Animals in Philippine Law by Timoteo B. Aquino

ANIMALS IN PHILIPPINE LAW*
Timoteo B. Aquino**
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………......... 46
I. STEWARDSHIP OF ANIMALS ………………………………................ 47
II. ANIMALS IN ROMAN LAW ……………………………………………… 47
III. LEGAL DEFINITION …………………………………………………….. 48
IV. NEW CIVIL CODE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY AS OBJECT OF RIGHTS .. 49
V. OTHER PROVISIONS UNDER THE NEW CIVIL CODE CONCERNING
ANIMALS .............................................................................. 54
VI. SUCCESSION …………………………………………………………… 56
VII. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY ANIMALS …………………….. 57
VIII. EFFECTS OF ANIMALS ON THE DETERMINATION OF NEGLIGENCE ... 59
IX. DAMAGE CAUSED TO ANIMALS ……………………………………….. 62
X. ANIMALS IN CRIMINAL LAW ……………………………………………. 63
XI. LEGAL THEORIES ON ANIMALS AS OBJECT OR SUBJECT OF RIGHTS 66
XII. THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT OF 1998 ……………………………….. 70
XIII. UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF ANIMALS ……………………... 75
XIV. LEGAL STANDING: PERSONALITY TO SUE AS PLAINTIFF ……………. 79
XV. THE PROBLEM OF SELECTION ………………………………………... 80
CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………….. 81
ABSTRACT
Issues regarding the status, nature and treatment of animals continue to persist to this day.
Under Philippine civil law, animals are considered properties and are not active subjects of rights.
Animals are, however, protected under Republic Act (RA) No. 8485 as amended by RA No. 10631,
otherwise known as the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, as well as other special laws, thus elevating
them to a level higher than other kinds of properties not subject to the same protection.
In this article, the author presents a comprehensive survey of laws and jurisprudence
concerning the status, nature and treatment of animals in the Philippines. The article also discusses
competing legal theories and philosophies concerning animal rights and protections, as well as
problem areas in the treatment of animals under the Philippine legal system.
The author recognizes that there are unresolved issues in the implementation of the Animal
Welfare Act of 1998 such as the lack of a precise definition of the term “animal.” The Supreme
Court, by settling actual controversies involving the interpretation of general statements on animals
under the law, or Congress, through the enactment of a new law, may eventually resolve these
issues. In the meantime, the author calls for the promotion of public awareness on animal rights
and protection and the continuance of an informed debate on issues relating to animals to aid the
Courts and legislators in solving the conceptual problems and in improving the present laws
concerning animals.
* Cite as Timoteo B. Aquino, Animals in Philippine Law, 1 U. ASIA & PAC. L.J. 45, (page cited) (2018).
** Professor of Law, Institute of Law, University of Asia and the Pacific. LL.B., Valedictorian, San Beda College of
Law (1988). Eighth Placer, Bar Examinations (1988). The author also wrote about Torts and Damages, Reviewer on Civil
Law, Reviewer on Commercial Law, Philippine Corporate Law Compendium, Notes and Cases in Negotiable Instruments
Law and Banking Law, Essentials of Credit Transactions and Banking Law, Essentials of Insurance Law, Essential of
Transportation and Public Utilities Law.
ANIMALS IN PHILIPPINE LAW
INTRODUCTION
Two separate original petitions were filed with the Supreme Court in 2007 asking that
respondents be enjoined from implementing Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46). The Contract
allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon
Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. The contract
was questioned for, among other grounds, violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
resolved these consolidated cases in its En Banc decision on April 21, 2015.1 Although the case
presents other important legal issues, this article concerns the special petitioners in the case.
What is unusual about this case is that the named petitioners include the “RESIDENT MARINE
MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES,
DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES.” The case presented the issue of
whether animals can be plaintiffs or petitioners in court cases, thus elevating to the Supreme
Court the issue concerning the status and nature of animals in Philippine law and jurisprudence.
Issues regarding the status, nature and treatment of animals continue to be in the public
sphere. Controversies involving such matters persist to this day. For instance, in February of
this year, there was an outcry over the loss of around twenty cats in a park in a commercial
district in Taguig City.2 The cats were allegedly relocated at the instance of the management of
a hotel in the area. Animal rights activists claimed that there was violation of existing laws. Less
than a month thereafter, a number of cats were found dead in another commercial district, this
time in Quezon City. Although the actual cause of death is not yet clear, there were those who
suspected that the cats were poisoned.3
This article is primarily a survey of the present laws and jurisprudence on animals. This
article examines the treatment of animals under Philippine laws and jurisprudence including the
concept of “animal rights” under the New Civil Code and special laws. The article discusses the
nature of animals as property and as subject of rights and explores the legal personality and
standing of animals in court cases. The competing legal theories and philosophy concerning
animals as well as problem areas will also be briefly discussed in this article.
I. STEWARDSHIP OF ANIMALS
Catholic Church teachings on animals emphasize man’s stewardship of animals. “In the
beginning God entrusted the earth and its resources to the common stewardship of mankind to
take care of them, master them by labor, and enjoy their fruits. The goods of creation are destined
for the whole human race. However, the earth is divided up among men to assure the security of
their lives, endangered by poverty and threatened by violence. The appropriation of property is
legitimate for guaranteeing the freedom and dignity of persons and for helping each of them to
meet his basic needs and the needs of those of his charge. It should allow for a natural solidarity
to develop between men.”4
1 Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Straits v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. Nos. 180771 &
181527, Apr. 21, 2015.
2 Matthew Reysio-Cruz, Loss of Taguig park cats sparks outcry, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER (Feb. 19, 2018),
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/969674/loss-of-taguig-park-cats-sparks-outcry (last accessed Apr. 11, 2018).
3 Cody Cepeda, After Taguig park cats et displaced, QC cats found dead, possibly poisoned, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER
(Mar. 8, 2018), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/973726/after-taguig-park-cats-get-displaced-cats-of-eastwood-city-found-
dead-possibly-poisoned (last accessed Apr. 11, 2018).
4 THE UNIVERSAL DESTINATION AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF GOODS, THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2402-3,
2406.
2
UNIVERSITY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC LAW JOURNAL
Pope Francis in his Encyclical Laudato Si declared that everything is connected. “It follows
that our indifference or cruelty towards fellow creatures of this world sooner or later affects the
treatment we mete out to other human beings. We have only one heart, the same wretchedness
which leads us to mistreat an animal will not be long in showing itself in our relationships with
other people. Every act of cruelty towards any creature is ‘contrary to human dignity’.” 5
II. ANIMALS IN ROMAN LAW
Animals in Roman Law are either wild animals (ferae naturae) or domestic animals. Both
types of animals can be subject to dominium or ownership. A group of animals are classified as
Res Mancipi together with slaves, and right of way. These animals are the beasts of burden that
include oxen, horses, asses and mules. 6
Ferae naturae are part of res nullius that can be acquired through occupation (occupatio).
If the wild animal escapes and possession is lost, ownership is also lost. 7 But if a domesticated
animal escapes, there shall be no loss of ownership.8
Roman law likewise required noxal surrender of animals. An owner of the animal that
caused damage may be required to compensate the injured person or surrender the animal. 9
Justinian’s Digest of Roman law likewise contains provisions on animals. For instance,
Gaius is credited in the Digest with the rule that “if anyone kills unlawfully a slave or servant-
girl belonging to someone else or a four-footed beast of the class of cattle, let him be condemned
to pay the owner the highest value that the property had attained in the preceding year.” 10 These
beasts of burden include sheep, goats, horses, mules, asses, and even elephants and camels.11
They do not include dogs, bears, panthers and lions. 12
III. LEGAL DEFINITION
The term animal is defined as “all sentient creatures other than humans which shall
include but not be limited to terrestrial, aquatic and marine animals.” 13
In this connection, it should be noted that the term animal is defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary as “non-human, animate being which is endowed with the power of voluntary motion.
5 ENCYCLICAL LETTER LAUDATO SI OF THE HOLY FATHER FRANCIS ON THE CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME, 67-8, ¶ 92.
6 BARRY NICHOLAS, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 105 (1962 ed.).
7 Id. at 131.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 224.
10 JUSTINIAN, THE DIGEST OF ROMAN LAW, Bk. 9, Title 2, at 71 (C.F. Colbert trans., Penguin ed., 1979).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8585, otherwise known as Animal Welfare Act of 1998, as
amended by RA 10631, signed by Department of Agriculture Secretary Proceso J. Alcala [hereinafter Revised IRR].
Animal life other than man.”14 Bouvier Law Dictionary contains the following explanation
regarding the definition of the same term:
[W]hen ‘animal’ is used in legal drafting, it usually means all animals other than
human beings. Still, according to context, statutory and regulatory use of the word animal
have sometimes meant only mammals, or mammals and birds, or any animals other than
fish or insects. Even so, given the presumption that ‘animal’ without any other qualification
is read broadly, interpreting such limitations in the absence of a statutory definition
requires context. Animals are differentiated under the law in many ways, particularly by
whether they are domesticated or wild; whether they are farm animals or otherwise raised
for food, fiber, or other commercial products; whether they are endangered, threatened or
potentially threatened with extinction.15
The Revised IRR that implements the Animal Welfare Act of 1998 likewise contains the
following important definitions:
a) Aquatic animals - all life stages of fish, mollusks, crustaceans and

amphibians originating from aquaculture establishments or removed from the wild, for
farming purposes, for release into the environment, for human consumption or for
ornamental purposes.
b) Marine mammals - refer to a group of animals that are warm-blooded, have

hair or fur, breathe air through lungs, bear live young, and nurse their young and spends
most or all of its life in the marine habitat. They belong to the Kingdom Animalia, Phylum
Chordata, Class Mammalia and represented by three (3) taxonomical Orders: (1) Carnivora,
(2) Cetacean/Cetartiodactyla, and (3) Sirenia.
IV. NEW CIVIL CODE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY AS OBJECT OF RIGHTS
“In its general and ordinary sense, the term right refers to any legally enforceable claim.”16
“It is a power, privilege, faculty or demand inherent in one person and incident upon another.
When used in relation to property, ‘right’ includes any interest in or title to an object, or any just
and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it.”17 The term right is also defined as “a power, privilege,
or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result
of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against the other.” 18
The existence of a right presupposes the existence of an object over which such right can
be exercised. All these rights, as meeting points between our needs and the things that are
destined to satisfy them, must have a thing that would serve as their object. 19 These objects
can either be the acts of another person or things. 20 Things that can be the object of rights are
those that can be appropriated or those that are considered in law as property.
14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 87 (1990 ed.), citing Bernadine v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 609, 44 N.Y.S.2d 881,
883.
15 BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 62 (2011 ed.).
16 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000 (Kapunan, J.,
concurring), citing SIBAL, PHILIPPINE LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 893.
17 Id., citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1189 (5th ed.); Rellosa v. Pellosis, 362 SCRA 486 (2001).
18 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Act Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004.
19 TIMOTEO B. AQUINO, REVIEWER ON CIVIL LAW 118 (2014 ed.), citing III SANCHEZ ROMAN 3-6.
20 Id., citing I CASTAN 359-363 (8th ed.), Part II, and II CAGUIOA, COMMENTS AND CASES ON CIVIL LAW 1 (3rd ed.).
4
The subject of rights and obligations are persons. With respect to obligations, persons
can either be the passive subject (obligor or debtor) or the active subject (obligee or creditor).
Human beings are persons under the law; they are referred to as natural persons under
the New Civil Code. Obviously, properties are not persons. However, there are those that are
considered by law as persons although they do not have independent physical existence. There
are entities that exist by fiction of law, known as juridical persons. The New Civil Code specifies
who are juridical persons:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according
to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to

which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are
governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.
The New Civil Code does not consider animals as juridical persons. Animals are not even
considered persons for special purpose. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that animals are
properties that can be the object of rights but cannot be the subject of rights.
Consequently, animals cannot enter into a contract; only persons can give consent.
Recently, an acquaintance tried to open a bank account in the name of a dog. The idea is to open
an account that will answer for the needs of the dog. The bank expectedly refused to open an
account in the name of the dog. It should be noted that bank deposits are governed by the laws
on simple loan. There is a contract that is being entered into when a bank account is opened. A
dog has no legal personality to enter into a contract or to give consent thereto. While it might be
possible for the bank to agree to open an account for the benefit of a dog (not in its name), the
party is still the depositor (the source of funds) although the release of the funds may be for a
special purpose.
Elevating animals to the status of persons is not simple. Even if Congress will consider
giving rights to animals, the legislators will inevitably encounter problems in crafting the law
thereon. For instance, as will be discussed hereunder, there is a problem of determination what
creatures are included in the term animal. Having determined the scope and meaning of the term
animal, Congress will then determine which of the animals should be given rights. In addition,
conferment of rights is often coupled with imposition of responsibility or obligation. While
Congress may consider giving animal rights, the implementation of the rights conferred and the
corresponding obligation will necessarily be imposed on natural or juridical persons. Even if
animals will be granted rights, there it would be impossible for the animals to be held liable for
abuse of right under present laws.
A. Animals as Real or Personal Properties
Certain specific provisions of the New Civil Code confirm the status of animals as
properties. The question to be resolved in some instances is not whether animals are properties
but if they are real/immovable properties or if they are personal or movable properties. This issue
is material and is a threshold issue in some cases because there are rules that apply to real
properties and there are rules that apply only to personal properties. For example, the period of
acquisitive prescription varies depending on the type of property involved.
Those who are not familiar with civil law might find it strange that there is an issue of
whether animals are movable or immovable properties because animals do move – some move in
increments while some may look like they are in perpetual motion. A lot of animals hardly stay
in one place. However, under the New Civil Code, the primary test to determine if a certain
property is considered movable or immovable is not the nature of the thing as having the capacity
to move from place to place but what is known as the Test by Exclusion. This simply means that
the immovable properties are those expressly enumerated by law, Article 415 of the New Civil
Code, and the only question is whether or not animals are included in the list. If they are excluded
from Article 415, they are movable properties rather than immovable properties. In this
connection, Article 415 includes in its paragraph 6 the animals that are considered real or
immovable properties. Paragraph 6 provides that “animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish
ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves
them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a
permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included.”
B. Animals as Object of Ownership
As properties therefore, animals can be the object of the right of ownership. The modes
of acquiring ownership include tradition (delivery), succession, donation, acquisitive
prescription, occupation, work including intellectual creation, and law.21 Obviously, animals
can be acquired through tradition (delivery), succession, donation, acquisitive prescription and
occupation.
With respect to occupation as mode of acquiring ownership, the New Civil Code contains
specific provisions which indicate the type of animals that can be acquired through this mode:
Art. 713. Things appropriable by nature which are without an owner, such as
animals that are the object of hunting and fishing, hidden treasure and abandoned
movables, are acquired by occupation.
Art. 716. The owner of a swarm of bees shall have a right to pursue them to
another's land, indemnifying the possessor of the latter for the damage. If the owner has
not pursued the swarm, or ceases to do so within two consecutive days, the possessor of
the land may occupy or retain the same. The owner of domesticated animals may also claim
them within twenty days to be counted from their occupation by another person. This
period having expired, they shall pertain to him who has caught and kept them.
Regarding succession which is another mode of acquiring ownership, the governing law
provides for rules concerning offspring of animals in Article 948 of the New Civil Code:
Art. 948. If the legacy or device is of a specific and determinate thing pertaining to
the testator, the legatee or devisee acquires the ownership thereof upon the death of the
testator, as well as any growing fruits, or unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected
income; but not the income which was due and unpaid before the latter's death.
21 CIVIL CODE, art. 712.
6
C. Animals as Fruits
If one owns an animal, then it follows the owner also owns the fruits of the animal that
he owns. Animals are even considered fruits (accession natural) in some cases. Articles 442 and
444 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young
and other products of animals.
Art. 444. Only such as are manifest or born are considered as natural or industrial
fruits.
With respect to animals, it is sufficient that they are in the womb of the mother,
although unborn.
Accession is not a mode of acquiring ownership, but an attribute of ownership. Hence,

when animals are considered fruits of another property (the female animal), the animals-fruits
belong to the owners of the female animal as a result of his or her ownership of the female animal
and not as an object of a contract or any mode of acquiring ownership.
Incidentally, there is also a rule pratus sequitor ventrem, which provides that as a general
rule, the young of the animal generally belongs to the owner of the mother.22
D. Animals as Object of Possession
Animals can also be the object of possession either as a part of ownership (just possidendi)
or as independent real right (just possessionis). In fact, the New Civil Code provides for the
specific rules on the possession of wild animals, domestic animals and domesticated animals.
Article 560 provides:
Art. 560. Wild animals are possessed only while they are under one's control;
domesticated or tamed animals are considered domestic or tame if they retain the habit of
returning to the premises of the possessor.
The right to be in possession can even be possession in the concept of a holder as in the
case of possession by a lessor or a usufructuary. In this regard, Article 591 provides for specific
rules that govern a special type of usufruct concerning a flock or herd of livestock:
Art. 591. If the usufruct be constituted on a flock or herd of livestock, the

usufructuary shall be obliged to replace with the young thereof the animals that die each
year from natural causes, or are lost due to the rapacity of beasts of prey.
If the animals on which the usufruct is constituted should all perish, without the
fault of the usufructuary, on account of some contagious disease or any other uncommon
event, the usufructuary shall fulfill his obligation by delivering to the owner the remains
which may have been saved from the misfortune.
Should the herd or flock perish in part, also by accident and without the fault of
the usufructuary, the usufruct shall continue on the part saved.
Should the usufruct be on sterile animals, it shall be considered, with respect to

its effects, as though constituted on fungible things.
22 II EDGARDO L. PARAS, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 211 (17th ed.), citing United States v. Caballero,
25 Phil. 356; Siari Valley Estate v. Lucasan, G.R. No. L-7046, Aug. 31, 1955.
V. OTHER PROVISIONS UNDER THE NEW CIVIL CODE

CONCERNING ANIMALS
A. Conjugal Partnership
Article 159 of the New Civil Code provides that whenever the paraphernal property or the
husband's capital consists, in whole or in part, of livestock existing upon the dissolution of the
partnership, the number of animals exceeding that brought to the marriage shall be deemed to
be of the conjugal partnership. This provision was however superseded by the provisions of the
Family Code.
B. Easements Relating to Animals
There are special rules concerning animals in the law on easements because of the
important role that animals play in the economy. The Philippines depends on agriculture as one
of its main sources of revenue even now, and more so at the time the New Civil Code was
promulgated in 1950. It should be noted, however, that the reason some of the provisions quoted
below appear to be antiquated is because they were carried over from the Spanish Civil Code.
Art. 640. Compulsory easements for drawing water or for watering animals can be
imposed only for reasons of public use in favor of a town or village, after payment of the
proper indemnity.
Art. 641. Easements for drawing water and for watering animals carry with them
the obligation of the owners of the servient estates to allow passage to persons and animals
to the place where such easements are to be used, and the indemnity shall include this
service.
Art. 657. Easements of the right of way for the passage of livestock known as
animal path, animal trail or any other, and those for watering places, resting places and
animal folds, shall be governed by the ordinances and regulations relating thereto, and, in
the absence thereof, by the usages and customs of the place.
Without prejudice to rights legally acquired, the animal path shall not exceed in
any case the width of 75 meters, and the animal trail that of 37 meters and 50 centimeters.
Whenever it is necessary to establish a compulsory easement of the right of way or
for a watering place for animals, the provisions of this Section and those of Articles 640
and 641 shall be observed. In this case the width shall not exceed 10 meters.
C. Provisions on Sale Involving Animals
The provisions on the law on sale concerning animals deal mainly with warranties,
particularly redhibitory defects of animals.
Art. 1572. If two or more animals are sold together, whether for a lump sum or for
a separate price for each of them, the redhibitory defect of one shall only give rise to its
redhibition, and not that of the others; unless it should appear that the vendee would not
have purchased the sound animal or animals without the defective one.
The latter case shall be presumed when a team, yoke pair, or set is bought, even if
a separate price has been fixed for each one of the animals composing the same.
Art. 1573. The provisions of the preceding article with respect to the sale of animals
shall in like manner be applicable to the sale of other things.
Art. 1574. There is no warranty against hidden defects of animals sold at fairs or
at public auctions, or of live stock sold as condemned.
8
Art. 1575. The sale of animals suffering from contagious diseases shall be void.
A contract of sale of animals shall also be void if the use or service for which they
are acquired has been stated in the contract, and they are found to be unfit therefor.
Art. 1576. If the hidden defect of animals, even in case a professional inspection
has been made, should be of such a nature that expert knowledge is not sufficient to
discover it, the defect shall be considered as redhibitory.
But if the veterinarian, through ignorance or bad faith should fail to discover or
disclose it, he shall be liable for damages.
Art. 1577. The redhibitory action, based on the faults or defects of animals, must
be brought within forty days from the date of their delivery to the vendee.
This action can only be exercised with respect to faults and defects which are
determined by law or by local customs.
Art. 1579. If the sale be rescinded, the animal shall be returned in the condition
in which it was sold and delivered, the vendee being answerable for any injury due to his
negligence, and not arising from the redhibitory fault or defect.
Art. 1580. In the sale of animals with redhibitory defects, the vendee shall also
enjoy the right mentioned in article 1567; but he must make use thereof within the same
period which has been fixed for the exercise of the redhibitory action.
Art. 1581. The form of sale of large cattle shall be governed by special laws.
D. Necessary Deposit of Animals
The New Civil Code likewise provides for rules on natural deposit of animals. Article 1999
of the New Civil Code provides that the hotel-keeper is liable for the vehicles, animals and articles
which have been introduced or placed in the annexes of the hotel.
E. Pledge of Animals
Animals can be pledged. This entails the transfer of possession of the animal to the
pledgee. The New Civil Code contains provisions that deal with the offspring of animals while the
animals are still in the pledgee’s possession.
Art. 2102. If the pledge earns or produces fruits, income, dividends, or interests,
the creditor shall compensate what he receives with those which are owing him; but if none
are owing him, or insofar as the amount may exceed that which is due, he shall apply it to
the principal. Unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, the pledge shall extend to the
interest and earnings of the right pledged.
In case of a pledge of animals, their offspring shall pertain to the pledgor or owner
of animals pledged, but shall be subject to the pledge, if there is no stipulation to the
contrary.
VI. SUCCESSION
There have been news reports that some wealthy individuals in the United States left
huge amounts of money to their pets. In one report, a woman who was residing in Manhattan
left around US$100,000.00 to her pets – a cat, a dog and 32 pet cockatiels.23
In the Philippines, animals cannot be instituted as heirs for the simple reason that
animals are not persons. Article 840 of the New Civil Code provides that “institution of heir is an
act by virtue of which a testator designates in his will the person or persons who are to succeed
him in his property and transmissible rights and obligations.” Only a person or persons can be
designated as heir/s under this provision.
However, it might be possible for a person to be designated as a voluntary heir for the
benefit of the testator’s pets or any animal that he/she may designate. The benefit given to the
pet may be provided for in the will in the form of a condition. Article 871 of the New Civil Code
provides that “the institution of an heir may be made conditionally, or for a certain purpose or
cause.” For example, a voluntary heir may be designated with a condition that the designated
voluntary heir will take care of the specified pets of the testator. The benefit in favor of the pets
may also be provided for in a will in the form of a charge. Article 882 of the New Civil Code
provides that “the statement of the object of the institution, or the application of the property left
by the testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it
appears that such was his intention.” However, Article 882 further provides that “that which
has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs
give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or
they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
obligation.”
VII. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY ANIMALS
Article 2183 of the New Civil Code provides for strict liability on the part of possessors of
animals. Article 2183 states that “the possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.”
A case involving Article 1905 of the Old Civil Code, which is now Article 2183 of the New
Civil Code, is Afialda v. Hisole,24 an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal.
Loreto Afialda, who was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos, died
while tending the animals. He was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his
injuries. The Supreme Court ruled:
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the
caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business
to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself.
And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
23 Emily Jane Fox, What Happens When Someone Leaves Millions to a Pet?, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/09/pet-will-fortune (last accessed Apr. 11, 2018).
24 G.R. No. L-2075, Nov. 29, 1949.
10
consequences.
In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries

(Vol. 12, p. 578), the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had
asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be "a veritable
accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905
of the Civil Code. The present action, however, is not brought under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, there being no allegation that, among other things, defendant's
business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of P20,000. As already stated,
defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code. but action under that
article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be
based on article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on
the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the
complaint contains no allegation on those points.
The above-quoted decision makes it clear therefore that the owners and possessors of
animals may be subject not only to strict liability under Article 2183 of the New Civil Code but
also for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the same law for the injuries or damage caused by
animals.
There can be no liability however if there is no proof that the animals caused the damage.
Thus, in Johnson v. David,25 the Supreme Court explained why Article 1905 of the old Civil Code
could not apply:
Article 1905 provides that the possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for the damages it may cause, even when said animal shall escape from him
or stray. No complaint, however, is made here that the injuries caused by the negligence of
the cochero were caused by the animal belonging to the defendant. This section might,
under certain conditions, render either the owner of the animal or the one using it liable
for damages. These sections do not include a liability on the part of the plaintiff for injuries
resulting from acts of negligence such as are complained of in the present cause. The
defendant not having contributed in any way to the injury complained of, he is in no wise
responsible for the same. The judgment of the lower court is therefore hereby reversed.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and
the case remanded to the lower court for execution. So ordered.
VIII. EFFECTS OF ANIMALS ON THE DETERMINATION OF NEGLIGENCE
The test of negligence is embodied in the decision in Picart v. Smith26 penned by Justice
Street which states:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in
25 G.R. No. L-2789, Feb. 27, 1906.

26 37 Phil. 809, 813 (1918). See discussion of the test of negligence in AQUINO, TORTS AND DAMAGES (2016 ed.)
view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of
much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by
the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence, they can be expected to take care only
when there is something before them to suggest or warn danger. Could a prudent man, in
the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so,
it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against harm. Reasonable foresight
of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that
an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct
or guarding against its consequences. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the determination of the presence or absence of negligence necessitates the

examination of the prevailing circumstances. Picart v. Smith27 likewise illustrates that the
presence and actions of animals may be included in the circumstances that should be considered
in determining negligence. The Supreme Court explained:
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on
December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that
upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before
he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared
the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts,
as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of
the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach,
he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about
75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided
it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as
yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that
the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the
horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to
the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing;
but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so
doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the
evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free space
where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably
less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff
received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether the defendant in maneuvering his
car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the
defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the
27 Id.
12
rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge
it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment
have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving
vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was
yet some distance away; and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the
plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the
situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his
car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take
the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited
fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the
animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump
under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse
and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
In Chua Yeng v. Roma,28 Santos Romeo was working for petitioner as cargador in loading
and unloading copra at the former’s warehouse. In the morning of May 16, 1956, after asking
permission from his employer, Santos Romeo went to petitioner’s house just across the street
from the warehouse to get a drink of water, the water pump in the warehouse being out of order
and no supply being available. Reaching the kitchen of said house and while he was drinking,
he saw a puppy eating some fried fish inside an open cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy
by saying tse, but as the puppy still continued to eat the fish, Santos Romeo made a motion with
hand to drive it away, in the course of which his right hand was bitten by said puppy. Santos
Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. One of the issues raised concerned his negligence.
The Court ruled that:
To the argument that the employee sustained the injury not from drinking water
but from driving away the puppy, suffice it to say that under the circumstances that
impelled him to act without opportunity for deliberate reflection, we are not prepared to
say that his act was unreasonable or negligent. Driving away a puppy is not so fraught
with potent danger as to deter every man possessed of reasonable disposition. As has been
said —
… [H]e was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably do—a
workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his pipe, and he may
reasonably pick it up again. (Ramos v. Poblete, supra., citing M'Lauchan v. Anderson, S.C.
529.)
By analogy, the deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water to satisfy
his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see a puppy eating some fried fish belonging
to his employer; and he may reasonably be expected to make a motion with his hand to
drive said puppy away.
At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions under
which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that there were no adequate
and sanitary means of water supply in the place of work; that petitioner's workers used,
for drinking purposes, water from a well at the back of the warehouse; that this well was
out of order at the time of the incident, so that the deceased had to cross a wide public
street to petitioner's house just to get a drink, thereby exposing himself to hazards which
may well have been avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more proximate to, the
place of work.
28 G.R. No. L-14827, Oct. 31, 1960.

Picart v. Smith29 teaches that there are instances when a reasonable man would be able
to foresee the natural reaction of animals. If the actor failed to foresee such natural reaction,
then the actor may be considered negligent in some cases.
On the other hand, there may also be cases when one’s expectation of the natural reaction
of animals may lead to the conclusion that there was no negligence on the part of the actor.
Thus, in Chua Yeng v. Roma,30 the Court observed that “driving away a puppy is not so fraught
with potent danger as to deter every man possessed of reasonable disposition.”
IX. DAMAGE CAUSED TO ANIMALS
A person who is wrongfully deprived wholly or in part of his property is entitled to

damages. Thus, if an animal is lost through the negligent act of another, an action for damages
may prosper against the person whose negligence proximately caused the damage or injury. As
in the case of loss of other properties, the claimant/plaintiff may recover actual damages which
corresponds to the value of the property at the time of the loss. However, the determination of
recoverable damages in case of injury to or loss of animals cannot be the same if there is injury
or loss to non-animal property. For instance, the measure of the value of the loss of a pet should
not be the same as the measure of the value of loss of any other personal property.
Partial injury may be treated as total loss in some cases. For instance, the case of People
of the Philippines v. Hon. Dionisio Mendiola31 involved the correct valuation of an animal. The
complaint stated that the value of one of the legs as only ¼, hence, the case was within the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, the first level court then. The Supreme Court did
not agree with how the value of the damage was determined stating that:
We disagree with this view, for experience has shown that a horse who has a
broken leg is useless for practical purposes as it can no longer be used in connection with
its ordinary occupation. For this reason, the value of the injury cannot be limited to the
fractured leg but to the animal as a whole. It may, therefore, be said that the value of the
property damaged as alleged in the complaint is the sum of P320.00. The horse has ceased
to be an asset to become a liability to its owner.
There may be liability for moral damages for the loss of or injury to animals in the cases
where the law allows the imposition of moral damages for loss of or damage to property. The
loss of animals may result in mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
similar injury for which moral damages may be imposed under Article 2217 of the New Civil
Code. In addition, Article 2220 provides that willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. On the other hand, the personal attachment to the animal may be considered in
awarding moral damages because Article 2218 provides that in the adjudication of moral
damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be considered. Hence, personal
attachment of the owner to his pet is one of the circumstances that may be considered in the
award of moral damages.
29 Supra note 26.

30 G.R. No. L-14827, Oct. 31, 1960.
31 G.R. No. L-14207, May 30, 1962.
14
X. ANIMALS IN CRIMINAL LAW
As property, animals can be the object of a crime. For instance, animals can be the object
of theft or robbery.32 In fact, special laws have been passed to deal with specific animals
including Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974.33
A. Ownership
The concept of ownership of animals may be crucial to criminal cases like theft. The fact
that the animal that was taken belonged to another is an important element with respect to theft.
It was explained that:
It is well-settled principle of law that a material variance between the allegations
and the proof as to the ownership of the stolen property in cases of larceny is fatal to a
conviction. (Underwood v. State, 72 Ala., 220; King v. State, 44 Ind., 285; Jones v. Com., 17
Gratt., Va., 563; State v. Wilson, 6 Ore., 428.) The legal title to the stolen carabao in the
case under consideration was in not in Francisco Tumaliuan, but he, Francisco, was in the
lawful possession of the animal. He held the carabao by right of his contract of purchase.
In the case of Fowler v. State (100 Ala., 96) Thomas J. Fowler was convicted of the
theft of an ox alleged to belong to Charles L. Philips. The evidence tended to prove that
Phillips had purchased the ox from Malone and Collins. On cross-examination Philips was
asked, "if it was not the understanding at the time he got the ox from Malone and Collins
that he should keep the oxen until fall, and that if he was able to pay for them he was to
take them; otherwise, he was to pay rent for them to Malone and Collins." To this question
the witness answered in the affirmative. He was then asked "if he had ever paid Malone
and Collins for the oxen, or offered to pay them for the same." The State objected to this
question, the court sustained the objections, and the defendant duly excepted.
In deciding the case on appeal the supreme court of Alabama said:
It was immaterial whether Phillips had paid, or offered to pay,

Malone and Collins for the oxen or not. If he was in possession of them, at
the time of the alleged larceny, either as a conditional purchaser or a
bailee, the ownership was properly laid in him.
The subject of the allegation and proof of ownership in cases of

larceny is discussed in 254 Cyc., and on page 91 thereof is the following
comment: "Any legal interest in the goods, although less than the absolute
title, will support an allegation of ownership. But there must be an actual
legal interest, not a mere claim or expectation of interest. Thus seller who
was has delivered the goods cannot be described as owner merely because
negotiations are pending between him and the buyer for canceling the sale.
So claiming ownership and attempting without success to do acts of
ownership is not enough to justify a description as owner. The ostensible
ownership is, however, enough to justify the description. So far as the thief
is concerned, he cannot question the tile of the apparent owner.
On pages 89 and 90 in Cyc., vol. 25, under the heading, “Who should be laid as
owner,” we find the following: “The actual condition of the legal title is immaterial to the
thief; so far as he is concerned, one may be taken as the owner who was unlawfully
disturbed by the taking. The possessor of the goods from whom the thief took them may
therefore properly be described as owner in the indictment. The possession must be actual;
right of possession alone will not suffice. Nor general direction and control, not amounting
32 United States v. Simbahan, G.R. No. L-6469, Mar. 18, 1911.

33 Ordono v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91721, July 31, 1991.
to a legal possession. The goods need not be in the actual manual possession of the person
described as owner at the moment of taking; it is enough that he was legally the possessor.
Upon this principle the property of goods stolen may be laid in a bailee from whom they
were taken, as for instance in a common carrier, an innkeeper, a pledgee, a receiver, a hirer
or borrower, a cestui que trust, one in possession under a contract for purchase, a washer-
woman who has the goods to wash, or a coachmaker who has a coach to repair, or a lien
or, a manufacturer who is performing work on the materials of another, a cashier of a bank,
or a constable who has attached or taken the goods in execution.”
Although the actual legal title to stolen carabao may not have been in Francisco
Tumaliuan, he was the peaceable possessor of the animal by reason of having purchased
the same from Florencio Fulgan. By reason of this purchase, accompanied with the actual
possession, Tumaliuan had a real or legal interest in the animal. The actual condition of
the legal title was immaterial in so far as the appellants are concerned. They took the
animal from the actual possession of Tumaliuan, the apparent owner. They cannot now be
heard to say that Tumaliuan was not the owner.34
B. Value
The value of the animal may also be crucial in criminal cases. For instance, it may
determine the penalty that should be imposed. In the case of People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Dionisio Mendiola35 a complaint for the complex crime of serious physical injuries and damage
to property thru reckless imprudence was filed against Pedro Capuno. The damage to property
that was alleged to have been caused was a fracture in one of the legs of a horse whose value is
P320.00. The value was determinative of the jurisdiction of the first level court in the case.
C. Possession
The concept of possession of animals may be determinative of the result of a criminal

case. In United States v. Mena36, the accused was found guilty of coercion because of forcible
taking of carabaos:
The acts committed by the defendant clearly fall within the foregoing definition of
the crime of coaccion. With violence he compelled the complaining witness to do that which
he did not desire to do — that is to say, to turn over the possession of the carabaos — and
it matters not whether it was “just or unjust” that they should thus have been turned over
to the defendant; whether it was or was not the duty of the complaining witness to turn them
over on demand, the defendant was guilty of the crime of coaccion unless he was lawfully
authorized to enforce his demand when the complaining witness refused compliance
therewith.
The defendant was not clothed with any judicial or administrative authority, and
it is a maxim of the law that no man is authorized to take the law into his own hands and
enforce his rights with threats of violence, except in certain well-defined cases, where one
acts in the necessary defense of one's life, liberty, or property, against unlawful aggression,
and manifestly the defendant cannot successfully maintain that his action was taken in
defense of life, liberty, or property. The carabaos were in the possession of the complaining
witness who claimed the right thereto for the purpose of turning them over to the justice
of the peace; the defendant denied the right of the complaining witness to this possession and
claimed the absolute right to possession in himself; but in forcibly depriving the
complaining witness of possession of the carabaos the defendant was not acting in defense of
his right to the possession of the property from the unlawful aggression, but rather
34 United States v. Gumarang, G.R. No. L-9267, Mar. 2, 1914.
35 G.R. No. L-14207, May 30, 1962.

36 G.R. No. L-4812, Oct. 30, 1908.
16
asserting his right to take possession from another, and thus he himself became the
aggressor.
A dispute having arisen as to the right of possession, and the carabaos being
actually in the possession of the complaining witness, it was the duty of the defendant if
he desired to enforce his claim, to seek the aid of the proper judicial authority; and had he
thus asserted his claim in the orderly manner provided by law, he would have secured not
only the possession of the animals, but damages for their detention, upon proof of the
justice of his claim.
A similar question was decided in the case of U.S. v. Tremoya (10 Phil. Rep., 89),
wherein it was held that where one was actually in [possession under color of title, the
lawful owner of the land with the true title to the possession was guilty of coaccion, when
with violence he compelled the person in possession to vacate.
XI. LEGAL THEORIES ON ANIMALS AS OBJECT OR SUBJECT OF RIGHTS
If animals can be subject of rights, then they will have legal standing in court to enforce
such right. There are animal activists who insist that animals should be given legal standing to
protect themselves against maltreatment. The view is that the rights of animals can be exercised
through persons who represent them.
For example, Philosopher Tom Regan justifies his advocacy for animal rights by citing the
concept of inherent value.37 According to this view, animals must have rights because they have
inherent value.
Professor Richard Epstein observed that “under traditional conceptions of law, animals
were typically regarded as object of rights vested in their human owners but not as the holder of
rights against human beings. Even as objects, animals historically occupied a large place in the
overall system of rights and social relations.”38
One of the justifications why animals cannot be elevated to the position of a person is
that “the natural cognitive and emotional limitations of animals, even the higher animals,
preclude any creation of full parity.”39 Professor Epstein went on further to explain:
For starters, we can recognize that in dealing with animals, there are two
dimensions in which it is necessary to strive for the appropriate balance. The first of these
is with the hierarchy of animals. The blunt truth, . . . is that the more animals look and
act like human beings, the greater the level of protection that we as humans are willing to
afford them. Rights of bodily integrity do not have much of a future for mosquitoes. Second,
the higher the species ranks on their own tree of life, the stronger the justifications that
must be advanced in order to harm members of that species. Cost aside, we would be
wholly inappropriate to think that we should capture or breed chimpanzees for food,
whatever our views on their use for medical experimentation. Conversely, it would be wholly
inappropriate to think that we could only justify the sacrifice of cattle for medical
experimentation, given their common use as food.
Professor Cass R. Sustein on the other hand opined that if rights mean being subject to
legal protection against harm, then many animals already do have rights. If “we take ‘rights’ to
mean a moral claim to such protection, there is a general agreement that animals have rights of
37 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, ANIMAL-RIGHTS-LIBRARY.COM (last accessed on April 6, 2018).
38 Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper
No. 171 (Dec. 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=359240 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.359240.
39 Id.
certain kinds.”40 Professor Sustein explained that private suits should be allowed to prevent
cruelty and neglect and public officials should not have the monopoly of enforcing animal
protection rules. He believes that the protection should be extended to areas that are now exempt
from the general rule on protection like scientific experiments and farming. With respect to the
proposition that animals should not be treated as property, he explained that: “those who insist
that animals should not be seen as property might be making a simple and modest claim: Human
beings should not be able to treat animals however they wish.”41 The thinking is that the status
of property is devastating to actual protection against cruelty and abuse, hence, the status of
animals as property should be eliminated if it is helpful in reducing suffering.42
Philosopher Christine Korsgaard offered a Kantian justification for animal rights stating
that animals must be regarded as ends in themselves because animals also take things to be
good or bad absolutely.43 “Then even if animals cannot obligate us through their wills, they can
obligate us through their natures, as beings of that kind.”44 Hence, she concluded that:
It is a presupposition of our own rational agency and of our moral and legal
systems that the fate of every such creature, every creature for whom life in this world can
be good or bad, is something that matters. That is why we should concede the moral claims
of the other animals, and protect those claims as a matter of legal right.45
On the other hand, there are other legal theorists who do no insist on elevating animals
to the status of persons. For instance, Professor Richard L. Cupp, Jr. is of the view that
legislators and courts must highlight the distinctiveness of animals. Animals cannot be lumped
together with other personal properties. His view is that we should do “more to recognize and
highlight animals’ special status as property that is capable of pain or distress may help us to
attain better treatment for animals while preserving an animal welfare paradigm.” 46 Professor
Cupp believes that judicial declarations of the distinctiveness of animals must be encouraged
while legislatures must create a sub-set of personal properties or goods for animals.47
Justice Leonen explained that “in the United States, animal rights advocates have managed
to establish a system which Hogan explains as the ‘guardianship model for nonhuman
animals’.48 He relied on the following explanation:
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman

animals may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights and protections:
guardianships. With court approval, animal advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf
40 Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals, University of Chicago Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 06 (Nov. 1999), http://ssrn.com/ abstract=196212; http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.196212.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Christine M. Korsgaard, A Kantian Case for Animal Rights, PEOPLE.FAS.HARVARD.EDU (last accessed on Apr. 6,
2018).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Animals as More than “Mere Things,” But Still Property: A Call for Continuing Evolution of
the Animal Welfare Paradigm, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2788309 (last accessed on Apr. 12, 2018).
47 Id at 26-31.
48 Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Straits, supra note 1.
18
of nonhuman animals in the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of
mentally-challenged humans who possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce
it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing? -Toward Legal Rights
for Natural Objects, Christopher D. Stone asserts that the environment should possess the
right to seek judicial redress even though it is incapable of representing itself. While
asserting the rights of speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals
certainly poses legitimate challenges - such as identifying the proper spokesman - the
American legal system is already well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by which
nonhumans may obtain standing via a judicially-established guardianship. Stone notes
that other speechless - and nonhuman - entities such as corporations, states, estates, and
municipalities have standing to bring suit on their own behalf. There is little reason to fear
abuses under this regime as procedures for removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts of
interest, and termination of a guardianship are well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed
possible. The court indicated that ALVA might have obtained standing in its own right if it
had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It
noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known
advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an
organization's standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant
consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities
demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its
desire to pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with
a -demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless
in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-

profit organizations with an established history of dedication to the cause and relevant
expertise to serve as official guardians ad litem on behalf of nonhuman animals interests.
The American legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and
interests of nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending these pre-existing
mechanisms to nonhuman animals are minimal compared to an interest in the proper
administration of justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals,
the legal system must recognize those statutory rights independent of humans and provide
a viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a guardianship for speechless
plaintiffs is not new and has been urged on behalf of the natural environment. Such a
model is even more compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient
beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are
qualitatively different from other legally protected nonhumans and therefore have interests
deserving direct legal protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals

threatens the integrity of the federal statutes designed to protect them, essentially
rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals would be
difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-known
example is found in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of
legislative intent to encourage civic participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law
of standing should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable
representatives of the natural environment, which includes nonhuman animals.49
49 Id.
XII. THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT OF 1998
The law that directly promotes animal welfare in the Philippines is RA 8485, as amended
by RA 10631, or the Animal Welfare Act of 1998. The purpose of the law is “to protect and promote
the welfare of all terrestrial, aquatic and marine animals in the Philippines by supervising and
regulating the establishment and operations of all facilities utilized for breeding, maintaining,
keeping, treating or training of all animals either as objects of trade or as household pets,” which
include birds.50
A. Protection of Animals: No Right or Freedom
The thrust of RA 8485 is clearly for the protection of animals. It does not give rights to
animals as subjects.
Animal welfare is defined under the special law as “the physical and psychological well-
being of animals. It includes, but is not limited to, the avoidance of abuse, maltreatment, cruelty
and exploitation of animals by humans by maintaining appropriate standards of accommodation,
feeding and general care, the prevention and treatment of disease and the assurance of freedom
from fear, distress, harassment, and unnecessary discomfort and pain, and allowing animals to
express normal behavior.”51
It is true that the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulation (Revised IRR) of Republic
Act No. 8485, otherwise known as the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, as amended by RA 10631
speaks of rights of animals and freedom of animals. The Revised IRR provides that the said Rules
and Regulations shall be “strictly construed in favor of the welfare and rights of animals by
ensuring the protection and security of their five basic freedoms”:
1) Freedom from hunger or thirst;

2) Freedom from discomfort;
3) Freedom from pain, injury or disease;
4) Freedom to express normal behavior; and
5) Freedom from fear and distress.52
However, while the Revised IRR speaks of animal’s five basic freedoms, the use of the
word “freedom” or “right” is not the equivalent of the liberty, freedom or enforceable right of man,
like freedom of speech, freedom to contract and the like. The five basic freedoms of animals are
certainly not “freedom” as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary which is “the power of acting, in the
character of a moral personality, according to the dictates of will.”53 In law, freedom refers to
freedom of persons; freedom with an active subject who will exercise the right. Freedom as the
term is being used in the Revised IRR, is actually, in effect, legally addressed to natural and
juridical persons. Natural and juridical persons are the ones who will perform the acts or
omissions; the natural persons are the ones who will avoid making the animals suffer from
hunger or thirst, discomfort, pain, injury, disease, fear and distress within the framework of the
law. While expressing normal behavior is part of the freedom of animals, this does not appear
to be an enforceable right to act but only a limitation on the rights of natural or juridical persons.
It imposes a legal duty on natural or juridical persons to respect the natural behavior of animals.
The responsibility, duty or obligation is imposed on the natural or juridical persons. Animals
50 RA 8485, § 1, as amended by RA10631.

51 Id.
52 Construction, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8485, otherwise known as the Animal Welfare
Act of 1998, as amended by RA 10631.
53 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 664, (6th Edition, 1990).
20
are not invested with personality to enforce a claim based on the “right” or “freedom” as the terms
are used in the Revised IRR.
The Revised IRR is consistent with the human responsibility framework on the treatment
of animals. There are persons who are responsible for respecting the freedom of animals. The
Revised IRR defines “Person Responsible” as “a person responsible under the Act for the care
and well-being of an animal shall be any person having ownership, charge, control, custody,
responsibility or possession of any animal, whether such ownership or charge, control, custody,
responsibility, or possession is on a permanent or temporary basis.” The Revised IRR further
provides that “a person who purchases or otherwise acquires, through donation, gift, succession,
assignment, or any other method, ownership, custody, control, or possession of an animal, shall
be regarded as a person who is responsible for the said animal’s welfare.”
B. Provisions to Promote Animal Welfare
The provisions of the special law that help promote the welfare of animals include the
following:
1) Registration of pet shop, kennel, veterinary clinic, veterinary hospital,

stockyard, corral, stud farm or stock farm or zoo for the breeding, treatment, sale or
trading, or training of animals with the Bureau of Animal Industry which issues a certificate
of registration therefor.54
2) A continuing requirement for operation of the above-mentioned

establishments that their facilities be adequate, clean and sanitary, and that they will not
be used for nor cause pain and/or suffering to the animals; 55
3) Imposing criminal liability on any person who subjects any animal to

cruelty, maltreatment or neglect; 56
4) Imposing a duty on any owner or operator of any land, air or water public
utility transporting pet, wildlife and all other animals to provide in all cases adequate, clean
and sanitary facilities for the safe conveyance and delivery thereof to their consignee at the
place of consignment. 57 They shall provide sufficient food and water for such animals while
in transit for more than twelve (12) hours or whenever necessary. 58
5) Making it unlawful for any person who has custody of an animal to

abandon the animal;59
6) Other than in the exceptional cases specified in the law there is a

prohibition on the killing of animals other than the animals specified in the law; 60
7) Even with respect to animals that are allowed to be killed, the requirement
is that humane procedures must be observed at all times. Humane procedures shall mean
54 RA 8485, § 2.
55 §2
56 §2
57 § 4.
58 § 4.
59 § 7.
60 § 6.
the use of the most scientific methods available.61
The law provides that “any form of cruelty shall be penalized even if the transporter has
obtained a permit from the Bureau of Animal Industry. Cruelty in transporting includes
overcrowding, placing of animals in the trunks or under the hood trunks of the vehicle.” 62 It is
also unlawful for any person to torture any animal, to neglect to provide adequate care,
sustenance of shelter, or maltreat any animal or to subject any dog or horse to dogfights or
horsefights, kill or cause or procure to be tortured or deprived of adequate care, sustenance or
shelter, or maltreat or use the same in research or experiments not expressly authorized by the
Committee on Animal Welfare.63
The killing of any animal other than cattle, pigs, goats, sheep, poultry, rabbits, carabaos
and horses is likewise declared unlawful except in the following instances:64
(1) When it is done as part of the religious rituals of an established religion or

sect or a ritual required by tribal or ethnic custom of indigenous cultural communities;
however, leaders shall keep records in cooperation with the Committee on Animal Welfare;
(2) When the pet animal is afflicted with an incurable communicable disease
as determined and certified by a duly licensed veterinarian;
(3) When the killing is deemed necessary to put an end to the misery suffered
by the animal as determined and certified by a duly licensed veterinarian;
(4) When it is done to prevent an imminent danger to the life or limb of a

human being;
(5) When done for the purpose of animal population control;
(6) When the animal is killed after it has been used in authorized research or
experiments; and
(7) Any other ground analogous to the foregoing as determined and certified
by a licensed veterinarian.
With respect to abandonment, the special law provides that if any person being the owner
or having charge or control of any animal shall without reasonable cause or excuse abandon it,
whether permanently or not, without providing for the care of that animal, such act shall
constitute maltreatment. If the animal is left in circumstances likely to cause the animal any
unnecessary suffering, or if this abandonment results in the death of the animal, the person
liable shall suffer the maximum penalty. Abandonment means the relinquishment of all right,
title, claim, or possession of the animal with the intention of not reclaiming it or resuming its
ownership or possession.”65
Under the special law, it is also the duty of every person to protect the natural habitat of
the wildlife. The destruction of said habitat shall be considered as a form of cruelty to animals
61 §6
62 RA 8485, § 4.
63 RA 8485, § 6, as amended by RA 10631. See Rule 6.1 of the Revised IRR for an enumeration of the examples of
acts of cruelty, abuse and maltreatment of animas and Rule 6.2 for acts that are prohibited in relation to animal fights.
64 RA 8485, § 6, as amended by RA 10631.
22
and its preservation is a way of protecting the animals. 66
On the other hand, Rule 6.3 of the Revised IRR extensively describes the duty to provide
the basic needs of animals like housing facilities that are clean, structurally sound, in good
repair, free from exposure to elements, with surfaces that are free from rusts, sufficiently heated
or cooled, and other similar conditions. Rule 6.4 thereof provides for the duty to maintain clean
and sanitary facility and receptacles. Rule 6.6 even imposes a duty to the persons responsible to
provide the opportunity to animals for exercise and play.
The penal provision of RA 8485 is Section 9 which states:
SEC. 9. Any person who subjects any animal to cruelty, maltreatment or neglect
shall, upon conviction by final judgment, be punished by imprisonment and/ or fine, as
indicated in the following graduated scale:
a. Imprisonment of one (1) year and six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2)
years and/or a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) if the animal
subjected to cruelty, maltreatment or neglect dies;
b. Imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and six (6)
months and/or a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) if the animal
subjected to cruelty, maltreatment or neglect survives but is severely injured with loss of
its natural faculty to survive on its own and needing human intervention to sustain its life;
and
c. Imprisonment of six (6) months to one (1) year and/or a fine not exceeding
Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) for subjecting any animal to cruelty, maltreatment or
neglect but without causing its death or incapacitating it to survive on its own.
If the violation is committed by a juridical person, the officer responsible thereof

shall serve the imprisonment. If the violation is committed by an alien, he or she shall be
immediately deported after the service of sentence without any further proceeding.
The foregoing penalties shall also apply for any other violation of this Act,
depending upon the effect or result of the act or omission as defined in the immediately
preceding sections.
However, regardless of the resulting condition to the animal/s, the penalty of two
(2) years and one (1) day to three (3) years and/or a fine not exceeding Two hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P250,000.00) shall be imposed if the offense is committed by any of the
following: (1) a syndicate; (2) an offender who makes business out of cruelty to an animal;
(3) a public officer or employee; or (4) where at least three (3) animals are involved.
In any of the foregoing situations, the offender shall suffer subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency and the inability to pay the fine. (As amended/inserted
by R.A. No. 10631 dated June 6, 2013)
XIII. UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF ANIMALS
The enjoyment of property like animals can be subject to regulation in the exercise of the
police power of the State. Police power may even be used for the purpose of protecting animals.
For example, Republic Act No. 7586 otherwise known as the "National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) which

encompassed “outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are
habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related
ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as ‘protected
areas.’”67 Another example is Republic Act No. 9147, otherwise known as the "Wildlife Resources
Conservation and Protection Act" which implements the policy of the the State to “conserve the
country's wildlife resources and their habitats for sustainability.” 68
However, any protection that will be given to animals should necessarily not be
constitutionally infirm. In United States v. Toribio,69 the Supreme Court cited Com. v. Alger70
where it was explained:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil

society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title,
holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
United States v. Toribio71 involved a law that regulated the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law as a valid
exercise of police power. The purpose of the law was to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. The Court observed that carabaos were
becoming scarce at the time the law was passed. The Court held:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals...
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court72 involved a petition to declare Executive Order No.
626-A unconstitutional. The thrust of the petition in the said case is “that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries. The petitioner claims that the penalty is invalid
because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process.” It was explained that the Executive Order was
issued in the exercise of police power. It was noted that the “Whereas Clause” provides that
“present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.” The Court affirmed “the need for such a
measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms
on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had
not taken steps to protect and preserve them.” However, despite such need for protection, the
Court through Justice Isagani Cruz found the Executive Order unconstitutional although the
67 Rep. Act No. 7586, sec 2.
68 Rep. Act No. 9147, sec 2.
69 G.R. No. L-5060, January 26, 2010, 15 Phil. 85.
70 7 Cush., 53, 84.

71 15 Phil. 85 (1910).
72 G.R. No. 74457, Mar. 20, 1987.
24
Executive Order dealt with a lawful subject:
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant
promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property
of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they
thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is
now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede
in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers,
benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is
entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of
fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those
who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half
must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement
each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of
the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based
on less than this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is
tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the
jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty
to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared
that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the
land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person
are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance,
would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be
sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example,
bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately
presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditious action will justify
omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad
dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to
the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person
sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the
country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the
public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such instances, previous
judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of
the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear
and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined
as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is
described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three
inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual,
as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before
he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in
practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some
relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est
suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
***
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as
the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the
second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter
of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province
to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between
the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing.
***
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
XIV. LEGAL STANDING: PERSONALITY TO SUE AS PLAINTIFF
This issue on the legal standing of animals was extensively discussed in the majority
opinion and the concurring opinion in Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon
Straits v. Secretary Angelo Reyes.73 The basic rule is provided under Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that “only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.” As noted earlier, animals are not persons
within the contemplation of Article 44 of the New Civil Code. Hence, they cannot file cases under
the rules.
It was also explained that cases cannot be filed by animal rights advocates under Section
2 of Rule 3 or as representative actions in behalf of animals under Section 3 of Rule 3. The
Supreme Court explained that:
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give
animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict
requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties
to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further
necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed
by a representative . . .
However, the Supreme Court explained that it is no longer necessary to confer legal
standing to animals because of the liberalized approach in environmental cases. The Supreme
Court ruled:
73 G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527, Apr. 21, 2015.
26
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not
only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty
for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring
actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many
environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she
would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach.74 While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not
progressed as far as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects,
the current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access
in environmental cases.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward
of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that
the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their
petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident
Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
It should be noted however in this connection that the law and rules may actually provide
animals with limited personality for purposes of filing cases. Just like corporations with artificial
personality, animals can be given such limited artificial personality for purposes of allowing the
filing of cases for their own protection especially cases that are not environmental cases. It
should be noted that there is precedent for this because even things that are not juridical persons
can be allowed to be a party in a case. As an example, due to the special nature of Maritime Law,
vessels can be specified as a party in a case. Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1521 otherwise
known as “The Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978” provides that a lien may be enforced in a suit in
admiralty, wherein the vessel itself may be made a party defendant. In the same manner,
Congress may likewise pass a law that allows any interested party to file a case in the name of
an animal for the limited purpose of protecting the animal from cruelty or negligence.
XV. THE PROBLEM OF SELECTION
George Orwell’s Animal Farm involves animals who rose up to protest against men. In
Chapter 1, while Major, the boar who led them, was giving his speech, four large rats crept out
of their hole and listened to the speech only to be chased by the dogs who were present during
the meeting. Major however “raised his trotter for silence” and said:
‘Comrades,’ he said, ‘here is the point that must be settled. The wild creatures,
such as rats and rabbits – are they our friends or our enemies? Let us put it to the vote. I
propose this question to the meeting: Are rats comrades?
The vote was taken at once, and it was agreed by an overwhelming majority that
rats were comrades. There were only four dissenters, the three dogs and the cat, who was
afterwards discovered to have voted on both sides. . .75
Major went on to say that animals, whether weak or strong, clever or simple, are all
brothers. He said: “All animals are equal.” However, George Orwell’s allegory reveals one basic
problem regarding animal rights. Even animals voted to include rats as comrades. They choose
to include them. One threshold problem then is to determine which of the animals should be
given rights.
74 See § 4, Rule 2 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, stating who may file under the rules and § 5,
defining a citizen suit.
75 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 6 (Everyman’s Library ed.)
Present legal rules do not treat animals as absolutely equal. For instance, only the killing
of cattle, pigs, goats, sheep, poultry, rabbits, carabaos and horses is allowed under Section 6 of
RA 8485 as amended by RA 10631. Deer and crocodiles were previously included in the list of
animals that can be killed under Section 6 before the law was amended by RA 10631 but the
amendatory law removed those animals from the list. Killing may not be consistent with animal
welfare except if done under exceptional circumstances for certain animals.
Indeed, there is even an issue regarding the creatures that are included in the definition
of animals under the Revised IRR. It is an issue if cockroaches, mosquitoes and insects are
sentient creatures if it can be established that they have emotions.76 Rats are clearly sentient
creatures within the meaning of the Revised IRR. However, field mice are used for food in some
areas in the Philippines while house rats are considered pests that are often trapped and killed.
Frogs likewise suffer the same fate, they are treated as both food and pests. Legal theorists and
philosophers have been debating about this problem for a long time but there is still no end to
this debate.77
CONCLUSION
Animals are considered properties in civil law. They are objects rather than subjects of
rights. The New Civil Code and other laws contain provisions addressing legal problems involving
animals. The special nature of animals and their importance to human activities like agriculture
necessitated specific provisions on animals with respect to possession, accretion, sale, pledge,
usufruct and other areas of law. In fact, under the present legal framework, the special nature
of animals can result in a treatment that is different from the treatment of other properties in
deciding cases. Thus, animals may be treated differently in cases that involve the determination
of the amount of recoverable damages or the presence of negligence or in the valuation of animals
in criminal cases.
Since animals are not subject of rights, it follows that they have no legal standing in Court
to file civil actions. They cannot likewise be represented in court in representative actions
because of the requirement that the party in whose name the case will be initiated is a real party-
in-interest. However, as the High Court extensively discussed in the majority opinion and the
concurring opinion in Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Straits v.
Secretary Angelo Reyes,78 the need to provide legal standing to animals “has been eliminated by
our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws.”
While animals are not the active subject of rights, the law gives protection to animals
under RA 8485 as amended by RA 10631 otherwise known as the “Animal Welfare Act of 1998.”
In a sense, the Animal Welfare Act of 1998 and its implementing rules as well as other special
laws providing for animal protection already elevated animals to a level that is higher than other
personal properties. The provisions of present laws, including the New Civil Code, that use the
terms “property” or “goods” are already deemed modified with respect to animals because of the
special rules provided under the Animal Welfare Act of 1998.
76 See Scientific American, I’ll Be There for You: Do Insects Feel Emotions?,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/i-ll-bee-there-for-you-do-insects-feel-emotions (last accessed Apr. 6, 2018).
77 Sunstein, supra note 40.
78 G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527, Apr. 21, 2015.
28
However, there are issues that are still unresolved in the implementation of the Animal
Welfare Act of 1998. For example, the meaning of animal itself is still subject to interpretation.
The term animal is still burdened by semantic ambivalence. Although the Revised IRR of the
special law provides for the definition of animals, such definition is not absolutely clear as to
which creatures fall under the term animal. Even if there is no doubt that certain creatures are
animals, it is still a question if all animals are included in the specific provisions of the special
law which use the word animal in general terms. The Court may eventually settle controversies
involving the interpretation of general statements about animals under the law or Congress may
pass laws that will clarify these issues. In the meantime, an effort to promote public awareness
about the present rules and views on animal “rights” and protection, as well as a continuing
healthy informed debate on the issues, will certainly help the courts and the legislators in
eventually solving conceptual problems and in improving the present laws concerning animals.
-oOo-

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ANIMALS IN PHILIPPINE LAW*

II. ANIMALS IN ROMAN LAW

III. LEGAL DEFINITION

6 BARRY NICHOLAS, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 105 (1962 ed.).

a) Aquatic animals - all life stages of fish, mollusks, crustaceans and

b) Marine mammals - refer to a group of animals that are warm-blooded, have

IV. NEW CIVIL CODE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY AS OBJECT OF RIGHTS

15 BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 62 (2011 ed.).

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to

Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.

A. Animals as Real or Personal Properties

B. Animals as Object of Ownership

21 CIVIL CODE, art. 712.

Accession is not a mode of acquiring ownership, but an attribute of ownership. Hence,

D. Animals as Object of Possession

Art. 591. If the usufruct be constituted on a flock or herd of livestock, the

Should the usufruct be on sterile animals, it shall be considered, with respect to

V. OTHER PROVISIONS UNDER THE NEW CIVIL CODE

B. Easements Relating to Animals

C. Provisions on Sale Involving Animals

D. Necessary Deposit of Animals

VII. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY ANIMALS

In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries

VIII. EFFECTS OF ANIMALS ON THE DETERMINATION OF NEGLIGENCE

25 G.R. No. L-2789, Feb. 27, 1906.

Hence, the determination of the presence or absence of negligence necessitates the

28 G.R. No. L-14827, Oct. 31, 1960.

IX. DAMAGE CAUSED TO ANIMALS

A person who is wrongfully deprived wholly or in part of his property is entitled to

29 Supra note 26.

X. ANIMALS IN CRIMINAL LAW

In deciding the case on appeal the supreme court of Alabama said:

It was immaterial whether Phillips had paid, or offered to pay,

The subject of the allegation and proof of ownership in cases of

32 United States v. Simbahan, G.R. No. L-6469, Mar. 18, 1911.

The concept of possession of animals may be determinative of the result of a criminal

34 United States v. Gumarang, G.R. No. L-9267, Mar. 2, 1914.

35 G.R. No. L-14207, May 30, 1962.

XI. LEGAL THEORIES ON ANIMALS AS OBJECT OR SUBJECT OF RIGHTS

Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman

This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-

Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals

XII. THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT OF 1998

A. Protection of Animals: No Right or Freedom

1) Freedom from hunger or thirst;

50 RA 8485, § 1, as amended by RA10631.

B. Provisions to Promote Animal Welfare

1) Registration of pet shop, kennel, veterinary clinic, veterinary hospital,

2) A continuing requirement for operation of the above-mentioned

3) Imposing criminal liability on any person who subjects any animal to

5) Making it unlawful for any person who has custody of an animal to

6) Other than in the exceptional cases specified in the law there is a

the use of the most scientific methods available.61

(1) When it is done as part of the religious rituals of an established religion or

(4) When it is done to prevent an imminent danger to the life or limb of a

(5) When done for the purpose of animal population control;

and its preservation is a way of protecting the animals. 66

The penal provision of RA 8485 is Section 9 which states:

If the violation is committed by a juridical person, the officer responsible thereof

In any of the foregoing situations, the offender shall suffer subsidiary

XIII. UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF ANIMALS