 Art 36 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Santos vs. Court of Appeals, Santos

G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS
Leouel and Julia were married. They a lived with the latter’s parents at the J. Bedia
Compound. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the young spouses’
family affairs. Julia finally left for the United States of America to work as a nurse. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get
Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed a complaint for “Voiding of Marriage Under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
- Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE
Whether or not the failure of Julia to communicate with Leouel constitutes Psychological
Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING
NO.
The Family Code did not define the term “psychological incapacity.”
the use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriages. Thus correlated, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions
of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably,
Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Molina

G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS
Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Roridel alleged that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of
the family. the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and
that it would be to the couple’s best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her
friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a
social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center.
ISSUE
Whether or not Reynaldo’s behavior constituted psychological incapacity as enunciated
in Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING

the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical

antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken
of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could
not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.

MOLINA GUIDELINES
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,”
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: “The following are
incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.

The Court ruled that applying the guidelines, the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te

G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009.*
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS
The parties eloped and got married through Rowena’s uncle’s helped. The two then
continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he
was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena. After a month, Edward escaped from the house
of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena
and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. Unmoved by his persistence
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate
lives. They then parted ways.
After almost four years, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The clinical psychologist
who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated
ISSUE

RULING

 Art. 38
Vda. de Carungcong v. People
G.R. No. 181409. February 11, 2010
CORONA, J.:
FACTS
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of
petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a
Japanese national. the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint.
However, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution and directed
the Prosecutor to file the Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph
3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased
Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
In an order dated April 17, 2006, the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case, based on the following:
 Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso.
“No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of
theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1)
spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line.”
On petition, the Court of Appeals likewise dismissed it. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not death by one of the spouses spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity
RULING
NO. Article 332 limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from
criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party. It has been held that
included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is
a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage.
The Court applied the continuing affinity view wherein the relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even
after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced
children or not.
The continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to
benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article
332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under
the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Further, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of “relatives by affinity in the same
line” is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction
between the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased
child can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court held that the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of
the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created
the affinity. The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s
relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article
13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories
under Article 20 also of the same Code.

Santos vs. Santos

G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.*
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS
The Regional Trial Court declared petitioner Celerina presumptively dead after her
husband, respondent Ricardo, had filed a petition for declaration of absence or
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. Ricardo later remarried. Ricardo
claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition
since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed
Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement
before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the remedy a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by
extrinsic fraud was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
RULING
NO.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order,
or resolution has become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
(or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Here, Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment less than two years from the
decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the
decision. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in
case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period
allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.
The Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of
reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to
the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead. However, reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will
only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of
her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
For the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying
the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere
filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina’s choice to file an action
for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.