against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of
G.R. No. 116290 December 8,
2000
DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
LEONOR LOZANO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision dated June
30, 1994 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 555-
89, of petitioner’s complaint for recovery of
possession with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages.
The undisputed facts of the case are as
follows:
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the
registered owner of Lot No. 415, a 146,900
square meter agricultural land situated in Ma-
a, Davao City under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-15757 particularly described as
follows:
…Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. 419 and
416; on the SE by the Davao River; on the
SE., (sic) by Lots Nos. 1092 and 1091; and
on the NW., by Lots Nos. 413 and 418…1
Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a
registered parcel of land located across and
opposite the southeast portion of petitioner’s
lot facing the Davao River. Lozano acquired
and occupied her property in 1962 when his
wife inherited the land from her father who
died that year.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint2
for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages
Bagaipo also presented Godofredo Corias, a
possession by Lozano of a certain portion of
land measuring 29,162 square meters which
is supposedly included in the area belonging
to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and (2)
the recovery of a land area measuring
37,901 square meters which Bagaipo
allegedly lost when the Davao River
traversed her property. Bagaipo contended
that as a result of a change in course of the
said river, her property became divided into
three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and
415-C.
In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a
resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the
trial court a survey plan3 prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno. The
survey plan allegedly showed that: a) the
area presently occupied by Bagaipo,
identified as Lot 415-A, now had an area of
only 79,843 square meters; b) Lot 415-B,
with an area measuring 37,901 square
meters, which cut across Bagaipo’s land was
taken up by the new course of the Davao
River; and c) an area of 29,162 square
meters designated as Lot 415-C was illegally
occupied by respondent Lozano. The
combined area of the lots described by
Engineer Magno in the survey plan tallied
with the technical description of Bagaipo’s
land under TCT No. T-15757. Magno
concluded that the land presently located
across the river and parallel to Bagaipo’s
property still belonged to the latter and not to
Lozano, who planted some 350 fruit-bearing
trees on Lot 415-C and the old abandoned
river bed.
former barangay captain and long-time
resident of Ma-a to prove her claim that the
Davao River had indeed changed its course.
Corias testified that the occurrence was
caused by a big flood in 1968 and a bamboo
grove which used to indicate the position of
the river was washed away. The river which
flowed previously in front of a chapel located
15 meters away from the riverbank within
Bagaipo’s property now flowed behind it.
Corias was also present when Magno
conducted the relocation survey in 1988.
For his part, Lozano insisted that the land
claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion
to their titled property. He asserted that the
Davao River did not change its course and
that the reduction in Bagaipo’s domain was
caused by gradual erosion due to the current
of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is
also because of the river’s natural action that
silt slowly deposited and added to his land
over a long period of time. He further averred
that this accretion continues up to the
present and that registration proceedings
instituted by him over the alluvial formation
could not be concluded precisely because it
continued to increase in size.
Lozano presented three witnesses: Atty.
Pedro Castillo, his brother-in-law; Cabitunga
Pasanday, a tenant of Atty. Castillo; and
Alamin Catucag, a tenant of the Lozanos.
Atty. Castillo testified that the land occupied
by the Lozanos was transferred to his sister,
Ramona when they extra-judicially
partitioned their parents’ property upon his
father’s death. On September 9, 1973, Atty.
Castillo filed a land registration case
involving the accretion which formed on the
property and submitted for this purpose, a
survey plan4 approved by the Bureau of
Lands as well as tax declarations5 covering
the said accretion. An Order of General
Default6 was already issued in the land
registration case on November 5, 1975, but
the case itself remained pending since the
petition had to be amended to include the
continuing addition to the land area.
Mr. Cabitunga Pasanday testified that he has
continuously worked on the land as tenant of
the Castillos since 1925, tilling an area of
about 3 hectares. However, the land he tilled
located opposite the land of the Lozanos and
adjacent to the Davao River has decreased
over the years to its present size of about 1
hectare. He said the soil on the bank of the
river, as well as coconut trees he planted
would be carried away each time there was
a flood. This similar erosion occurs on the
properties of Bagaipo and a certain Dr.
Rodriguez, since the elevation of the
riverbank on their properties is higher than
the elevation on Lozano’s side.
Alamin Catucag testified that he has been a
tenant of the Castillos since 1939 and that
the portion he occupies was given to
Ramona, Lozano’s wife. It was only 1 hectare
in 1939 but has increased to 3 hectares due
to soil deposits from the mountains and river.
Catucag said that Bagaipo’s property was
reduced to half since it is in the curve of the
river and its soil erodes and gets carried
away by river water.
On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an
ocular inspection. It concluded that the
applicable law is Article 4577 . To the owners
of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.7
of the New Civil Code and not Art. 4618 The
reduction in the land area of plaintiff was
caused by erosion and not by a change in
course of the Davao River. Conformably
then, the trial court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court and decreed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
plaintiff-appellant.9
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
erred in:
....NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO
THE RELOCATION SURVEY (EXHIBIT "B")
PREPARED BY LICENSED GEODETIC
ENGINEER GERSACIO MAGNO. THE
CASE OF "DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS.
HEIRS OF JUANA CAROLINA" 140 SCRA
396 CITED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT
IN DISREGARDING EXHIBIT "B" IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
....NOT FINDING THAT ASSUMING
WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE
QUESTIONED LOT 415-C (EXHIBIT "B-1")
OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT LEONOR
LOZANO WAS THE RESULT OF AN
ACCRETION, THE PRINCIPLE OF
ACCRETION CANNOT AND DOES NOT
APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE TO FAVOR
SAID RESPONDENT BECAUSE SAID LOT
415-C IS WITHIN AND FORM PART OF
PETITIONER’S LAND DESCRIBED IN TCT
NO. 15757 (EXHIBIT "A")
....FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF
LACHES WHEN SHE INSTITUTED THE
SUIT.
....NOT ORDERING RESPONDENT
LEONOR LOZANO TO VACATE AND
SURRENDER LOT 415-C IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER AND FOR HIM TO PAY
PETITIONER DAMAGES FOR ITS
UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION THEREOF.
....NOT HOLDING PETITIONER ENTITLED
TO THE ABANDONED RIVER BED.10
For this Court’s resolution are the following
issues: Did the trial court err in holding that
there was no change in course of the Davao
River such that petitioner owns the
abandoned river bed pursuant to Article 461
of the Civil Code? Did private respondent
own Lot 415-C in accordance with the
principle of accretion under Article 457?
Should the relocation survey prepared by a
licensed geodetic engineer be disregarded
since it was not approved by the Director of
Lands? Is petitioner’s claim barred by
laches?
On the first issue. The trial court and the
appellate court both found that the decrease
in land area was brought about by erosion
and not a change in the river’s course. This
conclusion was reached after the trial judge
observed during ocular inspection that the
banks located on petitioner’s land are sharp,
craggy and very much higher than the land
on the other side of the river. Additionally, the
riverbank on respondent’s side is lower and
gently sloping. The lower land therefore
naturally received the alluvial soil carried by
the river current.11 These findings are factual,
thus conclusive on this Court, unless there
are strong and exceptional reasons, or they
are unsupported by the evidence on record,
or the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.12 These factual
findings are based on an ocular inspection of
the judge and convincing testimonies, and
we find no convincing reason to disregard or
disbelieve them.
The decrease in petitioner’s land area and
the corresponding expansion of
respondent’s property were the combined
effect of erosion and accretion respectively.
Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the
old abandoned riverbed because the same is
inexistent. The riverbed’s former location
cannot even be pinpointed with particularity
since the movement of the Davao River took
place gradually over an unspecified period of
time, up to the present.
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits
a riparian owner when the following
requisites are present: 1) That the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted
from the effects of the current of the water;
and 3) That the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of the river.13
These requisites were sufficiently proven in
favor of respondents. In the absence of
evidence that the change in the course of the
river was sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion, the presumption is that the change
was gradual and was caused by alluvium and
erosion.14
As to Lot 415-C, which petitioner insists
forms part of her property under TCT No. T-
15757, it is well to recall our holding in C.N.
Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, 135:
… The fact that the accretion to his land used
to pertain to plaintiff’s estate, which is
covered by a Torrens certificate of title,
cannot preclude him (defendant) from being
the owner thereof. Registration does not
protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the
adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks
of rivers may gradually receive from the
effect of the current become the property of
the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the old
Civil Code; Art. 457 of the new). Such
accretions are natural incidents to land
bordering on running streams and the
provisions of the Civil Code in that respect
are not affected by the Land Registration
Act.15
Petitioner did not demonstrate that Lot 415-
C allegedly comprising 29,162 square
meters was within the boundaries of her titled
property. The survey plan commissioned by
petitioner which was not approved by the
Director of Lands was properly discounted by
the appellate court. In Titong vs. Court of
Appeals16 we affirmed the trial court’s refusal
to give probative value to a private survey
plan and held thus:
…the plan was not verified and approved by
the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec.
28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the
Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of
Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private
surveyors send their original field notes,
computations, reports, surveys, maps and
plots regarding a piece of property to the
Bureau of Lands for verification and
approval.1âwphi1 A survey plan not verified
and approved by said Bureau is nothing
more than a private writing, the due
execution and authenticity of which must be
proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance
that the plan was admitted in evidence
without any objection as to its due execution
and authenticity does not signify that the
courts shall give probative value therefor. To
admit evidence and not to believe it
subsequently are not contradictory to each
other…
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer
necessary now to discuss the defense of
laches. It is mooted by the disquisition on the
foregoing issues.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated
June 30, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G. R. CV No. 37615, sustaining the
judgment of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184746 August 8, 2012
SPOUSES CRISPIN GALANG and
CARlOAD GALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES CONRADO S. REYES AND FE
DE KASTRO REYES (As substituted by
their legal heir: Hermenigildo K. Reyes),
Respondents.
REYES,*
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the
April 9, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its October 6, 2008
Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV. No. 85660.
The Facts
On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S.
Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (the
Reyeses) filed a case for the annulment of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928
against spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang
(the Galangs) with the Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo, Rizal (RTC),docketed as Civil Case
No. 97-4560.
In their Complaint,3 the Reyeses alleged that
they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision
project known as Ponderosa Heights
Subdivision (Ponderosa), and (2) an
adjoining property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 185252, with an
area of 1,201 sq.m.;4 that the properties were
separated by the Marigman Creek, which
dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed
its course and passed through Ponderosa;
that the Galangs, by employing manipulation
and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of
title over the dried up creek bed from the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), through its Provincial
Office (PENRO); that, specifically, the
property was denominated as Lot 5735, Cad
29 Ext., Case-1, with an area of 1,573 sq.m.
covered by OCT No. P-928; that they
discovered the existence of the certificate of
title sometime in March 1997 when their
caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso),
informed them that the subject property had
been fraudulently titled in the names of the
Galangs; that in 1984, prior to such
discovery, Enteroso applied for the titling of
the property, as he had been occupying it
since 1968 and had built his house on it; that,
later, Enteroso requested them to continue
the application because of financial
constraints on his part;5 that they continued
the application, but later learned that the
application papers were lost in the
Assessor’s Office;6 and that as the owners of
the land where the new course of water
passed, they are entitled to the ownership of
the property to compensate them for the loss
of the land being occupied by the new creek.
The Galangs in their Answer7 denied that the
land subject of the complaint was part of a
creek and countered that OCT No. P-928
was issued to them after they had complied
with the free patent requirements of the
DENR, through the PENRO; that they and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in
possession, occupation, cultivation, and
ownership of the land for quite some time;
that the property described under TCT No.
185252 belonged to Apolonio Galang, their
predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No.
3991; that the property was transferred in the
names of the Reyeses through falsified
document;8 that assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the creek had indeed
changed its course and passed through
Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already
claimed for themselves the portion of the
dried creek which adjoined and co-existed
with their property; that Enteroso was able to
occupy a portion of their land by means of
force, coercion, machinations, and stealth in
1981; that such unlawful entry was then the
subject of an Accion Publiciana before the
RTC of Antipolo City (Branch 72); and that at
the time of the filing of the Complaint, the
matter was still subject of an appeal before
the CA, under CA-G.R. CV No. 53509.
The RTC Decision
In its Decision,9 dated July 16, 2004, the RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action and for being an erroneous remedy.
The RTC stated that a title issued upon a
patent may be annulled only on grounds of
actual and intrinsic fraud, which much consist
of an intentional omission of fact required by
law to be stated in the application or willful
statement of a claim against the truth. In the
case before the trial court, the Reyeses
presented no evidence of fraud despite their
allegations that the Galangs were not in
possession of the property and that it was
part of a dried creek. There being no
evidence, these contentions remained
allegations and could not defeat the title of
the Galangs. The RTC wrote:
A title issued upon patent may
be annulled only on ground of
actual fraud.
 Such fraud must consist [of] an
intentional omission of fact
required by law to be stated in
the application or willful
statement of a claim against the
truth. It must show some specific
facts intended to deceive and
deprive another of his right. The
fraud must be actual and
intrinsic, not merely constructive
or intrinsic; the evidence thereof
must be clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant,
because the proceedings which
are being assailed as having
been fraudulent are judicial
proceedings, which by law, are
presumed to have been fair and
regular. (Libudan v. Palma Gil
45 SCRA 17)
However, aside from allegations
that defendant Galang is not in
possession of the property and
that the property was part of a
dried creek, no other sufficient
evidence of fraud was presented
by the plaintiffs. They have,
thus, remained allegations,
which cannot defeat the
defendants title.10
The RTC added that the land, having been
acquired through a homestead patent, was
presumably public land. Therefore, only the
State can institute an action for the
annulment of the title covering it.
It further opined that because the Reyeses Hence, this petition.
claimed to have acquired the property by
right of accretion, they should have filed an Issues
action for reconveyance, explaining "[t]hat The Galangs present, as warranting a review
the remedy of persons whose property had of the questioned CA decision, the following
been wrongly or erroneously registered in grounds:
another’s name is not to set aside the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
decree/title, but an action for reconveyance,
APPEALS COMMITTED
or if the property has passed into the hands
GRAVE ABUSE OF
of an innocent purchaser for value, an action
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
for damages."11
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
The Court of Appeals Decision
NOT RESOLVING THAT THE
In its Decision, dated April 9, 2008, the CA
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
GENERAL, NOT THE
ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-928
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS,
and the reconveyance of the land to the
HAS THE SOLE AUTHORITY
Reyeses.
TO FILE [CASES FOR]
The CA found that the Reyeses had proven
ANNULMENT OF TITLE
by preponderance of evidence that the
INVOLVING PUBLIC LAND.
subject land was a portion of the creek bed
that was abandoned through the natural THE HONORABLE COURT OF
change in the course of the water, which had APPEALS COMMITTED
now traversed a portion of Ponderosa. As GRAVE ABUSE OF
owners of the land occupied by the new DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
course of the creek, the Reyeses had LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
become the owners of the abandoned creek HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
bed ipso facto. Inasmuch as the subject land RESPONDENTS HAVE [A]
had become private, a free patent issued CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
over it was null and void and produced no PETITIONERS EVEN
legal effect whatsoever. A posteriori, the free WITHOUT EXHAUSTION OF
patent covering the subject land, a private ADMINISTRATIVE
land, and the certificate of title issued REMED[IES].
pursuant thereto, are null and void.12
The Galangs moved for a reconsideration,13 THE HONORABLE COURT OF
but their motion was denied in a Resolution APPEALS COMMITTED
dated October 6, 2008. GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
 LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
DEVIATING FROM THE
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND
INTERPRETING ARTICLE 420
IN RELATION TO ARTICLE
461 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES BY
SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN
OPINION BASED ON
ASSUMPTION OF FACTS.14
A reading of the records discloses that these
can be synthesized into two principal issues,
to wit: (1) whether the Reyeses can file the
present action for annulment of a free patent
title and reconveyance; and (2) if they can,
whether they were able to prove their cause
of action against the Galangs.
The Court’s Ruling
Regarding the first issue, the Galangs state
that the property was formerly a public land,
titled in their names by virtue of Free Patent
No. 045802-96-2847 issued by the DENR.
Thus, they posit that the Reyeses do not
have the personality and authority to institute
any action for annulment of title because
such authority is vested in the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General.15
In this regard, the Galangs are mistaken. The
action filed by the Reyeses seeks the
transfer to their names of the title registered
in the names of the Galangs. In their
Complaint, they alleged that: first, they are
the owners of the land, being the owners of
the properties through which the Marigman
creek passed when it changed its course;
and second, the Galangs illegally
dispossessed them by having the same
property registered in their names. It was not
an action for reversion which requires that
the State be the one to initiate the action in
order for it to prosper. The distinction
between the two actions was elucidated in
the case of Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of
Dacut,16 where it was written:
An ordinary civil action for
declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title
is not the same as an action
for reversion. The difference
between them lies in the
allegations as to the character of
ownership of the realty whose
title is sought to be nullified. In
an action for reversion, the
pertinent allegations in the
complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed
land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga
where the plaintiff in his
complaint admits that he has no
right to demand the cancellation
or amendment of the
defendant’s title because even if
the title were cancelled or
amended the ownership of the
land embraced therein or of the
portion affected by the
amendment would revert to the
public domain, we ruled that the
action was for reversion and that
the only person or entity entitled
to relief would be the Director of
Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of
action for declaration of
nullity of free patent and
certificate of title would
require allegations of the
plaintiff’s ownership of the
contested lot prior to the
issuance of such free patent
and certificate of title as well
as the defendant’s fraud or
mistake; as the case may be,
in successfully obtaining
these documents of title over
the parcel of land claimed by
plaintiff. In such a case, the
nullity arises strictly not from the
fraud or deceit but from the fact
that the land is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands to bestow and whatever
patent or certificate of title
obtained therefor is
consequently void ab initio. The
real party in interest is not the
State but the plaintiff who
alleges a pre-existing right of
ownership over the parcel of
land in question even before
the grant of title to the
defendant. In Heirs of Marciano
Nagano v. Court of Appeals we
ruled –
x x x x from the out evidentiary parcels of
allegations in the matters. It would agricultural lands
complaint x x x have been entirely herein particularly
private respondents different if the described as
claim ownership of action were clearly follows [technical
the 2,250 square for reversion, in description of Lot
meter portion for which case, it would 1017 and Lot 1015
having possessed it have to be instituted x x x x 3. That
in the concept of an by the Solicitor plaintiffs became
owner, openly, General pursuant to absolute and
peacefully, publicly, Section 101 of C.A. exclusive owners of
continuously and No. 141 x x x x the abovesaid
adversely since parcels of land by
1920. This claim is It is obvious that private virtue of inheritance
an assertion that respondents allege in their from their late
the lot is private complaint all the facts necessary father, Honorio
land x x x x to seek the nullification of the Dacut, who in turn
Consequently, free patents as well as the acquired the same
merely on the basis certificates of title covering Lot from a certain
of the allegations in 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they Blasito Yacapin and
the complaint, the are the real parties in interest in from then on was in
lot in question is light of their allegations that they possession thereof
apparently beyond have always been the owners exclusively,
the jurisdiction of and possessors of the two (2) adversely and in the
the Director of the parcels of land even prior to the concept of owner
Bureau of Lands issuance of the documents of for more than thirty
and could not be title in petitioners’ favor, hence (30) years x x x x 4.
the subject of a the latter could only have That recently,
Free Patent. committed fraud in securing plaintiff discovered
Hence, the them – that defendants,
dismissal of private without the
x x x x That plaintiffs
respondents’ knowledge and
are absolute and
complaint was consent of the
exclusive owners
premature and trial former, fraudulently
and in actual
on the merits applied for patent
possession and
should have been the said parcels of
cultivation of two
conducted to thresh land and as a result
thereof certificates private property x x reconveyance, it is settled that
of titles had been xx in this kind of action the free
issued to them as patent and the certificate of title
evidenced by It is not essential for private are respected as
certificate of title respondents to specifically state incontrovertible. What is
No. P-19819 in the in the complaint the actual date sought instead is the transfer
name of the Hrs. of when they became owners and of the property, in this case
Ambrocio possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot the title thereof, which has
Kionisala, and No. 1017. The allegations to the been wrongfully or
P- 20229 in the effect that they were so erroneously registered in the
name of Isabel preceding the issuance of the defendant’s name. All that
Kionisala x x x x 5. free patents and the certificates must be alleged in the
That the patents of title, i.e., "the Department of complaint are two (2) facts
issued to Environment and Natural which admitting them to be
defendants are null Resources not having any true would entitle the plaintiff
and void, the same jurisdiction on the properties the to recover title to the disputed
having been issued same not being anymore public land, namely, (1) that the
fraudulently, but already private property," plaintiff was the owner of the
defendants not are unquestionably adequate as land and, (2) that the
having been and/or a matter of pleading to oust the defendant had illegally
in actual State of jurisdiction to grant the dispossessed him of the
possession of the lots in question to petitioners. If same.
litigated properties at all, the oversight in not
and the statement alleging the actual date when We rule that private respondents
they may have private respondents’ ownership have sufficiently pleaded (in
made in their thereof accrued reflects a mere addition to the cause of action
application are false deficiency in details which does for declaration of free patents
and without basis in not amount to a failure to state a and certificates of title) an action
fact, and, the cause of action. The remedy for for reconveyance, more
Department of such deficiency would not be a specifically, one which is based
Environment and motion to dismiss but a motion on implied trust. An implied trust
Natural Resources for bill of particulars so as to arises where the defendant (or
not having any enable the filing of appropriate in this case petitioners) allegedly
jurisdiction on the responsive pleadings. acquires the disputed property
properties the same through mistake or fraud so that
With respect to the purported he (or they) would be bound to
not being anymore
cause of action for hold and reconvey the property
public but already
 for the benefit of the person who
is truly entitled to it. In the
complaint, private respondents
clearly assert that they have
long been the absolute and
exclusive owners and in actual
possession and cultivation of Lot
1015 and Lot 1017 and that they
were fraudulently deprived of
ownership thereof when
petitioners obtained free patents
and certificates of title in their
names. These allegations
certainly measure up to the
requisite statement of facts to
constitute an action for
reconveyance.17 [Emphases
supplied]
In this case, the complaint instituted by the
Reyeses before the RTC was for the
annulment of the title issued to the Galangs,
and not for reversion. Thus, the real party in
interest here is not the State but the Reyeses
who claim a right of ownership over the
property in question even before the
issuance of a title in favor of the Galangs.
Although the Reyeses have the right to file
an action for reconveyance, they have failed
to prove their case. Thus, on the second
issue, the Court agrees with the RTC that the
Reyeses failed to adduce substantial
evidence to establish their allegation that the
Galangs had fraudulently registered the
subject property in their names.
The CA reversed the RTC decision giving the
reason that the property was the former bed
of Marigman Creek, which changed its
course and passed through their Ponderosa
property, thus, ownership of the subject
property was automatically vested in them.
The law in this regard is covered by Article
461 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 461. River beds which are
abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the
owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost.
However, the owners of the
lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the
same by paying the value
thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area
occupied by the new bed.
If indeed a property was the former bed of a
creek that changed its course and passed
through the property of the claimant, then,
pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the
old bed left to dry by the change of course
was automatically acquired by the claimant.18
Before such a conclusion can be reached,
the fact of natural abandonment of the old
course must be shown, that is, it must be
proven that the creek indeed changed its
course without artificial or man-made
intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case
the Reyeses, must prove three key elements
by clear and convincing evidence. These are:
(1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new
course of the creek, and (3) the change of
course of the creek from the old location to
the new location by natural occurrence.
In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce
indubitable evidence to prove the old course,
its natural abandonment and the new course.
In the face of a Torrens title issued by the
government, which is presumed to have
been regularly issued, the evidence of the
Reyeses was clearly wanting.
Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not
suffice to convince the Court to order the
reconveyance of the property to them. This
failure did not escape the observation of the
Office of the Solicitor General. Thus, it
commented:
In the case at bar, it is not clear
whether or not the Marigman
Creek dried-up naturally back
in 1980. Neither did private
respondents submit any findings
or report from the Bureau of
Lands or the DENR Regional
Executive Director, who has the
jurisdiction over the subject lot,
regarding the nature of change
in the course of the creek’s
waters. Worse, what is even
uncertain in the present case is
the exact location of the subject
matter of dispute. This is evident
from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court which failed
to specify which portion of the
land is actually being disputed
by the contending parties.
xxx
Since the propriety of the
remedy taken by private
respondents in the trial court and
their legal personality to file the
aforesaid action depends on
whether or not the litigated
property in the present case still
forms part of the public domain,
or had already been converted
into a private land, the
identification of the actual
portion of the land subject of
the controversy becomes
necessary and indispensable
in deciding the issues herein
involved.
xxx
Notably, private respondents
failed to submit during trial any
convincing proof of a similar
declaration by the government
that a portion of the Marigman
Creek had already dried-up and
that the same is already
considered alienable and
disposable agricultural land
which they could acquire
through acquisitive prescription.
Indeed, a thorough investigation
is very imperative in the light of
the conflicting factual issues as
to the character and actual
location of the property in
dispute. These factual issues
could properly be resolved by
the DENR and the Land
Management Bureau, which
have the authority to do so and
have the duty to carry out the
provisions of the Public Land
Act, after both parties have been
fully given the chance to present
all their evidence.19 [Emphases
supplied]
Moreover, during cross-examination,
Conrado S. Reyes admitted that the plan
surveyed for Fe de Castro Reyes and Jose
de Castro, marked before the RTC as Exhibit
"A-2," was prepared by a geodetic engineer
without conducting an actual survey on the
ground:
COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANTS:
I am showing to you Exhibit "A-
2" which is a plan surveyed for
Fe de Kastro Reyes and Jose de
Kastro. This plan was prepared
by the geodetic engineer without
conducting actual survey on the
ground, is it not?
A: I cannot agree to that
question.
Q: But based on the certification
of the geodetic engineer, who
prepared this it appears that this
plan was plotted only based on
the certification on this plan
marked as Exhibit "A-2", is it
not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, based on this certification
that the geodetic engineer
conducted the survey of this
plan based on the technical
description without conducting
actual survey on the ground?
A: Yes, sir.20
At some point, Mr. Reyes admitted that he
was not sure that the property even existed:
COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANTS:
The subject matter of this
document Exhibit I is that, that
property which at present is
titled in the name of Fe de
Castro Reyes married to
Conrado Reyes, et.al. is that
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: The subject matter of this
case now is the adjoining lot of
this TCT 185252, is that correct?
A: I do not know.
 Q: You mean you do not know
the lot subject matter of this
case?
A: I do not know whether it really
exists.
Q: Just answer the question, you
do not know?
A: Yes.21
The conflicting claims here are (1) the title of
the Galangs issued by the DENR, through
the PENRO, and (2) the claim of the
Reyeses, based on unsubstantiated
testimony, that the land in question is the
former bed of a dried up creek. As between
these two claims, this Court is inclined to
decide in favor of the Galangs who hold a
valid and subsisting title to the property
which, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Court presumes to have been
issued by the PENRO in the regular
performance of its official duty.
The bottom line here is that, fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for
cancellation of patent and annulment of title,
should never be presumed, but must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence,
with mere preponderance of evidence not
being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact
which must be proved.22
In this case, the allegations of fraud were
never proven. There was no evidence at all
specifically showing actual fraud or
misrepresentation. Thus, the Court cannot
sustain the findings of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition 1s GRANTED.
The April 9, 2008 Decision and the October
6, 2008 Resolution .of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. CV. No. -85660, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
97-4560 of the Regional Trial Court of Anti
polo City, Branch 73, is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO
GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY,
DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO
ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA,
FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO
MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG
and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a
parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela
having an estimated area of twenty (20)
hectares. The western portion of this land
bordering on the Cagayan River has an
elevation lower than that of the eastern
portion which borders on the national road.
Through the years, the western portion would
periodically go under the waters of the
Cagayan River as those waters swelled with
the coming of the rains. The submerged
portion, however, would re-appear during the
dry season from January to August. It would
remain under water for the rest of the year,
that is, from September to December during
the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually
moved from one person to another. On 9
May 1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo
acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina
Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad.
The land sold was described in the Deed of
Absolute Sale1 as follows:
. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug,
Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of
8.6500 hectares, more or less; bounded on
the North by Francisco Forto on the East by
National Road; on South by Julian Tumolva
and on the West by Cagayan River; declared
for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681
in the name of Faustina Taccad, and
assessed at P 750.00. . . .
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased
another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba
who had earlier acquired the same from
Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase
brought the total acquisition of respondent
Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece
of property was more particularly described
as follows:
. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of
tobacco land, and containing an area of
18,000 square meters, more or less,
bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the
South, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo
R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial
Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River
assessed at P 440.00, as tax Declaration No.
3152. . . .2
During the cadastral survey conducted at
Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October
1969, the two (2) parcels of land belonging to
respondent Manalo were surveyed and
consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot
No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains
4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of
the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio
Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the
8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina
Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a
rainy month, a portion of the land bought
from Faustina Taccad then under water was
left unsurveyed and was not included in Lot
307.
The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of
this case and which was identified by
respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan
River running from south to north, forks at a
certain point to form two (2) branches—the
western and the eastern branches—and then
unites at the other end, further north, to form
a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of
the river cuts through the land of respondent
Manalo and is inundated with water only
during the rainy season. The bed of the
eastern branch is the submerged or the
unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to
respondent Manalo. For about eight (8)
months of the year when the level of water at
the point where the Cagayan River forks is at
its ordinary depth, river water does not flow
into the eastern branch. While this condition
persists, the eastern bed is dry and is
susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River when
the cadastral survey was conducted, the
elongated strip of land formed by the western
and the eastern branches of the Cagayan
River looked very much like an island. This
strip of land was surveyed on 12 December
1969.4
It was found to have a total area of 22.7209
hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and
Lot 822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122
hectares while Lot 821 has an area of
11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly
opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the
latter only by the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River during the rainy season and,
during the dry season, by the exposed, dry
river bed, being a portion of the land bought
from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo
claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by
way of accretion to the submerged portion of
the property to which it is adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821,
upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot
821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821
along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions
on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products. They also cultivate the
western strip of the unsurveyed portion
during summer.5 This situation compelled
respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible
entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969.
The case was dismissed by the Municipal
Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both
parties to appear. On 15 December 1972,
respondent Manalo again filed a case for
forcible entry against petitioners. The latter
case was similarly dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of
Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a
complaints6 before the then Court of First
Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of
title, possession and damages against
petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two
(2) parcels of land he bought separately from
Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for
which reason he prayed that judgment be
entered ordering petitioners to vacate the
western strip of the unsurveyed portion.
Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that
judgment be entered declaring him as owner
of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim
during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the
material allegations of the complaint. The
case was then set for trial for failure of the
parties to reach an amicable agreement or to
enter into a stipulation of facts.7 On 10
November 1982, the trial court rendered a
decision with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
premises, the Court renders judgment
against the defendants and in favor of the
plaintiff and orders:
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is
declared the lawful owner of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini
Cadastre, and which is more particularly
described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to
vacate the premises of the land in question,
Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre,
and which is more particularly described in
paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being restrained
from entering the premises of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini
Cadastre, and which is more particularly
described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to
attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
which, however, affirmed the decision of the
trial court. They filed a motion for
reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of
an island surrounded by the two (2) branches
of the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals
found otherwise. The Court of Appeals
concurred with the finding of the trial court
that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate
and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River substantially
dries up for the most part of the year such
that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes
physically (i.e., by land) connected with the
dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo.
Both courts below in effect rejected the
assertion of petitioners that the depression
on the earth's surface which separates Lot
307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year,
the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of
the trial court are entitled to great respect,
and that they carry even more weight when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.9 This is in
recognition of the peculiar advantage on the
part of the trial court of being able to observe
first-hand the deportment of the witnesses
while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise
settled that the Court of Appeals is the final
arbiter of questions of fact.10 But whether a
conclusion drawn from such findings of facts
is correct, is a question of law cognizable by
this Court.11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached
by both courts below apparently collides with
their findings that periodically at the onset of
and during the rainy season, river water flows
through the eastern bed of the Cagayan
River. The trial court held:
The Court believes that the land in
controversy is of the nature and character of
alluvion (Accretion), for it appears that during
the dry season, the body of water separating
the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821,
Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land
which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio
Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba
becomes a marshy land and is only six (6)
inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width
at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W",
"W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been
held by our Supreme Court that "the owner
of the riparian land which receives the
gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to
make an express act of possession. The law
does not require it, and the deposit created
by the current of the water becomes
manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408).12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially
to the conclusion reached by the trial court,
thus:
As found by the trial court, the disputed
property is not an island in the strict sense of
the word since the eastern portion of the said
property claimed by appellants to be part of
the Cagayan River dries up during summer.
Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains
which comes during rainy season especially
from September to November which
increases the water level of the Cagayan
river. As the river becomes swollen due to
heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip
of land located at its southernmost point
would be inundated with water. This is where
the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry.
Consequently, if the water level is high the
whole strip of land would be under water.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Colegio de San Jose, it was held that —
According to the foregoing definition of the
words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay
during the dry season is the ordinary one,
and the highest depth they attain during the
extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the
former is the one which is regular, common,
natural, which occurs always or most of the
time during the year, while the latter is
uncommon, transcends the general rule,
order and measure, and goes beyond that
which is the ordinary depth. If according to
the definition given by Article 74 of the Law
of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or
basin of the lakes is the ground covered by
their waters when at their highest ordinary
depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de
Bay is the ground covered by its waters when
at their highest depth during the dry season,
that is up to the northeastern boundary of the
two parcels of land in question.
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous
to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level
of the waters of the Cagayan River is that
attained during the dry season which is
confined only on the west side of Lot [821]
and Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan
river itself. The small residual of water
between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small
stream already in existence when the whole
of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was
still susceptible to cultivation and uneroded.13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court
of Appeals that Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose 14 is
applicable to the present case. That case
involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de
Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal
provisions governing the ownership and use
of lakes and their beds and shores, in order
to determine the character and ownership of
the disputed property. Specifically, the Court
applied the definition of the natural bed or
basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law
of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other
hand, what is involved in the instant case is
the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the
Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law
applicable to the case at bar:
Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek
or river is the ground covered by its waters
during the highest floods. (Emphasis
supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural
bed or channel of a creek or river as the
ground covered by its waters during the
highest floods. The highest floods in the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur
with the annual coming of the rains as the
river waters in their onward course cover the
entire depressed portion. Though the eastern
bed substantially dries up for the most part of
the year (i.e., from January to August), we
cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the
waters ( i.e., from September to December)
causing the eastern bed to be covered with
flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the
depressed portion is a river bed rests upon
evidence of record.1âwphi1 Firstly,
respondent Manalo admitted in open court
that the entire area he bought from Gregorio
Taguba was included in Lot 307.15 If the 1.80
hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba
was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan
River referred to as the western boundary in
the Deed of Sale transferring the land from
Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as
well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina
Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed
(during the dry months) or the eastern branch
of the river (during the rainy months). In the
Sketch Plan attached to the records of the
case, Lot 307 is separated from the western
branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract
of land which includes not only Lot 821 but
also what this Court characterizes as the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by
respondent Manalo during his direct
examination depict the depressed portion as
a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits
"W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a
time when the eastern bed becomes
visible.16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which
according to respondent Manalo was taken
facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was
taken facing the west both show that the
visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower
elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has
dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to
Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward
and very prominent. This topographic feature
is compatible with the fact that a huge
volume of water passes through the eastern
bed regularly during the rainy season. In
addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban
testified that one had to go down what he
called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of
the land of respondent Manalo to the
depressed portion. The cliff, as related by
petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8)
meters.17
The records do not show when the Cagayan
River began to carve its eastern channel on
the surface of the earth. However, Exhibit
"E"18 for the prosecution which was the
Declaration of Real Property standing in the
name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the
eastern bed already existed even before the
sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old
bed" enclosed in parentheses—perhaps
written to make legitimate the claim of private
ownership over the submerged portion—is
an implied admission of the existence of the
river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property
made by respondent Manalo, the depressed
portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de
Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes
on either side of the eastern bed could have
been formed only after a prolonged period of
time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil
Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire
private ownership of the bed of the eastern
branch of the river even if it was included in
the deeds of absolute sale executed by
Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his
favor. These vendors could not have validly
sold land that constituted property of public
dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code
states:
The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development
of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers
and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which
includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed,
and (3) the banks.19 Manresa, in commenting
upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine
Civil Code was taken, stressed the public
ownership of river beds:
La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto
a su disfrute general, hace que sea
necesario considerar en su relacion de
dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes.
En efecto en todo rio es preciso distinguir 1.
esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3.
las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos
ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico,
como las aguas?
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin
alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el
Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio
publico, parece que debe ir implicito el
dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos
que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto
a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion
del art. 407, num 1, donde dice: son de
dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces
naturales; declaracion que concuerda con lo
que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas],
segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los
alveos o cauces de los arroyos que no se
hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los
alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la
extension que cubran sus aguas en las
mayores crecidas ordinarias.20 (Emphasis
supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent
Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft
of basis even if it were alleged and proved
that the Cagayan River first began to
encroach on his property after the purchase
from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad.
Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply
divesting, by operation of law, respondent
Manalo of private ownership over the new
river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch
of the Cagayan River into his landholding
obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but
this is a common occurrence since estates
bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and
other evils produced by the destructive force
of the waters. That loss is compensated by,
inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged
by Article 457 of the Civil Code.21 It so
happened that instead of increasing the size
of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After
examining the records of the case, the Court
considers that there was no evidence to
prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307
and the bed of the eastern branch of the river.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property
under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires
the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a)
that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river
(or sea); and (c) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers (or the sea coast).22 The
Court notes that the parcels of land bought
by respondent Manalo border on the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion
formed by this eastern branch which
respondent Manalo may claim must be
deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is,
the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the
bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but
directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan
River referred to in the Deeds of Sale
transferring ownership of the land to
respondent Manalo is the western branch,
the decision of the Court of Appeals and of
the trial court are bare of factual findings to
the effect that the land purchased by
respondent Manalo received alluvium from
the action of the aver in a slow and gradual
manner. On the contrary, the decision of the
lower court made mention of several floods
that caused the land to reappear making it
susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and
forceful action like that of flooding is hardly
the alluvial process contemplated under
Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and
hardly perceptible accumulation of soil
deposits that the law grants to the riparian
owner.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821
has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the
northern portion of the strip of land having a
total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it
difficult to suppose that such a sizable area
as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to
another lot of almost equal size. The total
landholding purchased by respondent
Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares
from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares
from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964,
respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot
821 which he claims by way of accretion. The
cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an
area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in
1969. If respondent Manalo's contention
were accepted, it would mean that in a span
of only ten (10) years, he had more than
doubled his landholding by what the Court of
Appeals and the trial court considered as
accretion. As already noted, there are steep
vertical dike-like slopes separating the
depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821
and Lot 307. This topography of the land,
among other things, precludes a reasonable
conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the
depressed portion by reason of the slow and
constant action of the waters of either the
western or the eastern branches of the
Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of
Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot
821 rests on accretion coupled with alleged
prior possession. He alleged that the parcels
of land he bought separately from Gregorio
Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly
owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in
possession thereof through his (Judge
Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was
transferred to him, respondent Manalo took
over the cultivation of the property and had it
declared for taxation purposes in his name.
When petitioners forcibly entered into his
property, he twice instituted the appropriate
action before the Municipal Trial Court of
Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent
Manalo's allegation of prior possession,
petitioners presented tax declarations
standing in their respective names. They
claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse
possession of Lot 821 since 1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior
possession, it was limited physically to Lot
307 and the depressed portion or the eastern
river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana
who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not
indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821.
In fact, the complaints for forcible entry
lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of
Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307
and the depressed portion or river bed and
not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax
declarations presented by petitioners conflict
with those of respondent Manalo. Under
Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in
an action for quieting of title must at least
have equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the
action. The evidence of record on this point
is less than satisfactory and the Court feels
compelled to refrain from determining the
ownership and possession of Lot 821,
adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent
Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
04892 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot
307. The regularly submerged portion or the
eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby
DECLARED to be property of public
dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be
determined in an appropriate action that may
be instituted by the interested parties inter
se. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.