Article

Culture & Psychology

19(1) 76–94
The niche of envy: ! The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/1354067X12464980

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ontogenesis of envy in
cultural psychology
Laura Quintanilla
UNED, Spain

Kristine Jensen de López

Aalborg University, Denmark

Envy is the religion of the mediocre. It comforts them, it responds to the worries that gnaw
at them and finally it rots their souls, allowing them to justify their meanings and their
greed until they believe these to be virtues.—Carlos Ruiz Zafón

Abstract
‘‘The niche of envy’’ is a cross-disciplinary attempt to capture and understand the
complex and self-conscious emotion of envy as unfolded within social relationships
and cultural settings. One of our main interests concerns how children come to under-
stand envy in ontogenesis. Accordingly, we review existing theoretical approaches to
understanding envy and introduce preliminary data about children’s understanding of
envy. This paper consists of three sections. In the first section, we define envy by
introducing the conditions and components that form part of it. We emphasize the
fact that envy is a complex and embodied emotion, which embraces a triadic relation-
ship, social comparison, and inequality. In this section, we also introduce social condi-
tions that may facilitate envy and its consequences, such as hostility and aggression. The
second section deals with coping strategies for envy. Here, we integrate research from
different disciplines, e.g., socio-cultural, psychological, and anthropological research.
Finally, in the third section, we introduce a cross-cultural and developmental view of
how envy is embodied. We briefly address and offer a critique of Klein’s psychoanalytic
view and present recent results from our cross-cultural studies of the ontogenesis of
understanding envy.

Corresponding author:
Laura Quintanilla, Depto. de Metodologı́a de las Ciencias del Comportamiento, Facultad de Psicologı́a, UNED,
c/ Juan del Rosal 10, Madrid 28040, Spain.
Email: lquintanilla@psi.uned.es
Quintanilla and Jensen de López 77

Keywords
Culture, development, embodiment, emotion, envy, self-consciousness

Introduction
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, envy is defined as ‘‘discontented or
resentful longing aroused by another’s possession, qualities, or luck.’’ Likewise, the
Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy has defined envy as ‘‘emulation [or the]
desire of the possession of others as well as resentment and spite towards another’s
success.’’ In science, envy has long been the interest of philosophers and social
scientists, who have analyzed different aspects of envy. Considered to be a sinful
emotion, the causes, consequences, and remedies or techniques to overcome envy
have also been analyzed from a religious point of view (Schimmel, 2008). The
hostile and conflictive nature of envy maintains a close link with social and
moral norms as a way of controlling hostile behavior in cultures and societies.
Historically, the meaning of envy has undergone major changes caused by the
need to improve the consumer economy and regulate the distribution of goods.
Thus, the original idea of envy as a sinful feeling has been softened to promote the
consumption of goods, thereby changing cultural norms about the feelings and
beliefs that parents should instill in their children about the acquisition of goods.
Recently, different psychological disciplines, such as social psychology, cognitive
psychology, developmental psychology, and evolutionary psychology have begun
to consider envy to be an emotion that is closely associated within an individual’s
social relationships, self-esteem and notion of self as well as other social emotions,
such as shame, resentment, pride, and anger (Cohen-Charash, 2009; Miceli &
Castelfranchi, 2007; Quintanilla & Sarriá, 2009; Smith, 2008; Smith & Kim,
2007). Importantly, envy is a highly embodied emotion, in that it is not expressed
by specific facial expression, as, for example, a smile is understood to express the
emotion of happiness (Quintanilla & Jensen de López, 2011). It is therefore not
surprising that envy also seems to hold within it a whole set of ‘‘hidden’’ social,
mental, and cultural components. These particular components are precisely what
we set out to investigate and understand in relation to how they interact in society
and in the ontogenesis of envy.
Within anthropological research, envy has been analyzed within an intricate
network of meanings held by Mesoamerican people, among whom the emotion
of envy is linked to daily behaviors (Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1966). Furthermore,
envy is a feeling that is related to the distribution of resources within economics;
consequently, envy is related to a sense of justice (Smith, 2004).
While existing literature about envy offers a handful of theoretical and empirical
studies, in the present approach we introduce a conceptual framework for envy,
which we propose consists of a niche. In doing this we include an ontogenetic and
cultural approach in order to better understand some of the characteristics of envy.
78 Culture & Psychology 19(1)

The present proposal also includes a discussion of the ways in which people cope
psychologically with envy.
In accordance with Toomela’s (2008) recent concern over the future of the
methodological thinking of cultural psychology, our first aim is to disentangle
the concept of envy from the range of concepts that capture emotions similar to
and related to envy. Hence, we set out to identify the dynamics of envy within
interpersonal relations, describing how envy works in culture and how it is related
to self-consciousness. An additional aim of our study is to identify historical and
cultural factors that, we propose, mediate children’s development of envy in order
to suggest a cultural model. Finally, we give an overview of developmental studies
of envy comprehension from a cross-cultural approach. The overall purpose of this
paper is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the social and psy-
chological functions of envy and to relate this understanding to the investigation of
children’s abilities to understand and cope with envy.

Disentangling the dynamics of envy

Envy and jealousy. Although most people know what envy is, people tend to use the
terms envy and jealousy synonymously in everyday language. However, at the same
time, people also wonder how the concepts of envy and jealousy differ from one
another. Parrot and Smith (1993) posit that the distinction between envy and jeal-
ousy is that envy is dominated by pain, lacking, and an unsatisfied desire to attain a
desired object, whereas jealousy leads a person to feel fear or even sadness because
of the loss of a loved or desired object. The relationship between a possession and
an envious person versus a jealous person is qualitatively different. An envious
person lacks, or at least believes that he lacks, the object, whereas a jealous
person possesses, or at least believes that he possesses, the object and hence is
afraid to lose it (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Parrot & Smith, 1993; Silver & Sabini, 1978a;
Smith & Kim, 2007). Both feelings are related to ownership of desired objects, but
the differences between the two feelings are that whereas an envier can be perceived
as someone who feels pain, resentment, or inferiority because of the lack of an
object that another person possesses, a jealous person can be perceived as a victim
who loses something that he has already possessed.
With this distinction in mind, we can ask whether it is possible to experience
envy and jealousy at the same time. For example, imagine a scenario in which a
couple (Robert and Rachel) go tango dancing with a good friend (David) who is a
fantastic tango dancer. Robert could become jealous of David because he dances
very well, which causes Robert’s girlfriend Rachel to feel attracted to David.
Moreover, Robert could feel envious of David’s dancing ability. It is reasonable
to think that Robert envies David’s dancing abilities because they attract Rachel’s
attention, which leaves less attention for Robert. The scenario suggests that it is
possible for one to experience envy and jealousy in tandem. Recognizing this close
overlap between the notions of envy and jealousy, confusion about the distinction
between the two seems natural. The nearly synonymous use of both terms in daily
Quintanilla and Jensen de López 79

life could result from the presence of both feelings in complex interpersonal situ-
ations, hence making them difficult to separate.
Addressing the confusion between the emotions of jealousy and envy from a
socio-cultural approach, the ease with which envy is often exchanged for jealousy
may be explained by the socio-cultural and moral meanings underlying the notion
of jealousy. For example, being ‘‘jealous’’ seems more socially acceptable than
being ‘‘envious.’’ In fact, some Western legal systems even condemn a crime
more harshly if it is committed as an act of envy than if it is committed as an
act of jealousy. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that envy and jealousy do
have different affective components. Jealousy comprises fear of loss, righteousness,
anger because of disloyalty, and insecurity. Envy involves the feeling of longing to
have what another person has, which is also known as feeling inferior or ill will
(Maijala, Munnukka, & Nikkonen, 2000; Parrot & Smith, 1993; Smith & Kim,
2007).

Benign envy and hostile envy. Another central distinction widely described in the
literature on envy is the distinction referred to as ‘‘benign’’ versus ‘‘hostile’’
envy. Benign envy refers to a form of empathy where the person recognizes
that he would like to be ‘‘in another person’s shoes.’’ An individual experiencing
benign envy might even openly state that he feels envious. This feeling of envy
carries with it the notion of praise or flattery. Hostile or destructive envy, on the
other hand, is associated with the idea that the envier desires that the person he
envies lose his good fortune. Foster (1972) notes that benign envy is a kind of
admiration of some ability or possession of another person; it does not involve
resentment of or distress regarding others’ good fortune, and it is not coherent
with envy defined as indicating pain or resentment (Silver & Sabini, 1978a,
1978b). Therefore, in the strictest sense, so-called ‘‘benign envy’’ is not genuine
envy. Turning to Kant, the aim of envy is the wish that the envied loses the
desired object (cited in D’Arms & Kerr, 2008). And, today, most authors consider
some sort of negativity to be a central property of envy because it is difficult to
conceive of envy without ill will or anger being involved (Smith & Kim, 2007).
In this paper, we follow the Kantian conceptualization of envy to include a hostile
intention.

Envy and schadenfreude. Envy involves not only the desire to obtain something that
is possessed by another but also the wish that the enviable object is destroyed so
that the envied person no longer possesses it. The mere knowledge that the envied
person has lost or damaged his goods causes the envier to feel pleasure. This
pleasure in the misfortune of others is even captured lexically in Western cultures
(e.g., by the German loan word schadenfreude and the Danish term skadefryd).
Social psychologists and sociologists, however, maintain that schadenfreude should
be considered to be distinct from the notion of envy. Whereas envy is associated
with a negative feeling (e.g., pain or resentment at another’s success), schaden-
freude is associated with a positive feeling, namely, pleasure at another’s
80 Culture & Psychology 19(1)

misfortune. Another reason to separate envy from schadenfreude is that the affect-
ive components thought to cause the feeling of schadenfreude, such as dislike or
resentment of undeserved achievements, are hostile (Feather & Sherman, 2002;
Hareli & Weiner, 2002). With the exception of ill will, these affective components
are, however, also involved in hostile envy, which makes it possible to understand
why an envious person could experience pleasure when seeing that the envier suf-
fers from the damage.
We argue that absence of the concept of schadenfreude in some languages
may suggest that the notion is not an additional emotion complementary to
envy but simply an experience that is subsumed as a consequence or part of
one’s experience of envy. In fact, the Spanish medieval philosopher Baltasar
Gracián (2007) includes the joy from damage to others as part of envy. In his
book, El Criticón, he associates envy with mixed feelings, such as suffering for the
achievement of another and joy for the harm of others. However, Spanish has not
lexicalized the notion of schadenfreude as a single word. With this example, we
acknowledge that even if a language has not developed an individual word
expressing schadenfreude, the notion of schadenfreude may nevertheless exist
as a concept in the specific culture. However, one could expect that people
living in cultures that have developed a separate concept expressing schaden-
freude consequently also possess a vivid and more immediate consciousness of
this experience. Studies addressing schadenfreude have occasionally focused on
the notion of deservingness, indicating that when someone is responsible for his
own disgrace, schadenfreude could be more pleasant than when the disgrace is
not deserved (Feather, McKee, & Bekker, 2011; Feather & Sherman, 2002), while
others understand schadenfreude as a consequence of envy (Powell, Smith, &
Schurtz, 2008).
In sum, it has become common to separate the different components of envy
when attempting to define, conceptualize and analyze the emotion. Moreover,
scholars work carefully to differentiate envy from other terms or emotions, such
as schadenfreude, jealousy, benign envy, or resentment and, in turn, inquire about
links between the components. It is, however, important for the study of cultural
psychology to emphasize that the meanings of envy are not fixed; they are mediated
through the historical, cultural and social context of the individual and the given
society within which the individual is socialized. As is the case for any complex
emotional meaning, the meaning of envy changes according to other emotional
meanings, rather than functioning as a discrete unit. In accordance with Vygotsky’s
notion of the mediated mind (Vygotsky, 1962), this relationship between a word
and its representation is dynamic or constantly changing because speakers con-
stantly transform the meanings and appraisals of situations or facts that words
express. In contrast to canonical meanings, the understanding of envy has been
enriched by emerging empirical evidence provided by studies that have investigated
the conditions underlying envious behaviors and attitudes. In the following section,
we introduce some of the characteristics that support our proposal that the emo-
tion of envy is best understood as a niche.
Quintanilla and Jensen de López 81

The niche of envy

Given that the concept of envy heavily overlaps with related emotions such as
jealousy, we attempt to capture the specific cultural and social components that
may constitute envy. In other words, we wish to describe the ways in which envy
can be understood as an evolutionary niche. First, the conceptualization of envy
indicates that envy is a social emotion that is enmeshed within a network of
meanings and values about objects, and that is closely related to the self. The
minimal condition that affords the emergence of envy is the triadic relationship,
which is composed of two people (or groups) and an object. Importantly, the
three pieces or components that comprise this triad maintain an unequal rela-
tionship between individuals and the object. One person (or sometimes even a
whole group) possesses the object, while the other person (or group) desires it but
is not able to obtain it. Thus, inequality seems to be a condition expected to
generate envy. However, in addition to inequality, it is also necessary for one to
actually have a desire for the object. This desire is most often motivated by a
social comparison in which the disadvantaged party feels inferior and thus feels
ill will. In fact, Miceli and Castelfranchi (2007), and Smith and Kim (2007) note
that social comparison (inferiority) and ill will are the two basic components
of envy.
When evaluating the notion of inequality from a socio-cultural perspective, we
consider that an object can only become enviable according to its conventional and
socially attributed value. Ownership of a desirable object, in turn, transfers value to
the owner, who becomes enviable. The object in the niche of envy prompts social
recognition or some way of identifying oneself as disadvantaged compared with
another. An object has many meanings, such as social prestige: its value depends on
what is socially acceptable or desirable. Take, for example, access to a water tap in
Western society. A tap is important but not unusual and ordinary taps are there-
fore not usual objects of envy. However, owning a water tap in less economically
advantaged countries leads to social recognition within the society, not just welfare
or quality of life. A tap becomes an object of prestige. A relation between scarcity
or abundance of resources and the attribution of value people give to this kind of
object is essential to raise the value of an object. But the object’s value also returns
to the person who possesses it. Sharing the value of things is a mode for sharing
meanings and is an important part of the niche of envy, especially when the object
is imperative to the self. These dynamics (i.e., how the meaning of the object
influences the value it is given in a society) indicate the importance of the self as
a component within the niche of envy. Envy raises awareness of the shortcomings
of the self, as compared with others who are more fortunate. This awareness may
be an uncomfortable awareness that is muted because of its possible consequences,
such as hostility, contempt, or resentment toward the envied. Envy thus returned to
the envious, in comparison with the other, creates awareness of one’s disadvan-
taged social position through the painful idea of the absence or lack of something
that one would like to possess.
82 Culture & Psychology 19(1)

Viewing the social dynamics of envy from an evolutionary perspective, envy

could be considered a strategy of social adaptation at times when it has been
necessary to calculate the attractiveness of the self within a social milieu—where
and when individuals should appear more attractive, resulting in competition or
collaboration (Hill & Buss, 2008).
The dynamics of the triadic relationship of envy are universal and are likely
shared in all cultures (Schoeck, 1966); however, what is not universal is the mean-
ing of the envied object, of being envious, and of being the envier. Being envied
relies on different meanings and depends on the specific cultural context. Western
people become proud when they are envied because envy is socially recognized, but
at the same time, they feel fear of the envier (Rodriguez & Parrot, 2010). In con-
trast, in non-Western cultures being envied is considered threatening. For example,
in Mesoamerican culture, people display more fear than pride before the envier
(Foster, 1972; Lindhom, 2008).
In most cultures, pain or the lack of something desired that another possesses is
the motive for envy. The specific cultural meanings surrounding being envied or
being the envier concern the concept of self. Cultural meanings are linked to cul-
tural practices that have in turn been linked to the notion of self-enhancement, self-
worth or self-construal. Hence, it is not possible to predict ad hoc what quality or
prototypical object will become enviable, as the value of the envied object depends
on the social, historical and cultural context. The common characteristic of any
enviable object is that the value of supremacy or advantage is attributed to an
envied object relative to another object. In short, envy occurs as a process in which
the meanings of the envied object, the self that has the object, and the context in
which this relationship occurs become dependent on changing socio-historical
determinants.
Within our dynamic view of the niche of envy, the envied person works as a
mirror wherein the envier reflects his lacking. We view envy as a ‘‘social meter’’ of
the self, reflecting what is defined as socially desirable in any given community or
social group. Navaro notes:

[. . .] what is envied tells more about oneself than it tells about the envied other. The
envied other is a mirror of the lack one feels inside; it may be that the other’s perceived
possession may be stirring up a lack that was not formerly conscious, i.e., being
successful, accomplishing something, being admired, etc. (Navaro, 2007, p. 90)

In this sense, envy is by nature a social emotion because it is nested in social

comparison and fosters our painful self-awareness about what we lack and what we
desire to be. This notion is consistent with the social-cultural proposal of con-
sciousness stated by Vygotsky (1992), in which he indicated: ‘‘We are self-conscious
because we are conscious of others, and in a similar way, we are aware of others
because we are others for another in relation to us.’’
The envious person’s frustration of unsatisfied desire, and the impotence pro-
duced by scarce likelihood of achieving a goal, each lead to the devaluation of the
Quintanilla and Jensen de López 83

self and feelings of inferiority. This devaluation, in turn, increases the value of the
envier. Social comparison research has shown that envy is more salient when the
gap between individuals is smaller (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004). Consequently, if
the domain and the goal of comparison are relevant to the self, envy is a more likely
result (Salovey & Rodin, 1984). Ownership of the object and evaluation of the self
are mediated through several factors, such as perceived controllability and attain-
ability, as well as the degree of similarity between the persons compared and the
relevance of the goal to the self (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Smith & Kim, 2007,
2008). The feasibility of attaining the goal may either enhance or mitigate hostile
consequences of envy. We continue to address these dynamics in the following
section by addressing the consequences of experiencing envy.

Hostility and aggression

Envy has been directly linked to hostile reactions (Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1966).
However, not all aggression or hostility is caused by envy, nor do all envy-related
situations end in hostility. The hidden nature of envy, in terms of the fact that it is
an unmentionable emotion without clear bodily expression, is a challenge to
researchers who wish to determine whether hostility is a byproduct of envy or
other feelings, such as a sense of injustice, resentment, depression, or anxiety.
A wide range of hostile reactions could follow experiences of envy; those
reactions express the different modes of socialization and the norms of distribu-
tion of goods within a culture. Hostile reactions such as contempt or disdain for
the desired object, or schadenfreude, have been considered consequences of
envy. Explicit and extreme hostility, such as crimes arising from envy, have
been discussed in anthropological and sociological studies (Foster, 1972;
Schoeck, 1966; Smith, 2008). During our fieldwork among Zapotec families,
one of the families was victim to an act of ill will. The episode occurred
during the sowing season, and the family had to irrigate the fields during the
night. The family obtained water from a pump in a deep pool, but the pump had
been destroyed by some stones that had been thrown into the pool. The Zapotec
people explained that this act of aggression was because they had obtained the
water pump through the local peasant organization, despite not being affiliated
with the organization. That is, the assaulted family was perceived to have
obtained a benefit without deserving it, and this occurrence is what provoked
the aggression. The family explained the motive of the crime to be an act of envy
(Quintanilla, 1999).
Inferring envy from hostility (contempt or derogatory comments) supports the
claim that depreciating attributes of the desired object are signs of envy (Silver and
Sabini, 1978b). Moreover, both arrogance and immodest expression from the
higher achiever play an important role in considering hostile reactions of the envi-
ous person. In the case of the Zapotec family, they made it clear that others
regarded their access to the water pump to be undeserved, and thus, the aggression
was the product of envy.
84 Culture & Psychology 19(1)

Envy has also been considered within economic studies of retaliation or sabo-
tage (Mui, 1995). The envier displays hostile reactions to restore or refill the gap
between himself and the person envied, even if it means paying the price inflicted by
damage. Vecchio (2005) demonstrates how envy affects organizations and work-
places in which social comparison is inevitable. The prestige gained by occupying a
high position within an organizational hierarchy is a sign of social recognition and
influences self-enhancement and self-esteem. To motivate employees or increase
production, rewarding employees with moves toward higher positions in the organ-
izational hierarchy is generally regarded to be effective. These promotional strate-
gies are an obvious occasion to generate envy among employees (Dogan &
Vecchio, 2001; Duffy & Shaw, 2000; Duffy, Shaw & Schaubroeck, 2008; Foster,
1972). Promotion at work is related to professional achievement and identity.
Consequently, workers who are not promoted may display low performance,
absenteeism, social loafing, and difficult relationships (Cohen-Charash, 2009;
Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007; Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004).
In sum, hostility involved in situations regarding envy seriously affects social
relations in different domains of life. Being envied could mean success or social
prestige or, in contrast, it could mean fear or threat (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Foster, 1972;
Parrot & Rodrı́guez, 2008; Smith & Kim, 2007).
It is necessary to regard the extent to which hostility and inferiority or frustra-
tion are the products of injustice and to distinguish how hostility is derived. Some
authors consider injustice and resentment to be elements of envy (Smith, Parrot,
Ozer, & Moniz, 1994), while others point out that the feeling of unfair treatment,
regardless of what actually happened in reality, is more important (Miceli &
Castelfranchi, 2007). In any case, we feel that it is important to stress that different
perspectives on the relationship between hostility, resentment, anger, and envy
constitute different views on the complexity of envy and on the directionality
between emotion and behavior. Envy, in our view, is enmeshed in many different
types of daily life activities and interacts with the distribution of resources, which is
essential in all social groups, including non-human groups. The nature of resources
(e.g., limited or unlimited, tangible or intangible) may interlink differently with
envy, and we argue that these specific relationships need further investigation in
developmental psychology. We therefore turn to address how people cope with the
feeling of envy and how the notion is developed in ontogenesis. We maintain our
cross-cultural approach, as doing so allows us to question the core universal com-
ponents underlying the notion of envy, while stressing the important role provided
by culture in experiencing emotions.

Coping with envy

Although most people prefer not to reveal that they suffer from envy, the strategies
or modes to cope with envy depend on cultural practices and views about the
world. Universally, envy indicates inferiority, a lacking or deprivation, and possible
ill will toward those one envies. As mentioned above, envy is considered
Quintanilla and Jensen de López 85

unmentionable and socially unacceptable. As pointed out by Smith (2004), envy

could suffer transmutations to justify feelings of inferiority obtained in social com-
parisons. For example, the envier could develop defensive attitudes to protect his
own self-esteem. Somehow, a hostile reaction is part of self-defense. Interestingly,
anthropologists have revealed that different cultures cope with envy differently. For
example, Foster (1972) documented the activities expressed by Purépecha peasants
from Michoacán, Mexico, to cope with envy. These Mexican peasants prefer to
hide their goods to avoid causing envy from others. If others do not know what one
possesses, they will not desire it; in turn, one will avoid becoming the target of envy,
hostility, and aggression. A similar reasoning is present in the Zapotec
Mesoamerican culture in which we have carried out our research. Zapotec
people similarly believe that envy causes damage and, hence, they attempt to pro-
tect themselves and others from envy. Aggression is considered an act of envy, as
illustrated in the above example of the water pump. Zapotec people attempt to
avoid causing envy in others and, consequently, they have created some remedies to
eliminate envy or the so-called ‘‘evil eye’’. For example, one can find advertise-
ments in the local newspaper for ‘‘curanderos’’ (witch doctors), who guarantee that
they can avoid envy. Foster (1972) argues that these particular behaviors are coher-
ent with Zapotec people’s view regarding ‘‘limited goods’’ and the notion of goods
being non-reproducible. Moreover, hiding objects or goods avoids situations where
others might desire them, which again may risk a psychological loss.
In contrast to the limited goods mechanism, people in Western societies do not
hide goods; in fact, Western societies have more explicit rules for distributing
goods. However, these rules of distribution were not directly developed to cope
with envy. Envy has a close link with ownership, how goods should be distributed,
and how property should be managed. Therefore, it is likely that strategies for
coping with envy are, on the one hand, linked to rule over resources and their
distribution but, on the other hand, are also linked to the individual’s own
resources. Principles about equity and equality play a role in mediating this distri-
bution. Some Western societies have norms or rules about flaunting goods. In fact,
modesty, contrary to envy, is a social rule that is practiced widely in Western
societies. The common reaction of Western people to a compliment is to depreciate
the value of the particular good admired by another person. For example, when
someone compliments another person on a new dress, the owner might answer,
‘‘Well, I got it on sale; it was really cheap.’’ The logic of using modesty or depre-
ciating the value of an object to avoid envy arising in another person is an attempt
to avoid hurting the other or to offer a perception of attainability. This reaction is
related to how envy can be used to encourage consumption.
In envy, it is important to acknowledge the beliefs underlying what is thought to
be the person’s motive for the feeling of envy. Obtaining emotional awareness is an
important aspect of coping with envy, and this ability depends on a whole set of
social resources in relation to understanding interpersonal relations, emotional
language, and, importantly, understanding the meanings and values within a spe-
cific society. These social abilities are formed through socialization during early
86 Culture & Psychology 19(1)

development, and facilitate within the child the development of cultural strategies
and competencies for coping with complex emotions. These notions direct us to our
final destination, namely, the ontogenesis of envy within the framework of cultural
psychology.

Envy in child development

Historically, the psychoanalytic perspective on envy was considered an important
explanation of how a child develops the notions of self and identity. Melanie Klein
(1957) is historically the best-known psychoanalytical author to reveal the role of
envy in the early development of the child. Her fundamental claim is that envy
emerges within the dyad relationship between mother and child and that this rela-
tionship goes beyond nutritional issues. Klein’s conception of envy mainly has to
do with sexual identification with parents. In her view, envy is perceived as a hostile
reaction, and it arises from the very beginning of life. Envy is exemplified in the
mother’s possession of the breast that the child desires. We find it difficult to
support the view that the feeling of envy is present in early infancy. Being envious
from birth, in our view, would require having a clear distinction of self–other to
recognize one’s own desire, and to be aware of a lack. Feeling envy, in the Kleinian
view, presupposes many social abilities that we know that infants have not yet
acquired.
The development of envy has also been related to gender identity and the ways
in which envy influences family relationship structures and the bonds between
parents and children (Navaro, 2007), as well as the ways in which society appoints
boys and girls different modes for expressing and conforming to emotions (Stearns,
1993). In Victorian times, the standard was to warn against jealousy, and the
emotion was gradually transformed from a masculine to a feminine characteristic,
as women came to be considered the guardian of the family.
Although envy has historically been considered part of normal child develop-
ment, very few empirical observations of envy have been carried out in develop-
mental psychology. We address these observations here. Frankel and Sherick
(1977) observed that children aged one to five years gradually come to understand
envy. In this study, however, children were reported to not yet experience proper
envy because no social comparison was involved, and emotions that are similar or
pseudo to envy emerge as the infant acquires the ability to express desires. When
the desire is not satisfied, infants simply react with anger and frustration. Toddlers,
however, progressively compare what other toddlers possess with what they them-
selves possess; they behave as if they feel the duty to possess things and often react
with aggression, by snatching objects and so on. Conflicts over objects are thus a
frequent scenario at this age. However, the content of the scenario of conflict is
mediated by cultural values, as is seen in the cross-cultural work of Rogoff
(Mosier & Rogoff, 2003). According to a more recent psychoanalytic view, it is
likely that toddlers do not feel genuine envy, despite their aggressive reactions
(Navaro & Schwartzberg, 2007). Between the ages of two and three years, an
Quintanilla and Jensen de López 87

awareness of social comparison appears, and the toddler then attempts to obtain
what the other child has. The difference between this age and younger ages is that
children value others’ situations more highly than they value their own situations.
Faced with wanting what the other child possesses, the toddler becomes socialized
toward understanding how to negotiate with others using social skills, such as using
polite requests or emulating abilities and, thus, toddlers are able to overcome the
difficulties that arise when experiencing envy. Interestingly, it is rarely, if ever,
observed that a toddler expresses the behavior of snatching an object from an
adult, and it seems that this interpersonal scenario of snatching is ‘‘reserved’’
exclusively for toddler–toddler interactions. This observation demonstrates the
importance of social comparison as a factor within the expression of envy, as we
have suggested earlier. The hierarchical gap between toddlers and adults is too
large to permit the child to execute the notion of social comparison between herself
and an adult, whereas the infant–infant relationship is considered socially equal.
We have set out to investigate children’s comprehension of envy from a cogni-
tive and socio-cultural perspective, while taking into account the niche of envy, as
described above. In our view, envy taps into different aspects of children’s social
development. From a socio-cultural perspective, it is necessary to take into con-
sideration the process of socialization in which parental practices influence the
ways in which children learn to cope with different emotions. Moreover, children
must learn how these particular emotions are used to manage relationships
(Hoffman, 1983). Young children adopt social norms and specific strategies to
cope with social and emotional situations. However, studies about envy from a
developmental perspective are scarce, as are studies on the role of culture in chil-
dren’s development of emotions. Cross-cultural studies in development have shown
that Nepalese and American children understand shame and guilt differently (Cole,
Brushi, & Tamang, 2002). Bers and Rodin (1984) have shown that American chil-
dren aged 6 to 11 years attribute envy or jealousy to a character who is socially
compared with a high achiever. However, children are able to understand emotions
such as anger, sadness, or happiness prior to age six, and they are able to under-
stand desires and beliefs at age three (Lagattuta, 2005; Wellman, Phillips, &
Rodrı́guez, 2000). Moreover, they have mental abilities prior to age six that suggest
they might understand envy. If these mental abilities are universal (Callaghan et al.,
2007; Quintanilla & Sarriá, 2003), then preschool children across different cultures
may understand envy, or at least some emotional precursors nested in the envy
situation, such as anger, negativity, or sadness. However, the rules for coping with
envy may also be influenced by cultural factors. Under this assumption, we carried
out a cross-cultural comparison of the attribution of envy among 3- to 5-year-old
Zapotec, Danish and Spanish children (Quintanilla & Jensen de López, 2011). Our
study shows that starting at the age of three years, children are able to understand
envy, are able to endorse negative feelings (sadness or feeling upset) to someone
who wants something that another child possesses and that is unattainable, and are
able to endorse happiness for the envier when witnessing that the desired object is
spoiled (that is, the notion of schadenfreude). Moreover, children were asked to
88 Culture & Psychology 19(1)

offer strategies to avoid a possible conflict when two individuals wanted the same
object.
The results of our studies also show that children from different cultures offer
different strategies to avoid conflict in an envy situation. Western children alluded
to strategies such as sharing objects or exchanging one object for another. On the
contrary, Zapotec children suggested that the character should retain the object
(Quintanilla & Jensen de López, 2011; Quintanilla, Jensen de López & Sarriá, 2008;
Quintanilla & Sarriá, 2009). The strategies used by these children were motivated
by the type of socialization that they experienced. Western mothers use the strategy
of distracting the child with a novel object to motivate the child to release the object
that he has at hand. In this way, the mother obtains the object considered inappro-
priate for the child. Western parents are also persistent in the idea that things
should be shared. In contrast, among the Zapotec, mothers do not give explicit
instructions when children engage in play, and they are explicitly involved to a
much lesser degree.
In another study, we asked children to explain the hostile reactions of a child
who is depicted as being deprived of an object by a second child. The stories
illustrated envy situations derived from spontaneous episodes of hostile envy
that were observed during fieldwork. The stories were presented in two different
contexts: one in which there were plenty of resources (several toys), and another in
which there were limited resources (one toy). The specific explanation offered by
the children suggested that in the story depicting several toys and an abundance of
resources, Zapotec children justify hostile reactions due to ownership of the object,
as they endorsed ownership, even though the story did not explicitly mention the
owner of the respective toys. The Danish children, on the other hand, offered
explanations that expressed moral justifications (e.g., the character is bad or selfish)
when plenty of resources were present. In contrast, in the scenario depicting limited
resources, the explanations in the envy situation expressing hostility are similar
between the two cultures. The children perceived the lack of goods and the
desire of the character as equal justifications for his hostility (Jensen de López,
Quintanilla, Giménez, & Sarriá, 2012).
The explanations about ownership alluded to by Zapotec children are consistent
with the Zapotec view described earlier in this paper regarding the relationship
between envy and aggression. Lay people often explain conflicts between neighbors
or relatives by attributing these conflicts to envy. These illustrations support our
argument that facial expressions in themselves are not sufficient cues for children to
learn complex emotions. Children must also rely on social norms, and for some
emotions, social norms are the main resources for understanding the emotion.
Social norms play an important role in understanding emotions that involve hostile
reactions. Schadenfreude involves a transgressor social reaction; thus, in one study,
we set out to investigate children’s understanding of this emotion. The study
showed that 3- to 5-year-old children displayed an increasing ability to attribute
schadenfreude (Jensen de López & Quintanilla, 2011a). In a cross-sectional devel-
opmental study of 3- to 8-year-old Danish children, we were able to illustrate that
Quintanilla and Jensen de López 89

children’s understanding of schadenfreude, follows an unexpected but interesting

developmental path. From age three to five years, children increase their attribu-
tion of schadenfreude; however, from age six, this tendency decreases, while 8-year-
old children attribute the opposite emotion (sadness) when the envied object is
spoiled (Jensen de López & Quintanilla, 2011b).
These results are consistent with other studies in which young children attribute
happiness to the transgressor, while older children attribute sadness. This pattern
of responses in development is known as the notion of the happy victimizer
(Barden, Zelko, Duncan, & Masters, 1980; Fuchs & Thelen, 1988; Nunner-
Winkler & Sodian, 1988; Yuill, 1986). Our studies capturing children’s develop-
ment of envy/schadenfreude indicate children’s increasing awareness about social
comparison in envy contexts and their reliance on their increasing comprehension
of the social norms. These rules emerge when children are able to understand that
displaying emotional expressions influences how others think about us.
In sum, these developmental studies show that from the age of three, children
understand envy. Moreover, they are able to understand some of the rules about
how to diminish or cope with envy. Furthermore, culture seems to mediate the
ways in which children understand and express which strategies are most useful in
resolving the conflicts produced by envy. As children become older, they under-
stand the social rules of emotions, and they come to understand that being envious
is not socially desirable; consequently, they change their criteria about when to
show schadenfreude in an envy context. Children also understand the nuances of
how the envious self would be better restored; they know that intentional damage is
more pleasant than accidental damage (Jensen de López & Quintanilla, 2011a;
Quintanilla & Giménez-Dası́, 2011).

Conclusion
We introduced this paper with a quote from Carlos Ruiz Zafón, who refers to envy
and envious people as mediocre. Paradoxically, we have argued that envy fuels
social consciousness. To be mediocre due to envy and to possess social conscious-
ness seems contradictory. However, Ruiz Zafón points out that mediocrity in part
causes envy, as social relations become the nest of conflicts, and envy is expressed
through sabotage, harassment, injury, contempt, anger, lust, and so on, with the
ultimate aim of restoring the gap perceived by the envious. In fact, we refer to our
proposal as the ‘‘niche’’ of envy because we mean that envy is a lack, or a type of
cavity or gap, that the envier tries to conceal or refill.
Although at first glance envy appears to be a well-known emotion, our detailed
analysis of previous cross-disciplinary research on envy reveals that there is no easy
way to provide a single definition of envy. This review described different elements
of envy in order to differentiate the meaning of envy from other concepts related to
it. We propose the triadic relationship as a conceptual outline of what is considered
the most basic condition for generating envy and other potential emotions that
appear within the niche of envy. Experiencing envy evokes important aspects of the
90 Culture & Psychology 19(1)

self and of social relationships in which the self is evaluated, angered, minimized, or
enhanced.
However, as we have seen, strategies for coping with envy are highly related to
culture: different cultural models posit different notions of self and different levels
of self-consciousness. This very notion of self-consciousness is mediated by social-
ization. However, in the development of the understanding of the emotion of envy,
there is a nucleus of basic components that are necessary, such as social compari-
son about goods or possessions, feelings of lacking, and an inequality of relations
with the desired object. Our studies show that these components are already rec-
ognizable in early childhood and by children growing up in different cultures. The
feeling and understanding of envy is relevant to the human construal of self because
this particular feeling of lacking something serves as a social meter of self in social
contexts. With our dynamic proposal, we hope to provide a conceptual framework
for future developmental psychology to elucidate the social-cultural complexity of
emotional understanding.

Funding
Financial support was partially provided by the Spanish Ministry of Education (Grant #
PSI2008-02174). This paper was written during the first author’s visit to the Cognitive
Psychology Unit, Institute of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University.
Additional support for collaboration during the revision of the paper was provided for
the second author by the Cognitive Psychology Unit, Institute of Communication and
Psychology, Aalborg University.

Acknowledgements
We acknowledge several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on pre-
vious versions of the paper.

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Author biographies
Laura Quintanilla has been a lecturer in the Faculty of Psychology of UNED since
2000. The teaching is in the area of research methodology in undergraduate and
graduate courses in psychology. Her area of research is the emotional development
in children, consisting of two lines. One line, ‘‘Thinking emotions: An intervention
program in preschool,’’ is applied, classroom intervention, which aims to improve
the understanding of emotional and social skills through the Philosophy for
Children methodology. The second line of work, a more fundamental
94 Culture & Psychology 19(1)

understanding of envy in child development, is the product of the previous works

of ethnic Mesoamerican cultural comparison to Western theory of mind, animism,
and realism (Zapotec in Oaxaca, Mexico). She has participated in several research
projects funded by the Ministry of Education in Spain.

Kristine Jensen de López (PhD) is a professor (with special responsibilities) in

Developmental Psychology. She is the Director of the Clinic for Developmental
Communication Disorders in the Cognitive Psychology Unit. She works with the
Institute of Communication and Psychology, Facility of Humanities at Aalborg
University, Denmark. Her current work is as a Principal Investigator of NASUD,
a 3 year research project that investigates typically and atypically developing
Danish-speaking children’s communicative abilities.