CASES – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

I. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
A. The President: In a theater of war during martial law
Case 1: Lagman v. Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017

FACTS:

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the
whole island of Mindanao and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May
25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law
declaration (as required by the Constitution).

The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to
the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing
rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners:

LAGMAN PETITION

Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A.

Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed this petition to assail the President’s declaration of
Martial Law.

Its main contention is that, the president’s declaration has no sufficient and factual basis
– arguing that acts of terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion. Lagman also contends
that the seeming affiliation with ISIS is only mere propaganda, designed to create an appearance
of capability for the Maute group.

The petition also cited several facts in the president’s report which was refuted by
several media networks and news articles because they turned out to be false or untrue. Among
these was the report about the attack on Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ransack of the Landbank of
the Philippines, and the burning of several schools.

CULLAMAT PETITION

The Cullamat Petition on the other hand avers that the president fails to show any acts
of rebellion and invasion outside Marawi City. Hence, the declaration of Martial Law for the
whole island of Mindanao has no sufficient basis. Cullamat also reiterated the false facts in the
president’s report, as pointed out in the Lagman petition.

MOHAMAD PETITION

The Mohamad Petition also avers that the power to declare Martial Law is a remedy of
last resort. It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed
sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.

OSG’S CONSOLIDATED COMMENT

 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the court should only review
Proclamation 216 under the lens of grave abuse of discretion, and not on the correctness of facts.

The OSG also further argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined
based on the facts/information that were available to the president at the time he made the
determination. Doing otherwise will impose an impossible standard on the president’s exercise of
discretion.

ISSUES:

 WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII.
 WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately.
 WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers
granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of martial law.
 WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not
even be a taxpayer.

2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the
Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the
exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On
the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events
supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into
the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an
appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the
sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was
made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently
from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of
Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
 3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do
so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement
on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which
the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the
manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the
Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration.

The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts
and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.

The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause
for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the
internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are
thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along
with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not,
actual rebellion exists.

Proclamation No. 216 was the 2017 proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao amid clashes between government forces and Maute group terrorists in
Marawi,[1] issued by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on May 23, 2017. The state of martial law was extended
thrice by Congress at the request of Duterte, citing necessity to quell hostile activities perpetrated by terrorist
groups,[2] and ended with the third extension lapsing on December 31, 2019.

Habeas corpus (/ˈheɪbiəs ˈkɔːrpəs/ (listen); from Medieval Latin, lit. 'that you have the body')[1] is a recourse in law
through which a person can report an unlawful detention or imprisonment to a court and request that the court
order the custodian of the person, usually a prison official, to bring the prisoner to court, to determine whether the
detention is lawful.

B. Congress: Bicameralism
Case No. 2: Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, April 16, 2013

NATURE:

The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that
JBC’s action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional

FACTS:
 In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature.

It is this practice that the petitioner has questioned in this petition. It should mean one representative
each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

Respondent contends that the phrase “a representative of Congress” refers that both houses of Congress
should have one representative each and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their
respective powers in the performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making
8 instead of 7 sitting members be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD:

Yes.

The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should be
construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both. That the
framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary for the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because
no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only.

FALLO: The motion was denied.

C. Senate: Composition of the Senate

Case No. 3: Trillanes v. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati on his participation with the infamous
Oakwood Mutiny in 2003.

4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat
in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".

The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general

HELD:

No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.

When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is
placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized
by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.

Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Senate: Special election

Case No. 4: Tolentino v. COMELEC, GR No. 148334, January 21, 2004
FACTS:

After President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo succeeded in the presidency, she nominated then Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President which the Congress confirmed, thereby leaving a vacancy in the
Senate.

Senate Resolution No. 84 called on the COMELEC to fill the vacancy via a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections of May 2001. Per the resolution, the candidate with the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Guingona.

After the votes of the May 2001 election have been canvassed, the COMELEC provisionally proclaimed 13
candidates as the elected Senators on June 5, 2001 where Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th
and 13th, respectively.

This was petitioned by 2 taxpayers and voters enjoining the COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the
candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes. They contend that COMELEC has no
jurisdiction as (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election (2) it
failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek
election under the special or regular elections (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the
candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections.

In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claimed that a special election to fill the seat of
Senator Guingona was validly held on May 14, 2001. COMELEC and Honasan raised mootness of the
 petition. Honasan also claimed that the petition is actually a quo warranto petition and which the Court
should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Recto on the other hand contended that he is not a party to the case
as he is the 12th ranking in the election. On July 20, 2001, COMELEC declared “official and final” the
ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed who took their oaths of office on July 23, 2001.

ISSUE

Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on May 14, 2001.

RULING

Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the
Senate and the House of Representatives “in the manner prescribed by law.

To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6645 which states, (SECTION 1)
“…the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special
election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy.” RA 7166 which amends Section 2 of RA 6645
states, “

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy
not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy.
However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election.”

D. House of Representatives
i. One (1) province/city, One (1) representative [Sec. 5 (3), Art. IV]
Case No. 5: Aquino v. COMELEC, 617 SCRA 623
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9716 was signed into law by President Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect
on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation. In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population
of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts.

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the
first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard.

ISSUE:

Is the population of 250,000 an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a

new legislative district in a province?

HELD:

Yes, it is an indispensable constitutional requirement. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on
one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is
entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province.

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a
city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. DISMISSED.

Aquino v. COMELEC (2010)

Main Opinion, J. Perez: A population of 250,000 is not an indispensable constitutional

requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. (Aquino v. COMELEC, GR
No. 189793; April 7, 2010)

Case No. 6: Bagabuyo v. COMELEC , GR No. 176970

FACTS:

Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before. In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371)
hence two legislative districts were created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he
went immediately to the Supreme Court. He was contending that the 2nd district was created
without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD:

No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no
such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit
took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory,
population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in

population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Case No. 7: Aldaba v. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010

FACTS:

This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates
a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before May 1, 2009, the
province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the
passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill
1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo
(then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos
will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is
unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or
projected.

Held:

It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at
least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification
which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the
Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following
statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which
provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the
Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have
been declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer,
in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1,
2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

Case No. 8: Sema v. COMELEC, GR No. 177597

Facts:

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of
the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be
called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City - this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration
from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).

Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with
Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because
her rival Dilangalen was from there and Dilangalen was winning - in fact he won). She contended
that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province
automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City - so
in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in Congress.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan
being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD:

RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
 follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot
validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in
order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On
the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.

ii. Election and Term of Office of Members of the House of Representatives

a. Regular election
 Case No. 9: Bañas-Nograles v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246328, September 10, 2019

This instant Petition for Review under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court assails Commission on
Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution No. 105242 dated April 11, 2019. The assailed Resolution
suspended the May 13, 2019 national and local elections (2019 general elections) for the
Representative of the First Legislative District of South Cotabato, including General Santos
City (1st District).

FACTS:

On March 11, 2019, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte signed into law Republic Act No. (R.A.)
11243.3 Under R.A. 11243, the 1st District was reapportioned, thereby creating the lone
legislative district of General Santos City. Under Section 1 of the said law, the creation of the
lone legislative district of General Santos City was "to commence in the next national and
local elections after the effectivity of this Act." Consequently, R.A. 11243 took effect on April
4, 2019 - just over a month before the 2019 general elections.

The same law directed the incumbent Representatives of First and Second Legislative
Districts of South Cotabato to continue representing their respective districts "until new
representatives shall have been elected and qualified."4 Thereafter, COMELEC was mandated
to issue the necessary rules and regulations to implement R.A. 11243.

RULINGS:
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 10524 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID. The elections for the representative of the First Legislative
District of South Cotabato, including General Santos City is UPHELD.

b. Special Election
 Case No. 10: Tolentino v. COMELEC, GR No. 148334
FACTS:
After President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo succeeded in the presidency, she nominated
then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President which the Congress confirmed,
thereby leaving a vacancy in the Senate.
Senate Resolution No. 84 called on the COMELEC to fill the vacancy via a special election
to be held simultaneously with the regular elections of May 2001. Per the resolution, the
candidate with the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of
former Senator Guingona.
After the votes of the May 2001 election have been canvassed, the COMELEC
provisionally proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators on June 5, 2001 where Ralph
Recto and Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th and 13th, respectively.
This was petitioned by 2 taxpayers and voters enjoining the COMELEC from proclaiming
with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes. They
contend that COMELEC has no jurisdiction as (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to
indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or
regular elections (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates
seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claimed that a special election to
fill the seat of Senator Guingona was validly held on May 14, 2001. COMELEC and Honasan
raised mootness of the petition. Honasan also claimed that the petition is actually a quo
warranto petition and which the Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Recto on the
other hand contended that he is not a party to the case as he is the 12th ranking in the
election. On July 20, 2001, COMELEC declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13
Senators proclaimed who took their oaths of office on July 23, 2001.

ISSUE
Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on
May 14, 2001.

RULING
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any
vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives “in the manner prescribed by law.
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6645 which states,
(SECTION 1) “…the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy
and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy.” RA 7166
which amends Section 2 of RA 6645 states, “
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least
one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days
 after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.”

 Case No. 11: Borja Jr. v. COMELEC, GR No. 133495

Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr., was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on
June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death
of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more
terms, from 1992 to 1998.

On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term.

The Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of Borja and declared Capco disqualified but
the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor.

Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves
the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of
the three-term limit.

Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the
office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.
Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.

● The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people.
A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption
that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.

To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time
for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people
to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495. September 3,
1998)
E. Partylist System
i. Proportional representation
 Case No. 12: Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
FACTS:

COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of

the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of
Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed
38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory
that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.

ISSUE:

 Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
 Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
 C) How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

HELD:

It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional
prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat.
Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats for concerned party

Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
 “representation.” Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even
pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to “the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio” to ensure meaningful local representation.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order
to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed
that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

 Case No. 13 Banat v. COMELEC, GR No 179271 21 April 2009

Facts:
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as
quoting the COMELEC of using the Panganiban formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-
list seats. BANAT contend that Article 6 Section 5 should be followed and that 20%of party-list
representatives shall be proclaimed. COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6 Section 5 (2)
of the Constitution mandatory?

Held:
Petition has partial merit. The party-list election has four inviolable parameters stated in
Veterans. First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent threshold only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit each qualified
party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats; Fourth, proportional representation the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their
total number of votes.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art
VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

 ARARO party-list v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192803, December 10, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered a total of 147,204 votes
in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked 50th. The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28) party-list
organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed and
additional seats. The petitioner questioned the formula used by the COMELEC and
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is
flawed because votes that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists
were not counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000)
votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on Elections’ erroneous
interpretation. 7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes according to petitioner
ARARO)

On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting
as the National Board of Canvassers is the following:
Number of seats available to legislative districts_x .20 =Number of seats available to
party-list representatives .80
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57
as shown below:
229__x .20 =57 .80
The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used
in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.
COMELEC18 to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats,
where:
Number of votes of party-list
______________________________=
Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
Total number of votes for party-list candidates

the Commission on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the
position that invalid or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor.
The Commission on Elections argues that this will contradict Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC22 and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It asserts that:
Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not
even vote for any qualified party-list candidate, as these voters cannot be
considered to have cast any vote "for the party-list system."24
I. Whether the case is already moot and academic
II. Whether petitioners have legal standing
III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its
interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-
list groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections
The third issue requires our determination of the computation of the correct divisor
to be used. The options are

HELD:
1. This case is moot and academic but the Court discussed the issues raised by the
petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet evading review32 and for the
guidance of the bench, bar, and public.33
2. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to
meet the 2% threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments will
neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the
argument in this Court.

3. The Court agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on
determined to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be
excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed
in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do
otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good
faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this
rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained
finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made
known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should
not be included in the divisor.

Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the
party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of
representation:
1. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list systemshall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted
in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates
Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system
including votes cast for party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are
subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification
was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to
such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not
include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.

FALLO:
 1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from proclaiming the qualified
party-list groups is denied for being moot and academic;

2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted
in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED

 COMELEC v. Aksyon Magsasaka-Tinig Partido ng Masa (AKMA-PTM)

FACTS:
Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative during the
national and local elections held on May 13, 2013.
On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC),
under NBOC Resolution No. 0006-13, proclaimed fourteen (14) party-list groups, which
obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system and were thus entitled to
one (1) guaranteed seat each, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941.
Petitioners filed for a TRO but the same was dismissed.Petitioner’s contention: 1.Allocation
of additional seats – prejudicial to the interest of the parties 2.It was hasty and premature
because there were still uncanvassed and untransmitted resultsfrom Mindanao and absentee
votes. 3.It was invalid as it was based on an incomplete canvass/consolidation of only 110
Certificates of Canvass (COCs), some of which were not electronically transmitted in gross
violation of Section 27, R.A. No. 8436 (as amended by Section 22, R.A. No. 9369).4.Allocation
of additional seats did not conform to Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 and this Court's ruling in
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.
Comment of the Solicitor General:1.COMELEC faithfully adhered to the procedure prescribed
in BANAT in the allocation of party-list seats (14 guaranteed seats were first allocated to
those who obtained 2% of the total votes cast for party-list and thereafter 44 additional seats
were completely distributed). It was explained that party-list groups with products of less
than one were still allocated seats depending on their rank and availability of seats. As to the
uncanvassed votes at the time, COMELEC had reserved five "buffer" seats to accommodate
possible changes in the ranking. 2.The Solicitor General further contends that COMELEC's
proclamation of initial winners under NBOC Res. No. 0008-13 is valid as the votes yet to be
canvassed did not materially affect the results of the election.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC acted in grave abuse of its discretion in allocating the additional
seatsfor the 38 party-list candidates proclaimed as winners in the May 13, 2013
elections.RULING: NO. The COMELEC did not. Both petitions are dismissed. 1.COMELEC is
authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining uncanvassed election
returns will not affect the result of the electionsA canvass of votes will only be illegal if the
election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election. In this case,
COMELEC based its ruling on its national canvass reportsfor party-list. As of May 28, 2013,
AKMA-PTM garnered 164,980 votes and ABANTE KA had 111,429 votes. In Party-List Canvass
Report No. 11 as of July 18, 2013, AKMA-PTM's total votes slightly increased to 165,784 votes
while ABANTE KA had a total of 111,625 votes. There was no significant change in the
rankings as per the latest canvass and therefore COMELEC had sufficient basis for proclaiming
the initial winners on May 28, 2013 and reserving only five buffer seats.2. COMELEC's
allocation of additional seats for party-list in accordance with our ruling in BANATIn BANAT v.
COMELEC, we laid down the following procedure in determining the allocation of seats for
party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941: (a) The parties, organizations,
and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections; (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
 guaranteed seat each; (c) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according tothe
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
numberof votes until all the additional seats are allocated; (d) Each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.There are two steps in the second
round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats,
38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product
of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to
determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. It is clear from
the foregoing that party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet
qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats depending on their ranking in the
second round. In sum, we hold that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
allocating the party-list seats in the 2013 elections and proclaiming the winners after
distributing the guaranteed and additional seats in accordance with our ruling in BANAT

Case No. 16: Abang Lingkod Party-list v. COMELEC, GR No. 206952, October 22, 2013
FACTS:
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and
fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It participated
in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the
House of Representatives.

In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD’s registration as a party-list

group on the ground that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the
cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some
alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s
registration under the party-list system.

RULING:
Yes. The flaw in the COMELEC’s disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list
groups to present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented.

Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future
performance.

As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to participate in the party-
list elections, track record pertains to the actual activities undertaken by groups to uplift the
cause of the sector/s, which they represent. x x x x

Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the partylist system are not
required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their
verified petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.”

Case No. 16: Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, GR No. 233766

FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court
(SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions
issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list
groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their
nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.

Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:

No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme
Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 7941 further provides that a"political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government.". On the
other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides
different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct
from each other.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different
from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did
not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along
sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed
to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking

in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution
has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court. Petitions Granted.