Moral panics revisited

THOMAS JOHANSSON
Stanley Cohen’s influential studyFolkDevilsand~YloralPanics: TheCreation oftheulods
and Rockers is an important landmark in youth culture research. It was in 1972 that
Cohen published his study of English youth culture and the construction of deviance.
This book was an empirical case study of the mods and the rockers; but also, and more
importantly, it was a theoretical study of the construction of images of you th and of
deviance. The most significant characteristic of a moral panic is that it tends to distort
and grossly exaggerate the seriousness and importance of certain events. Through
sensational headlines in the mass media, a melodramatic vocabulary and the
construction of ’folk devils’ - that is, groups of mostly young people who threaten
societal values and are considered to be violent and dangerous to ’ordinary people’ -
a moral panic is created.

In his book, Cohen presented the development of a moral panic. It all sta rted with
some incidents in a small holiday resort on the east coast of England at Easter in 1964,

and these events led to a full blown moral panic and strongly negative reactions
towards certain types of youth cultural styles and expressions. Mods and Rockers
were turned into folk devils and various pressure groups cried out for new legislation

and more social control. Cohen defined a moral panic the following way:

A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal
values and interests; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other
right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of
coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition disappears, submerges or deteriorates
and becomes more visible (Cohen, 1972/1987: 9).

According to Cohen, the development of moral panics always follows a certain

pattern. He distinguishes between four phases: warning, impact, inventory and reaction.
Even though single attacks against phenomena considered as upsetting or shocking
are often called moral panics, one of the cardinal signs of a moral panic is actually that

there exists a united opposition to the phenomenon in question. In the phase called
’inventory’ mass media plays a central role in exaggerating and distorting different
events and actions, and in creating folk devils. The media operates as a framing

device, focusing attention on certain events and individuals. All this leads to the
development of a control culture and to different kinds of attempts to put a stop to
a certain development or phenomenon.
Cohen’s definition and views of moral panics have been very influential in forming
our theoretical understanding of the construction of delinquent youth in particular,

and of youth cultural styles in general. It has generated a great amount of research. In

22
Sweden several studies have taken their point of departure in Cohen’s theory of moral
panics and youth culture, for example Roe (1985), Boethius (1987, 1989), Fridlund
(1988), Frykman (1988) and Knutsson (1987, 1989). &dquo;

However, the term ’moral panic’ is certainly disputable. It has often been used in
a very loose fashion and it has become difficult to discern the kinds of developments

that Cohen analysed using his original theory of moral panics. In a society where there
are no simple and clear-cut definitions of moral norms and where the distinction

between popular culture and high culture has at least partly lost its significance, it has
also become hard to initiate a moral panic.
Recently, Cohen’s theoretical model has been criticized. Although Angela
MIcRobbie agree with Cohen that the concept of moral panic is relevant and usable
in youth culture research, she also argues that we have to find new ways of
understanding this phenomenon in the age of the postmodern mass media.’ Mloral
panics are still about instilling fear in people; encouraging them to turn away from
visible and actual social problems, retreating into a ’fortress mentality’ - a feeling of
paralysis and political powerlessness. However, although the creation of a moral panic
is a powerful means to discipline young people, and even though it remains an
influential emotional strategy, today we rarely see the clear-cut type of moral panic
that Cohen wrote about in his book. McRobbie argues that

Broadly speaking it could be argued that the rectangular relationship of positions and processes
which held the old moral panic model together (the sociologists on behalf of the deviant; the
agencies of social control; the media; the moral guardians and experts) has been replaced by a more
diverse and more fluid set of institutions, agencies and practices which sometimes interlock
(lB1c Robbie, 1994: 211).).

In their ’Rethinking &dquo;moral panic&dquo; for multi-mediated social worlds’, MIcRobbie and
Thornton (1995) take this critique one step further by introducing the idea that ‘folk
devils’ are less marginalized than they once were. They have learned how to defend
their own interests and to use media strategically. Sometimes a moral panic is even
actively supported by the ’folk devils’ themselves and used to market a certain style
or taste culture. NlcRobbie and Thornton argue that the connection and clear-cut

distinction between ’the media’ and ’social control’ has dissolved. Most political
strategies today are media strategies and the diversification of forms of media and of
audience works against a consensus in social morality. Exit ’folk devils’, or?
In this article, I will discuss the changing phenomenon of moral panics, arguing
that it is still useful (see also Boethius, 1995), although there is a need for a
reformulation of the concept. A step in this direction would be to perform a thorough
analysis of the relationship between social changes and the repetitions of moral
panics. l~Iy ambition with this article is to present a n outline for such an analysis and
therefore the main focus is theoretical.
Modernity has led to drastic changes in the way we look upon class relations,
gender and ethnicity. These changes have had a great impact on the ways different

23
moral panics are created. Nloral panics are primarily about upholding boundaries
between various groups of people and maintaining moral conceptions. When significant
boundaries are threatened one way or another, the outbreak of a moral panic signals
an attempt to defend the boundary in question. In this article I will firstly discuss the

relationship between the formation of collective identities and moral panics. Secondly,
I will discuss various Swedish studies of moral panics. Using this material I will then
formulate some theoretical guidelines for an understanding of moral panics.

Modernity and the

differentiation of moral panics
The development of moral panics may be regarded as the result of threats towards
fundamental beliefs, values and social distinctions in a society. A common trigger of
moral panic is a supposed threat towards children’s or young people’s moral conduct
and health. As Cohen and Drotner have pointed out, the media plays a central role in
the creation of moral panics. Popular culture and media have often been used in order
to attack and ridicule moral values and norms; for example media scandals have been
an important part of the popular music scene since the 1950s.

The combination of rock and pop music’s sensual and sexual conten and the
shock appeal of scandal is a central feature of youth culture (Lull & Hinerman 1997).
Moral guardians have always regarded these aspects of youth culture as problematic
(Goode & Nachman 1994). At a manifest level -the media and often also the family
-

are made into scapegoats. Nloral guardians thus identify a causal pattern often

involving a problematic family background and popular media, which leads to a lack
of morality and consequently to criminality or other forms of deviant and immoral
behaviour. The actual content of a moral panic may take various forms, but the
manifest threats identified frequently show great similarity.
Moral panics are often the result of adult reactions towards different youth cultural
phenomena. Throughout modernity new expressions in commercial culture and
youth culture have often led to strong moral reactions. Mloral panics are also intimately
related to the development of the mass media. Kirsten Drotner ( 1992) uses the term
medtapanics to describe the panics of modernity. Media panics are created discursively
within the media, and are characterised by a quite short duration and by th eir rather
weak impact on people. Children and young people are the prime objects of the
media panics, as they are often media pioneers, challenging social and cultural norms,
symbolising ideological rifts and most importantly representing experiences and
emotions lost to adults.
Even though there is a great consistency in the way moral panics evolve, in their
social form, it is possible to identify some historical changes in social and cultural
conflicts taking place on these occasions. Modernization leads to significant changes
in collective identities, and especially in relation to class, gender and ethnicity, as

24
noted earlier. These identities become increasingly more complex, involving, as they
do, relationships between different aspects of modern identity. A more advanced
understanding of moral panics may be reached through studying how threats towards
collective identities and moral norms are treated in different historical contexts.
In the beginning of the 20th century, people increasingly moved into the big cities.
Individuals from different classes mixed in the cities, and even though status
distinctions were clearly marked by people’s economic conditions and lifestyles, the
working class began to call into question the privileged position of the bourgeoisie.
In different ways the ruling class defended its superior position in society, and tried
to educate and cultivate the working class into submission. Threats against class and
status positions caused strong reactions. These conflicts partly took place on the

cultural field of symbolic expressions. The distinction between good and bad culture
served primarily to uphold the privileged position of the bourgeoisie. Popular culture
was often regarded as a threat against the social order. At this time, and during the first

half of the 20th century, moral panics and the struggle against ’bad’ culture were
mainly expressions of class distinctions, the defence of the social order and the moral
mission to educate the working class.
In post-war western society, youth had become a social group in its own right,
characterised by certain lifestyles, values and ideals. However, even though many
analyses of youth during these years focused on the differences between youth
culture and adult society, it was, of course, still possible to distinguish between
working class and middle class-based youth cultures. On the one hand we had
workingclass rockers, on the other, middle class hippies, and so on. Another important
characteristic of youth culture was the growing disrespect for conventional sexual
morals and gender identities. In the different youth cultures which appeared in
Western society during the 1960s and 70s sexuality and gender identity were rapidly
changing. On the one hand, moral panics were caused by young people’s
experimentation with sexuality an~ family norms and their concomitant critique of
patriarchy; and on the other, by the threat of a growing femini~ation of society related
to the hippie movement and later to the punk culture and consequently to the

androgynous ideals cultivated within these specific youth cultures.

During the later part of the 1980s and in the 90s there were frequent outbreaks of
moral panics - for example, the panic around rave parties - but these panics often
passed quickly. As earlier mentioned, Angela lVcRobbie has even questioned if it is
appropriate to talk about moral panics today in the same sense as we did in the 1970s
yet in the 1990s, moral panics are still caused by threats against adult norms and ideals.
These threats may either be related to working class kids’ use of ’bad culture’ and
their aggressive behaviour, or to the increasing masculinization and feminization of
certain parts df youth culture. Nevertheless, they may be primarily related to clashes
between different ethnic groups and towards antidemocratic tendencies within
youth culture.

25
 The latent dynamics and
manifest focal of moral panics
When interpreting moral panics it is necessary to distinguish between a latent.
dynamic, manifest focus and content of a moral panic, and different historical forms
of moral panics. I will here distinguish between moral panics (following Cohen’s
conceptualisation) and postmodern media panics, which are mainly media products and
have no direct influence on politiCS.2
In order to really understand the development of different moral panics we have
to take a closer look at what I call ‘latent dynamics’. The latent dynamics of moral

panics mainly revolve around issues concerning class, gender and ethnicity. Modern-
ity means continuous erosion of traditional social boundaries When such boundaries
are threatened we often see the development of symbolic battles and attempts to

rectify these boundaries. Moral panics develop both as a consequence and a symbolic
expression of such symbolic battles. This process develops in various ways and at
different speeds in different countries. I will concentrate on the development of the
process in Sweden.
As earlier argued, it is possible to discern three main types of latent dynamics in
the moral panics developed in Sweden in the 20th century, evolving around class,
gender and ethnicity.4 Even though it is possible to discern such nodal points of
symbolic conflicts, a very complex pattern of identity questions are gradually
evolving. This growing complexity, where it becomes more difficult to discern clear-
cut patterns of a moral panic, also contribute to changes in the way we conceptualise
these phenomena. The postmodern media panics develop and die within the
discourses of the media, and they seldom activate social pressure groups and moral
guardians outside the sphere of the media. Earlier moral panics functioned as a
defence of traditional values and moral boundaries, but today in our post-traditional
western societies, the moral guardians often turn against subcultures and social

groups which are antimodernists and antidemocratic, and who actually want to
defend certain ’traditional’ values. A good example of this development is the
discussion and eventual potential panics around the skinhead movement in Sweden
and in other countries.
I will return to these questions at the end of the article. Firstly, however, I will draw
a rough sketch of the development of moral panics in Sweden, following the line of

argument presented above.

Nick Carter and the

respectable working class
The construction of social distinctions and moral boundaries in society are intimately
related to how different groups tend to approach and relate to popular culture. Mortal

26
panics, it could be argued, are symptoms of conflicts between different social groups
and their disparate world views. These conflicts manifest themselves in the form of
a discussion regarding good and bad culture, expressing certain groups’ defence of

class and status distinctions. The bourgeoisie defined legitimate taste in culture and
tried to educate the working class into submission, for example. Popular taste was
often treated as a sign of moral deterioration and regarded as a threat towards societal
values and moral norms.
In his book on the reception of detective stories and especially Nick Carter
magazines in Sweden 1908-1909, Ulf Boëthius (1984) analysed the historical and
social conditions which led to the development of a full-blown moral panic. According
to Boethius, Nick Carter became a scapegoat in the conflict between the bourgeoisie
and the working class. Moral entrepreneurs succeeded in creating a campaign
directed against the Nick Carter magazines, which finally led to considerable
restrictions in the distribution of these magazines. The right-wing entrepreneurs and
the Social Democrats joined forces in the campaign against Nick Carter.
In the beginning of this century the population in Stockholm increased considera-
bly. The process of urbanization and modernization lead to the rapid development of
the big city, with all its problems and temptations. The metropolis, with its growing
population and the corresponding development of amusements and popular culture,
was also the scene of a notable process of detraditionalization. Families were

dissolving, criminality among youth was increasing, and other social problems started
to appear. Many people lived under miserable conditions and the economic and social

differences between the classes were considerable.

There was, of course, a widespread belief among the bourgeoisie that ’the brutal
and uneducated’ working class could become a threat to the status quo in society. The
folk and popular culture cultivated within the lower classes were also considered to
have a bad influence on middle-class youth. Instead of locating the problems to the
growing inequality in society, right-wing moral entrepreneurs started a campaign
towards the demoralizing detective magazines and Nick Carter. The characters and
stories printed in these cheap magazines were regarded as having a bad influence on
young people’s characters and as being a possible cause of delinquency.
The respectable working class did not want to be associated with the negative
impact that Nick Carter magazines were supposed to have on youth. So, although the
campaign was initiated by right-wing moral entrepreneurs and mainly fought in the
name of legitimate culture, certain factions of the working class were involved in this
battle against ’bad culture’. The moral crusade against Nick Carter was only one
among a number of battles against the bad influences of popular culture on youth. In
the 1910s, moral entrepreneurs directed their efforts towards the increasingly popular
American movie industry, for example (Fridlund 1988).

27
 Hypermasculinity and
feminization
Whereas the moral panics that evolved in the beginning of the century were mainly
focused on class, post-war society moral panics to an increasing extent focused on the
general phenomenon of youth culture. The moral guardians, mostly middle-class
parents, school teachers and right-wing politicians, reacted strongly towards ’declining
sexual moral’ among youth. Popular culture and the mass media were made into
scapegoats, and the ’missing father’ was pointed out as the cause of delinquent
behaviour among youth.
In the 1950s American social scientists started talking about youth culture as a
homogeneous phenomenon, contrasting adult and youth lifestyles (see Talcott
Parsons, for example). Although many social scientists referred to youth culture in the
singular, there was, of course, a differentiation within this general ’culture’ related to
class, gender and other social positions. The rapidly growing media and music
industry had a great impact upon the formation of a youth culture, which was deeply
influenced by media images and the commercial circulation of fashion and styles. The
increasing mediazation of society and youth culture also led to the development of a
number of moral panics.
A large part of the media culture in general, and film and popular music in
particular, had a young audience. Consequently, many of the heroes of youth culture
acted out youthful anxiety and embodied an aggressive sexuality and lifestyle. A great
number of the films and the lyrics of the popular songs dealt with young people’s
problems, and in particular, their love problems. Whereas the large part of the media
culture in the 1950s contributed to the maintenance of bipolar gender identities and
status quo -where men were portrayed as tough, autonomous and heroic, and women
as weak and submissive - this way of constructing gender gradually became criticised

and problematized.’
The general societal changes and increasing criticism from feminists and others
against the patriarchal system led to changes within youth culture and vice-versa.
People started to call into question the many inequalities existing in the relationships
between men and women. Media and youth culture both influenced and were
influenced by the movement towards a more gender-equal society.
In the youth culture of the 1960s and 70s there was a tendency towards both
masculinization and feminization. I will argue that these tendencies tended to pose
a threat against middle-class based groups in society. The masculinization of youth

culture was clearly represented in the subculture of the rockers. Although the moral
panics focused on the rockers mainly occurred during the period of 1959-1960
(Bjurstrom, 1997), there were also frequent minor panics during the 1960s and 70s.
The rockers were and still are a predominantly male subculture. This youth culture
was particularly strong in the rural areas of Sweden and among working class youth.

Even though it was mainly characterised by a strong interest in American cars and

28
early rock’ n’ roll music, the media images of the rockers often exaggerated the more
negative characteristics of this subculture. I~~Ioral entrepreneurs reacted strongly on
the sexist and asocial tendencies in the rockers’ lifestyle (Bjurstr6m, 1997). In a-
society where many people tried to create more equal conditions for women and men,
the rockers were sometimes regarded as a masculine subculture defending unequal
gender ideals and roles.
As a contrast, we had the hippie movement and the more androgynous male
gender ideals cultivated within this subculture. There were also moral reactions
towards the values and lifestyle of this youth culture. The hippies’ critique against
traditional male gender ideals gradually turned into a more general critique of the
nuclear family and traditional ways of living together. Whereas the rockers tried to
defend traditional male gender identities and ideals and thus constituted a threat
against equality, the hippies turned the critique of masculinity and patriarchy into a
more general attack on the whole capitalist society and its values. In the 1970s the

threat against the genderorder thus consisted of a tendency towards a hypermasculine

ideal cultivated within certain male dominated subcultures, and a tendency towards
a more general feminisation of society.

Some factions among the moral guardians reacted strongly towards the former of
these tendencies, whereas other factions turned against the latter development. We
have here an increasing differentiation of both the groups involved in the moral
mission and in the causes of the moral panics. But the common factor is drastic
changes in gender identities during the 1970s. This hypothesis has to be supported
by more empirical research, however.
In the 1970s the pattern of moral panics thus became gradually more complex,
involving both class and gender issues. The moral panic around video violence in the
beginning of the 1980s was primarily a reaction towards the tendency among young
men to watch brutal and violent video films. More specifically it was also a middle

class based reaction against working class kids’ ways of approaching culture (Roe,
1985). The moral guardians were among other things afraid that these young men,
presumably from working class homes with absent fathers, would become violent
themselves through the imitation of the violent persons on the video screen.
Questions of masculinity and class intermingled in a certain way in this particular case.
In contrast to earlier moral panics, gender was now not only present as a part of a more
general agenda concerning primarily class relations, but also problematized and
treated as an important and central political issue in the public sphere, drawn into to
the whole debate around gender equality.

29
 Youth culture, ethnicity and
backlashes
In modernity class, gender and ethnic relations have been increasingly changing and
traditional social distinctions have been challenged and called into question. This
process of change has led to different reactions among young people and to the
formation of specific subcultures. Many of the subcultures discussed and analysed in
youth culture research may be understood in terms of reactions towards the general
changes in adult culture in particular and in society at large in general (cf. Hall &
Jefferson, 1976). Even though some youth subcultures tend to be promodernist -
mods and rockers - there are also strong tendencies towards the develo pment of
antimodernist subcultures. This becomes very clear if we turn to the moral panics of
the 1990s, where skins and bikers try to turn the wheel of modernity back towards
more ’fundamental’ values.

At the end of the 20th century, we are thus witnessing the development of youth
subcultures and othersubcultures which are antimodernist and show strong reactionary
tendencies. In Sweden skinheads, bikers, satanists and other violent groups have
frequently cropped up in the media. Skinheads have reacted strongly towards
immigrants, threatening and sometimes even using physical violence against people.
Antiracist groups have protested strongly and sometimes used violence against
skinheads. This conflict is mainly expressed in ethnic terms, but there are also class
and gender aspects involved in the creation of the skinheads. Whereas they mainly
react against changes in ethnic relationships in society, bikers tend to develop an

extremely masculine subculture. The male values and the lifestyle developed within
the biker culture are in many ways an expression of an attempt to defend certain
traditional ideals and gender identities. This also implies that the characteristics of
moral panics are changing. It has also become more difficult to defend the various
kinds of youth subcultures and to feel sorry for them if they are unjustly portrayed in
the media.
As indicated above, we have in the 1990s at least two different kinds of moral
panics. On the one hand, we have postmodern media panics, which appear and
disappear quite suddenly. On the other hand, we have moral panics that follow
approximately the pattern discussed by Stanley Cohen. However, there are important
differences between the panics studied by Cohen and others, and the moral panics
evolving in the 1990s. -

The postmodern media panic is mainly created in the media culture, and it seldom
leads to any more drastic effects in everyday life. Basically, it takes the form of a
discussion between different media intellectuals and experts, invited to talk shows
to express their opinions. Some of the experts and intellectuals defend the subculture
in question, whereas others try to show its harmful effects on society. But these
discussions very seldom lead to the kind of reactions and developments known from
full-blown moral panics, like for example the Nick Carter panic, which resulted in

30
stopping the sales of Nick Carter magazines. It is, of course, reasonable to raise the
question if these media panics can even be categorised as moral panics. Using the
earlier introduced distinction between moral panics and postmodern media panics,
it is however possible to distinguish between different types of ’panics’.
In the 1990s moral panics are often caused by violent and antimodernist subcultures,
such as the bikers and the skinheads. These subcultures often get a lot of attention
from the media. Even though they are clearly violent and sometimes criminal, the
question is whether they really deserve that much attention. As we know from earlier
studies on youth culture, media attention contributes to the construction of certain
subcultures and styles. In postmodern media certain subcultures and their specific
styles are turned into the sacred icons of popular culture. If instead of developing a
critical and realistic image of, for example, skinheads, the media were to exaggerate
and create fearful images of these folk devils, this could be negative. Media attention
does not automatically lead to the development of a successful campaign against the
’folk devils’ in question: it may just as well create such folk devils, as Cohen has
pointed out.
In the 1990s moral panics have become increasingly differentiated and their
dynamics, more complex. It is possible to distinguish between different types of
moral panics and to identify a number of different pressure groups and intellectuals
struggling in the cultural field. The mediazation of society has played a central role
in creating this new agenda for moral panics. However, we are in need of more
detailed empirical studies here.

Global youth culture and moral

panics
In the beginning of this century moral panics were mainly an expression of a struggle
between different classes and status groups in society. Popular culture was often
regarded as a threat against the social order. As Ulf Boethius has shown in his analysis
of this moral panic, there was actually an increasing problem with youth delinquency
in the big cities. These problems were related to drastic changes in societal structures
and transformations in the family than to the pretty harmless Nick Carter magazines,
however. Whereas the Nick Carter panic followed the same type of pattern described
by Cohen, the moral panics developed in the 1970s were more complex and cannot
be interpreted simply as expressions of class conflicts and of middle class interests.
Even though class differences were still striking, another factor - gender and the
question of equality between men and women - was put on the agenda in the 1960s
and 70s. Together with the increasing mediazation of society this factor contributed
to certain changes in the way moral panics were articulated and handled by the
intellectuals involved.
When looking closer at the moral panics in the 1960s and 70s, we find we are

3I
dealingwith the youth of the affluent consumer society, and facing a grand commercial
exploitation of youth styles and taste cultures. Youth culture gradually became more
differentiated and heterogeneous, and the mediazation of society also brought
forward different kinds of moral guardians. Although there was still an antagonism
between different classes involved in the creation of these moral panics, many of the
conflicts which led to panics in the 1960s and 70s also involved a strong component
and problematization of gender positions. Whereas, for example, rockers and bikers
developed ’hypermasculine’ values and ideals, the hippies oriented themselves
towards ’feminine’ values and wanted a radical transformation of society. These
different kinds of symbolic solutions of the insecurity created by the ongoing
transformation of gender activated different types of moral guardians.
In the 1970s the fragmented family and the absent father were considered a cause
of great problems. When the authority of the father declined, children and young
people were left to the influence of the mass media, some debaters argued (Lasch,
1979). The moral panic which arose around the video in the beginning of the 1980s
was also to a great extent a media panic; that is, the moral guardians in question were

afraid that young people, mostly boys, would start imitating the behaviour of the
actors on the video screen (cf. Roe, 1985). In the 1980s and the 90s we not only
witnessed a differentiation of youth culture and of the moral guardians, but also of the
way moral panics are constructed (i~IcRobbie (1994) and McRobbie and Thornton
( 1995)).
Nowadays it is possible to distinguish between postmodern media panics and
moral panics caused by often violent and countermodern subcultures. The former
kind is often short-lived and it seldom leads to anything more than a discussion
between different pressure groups and media intellectuals. It rarely leads to the
formulation of new norms or laws, it merely becomes an internal media business. The
latter kind of moral panics is often caused by countermodern subcultures and it is
difficult to defend these youth subcultures in the same way as certain intellectuals
defended the ’folk devils’ in the 1960s and 70s. In these cases it might even difficult
to use the concept of’moral panic’, because the values and behaviour of these groups
of young people are obviously reactionary and not humanitarian.
The mediazation of society and the global distribution of media representations
have led to a radical change in the way moral panics are appearing and disappearing.
As l~~IcRobbie has pointed out, a more diverse and fluid set of relations between moral
entrepreneurs, ’folk devils’ and intellectuals has developed. Postmodern moral
panics seldom lead to regulations and law reforms, they are often turned into a media
spectacle and are fairly short-lived. The other kinds of moral panics, where moral
guardians fight towards violent subcultural groups have a different character. They
usually follow the old model of moral panics, but do not lead to any clear decisions in
how to handle the threat from these counter-modernist groups. In a world lacking
clear moral criteria, it is very problematic to deal with groups, which show clear
reactionary tendencies.~ The phenomenon of moral panic has gradually been replaced

32
by a moral reflexivity, which is less inclined towards action and more oriented towards
dialogue and understanding. So, in some sense the moral panics of today are either
turned into media ,Ipeäades or into a process of moral contemplation where the outcome
is hard to predict.
In conclusion, the concept of moral panic is in great need of a revaluation. I
propose a distinction between postmo<lemr media panics (Drotner, lBIcRobbie) and
moral pm/Ù:B&dquo;. The former refers to the more complex and mediated ’panics’ described
by among others NlcRobbic and Thornton, the latter to moral reactions towards often
antidemocratic and antimodernist social movements and youth cultures. Most youth
cultures are today more or less accepted, and there seems to be little point in raising
a moral majority against them, but when it comes to skins and neo-nazis, for example,

can we then still talk about a moral consensus and maybe also moral panics?

I believe we can and maybe, we must also seek to formulate and adhere to certain
minimalist moral principles, boundaries orwhatever. Mloral panics were often initiated
and formulated by people who detested and had great problems with youth cultural
expressions of different kinds. These moral guardians tried to force their own rather
restricted moral views upon all citizens, and upon the immoral youth. A great deal of
this energy has nowadays been channelled into postmodern media panics and thus it
has loat its force and instead become the conservative view on culture within a
pluralistic informational network containing different and often divergent views on
culture.
However, when it comes to societal reactions towards skinheads and othcr
xenophobic groups there seems to exist a major consensus regarding the negative
character of such phenomena and groups. In this case, moral panics are no longer
expressions of a narrow and restricted view on vouth or culture, but a major force in
thc formulation of a moral boundary and a common political view on certain
phenomena in society. Morat panics may thus become a major political weapon in the
struggle for a more equal and less repressive society, an important contribution to the
democratic discussion, taking place in the public sphere. So, could it be that Cohcn’s
view on moral panics, moral guardians, etc. is turned upside down? Yesterdavs villains
are today’s heroes and vice versa’

Notes
1 For a thorough discussion of moral panics in different historical times, see Goode and
Nachman (1994) and Pearson (1983).
2 I use the term postmodern in order to describe a drastic change in the way moral panics are
articulated and manifested in contemporary society. The postmodern turn points at a totally
different way of approaching identity, morality and ethics (See for example, Bauman 1993 and
1995).
3 For a more elaborate discussion of this, see Sernhede (1997).
4 I am in debt to Ove Sernhede, who made me aware of this historical development.

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 5 There were, of course, other tendencies also, but I want to point to the main tendency at that
time.
6 For a discussion of the relation between antidemocratic youth groups and video violence, see
Bolin, 1998.

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