Acta Astronautica Vol. 20, pp. 73--77, 1989
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Printed in Great Britain
THE NASA TECHNOLOGY PUSH
TOWARDS ~ SPACE MISSION SYSTEMS
Stanley R. Sadin, Frederick P. Povinelli, Robert Rosen
NASA Headquarters, OAST
ABSTRACT
As a result of the new Space Policy, the NASA technology
program has been called upon to a provide a solid base of
national capabilities and talent to serve NASA's civil space
program, commewial, and other space sector ~ t s . This
paper describes the new technology program structure and
its characteristics, traces its origin and evolution, and
projects the likely near- and far- term strategic steps. It
addresses the alternative "push-pull" approaches to
technology development, the readiness levels to which the
technology needs to be developed for effective technology
transfer, and the focused technology programs currently
being implemented to satisfy the needs of future space
systems.
THE CHANGING ROLE FOR TECHNOLOGY
As directed by the newly issued U.S. National Space Policy
(Ref. 1), the NASA technology program is no longer
confined to an exclusively supporting role or to the
sometimes limited perspective of mission strategists, but
now, instead, shares the mantle of responaibility for shaping
the Agency's future by providing "technology that will make
future de~sions possible." NASA's technology program is
also called upon, in this policy statement, to build a solid
base of national capabilities and talent to serve comme~ial
and other space sector intemns. The principal attribute of
change will be shown to be the more comprehensive depth
of pursuit of the technology maturation process, namely
extending the research efforts through more thorough
development and demonstration phases. This program
transition did not attain its current statos effortlessly, nor is
the progressive evolution complete and productive capacity
fully demonstrated.
The dramatic change in the nature and structure of NASA's
space research and technology program signals the
emergence of a significant lransition in its Agency role; the
move is from an operating mode of being primarily
responsive to the "pull" from the requirements of major
flight programs to one that, instead, provides the "push" to
enable planned and candidate missions with greater
aspirations of systems capability, reliability and cost
effectiveness. This change, forecast in past IAF Congress
papers (Ref. 2, 3, and 4), is not only endorsed as an
integral part of U.S civil space policy, but is planned,
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budgeted, and under way in the form of the vital new
Agency initiatives, the Civil Space Technology Initiative
(CSTI) and Pathfinder.
PROGRAM PUSH AND TECHNOLOGY PULL
Technology advances for creating future system and mission
options is a unique characteristic of both the CSTI and
Pathfinder initiatives. The rather classic debate on the
relative value of technology push versus program pull
usually leads to the stalemate concession that a balanced
approach is the only sensible solution. But, for the most
part, space technology has, to date, been driven primarily by
identified program needs, or requirements; the payoff has
been undeniable and substantial, as demonstrated by the
successes of progrmns like Apollo and Viking. However, it
must also be recognized that when technology advances
sought as an integral part of program implemantation, the
cmt md risk cJm prove to be quite high. While a great many
U.S. programs have successfully borne the risk of pulling
technology forward, there are also less fortunate examples
where an inordinately high price has been paid for
embedding a technology development or demonstration
within a hard commitment to a major system development
schedule, The U.S. Space Shuttle program bears wimess to
this issue. Technology programs that push to enable future
mission capabilities are refe~rred to as "opportunity driven",
while mission pull technology programs are appropriately
designated as "need driven". Opportunity-oriented
technology programs need not be oblivious to identifiable
mission scenarios; neither should need-driven technology
efforts be cont'med to flight mission-proven options. The
planning, implementation and evaluation phases of CSTI and
Pathfinder will be conducted with a continual interaction
between the technologists and the system architects. The
evolving partnerships are expected to reap the valuable and
important rewards of new and dependable mission
capabilities.
FOCUSED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
The new NASA technology initiatives (Ref. 5, 6 ), det'med
as "focused", feature a crucially vital characteristic, the
inherent commitment to pursue the full course of technology
development required for mission readiness. This conu-asm
 74 STANLEYR. SAD[Net al.
dramatically with the "readiness chasm" that, in the past, has
inhibited the application of new technology to flight
programs These chasms were the result of marginally
funded technology programs that, too frequently, were not
carriedto an adequate level of readiness demonstration. The
bridges to cross these chasms were usually confined to the
previously described relatively high risk, high cost mission
user commitments.
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the earliest stages of NASA's pursuit of the civil space
program during the nineteen-sixties, the new space agency,
with never-yet-tried missions to accomplish and little to no
space technology inheritance to replicate,neceuarily relied
on technology advances pulled by commitments to new
flight programs. The mission series sets of earth orbiting
Explorers, planetary Pioneers and Mariners, and the largest
driver set of them all, the Apollo program systems,
generated a large, entirely new inventory of space
technology assets. These often followed the path of a fallm~
followed by successful redesign, but also evolved an R&T
process that could yield some remarkable tim-try ~ .
In the nineteen-seventies, these developed assets were
exploited by the mission mlmagers using program funds to
adapt and requalify the "shelf-stored" technology invmtory
to emerging user needs; this was done under the program
category known as Supporting Research and Technology
(SRT). Concurrently, the Advanced Research and
Technology (ART) program sought to pursue new concepts
that might also be carried into qualit'¢atinn procedurm by the
mission offices. However, budget limitations in the post-
Apollo period played havoc with the new technology
development process. The ART program could not pursue
feasibility to the level required by the users without
sacrificinga reasonable breadth of research interests. The
SRT programs suffered severe attrition in favor of pursuing
phased program studies for new flight initiatives as well as
serving the crucial needs of ongoing mission flight data
analysis and interpretation.
TECHNOLOGY FLIGHT READINESS
The differing perceptions of the researchers and the mission
planners between the intended and actual proof of readiness
was often the cause of an aborted handoff, or technology
transfer, of ART to the SRT users. On the other hand, there
were also many technology advances that enabled the
success of important missions. When historical records are
analyzed, it can be demonstrated that the difference between
success and failure is traceable to the adequacy, or depth, of
the ART program in pursuing technology readiness. After
all, there is little incentive for a flight project manager to
employ new, insufficiently demonstrated technologies whe~
proven, safe alternatives exist. The lure of high-risk
advances is not often offset by the price of expensive
mission failures. Applying this '3mowledge of hindsight" to
the planning of future programs underscores the vital nature
of conducting ART programs to a level of readiness
acceptable to the use~. A properly planned, thoroughly
executed technology research and development program can
provide substantive advm~.es at acceptable risk levels.
Stemming directly from the above-described learning
experience, a concept of explicitly defined readiness levels
has been formulated which provides the basis for developing
mutual nndemandings and technology handoff agreements
between research personnel, research management, and
mission flight program mangm's. These technology levels
ate as follows:
LEVEL 1 - BASIC PRINCIPLES OBSERVED AND
REI~RTED
LEVEL 2 - POTENTIALAPPr=,ICATIONVALIDA'iT~
LEVEL 3 - PROOF-OF-CONCEPT DEMONSTRATED,
ANALYTICALLY AND/OR
EXPERIMENTALLY
LEVEL 4 - COMPONENT AND/ORBREADBOARD
LABORATORY VALIDATED
LEVEL 5 - COMPONENT AND/OR BREADBOARD
V A ~ . m A T E D IN S I M U L A T E D O R REAL-
SPACE ENVIRONMENT
LEVEL 6 - SYSTEM ADEQUACY VALIDATED IN
SIMULATED ENVIRONMENT
LEVEL 7 - SYSTEM ADEQUACY VALIDATED IN
SPACE
These discretely defined readiness levels provide the
Agency, and the communities with which it interacts, with a
more precise means of describing the depth to which a
research and technology program is to be pursued. This
seven-level scale can be seen to embrace the more classically
recognizable, but less definitive, categories of basic
research, feasibility, davelopmant and demonstration. The
latter descriptions are, however, somewhat vNlue, and have
caused ambiguous understandings between the researchers,
their management, and the potential program users. MuRtal
comprehension of the planned depth of technology programs
can therefore no longer be left either unresolved or poorly
defined.
APPLICATION OF READINESS MEASURES
It is interesting to consider the use of these readiness levels
with respect to different classes of disciplines, and
noteworthy that acceptable readiness for flightapplication is
 NASA technology push towards future space mission systems
not fixed at any single, optimum level. ~ y , not all
R&T programs need to be pursued to full system
demone~'ation in space as a prerequisite to mission
application. Many spare eleclron/c circulwy systems, often
called black boxes, can be comfortably accepted for flight
spplication grouad t ~ in a simula~l enviromment (Level 5)
and occasionally Level 3 or even Level 2 ~ involves
no undue risk. Care must be exercised, however, that new
devices, materials, or processes are not introduced without
consideration of possible prior failure to achieve readiness
certification. By comparison with the relatively minimal
readiness demands of electronic circuitry, propulsion
systems or thermal transfer devices, for instance, will
generally require the minimum of Level 6 system adequacy
demonstration, with Level 7 flight test a more conservative
and desirable specification. This more demanding need is,
of course, what makes these relatively complex technologies
so time consuming and expensive to develop and to prove
flight.ready.
REBUILDING A TECHNOLOGY F O U N D A T I O N
With the recent hiatusin US space flight activity,much of
NASA has been dedicated to the restoration of Shuttle
operations, the shaping and initiationof Space Station
Freedom, and the detailed preparations necessary m resume
flight of scientific missions. But also, during this period,
others have been vigorously pursuing the commitment to,
and initiation of, a very aggressive plan to rebuild the
Agoncy's technological strength. The CSTI program,
last year, was shaped to provide an urgently needed
t~'.hnology capability for more effective access to, oper~ons
in, and science for low-earth orbit missions. Patht'mder, jusrr
initiated with very responsive Executive Office and
Congressional endorsements, proceeds from the CSTI low-
earth orbit focus to prepare for alternative science and
exploration mission options at the moon, Mars, and other
planets.
The NASA ART program is now structured with a Base
program that is generally directed at Levels 1 through 4,
while the focused programs vary in their emphasis from
Levels 3 through 7. The division can be seen as moderately
flexible with an obvious two level overlap, and, in fact,
some Level 5 component flight test activity in the Base and a
limited amount of Level 2 applied research activity in the
focused CSTI and Pathfinder programs. This system of
gradation is also quite valuable in the planning and costing of
NASA technology progrmns; the more explicit descriptors
providing an improved basis for det'ming work packages as
well as for establishing measurable accomplishment
milestones. Additionally, the discipline oriented Base
program engages in exploratory and mission-enabling
75
research, seeking concepm and opporumities for later, more
focused program development
CSTI A N D PATHFINDER F O C U S E D
DEIVlONSTRATIONS
Some illustrative examples are cited to show examples of the
application of readiness level concept to the ART Pmsram
structure. The CSTI program includes a major element, the
Aeroassist Flight Experiment project, intended to
demonstrate aerobraking techniques for application to orbital
transfer maneuvers, a Level 7 goal. This flight program will
demonstrate the readiness of a very high leverage technology
for new generation space transfer vehicles. The preparatory
work for this focused effort had been accomplished over
many years of investment in the Base program's disciplinary
research in aerothermodynamics, structures, guidance,
controls and materials. This is clearly a case where the
complex interactions of these disciplines with the chemistry
and physics of space and sensible atmospheric boundaries
cannot be simulated in the laboratory nor safely predicted by
analysis. The accumulation of flight data will eventually
permit combinations of modeling and simulation to obviate
the need for further, extensive and expensive flight test. For
instance, CSTI and Path~der engine development programs
require Level 5 or 6 readiness, where a reasonable base of
flight experience allows the application of modeling and
simulation techniques to provide the basis for negotiating
user accepumce.
The importance of demonstration to at least the system level
is based on the highly interactive effects of engine
components and other elements on each other. Once again,
years of research in propulsion, thermodynamics, diagnostic
sensory and control devices and materials disciplines under
the Base program have been translated into a highly focused
system program with the deliverable products of design
knowledge and techniques. Some of the Pathfinder progrmn
element goals are satisfied with component or subsystem
breadboard demonstrations of 1~.adineas Level 4. In some of
the automation, robotics and electronics efforts, for example,
this level proves to be an adequate damonstration. In the
case of electric propulsion and magneto-plasma-dynamics,
proof at the component level is considered as a sufficiently
serious challenge for feasibility demonstration, with higher
level investments therefore being deferred until that
milestone is achieved.
TOWARD A U.S. NATIONAL R&T BASE
With a constantly broadening mission scope, NASA's R&T
management must apply much of its limited budget and
76 STANLEY R. SADINet al.
personnel to the critical process of assuring the technology
readiness for new programs and initiatives. Discussed
earlier, NASA will have to provide for the continuing vitality
of its R&T Base in specialized areas where highly
recognized leadership already exists and/or where external
dependencies are undesirable. Because much of the nation's
capability resides at universities, there is a planned and
growing move towards nurturing their more extensive and
autonomous participation in NASA's ART program. This
direction is already evidenced by the three y e ~ old university
design program that funds thirty-five schools in future
m i n i o n concept study courses and the recent, new and
sizable grant awards to nine University Engineering
Research Centers. Further growth of these NASA programs
and others is planned; growth can be expected to couple
closely with R&T Base elements and with the more
fundamental research elements of the Pathfinder program.
Another major potential growth &ca for universities is in the
space flight technology experiment programs.
In addition to the basic and applied research efforts,
described previously, the Base program funds systems
studies and analyses to assess the technological demands
and opportunities in future space mission system concepts;
this activity provides comprehensive R&T planning and
priority insights. The Base can thus be seen to be a vital
program of generic and furtdamental activities that, over the
long-term, leads to focused approaches, understandings, and
capabilitiesto serve a range of future mission system needs.
It also serves as a seedbed for the development of internal
and external talent, computer and design tools, codes, and
techniques capable of addressing and solving agency
technology issues on demand. Such an activity, pursued as
a greatly expanded program, is that of space flight
experimentation. The program has been oriented to serve
both the internal NASA, and the external university and
industrial communities under the designations Inreach and
Outreach, respectively. The need and the interest in these
programs has reached such a high a level that planning is in
process to convert this activity into a new focu,~ed program.
IN-SPACE TECHNOLOGY EXPERIMENTS-
A NEW FOCUSED INITIATIVE
The current emergence of opportunities for longer-term
access to the space environment through space stations, and
platforms foretells a coming era of rapid growth in space
technology experiment activities. The opporumity to utilize
space assets as a veritable research and demonstration
laboratory facility wiU assuredly accelerate the progress of
technology development. It will no longer be necessary to
take the first risks in the space environment with new
technology such as flying it on vital missions. Starting in
the Shuttle program and expanding significantly on stations
and platforms, the presence of technology payloads will
become a more visible and sizable fraction of total payload
activity. Astronaut capability to serve as experiment
overseers will be substantially enhanced by the newly
emerging technologies of teleacience and teleoperations.
Space-based laboratories can be managed remotely from
Earth by principal investigators with little or no astronaut
assistance required. Once again, NASA is preparing for the
transition of an exploratory program nurtured in the R&T
Base, flight experiments, to become a major new focused
program next year (Ref. 7). This next step in NASA's
strategic technology plan will serve many urgent needs of
government, the aerospace industry, commerce and the
universities.
RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY
STRATEGIC VISION AND GOALS
The NASA Space Research and Technology progrmn is seen
as responding to the vision of demonstrating recognized
national leadership, enabling a broad range of future civil
space mission options, and providing a solid base of
capabilities and talent to serve all national space sectors. The
re-building and restructuring of the program to assure low
risk, readily transferable technology to mission use~ will
continue with both focused, in-depth demonstration
programs and an even more vigorous research base. The
establishment of cooperative technology handoff agreements
with mission users will play an important part in both
focused technology programs and in the success of future
NASA and other national cornmitments to bold new mission
initiatives. New focused initiatives can be expected to
emerge responding to developing topics of national and
international interest such as the planet Earth/global
habitability theme. There will also be increasing reliance
and interdependence on universities, industry, commercial
users and other agencies in sharing both the responsibility
for, and the benefits to be derived from, these activities.
Further expansion of the technology program's mission-
enabling potential will grow from the space-based laboratory
infrastructure including, in particular, Shuttle and Space
Station FTeedom. The ambitious intent of these successfuliy
planned and highly advocated new thrusts now stands as a
sustaining challenge to national resolve, to NASA, and to the
myriad contributors to its implementation and utilization.
 NASA technology push towards future space mission systems 77

REFERENCES

1. U.S. Space Policy, The White House, Jan 1988 5. CSTI Brochure, NASA TM-100949, 1988.

2. R. S. Colladay, S. R. Sadin, "Technologies For
Affordable Space Access", 1986
3. L. H. Harris, "reclmology... The Basis For The Past,
The Key To The Futm-e", 1987
6. Pathfind~ Brochure, NASA OAST, Dec. 1987.
7. J. H. Ambrus, L. A. Harris, J. Levine, R. W. Tyson,
"FutureDirectionsIn TechnologyDevelopment"
Increased Use Of Space As A Facility", Sept. 1988

4. S. R. Sadin, R. Romm, "Pathf'mderTechnologies For

Bold New Missions", 1988