394

DOI 10.1515/kant-2014-0017
Matthew McAndrew KANT-STUDIEN 2014; 105(3): 394–405

Matthew McAndrew
Healthy Understanding and Urtheilskraft:
The development of the power of judgment in
Kant’s early faculty psychology
Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant posits a special mental faculty that
he calls the ‘power of judgment’ [Urtheilskraft]. He describes it as our capacity to
apply rules. This faculty is not found in the psychology of any of Kant’s prede-
cessors, nor is it found in his own early philosophy. This raises the question:
when did Kant first introduce the power of judgment? In this paper, I demonstrate
that Kant introduced this faculty during the mid-1770s, most likely between the
winter semester of 1772–1773 and the winter semester of 1775–1776. I also show that
prior to this time, he attributed our capacity to apply rules, i.e. the function of
the power of judgment, to what he terms ‘healthy understanding’ [gesunder Ver-
stand]. This expression is often equated with common sense. Thus, ‘healthy
understanding’ originally performed the same function that Kant would later
assign to the power of judgment.

Keywords: Kant, power of judgment, healthy understanding, faculty psychology

Matthew McAndrew: Newtown, Pennsylvania; mmcandr@alum.emory.edu

In this essay, I attempt to make a small, but nonetheless meaningful, contribution

to the Entwicklungsgeschichte of Kant’s philosophy. I examine the development of
Kant’s faculty psychology during the 1770s, focusing on what I consider to be an
important innovation of this period: the introduction of the power of judgment
[Urtheilskraft] as a third higher faculty of cognition alongside the understanding
and reason. Given the importance of this faculty in Kant’s critical philosophy,
how and when Kant first introduced the power of judgment into his philosophy
seems a question worthy of our attention. It is also a topic that – at least to my
knowledge – has yet to be addressed in any significant detail by the existing lit-
erature on Kant’s intellectual development.
Kant’s conception of the mind and its faculties is largely informed by the em-
pirical psychology of Alexander Baumgarten. Baumgarten’s faculty psychology
was itself modeled upon that of Christian Wolff. Both philosophers divide the
soul’s faculty of cognition into two parts: a higher faculty of cognition and a lower
 Healthy Understanding and Urtheilskraft 395

one. The higher faculty of cognition consists of two main capacities: the under-
standing and reason. Neither philosopher posits a power of judgment. Baum-
garten has a faculty of judgment [iudicium], but it is strictly an evaluative capac-
ity. It is the capacity to represent “the perfections and imperfections of things.”1
This is different from what Kant will call the power of judgment. The power of
judgment concerns far more than just perfection. It is the general capacity to
apply rules and concepts to particular cases.
Like Wolff and Baumgarten, Kant also divides the faculty of cognition into a
higher and a lower faculty. This division is familiar to most scholars as Kant’s dis-
tinction between sensibility and understanding. He often refers to the lower fac-
ulty of cognition as ‘sensibility’ [Sinnlichkeit] and to the higher faculty as the
‘understanding’ [Verstand].2 These two general faculties each consist of a number
of more specific capacities, or sub-faculties. For example, the lower faculty of

1 Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb: Metaphysik. Trans. by Georg Friedrich Meier. Jena 2004, 139,
§ 451. Baumgarten makes conceptual distinctness the basis for his distinction between the higher
and lower faculties of cognition. He defines the lower faculty of cognition as the soul’s capacity
for confused, or sensitive, cognition. See ibid., 115f, § 383. He defines the higher faculty of cogni-
tion as the soul’s capacity for distinct cognition. See ibid., 143, § 462. Baumgarten’s faculty of
judgment [iudicium] is one of several faculties that do not belong exclusively to either the higher
or the lower faculty of cognition. It is the capacity to cognize perfection and imperfection. We
are capable of representing this perfection in a way that is either confused, e.g., if we perceive it
through the senses or the imagination, or conceptually distinct. Hence, unlike the senses or the
understanding, the faculty of judgment belongs to both parts of the faculty of cognition. The
intellectual faculty of judgment is the capacity to distinctly cognize perfection and imperfection.
The sensitive faculty of judgment is the capacity to represent perfection and imperfection without
distinctness, i.e. confusedly. Baumgarten equates the latter with taste. Thus, according to Baum-
garten, taste is the capacity to perceive perfection and imperfection, but only in a confused way.
See ibid., 140, § 453. This means that we can recognize perfection, but we cannot articulate any of
the reasons for why it is so.
2 The term ‘understanding’ [Verstand] is not univocal in Kant’s philosophy. It actually has two
distinct meanings. First, it can denote the higher faculty of cognition in general. This is the sense
that Kant contrasts with sensibility. Second, it can to refer to one of the three sub-faculties that
make up the higher faculty of cognition. When Kant compares the understanding with the power
of judgment and reason, he intends it in this narrower sense. Kant acknowledges the dual mean-
ing of the term ‘understanding’ in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. He writes, “Ver-
stand, als das Vermögen zu denken (durch Begriffe sich etwas vorzustellen), wird auch das obere
Erkenntnißvermögen (zum Unterschiede von der Sinnlichkeit, als dem unteren) genannt […]. Es
wird aber das Wort Verstand auch in besonderer Bedeutung genommen: da er nämlich als ein
Glied der Eintheilung mit zwei anderen dem Verstande in allgemeiner Bedeutung untergeordnet
wird, und da besteht das obere Erkenntnißvermögen (materialiter, d.i. nicht für sich allein, son-
dern in Beziehung aufs Erkenntniß der Gegenstände betrachtet) aus Verstand, Urtheilskraft, und
Vernunft.” (Anth, AA 07: 196.17–197.03.) See also KrV, A 130f./B 169.
396 Matthew McAndrew

cognition, or sensibility, includes the senses and the imagination. In his early
philosophy of the 1750s and 1760s, Kant follows the example of his predecessors
and posits just two higher cognitive faculties: the understanding and reason. For
example, in the concluding section of The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Fig-
ures (1762), Kant describes the higher faculty of cognition and its capacities.3 Here
he mentions just two sub-faculties: the understanding and reason. The power of
judgment is absent from these early writings.
In this essay, I will advance two principal claims. First, the power of judgment
is an innovation that Kant introduces during the mid-1770s. Second, the precursor
to the power of judgment is a capacity that Kant terms ‘healthy understanding’
[gesunder Verstand]. I will begin by arguing for the first claim. The remainder of
my paper will be devoted to the second.

I The introduction of the power of judgment

There is strong evidence that Kant first introduced the power of judgment during
the mid-1770s, most likely between 1773 and 1775. If we confine ourselves to Kant’s
published writings, the power of judgment does not appear until the Critique of
Pure Reason. Here, for the first time, Kant asserts that the soul’s higher faculty
of cognition is composed of three sub-faculties: the understanding, the power of
judgment, and reason.4 Prior to this point, there is no mention of the power of
judgment in Kant’s published writings. Indeed, The False Subtlety of the Four Syl-
logistic Figures pointedly lists just two components of the higher faculty of cogni-
tion. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that the power of judgment enters Kant’s
philosophy at some point between The False Subtlety (1762) and the first edition of
the Critique of Pure Reason (1781).
This is a fairly wide span of time. However, we can narrow it substantially if
we turn to Kant’s anthropology lectures. Kant offered his first lectures in anthro-
pology during the winter semester of 1772–1773. We possess two distinct sets
of student notes from these lectures: the manuscripts known as Anthropologie
Collins and Anthropologie Parow. Both of these notebooks state that the higher
faculty of cognition consists of just two faculties: the understanding and reason.
For example, we can read in Anthropologie Collins, “Verstand und Vernunft sind
die obern Kräffte der Seele. Verstand ist das Vermögen zu urtheilen. Vernunft das

3 DfS, AA 02: 59.08–17.

4 KrV, A 130/B 169.
 Healthy Understanding and Urtheilskraft 397

Vermögen zu schlüßen.”5 The next earliest set of anthropology notes that we pos-
sess is Anthropologie Friedländer, which is thought to date from the winter sem-
ester of 1775–1776. It contains the threefold view of the higher faculty of cognition
that Kant later advances in the Critique of Pure Reason. Anthropologie Friedländer
states,

Das Obererkenntniß Vermögen faßt dreyerley in sich: Verstand insbesondere, so ferne er

der Vernunft entgegen gesetzt wird, Urtheils Kraft und Vernunft. Verstand ist das Vermö-
gen der Begriffe. Urtheils Kraft ist das Vermögen der Anwendung der Begriffe im gegebenen
Falle; und die Vernunft ist das Vermögen der Begriffe a priori in abstracto. Der Verstand ist
das Vermögen der Regel, Urtheilskraft das Vermögen der Anwendung der Regel, und Ver-
nunft die Anwendung der Regel a priori.6

These passages show that, between the winter semesters of 1772 and 1775, Kant
expanded the higher faculty of cognition to include the power of judgment. He
moved from two higher cognitive faculties to three. Thus, we can conclude that he
introduced the power of judgment sometime during this period.

II The common understanding

I have argued that the power of judgment is an innovation of the mid-1770s and
that Kant first adds this faculty between the years 1773 and 1775. This raises an-
other question: given that the power of judgment does not enter Kant’s philos-
ophy until the middle of the 1770s, what faculty, if any, was responsible for the
application of rules and concepts prior to this point? This is the cognitive function
that later Kant assigns to the power of judgment.
We must, of course, consider the possibility that Kant did not assign this
function to any particular faculty until he added the power of judgment. Wolff
and Baumgarten never posited a specific faculty for the application of rules. One
might assume that Kant followed their example and did not become interested
in the application of rules until the middle of the 1770s, when he introduced the
power of judgment. However, this hypothesis is refuted by Anthropologie Collins
and Parow. These notes date from the winter semester of 1772–1773. Yet here we
find Kant discussing the skill required to apply rules correctly. He ascribes this
talent to what he calls ‘healthy understanding’ [gesunder Verstand]. Collins
states, “nur durch den gesunden Verstand, können wir einen Fall unter einer all-

5 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 147.03f.

6 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 537.23–538.02.
398 Matthew McAndrew

gemeinen Regel subsumiren”7. Likewise, Parow states: “Der gesunde Verstand

applicirt eine Regel auf einen casum datum”8.
The expression gesunder Verstand, or ‘healthy understanding,’ is often trans-
lated into English as ‘common sense.’9 Kant does associate it with the sensus com-
munis in his early logic lectures.10 However, the healthy understanding also has
a precise meaning in Kant’s philosophy, one that is not adequately captured by
the fairly generic expression, ‘common sense.’ Healthy understanding, for Kant,
is the ability to correctly use common understanding. For example, Kant writes
in the Prolegomena: “Denn was ist der gesunde Verstand? Es ist der gemeine Ver-
stand, so fern er richtig urtheilt.”11 Kant distinguishes between the way that most
people exercise their understanding and the method employed by professional
scholars. He refers to the former approach as the common understanding [gemei-
ner Verstand] and the latter as either the scholarly [gelehrt] or the speculative
understanding [speculativer Verstand]. This distinction is a relatively unknown
facet of Kant’s philosophy; however, he mentions it in the Prolegomena to Any
Future Metaphysics,12 the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,13 the Critique

7 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 156.13f.

8 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 361.07f.
9 The terms gesunder Verstand and gesunde Vernunft were originally theological concepts.
Human reason is corrupted by original sin and therefore prone to error and deception. Insofar as
we are able to overcome this corruption of our intellect, our reason is restored to health. Healthy
understanding and healthy reason originally described the correct use of these faculties, as op-
posed to their otherwise natural state of sickness and corruption. See Kuehn, Manfred: Scottish
Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800. Montreal 1987, 258.
10 “Diese Art des Verstandes heißt der Sensus communis (Sens commun) oder der gemeine Ver-
stand.” (V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 312.10f.) See also R 1579, Refl, AA 16: 18.05–08.
11 Prol, AA 04: 369.28f.
12 The most significant discussion of the common understanding in Kant’s published writings
occurs in the Prolegomena. The final section of that work addresses the possibility of a scientific
metaphysics. Kant famously concludes that such a science is only possible through a critique of
pure reason. He declares that dogmatic metaphysics is doomed to founder on transcendental
illusions. The only possible metaphysics is a critical one whose object is reason itself. As part of
this provocative conclusion, Kant challenges his critics to demonstrate a single metaphysical
proposition dogmatically, i.e. through analysis. He then rules out two other approaches, which
he claims are similarly unsuitable for metaphysics: probabilistic arguments and healthy under-
standing [gesunder Menschenverstand].
Kant defines healthy understanding as the correct use of the common understanding. I quoted
this definition above. He then defines the common use of the understanding and contrasts it with
the speculative use of this faculty. According to him, the common understanding cognizes rules
concretely; the speculative understanding cognizes them abstractly. Kant writes: “Und was ist
nun der gemeine Verstand? Es ist das Vermögen der Erkenntniß und des Gebrauchs der Regeln in
concreto zum Unterschiede des speculativen Verstandes, welcher ein Vermögen der Erkenntniß
 Healthy Understanding and Urtheilskraft 399

of the Power of Judgment,14 and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.15 He

discusses it in even greater detail in his lectures on logic and anthropology. Thus,
according to Kant, we can exercise our understanding in either a common or a
scholarly way. The common approach is known as common understanding. The
scholarly method for using this faculty is called the scholarly understanding or
the speculative understanding.
Kant does not always explain the differences between these two approaches
consistently. For example, there are significant differences between his expla-
nation of this distinction in his early logic lectures and his anthropology lectures
from the same period.16 Fortunately, his account in Anthropologie Collins and

der Regeln in abstracto ist.” (Prol, AA 04: 369.30–33) In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines
the understanding as the “faculty of rules” [Vermögen der Regeln]. See KrV, A 126; A 132/B 171;
A 158f./B 197f. According to the Prolegomena, we can exercise this faculty in either a common or
a speculative way depending on whether we represent rules concretely or abstractly.
Consequently, the common understanding can only grasp rules and principles through examples.
This is what it means to cognize a rule concretely: we represent the rule through a particular case
or instance. Kant provides an example of this concrete cognition. He claims that the common
understanding is incapable of conceiving of causality as a universal principle or rule. It only
understands this concept through examples. These examples are instances in which one event
clearly followed from another, e.g., a window breaking. The common understanding cannot
think about causality more generally, as a necessary rule that governs all appearances. This
requires the speculative use of the understanding. Thus, the common understanding can only
represent rules concretely, or through examples. See Prol, AA 04: 369.33–370.07.
The Prolegomena defines the common understanding as the capacity to cognize rules concretely.
The speculative understanding is the capacity to cognize these same rules abstractly. Kant repeats
this position in a number of his lectures from this period, including Logik Pölitz, Logik Busolt, and
the Wiener Logik. See e.g., V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 503.29–504.01; V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 612.04–21;
V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 795.16–31.
13 In the Groundwork, Kant begins by examining the common use of the understanding. It is the
manner in which most people exercise this faculty. Part one of the Groundwork is devoted to the
common understanding, specifically insofar as it employed in moral reasoning. Kant concludes
at the end of this section that the common understanding is more than adequate for this purpose.
In the remainder of the work, he endeavors to articulate the principles that implicitly guide the
moral judgments of the common understanding. See GMS, AA 04: 403.34–404.36.
14 KU, AA 05: 293.20–29.
15 Anth, AA 07: 139.17–140.14.
16 In Logik Philippi, Kant teaches that the common understanding is the inductive use of the
understanding. It infers general rules from experience. The scholarly understanding is the de-
ductive use of this faculty. It applies general rules to particular cases. See V-Log/Philippi, AA 24:
312.29–34. See also R 1578, Refl, AA 16: 16.14–19; R 1579, Refl, AA 16: 18.02–15. However, in Anthro-
pologie Collins and Anthropologie Parow, Kant teaches that the understanding in general is a ca-
pacity to judge. The difference between the common use of this faculty and its scholarly employ-
ment concerns whether our judgments are abstract or concrete. The scholarly understanding is
400 Matthew McAndrew

Parow is fairly straightforward. Both sets of notes define the understanding in the
same way. It is the “Vermögen zu urtheilen,” or the “capacity to judge.”17 We em-

the capacity to think and judge abstractly. The common understanding, on the other hand, is the
capacity to render concrete judgments about particular cases. The scholarly understanding is able
to formulate general rules because these rules are abstract judgments. However, it cannot apply
these rules because in order to apply a rule we must make a concrete judgment about an individ-
ual. Thus, the formal application of a rule requires a combination of both scholarly and common
understanding. The scholarly understanding formulates a rule and the common understanding
applies it. See V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 157.10–18; V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 359.19–29; 361.07–11.
Kant’s explanation of the difference between the common and the scholarly use of the under-
standing in Logik Philippi is not compatible with his explanation of this distinction in his anthro-
pology lectures. In Logik Philippi, he defines the scholarly understanding as the deductive use of
this faculty. This means that it starts with general rules and applies them to particular cases.
However, in his anthropology lectures, Kant insists that the application of rules requires a com-
bination of both scholarly and common understanding. Likewise, Logik Philippi defines the com-
mon understanding as the inductive use of this faculty. Induction also requires the ability to
make both abstract and concrete judgments. We start with a series of concrete judgments about
experience. On the basis of these initial judgments, we then infer a general rule that describes
them all. This rule is an abstract judgment. Thus, according to Logik Philippi, the common under-
standing is capable of making at least some abstract judgments because it infers rules from ex-
perience. Yet according to Anthropologie Collins and Parow, abstract judgments are the exclusive
province of the scholarly understanding. The common understanding only judges concretely.
Everything that we know about these texts indicates that they are roughly contemporaneous.
They all date from the beginning of the 1770s. Yet Kant’s definition of the common understanding
in Logik Philippi is incompatible with the ones found in Anthropologie Collins and Parow. There is
a potential explanation for this discrepancy. In Logik Philippi, the term ‘understanding’ is con-
strued broadly; it denotes the entire higher faculty of cognition. See n. 2. According to Kant, logic
is concerned with the laws that govern the correct use of the understanding. The term ‘under-
standing’ in this context is a synonym for the higher faculty of cognition. We can be certain of this
because Kant’s logic includes syllogistics. Wolffian faculty psychology regards reason as the
basis for syllogistic inferences and Kant accepts this view as well. See DfS, AA 02: 59.14–16. See
also KrV, A 299/B 355. Syllogisms are formed through the faculty of reason. Consequently, when
Kant refers to the ‘laws of the understanding’ he cannot mean the understanding in the narrow
sense. Otherwise, logic, which studies these laws, would exclude syllogistics. Logic is not only
concerned with the understanding in the narrow sense; it is also clearly interested in the proper
use of reason. Hence, it is concerned with the higher faculty of cognition in general. Conversely,
in Anthropologie Collins and Parow, Kant refers to the understanding in the narrow sense. He ac-
tually distinguishes between the common use of the understanding and the common use of rea-
son. Both of these faculties belong to the higher faculty of cognition. Thus, in his logic lectures,
Kant refers to the understanding in the broad sense, but in his anthropology this term is intended
narrowly. In Logik Philippi, the common understanding refers to how we use the entire higher
faculty of cognition, but in Anthropologie Collins and Parow, it only describes how we use one of
the sub-faculties that compose the higher faculty of cognition.
17 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 147.03f. See also V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 351.05.
 Healthy Understanding and Urtheilskraft 401

ploy this faculty in either a common or a scholarly way depending on whether

our judgments are concrete or abstract. The common understanding judges con-
cretely. The scholarly understanding, on the other hand, judges abstractly. This
raises the question: what is a concrete judgment and how does it differ from an
abstract one? Perhaps the simplest way to explain this distinction would be to
say that concrete judgments concern specific objects. Abstract judgments, on the
other hand, concern general concepts or principles. For example, the judgment,
‘Socrates is virtuous,’ is a concrete judgment. It concerns a specific person. The
judgment, ‘Honesty is a virtue,’ is an abstract judgment. It concerns a general
concept: the notion of honesty. The common understanding makes concrete
judgments about specific things; the scholarly understanding makes abstract
judgments about general concepts.
Kant illustrates the difference between these two kinds of judgments with an
example. He asks us to consider a scenario in which a legal question is posed to
both a jurist and an ordinary person with no special training in the law. Accord-
ing to him, both individuals are equally capable of coming to the right conclusion.
However, they will arrive at this conclusion in different ways, depending on how
they use their understanding.18 The ordinary person relies on healthy under-
standing. He approaches the question by considering it in relation to a specific
case or example and then judging what would be right in this situation. The ques-
tion that Kant poses is whether or not someone is obligated to pay for damage that
is caused by their property, even if they, themselves, are not actually at fault.
The ordinary person, who is a novice in legal matters, imagines that his ox has
damaged his neighbor’s property. He then judges what is owed to the victim in
this situation. Thus, the common understanding answers the question by con-
sidering a specific case. The jurist, on the other hand, employs the understanding
in a scholarly way. He knows the relevant legal principles and comes to a decision
based upon the law.
What is this example meant to show? Both sets of notes define the under-
standing as the capacity to judge. We use this faculty in a common or healthy way
by judging concretely. We employ it in a scholarly way by judging abstractly. In
the example, the person, who relies on healthy understanding, makes a concrete

18 “Eine Rechtsfrage kann einem Juristen und auch dem gesunden Versande vorgelegt werden.
Z.B. bin ich verbunden den Schaden zu reparieren, den mein Eigenthum dem Eigenthum eines
andern ohne mein Verschulden gemacht hat? Der gesunde Verstand braucht dabey ein wenig
Bedenckzeit, um sich einen Fall in concreto vorzustellen. e.g. Wenn das Eigenthum mein Ochs
wäre pp Er urtheilt gar nicht in abstracto, sondern in einem gegebenen Fall. Dies ist der gemeine
Verstand, und in so ferne er richtig ist, der gesunde.” (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 155.19–27) See also
V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 359.05–12.
402 Matthew McAndrew

judgment about a particular case. The jurist, on the other hand, uses his under-
standing in a scholarly way. He makes an abstract judgment about the law in gen-
eral.
According to both Collins and Parow, the understanding is the capacity
to judge. The common understanding is the capacity to judge concretely. The
scholarly understanding is the capacity to judge abstractly. Finally, the healthy
understanding is the correct use of the common understanding. It is the ability to
make correct concrete judgments. Anthropologie Parow states, “Das Vermögen in
Concreto zu urtheilen ist also der gemeine Verstand, insofern nun dieser richtig
ist, nennt man ihn gesunden Verstand.”19

III Healthy understanding and the application

of rules
Anthropologie Collins and Parow also state that the healthy understanding is the
capacity to apply rules. This is the same cognitive function that Kant later assigns
to the power of judgment. There is a remarkable similarity between the account
of the healthy understanding found in these lectures and what Kant will later say
about the power of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason. In order to show the
correspondence between these two accounts, I will first briefly explain how Kant
describes the power of judgment in the first Critique. I will then compare it with
the description of the healthy understanding in the anthropology lectures.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines the power of judgment as the
“faculty of subsuming under rules” [Vermögen unter Regeln zu subsumiren]. He
writes, “Wenn der Verstand überhaupt als das Vermögen der Regeln erklärt wird,
so ist Urtheilskraft das Vermögen unter Regeln zu subsumiren, d.i. zu unter-
scheiden, ob etwas unter einer gegebenen Regel (casus datae legis) stehe, oder
nicht.”20 As I explained earlier, the power of judgment is the capacity to apply
rules. If we subsume something under a rule this means that we have determined
that it is actually subject to this rule. We therefore apply the rule to the case
in question. The power of judgment is responsible for applying the rules of the
understanding by subsuming the appropriate representations under them. Kant
goes on to claim that the application of rules by the power of judgment cannot
itself be rule-governed. If it were, this would result in an infinite regress. Any

19 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 359.12–14.

20 KrV, A 132/B 171.
 Healthy Understanding and Urtheilskraft 403

rules that determined how the power of judgment should apply a rule would
themselves need their own rules to prescribe their application. Hence, there
are no rules that govern the correct use of the power of judgment. General Logic
prescribes rules for the correct or valid use of the understanding, but there are
no such principles that govern how these rules are to be applied by the power
of judgment. Kant concludes that “Urtheilskraft aber ein besonderes Talent sei,
welches gar nicht belehrt, sondern nur geübt sein will”21. It is possible to learn a
rule or concept, but not how to apply it correctly. The ability to correctly apply
rules, which Kant identifies with the power of judgment, can only be a talent.
Let us now compare the power of judgment to what is said in Anthropologie
Collins and Parow about the healthy understanding. Both sets of notes agree that
the healthy understanding is responsible for applying rules to particular cases. As
I explained earlier, according to Collins and Parow, we use the understanding in
either a common or scholarly way depending on whether our judgments are con-
crete or abstract. The scholarly understanding is the capacity for abstract judg-
ment. These notes also state that abstract judgments are rules. To judge abstractly
is equivalent to thinking of a rule or principle. For example, the proposition, ‘All
events are caused,’ is an abstract judgment. It is also a general rule. Thus, the
scholarly understanding is not only the capacity for abstract judgment, it is also
the capacity to form and conceive of rules. However, the scholarly understanding
cannot apply these rules. It can only make abstract judgments. In order to cor-
rectly apply rules to particular cases, one must also possess healthy understand-
ing. For example, Anthropologie Collins states,

Der subtile oder abstrahirende [Verstand] ist der, der eine allgemeine Regel erkennet, nach
welcher in besonderen Fällen soll gehandelt werden. Jedes Urtheil in abstracto ist bloß als
eine Regel anzusehen, nur durch den gesunden Verstand, können wir einen Fall unter einer
allgemeinen Regel subsumiren; kein geschickter, kein gelehrter Verstand, kann das thun,
wenn ihm der gesunde fehlt.22

The healthy understanding subsumes particular cases under universal rules. This
is the same cognitive function that Kant later assigns to the power of judgment in
the Critique of Pure Reason.
Like the power of judgment, the healthy understanding is a talent, one
that can be neither learned nor taught to others. It can only be acquired through
practice. Anthropologie Collins states, “Der gesunde Verstand ist also bloß das
Vermögen in concreto zu urtheilen. Dies Vermögen kann allein nicht entbehrt

21 KrV, A 133/B 172.

22 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 156.10–16. See also V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 359.19–29.
404 Matthew McAndrew

werden, es ist aber unmöglich daßelbe Jemand bey zu bringen.”23 We find the
same thing said in Parow: “Man kann keinen Menschen lehren einen Fall unter
einer Regel zu subsumiren”24. Thus, Kant’s early anthropology lectures describe
the healthy understanding in much the same way that Kant later explains the
power of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason. Both faculties are responsible
for the application of rules; they subsume particular cases under general rules.
They are also both talents that cannot be learned or taught to others. The healthy
understanding is the precursor to the power of judgment. It performs the same
cognitive function as the power of judgment in essentially the same way.
If one requires further evidence for this claim, consider that in the Critique
of Pure Reason, Kant claims that all three higher cognitive faculties – the under-
standing, the power of judgment, and reason – are involved in an inference of
reason or syllogism [Vernunftschluß]. The understanding, which Kant defines as
the faculty of rules, provides a rule that serves as the major premise. In the minor
premise, the power of judgment applies this rule to a particular case. Finally,
reason draws a conclusion about this particular case on the basis of the rule.25
Compare this to the account of such inferences found in Anthropologie Collins and
Parow. In both lectures, reason is given responsibility for a syllogism’s major
premise. The understanding applies this rule to a particular case in the minor
premise. Both faculties then join together to yield the conclusion. For example,
Parow states,

In jedem Schluß ist.

1.) Ein allgemeiner Satz, der durch die Vernunft eingesehen wird.
2.) Die Application eines Fall auf den allgemeinen Satz, und dies geschiehet durch den Ver-
stand.
3.) Die Conclusion, die sowohl durch den Verstand als durch die Vernunft geschiehet26

The anthropology lectures both assert that the understanding is responsible for
the minor premise of a syllogism. It applies the rule to a particular case by sub-
suming it under the rule. However, this act of subsumption is not simply per-
formed by the understanding; it is specifically an act of the healthy understand-
ing. Collins states, “Der gesunde verstand dient zur Application der Vernumft
(sic), Regeln ad casum datum.”27 Thus, the healthy understanding performs the
same subsuming role in a syllogism that Kant will later assign to the power of

23 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 156.22–24.

24 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 359.28f.
25 KrV, A 304/B 360f.
26 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 360.29–361.02. See also V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 158.15–17.
27 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 158.23–24. See also V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 361.07f.
 Healthy Understanding and Urtheilskraft 405

judgment. This further demonstrates that the healthy understanding is a precur-

sor to the power of judgment. When Kant introduces this faculty in the mid-1770s,
it takes over the task of applying rules, a function that he originally ascribed to
the healthy understanding.

*****

What I hope to have shown in this essay is that the power of judgment is an inno-
vation that Kant introduced sometime during the mid-1770s. There is no preced-
ent for this faculty in the philosophy of Wolff or Baumgarten, and it is not part
of Kant’s own early faculty psychology. It develops out of the notion of healthy
understanding. The healthy understanding is the correct use of the common
understanding. The common understanding judges concretely, and Kant initially
assigned it the function of applying rules to particular cases. It was responsible
for taking the otherwise abstract judgments of the scholarly understanding and
subsuming the appropriate representations under them. This is the same cogni-
tive function that is later performed by the power of judgment. The healthy under-
standing is the precursor to this faculty.