KAREN NUÑEZ VITO, LYNETTE NUÑEZ MASINDA, WARREN NUÑEZ,

AND ALDEN NUÑEZ vs. NORMA MOISES-PALMA

GR No. 244466, 27 March 2019

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

SOCORRO T. CLEMENTE, as substituted by SALVADOR T. CLEMENTE

vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Public Works and
Highways, Region IV-A)
GR No. 220008, 20 February 2019

FACTS:
Municipal Mayor Amado A. Clemente (Mayor Clemente), Dr. Vicente A.
Clemente, Judge Ramon A. Clemente, and Milagros A. Clemente were the
owners of a parcel of land, where they donated a 1-hectare portion of their
property via a Deed of Donation on March 16, 1963 in favor of the Republic
of the Philippines. The Deed of Donation was accepted by District Engineer II
Ciceron A. Guerrero of DPWH Region IV-A. Stated in the Deed of Donation,
was that the land would be used “solely for hospital site only, and for no
other else, where a Government Hospital shall be constructed, free from all
liens and encumbrances whatsoever”.
The construction for a hospital building commenced the following year,
the construction, however, has come to a halt for unknown reasons and only
the foundation remains today. Socorro and Rosario P. Clemente inquired
about the unfinished construction of the hospital to the District Engineer and
they were informed that “the DPWH no longer had a plan to construct a
hospital at the site and that the DPWH had no budget for the hospital
construction”. Socorro filed a complaint and an amended complaint for
Revocation of Donation, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession in 2004,
as heir and successor-in-interest of mayor Clemente. Socorro claimed that
“the Republic of the Philippines failed to comply with the conditions imposed
on the Deed of Donation, which was to use the property solely for hospital
site only and for no other else, where a Government Hospital shall be
constructed”.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, as the
Republic has agreed to comply with the condition of constructing a
government hospital and that the construction has commenced, although
development was halted and only the foundation remains. The RTC held that
“since the parties did not fix the period within which to comply with the
condition, but a period was indeed intended, the Court may fix the period for
the performance of the donee's obligation, under Article 1197 of the Civil
Code. However, since Socorro failed to pray for the fixing of the period, the
RTC dismissed the case”. Socorro then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied by the RTC on April 4, 2008.
Socorro appealed to the CA regarding the decision; it was, however,
denied on October 17, 2014 for the reason that Socorro cannot “assert the
concept of heirship to participate in the revocation of the property donated
by her successor-in-interest”. A Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed
but was however denied by the CA on August 14, 2015, thus leading to this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation of the 1-hectare property with a resolutory
condition is revocable before the fulfillment of the obligation

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Socorro, that the condition of the Deed of Donation
was a resolutory condition as it is demandable at once, but failure to fulfill
gives the donor the right to revoke the donation. In order for the donation to
remain valid, the Republic of the Philippines has to fulfill the condition of
using the land as a hospital site and constructing a Government Hospital,
where the donor has the right to revoke the donation if unfulfilled. The SC
found that the Republic of the Philippines has failed to fulfill the obligation of
constructing a government hospital and use the land as a hospital site,
stating:
“When the parties provided in the Deed of Donation that the donee
should construct a government hospital, their intention was to have such
hospital built and completed, and to have a functioning hospital on the
Subject Property. This can be evidenced by the accompanying words in the
Deed of Donation – "solely for hospital site only and for no other else, where
a government hospital shall be constructed." The condition imposed upon
the donee has two parts – first, to construct a government hospital, and
second, to use the Subject Property solely as a hospital site. The argument
of respondent that the mere construction of the foundation of a building
complies with the condition that a government hospital be constructed on
the Subject Property is specious. A foundation of a building is obviously not
a government hospital. The other condition in the Deed of Donation, which is
to use the Subject Property solely as a hospital site, is also not complied
with when the Subject Property is left idle, which means the Subject
Property is not being used as a hospital site. The foundation of a building
cannot function as a hospital site. Thus, even if we are to consider, for the
sake of argument, that the construction of the foundation of a hospital
building is enough to comply with the obligation to construct a government
hospital, the subsequent abandonment of the construction results in the
non-compliance with the second part of the donee's obligation – which is to
use the Subject Property solely as a hospital site.”

FELIPE AGONCILLO, and his wife, MARCELA MARIÑO vs. CRISANTO

JAVIER, administrator of the estate of the late Anastasio Alano.
FLORENCIO ALANO and JOSE ALANO
GR No. L-12611, 7 August 1918

FACTS:
Anastasio Alano, Jose Alano, and Florencio Alano entered an
agreement document with Da. Marcela Mariño on February 27, 1904,
promising to pay a debt of P2730.50 with an interest of P0.12 per annum.
The agreement also stated that the Alanos mortgaged their house and lot in
a town called Evangelista to Da. Marcela Mariño in case of insolvency, where
all their rights to the ownership and possession of the lot shall be transferred
to her. Anastasio Alano was only able to pay P200 in 1908 before passing
away in 1912 and no other payment due has been made.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint on March 17, 1916 against Cristano
Javier, as the administrator of the estate, Florencio Alano, and Jose Alano,
based upon the execution of the document. The defendants denied, claiming
that ***

ISSUE:
HELD:

LEONARDO BOGNOT vs. RRI LENDING CORPORATION, represented

by its General Manager, DARIO J. BERNARDEZ
GR No. 180144, 24 September 2014

FACTS:
The petitioner and his younger brother, Rolando A. Bognot applied and
acquired a loan of P500,000 payable on November 30, 1996 from RRI
Lending Corporation, a money lending business in Metro Manila, evidenced
by a promissory note and secured by a post dated check dated November
30, 1996. The petitioner renewed the loan several times on a monthly basis,
paying a renewal fee of P54,600 each time, issuing a post dated check as
security and renewing his promissory note. The respondent then cancelled
and returned the post dated checks issued by the petitioner prior to the
renewal.
The loan was again renewed on a monthly basis, the renewal fees paid
and a post dated check dated June 30, 1997 was issued as security. Days
before the loan’s maturity, Julieta Bognot, the wife of Rolando Bognot’s wife,
applied for another renewal of the loan, issuing another promissory note and
a check of P54,600 for the renewal fee. Julieta was allowed to bring home
the loan documents for the Bognot siblings to sign and replace. The
documents, however, were never returned and a post dated check was not
issued. The respondents also sent follow-up letters to demand payment of
the loan, with interest and penalty charges, but were ignored.
A complaint was filed in the RTC on November 27, 1997 against the
Bognot siblings by the respondent for the loan payment, plus interest and
penalty charges, claiming that since the documents were never returned and
a post dated check was not issued, no loan extension took place and the
original due date of June 30, 1997 applied.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents in January 17, 2000,
ordering the Bognot siblings to pay the loan of P500,000.00 plus 5% interest
monthly as well as 10% monthly penalty charges from the filing of the
complaint on December 3, 1997 until fully paid. As plaintiff was constrained
to engage the services of counsel in order to protect his right,defendants are
directed to pay the former jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 as
and by way of attorney’s fee.”
 The petitioners filed an appeal to the CA, where the CA ruled in favor
of the respondents on March 28, 2007, as they found that “petitioner’s
defense of payment untenable and unsupported by clear and convincing
evidence. It observed that the petitioner did not present any evidence
showing that the check dated June 30, 1997 had, in fact, been encashed by
the respondent and the proceeds applied to the loan, or any official receipt
evidencing the payment of the loan.” The petitioners moved for
reconsideration, but was denied, thus this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the loan.

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of the
solidarily liable with Rolando Bognot.
solidary obligation, wherein each of
obligation. Due to the admissibility of
evidence***
respondent, holding the petitioner
The obligation to pay the loan is a
the debtors is liable for the entire
the promissory note and absence of

SPOUSES ALEXANDER AND JULIE LAM, Doing Business Under the

Name and Style "COLORKWIK LABORATORIES" AND "COLORKWIK
PHOTO SUPPLY" vs. KODAK PHILIPPINES, LTD.
GR No. 167615, 11 January 2016

FACTS:
The petitioners entered an agreement (Letter Agreement) with Kodak
Philippines, Ltd. (Kodak) on January 8, 1992 for the purchase of 3 Kodak
Minilab System 22XL (Minilab Equipment) units for P1,796,000 each. The
agreement had the following terms:

This confirms our verbal agreement for Kodak Phils., Ltd. To

provide Colorkwik Laboratories, Inc. with three (3) units Kodak Minilab
System 22XL . . . for your proposed outlets in Rizal Avenue (Manila),
Tagum (Davao del Norte), and your existing Multicolor photo counter in
Cotabato City under the following terms and conditions:
 1. Said Minilab Equipment packages will avail a total of 19% multiple
order discount based on prevailing equipment price provided said
equipment packages will be purchased not later than June 30, 1992.

2. 19% Multiple Order Discount shall be applied in the form of

merchandise and delivered in advance immediately after signing of the
contract.

* Also includes start-up packages worth P61,000.00.

3. NO DOWNPAYMENT.

4. Minilab Equipment Package shall be payable in 48 monthly

installments at THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) inclusive
of 24% interest rate for the first 12 months; the balance shall be
re-amortized for the remaining 36 months and the prevailing interest
shall be applied.

5. Prevailing price of Kodak Minilab System 22XL as of January 8, 1992

is at ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY SIX THOUSAND PESOS.

6. Price is subject to change without prior notice.

*Secured with PDCs; 1st monthly amortization due 45 days after

installation

Kodak delivered 1 unit on January 15, 1992 in Tagum, Davao Province

and was installed by Noritsu representatives on March 9, 1992. A post dated
check was issued by the petitioners for P35,000 for each of the 12 months
as payment for the first unit. The first check was due on March 31, 1992 and
the petitioners asked Kodak not to negotiate on the first and second check
due to insufficiency of funds, but Kodak negotiated on them and were
honored by the depository bank. The remaining checks were dishonored as
the petitioners ordered the bank to stop payment. Kodak then cancelled the
sale and demanded the unit be returned but the petitioners ignored it, as
well as rescinding the contract through a letter in November 18, 1992 due to
Kodak’s failure to deliver the remaining Minilab Equipment units.
 Kodak filed a complaint against the petitioners on November 25, 1992
for replevin and/or recovery of sum of money. The petitioners were declared
default on July 30, 1993 for failure to “appear during the pre-trial conference
and submit their pre-trial brief despite being given extensions”. The court
decided in favor of Kodak and ordered the seizure of the Minilab Equipment
installed in Tagum, Davao Province and where the writ of seizure was
obtained in December 16, 1992 and enforced in December 21, 1992.
The petitioners filed a petition to the CA to “Set Aside the Orders
issued by the trial court dated July 30, 1993 and August 13, 1993” but was
remanded to the RTC for pre-trial. On February 26, 1999, the RTC found that
“The Lam Spouses were under obligation to pay for the amount of one unit,
and the failure to deliver the remaining units did not give them the right to
suspend payment for the unit already delivered. However, the trial court held
that since Kodak Philippines, Ltd. had elected to cancel the sale and retrieve
the delivered unit, it could no longer seek payment for any deterioration that
the unit may have suffered while under the custody of the Lam Spouses.”
The RTC then ordered Kodak to pay damages to the petitioners.
The petitioners filed for a partial appeal on March 31, 1999, claiming
that the RTC failed in ordering Kodak to pay actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
Kodak filed an appeal as well, but it got dismissed due to its failure to file its
appellant's brief, without prejudice to the continuation of the petitioners’
appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the contract between petitioners Spouses Alexander
and Julie Lam and respondent Kodak Philippines, Ltd. pertained to
obligations that are severable, divisible, and susceptible of partial
performance under Article 1225 of the New Civil Code.
2. Upon rescission of the contract, what the parties are entitled to under
Article 1190 and Article 1522 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:
1. The court found that the Letter Agreement which both parties entered
contained an indivisible obligation, where “the intention of the parties
is for there to be a single transaction covering all three (3) units of the
Minilab Equipment. Respondent’s obligation was to deliver all products
purchased under a "package," and, in turn, petitioners’ obligation was
 to pay for the total purchase price, payable in installments.”
Furthermore, acts in relation to the package deal proves the intention
of the agreement to be indivisible: one agreement covering all three
Minilab Equipment units and one purpose for the petitioners to obtain
the three Minilab Equipment units. Lastly, the Letter Agreement had no
indication that each of the three Minilab Equipment ordered by the
petitioner were covered by three different transactions.
2. The court agrees with the decision of the CA for restitution, as both
parties opted for it ***

WILLIAM C. LOUH, JR. and IRENE L. LOUH vs. BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
GR No. 225562, 08 March 2017

FACTS:
The Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) issued a credit card in
William’s name, with Irene as the extension card holder. Use of the credit
card entails 3.5% finance charge and 6% late payment charge. The
petitioners used the credit card and were able to pay in time, up until
October 14, 2009. Demand letters were sent to the petitioners 3 times, and
by September 14, 2010, they owed BPI a total of P533,836.27.
BPI filed a complaint in the RTC against the petitioners for Collection of
a Sum of Money on August 4, 2011. The petitioners failed to comply with the
prescribed period even after a 15-day extension granted by the court up to
March 4, 2012. The petitioners were declared default by July 24, 2012,
despite having filed an Answer on July 20, 2012. The RTC reached a decision
in favor of BPI. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied in the RTC, as well as the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining BPI’s complaint.

HELD:
The court affirmed the decision and resolution of the RTC and CA but
modified the principal amount and attorney’s fees awarded. ***
IGNACIO ARZAGA vs. EMILIO RUMBAOA, PLATON DAMO, ESTEBAN
ASENCION, ANTONIO ASENCION, DIONISIO BATANGAN, and
MARCIANO PASCUA
GR No. L-3839, 26 June 1952

FACTS:
Ignacio Arzaga, the plaintiff, was compelled by the CA to make
payment to the defendants within 30 days from the date of final entry of the
judgment in order to reconvey the land that was described in the pleadings.
Arzaga complied with the judgment, depositing the necessary amount on
December 10, 1949 to the Clerk of the Court of First Instance Ilocos Norte,
providing notice as well to each of the defendants by letter that the deposit
had been made.
The defendants filed an appeal, claiming that Arzaga did not comply
with the judgment of the court of appeals as the deposit was made with the
Clerk of the Court and not with the defendants, and that Arzaga failed to
deliver the amount to the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a deposit in court of the amount required to be paid to the
adverse party to secure a reconveyance is a sufficient compliance with the
judgment of the court requiring payment, or whether payment must be
made directly to the adverse party with the formalities of a consignation, in
accordance with articles 1176-1177 of the Spanish Civil Code.

HELD:
The court honored the deposit made to the Clerk of the Court, stating
the deposit made "had the charter and effect of actual payment in
accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals" and on the grounds of
“tender of payment of judgment is not the same as tender of payment of a
contractual debt and consignation of the money due from a debtor to a
creditor.” The court finds that “the order appealed from to be justified by the
evidence and the law, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.”

NAGA TELEPHONE CO., INC. (NATELCO) AND LUCIANO M. MAGGAY

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CAMARINES SUR II ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (CASURECO II)
GR No. 107112, 24 February 1994

FACTS:
Naga Telephone Co,. Inc. (NATELCO) is a telephone company in Naga
City while Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO II) is a
private corporation providing electricity power service in the said city. Both
parties entered into a contract on November 1, 1997 for:
“the use by petitioners in the operation of its telephone service
the electric light posts of private respondent in Naga City. In
consideration therefor, petitioners agreed to install, free of charge, ten
telephone connections for the use by private respondent.”
and included:
“That the term or period of this contract shall be as long as the
party of the first part has need for the electric light posts of the party
of the second part it being understood that this contract shall
terminate when for any reason whatsoever, the party of the second
part is forced to stop, abandoned its operation as a public service and
it becomes necessary to remove the electric lightpost”
The contract was observed for ten years, until CASURECO II filed a
complaint in January 2, 1989 claiming that, first, the rental price was unjust
and in violation of the guidelines of National Electrification Administration
(NEA) and demanded “the contract be reformed to abolish the inequities
thereon”. Second, that NATELCO has used 319 posts outside Naga City
starting the year 1981, therefore should be obliged to pay CASURECO II P10
per post per month from 1981 to the year of complaint, amounting to
P267,960. CASURECO II claimed that NATELCO has refused to pay the
amount despite demands. Third, CASURECO II complained about the “the
poor servicing by petitioners of the ten (10) telephone units which had
caused it great inconvenience and damages to the tune of not less than
P100,000.00”
On the first cause of action, the court found that
“while the contract appeared to be fair to both parties when it
was entered into by them during the first year of private respondent's
operation and when its Board of Directors did not yet have any
experience in that business, it had become disadvantageous and unfair
to private respondent because of subsequent events and conditions”
and ruled that
 “The contract should be reformed by ordering petitioners to pay
private respondent compensation for the use of their posts in Naga
City, while private respondent should also be ordered to pay the
monthly bills for the use of the telephones also in Naga City.”
For the second cause of action, the court ruled the use of CASURECO II’s
outside posts by NATELCO was not in the contract, ruling that the contract
be reformed to include the provision of use for the posts. Lastly, The court
found that the claim for the third cause of action is insufficient.
NATELCO appealed the decision to the CA where the decision of the
trial court was affirmed in the May 28, 1992 decision. A motion for
reconsideration was denied as well on September 10, 1992, hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

HELD:

ENGRACIO FRANCIA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HO

FERNANDEZ
GR No. L-67649

FACTS:
Engrancio Francia is the registered owner of a residential lot and a
two-story house in Barrio San Isidro. The Republic of the Philippines
expropriated a 125 square meter portion of the lot on October 15, 1977 for
P4,116. As the government found that Francia failed to pay estate taxes
from 1963 to 1977, his property was sold at a public auction on December 5,
1977 to satisfy his tax delinquency of P2,400.
Francia filed a complaint to annul the sale on March 20, 1979 but was
dismissed by the lower court on April 23, 1981. The decision was then
affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s obligation to pay P2,400 for estate tax
delinquency is extinguished by the government’s indebtedness to the former
of P4,116.
HELD:
 The court found that the principal contention of Francia has no merit,
“A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government
owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected”.
Additionally, the ruling against Francia was supported by the fact that the
amount of P4116 had been deposited to his account on September 30, 1977
but failed to do his obligation to pay his estate tax before the sale of his
property at the public auction.