Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LACUBTAN
SUBJECT: JD 105 “LEGAL PHILOSOPHY”
SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY
PART A.
QUESTION NO. 1: Section 14, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution says, “No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” Meanwhile, Article 9 of
the New Civil Code provides that no judge or court shall decline to render
judgment of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Article 10 of the
New Civil Code then provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation of or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.
ANSWER: No, there exist no contradiction between the Constitution and the
New Civil Code as regards the above mentioned provisions.
In writing a decision, a judge must always remember that Article VIII, Section
14 of the 1987 Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. xxx." Consistent with this constitutional mandate,
Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides that “a
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of
court."
The purpose of the Constitutional requirement has always been to inform the
person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached
by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the
applicable laws. This Constitutional provision falls within the framework of
legal formalism.
Now, in case of silence or insufficiency of the law and the rules, Article 9 of
the Civil Code expressly mandates the courts to make a ruling despite the
"silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws." This is precisely because
Courts must interpret the law and render a Decision.
In the case of Reyes vs. Lim (G.R. No. 134241; August 11, 2003), the
Supreme Court explains that the purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction
in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity
jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable
to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the
inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which
substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
Furthermore, if Courts decide only when the law is sufficient, the cogs of
justice will not grind smoothly. Experience teaches us that law is sometimes
behind social progress. Most of the time, something already exist before it
catches the attention of the lawmakers who will then enact a law to regulate
the act. A case in point is the case of People vs. Genosa (G.R. No. 135981;
January 15, 2004) where accused Genosa anchors her defense to the
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) which allegedly constitutes self-defense.
Because of the said case, Congress enacted RA 9262 and provided for BWS
as a valid self-defense.
QUESTION NO. 3: Discuss the Overlap Thesis of natural law theory and the
Separability Thesis of legal positivism. Then discuss whether it is possible to
be both a legal positivist and a strong moralist.
ANSWER: All forms of natural law theory subscribe to the Overlap Thesis,
which asserts that there is some kind of non-conventional relation between
law and morality. In this view, the law cannot be fully articulated without
reference to moral notions. The strongest construction of the Overlap Thesis
forms the foundation for the classical naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone.
Aquinas distinguishes four kinds of law: (1) eternal law; (2) natural law; (3)
human law; and (4) divine law. Eternal law is comprised of those laws that
govern the nature of an eternal universe; Divine law is concerned with those
standards that must be satisfied by a human being to achieve eternal
salvation; Natural law is comprised of those precepts of the eternal law that
govern the behavior of beings possessing reason and free will.
Meanwhile, the separability thesis asserts that law and morality are
conceptually distinct. The definition of law must be entirely free of moral
notions. This interpretation implies that any reference to moral considerations
in defining the related notions of law, legal validity, and legal system is
inconsistent with the separability thesis.
Legal positivism and natural law are two philosophical approaches that
provide different views on the relationship between law and morality.It is not
possible to be both a legal positivist and strong moralist.
Legal positivism posits that law is a separate entity from morality, and that
law should be studied without any reference to ethical considerations.
According to legal positivism, laws are created and enforced by the state, and
are only valid if they are consistent with existing legislation and legal
institutions. Legal positivists believe that the law exists independent of any
moral considerations, and that the only relevant sources of law are those
created by legal authorities.
PART B.
The first precept of the natural law, according to Aquinas, is the somewhat
vacuous imperative to do good and avoid evil. Here it is worth noting that
Aquinas holds a natural law theory of morality: what is good and evil,
according to Aquinas, is derived from the rational nature of human beings.
Good and evil are thus both objective and universal.
For John Finnis, however, the essential function of law is to provide a
justification for state coercion. Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid,
but it cannot provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive
power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails
to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. An unjust law, on this
view, is legally binding, but is not fully law.
Yes, judges should also employ practical reasoning. It bears stressing that the
life of the law has not been logic, but experience. The necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, and even the prejudices which judges share, have had a good
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed.