FEDERALISM AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS

SERIES EDITORS: SOEREN KEIL · EVA MARIA BELSER

Asymmetric Federalism
in India
Ethnicity, Development
and Governance
Harihar Bhattacharyya
 Federalism and Internal Conflicts

Series Editors
Soeren Keil, Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Fribourg,
Switzerland
Eva Maria Belser, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Switzerland
This series engages in the discussions on federalism as a tool of internal
conflict resolution. Building on a growing body of literature on the use
of federalism and territorial autonomy to solve ethnic, cultural, linguistic
and identity conflicts, both in the West and in non-Western countries,
this global series assesses to what extent different forms of federalism and
territorial autonomy are being used as tools of conflict resolution and how
successful these approaches are.
We welcome proposals on theoretical debates, single case studies and
short comparative pieces covering topics such as:

• Federalism and peace-making in contemporary intra-state conflicts

• The link between federalism and democratization in countries facing
intra-state conflict
• Secessionism, separatism, self-determination and power-sharing
• Inter-group violence and the potential of federalism to transform
conflicts
• Successes and failures of federalism and other forms of territorial
autonomy in post-conflict countries
• Federalism, decentralisation and resource conflicts
• Peace treaties, interim constitutions and permanent power sharing
arrangements
• The role of international actors in the promotion of federalism (and
other forms of territorial autonomy) as tools of internal conflict
resolution
• Federalism and state-building
• Federalism, democracy and minority protection

For further information on the series and to submit a proposal for

consideration, please get in touch with Ambra Finotello ambra.finotello@
palgrave.com, or series editors Soeren Keil soeren.keil@unifr.ch and Eva
Maria Belser evamaria.belser@unifr.ch.
 Harihar Bhattacharyya

Asymmetric
Federalism in India
Ethnicity, Development and Governance
Harihar Bhattacharyya
Department of Political Science
The University of Burdwan
Burdwan, West Bengal, India

Federalism and Internal Conflicts

ISBN 978-3-031-23726-3 ISBN 978-3-031-23727-0 (eBook)
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 For Saswati and Sahon
for their love, care and affection
 Preface and Acknowledgements

As a study in Indian federalism rather than of this book is centrally

concerned with India’s federal asymmetry, comprehensively and examines
its effectiveness in resolving ethnic conflicts, protecting ethnic identity and
delivering development and governance. Asymmetric federalism in India
like federalism generally has been facing challenges since the onset of
India’s neo-liberal reforms from 1991 and, more particularly, from 2014
when the BJP-led NDA came to power at the Centre. Federal asymmetry
got a jolt after the abolition of Article 370 in 2019 and demotion of the
State of Jammu & Kashmir to a Union Territory status with lesser terri-
tory. This was of course a part of the NDA electoral pledge but a lone
case in India’s post-1950s political history and the history of federalism in
India in particular. The most powerful challenge to federalism and asym-
metric federalism was the radical transformation of a command economy
to a market-driven economy since the 1990s. And yet, most of the institu-
tions of federalism and asymmetric federalism in India were crafted in the
days of the ‘socialistic’ public sector dominated economy, and the various
financial assistances to the asymmetric States were more intelligible within
the framework of the said political economy. Although the process of
institutional reforms was under way since the early 1990s, and during
the UPA governments in Delhi (2004–2014), the NDA governments
have been since taking it further more aggressively and with political radi-
calism of the Right brand. The Planning Commission was abolished, and

vii
viii PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

the NITI Aayog was formed with a different role; the GST was intro-
duced; the Concept of Special Category State was done away with in
2018; the States were re-defined to be competitive and collaborative in
pursuing a capitalist path of development with their new found freedom,
not by constitutional amendments, or legislatively speaking, but by the fiat
of executive federalism. In short, India is indeed passing through radical
changes.
There are articles and book chapters on asymmetric federalism in India,
but a single book, and that too, as a comprehensive treatment, on the
subject, is terra incognito in the existing literature on Indian federalism.
This book rectifies this neglect and fills the gap. It is centrally preoc-
cupied with the nature and role of various asymmetric institutions and
methods in India’s federation building, and the functioning, and effec-
tiveness of the same as ethnic conflict mechanisms, and protecting and
promoting ethnic identity, delivering better development and governance
with two particular case materials. I have asked new questions about
understanding institutions: what does an institution deliver? What does
it do? Why do institutions work, sometimes, and when they do not do
so? Conceived within a dynamic neo-institutional perspective it is argued
here that the successful working of representative political institutions
including asymmetric institutions is contingent upon a positive interac-
tive role of three factors: actors, institutions and content which in positive
combination work better the institutions and vice-versa. Taking a larger
perspective, I have offered a new expansive ambit to understand asym-
metry in Indian federalism and show that an asymmetric method was
followed by the States Reorganization Commission in recommending
statehood to different ethnic elites. This book also offers updated detailed
survey and statistical data as records of performances of the asymmetric
States. Finally, there is a detailed examination of two sub-State level tribal
self-governments as cases of federal asymmetry in this book and the book
also makes a strong plea to consider a tier beyond the conventional
two-tier federalism concept as prevalent in the existing knowledge.
In drafting this book I have incurred debt to some persons and insti-
tutions as well as those who volunteered knowledge during field works
in Assam and Tripura. The local research assistants in both the States
have helped in conducting field works and collecting other data. I wish to
record my thanks to Abhisek for extending hands of support in preparing
some tables. The Librarian and other staff members of the Burdwan
 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix

University Central Library, particularly Dr. Kanchan Kamilya, have also

helped in locating books and journal articles.
The International Leverhulme Trust, UK, funded a four-year-long
inter-universities project on ‘Continuity and Change in Indian Federal-
ism’ which was based in Edinburgh University and led by Dr. Willfried
Swenden of the Department of Politics and International Relation and
of which I was a Lead Researcher for the North-East. Dr. Jhumpa
Mukherjee, Assistant Professor, St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous),
Kolkata, was also part of the above project as a Research Co-coordinator
for the North-East and deserves thanks.
Subrata K. Mitra has always stood by me and has been very encour-
aging. I wish to thank him for his continuous encouragement.
Ambra and Soeren have been very helpful in the penultimate stage
in making the passage to Palgrave Macmillan possible. I sincerely thank
them. The other expert reviewer deserves thanks too for spotting some
infelicities and problems of citations. I wish to record my sincere thanks
to Aishwarya and Mathrus for their support in the penultimate days of
production. Prof. Apurba Ghosh, and his colleagues in the Environment
Science Department of Burdwan University have helped prepare the map
for which thanks are due.
My son Sahon has offered considerable editorial support for which he
deserves thanks. Saswati has endured yet another book project and must
no doubt wonder at times whether the academic in me shall ever retire.
Finally, the views expressed in the book are my sole responsibility.

Burdwan, India Harihar Bhattacharyya

 Praise for Asymmetric Federalism in
India

“This book by Harihar Bhattacharyya addresses the issue of asymmet-

rical federalism in the Indian context in a perspective which is extremely
provocative and stimulating for researchers. He makes it abundantly clear
that India has, for historical as well as political reasons, made a clear break
with the traditional understanding of federalism over the years and with
the emergence of new identities the question of recognition has come
to the forefront. He has very ably shown how the Indian polity seeks to
face the challenge of asymmetrical federalism at the institutional level by
focusing on the problem of governance.”
—Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Former SurendraNath Banerjee Professor of
Political Science, University of Calcutta, India

“Professor Harihar Bhattacharya’s book is the first full-length compre-

hensive study of various aspects of asymmetrical federalism to take into
consideration sub-national levels and made critical examination of institu-
tional performance and relative effectiveness so far generally neglected. It
is innovative and thought-provoking.”
—M.P. Singh, Former Professor of Political Science, an erstwhile Resident
National Fellow of Indian Institute of Advanced Study, India

“The scholarly contributions of Professor Harihar Bhattacharyya have

provided a valuable counterpoint over the past many years to the skep-
ticism about the strength and viability of Indian democracy voiced by

xi
xii PRAISE FOR ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM IN INDIA

the western liberal establishment and its Indian acolytes. In this new
book – redolent of the analytical rigour and meticulous fieldwork that
one has come to expect from him – Bhattacharyya has taken his core
argument about the Indian state at the heart of which lies a dynamic
neo-institutional model of state-society relations further, by the way of
India’s asymmetric federalism. As he cogently argues, in a country of
continental dimensions, this specific feature of the federal system has func-
tioned as an institutional nexus to link regional and subregional units of
vastly different size and institutional depth into a web of power-sharing,
empowerment and accountability. This is how the post-colonial state
successfully transformed subjects into citizens, rebels into stakeholders
and pulled peripheral units into the national mainstream. This important
book is destined to become a vital addition to the growing literature on
federalism and democratisation in India.”
—Subrata K. Mitra, Professor Emeritus, University of Heidelberg,
Germany
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 Concept of Asymmetric Federalism and the Politics
of Recognition 21
3 Founding Moment (1946–56) 39
4 Federal Asymmetry in India and Various Forms 55
5 Politics of Fiscal Asymmetry in India 65
6 Ethnic Cleavages and Federal Asymmetry 77
7 The Making and Unmaking of the Special Category
States in India 99
8 Asymmetry Within Asymmetry in India 107
9 The Working of Sub-State Federal Asymmerty
in Tripura 115
10 Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts in Assam 141

xiii
xiv CONTENTS

11 A Comparative Assessment of Asymmetric Federalism

in India 163
12 Conclusion 185

Bibliography 199
Index 209
 Abbreviations

AASU All Assam Students Union

ABSS Obor Surokha Samity
ABSU All Bodo Students Union
ADC Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council
AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AGP Ahom Gana Parishad
AHDC Autonomous Hill District Council
AHDR Assam Human Development Report
BAC Bodoland Autonomous Council
BLT Bodoland Liberation Tigers
BPF Bodoland People’s Front
BSF Border Security Force
BTAD Bodoland Territorial Districts
BTC Bodoland Territorial Council
CA Constituent Assembly
CAD Constituent Assembly Debates
CCP Chief Commissioner Province
CEM Chief Executive Member
CEO Chief Executive Offer
CH Conferatio Helvetica
CPI Communist Party of India
CPI-M Communist Party of India (Marxist)
DGHC Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council
DoNER Department of the Development of North Easter Region
HDI Human Development Index (UNDP)
INC Indian National Congress

xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS

J&K Jammu and Kashmir

JVP Jawaharlal Vallavbhai P. Sitaramiyya (committee of the CA)
LF Left Front
MDNER Ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region
MNGERGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Act
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NDFB Nationalist Democratic Front of Bodoland
NEDA North-East Democratic Alliance
NGO Non-Government Organization
NITI Aayog National Institute for Transforming India
NLFT Nationalist Liberation Front of Tripura
NSCM-IM Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Issac Muiva
PCTA Plain Tribal Council of Assam
PEI Policy Effective Index
PIB Press Information Bureau (Government of India)
SRC States Reorganization Commission
TMC Trino Mool Congress
TNV Tripura National Volunteers
ToR Terms of Reference
TUJS Tripura Upajati Youth Organization
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam
UPA United Progressive Alliance
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 List of Tables

Table 6.1 Army deployed in aid to civil order in the North-East,

1973–1983 81
Table 6.2 Ethnic peace accords in India’s North-East 83
Table 6.3 Population and areas of states in NE and India, 2011 84
Table 6.4 Tribes and their percentage to population
in the North-East (2011) 84
Table 7.1 Gadgil-Mukherjee Formula 101
Table 7.2 Performance of the SCS in HDI (1990–2018) 102
Table 7.3 Policy Effectiveness Index 103
Table 9.1 Party performance in ADC (28-member + 2 nominated
= 30-member) in 1982 and 1985 119
Table 9.2 Performance of political parties in election to the ADC,
2010 (May 3) 121
Table 9.3 Party position in the ADC in 2021 (total seats 28) + 2 122
Table 9.4 ADC’s field officers 124
Table 9.5 Land allotment to poor Jhumia Tribal Families
(2006–07 to 2009–10) 126
Table 9.6 Public expenditure on tribal welfare (2011–12) (amount
in INR @ 1 lakh (=100,000) 128
Table 9.7 Governmental Performances in Implementation
of MNREGA (2006–07 to 2014–15) 129
Table 9.8 Sources of ADC Fund (ADC budget estimate 2012–13) 133
Table 10.1 Bodos in Bodoland areas 150
Table 10.2 Population of Scheduled Tribes in Assam 151
Table 10.3 Party-wise results of elections in 2020 (40-member) 154

xvii
xviii LIST OF TABLES

Table 10.4 Seats won by political parties in the BTAD elections

(2010 and 2015) 154
Table 10.5 Deprivation of basic amenities in BTC districts (2013) 157
Table 10.6 Deprivation in basic amenities: Rural–urban districts 157
Table 10.7 Human Development Index in Bodoland (2014) 158
Table 10.8 Dimensional and human development indices of districts 158
Table 10.9 Landlessness in Bodoland districts (Per cent HH) (2013) 159
Table 11.1 States and ethnic groups in the NE (2011) 172
Table 11.2 Presidential rule (under Article 356 of the Constitution)
in the NE 179
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Federalism and more particularly asymmetric federalism in India seems

to be passing through a challenge since the onset of India’s neo-liberal
reforms, and more recently the abolition of Article 370 and the conse-
quent loss of statehood of Jammu & Kashmir in 2019 by the current
BJP-led NDA government in Delhi as part of the BJP’s electoral pledge1
and the making of two Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir, and
Ladakh, which remains an ethnically distinct territory but was part of the
former State of J & K, and arguably not treated by the same with equa-
nimity.2 The abolition of the Planning Commission in 2014 and with
it of the Special Category States (11 States including J & K) in 2018
seems to be another blow to the above. To be sure, neither the Planning
Commission nor the SCSs was part of the constitutional-legislative struc-
ture of federalism in India, but an extra-constitutional arrangement that
devised a changing mechanism for special plan assistance to be offered to
the SCSs. The Plan Assistance remains without the concept of the SCS.
But that does not mean the end of asymmetric federalism in India and
its importance. The States in North-East enjoy the special constitutional
status, are entitled to various other grants from the Centre, and more
money by way of the increased share of the States in Finance Commission
allocation since 2014. The MDoNER, a separate ministry of the Union
government (2004) has been financing a number of projects in the region
with remarkable success. Fiscal equalization apart, many States especially
with poorer resource bases and geo-strategic locations coupled with a

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_1
2 H. BHATTACHARYYA

significant presence of the deprived sections of society such as the Sched-

uled Tribes receive prioritized development and empowerment grants and
schemes either fully and or partly financed by the Centre. The other
structural asymmetry in respect of the composition of the Rajya Sabha
(Council of States), and the absence of the equality principle of represen-
tation of the States to the Rajya Sabha remains. This strongly suggests that
not all types of asymmetry are good for federalism. Indian federalism, to
be sure, is not perfect (no federalism is), and it is still being made. In light
of the above one would say that there cannot be a better time to critically
reflect on India’s asymmetric federalism, its origin, forms, meaning and
significance and effectiveness in furthering the cause of resolving ethnic
conflicts, and federalism, i.e. unity and diversity of India, and in producing
better development and governance.
This book examines India’s experiments with asymmetric federalism
and seeks to explain the institutional effectiveness in holding on the vast
and complex multi-ethnic country together for many decades. For long,
the term ‘federalism’ was a kind of taboo in discussions on politics and
the state even in the West, as a recipe for disintegration and collapse.
Although K. C. Wheare3 (1945/1953) wrote the classic book on feder-
alism by being based in Oxford, the British scholarship neglected (Burgess
1985) to pay any attention to it, which was at variance with the British
colonialism’s role as an exporter of the idea of federalism (like other
concepts) to the colonies. In the latter, the concept of federalism under-
went a metamorphosis in adapting to the local contexts so as to produce
a hybrid character (Bhattacharyya 2016: 72–85). Harold Laski declared
federalism as obsolete in 1938 on the basis of his observation of increasing
state authoritarianism in the West in the wake of Fascism, Nazism and
the War. The post-War (ll) interest in federalism was closely associated
with the questions of nation and state-building in the post-colonial coun-
tries, and that too, in the midst of immense cultural diversity, mass
poverty, underdevelopment and of the special problems of integration of
disparate regions. It was particularly challenging to do so in great hetero-
geneity considered thus far inhospitable to nation-building. As we will
see later in the book, India took a cautious but steady approach to feder-
alism, a multi-staged process accompanied by democracy to answer many
questions of diversity, identity, autonomy and power-sharing at multiple
levels, not always successful in every case of accommodation of identity,
however, but overall holding on a country of sub-continental proportions,
comparable to Europe, or the former Soviet Union. I argue in this book
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

that various asymmetric institutional arrangements in India, not simply

limited to India’s peripheral regions, have worked through territorial
autonomy and commensurate power-sharing in offering the cementing
bonds at many levels of the polity as well as financial equalization. In
the existing knowledge on Indian federalism, federal asymmetry remains
neglected. This study seeks to rectify the neglect by examining the consti-
tutional, political and fiscal aspects of federal asymmetry broadly within
the macro framework with some micro-level empirically based mate-
rials. It pays special attention to the institutional effectiveness of federal
asymmetry in delivering governance, and a sense of fulfilment of iden-
tity. The subject of accommodation of diversity today occupies a central
place in federalism and asymmetric federalism; a theoretical chapter will
deal with the current debates on the so-called ‘politics of identity and
difference’ and of recognition—usually not brought in the discourse of
federalism and asymmetric federalism, on the one hand, and in contempo-
rary political theory, on the other. The book follows a modified dynamic
neo-institutional approach that takes into consideration institutions and
institutional design, actors who work or do not work the institutions, and
the context which facilitates or hinders institutional working. A critical
comparative analysis of the relation between ethnic identity and asym-
metric federalism, and the special problems of why a territorial solution
to ethnic identity often does not work in India is offered towards the end
of the book.
Asymmetry as such is not a desirable human value, but in federalism it
has proved very functional and effective. Asymmetric federalism refers to
a system of unequal status and powers of some federal units and subunits
designed to meet some special socio-cultural, historical and economic
needs of certain people living in peripheral areas of the federation. It
refers also to special institutional arrangements for meeting problems
that arise from asymmetric size, strength and resource bases of certain
federal units, which may be de jure and de facto, and or de facto and
then made de jure. Federal asymmetry, in other words, is a fact of life in
most federations, and it has called for fiscal equalization at many levels
through formal and or informal practices. The so-called federal success in
a country like Switzerland, for example, has been made possible by many
pragmatic measures to accommodate asymmetry of many kinds and at
many levels (Dufflon 2007). Any understanding of asymmetric federalism
would involve inevitably some prior understanding of what federalism
is. After all, asymmetric federalism is unintelligible except for placing it
4 H. BHATTACHARYYA

within an overall federal framework. Asymmetric federalism does not and

cannot have a separate existence apart from federalism per se. This has a
special theoretical significance too in the sense that the special circum-
stances, or complex cultural diversity, that have called for asymmetric
institutional arrangements within federations remain proof against the
historical processes of homogenization undertaken in the days of building
classical nation-states in the West and elsewhere too. As I have pointed out
elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2001), when in neighbouring Germany, France
and Italy nation-states were being built around the principle of homo-
geneity, and uniformity, the Swiss case for federalism was something of
a great exception in having taken a more positive approach to cultural
diversity in order to maintain and protect diversity. In Switzerland, diver-
sity and federalism were, as if, two sides of the same coin. Apparently, the
Swiss case might not be a good starting example: a very small country of
some 8.7 million (2020) people having 26 Canton and half-Cantons (21
+ 5) and about 2880 municipalities each with its distinctive identity, and
provided with a government and autonomy would dismiss any grounds
for asymmetry. But on a closer understanding (Dufflon 2007), Swiss
federalism is very asymmetric in size and complexion, and the large scale
equalization, financially speaking, has meant that this federation would
not simply work without asymmetric institutions and practices.
In the current discourse on comparative federalism, globally speaking,
both federalism and asymmetric federalism have been conjoined to
meeting the diverse needs, i.e. the needs for identity and territorial
autonomy at many levels of the compound, federal polity.4 The central
motive behind the formation of classical federations was ‘union’, as a
kind of defensive alliance against external aggression. In the post-colonial
federations, the motive has been ‘uniting’ (read ‘unity and integrity’ in
the case of India) diverse people, ethno-regional, ethno-linguistic and
tribal. However, lately, in the West the existing state institutions in
unitary systems were revised in order to offer space for the accommoda-
tion of cultural diversity. Even in countries not formally federal, special
arrangements have been made to offer territorial autonomy to ethno-
regional communities. This has happened in 2018 in the Philippines
(Bhattacharyya 2019b: 191).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

A Revised Template of Federation

Long back Watts (1966: 353) wrote:

Federal systems are no panacea, but in many developing countries they

may be necessary as the only way of combining, through representative
institutions, the benefits of both unity and diversity. Experience has shown
that federations, both old and new, have been difficult to govern. But then,
that is why they are federations.

The above passage sums up the basic message of why a diverse country
needs a federal form of government, and also not lament that such
governments are not easy. We may add from Wheare (1953) that federal
governments are ‘so complicated and controversial’. Following Wheare
again federation is to be seen as a political modernity of a special kind
which means it is an ‘association of States’ (Wheare 1953: 51) that a
deliberate construction by a compact agreed upon not by the individual
citizens but by the pre-existing States. Here Wheare had in mind of
course the classical federations; the post-colonial and post-Soviet feder-
ations have had different trajectories in which case a written Constitution
or some other kinds of agreements and treaties are not necessarily valu-
able. In some cases, such as India, a federation has been built from above
by disaggregating a once centralized colonial state, and also by a lot of
adjustment and re-adjustment of territories by the political pressures from
below. Such initial conceptual issues have been dealt with adequately in
the existing knowledge.
The terms ‘federalism’ and ‘federation’ are often used interchangeably.
The Swiss still retain their original term ‘Conferatio Helvetica’ (CH for
short) although they transformed their system into a federation in 1848.
There are other species too (Watts 2008: 10–17). But there is a subtle but
substantial difference between the two. On the basis of the classic state-
ments on the subject (e.g. Wheare 1953; Watts 1966, 2008; Elazar 1987;
Burgess 2006), the term ‘federalism’ is to be understood, as a norma-
tive category, a political principle that advocates for a combination of
shared rule and self-rule—the former for the national purposes, and the
latter for regional ones. The same is understood to be a compound polity
thus constituted for unity and diversity, for ‘accommodating, preserving
and promoting distinctive identities within a larger political union (Watts
2008: 8). The epithet ‘shared rule’ and ‘self-rule’ is associated with the
6 H. BHATTACHARYYA

name of Daniel Elazar (1987), and has since been much in use in federal
discourse. There is a need for clarification of what they refer to. Watts
(2008) argued that how this ‘combination’ of two types of rule is made
and worked out depends on the particular context. He also forewarned
that if this combination is not most appropriate, federalism then fails,
often resulting in disintegration of the whole polity. There is also no
one form of shared rule by meaning the regions’ participation in the
national level policy making; nor is there one standard of regional partic-
ipation in national level policymaking. This is precisely where the area of
federal asymmetry, structurally speaking, comes in. In any case, a federal
rule, or rather two or more types of rule, is rather complex, for federal
governance is difficult, but an ethnically diverse country can hardly avoid
it; if it does so it does it only at its own peril. A multi-tiered feder-
alism is today accepted as a norm, sometimes expressed as ‘multi-level
governance’, not there is still a subtle difference between the two. One
could speak of multi-level governance in unitary systems of states too.
The recognition of a third tier below the federal units, if constitutionally
so guaranteed is certainly a part of the federal system of the countries
concerned. The extent of participation of the regions in national level
policymaking depends on how the federation is built—from below or
from the top. In the case of the latter, the federal second chamber is
not usually a house of the States with equal representation. Even in cases
where a federation was a result of a compact among pre-existing states, the
principle of equality of representation is not always followed. For example,
in Switzerland, the half-Cantons have half the share of the full Cantons
in the number of representatives sent to the federal second chamber.
While the issue of equal or unequal representation in the federal second
chamber remains unsettled, there is very little critical reflection on the
nature and extent of self-rule. Is self-rule enough shared rule? Does
it ensure the representation of different communities in a multi-ethnic
context? I raised this issue elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2019a) with special
reference to India’s North-East where achievement of statehood on the
basis of tribal ethnicity has not been inclusive enough; on the contrary,
this has produced exclusion of the newly created ethnic minorities. In
many such cases, there is a provision for non-territorial representation by
way of the nomination of the State Governor for sections not adequately
represented. But that little assuages the feeling of being outnumbered in a
parliamentary majoritarian model of democracy followed all over. Finally,
federalism as a political principle informed the structural arrangements of
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

shared and self-rule relative to specific contexts. If it is not adequately

so done, the system remains defunct. The system of power-sharing that
federalism defends among many tiers reflects the concerns for both shared
rule and self-rule.
Federation is a descriptive category, and a specific form of the broader
category of ‘federal political systems’. Federalism is after all about gover-
nance and that too, of complex multi-ethnic countries, for which some
kind of federation is a must if they want to survive and remain united.
Students of Politics and Federalism often become confused by writings
that seem to offer a long list of structural features for defining a federa-
tion. The great authority in our time late Watts (2008) has simplified our
task by offering a 6-point template of the common structural features of
a federation:

• Two or more orders of government—one for the whole country

(national level), and the other for the regions—each acting directly
on citizens;
• A constitutionally guaranteed distribution of legislative and executive
powers, and allocation of revenue resources between two or more
tiers of government;
• Provision for a second chamber with designated representatives from
the regions for regional participation in national-level policymaking;
• A supreme written Constitution not amenable to unilateral amend-
ment and requiring the consent of the federal units on significant
matters;
• An umpire (in the form of a Supreme Court or tribunal, referendum
or an upper chamber with special powers) to guard the Constitution,
resolve intergovernmental disputes; and
• Institutions and practices for intergovernmental collaboration (Watts
2008: 9).

The 6-points in the above template will require a lot of elaboration that is
not taken up here. Watts (2008) himself has done that. Here I will stress
that if a third tier is accepted in the tier structure of government in a
federating, then the sub-state level governments require to be considered
for federal asymmetry. In a multi-ethnic country like India, where many
smaller ethnic identity, especially the tribal ones, are rooted in a little
8 H. BHATTACHARYYA

territory, and are considered as their own, this at once involves the ques-
tion of recognition of identity and a local level government for the tribals,
and an asymmetric solution to the question of identity. Such a govern-
ment directly acts upon the local citizens; such governments’ autonomy
is protected by the Constitution. However, it suggests that the existence
of so many governments when government means more public expendi-
ture, but the ethnically surcharged people when so mobilized act often on
emotional grounds, and hardly like to see the cost of many governments.
At least for the local populace or their leaders a government means control
over public resources to spend, and enjoyment of the largesse of polit-
ical power. But then that is the price one pays for choosing a federation,
unavoidably, in culturally diverse countries. However, in a vast multi-
ethnic country, this facilitates governance by following the principle of
subsidiary i.e. by leaving the tasks to the level where it is most appropriate
and creating a space for contestation for power among the stakeholders.
It also decentralizes and thus helps localization of the problems and their
solution possible.
The above template needs to be revised, I would argue, to incorpo-
rate institutions of asymmetry, for Watts himself acknowledged above that
federation today does not refer to only a two-tier system, but multitier.
This was already acknowledged by Riker (1964) in his idea of the feder-
ation as a ‘constitutionally determined tiered structure’. The two-tier or
orders of government do not tell us much about the relation between
the tiers, or among the second tiers, or the second and the next tiers.
The embedded core assumption at least in the case of classical federa-
tions was that of symmetry in powers and status among the federating
units on the presumption that they were equal parties to the federal
compact. However, in the course of time, all classical federations in the
West experienced de facto asymmetry, which was to become de jure as
a constitutional practice. In large multi-ethnic federations in the Global
South, a mere two-tier structure was insufficient to accommodate mani-
fold cultural diversity. Watts (2008: 125–30) paid important attention to
the issue of symmetry and asymmetry in federations, and cautioned us,
however, about the possibility of dysfunctionality, if asymmetry is too
extreme. Watts (2008: 132–3) has paid attention to the sub-State level
local governments in India and elsewhere as another tier in federalism.
How can a federation with large cultural and ethnic differences manage
to hold itself together without significant scope for asymmetry? It cannot
do so without power-sharing at many levels of the polity. Consider the
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

5 Russian Federation (1993). It is territorially the world’s largest feder-

ation (with eleven time zones) of originally 89 constituent units—now
reduced to 86—with differential status and powers, constitutionally as
well as by treaties and bilateral agreements: 21 republics, 48 oblasts, 7
autonomous okrugs, 7 kranis and one autonomous oblast. Such exam-
ples today are galore. However, one factor that facilitates the running of
the Russian federation is its ethnicity in that about 90% of the population
speaks the Russian language and are Russian in ethnic stock. That the
federation is multi-tiered is more so because of the geographical vastness
of the territory than the ethnic factor. But the multilevel governments
have necessitated also large space of asymmetry in power and status of
the smaller units with ethnic minorities compared to the republics. No
wonder, many post-conflict federations have incorporated asymmetry in
their constitutional designs.

Federalism, Society and Ethnic Homeland

Does society matter for federalism or vice-versa? It does so in both ways.
Like democracy and liberty, federalism by origin is a Western notion asso-
ciated with a compact or contract or a partnership, and the mutual trust
in it is more closely connected with Christianity. But then like other
concepts federalism has also been adapted to different contexts in the
non-Western world not all professing Christianity. When the US feder-
ation was formed in 1789 there was a factor of political diversity in the
contracting States to be maintained. In the case of Swiss federalism, socio-
cultural diversity and distinctive political traditions in the pre-existing
States (now called Cantons) mattered a lot so much so that gradually
diversity and Swiss federalism came to be known as two sides of the same
coin. Since the early 1950s and 1960s some sociologically oriented studies
of federalism pointed our attention to social divisions within the federal
units with their potential for future politicization (Livingstone 1952 in
place of 1956; Watts 1966, 2008; Friedrich 1968; Duchacek 1970). A
society may be multi-cultural/ethnic but the polity may be unitary which
means that the values upheld in society are not honoured in the passage
of centralization and concentration of powers. On the other hand, a
federation is more likely to give expression to societal values by recogni-
tion of difference, i.e. many identities. Unlike democracy federation, does
not aim at equalization which is not possible where people’s identities
are concerned. The value of diversity and hence the required sensitivity
10 H. BHATTACHARYYA

to plurality have a greater chance to be maintained in the institutional

arrangements of federalism. This is not to be taken as an uncritical defence
of traditions, or any differences. Federalism is capable of accommodating
only those differences that have any territorial significance; other differ-
ences can be accommodated through the normal democratic process and
procedures.
Federalism per se faces at least two challenges. First, there is the ques-
tion of cultivation and developing a federal loyalty from the citizens;
this loyalty is of a civic character and occupies a higher place above
all ethnic/regional/sub-regional level. Second, there is the question of
regional loyalty i.e. loyalty to the region/State/Canton, etc.; this is not
an ethnic loyalty in the exact sense of the term, but rather an ethno-
territorial. But one should exercise caution about the characterization of
this loyalty. While in India, the States were created on the basis of some
kind of ethnic markers, and or a combination of language, region, tribal
ethnicity and so on, the American States do not represent any such ethnic
considerations. The cross-cutting ethnic loyalties in the Swiss Cantons
stand in the way of giving them any ethnic labels. But in Swiss feder-
alism, citizens maintain three loyalties simultaneously: federal, Cantonal
and Communal/Municipal. In post-colonial and post-Soviet federations,
the mutual co-existence of these two loyalties has often been wanting.
Even if loyalty to the regions/States is more easily available, and much
asserted by the politicians, loyalty to the federation is in short supply.
In India, for a variety of reasons the State level politicians cultivate a
lot of anti-Centrism (‘Centre’s deprivation’; ‘stem-motherly attitude to
the States’ and so on) (Bhattacharyya 2017: 197–211) which stands in
the way of developing a healthy federal loyalty. In the cases of sub-State
level territorial association based on tribal ethnicity, loyalty to the local
level government qua the territory is often not easily achieved; in such
cases, loyalty to the particular tribal pales into insignificance compared to
the territorial loyalty of the District Council. This may not be the case
in classical federations although there are other grounds for grievances
against a particular regime. John Kincaid, an American political scientist
and authority on US federalism, has pointed out that the federation has
been coercive of late in implementing some health programmers through
the NGOs by bypassing the States (Kincaid 2011: 37–53). This is a matter
of cultivating and sustaining a federal culture, and remains an unexplored
area of research, at least, in Indian federalism. This is more poignant in
India where many loyalties (national, regional; sub-regional; tribal and
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

sub-tribal and linguistic) co-exist not always in good harmony though.

Of them all, national/federal is highly demanded but is in a relatively
weaker position vis-à-vis the territorially rooted particular loyalties which
are often emotive.
From the perspective of asymmetric federalism, the demands for recog-
nition and autonomy stem from a society in which some ethnic groups
may feel discriminated under the rule of majority rule by a certain group.
In most cases, if not all, such demands are for ethnic homeland. The
homeland issue is not an easy one to explain let alone resolve. The avail-
able literature on Indian federalism has dealt with how such homeland
demands in India have been met since the early 1950s which have resulted
in statehood, for example, for the Tamils, the Telugus, Gujaratis, the
Marathis and so on; creation of sub-State ethnic authority by way of the
6th Schedule in India’s North-East is also to be seen in this context. This
has added more legitimacy to Indian federalism, and has been a major
factor in its success. However, comparatively, the definition and bound-
aries of such homelands have remained a bone of contention. The fight
over homeland demands has kept the ethnic leaders and the zealots preoc-
cupied; they lead masses to enter into clashes and blood baths; it has led
often to ethnic cleansing. People world over migrated from one area to
another for a variety of reasons; they change their locale many a times
over. Therefore, despite strong claims of antiquity over the proclaimed
homeland as a very common feature of ethnic mobilizations, as Anthony
D. Smith (1986: 154, 212)6 would have us believe, the matter has never
been suitably resolved. Often a homeland is declared without precisely
demarcating its boundaries. Smith (1986: 154) has noted how ethnic
conflicts transform into nationhood7 :

…more and more ethnie are trying to take on territorial components and
adopt a civic model, as they seek to become nations. Of course not all
ethnie are bent on attaining nationhood. Even if we refuse to adopt a
linguistic criterion of ethnicity on the ground that an ethnie requires myths
of descent, historical memories, a territorial association and a sense of soli-
darity, over and above any shared cultural attributes, there are still many
more ethnie in the world which are potential nations….. (Smith 1986:
154)

For Smith, when an ethnie becomes politicized it does so when it claims

a particular territory or a ‘territorial homeland’ (1986: 162), a ‘compact’
12 H. BHATTACHARYYA

space in which to control their destinies. We argue here that this space
becomes ethnic/nationalist as a result of the political imagination of a
community, or a nation, as Anderson (1983) would argue. The discur-
sive community or nation’s space determines here the political space of
contestation and struggles. On the basis of his global understanding of
the phenomenon, Smith argues that this ‘territorialization of ethnicity’
(1986: 162) is but an attempt to culturally appropriate the sites and
borders of homeland. This has many theoretical ramifications, which are
not undertaken here.

Theory and Concepts

Federal Asymmetry is one of the central concepts used in this book. Asym-
metry is not such a desirable human value, but in federalism it has proved
its remit. In the global discourse on federalism asymmetry has been well
recognized as an indispensable element of federalism in nearly all existing
federations (Burgess 2006; Watts 2008; Agranoff 1999; Bhattacharyya
2010, 2021). The symmetry of status and rights of the federal units is
considered the basis of federalism, but in diverse contexts, the space for
asymmetry has been expanded in order to accommodate diversity. In this
study, we look at various special rights that certain States in India enjoy
as per the Constitution, as well as by other means. We focus in our case
study materials drawn from the North-East of India to understand federal
asymmetry in a double sense: state and sub-State level governments with
special autonomy, and its impact on identity as well as legitimacy.
Ethnic identity, especially tribal identity, is another concept central to
our investigation. It is a problematic phenomenon because it defies any
precise definition; it is a contingent issue depending upon which part of
an identity will become significant politically speaking, and when, cannot
be ascertained a priori. Scholars have also argued that identity per se is
plural (Sen 2006). Since it is a mobilization concept, the real nature of
ethnic and tribal identity becomes obvious after many rounds of political
mobilizations when it is found out that after all what was initially claimed
as a single identity is in fact a case of many identities. In India, it has been
found in the existing research that ethnic identity is to be understood
as multi-layered and the politics over both remain central to the ques-
tion raised in this book. Does identity matter? Can it be defined precisely
especially when it comes to the question of tribal identity? This question
is raised because an identity as such may not be as problematic as when a
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

certain territory is demanded in its name when it is revealed that the claim
is not well-based and territorial demarcation is difficult. Ethnic elites very
often, ostensibly, mobilize a whole lot of tribals for homeland but once in
the corridors of power they may exclude many others from the benefits
of power.
The other concept used in this book is territorial autonomy and its link
with ethnic identity. India’s federation building—a process not, arguably,
complete yet—has involved precisely the territorial recognition of ethnic
identity since 1956. This autonomy has entailed a constitutionally guar-
anteed list of powers and authority. To accommodate smaller tribal ethnic
identity, special provisions by way of the 5th and the 6th Schedule of the
Indian Constitution have been made for the tribals in many parts of India,
and the hill tribes in the North-East, respectively. But the latter has been
amended from time to time to meet new situations though not always
successfully. Connected to the above but having a unique value is the
signing of ethnic peace accords which has since 1947 (Naga Peace Accord)
is another concept which in the case of North-East has offered a novel
instrument that has bound the stakeholders for a negotiable and peaceful
settlement of ethnic conflicts. This has worked at both the State and the
sub-State levels. In most cases, it has entailed the question of territorial
power. But in some cases, such accords have been signed to respond to
non-territorial issues and accommodation of the insurgent rebels for their
rehabilitation. All in all, power-sharing remains in this study the silver
lining across many issues and factors.
A theory of federalism per se is still an uncertainty. Federalism is, by
origin, a compact between pre-existing States and Union (government) to
be established, and hence the question of rights spoken about in federal
discourse is that of the States vis-à-vis the Union/Federal government.
Liberalism, as a theory or doctrine, concerns itself with the liberty of the
individual, and (these days) of groups such as minorities. The rights of the
territories are federal matters. In The Federalist (no 11), the founders of
American federalism defended federalism even at the cost of some ‘natural
rights’ of the people:
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of govern-
ment, and it is equally undeniable, whenever and however it is instituted,
the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest
it with requisite powers (Hamilton, Jay and Madison in Karmis and
Norman, 2005: 105).
14 H. BHATTACHARYYA

However, federalism and asymmetric federalism are both linked to the

liberty of the individual’s via the protection of diversity. Theoretically
then, as Michael Burgess (2006, 208–24) has tried to maintain, there
is a normative value in federalism. To my understanding federalism by the
spirit is liberal, for it cannot sustain itself in authoritarian and undemo-
cratic States. For example, the protection of rights of the ethnic minorities
via asymmetric federalism is also a protection of the individual members
of the same. Or better governance in an asymmetric federal unit means
better living for all members of the community. There is another aspect
of the theoretical issue in federalism. Long back K C Wheare highlighted
the associational dimension in forming a federation. Explaining what
the federal principle implies he says that it entails the art of associating
(Wheare 1953: 1), the art, I argue, is very modern in nature.
‘Ethnicity, Development and Governance’—the sub-title of the book—
requires some elucidation and explanation. Ethnicity refers to a group of
people having some common characteristics such as language, region, reli-
gion, culture and a sense of identity (Smith 2003: 12–13). Smith believes
that the territorial rootedness in that an ethnic group has a ‘homeland’
can also be considered as another common trait in defining ethnicity,
but when that is the case the boundary between ethnicity and nation-
hood becomes blurred especially when Smith himself defines the nation
as a ‘named human community connected to a homeland, possessing
common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements
of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity at least among the elites’
(Smith 2003: 13). In India, an ethnic group which includes tribes too
when politically conscious and demanded recognition to a homeland
has most often presented their script of identity in the rhetoric of self-
determination a la the classical notion of national self-determination.
India officially never calls itself a multi-ethnic federation, but in actual
political practices in the formation of the federation by state and sub-state
creation, the ethnic identity has been recognized. Thus, in India, there are
ethnically named States and sub-States as well as regionally named States.
As the literature on the ‘politics of recognition’ makes us aware,
recognition as such may not mean much if such recognition is not accom-
panied by powers and resources in a demarcated territory so that both
development and governance take place. In other words, recognition
without powers and powers without responsibilities do not carry much
meaning. The reason why certain minority ethnic groups demand a sepa-
rate territory in some form is because of the perceived feeling that they
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

are deprived and excluded in the existing distribution of powers and

resources. Serious attention will be paid in this book to measure devel-
opment (human) and governance that has taken place in the States and
sub-States under consideration. Governance today is measured not simply
by the conventional yardstick of law and order and political violence, but
also, more importantly, by the delivery aspects of governmental activi-
ties. In order words, we seek to show what the asymmetric States and
sub-States have done in respect of the above; how much they have deliv-
ered the socio-economic public goods and services, etc. In this respect,
I make use of the currently accepted yardsticks. While development and
governance are dealt with in detail in Chapter 4, the ethnic dimensions
remain central to both federalism and asymmetric federalism in several
other chapters.

Methodology
This research monograph has followed the methods of historical soci-
ology, and made use of multiple research methods: apart from the archival
sources (government records, newspapers and magazines), in several field
visits by the author and his research assistants, elite interviews (15 from
Tripura and 15 from Assam on a random basis) were taken in order
to supplement the official records and versions. Interview centred the
current challenges to State autonomy in the North-East, efficacy of the
Special Category States and the role of sub-State Levels Autonomous
Tribal District Councils in development and governance. Interviews were
taken during 2011–2012 and then again in 2015–2017.8 Interview data
have been used anecdotally to buttress a particular point, and to supple-
ment if any, the official discourse. I have also made use of ethnographic
methods. The primary sources used include Census Reports of India, and
other official survey of the State government, and of the sub-State level
governments too. Legislative proceedings of the ADC in Tripura were
utilized. Relevant books, journal article and newspapers and magazines
have also been used. Online sources have also been used.
The perspective that informs the analysis is modified dynamic neo-
institutionalism. It stresses the role of institutions, actors and context
in complex dynamic interaction. The institutions, however beautiful and
well-designed they may be, do not work automatically on their own. They
have to be worked, if at all, by actors. Actors are also not completely
free to work or not the institutions, as they wish. For in many cases
16 H. BHATTACHARYYA

institutions are path dependent and context-bound. The optimal corre-

lation of the above three variables is complex, and the institutional
working is therefore conditioned by several factors. The inappropriately
designed institutions may produce, not a good results, but disasters.
Also, well-designed institutions may not produce anything if they are not
worked by well-intentioned actors. Contexts may be permanently hostile
to work institutions that are not appropriately designed, or it may facilitate
institutional functioning.

Chapterisation
Chapter 1 is Introduction which explains the subject matter, the existing
literature, concepts used and methodology.
Chapter 2 titled Concept of Asymmetric Federalism and the Politics
of Recognition is theoretical and deals with the current concepts of
asymmetric federalism, its various uses, comparatively speaking, and its
problematic location in federal discourse, and discusses its implications
for the so-called politics of recognition and difference. It also raises ques-
tions about the need for rethinking the appropriate institutions to respond
adequately to the problems of diversity and the politics of recognition.
Chapter 3 titled Founding Moment (1946–1956) deals with as its
subject matter the formation of States and sub-States in India and the
asymmetrical method as followed by the CA and the SRC in the making
of the States. The data used are debates of the CA, reports of the SRC
and other official sources and books. It also brings out the debates of the
CA on the special provision with respect to the 5th and 6th Schedules of
the Constitution in order to offer self-governance to the tribal in India’s
North-East and other parts of India, and the special territorial arrange-
ments for some areas. How did the mind of the founders work on this?
How did they reconcile the need for asymmetry for the peripheral regions
in particular within a uniting discourse overall? This chapter also seeks to
answer that question.
There are large-scale structural asymmetries in the Indian federation
which is politically not very encouraging to the health of the federation,
especially so when the political parties act as the operators. In Chapter 4
titled Federal Asymmetry in India and Various Forms an attempt is made
to identify and critically discuss the various forms and levels of asymmetry
in India federalism, constitutionally as well as politically speaking. This
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

chapter also discusses the pros and cons of structural asymmetry in repre-
sentation in Indian federalism and points outs out that such asymmetries
are not unique to India. It also points out that such asymmetries are
rooted in the very mode of formation of the Indian federation.
Chapter 5 titled Politics of Fiscal Asymmetry in India examines the
various aspects of fiscal federal asymmetry and the strategic implications
of the same in nation-building. It shows how different types of fiscal asym-
metry have been designed in order to respond to varied needs of diversity
and special circumstances within the broad view of a multi-cultural nation-
building. The subject brought in for critical discussion is the Finance
Commission, and its method of distribution of money,
Chapter 6 Ethnic Cleavages and Federal Asymmetry offers a critical
exploration of the interface between ethnic cleavages and the making of
the asymmetric States in India. It pays attention to India’s North-East as
well as the other cases in the mainland. It shows how various markers
of social and cultural cleavages have been used to demand statehood
and sub-statehood that provided for the making of the interface between
ethno-territorial cleavages and the politics of statehood and sub-statehood
with special powers and status. This chapter also offers a profile of the
institutional effectiveness of the States in India’s North-East following a
set of parameters in comparison with the advanced States in India.
Chapter 7 deals with the Special Category States as another form of
federal asymmetry in India introduced way back in 1969 and extended
to include more States (eleven till 2018). This formulaic system of fiscal
disbursement was designed in the days of India’s planned economy as a
system of offering financial plan assistance to the States in the peripheries
which were economically backward with many geographical limitations.
This chapter also shows that although the system as such was withdrawn
in 2018, Central Plan assistance still remains, and points out with statis-
tical data that the method of SCS status did indeed work in producing
better policy effectiveness.
Chapter 8 titled Asymmetry Within Asymmetry in India examines the
making of the 6th Schedule and its differential application in India. It also
makes a brief comparison with the 5th Schedule in order to show that the
latter has not proved as effective as the former in guarding the rights of
the tribal people outside the North-East compared to the tribals in other
parts of India.
Chapters 9 and 10 are two case study chapters dealing with the Tribal
Autonomous District Council in Tripura and the Bodoland Territorial
18 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Council in Assam both governed by the 6th Schedule of the Indian

Constitution, respectively. Chapter 9 assesses the institutional effective-
ness of the ADC in Tripura within the appropriate backdrop. It assesses
its role in resolving ethnic conflicts and protecting tribal ethnic identity,
delivering development and governance. Chapter 10 is the second case
study of the BTC in Assam and assesses its effectiveness in resolving ethnic
conflicts and protecting tribal (and non-tribal) identity, and delivery of
law and order and governance. In both cases, an answer is offered as to
why and when institutions succeed and or fail.
Chapter 10 is about the second case study materials at the sub-State
level federal asymmetry. It offers a brief historical trajectory of the ethnic
movement for Bodoland in Assam, highlights the role of ethnic peace
accords and their institutionalization, and the institutional functioning
of the BTC in terms of power-sharing, development and governance.
This chapter also shows the limits of ill-designed institutions, and the
predictable effects of ethnic imbalance.
Chapter 11 seeks to offer a comparative assessment of asymmetric
federalism in India, and identifies the comparative best practices as well as
pays attention to unresolved territory claims in various regions of India.
Chapter 12 Conclusion summarizes the findings and evaluates their
implications for the future prospects of federalism in India, and the status
of the asymmetric States in India.

Notes
1. India’s Home Minister Amit Shah stated officially several times since 2020
that once the delimitations are completed and elections are held peacefully
in J & K, statehood would be restore to J & K (The Times of India June
13, 2021).
2. There was and still is resent among the sub-regional political elites about
the current status of the region as a Union Territory which appears to mean
nothing but a rule by Delhi bureaucracy. No wonder, there is a demand
placed by no less a person than an MP (sole) from Ladakh for extending
the 6th Schedule status to the region for the sake of accommodation of
their ethnic identity and autonomy. See for details on the current demand
‘Ladakh and the Sixth Schedule’ by Diptiman Tiwari, The Indian Express
dated 17 December 2021, p. 9. Such a demand followed the statehood
demand by the people of Ladakh.
3. K.C. Wheare was an Australian.
 1 INTRODUCTION 19

4. I have termed these diversity-claims as distinguished from equality-claims.

See Bhattacharyya (2015, 2021).
5. Formed in 1991 the Russian federation has turned out to be a problem
of Centre-regional relations, and has not been working (Gribanova 2011:
86–129). It has seemed troublesome from the beginning, and ridden with
power games, players in power politics and so on.
6. Anthony D. Smith. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell).
7. Smith uses the term ethnie in a specific sense as a ‘named human commu-
nity connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry,
shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure
of solidarity, at least among the elites’. Smith, A.D. 2003. Nationalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge), p. 13.
8. Interview’s during 2015–2017 in Assam and Tripura were taken as part
of the international collaborative research on ‘Continuity and change in
India Federalism in the Age of Globalization’ based in the University of
Edinburgh in which I was a Lead Researcher for the North-East.

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London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kincaid, J. 2011. Political Coercison and Administrative Cooperation in US
Intergovernemntal Relations. In Varieties of Federal Governance, ed. R.
Saxena, 37–54. New Delhi: Foundations Book.
Livintgstone, W.S. 1952. A Note on the Nature of Federalism. Political Science
Quarterly 67 (March): 81–95.
Riker, W. 1964. Federalism, Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little
Brown.
Sen, A. 2006. Identity and Violence the Illusion of Destiny. London: Penguin.
Smith, A.D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
———. 2003. Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Watts, R.L. 1966. New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth. Oxford:
Clarendon.
———. 2008/1999. Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd edn. Ontario: Queens
McGill University Press.
Wheare, K.C. 1953. Federal Government. Oxford: Clarendon
 CHAPTER 2

Concept of Asymmetric Federalism

and the Politics of Recognition

Introduction
Federalism especially in today’s context is considered as an institutional
solution to the politics of identity and recognition. Federals asymmetry
also responds to varied issues of ethnic/regional identity. Classical feder-
alism was more geared to the territorial distribution of powers with very
little to do with ethnic identity fulfilment. The close connection between
federalism and ethnic identity is a post-Second World War development.
Spawned by the Swiss in the late nineteenth century, federalism came
to be increasingly conceived as an institutional space for nation-building
but not by suppressing but integrating multiple identities within a single
federal polity. The Swiss experience, as Anderson (1991) pointed out,
offered the lesson for the post-colonial states that cultural diversity was
no longer to be considered as a problem, but an asset and resource to
build on. This identity turn in federalism became far removed from the
old impulse of federalism as a defensive alliance of the pre-existing states.
It has been increasingly seen that if appropriately designed, federalism
could be the only option to accommodate difference not only territo-
rially but also as ‘corporate federalism’ (i.e. non-territorially). However,
as we will see soon, constitutional recognition is not enough by itself; it
has to be accompanied by redistribution so that territorial self-rule does
not degenerate into rule by the ethnic zealots. The redistributive orien-
tation of such self-rule may provide for the much-needed check on the
concentration of powers in the hands of a few ethnic leaders. There is

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_2
22 H. BHATTACHARYYA

also a relatively unexplored issue: the existing knowledge of federalism as

a combination of shared rule (national purposes) and self-rule (regional
purposes) (Elazar 1987; Watts 2008) calls for some revision. We ought
to consider if self-rule is also enough shared rule ethnically speaking. The
examination of the effectiveness of federalism often stops at regional self-
rule, and does not go into the nature of self-rule, or the shared nature,
if any, of self-rule. But that is a question dealt with in detail elsewhere
(Bhattacharyya 2021).
The so-called ‘politicos of recognition’ has, however, acquired a place
of their own in contemporary debates in Western liberal theory espe-
cially multiculturalism, communitarianism, and citizenship (Taylor 1994;
Tamir 1998; Glazer 1998; Calhoun 1999; Kymlicka 2007; Young 1999;
Kakathas 2002; Markell 2006; Owen and Tully 2006). The issue at once
intersects with the question of ‘difference’ and its recognition in liberal
theory; the women’s rights; the question of reconciliation between indi-
vidual and groups rights in typically liberal democratic states in the West.
The issue has been considered to refer to such aspects as minority rights,
group rights, and their most appropriate recognition in the existing insti-
tutional arrangements of the nation-states, or in reformed institutions.
The question of appropriate recognition of minority identity and its rights
have remained since the 1980s as a lively debate among liberal scholars in
the West and the East centring around the ‘politics of recognition’. Sen
(2006) and Markell (2006) have raised, however, the question of how
to ensure redistribution via recognition, or if recognition does not lead
to equity, or redistribution it loses all significance. Markell has in partic-
ular drawn our attention to various issues connected with the ‘politics of
recognition’ such as ‘official language policy’, aboriginal rights; and land
claims (Markell 2008: 450). Sen argues that if recognition (of difference)
is not accompanied by equity, the real effects of such recognition do not
mean much (Sen 2005, 2006). Charles Taylor in his classic essay ‘Politics
of Recognition’ (1994) has pointed out the limits of ‘difference-blind’
liberalism to accommodate difference, and ethnic minority rights. Nancy
Fraser (1995: 69) has identified two approaches to the politics of recogni-
tion: affirmative and transformative. The former entails affirmative action
within mainstream multiculturalism (in the Indian case it would include
‘reservation’ or quota for the socially and economically underprivileged)
while the latter involves redistribution of resources and income.
The above brief reference to the debates suggests that the issue of
especially territorial recognition of identity/difference within the existing
 2 CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM … 23

liberal democratic systems remains far from resolved. The burning ques-
tion of why most liberal democracies in the West find it difficult to
accommodate ethnic identity claims of sorts is that the existing polit-
ical arrangements there are not appropriately federal. In the cases of the
predominantly unitary state structures, and their concomitant practices
the space is limited for accommodating what I have termed ‘diversity-
claims’ (Bhattacharyya 2015). Added to that are the interests of some
dominant groups who have been the beneficiaries of such structures and
practices and who seek to vehemently oppose such moves at ideolog-
ical and conceptual levels. Interestingly enough, Switzerland does not
confront such a problem about its varied ethnic minorities because the
existing political arrangements are designed in such a way as to recog-
nize and accommodate them. By contrast, as Moreno has pointed out
in the case of Spain, although different ethno-regional identity such as
the Basque Country, the Catalon, Valencia, Galicia and Andalsia surfaced
again and again clamouring for recognition from the late nineteenth
century, the Spanish state authorities have always looked down upon
them and repressed them (Moreno 2001: 207). Such repression took
extreme forms in Franco’s dictatorship which was anti-communist and
anti-separatist and bent on ‘to extirpate all forms of home rule’, region-
alism and ‘sub-state nationalism’ within a paradigm of national unity that
‘brooked no cultural or ethnic diversity’ (Moreno 2001: 207). Today
the ethno-regional identity in Spain has had a better deal because the
state is more federalized in practice by accommodating the ‘ideology of
autonomism’, and by providing for more financial and political space for
such identity.1 This served to pave the way for more political stability
and provide better political public sphere at the regional level—which is
a must for what is nowadays, termed ‘deepening democracy’.
However, globally speaking, Spain was not alone. Watts (2008: 1)
says that there are twenty-one countries in the world (about 40% of
the global population) that are governed by practices that have a federal
character. This has happened in the wake of worldwide decentraliza-
tion since the 1980s which has encouraged the connecting process of
regional devolution whether in federal countries or unitary ones in the
U.K. Belgium, Canada, Spain and India (Gagnon and Tully 2001; Bhat-
tacharyya 2001). Although Great Britain is still formally a unitary country,
in practice, particularly since 1992 it has allowed devolution to the
regions to a significant extent (Burgess 1995, 2006). In Asia, there are
many examples to show how federal practices are adopted in conceding
24 H. BHATTACHARYYA

autonomy to minority groups even within an otherwise centralized system

of government. In the Philippines in 2018 the government approved the
Bangsamoro Organic Law giving more autonomy to the Muslim regions
in the South (Bhattacharyya 2019a: 191).
For a long time, federalism as a word was taboo even in the land of its
origin, i.e. Europe. In the whole nineteenth century, Switzerland was the
lone country to go federal drawing largely from the US federation. The
larger debate on state formation and nation-building would suggest that
in the face of the homogenizing nation-state building project all over
Europe (Hobsbawm 1992), the ancient Swiss diversity was a powerful
check and federalism was the only option available to them (Bhattacharyya
2001). Therefore, the term federalism had to wait for another half a
century or so, till the beginning of the process of decolonization in the
non-Western world, for its renewal with a completely different thrust
(Watts 1966; Bhattacharyya 2010). In other words, federalism came to
be associated with the politics of recognition, accommodation of diver-
sity, protection and maintenance of ethnic identity for nation-building of
a different order from that of the classical Mazzinian model (Hobsbawm
1992).
The global acceptability and its indispensability, as it were, as a tool of
accommodation of diversity for maintaining territorial integrity today is
beyond doubt. Even post-Soviet Russia, the only one among the post-
Soviet States, had to refederalize although it is beset by a series of
problems including the relative absence of political will to fully recog-
nize differences. Smith (2001) has offered a detailed examination of the
problems that undercut at once the demands of liberalism, nationalism
(especially of the minorities) and the citizenship rights (Smith 2001: 364–
65). Smith expresses doubt about the sustainability of Russian federation
in the absence of many constitutionally guaranteed territorial rights to
the territorial minorities and in the presence of ‘the distinctive executive
functions of the federation, as secured by the president’ (Smith 2001:
347).
The above global level evidence are used to suggest that federalism is
always better placed to accommodate differences, heterogeneity, ethno-
national and regional identities and manage diversity for the sake of unity
and legitimacy. The most relevant question here is of course the appro-
priate institutional arrangements designed for the purpose. Late Watts
(1966, 2008) has repeatedly forewarned us about this ‘appropriateness’
 2 CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM … 25

in designing federations or responding to particular problems. The expe-

riences have shown that inappropriate institutional arrangements have
failed both the federation so designed as well as the diversity concerns.
The existing literature on federalism squarely suggests that federalism as a
political principle that defends both unities for shared, national purposes
and autonomy for protecting social-cultural diversity, and federation as
a political system—which offers the institutional arrangements for the
same—is best suited as an institutional design for multicultural contexts
provided the institutional arrangements so designed that they respond to
the needs for both unity and diversity (Elazar 1987; Watts 2008). This
should not, however, give the impression that the federal solutions are
easy, and federal governance is simple. On the contrary, federations are
typically difficult to govern (Watts 1966, 2008), and the federal solutions
are never simple. But then, for complex and multinational, multicul-
tural and multi-ethnic countries with mostly territorially rooted social and
cultural communities, the federal devices are unavoidable. Also, it must be
borne in mind that federal solutions, if not appropriately designed, could
be quite risky, paving the way for secession and eventual disintegration.
The example at hand is the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 giving birth
to Bangladesh.2 The distant examples are former USSR and Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia. Watts (1966) recorded many such failures in the
post-colonial federations in Asia and Central America. Today, however,
ethnically diverse countries in Asia are seriously considering the federal
option as a tool of the resolution of problems stemming from diversity
and minorities within the states (Bhattacharyya 2010, 2019a: 187–98).
There is another important development in the global discourse on
federalism which should merit some discussion. This is with reference to
the tiers of federalism. Conventionally, more or less, following the US
model, a two-tiered structure was the consensus for a considerable period
of time. The current global literature on federalism, however, rejects the
two-tiered model of federalism and the US federation as an ideal one
(Watts 2008; Stepan 2005: 255–69). Watts declared emphatically:

There is no single pure model of federalism that is applicable everywhere.

Rather the basic notion of involving the combination of shared rule for
some purposes and regional self-rule for other purposes within a single
political system so that neither is subordinate to the other has been applied
in different ways to fit different circumstances. (Watts 1996: 1)
26 H. BHATTACHARYYA

In the third revised edition of his book (Watts 2008: 7), Watts argued
that the current popularity of federalism, globally speaking, owes to the
fact that federalism can take ‘a variety of forms’. Globally speaking, then
he concedes:

Thus, there has been emerging trend towards three or even four (not
just two) levels of federal organization to reconcile supranational, national,
regional and local impulses and thereby to maximize the realization of
citizen preferences.

The above basic idea of federalism has revolutionized thinking in feder-

alism world over, and rescued, as it were, the concept of federalism from
the straight-jacketed notion of a merely two-tiered structure. Writing a
little earlier in 1996, William Riker, another international authority on
federalism (Riker 1996: 10) defined federalism as ‘a constitutionally deter-
mined tiered structure’, a form of government which implies arrange-
ments of tiers of government ‘in a permanent agreement’. However, the
two-tier model still remained in Riker’s definition, but there is a novelty
in his understanding which acknowledges arrangements of tiers, as well
as their being ‘constitutionally determined.’ Daniel Elazar (Elazar 1987:
7, 35) long time back while introducing the federal political system as a
combination of ‘self and shared rule’ in a single polity indicated also the
possibility of a matrix structure. He pointed out also the possibility of
a ‘power pyramid’, a ‘pyramid of governments with gradations of power
flowing down from the top’. Those who are familiar with the structural
arrangements of Swiss federalism know that in this organically evolved
federalism, the municipalities or the Communes, which themselves are
quite old, are the constitutionally recognized lowest tier of the three-tier
Swiss federalism (Bhattacharyya 2001: 10–11).
The reasons why I threw some light on the increasing acceptability of
federalism are two. First, we wanted to familiarize us with the overarching
institutional canvass of federalism and highlight its importance in multi-
ethnic societies. Second, since asymmetric federalism is part of the federal
lexicon, it required some discussion on the underlying issues involved.
The issues are both large and small but interconnected.
The very recent studies of comparative federalism (Burgess and Pinder
2007; Burgess 2006; Bhattacharyya 2019a, b, 2021; Watts 1999, 2008;
Adeney 2007; Keil and Kropp 2022) have recognized that there has been
 2 CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM … 27

an organic link between federalism and identity, particularly in ethno-

national/regional. Watts (1999) even went to the extent of claiming that
behind the formation of the US federation, the force distinct regional
political cultures were quite powerful (Watts 1999: 21). The more global
level theoretical literature on federalism emphasizes upon the fact that
plurality and diversity of political identity are in fact inherent in the
‘language of federalism’ (Karmis and Norman 2005: 9). Karmis and
Norman (2005) also argue that federalism has been quite attractive to
the multifaceted processes of globalization, in particularly appearing as
an alternative to secession (Karmis and Norman 2005: 4). The argu-
ment of Karmis and Norman (2005) in respect of the relation between
identity issues and federalism is quite original and requires some further
elaboration. They argue that for a long time since the days of the Enlight-
enment, a monistic conception has predominated our understanding of
the world including identity, and the classical theorists of federalism could
not break away from such a notion. As a result, the monistic language
of identity tended to imply the required identification of people (irre-
spective of their differences otherwise) with either one group, or one
standardized (by the State) notion of citizenship.3 Many leading theo-
rists of the nineteenth century such as John Calhoun, Proudhon and J.
S. Mill were monistic of sorts too. Recall Mill’s famous quote: [f]ree
institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different
nationalities (Quoted in Karmis and Norman 2005: 11). Proudhon’s so-
called notion of ‘integral federalism’ (Karmis and Norman 2005: 11–12),
when judged in the specific context of the Jacobinistic homogenizing
drives in France, was nevertheless more akin to confederation than feder-
ation in nature and implications. In much of the last century, a pluralistic
notion of federalism was something of an anathema to political thinkers
and politicians alike. One may recall that the dominant idea for the recon-
struction of Europe after the First World War was the Wilsonian notion of
national self-determination, and the breaking up of multinational Euro-
pean empires which were anti-pluralist in nature. The embedded prejudice
in the above notion was that ‘ethno-national identities would soon disap-
pear in the institutionally complete nation-state’, and hence there was
little ground for supporting a case for federalism, as it were. The propo-
nents of modernization and political development schools thought so
in regard to the prospects of modernization in the post-colonial coun-
tries, with unexpected results. Modernization of sorts has taken place in
such countries, but the traditional markers of identity have not only not
28 H. BHATTACHARYYA

been dissolved, or weakened, but rather been reinforced (Rudolph and

Rudolph 2008).
Today, in the wake of the disintegration of the former USSR, the
end of the Cold War and the multifaceted processes of globalization,
a remarkable shift of attention away from such deep-rooted monism to
what Watts terms ‘diminished state sovereignty’ (Watts 2008: 8), and to
recognition of ‘the plurality of allegiances that must be accommodated in
a viable multinational federation’ is unmistakable. Given the multi-ethnic
and national social and cultural complexion of much of the countries
of the world today,4 this provides the most congenial atmosphere for
rethinking identity issues and their federal solutions.5

Theoretical Framework of Asymmetric Federalism

Since this book is premised on the effectiveness of asymmetric federalism
as a tool of governance and legitimacy for accommodation of diversity
and ensuing unity and relative political stability, some theoretical discus-
sion is called for. Although Watts (2008) above has cleared the deck, to
some extent, for us by accepting the premise of multi-tiered federalism,
in the standard theoretical literature on the subject though the interest in
the subject is intermittent only (Tarlton 1965; McGarry 2007; Swenden
2012; Agranoff 1999) and more or less has remained confined to the two-
tiered structure of federalism in discussing asymmetric federalism. That is
most often at variance with the very complex social and cultural diversity
at many layers of society which may require multiple levels of institu-
tional arrangements for accommodating diversity, and power-sharing. In
other words, we ought to go beyond the simple and often unclear idea of
‘self-rule’ because self-rule often empowers one dominant ethnic iden-
tity to the exclusion of the others. That is to say, for responding to
multiple identities, self-rule should need to reflect elements of ‘shared
rule’ (so far conceived only for the national/federal level) so that the
micro-minorities within the self-rule structure do not fall victim to majori-
tarianism. In defending a case for sustainable federalism for Russia, Smith
has also drawn our attention to what needs to be done. In order to avoid
the danger of secession (in the case of Russian federation), he asserted:
‘it is important to ensure, first, that federal subunits are not defined as
the possession of one ethnic group, but rather as belonging to all resi-
dents; secondly, that a civic identity is developed which can be a source of
allegiance and identity for non-dominant groups…’ (Smith 2000: 365).
 2 CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM … 29

The observations of Smith above are profound and contain original

insights not only about the method of recasting federal subunits but also
the units below, i.e. the sub-State level units which, ethnically distinct,
demands also political recognition, which is not otherwise met by the
designing of the federal subunits. His second suggestion takes one to
a greater theoretical debate on nationhood. In a multi-ethnic country
in which ethnic identities are thick, and where such groups find little
in common to share with other ethnic groups, what then holds them
together? In my other writings (Bhattacharyya 2008, 2015), I resorted to
a conceptual distinction between ethnic and civic nationhood, and argued
that in multi-ethnic countries, it is not ethnic identity/identities which
provides for the cementing glue to hold them together but a thin layer of
civic nationhood which implies, inter alia, sharing in certain civic values
deriving mostly from the constitution but on which as societal consensus
has been built. The construction of ethnic identity is always and every-
where exclusivist; the ethnie define them always in terms of having the
other; in such a construction, there is always the ethnic other to which it
is opposed and from which it is different. This ethnic other is the enemy
to be fought out. Smith (1986) has brought out the various manners of
construction of such ethnic-self-identity the world over.
The term ‘asymmetry’ does not suggest a desirable value to be upheld,
not particularly in the Left radical thinking. The term ‘asymmetric feder-
alism’ may appear on the face of it to be sacrilegious. This is so perceived
because while symmetry implies a balance of elements, asymmetry implies
just its opposite. That, at least, is the dictionary connotation of the
terms. But then, if we take the view that the basic objective of federal
governance, however difficult it is, is to obtain and maintain a dynamic
political equilibrium among constituent parts, or elements, premised on
the protection and maintenance of diversity for identity of sorts, then
asymmetric federalism serves to play a supplementary role for the same
objective. It is so argued because not all identity demands could be
responded to, and met at ‘sub-national’ levels. This is particularly so in
complex multi-ethnic countries. This is, however, not to argue that the
tool of asymmetric federalism, or the practice of it, is something unique
and discovered recently. The fact of the matter is that all federations
starting with the US have had some space for asymmetric federalism,
theoretically and practically speaking, since their beginning.
What then is asymmetric federalism? Why is it provided for and
how? What is the motive behind asymmetric federal demands? Given
30 H. BHATTACHARYYA

the growing global interest in federal as the mode of governance for

multi-ethnic countries, it is time perhaps to alert the scholars of compar-
ative federalism to the need to pay more serious attention to federal
asymmetries across federal states because a symmetric approach, as it is
constitutionally and conventionally assumed so far in the most standard
literature on federalism, does not answer all the questions why federations
have succeeded in cases, and where they failed. Following Riker (1975),
Rao and Singh (2005: 4–5) argued that the ‘differences in bargaining
strength’ provides for a ‘source of asymmetry’—bargaining for economic
gain, greater freedom of action, and political representation (Rao and
Singh 2005: 5). About half a century back, Charles D. Tarlton’s seminal
essay titled ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A
Theoretical Speculation’ (1965) pointed our attention to this direction
when he argued that even in the US federation known for its symmetry
of relations between the States and the federation (although the US feder-
ation had had peripheral asymmetric structural elements from quite early
on) (Watts 1999 in Agranoff), in actual practice, there had been signifi-
cant areas of asymmetry in respect of the relations between the States and
the Federal government.
Defined very simply, asymmetric federalism refers to institutional
arrangements for different statuses and rights of the units of the feder-
ation premised on the political recognition of diversity ‘while deflecting
the secessionist potential of certain forces’ (Agranoff 1999: 9). Taking
a broader perspective, one would also go beyond to examine not only
the structures as designed in the institutional arrangements but also the
processes and outcomes to assess the effectiveness of such techniques. In
fact, the above is the main thrust of the collection of some ten long chap-
ters edited by Agranoff (1999). If Tarlton (1965) found out different
relationships of the States with the Central government, the scholars
found out that Tarlton was stating almost a universal fact about federalism
across the globe.
Sociologically oriented scholars on federalism (Livintgstone 1952;
Duchacek 1970; Watts 1966, 1999) point out the inadequacies of a
symmetric approach in federalism to adequately respond to the federal
qualities of society marked by differences of kinds. Agranoff (1999:
17–23) has identified a 9-point ‘guiding principles’ of asymmetric feder-
alism: de jure and de facto; conditions and outcomes; levels of asym-
metry; normative dimension; analytic dimension; asymmetry and political
stability; relational symmetry and asymmetry; neutrality of asymmetry and
 2 CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM … 31

asymmetry as a social reality. De jure and de facto asymmetry refer to

the constitutional/legal status and rights of units, and the actual prac-
tices either following from the de jure position/or not. Also, the de jure
asymmetry may vary enormously relative to social and cultural contexts,
and the compulsions in federation building. It may affect variously the
principles of representation and other institutional principles of federalism
and democracy. Differentiated federal structures, as Watts argues (1999:
16) are examples of de jure asymmetric federal arrangements. ‘Conditions
and outcomes’ refer to the social basis of federalism and the effect on the
‘politics of recognition’ that is embedded in asymmetric arrangements
respectively. The levels of asymmetry refer to the mostly vertical relation-
ship of the units, especially special units with the Centre suggesting more
diffuse centres of power within the federation. It is argued, for example,
that Quebec’s current relationship with the federal government in Canada
‘reflects the possibility of greater vertical asymmetry’ (Agranoff 1999: 18).
What is the normative implication of asymmetry? This principle takes one
down to the issues of ethnic and democratic rights of groups and their
self-rule because only through that the ethnic groups can resist rule over
them by other groups. The analytical dimensions of asymmetry entail
institutional designing, that is, the recognition of the nature of society
at stake, the details of regional or local autonomy and so on (Agranoff
1999: 19). The remaining principles suggest the cardinal issue of political
stability and recognition in favour of increasing devolution.
From the developing literature on asymmetric pressures on the federa-
tions, it also found out that such pressures act upon the actual operation
of the political systems, federal or unitary (McGarry 2007), including
that of coalition-building, as Swenden (2012) has pointed out. In this
context, it is worth considering a little more of the views of Watts
(1999, 2008: 125–30) Asserting like others before him on the subject
that all federations contain some asymmetric elements, he pointed, for
example, the case of US federation in which beyond the 50 symmetric
states (constituent units), there are what he terms ‘peripheral unit’ (two
federacies, three associated states, three home rule territories, three unin-
corporated territories and some 130 Native American Nations (de facto
federacies). He pointed out that they exist ‘in an asymmetric federal rela-
tionship to the federation’ (Watts in Agranoff 1999: 25). According to
Watts again (1999: 25), the current Russian Federation of 89 constituent
units of varying sizes and powers and jurisdiction provides the ‘most
complex’ de jure and de facto asymmetry. In his subsequent writing
32 H. BHATTACHARYYA

on the subject (Watts 2008: 125–30), Watts has distinguished between

political asymmetry—a function of social, economic, cultural and political
factors—and constitutional asymmetry, which is constitutional and legal
allowing a variety of units within the federations with differential powers
and jurisdiction, and influences within the federation (Watts 2008: 25–
27). The movements for more powers to the units, or to increase regional
autonomy and so on fall, Watts believes, within this category. Watts’
conclusion which is not to be ignored is that more and more asymmetric
pressures within the federation also induce counter-movements for more
symmetry. Second, extreme asymmetry may prove to be dysfunctional in
the end (Watts 2008: 30).
But, as we have already indicated at the beginning of the chapter,
the predominant thrust of asymmetric federalism so far has been in rela-
tion to federal units and their relations with the federation. Watts (1999,
2008) is perhaps alone in specifically focusing on the other what he calls
‘peripheral units’ to be considered in the purview of the discussion on
asymmetric federalism. My point of departure in this connection is that
we need to rethink the cases of asymmetry within asymmetry given the
very complex diversity to be accommodated. If federalism is to accom-
modate diversity, if it is to recognize difference, it ought to recognize not
just one, dominant difference, but many. This leads us to consider the
cases of sub-state level units as cases of asymmetry both de jure and de
facto. Our two case study materials from India’s North-East, with partic-
ular focus on two experiments—in Tripura and Assam—governed by the
6th Schedule of the Constitution of India are illustrative in this respect
in the sense that both the States (like other state in the region) have
enjoyed until 2014 asymmetric status as Special Category States within the
Indian federation and yet had to concede self-governance for the aborig-
inal people of Tripura comprising some one-third of the total population
of the State, but majority in the ADC areas; the State government is
constitutionally obliged to delegate jurisdiction and powers to the ADC.
In the case of Bodoland in Assam, also under the amended Sixth Schedule
of the Constitution, the same constitutional stipulations apply, and yet
the latter experiment, as we shall in the relevant chapter below, is fraught
with a host of problems. The whole experiment has produced incessant
inter-ethnic violence and deaths.
Finally, we ought to consider the cases of de facto federal asymmetry
in the land of the classic federalism. John Kincaid (2011, 38–53) has
forcefully argued that ‘contemporary American federalism’ has assumed
 2 CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM … 33

a ‘coercive’ functioning so that since the 1960s there have been federal
dictates on states and local governments (Kincaid 2011: 37). He said:

The era of coercive federalism has been marked by a shift of federal policy-
making from the interest of places (i.e. state and local governments) to the
interests of persons (i.e. voters and interest groups). (Kincaid 2011: 37)6

Evidently, this has undermined federal symmetry in the US. The point
that is being made here is that federal asymmetry is not to be taken out
of proportion at the cost of federal symmetry without which federalism,
symmetric and asymmetric, cannot work.
The lesson that can be drawn from the above theoretical landscape
is that as a tool of governance in multi-ethnic contexts, federal asym-
metry serves to add values and strength in the process of inclusive
governance, which otherwise is considered as a very difficult proposition,
and quite daunting for the politicians and statesman alike. Asymmetric
federal arrangements are part and parcel of all federations for addressing
some special cases especially in peripheral regions. As Burgess (2006:
209–25) argues, while federal asymmetry is not a threat to the state or
national integration, it is also not a panacea; beneficiaries of such institu-
tional arrangements must find other ways of securing their interests and
protecting their identity. If federalism is to result, desirably, in dynamic
political equilibrium, federal asymmetry for special cases serves to enhance
it rather than becoming a negative force.
There is a final point to be noted here. There are asymmetries in federal
design especially when the federations are made from the top rather than
bottom up. In the cases of federation being built from below with the
compacting parties equal in power and status, the structural asymmetry
does not have any space. But in the other cases, especially when federal
units are the result of federation building from above, federal units remain
quite asymmetric in respect of their share in shared rule and thus serve
to cause large areas of discontent in the federal dynamics. As the case of
India will testify, the principle of equality of representation in the second
chamber is not followed here so many small States send one or two MPs
to the Raja Sabha (Council of States) which contrast sharply with some
States sending as many as 31 (Uttar Pradesh) MPs to the second chamber.
The successive territorial reorganization and right-sizing of the States are
yet to balance this huge imbalance, which adversely affects the role of the
Second Chamber to do justice to the states smaller in size.
34 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Exclusion/Inclusion in Federalism
Does federalism exclude? Is federalism inclusive? Federalism could result
in exclusion of minorities who find themselves dominated by the majority
group in power at the level of federal units. Although federalism is a
combination of shared rule and self-rule, exclusion may occur at both
levels especially when one or two dominant and majority groups take
power at the national as well as sub-national levels. This can particularly so
happen at the sub-national level where the regional self-rule is not enough
shared rule. In other words, one ethnic group by being the majority may
exclude the minorities from sharing the powers as well as reaping the
benefits of governance and development. Territorial power-sharing in this
case may not be of any help, for the smaller size and dispersed habitation
of the minorities may not have enough territorial significance. A territo-
rial solution, if any, for the smaller minorities would be an asymmetric
solution. But non-territorial solution as ‘corporate federalism’ would be
another of its kind. Thus the tool of asymmetric federalism here addresses
the problem of exclusion that result from federation building by territorial
resizing.

Conclusion
The final point I would draw attention to is that in a complex multi-
ethnic/cultural country a federal solution to the problem of accommo-
dation, power-sharing, autonomy and development will necessarily be
complex in nature: two or more tiers of government each with its own
constitutionally guaranteed share of powers, an autonomous government,
and the appropriate measures to have the space of corporate feder-
alism so that non-territorial minorities are also included. A snag remains
though: to concede many layers of government based on localism, sub-
regionalism, regionalism and ethnicity may appear to be an exercise in
multiculturism. But this potentially cuts into the very basis of inter-
regional/sub-regional, ethnic and tribal terms of existence which can offer
the cementing glue to unite a diverse culture. That is to say, if all ethnic
groups are keen on having a government of their own in a tiny terri-
tory, this tends to add to further ghettoization—costs of government itself
apart. Over optimism in the so-called ‘right-sizing’ does not answer the
question as to when it is the ‘right’ time to stop ‘right-resizing’. The rest
of the book will seek an answer to this question too.
 2 CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM … 35

Notes
1. Spain’s state structure is today more decentralized, and the regional and
local level governments are responsible for spending significant amounts of
public expenditure: in 1999, for instance, Central government expenditure
was 54%; regional government (33%) and local government (13%), which
is a major departure from the days of hard dictatorship over the last four
decades or so (Moreno 2001: 201–22).
2. It took, awfully, some half a century for Pakistan to realize the value of
decentralization and power-sharing, and thus to curb the omnipotence of
one ethnic community, namely, the Punjabis, for the sake of better working
of its federalism. The 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010 abolishes
the North-West Frontier Province and renamed it Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
and provides for more representation of minorities in the Senate (upper
chamber), and devolution of powers to the provinces. The critical account
of this institutional move still finds the federation to be ‘majoritarian with
an ethnic core and small number of units’. See for further details, Adeney,
K. 2012. A Step Toward Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan? The Politics of
18th Amendment. The Publius 42 (4) (Fall): 1–27.
3. Even the authors of the Federalist and Tocqueville, the famous French
author of American democracy are not spared. It is argued that even in the
formation of the US federation, the embedded monism was undeniable in
that there was only one conception of ‘one nation’, or ‘one united people’,
and not as a multinational, multiethnic federation (Karmis and Norman
2005: 10).
4. For further details on the above, see Karmis and Norman (2005: 12–13).
5. See H. Bhattacharyya (2019a: 187–98) for the current interest in federalism
in South East Asia.
6. However, Kincaid does assure us that while the above has been taking
place in matters of certain grants-in-aid, especially health care, the coopera-
tive functioning of the three layers of governments remain, for cooperation
rather than obstruction has proved to be more beneficial for the state
and local government officials, as it concerns policy implementation, which
means spending and the scope for gaining in more popularity. See for more
details, Kincaid (2011: 37–52).

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 CHAPTER 3

Founding Moment (1946–56)

Introduction
The founding moment of India’s constitution-making and federation
building involved resorting to many asymmetric methods and was very
critical. In the aftermath of the communal riots between the Hindus and
the Muslims in 1946 followed by the Partition of the sub-continent into
Pakistan and India in 1947, the ground situation was really very grim.
The Indian nationalist, the INC in particular, made it their pledge to the
people during the freedom movements that in free India a Constituent
Assembly would be formed on the basis of universal adult suffrage or by
method closer to it to draft India’s Constitution. This did not happen,
for a Constituent Assembly was formed before India’s independence.
Although the Constituent Assembly (CA) was formed in 1946 the voters
were not the citizens and the members of the future CA would be elected
by members of the Provincial Legislatures constituted by elections in
1945 by the people on the basis of a limited franchise. Also, the initial
functioning of the CA was disrupted and slowed down. And yet the task
of drafting a Constitution for the vast and complex multi-ethnic country
was not easy. Harder still was determining the most appropriate basis
of accommodation of ethnic, most importantly the tribal ethnic identity
across India, more particularly in the peripheral North-East of India. The
State-making as the making of the federal units with lots of special provi-
sions was very vexing ethno-linguistic and tribal cleavages in the country
did not correspond with territories. Above all, there was the question

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 39

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_3
40 H. BHATTACHARYYA

of the princely States numbering some 562 interspersed between the

Provinces, and with great demographic mix; in many cases, there were
Muslim princes with the predominant Hindu subjects; in other cases, it
was the reverse. The initial round of simplifying the picture was different
types of States with differential statuses and powers which remained
between 1950 and 1956. The entire exercise of providing for three types
of States was asymmetric. The lots of the princely States were grouped
under Unions of States , which suggested a confederal type of system. But
the question of accommodating the tribals living in different parts of India
including those in the princely States was most vexing. How to accom-
modate them, especially those in the peripheral areas with the appropriate
degree of autonomy was quite puzzling.
The ‘founding moment’ in India’s constitution-making and federation
building was to be extended to 1956 when the first major reorganization
of territories in India took place. If the Constitution inaugurated on 26
January 1950 came up with as many as 27 units (States) (Basu 1997: 71),
the arrangements were asymmetric with States with differential status and
powers. In 1956, the picture was simplified to a large extent, but the reor-
ganization was still asymmetric, as the States Reorganization Commission
(1953–56) grappled with the very complex ethno-territorial situation at
the ground level up to the taluka, and failed to suggest one criterion as
the basis of State-making. The so-called ‘balanced approach’ of language,
economic viability and administrative efficiency was not and could not be
exact. The Commission in following a ‘balanced approach’ took note of
50% or more speakers of the language as a basis of State creation. This
left out of consideration speakers of other languages from gaining state-
hood. This aspect has received critical analysis by Schwartzberg (1985:
155–82).1 Despite successive reorganizations, the large linguistic minori-
ties remain without any territorial benefits but had to be content with
the so-called (non-territorial) safeguards for the linguistic minorities. The
various Reports of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities in India are
far from satisfactory on the protection of minority languages at the school
level.
This chapter deals with three main issues pertaining to the above. First,
it examines how the princely States were made members of the Union of
India. Second, it seeks to understand the concept of the States (to be
made) that the CA, the Constitution of India, and the States Reorga-
nization Commission (1953–56) came up with. Third, it seeks to bring
out the debates on the 5th and the 6th Schedules for meeting the needs
 3 FOUNDING MOMENT (1946–56) 41

of accommodation and autonomy for the tribals of India who comprise

today some 100 million in population.

Princely States: Asymmetric Integration

The princely States numbering some 562 and comprised of some two-
thirds of the territory of India till 1947, of different sizes and complexion,
and interspersed between British-created provinces, offered the most
formidable challenges in the making of the Union. They were not directly
ruled by the British; these were under ‘indirect rule’ of the British. The
so-called ‘indirect rule’ was an imperialist strategy, and designed to use
them as the bulwark of colonial rule in India. There were such large
and rich States as the Nizam of Hyderabad consisting of a few million
inhabitants, on the one hand, and Lawa in Northern India, with a few
hundred inhabitants, on the other hand. The princely rulers entered into
the so-called ‘subsidiary alliance’ with the Company Raj and became
dependent for their security on the latter in exchange for their loyalty
to the Company, and at the cost of paying annual revenues, and bearing
all costs of maintaining the British Residents in their domains as well as
providing for some territories for the military forces and their upkeep. In
return, the princes were assured of protection against external aggression
and internal rebellion, once and for all (Menon 1956: 5). While doses
of constitutional reforms, and limited participation of the subject in the
provinces were being introduced gradually on a limited scale eventuating
in the Government of India Act 1935 (which provided for much progress
towards self-government), a medieval autocracy was maintained in the
princedom till 1947. The Indian National Congress (born in 1885) also
did not allow any political activities for reforms in the princely States until
1938 under its name. The INC rejected the colonial offer of a federation
between the princely States and the rest of India in its Cabinet Mission
Plan on the ground that a federation could not be built between autoc-
racy and democracy (Bhattacharyya 2021: 55–85). The Government of
India Act 1935 had proposed a federation of the princes and British India
but made the latter’s joining the federation voluntary; the princely States
were very reluctant to cede their ‘sovereignty’ and autonomy in such an
eventuality. With the impending transfer of power from the British Crown
to India (and also Pakistan) in the late 1940s and the resultant lapse of
paramount, there were a lot of political activities by the princes and their
representatives on the issue of taking part in the Constituent Assembly
42 H. BHATTACHARYYA

and joining the Union of India. Ultimately a carrot and stick policy of
the INC worked in favour of their accession to the Union of India. The
classic book The Integration of the Indian States (1956) by V. P. Menon
who served as secretary to the Indian States Ministry headed by Sardar
V. Patel is a minefield of first-hand data on the whole drama of integra-
tion of the princely States. But the most interesting point for our purpose
here is that the integration of the princely States into the Union of India
was asymmetric. In the late 1940s, the princes themselves were busy
making several Unions, which looked like a regional federation. But those
efforts dissipated soon, and they were taken into the Union by following
different routes. Austin (1966) said that the princely States were ‘loosely
attached to the Union in a relationship resembling a confederation than a
federation’ (Austin 1966: 241). When the Constitution was inaugurated
on 26 January 1950 the princely States were actually several Unions of
States rather than just States, and did not have equal status and powers.
The three categories of States as per the Constitution (1950) were highly
asymmetric; most of the Princely States were grouped under ‘B States’,
and ten were categorized as part ‘C States’. The picture was simplified
and a better Union of States came out after the reorganization of the
States in 1956. Nonetheless, the scope of asymmetry remained especially
with regard to Jammu and Kashmir (Article 370), and Nagaland (371).
Sardar Patel’s ‘Unionization of the States’ was more complicated than
meets the eye. The SRC’s task was not easy either; it had to do a lot of
cutting and pasting; transfer of districts and taluks from one to the other,
to make States out of the British Provinces and the Princely States. But
in all cases, the most important criterion was language although the SRC
harped on the ‘balanced approach’ in tune with its Terms of Reference.
The SRC tried as far as possible to recreate States following a ‘bal-
anced approach’, in the sense indicated above; it could not concede to
the demands for statehood that were voiced by many ethnic groups. Also,
it kept Uttar Pradesh as it is which is to overlook the asymmetric implica-
tions of such a big-sized State. Its recommendation for a bi-lingual State
of Bombay was only a halfway approach for two States to appear in 1960
out of Bombay, namely, Gujarat and Maharashtra. Punjab was right-sized
even with one-third of its territory of the pre-independence period only
in 1966. It also left half-done the case of the State of Hyderabad.
 3 FOUNDING MOMENT (1946–56) 43

SRC’s Asymmetric Approach to State-Making

The States Reorganization Commission (1953–56) played a very instru-
mental role giving the Union of India a federal turn. Indian federation
has since the days of the CA been the result of federalization of two
types of territories inherited from the Raj: provinces directly governed by
the British, and the princely States which were under the indirect rule of
the Raj. The federation building in India has been a multi-staged process
(Bhattacharyya 2019b: 80–118) yet to be completed. If we consider India
relatively successful as a federation, the key to that lies in resorting to
various asymmetric routes in the making of the States: full States; half-
States; sub-States; and so on in finally turning the whole territory into a
federation of States with symmetric powers and those with asymmetric
powers. The CA and the interim government, particularly the States
Ministry headed by Sardar V. B. Patel, was successful in reorganizing the
princely States into Unions of States (B) and ten out of them into the
Chief Commissioner’s Provinces (C). While that was a splendid job, the
real push to ‘Unionization’ came from the SRC, which was confronted
with a Herculean task, but which it performed by resorting to various
routes of asymmetric re-territorialization. The large, in millions, number
of linguistic minority remained in many States after 1956 (Schwartzberg
1985: 165).
The work of the SC has been documented in the reports; its activi-
ties and recommendations have been critically assessed in some existing
literature (Schwartzberg 1985; Bhattacharyya 2010, 2019b, 2021). The
unresolved issues left behind by the SRC have of late been taken up for
critical scrutiny (Sarangi and Pai 2011). What I propose to highlight here,
briefly, is to point out that despite the considerable political momentum
generated by the campaigns for linguistic States after Andhra was created
in 1953, the terms of the SRC were limited and cautious. Second,
Congress’ nationalist pledge to reorganize India after independence into
a federation based on linguistic provinces reiterated from 1920 onwards
was not based on any detailed understanding of the ground situation—
the main reason why the JVP report (1948) of the Congress sought to
limit the scope of linguistic provinces by downplaying the Dar Commis-
sion report (1948) of the CA formed in order to advise it on the issue.
For a variety of reasons Nehru was rather reluctant to grant statehood
on the basis of language sensing the lurking dominant caste/class inter-
ests that would be served in the event of such statehood being granted
44 H. BHATTACHARYYA

(King 1997).2 In 1948 the Dar Commission was quite sensitive to the
force of nationalism being rooted in the provinces: ‘Indian nationalism
is deeply wedded to its regional languages; Indian patriotism is aggres-
sively attached to its provincial frontiers’ (Bhattacharyya 2001: 256). The
Commission did recommend for a federation with happy provinces, but
its prescription was largely ignored by Congress’s JVP Committee.
The Terms of Reference of the SRC clearly showed the mind of
the power that be. It was stated: ‘The Government expect that the
Commission would, in the first instance, not go into the details but
make recommendations in regard to the broad principle which should
govern the solution of the problem, and if they, so choose, the broad
lines on which particular States should be recognized…’ (SRC 1955:
01) [emphasis added]. This in a way tied the hands of the Commis-
sion, which recommended, nonetheless, the formation of States primarily
on the basis of language (50% and above!). The Commission’s recom-
mendations for State-making were both symmetric and asymmetric. The
States that the SRC recommended to be recognized and formed were
to be treated equally in terms of status and powers. The SRC recom-
mended for centrally administered territories of Delhi, Manipur (pending
its merger with Assam) and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Of the 16
States recognized by the SRC, little reorganization was involved: Assam,
Odisha (formerly Orrisa), West Bengal, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar
Pradesh; Kerala is the lone case of linguistically most homogeneous State
in India today, and its border did not change after 1956. The other
recommendations of the SRC with regard to the creation of Vidarbha,
and Hyderabad (pending till 1961), or the merger of Tripura with Assam
were not conceded to by the government. The other States such as
Bombay (bi-lingual), Madras (later Tamil Nadu), Andhra (later Andhra
Pradesh), Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab underwent major changes in
boundaries; the Bombay State was abolished in 1960. The States reorga-
nization went on, however. Beyond what the SRC recommended minor
adjustments of transfer of some territories from one State to the other
went from 1959 onwards. Interestingly, a portion of the Purnea district
and the district of Purulia minus the Chas thana of Bihar were transferred
to West Bengal; it was so done mostly on the basis of language.
 3 FOUNDING MOMENT (1946–56) 45

CA and the Making of Asymmetric

Provisions for Tribal Self-governance
India’s tribal people are today around 100 million (100.3 million) scat-
tered all over India with significant concentrations in some States and
in India’s North-East where there are three tribal dominated States,
namely Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya (They are also predomi-
nantly Christians.). The has provided for two asymmetric provisions for
the tribal—5th Schedule for Tribal Advisory Council for ‘tribal welfare
and advancement’ under the caption ‘Administration and control of
Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes’, which is far removed from
providing for self-government for the vast majority of tribals in India
while providing for the Sixth Schedule for Autonomous Tribal District
Council for the smaller hill tribes of India’s North-East. Debates took
place in the CA on both, but in the case of the former there was no
question raised about the absence of tribal self-governance via the 5th
Schedule, not surely achievable by an Advisory Council. While the CA has
provided for the 5th Schedule for the tribals India except the North-East
(where only a minority of tribals live). For the hill tribes in the North-
East, a more empowering 6th Schedule has been provided that includes
the formation by election of the Autonomous Tribal District/Regional
Councils for their self-governance via territorial power and autonomy.
Historically, while the INC was aware of India’s diversity, and committed
itself to reorganizing India after independence as a federation based on
linguistic provinces, the tribals of India were not recognized in a like
manner. As discussed below, where most tribals live in the rest of India,
no territorial provisions were made for tribal self-governance. For most
tribals, a 5th Schedule that provides for a Tribal Advisory Council was
made while a territorial authority with autonomy and powers for tribal
self-governance was provided by way of the 6th Schedule for the hill
tribals in India’s North-East who comprise about 8.1 million (26% of the
total population of the region) which is about 6% of the total tribal popu-
lation of India. One reason especially for the tribals of today’s North-East
was that the colonial rulers kept the tribal inhabited areas either ‘excluded’
or ‘partially excluded’ for any access from outside. In many cases, the
tribals were subjects of the princely States which were kept outside the
purview of Congress politics well until 1938 (Haripura Congress).3 Our
founding fathers did not visualize the tribal States as the federal units of
the Union would ever have to be formed although there were debates
46 H. BHATTACHARYYA

about the kind of territorial autonomy to be extended to the tribals by

way of autonomy and self-governance with powers and authority which
would be an example of asymmetric power sharing, and in todays’ lexicon,
a level of governance in India’s multi-level governance.
As far as the CA debates were concerned, the members expressed
concern about real ambit of the 5th Schedule, and the real efficacy of
the Tribal Advisory Council to be appointed/nominated for the purpose
of ‘administration and control of Scheduled Areas and Tribes’, and its
functioning under the State Governor (read State government). On 5
September 1949, Dr B. R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting
Committee of the Indian Constitution, introduced the 5th Schedule
above purpose. He added that among others ‘the executive powers of
a State shall extend to the Scheduled areas therein’ (CAD 2014, Vol. IX:
967). As the name suggests, the main ‘duty’ of the Council would be to
advise the State on matters pertaining to the welfare and advancement
of the tribes in the State. It was also not designed as a territorial animus
body unlike the 6th Schedule. The State Governor (read the State govern-
ment) is given powers of appointment to the Council and its meetings.
The advice relates to important areas such as land transfer from the tribals,
land allotment among them, and control of illegal money lending among
the scheduled areas. Nonetheless, members of the CA were particularly
concerned about the fate of the Scheduled Tribes under the 5th Schedule.
Jaipal Singh (from Bihar) raised many issues concerning the real efficacy
of the Council: Here again, I want that the Advisory Council should be
effective and have a real say in what is being done. I would not for one
moment, deny the Governor or the ruler his powers in initial things, but,
at the same time I do feel that the word ‘consultation’ is not the right
word there… (CAD 2014, Vol. 1X: 978).
Jaipal Singh further argued: As I have already stated, there are only
two principles in my five amendments: first that the Scheduled Tribes
should be benefited by the powers of the Fifth Schedule, and secondly,
that the Tribal Advisory Council should be a reality and not a farce Let
us not give it a big name, without any powers to do things (CAD 2014,
Vol. IX: 978). Singh got the problem right, but not the solutions. The
Tribal Advisory Council is not a territorial body armed with the requisite
powers; its advisory capacity, which is not binding in any way, makes it
in practice superfluous. Many other members of the CA who took part
in the debates and spoke a lot were minor matters of semantics without
much substance when seen from the perspective of the self-governance of
 3 FOUNDING MOMENT (1946–56) 47

the Scheduled Tribes, more numerous than that of the North-East who
would get, as we shall see soon blow, a much better treatment from the
CA by way of the 6th Schedule. Going by the mode of formation and
formation of the Council it can be said that it is representative of the
tribals though indirectly in that three-fourths of 30 members are to be
the MLAs belonging to the tribals in the concerned State. Each State
shall have one such Council if the provisions for Scheduled Areas and
Tribes apply.

The 6th Schedule: Asymmetry Within Asymmetry

The 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution like any other Schedule
and Articles are mere texts which do not give us the context and the
concerns behind their drafting; the reason that lay behind them, and
the apprehensions that many drafters had had in the event of these
being passed and so on. Since the Tribal Autonomous District Coun-
cils in the North-East (some ten are working) of India are governed
by the provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution (as
amended from time to time as per needs), we are required to famil-
iarize ourselves with the making of the particular Schedule during the
time of the making of the Indian Constitution, the debates surrounding
its making on the floor of the Constituent Assembly of India (1946–
1949, dated 5–7 September 1947) (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1003–1084)
and the detailed provisions of this Schedule (discussed in this book later)
in order to understand the rationale behind the incorporation of this
Schedule in the Constitution of India, the extent of autonomy avail-
able as per provisions of the Schedule, their efficacy in protecting tribal
identity, and finally the role of the Schedule via the Autonomous Tribal
District Council itself in the process of ‘national’ integration in India,
if any. Or did they promote separatism and disintegration? Before we
proceed any further we must remember that this is not the only Schedule,
i.e. the special provisions, for catering to the special needs of diversity
within the social and cultural morphology of India. Students of the Indian
Constitution are aware that the 6th Schedule4 apart, there are such other
special provisions as the 5th Schedule and Article 370, the latter designed
to concede special autonomy to the State of Jammu and Kashmir,5 as
well as Article 371 which offer asymmetric status to all the States in
the North-East. The reasons that those provisions and Schedules were
debated and finally made into the Constitution of India strongly suggest
48 H. BHATTACHARYYA

among others the sensitivity of the founding fathers of the Indian Consti-
tution to India’s diversity and the pledge that the Indian nationalists made
during the freedom struggle to respond to the needs for protecting diver-
sity after independence as well as maintaining national unity and territorial
integrity.
In the Constituent Assembly (CA), though over-dominated by the
members of the Indian National Congress,6 the rationale of incorporating
the 6th Schedule was debated. The debate centred on, on the one hand,
the issue of self-government for the tribals (aboriginal people in India’s
North-East), the need for accommodation of diversity, and on the other,
the problems that might occur in the way of national integration, for
nationhood because such little self-government bodies further isolate such
people from the ‘mainstream’ and thence hamper national integrity, on
the other. Those in favour of the latter argument were in favour of assim-
ilation of the tribal people. Mr Rohini Kumar Choudhuri, a member of
the CA, had this to say on the floor of the Assembly:

We want to assimilate the tribal people. We are not given that oppor-
tunity so far. The tribal people, however much they liked, had not the
opportunity of assimilation. So much as that, I living in Shillong, cannot
purchase property from any Khasi except with the permission of the Chief
of the State or with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. I have
no right to purchase property in any tribal areas. An Indian has no right
to purchase property in those areas without the permission of the Deputy
Commissioner, or the Chief of the State. If this Constitution is adopted
those disabilities will continue. I am not allowed to associate with the
tribal people; the tribal people are allowed to associate with me…...Why
do you want to dissociate them from us by creating these autonomous
districts which remain autonomous? Do you want an assimilation of tribal
and non-tribal people, or want to keep them separate? (CAD 2014, Vol.
IX: 1017)

Mr Lakshinarayan Sahu from Orissa held the opposite view and coun-
tered Mr Choudhuri by stressing that ‘we wish none should be able to
take away land from the aboriginals since they do not understand their
own economic interest’ (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1019). Mr Jaipal Singh,
another proponent of the 6th Schedule, highlighted in particular the
angle of accommodation through the Schedule. The Rev JJM Nichols
Roy from Assam and the most powerful and cogent defender of the 6th
Schedule refuted the cultural argument made by some members that the
 3 FOUNDING MOMENT (1946–56) 49

tribal people (backward) were to be assimilated and brought up to the

‘mainstream’, etc. Defending the culture of the hill men, Rev Nicols Roy
argued that the culture of the former was in some respect even superior
to that of the plainsmen. He said:

Among the tribesmen, there is no difference between class and class. Even
the Rajas and Chiefs work in the field together with their laborers. They
eat together. Is that practiced in the plains? The whole of India has not
reached that level of equality. (p. 1023)

He added:

The social organization is that of the village, the clan and the tribes, and
the outlook and structure are generally strongly democratic. There is no
system of caste or purdah and the child marriage is not practiced. (CAD
2014, Vol. IX: 1023)

Stressing the better culture of equality among the hill men and women,
he opined:

Even the Rajs and Chiefs work in the filed together with the laborers. They
eat together. Is that practiced in the plains. (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1023)

The Rev Roy’s conclusive statement is well-argued and forceful: This

Schedule gives a certain measure of self-government to these hill areas but
the laws and regulations to be made by the District Council are subject to
the control and assent of the Governor of Assam. What is more unifying
than that? (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1024).
In short, the Bordoloi Committee of the Constituent Assembly formed
for the purpose was confronted with three points of view regarding the
issue of autonomy to be conceded to the tribes under the Constitution of
India. The first view was in favour of complete assimilation of the tribes
with the political set up of India. The second one rejected any power of
the State Governor in the matter of the 6th Schedule. The third view
combined the first two in favour of giving autonomy to the tribes to be
guaranteed under the Indian Constitution but within the overall control
by the State Governor.7
The provisions for the 6th Schedule for autonomous tribal District
Council for the hill tribes in India’s North-East are more empowering
for the tribals, and the District Councils under this Schedule are like a
50 H. BHATTACHARYYA

State within a State, asymmetry within asymmetry. While I shall deal with
the details of the Schedule and its applications to cases otherwise not
befitting, this section seeks, in brief, to bring out the tenor of the debate
in the CA over it.
Opinions in the CA on the desirability of the 6th Schedule that while
none was so provided for the vast majority of tribals living elsewhere
in India was questioned by many including some members of the CA’s
Bordoloi Committee. It further stressed the risk and dangers in offering
autonomy to the hill tribes in the frontier regions of India. Brajeswar
Prasad raised the above issue (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1005–06) which was
not the lone voice. But Dr Ambedkar’s defense was two-pronged and very
powerful. First, he said:

Although we have constituted autonomous districts for the purpose of the

satisfaction of the tribal people living in those areas that they will have, at
any rate for the first ten years, autonomy in the matter of the government
of their areas we have nowhere provided that autonomous districts shall
not constitute part of the province of Assam. That being so, it is very
difficult to leave part of the Province to be governed by the Governor
of the province and part of the province be administered as a centrally
administered area (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1001). The second point in his
defence was: It has been provided in this Schedule that so far as the frontier
areas of Assam are concerned the Governor would be acting under the
President. Consequently, whatever strategic importance the frontier areas
may have, the Centre would certainly have jurisdiction to see that none of
the disturbing factors to which he has made reference will find any place
there. I therefore think that all the amendments are unnecessary and out
of place. (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1007)

What divided the CA about the 6th Schedule and the District Council
was two: the question of integration of the frontier region with the
Union of India, and the right method to do so. Second, granting terri-
torial autonomy to the hill tribes in the frontier regions would encourage
separatism or not. Some members such as Brajeswar Prasad (Bihari) and
Kuladhar Chaliha (Assam) opined that granting such autonomy would be
tantamount to Tribalistan (p. 1010). He was equally vociferous against
placing the Sixth Schedule above the act of Parliament (p. 1010). The first
question pertains to the manner of integrating the tribals into the main-
stream by force and or local self-government—either by assimilation with
the Assamese or by forcing them to do so. Brajeswar Prasad was opposed
 3 FOUNDING MOMENT (1946–56) 51

to the idea of self-determination as a justification of tribal self-rule via the

6th Schedule (p. 1011). Gopinath Bordoli (Assam), the Chairman of the
Tribal Subcommittee of the CA was sympathetic to the cause of the tribal
and their self-government, the latter’s integration peacefully rather than
forcefully assimilates. He appreciated the local tribal customs and rules of
self-governance by panchayats and other practices which he argued should
be honored. He said: In other words, they are exercising a certain amount
of autonomy, which, I thought, and the members of the Tribal Sub-
Committee thought, should be preserved rather than destroyed. What
is necessary for good government is already there (p. 1013).
While Rajeswar Prasad, Rohini Kumar Chaudhury and other opposed
the very idea of the tribal self-governance and autonomy, and were in
favour of assimilation, Dr B. R. Ambedkar, Jaipal Singh, Bordoloi and J.
J. M. Nichols Roy8 were in favour of offering the hill tribes autonomy
as a method of integration. Sardar Patel is quoted to have approved the
proposal of the Tribal Sub-Committee (p. 1019).

Conclusion
It is thus seen from the above debates that members of the CA were
divided over the introduction of the autonomy via the 6th Schedule
for the hill tribes of North-East India. Some members even went to
the extent of accusing Dr B. R. Ambedkar of indulging in separatism
like the departing British. Others who supported Dr Ambedkar and
the 6th Schedule defended it on grounds of culture and identity, and
accommodation (Jaipal Singh), and Rev Nicols Roy (some measure of
self-government for the tribals) and others defended it provided there is
control of the Governor over the Council. Those who were opposed to
it were worried about the unity of India after the Partition let separate
self-government was granted to the hill people on the frontiers. As the
following chapters will show, the supporters of the 6th Schedule have
been proven right, the various Autonomous Tribal District Councils have
been working for decades, with some upgraded to Union Territories, and
then Statehood such as Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Arunachal
Pradesh.
52 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Notes
1. As Schwartzberg showed, a very few States are linguistically ‘homogeneous’
which suggests that even with States created with symmetric status and
powers, they are hardly representative of the all the linguistic groups in the
State.
2. Nehru vacillated between two poles: linguistic domination vis-à-vis socio-
economic domination. Democracy here was like a double-edged sword.
3. Even at Haripura the INC resolved to allow individual Congressmen to
engage in political mobilization in the Princely States but not the party as
a whole.
4. This provides for State autonomy and also contains powers and functions of
the State governments in India in respect of the State and the Concurrent
Lists.
5. Abolished in 2019 by the current Union Government.
6. Granville Austin (1999/1966: 8–18) reported that after the creation of
Pakistan and with the Muslim League members deserted, the Congress
dominance was about 82% of the total members. (Austin, G. The Indian
Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation. Delhi: OUP.)
7. Roy Burman, B.K. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. In Gassah. L.
S. (ed.) 1997, op. cit., p. 24 (for details, pp. 15–39).
8. Roy referred to Jawaharlal Nehru’s approach to the tribal in the region and
defended that the tribal should be allowed some measure of autonomy. For
further details, see Nehru’s Letters to Chief Minister Vol. 4, 1988, Delhi,
p. 558 and see also Elwin, V. 1957. A Philosophy for NEFA. Government
of Assam, Shillong.

References
Austin, G. 1999/1966. The Indian Constitution: The Cornerstone of a Nation.
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Basu, D.D. 1997. The Constitution of India. New Delhi: Prentice Hall.
Bhattacharyya, H. 2001. India as a Multicultural Federation in Comparison with
Swiss Federalism. Fribourg: Hellbing and Lichetnhahn.
———. 2010. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia. London and
New York: Routledge.
———. 2019a. Federalism in Asia: Beyond the Diversity-Problematic. In Feder-
alism Studies (A Research Agenda), ed. J. Kincaid, 187–98. Cheltenham, UK:
Elgar and Northampton, USA.
———. 2019b. States Reorganization and the Accommodation of Ethno-
Regional Cleavages in India. In Territory and Power in Constitutional
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Transition, ed. G. Anderson and S. Chaudhry. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.
———. 2021. enlarged rev edn. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan, Malaysia,
Nepal and Myanmar. London and New York: Routledge.
Constituent Assembly Debates. 2014. Vol. IX, 5th September 1949: 967. New
Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat.
King, R. 1997. Nehru’s Language Policies. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Menon, V.P. 1956. The Integration of the Indian States. Hyderabad: Orinet
Longman.
Sarangi, A., and S. Pai, eds. 2011. Interrogating States Reorganization: Culture,
Ethnicity and Politics in India. New Delhi: Routledge.
Schwartzberg, J. 1985. Factors in the Linguistic Reorganizations of Indian States.
In Region and Nation, ed. P. Wallace, 155–82. Delhi: Oxford University
Press.

Official Sources
Reports of the States Reorganization Commission (vols. 1–4) (Ministry of Home
Affair: Government of India) (1955).
 CHAPTER 4

Federal Asymmetry in India and Various

Forms

Introduction
Conventionally, federal symmetry is the core assumption on which feder-
alism is based. It refers to equality of status and powers among the federal
units. This is particularly true in cases where federation was the result of a
compact among pre-existing states. Federal asymmetry is generally under-
stood as special cases such as for peripheries and federacies but beyond
the main structure of the two-tiered federal system. Asymmetry is also
found in relatively different sizes and political weights of the federal units.
But in any case, it is understood in relation to the federal units, but not
extended down to the subunits or sub-states which may be distinct ethno-
territorial units with constitutional guarantees, and which enjoy powers
and authority for local regional or sub-regional affairs. We seek to argue
that there are two grounds on which a case of asymmetric federalism in
federations in post-colonial countries can be made. First, since federation
building in such countries has followed a different route, by disaggrega-
tion of a once centralized colonial state (but not ethnically homogenous),
and also by incorporation of new territories, even at the level of states, the
scope for different degrees of asymmetries had to be provided for meeting
special, particularly diversity needs of regions. Elsewhere I (Bhattacharyya
2021) have discussed this aspect. Second, in post-colonial federation,
given the very complex ethnic diversity at the base of the states, espe-
cially those concerning the tribals, sub-state level asymmetric institutional
arrangements were unavoidable.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 55

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_4
56 H. BHATTACHARYYA

This chapter seeks to offer a critical examination of the concept of

asymmetric federalism, de jure and de facto within federations in conven-
tional federations. Second, we offer a critical outline of the various
institutional arrangements in India at the state and sub-state levels. In
the final part of the chapter, we point out the limits of such asymmetric
arrangements.
The predominant thrust of asymmetric federalism so far has been in
relation to federal units and their relations with the federation. Watts
(1999, 2008) is perhaps alone in specifically focusing on the other what
he calls ‘peripheral units’ to be considered in the purview of the discus-
sion on asymmetric federalism. My point of departure in this connection
is that we need to rethink the cases of asymmetry within asymmetry given
the very complex diversity to be accommodated. If federalism is to accom-
modate diversity, if it is to recognize difference, it ought to recognize not
just one, dominant difference, but many. This leads us to consider the
cases of sub-state level units as cases of asymmetry both de jure and de
facto. Our case study materials from India’s North-East, with particular
focus on two experiments—one each in Tripura and Assam—governed by
the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India are illustrative in this respect
in the sense that both the States (like other state in the region) have
enjoyed until 2014 asymmetric status as Special Category States (Bhat-
tacharjee 2016)1 within the Indian federation and yet had to concede
self-government for the aboriginal people of Tripura comprising some
one-third of the total population of the State, but the majority in the
ADC areas; the State government is constitutionally obliged to delegate
jurisdiction and powers to the ADC. In the case of Bodoland in Assam,
also under the amended Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, the same
constitutional stipulations apply, and yet the latter experiment, as we shall
discuss in the relevant chapter below, is fraught with a host of problems.
The whole experiment has produced incessant inter-ethnic violence and
deaths.
We seek to argue that the tool of governance in multiethnic contexts,
federal asymmetry serves to add strength to the process of inclusive gover-
nance, and generate some legitimacy in difficult terrains, which otherwise
is considered as a very difficult proposition but quite daunting for the
politicians and statesmen alike.
 4 FEDERAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA AND VARIOUS FORMS 57

State Level Asymmetry

Asymmetries in Indian federalism are very complex indeed born of histor-
ical compulsions, the particular mode of formation of the federation,
special geo-strategic considerations of some regions, formally centralized
nature of the federation, certain political considerations and so on (Arora
1995; Rao and Singh 2005; Saxena 2011; Tillin 2007) Rao and Sen
(2011) have mostly focused on the economic aspects of the phenomenon
although the identity, or cultural aspects have not escaped their attention.
The subject of asymmetric federalism and its role in holding the federa-
tion together has received some attention. There are gross misconceptions
too. Tillin (2007) has almost denied any role of India’s federal asym-
metry as India’s ‘national minorities’ (one does not know where in the
Indian Constitution there is such a recognition!) and the cultural rights
of others are not recognized. The students of Indian Constitution and
politics would recognize easily that there are no such things as ‘national
minorities’ in India, and the asymmetric arrangements made in the Indian
federation were designed to protect the cultural rights of ethnic minori-
ties, especially in the North-East. On the contrary, a la Riker (1975), that
since federalism involves much of bargaining for ‘enhancing freedom and
representation’ by some groups, the sources of asymmetry are precisely
the differences utilized for the above purpose. However, they have also
pointed out that de facto asymmetry can contribute to nation-building
(Rao and Sen 2011: 5). De facto asymmetry assumes special significance
in India because of the centralized nature of the federation (Rao and
Singh 2011: 5). In their account, the ‘Special Category States’ (SCS) in
India enjoying special status and powers relative to the general or non-
special category states, for a variety of reasons, part path dependency and
part contingent, has drawn their detailed attention. Until 2019 India had
11 SCS (comprising all 8 States in the North-East), Himachal Pradesh,
and Uttarakhand. Such States again do not enjoy the same kinds of power
and privileges. For example, Sikkim, a very small State, is a lone case that
can levy income taxes. Nagaland is another lone case in another respect.2
One central fact is common to all SCS: they are heavily dependent on the
Central government fiscal transfers for they have limited revenue-raising
capacity compared to the non-special category, or general category state.
Rao and Singh (2011: 20) inform us that the total population of the SCS
is only some small per cent of the total population, but they receive 90%
plan assistance as grant,3 and the rest is loans. Apart from the grounds for
58 H. BHATTACHARYYA

equity, the other strategic reasons may be at work because many of these
states are located on India’s international borders, and hence the issue of
foreign investment in such areas is not always easily, if at all, allowed by
the central government (Rao and Singh 2011: 2–21).4
Be that as it may, the paradigm of discussion of Rao and Singh (2011),
as above, like other scholars mentioned before, is asymmetric position
of the constituent units of the federation in relation to the Central
government and other units of the federation. In their estimate, and
by the provisions of the Indian Constitution (Article 371), for example,
Tripura is a ‘special category state’. But what is neglected in such anal-
yses is asymmetry within asymmetry, that is, the sub-state level institutional
arrangements for self-government for the accommodation of diversity and
protection of identity. The reference here is made to Autonomous Tribal
District Councils in the North-East as well as various other district-level
self-governing bodies, and regional councils/development councils else-
where in the country that tape part in power-sharing, and enjoy relative
autonomy.
Balveer Arora (1995) is alone in pointing our attention to this direc-
tion by referring to what he calls ‘sub-state political structures’ (Arora
1995: 84). This relates to relations between the State and the district-level
governing structures, and involves the issue of decentralization. Arora
(1995) has rightly pointed out that the Fifth and the Sixth Schedules
of the Constitution of India are the most important examples providing
for such arrangements although the latter is more empowering than
the former in respect of self-government of tribal (aboriginal peoples),
and protection of their identity (Arora 1995: 85). On the basis of the
experience of Autonomous District Councils in India, he seemed appre-
hensive of the real content of autonomy to be enjoyed by such structures
cast as they are in the same unitary mould of state–district relations, as
the centre–state relations (Arora 1995: 85). In other words, the refer-
ence here is made to some inherent limitations of such provisions which
make the district level government structures dependent upon the State
government for devolution of powers and functions.
Constitutional provisions apart one very important consideration in
respect of the extent of autonomy to be enjoyed by such autonomous
district councils is ethnicity or the ethnic content of both the State
government and of the district council. Very often, the State government
dominated by one or two ethnic groups may perceive the existence of
such councils as a potential threat to their authority because the very fact
 4 FEDERAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA AND VARIOUS FORMS 59

that such an institutional structure had to be worked out by carving up

territorial jurisdiction of the existing State government itself may be taken
as a defeat on the part of the State government run by a different polit-
ical party from that of the district councils. Ethnic deprivation is otherwise
ethnic States have triggered demands for further territorial division of the
existing States for recognition and accommodation of still smaller ethnic
minority. The history of the formation of all the district councils in the
North-East except Sikkim are a testimony to this.
While all the States in the North-East were until very recently Special
Category States, (We discuss it later in the book.) some States remain very
special. Nagaland of course leads others (after the abolition of Article 370)
and is somewhat unique enjoying, as it were, semi-sovereign authority.
Article 371A ensures that. It says:

Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution ---

No act of Parliament in respect of ---

a. Religious or social practices of the Nagas,

b. Naga customary laws and procedure,
c. Administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions
according to customary laws,
d. Ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the
State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a
resolution so decides. (Bakshi 2014: 391)

Beyond Nagaland, other States in the NE as well as the States in the

mainland enjoy some special provisions in respects of financial support to
the tribal communities not covered under the District Councils. Article
371B provides for financial support to a Committee of the Assam State
Assembly in order to extend some benefits of the 6th Schedule to
them, and the State Governor has been specifically empowered to secure
the proper functioning of the committee Bakshi 2017: 394). Article
371C provides for similar provisions. Article 371D has provided for the
purposes of ‘equitable opportunities and facilities belong to different parts
of the State’ (of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana) and determining the
local areas that needs such support; for such local areas direct recruitment
to local cadres under the State and admission to any university under the
State control (Bakshi 2017: 394–95). There is a provision (under Article
371 J) for setting up a Development Board in the State of Karnataka for
60 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Hyderabad-Karnataka region for the purpose of equitable allocation of

development expenditure for the region (Bakshi 2017: 400–01).
Although constitutionally speaking a ‘temporary and special provision’
Nagaland is a powerful case of asymmetry in Indian federalism which no
other States have enjoyed. The Naga politicians, however, believe that
the autonomy was not sufficient for the Nagas, as they are yet to achieve
Nagalim, a Naga federation to be constituted by incorporating the Naga
inhabited areas in Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh (Interviews
quoted in Bhattacharyya 2018: 45). Whether Nagalim is to be achieved
or not is a different question altogether, and its implications for India’s
multicultural social and political fabric of India in the event of its being
so achieved, the Nagas in power since 1963 have proven their ability to
develop and govern the State. The available records of which are compet-
itive. Its records of political participation in Lok Sabha elections over the
years show that starting with 53.77% in 1957, the voter turnout has gone
up as high as 91.77% in 2004, 90% in 2009, and 87% in 2014 (Bhat-
tacharyya 2018: 61). Its records of the rule of law has been quite high
too (Malhotra, 2014: 159). Going by Malhotra’s (2014) analysis, Naga-
land’s score in 2011 in terms of the rule of law—a composite index of
such sub-indexes as police personnel per 10,000 people, rate of crime
(IPC and State Laws), crime against women, etc.—was highest of all the
States in India. We will provide a comparative account of governance, and
development in the asymmetric States/Special Category States later in a
separate chapter.
The case of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 was another case
of asymmetry and its special autonomy was protected by Article 370 due
to the reason that the J & K acceded to the Union under very special
circumstance the politics of which is not acceptable to all observers of
Indian politics (Anderson 2014). It was deleted in 2019 by the current
Union government and the State was bifurcated into two Union Territo-
ries, namely, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladhak. However, J & K never
really enjoyed autonomy under Article 370 due to persistent Central
control over its powers and autonomy since 1954. Until 2014, Indian
federation contained eleven ‘special category states’ ( Jammu & Kashmir
and Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and all the seven (now
eight including Sikkim (since 2012) states in India’s North-east), an
arrangement connected with the complex processes and other strategic
considerations connected with the formation of the Indian federation
 4 FEDERAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA AND VARIOUS FORMS 61

(Rao and Singh 2005: 65, 68, 70).5 The special attraction of ‘special cate-
gory states’ is that the financial transfers from the Union/Centre to such
states are weighted (Rao and Singh 2005: 68). Rao and Singh (2005)
have given some indication of the considerations on which such provisions
are made into the Constitution of India: They include language designed
to protect, or customary laws and religious practices, restrictions on the
ownership and transfer of land, and restriction on immigration (Rao and
Singh, 2005: 68). Rao and Singh (2005) also argue that it is not true that
in all cases the spirit of ‘special category states’ is maintained by the Centre
which has had overruled the special autonomy enjoined in such provisions
by its centralization drives. This has so happened in the case of Nagaland
in respect of its ‘natural resources’ (Rao and Singh 2005: 69).6 Two inter-
esting features of the provisions for ‘special category states’ (SCS) in India
stand out. First, they are heavily dependent on the Centre for financial
transfer; to the extent of 80% of their public expenditure is financed by
the Centre. This makes them depend heavily on the Centre. Second, yet,
it does not cost the Centre much in terms of per capita transfer because
of the small size of populations of such states (the entire population of
all the SCSs amounts to only about 5.4% of the total population of India
(Rao and Singh 2005: 75). From the data given in Table 4.2 of Rao and
Singh (2005: 76–77) it is seen that the per capita central transfers to the
SCSs do not compare at all with the general category states. Nonetheless
the percentage share of own resources to finance public expenditure is
much higher in the general category states than in the SCSs. The average
for the general category states as a whole in this regard is 52.3% while for
the SCSs as a whole is only 20.2% (Rao and Singh 2005: 77).
There is another type of territorial power-sharing within the States and
Union Territories too. Ladhak, now a Union Territory, was part of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, and has since 1995 been governed by two
Autonomous Hill Development Councils of Kargil and Leh, which are
elected bodies: (26 out of 30 are elected, four being appointed for repre-
senting women and minorities). These autonomous bodies are governed
under the State law and their autonomy is limited. The Council has an
Executive Council as the top body. The Hill Council maintain liaison
with the sub-district level panchayats for ensuing equitable development
down to the grassroots. These Councils have powers relating to economic
development, healthcare, education, land use, taxation, and local gover-
nance which are further reviewed at the block headquarters in the pres-
ence of the Chief Executive Councilor. The Darjeeling Gorkha Territorial
62 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Council in West Bengal is another similar example of a territorial body

elected and operating under State laws. Such territorial/regional/sub-
regional as well as non-territorial arrangements are to be seen from a
broader perspective of asymmetric federalism in India.
Beyond those special provisions, there is structural asymmetry in the
making of States by the SRC. As we have seen in Chapter 2 above, the
State-making in the Indian federation is not complete yet, but in the first
major reorganization of the States in 1956, India’s most populous State,
i.e. Uttar Pradesh was kept unchanged. As a result, UP sends 80 represen-
tatives to Lok Sabha (popular chamber), and 31 to Rajya Sabha (second
chamber) while many States (smaller in population) send only one or
two. UP’s share of the above remains even after the bifurcation of the
State in 2000 and the carving up of Uttarakhand, The latter sends only
5 representatives to Lok Sabha, and three to Rajya Sabha. Unlike many
federations, India’s second chamber is composed of members decided
according to the size of the population. The larger population has other
advantages too in financial disbursement by the Finance Commission.

Conclusion
The last point to be addressed here is that even after the reorganiza-
tion of the States in 1956, most of the States remain multi-lingual and
-cultural in conditions when the States are known for the linguistic iden-
tity of the dominant groups. Because the SRC went by the criterion of
50% or more speakers of the language to qualify for statehood, the large
linguistic minorities came out as the after-effects. Such linguistic minori-
ties have been provided with ‘constitutional safeguards’,7 but they do not
have any territorial representation. For example, there are more than 10
million Bengali speakers out of West Bengal and Tripura, but they do not
benefit from what is called ‘corporate federalism’. This raises the issue of
representation at the level of decision-making bodies. A formal state struc-
ture as such is important for the dominant ethno-regional groups, but not
sufficient to incorporate the minorities. To look at it from the perspective
of so-called ‘politics of recognition’, this is clearly asymmetric. One would
suggest that the above be considered as a part of the discourse of federal
asymmetry for a more comprehensive understanding.
 4 FEDERAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA AND VARIOUS FORMS 63

Notes
1. Bhattacharjee (2016) is the first ever comprehensive book on the Special
Category States. However, his perspective that the system of SCS was a
‘flawed mechanism’ does not appear to take SCS as part of the overall
political economy of India. In other words, his otherwise very detailed
account does not place the SCS in then political economy of India.
2. Consider the following provision under Article 371A of the Indian
Constitution with respect to the state of Nagaland:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, (a) No act
of Parliament in respect of (i) the religious or social practices of the Nagas;
(ii) Naga customary law and procedure; (iii) administration of civil and
criminal justice involving decisions according Naga customary law, and;
(iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resource, shall apply to the
state of Nagaland unless the Legislative assembly of Nagaland by a reso-
lution so decides’ (Bakshi, P.M. 2009. The Constitution of India [New
Delhi: Universal law Publishing House Pvt. Ltd], p. 308). This, beyond
doubt, compromises with the sovereignty of Indian parliament, but then
that was an instance of the extent of asymmetry allowed for the sake of
accommodating diversity in India’s often very difficult circumstances.
3. It is not surprising that there is among some States of India a competi-
tion for being considered as ‘Special Category States’. It was in the news
that Bihar went all its way to get it by collecting a few hundred thousand
signatures of the people, and citation in some 1800 books in defence of its
claim in order to woo the investors. But the plea was turned down by the
Central government (The Statesman, Kolkata dated 2.4.12).
4. Of late though, in the wake of India’s reforms and opening up, the control
regime has been slackened to some extent. Added to that is the end of one-
party rule at the Centre and the growing importance of regional parties in
the coalition governments at the Centre, which means more bargaining
power in favour the regions for trade, commerce and investment.
5. Rao and Singh (2005) however argue that the so-called strategic geographic
considerations used to justify special category states are often exaggerated
because such states as created exercise bargaining power greater than their
political importance in terms of their size. (p. 71).
6. The government of Nagaland brought the issue to the attention of the
Sarkaria Commission but the latter did little except leaving it to the practice
of bargaining and negation, something which can only take place among
equals. (Rao and Singh 2005: 69).
7. The successive reports of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities have
pointed out the lack of adequate safeguards for the linguistic minorities at
the primary level of schooling.
64 H. BHATTACHARYYA

References
Arora, B. 1995. Adapting Federalism to India: Multilevel and Asymmetric
Innovations. In Multiple Identities in a Single State Indian Federalism in
Comparative Perspective, ed. B. Arora and D. Verney. New Delhi: Konarak
Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Chapter 3.
Bakshi, P.M. 2017. The Constitution of India, 14th ed. New Delhi: Universal
Law Publishing.
Bhattacharjee, G. 2016. Special Category States of India. Delhi: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Bhattacharyya, G. 2018. Radical Politics and Governance in India’s North East:
The Case of Tripura. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Bhattacharyya, H. 2021. enlarged rev edn. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan,
Malaysia, Nepal and Myanmar. London and New York: Routledge.
Malhotra, R. 2014. India Public Policy Report. New Delhi: Oxford University
Press.
Rao, M.G., and Taps Sen. 2011. Federalism and Fiscal Reform in India.
Working Paper No. 2011-84. National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
New Delhi. https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2013/04/wp_
2011_84.pdf. Sighted on 12 March 2011.
Rao, G., and N. Singh. 2005. The Political Economy of Federalism in India. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Riker, W. 1975. Federalism. In Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 5, ed. F. Green
and N. Polsbyeds, 95–112. Boston: Little Brown Company.
Tillin, L. 2007. United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism. Publius:
The Journal of Federalism 37 (1): 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/
pjl017. Sighted on 20 March 2022.
Watts, R.L. 1999. Comparing Federal Systems. Ontario: McGill Queens’ Univer-
sity Press.
———. 2008/1999. Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed. Ontario: Queens
McGill University Press.
 CHAPTER 5

Politics of Fiscal Asymmetry in India

Introduction
The political economy of fiscal federalism is a distinct area of study
in federalism in its own right. It deals with tax assignment, collec-
tion and distribution among many tiers of government. Federations
vary a lot about how this is done, and the practices followed. The
term ‘fiscal federalism’ was introduced way back in the late 1950s by
Musgrave to suggest measures for the distribution of governmental public
finance functions and fiscal relations between governments. The theo-
retical understanding of fiscal federalism is based on the assumption
that a ‘federal system of government can be effective and efficient at
solving problems of governments’ (https://www.britannica.com/topic/
fiscal-federalism). (sighted on 27/3/22) Richard Bird (2000), Richard
Bird, an authority on fiscal federalism (2000: 1–13) argued that fiscal
federalism entails a decentralization, and seeks to answer the following
questions: ‘who decentralises what revenues? Who is responsible for what
expenditure? How do inter-governmental transfer work? What degree
of freedom sub-national governments have with respect to borrowing?’
(p. 5). However, this is part of a discourse on public finance and fiscal
federalism, generally, none of which is the subject of our discussion here.
In this chapter, our objective is to critically examine asymmetric fiscal
arrangements in India as a political strategy designed to meet various
needs of diversity in the country in the light of the broad vision of nation-
building.1 This vision entails plurality, multiplicity and recognition of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 65

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_5
66 H. BHATTACHARYYA

diversity, and the required space for them to negotiate and bargain often
going beyond the constitutional provisions. Long back Jawaharlal Nehru
defined the contours of a liberal multicultural approach to be followed
for autonomy and self-governance for the tribal peoples of North-East.
In his five-point template of the approach to be followed in respect of the
tribal peoples of the region, he highlighted that the tribal ‘people should
develop along the lines of their genius’, ‘their rights to land and forest
should be respected’, they should not be over-administered’ and so on
(Nehru 1957).2
We seek to identify the ways in how Indian federalism has conjoined
finance to diversity so that the various critical regions in the country and
their peoples find a better reason to stay together and differently.
What value does asymmetric fiscal federalism add to the overall health
of a federation, and cohesion, particularly in a culturally diverse country?
Does it imply wasting public resources, and encouraging ‘dole-out poli-
tics’? Or does it encourage political secessionism? The last question
becomes particularly relevant in the sense that once a territorial concession
is granted by way of statehood, or sub-Statehood in the Indian federa-
tion to the ethnic rebels, such governments are entitled to receive the
money from the Union/State governments as grants and also by way of
implementing development and empowerment programmes and project
in their domain which with which come funds. This is a good incen-
tive to avoid secession, and to stay within the democratic Union for
the latter offers better space for bargaining and negotiation. The Indian
experience suggests that asymmetric fiscal arrangements of various kinds
have not encouraged political secessionism, or territorial disintegration,
for the regions which benefit from such institutional arrangements have
very poor, if not, none at all, resource bases to rely upon. Among other
reasons, this has ensured in most cases that ethnic elites, many of whom
were rebels in the near past, have exercised the voice option rather than
exit, to use a phrase from Hirschman (1970), developed stakes in the
system and offered to guard the frontiers.

Democracy and Federal Asymmetry

Added to the above is the close link between democracy and federalism
in India, the former providing the space for contestation and bargaining.
India’s democracy and the recognition of ethno-regional and ethno-
linguistic identity in the form of federalism do not provide the full answer
 5 POLITICS OF FISCAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA 67

to why India holds itself together, and that too, democratically. Democ-
racy in conditions of multi-ethnicity often leads to disintegration and
collapse. Also, federalism, if not accompanied by democracy, may be the
recipe for the same fate. The important question is what federalism does.
Does it redistribute, and if so, in what manner? The simple political and
constitutional recognition may not be enough to offer the cementing
bond across ethnic identities. Indian federalism is often considered as the
answer to why such a vast multi-ethnic country stays together. But, as
I have argued elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2015), it is India’s federalism
and democracy that offers the answer although federalism has here always
been privileged over democracy so that democracy has played the second
fiddle. While India has, in general, recognized its cultural diversity in
the making of federalism—a process not complete yet—the key lies in
India’s specific mode of fiscal federalism, in a manner that links finance
to diversity, is taken into consideration in distributing the tax money that
responds positively to diversity at many tiers of the polity. This diver-
sity may be of many kinds: social and cultural; regional and sub-regional;
geographic location, etc. The comparative theoretical literature on feder-
alism suggests that while there are certain patterns in taxing, its collection
and redistribution, there are a lot of variations among federations in this
regard (e.g., Watts, 1999/2008; Bird, 2000: 1–13). Watts says that the
need for fiscal equalization occurs in every federation in order to respond
to varied special needs of the federal units. But the mode of doing so
varies among federations, classical, post-colonial and post-Soviet. In the
case of India, as I argued elsewhere (Bhattacharyya, 2001: 247–305),
a pluralist and multicultural approach to nation-building lay behind the
mode of financial transfer to the States by way of the Finance Commis-
sion (under Article 280 of the Constitution), and by other means, an
approach that is accommodative and inclusive especially for the weaker
members of the federation and those in the peripheral and strategically
sensitive regions.

General Category and Special Cater

States for Fiscal Distribution
Asymmetries in Indian federalism are very complex indeed born of histor-
ical compulsions, the particular mode of formation of the federation,
special geo-strategic considerations of some regions, formally centralized
nature of the federation, certain political considerations and so on (Arora
68 H. BHATTACHARYYA

1995; Ra and Sen 2011; Saxena 2011; Tulin 2011). Rao and Singh
(2011) have mostly focused on the economic aspects of the phenomenon
although the identity, or cultural aspects have not escaped their attention.
Since federalism involves much of bargaining for ‘enhancing freedom and
representation’ by some groups, the sources of asymmetry are precisely
the differences utilized for the above purpose. However, Rao and Singh
(2005: 5) have also pointed out de facto asymmetry can contribute to
nation-building. De facto asymmetry assumes special significance in India
because of the centralized nature of the federation, legislatively speaking.
In their account, the ‘Special Category States’ (SCS) in India enjoying
special status and powers relative to the general or non-special category
states, for a variety of reasons, part path dependency and part contin-
gent, has drawn their detailed attention. Until very recently (2018) there
were 11 SCS (comprising of all 8 States in the North-East), Himachal
Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir and Uttarakhand. With the abolition of
Article 370 the number of SCS States was brought down to ten. Such
States again do not enjoy the same kinds of power and privileges. For
example, while Jammu & Kashmir (now demoted to Union Territory in
2019) (under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution) enjoyed unique
powers not enjoyed by any other units of the Indian federation, Sikkim,
a very small State, is a lone case which can levy income taxes. Nagaland
is another lone case in another respect3 (Ra and Sen 2011: 13). One
central fact is common to all SCS: they are heavily dependent on the
Central government for fiscal transfers. The revenue-raising capacity of
these States is also limited compared to a non-special category, or general
category states. The total population of the SCS is only 5.32% of the total
population of India, but they receive 90% of plan assistance as grant,4
and 10% as loans. Apart from the grounds for equity, the other strategic
reasons may be at work because many of these states are located on India’s
international borders, and hence the issue of foreign investment in such
areas is not always easily, if at all, allowed by the central government (Rao
and Singh 2011: 2–21).
Be that as it may, the paradigm of discussion of Rao and Singh (2011),
as above, like other scholars mentioned before, is the asymmetric posi-
tion of the constituent units of the federation in relation to the Central
government and other units of the federation. In their estimate, and by
the provisions of the Indian Constitution (Article 371), the States in
the North-East are Special Category States well until 2018. But what
is neglected in such analyses is asymmetry within asymmetry, that is,
 5 POLITICS OF FISCAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA 69

the sub-state level institutional arrangements for self-government for the

accommodation of diversity and protection of identity. There are as many
10 Tribal Autonomous District Councils operating in the region except
Sikkim. Since such sub-State level governments are constitutionally guar-
anteed, and received grants from the Finance Commission, there is no
reason why we should not consider them as an instance of asymmetry
in the Indian federation too. There is in the writings of the late Watts
(2008) of considering such levels in his definition of federalism primarily
a two or more tiers of government among others.
Balveer Arora (1995) was alone in pointing our attention to this direc-
tion by referring to what he calls ‘sub-state political structures’ (Arora
1995: 84). This relates to relations between the State and the district level
governing structures, and involves the issue of decentralization. Arora
(1995) has rightly pointed out that the Fifth and the Sixth Schedules
of the Constitution of India are the most important examples providing
for such arrangements although the latter is more empowering than
the former in respect of self-government of tribal (aboriginal peoples),
and protection of their identity (Arora 1995: 85). On the basis of the
experience of Autonomous District Councils in India, he seemed appre-
hensive of the real content of autonomy to be enjoyed by such structures
cast as they are in the same unitary mould of state–district relations,
as the Centre–state relations (Arora 1995: 85). Such apprehension is a
little farfetched, as the two case studies made in this book do suggest.
However, one should not ignore the inherent structural limitations in the
institutional designs of such bodies, more particularly the 5th Schedule. In
the cases of the rural local self-governing bodies and the Municipalities,
the major limitation is their over-dependence on the State government
which empowers them the way and the extent it desires. Financially both
the Tribal District Councils (under 6th Sch.) and the Gram Panchayats
have very few resources of their own and collect very few taxes.
Until 2014, the Indian federation contained eleven ‘special category
states’ (Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim,
and all the seven states in India’s North-east), an arrangement connected
with the complex processes and other strategic considerations connected
with the formation of the Indian federation.5 The special attraction of
‘special category states’ was that the very liberal financial transfers from
the Union/Centre to such States are weighted. Rao and Singh (2005)
have given some indication of the considerations on which such provisions
are made into the Constitution of India: They include language designed
70 H. BHATTACHARYYA

to protect, or customary laws and religious practices, restrictions on the

ownership and transfer of land, and restriction on immigration. Rao and
Singh (2005) also argue that it is not true that in all cases the spirit of ‘spe-
cial category states’ is maintained by the Centre which has had overruled
the special autonomy enjoined in such provisions by its centralization
drives. This has so happened in the case of Nagaland in respect of its ‘nat-
ural resources’ (Rao and Singh 2005: 69).6 Rao and Singh (2005) have
also brought out two interesting features of the provisions for ‘special
category states’ (SCS) in India. First, they are heavily dependent on the
Centre for financial transfer; to the extent of 80% of their public expen-
diture is financed by the Centre. This makes them depend heavily on the
Centre. Second, yet, it does not cost the Centre much in terms of per
capita transfer because of the small size of populations of such states (the
entire population of all the SCSs amounts to only about 5.4% of the total
population of India (Rao and Singh, 2005: 75). From the data given in
Table 4.2 of Rao and Singh (2005: 76–77) it is seen that the per capita
central transfers to the SCSs do not compare at all with the general cate-
gory states. Nonetheless, the total transfer amount is smaller in case of the
SCSs, but the percentage share of own resources to finance public expen-
diture is much higher in the general category states than in the SCSs. The
average for the general category states as a whole in this regard is 52.3%
while for the SCSs as a whole is only 20.2% (Rao and Singh, 2005: 77).

In India, federal fiscal asymmetry consists of both the Constitutional and

the extra-constitutional methods of transfer of funds from the Centre to
the States, in general, and the Special Category States, in particular (ceased
to exist since 2018). Beyond the above two, there are other ways of funds
transfer (ministerial) discretionary and various special financial packages to
the States. Thus, the space of fiscal federal asymmetry in India is quite
large. As far as the North East is concerned, the DoNER has other devel-
opment and empowerment schemes/projects which are to be considered
within the ambit of the asymmetric fiscal federalism in India. Beyond the
above, the Union government very often has shown flexibility in treating
thus far general Category State for a ‘Special package’ for a few years.
For example, on 01 March 2014, the Union Cabinet decided to offer
a ‘special package’ to Andhra Pradesh for five years to compensate for
the adverse effects of the bifurcation of the State to carve up Telangana
(Reddy and Reddy 2019: 176). But the devolution of tax money from the
Centre (Union) to the States on the basis of a set of criteria (which has
 5 POLITICS OF FISCAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA 71

been changing) in order to offer more equity and balance to the whole
economy remains the most determining factors in India’s federal cohesion.

Finance Commission and Fiscal

Asymmetry: Varying Needs of Diversity
The Finance Commission is the stabilizer of Indian federalism. The
Finance Commission of India (Article 280 of the Constitution) has since
1952 been the most important constitutional body that distributes the
divisible pool of Union taxes and excise duty every five years between
the Union and the States, decides the principles of grants-in-aid to State,
and any other matter. The Finance Commission and its distribution have
received a lot of academic attention (Reddy and Reddy 2019; Rao and
Singh 2005). But what is missing in the current understanding is the
asymmetry embedded in the Finance Commission’s disbursement that
follows from the differential criteria adopted by the Commission in calcu-
lating who gets what. The Constitutional provisions under Article 280 of
the Constitution states:

The President shall, within two years after the commencement of the
Constitution, and thereafter, at the expiry of every fifth year or so or as
such earlier time as the President considers necessary, by order, constitute
a Finance Commission which shall consists of a Chairman and four other
members to be appointed by the President. (Bakshi, 2017: 316–17)

The duty of the Commission is to recommend to the President the

following:

• Distribution between the Union and the States of the net proceeds
of taxes, and allocation between the States of the respective shares
of such proceeds;
• The principle that should govern the grant-in-aid of the revenues of
the States out of the Consolidated Fund of India;
• Measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a States to
supplement the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities7 in
the States on the basis of the recommendation made by the Finance
Commission of the State; and
• Any other matter referred to the Commission by the President in
the interest of sound finance (Bakshi, 2017: 316).
72 H. BHATTACHARYYA

The last point ‘any other matter referred to’ often has assumed signifi-
cance especially in the last Finance Commission (15th 2019–24. We will
come back to it a little later. What is of general significance from the
broader perspective of federalism here is the regularity of formation and
functioning of the Commission, and the regular transfer of money from
the Finance Commission to the States on a regular basis without which
the holding the vast country of immense diversity could not have been
possible. Second, the formula-based transfer by the Commission, and the
changes therein from time to time have helped to address the newer needs
arising out of the experience of the previous commissions.
The qualifications of the Chairman and other members of the
Commission (Under Article 280 of the Constitution) have been left to
Parliament. This aspect has attracted some serious critical scholarly atten-
tion (Rao and Singh, 2005: 312–15) for the administrative inefficiency
of the staff and other members who work usually on a deputation basis
from the Union Finance Ministry, and other political biases. This has not,
however, affected the tenor of the transfer system in a major way. Rao
and Singh (2005) have also admitted, however, that the importance of
such a rule-based, formula-based system has not been able to offset the
possibilities of ‘implicit’ and ‘invisible’ ways of powerful States to manage
to get more resources in their favour.
Since 1952, as desired by the Constitution, Finance Commissions have
been formed on a regular basis and formula-based transfers to the States
have taken place. Even during the heyday of late Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi’s Emergency regime (1975–77), the Finance Commission did its
job of distributing money from the Centre to the States (Brass 1989).
Another area of special attention is that the ‘core functions’ of the Terms
of Reference of the Commission have been expanded in keeping up with
the new requirements of the economy and the macro-economic stability.
The needs arose from natural calamity and the individual States’ inability,
financially speaking, to face it has been another factor to have been consid-
ered by the Commission. As a result of the increasing demands of the
States, the royalty from offshore exploration of mineral resources like
natural gas (Reddy and Reddy 2019: 32–3), not usually shareable, is also
brought under the remit of the Commission for determining the method
and quantum to be transferred to the State. Over the last three decades,
the debt burden of the States has been increasing; this has been brought
under the remit of the Commission too. The Commission has since 1992
been devolving money for the rural and urban local government bodies to
 5 POLITICS OF FISCAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA 73

augment the resources of the States on the basis of the recommendations

of the State Finance Commission.8
Since 1952 the following criteria have been used by different Commis-
sions at different times: population and its changing weightage; area, the
contributions of the States in income tax collections; income distance
(backward States benefited from this being too far from Delhi); inverse
per capita income; backwardness; index of infrastructure; poverty; tax
efforts; fiscal discipline, and self-reliance; fiscal capacity distance; and
forest cover (Reddy and Reddy 2019: 93–95). It is not true that all
the Commissions have adopted them all, or that one or two has been
repeated by all the Commissions. What is of special significance here is
that population even with differential weightage has remained a constant
variable.
It is natural that ultimately the public money is to go to the people who
are the sources of the same. Thus, the population received the greatest
weightage in the early period of the Commission. Until 1979–80, weigh-
tage for population was 80–90% and 100% for union excise duty. The
picture began to change drastically from the 8th Finance Commission
(1984–89) when the weightage to population was reduced to 22.50%
of the income tax, and 25% of the Union Excise duty @25%; this has
further shrunken. But until the 14th Finance Commission (2019–24),
the weightage went up and down but remained overall in the 20s. In the
14th Finance Commission, population’s weightage to all taxes was 27.5%.
In the 14th Finance Commission, the following were the criteria and
weightage: population (25.5%); income distance (50%); areas adjusted
infrastructure was 15%; and forest cover 7.5% (Reddy and Reddy 2019:
97–98).
Transfer of resources from the Union to the States on a five-yearly
basis has thus been regular, and increasing, the long jump in this
regard took place in the 14th Finance Commission when the overall
percentage of transfer was raised from the existing 32–42%. The 15th
Finance Commission (2021–2026) provided for 41% as vertical transfer
to the States—1% less in order to adjust the situation in the wake
of the demotion of J & K from statehood to Union Territory. With
grants, the States’ share of the divisible pool of taxes now is 50% plus,
which surpasses all previous commissions. This Commission followed
a modified formula as follows: area (15%); population (1971) 17.5%)
and population (2011) 10%; fiscal capacity/income distance9 (50%);
74 H. BHATTACHARYYA

and forest cover 7.5%) (https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2015-

2016/es2014-15/echapvol1-10.pdf (15th FC chapter10, vol.1) sighted
on 11/3/22). The Special Category States (now 10 in number) continue
to receive favourably discriminatory per capita transfers which are far
above the General Category States. Within the Special Category States,
those which are hilly and have a sizable number of Scheduled Tribe
population get even better per capita transfers.

Notes
1. Bird has in fact discussed in a paper with Valliancourt (2000) how Canada’s
linguistic and cultural diversity impact fiscal federalism there. For details
see their chapter ‘The role of Intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in
maintaining an effective state in Canada’ (pp 189.229).
2. See Nehru’s Preface to V. Elwin’s A Philosophy for NEFA. Shillong:
Government of Assam, 1957/1959).
3. The last two were inserted after 1992 in the wake of the passage of 73rd
and 74th Constitutional Amendments Acts for Panchayats and Municipal-
ities respectively when the rural and urban local self-governments in the
States were made constitutionally obligatory. Previously such provisions
were there in the Constitution under Article 40 (in chapter Directive Prin-
ciples of State Policy) which was and still is under States’ competence but
not obligatory.
2. Consider the following provision under Article 371A of the Indian
Constitution with respect to the state of Nagaland:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, (a) No act
of Parliament in respect of (i) the religious or social practices of the Nagas;
(ii) Naga customary law and procedure; (iii) administration of civil and
criminal justice involving decisions according Naga customary law, and;
(iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resource, shall apply to the
state of Nagaland unless the Legislative assembly of Nagaland by a reso-
lution so decides.’ (Bakshi, P. M. (2009) The Constitution of India (New
Delhi: Universal law Publishing House Pvt. Ltd), p. 308. This, beyond
doubt, compromises with the sovereignty of Indian parliament, but then
that was an instance of the extent of asymmetry allowed for the sake of
accommodating diversity in India’s often very difficult circumstances.
4. It is not surprising that there is among some States of India a competi-
tion for being considered as ‘Special Category States’. It was in the news
that Bihar went all its way to get it by collecting a few hundred thousand
signatures of the people, and citation in some 1800 books in defence of its
claim in order to woo the investors. But the plea was turned down by the
Central government (The Statesman, Kolkata dated 2.4.12).
 5 POLITICS OF FISCAL ASYMMETRY IN INDIA 75

5. Rao and Singh (2005: 71) however argue that the so-called strategic
geographic considerations used to justify special category states are often
exaggerated because such states as created exercise bargaining power greater
than their political importance in terms of their size.
6. The government of Nagaland brought the issue to the attention of the
Sarkaria Commission but the latter did little except leaving it to the practice
of bargaining and negation, something which can only take place among
equals (Rao and Singh 2005: 69).
7. This was so Inserted by the 73rd Constitutional Amendments 1992
(effective from 1993).
8. Provided for under Article 243-l of the Constitution after the passage of
the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992 with the same
functions as the central Finance Commission but in this its duty is limited
to financial transfer from the States to the local self-government bodies, and
to recommend for the sum required for the next five years to the central
Finance Commission. However, the all-India scenarios in this regard is not
very optimistic, for many States have not formed such Commissions.
9. It is a very complex criterion but ultimately it benefits the backward States.
For details, see Reddy and Reddy (2019: 95).

References
Arora, B. 1995. Adapting Federalism to India: Multilevel and Asymmetric
Innovations. In Multiple Identities in a Single State Indian Federalism in
Comparative Perspective, ed. B. Arora and D. Verney. New Delhi: Konarak
Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Chapter 3.
Bakshi, P.M. 2017. The Constitution of India, 14th ed. New Delhi: Universal
Law Publishing.
Bhattacharyya, H. 2001. India as a Multicultueral Federation: Asian Values,
Democracy and Decentralization (In Comparison with Swiss Federalism).
Fribourg: Institute of Federalism.
Bhattacharyya, H. 2015. Indian Democracy and Federalism: The Growing
Salience of Diversity-claims over Equality-claims in comparative and Indian
Perspective. Regional and Federal Studies 25 (3). https://doi.org/10.1080/
13597566.2915,1052965.
Bird, R. 2000. Rationale and Form of Decentralization. In Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations in Fragmented Societies, ed. R. Bird and T. Stauffer, 1–11.
Fribourg: Institute of Federalism.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Nehru, J. 1957. Preface to V. Elwin’s book The Philosophyfor NEFA. Shillong:
Government of Assam.
76 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Ra, G., and T. Sen. 2011. ‘Federalism and Fiscal Reforms in India’ Working
Paper. National Intitute of Public Finance and Policy, 211–84. New Delhi.
Rao, G., and N. Singh. 2005. The Political Economy of Federalism in India. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Reddy, Y.V., and Reddy, G.R. 2019. Indian Fiscal Federalism. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press.
Watts, R.L. 2008/1999. Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed. Ontario: Queens
McGill University Press.
 CHAPTER 6

Ethnic Cleavages and Federal Asymmetry

Introduction
Ethnic cleavages in India have paved the basis for federal asymmetry in
most cases. If one takes into account the majority of States in India, most
of them were created and carved up ethnically so that India’s States can be
said to be ethnic States. As we have seen in Chapter 3 above, some kind
of ethnic consideration was at play in demanding Statehood in the Indian
federation although it took many round to right-size them (Bhattacharyya
2019a: 81–99) However, there remained cases in which special provisions
had to be made to address special issues of geography and strategic loca-
tions, poor-resourced bases, and the presence of ethnic tribal peoples. The
formal-legalistic understanding usually does not take the content, that is,
the social and cultural basis of why federal asymmetry is demanded and
positively conceded to.
While in the rest of India, ethnic diversity and the resultant conflicts
have since the early 1950s (in staged processes) (Bhattacharyya 2019b:
81–99) been accommodated and managed by a set of territorial institu-
tional strategies, this has not so happened in the North-East of India
which has perhaps most difficult cultural diversity relative to territory,
and whose territorial trajectories were more complex. Formerly Jammu &
Kashmir (It was a very special case), Himachal Pradesh and Uttrak-
hand are very hilly and shared international borders, and resource-poor
so they were made special category States. If we consider the ethnic
cleavages, Jammu & Kashmir, although India’s lone Muslim majority

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 77

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_6
78 H. BHATTACHARYYA

State, it was actually three regions with three distinct ethno-religious

peoples: Muslim majority in Kashmir, the Hindu majority Jammu and
the Buddhist majority Ladhak. The asymmetric status of the former J & K
guaranteed under Article 370 that provided for a large area of autonomy
which no other States in India enjoyed. But its asymmetric status had
little to do with the internal ethnic cleavages than the circumstances
in which it ‘acceded’ to the Indian Union (Menon 1956; Anderson
2014). But the case of Himachal Pradesh, ethnically rather quite homo-
geneous with about 95% of the 8 million (about) people being Hindus
and Hindi speakers, and a small (about 5%) belonging to nine tribes,
was made a Special Category State’ since 1971, the year it was formally
recognized as a State in the federation. The story of its integration
with the Indian Union was very complex, and the State’s (comprising
some 30 princely States) political identity dwindled a lot Bhattacharjee,
2016: 316–21). The State had little or no internal ethnic conflicts but
there were economic conflicts for the princely ruler maintained a kind of
feudalism and slavery. It was known for long as a very peaceful country.
Unlike Himachal Pradesh, the achievement of a Special Cattery Status by
Uttarakhand was not easy, for despite its distinct ‘pahari identity’ born of
as an inclusive all ethnic identity, the making of the State out of Uttar
Pradesh in 2000 and the SCS status in 2001 when the NDA government
led by the BJP leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee was ruling at the Union level.
The movement for a separate statehood for the hilly regions of Garwal
and Kumauni regions was very old, but successive government at the
Centre and of the State of Uttar Pradesh maintained a niggardly attitude
to the plight of the hill peoples, and consequently Statehood was denied
to them. The unfoldment of the process of statehood for the regions was
chequered with its ups and downs, and the dirty political games played
out by various national level and regional and caste-based party politics
(Bhattacharjee, 2016: 340–352). The State was very backward in develop-
ment terms for many decades since 1947 surviving on remittances (nicked
named ‘money order’ economy) sent by the youths who were working
elsewhere in India.
Beyond those three above, most of the asymmetric States were found
in India’s North-East—a region (except Sikkim) in which there were
significant cases of sub-State federal asymmetry too, (I have termed them
‘asymmetry within asymmetry’.) and also where all eight States were until
very recently Special Category States (Bhattacharjee 2016).
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 79

This is India’s most strategic and security region with long interna-
tional borders, and where the demands for identity, autonomy and power
have invited more frequently state violence resulting in an unending war
like situation between the security forces of India, on the one hand, and
those on the other side of the fence, the ethnic rebels, on the other hand.
In other words, ethnic diversity of the region has provided for a fertile
ground for ethnic radicalism and violence. In post-statehood situation in
the rest of India, radical ethno-nationalism—whether of the Tamils, the
Telegus, the Marathas, the Gujaratis, or the Sikh (post-1966)—subsided.
In those cases, the territorial solution in the form of statehood has
worked. In the late 1950s and 1960s, territorial strategies for statehood
with autonomous powers accompanying the non-territorial but symbolic
recognition of identity turned the Tamil secessionists into the defenders
of Indian sovereignty and law and order. (Hardgrave jr. 1965: 399–407)
In the case of Punjab, the radical Sikh ethno-nationalists were accom-
modated within even a truncated and shorter Punjab (post-1966) (Nayar
1968; Singh 1994). By contrast, in India’s North-East, the same strate-
gies have not worked to ensure durable ethnic peace and political stability.
Unlike other regions of India, ethnicity and territory do not match with
each other neatly in the North-East. In the more improved political situa-
tion in the region since the 1990s, the militants surrendering arms to join
the ‘mainstream’ looks like a routine affairs.1 The Bodo Peace Accord
signed on 27/1/2020, the third of its kind, is a very recent case in point.
Sikkim’s route to be considered as a SCS and its inclusion in 2012 in
the North-East was simply a decision from the Centre to consolidate the
entire region under the overall direction and control of the ministry of
MDoNER of the Union government. In the North-East the territorial
solutions to ethnic conflicts have worked out sometimes, but have often
resulted in more conflicts. The complex ethno-territorial trajectories of
the region vis-à-vis ethnic diversity and identity are explored to show the
objective imperatives for designing multi-layered asymmetric solutions, as
well as to show why the same stands in the way of durable solutions to
ethnic conflicts in the region.

Demographics: Ethnicity and Diversity

India’s North-East comprising today eight States of the federation—
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Sikkim (added in 2012) and Tripura—remains very diverse, ethnically
80 H. BHATTACHARYYA

speaking, strategically significant and the hotbed of varieties of ethnic

radical politics. Das (2010: 45–47) offered an inventory of 77 armed
militant ethnic outfits still operative in the region (except Sikkim). The
number of such organizations has of course dwindled over the decades
since the 1950s in consonance with the changes in the outer polit-
ical environment. This region shares India’s international borders with
Bangladesh, on the west, (and south and east too for Tripura) and
Myanmar, China, and Bhutan, on the east and North-East. The so-
called ‘North-East’ was not known as such before 1947 but a creation
of the Indian state in 1972 by way of the North-Eastern States Reorga-
nization Act in Indian Parliament in 1972. During the British colonial
rule in India, the region comprised of four territorial units: Assam (as a
directly governed province), NEFA (today’s Arunachal Pradesh), Manipur
and Tripura as two princely kingdoms (with ‘indirect’ British control),
and Sikkim as a British ‘Protectorate’. Today’s Meghalaya, Mizoram and
Nagaland were the Hill Districts (predominantly tribal inhabited) within
Assam. During colonialism, the Hill Districts were ‘excluded’ and ‘par-
tially excluded’ (Chaube 1999) so that people from other parts of India
could not access those regions. After India’s independence (1947) the
Nagas rebelled and declared independence—pioneering the tradition of
ethnic radicalism in the region—but eventually after a long period of
rebellion and war with the Indian armed forces, settled down for a sepa-
rate State (1963) with special rights.2 Political insurgency, ethnic conflicts
and violence vis-à-vis the heavy hand of the Indian security forces have
most often served to mark the region out as ‘not normal’, and added a
blot on the process of democracy, participation and development in the
region. Given the special territorial trajectory of Sikkim which was added
to the region as late 2012, Sikkim would not fit with the rest of the region
in matters of the common problems afflicting it. No wonder, a kind of
insurgency framework of understanding has dominated the discourse on
the region (Kumar 1996; Bhaumik 2009; Baruah 2005, 2009; Chaube
1989). Baruah (2005) made an interesting point when he argues that
some States such as Arunachal Pradesh may not have ethnic militias but
nonetheless are not immune from them. He adds that since there are
Nagas inhabited areas in Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Assam, the
Naga militancy has spread over to these States (Baruah 2005: 5). The
Naga insurgent groups, most notably the Naga Socialist Council (NSC)
(Issac-Muiva) demand inclusion of such areas in their proposed Nagalim,
the greater Nagaland.
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 81

The deployment of military and para-military forces in the region, only

second after Kashmir (Bhaumik 1999), was more frequent as an aid to
civil order (Table 6.1). Civil order was difficult to obtain despite the intro-
duction of democracy based on adult suffrage in the region since 1952.
No wonder, various repressive laws of the Indian state, most notably, the
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958), have been imposed on the
States on various occasions.3
While the security forces of India have been deployed to restore civil
order in the region for decades (Table 6.1), things improved a lot since.
The better performance records of the States in the region, discussed
below, particularly from the 1990s are a proof of an atmosphere of
development and governance.

Table 6.1 Army

Year Place Reason Duration
deployed in aid to civil
order in the North-East, 1973 Assam Language riots 13 April–17
1973–1983 May
1973 Arunachal Tribal violence 13–18 June
Pradesh
1973 Imphal, Riots 13–21
Manipur September
1980 Assam Anti-foreigner’s February
stir (continuously)
1980 Tripura Tribal violence 7 June–14
November
1980 Meghalaya Tribal Unrest 17 April–17
May
1980 Nagaland Tribal violence 23–30 July/15
November*
1981 Assam Anti-foreigner’s Continuously
stir for 1 year
1982 As above As above As above
1982 Arunachal Tribal unrest 17 July–21
Pradesh August
1983 Northeast Anti-insurgency Continuously

Note The data in chapter 4 above has shown remarkable improve-

ment in law and order in the region as well as in Himachal
Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Source Cohen, S. P (1988) in Kohli
A ed. pp. 121–22
* It refers to a Naga federation, or gretaer Nagaland that inlcudes
the Naga-inhabitated areas in the neighbouring States
82 H. BHATTACHARYYA

The data in Table 6.2 show that the signing of ethnic accords
(Memorandum of Settlement, or Agreement) remained a frequently used
instrument for the transformation of the ‘rebels into stake holders’ in the
region and the basis of some territorial concessions to the militants who
found joining the Indian political process as a better option (voice) than
secession (exit option). Usually following the bipartite or tripartite peace
accords, the legislation has followed for institutionalization of the accords
and for participation which served the basis on which the insurgents of
yester years became the rulers by becoming either the Chief Ministers and
other ministers in the case of statehood, or some other incentives within
the system. In some other cases, ethnic peace accords were the instrument
for the rehabilitation of the militant who surrendered arms. However, the
same methods were not followed in the creation of the other asymmetric
States including the former J & K.
Sharing the country’s international border with Bhutan, Nepal, China,
Myanmar and Bangladesh, the region is marked by the extreme diversity
of social structures, languages, religions, and ethnic groupings, a large
presence of immigrants, the single largest concentration of tribals, the lack
of development (until about the 1980s), and relative deprivation, on the
one hand, and the persistent sub nationalism and political extremism, on
the other. The region’s population is estimated to be 45,587,982 (2011)
which was around 3.76% of the total population of India.
As evident from Table 6.3 below, the region is still sparsely populated;
of them, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram are still more sparsely popu-
lated compared to India as a whole. The region’s current level of decadal
growth of population is rather stable but historically that was not the
case. Due to India’s Partition (1947), the region, particularly Assam and
Tripura, received millions of refugees from across the border from East
Bengal (pre-1947), which became East Pakistan (1947–1971) and now
Bangladesh. In the wake of the Bangladesh war of independence further
migration took place disturbing and upsetting the demographic balance
in the region. In Assam, the rate of decadal growth of population during
1951–1961 and 1961–1971 was very high—35 and 34.7% respectively
compared to all India average of 21.6 and 24.6% respectively (Weiner
1978, 82). Weiner (1978, 75–143) shows, in greater detail, how this
huge demographic transformation became the roots of ethnic conflicts
in the State subsequently. In Tripura, the migration of Bengalis from East
Bengal and later East Pakistan reduced the local population (aboriginal
peoples) during 1941–1951, and later in 1951–1961 to a small minority
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 83

Table 6.2 Ethnic peace accords in India’s North-East

Name of Accord Date Nature Place Issue

Naga-Hydari 26–28 July 1947 Bipartite Kohima Naga Rights

Accord
16-Point 27–28 July 1960 Bipartite Shillong Naga Statehood
Agreement (Naga)
Shillong Accord 10–11 November Bipartite Shillong Surrender of arms
(Naga) 1975
Suppl. Shillong 5 January 1976 Bipartite Shillong Surrender of arms
Accord (Naga) and rehabilitation
Assam Accord 15 August 1985 Tripartite New Delhi Foreigners’
Mizo Accord 30 January 1986 Tripartite New Delhi Statehood to
Mizoram
TNV Accord 4 May 1988 Tripartite New Delhi Tribal causes
(Tripura)
1.1.1.1.ATTE 23 August 1993 Bipartite Agartala Tribal causes
Accord (Tripura)
Hmar Accord 29 September Bipartite Aizawl Hmar tribal
(Mizoram) 1993 causes
Bodo Peace Accord 20 February 1993 Tripartite Guwahati Bodo tribal
(Assam) causes
Bodo Peace Accord 10 February 2003 Tripartite New Delhi Bodo autonomy
Framework** 3 August 2015 Bipartite Nagaland Nagalim*
Agreement

Source Bhattacharyya 2018, p. 56

* It refers to a Naga federation, or gretaer Nagaland that inlcudes the Naga-inhabitated areas in the
neighbouring States
** It refers to a Naga federation, or gretaer Nagaland that inlcudes the Naga-inhabitated areas in
the neighbouring States

in their own state. The result was the loss of habitat to the settler Bengalis
in Tripura who came to dominate the state politics.
This region is reported to have as many as 215 Scheduled (constitu-
tionally recognized) Tribes (said to be the aboriginal peoples) and many
more which are not yet recognized as such to be entitled to constitu-
tional special protection and privileges. Of the eight States of the region,
four are predominantly tribal (aboriginal) inhabited (of them three are
predominantly Christian4 ) and there are significant proportions of them
in the rest (Table 6.4).
The data offered in columns second and third in Table 6.4 merits
some explanation for an adequate understanding of the depth of ethnic
diversity in each State in the region. The percentage figure in the third
column is very broad which is to be qualified by the data in column first.
For example, while it is true that 68.8% of the population in Arunachal
84 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Table 6.3 Population and areas of states in NE and India, 2011

State Area (sq. km) Population Density (per sq. Growth Rate*
km) (%)
Arunachal 83,743 1,383,727 17 26
Pradesh
Assam 78,438 31,205,576 398 17.1
Manipur 22,327 2,570,390 115 18.6
Meghalaya 22,429 2,966,889 132 27.9
Mizoram 21,081 1,097,206 52 23.5
Nagaland 16, 579 1, 978,502 119 −0.6
Sikkim 7,096 610,577 86 12.9
Tripura 10, 486 3,673,917 350 14.8
NE total 255,083 45,587,982 174 –
All India 3,287,263 1,210,193,422 382 17.64

*indicates the decennial growth rate during 2001–2011. Source Basic Statistics of North Eastern
Region 2015, North Eastern Council Secretariat, Shillong, pp. 1–4

Table 6.4 Tribes and

States Number of tribes Percentage to
their percentage to
population
population in the
North-East (2011) Arunachal 101 68.8
Pradesh
Assam 23 12.4
Manipur 28 35.1
Meghalaya 14 86.1
Mizoram 5 94.4
Nagaland 20 86.5
Sikkim 6 33.8
Tripura 18 31.8

Source Basic Statistics of North-East India (2015), p. 7

Pradesh are tribal but then they are 101 tribal groups and sub-groups—
each having their own identity and culture (perhaps inhabiting a little
territory of their own) and speaking a dialect. In Tripura, 31.8% tribal
refers to as many 18 tribal groups and sub-groups; in this case too each
of them has its own dialect although Kok-Borok is the lingua franca.
The intricacies of such diversity are to be read in conjunction with the
linguistic diversity in each State. The 50th Report of the Commissioner
of Linguistic Minorities, Government of India (2014) contains detailed
information of the linguistic diversity in each State.5
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 85

In Arunachal Pradesh, there is no majority language group, and hence

there is no dominant ethnic group. There are significant speakers of three
8th Schedule languages (i.e. Bengali, Hindi and Nepali). The majority
speak different tribal dialects lacking in scripts so that the official language
of the State is English. The State was created in 1987 without any distinct
identity basis, and movement for the same. However, after India’s inde-
pendence the erstwhile NEFA evolved into a Union Territory in 1971,
and finally a State in 1987 (Mukherjee 2014: 90–92).6
In Assam, the major State in the region with 68.45% of the region’s
total population in 2011, the Assamese speakers are found to have lost
their majority for the first time. In 1971, the Assamese speakers were some
60.89% of the total population so this loss of majority is likely to create
ethnic tensions among the Assamese in days to come. The linguistic diver-
sity in the State is immense because apart from the Assamese, Bengali,
and Bodo/Boro, the major language speakers, there are a plethora of
languages spoken, not all of which are officially recognized. The recent
decline in the percentage of Assamese is due to the relative decline
of Assamese speakers and the increase of Bengali speakers in seven
districts in the Brahmaputra Valley during 1991–2001 (The Hindu 9
October 2016). Assam has experienced territorial contraction since pre-
independence days, and more particularly since the 1960s when its Hill
Districts were separated; Nagaland was conceded as a State in 1963; and
in 1972 Mizoram and Meghalaya were conceded statehood. This added
to a greater percentage of Assamese to the total population but a diverse
ethnic situation remained. The dwindling demographic numbers of the
Assamese gave birth to ethnic militancy arising from the majority commu-
nity (i.e. the Assamese) in the form of the ULFA and the AGP among
others. Ethnic minorities have mobilized themselves in militant forms for
the protection of their identity. Various Bodo organizations have cropped
up for a State of Bodoland in the northern banks of the river Brahma-
putra. A Bodoland Territorial Authority has been conceded in 2003 but
it has created more problems than resolved (Bhattacharyya, Hausing and
Mukherjee 2017). Beyond them, there are demands for further territorial
separation out of Assam by different ethnic minorities group such as the
Karbi, Dimasa and the Nagas. Assam and Nagaland share a long 434 km
border, east of Assam, and there is a long drawn dispute (border) between
the two States over some territories on the border areas. The Nagalim
(greater Nagaland) demand of the Naga rebels (NSCN-IM) includes parts
of Assam’s territory.7
86 H. BHATTACHARYYA

In Manipur, the erstwhile princely State like Tripura, although the

Manipuri is spoken by the majority this majority is not high. There are
a lot of speakers of other tongues which are not all recognized officially.
Manipuri is the official language of the State but English is adopted as
an additional official language. There is still controversy about the script
to be used for Manipuri. The people in Manipur are diverse living in the
hills (41.1%) and the valley (58.9%). The people living in the plains are
also ethnically divided and profess different faiths. There are Kuki and the
Naga settlement in the valley—the Nags comprising the second largest
after the Meitei (Manipuri). There are some 29 tribes living in the hills
generically grouped into the Naga, the Kuki and the Zo. There are many
sub-groups among them too. The Nagalim demand of the Naga rebels
includes parts of Manipur inhabited by the Nagas.
When the State of Meghalaya was conceded in 1972 it was understood
to be the State of the whole people of Meghalaya, and that the ethnic
rebels fighting for Statehood were the representatives of the whole people.
But it turned out to be otherwise. It turned out that the Khasis, the domi-
nant tribe, got the State, and hence the second largest ethno-linguistic
group, i.e. the Garos, were unhappy and began demanding a State of
their own, which is yet to be fulfilled. The Khasis and the Gaors are the
two major linguistic groups, but then there is immense ethno-linguistic
diversity in the State (Table 6.4). It was created as an autonomous state
within the state of Assam on April 2, 1969. It comprises of the United
Khasi-Jaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills District. It became a fully
fledged State in 1972. And yet, statehood has not been able to resolve
inter-ethnic conflicts in Manipur.
Mizoram is the lone tribal State in the region whose dominant Mizo
community speaking Mizo/Lushai constitutes 73.21% of the total popu-
lation. This has served to ensure enduring ethnic peace in the State
although the Hmar tribe has been demanding some territorial autonomy
and protection of their identity for long; the Brus are the others.
However, the greater ethnic homogeneity in the State has produced
better governance results.
Contrary to all claims for a coherent Naga nationhood and solidarity,
Nagaland contains very diverse linguistic groups so that there is no
single Naga group as a majority in population. The two largest linguistic
groups—Ao and Konyak—constitute respectively 12.94 and 12.46% of
the total population. The various other groups have a population which
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 87

is significant in number in a State with a small population. This ethno-

linguistic diversity undercuts the demand for a homogenous Naga identity
has given birth to numerous ethnic rebels. However, the State of Naga-
land was offered a unique asymmetric federal status under Article 371A.
It says:
‘Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, —a. No Act of Parlia-
ment in respect of—

i. Religious or social practices of the Nagas,

ii. The Naga customary laws and procedure,
iii. Administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions
according to Naga customary laws,
iv. Ownership and transfer of land of the Naga unless the Legisla-
tive Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides……’ (Bakshi,
2017: 391).

The Naga case is an example of a kind of semi-sovereignty that no

other States in the Indian federation enjoys.
Sikkim is diverse too although its majority Nepali community has
majority (62.61%). The other language groups are smaller in number and
proportions. But the State has had a different trajectory, and shared very
little with the North-East. For a long period, it was a ‘feudal’ dynasty
which the British protected with its indirect control. After 1947 India
extended the protection but incorporated it into the Union of India in
1974 and made a State in 1975. In the 1960s and 1970s there were
attempts to construct a common Sikkimese (national) identity though it
turned out to be fraught with a host of problems stemming from a multi-
cultural social mosaic (Hiltz 2003). But the State has a distinct regional
identity, which again is multicultural, which sets it apart from similar
identity in the North-East.
Tripura’s linguistic diversity is not as complex, for the Bengalis and the
Tripuri/Kok-Borok languages cover more than 92% of the population.
But there is persistent and long drawn ethnic conflict in the State. The
roots of the conflicts lie in the fact that the tribals (Tripuri/Kok-Borok)
plus others such as the Mogh, Manipuri, Halam, and Garo speaking
(together about 31.8%) who were the original inhabitants of the princely
State were reduced in the wake of long drawn migration of Bengalis to
a minority. This entailed loss of land and habitats to the settlers on the
88 H. BHATTACHARYYA

part of the tribals. This has complicated the sense of identity both among
the tribals and the settlers Bengalis whose territorial loyalty is more to
the State, and the areas of East Bengal (East Pakistan) from where they
migrated respectively. In a detailed empirical survey, Mitra (2012: 59–
61) explained why a quarter of the people had reported (in a national
survey) themselves as not citizens of India with reference to the regions
and localities of their origin.
The above analysis suggests that a common identity in each State,
let alone in the region, remains a far cry. Each unit of the federa-
tion is ethnically heterogeneous, and most often territorially rooted, and
provided for fertile grounds for political mobilizations for identity and
autonomy. Often one dominant group has claimed power and autonomy
for the whole lot of people but once in the corridors of power, it has
discriminated against the other groups; or the minorities newly created
have expressed grievances against the dominant group in power. The latter
has followed suit for further territorial division for the protection of their
identity through the application of the principle of federal asymmetry.
Whether demanded by the minority tribals or not, there are some ten
Autonomous Tribal District Councils in the region since 1951, which are
yet to be taken up for a separate detailed d study.

Limits to Territorial Solution:

Demands for More (Survey Data)
Statehood and sub-state territorial status conceded to the ethnic groups
in the North-East have not been able to resolve all territorial issues and
hence ethnic conflicts. Territorial solutions in the region have given rise
to the demands for further territorial divisions in nearly all States in the
region excerpt Sikkim, where the extent is very limited. Such demands are
unavoidably linked to complex ethno-linguistic diversity we have exam-
ined above. In this section I will present evidences from elite interviews
conducted on the States during 2015–2016. 10 elites (politicians, MLA
and Ministers including former Chief Minister, senior civil servant, senior
journalists and academics) from each were selected on the random basis
to provide the answer to our question: Are there demands for territorial
restructuring in your State? If so, please give some examples? We take up
Arunachal Pradesh, an unlikely case for consideration of further territo-
rial divisions, first. This State was created in 1987 by upgrading it from
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 89

the status of Union Territory (directly governed by the Central govern-

ment) (1962) and without there being any strong political movement for
statehood. This small State (1.38 million people) is ethnically extremely
diverse, as we have seen above. 59 of 60 Legislative Assembly seats are
reserved for the tribes (101 in number) and the State is very sparsely
populated. And yet, in answer to our question above, 9 out of 10 elites
responded, and of them, 8 reported positive. The elites confirmed that
there was no demand for a separate statehood out of the State, but
there were demands for smaller territorial units such as Union Terri-
tory and Autonomous District Councils. One well-informed respondent,
the sub-editor of the Arunachal Pradesh Times, said that there were
demands for Autonomous District Councils in Mon, Patkai, and Ziro,
and a UT demand for Siang belt (Dated 20/9/16 at Itanagar). In the
case of Meghalaya, 9 out of 10 respondents reported positive. In most
cases, the demand for a separate State of Garoland for the Garos, the
second largest tribes in the State, the demand which was supported by
the legendary Garo leader late P N Sangma, the former Speaker of the
Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha). Some respondents did mention also the
demands for a separate state for the Khasi-Jaintia where an Autonomous
District Council is established. On the basis of the experiences of state-
hood in the region it has been found out that the Union Territory status
and the Autonomous District Councils have been the stepping stone
for demanding statehood. Assam remains almost perennially the fertile
ground for demands for territorial divisions in a State which has borne
the brunt of state contraction most. In the case of Assam, all respondents
reported positive and mentioned various cases of territorial restructuring.
Mr Prafulla K Mohanta, the former Chief Minister, a founder of the
AGP and powerful student leader in the late 1970s and 1980s,8 opined:
‘Yes, almost all ethnic communities in Assam are demanding statehood—
Boros, Rabhas, Mishing Rajbansis….’. (Dated 22/6/15 Guwahati). The
Vice President of the Assam State unit of the BJP Mr Chandrakant Das
was cynical: ‘Bodoland, Kamptapuri, Rajbansi….Not in every 50 sq km
area in Assam is composed of just one ethnic group’. (Dated 21/6/15
Guwahati). One top civil servant of Assam opined:
‘Yes, the Bodos, the Mishings, Rabhas, all are demanding separate
territory for them’. (30/6/15). The President of the Hind Majdoor
Sabha, Mr Ajay Dutta saw the tree in the woods:
90 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Whatever movements are taking place they are benefiting the elites
among the ethnic groups. The identities are not asking; it’s their leaders
who are demanding.” (Dated 22/6/15).
Mizoram in the North-East is considered the most successful tribal
ethnic State whose records of enduring peace after statehood remain
remarkable. It is also the most consolidated tribal state in the sense that
the Mizos comprise the overwhelming majority in population. Therefore,
on the face of it, Mizoram is an unlikely case of witnessing demands
for territorial restructuring. However, there are three Autonomous Tribal
District Councils in force in Mizoram, namely, Chakma, Lai, Hmar and
Maro. But there are demands for the Bru Tribal Autonomous District
Council in the State as well as by the Hmar. The Bru tribes, said to
be displaced by the Mizos, are sheltered in refugee camps in Tripura
for a long time. Of the many small tribal communities, the demand of
the Hmar tribal for more powers to their District Council was recog-
nized in a bilateral agreement (Ethnic Peace Accord) between the Hmar
People’s Convention and the Government of Mizoram in 1993 for more
powers and autonomy to the Hmar Autonomous Tribal District Council
including their demand for recognizing their language as an official
language in the State and a medium of instruction at the primary school
level.9
The case of Nagaland is set apart from the rest. Out of 10 respondents,
8 reported positive on one point: unification of all Nagas living in the
North-East under Nagaland. Consider the representative response offered
by Mr. Z. Lohe, Treasurer, Nagaland Congress Party, 4 times MLAs in
Nagaland Legislative Assembly and former Speaker of the Assembly:
No 13 of the 16-Point Agreement10 is that ‘the other Naga tribes
inhabited in the areas contiguous to Nagaland will be allowed to
join, if they so desire, Nagaland’.11 This is to be implemented. The
Naga Legislative Assembly passed four Resolutions on Naga integration
(Dated 2/7/16). There was, however, a lone exception. One respondent
mentioned that there were demands for ‘Eastern Nags of Mon, Tuensang,
Lenglon and Kiphike districts for a separate state’ (A civil servant dated
27/6/16). The unresolved Naga problems today is confined to their
demand for Nagalim12 a greater Nagaland by incorporating the Naga-
inhabited areas in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur—which is a
difficult demand to fulfil because the affected States would not be willing
to concede their territory. Such a demand if conceded to, will have far
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 91

reaching consequences for India’s multiculturalism, and may pave the way
for the country’s ‘balkanization’.

Conclusion
From the above account it is clear why statehood and sub-Statehood
in the North-East have been rooted in complex ethnic cleavages in the
region, and do apparently not work in favour of some enduring ethnic
peace. But there are records of relative peace, and for some States long-
term peace. Most of the States and some District Councils have worked
and shown competitive records of governance, development and better
identity fulfilment (This has been discussed in Chapter 7 and will be
further discussed in Chapters 9 & 10, and Conclusion). States in the
region are small in size and the minority tribal ethnic communities except
perhaps the Garos in Meghalaya are still smaller with pockets of territorial
concentration. It is also clear from the interviews and the exiting texts on
the politics of the region that however small the tribal communities are
in size and importance they (i.e. the elites) routinely form militias, artic-
ulate their demands in the rhetoric of ethnic self-determination, of which
the region, as shown in Baruah (2010), can boast of producing many, and
demand some territory following the provisions of the 6th Schedule of the
Indian Constitution, or otherwise. As Baruah (2005: 5) has observed:
The sheer number of militias in North-East is extraordinary. Indeed
it might appear that any determined young man of the numerous ethnic
groups of the region can proclaim the birth of a new militia, raise funds
to buy weapons or procure them by aligning with another militia and
become an important political player.
Demographically, the region is home to 8.6% of the tribal population
of India; four States are predominantly tribal: Arunachal Pradesh, Megha-
laya, Mizoram and Nagaland. Of the four, three are Christian dominated.
The other States also contain significant numbers of tribals. The total
tribal population in the region is approximately 26% of the region. In
terms of religion, Hindus are 54. 23%, Muslims, as the second largest
group, are 25.15% and Christians are 17.31%. Buddhists are not dominant
in any States (although they are 11.78% of the population of Arunachal
Pradesh). Ethnic militancy in the region has been found among the
tribals as well as non-tribal, Hindus as well as Muslims and Christians,
hill people as well as plains people. Unlike religion, language and tribal
92 H. BHATTACHARYYA

ethnicity have (and still do) played a powerful determining role inthepo-
litical processes in this region. Such loyalties and identities have remained
very active in political mobilizations for political recognition of identi-
ties within Indian federalism. This has called for both the territorial and
non-territorial solutions to the categorical problems. Territorially, this had
involved different degrees of statehood (from tribal, district, and regional
councils, often through associate statehood, to finally statehood as a
federal unit with autonomous powers). The non-territorial accommoda-
tion, through official recognition of language and its eventual placement
in the 8th Schedule of Indian Constitution, which entitles the particular
linguistic community to certain rights in matters of official communica-
tion and instruction etc., symbolic satisfaction of linguistic identity has
worked well. As I have argued elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2008), the ethnic
elements of nationhood in the region are very thick, and their civic ties
of nationhood are thin comparatively speaking. When the ethnic ‘nations’
in the region share little with the others in their own State, they hardly
share their identity concerns with the others in the other States in the
region. The question of common sharing of identity and values with
the others in the rest of India thus simply does not arise. Oddly, their
incessant demands for identity, (territorial) autonomy and power are at
variance with the very poor resources available, given that the region is
heavily dependent on the Centre for funding, and then there is the cost of
government itself. Emotions born of ethnicity most often does not take
care of the practicality in governance.
An important factor that has more easily turned the ethnic groups
to take up arms is the deployment of security forces in the region. To
the outside world the region has generally been known as India’s ‘insur-
gent country’ (Bhaumik 1999: 322). The region’s ethnic movements and
politics, persistent political militancy, ethnic genocides13 and geographic
isolation have made it a ‘problem area’ of India. The States in the region
share India’s international borders, particularly with China and Myanmar
and hence have witnessed, unavoidably, deployment of security forces
on a regular basis. For Indian rulers since independence, the region has
remained a major security concern, and many of the policies for ‘national
integration’ have been adopted through a security paradigm. A large
number of India’s security forces have been deployed in the region, only
second to the numbers deployed in Kashmir (Bhaumik 1999: 326)14 , and
the AFSPA has regularly been in force except in Tripura. This securitiza-
tion of the region has failed to quell the large number of ethnic militant
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 93

and political outfits15 fighting for autonomy and/or secession. Beyond

doubt, this securitization of the region has increased dissatisfaction and
the support for movements challenging the writ of the state (although it
is important to stress that the intensity of conflict varies markedly across
the different States for reasons very specific to the states concerned).
In economic terms, the region’s resource bases are meagre. Histor-
ically, about 80% of the region’s revenue has come from the Centre.
Because of their backwardness, isolation and strategic location, until 2014
all the States of the region were Special Category States (SCS) that
received (favourable) asymmetric financial treatment from the Centre.16
The abolition of the Planning Commission in August 2014 raises now
questions about the future financing of the region. There is much
resentment among the elites of the region against this decision.
Finally, contrary to what Baruah (2005, 2010) would have us believe,
the formation of militias in the region is not the entire story. Since
the day of the famous Naga-Akbar Hydari Ethnic Peace Accord (26–27
June 1947) with the Naga rebels followed by the ‘16-Point Agree-
ment’ (1960), institutionalization of ethnic radicalism has also taken place
in which the ethnic rebels have decided to give up arms in favour of
joining the democratic political process, taking part in elections and finally
forming the government by them. This has happened in most States, and
served to pave the basis for democratic power-sharing and taking part in
governance. The ethnic radicals in the region have also learnt that the
simply rebellious action does not pay, and for long, and leaves them with
little space. The other side of ethnic rebellion in the region since the days
of the Nagas in 1947 and then from the 1960s remains negotiation for
peace (read power and autonomy) and a share in power. The governments
of the days at the State and Central levels have also sought a negotiated
settlement, and bipartite and tripartite peace agreements (Datta 1995)
that have most often worked. This has transformed yesterday’s rebels into
tomorrow’s stake holders (Mitra and Singh 2009). The past militant AGP
in Assam of the Assamese (majority), not of the tribals, took part in Ethnic
Peace negotiation in 1985, took part in elections, got into state power in
1985, and 1991, and ruled Assam for the next ten years.17 The other case
is the Mizo National Front, one time formidable ethnic rebel organiza-
tion, entered into the bipartite (The MNF and the Government of India)
ethnic agreement known as the Mizo Accord (Memorandum of Agree-
ment) in 1960, (Datta 1995: 146–151) transformed itself into a political
party,18 took part in elections which returned them to power in 1989 and
94 H. BHATTACHARYYA

in 1993 as the dominant party (in coalition) and governed the State till
on its own from 1998 to 2008 winning successive elections. As a result
of this process of institutionalization of ethnic radicalism in North-East in
and through a democratization process, the space for ethnic rebellion has
been minimized, and that the region has a better record of the manage-
ment of ethnic conflict and peace since the 1990s has to be explained
with reference to the politics of institutionalization of ethnic radicalism
and the resultant governance, treated elsewhere with detailed statistical
data (Bhattacharyya 2018).

Notes
1. In Tripura, 4 militants (ethnic radicals) belonging to the National
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) surrendered before the Border
Security Forces (BSF) yesterday at eastern border at Rajbari under
Rashiyabari police station in Dhalai district. According to Border Secu-
rity Force officials, the militants surrendered without arms, as they
confessed that the NLFT had been facing shortage of arms and
other resources that compelled them to surrender. The surrenders
were identified as Milan Mohan Tripura (38), Niranjoy Tripura (20),
Danto Mohan Tripura (24) and Raiya Tripura (37) of the same
district. (https://thenortheasttoday.com/4-national-liberation-front-of-tri
pura-militants-surrender-in-tripura/ (sighted on 27 August 2017).
2. Article 371-A of the Indian Constitution says: Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Constitution—-
a. No Act of Parliament in respect of: (i) religious or social practices
of the Nagas; (ii) Naga customary law and procedure; (iii) administration
of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to the Naga
customary law; and (iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resources,
shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of
Nagaland by a resolution so decides.’ (Bakshi 2017: 391–92).
3. On 3 August 2017 the entire State of Assam has been declared as ‘dis-
turbed areas’ under the above law. Areas near Meghalaya’s border areas
adjoining Assam and three districts in Arunachal Pradesh have also been
declared as ‘disturbed’ under the AFSPA for two more months with effect
from August 3. (The Hindustan Times 7 August 2017).
4. These are Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland.
5. See 50th Report of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities in India
(July 2012–June 2013) (www.nclm.in) accessed on 20/2/22).
6. See Mukherjee (2014: 90–107) for more details on state formation in the
region.
 6 ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND FEDERAL ASYMMETRY 95

7. The map of Nagalim, released by the NSCN-IM, includes the Karbi

Anglong and North Cachar Hills District of Assam as well as parts of
the districts of Golaghat, Sibasagar, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, and Jorhat. The
unresolved dispute is deeply rooted in the history of British colonialism in
the region since the late ninetieth century.
8. He was in the forefront of the campaign against foreigners and the illegal
immigrants in the late 1970s and early 1980s. His party the Asom Gana
Parishad (AGP) was returned to power in 1985 and again in 1991 and
ruled the State for 10 years before conceding defeat to Congress. This
party was out of power for a long time since the 19990 s but has joined
the BJP led state level coalition government in Assam in 2016 with its 14
Assembly seats.
9. For more details, see Datta ed. 1995 Ethnic Peace Accords in India (New
Delhi: Vikash Publishing House Pvt. Ltd), p. 152.
10. This was signed between the Naga People’s Convention and the Govern-
ment of India in July 1960 (see Datta ed. 1995, pp. 156–61).
11. This statement was under Point 13 was not true. In the actual Agreement,
the Government of India did not so commit. (Datta 1995, pp. 159–60).
12. There many such Naga groups, based in the neighbouring coun-
tries, especially Myanmar, but six of them are of any signif-
icance, and the Government of India is keen on negotiation
with them. https://thenortheasttoday.com/naga-accord-nagaland-gov
ernor-urges-nscn-k-to-join-peace-talks/ (sighted on 28/10/17).
13. Tripura in 1981 (Mandai ethnic riots) see Bhattacharyya, H. (1999).
Communism in Tripura. Delhi, Ajanta Book International for details,
Assam before 1985 and now in the Bodoland areas.
14. These include the BSF and several para-military forces like the Assam
Rifles, the Gurkha Regiment and the CRPF.
15. Das (2010: 45–47) reported that there were some 76 such organizations
in the region.
16. These states have traditionally received 90% of India’s Planning Commis-
sion’s disbursement of funds as grants and 10% as loans. In comparison,
the general category ‘mainstream’ states received 70% of central funds as
loans and 30% as grants. In addition to the seven states of the North-
East, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim
also enjoyed Special Category Status.
17. It is reported that sixty-eight militants (ethnic rebels) along with a
huge cache of assorted weapons such as AK series assault rifles, surren-
dered on Monday 14 August 2017 in Manipur before Manipur Chief
Minister N Birendra Singh at the parade ground of the 1st Battalion
Manipur Rifles. The ethnic radical groups they represented were as
follows: 23 from Kangleipak In Tripura, 4 militants (ethnic radicals)
96 H. BHATTACHARYYA

belonging to the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) surren-

dered before the Border Security Forces (BSF) yesterday at eastern border
at Rajbari under Rashiyabari police station in Dhalai district. According
to Border Security Force officials, the militants surrendered without
arms, as they confessed that the NLFT had been facing shortage of
arms and other resources that compelled them to surrender. The surren-
ders were identified as Milan Mohan Tripura (38), Niranjoy Tripura
(20), Danto Mohan Tripura (24) and Raiya Tripura (37) of the same
district. (https://thenortheasttoday.com/4-national-liberation-front-of-tri
pura-militants-surrender-in-tripura/ (sighted on 27 August 2017).
The AGP today is a junior partner in the coalition government in
Assam led by the BJY (since 1026). The Bodo People’s Front, another
ethnic radical party, has also followed suit. Although AGP has joined the
BJP led coalition government in Assam in 2016 it has not given up its
regionalism and localism for development, employment and empowerment
in government and non-government sectors. The Bodo People’s Front
came out of the erstwhile militant outfit (Boland Tigers Force) in 2001.
18. The specialized knowledge on Mizo politics suggests that much credit is
due to the MNF as a political party and its leadership for far better ethnic
peace in Mizoram than elsewhere in the region. (See for details, Hassan,
M. S. 2010 ‘The Mizo Exception: State-Society Cohesion and Institu-
tional Capacity’ in Baruah, S ed. Beyond Counter-Insurgency Breaking
the Impasse in North-East India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
207–31.

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 CHAPTER 7

The Making and Unmaking of the Special

Category States in India

Introduction
The concept of Special Category States (SCS) in India (discontinued in
2018) was associated with India’s asymmetric federalism from 1969, and
also a part of India’s Planning process. It was not constitutionally so
provided, but there are references in the Constitution for providing grants
to the States as well as for treating some States with special rights and
privileges. Therefore, the notion of SCS was not anti-constitutional. But
it must be said that the notion was associated with a political economy
of India dominated by the public sector and command economy. As was
true with the abolition of the Planning Commission (2014), which was
a misfit for a free market economy, the notion of SCS was also a part
of the same political economy. Today, the notion is no longer there, but
its spirits remain in a modified form in the provision for Normal Plan
Assistance.
The criteria followed in considering an SCS were many: hilly and
difficult terrain; low population density; sizeable presence of the Sched-
uled Tribes population; strategic geographical location on international
borders; backward infrastructure; and non-viable state finance (Bhat-
tacharjee, 2016: 3). Beginning in 1969 with three Special Category States
such as Nagaland, Jammu & Kashmir and Assam, other States have been
added to the list in different times. During 1974–1975, five States were
added: Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya and Sikkim. In 1990,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 99

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_7
100 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram received the status; and in 2001, it was
Uttarakhand’s turn.
Until 2018, 11 States (all eight States in the North-East, Jammu
and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand) were Special Category
States. The concept of SCS was introduced in 1969 by a Cabinet deci-
sion when the 5th Finance Commission wanted to extend preferential
treatment to certain States by providing them financial assistance and tax
breaks. But it was not until 1974–1975 that the category came to be
known as such. The factors are taken into consideration in deciding the
SCS were hilly and difficult geographical terrains; low density of popula-
tion; sizeable share of tribal peoples; locations at the international borders;
and economic and infrastructural backwardness (Bhattacharjee, 2016: 2–
3). In 1969 only three States received such status, namely, Jammu and
Kashmir, Assam and Nagaland. SCS was granted by the NDC on the basis
of the recommendations of the Planning Commission (abolished on 15
August 2014, the NITI Aayog taking its place). But it remains an extra-
constitutional arrangement. The Fifth Finance Commission is said to have
recommended a ‘liberal dose of central assistance’ to those States (Bhat-
tacharjee 2016: 4). All the SCS were located in the periphery of India.
For our specific purposes, the SCS status was an important example of
asymmetric federalism in India, something linked to diversity and identity
needs. For the SCS it was enjoying double status: asymmetric and SCS.
As we will soon below, these States’ performance records in development
and governance over the last thirty years have been commendable, and
often above the all-India average.
There is some confusion, however, whether after the abolition of the
Planning Commission, and the introduction of the market economy, the
SCS still exist or not. Reddy and Reddy (2019: 180–82) argue that they
exist in a much diluted form as those States still receive Normal Plan
Assistance from the Centre on the basis of the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula.
On the basis of the data provided in Table 1.6 in Bhattacharjee (2016:
33), it is seen that the quantum and per cent of transfers to the SCS has
since 1969–1974 (fifth Finance Commission) have increased from 9.80 to
12.48% in 2010–2015. The Statutory transfers have also increased: 35.9%
in the same year to 68% in 2005–2010. From the records of the Home
Ministry dated 11 December 2018 it is learnt that the Special Category
State status had ceased to have existed although Normal Plan Assistance
was given to those States.
 7 THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE SPECIAL CATEGORY … 101

Table 7.1 Gadgil-Mukherjee Formula

Criteria Weightage in per cent

Population 60
Per capita GSDP 25 (20% for States below the national average; 5% for all States in
distance method)
Performance 7.5
Special problem 7.5*

*It is a function of some other factors. Source Reddy and Reddy 2019: 197

Since its inception in 1969, the SCS have been offered Plan assis-
tance by then Planning Commission, now by the Ministry of Finance,
Government of India, by following a formula—long known as the Gadgil
formula, later modified as Gadgil-Mukherjee formula. D R Gadgil was an
economics and Vice-Chairperson of the Planning Commission. The so-
called Gadgil formula prescribed that of the total Plan Assistance 30%
should be earmarked for the SCS; of the sum 90% is to be given as
grants and 10% as loans. This is in contrast with the general category
States which receive 70% as loan and 30% as grants (Reddy and Reddy,
2019: 14–15). The distribution of the assistance money, population is the
predominant factor; other factors are backwardness, fiscal performance,
special problem, etc. (Reddy and Reddy, 2019: 15). In the beginning
(Table 7.1), population weightage was not very high (60%).
Third, there were ministerial transfers to the States though of a small
per cent. Beyond those there are other special funds for the Backward
Districts Development Grant Fund and the fund for Border Development
etc. Of late Centre’s/Prime Minister’s special financial packages to some
States have also meant some asymmetric transfers. The Finance Commis-
sions since 1993 have been earmarking grants for the Panchayats and
Municipalities and the Autonomous Tribal District Councils through the
concerned States governments.

SCS: Development and Governance

Although SCS has been withdrawn, the performance records of such
States in terms of development and governance have remained stellar
often above the national average. Data in Table 7.2 show how since 1990
all the SCSs improved their lot in terms of the Human Development
102 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Index. Except Assam all the SCSs in 2018 have performed in HDI above
the national average. Assam has also registered development and its record
in 2018 of 0.614 is only a few point lower than that of the all-India
average of 0.645. The Special Category States including those with asym-
metric status and powers have been jealous about their ethnic identity and
territory. However, language as part of ethnic identity remains problem-
atic for some States in the North-East. For example, Nagaland, Mizoram
and Meghalaya language has never been an issue; their statehood demand
was based on tribal identity. These States are Christian dominated, and
the movements for statehood on the basis of Christianity was initially
launched, but very soon, realizing that in India religion-based territory
would not be conceded, switched over to tribal ethnicity (Weiner 1978).
A detailed statistical study by Malhotra (2014) on the records of
their development and social well-being during the period of 1981–2011
shows various performance levels, but also their competitive records in
governance, development and the protection of their ethnic identity. As
the data in Table 7.3 below shows all the SCSs have made progress in
terms of Policy Effective Index (PEI) from 1981, and their records are
even higher than the all-India average. The PEI is a composite index
of some variables such as the rule of law, attacks on women, liveli-
hood opportunity, households without safe drinking water, sanitation and

Table 7.2 Performance of the SCS in HDI (1990–2018)

States 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018

Assam 0.411 0.447 0.488 0.531 0.567 0.567 0.614

Arunachal Pradesh 0.437 0.471 0.502 0.535 0.641 0.641 0.661
Manipur 0.495 0.526 0.559 0.598 0.681 0.681 0.698
Meghalaya 0.456 0.469 0.477 0.533 0.620 0.620 0.656
Mizoram 0.525 0.547 0.547 0.630 0.686 0.699 0.705
Nagaland 0.531 0.533 0.557 0.621 0.661 0.679 0.679
Sikkim 0.541 0.548 0.548 0.590 0.633 0.631 0.691
Tripura 0.447 0.448 0.531 0.561 0.608 0.608 0.643
Himachal Pradesh 0.479 0.530 0.589 0.644 0.667 0.667 0.701
Jammu & Kashmir 0.493 0.511 0.528 0.587 0.640 0.640 0.674
Uttarakhand 0.629 0.635 0.630 0.656 0.641 0.641 0.684
All India 0.431 0.463 0.498 0.539 0.582 0.527 0.645

Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_states_and_union_territories_by_Human_Develo
pment_Index (sighted on 22/2/21)
 7 THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE SPECIAL CATEGORY … 103

electricity etc. Those sub-variable are also composite (Malhotra, 2014:

148–156). Assam, the largest State in terms of population is of course a
slow mover, and the case of Sikkim is not to be comparable with the rest.
The former State of Jammu & Kashmir was a slow mover till 1991 but
afterwards it made it up. Himachal Pradesh has been a fast mover. The
records of Mizoram are the highest of all the States which is due to rela-
tively enduring ethnic peace, and more homogenous population than the
rest. The Nagas have kept the home front well, and its record is higher
than the all-India average.
It seen from Table 7.3 above, the States have since the 1980s consis-
tently progressed with some notable records such as Mizoram and
Nagaland. Uttarakhand since its formation in 2000 has not fell behind.
Jammu & Kashmir has made considerable improvement since the late
1990s.
In terms of Human Development Index of the UNDP (Table 7.2)—
income, health and education—all the States have held on to their rate
of progress, in all cases keeping their records above the all-India aver-
ages. Contrary to popular perception, the records of Jammu & Kashmir
have consistently outperformed all-India average. The political scien-
tific conclusion that one may arrive at here is that the SCS status and
other asymmetric arrangements have well responded to the questions of
backwardness and under development that such States have often been

Table 7.3 Policy Effectiveness Index

State/UT 1981 1991 2001 2011

Arunachal Pradesh 0.188 0.243 0.303 0.345

Assam 0.177 0.193 0.220 0.232
Himachal Pradesh 0.239 0.268 0.290 0.359
Jammu & Kashmir 0.188 0.258 0.308 0.347
Manipur 0.275 0.280 0.330 0.328
Meghalaya 0.248 0.327 0.374 0.383
Mizoram 0.229 0.335 0.424 0.493
Nagaland 0.261 0.372 0.341 0.371
Sikkim 0.237 0.388 0.503 0.566
Tripura 0.193 0.257 0.262 0.302
Uttarakhand – – 0.255 0.311
INDIA 0.205 0.228 0.246 0.285

Source Malhotra Rajeev, India Public Policy Report, (2014), p. 148

104 H. BHATTACHARYYA

accused of. It is also seen from the available data that in some cases
the records of these States in 2018 were comparable to those of the so-
called advanced States of India: for example, the development index of
Jammu & Kashmir in 2019 (0.688) is above that of Karnata (0.683);
Gujarat (0.672) and Telangana (0.669), and comparable, internation-
ally, to that of Morocco. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_
states_and_union_territories_by_Human_Development_Index (sighted on
22/2/21).
The SCS status has been withdrawn but special funding for the North-
East has not decreased, but increased a lot, in fact. From 1996, the Union
government announced ‘New Initiatives for North Eastern Region, one
of which was the policy to earmark at least 10% of the Plan budget of
the Union ministries for the development of the region’ (Annual Report
of the MDoNER 2021–2022) (https://mdoner.gov.in/contentimages/
files/Annual_Report_2021-22.pdf) (sighted on 14/3/22). According to
10% of the Plan Budget of the Union Ministries has since been named
as Plan Gross Budgetary Support (GBS). The formation of a separate
Department for the Development of North Eastern Region in 2001 in
the Union government, and later a separate Ministry of Development
of the North Eastern Region (MDoNER) in 2004 was a continuity
in public policy on regional development added with several other
funded projects by the international and national agencies. This was a
unique institutional arrangement focused on infrastructural development,
empowerment, communication and social and economic development in
the region—connected to the implementation of India’s Look East Policy
(1992)/Act East Policy (2014–). This Ministry is a nodal agency that acts
by pooling resources from several other ministries. Under the aegis of the
Ministry a plethora of projects for multifarious activities have been under
taken, and a massive amount of funds have been earmarked and released
under such projects as the Central Pool of Resources for the region,
Hill Areas Development programmes, North Eastern Livelihood Projects,
Special Development Package for the BTC and other Autonomous Tribal
District Councils. Many of those projects are associated with the Ministry
of Home Affairs, the Railway Ministry, Civil Aviation and so on, and
some of them have a grants portion. In the financial year 2022–2023,
a huge sum of Rupees 76,040.07 crores was the total budgetary alloca-
tion for the Ministry (Annual Report of MDoNER 2021–2022). Several
development projects of the Central government have been carried
out in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand for better connectivity, and
 7 THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE SPECIAL CATEGORY … 105

the records of both the governments are exemplary. Like other ex-
SCSs, these two States also receive Central Assistance as per the Gadgil
formula provided a certain number of projects were implemented on
time (https://www.constructionweekonline.in/projects-tenders/15334-
himachal-pradesh-implements-32-amrut-projects) (sighted on 14/3/22).
The above institutional arrangements and funding for the ex-SCSs
are to be seen as further examples of asymmetry in financial disburse-
ment in Indian federalism thus far neglected in the existing studies. True,
the formation of a Union Ministry of the MDoNER and its nodal role
appears to be a kind of centralization, but then the Ministry functions
in association with the State governments, which have to provide for the
administration of the tasks. Many of the projects are implemented by the
sub-State levels local governments, urban and rural as well as Autonomous
Tribal District Councils. The MDoNER’s Annual Report of 2021–22
offers detailed statistical data on the implementation of various projects
and its effects in the region. Substantial reduction in poverty level has
also taken place in the region. There is in the MDoNER list of project of
the special funding for the Scheduled Tribes in the region. The evidence
offered above on indices of HDI as well as governance in the region and
Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand seem to testify to the relative success
of many programmes and projects undertaken by the MDoNER and its
predecessor DoNER.

Conclusion
The concept of SPC was withdrawn in 2018 although the practice of
giving plan assistance (Central Plan Assistance) remains for the erstwhile
SCSs. However, an element of ‘condition’ has been added. Those States
still received the assistance on the basis of the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula.
To be sure, the SCS system was a part of the planned economy which
no longer exists nationally. As part of the major institutional reforms
being carried on since the early 1990s, most of the institutions of the
bygone days have been abolished, and some of them have been replaced
by new institutions. Bhattacharjee (2016) argued that the reason the SCS
were introduced way back in the early 1963 was partly political, and the
mode of such disbursement was entailed an element of ‘discretion’ that
was beyond the statutory allocation by the Finance Commission. The
Gadgil formula in grants allocation to the SCS was designed to remove
106 H. BHATTACHARYYA

any element of discretion and discrimination. Given the records of devel-

opment and governance given above it is not easy to explain away the
effectiveness of such system of financial assistance to the hilly and border
States. In the shifting political economy of neo-liberalism sweeping the
country, the erstwhile SCSs are placed in a dilemma: they are unable to
attract private investment, foreign or national, and yet, they have to be
competitive. The choice is hard.

Bibliography
Bhattacharjee, Govind. 2016. Special Category States of India. Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Malhotra, R. 2014. India Public Policy Report. New Delhi: Oxford University
Press.
Weiner, M. 1978. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Official Sources
Annual Report of DoNER (various years).
 CHAPTER 8

Asymmetry Within Asymmetry in India

Introduction
Indian federalism is perhaps a lone case of having asymmetric within
asymmetry in constitutionally guaranteed institutional arrangements. This
means that India’s asymmetric States have within them sub-State level
asymmetry and respective political institutions under the 6th Schedule of
the Indian Constitution that provides for tribal self-governance for the
hill tribes of North-East India and offers autonomous powers to govern
and develop. For non-asymmetric States in the rest of India, the tribals in
millions were not as lucky for them the 5th Schedule for a Tribal Advi-
sory Council was provided, an asymmetric structure of sorts, but not as
empowering as the 6th Schedule. Unlike the 6th Schedule, the Tribal
Advisory Councils are subject to control of the State government; and it is
also not a democratic body like the Autonomous Tribal District Councils
under the 6th Schedule.
In Chapters 2 and 3 above there is a more detailed analyses of different
forms of asymmetry throughout India with different degrees of powers
and autonomy. In Chapter 3, I have discussed in detail the various forms
federal asymmetry at the state and sub-State levels. Chapter 2 contains
a detailed discussion of the debates that took place in the CA on tribal
self-governance. Here my focus would be on the 5th and 6th Schedules
as per Constitution and the application by amendments of the latter to
respond to a unique situation.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 107

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_8
108 H. BHATTACHARYYA

5th Schedule (Under Art 244(1))

This Schedule was designed for ‘administration and control’ of Scheduled
Areas and Schedule Tribes in the States except those of the North-East.
There is a Provision for a Tribal Advisory Council (TAC) in each State
having Scheduled Areas consisting of nor more than twenty members of
whom three-fourths shall be representatives of the Scheduled Tribes in
the concerned State Legislative Assembly. If the said number of MLAs are
not found, then the remaining seats shall be filled by other members of
those tribes. Thus the MLAs are members of the TAC, and the job of the
Council is to advise on matters pertaining to welfare and advancement of
the Scheduled Tribes as may be referred to them by the State Governor
(Bakshi 2017: 421). The State Governor has been empowered by the
Schedule to make regulations of the areas as well as to make exceptions
to the laws of the State Legislature or Parliament if they are found to be
appropriate for the areas. As it has been made more clear by the verdict
in the case of Sudhakar B Kadu vs the State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR
2014 MP 69 (DB) (Bakshi 2017: 421) that the Governor is competent
to enact provisions restricting transfer of land located in the Scheduled
Areas between tribals and non-tribals.
Tribal Advisory Council has been formed in many States including
Himachal Pradesh which has a smallper cent of tribals (about 4 lakh)
but belong to several tribes and sub-tribes. The TACs have not yet
attracted scholarly attention, but the many court cases in several States
regarding the vital issues of land transfer, forest resources and mining
operations are an indication that the relative lack of adequate protection
to the tribals living in the Scheduled Areas the TACs having been formed
notwithstanding. The Government of India Tribal Affairs Ministry’s own
document have highlighted the vital issues and also used the judgement
of many court verdicts (Land and Governance under the Fifth Schedule).

6th Schedule
The 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution provides for the formation
of Autonomous Tribal District Councils for the hill tribes of North-
East India. This is more empowering than the 5th Schedule applicable
 8 ASYMMETRY WITHIN ASYMMETRY IN INDIA 109

to Scheduled Areas and Tribes in the rest of India; but the latter offers
the Tribal Advisory Council only advisory capacity. By contrast, the 6th
Schedule has autonomous powers over many matters affecting the hill
tribes of the district so formed. For our purpose, such Councils that are
formed at the sub-State level are examples of asymmetric federalism, and
to be more precise, asymmetry within asymmetry.
The above Articles of the Indian Constitution provide for the consti-
tution of an autonomous tribal district within a state by the Governor
of that State, and the formation by elections, on the basis of universal
adult suffrage, of an Autonomous Tribal District Council consisting of
30 members out of which 26 are to be elected and not more than four
shall be nominated by the Governor of the State concerned. The term
of office of this Council is five years like any such body corporate in the
Indian polity.
The District Council has been provided with a range of legislative,
executive and some quasi-judicial powers. The fact that it is provided with
powers to make laws makes it more autonomous than the 5th Schedule,
and semi-sovereign , so to say. Its legislative powers pertain to: allotment,
occupation, or use, or the settlement of land, other than reserved forest,
for the purpose of agriculture or grazing or for residential or other non-
agricultural purposes, or for any other purpose that promotes the interests
of a village or town within its jurisdiction; the management of any forest,
not considered as ‘reserved forest’; use of any canal or water course for
the purpose of agriculture; the regulation of the practice of jhum or any
other forms of shifting cultivation; the establishment of a village or town
committee or council; village or town police, public health and sanitation;
the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen; the inheritance of
property; marriage and divorce; and social customs. The Council has also
the power to levy taxes and collect the same on lands and buildings, and
tolls on persons residing within the area; professions, trade, calling and
employment; animals, vehicles and boats; the entry of goods into a market
for sale; and for maintenance of schools, dispensaries or roads, and so on.
The Council has also the power to make regulations for the control of
moneylending and trading by non-tribals within its jurisdiction. All laws
made by the Council take effect only upon having received the assent of
the Governor of the State concerned. It is also to be pointed out here that
just as in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the Council has executive powers on
laws made by it. Beyond that, the Council has powers to establish primary
schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle pounds, ferries, fisheries, roads and
110 H. BHATTACHARYYA

road transport and waterways. There has been a provision of a District

Fund for the administration of the district under the overall control of the
Governor in respect of payment into the District Fund, or the withdrawal
of money from it. There is also a provision for royalty sharing in respect
of mineral within the Council areas between the Council and the State
government.
The Council has been provided with some quasi-judicial powers in
respect of administration of justice in the autonomous districts, and that
too, for the tribes, and for this the Council is empowered to create village
councils or courts. The latter shall exercise the powers of appeal in respect
of all suits and cases triable by a village courts or council.
The quasi-sovereign character of the Council under the 6th Schedule
is further evident in the provision (Clause 12AA) which states that
‘notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no Act of the
Legislature of the State of in respect of the District Council, may make
laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State shall apply to the Council
areas in respect of prohibiting or restricting of any non-distilled alcohol
liquor (Bakshi 2017: 423–41).
Currently the following Autonomous Tribal District Councils are in
operation in the North-Eats: the North Kachar Hill District, the Karbi
Along District, the Khasi Hill District, The Jaintia Hill District, the
Garo Hill District, the Tripura Tribal Autonomous District, the Chakma
District, the Mara District, the Lai District, the Bru Autonomous District
Council and the Bodoland Territorial Council. Of them, the Bodoland
Territorial Council is an odd man out. This was major deviation made in
respect of extending the 6th Schedule to Plain tribes on the Northern
Bank of the river Brahmaputra, and that too, to the Bodo whoa are
a minority in the areas. There is another deviation involved here: the
majority of 46-member Council has been reserved for the Bodo minority
seats in the Council have been reserved, ostensibly, to make the minority
Bodos a political majority. The extension of the 6ht Schedule was done
by an amendment of the 6th Schedule by the parliament in 2003 (w.e.f
7/9/2003) (Bakshi, 2017: 424) Out of 46 seats, 30 are reserved for the
Bodos; 5 reserved or non-tribal communities; 5 open to all; and 6 to be
nominated by the State Governor from the unrepresented communities.
The Bodos thus have been given an in-build and structural majority. This
arrangement has made the non-Bodos of many communities and tribes
too vehemently opposed, and they began to organize themselves against
the Bodos (discussed at some length later in the book on the chapter on
 8 ASYMMETRY WITHIN ASYMMETRY IN INDIA 111

the BTC) which has seen persistent ethnic violence in the areas, and thou-
sands from the Bodos and non-Bodos in relief camps. This has seriously
affected the functional effectiveness of the Bodoland Territorial Council.

Ethnic Cleavages and Tribal

Autonomous Districts: How Far to Go
The Autonomous District Councils were predicated upon the ethnic
cleavages and the special needs for self-government for the minority
tribes. The underlying principle is self-determination. The founding
fathers of the Indian Constitution were divided between the two opposed
methods of integration by way of decentralization through the Councils,
on the one hand, and assimilation but no separate governmental authority
especially in the frontier areas to encourage further separation. A separate
serious scientific study of all the District Councils is yet to be undertaken.
So demanded, District Council defeats all rationale of government and
public finance, for any governmental institution involves cost. Second, if
this defeats also the purpose of building a multicultural society and any
bid for ensuring any inter-community amity.
Autonomy by way of the provisions of the 6th Schedule is not to
be misunderstood. It is not absolute, but relative. The Councils have
to work under the overall control of the State Governor, and the State
administration. The funds for the Council comes from the Finance
Commission as well as the State government apart from the Council’s
own revenues, which very limited. There are criticism of the Schedule
for, a top officer, known as the CEO, of the 30-member District Council
is a top civil servant of the rank of I. A. S who is an all-India recruit
by the Union Public Service Commission, New Delhi a Constitutionally
autonomous body, posted in a particular State, and sent out on deputa-
tion by the concerned State government. The critics point out that this
hampers autonomy (Gassah, 1997) of the elected body. This is a wrong
way of looking at the issue: in an elected body dominated by the party
that has a majority may be partisan when the CEO may strike the balance.
Already in the same decade the Councils were introduced for the Garos
in Meghalaya, strong reservations were expressed by former CEM (Chief
Executive Member) of the Garo Hill Autonomous District Mr Williamson
A. Sangma:
112 H. BHATTACHARYYA

By experience, the tribal leaders have found that the provisions of the Sixth
Schedule do not give the hills adequate power to safeguard their interests—
social, economic and political—and that on the contrary there are ample
loopholes for interference from outside in matters relating to day-to-day
administration of the districts. (Quoted in Gassah 1997: 7–8)

Sangma has not supplied though any examples to substantiate his claim
for under the 6th Schedule there is no such scope. In his Introduction to
the study referred to above, Gassah also pointed out that the arrangement
of the 6th Schedule was a ‘fragile’ one:

Lacking in statutory support, the Autonomous District Councils therefore

had to depend on the changing political relation with the state leadership.
The developmental activities of the Autonomous District Councils there-
fore depend very much on the political party or parties that run the state
administration. (Gassah 1997: 9)

This is unavoidable, for who can guarantee that the same party will rule
in both the State government and the Council. B K Roy Burman, raised
the issue which grappled the CA members drafting the 6th Schedule:
autonomy to statehood, or secessionism. He remarks ‘[I] Inadequacy of
the Sixth Schedule to satisfy the self-management urge has stimulated
two types of responses from the communities concerned (Roy Burman,
1997: 23). First, it has encouraged the tribals to seek alternative polit-
ical arrangement within India in the form of statehood on which the
tribal could dominate. Second, this had led to secessionist demand for
a separate state outside of India, and such demands are often articulated
rather violently (Roy Burman, 1997: 23). Stanley Nichols Roy, the son
of the Rev. Nichols Roy, one of the architects of the 6th Schedule in
the Constituent Assembly, engaged in the hill people’s movement since
the 1950s, expressed doubt about the economic authority of the Council
to control trade and commerce conducted by the non-tribals because
the Supreme Court order in 1987 in a case had presumably diluted the
authority of the Council in the matter (Roy 1997: 325–26).
And yet, the 6th Schedule has acquired an enduring legitimacy in
Indian among the tribes and even the non-tribals who demand this to
be extend to their territory. There are many such ethno-tribal movements
for autonomy or self-government in the North-East and even beyond
(e.g. Gorkhaland movement in West Bengal) have been fighting for the
Sixth Schedule status to be extended as a means of political recognition
 8 ASYMMETRY WITHIN ASYMMETRY IN INDIA 113

of their identity. In many cases, the tribal District Councils have been
the stepping stone to higher political status such the Union Territory,
and then finally statehood. Very few have demanded secession outside of
India basing themselves on the District Council. The case of Bodoland
in this book shows that although the Bodoland Autonomous Council
(BAC) was conceded to the Bodos in 1993 with a long list of subjects
to be under the control of the BAC, since it was governed under the
State law, and hence very much dependent on the sweet will of the State
government, the Bodoland movement turned even more violent, and
demanded doggedly the Sixth Schedule status to their territorial authority.
Since the Bodos are Plain Tribesmen, the Sixth Schedule did not origi-
nally apply to them. The Schedule was designed to protect tribal identity
in the hills. But then, in this case, the Constitution was amended as per
provision of the Tripartite Ethnic Peace Accord with the Bodo militants
in 2003, and the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTADs)
was incorporated in the Constitution. In other words, the instrument of
the Sixth Schedule has added legitimacy to India’s constitutional engi-
neering in respect of the aboriginal tribes in India’s North-East but with
a heavy price for the Bodos and non-Bodos, and the records of persistent
violence. Therefore, the limits to autonomy are mostly political in char-
acter i.e. something unavoidable in culturally and politically diverse India.
The institutional ill-designing as the Bodo case will testifies is expected to
produce undesirable effects on governance and development.

Conclusion
Evidently the institutional arrangements for the 5th Schedule raise ques-
tion about the effectiveness of the TAC. The many judicial interventions
in several States testify to it. Unlike the provisions of the 6th Schedule,
the 5th Schedule does not provide a democratic self-governing body
for the tribals in the Scheduled Areas especially when those areas have
proven records of land alienation, extraction of mineral resources and
forest resources. In so far as the 6th Schedule is concerned, every time
a new autonomous tribal district council in the North-East has been
conceded, the said Schedule has been amended. But when in 2003 the
Bodoland Territorial Council was conceded the application of the said
Schedule deviated for the first time from the democratic norms so that
an autonomous tribal district council was conceded to the Bodos who
are a minority within its jurisdiction. It deviated from the Constitution
114 H. BHATTACHARYYA

in another matter: the founding fathers of the Constitution designed the

6th Schedule for self-governance of the Hill Tribes of North-East India.
In this case, it was applied to the Plain Tribesmen. Such measures set,
no doubt, undesirable precedent in the façade of India’s constitutional
democracy.

References
Bakshi, P.M. 2017. The Constitution of India, 423–41. New Delhi: Universal
Law Publishing.
Gassah, L.S., ed. 1997. The Autonomous District Councils. New Delhi: Omsons.
Land and Governance under the Firth Schedule (Ministry of Tribal Affairs,
Government of India and the UNDP) online.
Roy Burman, B.K. 1997. Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. In The Autonomous
District Councils, ed. L.S. Gassah, 15–39. New Delhi: Omsons.
 CHAPTER 9

The Working of Sub-State Federal

Asymmerty in Tripura

Introduction
Institutional designs even if appropriately so formulated to fit the context
do not always work. In a democracy in complex cultural diversity such as
India, representative institutions have not always worked up to the satis-
faction of the citizens. Their effective working depends on a judicious
combination of actor, institutions and context. Political secessionists often
tend to ignore that a political separation does not always work, for forma-
tion and running a government has costs, which the poor resource bases
do not offer.
The Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council (TTADC)—at work
since 1982—is a case of sub-state asymmetry and government which
offers an example, in comparative politics and federalism, of when institu-
tions sometimes work. Institutional effectiveness for us is to be measured
in terms of continuity in political participation, political stability within
and outside, and finally the delivery of what it was pledged: law and
order, and other goods and services. In the case of multi-ethnic body,
inter-tribal amity and equality is a factor that facilitate institutional func-
tioning. As Blondel (2006: 717) wrote, institutions do not work on their
own, but are to be worked, and so worked by the political actors. A
neo-institutional (dynamic) approach recognizes context, institutions and
actors in explaining why institutions sometimes work, and or not. Blon-
del’s approach above indicates his acceptance of such thinking in the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 115

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_9
116 H. BHATTACHARYYA

broad neo-institutional perspective. I have followed the same in this book

including the two case studies.

A Brief History
If an ethnic identity provided the initial impulse to demand a territo-
rial solution via the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution, it was a
Tripuri ethno-nationalist identity which was born in a militant armed
struggle against both the fledgling tribal princely regime in Tripura as
well as the military clampdown of the nascent Indian state in the later
1940s. The main agency that spearheaded this movement was the Gana
Mukti Parishad (GMP), which resisted the state repression, and articu-
lated a powerful tribal identity (Bhattacharyya, 2018: 117–40). However,
the cutting edge of this identity was somewhat blunted in the aftermath of
India’s independence which turned this otherwise tribal State into Bengali
(refugee) dominated one, with the tribals reduced to a minority. The
refugee influx and their eventual settlement in Tripura entailed large-scale
alienation of tribals’ lands to the Bengalis by means fair and foul. This
served to strike a severe blow to the very existence of the tribals in their
own State.
As the history of the communist movement to which the GMP was
subjugated from around the early 1950s1 shows, the GMP found itself
increasingly cornered and desperate to stop any further erosion and
damages to tribal identity in Tripura by voicing its resentment at different
fora, and by advocating for the introduction of available institutional
resources available within the Indian Constitution for the protection of
tribal identity.2
From the detaild accounts of the GMP-communist movement in
Tripura (Bhattacharyya 1999; 2018) it is learnt that the GMP backed by
the Communist Party of India/CPI-M was in the forefront of the move-
ment for the introduction of the ADC in Tripura. As the following will
show, the ADC whether under the 7th Schedule (1982–85), or under
the 6th Schedule (since 1985) was not designed to be anti-Bengali, but
pro-tribal in the tribal compact areas in order to protect the distinct iden-
tity, culture, tradition, customs and ways of life of the tribals. That was
the original intention of the making of the 6th Schedule. In the specific
context of Tripura, the protection of the tribal identity assumed special
significance because no other State in India’s North-East experienced
such a huge demographic revolution that had overturned an originally
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 117

tribal dominated State into a Bengali dominated one. No other State

in India’s North-East, or for that matter, any state in the world, had
faced such a situation of large-scale alienation of land of the tribes to
the Bengali settlers in mostly dubious ways. In no other State in India or
the world, has had witnessed the original inhabitants been reduced to a
small minority in a State which was once their own.
The Tripura Legislative Assembly for the purpose of introducing the
ADC under the 7th Schedule of the Indian Constitution (under the
control of the State) in 1979, and an elected ADC was proposed to be
formed by elections. This triggered a lot of apprehensions among the
Bengalis less than the tribal that perhaps now the Bengalis would be
unsettled and driven out of Tripura. The tenor of the controversy was the
possible effect of the ADC: would it mean the eviction of the Bengalis
out of Tripura? Would it mean that all lands held by the Bengalis were to
be transferred back to the Tribals? This speculation led to major ethnic
riots between the Bengalis and the tribals in 1980 in Mandai in which
more tribals were killed than the Bengali; this happened when late Nripen
Chakrabarti, a Bengali, and member of the CPI-M Polit Bureau, was the
Chief Minister of Tripura.
On the question of the link between the introduction of the ADC and
the riots in Tripura in 1980, late Nripen Chakrabarti, ex-Chief Minister
of Tripura of the first Left Front government denied any link whatso-
ever by pointing out the cases of riots taking places elsewhere in India on
many grounds; he also denied that the charge that the ADC would meant
eviction of Bengalis, or its adverse effects on the Bengalis on the grounds
that (a) only the money-lenders among the Bengalis who grabbed tribal
land by fraudulent means would be affected; and (b) a major portion of
territory under the ADC was hills which were under the control of the
Forest Department as ‘Reserved Forest’. He also pointed out that most
fertile areas of the State, namely, the western part of the State adjoining
Bangladesh, where most Bengalis lived, where most trade, commerce,
cultivation etc. take place; he also made another very strategic point:
in the Tripura Legislative Assembly of 60 members, the tribal M L As
were only 19; but the Bill for the ADC Act was supported also by 38
Bengali M L As (CPI-M, 1981: 3). On the vital question of the role of the
ADC in protecting tribal identity, Chakrabariy’s defence was very cogent,
historically grounded and couched in the tribal nationalist moorings:
118 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Tripura was predominantly a tribal state. By historical compulsions, the

Bengali refugees have entered Tripura. Although the tribals are weaker
they have a distinct identity, language, culture and way of life. Compared
to them, the Bengalis are more advanced, if not the most advanced in
India. They constitute today some 70% of the population. Quite naturally,
there is a fear among the tribesmen in Tripura if they will be able to protect
their identity. There is a fear among them that if they will be able to
develop their national identity. They are not that educated enough; they
are not businessmen; neither are they peasants. They today possess any
good piece of land to cultivate. In the face of a secessionist demand for
an independent Tripura out of India by a section of the disgruntled Tribal
youths, the proposed ADC will promote national integration, provides the
space within which the tribal themselves will protect their national identity,
protect their own language (Kok-borok) and spend the money allocated
to them. (CPI-M, 1981: 3–4)

Late Dasarath Devbarma, former Chief Minister of Tripura, and a

legendary Tribal leader (of the GMP and later CPI/CPI-M) on the ques-
tion of how could the ADC protect tribal interests, sounded very realistic
when he said that the ADC alone could not do all welfare for the tribal
people because, first of all, the full protection of interests was connected
with the end of exploitation in India as a whole and the establishment
of socialism. Secondly, the ADC nonetheless, given the time and space,
could play a fruitful role as an agency of tribal welfare. However, he fore-
warned, the ADC was not going to be a separate state; it was the State
government which would make the laws, which the ADC would only
implement. Even if the ADC wanted to make a law for the tribals it would
have to inform the State government beforehand. Finally, he said that the
State was also responsible for the protection of tribal interests (CPI-M
1981: 8–9). But he also made it a point that in the post-independence
period: the tribal areas have been neglected. Even the minimum efforts for
the development of the tribal areas have not been taken. There has been
gross neglect in respect of developing their culture, language, identity and
economic basis (CPI-M, 1981: 10).
The materials contained in the section serve to suggest that the State’s
communist movement has ‘increasingly recognized tribal nationalism as
a distinct force in the State and not merely as a second-order derivative
of capitalism reducible in the last instance to the economic distortions of
true class consciousness’s’ (Bhattacharyya and Nossiter, 1988: 152).3
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 119

Formation of the ADC

The first elections to form the ADC (under the 7th Schedule meaning
thereby under the State laws) (Table 9.1) was held on 03 January 1982
which were swept by the Left Front under the leadership of the CPI-
M which alone got 19 out of 28 seats on the basis of 56 per of the
popular votes cast. The TUJS (b. 1967), an indigenous tribal youth front,
recognized as such as a political party, got significant number of seats (7)
and 37.5 per popular votes polled. The TUJS managed to increase its
share of seats to 10 in the next elections held in 1985 (under the 6th
Schedule of the Indian Constitution) although its share of popular votes
shrank by 4%. Two other noticeable features of the party performance in
the two elections held within a short span of three years only are quite
significant increase of votes for the Congress (INC): 3 seats with 14.3%%
popular votes, and second, the relative loss of strength for the Left Front,
particularly the CPI-M: its share of seats dropped to 15, and share of
popular votes shrank by about 14%. One would argue that the activities
of the ADC with the backing of the friendly State government in Agartala,
particularly in respect of restoration of lands illegally alienated from the
tribals by the Bengali landed interests and money-lenders to their original
owners must have antagonized the Bengali vested interests which formed
part of INC’s vote-bank in Tripura.
Except 1990 and 2000, the two elections that the Left Front
lost to Congress-TUJS-TNV alliance (1990) and IPFT backed by the
extremist organization NLFT respectively and that too, in the background

Table 9.1 Party

1982 Seats &% of votes 1985 (Seats & %
performance in ADC
polled of votes polled)
(28-member + 2
nominated = CPI 1 (3.3%) 0 (1.4%)
30-member) in 1982 CPI-M 19 (56.5%) 15 (42.3%)
and 1985 INC – 3 (14.3%)
RSP 0 (1.2%) –
FB 1 (1.3%) –
TUJS 7 (37.5% 10 (33.5%)
Independents 0 (0.1%) 0 (1.8%)
THPP – (7.2%)

Source Bhattacharyya and Nossiter, 1988: 152

120 H. BHATTACHARYYA

of considerable pre-poll violence, and charges of rigging and booth-

capturing.4 In the 1990 elections, the magnitude of violence went to
such a passé that out of 864 booths, as many as 724 booths had to be
declared ‘sensitive’ where (Central) para-military forces were deployed.5
Nonetheless the Left Front won in 10 seats (CPI-M = 9 and THPP =
1) and the Congress-TUJS alliance got 18 (Congress = 6 and TUJS =
12). The elections were held when the Congress-TUJS alliance was in
State government, and is alleged to have facilitated the emergence of the
dubious electoral process leading up to massive exercise of violence and
insurgency. The 2000 elections took place when the Left Front headed
by the CPI-M was in power at the State level since 1993 and 1998, but
then the NLFT led insurgency and added violence, and other secessionist
activities were at its nadir in the period up to the elections in 2000. The
Oriental Times reported as much:

The newly floated IPFT, a tribal party, came into existence just before the
elections and registered victory over the Left Front by unleashing a reign
of terror during the run up to the elections. (OT , May 22, 2000)

In this elections the IPFT got 18 seats leaving 10 to the Left Front (CPI-
M = 8; CPI = 1; and FB = 1) Oriental Times (May 22, 2000) gave
more evidence of NLFT violence: it holds the views that all non-tribals
should leave Tripura; it engaged in massive offensive against the non-
tribals with massacre, abductions, arsons and rapes; it abducted many
candidates and their relatives who stood up against the IPFT; barring
Congress, all other opposition parties such as the BJP, TMC, Janata Dal
(U), TUJS boycotted the elections. The tribal extremists thus won the
battle of ballot by bullet, but is said to have missed. Tripura Darpan in its
‘Tathy Panji’ (2011: 117) reported that during 2000–05, the Executive
Committee of the ADC changed hands five times because of intra-party
squabbles. Hence, one could expect very little developmental activities
during this period.
The Left Front regained its hold over the ADC since 2005 with over-
whelming majority. In the elections held in 2010, all 28 seats were won
by the parties of the Left Front in which many other political parties took
part but drew only a blank. However, the Congress party and the INPT
together retains more than 30% popular vote support. The fact that they
could not win a single seat was because at the constituency level, the
margin of support for the Left Parties was too high (Table 9.2).
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 121

Table 9.2
Political parties Seats won Percentage of votes polled
Performance of political
(%)
parties in election to the
ADC, 2010 (May 3) CPI-M 25 60
AIFB 01 1.79
RSP 01 0.05
CPI 01 0.91
INC Nil 21.09
BJP Nil 0.55
AITC Nil 0.28
INPT Nil 11.52
Independents Nil 2.51

Total seats = 30 (28 elected and 02 nominated by the Governor)

Source State (Tripura) Election Commission
Notes Left Front (CPI-M, AIFB, RSP and CPI) together got all
28 seats

In 2015 (4 March) elections to the ADC the Left Front swept the
poll winning all 28 States: the CPI-Ms tally was 25, and its partner CPI,
RSP and AIFB each winning one. But the Front all out defeat in the next
elections in 2021 is not intelligible except one major factor that since
2018 the State has been governed by the BJP in alliance with a party of
the tribals (and arguably secessionist) INLFT.
In (6 April) 2021 elections, of 28 seats, there are only two Bengalis
representing the SC category. Also, of the 26 seats won by the tribals,
there is a fair representation of different tribes in Tripura: 16 Tripuris
(61.53%)6 ; 3 Reangs; 3 Jamatias; 02 Mogs, and 01 each for the
still smaller tribal communities. The Chairman of the Chief Executive
Committee is a Mog (Mongsajai Mog) who represents one of the smallest
tribal communities in Tripura. In the 9-member CEC, only four members
are from the majority tribal community (Tripuri/Devbarma), and the
portfolios are distributed among others: Jamatia, Chakma, Reang, and
Bengali. It is therefore difficult to argue a case of Tripuris’ over domi-
nance in the ADC. On the contrary, other communities have been taken
on board. In the elections to the ADC on 4 May 2015, the Left swept
the poll wining all 28 seats. But in the last elections held on 6 April
2021, with the BJP-INLT alliance in State government since 2018, the
Left drew a blank: the TIPRA, a newly launched party by a surviving
member of the dynasty Kirit Prodyot Devbarma, in alliance with the
INPT, swept the poll by winning 16 and 9 seats respectively leaving one
122 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Table 9.3 Party

Political Parties Vote share Seats won
position in the ADC in
2021 (total seats 28) + TIPRA 37.43 16
2 INPT 9.3 2
BJP 18.72 9
Independents 6.49 1
CPI-M 12.46 0
INC 2.24 0
Total 28

Source The Indian Express 25 February 2022

Notes TIPRA and INPT were in an alliance. The BJP ruling over
the State won 9 seats from 0 in the last time

seat for an Independent candidate. The poll was peaceful and the turnout
was very high (85.74%). The results of this election are very significant
and a turning points in the politics of Tripura, and more particularly the
ADC functioning. It clearly shows that the Left has lost the loyalties of
the tribals. But then the ADC administration under the new alliance will
have to work with their adversary in the State capital, i.e. BJP whose polit-
ical ideology does not accord at all with that the new regional party of
TIPRA which went to the polls with the issue of separation of the tribals
in Tripura territorially into a State outside of Tripura (Table 9.3).
However, the question is if working under the 6th Schedule of the
Indian Constitution and the overall control of the State Governor, that is
a realizable objective or not.

Activities of the ADC: Institutionalization,

Devolution and Delivery7
Since the experiment with the TTADC in now about four decades old it
was not easy to access data of the past periods. Thus my assessment of
the performance records of the ADC is limited to the last ten years or
so. But we can assume that the regularity of elections to form the ADC
and its continuity, multi-party competition, and with high popular partic-
ipation in most cases is a proof of some efficacy. One important point
to consider is its institutionalization in Tripura and visibility beyond the
State. In other words, any assessment of the ADC as a tribal local self-
government body within the State of Tripura must prima facie take into
considerations a few issues. First, the success of an institution of this kind
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 123

requires continuous institutionalization in terms of differentiation in its

structures and functions, and the concomitant legislative empowerment.
Second, such an institution requires undertaking realistic objectives for
fulfilment rather than some unrealizable absolute objectives. Third, since
the ADC was designed for protection of tribal interests in Tripura and
for ensuring their self-government, and that they are mostly poor and
underdeveloped, a pro-poor public policy orientations were also required
to be implemented. Fourth, although the ADC receives grants from
the Finance Commission, and also that it can legislate, it is nonetheless
dependent on the State government for a variety of purposes: legislation;
revenues; projects; and administrative staff. The ADC-State government
relation is thus a serious matter of concern especially when governments
in our times are all-party governments. Fifth, it is a matter of considerable
success of the ADC in respect of differentiation of structures that it has
successfully undertaken to devolve powers down to Village level by insti-
tuting elected Village Committees, as per provisions of the 6th Schedule,
since 2006.
Since its formation in 1982, and more importantly since 1985 (6th
Schedule) the ADC has continuously differentiated its structures in order
to develop a more decentralized administrative machinery but with the
democratic participation of the people at each level. Accordingly, it passed
laws and made amendments to existing Acts for the purpose.
A bureaucratic structure has taken shape in the ADC development
purpose, not in large number to supervise village level development in
which the Village Committees (elected) played the most crucial role
(Table 9.4).
The Zonal and Sub-Zonal Officers supervise in particular the activi-
ties of the Village Committee numbering 527, each assisted by a Village
Committee Secretary. In the Village Committees, the election for which
was held in 2011, the Left Front won 472 out of 527 Committees
leaving only 55 to Congress-INPT alliance. Block level performance of
the parties shows that the Left Front, especially the CPI-M’s, margins of
victory in popular vote share ranged between 60 and 75% (State Elec-
tion Commission, Tripura, 2011). Seats were reserved @33% for women
(in the total members as well as position of Chairpersons), and also in
adequate number for the ST and SC. As a result, as many as 1662 women
members out of 3652 belong to the STs and 20 members belong to
SCs. Similarly, 120 women chairpersons, 494 ST Chairpersons and 13 SC
chairpersons were also elected. The formation of democratically elected
124 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Table 9.4 ADC’s field

Institution Number
officers
Zonal Development Office 4
Sub-Zonal Development Office 32
Engineering Divisions Office 4
Engineering Sub-Division Office 17
School Inspectorate Office 17
Circle Office of Education 65
Education Sector Offices 34
Village Councils 527

Source Hamkraini Yakhlii (in Kokborok) (Development Initiatives

of the TTAADC) (2005–06 to 2009–10) (Khumlung: TTAADC,
2011), p. 27

Village Committees under the ADC since 2006 is a remarkable demo-

cratic achievement of the ADC in decentralization and devolution of
powers and responsibilities for tribal development. This is also an achieve-
ment, democratically speaking, because these Committees replaced the
previous nominated Committees. The relevant Act for the formation of
such Committees was passed way back in 1994 by the TTAADC.8 As of
2012, in the Village Committees (total number being 4165), there are
210 women chairpersons, 317 male chairpersons, 19 SC chairpersons,
494 tribal chairpersons, 1662 women members altogether, and 3652
tribal members. Beyond that, there are 494 Village secretaries posted in
the villages. That is quite an achievement of empowerment of the weaker
sections of society, institutionally speaking. As per provisions of the Village
Committee Act (1994) of the TTAADC, the following are the functions
of the Village Committee:

The Village Committee shall initiate the development schemes for the
Village areas on the control and guidance of the Executive Committee.

The Village Committee may exercise all or any of the following Functions:

a. Sanitation and conservancy of the Village areas;

b. Cleaning and maintaining of Village roads and paths;
c. Construction and maintenance of Rest house in the Village;
d. Maintenance of children, adult and women education9 ;

The Left’s overwhelming electoral victory and the retention of strong

support bases in the villages in the ADC areas as well as over the ADC
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 125

itself over the were a testimony to positive activities undertaken by the

ADC for the tribals over the last few years.10 Simultaneously, the very
poor show of the Congress-INPT alliance (with 55 VCs out of 527) is
also an indictment on what they did for the tribals during 2000–05 when
the latter (with the backing of the former) was in power in the ADC.

Governmental Performance of the ADC

Governmental performance of the ADC means the delivery aspects of
the ADC as administrative and democratic governmental machinery. An
assessment of the ADC’s governmental performance must include the
objectives and goals formulated as defined by the ADC, their realistic
character relative to the surrounding context within which they have to
be implemented. Second, we need also to consider the powers and func-
tions available at hand because the former is contingent upon the State
government that transfers Department (s) to the ADC as per provisions
of the 6th schedule or not.
To take up the second issue first, the State government has transferred
not all subjects, as per the 6th Schedule, but primary school, social educa-
tion, market, rural industries, village roads etc. In other areas of devel-
opment activities, many State government offices have been transferred
and staff (3256) of many categories deputed to the ADC administra-
tion. Thus, such departments as agriculture, horticulture, fisheries, forest,
cooperation, industries, school and social education, language promotion,
health, information, culture and tourism, tribal youth programme, tribal
welfare programme rural development land record and settlement, and
finance are under the over control and supervision of both the ADC
and the State government. The ADC administration, it appears, is to
work in tandem with the State administration. With the above-mentioned
combined governmental-administrative set up, many developmental and
promotional activities have been under taken successfully by the ADC
over the years. Some records of its achievements are outlined below
(Table 9.5).
As per information provided in the Tripura Human Development
report (2007), during 1997–2005 around 34, 349 tribal families have
received land amounting to 34, 598 acres redistributed out of the
Government khas land; in 2005, 7147 acres of land were distributed
among 9000 tribal families. (p. 16) While the report does not make it
clear if the second category of land distributed among the tribal families
126 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Table 9.5 Land

Year Cases approved Areas involved in Hect.
allotment to poor
Jhumia Tribal Families 2006–07 162 28, 768
(2006–07 to 2009–10) 2007–08 271 30, 396
2008–09 451 68, 700
2009–10 364 47, 964

Source Hamkraini Yakhili (Development Initiative of the TTAADC,

2010, p. 73. (Henceforth HY 2010)

was those alienated from them by the Bengali or not. But it is gratifying to
note that the process of land redistribution among the poor tribal families
has remained recurrent activity of the ADC.
Although the Land and Revenue Settlement Department of the
TTAADC is to sanction the proposal for allotment, the power of making
the actual allotment lies with the Revenue Department of the State
government. However, the State government carries out such operation
with the assistance of Sub-Divisional Land Allotment Committees that
select the eligible poor jhumias for the purpose. The official report of the
ADC, the HY 2010 records many achievements of the ADC in respect
of rural development and tribal youth self-employment programme and
their skill development such as motor driving, computer training, Diesel
mechanic, short hand training, black smith, wool knitting, electrical
wiring, carpentry, tailings and beautician and so on. (HY 2010: 69)
There is evidence of success in sustainable tribal development initiative
in respect of rubber plantation and rubber nursery. During 2006—07,
for instance, 2073 hectares of rubber plantations have been raised bene-
fiting some 2073 tribals, involving a cost of Rupees 1059.34 lakh (1 lakh
= 100,000). It is to be noted here that the multiple sources of fund
were utilized for the purpose: Special Central Assistance, NREGA and
the ADC’s Plan Fund. (HY 2010, 67). The Tripura Human Development
Report (2018) recorded that till March 2014 some 8146 acres of lands
had been restored to the tribals (THRP 2018, 46). In the same report it
has been mentioned that 231, 757.375 acres of khas land (government
land) had been distributed among 199,356 families out of which 42%
are tribals, and 17% are dalits (THDR 2018, 47). This has to be read
in conjunction with a pro-tribal and pro-poor State government of the
LF led by the CPI-M. Though a separate human development report on
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 127

the ADC areas is not available, but from the Tripura Human Develop-
ment Report 2018 it is seems clear in the field of education (primary and
secondary) in the districts under the ADC much improvement has taken
place.
Language is the most essential part of one identity. Kok-borok has long
been recognized as the second official language in Tripura. But there is
no one tribal language in Tripura. Tripura’s tribals speak many languages
and dialects. The ADC has therefore has taken various steps to promote,
protect and improve the languages by means encouragement of many
sorts: translation of good books in literature; compilation of books in
Kok-borok; setting up of Kok-borok Book Museum; provision for awards
for writers in the languages; fairs organized for the purposes; orientation
training for teachers in Kok-borok and so on (HY 2010, 57–59).
Remarkable achievements have also taken place in the areas of primary
education among the tribal people in the ADC areas. From the unofficial
sources, it is found out that while the tribal student enrolment in primary
section in 1972 was 34, 088, the figure grew to 2, 02, 615 in 2006. There
has also been a change in student enrolment in class 9 and 10: 1517 in
1972 to 25, 240 in 2006, which is 16 times the figure of 1972.11 It has
increased since manifold (THDR 2019).
Many primary schools (462) have been set up and the existing ones
have been upgraded (237) to upper primary in the school less tribal areas.
Hostels for the tribal students and the youths have also been constructed.
There has also been improvement in providing for safe drinking water by
sinking mini deep tube wells as well as by Masonry Wells. From the report
of Malhotra (2014) it is seen that the ST households without access to
electricity, safe drinking water and sanitation between 1991 and 2011 has
decreased: 52.3% (1991) to 34.2% in 2001 and 22.9% in 2011 (Malhotra,
2014: 235). Irrigation facilities have also been much improved. During
2008–09, some 140 hectares of paddy lands were brought under this
improved irrigation project of 2 Horse Power Mini Deep Well. Tribal
youths have been befitted by the various self-employment schemes. It is
to be noted here again that in carrying out the developmental schemes of
the ADC, various State and Central government sponsored schemes have
been harnessed. There are today as many as 11, 750 Self-Help Groups
among the tribal women in the ADC areas (Economic Survey, 2009–10,
Govt. of Tripura, 28) as a proof that tribal women are forthcoming in self-
employment endeavour. Literacy rate among the tribes has improved since
1981 (23.07%) to 56.5% in 2010 (Economic Survey, 2009–10, Govt. of
128 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Tripura, 28) Of this, 68% are tribal male and 44.6% are tribal women. It
is found out that during the last five years or so, the more tribal jhumias
families have befitted out of the improved method of cultivation: 2000
families in 2005–06 to 18, 026 families in 10,090–10 (HY 2010, 36–37).
The figures on the above are much higher in the lasts THDR 2018.
Most remarkable aspect of the achievement of the ADC has decen-
tralized community participation in decision making at the village level
through the institution of Village Committees since 2006 where a women
reservation of seats @33% is followed and in which with the formation of
Sub-Zonal and Zonal Development Committees, the village administra-
tion has been strengthened. Those bodies have served to build capacity
among the villagers, and to impart training for undertaking various activ-
ities themselves. Above all, 40% women out of the total of 4165 Village
Committees seats seems a most remarkable achievement in community
empowerment.
The ADC has been empowered to make laws with respect to the
allotment, occupation or use of land (excluding the reserved forest),
regulation of shifting cultivation, water uses for agricultural purposes,
inheritance of property, marriage and divorce, social customs etc. The
Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution empowers the ADC to estab-
lish, construct or manage primary schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle
pounds, ferries, fisheries, village roads, waterways etc. The ADC has also
financial powers to taxation. In short, it is seen as a governmental insti-
tution to deal with multifarious activities relating to the development and
welfare of the tribals (Table 9.6).
By performing multifarious activities particularly related to the welfare
and development of the tribals, the ADC has been found to be heavily

Table 9.6 Public

Name of schemes Approved ADC Physical target
expenditure on tribal
budget
welfare (2011–12)
(amount in INR @ 1 Rubber plantation 140.00 1094 Hectares
lakh (=100,000) Nucleus budget 30.00 125 Fa
Tribal rest house 25.00 04 Nos
Composite welfare 19.50 1000 F
and Relief Scheme
Total 214.50

Source Annual Plan 2011–12 (ADC, Khumulwng, Tripura, p. 26)

 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 129

engaged in various developmental and empowerment programmes in its

jurisdiction. Of the jobs received under the MNREGA (Table 6.8), a high
proportion constitutes the tribal families because the tribals are mostly
poor and landless. Under various welfare and empowerment schemes
including MNREGA till 31 December 2014, the tribal families bene-
fitted were 93,183 and the sum spent for the purpose was INR 1332.8
million (Ray, 2015: 191). Tripura’s records in implementation of the
MNREGA (100 days rural employment guarantee) place it at the very
top scorer in the country. The literacy rate among the Scheduled Tribes in
Tripura has increased manifold (from only 23.07% in 1981 to 56.50% in
2011) although this is far behind the high level of general literacy in the
State (87.75%, all India being 74.03%). (Economic Survey, Government
of Tripura 2013–14). The tribal population in the State began to increase
from 1981. The decadal growth was 8–53% in 1991 over 1981, 9.93%
in 2001 over 1991 and 11.66% in 2011 over 2001 (Economic Survey
2013–14, 307, Government of Tripura) (Table 9.7).
The ADC has appeared to be an effective institutional safeguard to the
identity of the tribals. What the state government of Tripura could not
do, the ADC did it. Within the first rather shorter term of its existence,
the ADC restored some 2, 946 acres of tribal land to some 3,006 tribal
families.
The other kinds of benefit the tribals received included scholarship to
tribal students in hotels (number was 230,585); pre-Madhyamik scholar-
ship; Madhyamaik and post-Madhyamik scholarship; provisions for special
coaching to tribal girl students; coaching for drop-out tribal students
(26,059); supply of books free of costs to the tribal students (1,321,745);

Table 9.7
Year Job seekers Job received Percentage
Governmental
Performances in 2006–07 75,067 75,067 100
Implementation of 2007–08 425,299 423,724 99.63
MNREGA (2006–07 to 2008–09 549,145 549,022 99.82
2014–15) 2009–10 577,540 576,487 99.82
2010–11 557,413 557,055 99.94
2011–12 567,129 566,793 99.94
2012–03 597,437 596,530 99.85
2013–14 605,187 599,531 99.00
2014–15 595,862 571,111 97.48

Source Ray 2015: 289

130 H. BHATTACHARYYA

support to form Self-Help Groups among the tribals (1502 formed till
2014); 34 Tribal Rest House constructed; 17,320 tribal families have
been trained and helped to engage in rubber plantation; and so on. (Ray
2015: 188–89) The Government of Tripura recognized Kok-Borok as
the second official language of the State way back on 19 January 1979,
and 19 January is observed every year as the Koko-Borokday.The ADC’s
Language Cell (for all round cultivation of Kok-Borok language) had INR
22 lakh as its annual plan budget for 2011–12. (ADC 2010–11: 18).

Implications for Governance

To the State’s Marxists’ rulers (till 2018), the ADC symbolized a recon-
ciliation of class and tribal ethnicity, a fulfilment of a long standing aim of
the democratic movement in the State. The ADC in Tripura is a sign that
the force of tribal nationalism is recognized in the state, and ‘not merely
a second-order derivation of capitalism reducible in the last instance to
economic distortion of true class consciousness. ‘
For our purpose, the ADC represents a case of sub-State federal asym-
metry, a major territorial institutional innovation and measure for the
accommodation of identity, and the management of ethnic conflicts. The
tribal elites (elected officials at the ADC) as well non-elected GMP leaders
interviewed in May-December 2015 recognized in interviews the (devel-
opmental) role of the ADC plus the determined political intervention by
the GMP and the CPI-M to politically neutralize insurgency in the State.
To be sure, the ADC was not an elite imposed device on the tribals, but a
result of the institutional resource at the above combined with the popular
political pressures from below for the establishment of such a decentral-
ized political unit of tribal self-governance. The Tripura State government
had had to delegate and part with a lot of powers with the ADC (08
Department were transferred), but then that helped in containing seces-
sionism in Tripura, to a great extent. The State government has also
shared the revenues with the ADC to a large extent.
The ADC’s own taxes bases are very limited so it is heavily depen-
dent on funding by the State government as well as the Union Finance
Commission which makes the resources available through State Plans
to the ADC. One must not, however, come to the conclusion that the
ADC offered all the answers to the tribals’ overriding need for protecting
their identity and their well-being in Tripura. The ADC had problems,
both structural and operational, to ensure what was termed ‘meaningful
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 131

autonomy‘. As an institutional measure to supplement the ADC in its

drive for ‘meaningful autonomy‘, the Tripura State Assembly passed the
Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District (TTAAD) (Establishment of
Village Committee) Act, 1994 that provide for the formation of the
Village Committees (VC) in the ADC areas as a step towards real,
meaningful decentralization of power.
The survey report by the author (2013 & 2014–15) on the ADC
showed that all tribal communities have been represented in the ADC;
there is satisfaction over the role of the ADC in regard to the protection
of tribal identity.12 Despite the fact the ADC is a success story in Tripura,
sub-state level power-sharing and identity accommodation; there are areas
of dissatisfaction, negative assessment, and the evident lack of knowledge
of the actual work done by the ADC for the last five years (2005–10, and
2010–15). However, the negative side of the story must not be blown out
of proportions. The regularity of holding elections at the interval of five
years in a free multi-party competition has meant that institutionalization
of the self-governing body in the tribal-dominated areas of the state has
taken place.
The democratization even within ADC decisional process is not
doubted by the INPT, the arch enemy of the CPI-M/GMP:’…apparently
all decision are taken on the floor of the ADC, the implementation of such
decision depends ultimately on the will of the state government….’. (An
INPT leader Interviewed in Agartala on 10.9.11) Given the fact that the
ADC funds from the Centre come via the state government, the latter
naturally has a hand. But what is intriguing is the relatively higher cost of
financing such government (the ADC establishment). Of the knowledge
and awareness of the Schedule that governed the ADC, 12 out of 15
leaders/elected official of the ADC responded positive, only 03 negative.
No less the persons than the civil servants associated with the ADC
admitted at the rate of 89% (9 out of 10 interviewed) that more than 80%
of ADC money goes to pay for the establishment—the cost of running
the government at the ADC—leaving little for actual development works.
But then, as Max Weber reminded us long back, more democracy results
in more bureaucracy, inevitability and irony in a democracy. 9 out of 15
leaders/elected official of the ADC was found to be aware of the ongoing
activities of the ADC. 6 had negative response. How effective was the ADC
in protecting tribal identity? 14 out of 15 responded ‘positive’. 11 out of
15 could identify some concrete activities of the ADC over the last five
years.
132 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Be that as it may, the ADC experiment in Tripura has not failed unlike
its neighbours; it has enabled the tribal folks of Tripura in the art of gover-
nance, to take part in debates in their own language (Kok-Borok) on the
floor of the Council, and thrash out the vital issue such as land, rubber
plantation, and schooling for the tribal children and so on. There is no
doubt that the idea of self-government has been implemented in Tripura
in the tribal inhabited areas under the jurisdiction of the ADC. The ADC
in Tripura has proved that democracy can also be self-government. The
next chapter will consider all the three States together and move in the
direction of distilling the specific findings into more general conjectures.

Limitations
And yet, the ADC’s achievements, despite the best intention of the
State government and the ADC administration, are overshadowed by
the limitations that are often beyond their control. Over the years
since the formation of the ADC, one does not hear of the misuse, or
under-utilization of funds and the audit reports have mostly been above
many remarks. The ADC’s limitations are party environmental (difficult
geographical terrain and limited resources available) and partly structural,
which are detailed below.
The ADC’s financial sources are diverse but they are nearly 100%
external. The territorial jurisdiction of the ADC being 68% of the total
geographical terrain of the State falls mostly on the eastern half of the
State covering four districts of Tripura and is hilly with limited land avail-
able for settle cultivation.13 The area is inhabited mostly by the tribes,
which are otherwise 31% of the total population of the State. The 18
tribes that constitute the tribal population of the State mostly survive on
jhum cultivation, and more backward in terms of HDI. As the ADC in
its Memorandum to the 13th Finance Commission itself admitted:

The percentage of people living below the poverty line in Tripura Tribal
Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) is much higher than that
of the State average of approximately 55%. The economic condition of the
people living in the ADC areas (primarily tribal population) is quite poor
and most of the people are dependent upon subsistence agriculture based
on jhuming. Majority of the villages in the ADC areas suffer on account
of poor communication network resulting in poor education and health
infrastructure. Since the areas included in the Council is very backward and
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 133

underdeveloped, it requires the mobilization of large resources to promote

the economic upliftment of the people residing in the area. (Memorandum,
p. 2) (http://www.ttaadc.nic.in/13thfinane.pdf) (accessed on 29. 12. 20).

From the Memorandum submitted by the ADC administration to the

14th Finance Commission it is seen that during 2012–13 the ADC’s own
resource of the total money accounted for only 0.60%: Annual Plan grants
90 crores; Share of taxes 35 crores; Other receipts 25.8 crores; Transfer
fund 154.2 crores out of the total sum of 307.8 crores (THDR 2018,
Table 9.5).
Resource mobilizations from such area and from such peoples are
inherently limited in nature. From the various official sources it is found
that the (Union) Finance Commission is an important source of finance
of the ADC. For example, the 13th Union Finance Commission (2010–
15) recommended a sum of Rupees 12.67 crores for the TTADC for the
construction of four Zonal Offices (INR 5 crores), development of Kok-
borok language and culture (INR 2.5 crores) and provision of drinking
water facility (as a special grant) of INR 5.17 crores. (http://www.tta
adc.nic.in/13thfinane.pdf (accessed on 29. 12. 19). However, the same
Commission recommended for transfer of a sum of INR 369.80 crores
to Tripura under ‘local bodies’, which include items overlapping with
the activities of the ADC. (http://11planningcommision.nic.in/plans/
fnres/grants12th13th.xls (accessed on 29. 12. 20)14 The following table
gives details of the diverse sources of the ADC fund (Table 9.8).

Table 9.8 Sources of ADC Fund (ADC budget estimate 2012–13)

Sources Sum in Rs in ‘000 thousands Percentage of the total

a. Plan Fund 14,260.61 43

b. Share of Taxes 4870.25 0.15
c. Transferred Fund 12,811.40 38.26
d. 13th Union Finance 1267.00 3.79
Commission Award*
e. Market licences and other 228.55 0.68
revenue receipts
f. Miscellaneous 45 0.0013
Total = 33,482.81

Source ADC Budget 2012–13, p. 2. * The 13th Union Finance Commission award during 2011–12
was Rs. 1396.00 (INR/lakh) (ADC Budget 2012–13), p. 4)
134 H. BHATTACHARYYA

In the more recent times, (2020–21), the following are the sources
of the ADC funds: 12% from the Finance Commission; Transfer fund =
31% (from the Consolidated Fund of the State); Excluded Areas grant
(from the Centre) 13%; Plan grant 28%; shared taxes revenues = 15%;
and revenue money (ADC’s own) = 1%.
Of the above sources of fund of the ADC, the ADC’s own fund, that
is, ‘share of taxes’ (non-plan) is only a meagre sum of Rupees 4870.25
lakh, which is about 0 0.15% of the total budget of the ADC. The
sum under heading e (Rs. 228.55 lakh) (I lakh = 100, 000) may also
be considered as the ADC’s resources. But that comes down to only
0 0.68%. This is somewhat inevitable because one does not know how
and from what sources can the ADC mobilize resources in the areas
in which there is, in the words of the ADC itself, ‘high incidence of
poverty’. (Memorandum, p. 5) In short, the ADC is over-dependent
upon the State government on finances without whose support the self-
government for the tribes in the ADC becomes superfluous. The latter
pools resources from various Departments and Ministries such as Tribal
Welfare, Fisheries, and Animal Husbandry and juxtaposes that with the
resources of the ADC for carrying out various developmental activities in
the ADC areas. It is also admitted in the ADC document (Memorandum
to the 13th Finance Commission) that the Government of Tripura had
transferred the following subject, as per 6th Schedule of the Constitu-
tion, to the ADC: primary education, social education, Markets, Rural
Industries, Village Roads, 527 Village Committees, Minor Irrigation and
Agriculture. However, from the different portfolio allocation among the
8-member Executive Council of the Council it is seen that such depart-
ments as science and technology, cooperation, sports and youth welfare,
finance, general administration, Public Works, tribal welfare, land records
and settlement, tourism and culture are now under the purview of the
ADC [Tathyapanji o nirdenshika (in Bengali) (Facts and Directory), 2011
(Agartala: Tripura Darpan, 2011, 113)].
It is found out further from the ADC’s Annual Account of Expendi-
ture submitted to the Auditor-General, Government of Tripura for the
year 2020–21 that 59% its money is spend on ‘direction and administra-
tion’; 3% on pension, and 38% on development. The ADC is not only
dependent upon the Union government for funding, but substantially
on the State government too. Of the total transfer from the State, the
following is the break up: land revenue = 40%; professional tax = 25%;
Agricultural income tax = 50%; forest revenue = 75%; gas royalty = 30%
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 135

and motor vehicle tax = 25% (http://ttaadc.gov.in/sites/default/files/

Budget_estimates_2020-21.PDF) (accessed on 29. 10. 21).

Governmental Cost
of Self-Government: ADC in Tripura
It is a perennial dilemma for the advocates of self-government, and
that too, identity-based ones, that while a new governmental set up is
demanded at a lower tier, the same also eats up significantly the resources
in terms of the establishment cost, or the cost titled ‘direction and admin-
istration’. One might call it bureaucratic cost, which, following Max
Weber is unavoidable in a mass democracy. Weber would in fact argue
that more democracy we have, more bureaucracy we have too because
democratization inevitably results in further bureaucratization. They are,
as it were, intertwined with each other.
Keeping those conceptual issues in mind, we will now look at the cost
of administering self-government by way of the ADC. As per the statistics
offered by the ADC authorities in its Memorandum to the 13th Finance
Commission, mentioned above, the ADC has appointed some 635 offi-
cers of different categories (p. 3). The ADC’s own staff including those
officers are 5494 out of which 3292 (60%) are tribal and the rest (2202)
are non-tribal (40%) (Source: Samiran Roy, Editor, Tripura Darpan, Agar-
tala dated 4.1. 13 over telephone) are of General and SC categories, the
proportion being fair given that the tribal do not constitute cent% of the
population in the ADC areas, but about 80%. Their educational attain-
ment of the tribals, particularly with respect to the post of officers is
also to be considered relative to other communities. However, as per the
proposal of the ADC to the 13th Union Finance Commission, some 11,
178 posts are lying vacant to be filled up for the overall development of
the tribal areas. (Memorandum, p. 6) If those posts are filled up, it will
means of course some employment for the tribals too, but also add to
the bureaucratic expenditure for the ADC. Added to that are some 325
staff members deputed from the State Government whose salaries etc. are
paid out of the transferred fund in the ADC budget. Even if the vacant
posts are not filled up, for the moment, the ADC then has already got
a huge bureaucratic apparatus, which has entailed a large budgetary sum
to meet up their salary and other benefits. In sum, some 62% money is
to be spent for ensuring development at the rate of 38%. As per the 15th
136 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Finance Commission recommendations, it is seen that while the Commis-

sion provided for 12% of the resources for the ADC, the other sources of
money are as follows: transferred fund from the State government of 13%;
excluded areas grants 28%; share tax revenues 15% and its own revenue
is only 1%. However, in terms of district wise ranking in HDI, Dhalai,
which contains most of the population in the ADC areas, achieved the
composite lowest rank of 8 while West Tripura district has got 1 (THDR
2018, 206). West Tripura district is a fertile land with alluvial soil adjacent
to Bangladesh, and where the (settler) Bengalis live.

Conclusion
The ADC is a relative success story in federal asymmetry in India—the
sub-State level institutional arrangements for the Hill Tribes in India’s
North-East that over the years since 1985 has continuously differentiated
and institutionalized with the regularity of elections and further decen-
tralization within the ADC in respect of forming by elections the Village
Committees. As a result, a relatively large administrative structure has
evolved in response to various activities to be undertaken. Multifarious
empowerment and developmental works have paved the basis of more
education, health care, road and communication and so on. The THDR
2018 has recorded much of this. Crores (10 million) of Indian rupees
have been allocated to the ADC by the Finance Commission, the Central
government (under various schemes) and the State government for infras-
tructural development as well as empowerment. The ADC’s own resource
is very negible. The ADC has come out as an effective agency to carry
out works for the State and Central governments as well as for itself. The
most important point is that the tribals in the ADC have to self-govern,
theoretically speaking. In practice though there is already much of a
bureaucratic administrative structure so that 62% of its money is spent on
administration, and 39% for development. In fine, tribal self-government
in this respect comes with a huge price tag.
Since the ADC has to work in association with the State government
on which it is dependent, financially, and the Finance Commission and the
Union government, latter for development and empowerment projects, it
is closely linked up with them, and has to function as the lowest tier in
India’s federal governance. For long, the tribals’ identity issue was organ-
ically linked with the land question—restoration of illegally transferred
land to the tribals—but in the course of time, with the growing grip of
 9 THE WORKING OF SUB-STATE FEDERAL ASYMMERTY … 137

the settlers Bengalis over administration and the political parties, the tribal
identity issue, at least for the State’s Marxists, has been delinked from the
land question, and linked mostly to offering them state welfare bene-
fits from development and empowerment schemes mostly of the Union
government.

Notes
1. The growth of the GMP as a tribal nationalist movement and its subse-
quent subjugation to the authority of the Communist party since the early
1950s has been dealt with at greater length in Bhattacharyya, Harihar
1999, especially pp. 90–126. There it is examined in greater detail how
the GMP first articulated the tribal identity issues in a militant mass
mobilization against the state power.
2. There is evidence, however, to suggest that the now defunct TUJS (b.
1967) (re-christened NLPT, also demanded such a Council under the
6th Schedule from its birth on although it sought a much more radical
solution, with strong elements of secessionism.
3. For further details, see Bhattacharyya (2018); and Mitra and Bhat-
tacharyya (2018).
4. Oriental Times, Vol.2, No. 4, 47–48, 200 (http://www.nenanews.
com/ot%20may%2022-%20june6,%2000/oh3.htm (accessed on 5.1.13);
See, also ‘Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Elections’,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 30, July 28, 1990, 1627–29.
5. ‘Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Elections’, Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 30 (July 28, 1990), p. 1627.
6. In the total tribal population of Tripura, they are about 55% (2001),
followed by the Reangs (16.6%); Jamatias (7.5%); Chakmas (6.5%);
Halams (4.5%); Mog (3.1%); Munda (1.2%), Any Kukti (1.2%); and Garo
(1.1%)––these together comprise about 97% of the tribes in Tripyra. For
details on the interviews, see Miutra and Bhattacharyya 2018: 266–67.
7. Chakrabarty, S. 2000 ‘Identity, Autonomy and Development: A Study
of Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (Calcutta: Ekushe)
made an assessment of the ADC up to 2000.
8. The Village Committee Act 1994 passed by the Tripura Tribal Areas
Autonomous District Council, which has received the assent of the
Governor on 28–04-94. This Act has been enacted with the objective to
Establish and develop Local Self Government and to make better provi-
sions for administration of Village into well –developed and sufficient unit.
The Village Committee means a Committee constituted Accordance with
the provision of paragraph 3(1)(e) of the Sixth Schedule to the constitu-
tion of India and this Act. The relevant Rules were made in 2006. The
138 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Village Committee (Election of

office bearers) Rules 2006.
9. See note 5 above.
10. However, it must be pointed out that although the Left Front won 3
more seats in 2010 over 2005 election in the ADC itself, and the INC
and the NPT drew a blank in 2010, the Left Front’s share of popular votes
shrank by about 8% over its performance in 2005. Significantly, there was
also a huge rise in popular voting percentage from 2005: 67.19% in 2005
to 81.84% in 2010. While the votes for the tribal party (INPT) remained
more or less stable around 12%, the Left Front’s loss of this 8% votes went
over to INC (The State Election Commission, Tripura).
11. Sarkar, M. 2010 ‘ADC jati-upajati maitri bandhan’ Tripura Darpan,
February 2010. (in Bengali).
12. The two surveys were conducted by the authors and his assistants under
funding from two agencies: Indian Council for Social Science Research,
New Delhi and the International Leverhulme Trust, UK during 201-14-
17.
13. Harinath Devbarma, a former member of the TTAADC, brought to our
attention another constraint to resource mobilization by the ADC. He
says that the ADC areas comprise mostly hills and forests in Tripura, the
forests are declining by the day and also that the ADC does not have
any authority over the Reserved Forests, the ADC’s capacity to raise more
resources is further limited. For further details, see his ‘Amendment of
the Sixth Schedule in the light of the Problems faced by the Autonomous
District Councils’ in Gassah, L. S. ed. The Autonomous District Councils
(New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1997), pp. 338–39.
14. As per recommendations of the 13th Finance Commission of India (2010–
15), the grants under ‘local bodies’ are also to be treated under Article
275 of the Constitution.

References
Bhattacharyya, H., and T.J. Nossiter. 1988. Communism in a Micro-State:
Tripura and the Nationalities Question. In Marxist State Governments in
India, ed. T.J. Nossiter. London: Pinters.
Bhattacharyya, H. 1999. Communism in Tripura. Delhi: Ajanta Books Interna-
tional.
———. 2018. Radical Politics and Governance in India’s North East: The Case
of Tripura. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Blondel, J. 2006. About Institutions, Mainly, But Not Exclusively, Political. In
The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, ed. R.A.W. Rhodes, et al., 716–
31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Hamkraini Yakhili (Indicatives of the ADC) (Khumulwng: TTAADC) 2010.

Malhotra, R. 2014. India Public Policy Report. New Delhi: Oxford University
Press.
Orinetal Times, Agartala 22 May 2000.
Tripura Human Development Report 2007. https://planning.tripura.gov.in/
hdr. Sighted on 12 March 2022.
Tripura Human Development Report 2018. https://planning.tripura.gov.
in/sites/default/files/Draft%20Tripura%20Human%20Development%20R
eport%20%28THDR%29%20-%20II%2010%20April%202018.compressed.pdf.
Sighted on 22 March 2022.
Tripura Human Development Report 2019.
Tripura Darpan (Mirror of Tripura) in Bengali. 2011. Published by Tripura
Darpan Press, Agartala (Tripura).
Ray, S. ed. 2015 & 2011. Tathya Panji (in Bengali), Agartala: Tripura Darpan.
 CHAPTER 10

Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts

in Assam

Introduction
As I have been arguing in this book, institutions grow out of social
and cultural cleavages and also operate in the context, if so done by
the political actors. The cleavage-based social surrounding may not facil-
itate institutional functioning if there is a misfit between the institutional
design, on the one hand, and social and cultural cleavages. In the case of
Tripura, as we have seen the extent of cleavages within the jurisdiction of
the TTADC is minimal that about 97% belongs to the tribes. The BTC
has not been as lucky. Unlike Tripura, the political recognition of the
plain tribes in Assam in the form of a territorial authority for ‘homeland’
remains very complex and plagued by many factors, which are apparently
beyond the control of the Bodos and those on the other side of the fence.
The decision to form the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) in 1993
under the State government, and then the Bodoland Territorial Council
in 2003 under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution was preceded
by large scale and persistent violence by different groups of the Bodo
militants, such as the Bodoland Liberation Tigers, the Bodo Volunteers
Force, Bodo Security Force, the National Democratic Force of Bodoland
and the counter-violence by a plethora of organizations of the non-Bodos.
This aspect has received some scholarly attention (Baruah 2005; Bhaumik
2009; Mishra 2012; Pathak 2012; Mohanta 2013; Talukdar 2020; Swar-
giary 2020; Sharma 2017; Chakladar 2004; Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 141

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_10
142 H. BHATTACHARYYA

2017, 2019). The reason the Bodoland issue has attracted so much atten-
tion is because of the ethnic political violence which apparently does
not see any end. The BTC was formed in 2003 but spiraling political
violence has remained a hurdle to normal governmental functioning. With
the relative loss of political space of the BLF in the electoral competi-
tion within the BTC, and a rival group taking most of its space under a
coalition led by the BJP (which is actually a small partner) in 2020, the
grounds for further conflicts seem inevitable.
In this chapter, I seek to make three arguments. First, political stability
or governmental stability is a major factor why representative institutions
work sometimes in matters of maintaining law and order and delivering
social and economic goods. Second, persistent violence of one ethnic
community over the others fails any government to be effective, espe-
cially when it is a conflict between a ruling minority and the vast majority
that is ruled. Third, defective institutional design is foreordained to fail.

A Short Trajectory of Bodoland Movement

The Bodos are a minority in the population of Assam, and the so-called
plain tribesmen with a concentration in four districts of Assam on the
Northern bank of the river Brahmaputra. Beyond those four districts,
the Bodos are spread over the State. Very significantly, the Bodos in
the four districts, namely Kokrajhar, Chirang, Udalguri and Baksa, are
also a minority in population (in each district) of about 30%, the rest of
the population being the non-Bodos such as the Bengali and Assamese
Hindus, the Bengali Muslims, the Santhals and Sarnias. The Santhals
elsewhere in India are categories as Scheduled Tribes, but not in Assam.
The political recognition of the Bodos first in 1993 and then 2003 was
a radical departure in Indian state and nation-building and asymmetric
federalism too. This was for three reasons. First, this was for the first time
that the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution was extended to the
Plain Tribes, which was contrary to the original intention of the Schedule.
Second, self-government was conceded to the Bodos in areas where they
are a minority in population. Third, as connected to the above: a demo-
graphic minority was made a political majority in reserving 30 out of
46 seats in the Council, which was very discriminatory to the majority
of non-Bodos in the same areas, and anti-democratic. No wonder, the
BAC/BTC resolved few problems but created more for the Bodos as
well as the non-Bodos. A separate State of Bodoland outside Assam has
 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 143

not been conceded to, but the experience of the BAC/BTC is a proof of
when ethnic self-rule exacerbates exclusion and persistent violence.
The Bodoland movement1 has received much scholarly attention, as we
have mentioned above. Although the aspiration of the Bodos for recog-
nition goes back to the days of the Simon Commission (1928) when
the Kachari Yubak Sammelon submitted in 1927 a memorandum to the
Commission for ‘independent identity’, and separate Kachari Regiment
(Majumdar and Singh 1997: 179) the real beginning of the movement
was made in the 1950s. In early 1947, the Assam Tribal League submitted
a memorandum to the Constituent Assembly to include the plain tribals
under the 5th Schedule of the Constitution for their self-government for
socio-economic development, but of no avail (Chakladar 2004: 53).
Very broadly, the Bodo movement in Assam could be said to have
passed through three phases: cultural (1947–1967); cultural–political
(1967–1990); and political and violent from the late 1980s. We are aware
that when an aggrieved ethnic community fights for its identity, language
and culture, and against manifold discrimination, its movement is political
by nature. But in the very specific sense the Bodos’ demand in the first
phase was not associated with the territory demand or self-rule demand.
The Bodos had long been suffering due to large scale and persistent
land alienation (see Chapter 6), attempts of assimilation and deprivation
particularly due to the neglect of their language, and imposition of the
Assamese on them. The Bodo Sahitya Sabha as a counter to the Ahom
Sahitya Sabha was formed in 1952 in order to harp on the above, and
therefore to share in political power. The Ahom Sahitya Sabha urged upon
the government to declare Assamese as the official language in the State
which was so done in 1960 under the Official Language Act 1960 (23
October). This was taken by the Bodos as an attempt to assimilate them
and synonymous with the death of their language. For long, their move-
ment was peaceful and followed the constitutional methods of protest,
demonstration and submission of memoranda to different authorities in
Assam. Historically speaking, the Bodo question, the question of their
protection in land, language and culture was not taken up seriously by the
Constituent Assembly (of India) which preferred to leave the matter to
the State Government’s minority affairs department or committee. Their
question was neglected by the States Reorganization Commission (1953–
1955) too. The PTCA (formed on 27 February 1967) as the political
organization of the plain tribes demanded the creation of Udayachal,
a Union Territory and homeland of plains tribal in the north bank of
144 H. BHATTACHARYYA

the river Brahmaputra. This demand was made in the wake of the news
of the States Reorganization in the North-East, which would take place
in 1972 as per the North Eastern States Reorganization Act 1971. It
also demanded an extension of the provisions of Sixth Schedule in the
northern bank of Brahmaputra. One of the PCTA’s memorandums high-
lighted the following demands: political self-government or autonomy;
control over land and other resources; preservation of their language,
culture, stop assimilation, ethnocide etc. (Singh Committee 1991)2 . It
also pointed out the ‘ineffectiveness of the so-called Tribal Advisory
Council and the Assam Tribal Development Authority’ (Singh Committee
1991).
In the wake of reorganization of Assam and the subsequent creation of
tribal States of Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya, the erstwhile cultural
demand gave way to the demand for the creation of an Autonomous
Region and the formation of Udayachal by the Plains Tribal Council of
Assam. It was during this period that the Bodo movement witnessed a
change of guards with the leadership passing off to the dynamic All Bodo
Students’ Union (ABSU) which shed off the earlier democratic tactics
and adopted a militant strategy to pursue the goal of a separate state
of Bodoland and conferment of the Sixth Schedule status on the Bodo-
Kacharis of Karbi Anglong. The subsequent years saw Assam rocked in
bandhs, roads and rail blockades, assassinations, kidnapping, abduction
and inhuman violence including ethnic cleansing. In May 1996 about
100 people died in ethnic clashes between the Bodos and the Santhal; 30
persons were killed in August 1996 (Chakladar 2004: 63).
Till the 1990s the Bodo organizations resorted to selective violence
to get their due share of power in the political process. After many
informal talks with the government authorizes (State and Union), the
Bodos were brought to the table to sign an ethnic peace accord in 1993
(details below) to form an autonomous council to be called Bodoland
Autonomous Council. Such a council was formed by elections. However,
the 1993 accord failed to satisfy them and the next couple of years saw
a militant bloodbath by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB) and Bodoland Liberation Tigers (BLT) which saw the failure of
conventional associations and groups to wrest power exclusively for the
Bodos and the changing demography of the region wherein the ethnic
rulers (Bodos) were being transformed into a minority group in rela-
tion to the Adivasis, Mishings, Rabhas and the immigrant Muslims. The
 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 145

new leadership believing in only militant methods restarted the move-

ment for an exclusive Bodo ‘homeland’3 and resorted to ethnic cleansing.
Because of the region’s changing demography, persistent Bodo home-
land demand and organized discrimination against the non-Bodos, a
number of non-Bodo organizations have started agitational programmers.
Mention may be made of the Sanmilita Janagoshthiyo Oikya Mancha,
a united forum of 21 organizations, who are demanding a Scheduled
Tribes status for the Koch-Rajbongshis and the Adivasis which the Bodo
leadership was in no mood to relent. While demanding a White paper
on the situation created by the Bodo movement, the organization was
pressurizing the Union Government to review the BTC accord and to
apply an amended Sixth Schedule to the Constitution to them. This was
so done following the Second Bodo Accord in 2003 (details below) by
the minority NDA Union government then headed by the BJP. This
was highly resented by the non-Bodos who became apprehensive about
their constitutional rights and feared exclusion by the Bodos from their
habitat in the Bodoland areas (Interview 9 August 2014, Editor, Muslim
Mirror). The non-Bodos have also mobilized themselves and intensified
their struggle by launching another organization Oboro Suraksha Samiti
(ABSS: Non-Bodo Protection Forum). The main demand of the Oboro
Suraksha Samiti was the decision to exclude 64 non-Bodo-dominated
villages from Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD). The Samiti
has actively contested the BTC elections (April 2015) and drawn up the
poll manifesto comprising 17 points, which includes steps to foil any bid
for further extension of BTAD areas; curtailing of non-Bodo majority
villages from BTAD through review of BTC Accord; to oppose and
check the transfer of Home and Finance departments to the BTAD; to
accord recognition of ST status to the Koch-Rajbongshis, Adivasis, Tai-
Ahoms, Morans, Motoks etc.; seizure of illegal arms in BTAD; to keep
the surrendered NDFB cadres in the designated camps under the vigi-
lance of the Army; stringent steps against corruption, extortion, violence
and killing; Government employment to educated unemployed youths;
to make provision of constituency reservation on the basis of ethnic
population pattern; to resolve the problem of issuing caste certificate to
the Sarania community; to resolve the problem of teachers in BTAD,
appointed in 1999, and to foil the conspiracy of further division of Assam
etc. It can, thus, hardly be denied that the electoral fray is no longer
confined to the Bodo political parties but non-Bodo organizations are
equally competing to represent themselves in the Territorial Council.
146 H. BHATTACHARYYA

And yet, such cases of success or failure are not as significant as the
larger and deeper issues involved: representation, redistribution, political
discrimination by the majority over the minority, or of the ruling minority
over the majority. Second, the majoritarian principle of representation (via
the electoral system of first past the post) and rule as the only institutional
arrangement available in Indian democracy hardly match the multicultural
mosaic of the country at all levels.4 There is also the fundamental question
of what defines the ‘homeland’. Are homelands, as demanded by an ethnic
majority or minority as distinct and clear with their clear-cut geographical
boundary as proclaimed by the ethnic rebels? Baruah (2005, 2009) has
raised new questions about the basis of this homeland demand, historically
speaking. Third, is the ethnic identity at stake as homogenous as claimed
by the ethnic rebels? The fact of the matter is that in the Indian context,
no ethnic identity is homogeneously divided as they are by caste and class,
religion, community, tribes and sub-tribes. Often such sub-divisions have
given birth to rival political agencies to articulate demands contrary to
those of the dominant group. This creates a lot of anxiety and despera-
tion on the part of the dominant group which engages itself in violent
action as a means of achieving some territorial authority as the authentic
representative of the ethnic group (s).

The Case of Bodoland: Whose Homeland?

What is Bodoland? Whose land is it? Who are the Bodos/Boros? Today
the Bodos are the Plain Tribes of Assam comprising 13.73% of the total
population of Assam (2001) and about 32% (2001) in the BTC area.
The Bodos are not a homogeneous community linguistically speaking;
there were as many as 18 branches of the language such as Kachari,
Meech, Dimasa, Koch, Garo, Tripuris, Reangs, Jamatia and Rabha (Chak-
ladar 2004: 34–35).5 No wonder, Gait (1905: 3) considered the Bodos
as a ‘complex tribes’.6 But as it happens in ethnic self-definition, those
sub-groups are not recognized as the Bodo today by the leaders of the
Bodoland. Their self-definition of the community is exclusive. In their
Memorandum to the Government of Assam in 1987, the Bodo leaders
were found to be defensive. In the Memorandum it was stated: ‘Boro
includes only the purely Boro speaking people …but the term Bodo refers
to all Kachari or Bodo groups of people’.7 That is to say, the Bodos
are claimed as an ethnic group rooted in Assam. It has been observed
that the Bodos are known in different parts of North-East India and
 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 147

West Bengal (northern districts) by different names. They are the orig-
inal autochthonous tribe in Assam, and their racial stock is of the ‘Great
Mongoloid’, and their language belongs to Assam-Burmese (a sub-family
of the Tibeto-Burman. There are historical references of their antiquity,
as recorded in books on the history of Assam (e.g. Gait 1905) which
suggest that the Bodo had once established kingdoms in large parts of
what is Assam today and even in Northern Bengal. They had what then
was known as the Kachari (Bodo) kingdom on the south bank of the
river Brahmaputra; the Ahom (Assamese) had come to the region only in
the thirteenth century. No wonder, this got reflected in the rhetoric of
national self-determination in the passages of the Memorandum (1987):
The Bodos established a big kingdom covering the entire Assam and
North Bengal (now part of West Bengal). They subjected many tribes
and imposed their language and culture upon them. The accultured tribes
retained their original group names (quoted in Chakladar 2004: 35). The
Bdos also got it recorded in the ethnic peace accords signed with the
governments (Assam and India) in 1993 and 2003 as well as in the Acts
passed subsequently and published in the Gazettes.8 The 6th Schedule of
the Indian Constitution was amended in 2003 by the Indian Parliament
(w.e.f. 7.9.2003) in order to insert provision for the Bodoland Territorial
Council in the text of the Constitution itself.9

Bodo Ethnic Peace Accords

for Power-Sharing and Legitimacy
The Nagas set the trend way back in 1947 when the Naga-Akbar Hydari
Accord was signed on 26–28 June 1947 at Kohima between the Govern-
ment of India and the 10 Naga groups. In the wake of Naga’s resistance
to join the Indian Union in view of the impending transfer of power
from the British to India, this accord was path-breaking in negotiating for
ethnic peace and accommodation of ethnic diversity. This accord asserts
the right of the Nagas to develop themselves according to their customs
and laws; the Naga autonomy is preserved at all costs and all the Naga-
inhabited areas in other areas in the region to be transferred back to the
Nagas etc. (Datta 1995: 153–54). More such accords with the Nagas
have since been signed although it remains a big question if the so-called
Nagalim demand can be met without disturbing India’s commitment to
multiculturalism.
148 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Such ethnic peace accords have since been signed, bipartite or tripar-
tite, for the Bodos, the Mizos, TNVs (Tripur) as well as for the majority
Assamese (represented by the All Assam Students’ Union later converted
into the AGP in 1985 as a political party and took part in elections and
formed the first AGP government in the State) that did not involve always
the issue of territorial power-sharing (Datta 1995). So far three Bodo
Peace Accords have been signed. The first two were signed one each in
1993 and 2003 to define the terms of power-sharing and the institutional
arrangements to do so. The second one in particular was more impor-
tant in that the tribal self-rule here was placed under the 6th Schedule
of the Indian Constitution that is more empowering than that of the
former (1993) that provided for self-rule under the State government.
In the first accord which was signed on 20 February 1993 between the
Government of Assam (the Union Home Minister was present) and Bodo
leaders (All Bodo Students’ Union and Bodo People’s Action Committee)
provided for constituting a 40-member Bodoland Autonomous Council
with detailed provisions for power-sharing for the sake of autonomy
and ethnic self-determination and ‘homeland’; the BAC was conceived
as territorial authority under the State government which meant among
other things that it will be governed by State laws. The proposed BAC to
be elected shall have 40 members out which 30 shall be reserved for the
Bodos, and the rest for the non-Bodos (5 for the non-Bodos and 5 to be
nominated by the State Governor). The special provisions were also made
for the BAC to protect the religious and social practices of the Bodos; the
Bodo customary laws and procedures; and ownership and transfer of land
within the BAC areas (Datta 1995: 43). However, it was also mentioned
that the BAC would govern the areas keeping in mind the ‘demographic
complexion of the areas within its jurisdiction’ (Datta 1995: 43) in which
a reference is made to the question of the majority non-Bodos living in
the BAC areas.
The second Bodo Ethnic Accord was signed on 10 February 2003
(after many rounds of negotiations, cease-fires and violence)10 in New
Delhi between the Government of India, the Government of Assam and
the Bodo militant group called BLT. This accord replaced the BAC by the
BTC and provided for a two-tier governance structure: General Council
of 46 members out of which 30 are reserved for the (Scheduled Tribes)
(read Bodos), 5 for the non-Bodos, 5 are open to all to compete and 6
are to be nominated (including 2 women) by the State Governor. There
shall be an Executive Council consisting of 12 members one of which will
 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 149

be the Chief and one the Deputy Chief. The Council shall have legisla-
tive, administrative and financial powers on as per provisions of the 6th
Schedule. The Bodo language was also declared to be the official language
of the BTC (Chakladar 2004: 72–73).
The third accord called the Memorandum of Understanding signed
on 27 January 2020 with different factions of the NDFB, and the ABSU
centred on ‘increasing the powers of the BTC; to promote and to stream-
line its functioning; resolved issues relating to Bodo people outside the
BTADs’. The agreement also promised ‘to promote and protect Bodo’s
social, cultural, linguistic and ethnic identities; provide legislative protec-
tion for the land rights of tribals; ensure quick development of tribal areas
and rehabilitate members of NDFB factions’. More vitally, the accord
also committed itself to resolve the pending issues of the inclusion of
villages with Bodo majority, but contiguous to the BTADs and exclusion
of villages without Bodo majority from the BTADs. Among others, the
Bodo language was declared to be considered as an associate language in
Assam, and a fund of some 1599 crores was earmarked for the develop-
ment of the language, and the schools to be set up for the Bodo medium
etc. (PIB, Government of India 2021). The above promises are to be
understood in conjunction with the fact that the BJP is now in govern-
ment not only at the State level but also in the BTC in the last elections
held on 7 and 10 December-—the first time since 2005 that the Bodo
People’s Front lost control over the BTC.

From BAC to BTC: Half-Hearted

Institutionalization
An ethnic peace accord followed by a legislation and formation by a
free multi-party competitive election a designated body has more or less
worked in most cases in North-East India. This, however, did not happen
in the case of the BAC. After the first ethnic peace accord (1993), the
State government passed the required Act in May 1993, but elections
to constitute the BAC did not take place. The State government handed
over authority to the Interim Council on 10 June 1993 headed by S K
Bwiswmuthiary elections being scheduled for November 1993 (George
1994: 887–88). The Chairman, however, resigned on the grounds of
differences with the State government on the unresolved issue of delim-
itation of the BAC areas. With the BAC being left defunct, the militant
leaders of the movement began their violent activities over the issue of
150 H. BHATTACHARYYA

territory (the villages contiguous to the BAC but to be incorporated

in the BAC’s jurisdiction). From September 1993 onwards, the Bodo
militants engaged in ethnic cleansing in 515 villages in Kokrajahr and
Bongaigaon district in which 19 persons most of them being members of
the minority settled community and over 30 thousand fled their homes
to take shelter in relief camps (George 1994: 890). This was followed by
further violence and more loss of life (George 1994: 890). In George’s
estimates, by early 1994, some 70,000 people were displaced and took
shelter in relief camps (George 1994: 890).11 This included both the
Bodos and non-Bodos. The Bodo violence rocked the State for the whole
of the 1990s involving road blocks, blowing off train and railways tracks,
ethnic cleansing, inter-ethnic riots and so on.
Following the second Bodo accord, the Indian Constitution was
amended in 2003 (44 of 2003) (w.e.f. 2.7.2003) with additional powers
to make laws with regard to the matters in the Schedule (Bakshi 2017:
425–26). The major structural limitations of the Bodos is their numerical
minority in the Bodo areas (Table 10.1).
The point is that the Bodos constitute around 31% of the total popu-
lation in the BTC area and are not in majority in any of the four
newly created Bodoland Autonomous Districts (Table 10.1). The rest
of the population are non-Bodos, which includes the Asomiya Hindus,
Koch-Rajbanshis, Muslims, Bengali Hindus, Adivasis, Nepalis etc. This
creates the problem of legitimacy basis for claiming a homeland with
30% plus population in the BTC areas. Thirty out of 46 seats of the
Council were reserved for the Bodos—a bizarre norms—which seems very
discriminatory and defies any democratic logic.
In Assam, the Bodos are 40% of tribes. There are other tribes who are
substantial in number (Table 10.2). While the Bodos/Boros claim that
the area under the BAC as per Ethnic Peace Accord (1993)12 with the

Table 10.1 Bodos in

Districts Bodo population Per cent
Bodoland areas
Kokrajhor 278665 31.41
Baksa 331007 34.84
Chirag 178688 37.06
Udaguri 267372 32.15

Source Assam Statistical Handbook (2020)

 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 151

Government of Assam is their homeland, or for that matter the juris-

diction of the subsequent BTC (2003) under the Sixth Schedule of the
Indian Constitution as their homeland, the other communities living
within the same jurisdiction also claim it as their homeland. The latter
together constitute more than 70% of the population in the area.
The non-Bodos leaders opined that such a territorial authority with
the minority Bodos ruling over the majority non-Bodos should not have
been created at all. Consider the following opinion of a leader of Adivasi
People’s Army (in ceasefire since 2012) (unattributable):

Even after identifying ourselves as a part and parcel of the greater Assamese
society, we are seen today as outsiders. This has paved the way for
resentment and bitterness in our community….
The simple problem with Bodoland is that the Bodos are a minority
in the region. The only way to become majority in a multi-ethnic region
like Assam is to systematically carry out ethnic cleansing which the Bodo
Militant have been doing for years now. It is sad that ‘there has to be such
exclusive demand where so many people have been living peacefully for
years….

The demand for Bodoland has alienated all communities in the region. All
of us are suffering due to it. We were made to take up arms to counter
this demand. We have been living here for so long yet are denied the ST
status. We were evicted from our lands in the name of forest acts. Most
of the schemes are denied to us. Our social indicators are worst. In such a

Table 10.2 Population of Scheduled Tribes in Assam

Name of the Scheduled Tribe Total population Proportion to the total ST

population (%)

All STs 3,308,570 100

Boro 1,352,771 40.9
Miri 587,310 17.8
Mikir (now recognized as Karbi) 353,513 10.7
Rabha 277,517 8.4
Kachari 235,881 7.1
Lalung 170,622 5.2
Dimasa 110,976 3.4
Deori 41,161 1.2

Source Assam Statistical Handbook (2020)

152 H. BHATTACHARYYA

situation we were left to ourselves to defend our rights. (Interview on 12

September 2015 at Dekhiajuli)

Nearly similar resentment has been expressed by the former Tea Tribes
(as they are called). Sanjiv Mirdha, former President of Guwahati City
Committee and currently a member of the Tea Tribe Welfare Board,
believed that the BAC as a compromise short of a separate state of
Bodoland has affected inter-community relations ‘very badly’: BAC was
formed to end violence. But this never happened. It became a consti-
tutional tool in the hands of Bodo elites to oppress others. Today, the
minority Bodo people in the BAC are receiving all benefits, and the non-
Bodos are living as second-class citizens. It is clear that the BAC has done
more harm than good (Interview on 2.9.15 at Guwahati).
There are 18 non-Bodo organizations for their rights within the BTC.
Arun Jyoti Das, representing the Koch-Rajbansis (founder President of
Koch-Rajbansi Research and Development Centre, Guwahati), opined
that his tribesmen were ancient and like the Bodos they had also encoun-
tered problems of protecting their identity in the face of the dominant
Assamese community. In answer to the question ‘How has your commu-
nity reacted to the demands for Bodoland?’, his answer was very candid:
‘Our community forms a substantial population of the BTAD; therefore,
it is quite obvious to be apprehensive about any kind of autonomy to a
rival group. At the same time, the demand for a separate state of Bodoland
takes areas which fall under the proposed state of Kamtapuri demanded by
the Koch-Rajbansi community’ (Interview at Guwahati on 07 September
2015). Sharply commenting on the outcome of Bodoland, he said: ‘All
groups are now demanding separate state’. He pointed the direction to
‘continuous killing and rioting’ because, for him, the Bodos can transform
themselves into a majority only by ‘ethnic cleansing’.
However, quite predictably, the Bodo leaders would defend their case.
For instance, Mr. Tridip Daimary (aged about 40) of the Bodo People’s
Front (BPF) considered the institutional arrangement of the BTC/BTAD
as a means of ‘self-realization’ (read self-determination) of the Bodos.
That 30 seats out of 46 are reserved for the minority Bodos does not
seem to be undemocratic; it is a case of what he terms ‘preferential right’
for the Bodos which is legitimate for him: ‘Bodoland was carved out to
safeguard the rights of the indigenous population of this part of the state’
(Interview dated 9 September 2015, Guwahati).
 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 153

The Bodo People’s Front (BPF), the main representative of the Bodo
interests, has been controlling the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC)
since the first election held in 2005 and has also emerged as the largest
party in the elections in April 2015, with only one seat short of a simple
majority. While elections were held for 40 seats, the BPF won 20 in
comparison to 33 it had won in 2010, and the non-Bodo organizations
got 18 seats (All-India United Democratic Front = 4, Jangustio Aikyo
Mancha=4, People’s Co-ordination for Democratic Right= 7, A-Bodo
Surakha Samiti = 3), thus highlighting the emergent dominance of the
non-Bodo organizations and a potential threat to Bodo identity (Indian
Express 13 April 2015). A comparative study of the 2010 and 2015 BTC
elections shows that though the BPF still remains a potent force yet the
non-Bodo organizations are gradually gaining strength thus bringing to
the fore the declining power of the Bodos in their own homeland. The
BPF is an offshoot of the earlier Bodo Liberation Tigers, a ruthless mili-
tant outfit which was a party to the Memorandum signed in 2003. While
the BPF won without any opposition in the first BTAD elections in 2005
and even in the 2010 BTAD elections, however, in 2015 their domi-
nance stands seriously contended by both non-Bodo and independent
candidates who if seen reflects the rising power of a strong non-Bodo
opposition, a reality which the BPF can hardly afford to ignore. One
of the reasons may be the deeply divisive nature of Bodo organizations
and the Bodo electorate is itself divided among the BPF and PCDR.
Though the BPF won 20 seats, it polled only 28.5% vote share in these
elections. In most seats, the party faced stiff competition from the non-
Bodo candidates and also from the Peoples Coordination for Democratic
Rights (PCDR). PCDR, formed by the All Bodoland Student Union
(ABSU), and Bodoland Peoples Progressive Front (BPPF)—in collabora-
tion with the Pro-Talk National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB),
contested the elections as an independent party. PCDR came out of the
Bodo community, as a response to the widespread corruption by the BPF
party, and its dictatorship in the governing process. The margin between
the winners of the BPF, and the runners-up candidates were very less,
the lowest being only 13 votes. The PCDR, which contested as an inde-
pendent, had snatched seven seats from the BPF.13 The BPF lost further
ground in the elections in 2020 (Table 10.1) merging as the single largest
party with 17 seats—04 short of a single majority mark—but formed the
Council in alliance with the BJP which got 9 seats. But the non-Bodos
are more organized and bagged 12 seats in total in 2020 (Tables 10.3).
154 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Table 10.3 Party-wise results of elections in 2020 (40-member)

Parties Seats contested Seats won

±/

Bodoland Peoples’ Front 37 17 −7

United People’s Party (Liberal) 40 12 +3
Bharatiya Janata Party 13 9 +1
Gana Surakha Party 35 1 +1
Asom Gana Parishad 1 0
Congress 2 1

Source: The Hindu dated 13 December 2020

From 2010 (Table 10.4) the Bodos have increasingly lost their bases
of support from 31 seats in 2010 to 17 in 2020. The increasing loss of
ground of the Bodos was evinced in 2014 Lok Sabha elections when the
sole seats from Korajhar so far held by a Bodo candidate were won by a
non-Bodo candidate put up by the SJA, a political platform of 20 non-
Bodos by a high margin of 355778 votes. Naba Sarania won the elections.
This was a political possibility that in the unique demographic situation,
since the vast majority are the non-Bodos, the latter may get together to
defeat and stop the Bodos by following the very democratic norms.

Table 10.4 Seats won by political parties in the BTAD elections (2010 and
2015)

Political Seats contested Seats won in Seats contested Seats won in Gain/loss
parties in 2010 2010 in 2015 2015 since 2010

BPF 40 31 40 20 −11
INC 23 03 40 0 −3
AIUDF – – 08 04 +4
BJP 08 – 40 01 +1
IND 40 06 40 15 +9
CPI(M) 05 0 07 0 Nil
AGP 09 0 06 0 Nil

Source Assam State Election Commission 2015

 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 155

Map 10.1 Map of Bodoland Territorial Territorial Districts

Performance of the BTC

Citizens judge the efficacy of the government, at any level, by what
it does, that is, what it delivers by way of law and order, and other
goods and services. Violence, and that too, persistent, is a bad companion
to development. Development defined in any terms requires peaceful
environment for its working14 that entails the rule of law, delivery of
services and goods and so on. Violence and killing including large-scale
displacement are the grossest anti-thesis to governance. Since the 1990s
ethnic violence and cleansing in Bodoland never stopped. Elsewhere Bhat-
tacharyya and Mukherjee (2018) offered reports of spiraling violence in
the region which resulted in killing in hundreds and displacements of
thousands (of both the Bodos and the non-Bodos) (Bhattacharyya and
Mukherjee 2018). The Assam Tribune dated 28 December 2014 terms
it a ‘killing field of Assam’ and reported that in 1993 more than 20,000
people were displaced and about 1000 killed; in 1994, 400 people were
killed; in 1996, ‘NDFB massacred over 250 Adivasis mostly in Kokra-
jhar district and burnt down scores of villages’; in retaliation, the Adivasis
organized themselves and fought back which resulted resulting in some
156 H. BHATTACHARYYA

200,000 people being displaced and took refuge in government shelters;

in 1998, some 50 people were killed, 500 houses burnt down and 75,000
displaced. In 2008, some 100 people were killed and one and a half lakh
were displaced. There are reports of continuing violence in the region
since.
As must be obvious by now, institutional ill-designing in an inappro-
priate environment in institutionalizing the BTC since 2005 has not been
the answer to the complex identity question in Bodoland whose impact on
development governance was somewhat predictable. Nonetheless, some
records as available from the Assam Human Development Report (2014)
(in association with the UNDP) and other sources such as the MDoNER
report show a level of development in the BTC areas to have taken place.
The BTC’s own sources of revenues are very limited being basically
an agricultural economy, but it receives funds from multiple sources:
the Assam government grant (no. 78) provided for 2021 a sum of Rs.
787131.39 (lakh) as revenue grant and Rs. 46480.69 (lakh) as capital
grant up to 31st March 2022. (Assam Budget). The DoNER has multiple
routes to grant for the region and has its ‘special package’ for the BTC. It
has agreed to offer Rs. 500.00 crores (100crores per year) for five years
for socio-economic development of the areas under the BTC over and
above the normal Plan assistance as per the MoU singed on 10/2/2003.
In 2008, the then Prime Minister in his visit to Assam announced an
‘additional package’ of Rs. 250.00 crores for the same purpose (PIB,
New Delhi 11/8/21) (online). However, the funds are not directly
released to the BTC but to the Government of Assam under ‘special
package’ for various development projects (PIB. Government of India,
New Delhi 11/1821) (online) in the BTC areas. The BTC also bene-
fits from seven other projects under the MDoNER such as North-East
Special Infrastructural Development Schemes, Non-Lapsable Central Pool
of Resources-State and North-East Road Sector Development Scheme.15
The BTC16 like many other Autonomous Tribal District Councils in
North-East India is, financially, dependent upon the State and Union
governments.

Status of Development
Any ‘report card’ on development in the BTC is not available. To begin
with, in 2013 in the four Bodoland districts, there was large-scale depri-
vation of the households of the basic amenities (Table 10.5). The district
 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 157

of Udalguri was well ahead in terms of access to electricity compared

to the other three districts, but in terms of sanitation all four districts
had a dismal picture. As many as 84.4% of all households, for example,
in Chirag, were without any sanitation. In terms of safe drinking water,
Chirag and Udalguri performed much better than the other two. To be
sure, these are to be seen as both development and empowerment.
The data in Tables 10.6 and 10.7 are to be read together in order to
read the wide rural–urban disparity and also the fact that it was the rural
people who are mostly deprived of those basic amenities.
The overall performance indexes for each district are 0.310, 0.516,
0.412 and 0.391 respectively. In comparison, Assam’s overall performance
even as a backward State in India was 0.557 in 2014 which was an
improvement from 2001 (0.386). However, the level of development in
Bodoland is still much below the State average.

Table 10.5 Deprivation of basic amenities in BTC districts (2013)

Districts Households without Households without Households without safe

electricity (%) toilet (%) drinking water (%)

Baksa 34 71.1 23.2

Chirag 26.4 84.4 0.8
Kokrajhar 44.0 72.2 14.8
Udalguri 0.6 78.1 7.4

Source Swargiary, P. http://www.ijstr.org/final-print/apr2020/A-Study-Of-Human-Development-In-

Bodoland-Territorial-Area-Districts-btad-Assam.pdf (sighted on 1/3/22)

Table 10.6 Deprivation in basic amenities: Rural–urban districts

District HH without electricity HH without toilet HH without

drinking water
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total

Baksa 34.7 13.3 34.4 72.8 13.3 72.1 23.3 13.3 23.2
Chirang 28.7 0.0 26.4 85.9 66.7 84.4 0.9 0.0 0.8
Kokrajhar 46.0 15.8 44.0 75.3 29.0 72.2 14.4 21.1 14.8
Udalguri 0.0 11.3 0.6 79.8 47.2 78.1 7.6 1.9 7.4
ASSAM 36.2 7.3 31.7 77.3 29.7 69.8 14.2 5.7 12.9

Source Assam Human Development Report (2014) (Based on the survey conducted in 2013), p. 217
158 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Table 10.7 Human

District Health Education Income
Development Index in
Bodoland (2014) Baksa 0.216 0.367 0.255
Chirag 0.614 0.644 0.347
Kokrajhar 0.427 0.570 0. 287
Udalguri 0.325 0.558 0.268

Source Assam Human Development Report (2014)

In the UNDP’s measurement criteria of human development in terms

of access to health care, education and living standard, the Bodoland
district’s performance varies but only Chirag district has been found to
be well ahead of others: its rank is 7 while the rest are far below: 26, 20
and 18 (Table 10.8).
The question of development is very closely related to the level people
in general are, economically speaking. Available statistical survey data, as
mentioned below, shows that landlessness (homestead as well as cultivable
land) among the households in four Bodoland districts is very high (Table
10.9). While the people have in most cases some homestead land, a high
percentage have limited cultivable land especially when a very per cent
cultivable land has not irrigation facilities. This is a major hurdle to the
development and empowerment of the people. When this is the condition
of the people (all communities) in Bodoland is so precarious, this raises
many further questions about the prospects of identity in the region.
Comparatively, the performance records for composite development
index of Assam and the Bodoland districts, in the assessment of the NITI

Table 10.8 Dimensional and human development indices of districts

District Health Education Living Standard Human

Development Index
Dimensional Rank Dimensional Rank Dimensional Rank Dimensional Rank
Index Index Index Index

Baksa 0.340 26 0.606 23 0.404 21 0.437 26

Chirang 0.746 4 0.677 12 0.457 17 0.614 7
Kokrajhar 0.539 14 0.645 18 0.402 22 0.519 20
Udalguri 0.538 15 0.602 25 0.441 18 0.523 18

Source Assam Human Development Report (2014: 192–93)

 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 159

Table 10.9
District No homestead No No
Landlessness in
land cultivatable irrigated
Bodoland districts (Per land land
cent HH) (2013)
Baksa 0.6 54.5 75.8
Chirang 0.0 45.3 75.7
Kokrajhar 0.5 42.7 83.7
Udalguri 1.2 54.7 94.2
ASSAM 0.8 48.5 89.5

Source Assam Human Development Report (Based on a survey

conducted in 2013), p. 212

Aayog, are behind that of Tripura and the areas within the TTADC during
2020–21 (data period 2019–2020). During the said period, Tripura’s
record was 71.9 to 75.5, and the Dhalai district and part of North Tripura
were above 72 and 75% respectively. Assam’s record for the same period
was 62.77–71.75%, and the four districts of Bodoland were as follows:
Baksa (62. 65%); Chirag (27 to 69%); Kokrajhar (59.69%) and Udal-
guri (53 to 73%) ((niti.gov.in/sights/default) dated 4.4.21) (sighted on
11.11.21).

Conclusion
The various experiments of the Autonomous District Councils in the
North-East are based on the premise of a certain ethnic minority who
have demanded an Autonomous District Councils in the States, but who
are a majority in the areas inhabited by them. This has facilitated through
institutional functioning but produced at the same time exclusion. But
the BTC has remained a glaring exception to the rule, an undesirable
experience at that, in which seats are over-reserved for the Bodo minority
confronted with a majority of 70% non-Bodos of different communities,
tribals and others, the Hindus and the Muslims. It could otherwise have
been a good case of experimenting with real multiculturalism so that all
communities take part in power-sharing as none of them is a majority, and
hence all could collectively take up the development and better protection
of human rights—a solid sure guarantee for peaceful method of resolving
conflicts. But that was not to be. The fact that the Bodos are living in
other areas of Assam outside the BTC areas would have added further
reasons for such power-sharing. Like elsewhere in India and at many levels
160 H. BHATTACHARYYA

of the polity, the majoritarian principle of democracy (the Winners take

all!) has been infectious for the counter-ethnic elites who have indulged
in mobilizing the ethnic brethren, sentimentally and emotionally, of the
story of their deprivation, loss of their identity and so on. One may call it
the politics of identity and recognition, but when a territory is conceded
for a government, this often becomes self-defeating because the govern-
ment itself means more public expenditure to be borne by the people
in a democracy leaving most often very little for ‘development’. For the
BTC, it has been fortuitous that the BPF is a partner of the NDA and
NEDA which has meant ‘Special financial package’ for the Bodos. But
the intra-tribal and community strife in the BTC and beyond will remain.

Notes
1. See George (1994) for a succinct account of the movement till 1993.
2. A three-member Committee was formed by the Union government under
the Chairmanship of Bhipinder Singh in 1991 to study the Bodoland
situation.
3. Baruach has pointed out the unreason of the proliferation of ethnic
homeland discourse in the region (Baruah 2010).
4. Globally, as Smith (2003: 17) informs us, nearly ‘90 per cent of the states
are polyethnic, and about half of them are seriously divided by ethnic
cleavages’.
5. Chakladar, S. 2004 Sub-Regional Movement in India (Kolkata: K. P.
Bachi & Co), Chapter 2 ‘Bodoland a Sub-region in Assam), 34–73.
6. Gait, Sir E. A. 1905. A History of Assam (Guwahati) quoted in Chakladar
(2004: 34).
7. Quoted in Chakladar (2004: 35).
8. In the Accord in 1993, the objective was stated to be: ‘to provide
maximum autonomy within the framework of the Constitution to the
Bodos for social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural develop-
ment’ (Datta 1995: 41). In the Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993
(Assam Act No. Xl of 1993) (Datta 1995: 41–49).
9. The Constitution of India (introduced (2014, 12th edn.) by P M Bakshi)
(New Delhi: Universal Law publishing hose Pvt. Ltd.), p. 363.
10. See South Asia Terrorism portal for the day to day reports on the issue.
11. See Chaudhruy, K. 1994. ‘Outrage in Assam: Bodos on the Rampage”,
Frontline 11 (17), 13–26, 28–30.
12. Datta, P. S. ed. 1995. Ethnic Peace Accords in India (New Delhi: Vikash
Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.).
 10 BODOLAND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS … 161

13. Nazimuddin Siddique, Bodoland Area District Elections 2015—A Discus-

sion, in EPW , Vol. L, No.31, August 01, 2015 in http://www.epw.in/rep
orts-states/bodoland-territorial-area-district-elections-2015.html (sighted
on 2/3/22).
14. See, for example, Goswami, N. 2014 ‘Bodoland Violence: Contest for
Power and Authority’; https://idsa.in/idsacomments/Bodoviolence_ngo
swami_090514 (sighted on 2/3/22); Pathak, S. 2012. Ethnic violence
in Bodoland’, EPW, Vol. 47, 34, August 25, 10–23; Bhattacharyya and
Mukherjee 2018. ‘Bodo ethnic self-rule and persistent violence in Assam:
A failed case of multinational federalism in India’ Regional and Federal
Studies.
15. How much and in what manner such money has been utilized for the
purposes require a separate study and field visit. This is left to the future
researchers.
16. The BTC is placed under the Government of Assam Department of
Welfare of Plain Tribes and Backward Classes for the purpose of making
money available to the former.

References
Bakshi, P.M. 2017. The Constitution of India, 14th ed. New Delhi: Universal
Law Publishing.
Baruah, S. 2005. Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India.
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
———, ed. 2009. Beyond Counter-Insurgency Breaking the Impasse in North-east
India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
———, ed. 2010. Ethno-Nationalism in India: A Reader. Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Bhaumik, S. 2009. Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India’s North East. New Delhi:
Sage.
Bhattacharyya, H., and J. Mukherjee. 2018. Bodo Ethnic Self-Rule and Persistent
Violence. Regional and Federal Studies 28 (4). https://doi.org/10.1080/
13597566.2018.1478293
Chakladar, S. 2004. Sub-Regional Movements in India. Kolkta: K P Bagchi &
Co.
Datta, P.S., ed. 1995. Ethnic Peace Accords. New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House
Pvt. Ltd.
George, J. 1994. ‘Bodoland Violence-Victoims All’. Economic and Political
Weekly 29 (24) (June 11).
Majumdar, A.K., and B. Singh. 1997. Regionalism in Indian Politics. New Delhi:
Radha.
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Mishra, U. 2012. The Burden of History. Economic and Political Weekly 47 (37)
(September 15): 36–42.
Mohanta, N.G. 2013. ‘Politics of Space and Violence in Bodoland’. Economic
and Political Weekly 45 (23) (June): 49–57.
Pathak, S. Ethnic Violence in Bodoland. Economic and Political Weekly 47 (34)
(August 25): 19023.
Sharma, S. 2017. ‘The Bodoland Demand: Genesis of an Ethnic Conflict’.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. (online)
Smith, A.D. 2003. Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Swargiary, P. 2020. A Study of Human Development in Bodoland Territorial
District Assam. International Journal of Science and Technology Research 9
(4) (April): 1546–48.
Talukdar, S. 2020. The Role of Badland People’s Front in Bodoland Territorial
Council and Assam. International Journal of Political Science 6 (1): 1–6.

Official Sources
Assam Human Development Report 2014.
 CHAPTER 11

A Comparative Assessment of Asymmetric

Federalism in India

Introduction
Does asymmetric federalism add any value to the discourse of India’s
unity and integrity? What do asymmetric federal institutions stand for? Do
asymmetric institutions staying as they are in the periphery of the country
perform any job worthy of our attention? There is some scholarly reserva-
tion about this (e.g. Tillin 2007). Such reservations are largely misplaced.
India’s federal asymmetry has proved to be an effective instrument to
accommodate ethnic diversity not manageable otherwise. Although terri-
tory claims have most often been the main object in state creation, the
territory is not an undifferentiated entity in that not all territories are as
resourceful and many are often quite barren. And yet, tribes and sub-
tribes as well as other ethnic groups have articulated demands for official
recognition of their territory in favour of self-government. When such
territories are in India’s international border regions, they have deserved
special treatment. Some ethnic claims for self-deamination with the story
of deprivation, exclusion and discrimination have served to offer the basis
of self-government and development. At the levels below the asymmetric
States the same objective informed the institutional design for tribal self-
governance for the hill and Plain Tribals in North-East India. Therefore

Some materials in this chapter are derived from Bhattacharyya, H. 2019

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 163

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_11
164 H. BHATTACHARYYA

at the base of this vast multi-ethnic country such asymmetric and sub-
asymmetric institutions add value to India national unity and integrity,
political order and stability. As the Indian experience from the North-East
has specifically shown, such sub-asymmetric institutional arrangements for
power-sharing have helped to resolve ethnic conflicts at the base levels,
very often by offering the space to be utilized by the militants and insur-
gents of yester years to transform themselves from rebels to stake holders
in the system, and with constitutionally guaranteed powers and authority
to act the guardians of law and order and defend the border.
Asymmetric federalism entails the issues of identity, territory and self-
determination in a particular territory. While identity recognition is easily
done, recognition of territory-based identity is never easy, especially if
it entails tribes who are not always too deeply attached to a territory.
In the age of India’s neo-liberal reforms, governing itself is challenging
in the sense that the governments have to show results; to develop and
improve the living standard measured by HDI and other yardsticks. For
the asymmetric States with very limited resource bases of their own, and
which are financially very dependent Central transfers, it is even more
challenging when the aspirations of the people are fast growing.
Before we proceed further, we ought to pay some attention to the
following three considerations here. First, nearly all federations have
either de jure or de facto asymmetry. This suggests that asymmetries
are unavoidable in order to respond to certain issues that require special
attention and some asymmetric institutional arrangements. Second, asym-
metry conceptually is not intelligible apart from federalism per se, or to be
more precise, federal symmetry. Third, in practical politics, de facto asym-
metry creeps even in a condition of federal symmetry so that the federal
symmetrical units suffer a temporary setback. Kincaid has shown how in
the US the federal government has bypassed the States and handed over
health programme grants to the NGOs (Kincaid, 2011: 37–54).
Consider what Kincaid said about this:

Contemporary American federalism can be described as an era of coercive

or regulated federalism in which the predominant political, fiscal, statutory
regulatory and judicial trends have entailed imposition of federal dictates
on state and local government (Kincaid, 2011: 37).

This is, for him, a major shift in the federal balance from the interest
of places to the interests of persons and interest groups.
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 165

India, by contrast, has done quite well for there are few murmurs
among the ruling parties in the asymmetric States in India of the Centre’s
neglect or they being bypassed at least financially speaking. Politically
though, as we have seen above in Chapter 5, there are complaints of
the Centre not taking into confidence of the Chief Ministers of the States
in India’s North-East into matters of Act East policy. The asymmetric
States in India have not resented for not getting enough funding from
the Centre. As it applied generally, the Centre is dependent on the States
to implement its various legislations concerning empowerment, poverty
alleviation and development. This very often encroaches upon the rights
of the States for the latter have to allow their administrative machinery to
be used as well as for sharing a portion of the funds especially when the
States are allegedly not consulted in the policy-making process.
However, asymmetric federalism in India is to be understood in the
particular context of Indian federalism, its mode of formation and social
and cultural cleavages around it. The relative success of Indian federalism
in managing ethno-regional conflicts in the mainland of India thus can be
safely extended to include the asymmetric States for no States, symmetric
or asymmetric, in India is mon-ethnic, or cultural. Neither Himachal
Pradesh nor Uttarakhand is mono-ethnic, but multi-ethnic. Erstwhile
J&K was distinctively multi-ethnic: Muslims, Hindus and Buddhist. That
Ladhak, now Union Territory, had had a Regional Development Council
whose performance records remain a gold standard. India’s North-East
contains most of the asymmetric States, and the SCS until recently has
offered a picture of both success and failure. Assam, for instance, has
always been a difficult State to govern due mostly to its complex ethnic
mosaic and the long-drawn history of ethnic insurgency and political
violence. Until the 1990s, the region witnessed high level of insurgency
and political violence and Central rule (under Article 356 of the Constitu-
tion). With a lot of state contraction in many phases, Assam still remains
ethnically very diverse and politically volatile. On the success side, many
ethnic issues have seen their resolution in the region by State and sub-
State creation, but the success is relative because there are claims by some
ethnic groups as being deprived and so demand a state of their own.
Many of such issues are the consequences of resolution of some ethnic
conflicts in a certain way that has failed to satisfy the ethnic others. The
ethno-territorial model of ethnic conflict management in India followed
since 1956 has confronted two types of problems: the ethnic minorities,
and their lack of adequate representation in decision-making, and the
166 H. BHATTACHARYYA

tribals in other parts of India where the 6th Schedule is not applicable.
One wonders if the 6th Schedule could be amended to accommodate
the Bodos who are not hill tribes and a minority in their proclaimed
homeland—a wrong application though—why cannot it be applied to the
tribes in other parts of India who are in millions and occupy vast terri-
tory. Such unresolved issues are the fall outs of the model generally. Many
distinct ethnic communities territorially rooted are demanding a state of
their own, or in some cases, extension of the 6th Schedule benefits to
them. The demand for Vidarbha State out of Maharashtra, or some tribes
in the region demanding the 6th Schedule are cases in point.
Despite the relative success of Indian federalism in the mainland, to a
large extent, what Indian federalism so far has not been able to resolve is
the relation between ethnicity and territory. What is the optimal level of
correspondence between ethnicity and territory? What is the optimal size
of the population to be provided with territorial concession? More tribal
peoples live in the mainland of India than that in North-East India, but
comparatively very little special protection and safeguards are available to
them than that of the tribals of North-East which are smaller in per cent.
I cite the example of the State of Jharkhand created in 2000 as a State for
the tribals, for the Jharkhand movements were one of the oldest of such
movements; but when the State was created, the tribals were found to be
in a minority who can influence public policy only to a limited extent, and
the jobs in public sectors (shrinking in any way) that could be reserved
for them are mostly in lower category in offices and administration.
In the case of the North-East, for example, the federal experiment has
scored some limited success, but the relation between tribal ethnicity and
territory here remains precarious. In this region, the size of the popula-
tion of the States except Assam is a very small. And yet, many sub-State
level asymmetric arrangements had to be provided for to accommodate
ethnic diversity. But there are demands for more, one reason responsible
for the above is India’s majoritarian mode of democracy that is exclu-
sionary in nature particularly among the tribals whose internal divisions
and sub-divisions are manifold and often puzzling to the anthropologists.
Although India officially proclaims to be a multicultural state, this is less
reflected in its democratic institutional practices.
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 167

Theoretical Considerations
Theoretically, the scholars of ethnicity and nationhood are grapple with
a question: Why and when ethnicity gets attracted to territory, or how
ethnicity becomes territorialized? This has been debated in the theoret-
ical discourse on the subject. (e.g. Smith, 1986: 161–77) Smith argues
that many often territorialization is an ethnic group’s transformation into
nationhood via the civic association of statehood. Ethnic heterogeneity
and territory claims have remained, however, contested in the courtiers of
Asia and Africa where ethnic diversity is very complex and often baffling.
Why territorial option does not work in sub-Saharan plural Africa has been
well-argued in recent research. Coakley in a comparative study of territo-
rial management of ethnic conflict management has shown that different
societies have different meanings of ethnicity, and second, the boundaries
of ethnic groups are blurred so that ethnicity and territory do not go well.
He rightly says: ‘Ethnic affiliation is in realty much more complex’. Thus
the current theoretical knowledge on the subject suggests that given the
very complex nature of ethnicity and overlapping loyalties that it entails,
it is not easy to disentangle them for any territorial solution. And yet,
ethnicity, if it is associated with languages, could arouse serious emotions
and sentiments among its adherents for hasty, often over-simplified solu-
tion in territorial autonomy and relative power, if not, in eking out a
separate nation-state. Elite instrumentalities in such cases are more likely
to succeed because people are easy prey to being mobilized when the
issue is their sentiments and emotions. The point that is being made here
is that when ethnicity is of tribal affiliations, as we shall see shortly below,
any attempts at the territorial solution is bound to create more problems
of exclusion and further ethnic discontent.

A Brief Macro Picture

In India, the world’s most diverse country, ethnically speaking, ethno-
linguistic identity’s ‘natural’ claims to territory were a consensus, as it
were, since the days of anti-colonial liberation movements led by the
Indian National Congress, which endorsed it way back in its Nagpur
session in 1920. With the leadership over Congress by M K Gandhi in
the early 1920s the claim began to receive greater legitimacy. It became
eventually an official pledge of Congress to many linguistic groups that
after independence (1947) India would be a federation based on linguistic
168 H. BHATTACHARYYA

provinces (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 193–219). Even the Congress organiza-

tion itself was reorganized to fit the linguistic identity. It was so done
for better political communication between the party and the masses
in a linguistically very diverse country. But what was little understood
then and perhaps also later was the fact that linguistic identity and terri-
tory were never a neat-fit in India, nationally, and more particularly at
the sub-national levels (and also below them); there was thus more to
the so-called ethno-territorial linguistic identity than met the naked eye.
The internal diversity of the so-called ethno-territorial linguistic identity
in India was overwhelming but overshadowed by the nationalist zeal,
short-sightedness and political expediency.
In the post-independence period particularly after 1956, a multi-staged
process of recasting the territory of India has been in place to recreate
new federal units called ‘States’ around linguistic and other ethnic iden-
tity (the process is far from complete) in order to regulate ethnic conflicts.
The method has been relatively successful in the mainland India. This is
more or less adequately examined in the existing knowledge ; Adeney
2007 ; Bhattacharyya 2001, 2010, 2017, 2018; Tillin 2013; Sarangi
and Pai 2011), although there are differences in assessment. What such
macro-level analyses neglect to consider is that although secessionist
conflicts in the mainland have dissipated to a large extent, the domi-
nant ethnic group(s) which spearheaded the movement for new States
and received power as a result have established their own hegemony over
the States because they were economically dominant castes and classes in
their respective regions. Thus, Kammas and Reddys were the real bene-
ficiaries of Andhra Pradesh state; Lingayats and Vokkaligas in the case
of Karnataka; the Jat Sikhs in the case of Punjab and so on. This has
been detailed in Bhattacharyya (2019b). To add some credence to Singh
(2000)’s thesis of ‘ethnic democracy’ operating at the State level which
has resulted in the marginalization of new minorities so created. Since
the base-line of consideration of the SRC (1955) was 50% and above
language speakers deserving a State it had left out millions of other
language speakers out of its consideration. Thus the new States so created
were multi-lingual and multicultural. In subsequent States reorganization
in the 1960s many of such limitations were taken care of by creating more
States, most States today (except Kerala) have large linguistic minori-
ties without territorial concentration and or district-level concentration.
Indian federalism and democracy as such do not have any solution to their
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 169

problems; even a non-territorial solution, or what Lijphar calls, ‘corporate

federalism’ is not yet considered.
It is argued here that while ethno-federal conflict management
resulting in new State creation out of the existing Indian territory served
to ensure better political order and legitimacy in the mainland of India,
the problem remains unresolved, and in the North-East, this remains
problematic. In the case of Punjab, as Singh and Kim (2017: 427–44)
have argued, the experience of federalism remains very limited as the state
has witnessed large-scale deployment of the Indian security forces, which
culminated in 1984 in the Indian Army’s crackdown, nick-named ‘Oper-
ation Bluestar’, on the Golden Temple, the most sacred place of worship
of the Sikhs. Interestingly, in the Punjab case, where statehood was finally
conceded in 1966, ethnicity and territory threw out a bitter lesson: to
create a Sikh majority (only about 52%) state in the Punjab, the territory
was so much slashed that what came out as Punjab in 1966 was actu-
ally the one-third areas of the original state. In the case of North-East,
the method followed in territorialization of ethnicity and creation of small
‘ethnic homelands’ did not result in sustaining ethnic peace but the newer
bases of ethnic conflict.

Comparative Practices
Federal asymmetry remains a part of most federations. In the Asian feder-
ations, India and Malaysia can be said to have achieved some success. In
Malaysia, there are two asymmetric States on the Borneo islands: Sabah
and Sarawak who joined the federations in 1963 but enjoy constitution-
ally speaking special rights with regard to their non-Malaya interests,
and identity. Of late though there is resentment among the indige-
nous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak about the lack of protection of
their languages and increasing attempts by the Centre in extraction and
logging-taking activities in the regions (Bhattacharyya, 2019b: 193). In
India, similar resentments are heard of the mining activities in the North-
eastern States by the private players leaving the areas hugely damaged,
environmentally speaking. The erstwhile State of J&K was assured of
autonomy (under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution); it was also a
Special Category States. But in reality, many Union government orders,
Ordinances and the frequent use of Article 356 of the Constitution
backed up by the huge deployment of the Indian security forces meant
170 H. BHATTACHARYYA

that the State’s so-called autonomy was merely on paper. Of all the asym-
metric States in India, J&K, and those in the North-East for long were
infested with insurgencies and political violence, but in the latter, things
began to subside from the 1990s. Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand,
though hilly and sharing international borders, remain exceptions.

Contentious Territory Claims

Unlike the former J&K, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, the States
in the North-East have witnessed on a regular basis the newer claims
for territory however small they might be. The region as such is very
diverse though but the diversity particularly relating to the tribes is
puzzling for a clear-cut territorial solution. No wonder, the region has
remained until recently volatile and the hotbed of varieties of ethnic
radical politics and political extremism. This has been well-covered in
the existing writings on the region. (Baruah 2005, 2009 and 2010;
Bhaumik 2009; Lacina 2009; Mitra and Bhattacharyya 2000; Hausing
2014; Bhattacharyya 2017, 2018) Das (2010, 45–47) offered an inven-
tory of 77 armed militant ethnic outfits still operative in the region
(except Sikkim). The number of such organizations has of course dwin-
dled over the decades since the 1950s in consonance with the changes in
the outer political environment. But each State has many ethnic militant
groups working underground and many working over the ground. True,
all militants have not demanded territorial concession; in many cases, they
have demanded expulsion of the migrants from the States and engaged
themselves in political violence: arson; kidnapping; killing the migrants
and so on. The objectives of various Ethnic Peace Accords signed (see
Chapter 5) are evidence enough of the various demands of the various
ethnic militants. The AGP’s campaign in Assam in the 1980s was for the
identification of foreigners and then their expulsion. But the campaign
paralyzed Assam for many years. This region shares India’s international
borders with Bangladesh, on the west (and south and east too for Tripura)
and Myanmar, China and Bhutan, on the east and North-East.
Demographically, the region is still sparsely populated; of them,
Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram are still more sparsely populated
compared to India as a whole. The region’s current level of decadal
growth of population is rather stable but historically that was not the
case. Due to India’s Partition (1947) and the birth of Bangladesh (1971),
the region, particularly Assam and Tripura, received millions of refugees
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 171

from across the border from East Bengal (pre-1947), which became East
Pakistan (1947–71) and now Bangladesh. In the wake of the Bangladesh
war of independence further migration took place disturbing and upset-
ting the demographic balance in the region. In Assam, the rate of decadal
growth of population during 1951–61 and 1961–71 was very high—35
and 34.7% respectively compared to all-India average of 21.6 and 24.6%
respectively. (Weiner, 1978: 82) Weiner (1978: 75–143) had shown in
greater detail how this huge demographic transformation became the
root of ethnic conflicts in the State subsequently. By the 2011 Census
Reports of India, the Assamese have lost the majority in population (now
48.81%). In Tripura, the migration of Bengalis from East Bengal and later
East Pakistan reduced the local population (aboriginal peoples) during
1941–51 and later in 1951–61 to a small minority in their own state.
The resultant loss of land and habitat to the settler Bengalis in Tripura
was to become the roots of persisting radical ethnic politics in the State
(Bhattacharyya 2018).
The tribal people constitute about 8.6% (some 104 million) (2011) of
the total population of India and are spread over the country with the
North-East as one of the areas of their concentration. The term ‘tribe’
used since the British colonial days is a loose category that covers tribes,
sub-tribes as well as assimilated ones. This region is reported to have
as many as 215 Scheduled (constitutionally recognized as such) Tribes
(Table 11.1) and many more which are not yet recognized as such to
be entitled to constitutional special protection and privileges. The lists of
Scheduled Tribes vary across the States in India. Of the eight States of
the region, four are predominantly ‘tribal’ inhabited (of them three are
predominantly Christian) and there are significant proportions of them in
the rest.
When the percentage figure of the tribals is offered in statistical presen-
tation, it is not always made clear that such tribals are not a homogeneous
category. For example, while it is true that 68.8% of the population in
Arunachal Pradesh are tribal but then they are 101 tribal groups and sub-
groups—each having their own identity and culture Table 11.1) (perhaps
inhabiting a little territory of their own) and speaking a dialect. In
Tripura, 31.8% tribal refers to as many as 18 tribal groups and sub-groups;
in this case too each of them has its own dialect although Kok-Borok
is the lingua franca. The intricacies of such diversity are to be read in
conjunction with the linguistic diversity in each State. The 50th Report of
the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities, Government of India (2013)
172 H. BHATTACHARYYA

Table 11.1 States and ethnic groups in the NE (2011)

States Major linguistic ethnic groups Majority/minority

Arunachal Pradesh *Nissi/Dafla, Adi, Bengali, No majority group: Daflas

Nepali are 18.97%; Adi 17.61%
Assam Assamese, Bengali, Hindi, No majority group; Assamese
Bodo** as dominant group (48.81%)
Manipur Manipuri, Thada, Thankhul and Manipuri (58.43%)
11 others
Meghalaya Khasi, Garo, Bengali and 4 No majority group; Khasis
others are dominant group
(47.05%)
Mizoram Lushai/Mizo, Bengali and six Lushai/Mizo (73.25%)
others,
Nagaland Ao, Konyak, Lotha and Angami No majority (AO = 12.94%
and 18 others as the largest group)
Sikkim Nepali, Bhutia, Hindi, Lepcha, Nepali (62.61%)
Limbo and three others
Tripura Bengali, Tripuri*** Bengali**** (67.14%)

Source 50th Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities in India (July 2012 to June 2013)
(New Delhi: Government of India) Notes * Nissi/Dafla and Adi are divided into 101 sub-groups;
** Bodos are plains tribes but there are many tribal groups speaking their own dialect and have their
terrestrial concentration in the hills such as the Nagas and the Dimasas. *** Tripuris are sub-divided
into 18 groups. **** Bengalis are settlers in the state. No territorial changes took place after 2011

contains detailed information on the linguistic diversity in each State and

the state of protection of minority languages at the grassroots.
In Arunachal Pradesh, there is no majority language group and hence
there is no dominant ethnic group. There are significant speakers of three
8th Schedule languages (i.e. Bengali, Hindi and Nepali). The majority
speak different tribal dialects lacking in scripts so that the official language
of the State is English. The State was created in 1987 without any distinct
identity basis.
In Assam, the major State in the region with 68.45% of the region’s
total population in 2011, the Assamese speakers are found to have lost
their majority for the first time in 2001. In 1971, the Assamese speakers
were some 60.89% of the total population so this loss of majority is
likely to create ethnic tensions among the Assamese in days to come.
The linguistic diversity in the State is immense because apart from the
Assamese, Bengali and Bodo/Boro, the major language speakers, there
are a plethora of languages spoken, not all of which are officially recog-
nized. The recent decline in the percentage of Assamese is due to
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 173

the relative decline of Assamese speakers and the increase of Bengali

speakers in seven districts in the Brahmaputra Valley during 1991–2001
(The Hindu Kolkata 9 October 2016). Assam has experienced territo-
rial contraction since pre-independence days and more particularly since
the 1960s when its Hill Districts were separated; Nagaland was conceded
as a State in 1963; and in 1972 when Mizoram and Meghalaya were
conceded statehood. This added to greater percentage of Assamese to
the total population but a diverse ethnic situation has remained. The
dwindling demographic numbers of the Assamese gave birth to ethnic
militancy arising from the majority community (i.e. the Assamese) in the
form of the ULFA and the AGP among others. Ethnic minorities have
mobilized themselves in militant forms for the protection of their iden-
tity. Various Bodo organizations have cropped up for a State of Bodoland
in the northern banks of the river Brahmaputra. A Bodoland Territorial
Authority was conceded in 2003 but it has created more problems than
resolved any (Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee 2018) because ethnicity and
territory here have been on a black burner: a territorial government has
been conceded to an ethnic minority (30% Bodos) in an area inhabited
by some 70% non-Bodos! Beyond them, there are demands for further
territorial separation out of Assam by different ethnic minorities groups
such as the Karbi, Dimasa and Nagas. Assam and Nagaland share a long
434 km border, east of Assam, and there is a long-drawn dispute (border)
between the two States over some territories on the border areas. The
Nagalim (greater Nagaland) demand of the Naga rebels (NSCN-IM)
includes parts of Assam’s territory.
In Manipur, the erstwhile princely State like Tripura, although
Manipuri is spoken by the majority, this majority is not large. There are
a lot of speakers of other tongues which are not all recognized officially.
Manipuri is the official language of the State but English is adopted as
an additional official language. There is still controversy about the script
to be used for Manipuri. The people in Manipur are diverse living in the
hills (41.1%) and the valley (58.9%). The people living in the plains are
also ethnically divided and profess different faiths. There are Kuki and the
Naga settlement in the valley—the Nags comprising the second largest
after the Meitei (Manipuri). There are some 29 tribes living in the hills
generically grouped into the Naga, the Kuki and Zo. There are many
sub-groups among them too. The Nagalim demand of the Naga rebels
includes parts of Manipur inhabited by the Nagas.
174 H. BHATTACHARYYA

When the State of Meghalaya was conceded in 1972 it was under-

stood to be the State of the whole people of Meghalaya, and that the
ethnic rebels fighting for Statehood were the representatives of the whole
people. But it turned out to be otherwise. It turned out that the Khasis,
the dominant tribe, got the State, and hence the second-largest ethno-
linguistic group, i.e. the Garos, were unhappy and began demanding a
State of their own, which is yet to be fulfilled. The Khasis and the Gaors
are the two major linguistic groups but then there is immense ethno-
linguistic diversity in the State. It was created as an autonomous state
within the state of Assam on 2 April 1969. It comprises the United Khasi-
Jaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills District. It became a fully-fledged
state in 1972. And yet, statehood has not been able to resolve inter-ethnic
conflicts in Manipur.
Mizoram is the lone tribal State in the region whose dominant Mizo
community speaking Mizo/Lushai constitutes 73.21% of the total popu-
lation. This has served to ensure enduring ethnic peace in the State
although the Hmar tribe has been demanding some territorial autonomy
and protection of their identity for a long. So is the Brus many of
whom are living in refugee camps in Tripura. However, the greater
ethnic homogeneity in the State has produced better governance results
(Bhattacharyya 2018).
Contrary to all claims for a coherent Naga nationhood and solidarity,
Nagaland contains very diverse linguistic groups so that there is no
single Naga group as a majority in population. The two largest linguistic
groups—Ao and Konyak—constitute respectively 12.94 and 12.46% of
the total population. The various other groups have populations which
are significant in number in a State with a small population. This ethno-
linguistic diversity undercuts the demand for a homogenous Naga identity
and has given birth to numerous ethnic rebel groups.
Sikkim is diverse too although its majority Nepali community is 62.61%
of the population. The other language groups are smaller in number and
proportions. But the State has had a different trajectory and shared very
little with the North-East, let alone India, generally. For a long period, it
was a feudal dynasty which the British protected with its indirect control.
After 1947 India extended the protection but incorporated it into the
Union of India in 1974 and made a State in 1975. In the 1960s and
1970s, there were attempts to construct a common Sikkimese (national)
identity though it turned out to be fraught with a host of problems stem-
ming from a multicultural social mosaic (Hiltz 2003). But the State has
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 175

a distinct regional identity, which again is multicultural, that sets it apart

from similar identity in the North-East.
Tripura’s linguistic diversity is not as complex for the Bengalis and the
Tripuri/Kok-Borok languages cover more than 92% of the population.
But there is persistent and long-drawn ethnic conflict in the State. The
roots of the conflicts lie in the demographic upheaval due to the influx of
Hindu refugees from across the border adjacent to the princely State were
reduced in the wake of long-drawn migration of Bengalis to a minority.
This entailed loss of land and habitats to the settlers on the part of the
tribals. This has complicated the sense of identity both among the tribals
and the settlers Bengalis whose territorial loyalty is more to the State and
the areas of East Bengal (East Pakistan) from where they had originated
and migrated respectively. In a detailed empirical survey, Mitra (2012:
59–61) explained why a quarter of the people had reported (in a national
survey) themselves as not citizens of India with reference to the regions
and localities of their origin.
In light of the above, three issues need to be considered. First, a
common North Eastern regional identity has not emerged and is unlikely
to do so. A common identity in each State, let alone in the region, remains
still a far cry. Each unit of the federation is ethnically heterogeneous
and most often territorially rooted and has provided fertile grounds for
political mobilizations for identity, autonomy and power. Second, ethnic
heterogeneity within the States is not conducive to development and
governance, for the ruling parties of some ethnic groups may discrimi-
nate against the minority others. Often one dominant group has claimed
power and autonomy for the whole people but once in the corridors of
power, it has discriminated against the other groups, or the minorities
newly created have expressed grievances against the dominant group in
power. Third, ethnic heterogeneity means there is little correspondence
between ethnic identity and ethnic territory, and hence the potentials for
persistent conflicts is embedded in the social fabric. As a result, the ‘other’
ethnic minorities have come out to demand a territory of their own. The
latter has followed suit for further territorial division and sub-divisions for
the protection of their identity. Baruah (2010) has rightly pointed out
that the region witnessed a proliferation of ethnic homeland discourse
and the demands for more.
In terms of religion too, this region is especially very diverse but the
Hindus are overall in majority (54.23%). In the North-East, Hindus
are the majority in population in only three States—Assam, Sikkim
176 H. BHATTACHARYYA

and Tripura. In Manipur, the Hindus are the single largest group
(43.21%). The Christians here have a significant presence in the popu-
lation. Muslims are sizeable proportions of the population in Assam,
Manipur and Tripura. Nonetheless, religion did not play a determining
role in redefining ethnic identity in the North-East, a role played rather
effectively by other factors such as language and tribal ethnicity. Weiner
and Katzenstein reported that in the 1960s, some of the Khasi, Garo
and Naga tribesmen had begun to assert their identity as Christians in
demanding separate territories, but then realizing the political unaccept-
ability of a religion-based territory claim, switched to tribal loyalties and
identities and were successful carving out three tribal States. It must,
however, be acknowledged that Christianity has played nonetheless a crit-
ical role in redefining tribal ethnic identity in Nagaland, Meghalaya and
Mizoram.
Three States in the region—Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland—are
predominantly Christian, and there are a large number of Christians in
Assam and Manipur (3.7% and 30.28% respectively). However, the Chris-
tians overall in the region are only 17.31%. Arunachal Pradesh is the
only State with a significant Buddhist population (11.7%). Many mili-
tant ethnic organizations such as the AGP (until 1985) and the ULFA
are dominated by the caste Hindu Assamese. The Muslims in Assam have
mobilized themselves separately as well as within the Congress party. In
Tripura because of the impact of Left politics over the decades, communal
polarization along religious lines did not take place. On the contrary,
the fact that most tribals here are Hindus has added to inter-community
amity. In Tripura again, the Muslims have traditionally been the support
bases of the Left.
Since 2014 the BJP’s Hindutva politics has made some headways in
the region so that the party obtained a majority of seats in the Legislative
Assembly (36 out of 60) in Tripura in alliance with the local tribal outfit
though. In Tripura, the whole hog of the Congress and TMC joined
the BJP just before the elections. In Assam in 2016 the party itself got
60 seats (04 short of majority) out of 126 but with the allies another
27 seats. With the AGP, an ethnic Assamese party, leaving the govern-
ment in 2019, the coalition has now 73 seats. The BJP has been returned
in 2021. In other States such as Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Naga-
land, Meghalaya and Manipur the BJP remains a junior partner with a
very few seats. Its alliance (North-East Democratic Alliance) partners are
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 177

not all parties of the Hindus—most of them are Christian dominated in

Mizoram, Meghalaya and Nagaland.
Since the States in the region are resource-starved, the region was
dependent heavily on rather liberal Central grants by way of various
arrangements. Until 2014 a system of Special Category Status (SCS)
ensured that there was a provision for 90% as grants from the Centre and
10% as loan out of the total plan outlay by the then Planning Commission,
which for the general category States was 30:70 (Bhattacharjee 2016).
The purpose of such a device by the National Development Council (of
the Planning Commission) was to help the region overcome its economic
backwardness with rather liberal access to the central funds. However,
the SCS status was criteria-based (Bhattacharjee, 2016: 3) which served
to balance between finance and diversity.
The formation of the North Eastern Council (NEC) in 1972 by an Act
of Parliament (1971) was the first major institutional step by the Centre to
recognize the region’s political identity. Located in Shillong, the capital of
Meghalaya, the Council is thought only as an Advisory Body consisting
of members including all the Chief Ministers and the Governors of the
States in the region for planning, development and supervision. It can
fund projects of common of interests such as production of electricity and
roads but most of its funds come from the Centre; the State governments
share part of the funding. Apparently designed to serve as a zonal body
like the other Zonal Councils for other regions, the NEC does not as yet
have any power to resolve inter-state conflicts let alone to participate in
policy matters beyond the region with neighboring countries even though
such policies have larger ramifications for the region. India’s Look/Act
East Policy (1992–)is an instance in which the North-East is a land bridge
to Southeast Asia for development, trade and investment. The Council’s
role in planning was also overshadowed by the Planning Commission,
now defunct (2014)—replaced by the NITI Aayog. The ineffectiveness of
the Council has been pointed out by Bhattacharjee (2016) in his detailed
study of the SCS. In the official website, the NEC is stated as an organ
of the Government of India.
The other major institutional measure that recognizes the NE as a
region was a Department of Development of the North Eastern Region
in 2001 (DoNER)—then a Department first within the Union Ministry—
which became a fully-fledged ministry of the Union government in 2004
(MDoNER). The idea was mooted during the rule of the first NDA
government at the Centre during 1999–2004. This is a Central ministry
178 H. BHATTACHARYYA

housed in Delhi and headed first by a Minister of State Dr. Jitendra Singh
(now headed by a Cabinet Minister Mr. G. Kishan Reddy (Hyderabad)
who was elected to Lok Sabha (Popular chamber of Indian Parliament)
from Jammu, not the North-East. In 2017–18, the Ministry had a sump-
tuous budget of INR 3000 crores (US $ 70 million). The Ministry was
set up to facilitate between the Central ministries and the State govern-
ments of the region in economic development, including the removal of
institutional bottlenecks and provision of basic minimum services in the
region. The other important objective of the Ministry is to create an ‘envi-
ronment of private investment’, and to remove all impediments to lasting
peace and security in the region. But what is of special importance to
us here is that the MDoNER has brought the NEC under its control!
The formation of a separate Ministry for the region’s development is
significant but then this is an instance of centralization.

Limited Federalism in the North-East

The eight States of India’s North-East (Sikkim was added in 2002) did
not experience the federal treatment from the Centre. On the contrary,
the States in the region except Sikkim had had rather bitter experi-
ences of central rule via the President’s rule under Article 356 and or
semi-military rule under the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act
(1958) (AFSPA). The ambit of the Act is said to be minimized in the
States where it is clamped. The territorial evolution of the region’s units
into statehood was chequered; there took place state contraction in the
case of Assam, which had to concede to territorial divisions that gave
birth to the states of Nagaland (1963), Mizoram (1987) and Meghalaya
(1972). The erstwhile North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)—a construct
of the imperial ruler—was made into a State too in 1987. But some of the
units were Union Territories and had their elected governments. There-
fore, when the central rule under Article 356 was imposed the Union
Territories were not spared. The available records show that Assam,
Manipur and Nagaland are the worst sufferers (Table 11.2) where there
is no normal democratic governance for a prolonged period. Such rule
was clamped on Assam when the government was run by the Assam
Gana Parishad (AGP) had a majority in the State Assembly in 1990–91.
Likewise, Arunachal Pradesh was under the President’s rule in 1979 for
76 days, and also later in 2015–16. The rest of the units except Tripura
underwent similar experiences. We learn from the data provided by Cohen
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 179

Table 11.2
States Since 1950 (days)
Presidential rule (under
Article 356 of the Assam 1117
Constitution) in the NE Manipur 1327
Meghalaya 172
Sikkim 347
Nagaland 1545

Source Compiled from various media reports. Note The figures are
not final

that during 1973–83 the army was regularly deployed as an ‘aid to civil
order’. Except Jammu and Kashmir, the States in the North-East are the
other areas in which the draconian AFSPA (1958) was in force routinely.
When the areas or the States are placed under this act, democracy and
federalism take a back seat. Even in a State such as Tripura (under the
Left rule over the last 25 years at a stretch and during 1978–88), the Act
was withdrawn only on 29 May 2015 after long 18 years. Nagaland which
was placed under this Act for several decades is placed again under this
Act on 01 January 2018. Ironically, Nagaland has remained the highest
scorer over the three decades from 1981 to 2011 in terms of the main-
tenance of the rule of law (Malhotra, 2014) whose link with the force of
the APSPA is arguably not strong enough. But AFSPA has been clamped
over the state again on 31 December by the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India for six months. This Act gives the troops and the
paramilitaries nearly the license to kill with guaranteed immunity anyone
suspected in the eyes of a Commissioned Officer or a non-Commissioned
officer not below the rank of Havildars of the troops in the interest of
public order. Awfully, this Act had its origins in the repressive Bengal
Jail Code/Regulation (1818) of the East India Company. The frequency
with which this Act has been in place and the consequences it had had on
human rights of the citizens in the region predictably produced only an
ugly face of the Centre. No wonder, anti-Centre sentiments are rampant
among the people at large and the elites in the region.

Conclusion
We argue here that the North-East of India continues to experience polit-
ical centralization and encroachment on the special States’ rights when
the overall political climate in India over the last three decades or so is
180 H. BHATTACHARYYA

characterized by more autonomy and freedom of action for the States.

In the North-East, as we have seen above, the inter-State institutions
of the region have all been brought under the control of the Centre.
Rather than empowering the regional bodies such as the NEC via legisla-
tive federalism, the Centre has chosen the path of further centralization
through the method of what I have termed ministerialization. A separate
ministry is created under the Union government called the Ministry of
Development of the North Eastern Region (MDoNER) in 2004 headed
by a Minister who was elected from Jammu, not from the region. The
Centre’s encroachment on the special States’ rights in the region has taken
place in mining operations carried on by the private players as well as by
the Central government agencies. In other matters so vital to the region
such as the Look/Act East Policy, all policy decisions are taken by the
Centre in total neglect of the State governments when the North-East
is regarded in the policy as the land bridge to the Southeast as well as
the nodal point of development. With only 25 Members of Parliament
(Lok Sabha, the popular chamber), the region does not perhaps count
as much in the making or unmaking of the government at the Centre,
let alone in policy decisions including those affecting the region. But
the strategic importance of the region goes beyond the numbers. The
abolition of the Planning Commission (2014) and along with the Special
Category Status of the States (2018) has created legitimately a deep sense
of anxiety and uncertainty among the region’s elites to which the so-
called (Centre’s) ‘Special Economic Packages’—not above the charge of
political discrimination—is hardly an alternative. In short, the apparent
anti-federal approach of the Centre to the region goes against the so-
called ‘competitive cooperative federalism’ that the Prime Minister Modi
has been highlighting so much in his public postures. Political centraliza-
tion and neglect of the region by the Centre is a bad omen for the region
long known for its political insurgency and violence.
Second, despite many rounds of reorganization, the relationship
between ethnicity and territory remains very uncertain in the region.
The experience suggests that perhaps territorialization of ethnicity in the
region has not been a rational political decision with very small, econom-
ically unviable states afflicted with further ethnic conflicts for territory.
Territorialization of tribal ethnicity in the North-East via many ‘micro-
partitions’ has produced only many small economically unviable States,
and sub-States in the shape of the territorial District Councils, which
are a testimony to the final limits, as it were, of the so-called ‘unity in
 11 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ASYMMETRIC … 181

diversity’ model of nation-building in India in which diversity is recog-

nized, most often politically too, to create the basis of unity grounded
in the recognition of multiple ethnic identity. Given the intra-tribal and
inter-tribal identity claims compounded by rival claims to territory, any
further territorialization of tribal ethnic identity may be a bad omen for
legitimacy and governance in the region, especially when the existing
territorial boundaries are contested. How, for example, the Nagalim
demand of the Naga organizations can be fulfilled which would mean
that Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur will have to part with their
Naga-inhabited territories?
Finally, the reasons why ethno-federal model of management of sub-
national movements in the mainland happens to be the lesser real risk of
secessionism and greater ethnic homogeneity in the movements although,
as we have indicated, there are significant ethnic minorities with many
territorially rooted in the same areas. Except Kerala and Gujarat, most
of the new States so created are multi-ethnic and multi-lingual. In the
peripheries, and that too, with international borders the risks for seces-
sionism are real; management of long borders for cross-border insurgent
activities, smuggling of arms and drug etc. is a serious challenge and the
complexity of tribal ethnicity that defies any clear correspondence with
territory has meant that the strategy of territorialization of ethnic conflicts
may not work.

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 CHAPTER 12

Conclusion

The various chapters in this book above have been centrally preoccupied
with the question of India’s asymmetric federal institutional arrangements
and their efficacy in identity protection, development and governance.
In this book I have adopted an extended conception of asymmetry
in Indian federalism since the inauguration of the Constitution, if not
before—something missing in the existing literature. I show how the
very federation-building process in India has followed an asymmetric
method. The book throughout has attempted to answer what India’s
federal and asymmetric federal institutions have done in respect of iden-
tity, development and governance at both the State and sub-State levels.
A larger perspective is offered here in understanding India’s varied forms
of federal asymmetry and their effectiveness from the days of the making
of the Constitution up to today when India’s political economy has
made a major and radical shift since the early 1990s in the wake of
India’s adoption of the policy of neo-liberal reforms. I have pursued the
inquiry down to the sub-State level asymmetry too in order to offer
a comprehensive account of federal asymmetry thus far not studied as
well as detailed case materials on how such institutions actually work
in promoting and protecting identity, producing better development
and governance. Two case study materials from India’s North-East—
not seen usually as an exemplar of development and governance, and
always treated, condescendingly, as a test case of militancy and political

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 185

Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_12
186 H. BHATTACHARYYA

violence—of sub-State asymmetric institutions, and their actual func-

tioning; in the latter, I sought to explain when representative institutions
in India work, sometimes, and when they do not do so. A dynamic neo-
institutional approach, as distinguished from static neo-institutionalism
(e.g. Singh 2022) followed in this study has sought to highlight the
role of institutions, actors and context, and to show how the appropriate
combination of them, if any, can produce better results in producing
protection of ethnic identity, development and governance; and when
ill-designed institutions fail and produce an unusual and disastrous results.
The larger perspective within which the materials in this book have
been critically treated needs some re-emphasis. This is the question of
what is called ‘the politics of recognition’ in the current liberal discourse.
India’s experience in this regard since the 1950s, if not before, has
worked. It has been a multi-staged and very cautious approach (Bhat-
tacharyya 2019b). The success in those cases meant, by and large,
lessening the level of ethnic conflicts and mobilizations, and violence in
favour of more enduring ethnic peace and political stability, which has
produced better development and governance. Today the yardsticks of
measuring any success or failure of governments are different from the
olden days when the sole criterion was governmental stability (Mitra
1978). Myron Weiner (1968) in identifying the methods of studying
state politics in India was also puzzled by how to measure governmental
performance in the absence of statistical evidence, and that too, consis-
tent, Weiner had to settle down for governmental stability as the marker
of governance. Things have since improved, and so has the expansion
of the notion of governance. Today not only governmental stability, law
and order and political violence are considered as important variables of
measuring governance, but also the socio-economic variables more partic-
ularly relating to the delivery of services and goods are considered very
important (Mitra and Bhattacharyya, 2018: 276–307).
Officially since the inauguration of the Indian Constitution, if not
before, any ethnic ‘homeland’ demand has, however, been ruled out.
Indians are thought to have only one homeland, that is, India. But in
practice, the various ‘ethnic homelands’ have been recognized. India’s
federation building through ‘states reorganization’ has entailed almost
an unending process of recasting its territory in order to right-size the
political map. Various States and sub-States that have resulted from this
process are all based on some kind of rhetoric of ethnic self-determination
in a homeland, whether based on language, region, religion (in part),
 12 CONCLUSION 187

tribal affiliations, or a combination thereof. But the so-called successes of

some dominant ethnic groups in having eked out a State for them within
the federation with relatively autonomous powers have not been unblem-
ished: ethnic minorities, or the so-called ‘micro-minorities’ produced as a
result of the process have faced exclusion on many counts; their language
rights as fundamental rights fared very badly at the grassroots (Report of
the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities, Government of India, 2011:
76). No wonder, they began demanding a State, or a sub-State for them
as a redress. Added to that are the various brands of ‘nativist’ move-
ments that defended, not always unjustly, the principle of ‘sons of the
soil’ (Weiner 1978) and or what is called the ‘ethnic homeland’. Baruah
(2010) has informed us of the proliferation of such discourse in India’s
North-East, which often results in a tiny-sized territorial concession to
some ethnic group who formed a Tribal District Council (under the
6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution) that is not economically viable.
And yet, economic viability was one of the criteria that the SRC (1955)
adopted in recommended in state creation, but the governments of the
day since have much deviated from such principle for often short-term
political goals.
In Chapter 1 we have introduced the subject, defined the problems,
considered a revised template of federalism, discussed the cocneptual
framework of asymmetric federalism, and the issues of exclusion and
inclusion, issue of ethnic homeland in federalism. We have discussed
also our methodology. In Chapter 2 we have analyzed the conceptual
issues of asymmetric federalism and examined the current debates on
the concept. We have highlighted the special importance of the concept
in multi-ethnic, diverse countries, and made with reference to India a
plea for considering the sub-State level autonomous institutions into the
conceptual framework of asymmetric federalism.
The subject matter of Chapter 3 is rather novel. Here I have explored
critically the state-making process in India since 1950 as asymmetric and
pointed out as how the idea of the States have evolved with differen-
tial powers and status. The Making of the Six Schedule providing for
self-government for the hill tribes in India’s North-East is also offered
here utilizing the debates in the Constituent Assembly. We pointed out
the special sign finance of the 6th Schedule. I have used the expression
‘asymmetry within asymmetry’ for the ten such Councils in operation in
the region that fall within the States which are asymmetric. The States
188 H. BHATTACHARYYA

in the North-East have also undergone a similar process. Such asym-

metric approach in the making and unmaking of the States in India has
proved very effective for the often cautious and steady nature. The asym-
metric States in the North-East were not created in one go. Except Assam
which a directly governed Province under British rule, the rest underwent
territorial evolution with asymmetric status—District Councils to Union
Territory to finally statehood.
In Chapter 4 we have identified various forms of federal asymmetries
in India various forms of the States, sub-States and other agencies with
special powers to meet the special situations all over India. It has dealt
with de jure and de facto asymmetry, and various other forms of power-
sharing, and argued that the gamut of asymmetry in India’s federalism
is quite complex and large indeed, but this has proved functional for
the internal cohesion and unity in this vast multicultural country. The
various levels of power-sharing down to the sub-State levels (e.g. tribal
district councils) have paved the basis of the insurgents and the militates
to transform themselves into stakeholders at various levels of the Indian
polity.
Chapter 5 has as its subject matter fiscal asymmetry in Indian feder-
alism starting with the Finance Commission, the Special Category States
and other financial transfers to the States and sub-State level local self-
governments. In this chapter, we have noted the recent changes in Indian
federalism with particular reference to the 14th and 15th Finance Commis-
sions (2021–22), scrapping of the SCSs in 2018 but retention of the
Annual Plan Assistance; and various other transfers by way of projects of
development, infrastructure and empowerment in the hilly border States
and the North-East, and the formation of the DoNER as a separate
and intendent ministry for the North-East. The most important aspect
covered in this chapter is the comparative performance records in develop-
ment and governance in the ex-SCS particularly since the 1990s. I argued
there that the olden image of the North-East, in particular, as the home
of militancy and political violence may no longer hold true, and tried to
make a plea to abjure the so-called ‘insurgency approach’ (e.g. Baruah,
2005 and 2010) in understanding the region.
India’s asymmetric States were rooted in ethnic cleavages. In Chapter 6
we provided a critical account of the interface between social and cultural
cleavages, on the one hand, and the rise of the States with asymmetric
powers and status, on the other. I have argued there that most of India’s
States carry some ethnic content and character in the sense that some kind
 12 CONCLUSION 189

of ethnic factor was responsible for their creation. We have offered a broad
overview of all the Special Category States and make pointed reference
to identity-based sub-State level asymmetry. However, we have argued
that there should be an end in what is called ‘micro-partitioning’ India
with too many little governments especially with regard to the tribals in
the North-East who go on demanding a territory of their own while
not believing in territorial boundaries as such! I have pointed out that
after all governments mean public expenditure, and more governments
means more public expenditure. This of course raises the tricky question
of where to stop, and what is the optimal level (Bhattacharyya 2019a).
Chapter 7 discusses the Special Category States in India, their origins
and development, and governmental performance in terms of develop-
ment, governance and identity protection. It shows that despite the
withdrawal of the system in formal terms, the subject of Central Plan
Assistance to the States in the peripheries remain. It finally, examines the
implications of India’s neo-liberal reforms for the future prospects of the
States in the peripheral areas of India.
The subject matter of Chapter 8 was ‘asymmetry within asymmetry’
in India federalism. It sought to bring out the constitutional debates on
the institutional forms of self-governance for the tribes of India in the
North-East and those in the mainland. It shows that the provisions of the
5th Schedule for tribal self-governance in the mainland of India where
most tribes live are inadequate and less empowering than that of the 6th
Schedule meant for the hill tribes of North-East India. The former has
provided only for a Tribal Advisory Council which has been of little effects
in protecting the rights of the tribes while the latter has provided for
tribal self-governing bodies. It has paid attention to the working of ten
Tribal Autonomous Districts Councils in the North-East. It has shown
the seriousness of the Bordoli Committee of the CA, and highlighted the
quality of debates on the 6th Schedule compared to the 5th Schedule
which received only perfunctory attention of the founding fathers.
Chapters 9 and 10 are case study chapters that offered critical accounts
of the formation, composition and performance of the two district
council—Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council and the Bodoland
Territorial Council respectively. In a way, these are cases in contrast. In
the case of the ADC (Tripura), it has been a case of relative success story
by being one of the longest serving Council with more homogeneous and
concentrated tribal groups in the eastern areas of Tripura. In Tripura, the
tribal ethnic identity question and their protection were initially related
190 H. BHATTACHARYYA

to their loss of land to the settler Bengalis who are now over 70% of the
population. The tribal pro-nationalist organization the TRUGMP (GMP
for short) in association with the CPI/CPI-M defended tribal interests
and tried to restore lands illegally transferred, but subsequently settled
down for a new definition of protection of tribal identity by de-linking
it from the land questions and re-linking it to enjoyment of government
welfare programmes, and making maximum use of them (Bhattacharyya
2023: 273–86). However, the ADC’s fate dwindled when it is governed
by a different political party that was in power at the State level. With
the LFG led by the CPI-M in power at the State level and the same Left
coalition in power at the ADC, it was a royal combination that produced
better results for the tribals in Tripura. In fine, the most important reason
why the ADC has been a success story is its institutionalization for over
three decades.
The BTC formed in 2003, by contrast, is another story. It is ill-fated
in the sense that the Bodos are a minority (about 30%) in the region
confronted with a huge majority of multiple communities. What has
added further fuel to the fury is that 30 seats in the 40-member Council
have been reserved for the Bodos to make them a political majority—a
clear defiance of the democratic principle in a situation where multiple
ethnic communities reside for ages. The ill-designed institutional frame-
work has paved the basis for persistent inter-conflict and violence. This
has also cleared the deck for the non-Bodos (about 70%) to counter-
mobilize against the BPF, the main party of the Bodos, and appeared
as a formidable challenge to the Bodos who are losing grounds, polit-
ically speaking. The results have been ethnic cleansing, and riots which
sent thousands of the Bodos and non-Bodos to government relief camps
apart from hundreds of death and many thousands injured. The detailed
account in Chapter 10 shows that the counter-mobilization has taken
place and the Bodo People’s Front, the party of the Bodos has been
increasingly lost ground so that in the last elections in 2021 it formed a
coalition with its erstwhile adversary, the BJP. With the BJP-led coalition
in the State in which the BPF is a partner, a large sum has been earmarked
in the MDoNER for the ‘Special packages for Bodoland’. Some limited
development and improvement in human development has taken place
but here most of the people are landless and above 70% rural household
in some districts under the BTC are without basic amenities.
I have explained in Chapter 10 the problematic concept of ‘homeland’
for the Bodos. In the survey (elite interviews) we have seen that the other
 12 CONCLUSION 191

communities (Hindus, Muslims, Assamese, Santhals and others) also call

the region their ‘homeland’ too. Therefore, the institutional working in
this case remains mired in ethnic claims and counter-claims, and conflicts,
and those in power often are bent on converting the minority into a
majority by means, fair and foul. To be precise, the failure of Bodoland
Territorial Council lies in its institutional ill-design. Even if the BTC has
relatively failed, or some other Councils elsewhere in India have failed to
deliver, that does not lead to political instability in the country because of
two reasons: first, such conflicts are localized with little spillover effects;
and second, where such experiments have been successful that have meant
territorialization of conflicts, and some value addition to the overall
political stability and order in the country.
Chapter 11 has dealt with the comparative aspects of asymmetric feder-
alism in India, and highlighted the best practices in institutional working
in resolving ethnic conflicts, delivering better development and gover-
nance. It has also how in the wake of India’s neo-liberal reforms the
asymmetric States especially in the North-East have suffered in matters
of their special rights and autonomy. It has shown that while the region
has been considered as the land bridge to South-East Asia in India’s new
foreign policy initiative titled ‘Look/Act East Policy’ the stakeholders in
the region have not been adequately involved in policy taking . With the
establishment of a new Union Ministry called Ministry of Development
of the North-Eastern region (MDoNER) more ministrialisation has taken
place especially when so far not a single member of Parliament from the
region has been appointed the Minister in charge of the above ministry.
Finally, this chapter has shown that while territorial autonomy has proved
quite effective in resolving ethnic conflicts, there are incessant demands
for more, which does not appear to be a viable option. Given the very
complex ethnic situation relative to territory in the region, some ethnic
conflicts will remain unresolved, and suggested that territorial solutions
have limits, and there is a need for considering consociation measures to
supplant the territorial representation.
From the foregoing it is clear that the reasons why India has stayed
united amidst diversity and democracy, despite many odds, lie in her
ability to adapt ideas and institutions, which had their origins in the
Western political theory and discourses and federalism, to suit local
circumstances and needs. India’s innovation in institutions and ideas in
the applied pool of federalism in this regard can hardly be underestimated.
True, a majoritarian model of democracy at any level of the polity excludes
192 H. BHATTACHARYYA

others from power-sharing. This has created problems of representation

and redistribution especially for the tribals in India’s North-East. For
example, the creation of the State of Meghalaya did not resolve the prob-
lems of all the tribals, but seemed to empower one dominant group of
the Khasis. The Garos, the second-largest tribal community in the State
resented. A Garo Tribal District Council under the 6th Schedule was
formed to address their problems of self-government. There are provi-
sions in the 6th Schedule that the State Governor can nominate up to
4 persons from communities which are not otherwise represented in the
decision-making body. This addresses the issue of non-territorial represen-
tation, a kind of consociationalism a la Lijphart (1969 & 1977). When
it is so done it is a case of both self-rule and shared rule writ small, the
most essential conditions of federalism.
In the days of India’s ongoing neo-liberal reforms Indian federalism
and asymmetric federal institutions are facing challenges. Some old struc-
tures have been abolished and replaced by new ones. The abolition of the
Planning Commission in 2014, abolition of Article 370 and conversion of
the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir into a Union Territory (under
Central control), abolition of the concept of Special Category States in
2014 are some examples of the old structures being abolished. The new
institutions and structures are as follows: the introduction of the GST and
the formation of the GST Council in 2016; formation of the NITI Aayog
and the MDoNER (2004) etc. When the Plan Assistance (now called
Normal Central Assistance) with the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula remains,
a diluted form of SCS is said to be existing (Reddy and Reddy 2019).
But this may not be as simple. It is found out, for example, that in the
case of Himachal Pradesh, such assistance based on the Gadgil-Mukherjee
formula is said to be available provided the State complete certain projects
in time. While the SCS has been withdrawn, the asymmetric status of
some States, most notably in the North-East remains (Article 371). The
funding for the erstwhile SCSs has in fact increased manifold via the
MDoNER and several other projects of the Union government for the
hill States in India.
The most significant area of change in the post-1991 period has
been the shift of the command economy to a market economy, and the
retuning of India’s political institutions to the new task. In so far as the
States in general are concerned, it has been a change for their greater
autonomy of policy taking and action in matters of investment (foreign
and indigenous), and trade and commerce in their domain which has set
 12 CONCLUSION 193

in motion a competition among the States. This newfound autonomy of

the States for the first time ever since 1950 has been so possible by the
fiat of executive federalism rather than by constitutional change or amend-
ments. As I have shown elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 1999, 2012), this new
definition of the States’ rights has resulted in new regional disparity in
development so that in human development terms, there are in India
broadly two types of States: forward and backward. Rao and Singh (2005:
382) have identified wide disparity among the States in terms of FDI in
the States. The States in the North-East have received little or nothing
FDI. Reddy and Reddy (2019) have observed that the role of the govern-
ments (Union and States) in matters of public expenditure has decreased,
but there is ‘more competition between the Centre and States to provide
private goods, or subsidized private goods, than for public goods such
as road and law and order’ (p. 262). The study made by Bhattacharyya
(2018: 63–66) on the North-East shows that a precarious situation has
arisen in India’s advanced States where high growth and low level of the
rule of law co-exist. As Mitra and Bhattacharyya (2018) have argued, this
called for revision of the existing understanding of governance in India
as advanced by Atul Kohli (1990). While the States in India are enjoying
more rights in India’s ‘market federalism’, the same cannot be said to be
true for all the States, as we have already indicated above. There is resent-
ment though expressed by the weaker States—formerly SCSs—that there
is more centralization and increased encroachment by the Centre in the
domain of the States (Elite interviews in Chapter 5). Many political elites
in the North-East complained about the Centre’s one-size-fit-all policy
that does not apply to the specific situation in the North-East. There is
also scholarly reservation corroborating the above. As Reddy and Reddy
(2019: 262) wrote:

The concern of the States is that their administrative machinery and funds
are used to implement the Centre’s programmes. The institutional frame-
work needs to be revised in order to address, even if partially, these
complex issues.

This is mostly relating to the Centrally sponsored Schemes and Central

Sector programmes; 100 days rural employment programmes (MNREGA
2005) which was adopted in 2005 and there is a policy continuity from
the then UPA-1 and 11 to the NDA regimes since 2014. Although BJP,
194 H. BHATTACHARYYA

and PM Modi, in particular, was not very enthusiastic about its contin-
uation, electoral compulsions and the popular sentiments around it were
not easy to overcome. So the programmes continue with larger funding.
However, there is an unmistakable trend in centralization so far as the Act
East Policy was concerned. In the policy, the North-East is supposed to
be bridge to the Far East, the Chief Ministers of the States in the regions
were not taken into confidence although in implementing several projects
the administrative cooperation has been much sought after.
Certainly, the abolition of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution that
assured the ‘special status’ of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (it was also
a SCS) appears a blow to India’s asymmetric federalism. The issue of
revocation of the action is still far from resolved but there is a promise
made by no less a public functionary than Mr. Amit Shah, the Home
Minister of the Union government (https://www.hindustantimes.com/
india-news/what-amit-shah-said-on-jammu-and-kashmir-in-parliament-
10-points-101613207499312.html) (The Hindustan Times 18 March
2020). If development is a concern for the State, then its performance
since the 1990s, (Chapter 7) has been quite satisfactory. So underde-
velopment could no longer be held against the State. Constitutionally
though, Articles 370 and 371 were not only ‘special provisions’ but
‘temporary’ too. Technically one has had very little to argue against its
abolition since it was part of the electoral Manifesto of the NDA led by
the BJP and with huge popular mandate in 2014 and 2019 the electoral
promise was materialized.
Finally, India’s neo-liberal reforms have impacted both federalism
and asymmetric federalism in India. The States’ strategic importance in
carrying out those reforms has been clear to the Centre. The items in the
State list, in particular, land, its reforms, use and acquit ion, public health,
law and order and water supply etc. are much needed to implement
reforms, but the same cannot be so done without the States concerned
being willing and consider themselves partners in globalization. While
this has opened up opportunities for some States, others have responded
negatively. There are also records of the Centre cajoling and coercing
the States to swallow the sweet-bitter pill of globalization (Bhattacharyya
2009) in respect of reforms in many sectors. Certainly with a sway of
globalization over the last three decades or so, the Centre–State relations
can hardly be understood in term of existing constitutional provisions.
No wonder, a Second Centre–State Relations Commission known as the
Punchi Commission after its Chairman Justice (former Chief Justice of the
 12 CONCLUSION 195

Supreme Court) M. M. Punchi was set up in 2007 following a govern-

ment notification dated 30 September 2005 to review the existing Union
and States relations in the light of the changes in India following neo-
liberal reforms. The Commission has submitted its seven-volume reports
to the Government of India. The tenor of the Terms of Reference of the
Commission is quote-worthy:

Are the existing arrangements governing Centre–State relations—legisla-

tive, executive and financial—envisaged in the Constitution, as they have
evolved over the years, working in a manner that can meet the aspirations
of the Indian society as also the requirements of an increasingly globalized
world? If not, what are the impediments, and how can they be remedied
without violating the basic structure of the Constitution? (Vol 1, p. xxii,
Commission on Centre–State Relation, March 2010)

The space here does not permit any further discussion on the reports and
the recommendations, but a close look at the summary and conclusions
suggests that in the Commission’s concept of ‘collaborative federalism’
there is a vision of a federalism of strong Centre with strong States,
focus on the backward regions, and the North-East for development and
investment, and stopping of the ‘one-size-fit-all’ public policy in order to
respect diversity. The Commission has also highlighted the importance
of local governments, and urged that the money to the latter should
not bypass the State governments. However, a detailed critical study of
the report of the Commission in seven volumes from the perspective of
federalism and asymmetric federalism is left to the future researchers.1
What is clear though is that the Commission defended more space for
private players (‘increasing the space for private participation in gover-
nance’), civil society involvement in policy taking and implementation,
Centre suo motto intervention in times of communal riots and caste
conflicts, need for ‘public hearing’ in the Panchayats and the Municipali-
ties etc. are at once redolent of the basic urges of globalization as well as
transparent and responsible government at all layers of the government.2
Be that as it may, when asymmetric institutional measures (special regional
autonomy) are being introduced in some parts of the world to respond
to the special needs of that region (e.g. the Muslim regions in the south
of the Philippines in 2018) (Bhattacharyya 2019a: 191), even though the
county itself is not federal, sustenance of asymmetry in Indian federalism
196 H. BHATTACHARYYA

is a must if India wants to keep its ethnically diverse peripheries stable and
peaceful.

Notes
1. The Economic Times dated 25 May 2018 reported that the Inter-State
Council deliberated on the reports of the Commission and decided to
take a close look at the 272 recommendations in due course. (https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/deliberations-
on-punchhi-commission-report-completed/articleshow/64320379.cms?fro
m=mdr) sighted on 18/3/22.
2. See volume 7 of the Reports on the Punchhi Commission
Chapter 8.(http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/
06/volume7.pdf) sighted on 20/3/22.

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 Index

A Anderson, B., 21
Aboriginal rights, 22
Accommodation of diversity, 3, 24,
28, 48, 58, 69
Act East Policy, 104, 165, 177, 180,
192
ADC, 15, 18, 32, 56, 116–136, 189
ADC performance, 119, 122, 125
ADC’s expenditure, 134, 135
ADC’s Plan Fund, 126, 134
Additional package, 156
Adeney, K., 26, 168
Adi, 172
Advisory Body, 177
Africa, 167
AFSPA (1958), 178, 179
AGP’s campaign, 170
Agranoff, R., 12, 28, 30–32
Ahom Sahitya Sabha, 143
AIFB, 121
All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU),
144, 149, 153
American States, 10
Andalsia, 23
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 44
Andhra Pradesh, 44, 59, 70, 168
Annual Account of Expenditure, 134
Anti-Centrism, 10
Ao, 86, 172, 174
Arora, B., 57, 58, 67, 69
Article 370 (J & K), 1, 42, 47, 60,
68, 78, 169, 191, 193
Article 371A, 59, 87
Art of associating, 14
Arunachal Pradesh, 51, 60, 79, 80,
83, 84, 88, 90, 91, 100,
170–172, 176, 178, 181
Asia, 23, 25, 167, 177
Asian federation, 169
Assam, 15, 18, 19, 32, 44, 48–50,
52, 56, 59, 60, 74, 79, 83, 85,
86, 89, 90, 93–96, 99, 100, 102,
103, 141–146, 148–151, 154,
156–161, 165, 166, 170, 172,
174–176, 178, 181, 187
Assam Budget, 156
Assamese Hindus, 142
Assam Gana Parishad (AGP), 85, 89,
93, 148, 173, 176, 178

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive 209
license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and
Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0
210 INDEX
Assam Rifles, 95
Assam Tribal League, 143
Assimilation, 48–51, 111, 143, 144
Associate States, 92
Association of States, 5
Asymmetry within asymmetry, 32, 49,
56, 58, 68, 78, 109, 187
Auditor-General, 134
Austin, G., 42, 52
Autonomism, 23
Autonomous powers, 79, 92, 107,
108, 187
Autonomous Tribal District/Regional
Council, 15, 45, 49, 51, 58, 88,
90, 101, 105, 107–110, 113,
114, 156
Autonomy, 2–4, 8, 11–13, 15, 24,
25, 31, 32, 34, 40, 41, 45–47,
49–51, 58, 60, 61, 66, 69, 70,
78, 86, 88, 90, 92, 107,
111–113, 131, 144, 147, 148,
152, 167, 169, 170, 174, 175,
180, 191, 194
Autonomy to minority groups, 24
B Bodo People’s Committee, 148
Backward Districts Development
Grant Fund, 101
Bakshi, P.M., 59, 60, 63, 71, 74, 94,
108, 110, 150, 160
Balanced approach, 40, 42
Balkanization, 90
Bangladesh, 25, 80, 82, 83, 117, 136,
170, 171
Bordoloi Committee, 49
Baruah, S., 80, 91, 93, 96, 141, 146,
160, 170, 175, 187, 188
Basis of State making (India), 40
Basque Country, 23
Bengal, 83, 88, 147, 171, 175, 179
Bengali landed interests, 119
Bengali Muslims, 142
Bezbaruah, M.P., 170
Bhattacharyya, H., 2, 4, 6, 10, 12,
22–26, 29, 41, 43, 44, 55, 60,
67, 77, 85, 92, 94, 116, 118,
141, 155, 168–171, 173, 174,
186, 189, 191–194
Bhaumik, S., 80, 81, 92, 141, 170
Bhutan, 80, 82, 170
Bihar, 44, 46
Bird, R., 65, 67
BJP, 1, 78, 120–122, 142, 145, 149,
153, 154, 176, 190, 192, 193
BJP-INLT Alliance, 121
Blondel, J., 115
Bodo ‘homeland’, 145
Bodoland Autonomous Council
(BAC), 113, 141, 144, 148
Bodoland in Assam, 32, 56
Bodoland Liberation Tigers, 141, 144
Bodoland Territorial Authority, 85,
173
Bodoland Territorial Council, 18,
110, 111, 113, 141, 147, 153,
189
Bodo People’s Front, 149, 152, 153,
190
Bodos, 89, 110, 111, 113, 114,
141–148, 150–154, 159, 160,
166, 172, 189, 190
Bodo Volunteers Force, 141
Bombay, 42, 44
Border Security Forces (BSF), 94, 95
Brahmaputra Valley, 85, 173
Brass, P.R., 72
British Crown, 41
Bru Tribal District Council, 90
Bureaucratic cost, 135
Burgess, M., 2, 5, 12, 14, 23, 26, 33
Bwiswmuthiary, S.K., 149

C Constituent Assembly, 39, 41, 47–49,
Canada, 23, 31
Canton and half-Cantons, 4, 6
Central America, 25
Central control, 60, 191
Central plan assistance, 17, 105
Central pool resources, 104
Central Rule (Article 356), 165, 178
Chakladar, S., 143, 146, 147, 149
Chakma, 90, 121
Chakrabarti, Nripen, 117
Chaube, S.K., 80
Chief Commissioners’ Provinces, 43
Chief Executive Committee, 121
China, 80, 82, 92, 170
Choudhuri, Rohini Kumar, 48
Christian, 45, 83, 91, 171, 176, 177
Christianity, 9, 102, 176
Citizenship, 22, 24, 27
Civic identity, 28
Civic Loyalty, 10
Civic values, 29
Civil and criminal justice, 59, 87
Civil order, 81
Classical federalism, 21
Coakley, J., 167
Collaborative federalism, 194
Commissioner of Linguistic
Minorities, 50th report, 84, 94,
171
Common identity in each State, 88,
175
Communes, 26
Communism, 116, 118
Communitarianism, 22
Compact space, 11
Competitive records of governance,
91
Complex tribes, 146
Congress (INC), 119
Congress-TUJS-TNV alliance, 119
Consociationalism, 191
INDEX 211
112, 143, 187
Constitutional Amendments, 73rd and
74th (India), 74, 75
Constitutional recognition, 21, 67
Constitutional safeguards, 62
‘Corporate federalism’, 21, 34, 62,
169
Corridors of power, 13, 88, 175
CPI, 118, 119, 121, 189
CPI-M, 116–123, 127, 130, 131, 189
Cross-border, 181
CRPF, 95
Customary laws and procedures, 59,
87, 148
Czechoslovakia, 25
D
Daimary, T., 152
Dar Commission, 43
Datta, P.S., 93, 147, 148
Decentralization within the ADC, 136
Defence of traditions, 10
Defensive alliance, 4, 21
Delhi, 1, 44, 73, 178
Demands for identity, 78, 92
Demands for recognition, 11
Demographic transformation, 83, 171
Deployment of security forces, 92
Deprivation, 10, 59, 83, 143, 156,
157, 160, 163
Descriptive category, 7
Devbarma, Dasarath, 118
Development and better identity, 91
Development index of J and K, 104
Dhalai district (Tripura), 159
Difference, 5, 6, 8–10, 16, 21, 22,
24, 30, 32, 49, 56, 57, 68, 149,
168
Differentiated its structures, 123
Dimasas, 172
212 INDEX
Diminished state sovereignty, 28
Discrimination, 106, 143, 145, 146,
163, 180
Disintegration, 2, 6, 25, 28, 47, 66,
67
Distinct regional identity, 87, 175
Diversity and power sharing, 13
Diversity and Swiss federalism, 9
Diversity-claims compare
(equality-claims), 23
Dominant Mizo Community, 86, 174
Dominant tribe, 86, 174
Duchacek, I., 9, 30
Dufflon, B., 3, 4
Dynamic neo-institutional approach,
3, 186
E
East Pakistan, 83, 88, 171, 175
Economic Survey, 128
Elazar, D., 6, 22, 25, 26
Elite instrumentalities, 167
English, 85, 86, 172, 173
Enlightenment, 27
Environmental, 132
Equality-claims, 23
Equal representation, 6
Equity, 22, 58, 68, 71
Establishment of Village Committee,
131
Ethnic, 2, 3, 6, 8–15, 17, 18, 21–24,
28–31, 33–35, 39, 42, 55,
57–59, 66, 67, 77–89, 91–94,
102, 103, 111, 116, 117,
142–152, 155, 159, 160,
163–176, 180, 181, 186–190
Ethnic and tribal identity, 12
Ethnic cleansing, 11, 144, 145,
150–152, 189
Ethnic cleavages, 17, 77, 78, 91, 111,
188
Ethnic conflict management, 167
Ethnic conflicts, 2, 11, 13, 18, 78–80,
83, 86–88, 94, 130, 164, 165,
168, 169, 171, 175, 180, 181,
186
Ethnic diversity, 23, 55, 77, 79, 83,
147, 163, 166, 167
Ethnic elements, 92
Ethnic elites, 13, 66, 160
Ethnic heterogeneity, 167, 175
Ethnicity and territory, 79, 166, 167,
169, 173, 180
Ethnic militancy, 85, 91, 173
Ethnic movements, 18, 92
Ethnic Origins of Nations Oxford, 19
Ethnic peace accords, 13, 18, 82,
144, 147–150, 170
Ethnic self-rule, 143
Ethno-linguistic, 4, 39, 66, 86, 88,
167, 174
Ethno-regional, 4, 23, 62, 66, 165
Ethno-territorial model, 165
Eviction of Bengalis out of Tripura,
117
Exclusion, 6, 28, 34, 143, 145, 149,
159, 163, 167, 187
F
Fascism, 2
FDI in the States, 192
Federal governance, 6, 25, 29, 136
Federalism, 1–16, 18, 21, 22, 24–34,
55–57, 60, 62, 65–67, 69–72,
91, 99, 100, 105, 107, 109, 115,
142, 163–166, 169, 179, 180,
185, 187, 188, 190–194
Federalism and identity, 27
Federal loyalty, 10
Federal practices, 23
Federal second chamber, 6
Federation, 3–10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 24,
25, 27–30, 32–34, 39–45,

55–58, 60, 62, 65–69, 77, 79,
87, 88, 168, 169, 185–187
Finance Commission, 1, 17, 62, 67,
69, 71–73, 75, 100, 106, 111,
123, 130, 133–136, 138, 188
Finance linked to diversity, 66, 67
Financial transfer, 61, 67, 69, 70, 188
Fiscal equalization, 1, 3, 67
Fiscal federalism (Indian model of),
67
Formula-based system, 72
Fraser, N., 22
Free market economy, 99
Friedrich, C., 9
Full states, 43
Funds transfer, 70
G 108, 165, 170, 191
Gadgil formula, 101, 105, 106
Gadgil-Mukherjee formula, 100, 101,
105, 191
Gagnon, A., 23
Gait, E.A., 146, 147
Galicia, 23
Gana Mukti Parishad (GMP), 116
Garo Hills District, 86, 174
Garos, 86, 89, 91, 111, 174, 190
Gassabh, L.S., 111
Geographical vastness, 9
George, S.J., 149, 150, 160
Ghettoization, 35
Golden Temple, 169
Governance, 2, 3, 6–8, 14, 15, 18,
28, 30, 32–34, 45, 46, 56, 60,
61, 66, 81, 86, 92–94, 100, 102,
103, 105, 106, 113, 130, 132,
148, 155, 156, 174, 175, 178,
181, 185, 186, 188, 192
Governance (measuring), 186
Government of India Act 1935, 41
Grants-in-aid, 35, 71
INDEX 213
GST, 191
Gujaratis, 11, 79
Gurkha regiment, 95
Guwahati City Committee, 152
H
Half-states, 43
Hamkraini Yakhili, 126
Hausing, S., 85, 170, 173
Hill areas development programmes,
104
Hill councils, 61
Hill districts, 80, 85, 173
Hill Tribes of North-East, 13, 45, 49,
51, 107, 108, 114, 136, 187
Himachal Pradesh, 57, 60, 68, 69,
77, 81, 95, 99, 100, 103, 105,
Hindu subjects, 40
Hirschman, A., 66
Hmar tribe, 86, 174
Hobsbawm, E., 24
Homeland, 11, 13, 14, 141, 143,
145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153,
175, 186, 190
Homeland demand, 11, 145, 146
Homeland of Plain Tribal, 143
Home rule, 23, 31
Hostels for the tribal students, 127
Human Development Index (HDI),
102, 103, 105, 132, 136, 158,
164
I
Identity, 2–4, 8, 12–14, 18, 21–24,
27–29, 33, 39, 51, 57, 58, 62,
66, 68, 69, 78, 79, 83, 85–88,
92, 100, 102, 103, 113, 116,
118, 127, 129–131, 136, 137,
143, 146, 152, 153, 156, 158,
214 INDEX

160, 164, 168, 169, 171–177, Katzenstein, M., 176

181, 185, 186, 188, 189 Kerala, 44, 168, 181
Identity turn in federalism, 79 Khasis, 86, 172, 174, 190
Immigrants, 82 Kim, H., 169
Incessant violence, 33, 56 Kincaid, J., 10, 33, 164
Inclusive governance, 33, 56 King, R., 44
India’s majoritarian mode of Kirit Prodyot Devbarma, 121
democracy, 166 Koch, 146
India’s North-East, 6, 17, 48, 60, 69, Kok-Borok, 84, 87, 118, 127, 130,
113, 116, 117 132, 133, 171, 175
Indian National Congress (INC), 39, Konyak, 86, 172, 174
41, 42, 45, 48, 119, 167 Kuki, 86, 173
Indian Union, 78, 147 Kumar, B.B., 80
Individual and group rights, 22
Innovative instrument, 82
INPT, 120–123, 125, 131 L
Institutional designs, 69, 115 Lacina, B., 170
Institutional ill-designing, 113, 156 Ladakh, 1, 18
Institutional innovation, 130 Lai, 90, 110
Institutionalization of ethnic Land alienation, 113, 143
radicalism, 93, 94 Land and habitats, 87, 175
Institutional reform, 105
Landlessness, 158, 159
Insurgent activities, 181
Language of federalism, 27
Inter-ethnic conflicts, 86, 174
Language rights, 187
Inter-tribal amity and equality, 115
Language(s), 9, 10, 14, 27, 40,
Intra-tribal and community, 160
42–44, 61, 62, 69, 84–87,
IPFT, 119, 120
90–92, 102, 118, 125, 127, 130,
132, 133, 143, 144, 146, 147,
J 149, 168, 172–174, 176, 186,
Jamatia, 121, 146 187
Janata Dal (U), 120 Large scale displacement, 155
Jangustio Aikyo Mancha, 153 Laski, H., 2
Jhumias , 126, 128 Left Front (LF), 117, 119–121, 123,
JVP report, 43 138
Jyoti Das, Arun, 152 Left parties, 120
Liberalism, 13, 22, 24
Liberty of individuals, 13
K Limited resources, 132
Kachari, 146, 147, 151 Lingayats, 168
Kammas, 168 Linguistic diversity, 84–87, 171, 172,
Karbi Anglong, 94, 144 174, 175
Karnataka, 59, 168 Linguistic minority, 43

Linguistic States, 43
Livingstone, W.S., 9, 30
Lok Sabha elections, 60, 154
Look East Policy, 104
Loyalties in federalism, 10
M
Macro-economic stability, 72
Madhya Pradesh, 44
Madras, 44
Mahanta, Prafulla Kumar, 89
Maharashtra, 42, 166
Majoritarian model, 6, 190
Major security concern, 92
Majumdar, A.K., 143
Malaysia, 169
Malhotra, R., 60, 102, 103, 127
Management of ethnic conflicts and
peace, 130
Manipur, 44, 60, 79, 85, 86, 90, 99,
173, 174, 176, 178, 181
Manipuri, 85–87, 173
Marathis, 11
Markell, P., 22
Maro, 90
Maximum autonomy, 160
McGarry, J., 28, 31
MDoNER, 1, 79, 104, 105, 156,
177, 180, 190, 191
Measuring development and
governance, 186
Meech, 146
Meitei, 86, 173
Memorandum, 133–135, 143, 144,
146, 147, 149, 153
Memorandum to the Government of
Assam, 146
Menon, V.P., 41, 42, 78
Militancy in North-East, 80
Minority rights, 22
Mitra, S.K., 88, 93, 137, 170, 175,
186, 192
INDEX 215
Mizo accord, 93
MNF, 93
MNREGA, 129, 192
Modernization, 27
Money-lenders, 117, 119
Moreno, L., 23, 35
Mukherjee, J., 85, 141, 155, 173
Multi-cultural, 9, 17, 111, 168
Multiculturalism, 22, 90, 147, 159
Multi-ethnic body, 115
Multi-lingual, 62, 168, 181
Multiple research methods, 15
Multi-tiered federalism, 6, 28
Municipalities, 4, 26, 69, 71, 101,
194
Muslim majority, 77
Muslim Mirror, 145
Muslim princes, 40
Myanmar, 80, 82, 92, 170
N
Naga identity, 86, 174
Nagalim, 60, 80, 85, 86, 90, 147,
173, 181
Naga nationhood, 86, 174
Naga peace convention, 13
Nagas are not coherent group, 86,
174
Naga settlements, 86, 173
Naga Socialist Council, 80
Naga’s resistance, 147
Nation, 2, 12, 14
National Democratic Force of
Bodoland, 141
Nationalism, 24, 44, 83, 118, 130
National self-determinism, 14, 27,
147
Nation building, 2, 142
Nationhood, 11, 14, 29, 48, 92, 167
Nation-states, 4, 22, 24, 27, 167
Natural calamity, 72
216 INDEX
Natural gas, 72
Natural resources, 61, 70
Nazism, 2
NDA, 1, 78, 160, 177, 192, 193
NEDA, 160
NEFA, 80, 85, 178
Negotiation for peace (read power
and autonomy), 93
Nehru, J., 43, 66
Neo-liberalism, 106
Neo liberal reforms, 1, 164, 185,
191, 193
Nepali community, 87, 174
Nissi/Dafla, 172
NITI Aayog, 100, 159, 177, 191
NLFT, 119, 120
Non-territorial representation, 6
Normal Plan Assistance, 99–101, 156
Normative category, 5
Normative value in federalism, 14
North Cachar hills district, 94
North-East, 1, 15, 17, 68, 79, 102,
144
North Eastern Council, 177
North Eastern Livelihood Projects,
104
Nossiter, T.J., 118
O Prime Minister Modi, 180, 192
Odisha, 44
Official language policy, 22
One-size fit all, 192, 194
P Punjab, 42, 44, 79, 168, 169
Pakistan, 25, 39
Pali, S., 43, 168
Panchayats, 51, 61, 69, 71, 101, 194
Participation, 6, 41, 60, 80, 82, 115,
122, 123, 128
Partition (of India), 83, 170
Patel, S.V., 42, 43, 51
People living below poverty, 132
People’s Co-ordination for
Democratic Right, 153
Peripheral areas of the federation, 3
Persistent violence, 113, 141–143
Philippines, The, 4, 24, 194
PIB, Government of India 2021, 149
Plain Tribesmen, 113, 114, 142
Plan Assistance, 1, 101, 105, 191
Plan Gross Budgetary System (GBS),
104
Planning Commission, 1, 93, 99–101,
177, 180, 191
Plurality, 9, 27, 65
Plurality of allegiances, 28
Policy Effective Index (PEI), 103
Political discrimination, 146, 180
Political imagination, 12
Political modernity, 5
Political principle, 5, 6, 25
Political recognition of plain tribes,
141
Political secessionism, 66
Post-Soviet states, 24
Power sharing, 3, 7, 8, 13, 18, 34,
46, 58, 148, 159
Primary schools, 90, 109, 125, 127,
128
Princely States, 40–43, 45
Protecting tribal identity, 47, 117,
131
PTCA, 143
Punchi Commission, 193
Q
Quasi-judicial powers, 109, 110
Quebec, 31
Question of identity, 8

R Sarnias, 142
Rabha, 144, 146, 151
Rajya Sabha, 2, 62
Rao, M.G., 30, 57, 58, 61, 68–70,
72, 191
Reangs, 121, 146
Recognition of difference, 9
Reddys, 168
Redistribution, 21, 22, 67, 126, 146,
190
Regional and local governments, 105
Regional Development Council, 165
Relative power, 167
Religion, 14, 82, 91, 146, 175, 176,
186
Religious practices, 61, 70
Representation, 2, 6, 17, 30, 31, 33,
57, 62, 68, 121, 146, 165, 190,
191
Reservation or quota, 22
Resource mobilization, 133
Restoration of illegally transferred,
136
Right-sizing, 34, 35
Riker, W., 8, 26, 30, 57
Riots, 39, 117, 150, 189, 194
Roy Burman, B.K., 112
Roy, ReV. JJM Nichols, 48, 51, 112
Roy, Samiran, 135
RSP, 119, 121
Russian Federation, 9, 24, 28, 32
S Sikkim, 57, 59, 60, 68, 69, 78–80,
Sabah, 169
Sangma, P.N., 89
Santhals, 142, 144
Sarangi, A., 43, 168
Sarania community, 145
Sarania, Naba, 154
Sarawak, 169
Sarkaria Commission (India), 63, 75
INDEX 217
Saxena, R., 57, 68
Schedule, 5th, 13, 16, 17, 40, 45–47,
69, 107–109, 113, 143
Schedule, 6th, 11, 13, 16–18, 32, 40,
45–51, 56, 59, 91, 107, 108,
110–114, 116, 122, 123, 125,
134, 141, 142, 147–149, 166,
190
Scheduled Tribes, 2, 46, 47, 99, 105,
108, 129, 142, 145, 151, 171
Schwartzberg, J., 43
Secessionist, 30, 79, 112, 115, 118,
120, 168
Second Bodo Accord, 145, 150
Second Bodo Ethnic Accord, 148
Second official language of the State,
130
Security region, 78
Self-definition, 146
Self-governance for the hill tribes, 45,
107, 114
Self-rule, 5–7, 21, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34,
50, 143, 148, 191
Semi-sovereign, 109
Semi sovereign status (Nagaland), 87
Sen, A., 12, 22
Sen, T., 22, 57
Separate statehood, 78, 89
Settler Bengalis in Tripura, 83, 171
Shared memories, 14
Shared-rule, 5, 7, 191
Sikhs, 169
84, 87, 88, 99, 102, 103, 172,
174, 175, 178, 179
Sikkimese identity, 87, 174
Simon Commission, 143
Singh, B., 143
Singh Committee, 144
Singh, G., 169
Singh, J., 46, 48, 51, 178
218 INDEX
Singh, M.P., 186
Singh, N., 30, 57, 58, 61, 68–70, 72,
191
Singh, V.B., 93
Six-point template, 7
Sixteenth-Point Naga agreement, 82,
90, 93
Smaller ethnic identity, 7
Smaller tribal ethnic identity, 13
Smith, A.D., 11, 12, 14, 24, 28, 29,
167
Social divisions, 9
Societal values, 9
South Asia, 160
South East Asia, 177
Spain, 23
Special arrangements, 4
Special Category States, 1, 15, 17, 32,
56, 57, 59–61, 68–70, 74, 77,
78, 93, 99, 100, 102, 169, 188,
191
Special Central Assistance, 126
Special Development Package, 104
Special package, 70, 156
Special provisions, 13, 16, 39, 47, 59,
62, 77, 148, 193
Spillover effects, 190
SRC’s terms of reference, 44
State Administration, 111, 112, 125
State Finance Commission, 73
State Governor, 6, 46, 49, 59, 108,
110, 111, 122, 148, 190
Statehood, 1, 6, 11, 17, 40, 42, 43,
51, 62, 66, 73, 77–79, 82, 85,
86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 102, 112,
113, 167, 169, 173, 174, 178,
188
State of Garoland, 89
State plans to the ADC, 130
State politics, 83, 186
State welfare benefits, 137
Stepan, A., 25
Structural asymmetry, 2, 17, 33, 62
Structural limitation, 69, 150
Sub-asymmetric for power-sharing,
164
Sub-State ethnic authority, 11
Sub-state level, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15,
18, 29, 32, 55, 56, 58, 69, 105,
107, 109, 131, 136, 166, 185,
187, 188
Sub-state nationalism, 23
Sub-States, 14–16, 43, 55, 180, 186,
188
Sub-Zonal Councils, 128
Sudhakar B Kadu vs State of Madya
Pradesh (AIR 2014 MP 69), 108
Sweden, W., 28
Swiss diversity, 24
Swiss experience, 21
Swiss federalism, 4, 9, 10, 26
Switzerland, 3, 4, 6, 23, 24
Symmetry in powers and status, 8
T
Tamil Nadu, 44
Tamils, 11, 79
Tarlton, C.D., 28, 30
Taylor, C., 22
Tea Tribes, 152
Tea Tribe Welfare Board, 152
Telugus, 11
Terms of power-sharing, 148
Territorial autonomy, 3, 4, 13, 46,
50, 86, 167, 174
Territorial contraction, 85, 173
Territorial homeland, 11
Territorially loyalties, 10, 87, 175
Territorial power and autonomy, 45
Territorial recognition (liberal), 22
Territorial resizing, 34
Territorial self-rule, 21
Territorial strategies, 79

Territory-based identity, 164
Territory claims, 18, 163, 167, 170,
176
THDR (Tripura Human Development
Report), 126–128, 133, 136
The Assam Tribune, 155
The Catalon, 23
The Federalist , 13
The Hindu, 39, 78, 159, 175–177
The Indian Express , 18
The Tripura Tribal Autonomous
District Council (TTADC), 115,
122, 133, 141, 159
Third tier, 6, 7
Three categories of States, 42
Three phases of Bodoland
movements, 143
Tillin, L., 57, 163, 168
TIPRA, 121, 122
TMC, 120, 176
TNVs, 148
Tocqueville, Alex De., 35
Tribal, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 34,
39, 45, 48–51, 58, 59, 66, 69,
77, 80, 83, 85, 86, 89–92, 100,
102, 107, 109, 110, 112–114,
116–132, 134–137, 144, 148,
149, 166, 167, 171, 172, 174,
176, 180, 181, 187, 189, 190
Tribal Advisory Council (TAC), 45,
46, 107, 108, 113, 144
Tribal cleavages, 39
Tribal ethnicity, 6, 10, 91, 102, 130,
166, 176, 180, 181
Tribal identity, 12, 47, 102, 113, 116,
131, 137, 189
Tribal nationalism, 118
Tribal people, 17, 45, 48, 50, 118,
127, 171
Tribal self-governance for the hill and
the plain tribes, 16, 45, 46, 66,
107, 114, 163
INDEX 219
Tribal sub-state, 10, 15, 188
Tripura Darpan, 120, 134, 135
Tripura Human Development report
(2007), 125–128, 133, 136
Tripura Legislative Assembly, 117
Tripura State Assembly, 131
Tripuris, 121, 146, 172
TUJS, 119, 120
Tully, J., 23
U
Udayachal, 143, 144
ULFA, 85, 173, 176
UNDP’s measurement, 158
Unions of States (India), 40, 42, 43
Union territory, 61, 68, 73, 85, 88,
89, 113, 143, 165, 188, 191
Unitary state structures, 23
United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District, 86,
174
US federalism, 10
US model, 25
USSR, 25, 28
Uttarakhand, 57, 60, 62, 68, 69, 78,
81, 100, 103, 105, 170
Uttar Pradesh, 34, 42, 44, 62, 78
V
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 78
Value of decentralization, 35
Vidarbha, 44, 166
Vidarbha State, 166
Villages Committees (VC), 123, 124,
128, 131, 134, 136
Violence, 15, 79, 80, 111, 120, 141,
142, 144, 145, 148, 150, 152,
155, 156, 161, 165, 170, 180,
186, 188, 189
Vokkaligas, 168
220 INDEX

W Y
Watts, R.L., 5–9, 12, 22–28, 30–32, Yugoslavia, 25
56, 67, 69
Weber, Max, 131, 135
Weiner, M., 83, 102, 171, 176, 186,
187
West Bengal, 44, 62, 113, 147 Z
Western liberal theory, 22 Zo, 86, 173
Wheare, K.C., 2, 5, 14 Zonal Council, 177
Women’s rights, 22 Zonal Development Committees, 128