebels proclaimed an intention to set up a “democratic military dictatorship,”
but they called off a march to the capital (Manitzas 1962). The crisis was momentarily
resolved on August 11 when Dr. Guido named compromise choice, retired Gen. José
Octavio Cornejo Saravia, as War Secretary, and troops returned to their barracks
(E. C. Burks 1962c). “Toranzo Montero, for his part, found Cornejo Saravia acceptable
because he had recently shown coolness to Loza” and was likely to agree with his “anti-
integrationist” faction of the military. However, “Much to the surprise of everyone,
including General Toranzo Montero, who expected to be named Commander-in-Chief,
Cornejo recalled retired Brigadier Juan C. Lorio to active duty, named him to that
post, and in violation of Army peacetime regulations, promoted him to the grade of
major general” (Robert A Potash 1996, 38). Meanwhile, Toranzo Montero supporter
Gen. Carlos Turolo was appointed army chief of staff, which led to more unrest. His
opponents forced his resignation on August 21 (E. C. Burks 1962a). On August 30,
Dr. Adolfo Lanús was appointed Minister of Defense two weeks after Cantillo resigned
(Robert A Potash 1996, 43).
Coding rationale: Robert A Potash (1996, 34) characterized the causes of the mutiny
this way: “Once again, a sector of the Army rebelled against the Army Secretary.
In this instance, it was the anti-integrationists who took the initiative, in an effort
to regain control of the institution. The timing of the movement suggests that the
precipitating factor was the favorable treatment that Army Secretary Loza continued
to give to General Rauch.” As the ranking major general, Toranzo Montero believed
“he was the legitimate successor to the post that Loza had been occupying improperly
425
on a prolonged interim basis, together with the secretaryship.” Evidently, a majority
of generals had complained that Loza could not hold the position as he was on the
retirement list and that Loza had appointed retired Peronista officers to positions above
active commanders (New York Times 1962d). On the one hand, Gen. Toranzo Montero
and his followers wanted to democratize the army by requiring consensus agreement of
commanders (Summerlin 1962). On the other hand, they believed that Argentina was
not ready for democracy, and they feared a return of Peronistas in government in fair
elections; many still recognized the utility of forgoing direct military rule (E. C. Burks
1962b).
Based on the evidence, we interpret this event as a factional struggle over control of the
army. This event successfully led to the “irregular” ouster of Loza, the leader of the
indirect military regime, although it did not target the nominal executive, president
Guido. We therefore do not exclude this event as “Not regime leader.” As Robert A
Potash (1996, 59) notes, President Guido “capitulated to rebel demands, and sacrificed
a loyal Army Secretary, rather than allow the tanks to move.” We code Cantillo as
acting regime leader from August 9-14, 1962 (replaced on day 7), and Lorio as regime
leader from August 14 until September 22, 1962. Although the coup leader Toranzo
Montero did not seize power himself, a compromise post-coup leader acceptable to the
putschists (Cornio then Lorio) did remain in power for more than a week. While most
sources code failure (presumably because the coup did not oust President Guido), we
nevertheless code this event as a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 160-1962-9-22: Argentina, Juan C. Lorio

(September 19); successful coup - Thompson (September 19); Archigos codes José
June 28, 1966, which was led by Lorio from about August 1961 through September 22,
1962. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since
1946.
Event: On Tuesday, September 18, 1962, Gen. Carlos Peralta, joined by Generals
Pascual Pistarini and Julio Alsogaray, delivered a demand on the behalf of their faction
of legalist (Azul or Nationalist) officers to Secretary of War General Cornejo Saravia.
They demanded he dismiss army commander-in-chief Gen. Juan Lorio, and the army
chief-of-staff Gen. Bernadino N. Labayru, both of which along with Saravia were
associated with a rival faction of anti-integrationist officers (Colorados or Democrats).
Instead, Saravia dismissed the rebel Azul generals (51). The Campo de Mayo garrison
launched the Azul revolt of the Cavalry Corps led by General Juan C. Onganı́a (New
York Times 1962c).
On September 19, a war of communiques ensued. The Azul objectives were declared
clearly as follows: “National goal: To maintain and strengthen the current Executive
Power and assure it the necessary and sufficient freedom of action as it undertakes
426
to fulfill the promises made to the people of the Nation to restore the Constitution to
effect in the shortest period of time. Military goal: To struggle to reimplant Justice and
Discipline, respects for Military Laws and Regulations, and their enforcement without
any class of discriminations.” At 5:40 p.m., president Guido summoned Onganı́a to
a meeting and formally ordered his subordination to military command. Just after
9 p.m., Onganı́a stated that he could not comply since his troops were vulnerable to
attack. He repeated his demand for the dismissal of generals Lorio and Labayru and
restated his pledge of support for Dr. Guido (Robert A Potash 1996, 52-55).
Over the next three days, armed clashes took place, despite Guido not authorizing the
Colorado forces to open fire on the Azules. On September 20, Dr. Guido got both sides
to agree to a two-hour ceasefire beginning at 11:15 p.m., during which he negotiated
an agreement, the details of which are contested. The official communique released at
4:50 a.m. on September 21 read like a decisive victory for the Azules: it was announced
that Cornejo Saravia had resigned and Lorio and Labayru had been deactivated. It
did not mention any Azule concessions. The agreement therefore fell through within
hours and military operations resumed. Later that day, president Guido named himself
interim army secretary and began to treat the Colorados, not the Azules, as the rebels.
Azul commanders reportedly rebuffed Navy overtures, “preferring the continuation of
Dr. Guido as President to the establishment of a military regime.” By September
22, the Azule forces had gained control of the situation. That night, president Guido
appointed Gen. Onganı́a army commander-in-chief (56-61).
Coding rationale: This event was an outgrowth of the factional struggle within the
army that broke out in August (see 160-1962-8-9). Since then, the legalistas (who now
called themselves Azules, or Blues) sought to take control of the army at the expense
of the Colorados or anti-integrationists (or Reds) then in power. The Azules, centered
among the cavalry officers, invited General Onganı́a to be their leader. Their plan
was to depose Generals Saravia, Lorio, and Labayru. A September 13 memorandum
accused the generals of trying “to seize power and establish a military government
for several years,” and pledged Campo de Mayo to support Dr. Guido. The public
communiques of September 19 drew from this document Robert A Potash (1996, 46-
49). The evidence suggests that the Azules “had no desire at that time to assume
control of the government, provided that their goal of gaining control of the Army
was achieved.” Evidently, the Azul Command and Onganı́a rejected the alternative of
carrying out a revolution against the government (52). This event therefore did not
seek nor result in a regime change.
Contrary to PT, who code this coup event as a failed (presumably because it did not
oust President Guido), we code the event as a success against Colorados since post-coup
military leaders remained in power for more than one week. According to Robert A
Potash (1996, 378), for the remainder of 1962 following the overthrow of Frondizi and
the entry of Guido, “the Army was torn apart by a series of confrontations culminating
in warlike acts. The ultimate victors in this struggle were the onetime legalists, now
labeled the Azules (Blues), chiefly cavalry and artillery officers who henceforth looked
to General Juan C. Onganı́a as a national leader.” Consistent with Geddes, Wright,
427
and Frantz (2014), we code this event a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 160-1962-12-12: Argentina, Juan Carlos Ongania

Singh; Archigos codes José Maria Guido as the leader of Argentina from March 29,
1962, to October 12, 1963; GWF code an indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66)
from February 23, 1958, until June 28, 1966, which was led by Ongania from September
1962 through late 1965. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Event: On December 11, 1962, President Guido dismissed two air force commanders,
Brig. Gilberto Hidalgo Oliva and Brig. Cayo Antonio Alsina. The former was arrested,
while the latter flew back to Cordoba – some 400 miles northwest of Buenos Aires – to
establish headquarters for a rebellion, saying he had the support of Air Force units in
central Argentina. Alsina’s replacement as Air Force commander-in-chief said Alsina
was making “a desperate effort to maintain his personal ambitions” and that his sup-
port was limited to units in Cordoba. The new commander said the air force reaffirmed
its support for elections that Guido sought to organize for June 1963 (Associated Press
1962b). By late on December 12, Alsina’s rebellion had collapsed, and was seen “as
a setback for ultra-nationalist military men who opposed elections planned for next
year” (E. C. Burks 1962d).
Coding rationale: It is not necessarily clear whether Alsina sought to oust Guido, On-
gania, or both. However, we do not exclude this event as “not regime leader” because
it targeted leaders of an indirect military regime. Based on the evidence, this event
appears to have sought to maintain Alsina’s standing within the regime and perhaps
to prevent coming elections. We have no direct evidence Alsina sought to necessarily
rule without a civilian executive, prevent personalization, or change the ethnic power
balance. Instead, we assume motives were defensive, i.e. to prevent dismissal and
the entry of new civilian elites into the regime. We therefore code this event a failed
reshuffling coup.

CSP, PT, Singh, and Thompson; Archigos and Svolik code José Maria Guido as the
leader of Argentina from March 29, 1962, to October 12, 1963; GWF code an indirect
military regime (Argentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958, until June 28, 1966, which
was led by Ongania from late 1962 through late 1965. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as
the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since 1946.
Event: On Tuesday, April 2, 1963, conservative “Colorado” Navy officers led an anti-
Peronist revolt and seized the national radio and other military sites. They accused
the government of corruption and allowing communist gains and proclaimed a goal
428
of returning Argentina to the “path of honor” (E. C. Burks 1963d; Associated Press
1963a). “Describing the Guido government as “fraudulent, undemocratic, and under-
mining the nation’s institutions,” the colorados of the navy called for its overthrow.”
The rebels took “parts of downtown Buenos Aires, but the navy made no effort to
bombard the city. Nor was there a major military encounter between the large rebel
force at Puerto Belgrano and an advancing loyalist force of 25,000” (Goldwert 2014,
194).
Most of the Navy joined the rebellion while support for the uprising was also widespread
in the Army. However, the rebellion in the Air Force was confined to three bases. The
revolt failed because it received little active support from army units in Buenos Aires.
Thus, loyal Azul army units from Campo de Mayo were able to enter the capital and
recapture the Aeroparque and Navy headquarters. The rebel leaders retreated to the
port to escape by ship to the main naval base of Puerto Belgrano (Robert A Potash
1996, 93). “After four days of light fighting the navy capitulated” (Goldwert 2014,
194). On April 5, an acta was signed for the surrender of the rebel Navy forces. In
total, 181, all but 52 active duty, were charged with participating in the revolt (Robert
A Potash 1996, 93). However, President Guido issued an amnesty on September 12
and restored all military ranks, although the active duty officers were still forced onto
the retirement list (E. C. Burks 1963a). “On April 16, 1963, the number of admirals
was reduced from twenty-seven to two, and to ensure against future naval revolts, the
strength of naval marines, who had done much of the fighting, was cut from 8,000 to
2,500” (Goldwert 2014, 194). Thus, the Navy “underwent a major purge and lost what
remained of the political leverage it had enjoyed since 1955” Robert A Potash (1980,
378).
Coding rationale: Planning for the April 2 revolt grew out of Colorado (Red) disaffec-
tion with Azul (Blue) seizure of control of the Army in September (see 160-1962-9-22),
after which the Azules imposed “a victor’s peace, forcing hundreds of Colorado officers
into premature retirement” (378). The Colorados were also anxious to forestall the
national election in June in which Peronists were to participate (E. C. Burks 1963d);
and they rejected an Azul-endorsed plan for a so-called national front “that would
include Peronists but not Perón and would serve as an electoral vehicle for General
Onganı́a” (Robert A Potash 1980, 378). The rebel navy and its supporters declared
themselves against a return of Peronist totalitarianism (E. C. Burks 1963e), and they
criticized the government contention that the Peronists could be “controlled by forcing
them into a democratic mold” (E. C. Burks 1963b, 1963c).
“When in January, 1963, the electoral court recognized the legality of three neo-
Peronist parties, the air force led the way in an anti-Peronist interpretation of the
communiqué. That branch issued a statement demanding that “the Executive Power
take all necessary steps to insure the full force and effect of existing legislation to
prevent a Peronist return to power.” Confusion reigned” and was exacerbated by a
statement by Minister of War Rattenbach on February 8, 1963, opposing “peronismo”
but endorsing “justicialismo.” “By late March, 1963, the two apparent inconsistencies
in the azul position brought the nation to the brink of crisis. Retired Admiral Rojas,
429
the personification of the colorado position, openly voiced his opposition to the Ratten-
bach distinction. Rumblings of opposition in the navy, the rise of colorado discontent
in the army, and general confusion–all of these caused the Guido regime to harden its
policy toward Peronism. Arrest warrants were issued for labor leader Andrés Frámini
and other Peronists” (Goldwert 2014, 193).
The “Little Revolution” of April 1963 was “an attempt by the colorados of the navy
to make a comeback with the aid of retired army and air force generals” (193). Serious
planning for the coup began in late November and early December 1962, after the
release of key officers from detention. On March 24, five retired officers signed an acta
de constancia: Generals Benjamı́n Menéndez and Federico Toranzo Montero, Admirals
Arturo Rial and Carlos Sánchez Sañudo, and Air Force Commodore Osvaldo Lentino.
Designating Gen. Menéndez as their leader and President, they conspired to create a
revolutionary government modelled on the “liberating revolution” of 1955-1958. On
March 29, the five men agreed to move on April 2, contingent on assurance of Navy
support, which was given by Sánchez Sañudo on March 31 (Robert A Potash 1996, 91-
93). According to Goldwert (2014, 194), Menéndez was a “figurehead” while “the real
leaders of the rebellion were retired Admirals Jorge Palma and Isaac Rojas, along with
most of the senior naval officers on active duty, and retired colorado leader General
Federico Toranzo Montero.”
Based on the evidence, we assume that the rebels sought to prevent the inclusion of
new groups (Peronists) into the regime through upcoming elections, indicative of a
reshuffling motive. However, if we assume the rebels sought a return to direct military
rule in which they would no longer rule in conjunction with an elected civilian president,
this would narrow the support coalition (excluded peronist elements) and could be
coded as a failed regime change coup. This issue here is that the military ruled via
a civilian executive but did not allow the Peronist party – and Peron himself – to
influence the selection of the civilian executive (thus the Peronists were technically
excluded under indirect military rule). If we assume a successful coup would have
excluded any civilian rule, this case would be a failed regime change coup. If we
assume a successful coup would have excluded Peronists but continued civilian rule,
this should be coded a failed reshuffle coup. We side with the latter but acknowledge
the merits of both assumptions.
• # 160-1966-6-28: Argentina, Pascual Pistarini

and Singh; Archigos codes Arturo Illia as leader of Argentina since October 12, 1963,
until being removed on this date by military actors without foreign support; Svolik
codes Ongania as entering by a military coup on this date (and toppling a democracy);
GWF code an indirect military regime (Argentina 58-66) from February 23, 1958,
until June 28, 1966, which was led by Pistarini as of January 1, 1966. EPR codes
Event: The victory of Azules over Colarados in the military by early 1963 “guaranteed
430
in the short term one further experiment with civilian government in the July 1963
elections that gave rise to the People’s Radical (UCRP) administration of Dr. Arturo
Illia. Ironically, the chief civilian support of the defeated Colorado officers had come
from members of this party. Dr. Illia’s relations with the Azul-dominated Army were
therefore anything but cordial.” Senior military officers also were disillusioned with the
Illia administration’s failure to provide clear national aims, promote economic growth,
or overcome peronist-anti-peronist political divisions, and over time these officers came
to believe that a revolutionary military regime without obligations to the political
sector would be able to accomplish these ends (Robert A Potash 1980, 378-379).
At 5 p.m. on June 27, 1966, the military’s high command issued orders to arrest
Maj. General Carlos A. Caro, the commander of the II Army Corps and a supporter
of President Arturo Illia, and said it would no longer recognize the authority of the
Minister of war, Brig. General Romulo Castro Sanchez. Gen. Caro was accused of
being party to a Peronist plot with his brother, a Peronist deputy in Congress. Illia
called an emergency cabinet meeting and ordered that General Pascual Pistarini, the
army Commander-in-Chief, be dismissed for insubordination. The military ignored the
order (H. Maidenberg 1966a). General Pistarini then issued orders to arrest to oust
the elected president (Robert A Potash 1996, 156-157). General Julio Alsogaray, the
commander of the I Corps and thus all forces in the Greater Buenos Aires area, was
“the key active-duty officer in the planning for the demise of the Illia government”
(161).
Just before dawn on June 28, Pistarini, Admiral Benigno Ignacio Varela, the head of the
Navy, and Brig. Gen. Adolfo Teodoro Alvarez, the head of the Air Force, on behalf of
the high command invited the previous army commander-in-chief, General (Ret.) Juan
Carlos Onganı́a, to take over the government (156-157). The junta dissolved Congress,
the Supreme Court, and all political parties, and made no promise of elections. A
manifesto justified the coup by saying the military could no longer tolerate the “anarchy
brought about by the fragmentation of national life and political squabbling” or the
government’s “economic mismanagement.” Military men said “there are no civilians
fit to govern” at the time (H. Maidenberg 1966a).
“The 1966 coup was not the work of a secret society or a cabal of officers. It was
planned in the war ministry with all the resources of the general staff, although not all
contributors were aware of the nature of the end product, and coordinated between the
services like a military contingency plan. Representatives of powerful civilian elements
also participated in the elaboration of programs to be implemented by a new govern-
ment. Only the date was left open. General Ongania must have been aware of the
general outlines of the planning, but there is no evidence that he actively participated.
There is similarly no evidence that any other leader was ever seriously considered for
the successor government. That a coup was coming, indeed foreordained, appeared to
have been accepted by informed elements of the capital throughout the early months
of 1966. The subject was widely discussed in newspapers, on the radio, and in ev-
ery confireria” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 111). Pro-Azule civilian intellectuals also
supported the coup, as did Dr. Frondizi, who by this point believed that elected gov-
ernment could not undergo the necessary reforms (Robert A Potash 1980, 379). For
431
summaries of the coup, also see O’Donnell (1988, 39-40).
Coding rationale: We do not code this event as an autogolpe, even though it involves
the regime leader ousting the nominal executive, because in this case the military
leader was targeting the nominal executive of an indirect military regime. This event
also involves leadership change, but following the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014)
coding, passing from Gen. Pistarini to Gen. Ongania, who ruled now without civilian
participation. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event

Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP, Luttwak, PT,
Singh, and Thompson; not a candidate - LPL; Archigos codes Ongania as exiting on
June 8, 1970 through “irregular” means by military actors without foreign support;
GWF code a military regime (Argentina 66-73) from June 28, 1966 to May 25, 1973;
EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since 1946.
Event: By 1970, nearly four years since Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Ongania had taken power
in the 1966 coup toppling president Artuto Illia (see 160-1966-6-28), a traditionalist
faction became increasingly worried that Ongania was negligent in dealing with the
rise of strikes and terror attacks since 1969. The kidnapping of former President Pedro
Eugenio Aramburu in May 1970 by leftist radicals inability of police to find him caused
a crisis (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 119). “With urban guerrilla groups from both the
traditional left and various Peronists factions turning to violence and terror, Argentina
became virtually ungovernable. The military’s solution was to remove Ongania in 1970
and make an abrupt turn to the right” (Gordon 1988, 206).
On June 8, 1970, after Ongania failed to consider a plan of the National Security
Council to respond, the office of Lt. General Alejandro Lanusse, the army commander,
announced that the revolutionary statutes should be changed to allow greater military
control of basic government decisions. “Ongania responded by firing Lanusse for stating
views “which go beyond his specific area of competence,” but found himself without
sufficient support to make his action stick in his only real base–the military” (Charles
D Corbett 1972a, 120). That afternoon, military commanders sent 500 soldiers to take
up positions around Government House, where Ongania had barricaded himself and
which was guarded by 1,200 troops loyal to Ongania (Associated Press 1970b). “In a
series of communiques that followed, the “Junta of the Commanders in Chief of the
Argentine Armed Forces” announced its decision to “reassume the political power of
the republic, with Lt. General Juan Carlos Ongania ceasing to serve in the post of
President...,” made certain personnel changes in the federal police and the cabinet, and
promised to name a new president within ten days” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 120).
The new junta initially included Lt. Gen. Lanusse of the army, Admiral Pedro Alberto
José Gnavi of the Navy, and Brig. Gen. Juan Carlos Rey of the Air Force. Their stated
“aim was “to establish order” at a time when terrorist challenges to the Government
432
had reached a climax” (Associated Press 1970b). On June 9, the junta promised a
return to civilian rule, but gave no date for elections (H. Maidenberg 1970a). On June
13, Adm. Gnavi, president of the three-man junta, announced that Brig. Gen. (ret.)
Roberto Marcelo Levingston, then serving as the military attaché in Washington, was
chosen to be the next president (Malcolm W. Browne 1970), and he was sworn in on
June 18. By June 21, the junta issued a set of new policies (Charles D Corbett 1972a,
120).
Coding rationale: All major coup datasets except for Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán (2014)
code this event as a coup. It unclear why the latter does not consider this a coup,
though presumably it is because they either consider Ongania’s resignation as volun-
tary or his ouster at this point an autogolpe. For a detailed account of the events
surrounding this bloodless coup, see Robert A Potash (1996, chapter 7). Consistent
with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event as a successful reshuffling
coup against Ongania, who GWF code as the regime leader. Deborah Lee Norden
(1996, 39) aptly notes that “The bureaucratic-authoritarian system continued, how-
ever, even as the presidency was transferred first to Levingston and finally, in March
1971, to General Alejandro Lanusse, perceived by many to be the true force behind
the movement from the beginning.”
• # 160-1971-3-22: Argentina, Roberto Levingston

Other Datasets: successful military coup - CCD; successful coup - CSP, Luttwak, PT,
and Singh; Archigos codes Levingston as being removed on this date through “irreg-
ular” means through a power struggle within the military short of coup; Svolik codes
Levingston as being removed by a military coup on this date; GWF code a military
regime (Argentina 66-73) from June 28, 1966, until March 11, 1973, led by Levingston
as of January 1, 1971; EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Event: On March 20, 1971, President Roberto Marcelo Levingston “fired General Eze-
quiel Martinez, Chairman of the Joint Staff [since March 3] and top military planner
for political reorganization, and again insisted that the “second stage” of the revolution
would require another four years before elections could be considered. In an elaborate
ruse, Levingston tried to oust Lanusse as army commander by separately convincing
the other two members of the junta that his counterpart had acquiesced in the move.
The move backfired” (Charles D Corbett 1972a, 122).
On March 23, Levingston himself was ousted. The junta of the commanders of the
three armed services who had installed Levingston announced that it would “resume
political power until the Argentine revolution has been completed.” Levingston “was
accused of not having “acted with sufficient authority to quell the recent strike violence
in Cordoba” (H. Maidenberg 1971). On March 26, Lieut. Gen. Alejandro Agustin
Lanusse was sworn in as president, remained on the junta, and kept 6 of 8 cabinet
ministers that had served under Levingston (Malcolm W. Browne 1971). “Lanusse
was selected president due to his position of leadership within the junta of chiefs of
433
staff, which ruled as a group” (Gordon 1988, 206). For a more detailed account of
events surrounding the coup, see Robert A Potash (1996, 339-359).
we consulted. However, whether or not this event is a coup or an autogolpe depends
on whether one considers Levingston or Lanusse as the regime leader at this time.
As explained in our appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we agree with Archigos that
Levingston was regime leader of the military regime even though Lanusse was the army
commander. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code this event
as a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 160-1971-5-1: Argentina, Alejandro Agustı́n Lanusse

Category: coup plot
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt and dissident action - CCD; not a candi-
date - CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Agustı́n Lanusse as the leader of Argentina
from March 25, 1971, to May 25, 1973; GWF code a military regime (Argentina 66-73)
from June 28, 1966, until March 11, 1973.
Event: In May 1971, General (ret.) Eduardo Labanca led an “abortive” Nationalist
military rebellion against General Alejandro Lanusse. “In his revolutionary proclama-
tion, Labanca announced the inception of a new “national and popular movement,”
which would be “basically Christian.”” Labanca “attacked the “financial Right, the
agent of British imperialism that has put Argentina in a state of dependency... making
it into a great ranch made up of fat cows and thin workers” (Rock 1993, 220-221). On
May 12, officials announced that they had ordered the arrest of LaBanca and other
officers on charges of “trying to foment a rebellion at the Tucuman military base in
the north” (Associated Press 1971b). The plot was allegedly discovered when “an
intelligence officer in Utcuman, a city in the interior, invited his commanding officer
to join the conspiracy.” The officer was arrested, flown to Buenos Aires, where he
divulged details of the plot. “Military and police units have occupied radio and televi-
sion stations in a number of cities to guard against attempts to broadcast revolutionary
communiques by the conspirators” (Associated Press 1971c).
Coding rationale: Whether or not one codes this event a coup attempt or coup plot de-
pends on how one assesses the evidence that Labanca and his co-conspirators took any
concrete actions to oust Lanusse. According to Robert A Potash (1996, 383), “Wrap-
ping himself in the mantle of the “national revolution,” Labanca was a participant and
would-be leader in a widespread uprising planned for May 12. However, the authori-
ties got wind of the movement a few days before, and proceeded to detain a number
of officers suspected of plotting. Labanca, who had little to lose professionally, went
into hiding; but six highly regarded colonels, several of whom had held assignments to
the War Academy, lost their careers. Discovered to have been holding unauthorized
meetings, they were declared unfit for performing duties of their grade, and placed in
compulsory retirement.”
Based on this evidence, we assume that Labanca’s coup attempt was preempted before
434
it could be launched on May 12. We therefore code this event as a coup plot. Had we
found evidence that Labanca had been able to take concrete actions in his rebellion
(such as actually broadcast his revolutionary proclamation), we would have coded this
event a failed reshuffling coup, as we assume that Lanusse–a retired officer–sought to
prevent Lanusse from broadening the regime or empowering opposition Peronists, and
would have continued to rule in conjunction with military elites. Although the plot’s
leaders were retired officers, there is evidence that current active military members
were involved.

Category: not exist
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, PT, and Singh; successful coup -
Luttwak; Archigos codes Agustı́n Lanusse as the leader of Argentina from March 25,
1971, to May 25, 1973; GWF code a military regime (Argentina 66-73) from June 28,
1966, until March 11, 1973.
Event: See coding rationale below.
a coup. We can find no evidence of any coup event in Argentina on this date, success-
ful or otherwise. All major sources indicate that Lanusse remained in power beyond
this date. Other datasets confirm a coup in Bolivia on this date (which Luttwak also
codes), and Torres fled to Buenos Aires as a result of the Bolivia coup. We therefore
code this event as not exist.

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP, PT, and Singh;
Archigos codes Agustı́n Lanusse as the leader of Argentina from March 25, 1971, to
May 25, 1973; GWF code a military regime (Argentina 66-73) from June 28, 1966,
until March 11, 1973. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in
Event: On Friday, October 8, 1971, about 1,200 troops from two armored cavalry units
based in Azul and Olavarria south of Buenos Aires rebelled an 18-hour revolt by occu-
pying the towns before being put down. By October 12, 65 people had been arrested
in connection with the coup attempt, including right-wing priest Fr. Julio Meinvielle
and former president retired Gen. Roberto M. Levingston, who was known to oppose
Lanusse’s plan to hold democratic elections in March 1973 (Associated Press 1971d,
1971e). In a radio broadcast the rebels called for a return to the “original principles”
of the 1966 revolution (Associated Press 1971e), which inaugurated the 1966-73 mili-
tary regime. The mutineers also broadcast appeals to other military units to help them
“oust this corrupt, inept and ludicrous Government.” Sources said the mutiny involved
“a few colonels who had no mass support” (H. J. Maidenberg 1971). On October 11,
65 arrests were made, including former President Roberto Levingston and Brig. Gen.
435
Ricardo Etcheverry Boneo, commander of the First Armored Cavalry Brigade (Asso-
ciated Press 1971a).
Coding rationale: Associated Press (1971f) reported that the uprising was “believed
led by right-wing elements opposed to the government’s attempts at conciliation with
the followers of former dictator Juan D. Peron.” Lanusse’s military enemies reportedly
opposed his announcement of elections for March 1973, seeing it as a humiliating admis-
sion the military had not solved the economic problems, fearing labor gaining power,
and seeking to avoid losing their double income as soldiers and officials. Many experts
reportedly viewed the rebellion as a test of strength of Gen. Lanusse by these military
enemies (H. J. Maidenberg 1971). According to Robert A Potash (1996, 384-5), the
initial plotters for the uprising set for October 9 or later included “officers of several
different political orientations, including ultranationalists, moderate nationalists with
links to Levingston, developmentalists, and even a small group of democratic officers
unhappy with the government. What they had in common was their opposition to
Lanusse, but their ideological differences had prevented agreement on a single leader,
and led certain Air Force officers to withdraw from the plot.” Evidently, the coup
failed because two lieutenant colonels, Fernando Amadeo de Baldrich, the deputy chief
of the 10th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and Florentino Dı́az Loza, the commander of
the 2nd Cavalry, erroneously believed Baldrich’s commander Colonel Manuel Garcı́a
had been arrested and believed their arrest was imminent. They thus launched the
rebellion without consulting the other plotters, who did not come to their aid. Robert
A Potash (1996, 386) concluded, “In thus seeking to turn the clock back to 1966, or
perhaps 1970, the October 8 uprising inevitably alienated most of the political forces
in the country.” We interpret this evidence to mean the coup attempters sought to
preserve rather than destroy the incumbent military coalition, and simply sought to
reshuffle Lanusse out of leadership position.
• # 160-1973-7-13: Argentina, Héctor Cámpora

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and PT; successful coup - Singh; Archi-
gos codes Campora as the leader of Argentina from May 25, 1973, until exiting on this
date through “regular” means; GWF code a democracy (Argentina 73-76) from May
25, 1973, until March 24, 1976.
Event: On May 25, 1973, Dr. Héctor Cámpora became president after winning elec-
tions in which he ran as the surrogate for ex-president Juan Perón, then in exile in
Europe. The military had barred Perón from running himself. On July 12, Cámpora
announced that he was resigning to pave the way for Juan Perón to return to power.
Perón was said to have been the power behind Cámpora’s presidency all along. Some
radical leftist elements denounced the plan as a “right-wing coup” (Associated Press
1973a). General Jorge Carcagno, commander in chief of the army, promised “to back
the Peronist Government as long as it abided by the Constitution” (Kandell 1973b).
On July 13, Congress accepted Cámpora’s resignation and that of the Vice President
and cabinet. Raúl Lastiri, president of the Chamber of Deputies, became interim pres-
436
ident and called for “immediate elections” (Kandell 1973c).
Coding rationale: Some claim that military pressure for Cámpora to resign amounted
to a coup. However, although the military accepted the move, we find no evidence
that current and active troops took concrete actions to force Cámpora’s resignation.
General Perón, for his part, was a prior defector at this time, not a current and active
troop. Because Cámpora’s resignation appears voluntary and his replacement appears
to have followed constitutional procedures in Congress, we concur with Archigos that
this event was “legal.”

Category: not regime leader
Singh; failed coup attempt - Luttwak; Archigos codes Juan Peron as the leader of
Argentina from October 12, 1973, until July 1, 1974 (when he died); GWF code a
democracy (Argentina 73-76) from May 25, 1973, until March 24, 1976.
Event: On February 28, 1974, some 800 members of the 2,000-man police force in
Córdoba, Argentina’s second largest city some 430 miles northwest of Buenos Aires,
revolted after governor Ricardo Obregon Cano dismissed the police chief, Lt. Col.
Antonio Domingo Navarro. The police chief instead had his forces seize Córdoba’s
radio and television stations and arrest the governor, deputy governor Atilio Lopez,
and cabinet ministers (Kandell 1974b). They called on the public to support their
move to oust what it called the “Marxist clique” that was in control of provincial
government (Reuters 1974d). President Perón was initially silent during the crisis, and
the local army garrison did not interfere (Kandell 1974b). On March 1, the police
freed the governor and other hostages, though it was unclear if the governor would be
restored to his post, which was taken over by the provincial president of the Chamber
of Deputies, Mario Dante Agodino, a conservative Peronist (New York Times 1974b).
For the next few days, violence plagued Córdoba that the rebel police still occupied
(Kandell 1974c). On March 5, the Senate approved President Perón’s appeal for a
federal official to take over the governorship in Córdoba State (New York Times 1974a).
Coding rationale: The evidence indicates that the police forces targeted a provincial
government, not the federal government. We therefore code this event as “not regime
leader.”
• # 160-1975-12-18: Argentina, Isabel Perón

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; not a candidate - CSP; failed
coup attempt - PT, Singh, and Luttwak; Archigos codes Isabel Peron as the leader of
Argentina from July 1, 1974, until March 24, 1976; GWF code a democracy (Argentina
73-76) from May 25, 1973, until March 24, 1976. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
437
Event: On December 18, 1975, Air Force Brigadier Jesús Orlando Capellini, influenced
by Jordán Genta and Catholic nationalists (Robben 2005, 392), led an abortive military
uprising that foreshadowed the March 1976 coup (G. L. Munck 2010, 50). The rebels
seized control of the “air transport command headquarters at the municipal airport”
in Buenos Aires and the air force’s main base at Morón 20 miles from the capital.
They detained the air force commander, Gen. Hector Luis Fáutario, and took him “to
an air force repair shop near Quilmes, a Buenos Aires suburb.” Meanwhile, several
plans flew over the capital and Government House dropping rebel leaflets. Capellini
called for the overthrow of the government of President Isabel Perón and for Lt. Gen.
Jorge Videla, the commander in chief of the army, to form a military government to
“eradicate corruption and Marxist subversion in its causes and effects” (J. d. Onis
1975b). Capellini did not receive much if any support for this “premature coup”
(Robben 2005, 388). An army colonel dismissed the “air force affair.” On the afternoon
of the eighteenth, Fáutario was released but the government announced that he was
being replaced as air force commander by Brigadier Orlando Ramón Agosti (J. d. Onis
1975b).
On December 19, Lt. Gen. Videla publicly rejected the air force appeals that he oust
the president and form a military junta. But in his national radio broadcast Videla said
President Perón must provide a “profound and patriotic solution” to end the revolt,
which army sources said meant she should resign in favor of a constitutional successor
such as Senator Italo Luder, president of the Senate. At a cabinet meeting the three
armed service commanders conveyed Videla’s message. Meanwhile, air force rebels flew
mock strafing runs over Plaza de Mayo. However, the General Confederation of Labor
and Peron’s party issued statements of support (J. d. Onis 1975g). That night, the
General Confederation of Labor called off its mobilization in the capital. Meanwhile,
Cmdr. Nestor Horacio Rocha, a rebel spokesman, told reporters: “We want a national
rebirth, and the armed forces are today the only moral reserve the country has left.”
On December 20, Agosti ordered loyalist jets to strafe the Morón air base, damaging
runways and preventing rebel planes from taking off any more. The rebels threatened
to bomb Government House as Commodore Jaime Caceres, a rebel spokesman, said
“We will stay at our stations to the death.” Army Gen. Rodolfo Mugica, commander
of the National War College, announced his solidarity with the air force rebellion, but
he commanded no troops and army and navy commanders reported that none of their
units had supported the rebellion (J. d. Onis 1975f).
On December 22, the rebellion which sought “a rebirth of nationalist and Christian
principles” ended bloodlessly and Perón praised the military for “defending the institu-
tional process” (J. d. Onis 1975a). The rebels’ surrender was negotiated by Archbishop
Adolfo Tortola, the vicar general of the armed forces, who said “I cannot approve a
rebellion, but I cannot fail to recognize that many of the things these people said
are true. In my personal opinion, the country cannot continue like this” (J. d. Onis
1975e). General Agosti, a friend of Capellini, said there were no hard feelings towards
the rebels who would face court martial (J. d. Onis 1975a). In the end, “Capellini was
not even sanctioned” (Robben 2005, 391). Ironically, the armed forces emerged from
the failed air force rebellion “more united and determined to control national affairs”
438
(J. d. Onis 1975e). The high command, which rejected power now, would launch their
own successful coup bid in March 1976 (see 160-1976-3-24).
coup.

Category:prior defection
Archigos codes Isabel Peron as the leader of Argentina from July 1, 1974, until March
24, 1976; GWF code a democracy (Argentina 73-76) from May 25, 1973, until March
24, 1976.
Event: On December 23, 45 left-wing guerillas, said to be members of the Marxist
People’s Revolutionary Army, tried to storm an arsenal in Quilmes 10 miles outside of
Buenos Aires. The guerillas were repelled by soldiers in a battle that ended early on
December 24 and left as many as 100 dead, including seven soldiers and two policemen,
according to an army communique. (J. d. Onis 1975c). A second guerilla attack
occurred on December 27 (J. d. Onis 1975d).
Coding rationale: There is no evidence that current or active troops joined the guerilla
assault in Quilmes on this date. We therefore code this event as a case of prior defection.

Luttwak, Perez, and Singh; Archigos codes Isabel Person as exiting on this date through
of a democracy (Argentina 73-76) on this date. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the
monopoly ethnic group in Argentina since 1946 with indigenous as discriminated under
the military regime after this coup.
Event: Following the Capellini coup attempt in December 1975 (see 160-1975-12-18),
“the fate of Isabel Perón’s government was cast” (G. L. Munck 2010, 55). “The legalists
and the hardliners agreed on the need of a coup by late December 1975” (Robben 2005,
391). The Perónist project of “national unity” had definitively failed due in large
measure to a lack of decisive leadership and “the loss of control by the trade union
bureaucracy over the working class. There was no other credible “constitutional”
outcome possible in a situation of crisis in the bourgeois camp” (R. Munck 1985, 56).
The emerging coup coalition “agreed on the need of a cultural war, but they disagreed
on the time frame of their intervention. The hardliners wanted an unlimited military
reign, while Videla and Viola were proposing a transitional military government of
three to five years followed by a gradual opening to democracy. Pressure from air force
and navy made Videla give in to the hardliners to secure his place at the head of the
military junta” (Robben 2005, 391). With the decision to take power having made, “A
439
desperate move, whereby the Peronist government would submit to Congress a series
of bills that would have given the military almost unlimited powers to pursue their
“war against subversion,” had no effect” (G. L. Munck 2010, 55).
In January 1976, Army Commander-in-Chief Videla gave a public speech in which he
issued an ultimatum to the government that “if the house was not in order” in 90
days, then “the military would have to take power in “the interests of the nation.” As
that deadline came on Wednesday, March 24, “President Isabel Perón’s helicopter flew
from the roof of the Government house–the Casa Rosada–en route to the presidential
residence in Olivos. But unbeknownst to Isabel, the helicopter was on its way to the
airport of the city of Buenos Aires, where she was detained and informed that she was
president no longer.” At 4 a.m., troops surrounded and took over Government House
(Kandell 1976). During the coup, “no great show of military force was necessary, as
little resistance was offered” (G. L. Munck 2010, 55). “The only resistance came in a
brief shooting incident at a union headquarters” (New York Times 1976).
At 10:40 a.m. on March 24, “a new government was formed, headed by a military junta
made up of the three commanders-in-chief of the armed forces: Army General Videla,
Navy Admiral Eduardo Emilio Massera, and Air Force Brigadier General Orlando
Ramón Agosti” (G. L. Munck 2010, 55). A communique said the military had taken
power “to restore the essential values” of the nation and eradicate left-wing subversion
(New York Times 1976). “Congress was dissolved, political party activity was sus-
pended, union activity was banned and all provincial and municipal governments were
removed” (Omang 1976). Martial law was imposed “and communiques were broadcast
threatening terrorists and saboteurs with death.” The United States recognized the
junta (New York Times 1976). On March 26, “Videla was named president, and on
the March 29 his cabinet was sown in. Thus began what the military themselves called
the Process of National Reorganization (Proceso de Reorganización Nacional” (G. L.
Munck 2010, 55).
Ten days after the coup, General Videla said: “To the people of the Argentine Re-
public: The country is passing through one of the most difficult periods in its history.
With the country on the point of national disintegration, the intervention of the armed
forces was the only possible alternative in the face of the deterioration provoked by
misgovernment, corruption, and complacency.” Videla “failed to mention the guerrilla
insurgency, for the simple reason that the coup served primarily to construct a new
foundation to Argentine society, and only secondarily to wage a more effective coun-
terinsurgency war. The military had already been granted extensive powers to combat
the armed violence in October 1975 and did not need a coup to defeat the guerrillas.
Not a military but a perceived cultural threat required an absolute political control
unobtainable under a democratic government” (Robben 2005, 171).50
Led by the armed service commanders, the coup was “the most clearly professionalist
instance of military intervention in Argentine history” (Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 50).
“The 1976 coup was, in many respects, a logical outgrowth of the process began with
50. On October 6, 1975, “Luder signed the fateful decree 2772 bestowing on the armed forces the power to
annihilate the guerrilla insurgency in Argentina” (Robben 2005, 175).
440
Ongania’s “Argentine Revolution” in 1966” of creating a “bureaucratic-authoritarian
state” (Gordon 1988, 207).
• # 160-1981-11-20: Argentina, Roberto Viola

Category: legal
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and Singh; Archigos codes Viola as
retiring on this date due to poor health (a “regular” exit); Svolik codes Viola as being
removed by a military coup on this date; GWF code a military regime (Argentina
76-83) from March 24, 1976, until October 30, 1983.
Event: On November 20, 1981, eight months after assuming the presidency, Gen.
Roberto Viola was forced to “temporarily give up his duties as Argentine President.”
On November 21, Viola’s duties were assumed by the interior minister, Gen. Horacio
Tomás Liendo, described as “a Viola loyalist with little personal power.” Yet it was
further reported that “His health could give his fellow military rulers a graceful reason
to replace him permanently at a time of political and economic malaise” (Slavin and
Freudenheim 1981). According to Lentz (1994), Viola was vulnerable to overthrow at
this time as he “was unable to halt the growing economic recession, and he further
aggravated the military by freeing Isabel Perón and conducting meetings with banned
political parties. The junta feared that President Viola might try to restore a civilian
government.
Coding rationale: One can argue that Gen. Viola was ousted either during this event
or subsequently in December 1981 (see 160-1981-12-11), but not both. Because Viola
was only temporarily replaced at this point due to health reasons, and his duties were
assumed by his own loyalist, we do not code any leader change at this time, and if
there was, deem such leader change as legal. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 160-1981-12-11: Argentina, Roberto Viola

Other Datasets: successful military coup and palace coup - CCD; not a candidate -
CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Liendo as entering office through “regular” means
on November 20, 1981, and exiting office on this date through “irregular” means in a
military power struggle short of a coup; Svolik codes Liendo as entering and exiting
as an interim leader from November 20 to December 11, 1981; GWF code a military
regime (Argentina 76-83) from March 24, 1976, until October 30, 1983. EPR codes
Event: On December 11, 1981, just several weeks after at least nominally being “tem-
porarily” relieved of his duties as presidency after a heart ailment (see 160-1981-11-20),
Argentina’s three-man military junta announced that Gen. Roberto E. Viola would be
replaced as president permanently by the army commander, General Leopoldo Galtieri,
441
on December 22. Defending the legality of the move, the junta announced that it had
invoked Article 2 of the National Reorganization Statute which says “The military
junta is empowered, when for reasons of state it considers convenient, to remove the
citizen acting as President of the nation, and designate his replacement” (Associated
Press 1981a). The junta claimed Viola had resigned for health reasons, “though it
appeared obvious that he had been forced from office” (Lentz 1994). Reports circu-
lated that “Viola had resisted removal, offering to resign only if it were made explicit
that he was leaving for political reasons, not for questions of health. These reports,
attributed to military sources, suggested that the condition had been rejected by the
junta” (Associated Press 1981a). On December 22, General Leopoldo Galtieri took
the presidential oath. “The two other junta members – air force chief, Gen. Basilio
Lami Dozo, and navy commander, Adm. Jorge Anaya – presented” Galtieri with the
ceremonial sash and baton (Associated Press 1981b).
Coding rationale: Tedesco (1999, 48) calls Viola’s ouster in December 1981 a “palace
coup” which “represented a regrouping of various right-wing military sectors in a new
complex realignment with the economic and financial interests associated with the
Martinı́z de Hoz group.” According to Pion-Berlin (1985, 64), the reasons for the coup
stem from the fact that Viola had supported from his inauguration a plan of “na-
tional integration” that suggested a strategy of “apertura” and re-democratization.
In September 1981, Viola stated that the next presidential elections in 1984 should
include political parties. Galtieri, by contrast, opposed a rapid end of the “proceso”
in a speech he gave in May 1981. Other scholars also characterize Viola’s ouster at
this time a coup, including Barros (2002, 71). Based on the evidence, we assume that
Viola (and Liendo, who was temporarily assuming Viola’s duties) was indeed forced
to resign against his will at this time. We therefore code this event as a military coup,
not regular exit. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we code it a
successful reshuffling coup. AMBIGUOUS.
• # 160-1982-6-17: Argentina, Leopoldo Galtieri

Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; Forced leadership change not
considered coup détat (resignation of executive due to poor performance/loss of le-
gitimacy) - CSP; not a candidate - PT and Singh; Archigos codes Galtieri as being
removed on this date through “irregular” means through a power struggle within the
military short of coup; Svolik codes Galtieri as being removed by a military coup on
this date; GWF code a military regime (Argentina 76-83) from March 24, 1976, until
October 30, 1983. EPR codes Whites/Mestizos as the monopoly ethnic group in Ar-
gentina since 1946.
Event: According to Lentz (1994, 44), Galtieri “took over as president on December
22, 1981. He also remained as army chief of staff. In an attempt to gain public support
for his administration, Galtieri invaded the Falkland Islands, off the coast of Argentina.
The Falklands were claimed by Great Britain, and the Argentine invasion prompted
a military response from the British... Argentina surrendered on June 15, 1982. Two
442
days later Galtieri resigned his positions after widespread criticism of the military’s
defeat. He was replaced as army chief of staff by General Cristino Nicolaides and was
temporarily succeeded as interim president by his interior minister, Maj. General Al-
fredo Oscar Saint-Jean.”
Coding rationale: Barros (2002, 71) argues that “Shortly after Argentina’s defeat in
the Malvinas/Falklands War, in June 1982 Galtieri was ousted by the army high com-
mand. The latter’s unilateral designation of a successor, General Bignone, led the navy
and air force to withdraw from the government, resulting in the temporary dissolution
of the junta.” Although one source suggests that Galtieri resigned voluntarily under
pressure, most sources emphasize that he was forced to resign. We use the evidence
on the collapse of the junta over the installation of Bignone as president as evidence
that concrete and unconstitutional actions were taken to oust Galtieri and replace him
with an army-backed candidate (thus explaining why the Navy and Air Force withdrew
from the junta, since they were supposed to have a vote on Galtieri’s replacement).
AMBIGUOUS.
• # 160-1987-4-17: Argentina, Raúl Alfonsı́n

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD v2.0; not a candidate - CSP,
PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Alfonsin as the leader of Argentina from December 10,
1983, until July 8, 1989; GWF code a democracy (Argentina 83-NA) since December
10, 1983.
Event: The Semana Santa (Holy Week, or Easter) uprising of April 1987 by junior
officers was “, above all, as a protest against the military trials” (Deborah Lee Norden
1996, 129). “When first in power in March 1985, army commander Hector Rı́os Ereñú
had sought and gained cooperation from the military general staff to wage a legal
battle to exonerate those officers accused of transgressions” during the Dirty War
carried out under the former military regime. “The junior officers were skeptical but
ultimately cooperated with Rı́os Ereñú so long as the process did not turn against them.
Rı́os Ereñú, in turn, had placed his trust in the Alfonsı́n government to find an exit,
should the trials prove to be too embarrassing or damaging to the armed services. The
government responded with” the Punto Final law (Pion-Berlin and López 1992, 72-73),
which Congress passed by Congress in December 1986. The legislation “established
a 60-day deadline for new enquiries about officers accused of human rights violations
during the Dirty War. Existing investigations and indictments were not effected by
the legislation and the public was free to bring new charges during the 60-day period.
This legislation, passed without major public dissent, offered a “light at the end of the
tunnel” for the military while not granting a blanket amnesty” (Gordon 1988, 219).
“Unrest among junior officers continued” (219) into 1987 because ultimately the Punto
Final “failed to stop the trials. Human rights groups and lawyers working feverishly
under deadline during the summer vacations were able to hand down 400 indictments
(far more than the government had anticipated) against 130 soldiers, one-fifth of whom
were on active duty.” Junior officers knew that “additional convictions would follow”
443
(Pion-Berlin and López 1992, 73).
On April 14, 1987, “Major Ernesto Guillermo Barreiro’s refusal to answer a federal
summons plunged the Alfonsin government into crisis” (Gordon 1988, 219). Barreiro
“took refuge in the 14th Airborne Infantry Regiment in Córdoba” (Tedesco 1996, 30).
“Major Barreiro’s refusal to present himself in court gave the leaders of the soon to
be denominated Operación Dignidad [Operation Dignity] a concrete case, and thus an
excuse to carry out the protest that they had been planning for some weeks” (Deborah
Lee Norden 1996, 129). On April 17, army officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Aldo
Rico “barricaded themselves inside the Campo de Mayo military base” near Buenos
Aires. “Rico refused to comply with his superiors’ calls for surrender, gambling that
the government would not or could not suppress the rebellion. As it turned out, he
was proven right. Subordinates ignored the orders issued by the Second Army Corps
chief to surround the base. Some troops moved hesitantly toward Campo de Mayo but,
once there, refused to fire on the rebel. The reason was clear enough: the majority
of soldiers sympathized with the rebels view that the judicial proceedings needed to
end” (Pion-Berlin and López 1992, 73). The mutineers were led by “officers ranking
no higher than colonel” (Deborah L Norden 2011, 92). General Rı́os Ereñú resigned
after loyalist troops refused his orders (Tedesco 1996, 3). “The crisis was resolved
when president Alfonsı́n intervened personally by flying to the military installation to
negotiate an end to the hostilities” (Pion-Berlin and López 1992, 73).
The rebel carapintadas, “so named for the camouflage paint they smeared on their
faces” (74), had demanded “an end to the military trials, the retirement of Army Chief
of Staff Rı́os Ereñú (or, even better, the removal of all the high command), an end to
the “campaign of disparagement against the Armed Forces,” and impunity for their
actions. As Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico, the leader of Operación Dignidad, declared,
“The hopes that the present leadership of the force might put an end to the injustices
and humiliations that weigh on the armed forces are considered to be extinguished.”..
Feeling betrayed by their leaders, the middle ranks were taking things into their own
hands. Yet despite the undeniably political nature of the trial issue, the rebels’ political
demands went no further at this point. Repeatedly, the rebels emphasized that this
was not a coup d’état, that they were not attempting to overthrow the constitutional
order, and that the uprising represented an internal conflict. Their fight, they argued,
was with their own military superiors” (Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 129). The rebels
“contended that they did not wish to challenge the authority of the President, and
were acting only to demonstrate their opposition to the Dirty War trials” (Gordon
1988, 220). Indeed, others conclude that the event reflected the professional concerns
of the “parallel army” whose “purpose was neither to provoke violence nor to foment
a coup” (Pion-Berlin and López 1992, 74).
During the rebellion, “social demonstrations supporting the government were held in
the main squares of the Argentinean cities. In Buenos Aires, crowds had filled the Plaza
de Mayo since the very beginning of the rebellion. There were also social demonstra-
tions against the military rebellion in front of the Campo de Mayo Regiment” (Tedesco
1996, 30-31). Crowds of 100,000-150,000 people swarmed in Buenos Aires and Córdoba
(New York Times 1987). As a result, “The carapintadas found themselves completely
444
isolated from civil society. Democracy was supported by all the political parties and
other institutions such as the Church and the representative organizations of labour
and business. An Acta de Compromiso Democratico (Democratic Commitment Act)
was signed by all the political parties whose leaders were in the House of Government
during the days of the rebellion (Cları́n, 18/4/1987, p. 2). The Confederation General
del Trabajo (CGT - General Confederation of Labour) called for an unlimited strike
to support democracy and its General Secretary, Saul Ubaldini, joined the political
leaders in the House of Government (Cları́n, 18/4/1987, p. 8-9). This was the first
time in Argentina’s history that the political parties, the representatives of the organi-
zations of labour and business, the Church and society together had actively supported
democracy against a military rebellion” (Tedesco 1996, 30-31). “After several tense
days, the rebellion ended peacefully after a massive outpouring of public support for
the government and a strong show of unity by opposition political parties and labor
unions” (Gordon 1988, 220).
Soon after the uprising, “The President, ever the realist and not totally unsympa-
thetic to the junior officers, proposed the obediencia debida (due obedience) legislation
aimed at exempting from prosecution those officers” (of the rank lieutenant colonel
or lower) “who were compelled to follow orders during the Dirty War” (220). “The
obediencia debida, which would amnesty most junior officers accused of illegal acts,
angered many human rights groups. Once again, Alfonsin and the civilian leaders were
caught between the public’s demand for justice, and the still considerable power of the
military...For some the obediencia debida marked Alfonsin’s surrender to the military;
for others it was a necessary step on the path to national reconciliation and institu-
tionalization of civilian rule” (220). “The rebels were not, however, able to obtain a
guarantee of impunity for Rico, which led, in turn, to the Monte Caseros rebellion” of
January 1988 (Deborah L Norden 2011, 97). These rebellions “served as a reminder
that even the most favorable context for the assertion of civilian control placed limits
on how far civilians could go in confronting the armed forces” (Hunter 1997, 446).
“Why did the Semana Santa rebellion not end in a military coup? One could suggest
that the carapintadas did not want to overthrow the democratic government (Norden,
1990, p. 168-169). However, I argue that the deep-rooted opposition of Argentine soci-
ety to the military rebellion completely isolated the carapintadas. The massive support
of democracy by the political parties, the CGT, the Sociedad Rural Argentina (Ar-
gentine Rural Society), the Union Industrial Argentina (Argentine Industrial Union),
the Catholic Church, and thousands of people demonstrating in Plaza de Mayo and
in Campo de Mayo explains why the Semana Santa rebellion did not escalate into
more than just a rebellion. Finally, the international community also condemned the
military action (Cları́n, 17/18-4/1987)” (Tedesco 1996, 31). For a detailed analysis of
the Semana Santa rebellion, also see Huser (2002, 105-113).
Coding rationale: We find no evidence that the mutineers’ goals included toppling Pres-
ident Alfonsı́n, but instead they sought policy concessions and targeted the military
high command. “It is evident that although the rebels did not intend to overturn the
democratic government, they were seeking changes in government policy” (Pion-Berlin
445
and López 1992, 75). We therefore code this event as a mutiny.
• # 160-1988-12-2: Argentina, Raúl Alfonsı́n

Category: mutiny
Archigos codes Alfonsin as the leader of Argentina from December 10, 1983, until July
8, 1989; GWF code a democracy (Argentina 83-NA) since December 10, 1983.
Event: The Semana Santa rebellion of April 1987 (see 160-1987-4-17) was followed by
the Monte Caseros rebellion of January 1988 and then the Villa Martelli rebellion of
December 1988.
“At the end of 1988, another personal situation provoked yet another military rebellion.
This time, Colonel Mohamed Alı́ Seineldı́n,” a former superior and instructor of Lt.
Colonel Aldo Rico (the officer who led the Semana Santa uprising) “who was in Panama
training a special force of Manuel Noriega’s Army, instigated a rebellion when the Army
refused to promote him to general” (Tedesco 1996, 32).51 “Seineldı́n was seen as the
‘moral leader’ of the carapintadas, therefore the refusal was viewed as another measure
to neutralize the role of the rebellious movement within the Army. On 30 November,
members of the Albatross unit of the Prefectura Naval left their base armed and in
combat gear” (32). “It was not known where they were headed or for what purpose.
Media reports began to express increasing alarm, despite the usual marginality of the
Prefectura in political questions. Simultaneous revolts in two army regiments increased
the apprehension” (Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 132).
Two days later, on December 2, “the young Albatros officers reappeared in Villa
Martelli” (132). They “took over the infantry school at Campo de Mayo, and an-
nounced that they were under Col. Seineldı́n’s orders. The Colonel left Panama to
lead the rebellion in Buenos Aires” (Tedesco 1996, 32). The rebellion quickly “spread
to regiments throughout the country” (Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 132). “The carapin-
tadas demanded amnesty for those accused of human rights violations and participation
in the previous rebellions. General Caridi, in a meeting with Seineldı́n, agreed to ac-
cept this as a general demand of the Army. But Alfonsı́n refused to grant amnesty,
and ordered the Army to quash the rebellion” (Tedesco 1996, 32). While“ loyalist
troops were summoned to suppress the uprising, very few seemed willing to actively
oppose the rebels. Many tried to give the appearance of following orders, while ac-
tually obstructing efforts to reassert control” (Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 131-132).
Meanwhile, Congress “called an emergency session which was also attended by several
ambassadors to show their support for the government (Cları́n, 6/12/1988, p. 2). The
CGT and business organizations called a general strike to support democracy while
the population was demonstrating against the rebellion in the main squares of Argen-
tinean cities.” General Isidro Cáceres, with the approval of General Caridi, led loyalist
troops into the barracks at Villa Martelli and negotiated with the mutineers. “A social
51. Years before, the Alfonsı́n administration had appointed Seineldı́n as military attaché in Panama “as
a form of honorable exile for an officer it deeply mistrusted,” though he had not participated in nor publicly
supported either of the two prior carapintada rebellions (Pion-Berlin and López 1992, 81-82).
446
demonstration against the carapintadas ensued which provoked fights between civil-
ians and the carapintadas, leaving three people dead and forty-three injured.” Soon
after, “General Caridi announced that the operation had ended (Clarin, 6/12/1988,
p. 1). The carapintadas soon publicly announced the terms of the agreement they
had reached with General Cáceres: that General Caridi would be replaced by General
Cáceres before 23 December, that wages would be increased, that the carapintadas
would not be judged, that the ‘dirty war’ would be recognized as a positive event, and
that a general amnesty would be granted during the next change of administration
(Acuna and Smulovitz, 1991, p. 27) (Tedesco 1996, 32-33). In short, “the rebels fully
regained their pre-Monte Caseros standing” (Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 131-132). In
total, “only two officers were ultimately arrested for participating” (Deborah L Norden
2011, 97).
“Not surprisingly, the rebels’ demands were an extension of those posed in the earlier
rebellions, centering around the enhancement of military prestige and the impunity of
the vast majority of the carapintadas. However, the situation was different this time.
First, Seineldı́n had lent his own, more ideological slant to the movement. Secondly,
despite the failure of the Monte Caseros rebellion, the elapsed time since the initiation
of Operación Dignidad had given the carapintadas the opportunity to more effectively
consolidate the movement. They had begun to entrench themselves in little pockets,
such as ostensible research institutes, and were reputed to have established a virtual
parallel army command. Finally, as Rosendo Fraga points out, the context of Villa
Martelli had evolved from that of a year and a half earlier, in that while the trials
were still an important rallying point, they had ceased to be a real issue (1989). By
December of 1988, the number of military officers being prosecuted for human rights
trials had been reduced from the pre-Semana Santa total of 450 to a mere 20. This
meant that despite the similarities between the demands posed at this point and those
posed previously, the implications were somewhat different. Rather than defending the
military from a concrete, shared threat, the Villa Martelli uprising appeared aimed at
securing a “place” in the political arena. In other words, the goals of this rebellion
seemed to have more to do with increasing the prestige and status of the military
institution and, in particular, the carapintadas, instead of merely protecting the army
from punishment for what they consider to have been justifiable actions” (Deborah Lee
Norden 1996, 133-134).
Following the election of Carlos Menem, the carapintadas were “weakened by Menem’s
appointments,” but “they had not been vanquished. Much of the December 1988 ac-
cord had not as yet been fully implemented, giving rise to renewed pressures from
Colonel Seineldı́n who by July 1989 had been placed under house arrest. It is reported
that members of Menem’s government consulted regularly with Seineldı́n at his resi-
dence to try to curtail further dissent, by forging arrangements suitable to him and
the high command (New York Times, December 22, 1990: 3). Such consultations,
of course, only reinforced Seineldı́n’s conviction that, in fact, the carapintadas were a
Parallel Army and a political force to be reckoned with. In this context Carlos Menern
announced in October 1989 the pardon of all those officers who had participated in the
three military uprisings and of 18 senior officials who had been charged with human
447
rights transgressions during the Dirty War. This seemed to have at least temporarily
mollified the rebels by fulfilling part of the December 1988 agreement” (Pion-Berlin
and López 1992, 84). For a detailed analysis of the Villa Martelli uprising, also see
Huser (2002, 116-120).
Coding rationale: As in the Semana Santa rebellion of April 1987, we find no evidence
that the mutineers’ goals included toppling President Alfonsı́n, but instead they sought
policy concessions and targeted the military high command. We therefore code this
event as a mutiny.
• # 160-1990-12-3: Argentina, Carlos Menem

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: failed military coup attempt - CCD; failed coup attempt - CSP; no
executive - PT; not a candidate - Singh; Archigos codes Alfonsin as the leader of
Argentina from December 10, 1983, until July 8, 1989; GWF code a democracy (Ar-
gentina 83-NA) since December 10, 1983.
Event: Following the Villa Martelli uprising of December 1988 (see 160-1988-12-2) the
carapintadas’ agenda held much less appeal to the rest of the officer corps than they
had over the 1987-1989 period (Pion-Berlin and López 1992, 84).
“On 3 December 1990, the Seineldı́nistas mobilized their followers for what appears to
have been the last major carapintada uprising. At about three-thirty in the morning,
some fifty followers of Colonel Seineldı́n entrenched themselves in army headquarters
(Edificio Libertador), just around the corner from the government house in Buenos
Aires. Almost simultaneously, rebels occupied the Patricios infantry regiment in nearby
Palermo, the TAMSE tank factory in Boulogne, and a quartermaster battalion in El
Palomar, and sequestered a cavalry regiment in the province of Entre Rios. Insur-
gents from Albatros, the elite Prefectura Naval [Coast Guard] unit active during the
Villa Martelli, moved to occupy Prefectura headquarters. Over six hundred men are
estimated to have participated. After a few signs of early success, the rebels’ good
fortune quickly diminished. The December Third rebellion, named “Operación Virgen
de Luján,” broke the unwritten rule of military uprisings in Argentina—no bloodshed
among comrades,” contributing to its failure (Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 149). The
rebels “were far outnumbered and overpowered by loyalist troops who fought fiercely
and unhesitatingly–a marked contrast to earlier revolts when they balked at orders from
their superiors to fire on the rebels.” What’s more, “many officers who had counted
themselves as carapintadas in the past switched sides this time to join the loyalists.
Those who did side with the rebels were apparently of junior rank, had graduated at
the bottom of their military classes, and had been lured into battle with promises of
professional advances they could not achieve on their own” (Pion-Berlin and López
1992, 84).
“As in past rebellions, the rebels emphasized that the uprising was not a coup and
demanded both the elimination of the army command and the restoration of the army’s
status and capabilities. However, there were some important new elements distinct
448
from the earlier uprisings. No longer was replacing the army chief of staff considered
sufficient; now the insurgents wanted a complete purge, with Seineldı́n assuming the
command. In addition, economic deterrents to institutional morale appeared to have
replaced such earlier irritants as negative media coverage and prosecution for human
rights violations. In the early hours of the episode, Major Abete announced: “This is a
continuation of Monte Caseros because we cannot permit that a member of the military
is a taxi driver or a newspaper vendor. We should be defending the fatherland 24 hours.
This is not a coup d’état; we respect the Constitution but we do not recognize the
generals. The legitimate commander of the army is Colonel Mohammed Alı́ Seineldı́n”
” (Deborah Lee Norden 1996, 151). Some clam that “the mutiny was a political vehicle
designed by a handful of power-thirsty colonels who believed they could overturn the
military command and, from that position, challenge the political leadership of the
nation itself” (Pion-Berlin and López 1992, 84-85).
Coding rationale: As in the Semana Santa rebellion of April 1987 and the Villa Martelli
rebellion of December 1988, we find no evidence that the mutineers’ goals included
toppling President Alfonsı́n, but instead they sought policy concessions and targeted
the military high command. We therefore code this event as a mutiny.
449
2.1.21 165: Uruguay
Table 21: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Uruguay

165-1973-2-10 Uruguay 42-73 Bordaberry, Juan Marı́a mutiny

165-1973-6-27 Uruguay 42-73 Bordaberry, Juan Marı́a Anti-Dem. Coup (S)
165-1974-5-21 Uruguay 73-84 Posse, Hugo Chiappe Reshuffle Coup (S)
165-1976-6-12 Uruguay 73-84 Vadora, Julio César Autogolpe (S)
165-1976-9-1 Uruguay 73-84 Vadora, Julio César legal
• # 165-1973-2-10: Uruguay, Juan Marı́a Bordaberry

Category: mutiny
Other Datasets: successful military coup - BR and CCD; not a candidate - CSP;
successful coup - PT and Singh (February 14); Archigos codes Bordaberry as the
leader of Uruguay from March 1, 1972, until June 12, 1976; GWF code a democracy
(Uruguay 42-73) from 1943 until June 27, 1973.
Event: President Bordaberry was by 1973 quite isolated as he allowed ever “more
autonomy and power to the military” to repress the Tupamaros (L. E. Gonzalez 1988,
86). “In February 1973, a deep conflict emerged among the president, the General
Assembly, and the armed forces. The army and air force rebelled against Bordaberry’
s selection of a civilian as minister of national defense” (Jacob and Weinstein 1990,
42). “What sparked the military insubordination of February 1973 was Bordaberry’s
decision to name” Antonio Francese, a retired general, as “Minister of Defense in a
clear bid to re-establish control. Francese had been Minister of Defense for a time
under Pacheco, but did not have close relations with the new commanders, and they
immediately refused to recognize his authority” (Gillespie 1987, 131).
“On February 9 and 10, the army issued two communiques proposing a series of politi-
cal, social, and economic measures” (Jacob and Weinstein 1990, 42). The first commu-
nique, broadcast on the night of February 8, declared that the army commander, Gen.
César Martı́nez, and air force commandr, Brig. José Pérez Caldas, rejected orders by
Francese that they resign. President Bordaberry responded with an address on radio
and television saying that Francese would stay in his post, and calling on civilians and
the rest of the military to defend democracy. Initially, the navy backed the government
(Reuters 1973c). When he “attempted to stop the military-in February 1973-nobody
trusted him and, accordingly, nobody was willing to help him” (L. E. Gonzalez 1988,
86). Some shops closed, but no mass demonstrations came to his defense.
On February 9, a column of tanks and trucks filled with soldiers approached the capital
(Reuters 1973b). “ Unable to stop the military he negotiated with them: he managed
to remain as president of the de facto regime by lending to their coup the prestige of his
post (L. E. Gonzalez 1988, 86). After sending three representatives to parley with the
military, that night President Bordaberry accepted Francese’s resignation. The army
450
withdrew the tanks that it stationed at Prado Park, near the president’s residence
(Reuters 1973b). The crisis did not end. On February 10, negotiations continued as
the generals’ outlined a 19-point “national reconstruction” program, all while insisting
they “do not want to remove Mr. Bordaberry and they do want constitutional rule to
continue” (Associated Press 1973c). However, other reports said that the armed forces
offered Bordaberry an ultimatum “to resign or accept its program of reforms.” On
February 11, the navy joined the other military services in rebellion (Reuters 1973d).
The Communists “strongly supported the military’s demands for reform” (Gillespie
1987, 164).
“Figuring-that if he could not beat them he would join them, Bordaberry decided to
make a deal with the rebel Colonels and Generals” (132), which became “known as the
Boisso Lanza Pact, that guaranteed their advisory role and their participation in polit-
ical decision making. In effect, the pact constituted a quasicoup” (Jacob and Weinstein
1990, 42). The accord was announced on February 12, though its details were not made
public (Howe 1973c) and it was only finalized on February 14 (Howe 1973b). The deal
increased military control of government in the background yet preserved the consti-
tutional system (New York Times 1973). On February 23, “The National Security
Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional—Cosena) was created as an advisory body to
the executive. Its members included the commanders of the army, navy, and air force,
plus an additional senior military officer, and the ministers of national defense, interior,
and foreign affairs” (Jacob and Weinstein 1990, 42). General Gregorio Alvarez became
COSENA’s secretary (Gillespie 1987, 309). Cosena had “with veto powers over his ad-
ministration” (Gunson, Thompson, and Chamberlain 2015, 22). Gillespie (1987, 159)
claims that COSENA “had a majority of Generals and could over-ride the President
as it saw fit.” L. E. Gonzalez (1988, 101) likewise says that after February 1973, “The
final decisions were always taken by the military.”
Coding rationale: Some observers view this event as a “quasi-coup” creating a military
veto over the administration and indirect military dictatorship. Indeed, there is evi-
dence of an over “coup threat.” However, we code this event – the concrete actions of
the military – as a mutiny because the target appears to have been policy concessions
and did not appear aimed at deposing President Bordaberry (as yet) or installing a
junta. Consistent with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), the transition to autocratic
rule was only completed in June 1973.
• # 165-1973-6-27: Uruguay, Juan Marı́a Bordaberry

Other Datasets: autogolpe - CCD; not a candidate - CSP, PT, and Singh; successful
coup - Luttwak and Perez; Archigos codes Bordaberry as exiting on this date through
of a democracy (Uruguay 42-73) on this date. EPR codes ethnicity as irrelevant in
Uruguay from 1946 to 1988 with Whites/Mestizos as the largest ethnic group.
Event: The military pushed for “final approval and implementation of the State Se-
curity Law. However, differences with the General Assembly, which was investigating
451
charges of torture committed by the military and felt that the military had exceeded
its powers, continued until June 27, 1973. On that date, with the backing of the armed
forces, Bordaberry dissolved the General Assembly and replaced it with the Council
of State, and he empowered the armed forces and police to take whatever measures
were necessary to ensure normal public services” (Jacob and Weinstein 1990, 42-43).“
The June 27 occupation of the National Assembly was based on a presidential decree
dissolving it “for grave violations of the principles of the Constitution” (Gillespie 1987,
171).
“In essence, a de facto dictatorship had been announced. The new situation was
supported by some Colorados (the Pachequist faction) and some Blancos (Aguerrondo’s
Herrerists)” (Jacob and Weinstein 1990, 42-43). “Despite illusions among many sectors
of the Left that the coup might bring to power progressive generals the immediate
response from labor was the declaration of an indefinite General Strike by the CNT.
Two weeks of factory occupations, sabotage and economic paralysis followed that were
only broken by a combination of wage increases and mass arrests” (Gillespie 1987, 171-
172). “When the civil-military dictatorship was consolidated, it banned the CNT, the
PCU, and other existing and alleged Marxist-Leninist organizations, and it intervened
in the university to quell dissident activities by the students” (Jacob and Weinstein
1990, 42-43).
“What has been popularly called the autogolpe (self-coup), placing President Bord-
aberry at the mercy of the army, was a slow process,” with a coup in three stages:
October 1972, February 1973, and June 1973 (Kaufman 1978, 1). After June 1973,
Bordaberry was “effectively a political prisoner of the armed forces” who “remained
president only on the sufferance of the armed forces” (Gunson, Thompson, and Cham-
berlain 2015, 22).
Coding rationale: This event does not entail nominal leader change, as Bordaberry
acted to dissolve the legislature and stayed on as president for several years. This
would suggest this event was a successful autogolpe. However, the military’s influ-
ence over politics had increased since February 1973, and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
(2014) code the start of a new autocratic regime – with the head of the military as the
de facto regime leader after this event. Indeed, scholars such as Gillespie (1987) also
mark the initiation of military rule in 1973. Thus insofar as this event led to a change
in the de facto leader (and a regime change from democracy to autocracy) we code it
as a successful anti-democratic military coup d’etat even though Bordaberry stayed in
office as nominal executive.
• # 165-1974-5-21: Uruguay, Hugo Chiappe Posse

Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, Singh, and PT; Archigos codes Bord-
aberry as leader of Uruguay from March 1, 1972, until June 12, 1976; GWF code a
military regime (Uruguay 73-84) from June 27, 1973, until November 25, 1984, which
was led by Posse on January 1, 1974, and Vadora on January 1, 1975. EPR codes eth-
nicity as irrelevant in Uruguay from 1946 to 1988 with Whites/Mestizos as the largest
452
ethnic group.
Event: By mid-May 1974, a power struggle emerged between President Bordaberry
and disaffected senior military officers who began “discussing ways of forcing changes
in Bordaberry’s cabinet. These army elements were reportedly dissatisfied with the
“performance of M. Cohen (director of central planning and interim minister of econ-
omy and finance) and Ruralist Benito Medero (minister of agriculture)” (Kaufman
1978, 115). Some officers complained because the lack of economic progress was being
blamed on the military, which Uruguayans saw as holding the real power (Associated
Press 1974d). As civil-military tensions heightened, Lt. Gen. Hugo Chiappe, the
army commander in chief, was known to all as “a personal associate of President Bor-
daberry” (Kaufman 1978, 115). Seen as a moderate officer (Associated Press 1974d).
Gen. Chiappe reportedly opposed “a complete military take-over of the Government.”
By contrast, “hard-line officers led by Gen. Esteban Cristi, a strong admirer of Brazil’s
military Government,” evidently sought a cabinet reshuffle in which the military would
gain more control over economic ministries (Kandel 1974).
On Tuesday, May 21, 1974, “the army was placed on the alert in order to force the Pres-
ident to dismiss the acting Minister of the Economy, Sr Moises Cohen” (Hodson and
Hoffman 1974). “Soldiers blocked access to the 1st district headquarters” and diverted
traffic to other streets, though “Montevidea was otherwise calm.” Sources reported
that the cabinet demands brought a split between the commanders of Uruguay’s four
army districts and Gen. Hugo Chiappe Posse (United Press International 1974a). In
one version, “the commanding officers of the strongest army garrisons” forced Hugo
Chiappe’s resignation (Kandel 1974). “In recent secret meetings army officers with-
drew their support from the moderate commander in chief... forcing him to resign”
(Associated Press 1974b). In this account, Lt. Gen. Chiappe Posse “asked for his own
transfer” after “it was apparent he no longer had the backing of his fellow officers” (As-
sociated Press 1974d). In an alternative account, Bordaberry dismissed Gen. Chiappe
Posse under military pressure (Kaufman 1978, 115). “ A Presidential decree, issued
under pressure from the country’s four regional military commanders, had removed
Gen. Chiappe Posse from office in the middle of the crisis” (Agence-France Presse
1974).
Either way, as of May 21, Chiappe Posse stopped commanding the army. Later that
day, “President Bordaberry also reportedly agreed to overhaul his Cabinet” within
a few days “to avert a further confrontation” with the military. Gen. Julio Vadora,
Uruguay’s army attache in Washington, not then “considered a strong figure in his own
right,” was appointed as the new Commander in Chief. On an interim basis, General
Cristi “assumed command while remaining the head of the Montevideo garrison, the
army’s strongest” (Kandel 1974). On May 22, top military commanders continued to
press Bordaberry on cabinet changes; informed sources said they would force him to
resign if he refused (Associated Press 1974b). On May 27, Vadora returned to Uruguay
to take up command (Agence-France Presse 1974).
Chiappe Posse’s exit and the subsequent cabinet reshuffle let the military further pen-
etrate and dominate the state. “At the end of June military officers were brought into
453
the department of the Economy, Central Planning and Budget, an in July military of-
ficers were placed at the head of the principal nationalized industries, fuel (ANCAP),
power (UTE), the Servicio Oceanografico y de Pesca (SOYP), the Central Bank, and
the Post Office” (Hodson and Hoffman 1974). “The departure of Chiappe was seen
as a shift to the ‘right’ in the high command: in actual fact it signified to a greater
extent an effort to preserve the Armed Forces’ collegiality and continue the process of
generational renewal in the High Command” (Gillespie 1987, 173).
Coding rationale: No prior major dataset codes this event as a coup. However, because
some historical references refer to this event as a forced resignation, we consider it. As
discussed in the prior and subsequent case, we disagree with Archigos insofar as we do
not consider President Bordaberry to be the regime leader after June 1973, but instead
the nominal executive. Because General Posse was regime leader of a military (and
not civilian-led) regime according to Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), we do not
exclude this event as not regime leader.
Whether or not Gen. Posse’s resignation / dismissal was legal or constitutes a coup
depends on whether military actors took concrete actions to force his resignation. The
evidence is ambiguous on this point. One account states that Chiappe Posse voluntarily
resigned after losing support in the military, whereas others claim that Bordaberry
dismissed him under pressure from the military. Despite the ambiguity, we interpret
the “secret meetings” and the mobilization of troops as a show of force to constitute
concrete actions forcing Chiappe Posse’s dismissal. Consistent with Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz (2014), we therefore code this event a successful reshuffling coup.
• # 165-1976-6-12: Uruguay, Julio César Vadora

Other Datasets: successful military coup and palace coup - CCD; successful coup -
CSP, PT, and Singh; Archigos codes Bordaberry as leader of Uruguay since March 1,
1972, until being removed on this date through “irregular” means by domestic mili-
tary actors without foreign support. Svolik codes Bordaberry as being removed by a
military coup on this date; GWF code a military regime (Uruguay 73-84) from June
27, 1973, until November 25, 1984, which was led by Vadora from before January 1,
1975, through after January 1, 1978.
Event: In 1976, President Juan Maria Bordaberry attempted “to impose new institu-
tional forms which the military found unacceptable. Bordaberry proposed the elimi-
nation of the traditional parties, Blancos (Partido Nacional) and Colorados, and their
substitution by ’currents of opinion’ within a corporatist framework. These plans were
rejected in part because they implied a greatly reduced role for the armed forces, but
also because their conception of the problem differed. Distinguishing between the insti-
tution of the traditional party system and its leadership during the coup and pre-coup
periods, the armed forces proposed to retain the parties (which as multi-class groupings
were an effective defence against class politics) while purging their leaderships” (Finch
1985, 597).
454
Instead, on June 12, 1976, the military forced Bordaberry to resign. In a commu-
nique that appeared in the press June 13, the military bluntly denigrated Bordaberry’s
proposals and insisted it did not “want to share historical responsibility for abolish-
ing the parties” (Gillespie 1987, 181). The military instructed the interim president,
Demichelli, to publish two “institutional acts” on June 12, the first suspending elec-
tions until further notice and the second creating a “Council of the Nation” headed
by a Junta of Generals that had the power to name the President and members of the
civilian Council of State (176).
Coding rationale: This is a consensus coup according to other major datasets. But
whether or not one considers this a coup or an autogolpe depends on whether one con-
siders President Bordaberry or General Vadora to be regime leader at this time. As
explained in our appendix of Colpus regime leaders, we consider Vadora to be regime
leader and Bordaberry to be the nominal executive. We therefore code this event as
an autogolpe by a military hierarchy that sought a more pliant figurehead.
• # 165-1976-9-1: Uruguay, Julio César Vadora

Category: legal, not regime leader
Other Datasets: not a candidate - CCD, CSP, and PT; Archigos codes Demichelli as
being removed through “irregular” means by domestic military actors without foreign
support on this date; Svolik codes Demichelli as being removed by a military coup
on this date; GWF code a military regime (Uruguay 73-84) from June 27, 1973, until
November 25, 1984, which was led by Vadora from before January 1, 1975, through
after January 1, 1978.
Event: After Bordaberry was ousted by the military (see 165-1976-6-12), Alberto
Demichelli Lizaso became interim president. Demichelli was “a lawyer and member
of the liberal wing of the Colorado party. He supported the military coup that banned
political activities in February of 1973.” Demichelli “remained president under the
supervision of the military until the selection of Aparacio Méndez Manfredini as pres-
ident on September 1, 1976” (Lentz 1994, 814). The military engineered giving itself
the power to appoint the president via the Council of Nations. In line with Insti-
tutional Act No. 2, “The Council of the Nation then chose Aparicio Mendez as the
next President” (Gillespie 1987, 184). Mendez remained president through 1981 and
“essentially decreed the political prohibition of all individuals who had participated in
the 1966 and 1971 elections. Political life thus came to a halt” (Jacob and Weinstein
1990, 43).
Coding rationale: As in the prior case targeting Bordaberry, this event entailed a
change in nominal executive only, not regime leader (the leader of the military, Vadora),
according to Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Even had we considered Demichelli
to be the regime leader, there is no clear evidence that his exit at this time was not
a “regular” or legal transfer of power. We therefore code this event a legal change in
nominal executive, not regime leader.
455
3 References
This document includes a total of 1761 unique references, including 1393 newspaper
articles, 105 journal articles or reports, and 263 other secondary sources (principally
books or book chapters).
For each country, our narrative are based on the following total number of country-specific
unique citations (these figures exclude general references or references with regional coverage
covering multiple countries):
Argentina – 130; Bolivia – 218; Brazil – 114; Chile – 17; Colombia – 14; Costa
Rica – 5; Cuba – 35; Dominican Republic – 74; Ecuador – 103; El Salvador – 26;
Guatemala – 154; Haiti – 161; Honduras – 75; Mexico – 3; Nicaragua – 34; Panama –
128; Paraguay – 71; Peru – 122; United States – 84; Uruguay – 18; Venezuela – 116.
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92: El Salvador
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93: Nicaragua
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135: Peru
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The Colpus Dataset: Case Narratives for Candidate

Coup Events in the Americas, 1946-2020 ∗

2 Coup Attempts, 1946-2020 2

Table 1: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in the United States

2-1992-1-16 USA 1871-NA Bush, George H.W. not exist

• # 2-1992-1-16: United States, George H.W. Bush

• # 2-1998-10-8: United States, Bill Clinton

• # 2-2017-5-16: United States, Donald Trump

• # 2-2017-5-17: United States, Donald Trump

• # 2-2019-9-24: United States, Donald Trump

Table 2: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Cuba

40-1952-3-10 Cuba 44-52 Prı́o Socorrás, Carlos Anti-Dem. Coup (S)

• # 40-1952-3-10: Cuba, Carlos Prı́o Socorrás

• # 40-1953-7-26: Cuba, Fulgencio Batista

• # 40-1957-9-5: Cuba, Fulgencio Batista

• # 40-1959-1-1: Cuba, Fulgencio Batista

• # 40-1961-4-17: Cuba, Fidel Castro

Table 3: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Haiti

41-1946-1-11 Haiti 41-46 Lescot, Élie Reg. Ch. Coup (S)

• # 41-1946-1-11: Haiti, Elie Lescot

• # 41-1950-12-6: Haiti, Paul E. Magloire

• # 41-1956-12-12: Haiti, Paul E. Magloire

• # 41-1957-2-3: Haiti, Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis

• # 41-1957-3-31: Haiti, Franck Sylvain

• # 41-1957-4-2: Haiti, Franck Sylvain

• # 41-1957-5-20: Haiti, Executive council

• # 41-1957-5-25: Haiti, Léon Cantave

• # 41-1957-5-26: Haiti, Léon Cantave

• # 41-1962-8-8: Haiti, François Duvalier

• # 41-1963-4-30: Haiti, François Duvalier

• # 41-1963-8-5: Haiti, François Duvalier

• # 41-1968-5-20: Haiti, François Duvalier

• # 41-1970-4-24: Haiti, François Duvalier

• # 41-1986-2-7: Haiti, Jean-Claude Duvalier

• # 41-1988-6-17: Haiti, Henry Namphy

• # 41-1988-6-20: Haiti, Henry Namphy

• # 41-1988-9-17: Haiti, Henry Namphy

• # 41-1988-10-16: Haiti, Prosper Avril

• # 41-1989-4-2: Haiti, Prosper Avril

• # 41-1989-4-5: Haiti, Prosper Avril

• # 41-1990-3-10: Haiti, Prosper Avril

• # 41-1991-1-6: Haiti, Ertha Pascal-Troillot

• # 41-1991-9-30: Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide

• # 41-1994-9-19: Haiti, Raoul Cédras

• # 41-2000-10-16: Haiti, Rene Garcia Preval

• # 41-2001-12-17: Haiti, Rene Garcia Preval

• # 41-2004-2-1: Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide

• # 41-2004-2-29: Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide

• # 41-2004-8-30: Haiti, Boniface Alexandre

Table 4: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in the Dominican Republic

• # 42-1961-5-30: Dominican Republic, Rafael L. Trujillo

• # 42-1961-7-15: Dominican Republic, Joaquı́n Balaguer

• # 42-1962-1-16: Dominican Republic, Joaquı́n Balaguer

• # 42-1962-1-18: Dominican Republic, Pedro Echevarrı́a

• # 42-1963-9-25: Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch

• # 42-1965-4-25: Dominican Republic, Reid Cabral

• # 42-1973-2-15: Dominican Republic, Joaquı́n Balaguer

Table 5: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Mexico

70-1994-1-16 Mexico 15-00 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos not exist

• # 70-1994-1-16: Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gortari

Table 6: Our Coding of Candidate Coups in Guatemala

90-1946-6-26 Guatemala 44-54 Arévalo, Juan José coup plot

• # 90-1946-6-26: Guatemala, Juan José Arévalo

• # 90-1950-11-6: Guatemala, Juan José Arévalo