Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

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Information & Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/im

Examining the role of E-government in controlling corruption: A

longitudinal study
Prakrit Silal a, *, Ashutosh Jha b, Debashis Saha c
a
Indian Institute of Management Jammu, Jammu, Jammu and Kashmir, India
b
S.P. Jain Institute of Management and Research Mumbai, Mumbai, India
c
Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Calcutta, India

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Associate Editor: Patrick Chau Acknowledging the global relevance of controlling corruption, our study contributes to the existing body of
literature by exploring the relationship between E-Government (EGOV) and Corruption Control at the EGOV
Keywords: subindices level. Toward this, we draw upon theoretical insights from Resource-Based View (RBV), Media Lit­
E-Government eracy Theory, Agency Theory, Information Quality, and Transaction Cost Theory to derive a set of testable
Corruption Control
hypotheses. Using a panel dataset comprising 102 countries, we employ a Linear Mixed Effects (LME) estimation
Linear Mixed Effects (LME)
method to thoroughly investigate and uncover the relative effectiveness of EGOV subindices in controlling
Human Capital (HC)
Telecommunications Infrastructure corruption. Accordingly, we draw implications for theory, praxis and future research.
Online Services (OS)

1. Introduction “E-Government – Corruption Control” (EGOV-COR) relationship stands

Extant literature unambiguously recognizes corruption as a signifi­
cant barrier hindering the socioeconomic development of a country.
Corruption obstructs the smooth functioning of government machinery
and equitable distribution of public goods and services, thereby result­
ing in inefficiencies such as irresponsible government spending and
diversion of public funds [1–3]. It also involves the misuse of power by
public officials and/or governing authority [4], which leads to the
manifestation of the principal-agent problem arising out of information
asymmetry, and nonalignment of incentives [5]. According to the World
Economic Forum [6,7], the global annual cost of corruption amounts to
about 5% of global GDP, which is approximately equal to USD 3.6 tril­
lion. The ambit of negative externalities caused by corruption extends
beyond the social, economic, and political domains to encompass sus­
tainability issues like aggravating environmental degradation [8]. In the
wake of its adverse impact of such high magnitude, wide focus, and
immense scale, controlling corruption at the national level becomes
imperative for governments worldwide.
E-Government (EGOV), which uses Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) to improve public service delivery, has been widely
touted as a useful anticorruption tool [9] in the extant literature
[10–13]. The ever-growing body of research [5,8,14–18] on the
testimony to this claim. However, the relevant literature is somewhat
limited in explaining the EGOV-COR relationship in its entirety due to its
partisan emphasis on cross-sectional analyses covering only a selected
set of countries [15,17]. Moreover, these studies primarily use datasets
that are either time-averaged over a few years or correspond to a
particular year under consideration [15,17]. Such restricted analyses
lead to several drawbacks. Firstly, both EGOV and corruption levels of a
country are dependent on temporal changes; the results obtained from the
analysis for a specific year under consideration often may not hold after
a couple of years down the line. Such snapshots portray only a period
piece in the relationship, which is not much useful for policymakers in
taking long-term decisions [19]. Secondly, the use of cross-sectional
datasets limits researchers’ ability to model lagged effects, which are
extremely crucial considering that policy interventions in the form of
EGOV usually take time to exhibit their intended effects. Thirdly, the
empirical frameworks analyzed in the existing studies are not suitable to
model the within-country factors exhaustively, leading to challenges such
as model misspecification and biases in parameter estimates [19].
Therefore, in our opinion, longitudinal studies, which may provide
meaningful insights into the validity of the continued effectiveness of
EGOV as an anticorruption tool by incorporating the temporal variations
in the associated factors, are very much needed in enriching the deeper

* Corresponding author at: Office 308, IIM Jammu, Jammu, Jammu and Kashmir, India 180016.
E-mail addresses: prakrit@iimj.ac.in (P. Silal), ashutosh.jha@spjimr.org (A. Jha), ds@iimcal.ac.in (D. Saha).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2022.103735
Received 23 July 2020; Received in revised form 24 November 2022; Accepted 28 November 2022
Available online 30 November 2022
0378-7206/© 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

understanding of the EGOV-COR connection. Belanger and Carter’s call

for conducting more longitudinal studies in the EGOV research arena
also bolsters our claim [20]. To fill this gap, we propose to use a panel
dataset of 102 countries (Appendix 1) over a period of about a decade
(2008–2019) to conduct a Linear Mixed Effects (LME) analysis with a
view to assessing the temporal behavior of the EGOV-COR relationship
over a span of nearly 12 years. LME is particularly applicable in our
study as it models lagged effects and accounts for both unobserved as
well as observed country heterogeneities [21] arising due to
within-country factors, such as social, cultural, political, and other
country-specific idiosyncrasies [22].
Interestingly, while performing the above analysis, we notice a
counterintuitive trend for several countries [23]. In some of these na­
tions, quite surprisingly, corruption rises despite the increase in the
EGOV development. In some other cases, even after maintaining a high
level of EGOV development over the years, they are experiencing an Fig. 1. Conceptual Framework with underlying theoretical perspectives.
uptrend in their corruption levels. For instance, Australia and Canada
have witnessed a rise in corruption during the period of our analysis. explain these theories and their relevance to the current research in finer
This phenomenon, however, cannot be considered universal because details in the upcoming sections. Further, we account for country het­
South Korea and Estonia, which exhibit similar EGOV development as erogeneities by using LME, which incorporates both fixed effects as well
that of Australia and Canada, have been able to reduce corruption over as random effects for each country. Fixed effects are adept at controlling
the considered period. Unfortunately, the existing empirical literature time-invariant stable characteristics of countries by focusing only on
provides no convincing explanation for this apparent anomaly. Our within-country variations, while random effects are helpful in capturing
apprehension is that, since these studies have investigated the between-country heterogeneities. We firmly believe that such in-depth
EGOV-COR relationship at the composite index level (viz. EGOV analyses, at the end of the day, will certainly help the policymakers in
Development Index (EGDI) level), they have missed out on the indi­ allocating EGOV resources more effectively along HCI, TII, and OSI di­
vidual impacts of each of the three dimensions (also known as sub­ mensions, thereby achieving better anticorruption outcomes in the long
indices) of EGDI, and hence could not explain if the overall impact is due term.
to equal contribution from all the three subindices or there are dissim­ The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a
ilarities in the nature of contributions by individual subindices. review of relevant literature followed by hypothesis formulation, and
Although some studies have employed one of three subindices of EGDI Section 3 elaborates on the research framework, data, and methodology.
(mostly Online Services Index (OSI) in isolation), they have missed out Section 4 describes the main results and findings, and Section 5 presents
on the individual impacts by the remaining two subindices of EGDI on the discussion, including implications, limitations, and future work.
Corruption Control. The three subindices of EGDI are (1) Human Capital Section 6, finally, concludes the paper.
Index (HCI) – which captures the country-level human capabilities, (2)
Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (TII) – which captures the
2. Literature review and hypothesis
status of telecom infrastructure in a country, and (3) OSI – which de­
termines the scope and quality of online services (OS) [24]. We have
Although extant research substantially demonstrates the anticor­
observed in our analysis that these subindices differ considerably in their
ruption effectiveness of EGOV, tackling corruption with the help of
anticorruption effectiveness, which may also explain the existence of
EGOV has not been a straightforward exercise at the national level. The
widely varying corruption levels in countries with almost identical
complexity arises due to the multitude of ways in which corruption
EGDI. For instance, while Uruguay and Kazakhstan had almost similar
manifests itself [15] vis-à-vis the way it is perceived across countries
EGDI (0.724 and 0.725, respectively) in 2016, their corruption levels
[25]. Despite the plethora of negative consequences of corruption, it is
differed significantly.1 Therefore, further investigation is needed to
quite surprising that resorting to corrupt practices is a fairly accepted
develop a more nuanced understanding of EGOV’s effectiveness on
behavior in a few countries [26]. Such practices enjoy social acceptance
Corruption Control at the level of its three subindices. To the best of our
in those societies, often being connoted by various metaphors including
knowledge, the EGOV-COR relationship is relatively unexplored down
‘pot-de-vin (a glass of wine) in France or gasosa (soft drink) in Angola,’
to this level. So, we plan to go inside EGDI to extend the depth of our
which dilute the gravity of the malpractice [27]. Accordingly, there
study with an objective to address this lacuna in extant research. Also,
exists wide heterogeneity in the way corruption is perceived across
extant studies have not investigated the variations in the impact of the
countries [28,29], and hence there ought to be differences in their ap­
subindices across different time-lags, except one study that has assessed
proaches toward mitigating corruption. Irrespective of these differences,
their impact for a one-year lag [5]. Our study further attempts to address
there is always a global consensus on the need to mitigate corruption.
this research gap in the existing body of EGOV-COR literature. Fig. 1
Hence, EGOV has gained wide acceptability in the international arena as
represents a conceptual framework for our study and the theoretical
one of the most effective anticorruption measures, as evidenced by its
perspectives used therein. As indicated in the figure, we have drawn
global implementation across countries [23]. Therefore, we first present
insights from Resource-Based View (RBV), Agency Theory, Theory of Media
an account of the existing scholarly works on the EGOV-COR discourse
Literacy, Information Quality stream of literature, and Transaction Cost
broadly at the cross-country level. Since our work does not delve into the
Theory to conceptualize the link between EGOV and Corruption Control.
analysis of approaches followed by individual countries, our method­
Specifically, we invoke these theories to explicate the roles of EGOV,
ology (Section 3) offsets for country-specific differences by incorpo­
HCI, TII, and OSI in the effective management and consumption of in­
rating appropriate modeling.
formation within the broader public service delivery system. We will

2.1. Survey of previous works

1
Their corruption perception indices (CPIs) differed widely at 71 and 29,
respectively; CPI is a common measure to capture the corruption level in a One of the significant enablers of corruption has been the presence of
country; we shall discuss CPI in details later on. information asymmetry among the three major stakeholders

2
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

(governments, public service agents, and citizens) involved in the public Table 1
service delivery process [5,30–32]. The more the information asym­ Summary of Literature Review.
metry, the higher the discretionary power enjoyed by that stakeholder Ref. Authors, Year Nature of Analysis Major Findings
with information superiority [33]. Such power inequality arises pri­ Work Techniques / and/or Limitations
marily due to the inability of other stakeholders with relatively less in­ Level of Analysis
/ Data used
formation to hold the superior stakeholder accountable for the latter’s
actions [33]. Addressing the Corruption Control issue from this angle, [4] Mistry, 2012 Conceptual Case Study E-Government
multiple studies have already argued for the efficacy of EGOV in / Empirical Method, controls Corruption
Country-level by reducing
reducing the government-agent-citizen information asymmetry [14,15], analysis, single discretionary
thereby reducing the discretionary powers of public agents [4] and case of India powers through IT-
increasing the ability of citizens to hold their government and/or used enabled
representative agents accountable [15]. These scholarly works on transparency and
information access.
lowering agent discretionary powers [4,5] can be broadly classified
[17] Kim, 2014 Empirical Multiple E-Government has a
under two categories (Table 1): (i) reducing the information asymmetry Regression significant positive
[4,17,32] and (ii) infusing greater transparency in the public service Analysis, Cross- effect on Corruption
delivery process [5,8,15,16,32]. country level, Control.
Notably, as illustrated in Table 1, most of the empirical studies that 154 countries Relationship tested
(2005 and 2007 only for cross-
quantitatively validate the effectiveness of EGOV as an anticorruption data) section data.
tool fall short of explaining the country heterogeneities mentioned in the [32] Srivastava Empirical SUR Panel Data E-Government
Introduction section mainly due to their methodological constraints. et al., 2016 Analysis, Cross- controls permeated
This limitation is especially evident in the studies that adopt a cross- country level, 63 corruption via its
countries (2004 effect on corruption
sectional analytical approach, as discussed earlier. The failure to
to 2007) in legal and media
tackle the same infuses biases in the estimated effects of EGOV on institutions. The
Corruption Control, thereby casting serious doubt on the validity of their study does not
findings. Naturally, accounting for such heterogeneities is imperative for account for country
obtaining consistent and unbiased estimates. Moreover, barring a few heterogeneity in
terms of initial
exceptions [5,6,30], there is an evident lack of studies to assess the
corruption levels or
EGOV-COR relationship’s stability over a long period of time. But this type corruption variation
of study seems extremely useful, where EGOV is found to affect Cor­ across time.
ruption Control significantly. Though Elbahnasawy (2014) considered [16] Shim and Eom, Empirical Cross-sectional E-Government was
2008 Analysis, Cross- significantly and
for the longitudinal stability of the EGOV-COR relationship using panel
country level, negatively
regression analysis with data till 2009 [5], his findings have not been 127 countries associated with
tested further with post-2009 data. In summary, there exists only a (2003 -E- Corruption.
handful of studies that account for both country heterogeneities as well as Government Relationship tested
longitudinal stability while exploring the EGOV-COR relationship data; 2004 only for cross-
Corruption sectional data.
internationally.
Perception Index
Another distinct observation from the existing stream of EGOV-COR Data)
literature is the presence of nonuniformity across countries and regions in [8] Krishnan et al., Empirical SEM Cross- E-Government has a
the nature and strength of the EGOV-COR relationship. For instance, 2013 sectional significant negative
analysis effect on Corruption
Andersen (2009) found that EGOV-COR relationships may be slightly
(averaged (mediator).
weaker in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries [14]. Nam dataset), Cross- Relationship tested
(2018) too corroborated the presence of nonuniformity in the country level, only for cross-
EGOV-COR relationship with his analysis involving data pertaining to 105 countries sectional data.
179 countries in 2016 [15]. On the other hand, Bac (2001) observed that (2004 to 2008
Data)
the effect of transparency (whether EGOV-induced or not) in lowering
[5] Elbahnasawy, Empirical Panel Data E-Government has a
corruption might cease to exist or reverse the trend after an upper level 2014 Analysis, Cross- significant negative
of transparency is breached, due to “connections” effect overpowering country level, effect on
the “detection” effect [34]. In the context of developing countries, 160 countries Corruption. Similar
(1995–2009 analysis has not
contrary to popular belief, Schuppan (2009) argued that how EGOV
Data) been done for post-
could lead to more corruption due to the potential abuse of ICT solutions 2009 data. Also, the
by bureaucratic elites for their vested interests [35]. Although these study does not
findings clearly point toward the presence of nonuniformity in the account for country
EGOV-COR relationship across countries, few studies have taken it into heterogeneities in
terms of individual
consideration while analyzing the impact of EGOV on Corruption Con­
corruption levels
trol. As mentioned earlier, most EGOV-COR studies conducted at the and corruption
composite index level [14] mask the individual effects of the subindices, variation across
viz. HCI, TII, and OSI, and hence fail to account for variations in their time.
individual effects on Corruption Control. While our study does not fully [15] Nam, 2018 Empirical Cross-sectional E-Government has a
Analysis, Cross- significant positive
investigate the underlying reasons for nonuniformity, we apprehend country level, effect on Corruption
that the possibility of the wide variation in the individual effects of HCI, 179 countries Control.
TII, and OSI on Corruption Control might be a cause for the observed (2016 Data) Relationship tested
nonuniformities in the EGOV-COR relationship [5]. It is worth only for cross-
sectional data.
mentioning here that Elbahnasawy (2014), using global data till 2009,
[14] Andersen, Empirical Panel Data E-Government has a
already demonstrated visible differences in the individual effects of the 2009 Analysis, Cross- significant positive
three subindices on Corruption Control – TII and OSI were found to be (continued on next page)
significant, while HCI did not have any significant effect on Corruption

3
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

Table 1 (continued ) with non-IS capabilities/competencies [44]. Bryson et al. (2007)

Ref. Authors, Year Nature of Analysis Major Findings adapted RBV to public sectors in the form of “a livelihood scheme” and
Work Techniques / and/or Limitations outlined a sequence of steps to effectively deploy distinctive compe­
Level of Analysis tencies to achieve specific goals [45]. Similarly, Pee and Kankanhalli
/ Data used (2016) employed RBV to better understand the interaction among
country level, effect on Corruption physical knowledge management resources, organizational resources,
149 countries Control while and human resources in the context of public-sector organizations [46].
(1996 and 2006 accounting for
Accordingly, RBV can help public sector managers in mapping out
Data) country
heterogeneities in specific competencies to public sector objectives and “potentialization”
initial corruption [47], thus being a suitable fit for studying the role of EGOV and its
levels and subindices toward controlling corruption, a perennial public sector
corruption aspiration. Given the growing complexities in the public sector envi­
variations across
time. Similar
ronment, RBV assumes great relevance in conceptualizing the use of
analysis has not distinct IS/non-IS competencies in formulating effective information
been done for data management, dissemination, and consumption strategies to ensure
post-2006. streamlined public service delivery [47,48]. Additionally, in comparison
[34] Bac, 2001 Conceptual Game Theory- Transparency may
to the macro-level conceptualization of EGOV endorsed by institutional
based Model deter corruption
building. through detection theory [32], neoliberalism, or modernization frameworks [15], RBV can
effect as well as help unwrap the EGOV “black box” and link specific lower-level com­
enable corruption petencies to public sector goals. Toward this, we draw upon RBV to
through connection conceptualize EGOV as a distinctive competency to exploit collaborative
building effect. The
final overall effect
opportunities between government and citizens to “ward off threats”
depends on which [45] such as corruption. However, a limitation of RBV is its major focus
effect dominates the on input or feeding resources espousing an input-focused approach.
other. Therefore, RBV does not readily align with the dominant output-focus
[35] Schuppan, Empirical Case Study E-Government
prerogatives of public management, where the substantial interest lies
2009 Method, implementation
Country group- requires taking into in understanding the results, outcomes, and impacts of policy in­
level analysis careful terventions [49]. Specific explanations for how the inputs translate to
(Sub-Saharan consideration of the impacts, therefore, lie outside the RBV discourse [50]. To overcome this
Africa), three necessary limitation, we draw from Agency Theory, Theory of Media Literacy,
countries contextual factors.
Quality of Information Access, and Transaction Cost Theory to relate
analyzed.
specific EGOV competencies to Corruption Control, a core objective of
contemporary public management. HCI, TII, and OSI represent specific
Control [5]. However, as already argued, we have revisited the EGOV lower-level competencies achieved through the deployment of a
EGOV-COR relationships using the latest available dataset as the impact combination of critical resources that define the EGOV landscape of a
of EGOV subindices on Corruption Control has not been investigated for country. We first hypothesize the relationship between EGOV and Cor­
post-2009 data, to the best of our knowledge. ruption Control over time. Subsequently, we establish a link between
To better isolate the effects of the EGOV subindices on Corruption HCI, TII, and OSI on the one hand and their effect on Corruption Control
Control, we have included random intercepts and random slopes in our on the other hand.
model to control for cross-country differences. The random intercepts
and random slopes can effectively accommodate temporally and 2.2.1. Relating E-Government and corruption control
spatially correlated errors [36], leading to more accurate estimates than EGOV has already occupied a core position in the modernization
rival models [37]. The commonly cited weakness of the mixed effects agenda of countries, as national governments seek to leverage the
model (which lies in the normal distribution assumption of the random transformation potential of EGOV in re-engineering their administrative
effects) does not affect our analysis as prior simulation studies have processes and subsequently enhancing the reach of public services to
established its robustness to deviations from normality [38]. Given prior citizens [15,32]. The overall EGOV development in a country attempts
scholarly support [36–39], we consider the use of random intercepts and to empower citizens by improving human capital (HC), making ICT
random slopes in our model as a reasonably adequate approach for accessible to citizens, and increasing the direct connection between
uncovering the dissimilarities in the individual impacts of EGOV sub­ government and citizens through online or electronic modes of public
indices on Corruption Control. service delivery [5]. When such a direct connection between citizens
and government is well established, the discretion earlier available to
2.2. Hypotheses formulation intermediate public agents diminishes naturally because of disinterme­
diation. We draw from Agency Theory to delineate the relationship
As shown in Fig. 1, we draw upon the theoretical underpinnings of between EGOV and Corruption Control. Agency Theory, which is
the RBV to conceptualize the link between the EGOV subindices and conceptually rooted in the contracts literature, primarily concerns
Corruption Control. According to the RBV concept [40,41], which is agency problems arising out of the conflict of interests between the
widely used in strategic management literature to understand a firm’s outrightly honest principal and their agents, who are assumed to have
competitive advantage, the capabilities enabled by the strategic their own vested interests [51]. The situation is often aggravated due to
deployment of resources rather than the mere possession of resources the inability of the principal to monitor their agents owing to their prior
give firms their competitive edge. Although RBV is dominantly used in commitment to competing priorities or their general lack of competency
firm analysis, the concept can be readily applied in the public sector and and/or time [5,51]. The inability to monitor may confer discretionary
Information Systems (IS) context, as demonstrated in past studies [42, powers on the public agents, who already enjoy information superiority
43]. Toward this, Wade and Hulland (2004) argue that RBV can due to their dominant role in linking government and citizens, thereby
significantly contribute to IS research by: (i) helping evaluate the stra­ creating an environment conducive to rampant corruption [4,33].
tegic value of IS through direct linking of IS capabilities/competencies to EGOV, through disintermediation, facilitates a direct
strategic goals and (ii) providing a common framework for comparing IS government-citizen connection, thereby helping lower the

4
P. Silal et al.
government-agent-citizen information asymmetries and subsequently
reducing the agent discretionary powers [5,32]. Accordingly, the EGOV
development of a country provides the government with core capabil­
ities that enable them to have greater control and monitoring capacity
over their agents [32]. EGOV may also provide unhindered public access
to information, which enhances the transparency of government func­
tioning and substantially empowers citizens to hold the government and
their agents accountable for their actions [5]. EGOV, thus, discourages
corruption enablers and positively contributes to Corruption Control by
enabling direct government-citizen connection and facilitating greater
control over agents. We, therefore, hypothesize that EGOV has a positive
association with Corruption Control over time, as stated below.
H1: Increase in a country’s E-Government development levels is positively
associated with an increase in its Corruption Control over time.
2.2.2. Relating human capital and corruption control
Human Capital (HC), as conceptualized in the RBV stream of liter­
ature, refers to the expertise and knowledge of employees in a firm [42].
These capabilities of employees represent a source of strategic advan­
tage for a firm as another firm cannot easily imitate them. At the country
level, HC is captured by the literacy levels and skill sets of citizens [52].
Increasing mass education and literacy improves cognitive capacities,
such as conceptualization ability [53] of citizens that help them analyze
information better and improve its effectiveness in reducing information
asymmetry and enhancing transparency. Accordingly, we draw from the
Theory of Media Literacy to explicate the link between HC and Cor­
ruption Control. The Theory of Media Literacy, which is conceptually
rooted in the communications literature, concerns the ability of the
citizen to “access, analyze, and communicate messages in a variety of
forms” [54]. Media Literacy assumes high contemporary relevance
given the crucial need for citizens to make sense of the continuous influx
of information enabled by EGOV [55]. Accordingly, improved cognitive
capacities, due to HC improvements, equip citizens with the requisite
Media Literacy to effectively process information present across media
channels [56] while also enabling them to understand the underlying
ideologies of media messages [57]. As the effectiveness of the infor­
mation provided is only as good as the person using it, with improved
HC levels of a country, citizens could make better sense of publicly
available information and hold governments accountable for their ac­
tions [56]. Drawing from our earlier arguments, the push from citizens
for greater government accountability could better help in curbing
corruption. Accordingly, we hypothesize that as follows:
H2: Increase in a country’s Human Capital is positively associated with
an increase in its Corruption Control over time.
2.2.3. Relating telecommunications infrastructure and corruption control
Telecommunications Infrastructure (TI) of a country plays an inte­
gral role in the EGOV development of the country [5]. Borrowing from
RBV, TI represents the capability of countries to deploy ICT infrastruc­
ture to ensure the widespread availability and seamless use of ICT devices
and allied services, including mobile, broadband, and the Internet [42].
TI, therefore, empowers citizens to enjoy unhindered and timely access
to public information and seeks to reduce the information asymmetry
existing among government, public agents, and citizens [58]. On this
note, the extent to which TI can reduce the information asymmetry is
contingent on the quality of information it is able to disseminate. Prior
literature defines information quality as the output quality of informa­
tion systems, assessed in terms of their business relevance and useful­
ness, ease of understanding, and ability to satisfy user requirements
[59]. Toward this, the Information Quality literature recognizes accuracy
(concurrence with reality), consistency (absence of conflict between
datasets), completeness (presence of all relevant data), and currency
(up-to-date) as the four dimensions of information quality [59].
Accordingly, the extant literature highlights the positive association of
information quality with reduced information asymmetry [60,61] and
enhanced transparency [62]. As the TI level in a country increase, we
5
Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735
argue that citizens’ access to quality information increases substantially,
which results in lower information asymmetries, enhanced trans­
parency, and subsequent reduction in corruption levels. We accordingly
hypothesize that as follows:
H3: Increase in a country’s Telecommunications Infrastructure is posi­
tively associated with an increase in its Corruption Control over time.
2.2.4. Relating online services and corruption control
Online Services (OS) capture the digitalization of the public service
delivery infrastructure of a country and hence represent an ICT-enabled
capability [15,42]. OS, therefore, seeks to streamline the public service
delivery process, which presently entails high transaction costs for cit­
izens while availing these services. Toward this, we draw from Trans­
action Cost Theory to argue that OS reduces the cost of availing public
services by lowering uncertainty and reducing asset specificity [63]. Un­
certainty, in this context, refers to the unreliability in quality, timeline,
and experience of service fulfillment [64]. Online mechanisms help
citizens track the service delivery process end-to-end, thereby ensuring
transparency and reducing uncertainty [62]. Accordingly, a higher level
of OS infrastructure in a country can enable a transparent, disin­
termediated, and accountable public service delivery system, which
clamps down on any resource leakages and wipes out opportunities for
extorting bribes and other favors [15,32]. Asset specificity, in our context,
refers to the degree to which a public service agent (aka service pro­
vider) is responsible for fulfilling the public service needs of citizens (aka
service consumers) [63]. The higher the agent’s degree of involvement,
the higher the asset specificity. Greater asset specificity implies a greater
dependence of citizens on the whims and fancies of the agent, which
may enhance their discretionary power resulting in a higher prevalence
of petty bribes and corrupt practices. On this note, government process
re-engineering, enabled by the digitalization drive, restructures and au­
tomates the public service delivery process (i.e., less human agent
intervention), which, in turn, may reduce the asset-specificity of services
and minimize the scope for corrupt practices among agents, bureau­
cratic elites, and politicians alike [32,63]. Accordingly, we employ the
Transaction Cost Theory to argue that as countries attain higher levels of
OS, they achieve higher effectiveness in controlling corruption through
reduction of service uncertainty and asset specificity. Therefore, we
hypothesize as follows:
H4: Increase in a country’s Online Services is positively associated with
an increase in its Corruption Control over time.
3. Research methodology
Our research model, derived from Fig. 1, outlines the hypothesized
relationships as shown in Fig. 2. Our independent variables comprise
EGOV, HC, TI, and OS, while Corruption Control represents our outcome
variable. Further, we have used a set of five control variables (to be
explained later) to account for other known determinants of Corruption
Control. While we also checked for the possible moderating effects of
these control variables (shown in Appendix 2), we opted for the most
parsimonious model without any moderating variables (Random In­
tercepts and Slope model presented later in Table 13) having a condi­
tional R-squared value equal to 0.9848. In the following subsections, we
first elaborate on data and measures, and then we discuss the research
method employed.
3.1. Data and measures
We use archival secondary data sourced from reputed institutions to
operationalize our set of constructs.
3.1.1. Outcome variable
The outcome variable Corruption Control is operationalized using
the measure “Corruption Perceptions Index” (CPI), published annually
by Transparency International [65]. CPI is a well-known Corruption
P. Silal et al.
Fig. 2. Research Model.
Control measure and has been widely used across various disciplines
[5]. CPI captures citizens’ perceptions of the prevalence of corruption in
national institutions spanning judiciary, legislature, police, and other
law-enforcing agencies, military, public service, and media, among
others. In doing so, it provides a near proxy measure for capturing both
bureaucratic and political (or grand) corruption. CPI values, obtained
through expert assessments and opinion surveys, range from 0 to 100,
with higher values corresponding to lower corruption, i.e., higher Cor­
ruption Control in our context. In other words, the level of Corruption
Control is directly calibrated to the CPI values.
3.1.2. Independent variables
The independent variables are operationalized using data from the
United Nations E-Government Survey [24]. EGOV is operationalized
using the composite index E-Government Development Index (EGDI).
HC is operationalized using the Human Capital Index (HCI), which is a
country-level measure comprising: (i) adult literacy percentage, (ii)
gross enrolment ratio, (iii) expected years of schooling, and (iv) mean
years of schooling [23]. HCI ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value
corresponding to higher HC. TI is operationalized using the Telecom­
munications Infrastructure Index (TII), which is assessed using five in­
dicators: (i) individuals using the Internet (% population), (ii) mobile
cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), (iii) fixed telephone sub­
scriptions (per 100 people), (iv) wireless broadband subscriptions (per
100 people), and (v) fixed (wired) broadband subscriptions (per 100
people) [5]. TII too ranges from 0 to 1, where a higher value represents
better TI in the country. Finally, OS is operationalized using the OSI,
which assesses the deployment of ICT tools by governments for
rendering public services [15]. The United Nations employs a rigorous
process to ensure the reliability and validity of OSI measure [24]. The
index is based on the evaluation of national websites, including national
service portals, e-service portals, and e-participation portals. It involves
a primary research team who are adequately trained in all the UN offi­
cial languages to ensure consistency in their assessments and also to
evaluate the websites with the mindset of a common person. The pri­
mary research team, with the help of translators, calculates the scores
using a uniform predefined guideline which encompass: (i) identifying
and locating the relevant national and ministerial websites, based on the
information supplied by respective member states and/or through
search engines and (ii) closely evaluating each of these websites based
on the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines of the World Wide Web
Consortium. The second quality assurance team follows who, besides
ensuring objectivity and accuracy of the derived measures, carries out
final adjustments in the OSI scores [66]. OSI values range from 0 to 1,
with a higher value representing better OS facilities in a country.
3.1.3. Control variables
Regarding control variables, unfortunately, there is no universally
agreed upon set as the determinant of corruption [67]. So, following the
6
Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735
footsteps of most researchers, we too make use of five parameters,
namely Government Effectiveness (GE), Rule of Law (RL), Economic
Prosperity (EP), Anti-Press Freedom (APF), and Trade Openness (TO) as
control variables. They are widely theorized in the existing literature as
predictors of corruption [5,30,33,68–72]. GE is collected from the World
Governance Indicators [73] of the World Bank. In this, each country is
scored as per the Kaufmann Index scale [74], which ranges from − 2.5 to
+2.5, where “− 2.5′′ signifies the lowest level of GE while “+2.5′′ sig­
nifies the highest level of GE. GE captures the quality of policymaking
and public service delivery and the “credibility of government’s
commitment to such policies” [17]. Higher levels of GE can contribute
toward an effective, efficient, and transparent government [75], thereby
discouraging any corrupt practices [76]. In line with prior studies [17,
75,76], the higher the GE, the lower the corruption. RL, which concerns
law and order, is also collected from the same World Governance In­
dicators [73]. This variable “reflects perceptions of the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and particularly
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” [73]. The RL score is
also based on the Kauffman Index scale, where “− 2.5′′ signifies weak law
and order, while “+2.5′′ signifies good law and order. Good law and
order, i.e., a high RL score, is expected to lower corruption, as demon­
strated in many past studies [69,72]. EP is captured in the form of GDP
per capita obtained from the World Development Indicators of the
World Bank [77]. EP can be considered as a proxy for national average
living standards, where a higher national average prosperity is expected
to result in reduced competition for public resources resulting in lower
corruption [68]. EP has been shown to be a prominent determinant of
corruption in the extant literature [33,71]. APF captures the extent to
which the national media institutions are free from political influence
[78]. Greater media transparency or press freedom is expected to foster
greater openness and transparency [70,72]. However, it may or may not
lead to higher CPI because it is possible that citizens could be over­
whelmed by too many reports on corrupt practices and hence may
develop a negative perception regarding corruption in the country. The
data on press freedom published annually by Freedom House [78] is
used to measure APF, which scores countries on a scale of 0 to 100,
where “0′′ represents the highest level of press freedom while “100′′
represents the lowest level of press freedom. TO captures the extent to
which a country practices an open trade policy [72]. Higher levels of TO
are expected to lower corruption as the country’s economy would then
be subject to market forces, and more transparent market-based pricing
would limit opportunities for price manipulation. TO has been oper­
ationalized by two measures, namely Imports of Goods and Services, and
Exports of Goods and Services [67], both of which are obtained from the
World Bank World Development Indicators [77]. TO is calculated as the
following: TO = Imports of Goods and Services (as% of GDP) + Exports
of Goods and Services (as% of GDP).
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

3.2. Data analysis Table 3

Pairwise Correlation Matrix.
As noted above, the values of several operationalized variables are EGDI (1-year HCI (1-year TII (1-year OSI (1-year CPI
not within the range of 0 to 1, which might lead to an imbalance in our lag) lag) lag) lag)
analysis. To preempt that possibility and ensure comparability across EGDI (1- 1
the variables, we have first preprocessed the data wherever necessary year lag)
and rescaled the variables in the range between 0 and 1. The descriptive HCI (1-year 0.74*** 1
statistics and the correlation matrix are depicted in Table 2 and Table 3, lag)
TII (1-year 0.93*** 0.59*** 1
respectively. As observed in Table 3, the correlation values are along lag)
expected lines, with positive correlations between CPI and EGDI, as well OSI (1-year 0.89*** 0.44*** 0.77*** 1
as between CPI and the individual EGDI subindices, namely HCI, TII, lag)
and OSI. The correlation values among HCI, TII, and OSI are below the CPI 0.78*** 0.56*** 0.82*** 0.61*** 1
threshold of 0.8. Therefore, multicollinearity concerns are expected to ‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.
be minimum. As an additional precaution, we calculated the Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) scores for all our regression specifications. The VIF covariates). Our most comprehensive specification, the Random In­
values were well below the acceptable threshold of 10 [79], with 5.31 tercepts and Slope Model (with covariates), includes country-specific
being the highest calculated VIF score across all specifications. Based on intercepts and country-specific slopes, which help in controlling for all
the correlation and VIF scores, multicollinearity concerns appeared to be time-invariant structural country-level characteristics that may affect
minimal for our regression specifications. We use a balanced panel corruption [14]. The same could also be achieved by an alternative
dataset because it provides several advantages over a cross-section specification involving lagged dependent variables [86]. However, the
dataset, including the following: (i) controlling for endogeneity con­ extant literature highlights concerns when including lagged dependent
cerns due to omitted predictor variables, if any, and (ii) exploring dy­ variables in the mixed effects model, as this may induce endogeneity due
namic relationships over time, which otherwise is not possible using to violation of independence assumption between lagged dependent
cross-sectional data [80]. variables and random intercepts [14,86]. To summarize, the Random
Furthermore, to better account for within-subject (within-country in Intercepts and Slope Model can effectively accommodate temporally and
our case) correlations among the yearly data, we employ the LME spatially correlated errors [36], leading to more accurate estimates than
technique over the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. OLS assumes rival models [37]. Ignoring random slopes or random intercepts, espe­
independence among the annual data, which may result in biased esti­ cially in cross-country contexts, can lead to inconsistent estimates and
mates [81]. Mathematically, LME models are very similar to the family misleading inferences [39]. Therefore, given compelling evidence from
of models that include Hierarchical linear models and Growth Curve prior scholarship [36–39], the approach used in this study can be
Models [82,83]. It is superior to alternate models used for fitting considered adequate.
repeated measure data, such as ANOVA, because it can model for We begin by assessing the growth of Corruption Control over time,
country-specific intercepts and slopes while also allowing the inclusion while allowing countries to enter at different initial Corruption Control
of time-varying predictor variables [84]. LME combines the best of both levels. Specifically, this specification helps us capture the heterogeneity
fixed effects and random effects, where the fixed effects part is similar to among countries (between-country) in terms of their initial Corruption
the traditional regression analysis and helps in determining the effects of Control levels.
the covariates on the outcome variable(s) [19]. While fitting the fixed
effects, appropriate dummies or proxies are included in the model for 3.2.1. Unconditional random intercepts model without covariates
each individual unit (assuming n countries where n>1, n proxies are The Random Intercepts Model allows the inclusion of separate in­
needed), which results in the loss of (n-1) degrees of freedom. The tercepts for each country. This is very much in sync with reality, where
random effects component helps structure the error terms after the fixed each country starts at different levels of Corruption Control (outcome
effects portion has been fitted while allowing separate intercepts for variable). Separate intercepts not only address country-specific idio­
each country and also separate country-specific slopes for each of the syncrasies [19] but also take care of nonindependence owing to multiple
covariates [19]. To appropriately account for the loss of freedom during responses from the same country [87]. In this model, we focus our
the fixed effects fitting and subsequently obtain unbiased random effects analysis on corruption and its decay/growth over time while not
estimates, we compute our models using the Restricted Maximum including the predictor and control variables. Accordingly, the model
Likelihood (REML) estimation technique [82]. Throughout our analysis, consists of the following components (Eq. (1)): (i) fixed intercept for all
we maintain the variance-covariance structure of the random effects to countries, (ii) fixed slope for the independent variable, time (t), (iii)
remain the most general (or unstructured) to ensure that our linear random intercept for each country, and (iv) error term for country i and
mixed models are “maximal” [19,85]. Specifically, we have used four year t.
variations of LME models for testing our hypothesized relationships.
These four models are as follows: (i) Unconditional Random Intercepts Corruption Controlit | time, U1i = β1 + β2 timet + U1i + εit
Model (without covariates), (ii) Random Intercepts Model (with cova­
riates), (iii) Unconditional Random Intercepts and Slope Model (without where
covariates), and (iv) Random Intercepts and Slope Model (with

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Variable and Main Explanatory Variables.
EGDI HCI TII OSI CPI
Year Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Year Mean SD

2008 0.542 0.174 0.843 0.151 0.294 0.237 0.490 0.192 2009 0.471 0.221
2010 0.519 0.166 0.855 0.142 0.310 0.220 0.395 0.196 2011 0.468 0.223
2012 0.589 0.186 0.782 0.166 0.414 0.245 0.572 0.202 2013 0.487 0.198
2014 0.580 0.197 0.728 0.167 0.468 0.244 0.543 0.234 2015 0.500 0.201
2016 0.604 0.186 0.719 0.167 0.468 0.220 0.624 0.220 2017 0.493 0.193
2018 0.658 0.175 0.737 0.158 0.512 0.211 0.726 0.203 2019 0.494 0.191

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P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

( ) ( )
U1i ∼ N 0, τ 2
and εit ∼ N 0, σ 2
(1) and GE.

As mentioned earlier, the coefficients were estimated using the Corruption Controlit |EGOV, time, U1i = β1 + β2 EGOVi(t− 1) + β3 timet + U1i
REML method, which appropriately accounts for the loss of degrees of + εit
freedom, while fitting the fixed effects to provide unbiased estimates of
the random effects. The REML estimates were calculated under a normal
where
distribution assumption for random intercepts and random slopes. This
( ) ( )
assumption is driven “more by mathematical convenience than by U1i ∼ N 0, τ2 and εit ∼ N 0, σ 2 (2)
empirical reality” [88]. To check the robustness of our findings to other
alternate distribution specifications, we relied on prior guidance [19,88] Corruption Controlit |HC, TI, OS, time, U1i
and repeated the analysis for all our models using the full maximum
= β1 + β2 HCi(t− + β3 TIi(t− + β4 OSi(t− + β5 timet + U1i + εit
likelihood estimation (MLE), which relaxes this normal distribution
1) 1) 1)

assumption. We obtained identical results using the alternative MLE where

technique, which assures us confidence in our results. The estimated ( ) ( )
coefficients are given in Table 4, which tells us that, on average, a U1i ∼ N 0, τ2 and εit ∼ N 0, σ 2 (3)
country’s Corruption Control level increases by 0.0057 units per annum.
Countries enter the observation period at different levels of Corruption Corruption Controlit |HC, TI, OS, APF, RL, EP, TO, GE, time, U1i
Control, with the variation being significant, as evidenced in the = β1 + β2 HCi(t− 1) + β3 TIi(t− 1) + β4 OSi(t− 1) + β5 APFi(t− 1) + β6 RLi(t− 1)
observed 95% confidence interval of (0.426, 0.505). On average, most +β7 EPi(t− 1) + β8 TOi(t− 1) + β9 GEi(t− 1) + β10 timet + U1i + εit
countries begin the observation period at a Corruption Control level of
0.465 ± 0.02, and they increase their Corruption Control levels annually where
( ) ( )
by 0.0057 units. U1i ∼ N 0, τ2 and εit ∼ N 0, σ 2 (4)
Our next model specification extends the previous model to include
the theorized predictor variables and control variables while retaining Based on the REML estimates, we find that the slope of Corruption
the country-specific intercepts. Using this specification, we first seek to Control reduces on adding the time-varying covariates for all three
assess the impact of EGOV on Corruption Control, taking into consid­ equations. As per Eq. (2), most countries enter the analyzed time period
eration the country heterogeneity due to varying initial Corruption at the Corruption Control level of 0.392±0.024. Similarly, on average,
Control levels. Subsequently, we extend this specification to explore the corresponding entry-level Corruption Control observed for Eqs. (3)
more deeply the impact of EGOV at the subindices level, as discussed in and (4) is 0.443±0.035 and 0.435±0.027, respectively. According to
the Introduction. Eq. (2), the Corruption Control level increases at a rate of 0.147 units per
single unit increase in the EGOV level. Also, Eqs. (3) and (4) provide
3.2.2. Random intercepts model with covariates evidence of the positive effect of TI on Corruption Control, with the
To build our second model, we add time-varying covariates with a Corruption Control level improving by 0.197 units and 0.122 units,
one-year lag to the Unconditional Random Intercepts Model given in Eq. respectively, for every unit increase in TI. Surprisingly, HC is found to
(1). Given the time delay observed for public sector innovations to show have a negative effect on Corruption Control, with the Corruption Control
their effects, we have used a one-year lag in our models. It is recom­ level deteriorating by 0.032 units and 0.07 units with every unit increase
mended in literature to start with the smallest possible time-lag (one- in HC for Eq. (3) (not significant at 95% significance level) and Eq. (4),
year lag in our case) instead of directly jumping to arbitrary higher time- respectively. The effect of OS on Corruption Control is not found to be
lags to avoid missing the “maximum effect moment” [89]. This approach significant. Additionally, the effects of control variables RL (0.081), EP
is also pragmatic given the absence of prior scholarly guidance (0.144), and GE (0.070) on Corruption Control are found to be signifi­
regarding the optimal number of time-lags to be considered in the cant. The results are summarized in Tables 5, 6, and 7.
EGOV-COR relationship [90,91]. A similar approach was also used in Our subsequent model specification is an enhancement of the Un­
prior literature [5,19]. It may be noted that we have also found one-year conditional Random Intercepts Model, which attempts to examine the
lag as a reasonable lag-length in our post-hoc analysis based on the growth of Corruption Control over time while allowing for its slope to
log-likelihood and AIC values. Eq. (2) analyses the effect of EGOV on vary across countries (in addition to varying intercepts). Through this
Corruption Control using this updated Random Intercepts Model. Sub­ specification, we seek to explore the country heterogeneities in some
sequently, we analyze the effect of HC, TI, and OS on Corruption Control more depth.
as captured in Eq. (3). Finally, using Eq. (4), we analyze the effect of HC,
TI, and OS on Corruption Control while accounting for APF, RL, EP, TO, 3.2.3. Unconditional random intercepts and slope model without covariates
We now include in our model (Eq. (5)) the temporal variations in the
Corruption Control trajectory across countries by incorporating random
Table 4 slopes for individual countries. Adding country-specific slopes helps
Summary of Unconditional Random Intercepts Model. account for the between-country variations in their overall environment
Eq. (1) No. of obs.: 612 Group Variable: No. of groups: that influences their ability or capacity to control corruption over time
Country 102 [19]. We do not include any time-varying covariates in this model in
Log-restricted likelihood: 928.7989 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): order to limit the analysis to investigating the Corruption Control
− 1868.033
growth over time while allowing individual countries to enter the
Coef. Std. t-stat Sig. 95% Confidence
Err. Interval observation period at different Corruption Control levels. Corruption
Control growth rates also vary across countries.
Time 0.0057 0.0008 7.229 *** 0.0042 0.0073
intercept 0.4654 0.0203 22.976 *** 0.4255 0.5053 Corruption Controlit |time,U1i , U2i = β1 + β2 timet + U1i + U2i timet + εit
Random-effect Estimate 95%
Parameters Confidence
Interval
where
nation: identity ( ) (( ) ( ))
U1i 0 τ τ12 ( )
Sd (intercept) 0.2022 0.176 0.232 ∼ MVN , 11 and εit ∼ N 0, σ 2 (5)
Sd (residual) 0.0334 0.031 0.036
U2i 0 τ21 τ22

‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1. On running this model using REML, we again obtain the same

8
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

Table 5
Random Intercepts Model with covariates for EGOV-CPI.
Eq. (2) No. of obs.: 612 Group Variable: Country No. of groups: 102
Log-likelihood: 936.1174 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): − 1885.977
Coef. Std. Err. t-stat Sig. 95% Confidence Interval

EGOV 0.1473 0.0312 4.717 *** 0.0828 0.2142

Time 0.0022 0.0011 2.051 * − 0.000005 0.0044
intercept 0.3919 0.0240 16.337 *** 0.3438 0.4407
Random-effect Parameters Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
nation: identity
Sd (intercept) 0.1815 0.157 0.210
Sd (residual) 0.0335 0.031 0.036

‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.

Table 6
Random Intercepts Model for HC/TI/OS-CPI.
Eq. (3) No. of obs.: 612 Group Variable: Country No. of groups: 102
Log-restricted likelihood: 956.5217 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): − 1935.454
Coef. Std. Err. t-stat Sig. 95% Confidence Interval

HC − 0.0324 0.0330 − 0.982 − 0.1007 0.0378

TI 0.1966 0.0233 8.421 *** 0.1471 0.2480
OS 0.0042 0.0135 0.314 − 0.0221 0.0307
Time − 0.0045 0.0016 − 2.857 ** − 0.0076 − 0.0014
intercept 0.4431 0.0348 12.742 *** 0.3695 0.5166
Random-effect Parameters Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
nation: identity
Sd (intercept) 0.1675 0.143 0.196
Sd (residual) 0.0323 0.030 0.034

‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.

Table 7
Random Intercepts Model for HC/TI/OS-CPI with control variables.
Eq. (4) No. of obs.: 612 Group Variable: Country No. of groups: 102
Log-likelihood: 1080.725 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): − 2212.476
Coef. Std. Err. t-stat Sig. 95% Confidence Interval

HC − 0.0696 0.0266 − 2.62 ** − 0.1216 − 0.0182

TI 0.1215 0.0214 5.679 *** 0.0789 0.1629
OS − 0.0168 0.0128 − 1.312 − 0.0417 0.0082
APF − 0.0257 0.0180 − 1.427 − 0.0607 0.0094
RL 0.0808 0.0108 7.519 *** 0.0598 0.1026
EP 0.1445 0.0343 4.21 *** 0.0780 0.2109
TO 0.0101 0.0077 1.306 − 0.0055 0.0253
GE 0.0702 0.0110 6.361 *** 0.0488 0.0918
Time − 0.0030 0.0015 − 1.964 ⸸ − 0.0060 − 0.00001
intercept 0.4352 0.0266 16.355 *** 0.3836 0.4877
Random-effect Parameters Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
nation: identity
Sd (intercept) 0.0490 0.041 0.056
Sd (residual) 0.0312 0.029 0.033

‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.

average slope of 0.0057 as obtained in the Unconditional Random In­
tercepts Model. Most countries enter the observation time period at the
Corruption Control level of 0.465±0.023. Further, the negative corre­
lation (− 0.67) observed between intercepts and time suggests that
countries with higher Corruption Control levels have a slower temporal
growth rate, while countries that start at a lower Corruption Control
level move up faster as they have more opportunity and scope for
growth. The relevant results are summarized in Table 8.
Our final model specification augments the Unconditional Random
Intercepts and Slope model by including the theorized predictor vari­
ables while retaining the country-specific intercepts and country-
specific slopes. Through this model, we examine the EGOV-COR rela­
tionship at the composite and subindices level after allowing countries
to vary in their initial Corruption Control levels and its growth over
time.
3.2.4. Random intercepts and slope model with time-varying covariates
We now build on Eq. (5) and include our explanatory variables and
control variables to obtain Eqs. (6), (7), and (8). Specifically, Eq. (6)
explores the effect of EGOV on Corruption Control. Subsequently, Eq. (7)
seeks to unwrap the EGOV “black box” as we assess the effect of the
individual EGOV subindices on Corruption Control. Finally, Eq. (8) as­
sesses the influence of HC, TI, and OS on Corruption Control, while
controlling for APF, RL, EP, TO, and GE. These augmented sets of models
are presented below. First, we present Eq. (6), subsequently followed by
Eqs. (7) and (8).
Corruption Controlit |EGOV, time, U1i , U2i
= β1 + β2 EGOVi(t− 1) + β3 timet + U1i + U2i timet + εit
where

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P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

Table 8 Table 9
Summary of Unconditional Random Intercepts and Slope Model. Random Intercepts and Slope Model with covariates for EGOV-CPI.
Eq. (5) No. of obs.: 612 Group Variable: No. of groups: Eq. (6) No. of obs.: 612 Group Variable: No. of groups:
Country 102 Country 102
Log-likelihood: 1026.312 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): Log-restricted likelihood: 1027.243 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC):
− 2058.249 − 2063.702
Coef. Std. t-stat Sig. 95% Confidence Coef. Std. t-stat Sig. 95% Confidence
Err. Interval Err. Interval

Time 0.0057 0.0014 4.179 *** 0.0030 0.0084 EGOV 0.0755 0.0263 2.87 ** 0.0214 0.1319
intercept 0.4654 0.0228 20.398 *** 0.4205 0.5103 Time 0.0039 0.0015 2.641 ** 0.0009 0.0069
Random- Estimate 95% Confidence intercept 0.4277 0.0254 16.824 *** 0.3771 0.4788
effect Interval Random- Estimate 95% Confidence
Parameters effect Interval
nation: Parameters
unstructured nation:
Sd (time) 0.0126 0.011 0.015 unstructured
Sd (intercept) 0.2294 0.200 0.264 Sd (time) 0.01235 0.010 0.015
Corr (time, − 0.67 − 0.777 − 0.532 Sd (intercept) 0.21876 0.190 0.253
intercept) Corr (time, − 0.69 − 0.789 − 0.550
Sd (residual) 0.0238 0.022 0.025 intercept)
Sd (residual) 0.02401 0.022 0.026
‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.
‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.
( ) (( ) ( ))
U1i 0 τ11 τ12 ( )
∼ MVN , and εit ∼ N 0, σ 2
(6) analyzed above. Our analysis reveals interesting observations, as
U2i 0 τ21 τ22
captured in Table 12 and Fig. 3. TI is still found to have a consistent
Subsequently, Eq. (7) investigates the effects of HC, TI, and OS on significant and positive effect on Corruption Control, with the effect size
Corruption Control. peaking at a one-year lag. Meanwhile, HC takes a two-year lag to have a
Corruption Controlit |HC, TI, OS, time, U1i , U2i significant positive effect on Corruption Control. In particular, HC’s effect
on Corruption Control peaked at the two-year lag point, after which its
= β1 + β2 HCi(t− 1) + β3 TIi(t− 1) + β4 OSi(t− 1) + β5 timet + U1i + U2i timet + εit effect, while remaining positive, lost significance at the four-year lag
point. Further, OS more or less fails to have any significant effect on
where Corruption Control except at the two-year lag point, where the effect
( ) (( ) ( )) was negative. Also, given the observed significance in the effects of some
U1i 0 τ11 τ12 ( )
∼ MVN , and εit ∼ N 0, σ 2 (7) of the control variables (namely, RL, EP, and GE) on Corruption Control,
U2i 0 τ21 τ22
we ran some additional models to assess the possible moderating in­
Finally, Eq. (8) considers the control variables, namely APF, RL, EP, fluence of the control variables (Appendix 2). As depicted in Appendix 2,
TO, and GE. we found a significant moderating influence of RL, EP, and GE in the
EGOV-COR relationship at the subindices level, which provides oppor­
Corruption Controlit |HC, TI, OS, APF, RL, EP, TO, GE, time, U1i , U2i
tunities for future works.
= β1 + β2 HCi(t− 1) + β3 TIi(t− 1) + β4 OSi(t− 1) + β5 APFi(t− 1) + β6 RLi(t− 1)
+β7 EPi(t− 1) + β8 TOi(t− 1) + β9 GEi(t− 1) + β10 timet + U1i + U2i timet + εit
4. Results
where
( ) (( ) ( )) The gist of the results is shown in Table 13. Foremost, the negative
( )
U1i
∼ MVN
0
,
τ11 τ12
and εit ∼ N 0, σ 2
(8) correlation between intercepts and time slopes indicates that the rate of
U2i 0 τ21 τ22 increase in Corruption Control is low for countries that may have
We note that, on including the time-varying covariates, the average already attained their near saturation Corruption Control levels. On the
slope for Corruption Control flattens (i.e., the value reduces) in all the contrary, countries at lower Corruption Control levels can improve upon
three models pertaining to Eqs. (6), 7, and 8. In this case, on average, their status at a quicker rate till they reach close to their saturation levels
countries enter the observation period at Corruption Control levels of when the rate tapers off. In this case, including nonlinearity did not seem
0.428±0.025, 0.479±0.033, and 0.453±0.027 for Eqs. (6), 7, and 8, compelling to us due to the following reason. The residual versus fitted
respectively. Further, from Eq. (6), the rate of increase in the Corruption plot (Appendix 3) of the Random Intercepts and Slope Model (Table 13)
Control level is 0.076 units for every unit increase in the EGOV level. TI did not show any specific patterns, and the error terms were found to be
is consistently found to have a significant positive effect on Corruption randomly distributed, potentially ruling out the presence of nonlinearity
Control with an effect size of 0.125 and 0.096 for Eqs. (7) and 8, in the covariates [92]. In addition to the visual assessment, we also
respectively. HC was again found to have a negative effect on Corruption conducted a ‘sign test’ on the conditional residual values obtained and
Control with effect size obtained as − 0.053 (not significant at 95% found the residuals randomly distributed, indicating linearity [93].
significance level) and − 0.084 for Eqs. (7) and 8, respectively. OS was Further, we have tested for the influence of near saturation Corruption
not found to have any significant effect on Corruption Control. The Control by including an additional model configuration (Saturation
relevant results are summarized in Tables 9, 10, and 11. Dummy Model) in Table 13. The Saturation Dummy Model includes a
saturation dummy variable (similar to [94]), which takes the value of 1
for a country-year if the country’s growth in Corruption Control is less
3.3. POST-HOC analysis than 5% in that year as well as for all subsequent years hence. Accord­
ingly, the saturation dummy variable captures whether a country has
To better understand HC’s negative effect on Corruption Control and attained near saturation Corruption Control level in the previous year.
the insignificance of OS on Corruption Control, we have further However, the effect of the saturation dummy was not found to be sig­
analyzed the Random Intercepts and Slope Model of Eq. (8) with nificant. As shown in Table 13, the inclusion of time-varying covariates
increased time-lags. In particular, we have run the model for time-lags of has improved the model fit significantly, which is also visible from the
two, three, and four years, in addition to the one-year lag already improvements in parameter estimates, Akaike Information Criterion

10
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

Table 10
Random Intercepts and Slope Model for HC/TI/OS-CPI.
Eq. (7) No. of obs.: 612 Group Variable: Country No. of groups: 102
Log-likelihood: 1038.395 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): − 2095.158
Coef. Std. Err. t-stat Sig. 95% Confidence Interval

HC − 0.0529 0.0277 − 1.909 ⸸ − 0.1118 0.0083

TI 0.1252 0.0213 5.877 *** 0.0806 0.1717
OS 0.0033 0.0108 0.303 − 0.0178 0.0245
Time − 0.0017 0.0018 − 0.985 − 0.0052 0.0018
intercept 0.4793 0.0330 14.516 *** 0.409 0.5491
Random-effect Parameters Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
nation: unstructured
Sd (time) 0.01176 0.010 0.014
Sd (intercept) 0.20628 0.177 0.239
Corr (time, intercept) − 0.63 − 0.751 − 0.476
Sd (residual) 0.02334 0.022 0.025

‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.

Table 11
Random Intercepts and Slope Model for HC/TI/OS-CPI with control variables.
Eq. (8) No. of obs.: 612 Group Variable: Country No. of groups: 102
Log-likelihood: 1146.1 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): − 2339.304
Coef. Std. Err. t-stat Sig. 95% Confidence Interval

HC − 0.0840 0.0253 − 3.316 *** − 0.1334 − 0.0349

TI 0.0961 0.0200 4.794 *** 0.0566 0.1351
OS − 0.0101 0.0109 − 0.931 − 0.0315 0.0111
APF − 0.0231 0.0164 − 1.413 − 0.0557 0.0086
RL 0.0867 0.0102 8.523 *** 0.0666 0.1080
EP 0.1797 0.0336 5.343 *** 0.1095 0.2486
TO 0.0033 0.0077 0.423 − 0.0122 0.0186
GE 0.0589 0.0105 5.621 *** 0.0385 0.0796
Time − 0.0027 0.0018 − 1.534 − 0.0062 0.0008
Intercept 0.4532 0.0272 16.668 *** 0.4004 0.5073
Random-effect Parameters Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
nation: unstructured
Sd (time) 0.0110 0.009 0.013
Sd (intercept) 0.0731 0.062 0.085
Corr (time, intercept) − 0.77 − 0.856 − 0.657
Sd (residual) 0.0237 0.022 0.025

‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.

Table 12
Lag Analysis for Random Intercepts and Slope Model for HC/TI/OS-CPI.
Eq. (8) 1-year lag 2-year lag 3-year lag 4-year lag
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.

HC − 0.0840 *** 0.104 *** 0.064 * 0.048 ⸸

TI 0.0961 *** 0.067 ** 0.081 *** 0.051 *
OS − 0.0101 − 0.024 ⸸ − 0.021 − 0.020
APF − 0.0231 − 0.102 *** − 0.061 * − 0.087 **
RL 0.0867 *** 0.071 *** 0.083 *** 0.081 ***
EP 0.1797 *** 0.180 *** 0.156 *** 0.163 ***
TO 0.0033 0.001 0.002 0.001
GE 0.0589 *** 0.041 *** 0.042 *** 0.046 ***
Time − 0.0027 0.005 * 0.003 − 0.002
intercept 0.4532 *** 0.354 *** 0.365 *** 0.419 ***
Sd (time) 0.0110 0.013 0.013 0.014
Sd (intercept) 0.0731 0.081 0.079 0.069
Corr (time, intercept) − 0.77 − 0.76 − 0.8 − 0.68
Sd (residual) 0.0237 0.024 0.025 0.019
Log-likelihood 1146.1 916.29 903.01 761.43
AIC − 2339.3 − 1876 − 1850 − 1566
No. of obs. 612 510 510 408
No. of groups 102 102 102 102

‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.

(AIC), and log-likelihood value. Based on these parameter values, we can
conclude that the Random Intercepts and Slope Models have a better fit
over the Random Intercepts Models. Also, the Random Intercepts and
Slope Models seem to be more efficient, as they have smaller residuals
and narrower confidence intervals. Therefore, we use the Random
Intercepts and Slope Models along with the results from the post-hoc
analysis to test our hypothesized relationships.
The hypothesis test results (Table 14) are mostly in line with our
arguments. EGOV exhibits a significant positive effect on Corruption
Control over time, even after allowing for heterogeneity among

11
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

Fig. 3. Lag Analysis for HC/TI/OS-CPI Coefficient.

Table 13
Model Comparison for HC/TI/OS-CPI.
Model Comparison Unconditional Random Random Unconditional Random Intercepts and Random Intercepts and Saturation Dummy
Intercepts Intercepts Slope Slope Model
Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.

HC − 0.070 ** − 0.084 *** − 0.096 ***

TI 0.122 *** 0.096 *** 0.093 ***
OS − 0.017 − 0.010 − 0.006
APF − 0.026 − 0.023 − 0.045 *
RL 0.081 *** 0.087 *** 0.093 ***
EP 0.145 *** 0.180 *** 0.151 ***
TO 0.010 0.003 0.005
GE 0.070 *** 0.059 *** 0.059 ***
Saturation Dummy − 0.005
Time 0.006 *** − 0.003 ⸸ 0.006 *** − 0.002 − 0.003
Intercept 0.465 *** 0.435 *** 0.465 *** 0.453 *** 0.477 ***
Sd (time) 0.013 0.011 0.012
Sd (intercept) 0.202 0.049 0.229 0.073 0.080
Corr (time, intercept) − 0.67 − 0.77 − 0.83
Sd (residual) 0.033 0.031 0.024 0.024 0.023
Log-likelihood 928.8 1080.7 1026 1146.1 938.9
AIC − 1868 − 2213 − 2058 − 2339 − 1931
No. of obs. 612 612 612 612 510
No. of groups 102 102 102 102 102

‘***’p<0.001; ‘**’p<0.01; ‘*’p<0.05; ‘⸸’p<0.1.

countries in terms of their intercepts and slopes. Therefore, these find­

Table 14
ings lend support to our hypothesis H1. Although this is quite in
Summary of Hypothesis Testing.
agreement with past studies exploring the EGOV-COR relationship [5,8,
Sl. Hypotheses Statements Status 15,32], it is worth noting here that we have considered the overall EGOV
No.
Development of a country while conceptualizing EGOV hence capturing
H1 Increase in a country’s E-Government development levels is Supported# a more holistic picture of the EGOV-COR relationship vis-à-vis studies
positively associated with an increase in its Corruption Control
that have limited their EGOV definition to only the OS component as
over time.
H2 Increase in a country’s Human Capital is positively associated Supported* done in [8,15]. Let us now look at the individual impact of the three
with an increase in its Corruption Control over time. subindices of EGOV Development on Corruption Control. As depicted in
H3 Increase in a country’s Telecommunications Infrastructure is Supported# Fig. 3, HC has a significant positive impact on Corruption Control only
positively associated with an increase in its Corruption Control after a two-year lag. Therefore, the observations in the post-hoc analysis
over time.
provide support to our hypothesis H2, albeit there being a two-year
H4 Increase in a country’s Online Services is positively associated Not
with an increase in its Corruption Control over time. Supported delay. Meanwhile, TI has a significant positive effect on Corruption
#
Control for all the lag values analyzed, providing strong support to our
significant at one-year lag;.
* hypothesis H3. Finally, OS does not have a significant positive impact on
significant at two-year lag.
Corruption Control for any of the lag values analyzed. So, our hypothesis

12
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

H4 is not supported, which is in stark disagreement with the existing
stream of literature that strongly supports the role of service digitali­
zation in controlling corruption [5,8,15]. However, those studies have
analyzed only the isolated effect of OS (connoted as “E-Government
maturity”) on Corruption Control [8,15]. Thus, in the presence of HC
and TI, the effect of OS on Corruption Control loses significance or be­
comes negative. We explain this phenomenon in the subsequent section.
5. Discussion
While the broad focus of our study has been to understand the
relationship between EGOV and Corruption Control and its stability
across time, our secondary intention was to delineate EGOV’s role in
controlling corruption by exploring the individual effects of EGOV
subindices and developing a more nuanced understanding of the rela­
tionship. Our novelty specifically lies in our analytical approach, which
enables us to cater to the limitations inherent in current analytic ap­
proaches, including the widely used cross-sectional analytical tech­
niques as well as the traditional panel estimation techniques. In
particular, our analytical model helps us to assess the effects of within-
country time-invariant factors while simultaneously allowing us to
model the efficient and “maximal” error structures of the random effects
estimation technique, thereby enabling us to combine the best of both
fixed effects and random effects estimation techniques [19]. The avail­
ability of panel data also allows us to explore the relationships between
HC/TI/OS and Corruption Control for various time-lags, which is not
possible with cross-sectional data. Most importantly, our approach seeks
to extend the available empirical literature on the EGOV-COR rela­
tionship by accounting for country-level variations in both initial cor­
ruption levels as well as their longitudinal corruption trajectories while
analyzing the EGOV-COR relationship.
Our study, thus, adds to the existing body of literature by investi­
gating the EGOV-COR relationship at the subindices level while also
assessing its stability over time. These findings particularly help explain
the stark observations discussed earlier in the Introduction section.
Although Australia and Estonia have witnessed similar EGOV growth
rates between 2008 and 2018, Australia has experienced an 11% in­
crease in corruption in stark contrast to a 12% reduction in corruption
observed in the case of Estonia within the same time period. Despite
identical EGOV growth, a closer look uncovered stark differences in the
TII change between the two countries. At the same time, HCI and OSI
experienced similar growth trends for the same time period. Estonia’s
TII grew at 27%, while Australia’s TII levels grew at a mere 8%. Again,
Uruguay and Kazakhstan show stark differences in their corruption
levels despite similar EGOV levels. A closer investigation uncovers a
relatively low TII contribution to the EGOV index for Kazakhstan
compared to Uruguay. TII seems to be the major differentiating factor in
both cases, thereby making a case for the importance of understanding
the EGOV-COR relationship at the subindices level. While our study
attempts to provide preliminary explanations for these anomalous ob­
servations by highlighting the dissimilarities in the individual effects of
EGOV subindices on Corruption Control, yet there is ample scope for
more work to uncover the underlying country-specific nuances.
In Table 15, we have provided a comparison between our study and
other related studies in this area. Notably, our study provides empirical
evidence pertaining to the following three themes: (i) the three EGOV
subindices differ in their effectiveness on Corruption Control, (ii) HC has
a delayed effect on Corruption Control, and (iii) OS exhibits relative
ineffectiveness on Corruption Control. In a sense, our study comple­
ments the work of Elbahnasawy [5] not only because of the recent time
period considered but also because of the highlight on how the sub­
indices interplay as EGOV matures. Interestingly, HC needs at least a
two-year gestation period for positively influencing corruption; there­
fore, deploying HC for corruption requires a more proactive planning
approach than TI, which starts influencing Corruption Control almost
immediately. We specifically contribute to the existing body of literature
by uncovering the dissimilarities in the influence of the three EGOV
subindices on Corruption Control and the temporal variations in their
impact. We elaborate more on this in the remainder of this section.
5.1. Heterogeneities in the E-Government corruption control relationship
Our study reveals the following heterogeneities: (i) variations among
countries in terms of their initial Corruption Control levels (captured by
intercepts) and the improvement rate (captured by slope) of Corruption
Control, and (ii) dissimilarities in the individual effects of three EGOV
subindices on Corruption Control. These variations imply that countries
at lower initial Corruption Control levels can improve easily and quickly
with little EGOV development effort. However, incremental improve­
ments at higher levels of Corruption Control require extensive and
focused EGOV effort by the governments.
Further, we are also able to substantiate our initial apprehension that
dissimilarities exist in the influence of the three EGOV subindices on
Corruption Control. TI is consistent in having a positive effect on Cor­
ruption Control, HC has a delayed positive effect on Corruption Control,
and OS is ineffective in reducing corruption. Accordingly, our study
reveals that there exists dissimilarity in impact by HC, TI, and OS on
controlling corruption. For instance, with a one-year lag, HC has a
negative impact, TI has a strong positive impact, and OS has no impact
on Corruption Control. Our analysis also exhibits that the extent of
dissimilarity is not uniform over the various time-lags studied. For
instance, when we move from one-year lag to two-year lag,

Table 15
Comparison of Related Research.
Paper Andersen 2009 Krishnan et al. 2013 Elbahnasawy 2014 [5] Srivastava et al. 2016 [32] Nam 2018 [15] This Paper
[14] [8]

Design Longitudinal Cross-sectional Longitudinal Longitudinal Cross-sectional Longitudinal

Data 149 countries, 105 countries, 160 countries, Years 63 countries, Years 102 countries, 102 countries, Years
Years 1996 and Averaged over 2004 1995–2009 2004–2007 Year 2016 2008–2019
2006 to 2008
Analysis Technique OLS, 2SLS Path analysis Panel Random Effects Seemingly Unrelated Path Analysis, Random Intercepts and
Regression (SUR) Moderated Slopes Model with one-
Mediation year lag.
Dependent Variable Control of Control of Corruption Corruption Perceptions Base Corruption, Permeated Control of Corruption Perceptions
Corruption with a reverse Index with a reverse Corruption (Global Corruption Index
adjustment adjustment Corruption Barometer)
Predictor Variables
E-Government Positive, p<0.1 Negative*, p<0.001 Negative*, p<0.05 Negative*, p<0.05 Positive, p<0.05 Positive, p<0.01
Human Capital – – Not significant Positive, p<0.01 Positive, p<0.05 Positive, p<0.001
Tele-communications – – Negative, p<0.01 – – Positive, p<0.001
Infrastructure
Online Services – – Negative, p<0.1 – – Not significant
*
Corruption measure is reverse adjusted in these studies.

13
P. Silal et al.
interestingly, HC shows a positive impact, TI as usual shows positive
impact, but the strength has gone down, and OS continues to have no
impact on Corruption Control. Again, for a three-year lag, the positive
impact of HC diminishes, TI continues having a positive impact, and OS
now has a negative impact on Corruption Control. Thus, our study
further indicates that for some subindices, the variation is negligible
across time-lags, whereas for others, the change is substantial. These
differences highlight the need for policymakers and future researchers to
appropriately account for the unequal time horizon of HC and TI’s in­
fluences on Corruption Control while implementing EGOV for anticor­
ruption or while exploring the EGOV-COR relationship.
5.2. Human capital works but with a delay
Given no previous guidelines on the exact amount of time delay
required for HC to positively influence Corruption Control, we relied on
prior scholarly guidance [89] and started with a one-year lag during the
hypothesis formulation stage while subsequently moving on to higher
time-lags at the post-hoc analysis stage. Our results highlight the effec­
tiveness of HC in controlling corruption after a two-year delay. In fact, at
a one-year lag, HC has a negative effect on Corruption Control. For a
three-year lag, the positive effect continues, though at a smaller effect
size, finally losing significance at a four-year lag. In particular, the
two-year delay may be attributed to the additional cognitive load and
hence the time required to process the new information and the proper
assimilation of knowledge inputs imparted through interventions tar­
geted at HC improvements [95,96]. This observation is in line with
evidence from allied domains such as education and human resource
management, where some lapse of time has been shown to be imperative
before positive impacts of literacy and training interventions materialize
[97,98]. As can be inferred from the negative effect of HC on Corruption
Control at a one-year lag, any premature application of acquired
knowledge may suffer from the problems of erroneous beliefs or
misinformation resulting in suboptimal or detrimental outcomes [99].
The subsequent reduction of HC’s effect post the two-year lag may be
attributed to relative obsolescence and decay in the value of knowledge
acquired two years back [100]. This finding points to the need for
continuous updates on disseminated knowledge from time to time to
preserve or enhance the value of accumulated knowledge [100,101].
Thus, policymakers may strategize that HC improvements need to begin
with a two-year head start with handholding during the first two years
and also plan for adequate interventions to update existing knowledge
from time to time.
5.3. Service digitalization may not be enough
Compared to HC and TI, OS or the digitalization of public service
delivery infrastructure is found to be insignificant in contributing to­
ward Corruption Control. While this is in stark contrast to the larger
body of literature espousing a positive significance of OS in controlling
for corruption, it finds support in an alternative stream of literature.
These studies emphasize e-readiness and appropriate high importance to
enabling factors, such as HC and TI, as a prerequisite to ensuring the
effectiveness of digitalizing (often partly) offline public service channels
[102–104]. In fact, some authors note the futility of public service
digitalization, or OS, are pointless if citizens are unable to appropriately
use it due to a lack of knowledge or access [102]. Again, the insignifi­
cance can also be attributed to the nature of digitalization, specifically
whether the digitalization initiative focuses on improving the effec­
tiveness of the process or whether it is just limited to increasing the
efficiency of the process. If the digitalization initiative focuses on effi­
ciency or being quick “ICT fixes” only, then the emergent OS may further
amplify pre-existing inefficiencies prevalent in the offline processes
[105]. Conversely, a digitalization initiative targeted toward improving
process effectiveness necessitates radical changes, such as
re-engineering old ineffective and outdated processes to usher in
14
Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735
improved processes, which may lead to positive long-term impacts
compared to the relatively superficial efficiency-focused initiatives
[104,106].
5.4. Implications, limitations, and future works
Our study helps derive several implications for theory and praxis.
Specifically, we seek to contribute to the management and consumption
of information in the public service delivery systems by conceptualizing
and empirically validating the role of EGOV and its subindices on Cor­
ruption Control. We outline these contributions and implications in the
sections below, followed by some discussions on study limitations and
future research avenues.
5.4.1. Contributions to theory
Our study contributes to the existing body of literature on EGOV and
Corruption Control. Firstly, we adopt the RBV perspective to highlight
EGOV and its subindices, namely HC, TI, and OS, as distinct compe­
tencies. Building on the distinct nature of their competencies, we
conceptualize the unique mechanisms via which they contribute to
effective information management and consumption, thereby stream­
lining public service delivery by contributing to Corruption Control.
Toward this, we have drawn from the theoretical perspectives under­
lying Agency Theory, Theory of Media Literacy, Information Quality
literature, and Transaction Cost Theory to conceptually link EGDI and its
subindices with Corruption Control. Using this assemblage of theories
helps capture greater complexities inherent in the EGOV-COR relation­
ship while also helping circumvent RBV limitations owing to its input-
focused emphasis. Secondly, our study uses the most recent dataset
and employs an analytical approach to allow for country-specific in­
tercepts and slopes as we attempt to uncover the heterogeneities implicit
in the EGOV-COR relationship across countries and subindices. This
approach enables us to empirically capture the dissimilarities countries
exhibit in their initial corruption levels as well as their decay/growth
rates across time, thereby helping us obtain EGOV-COR estimates robust
to country-specific differences in their Corruption Control tendencies.
Also, we empirically demonstrate the heterogeneity in the individual
effects of EGOV subindices on Corruption Control. While TI’s influence
on Corruption Control was positive and stable for all the time-lags
considered, HC required a longer time-lag to impact Corruption Con­
trol positively. Meanwhile, our findings help unearth the insignificance
of OS on Corruption Control, which is in stark contrast to previous
findings. Thirdly, we add to the time-lag scholarship on the EGOV-COR
relationship by highlighting the variations in impact by EGOV sub­
indices over different time-lags. Using all possible time-lags (up to four-
year lag) within our dataset, we observe the maximum effect of TI on
Corruption Control for one-year lag, while HC showed the maximum
effect on Corruption Control for a two-year lag. These identified time-
lags can serve as an initial reference for future EGOV-COR studies.
5.4.2. Practitioner implications
Based on our findings, we also extracted a few actionable items for
policymakers. Firstly, while deciding on their EGOV agenda, govern­
ments should acknowledge the dissimilarities across EGOV subindices in
their influence on Corruption Control. Specifically, given the significant
influence of HC and TI, the EGOV agenda might focus more on devel­
oping supporting infrastructure in the form of TI and HC for increasing
effectiveness toward mitigating corruption. Secondly, governments
could appropriately consider the variations in the time taken by EGOV
subindices in positively influencing Corruption Control. For instance, TI
can lead to positive changes in Corruption Control within a year, while
HC requires a two-year lag in positively influencing Corruption Control.
Again, we found that the effect of HC on Corruption Control loses sig­
nificance after around four years. Attributing such behavior to knowl­
edge decay, we suggest that HC strategies may include proper
handholding of citizens and ensure continuous update of accumulated
P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

knowledge. Thirdly, relative to HC and TI, OS may not be as effective in
positively contributing to Corruption Control as earlier thought, which
may be attributed to the relative importance of the supporting infra­
structure in the form of HC and TI vis-à-vis OS. Alternatively, the
insignificance could also stem from OS being used as a window-dressing
strategy [107,108] while ignoring service delivery effectiveness. To­
ward this, we suggest that OS strategies, through process re-engineering
exercise, would focus more on increasing service delivery effectiveness
as an integral part of their digitalization strategy instead of limiting their
digitalization focus on increasing process efficiency.
5.4.3. Limitations and future research avenues
While extreme care was taken in conducting the study, there are few
limitations that provide new opportunities for future research. Firstly,
our study was limited to 102 countries out of 190 odd countries
worldwide, as complete data was not available for the remaining
countries. The nonavailability of data is particularly evident for those
countries reeling under political crises or war-like situations. Further­
more, there is a time discontinuity in the dataset used, as EGDI data for
some of the years were not available (UN did not publish EGDI data for
these years). We also acknowledge that the scope of the validity of our
results is limited to the time period of the dataset under consideration.
Accordingly, reassessments of priorly established relationships are
required for capturing the time-induced changes. Secondly, the tradi­
tional measure used for OS is limited in the sense that it captures only
superficial aspects, such as the number of services, while ignoring
quality measures such as the extent of internal process improvements or
service orientations. This limitation may have undermined the effec­
tiveness of OS as a construct. Future studies may explore the possible
inclusion of these quality measures when constructing the OSI (Online
Service Index) and re-examine our hypothesized relationships using
such advanced measures. Thirdly, our findings could further be com­
plemented via supporting qualitative studies that examine our hypoth­
esized relationships at a more micro-level. Besides, recent evidence
shows wide variations in the implementation of EGOV across political
regimes. As the analysis of political systems was outside the scope of this
present study, future studies could examine our model under different
political regimes. Fourth, our study does not include the possible
moderating effects of government quality measures, such as RL, EP, or
GE, within the scope of this study. While we have controlled for their
effects in our analyses, future studies could further enhance our findings
by including the moderating effect of these government quality mea­
sures in the EGOV-COR empirical framework. Future works could
particularly assess the moderating effects of RL, EP, and GE indicated by
our post-hoc moderation analysis (Appendix 2). Finally, given our study
focus, we have not explicitly hypothesized for the following: (i)
nonlinear relationships, including the higher marginal growth of Cor­
ruption Control observed for countries with lower initial Corruption
Control levels and (ii) structural breaks, including the Corruption Con­
trol saturation points for different countries. Accordingly, future studies
could include nonlinearity into their models to better explicate the
decreasing marginal growth of Corruption Control with increasing
Corruption Control levels. Also, identifying Corruption Control satura­
tion points for countries would immensely enrich our understanding of
the phenomenon.
6. Conclusion
Against the backdrop of a dearth of studies exploring the relationship
between EGOV and Corruption Control at the EGOV subindices level,
our study contributes to the body of literature by thoroughly investi­
gating the relative effectiveness of the three EGOV subindices in con­
trolling corruption. In doing so, we also assess the temporal stability of
these relationships over a considerable period of about a decade. To­
ward this, we draw upon the theoretical insights from RBV, Theory of
Media Literacy, Agency Theory, Information Quality literature, and
Transaction Cost Theory to derive a set of testable hypotheses. Using a
panel dataset for 102 countries pertaining to the time period of
2008–2019, we employ an LME estimation method, which enables ac­
curate modeling of reality by allowing the inclusion of individual in­
tercepts and slopes for countries. Based on our analysis, TI was found to
have a significant positive effect on Corruption Control, while OS was
ineffective in controlling corruption. Interestingly, HC was found to
have a delayed impact on Corruption Control, with its effect peaking at
the two-year lag point. Besides the theoretical implications, our findings
seek to guide policymakers in prioritizing among the three EGOV sub­
indices while directing the national EGOV development initiatives more
effectively toward Corruption Control.
Declaration of Competing Interest
None

Appendix 1: List of Countries Studied

Continent Countries

Africa (20) Algeria; Botswana; Cameroon; Egypt; Gambia; Ghana; Kenya; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritius; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nigeria; Senegal; South
Africa; Tanzania; Uganda; Zimbabwe
Asia (21) Bangladesh; China; India; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Republic of Korea; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Malaysia; Pakistan; Philippines; Qatar;
Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; United Arab Emirates; Vietnam
Europe (39) Albania; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece;
Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Moldova; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian
Federation; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; Ukraine; United Kingdom
North America Canada; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Trinidad and Tobago; United States
(12)
Oceania (2) Australia; New Zealand
South America (8) Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Paraguay; Peru; Uruguay

Appendix 2: Summary of Analyses with Potential Moderators

Model Comparison Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

HC − 0.084*** − 0.078 − 0.058* − 0.118*** − 0.092* − 0.055*

TI 0.096*** 0.099** 0.010*** 0.142*** 0.131*** 0.102***
OS − 0.010 0.015 − 0.004 0.013 0.013 0.001
(continued on next page)

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P. Silal et al. Information & Management 60 (2023) 103735

(continued )
Model Comparison Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

APF − 0.023 0.025 − 0.015 − 0.017 − 0.021 − 0.010

RL 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.032 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.085***
EP 0.180*** 0.166*** 0.169*** 0.136 0.201*** 0.162***
TO 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.013 0.042 0.010
GE 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.057*** − 0.017
APF*HC − 0.021
APF*TI − 0.006
APF*OS − 0.057
RL*HC 0.080**
RL*TI − 0.002
RL*OS − 0.012
EP*HC 0.324*
EP*TI − 0.202*
EP*OS − 0.111*
TO*HC 0.005
TO*TI − 0.041
TO*OS − 0.026
GE*HC 0.107***
GE*TI 0.001
GE*OS − 0.015
time − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.002
intercept 0.453*** 0.435*** 0.414*** 0.434*** 0.420*** 0.402***
Sd (time) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011
Sd (intercept) 0.073 0.073 0.069 0.073 0.073 0.069
Corr (time, intercept) − 0.77 − 0.78 − 0.73 − 0.73 − 0.76 − 0.73
Sd (residual) 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.023
Log-likelihood 1146.1 1141.6 1142.5 1158.2 1142.4 1147.3
AIC − 2339.3 − 2335.98 − 2345.6 − 2367.7 − 2342.5 − 2354.99
No. of obs. 612 612 612 612 612 612
No. of groups 102 102 102 102 102 102

Note: Model 1: Random Intercepts and Slope Model with covariates and no moderation; Model 2: Random Intercepts and Slope Model with
covariates and Anti-Press Freedom (APF) as a moderator; Model 3: Random Intercepts and Slope Model with covariates and Rule of Law (RL) as a
moderator; Model 4: Random Intercepts and Slope Model with covariates and Economic Prosperity (EP) as a moderator; Model 5: Random Intercepts
and Slope Model with covariates and Trade Openness (TO) as a moderator; Model 6: Random Intercepts and Slope Model with covariates and
Government Effectiveness (GE) as a moderator.

Appendix 3: Model Residual versus Model Fitted Values Plot for Random Intercepts and Slope Model

16
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Prakrit Silal: Prakrit Silal is an Assistant Professor in the Information Technology Systems
& Analytics Area at Indian Institute of Management Jammu. He has recently completed his
Ph.D. from the Department of Management Information Systems at the Indian Institute of
Management, Calcutta. His research interests include Digital Government, E-Participation,
and Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D). His research
publications have appeared in Government Information Quarterly, Marketing Intelligence
& Planning, Journal of Global Information Technology Management, Health Marketing
Quarterly, and International Journal of Technology Diffusion. Some of his works have
been presented in international reputed conferences including International Conference on
Information Systems (ICIS) and Academy of Management (AOM) Annual Meetings.
Ashutosh Jha: Ashutosh Jha is an Assistant Professor in the Information Management
Group at SPJIMR, Mumbai. His research interests include Adoption and Diffusion of Mo­
bile Information Systems, Techno-Economics of Next Generation Networks, and E-
Governance. His research publications have appeared in Information Systems Frontiers,
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, IEEE Access, Applied Economics Letters,
IIMB Management Review, and Decision. His works have also been presented in several
international conferences, including International Conference on Information Systems
(ICIS), European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Hawaii International Con­
ference on System Sciences (HICSS), International Association for Management of Tech­
nology (IAMOT), and IEEE, among others.
Debashis Saha: Debashis Saha, currently an Endowed Chair Professor in the MIS area in
IIM Calcutta, has been teaching IT and Digital for more than 30 years now. His research
interests include Fintech, ICT4D, Emerging IT paradigms, Digital Disruption, E-Gover­
nance, Digital Business Transformation, IT strategy and governance, and Business-driven
IT. He has co-supervised 17 doctoral theses, published about 300 research papers in
various journals/conferences, and directed four funded projects on IT. His research has
appeared in major journals including Decision Support Systems, OMEGA-The Interna­
tional Journal of Management Science, Information System Frontiers, among others. He
has also served on the editorial board of selected international journals.