IV.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
A. Executive Power
A. Executive Power (Definition)
The executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. (NEA v. CA, 2002)

B. Executive Power, Scope

1. The scope of power is set forth in the Constitution specifically in Article VII.
2. However, Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. It
includes residual powers not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. (Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)
0. The prosecution of crimes appertains to the Executive Department, whose
responsibility is to see the laws are faithfully executed. (Webb v. De Leon)
3. BUT the President cannot dispose of State property unless authorized by law.
4. Enforcement and administration of election laws is the authority of the COMELEC.
BUT the President cannot create public office without valid delegation from Congress and subject to the
Constitutional rules.

C. Executive Power, Where Vested

The Executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

D. Ceremonial Functions (Head of State)

In a presidential system, the presidency includes many other functions than just being executive. The
president is the [symbolic and] ceremonial head of the government of the [Philippines].

E. Executive Immunity from suit

Rules on Immunity during tenure
b. The President is immune from suit during his tenure.
b. He may be filed impeachment complaint during his tenure. (Article XI)
b. The President may not be prevented from instituting suit (Soliven v. Makasiar)
b. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege. (Soliven v. Makasiar)
b. Heads of departments cannot invoke the presidents’ immunity (Gloria v. CA)
Rules on Immunity after tenure
g. Once out of office, even before the end of the six year term, immunity for non-official acts is lost.
Such was the case of Joseph Estrada. (See Bernas Commentary, p 804 (2003 ed.) It could not
be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while
sitting in office. (Estrada v. Disierto; See Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan)

Note: In David v. Arroyo, the Court held that it is improper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
However, it is well to note that in Rubrico v. Arroyo, Min. Res., GR No, 180054, October 31, 2007, the
Supreme Court ordered the respondents, including President Arroyo, to make a return of the writ: “ You,
respondents President Macapagal Arroyo….are hereby required to make a return of the writ before the Court
of Appeals…”

Reasons for the Privilege:

1. Separation of powers. The separation of powers principle is viewed as demanding the
executive’s independence from the judiciary, so that the President should not be subject to the
judiciary’s whim.
2. Public convenience. By reason of public convenience, the grant is to assure the exercise of
presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the Chief
Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided
attention (Soliven v. Makasiar)

B. President
A. Who is the President
The President is the Head of State and the Chief Executive. (He is the executive) He is the repository of all
executive power.

B. Qualifications
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.

1. Qualifications
1. Natural born citizen of the Phils.
2. Registered voter
3. Able to read write
4. At least 40 years of age o the day of the election
5. A resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election.

2. Reason for Qualifications

Qualifications are prescribed for public office to ensure the proper performance of powers and duties.

3. Qualifications are exclusive

The above qualifications are exclusive and may not be reduced or increased by Congress. The applicable
rule of interpretation is expression unius est exclusio alterius.

4. Natural Born
One who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship. (Article IV, Section 2)

An illegitimate child of an American mother and a Filipino father is a natural born Filipino citizen if paternity is
clearly proved. Hence such person would be qualified to run for President. This was the case of Fernando
Poe, Jr. (Tecson v. COMELEC)

5. Registered Voter
Possession of the qualifications for suffrage as enumerated in Article V, Section 1.

6. Age
The age qualification must be possessed “on the day of the election for President” that is, on the day set by
law on which the votes are cast.

7. Residence Qualification
The object being to ensure close touch by the President with the country of which he is to be the highest
official and familiarity with its conditions and problems, the better for him to discharge his duties effectively.

● G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR vs The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
FACTS:

FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
 Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate
of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the
Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who
in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11,
1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence
of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time
of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of
private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20,
1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate. ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER.

● G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, vs COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO

FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the
US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical
condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with
her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on,
she stopped using her American passport.
 Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a
FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled
her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is
qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently
providing 99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said probability and
circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as
to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens.

(3) (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the
country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

● G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

RIZALITO Y. DAVID VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES

FACTS:
Senator Poe is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was
abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Loca l
Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name
MaryGrace Natividad Contreras Militar. The Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live
Birth/Foundling Certificate. Thereafter, Senator Poe was adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr. And Susan Roces.

Senator Poe became an American citizen, but subsequently re- acquired Philippine
citizenship through RA 9225, as granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
through an Order which stated:
 A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition indicate that Poe
was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to
be a natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder of an
American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.

On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the
MTRCB, which requires natural-born citizenship.

ISSUE:
Did Senator Poe fail to comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution?

HELD:
Qualified. Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continue to be a natural-
born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth,
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship. To repeat,
Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced her American citizenship on
20 October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until today.

2. Term of Office

Term of Office

6 years. The President (and the Vice-President) shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term
of six years.

Noon of June 30.Term hall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter.

No re-election. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time.

Reason for prohibition on any reelection for Presidency. It was thought that the elimination of the
prospect of reelection would make for a more independent President capable of making correct even
unpopular decisions. He is expected to devote his attention during his lone term to the proper discharge
of his office instead of using its perquisites to ensure his remaining therein for another term.

● Rommel Arnado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was
naturalized as a US citizen.

Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied
for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San Francisco. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections. However, his
co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that he continued to use his US passport for entry
to and exit from the Philippines after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation.
 While the petition for disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded, wherein Arnado
garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner.

COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.

Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the application of the rule
on succession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnado was correctly disqualified from running for public office by virtue of his
subsequent use of US passport, which effectively disavowed or recalled his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.

RULING:
Yes, Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because as held in Maquiling, his 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Since
then up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.

Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he filed his COC
for the May 13, 2013 elections.

Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any elective local
position. This refers to dual allegiance. Consequently, congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad to reacquire their
Philippine citizenship and enjoy full civil and political rights.

Hence, they may now run for public office provided they:

Meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and

Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath, prior to or at the time of filing their COC.

● Sec.4 Art. VII, Const.

SECTION 4.

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of
six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be
eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the
service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be
held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence
 of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law,
canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by
the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.

● See Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA 799 (1991)

Facts:

Petitioner incumbent Rep. Dimaporo of Lanao del Sur filed on Jan 15, 1990 for Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the ARMM. Respondent Speaker Mitra and the Sec. of
the House then excluded Dimaporo’s name from its Roll of Members xxx, considering him permanently
resigned from his office upon filing of his Certificate of Candidacy pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code
(BP 881) Art IX, Sec 67 which states “any elective official xxx running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for the Pres. and VP shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Having lost in the election,
Dimaporo expressed his intention “to resume performing” his “duties as elected Member of Congress”
but he failed his bid hence this petition. He argues that Sec 67, Art IX of BP 881 is unconstitutional in that
it provides for the shortening of a congressman’s term of office on a ground not provided for in the
Constitution.

Issue:

Does Sec 67, Art IX of BP 881 shorten a term of a congressman by means other than that provided in the
Constitution?

Held:

No. Dimaporo seems to confuse “term” with “tenure” of office. The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an officer
actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances xxx. Under the questioned provision,
when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed
to have voluntarily cut short his tenure not his term. The term remains xxx. Forfeiture is automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office xxx. It is not
necessary that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Sec 13, Art VI of the
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Sec 67, Art. IX of BP, Blg. 881, which is actually a
mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Sec 7(2) of Art VI of the Constitution. Petition dismissed.

C. Election
1. Regular Election
 The President (and Vice-President) shall be elected by direct vote of the people. Unless otherwise
provided by law, the regular election for President (and Vice-President) shall be held on the
second Monday of May.

2. Special Election
Article 10.
3. Canvassing for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.

Is the function of Congress merely ministerial?

Bernas: The function of Congress is not merely ministerial. It has authority to examine
the certificates of canvass for authenticity and due execution. For this purpose, Congress
must pass a law governing their canvassing of votes.
Cruz: As the canvass is regarded merely as a ministerial function, the Congress shall not
have the power to inquire into or decide questions of alleged irregularities in the
conduct of the election contest. Normally, as long as the election returns are duly
certified and appear to be authentic, the Congress shall have no duty but to canvass the
same and to proclaim as elected the person receiving the highest number of votes.
Justice Carpio Morales: This duty has been characterized as being ministerial and
executive.

Validity of Joint Congressional Committee.

Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of
the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee so long as the decisions and final
report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of Both Houses
of Congress voting separately. (Lopez v. Senate, 2004)

COMELEC.
There is no constitutional or statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate and
“unofficial” tabulation of result whether manually or electronically. If Comelec is proscribed from
conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the Comelec
is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes. (Brilantes v.
Comelec, 2004)

The proclamation of presidential and vice-presidential winners is a function of Congress and

not of Comelec (Macalintal v. COMELEC)

Congress may continue the canvass even after the final adjournment of its session. The final
adjournment of Congress does not terminate an unfinished presidential canvass. Adjournment
terminates legislation but not the non-legislative functions of Congress such as canvassing of
votes. (Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress, 2004)

Who will be proclaimed

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by
the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
 4. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.

Q: Can Susan Roces, widow of Fernando Poe. Jr, intervene and/or substitute for him, assuming
arguendo that the protest could survive his death?
A: No. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
Rules. It provides that only the 2nd and 3rd placer may contest the election. The Rule effectively
excludes the widow of a losing candidate. (Fernando Poe v. Arroyo)

The validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are under the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to election, returns and qualification of President and Vice-President is
expressly vested in the PET in Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty
to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. (Legarda v. De Castro, 2005)

Q: After Fidel Ramos was declared President, defeated candidate Miriam Defensor Santiago filed
an election protest with the SC. Subsequently, while the case is pending, she ran for the office of
Senator and, having been declared elected, assumed office as Senator. What happens to her
election protest?
A: Her protest is deemed abandoned with her election and assumption of office as Senator.
(Defensor Santiago v. Ramos)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1793 (AN ACT CONSTITUTING AN INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL TO TRY, HEAR AND DECIDE PROTESTS CONTESTING THE ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PROVIDING FOR
THE MANNER OF HEARING THE SAME)

Section 1. There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to be composed of

eleven members which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines. It shall
be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the Supreme Court. The Chief
Justice shall be its chairman.

● Sec. 4, Art. VII, Const.

o Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for
a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day
of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall
not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as
such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
o No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
the service for the full term for which he was elected.
o Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be
held on the second Monday of May.
o The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
 shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
o The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen
by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
o The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
o The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.

● Sec. 10, Art. VII, Const.

SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the
offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-
President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call.
The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of
this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations
for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

● First Paragraph, Sec. 8, Art. VII, Const.

SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President,
the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or
resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the
Acting President.

● Sec. 9, Art. VII, Const.

SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he
was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

● Sec. 4, Art. VII, Const.

SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term
of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election
and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any
 reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years
shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on
the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall
have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

● Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil. 326 (2010).

Facts:

Atty. Macalintal filed a petition that question the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progency of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

The petitioner highlighted the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Buac vs. COMELEC which declared
that contests involving the President and the Vice-President fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the PET, in the exercise of quasi-judicial power. On this point, petitioner reiterated that the constitution of
PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme
Court and of other Courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) commented that the petition was unspecified and without
statutory basis and that the liberal approach in its preparation is a violation of the well-known rules of
practice and pleading in this jurisdiction.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
 2. Whether or not the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Discussion:

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential
and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision.

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members violate the
proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.” Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of “dealing with the settlement
of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable
and enforceable” is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial
power was expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in
the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.

At the higher levels — city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial — exclusive
and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate
Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law,
they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of
judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for
the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the
Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions
are still subject to judicial review — via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party — if there is a
 showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election disputes, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of
judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.

The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. As intended by the
framers of the Constitution, the PET is to be an independent institution, but not separate, from the
judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

● P.E.T Case No. 005, February 16, 2021, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., PROTESTANT, VS.
MARIA LEONOR "LENI DAANG MATUWID" G. ROBREDO, PROTESTEE.

● Re-election
The President shall not be eligible for any reelection.

C. Presidential Succession
1. Vacancy before the Beginning of the President’s Term (Sec.7)

2. Vacancy during the President’s Incumbency

a. Permanent Vacancy (Sec. 8)

b. Temporary Vacancy (Sec.11)

· G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.

After the people’s clamor in EDSA for him to resign from his position, Petitioner Joseph
Estrada issued a statement that he will be leaving the Malacañang Palace in order to have a
peaceful transition of power and start the healing of the nation warped by confusion due to his
impeachment trial. Nevertheless, he sent a letter to the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House stating that he is temporarily unable to perform the duties of the office of the
President and let then Vice-President Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assume the
position of Acting President.

Later, the Office of the Ombudsman filed plunder and perjury charges against the
Petitioner. A special panel of prosecutors were assigned to investigate the charges against the
Petitioner. Thus, the Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court. He
alleged that he cannot be criminally charged by the Ombudsman on the ground of immunity
from suit. He claimed that he is still the President of the Philippines, and that Respondent is
merely holding the position in an acting capacity. Further, he claimed that he cannot be
considered as to have resigned because he is prohibited by law from resigning since he was
under an investigation, i.e. an impeachment trial.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as President.

2. Whether or not the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of exercising the Presidency.

Ruling:

1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there must be an intent to resign, and
that intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
government by any formal requirements as to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or
implied. So long as the resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.

In the present case, it was established the Petitioner resigned from his position as President of
the Philippines. According to the Angara Diary, which serialized the final days of the Petitioner
in Malacañang Palace, the Petitioner made pronouncements which was interpreted as intention
of giving up the position such as when he proposed a snap election where he would not be a
candidate; non-defiance to the request of a peaceful and orderly transfer of power; prior
agreement to the transfer of power with conditions as to the state of the Petitioner and his
family; and the issuance of a statement wherein the Petitioner leaves the palace, the seat of the
Presidency, for the sake and peace and order. Hence, the resignation of the Petitioner was
implied by his actions to leave the Presidency.

2. NO. The Court ruled that it is not within its jurisdiction to review whether the Petitioner was
temporarily incapable of exercising the Presidency for being political in nature, and addressed
solely to Congress, as provided in the Constitution. Even if the Petitioner can prove that he did
not resign, the Petitioner cannot successfully claim that he was merely on leave because
Congress recognized the Respondent as the de jure president, which cannot be reviewed by the
Court without violating the principle of separation of powers.

In the present case, both Houses of Congress recognized the Respondent as the President when
they issued Resolutions to the said effect. Further, both Houses issued a Resolution approving
the selection and appoint of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President. Further, finally, both
Houses started sending bills to be signed into law by the Respondent. Hence, the Petitioner was
not temporarily incapable to exercise the Presidency because he resigned as President, and
Houses of Congress already recognized the legitimacy of the Respondent.

· First Paragraph, Sec. 8, Art. VII, Const.

Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the
President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President
and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified.

· Sec. 9, Art. VII, Const.

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which
he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

3. “Designated Survivor”

4. Summary of Officials’ Succession to the Presidency.

· Last Paragraph, Sec. 7, Art. VII, Const.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been

chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a
Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as

President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in

case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next

preceding paragraph

· Last Paragraph, Sec. 8, Art. VII, Const.

D. Presidential Immunities and Privileges

1. Presidential Immunity

· Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 (2010)

 · De Lima v. Duterte, G.R No. 227635, October 15, 2019.

· David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R No. 171396, May 3, 2006

· G.R No. 227635, October 15, 2019.

· G.R No. 256288, June 29, 2021

· De Lima v. Duterte, supra

· G.R No. 171396, May 3, 2006

· 613 SCRA 233 (2010).

· 662 SCRA 312 (2011).

· x 19(88).

· G.R No. 119903, August 15, 2000.

· Estrada v. Desierto, G.R No. 146710, March 2, 2001

· Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 (1984).

· G.R No. 146710, March 2, 2001

2. Executive Privilege

3. Salary

E. Inhibitions against the President

1. Additional Office.

· Sec. 6, Art. VII, Const.

· Sec. 13, Art. VII, Const.

· Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

· See Bermudez v. Torres, 311 SCRA 733 (1991)

2. Practice of Profession

3. Participation in Business

4. Financial Interest in Government

· 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

· Sec. 13, Art. VII, Const.

 · See Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85468, September 7, 1989

5. Conflict of Interest

6. Financial Accommodations

7. Double Compensation

8. Salary Increase

9. Additional Office.

· Sec. 13, Art. VII, Const.

· Sec. 16, Art. XI, Const.

· Sec. 6, Art. VII, Const.

F. Powers of the President

1. Executive Power

2. Residual Power

· Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013).

· Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R No. 88211, September 15, 1989.

· Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R No. 88211, October 27, 1989.

3. Control Power
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.

A. Control

Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. 1
It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a
power directly vested in him by law. 2 The power of control necessarily includes the power of
supervision.3

B. Control v. Supervision

Control is a stronger power than mere supervision.4

1
2lippine Political Law, p. 198 (1995 ed).
3 Bernas Primer at 313 (2006 ed.)
4 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 198 (1995 ed).
 Supervision. Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officer performs their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may
take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. 5

Bernas Primer: Power of Supervision is the power of a superior officer to “ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed” by inferiors. The power of supervision does not include the power of control; but the
power of control necessarily includes the power of supervision.6

Control
An officer in control lays down
the rules in the doing of an
act.
If rules are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order
the act undone, re-done by
his subordinate or he may
decide to do it himself.
Supervision
Supervision does not cover the authority to lay
down the rules.
Supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that
the rules are followed.
If the rules are not observed, he may order the work
done or re-done but only to conform to the
prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed. (Drilon v. Lim)

C. The President and Power of Control

1. Power of Control of the President

[Power of Control] has been given to the President over all executive officers from Cabinet
members to the lowliest clerk. This is an element of the presidential system where the
President is “the Executive of the government.”7

The power of control vested in the President by the Constitution makes for a strongly
centralized administrative system. It reinforces further his position as the executive of the
government, enabling him to comply more effectively with his constitutional duty to enforce
laws. The power to prepare the budget of the government strengthens the President’s position
as administrative head.8

2. Scope
a. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
(Section 17)

b. The President has control over officers of GOCCs. (NAMARCO v. Arca) (Bernas: It is
submitted that such power over government-owned corporation comes not from the
Constitution but from statute. Hence, it may also be taken away by statute.)

c. Control over what? The power of control is exercisable by the President over the acts
of his subordinates and not necessarily over the subordinate himself. (Ang-angco v. Castillo)

5 Mondano v. Silvosa
6
7 Bernas Primer at 310 (2006 ed.)
8 Sinco, Philippine Political Law, p 243 (1954ed).
 It can be said that the while the Executive has control over the “judgment” or “discretion” of
his subordinates, it is the legislature which has control over their “person.” 9

d. Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of the Cabinet. He may
appoint them as he sees fit, shuffle them at pleasure, and replace them in his discretion
without any legal inhibition whatever.10

e. The President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other
subordinate executive officers. (City of Iligan v. Director of Lands) Even where the law
provides that the decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact shall be conclusive
when affirmed by the Sec of DENR, the same may, on appeal to the President, be reviewed
and reversed by the Executive Secretary. (Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano)

f. It has been held, moreover, that the express grant of the power of control to the President
justifies an executive action to carry out the reorganization of an executive office under a
broad authority of law.11 A reorganization can involve the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or even abolition of positions by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged with the legislature, the
authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may include such
abolition, is permissible under present laws.12

3. Section 17 is a self-executing provision

The President derives power of control directly from the Constitution and not from any
implementing legislation. Such a law is in fact unnecessary and will even be invalid if it limits
the exercise of his power or withdraws it altogether from the President. 13

4. Power of Control is not the source of the Executive’s disciplinary power

The power of control is not the source of the Executive’s disciplinary power over the person of his subordinates.
Rather, his disciplinary power flows from his power to appoint. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo) 14

· Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006; National Electrification
Administration v. COA, 247 Phil. 464 (2002).

· De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457 (1989).

· Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R No. 88211, September 15, 1989.

· Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992).

· See NAMARCO v. Arca, 29 SCRA 648 (1969).

· G.R. No. 139554, July 12, 2006.

· 129 Phil. 123 (1967).

· The Province of Negros Occidental v. COA, G.R. No. 182574, September 28,
2010: Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).

9 Bernas Primer at 313 (2006 ed.)

10 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 199 (1995 ed).
11 Anak Mindanao v. Executive Sec, G.R. No. 166052 , August 29, 2007; Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA. G.R. No. 167324, July 17,
2007;
12 Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007.
13 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 199 (1995 ed).
14 Bernas Primer at 313 (2006 ed.)
· Ambil, Jr. V Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011:Drilon v. Lim, G.R.
No. 112497, August 4, 1994

· Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. CA, G.R. No. 167324, July 17,
2007.

· G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007.

· Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines v. Executive

Secretary, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007.

· G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006.

· G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016.

· Baculi v. Office of the President, 807 Phil. 52 (2017).

· G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008.

· Guzman v. COA, G.R. No. 24527, October 12, 2020.

· SSS v. COA G.R. No. 243278, November 3, 2020.

· Philippines Institute for Development studies v. COA G.R. No. 212022, August
20, 2019.

· Villena v. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939).

· Lacson-Magallanes v. Paño, 129 Phil. 123 (1967): Echeche v. CA 198 SCRA

577 (1991).

· 533 Phil. 544 (2007).

· G.R. No. 212022, August 20, 2019.

· NAPOCOR Board of Directors v. COA, G.R. No. 218052, January 26, 2021;
NAPOCOR Board of Directors v. COA, G.R. No. 242342, March 10, 2020; Atty
Manalang-Demigilio v. Trade and Investment Development Corp. of the Phils.
(TIDCORP), 705 Phil.331 (2013).

· G.R. No.218052, January 26, 2021.

· G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015.

· 486 Phil. 754 ( 2004).

· See Constantino Jr. V. Cuisia, 472 SCRA 505 (2005)

· Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and

Freeport Authority, G.R. No. 198688, November 24, 2020; Constantino, Jr. V.
Cuisia, 472 SCRA 505 (2005).
 · Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v. CIR.
G.R. No. 198146, August 8, 2017

· G.R. No. 140423, July 14, 2006.

4. Administrative Power

· Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. V. Secretary Defensor , 529 Phil.

573 (2006).

· Ople v. Torres, G.R. No.127685, July 23, 1998: See also DTI v. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 225301, June 2, 2020.

· See Secs. 2-7, Chapter 2, Title 1, Book III, Administrative Code.

· See Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021 and
ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246 (2008).

· Province of Pampanga v. Romulo,

· G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998.

5. Power of General Supervision

· G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006.

· The Province of Negros Occidental v. COA, G.R. No. 182574, September 28,
2010.

· Pimentel, Jr. V. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000.

· G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010.

· Sec. 16, Art. X, Const.

· See Sec. 25(a), LGC

· Sec. 452, LGC.

6. Appointing Power

a. Nature of the Power

· Sec. 451, LGC; Del Rosario v. Comelec, G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020.

· Secs. 13(b) and 452 (b), LGC.

· G.R. No. 932252, August 5, 1991.

 · Appari v. CA, G.R. No. 30057, January 31, 1984.

· Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. 16808, january 3, 1921.

· National Amnesty Commission v. COA, 437 SCRA 655 (2004).

· Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr. 188 SCRA 154 (1990)

· Triste v. Leyte State College, G.R. No. 78623, December 17, 1990.

· Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., supra; for instance, an Undersecretary designated

as OIC- Secretary pending the appointment of a Secretary.

· National Amnesty Commission v. COA, supra; Sec 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book
III, Administrative Code provides:

· 118 Phil. 691 (1963).

· Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006.

· G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999.

· Government v. Springer, G.R. No. 26979, April 1 1927.

· Pimentel, Jr. v . Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005.

· Rufino v. Endriga,

· G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993.

· G.R. No. 164978. Octtober 13, 2005.

b. Presidential Appointments

· Oliveros-Torre v. Bayot, G.R. No. 34433, July 31, 1974.

· Lusterio v. IAC, G.R. No. 74814, July 16, 1991.

1. Requiring Commission on Appointments Confirmation

· Sec. 16, Art. VII Const

· Sec. 8(1) and (2), Art. VII, Const.

· Sec. 1(2) Art. IX-B, Const.

· Sec. 1(2) Art. IX-C, Const.

· Sec. 1(2) Art. IX-D, Const

· Sec. 16, Art. VII, Const. In relation with Sec. 18, Art. X
 Ad Interim Appointments

Ad Interim (1991, 1994 Bar Question)

An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session; takes effect
immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the
next adjournment of Congress. In the latter case, the ad interim appointment is deemed “by-passed”
through inaction.
The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions in vital government services that would
otherwise result form prolonged vacancies in government offices.

Ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment. It is a permanent appointment because

it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 2002)

Ad interim appointed, how terminated.

1. Disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments;
2. Adjournment by Congress without the CA acting on the appointment.
There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim
appointment, the appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the
approval is a final decision of the Commission in the exercise of its checking power on the
appointing authority of the President. Such disapproval is final and binding on both the
appointee and appointing power.
But when an ad interim appointment is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final decision by the Commission to give
or withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such decision, the President is free to
renew the ad interim appointment. (Matibag v. Benipayo)

Q: What happens if a special session is called and that session continues until the day before the
start of the regular session? Do appointments given prior to the start of the special session lapse
upon the end of the special session or may they continue into the regular session?
A: Guevara v. Inocente again says that there must be a “constructive recess” between the sessions
and thus appointments not acted upon during the special session lapse before the start of the
regular session.15

Difference between an ad interim appointment and an appointment in an acting capacity.

1. The former refers only to positions which need confirmation by the CA while the latter is also given
to those which do not need confirmation.
2. The former may be given only when Congress is not in session whereas the latter may be given
even when Congress is in session.

MANALO VS. SISTOZA, 312 SCRA 239, 11 AUGUST 1999

Facts:

On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6975,
creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP Chief,
Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through
Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the
Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers
took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of
Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized
disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.

15
 Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject
appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA 6975 requires
confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by
the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires
confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in
favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is
acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:

Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation

Held:

Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government
to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who
are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As
held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government
officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

· ANTONIO LACSON VS. HONORIO ROMERO 84 Phil. 740 (1949). GR No. L-3081, Oct 14, 1949

FACTS:

In July 25, 1946, the Petitioner, Antonio Lacson, was appointed by the President as provincial fiscal
of Negros Oriental which was affirmed by Commission on Appointment. He took the office and,
thereafter, performed his duties. In May 17, 1949, upon recommendation by Secretary of Justice,
the President nominated him to the post of provincial fiscal in Tarlac and, simultaneously, the
President nominated the Respondent, Honorio Romero, to his position as provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental. Both of them were confirmed by the Commission on Appointment. The Petitioner neither
accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac but respondent Romero took his
oath of office of the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental, notified the Solicitor General and, thereafter,
proceeded to his station. Commotion started between the parties as both of them appeared in the
hearings of Judge Narvasa and Judge Ocampo where the latter judges favors the Respondent. When
the Petitioner requested payment for his salary as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, it was turned
down and instead paid Respondent Romero.
 Issue:

Whether or not the confirmation Commission on Appointment alone, without the acceptance of the
nomination by the Petitioner, can create a vacancy in the post of provincial fiscal of Negro Oriental.

Ruling:

No, the appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves
several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid and
permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said nomination.
The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two
steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive
and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make the
appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not
accept the appointment or nomination.

As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, “there is no Power in this country which can compel a
man to accept an office.” Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as
provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal
of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully
removed as Such fiscal of Negros Oriental.

Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002.

Facts:

Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director
IV” of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity.
Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments
were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the
failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their appointments.

Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a

memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of herein
respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on
the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments
and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

Issue:

(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the
Constitution

(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character

Ruling: NO.

(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this provision
should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
 confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the
President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments – did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments because the plan was
for Congress to remain in session throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory
recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the
framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution
on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad
interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital
government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government
offices, including the three constitutional commissions.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make
ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim
appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of
two modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the prospective
appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot
qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad
interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume office.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad interim
appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants
her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President
in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.

In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute
temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately

and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution provides as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

Gueveara v. Inocentes, G.R. No. 25577, March 15, 1966.

FACTS:
 The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of
Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25th
same year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966
declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive lapsed with the
adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The
respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the
incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo
Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of
Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935 Constitution. which states that:

The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress.

Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which
commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the petitioner’s ad interim
appointment as well as other made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress
adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the specific provision in the
Constitution which states that: “until the next adjournment of Congress” means adjournment of a
regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die
at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative merely ‘suspended’ its session
and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that
Congress has been in continuous session without interruption since January 17.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention regarding “the next adjournment of Congress
specifically provides for regular session only.

2. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention that Congress is still in continuous session?

HELD:

1. NO. The phrase “until the next adjournment of Congress” does not make any reference to specific
session of Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-know Latin maxim is statutory
construction stated that ‘when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the 1935
Constitution used the word “adjournment” had in mind either regular or special and not simply the
regular one as the petitioner contended.

2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House
of the Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the
adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the
petitioner’s ad interim appointment must have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment
of the Senate.

Fetalino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890, December 4, 2012, 686 SCRA 813, (2012).

FACTS:
 On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the
petitioners as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2,
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos
renewed the petitioners’ ad interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however,
adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on
presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as
Comelec Commissioners. Thus, the petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for
more than four months, or from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998.Subsequently, on March 15,
2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the
Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568.9 The Comelec initially approved the petitioners’ claims .On
February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a pro-
rated gratuity and pension. Subsequently, on October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-
computation of their retirement pay on the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568,13 does not
cover a pro-rated computation of retirement pay.

ISSUE

(1)Whether or not they are entitle to a gratuity pay

(2)Whether or not liberal construction of retirement should be followed

Rulling

(1) The petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, To
be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the
following events must transpire:

(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office;

(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office

(3) Death while in the service; and

(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the
term of office. In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service
in the government at the time of retirement.

Based on these considerations, we conclude that the petitioners can never be

considered to have retiredfrom the service not only because they did not complete the full term,
but, more importantly, because they did not serve a "term of office”

(2) No occasion for liberal construction since Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, (AN ACT TO PROVIDE
LIFE PENSION TO THE AUDITOR GENERAL AND THE CHAIRMAN OR ANY MEMBER OF THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.) as amended, is clear and unambiguousWe DISMISS the petition
and DENY Barcelona’s petition for intervention

Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005.

FACTS:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They
were appointed in acting capacities only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other
senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA
cannot make such appointments without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that,
in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the
undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in acting capacities and not
anyone else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is
empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments
even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary
designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not
exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments
re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the
safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial
appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim
appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith.

It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is
the president’s to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She
cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in
the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter
ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the
permanent appointee.

Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the
president “may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as
long as the President deems that person competent.
 NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity

2. By the President Alone

· By the President Alone

· Sec. 26, Art. VII, Const.,

Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006; Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 SCRA
549 (1987).

· 667 SCRA 200 (2012).

3. Requiring Judicial and Bar Council Nomination.

· Kida v. Senate, 667 SCRA 200 (2012).

· 172 SCRA 160 (1989).

· Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006.