SHCRET APPENDIX D. Report on Military Planning Aapect of TPASAX avn ee: SECRET Military Aspects Operation TPASAX In early aunuer 1953 Carroll was assigned tha task of planning military anpecta of TPAJAX, Several assumptions tiret AL a. c, nad to be taken into account: Operation vould be joint operation with SIS. Operation vould rely heavily upon eiittary wiliingnesd to fight for shah, Armed foreas in Iraq under Mossadag very strongly led by pro-Hossadeq officers, Operational assets within armed forces controlled by SIS or CIA wore not at the outset capable of oxeouting the military objectives of TPAJAX. Planning Tasks which had to be accomplished: g Detailed study of tha leading military personali- thea tn Tran, Detailed atudy of order of battle of the Lranian Army with emphasis on the Tehran garrison. Detailed @ilitury study of communications, supply dumps, axmunition depots, coumand structure Iranian armed forces, timo and distance factors within Tehran and thvoughout Iran, including road and vall nate. Detailed study military aasets possessed by SIS. Operational assets to be developed by CIA; ainost no military assets were then under CIA control. SECRET: SECRET George Carroll in Washington began a staff study pre- Matnary to drafting # military plan. Persona who were particularly helpful in the praparation of this atudy were Jorone F. Hegert, Willian Fowlkes, Jr., Eugene E. Cllsdort, Elizabeth B. Uclelll, Betty J. Caldwell, aad Arthur W. Dubois. This group constituted a branch task force. Throughout the cumaor cables were exchanged with the Tehran Station in an effort to procure the latest taforma- tion on the order of battle of Iranian armed forces. The Kranian desk, G-2, Pentagon, was queried in an effort to obtain whatever information they could. get which might help Accomplish tha above tasks. Information available 4n G2 wasn almost non-existent. Biographical informatioa on Jeading Army figures vas extranely scanty. G2 did not Possess a tactical mip showing the military aituntion im the city of Tehran. X¢ must also be admitted that CTA too was unprepared for this type of operational plan and @ heavy burden had to be laid upon the field at a time when the Tehran Station was already o¢cupied with the opening phases of TPAJAX, : The primary diftioulty tn stage planning at thie time was the fact that neither the field nor Headquarters pos— Seased detalled information on tiilitary figures in Tran. CTA had heretofore never placed particular emphasis on 2 SECRETSECRET that typo of operational reporting, and wa laarned ap the days went by hoy oxtremely important, indeed vital, that tyze of reporting fe. Taroughout the month of June, the branch task fatee gradually was supplied laforamtion from the field which made it possible to begin thinking about the use of the forees within the Tehran garrison, The field veported that Tehran was garrisoned by five brigades, three infan— try mougtaiy brigades, aid two armored brigades. In addition, four other military forces existed: tte den dammerie, “the police, the arsed custous guard, aid the torsas under the adiltary governor, Tt was also learned shat the young Chief of Staff, Brigadier Geueral Taght Riahi, aid bis staff fad beon drawn primarily trom sexbers of the pro-Masgadaq Ivan Party, Yt had to be aedumed that the chief of staff and officers within all sections of his staff were under control of Koasoded, Jt algo had to ba asdunied that at least three out of five of tha brigade xoimanders in Tehran were completely under General tahi's control, These essumptions proved to‘e gorrect, SIS reported thet Colone! SiS iain ==! ert Ee « be relied upon; this later turned out to be Lneprract tit Yor staff planning purposes in Jude it fad to be assumed evrondtSECRET correct. It was disappointing te leary that Major General Bahodt, Prime Hinister designate unger TPAJAX, possessed Rimgst na military assets. General Zahedi, theretore, could net be relied upon to execute bis own staff plan, In the early part of July, the Dranch task force was able to drag up a phan designed to neutralize tho Tehran garrison and to isolate all other brigades in Iran. Tb appeared at that time that only a very saall farce could be relied upon by CIA, primarily the Third Mountaln Bzigade in Tenray, Therefore, our ¢irst start plan was based upon bho wee of the Third Mountain Brigade for the capture and urredt of the officers assigned to the Chief of Staff, as wall as the arrest and néwtraltzation af all other forces in the city of Tehran, Because of the fact ‘that CLA dd not possess any mbli- tary agseta capable at that the of helping TPAJAX, it was suggested that Station agent Colanel Ei be given special training, iz: trained in x saves house in Washington with the agsistande of instructors from the training division, [RRRBBRMMBphad no idea what lay before him. We had nevér previously participated in any military action, although he had been Superbly trained 4 aARCRETSECRET before that had beea tha Becduse of tho oxtrene sensitivity of TPAJAX, was given the lle detector test, In early July, directed to go to Tehran aad to renew all, of his old contacts within the Ivandin Army. In dune, Carrol) was assigned TOY to Cyprus to work with Donald Wilber, NEA Planning Officer, and SIS. Carroll concentrated on allitary planning as¥ects with STS, and ascertained the extent to vhich SIS could control tran military assets. Headquarters wae extremely concarned because the plan astumed that the Shah would sign a fLrman diswiesiug Mosssdeq without boing certain that bis Aray officers and men were well organized enough to force Wossadeq from office Li the avont Mosandeq did not obey tho firman, sinee CIA and SIS did not possess military assets capable af being organized into an affective fight ing force and it was feared that the development of new military nasote and thelr organization into a fighting force could not bé. teconplished in time, SIS in Cyprus stated that it did have several tmpértant, 5 . SECRETSECRET friends among the military, but the only officer among their ftiends then in a posttion to be of assistance to us was Colonot SMM S15 agreed that our preliminary military Plan must be based upon the asaumption that Colonel J would cooperate. Military Planner Carroll doubtad whether one brigade out of five would be sufficient to everthrow Mossadeq and stated frankly that our military plan must be viewed ag extrouely tentative; he also stated tliat he hoped upon arrival in Tehran to f{n@ other assets in addition to Colawel ER2=44 From the dilttury point of view the dig- cussions in Cyprus were extremely disappointing because they made At clear that we wanted to accomplish much but had very Attle with which té accomplish dt. ft also made 1t clear ——— AS Soon as possible where the military plan would of neces aity have to bo completed. of 15 July Carroll lett for tenday where SIS studied the military plan for two days and approved It with Little coniment, They agreed that, it TPATAX were to succeed, CLA must start fram scratch and work quickly to find powerful friends among Iranian Army troop cesnanders. In London, Carroll with Major Keen and two other British Army officers on duty with SIS, went over two militmry plans which had bean dyawn by the branch task force, Beth of our military plans used the gate arrest Lists 6 SECRETSECRET for military and civillan, persons in Tehran, These lists Were complied az a result of a long study of pronHossadeq tranians, and lntor proved te ba at least 90 percent cor- rect,. The British approved the arrest lists after they CE expert and their blographiéal saétion had studied thea. 4 third arrest list, the Tudeh Arvest List, was studied very oarofully by 519 Tudeh Party experts and wad approved with~ out addition, It would seem that or appratsal of Iraniand must have been based upon approximately the same information. While these arresté lists Were farmed owt to SIS ex+ parte, Carrol) sat dows to study the two military plans with Wajor Keen and with the British major. The first plan wait based upon the assuaption tit [ie «as x con trolled British agent iia Be Attorn aéintice oxamtantion of the. Target Let for Neutralization In the City of Tehran (machine gua factory, Hinietry of Past and Telegraph, Office of the Chief of Staff, ote.), S18 stated that the targete we had Listed tor noutralization wero the correct ones and tha: we had ussighed dutles for ganponents of the Third Mountala Brigade about as well ad any otter way they might suggest. We next turned to an examination of our setond military plan based upon the asoumphion that Carroll might be able to dovyolop assets tn Tohran capable of controlling three brigades. We all agreed that 1t would be extrenely 7 SECRETSEGRET hazardous to base all of our Aopes upon one brigade out of the five in Tehran and that, 1¢ possible, wo should attempt. te develop additional forces. SIS approved this plan and they then passed both plans up to 4 brigadier who returned them the text day without comment. Turing these-discussions a cable arrived in London via Gyptus from Tehran tn which Tekran station reported General Zahedi's “wilitary assets.” This message con firued Il of our fears. For some tise the Station bad been attempting to persuade General Zahedi ty 1ist his wilitary aeseta and to indienta how ke foped to uso them, At last General Zaliedd reported, He claiwed none of the five brigades in Tohran. His ailitary plan assumed that he might be able to whe the Imperial Guard, some troops from the Departmen of Arey Transport, components fron tha De~ partment of Police, and components of the Armed Customs Giard, He sidea uoped that Colonet RB cece be able to bring troops to Tehran tron [RERERM. srs asked Carvoll te write for them an appreciation of Zattiedl's plan. th that appraisal Lt was stated that he did not believe the Shit would sigh a firman dismissing Monsadeq until Zahedi could indicate to hia how Chiet of Starr Riahi's control over the Tehran garrison could be broken; further, he felt that if TPAJAK were to succeed military 8 SECRETSECRET assets must be developed within the five brigades dn Tehran, SIS agreed in London that military tasks should take the following priority: 1. Seizure and occupation of designated points, 2, Execution of arrest and detention lists, 3. Neutralization of pro«Masandeq military forces in Tehran. 4: Neutralization of the ety of Tehran. & Relnforcenent df pro-Zihedi forces Ln Tehran by forces outside of the aity. These priorities were lild down because it was dosired that communiodtions te tnocked out as goon as possibie in order to preveat pro-Hoguaded forces and persoanel from commnicating with each other. Carroll loft London oa the firat available alreratt following these conferences, arrived in Tehran on 21. July, and got in touch with ae Sitting through mz operational contact reports covering 421 of hia important conversations in TT | oc1- cers were noted as being of special promise. These vere contact reports of conversations with Major Genora | ay BBE 1c ith colons) RI both of whom a SECRETSECRET were old end good triends of MMMM, those: two officers retloctad the fear of the Tudeh Party thnt was bocoming gen~ eral after the Tudeh showing of 31 ly, Goiran, Goodwin, and Carroll agreed that it was imperative. that Carroll meet as soon a9 possible with an officer appointed by Zahedi to work on our military scheme. Zaked! never did designate a military Secretariat, and it was necessary for us to develop our ovas Betause of Gonerai Zahedi's manifestly weak positton among the military then an active duty, ond bacause it be— cue apparent that it would be necéssary for LA to seize tha initiative and to furnish Nim with « military plan and. military forces, the development of Colone! (MM: was. stepped up_ Ea was directed to determine what assets Colonel [gia might ba able to Lead us’ to, Colonel, HEB sirct otterca 9 "pian a" which called tor a aiitéary coup d'etat without explaining hav it was to be-nedouplished. ‘then BBG! ss pressed to persuade Colonel HE > more roglistic, and an 30 July he received fro Colonel az 4 plan Which was more specific but still pitifully tnudequata; Colonet BRMMoaid ne coutd execate arvosts and target lists, neutralize military installations and non-csgperating forces within two hours; this waa: nonsense. The most important thing Colonel ; | reported was’ that he was {n towoh with three young colonels who might possoss Ww SECRETSECRET Important strength within the Tobran garrison. Colonel FEB tse told EE that concn) lacked courage but would atitfen his back should the Shah appoint him chief of staff. Colonel SMM dia not mention General Zahedi and did not geom to be in touch with him, RINE told Co2one! QAM thot bo could put Colonel EMM in touch with one or two Anevicans whon he had met in the United States. At this time the Shah also-dndicated that he dld not have control of important military agsote. eaxtoll not EES... on Zand 3 August and began staff planning, Colonel (9M ¥as full of desire to do something, but had no idem of how to go wbowt Lt. Ha sald that he had friends who could control the Second and Third Mountain Brigades but did uot trust efthar Colonel a eae ae TEE, Cotone! vomtaz, Copmanding Ottlcer of the Second Mountain Brigade. colone Sil reportad that General Ha: told hin the day before that if the Shah acted he wae ready to perform any seivice whatsoever and to dia for the Shah 1f necessary. Attar those early meetings with Colonel PBB; 1t vecane apparont that he, himself, was not in @ position to command anything and was only hoping that he might geratade his iL SHORETSECRET felends to do so. Carrol) then Ket directly with Colone) EMM ond his friend, ‘The Intter turned out to be Colone] EI’, a a ee long list of assets witha the Tehran garrison, principally snong deputy commanders of brigades and regimental com- sanders. Un 6, 7, And 8 August, Colonels Sas EES. 2s ex. carrot carried on state plan~ wing based upon the units cowmanded by ¢eLends vhon HY cresneu, coroner stited chat his peisary tetonds ware of ¢he Tehran poliea; EER TB, of the Tehran Gendarmerte District; and ay «eet certain that wtimate victory would be ours throug these friends, ond through his grienda who wore regimental and battnLion commanders, among whom vere these important unit comminders ia the Tehran garrigon! ‘Through théve officers Colonel J Ha «:; {nm touch with every initantry battalion commander Le Tehrag and with post of the company contandets; however, w SkCRETSECHET these officers had not been formed inte an organization and were not ready to overthrow Chief of State Genarak Rlani's firm contro) of the Tehran garrison which he ‘ex~ evcised throtgl the Brlgede Conmeaders in Tehran. For instance, 1f wa were to succeed we must errest Colonel Sharokh, Commanding Otficor First Armored Brigade; Colonol Parsa, Counandinig Ofticer Firet Kountain Brigade; Colonel Wontaz, Conmanding.Ofticer Second Mountain Brigada; ond probably Colonel Ashrat!, Milltary Governor and Commanding Officer of the ‘Third Wountasa Brigade, Colonel Novzari, Commanding Officer of the Second Armored Brigade vould probably remin mduéral tut #@ elk £t lmperative tin¢ hls depity, Lt. Colonel Bahrant, be arrested. Tt therefere became clear frou the military point of view that success wiybt depend upon whether or aot General Rlaht suéceeded Ln eeresting our friends before we arrested nis, and that the test pt strength would very largely reat upon the amount of security we were uble,te exintaln while attempting te katt all of our friends inte 2 funetLloning team. ft algo was clear that we had to devise a scheme capable of carrying on our pperationa in the event our first platoon of young officers wae arrested. Garroll therefore worked 13 SECRETSECRET devising 5 system which would work in the event our first foam yas arrested, The dangor signal we adopted to alort battalion and company commanders to take. tndagendent action ‘wan the arrest of Colonel SBBBMMM and of hic closest friends. The weekuess in our plan Jay {n the fact that the station would net be in a position to contest battalion and company coumanders but would have to depend upon Colonel HERES 2 co the Job. White disctissing thie subject, Colonel Ft stated that he wowld We able ta contact lower untt commanders within 48 hours after xeceist of the shan's f1roun, The healtation of the Shah in signing the firman worked to our advantagé for it gave us several. mote important days’ in Which to discuss with Colonel Baal the development of our fiona) staff plan which was based,upod the ued of the undts which bis friends tomaanded. This problom was compli- enxfea hy the fact that Colonel JM tecare yiolentiy £12 and was Inter forced to ratire to his bed, asthe climax approached, tension incredsed and Lt Ls pot inconceivable that tension caused by fear had something todo With Colonel, BE itingss. Colonel MMM did remain on hic tect ‘ote enough to speak to the Shah on 9 August if an interview waich later proved vital ta the success of the military phos of TPAJAX. Uuti2 Colonel JM sow the Shah, he was not Ad. SECRETSECRET certain that our trtends in the Tehran gartison would act without the Shah's approval, However, attor talking with the Shah, Colonel [MME "as ablo to tel) colone) BT HR es: the Shah did destre militery support in the event lie atould decide to sign the firman, Colones MMM as asked Sy tho Shah whether or not the Army would beck u tirnas diamisding Wossadeq, Cologal HMMM tog the shan that he bad been mopting With Carroll and that © reasonable ststz plan was being prepared, otie that agsurdd victory Lf £4 were carried cut properly. The Shah then | for the names of the officora who would cooperate, and Colonel (reported the same names which we had earlier subsittted to the Shab through Assdoliah. Rashtdian. He asked BMBMMto sect Goneral Zaheds. In reporting the stthetance of bie audience with the Bhat, Colone) MMMM ssked the station 4 tho Colted States vould support General Zaiedt. Re was told that it woula. colene: EE) ala accepted Ganori Zehedi. Both officera stated that they had not baan in touch wlth General Zahedi. for séveral months but believed hin to he a very good leader. During the nights of 11, 12 and 13 Auguat, staf? plan- ning continued based upoh the use of forty dine. commanders within the Tebran garrison, Colode) EG: General 1s SECRETSECRET @abod{ who agreed that General a ight be chier of dtaff, Goneral SEER oxprodecd the desire to meet Carroll and to digcues plans vith Ai, Farzanogan, Colone! REE, acd cotone! QRBBBEY tote necting Was postponed uqtil we felt. our staff plan waa complete enough tor Ganora) FREER to xct upon Lt. On 1 August Zahedi. asked QR to. havc cone to see hiu. General Zahedi and FBG tatkec for three hours. [MMMM reported that General Zahedi wis oxtrenoly appredintive of American aasistanca and asked EMME to act as a lieison officer botwoen hime self and the Americans for military purposes; he also asked. hin ¢o become his offieer in charge of the Hid ttary’ Buren which had been ueeting with Carroll during the last week. On 12 August Farzanogan teak Corers] Eee to see Zahedi, and Conore] SE Cledged General Zahedi all assistance, [RRREMEEME atso took Colone! aay to seo Inhedi and the latter reported te General Zahedt progress of wilitary staff planning, In retrospect 4t Would appear that unde# wore favorable conditions we should have spent more tina going over the stat plan with Zabedi and Genera) QRBBBBBBMBB, tor it was at this moment that tho military phase of TPAJAX passed into Zakedi's hands, although Zahedi did nat know any of the young officers oT SECRETSECRET Anvoteod and Cones? AIIM xcw onty a tov of then. During the afternoon of 13 August, Carroll met with General and the Hiditary Secretariat composed of colonel (MB =0d colone: SM. ‘the firrians were expected momentarily and much of the conversation revalvad around the quantion of haw long it would take Cotonol RE to contig: our Artondly forty Ling comminders, After 2 long discuseion everyone Agreed action should cémmence within 48 hours a¢ the te- ceipt of the tirman: It was also agreed that Colonel a deliver tha tiruay to Moxsadeq attor he had sont the station & radio Sat attined to Colonel Ea command net. + CoLonol FIRB tier to Rassar with the unyigned fimiane om LY -Auguat, uy SECRET