AD-1142

Administrative Law with The Right to Information act, 2005

LL.B.(Part II)(Second Semester)Examination, 2016
Attempt 5 questions in all.
All questions carry 20 marks each.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in Bharat Bank Ltd. Vs Employees of Bharat
Bank Ltd. AIR 1950 SC 188.
The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi vs Employees Of The Bharat Bank ... on 26 May, 1950
Equivalent citations: 1950 AIR 188, 1950 SCR 459
PETITIONER:THE BHARAT BANK LTD., DELHI
Vs.
RESPONDENT: EMPLOYEES OF THE BHARAT BANK LTD.,DELHI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/05/1950
ACT: Constitution of India, Art. 136--Supreme Court--Appellate Jurisdiction--Award of Industrial
Tribunal—Whether appealable--460
Applicationt for special leave--Maintainability -- Nature of functions of Industrial Tribunal-Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, es. 8, Case heard by Bench of three members.
Facts of the case: Employees of Bharat Bank made certain demands. The Bank refused to
fulfill those demands. Employees stopped work. Bank retrenched some of the employees.
Central Government constituted an Industrial Tribunal under Section 7A in The Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 – matter heard by 3 members, decision given and signed by 2 members only – in favour of
the Bank employees.
The Bank, not satisfied with the Industrial Tribunal Decision then files a petition/SLP in the Supreme
Court under the article 136 in the constitution of India.
Section 7A in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Tribunals.-
(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more
Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether
specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule 5 and for performing such other functions as
may be assigned to them under this Act].
(2) A Tribunal shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Tribunal unless--
(a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or
(aa) 1 he has, for a period of not less than three years, been a District Judge or an Additional District
Judge; 2 xxx] 2
(4) The appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint two persons as assessors to advise
the Tribunal in the proceeding before it.

Article 136 in The Constitution Of India 1949, Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or
made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces
Objection was raised by the Central Government and the employees of the Bank stating that
the Industrial Tribunal is not a judicial body and hence the Supreme Court may not grant special
leave to appeal by the Bank.
Issues: There are two questions which require consideration on this preliminary point.
The first is, whether the award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal constituted under
the Industrial Disputes Act is a judicial decision in the proper sense of the expression or is it
the pronouncement of an administrative or quasi-judicial body which may exercise some of
the functions of a Court of law but is really not so ?
The other question turns upon the construction to be put upon article 136 of the Constitution
particularly on the meaning to be given to the words 'tribunal' and 'determination' occurring
therein; and the question is whether the language is wide enough to include an adjudication
or award of an Industrial Tribunal.
Decision of the Supreme Court :
The process by which an Industrial Tribunal comes to its decisions is not judicial process at
all. In settling the disputes between the employers and the workmen, the function of the Tribunal is
not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer rights and privileges on
either party which it con- siders reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of
any existing agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and
obligations of the parties. It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers
essential for keeping industrial peace. An industrial dispate as has been said on many occasions is
nothing but a trial of strength between the employers on the one hand and the workmen's
organization on the other and the Industrial Tribunal has got to arrive at some equitable arrangement
for averting strikes and lock-outs which impede production of goods and the industrial development
of the country. The Tribunal is not bound by the rigid rules of law. The process it employs is rather
an extended form of the process of collective bargaining and is more akin to administrative
than to judicial function.
We now come to the other question as to whether an appeal could be taken to this Court against an
award of an Industrial Tribunal by special leave under article 136 of the Constitution. Article 136 is a
part of Chapter IV of the Constitution which deals with the Union Judiciary.
The article is worded in the widest terms possible. It vests in the Supreme Court a plenary
jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by granting of special leave against any
kind of judgment, decree or order made by any Court or tribunal in any cause or matter and the
powers could be exercised in spite of and overriding the specific provisions for appeal con- tained in
the previous articles. The controversy so far as the present case is concerned mainly centers round
the interpretation to be put upon two words, namely, "determination" and "tribunal" used in the
article. Does the word "tribunal" mean a judicial tribunal only and is the expression "determination"
restricted to what is known as "judicial determination"?
To summarize:
The word ‘Tribunal’ in Article 136 has been used i in a wider sense.
The word ‘Determination’ in Article 136 includes the determination made by Industrial
Tribunals or similar bodies and is not confined only to the determination of the Court or
purely judicial character bodies.
Note – Tribunals which do not derive their authority from the sovereigh power cannot fall
within the scope of Article 136.
Tribunals performing purely administrative or executive functions donot fall within the scope
of Article 136.
Tribunals which perform some function of Court of Justice fall within the scope of Article
136.
Thus, Supreme Court said,
Industrial Tribunal Decision should be fair and unbiased. The Industrial Tribunal should be properly
constituted. It was not properly constituted in the present case.
in the present case the matter was heard by 3 members, decision given and signed by 2 members
only – in favour of the Bank employees. Mr Chandrasekar Iyer was not availabe at the time of
signing. Hence, the Apex Court had set aside Industrial Tribunal Decision and asked.
1. Explain the rights and obligations of State regarding Contract.

Define Administrative Law & discuss its usefulness in a welfare state.

Administrative law is the body of law that governs the administration and regulation of
Government agencies (both Federal and State). Administrative Law is the law relating to the
administrative operation of government. It deals with the powers and duties of administrative
authorities, the procedure followed by them in exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and the remedies available to an aggrieved person when his rights are affected by any
administrative action. Administrative law deals with the decision making of such administrative
units of Government as Tribunals, Boards or Commissions that are part of a National Regulatory
Scheme in such areas as Police law, International Trade, Manufacturing, The Environment,
Taxation, Broadcasting, Immigration and Transport. Government agency action can include rule
making, adjudication, or the enforcement of a specific regulatory agenda. Administrative law is a
branch of public law that is concerned with the procedures, rules and regulations of a number of
Governmental agencies. An example of Administrative law is the regulation and operation of the
Social Security Administration, and the administration of benefits to the people. The primary
objective of administrative law is to limit the powers of the Government to protect citizens against
their abuse. Administrative law, the legal framework within which public administration is carried out.
Describe the sources of Administrative Law in India.
The main sources of administrative law in India are as follows:
The Constitution of India : India has a written Constitution which is the supreme law of the land.
Being the grundnorm of the legal system of the country, it conditions and overrides all legislative and
administrative actions. Besides providing for functional organisation and consequential growth in
administrative process, the Constitution has also provided for an elaborate control mechanism. The
Constitution demarcates the legislative and administrative power of the Union and the States
conferring on the courts, the power to review legislative and administrative action and adjudge their
constitutionality. All the legislative actions of the administration have been expressly brought by the
Constitution within the purview of Article 13 by defining ‘Law’ as including ‘order’, ‘bye-law’, ‘rule’ and
‘notification’ etc. having the force of law. All these features of the Constitution influence and shape
the nature and content of administrative law in India.
Statutes: Statute is the principal source of administrative power. Statute emanates from the
Constitution. Under the Constitution, law-making power has been given to Parliament and State
Legislatures. Administration is given powers by statutes. All the statutes have to conform to the
constitutional patterns. Exercise of administrative powers has to conform to statutory patterns. In
England as well in the United States, a good deal of legislation has been enacted to provide for
administrative procedures, composition and procedures of tribunals, liability of state and its
bureaucracy and for strengthening the control on the exercise of administrative powers.
Ordinances: The ordinance-making power relates to the legislative powers of the Chief Executive in
Union and States. Article 123 of the Constitution of India which deals with the legislative powers of
the President empowers the President to promulgate ordinances during the recess of Parliament,
and Article 213 confers a similar power on the Governor to promulgate ordinances during the recess
of state legislature.
These provisions have secured considerable flexibility both to the Union and to the State to enact
laws to meet emergent situations as also to meet circumstances created by laws being declared void
by courts of law. Grave public inconvenience would be caused if an Act, like the Bombay Sales Tax
Act, being declared void, no machinery existed whereby a valid law could be promptly promulgated.
However, it must be remembered that under the Indian Constitution a validating Act must stand the
test of Part III of the Constitution. Further it must be noted that the Ordinance making power of the
Chief Executive is not unlimited or unbridled. It is provided under the Constitution that the President
or the Governor, as the case may be, can issue ordinances on the advice of Council of Ministers.
For the confirmation of ordinance approval of the Houses is required. In this way, the power is
subjected to legislative control.
Delegated Legislation: Law-making is the primary function of the Legislature. Yet, in no country
does the legislature monopolise the whole of legislative power. A good deal of legislation is made by
the administration under the powers conferred by the Legislature. This type of administrative
legislation is called delegated or subordinate legislation. The delegated legislation is subject to
Judicial and Parliamentary control. In this way, delegated legislation is an important source of law.
Case Laws: The basis of Indian Administrative Law is judge-made law. This means that it is subject
to all the strengths and frailties of judicial law-making. In the absence of special administrative
courts, new norms of administrative law have been evolved. The function of courts is two-fold,
regulative and formative. The rules laid for controlling the actions of administration by various
devices namely, reasoned decisions, quasi-judicial function, rules of natural justice, for instance, rule
of hearing and rule against bias have been developed. The new principles laid down form guidelines
for the future course of action.

1. What is delegated legislation ? Discuss how Judiciary controls the delegated legislation
? Explain the classification of the delegated legislation and discuss the judicial control
over delegated legislation.

What is the utility of Public Corporations in modern system of Administration ? To whom are
they responsible ? Explain.
Discuss the Judicial and Parliamentary controls over Public Corporation of India.
Corporations are owned by their stockholders (shareholders) who share in profits and losses
generated through the firm’s operations, and have three distinct characteristics (1) Legal existence:
a firm can (like a person) buy, sell, own, enter into a contract, and sue other persons and firms, and
be sued by them. It can do well and be rewarded, and can commit offence and be punished. (2)
Limited liability: a firm and its owners are limited in their liability to the creditors and other obligors
only up to the resources of the firm, unless the owners give personal-guaranties. (3) Continuity of
existence: a firm can live beyond the life spans and capacity of its owners, because its ownership
can be transferred through a sale or gift of shares. Corporations can be mainly divided into two
parts: Public Corporation and Private Corporation. Here, we discuss about the
Public Corporations.
Public corporations are those corporations which are run by the government. They are simply
government owned corporations. A public corporation is that form of public enterprise which is
created as an autonomous unit, by a special Act of the Parliament or the State Legislature. Since a
public corporation is created by a Statute; it is also known as a statutory corporation.
The Statute defines the objectives, powers and functions of the public corporation.
The features of statutory corporation are as follows:-
(1) Management: Statutory corporations are managed by the Board of Directors, appointed by the
government.
(2) Accountability: Statutory Corporation is accountable to public & parliament. Hence it is account
and audited by the Comptroller & Auditor General of India (CAG). This ensures public accountability.
(3) Appointment: They can freely recruit people and can give promotions and transfers to any
employee according to the company requirement.
(4) No Interference: Statutory Corporation can have its own pattern. There is no political interference
in day to day working of the corporation.
(5) Objectives: It works on profit objective and as such its activities are commercial in nature.
(6) Service motive: The primary motive of the corporation is public service rather than private profits.
It is, however, expected to operate in a business-like manner.
(7) Financial independence: It enjoys financial autonomy. Its initial capital and borrowings are
provided by the government but it is supposed to be self-supporting. It can borrow money from the
public is empowered to plough back its earnings.
The statutory Boards or Corporation which had been formed in India are:
(1) The Damodar Valley Corporation— 1948.
(2) The Industrial Finance Corporation—1948.
(3) The Rehabilitation Finance Administration—1948.
(4) The Employees’ Insurance Corporation— 1948.
(5) The Reserve Bank of India—1948.
(6) The Air Transport Corporation—1953.
(7) The State Bank of India—1955; and
(8) The Life Insurance Corporation—1956.
In India, the different forms of control to which the public corporation may be subject to are:
Parliamentary Control, Control by the Public, Government Control, Judicial control and Central
agency control.
Parliamentary Control: These public corporations are solely controlled by the government. As
public authorities they are subject to the normal controls of constitution and administrative laws to
supervision by the Minister, who in turn is answerable to Parliament, and by Courts through the
control which they exercise over administrative authorities. The annual reports of these corporations
are submitted to the government of India giving an account of the activities and then they are laid
before both the houses of the parliament.
Under the Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, besides the auditor’s report and annual report, the
report of the actuaries containing the result of an investigation made by the actuaries into the finan-
cial condition of the business of the Corporation should also be so laid. The parliamentary control
over the public corporation is confined to only broad criticisms and the day to day functioning of the
public corporation is outside the functioning of parliamentary control over the public corporations.
Control by the public: The public also has control over the public corporations in India. These
corporations are owned by the government and created by special statutes. These corporations are
autonomous in functioning. These corporations are built up for the overall good of the nation and the
public. So the public can also control the public corporations.
Government Control: In the framework of economic planning in India, the policies, investment
decisions and programmes for growth and expansion of public corporations have to be co-ordinated
with national priorities and the mobilisation and allocation of resources. Even when investment and
expenditure decisions of some of these enterprises do not depend on governmental budgetary
support, their overall impact on the economy through backward and forward linkages, their decision
to buy equipment from indigenous sources or import, and their claim on total economic resources
(especially jn the core sector) may be so important as to require their reconciliation with national
planning objectives. Similarly, wage and employment policies of different public enterprises with
implications for other enterprises and the national economy are subjected to the same overall co-
ordination. There are thus a number of areas where the intervention of the government in the
management of public corporations is inevitable in the interests of national planning for this type of
economy.
Central Agency Control:
Central agency controls over central public enterprises in India operate as follows:
 Board level appointments of the chief executives and full-time directors are made by the
Appointments Committee of the Cabinet consisting of the Minister-in-Charge of the
administrative ministry concerned, Minister-in-Charge of Home Affairs and the Prime
Minister. These appointments are made on the basis of the recommendations of the Public
Enterprises Selection Board under the Department of Personnel.
 Project Appraisal Division and various sectoral divisions of the Planning Commission play an
important role in the authorization of major capital projects of individual public enterprises,
while the Commission also monitors progress of projects during construction and of units
under production.
  Public Investment Board, which is headed by Secretary (Expenditure) and is an inter-
ministerial committee of ministerial secretaries, authorizes major capital investments
including those of public enterprises.
 Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices in the Ministry of Industry makes recommendations in
respect of prices which are administered by government.
 Bureau of Public Enterprises in the Ministry of Industry monitors budgetary implementation
and performance of public enterprises and issues guidelines for periodic wage settlements.
 Labour Ministry regulates employment policies, provides general guidance on industrial
relations and intervenes through its agencies in industrial disputes involving public
enterprises.
 Home Ministry has a watchdog role through the Central Vigilance Commission, Central
Bureau of Investigation, and Central Industrial Security Force.
 Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes may receive direct rep resentations from
economically and socially backward communities in regard to the placement and promotion
of their members in public enterprises.
Judicial Control: The judiciary also controls the public corporations in India. As statutory
corporations or the public corporations itself are created by the statutes. The judiciary has a powerful
control over the public corporations. Different powers are vested to the public corporations by the
judicial system. The judicial system consists of judges and courts. If there is any misuse of power by
the public corporations then the corporation is answerable to the judicial system of the state of India.
These are the various types of controls over the working of public corporations in India. Public
corporations are autonomous systems but still they are controlled by the above forces. These
corporations are created by statute and these are created for the overall welfare of the people of the
state. So the proper functioning of these corporations is very important. This control over the working
of public corporations helps these corporations to function properly and to create maximum benefit.

What do you mean by ‘Rule of Law’ ? Discuss its importance in India.

The term 'Rule of Law' is nowhere defined in the Indian Constitution but this term is often
used by the Indian judiciary in their judgments. Rule of law has been declared by the
Supreme Court as one of the basic features of the Constitution so it cannot be amended even
by the constitutional amendment. The concept of Rule of Law is that the state is governed,
not by the ruler or the nominated representatives of the people but by the law. The
Constitution of India intended for India to be a country governed by the rule of law. The rule
of law exists when a state's constitution functions as the supreme law of the land, when the
statutes enacted and enforced by the government invariably conform to the constitution.
Rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public
and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights principles.
Dicey’s theory of Rule of Law consists of three basic principles
(i) The supremacy of law– Dicey believed that Rule of Law stands for absolute supremacy of law.
No person, irrespective of his position whether he is a common man or government authority is
bound to obey the law. No one should be punished except for the breach of law and that the alleged
offence is proved before the ordinary court following the due procedure.
(ii) Equality before law– It means the equal subjection of all class of people to the law of the land
administered by the ordinary courts. No man is above the law and would be treated equally in the
eyes of law irrespective of their pedestal in life.
(iii) The predominance of Legal Spirit– The phrase legal spirit refers to the spirit of justice. This
concept advocates the principle that law should be according to justice and not vice-versa. He was
against providing rights such as the right to personal liberty, freedom, etc. in the written constitution
of the country. The constitution is not the source but the consequence of the rights of the
individuals[4] thus these rights should be a result of the judicial decisions.
Development of Rule of Law in India
Constitutional provisions
The Rule of Law as administered in India is interpreted to be embodied within several provisions of
the Constitution. Constitution is the grundnorm of the country from which all other laws derive their
authority, thus acting subservient to it and upholding the postulates of Rule of Law that is envisaged
under the Constitution of India. Further Article 13(1) states that any law that is made by the
legislature has to be made in conformity with the Constitution failing which it will be declared
invalid. Thus every law that is created has to be in line with the constitutional provisions. The
Preamble to our constitution incorporates the word justice, liberty and equality which are a clear
indicator of a just and fair system without any existent disparity between the masses irrespective of
their stature in life. The equality before the law as enumerated by Dicey is incorporated in Article 14
of the Constitution of India which lays down the principle of equality before law and equal protection
of laws. The right to life and personal liberty which is the basic human right is also guaranteed to
every person by the constitution.
Judicial Pronouncements
Apart from the constitutional provisions, the judicial decisions have also played a vital role in the
understanding and development of Rule of Law in India. Rule of Law is regarded as a part of the
basic structure of the Constitution or and, therefore, it cannot be abrogated or destroyed even by the
Parliament. Several jurists have opined that the Rule of Law is the basis upon which our constitution
is founded.
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF RULE OF LAW IN INDIA
One of the most important factors contributing to the maintenance of the Rule of Law is the activity of
the courts in the interpretation of the law. It is rightly reiterated by the Supreme Court in the
case Union of India v. Raghubir Singh that it is not a matter of doubt that a considerable degree that
governs the lives of the people and regulates the State functions flows from the decision of the
superior courts.
Most famously in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the court ensured that exercise of
power in an arbitrary manner by the government would not infringe the rights of the people and
in Kesavananda Bharati, the court ensured that laws could not be made that essentially go against
the Rule of Law by saying that the basic structure could not be breached.

Describe the appointment, functions & jurisdiction of Indian Ombudsman (Lokpal).

What are Lokpal and Lokayukta?
 The Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013 provided for the establishment of Lokpal for the
Union and Lokayukta for States.
 These institutions are statutory bodies without any constitutional status.
 They perform the function of an "ombudsman” and inquire into allegations of corruption
against certain public functionaries and for related matters.
Why do we need such institutions?
 Maladministration is like a termite which slowly erodes the foundation of a nation and hinders
administration from completing its task. Corruption is the root cause of this problem.
 Most of the anti-corruption agencies are hardly independent. Many of these agencies are
advisory bodies without any effective powers and their advice is rarely followed.
 There is a problem of transparency and accountability. Moreover, there is no effective
mechanism to put a check on these agencies.
 In this context, an independent institution of Lokpal has been a landmark move in the history
of Indian polity which offered a solution to the never-ending menace of corruption.
Background
 In 1809, the institution of ombudsman was inaugurated officially in Sweden.
  New Zealand and Norway adopted this system in the year 1962 and it proved to be of
great significance in spreading the concept of the ombudsman.
 In 1967, on the recommendations of the Whyatt Report of 1961, Great Britain adopted the
institution of the ombudsman and became the first large nation in the democratic world to
have such a system.
 In 1966, Guyana became the first developing nation to adopt the concept of the ombudsman.
Subsequently, it was further adopted by Mauritius, Singapore, Malaysia, and India as well.
 In India, the concept of constitutional ombudsman was first proposed by the then law
minister Ashok Kumar Sen in parliament in the early 1960s.
 The term Lokpal and Lokayukta coined by Dr. L. M. Singhvi.
 In 1966, the First Administrative Reforms Commission recommended the setting up of
two independent authorities- at the central and state level, to look into complaints against
public functionaries, including MPs.
 In 1968, Lokpal bill was passed in Lok Sabha but lapsed with the dissolution of Lok Sabha
and since then it has lapsed in the Lok Sabha many times.
 Till 2011 eight attempts were made to pass the Bill, but all met with failure.
 In 2002, the Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution headed by M.N.
Venkatachaliah recommended the appointment of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas; also
recommended that the PM be kept out of the ambit of the authority.
 In 2005, the Second Administrative Reforms Commission chaired by Veerappa
Moily recommended that the office of Lokpal should be established without delay.
 In 2011, the government formed a Group of Ministers, chaired by Pranab Mukherjee to
suggest measures to tackle corruption and examine the proposal of a Lokpal Bill.
 "India Against Corruption movement" led by Anna Hazare put pressure on the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government at the Centre and resulted in the passing of the
Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill, 2013, in both the Houses of Parliament.
 It received assent from President on 1 January 2014 and came into force on 16 January
2014.
The Lokpal and Lokayuktas (Amendment) Bill, 2016
 This Bill was passed by Parliament in July 2016 and amended the Lokpal and Lokayukta Act,
2013.
 It enables the leader of the single largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha to be a
member of the selection committee in the absence of a recognized Leader of Opposition.
 It also amended section 44 of the 2013 Act that deals with the provision of furnishing of
details of assets and liabilities of public servants within 30 days of joining the government
service.
 The Bill replaces the time limit of 30 days, now the public servants will make a declaration of
their assets and liabilities in the form and manner as prescribed by the government.
 It also gives an extension of the time given to trustees and board members to declare their
assets and those of their spouses in case of these are receiving government funds of more
than Rs. 1 crore or foreign funding of more than Rs. 10 lakh.
Structure of Lokpal
 Lokpal is a multi-member body, that consists of one chairperson and a maximum of 8
members.
 Chairperson of the Lokpal should be either the former Chief Justice of India or the former
Judge of Supreme Court or an eminent person with impeccable integrity and outstanding
ability, having special knowledge and expertise of minimum 25 years in the matters relating
to anti-corruption policy, public administration, vigilance, finance including insurance and
banking, law and management.
 Out of the maximum eight members, half will be judicial members and minimum 50% of the
Members will be from SC/ ST/ OBC/ Minorities and women.
  The judicial member of the Lokpal either a former Judge of the Supreme Court or a former
Chief Justice of a High Court.
 The non-judicial member should be an eminent person with impeccable integrity and
outstanding ability, having special knowledge and expertise of minimum 25 years in the
matters relating to anti-corruption policy, public administration, vigilance, finance including
insurance and banking, law and management.
 The term of office for Lokpal Chairman and Members is 5 years or till the age of 70
years.
 The members are appointed by the president on the recommendation of a Selection
Committee.
 The selection committee is composed of the Prime Minister who is the Chairperson; Speaker
of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha, Chief Justice of India or a Judge
nominated by him/her and One eminent jurist.
 For selecting the chairperson and the members, the selection committee constitutes a
search panel of at least eight persons.
 Lokpal Search Committee
 Under the Lokpal Act of 2013, the DoPT is supposed to put together a list of candidates
interested to be the chairperson or members of the Lokpal.
 This list would then go to the proposed eight-member search committee, which would
shortlist names and place them before the selection panel headed by the Prime Minister.
 The selection panel may or may not pick names suggested by the search committee.
 In September 2018, the government had constituted a search committee headed by former
Supreme Court judge Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai.
 The 2013 Act also provides that all states should set up the office of the Lokayukta within
one year from the commencement of the Act.
Lokpal Jurisdiction and Powers
 Jurisdiction of Lokpal includes Prime Minister, Ministers, members of Parliament,
Groups A, B, C and D officers and officials of Central Government.
 Jurisdiction of the Lokpal included the Prime Minister except on allegations of corruption
relating to international relations, security, the public order, atomic energy and space.
 The Lokpal does not have jurisdiction over Ministers and MPs in the matter of anything said
in Parliament or a vote given there.
 Its jurisdiction also includes any person who is or has been in charge (director/ manager/
secretary) of anybody/ society set up by central act or any other body financed/ controlled by
central government and any other person involved in act of abetting, bribe giving or bribe
taking.
 The Lokpal Act mandates that all public officials should furnish the assets and liabilities of
themselves as well as their respective dependents.
 It has the powers to superintendence over, and to give direction to CBI.
 If Lokpal has referred a case to CBI, the investigating officer in such case cannot be
transferred without the approval of Lokpal.
 The Inquiry Wing of the Lokpal has been vested with the powers of a civil court.
 Lokpal has powers of confiscation of assets, proceeds, receipts and benefits arisen or
procured by means of corruption in special circumstances.
 Lokpal has the power to recommend transfer or suspension of public
servant connected with allegation of corruption.
 Lokpal has the power to give directions to prevent the destruction of records during the
preliminary inquiry.
 Limitations
 The institution of lokpal has tried to bring a much needed change in the battle against
corruption in the administrative structure of India but at the same time, there are loopholes
and lacunae which need to be corrected.
  Five years have passed since the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013 was passed by
parliament, but not a single Lokpal has been appointed till date indicating the lack of
political will.
 The Lokpal act also called upon states to appoint a Lokayukta within a year of its coming to
force. But only 16 states have established the Lokayukta.
 Lokpal is not free from political influence as the appointing committee itself consist of
members from political parties.
 The appointment of Lokpal can be manipulated in a way as there is no criterion to decide
who is an ‘eminent jurist’ or ‘a person of integrity.’
 The 2013 act did not provide concrete immunity to the whistle blowers. The provision
for initiation of inquiry against the complainant if the accused is found innocent will only
discourage people from complaining.
 The biggest lacuna is the exclusion of judiciary from the ambit of the Lokpal.
 The Lokpal is not given any constitutional backing and there is no adequate provision for
appeal against the Lokpal.
 The specific details in relation to the appointment of Lokayukta have been left completely on
the States.
 To some extent, the need for functional independence of the CBI has been catered to by a
change brought forth in the selection process of its Director, by this Act.
 The complaint against corruption cannot be registered after a period of seven years from the
date on which the offence mentioned in such complaint is alleged to have been committed.
Suggestions
 In order to tackle the problem of corruption, the institution of the ombudsman should be
strengthened both in terms of functional autonomy and availability of manpower.
 Greater transparency, more right to information and empowerment of citizens and
citizen groups is required along with a good leadership that is willing to subject itself to
public scrutiny.
 Appointment of Lokpal in itself is not enough. The government should address the issues
based on which people are demanding a Lokpal. Merely adding to the strength of
investigative agencies will increase the size of the government but not necessarily improve
governance. The slogan adopted by the government of “less government and more
governance”, should be followed in letter and spirit.
 Moreover, Lokpal and Lokayukta must be financially, administratively and legally
independent of those whom they are called upon to investigate and prosecute.
 Lokpal and Lokayukta appointments must be done transparently so as to minimize the
chances of the wrong sorts of people getting in.
 There is a need for a multiplicity of decentralized institutions with appropriate accountability
mechanisms, to avoid the concentration of too much power, in any one institution or
authority.

Write in short about the provisions of the Right to Information Act.

The Right to Information Act
The Right to Information Act passed in 2005 extends to all states and union territories of India
excepting the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This act gives Indian citizens the right to access
information about any public authority or institution, including non-government organizations
substantially funded by the government.

The main aims of the RTI act are to provide clarity of information to the citizens of India, to contain
corruption and to promote accountability in the working of every public authority.
What is Information According to RTI?
“Information means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails,
opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples,
models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which
can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force.” [S.2(f)]
What Does Right to Information Mean?
This includes the right to:
i. inspect works, documents, records.
ii. take notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records.
iii. take certified samples of material.
iv. obtain information in form of printouts, diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any
other electronic mode or through printouts.[S.2(j)]
What Does Public Authority Mean?
It means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted:
a. by or under the Constitution;
b. by any other law made by Parliament;
c. by any other law made by State Legislature;
d. by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government.
and includes any
i. body owned, controlled or substantially financed
ii. non-government organization substantially financed directly or indirectly by the appropriate
government. [S.2(h)]
What are the obligations of public authorities?
Public authorities are to maintain and catalogue records in accordance to the act and ensure that
records that are appropriate are computerised within reasonable time and subject to availability of
resources.[S.2(a)]
Who are Public Information Officers (PIOs)?
According to this act, Public Information Officers (PIOs) are “to provide information to persons
requesting information under this Act.” [S.2.(5)(1)]
How do you request for information?
A person can request information in writing or through electronic means in English, Hindi or in the
official language of the area in which the application is being made, along with the prescribed
application fee [S.6.(1)]. The application can be made to the Central Public Information officer, State
Public Information Officer, Central Assistant Public Information Officer, or State Assistant Public
Officer depending on the case.
What is the time limit to get information?
 Thirty days from the date of application.
 Forty-eight hours for information concerning the life and liberty of an individual
 An additional five days will be added to the above response time, in case of transfer of
application Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer.
 Failure to provide information within the specified period is deemed as a refusal.
What is the fee?
 There is an application fee of Rs.10 but it varies from state to state.
 If further fees are required, the person concerned has to be informed in writing along with
calculation details of how the figure was arrived at.
 No fee will be charged to people living below the poverty line.
 Applicants can seek review of the decision on fees charged by the PIO by applying to the
appropriate Appellate (terms to know) Authority.
 Applicant must be provided information free of cost if the PIO fails to provide information
within the prescribed time limit.
Who are Appellate Authorities?
 An Appellate Authority is required to look into complaints made by people regarding
o inability to submit requests to a Central or State Public Information Officer
o denial of access to information
o no response to information within the specified time limit
o unreasonable fee amount to be paid
 o any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to information
 A first appeal can be made to a senior ranked Central Public Information Officer or State
Public Information Officer within thirty days from the date of expiry or from receipt of
decision. [S.5.(19)(1)]
 Third party appeal against decision made by the Public Information Officer (PIO) must be
made within 30 days from date of decision.
 A second appeal can be made to Central Information Commission or the State Information
Commission within “ninety days from the date on which the decision should have been made
or was actually received.” [S.5.(19)(3)]
 The responsibility of proving denial for request lies with the Public Information Officer who
denied the request. [S.5.(19)(5)]
 An appeal will be disposed of within 30 days from date of receipt or within an extended
period of 15 days. [S.5.(19)(6)]
What are the penalty provisions?
 A penalty of Rs.250 up to a maximum of Rs.25,000 will be issued to any Public Information
Officer on the following grounds
o Refusing to receive an application for information
o Not furnishing information within the specified time
o Denying request for information in bad faith
o Destroying information requested
o Obstructing access to information.
What are the grounds for rejection?
 An application can be rejected if the disclosure of information
o affects the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or
economic interests of India or would lead to incitement of an offence. [S.2.(8)(a)]
o is forbidden to be published by any court, tribunal or if disclosure may constitute
contempt of court. [S.2.(8)(b)]
o including information such as trade secrets, commercial confidence, intellectual
property. [S.2.(8)(d)]
Importance of the Right to Information Act
 This law empowers people to ask for information about central, state governments including
non-governmental organizations which are substantially funded by the government.
 The law gives citizens of India the tools to fight against corruption.
 RTI gives people the right to hold the government and organizations substantially funded by
the government accountable
 The Right to Information Act gives citizens the right to ask for information and decide, based
on the information received, whether their constitutional rights have been met.
 This law arms individuals with information so that they can advocate for themselves.

SE-223
Administrative Law with The Right to Information act, 2005
LL.B.(Part II)(Second Semester)Examination, 2017
Attempt 5 questions in all.
All questions carry 20 marks each

What is Administrative Law and what are its sources ?

Question repeated. Answer available in the earlier pages.

Discuss the relation between Administrative Law and Constitution.

“Constitutional law is a body of law which defines the role, powers, and structure of different
entities within a state, namely, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary; as well as the
basic rights of citizens and, the relationship between the central government and state, provincial, or
territorial governments.”
“Administrative law is the body of law that governs the activities of administrative
agencies of government. Government agency action can include rule making, adjudication, or
the enforcement of a specific regulatory agenda.
Administrative law deals with the decision-making of such administrative units of
government as tribunals, boards or commissions that are part of a national regulatory
scheme in such areas as police law, international trade, manufacturing,
the environment, taxation, broadcasting, immigration, and transport.”
As every law of the state must satisfy the constitutional benchmark, it’s essential to know the
relationship between them. Constitutional Law is the genus and Administrative Law its Species. Both
of them are a part of the Public Law in the Modern State.
Relationship between Constitutional & Administrative Law

Constitutional law and administrative law both are concerned with functions of government, both are
a part of public law in the modern state and the sources of the both are the same. Yet there is a

distinction between the two. The administrative law is an addition of the constitutional law.

Administrative law deals with the organization, functions, powers and duties of administrative

authorities while constitutional law deals with the general principles relating to the organization and

powers of the various organs of the state and their mutual relationship of these organs with the

individuals. In other words, constitutional law deals with fundamentals while administrative law deals

with details.

In countries which have written constitution, the source of constitutional law is the constitution while

the source of administrative law may be statutes, statutory instruments, precedents and custom.

A student of administrative law is not concerned with how a minister is appointed but only with how a

minister discharges his functions in relation to an individual or a group. How the minister of housing
and rehabilitation is appointed is not the concern of administrative law but when this minister

approves a scheme of new township which involves the acquisition of houses and lands of persons

living in that area, questions of administrative law arise. However some of the most important

differences between the constitutional and administrative law are:

Constitutional Law:
1. It is the supreme and highest law of the country. No law can be regarded above the law of
constitution of Pakistan.
2. The constructional law is always regarded as the genus. It is the main law.
3. This law mainly deals with various organs of a state.
4. It mainly deals with the structure of the state.
5. It touches all the branches of law and gives guidelines with regard to the general principal relating
to organization and powers of organs of the state, and their relations between citizens and towards
the state.
6. It also gives guidelines about the intentional relations.
7. It deals with the general principal of state pertaining to all branches.
8. It demarcates the constitutional status of Ministers and public servants.
9. It imposes certain negative duties on administrators, if they are found violating the fundamental
rights of the citizens and etc. It also imposes certain positive duties on administrators, viz,
implementation of social welfare schemes.
10. The constitutional laws have complete control on the administrative law and administrators of the
country.
Administrative Law:
1.It is not the supreme law of the country rather it is subordinate to the constitutional law.
2. Administrative law is the species of Constitution law.
3. It deals with the organs of the state as motion.
4. It mainly deals with the various functions of the state.
5. It doesn't deal with all branches of law, rather it details with the powers and functions of
administrative authorities.
6. It does not deal with the international law. It deals exclusively with the powers and functions of
administrative authorities.
7. It deals with the powers and functions of administrative authorities, including services, public
departments, local authorities and other statutory bodies exercising administrative powers, quasi
judicial powers, etc.
8. It is concerned with the organization of the services or the working of the various government
departments.
9. The administrators have to follow constitutional law first and next the administrative law.
10. The administrators should perform their functions with utmost obedience to constitutional law.
Administrative law is just a subordinate to constitutional law.

Or
What are the causes of the growth of delegated legislation under modern times ? What is
delegated legislation ? Discuss how Judiciary controls the delegated legislation ? Explain the
classification of the delegated legislation and discuss the judicial control over delegated
legislation.
 1. Discuss the various principles of Natural Justice and its exceptions.
Or
2. Discuss the writ of Prohibition. What is its utility in Administrative Law ?

3. Fundamental Rights are given by Indian Constitution by which administrative

discretions of Government can be controlled upto some extent. Discuss.
Or
4. Explain the liability of Government for the tortious acts of its servants.

5. Discuss the Judicial and Parliamentary controls over Public Corporation of India.
Or
What are the informations which can be denied to be provided under the Right to Information
Act, 2005 ?
Grounds of Rejection of RTI There are only three possible grounds on which
information can be denied:
 The organisation is not a Public authority - eg. a Cooperative Society, or a Private corporate
or Institution, not substantially financed or controlled by the Government.
 What is asked for ‘not information’ as defined under the Act: Information has to exist.
Interpretations of law or decisions which do not exist, or reasons for decisions which do not
exist will not be covered under the definition of ‘information’
Some examples to explain the above:
‘Why have I not got a ration card?’ is not asking for information; but ‘I want the progress of my file
relating to my application for a ration card’ is asking information.
‘Why have I not got admission?’ is not asking for information, whereas ‘I want the cut-off marks at
which admission was granted’ is asking for information.
 The information asked for falls in the exemptions of Section 8(1) or under Section 9 applies.
Section 9 bars giving information which would violate private party copyright.
Section 8 in The Right To Information Act, 2005, Exemption from disclosure of information.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,—
(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India,
the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead
to incitement of an offence;
(b) information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law or tribunal or
the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court;
(c) information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or the State
Legislature;
(d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure
of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is
satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;
(e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is
satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;
(f) information received in confidence from foreign government;
(g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or
identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security
purposes;
(h) information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of
offenders;
(i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other
officers: Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material on
the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken,
and the matter is complete, or over: Provided further that those matters which come under the
exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed;
(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has not relationship to
any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the
individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the
appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the
disclosure of such information: Provided that the information, which cannot be denied to the
Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923) nor any of the exemptions
permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority may allow access to information, if
public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.
(3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i) of sub-section (1), any information relating to
any occurrence, event or matter which has taken place, occurred or happened twenty years before
the date on which any request is made under section 6 shall be provided to any person making a
request under that section: Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which the
said period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of the Central Government shall be
final, subject to the usual appeals provided for in this Act.
Section 9 in The Right To Information Act, 2005, Grounds for rejection to access in certain
cases.—Without prejudice to the provisions of section 8, a Central Public Information Officer or
State Public Information Officer, as the case may be may reject a request for information where such
a request for providing access would involve an infringement of copyright subsisting in a person
other than the State.
Section 24 (1) of the Act specifies it clearly that the provision of the RTI Act will not apply to
Intelligence and Security organisation except in cases of alleged Human rights violation
and/or Corruption.
Section 24(1) in The Right To Information Act, 2005, Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the
intelligence and security organisations specified in the Second Schedule, being organisations
established by the Central Government or any information furnished by such organisations to that
Government: Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and human
rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub-section: Provided further that in the case of
information sought for is in respect of allegations of violation of human rights, the information shall
only be provided after the approval of the Central Information Commission, and notwithstanding
anything contained in Section 7, such information shall be provided within forty-five days from the
date of the receipt of request.

6. State the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of A.K.Kripak and others vs
Union of India and others AIR (1970) SC 150.
Or
7. State the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Harishankar Bagla vs
State of M.P. AIR (1954) SC 465.

LA-159
Administrative Law with The Right to Information act, 2005
LL.B.(Part II)(Second Semester)Examination, 2018
Attempt 5 questions in all.
All questions carry 20 marks each

1. Define Administrative Law & discuss its importance, nature and scope.
Or
What is the meaning of Delegated Legislation ? What is its importance in Modern times ?
What are the causes of the growth of delegated legislation under modern times ? What is
delegated legislation ? Discuss how Judiciary controls the delegated legislation ? Explain
the classification of the delegated legislation and discuss the judicial control over delegated
legislation.
Delegated legislation is law made by some person or body other than parliament, but with the
permission of parliament. The authority is laid down in a parent act of parliament, known as an
'enabling act' which creates the structure of the law and then delegates' powers to others to
make more detailed law in the area.. Delegated legislation allows the Government to make
changes to a law without needing to push through a completely new Act of Parliament. ‘Delegated
legislation’ means exercising of legislative power by an agent who is lower in rank to the
Legislature, or who is subordinate to the Legislature. By delegating the legislation by
Parliament to the Executive or any subordinate, it empowers different people or bodies to
integrate more details to an Act of Parliament. Parliament along these lines, through essential
enactment (for example an Act of Parliament), licenses others to make laws and guidelines through
delegated legislation. Laws must be changed to meet the current demands of the society.
Meanwhile, law maker while making laws are not in a position to take care of these dynamic
changes. Hence, they have to delegate their law making powers to Administrative officers to
legislate on their behalf to meet the current changes of the society.
Types of Delegated Legislation
Delegated legislation means giving power or authority to someone lower than his rank to make laws.
So there can be many ways in which this excess of power can be given to subsidiary rank people or
an Executive. These types are as follows:
Orders in Councils: This type of Delegated legislation can be given by Queens or the Privy
Councils. This Delegated legislation allows the Parliament to make laws without going through the
Parliamentary proceedings. Today, its main use is that it gives legal effect to European directives.
When the order issued under the privilege of the Queen or the Crown such order is subject to review
by the courts. But order issued by the Parliament may or may not be subject to review by the courts
as it is made within the prescribed limits Act of Parliament. In both the case the question can arises
that if this legislation is the same as the Executive legislative. The answer to this question is yes, it is
equivalent to executive legislative. There is no major difference between these orders and Executive
legislative almost they both are same. The meeting of Privy council in such case could simply means
a meeting of some Privy Councillors which includes three or four ministers, President, Councils and
Clerk of Privy Councils. This shows that this order is issued by the Executive who exercises powers
of the Council.
Rules of the Supreme Court and the County Courts: The Parliament by statutes bestow some
persons or authority with the power to make laws for a specific purpose. But it is different in England
where a Court has been given wide power to make laws. This task of making law has been
entrusted upon the Rules Committee of the Supreme Court and the County Courts. Entrusting
Judicial branch to control its Procedural law to a great extent has an advantage as it is given to that
authority who knows better about it than any person. Procedure and cost that are drawn by Rules
Committee of County Courts deals by the County Courts itself. Such rules are not subject to the
control of Parliament. When these rules used to come into force? It comes into force when the Lord
Chancellors with the consent of the Rules Committee of the Supreme Court confirms it.
Departmental or Executive instructions or regulations: When the power of legislature directly
delegated to the administration such as a Board, Ministers or a Committee, then the exercise of that
given power results in delegation through Departmental or Executional Instructions or Regulations.
Sometimes very wide powers are given to the administration or the delegated person. But this wide
delegation of legislation is not accepted by the judiciary as it is difficult for them to control
administrative action. There is extensive use of this delegated legislation in today’s world. Nowadays
only the broad line of making legislation is in the hands of Parliament and the rest power is given to
the Administrator.
Delegated legislation by laws: It can be given in two ways, firstly, it can be given by laws of
autonomous bodies, e.g., Corporation and secondly, it can be given by-laws of a local authority.
By-laws of autonomous bodies: These autonomous bodies have got the power to pass by-laws on
matters affecting them and other people in that locality or people residing in a particular area. For
example, they can make laws as public utility authorities for light, water, etc. Usually, these
authorities are given the power to make rules for regulating their working. Such by-laws are subject
to judicial review. It can be reviewed to check that it must not be ultra vires the Parent Statute. These
autonomous bodies have the power to frame rules for themselves. One more example of this
autonomous body is an association of Employers. The rules of these association are termed as
voluntary but this is not so in reality. It is fictitious as in its effect these rules are binding upon
members like other rules such as rules of a professional association, industrial organisation, etc.
By-laws of the local authority: Parliament has the power to make new local bodies or it can alter
the existing body. It empowers such body with powers to make by-laws for themselves for specific
purposes. These authority exercises excess power for public health, safety, and for good rule and
governance. These by-laws incur a penalty on its breach.
Reasons for growth of Delegated Legislation
Many factors are responsible for the rapid growth of delegated legislation in today’s time. Because of
the radical change in the governance of a country from ‘police state’ to the ‘welfare state’ the
function and the need of delegated legislation have increased. These factors and reasons for growth
of delegated legislation can be seen as follows:
Pressure upon time of Parliament: The area, scope, or horizon of state activities are expanding
day by day and it is difficult for the Parliament to make laws on each and every matter as they are
having a lot of work to do and they also have to make legislation on various matters. The Parliament
is so much occupied with matters concerning foreign policy and political issues that it has not much
time to enact the laws in detail. So it only frames the broad part of the rule and outline of the
legislation and gives that legislation to the executive or some of its subordinates to fill the full detail
following the necessary rules and regulations. It is like they have given the only skeleton and the
subordinate have to fill flesh and blood to the skeleton to make it alive. The committee on Ministers’
Power has observed that if the parliament is not willing to delegate law making power to the
subordinate then he will unable to pass the quality of rules and regulations that a person needs to
live a happy life or legislation which a modern public requires.
Technicality in the matters: With the progress and advancement in society, things have become
more twisted, complicated and technical. So to understand the technicality of each and every topic,
legislature needs the expert of that particular topic who is well aware of each and every detail of that
matter. Over the years it has been observed that some legislature only know politics and some might
have knowledge about one or two topics. Therefore, after framing policies by the parliament on any
topic, that topic is given to the government department or any particular person who knows about the
technicalities of that particular topic and given the power to lay down the details.
Flexibility: Parliamentary amendment is very slow and it requires a process to make any type of
law but by the tool of delegated legislation it can be made expeditiously with the help of the
executives, e.g., police regulation, bank rate, import and export, foreign exchange, etc. Also,
Parliament cannot foresee the contingency while enacting a law so to make it foresee the workload
is being given to the executives. So it is necessary to give work to lower body to have that work in a
smooth and better manner.
Emergency: In any type of emergency one should know how to deal with it quickly without any
delay. The legislature is not equipped with the skills of providing an urgent solution to meet the
situation of emergency. Delegated legislation is the only way to meet that situation. Therefore, in
times of emergency and war, an executive is given wide power to deal with that situation. Some
examples of delegation in England during the First and Second World War are the Defence of the
Realm Act 1914-15, the Emergency Power Act, 1920, etc. Similarly, in the case of inflation, flood,
epidemic, economic depression, etc immediate remedial actions are necessary.
Experiment: The practise of delegated legislation enables the Executive to experiment. As every
work is new for the legislative and he has to experiment that either this law is working in perfect
condition or not. This method or approach permits the utilization of experience and implementation
of the necessary changes in the application of the provision made by the Parliament. For example, in
traffic matters of the road an experiment method can be conducted and in the wake of its application
necessary changes can be made in the provisions. The advantages of such a course is that it allows
the delegated authority to consult the interest of people at the ground level that what type of law is
affecting them and then he makes an experiment by altering the provisions.
Complexity of modern administration: Modern administration used to take added responsibilities
when it came to upraise the condition of the citizens such as looking after their employment, health,
education, regulating trade, etc. Therefore, the complexity in modern administration and expansion
of states’ function to the social sphere and economic have allowed the formation of a new form of
legislation and to give wide powers to various authorities on various occasions. It is important that an
administration should give an excess of power to activate socio-economic policies. In a country like
Bangladesh where control over private trade, business or property may be required to be imposed, it
is necessary that the administration should hand over the excess amount of power to implement
such policy.
Therefore, we can say that there is a rapid growth of this delegated legislation and also it is
necessary for a country to run smoothly.
The re Delhi Laws Act is a landmark judgment of the 7 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
wherein each judge had a difference of opinion. Therefore, an analysis of the same would
lead to a better understanding of the applicability of the concept of delegated legislation in
India

Judicial Control of Delegated Legislation:

In India the invalidity of delegated legislation may arise from any of the following reasons:
(1) The enabling Act or delegating statute being unconstitutional. The unconstitutionality of an
Act may arise under the following three conditions: (a) A law will be ultra vires if it violates a
constitutional provision. Where the law is unconstitutional on any of the grounds it is devoid
of any effect and is unenforceable. (b) Secondly, the other type of limitation on the Legislature is
known as express limitation. According to this, no Legislature has the power to transgress the
scheme of distribution of powers embodied in the Constitution. The Parliament of India can make
laws for the whole of India or any part thereof in respect of matters contained in the Union List and in
the Concurrent List. The residuary powers belong to the Union. An Act of Parliament which
encroaches upon a subject in the State List is invalid. Thus any provision of delegated legislation
contained in an Act which is in violation of the constitutional scheme of distribution of
legislative powers would be ultra vires. (c) The third condition leading to unconstitutionality
of an Act is, where the Legislature has the power, subjected to certain restrictions which are
not observed by it.
(2) The subordinate legislation violating the Constitution. The second mode for judicial review
comes into play where the delegated legislation violates the provisions of the Constitution or any of
the fundamental rights given thereunder.
(3) The subordinate legislation being ultra vires the delegating Act. In all circumstances the
power of delegated legislations should be exercised within the scope of the rulemaking power
provided in the statute.
In the control-mechanism, judicial control has emerged as the most outstanding controlling
measure. Judicial control over delegated legislation is exercised by applying two tests:
 Substantive ultra vires; and
 Procedural ultra vires.
Ultra vires means beyond powers, when a subordinate legislation goes beyond the scope of
authority conferred on the delegate to enact, it is known as substantive ultra vires. It is a
fundamental principle of law that a public authority cannot act outside the powers and if the authority
acts, 'such act becomes ultra vires and, accordingly void'. It has been rightly described as 'the
central principle' and 'foundation of large part of administrative law'. An act which is done in excess
of power is ultra vires.
Ultra vires is a Latin phrase used in law to describe an act which requires legal authority but
is done without it. Its opposite, an act done under proper authority, is intra vires. Acts that
are intra vires may equivalently be termed "valid", and those that are ultra vires termed
"invalid"
When a subordinate legislation is enacted without complying with the procedural requirements
prescribed by the Parent Act or by the general law, it is known as procedural ultra vires. In case of
procedural ultra vires, the Courts may or may not quash delegated legislation as it depends upon the
circumstances whether the procedure is held to be mandatory or directory. Judicial control over
delegated legislation is exercised by applying the doctrine of ultra vires in a number of
circumstances.

=========================================================
Discuss Conditional Legislation in India.
When the law is complete and certain conditions are laid down as to how and when the law would be
applied by the delegate, it is conditional legislation. It includes no law-making powers but only the
power of determining when it should come into force or when it should be applied.
Supreme Court in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, stated that in conditional legislation,
the delegate’s power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become
effective.
Conditional Legislation can be found in the occurrences where,
I. The legislature empowers the executive to expand the activity of a current law to a specific area or
region.
II. To determine and decide the time of application of an Act to a given area.
III. To broaden the span of a Temporary Act, subject to maximum period fixed by the legislative
assembly.
 IV. To determine and decide the degree and limits within which the statute or Act should be
employable and operative.
V. Lastly, to introduce a special law if the contemplated situation has arisen in the opinion of the
government.
Conditional Legislation allows better implementation and better reach of laws as it gives them ample
discretion to work and to make decisions regarding implementation in the best manner possible.
Thus, all the modern socio-economic welfare schemes are a formation of the legislature, but they
have become successful in the country because of their implementation. All the “when, where and
how” aspects of implementation have been ticked generously by the government because of the
discretion that they have been given by the legislature for the implementation of the Acts framed by
the lawmakers. But this discretion cannot be exercised beyond the power that has been delegated. If
exceeded, then that action is null and void.
Conditional legislation though a kind of delegated legislation is different from it as the latter
includes conferring law-making power to another body, but the former is only for bringing the
law in force by another body without having any law-making power. Both the jobs are being
done by delegates, but one involves law making and the other involves implementing the
same. The point of commonality being that both are done by delegates with a motive of better
implementation and usage of law. One with framing supporting rules, guidelines,
notifications and the other with method and satisfying conditions for execution of the law
made by the assembly accordingly. In the end, delegated legislation be it of any kind is
working under the umbrella of powers given by the law-making bodies of central and state
governments respectively.
The re Delhi Laws Act is a landmark judgment of the 7 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
wherein each judge had a difference of opinion. Therefore, an analysis of the same would
lead to a better understanding of the applicability of the concept of delegated legislation in
India

What are the three sources of Administrative law and their functions ?
The Administrative law sources and its functions are
 Executive – Enforcing Law and Regulations.
 Quasi-legislative – Making Regulations to establish policies for future application.
 Quasi-judicial – Adjudicating violations of laws or regulations through application of the
policies established by Quasi-legislative agency.

Quasi-judicial is defined as an action by an administrative agency which;

 ascertains certain facts,
 hold hearings,
 weigh evidence,
 make conclusions from the facts as a basis for their official action, and
 exercises discretion of a judicial nature.
The proceedings of administrative agencies are quasi-judicial when; hearing is held, both parties
participate, the presiding officer subpoena witnesses and the administrative body has the power to
take remedial action. Although there are wide differences between administrative agencies and
courts, they share a relationship similar to lower and upper courts. similarly while performing a
judicial function an entity is similar to a district court. When an administrative body acts in a quasi-
judicial manner, due process requires notice and an opportunity for a full and fair hearing.
A non-constitutional body is an organisation or institution which is not mentioned in
the Constitution of India. Unlike a Constitutional Body, a non-constitutional body does not derive
its powers from the Indian Constitution.
Usually, a non-constitutional body derives in powers from corresponding laws passed by the
Indian Parliament.
 List of Non-Constitutional Bodies in India which are quasi-judicial in nature
 National Human Rights Commission
 National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
 Competition Commission of India
 Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
 National Company Law Tribunal
 Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
 Railway Claims Tribunal
 Intellectual Property Appellate Tribunal
 Banking Ombudsman
 National Green Tribunal
 Central Information Commission
 SEBI
 RBI
Note: ‘Quasi’ is Latin for “as if.” Quasi-Judicial bodies have a partly judicial character.
They possess the right to hold hearings and conduct investigations into disputed claims and alleged
infractions of rules and regulations. They make decisions in a similar manner as courts.

Discuss the meaning, nature and characteristics of Administrative tribunals.

Tribunals have been defined as “Bodies outside the hierarchy of the courts with administrative or
judicial functions.” Administrative tribunals resolve disputes between, for example, the citizen and an
officer of a government agency or between individuals in an area of law in which the government has
legislated the conduct of their relations. Administrative tribunal is a legal organization that makes
decisions in disagreements between two people or between a person and a government
department, but which is not part of the court system.
Tribunal is a quasi-judicial institution that is set up to deal with problems such as resolving
administrative or tax-related disputes. It performs a number of functions like adjudicating
disputes, determining rights between contesting parties, making an administrative decision,
reviewing an existing administrative decision and so forth. A Tribunal, generally, is any person
or institution having an authority to judge, adjudicate on, or to determine claims or disputes –
whether or not it is called a tribunal in its title.
Need of Tribunal
 To overcome the situation that arose due to the pendency of cases in various Courts,
domestic tribunals and other Tribunals have been established under different Statutes, hereinafter
referred to as the Tribunals. The Tribunals were set up to reduce the workload of
courts, to expedite decisions and to provide a forum which would be manned by lawyers and
experts in the areas falling under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
 the provision of a speedier and cheaper procedure than that afforded by the ordinary
courts (tribunals avoid the formality of the ordinary courts).
 The tribunals perform an important and specialised role in justice mechanism. They
hear disputes related to the environment, armed forces, tax and administrative issues.
Tribunals were not part of the original constitution, it was incorporated in the Indian Constitution
by 42nd Amendment Act, 1976.
 Article 323-A deals with Administrative Tribunals.
 Article 323-B deals with tribunals for other matters.
Under Article 323 B, the Parliament and the state legislatures are authorised to provide for the
establishment of tribunals for the adjudication of disputes relating to the following matters:
 Taxation
 Foreign exchange, import and export
 Industrial and labour
 Land reforms
 Ceiling on urban property
 Elections to Parliament and state legislatures
 Food stuff
 Rent and tenancy rights
Characteristics of Administrative Tribunals
 Administrative Tribunal is a creation of a statute.
 An Administrative Tribunal is vested in the judicial power of the State and thereby
performs quasi-judicial functions as distinguished from pure administrative functions.
 Administrative Tribunal is bound to act judicially and follow the principles of natural justice.
 It is required to act openly, fairly and impartially.
 An Administrative Tribunal is not bound by the strict rules of procedure and evidence
prescribed by the civil procedure court.

No. Court of Law Tribunal

A court of law is a part of the traditional An Administrative Tribunal is an agency

1. judicial system whereby judicial created by the statute and invested with
powers are derived from the state. judicial power.

The Civil Courts have judicial power to
try all suits of a civil nature unless the
2.
cognizance is expressly or impliedly
barred.
Tribunal is also known as the Quasi-
judicial body. Tribunals have the power to
try cases of special matter which are
conferred on them by statutes

Judges of the ordinary courts of law

Tenure, terms and conditions of the
are independent of the executive in
services of the members of Administrative
3. respect of their tenure, terms and
Tribunal are entirely in the hands of
conditions of service etc. Judiciary is
Executive (government).
independent of Executive

The president or a member of the Tribunal

The presiding officer of the court of law may not be trained as well in law. He may
4.
is trained in law. be an expert in the field of Administrative
matters.

A judge of a court of law must be

An Administrative Tribunal may be a party
5. impartial who is not interested in the
to the dispute to be decided by it.
matter directly or indirectly.

An Administrative Tribunal is not bound by

A court of law is bound by all the rules
6. rules but bound by the principles of nature
of evidence and procedure.
of Justice.
 Administrative Tribunal may decide
Court must decide all questions by taking into account
7. questions objectively on the basis of departmental policy, the decision of
evidence and materials on record. Administrative Tribunal may be subjective
rather than objective.

A court of law can decide vires of a

8. Administrative Tribunal cannot do so
legislation

Or
2. Against whom does the writ of Mandamus can be issued ? What are its exceptions ?

3. What is Administrative Discretion ? How an administrative officer should exercise his

discretionary powers ?
Or
4. Explain Tort against State and Contractual Liability with an example.

5. Define Corporation and describe the characteristics and kinds of Corporations.

Or
Explain briefly the provisions mentioned in the Right to Information Act, 2005.
The Right to Information (RTI) is an act of the Parliament of India which sets out the rules and
procedures regarding citizens' right to information. It replaced the former Freedom of Information
Act, 2002. Under the provisions of RTI Act, any citizen of India may request information from a
"public authority" (a body of Government or "instrumentality of State") which is required to reply
expeditiously or within thirty days. In case of matter involving a petitioner's life and liberty, the
information has to be provided within 48 hours. The Act also requires every public authority to
computerize their records for wide dissemination and to proactively publish certain categories of
information so that the citizens need minimum recourse to request for information formally.
The RTI Bill was passed by Parliament of India on 15 June 2005 and came into force with effect
from 12 October 2005. Every day on an average, over 4800 RTI applications are filed. In the first ten
years of the commencement of the act over 17,500,000 applications had been filed.
Although Right to Information is not included as a Fundamental Right in the Constitution of
India, it protects the fundamental rights to Freedom of Expression and Speech under Article 19(1)
(a) and Right to Life and Personal Liberty under Article 21 guaranteed by the Constitution. The
authorities under RTI Act 2005 are called public authorities. The Public Information Officer (PIO) or
the First Appellate Authority in the public authorities perform quasi judicial function of deciding on the
application and appeal respectively. This act was enacted in order to consolidate the fundamental
right in the Indian constitution 'freedom of speech'. Since RTI is implicit in the Right to Freedom of
Speech and Expression under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, it is an implied fundamental right.
Scope
The Act extends to the whole of India. It covers all the constitutional authorities, including executive,
legislature and judiciary; any institution or body established or constituted by an act of Parliament or
a state legislature. It is also defined in the Act that bodies or authorities established or constituted by
order or notification of appropriate government including bodies "owned, controlled or substantially
financed" by government, or non-Government organizations "substantially financed, directly or
indirectly by funds".
Private bodies
Private bodies are not within the Act's In a decision of Sarbjit Roy vs Delhi Electricity Regulatory
Commission, the Central Information Commission also reaffirmed that privatised public utility
companies fall within the purview of RTI. As of 2014, private institutions and NGOs receiving over
95% of their infrastructure funds from the government come under the Act.
Political parties
The Central Information Commission (CIC) held that the political parties are public authorities
and are answerable to citizens under the RTI Act. The CIC said that seven national parties
- Congress, BJP, NCP, CPI(M), CPI and BSP and BJD - has been substantially funded
indirectly by the Central Government and have the character of public authorities under the RTI Act
as they perform public functions. But in August 2013 the government introduced a Right To
Information (Amendment) Bill which would remove political parties from the scope of the law.
Currently no parties are under the RTI Act and a case has been filed for bringing all political parties
under it.

6. State the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of A.K.Kripak and others vs
Union of India and others AIR (1970) SC 150.
Or
7. State the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Bhagat Raja vs Union of
India, AIR 1967, SC 1606.

LB-131
Administrative Law with The Right to Information act, 2005
LL.B.(Part II)(Second Semester)Examination, 2019
Attempt 5 questions in all.
All questions carry 20 marks each

2. Explain the nature, scope and sources of Administrative law in the Indian perspective.
Or
3. Explain the classification of the delegated legislation and discuss the judicial control
over delegated legislation.

4. Discuss the various jurisdictions of Administrative tribunal.

Or
5. Explain the Judicial control over Administrative actions.
 6. What do you understand by Administrative discretion ? Explain the Administrative
discretion and Rule of Law.
Or
7. Explain the Sovereign and the Non Sovereign function of the State in matters of the
Liability of the State.

8. Write short notes on any of the two of the following:

 Lokpal and Lokayukta
 Corporation
 Vigilance Commission
Or
9. Explain the importance of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Are there any
exceptions to it ? Explain.

10. State the facts and principles of law laid down in Bharat Bank Ltd. Vs Employees of
Bharat Bank Ltd. AIR 1950 SC 188.
Or
11. State the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Harishankar Bagla vs
State of M.P. AIR (1954) SC 465.

What do you mean by Droit Administratif?

Droit Administratif: Droit is french for ‘Right or Law’. French administrative law is known as Droit
Administratif which means a body of rules which determine the organization, powers and
duties of public administration and regulate the relation of the administration with the citizen
of the country. Droit Administrative does not represent the rules and principles enacted by
Parliament. It contains the rules developed by administrative courts. Napoleon Bonaparte
was the founder of the Droit administrative. It was he who established the Conseil d’Etat . He
passed an ordinance depriving the law courts of their jurisdiction on administrative matters and
another ordinance that such matters could be determined only by the Conseil d’Etat.
Waline, the French jurist, propounds three basic principles of Droit administrative:
 the power of administration to act suo motu and impose directly on the subject the duty to
obey its decision;
 the power of the administration to take decisions and to execute them suo motu may be
exercised only within the ambit of law which protects individual liberties against
administrative arbitrariness;
 the existence of a specialized administrative jurisdiction. One good result of this is that an
independent body reviews every administrative action
The Conseil d’Etat is composed of eminent civil servants, deals with a variety of matters like claim of
damages for wrongful acts of Government servants, income-tax, pensions, disputed elections,
personal claims of civil servants against the State for wrongful dismissal or suspension and so on. It
has interfered with administrative orders on the ground of error of law, lack of jurisdiction, irregularity
of procedure and detournement depouvior (misapplication of power). It has exercised its jurisdiction
liberally.
Main characteristic features of droit administratif: The following characteristic features are of the
Droit Administratif in France:
Those matters concerning the State and administrative litigation falls within the jurisdiction of
administrative courts and cannot be decided by the land of the ordinary courts.
Those deciding matters concerning the State and administrative litigation, rules as developed by the
administrative courts are applied. If there is any conflict of jurisdiction between ordinary courts and
administrative court, it is decided by the tribunal des conflicts.

Conseil d’État, (French: “Council of State”), highest court in France for issues and cases
involving public administration. Its origin dates back to 1302, though it was extensively
reorganized under Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821). It was Napoleon Bonaparte who passed
an ordinance depriving the law courts of their jurisdiction on administrative matters and
another ordinance that such matters could be determined only by the Council of State or the
Conseil d’État, the highest administrative court. It has long had the responsibility of deciding or
advising on state issues and legislative measures submitted to it by the sovereign or, later, by the
president, the cabinet, or the parliament. It is the court in which French citizens may bring claims
against the administration, though usually since 1953 such claims originate in the regional
administrative tribunals of first instance, and appeals are taken to the Conseil d’État.
The Council of State (Conseil d’État) advises the Government of France on the preparation of
bills, ordinances and certain decrees. It also answers the Government’s queries on legal
affairs and conducts studies upon the request of the Government or through its own initiative
regarding administrative or public policy issues.
The Conseil d’État is the highest administrative jurisdiction - it is the final arbiter of cases
relating to executive power, local authorities, independent public authorities, public administration
agencies or any other agency invested with public authority.
In discharging the dual functions of judging as well as advising the Government, the Conseil d’État
ensures that the French administration operates in compliance with the law. It is therefore one of the
principal guarantees of the rule of law in the country.
The Conseil d’État is also responsible for the day-to-day management of the administrative tribunals
and courts of appeal.

==========================================
What are the principles of judicial control over administrative action in India? Explain
Judicial Control over Administrative actions.
An administrative action is controlled by courts through the writs of Habeas corpus, Mandamus,
Certiorari, Prohibition and Quo warranto, Courts exercising ordinary judicial powers through suits,
injunctions and declaratory actions, higher administrative authorities.
The control exercised by the Courts over the administration is called judicial control, that is,
to the power of the court to keep the administrative acts within the limits of law. It also implies
the right of an aggrieved citizen to challenge the wrongful act of administration in the court of law.
The primary purpose of judicial control over administration is the protection of the rights and liberty of
citizens by ensuring the legality of administrative acts.
Means of Judicial Control Over Administration
Broadly speaking, there are two systems of legal remedies against administrative encroachments on
the rights of citizens. One is called the Rule of Law system and the other is called the
Administrative Law system. The Rule of Law means that everybody, irrespective of social and
cultural differences, whether an official or a private citizen is subject to the same law and the
ordinary law of the land. The official cannot take shelter behind state sovereignty in committing
mistakes in his official capacity. The administrative law system is based on the assumption of
separate law and courts for dealing with administrative actions. This system prevails mainly in
France. In the following paragraphs, we shall discuss some of the forms of judicial control
over administration in India, under the Rule of Law system.
Judicial Review: The judicial review implies the power of the courts to examine the legality and
constitutionality of administrative acts of officials and also the executive orders and the legislative
enactments. This is very important method of judicial control. This doctrine prevails in countries
where Constitution is held supreme, for example, in U.S.A. India, Australia, etc.
Statutory Appeal: The statutes made by Parliament and State Assemblies itself provide that in a
particular type of administrative action, the aggrieved party will have a right of appeal to the courts
Judicial Administration or to a higher administrative tribunal. Sometimes, legislative enactment itself
may provide for judicial intervention in certain matters.
Suits against the Government: There are several limitations, varying from country to country, as
regards filing suits against the government for its contractual liability. The contractual liability of the
Union and the State Governments is the same as that of an individual citizen under the ordinary law
of contracts, subject however, to any statutory conditions of limits, which the Parliament can regulate
under the constitution. The State is liable for the tortuous acts of its officials in respect of the non-
sovereign functions only.
Criminal and Civil Suits against Public Officials In India, civil proceedings can be instituted
against a public official for anything done in his official capacity after giving two months notice. When
criminal proceedings are to be instituted against an official for the acts done in his official capacity,
previous sanctions of the Head of the State i.e., the President or the Governor is required. Some
functionaries like the President and the Governor are immune from legal proceedings even in
respect of their personal act. Ministers, however, do not enjoy such immunity.
Extraordinary Remedies: Apart from the methods of judicial control already discussed, there are
the extraordinary remedies in the nature of writs of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus., Prohibition,
Certiorari and Quo-Warranto. These are called extraordinary remedies because the courts
grant these writs except the writ of Habeas Corpus, in their discretion and as a matter of right
and that too when no other adequate remedy is available. A writ is an order of the court enforcing
compliance on the part of those against whom the writ is issued. In India, these writs are available
under the provisions of the Constitution. While the Supreme Court is empowered to issue these writs
or orders or directives only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, the High Courts are
empowered to issue these writs not only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also for
other rights. We will discuss these writs now:
a) Habeas Corpus: Habeas Corpus literally means ‘to have the body of.’ This writ is an order
issued by the court against a person who has detained another to produce the latter before
the court and submit to its orders. If it is found that the person in unlawfully or illegally
detained, he will be set free. A friend or a relation of the detained person may also apply for this
writ on his/her behalf. This writ is a great bulwark of individual freedom and can be described as the
cornerstone of personal liberty. This writ is granted as a matter of a right of prima-facie, if it is
established that the person is unlawfully detained. Its utility is, however restricted in India in view of
the provision of Preventive Detention Act.
b) Mandamus: Mandamus literally means command. If a public official fails to perform an act
which is a part of his public duty and thereby violates the right of an individual, he /she will be
commanded to perform the act through this writ. From the standpoint of judicial control over
administrative lapses, it is an effective writ. In India, this can also be issued to compel a court or
judicial tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction.
c) Prohibition: It is a judicial writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court, preventing it from
usurping jurisdiction, which is not vested with it. While Mandamus commands activity, Prohibition
commands inactivity. This writ can be issued only against judicial or quasi-judicial authorities to
prevent exercise of excess of jurisdiction by a subordinate court. As such its significance as a
method of judicial control over administration is limited.
d) Certiorari: While Prohibition is preventive, Certiorari is both preventive and curative. It is a writ
issued by a superior court for transferring the records of proceedings of a case from an
inferior court or quasi-judicial authority to the superior court for determining the legality of
the proceedings.
e) Quo-Warranto: Literally, Quo-Warranto means 'on what authority'. When any person acts in a
‘public office’ in which he/she is not entitled to act, the court by the issue of this writ, will enquire
into the legality of the claim of the person to that office. If the said claim is not well founded,
he/she will be ousted from that office. It is, thus, a powerful instrument against the usurpation of
‘public offices’.
Besides these, there is one more writ, namely the writ of Injunction. It is of two kinds, mandatory and
preventive. Mandatory injunction resembles the writ of Mandamus while Preventive Injunction
resembles the writ of Prohibition. Through this writ, a public official can be restrained from doing a
thing which, if done would cause irreparable damage to the rights of individuals. While Prohibition is
a writ available against judicial authorities, Injunction is a writ, which is issued against executive
officials.
==========================================
What are the various Limitations Of Judicial Control Over Administration ???
The effectiveness of judicial control over administration is limited by many factors. One of the most
important factor is that the courts cannot interfere in the administrative activities on their own accord
even if such activities are arbitrary. They act only when their intervention is sought. Judicial
intervention is restrictive in nature and limited in its scope. Some of these limitations are:
a) Unmanageable volume of work: the judiciary is not able to cope up with the volume of work. In a
year the courts are able to deal with only a fraction of cases brought before it. Thousands of cases
have been pending in Supreme Court, High Courts and Lower Courts for years together for want of
time. There is an increase in the cases of litigation without a commensurate expansion of judicial
mechanism. The old adage of 'justice delayed is justice denied', still holds good. This excessive
delay in the delivery of justice discourages many to approach the court. The feeling of helplessness
results in denial of justice to many.
b) Postmortem nature of judicial control: In most of the cases the judicial intervention comes only
after enough damage is done by the administrative actions. Even if the courts set right the wrong
done, there is no mechanism to redress the trouble the citizen has undergone in the process.
c) Prohibitive Costs: the judicial process is costly and only rich can afford it. There is some truth in
the criticism of pro-rich bias of judicial system in India. As a result, only rich are able to seek the
protection of courts from the administrative abuses. The poor are, in most cases, the helpless
victims of the administrative arbitrariness and judicial inaction. As V.R. Krishna Iyer pointed 'the
portals of justice are not accessible to the poor'.
d) Cumbersome procedure: Many legal procedures are beyond the comprehension of common
man. The procedural tyranny frightens many from approaching the courts. Even though the
procedures have a positive dimension of ensuring fair play, too much of it negatives the whole
process.
e) Statutory limitations: the courts may be statutorily prevented from exercising jurisdiction in
certain spheres. There are several administrative acts, which cannot be reviewed by courts. For
instance, ninth schedule of Indian constitution.
f) Specialised nature of administrative actions: The highly technical nature of some
administrative actions act as a further limitation on judicial control. The judges, who are only legal
experts, may not be able to sufficiently appreciate the technical implications of administrative
actions. As a result, their judgments may not be authentic.
g) Lack of awareness: In developing societies, most of the people who are poor and illiterate are
not aware of judicial remedies and the role of the courts. As a result they may not even approach the
court to redress their grievances. The courts, which can intervene only when it is sought, may be
helpless in this situation. The general deprivation of people also results in deprivation of justice to
them.
h) Erosion of autonomy of judiciary: There is executive interference in the working of judiciary.
The quality of judiciary mostly depends on the quality of the judges. The Law Commission made
many recommendations to ensure the judicial standards of the bench. The suggestion to create
Judicial Commission with responsibility for judicial appointments deserves serious consideration. In
recent years, there are many allegations of corruption against judges. This undermines the prestige
and the effectiveness of the judiciary.
Many steps have been initiated to overcome some of the limitations mentioned above. In the
succeeding paragraphs, we shall discuss some of these measures, in particular, Public Interest
Litigation, Legal Aid and Nyaya Panchayats.

Article 32 falls under Part III of the Indian Constitution which includes the Fundamental
Rights of the Indian citizens. It allows all the Indian citizens to move to the country's Apex
Court in case of violation of Fundamental Rights.
Article 32 in The Constitution Of India 1949, Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by
this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction
all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by
this Constitution.

Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the Hon'ble High Courts to exercise power through
issuance of writs – habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari or
any appropriate writ.
Article 226 in The Constitution Of India 1949, Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them,
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose
(2) The power conferred by clause ( 1 ) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the
territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not
within those territories
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any
other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause ( 1 ), without
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such
interim order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the
vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such
order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application
within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy
of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last
day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and
if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the
case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power
conferred on the Supreme court by clause ( 2 ) of Article 32
What Does Territorial Limits Mean?
In liability insurance, territorial limits pertain to the geographical areas or locations outside of which
an insurance policy may not provide coverage to the insured.
The territorial jurisdiction extends to territorial water up to 12 nautical miles (21.90 Kms) from
the nearest point of the baseline; beyond territorial waters is the Contiguous Zone extending
up to 24 nautical miles; and beyond that up to 200 nautical miles is the Exclusive Economic
Zone of India.
1 Statute mile = about 1.6 km (1.584 km)
1 Nautical mile = about 1.8 km (1.852 km)

===========================================================
What is the meaning and essential ingredients of Locus Standi ???
The Latin Maxim “Locus Standi” consists of two words namely “locus” which means place and
“standi” means the right to bring an action. So, collectively, it means the right to appear or the right
to bring an action before the court. As per this maxim, one person needs to show his legal
capacity before approaching the court. It means the person can only approach the court when his
personal interest has suffered or an injury is inflicted upon him.
In India, the concept of locus standi is mentioned under Order 7 Rule 11 of the civil procedure
code, 1908. For instituting any action, the plaintiff or the appellant must prove his locus standi first
and the trial will start thereafter. The court can dismiss the entire case, irrespective of its merit if the
requirement of locus standi is not fulfilled.
This doctrine of “Locus Standi“ ensures that only the bonafide parties came to the court. However,
in recent times, the rule of locus standi has been relaxed and even allowed a public-spirited citizen
to approach the court on behalf of poor and downtrodden people.

Essential ingredients of Locus Standi

Presence of injury:
The primary requirement for instituting a suit is that the person must have suffered some injury. As
per the Oxford dictionary, the term injury means the violation of any legal right or some other
physical or monetary harm that occurred to any person. The injury can occur from the act of private
parties or the act of state. It is also important to note that the injury may be actual or maybe
anticipatory. Further, the nature of the injury can be economic or non-economic.
illustration – A booth office prohibited a person from casting his vote. Now the person’s legal right is
infringed and he will have the locus standi to approach the court.
Causation:
The term causation means the cause and effect relationship. It means that there shall be a sufficient
relationship between the act of one party and the injury suffered by the other party. The main object
of this ingredient is to ensure that the injury can be traced back to the action of the defendant. It also
further ensures that the impugned injury is not related to some independent or some other third
party.
Illustration – A local cable TV operator approached the court against the BCCI by stating that he
has suffered huge damage due to the suspension of IPL on account of covid 19. The court will
dismiss the suit at the outset because there is no direct relationship between the act of the BCCI and
the monetary injury that occurred to him. So, he doesn’t have the locus standi to institute a suit
against BCCI.
How do you prove locus standi?
The SCA considered the requirements for locus standi, being that the appellant must have an
adequate interest in the subject matter of the litigation; the interest must not be too remote; the
interest must be actual; and the interest must be current (not hypothetical), and concluded that the
court a quo rightly found .
Is locus standi applicable in mandamus?
Only a person whose right has been infringed can apply to court of law for Writ of Mandamus
Does locus standi apply in habeas corpus?
It was held that if a person detained or confined can't file an application for the writ than some other
person can file it on his behalf which quashed the locus standi approach. ... So the writ petition of
habeas corpus was filed in the court.

Is PIL an exception to locus standi?

The exception to the rule of Locus Standi-Public Interest Litigation: ... So, to remove the hardship of
law, a new concept of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) came into existence. It was the result of the
efforts of judicial activism in a direction to achieve justice in a true sense.

=========================================
The exception to the rule of Locus Standi - Public Interest Litigation
From the period of independence, there is an alarming rise in the poverty and unemployment rate. A
lot of people didn’t have the necessary resources to approach the court. They were grossly exploited
by others and their legal rights were deeply prejudiced. The cost of litigation was very high and the
people due to money and illiteracy were not approaching the court. So, to remove the hardship of
law, a new concept of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) came into existence. Public Interest Litigation
differs from ordinary litigation. It does not involve the enforcement of the rights of one person against
another. Rather, this type of litigation is filed to provide justice to the deprived sections of the society.
It is a collaborative effort that encompasses the petitioner, the court and the government. It is
commendable to see that courts have taken all possible measures to allow access to public spirited
persons and even NGOs to file petitions on behalf of those who cannot approach the court. It was
the result of the efforts of judicial activism in a direction to achieve justice in a true sense. Writ can
be filed by individual for personal benefit while PIL can be filed by any public spirited person for
benefit of public at large. It is pertinent to be noted that once a PIL has been filed, it cannot be
withdrawn. The courts might also take suo motu cognizance of matters involving public
interest. suo motu is the power of the court to initiate proceedings against a party by its own
motion.
However, the procedure to file a PIL is similar to that of a writ petition.
 Public interest Litigation (PIL) means litigation filed in a court of law, for the protection of
“Public Interest”, such as Pollution, Terrorism, Road safety, Constructional hazards etc. Any
matter where the interest of public at large is affected can be redressed by filing a Public
Interest Litigation in a court of law.
 Public interest litigation is not defined in any statute or in any act. It has been
interpreted by judges to consider the intent of public at large. Article 38 forms the basis of
PIL – State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people.
 Public interest litigation is the power given to the public by courts through judicial activism.
However, the person filing the petition must prove to the satisfaction of the court that the
petition is being filed for a public interest and not just as a frivolous litigation by a busy body.
 The court can itself take cognizance of the matter and proceed suo motu or cases can
commence on the petition of any public spirited individual.
 Some of the matters which are entertained under PIL are:
o Bonded Labour matters
o Neglected Children
o Non-payment of minimum wages to workers and exploitation of casual workers
o Atrocities on women
o Environmental pollution and disturbance of ecological balance
o Food adulteration
o Maintenance of heritage and culture
Genesis and Evolution of PIL in India: Some Landmark Judgements
 The seeds of the concept of public interest litigation were initially sown in India by Justice
Krishna Iyer, in 1976 in Mumbai Kamagar Sabha vs. Abdul Thai.
 The first reported case of PIL was Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar (1979) that
focused on the inhuman conditions of prisons and under trial prisoners that led to the release
of more than 40,000 under trial prisoners.
o Right to speedy justice emerged as a basic fundamental right which had
been denied to these prisoners. The same set pattern was adopted in subsequent cases.
 A new era of the PIL movement was heralded by Justice P.N. Bhagawati in the case of
S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India.
o In this case it was held that “any member of the public or social action group
acting bonafide” can invoke the Writ Jurisdiction of the High Courts (under article 226) or
the Supreme Court (under Article 32) seeking redressal against violation of legal or
constitutional rights of persons who due to social or economic or any other disability
cannot approach the Court.
o By this judgment PIL became a potent weapon for the enforcement of “public
duties” where executive action or misdeed resulted in public injury. And as a result any
citizen of India or any consumer groups or social action groups can now approach the
apex court of the country seeking legal remedies in all cases where the interests of
general public or a section of the public are at stake.
o Justice Bhagwati did a lot to ensure that the concept of PILs was clearly
enunciated. He did not insist on the observance of procedural technicalities and even
treated ordinary letters from public-minded individuals as writ petitions.
o The Supreme Court in Indian Banks’ Association, Bombay & Ors. vs. M/s
Devkala Consultancy Service and Ors held :- “In an appropriate case, where the
petitioner might have moved a court in her private interest and for redressal of the
personal grievance, the court in furtherance of Public Interest may treat it a necessity to
enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice.” Thus,
a private interest case can also be treated as public interest case.
 M.C Mehta vs. Union of India: In a Public Interest Litigation brought against Ganga water
pollution so as to prevent any further pollution of Ganga water. Supreme Court held that
 petitioner although not a riparian owner is entitled to move the court for the enforcement of
statutory provisions, as he is the person interested in protecting the lives of the people who
make use of Ganga water.
 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan: The judgement of the case recognized sexual harassment
as a violation of the fundamental constitutional rights of Article 14, Article 15 and Article
21. The guidelines also directed for the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.
Any citizen can file a public case by filing a petition:
o Under Art 32 of the Indian Constitution, in the Supreme Court.
o Under Art 226 of the Indian Constitution, in the High Court.
o Under sec. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the Court of Magistrate.
 However, the court must be satisfied that the Writ petition fulfils some basic needs for PIL
as the letter is addressed by the aggrieved person, public spirited individual and a social action
group for the enforcement of legal or Constitutional rights to any person who are not able to
approach the court for redress.
 A Public Interest Litigation can be filed against a State/ Central Govt., Municipal Authorities,
and not any private party. The definition of State is the same as given under Article 12 of the
Constitution and this includes the Governmental and Parliament of India and the Government
and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of
India or under the control of the Government of India.
Significance of PIL
 The aim of PIL is to give to the common people access to the courts to obtain legal
redress.
 PIL is an important instrument of social change and for maintaining the Rule of law and
accelerating the balance between law and justice.
 The original purpose of PILs have been to make justice accessible to the poor and the
marginalised.
 It is an important tool to make human rights reach those who have been denied rights.
 It democratises the access of justice to all. Any citizen or organisation who is capable
can file petitions on behalf of those who cannot or do not have the means to do so.
 It helps in judicial monitoring of state institutions like prisons, asylums, protective homes,
etc.
 It is an important tool for implementing the concept of judicial review.
 Enhanced public participation in judicial review of administrative action is assured by the
inception of PILs.
=========================================
Grounds for rejecting a PIL
There are no specified grounds on which a PIL can be rejected. However, our apex court has laid
down certain criteria for a PIL not admissible in the court of law. These grounds are hereinbelow
provided –
Res Judicata
The principle of Res Judicata is enshrined under section 11 of the Civil procedure code 1908. This
principle states that a party to a suit is not entitled to go for another suit if a petition is already
pending in another court of law. For applying this principle, the nature and the content of both the
suit must be the same. This principle is the cornerstone of both the civil and criminal judicial system.
Thus, any PIL that raises an issue, which is already under consideration of a competent judicial
authority, cannot be allowed to proceed as per the aforesaid principles.
Misrepresentation or Suppression of Facts
It is well-settled law that one should approach the court with clean hands. It means he should
disclose all the necessary facts and shall act honestly. If he indulged in false or fraudulent practices
involving the suppression of facts, then the court can reject the PIL straight away. In K Welcome
Hotel v. State of Andhra Pradesh: A PIL is filed and the petitioners have not shown its complete
turnover in the pleadings and later on, the court came to know about it. The court rejected the
appeal.
Infructuous Petition
The term infructuous means that there is no legal authority left on the matter. It is generally said
when the course of action required in the PIL ceases to exist. In the case of Mohit v. District
Magistrate, a petition was filed under Article 32 to issue the writ of habeas corpus. However, the
person was released during the pendency of the proceedings. Now, the petition became infructuous.
Not Impleading the Necessary Parties
In public interest litigation, it is very important to plead with the necessary parties in the case. In a
landmark case of Krishna Swamy v. Union of India, the writ petition was related to the removal of
a sitting Supreme Court Judge from his office, but the Hon’ble Judge was not made a party to it. The
petition was therefore dismissed on this sole ground.
=========================================
In common law legal systems, laches is a lack of diligence and activity in making a legal claim,
or moving forward with legal enforcement of a right, particularly in regard to equity. The
doctrine of laches is based on the maxim that "equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on
their rights." The outcome is that a legal right or claim will not be enforced or allowed if a long delay
in asserting the right or claim has prejudiced the adverse party.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in Bhagat Raja vs The Union Of India & Ors on
29 March, 1967.
PETITIONER: BHAGAT RAJA Vs. RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF
JUDGMENT: 29/03/1967 CITATION: 1967 AIR 1606 1967 SCR (3) 302
ACT: Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development Act, 1957, s. 30 and Rules 54 & 55 made
under the Act-state Government's order refusing mining lease to one party and granting it to another-
Central Government whether in deciding revision under. 55 should pays 'speaking order'.
Facts of the case: The facts leading to the two appeals are as follows:
1. In response to a notification dated January 8, 1964 published in the State Gazette by the Andhra
Pradesh Government inviting applications under r. 58 of the rules framed under the Mines and
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules and the Act)
the appellant submitted two applications in the prescribe form viz., Form "I" for areas aggregating
Ac. 113-50 in village Brahmanapalli and Ac. 13-10 in village Ippatta both in the district of Cuddapah
for mining asbestos.
2. Respondent No. 3 also made similar applications on the same date. According to the appellant his
applications complied with all the requirements of Form "I" while those of respondent No. 3 were
defective in some respects.
3. Besides the appellant and the respondent No. 3, there was only one other person who applied for
a prospecting license which was rejected off-hand.
4. As between the appellant and the respondent No. 3, the Government of Andhra Pradesh
preferred the latter. The relevant portion of the order dated 19th October 1964 in respect of the
village Brahmanapalli under s. 10(3) of the Act was as follows: "As between the other applicants Sri
Bhagat Raja and M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and, Paints Ltd., the Government prefer M/s. Tiffin's
Barytes...... as they are having adequate general experience and technical knowledge, and are old
lessees in the district, without any arrears of mineral dues to the Government.
5. The mining lease application of Sri Bhagat Raja for the areas covered by the mining lease
application of M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd. is rejected." The text of the Order with
regard to village Ippatta is practically the same.
6. The appellant filed application in revision in the prescribed form i.e. Form 'N' under s. 30 of the Act
read with r. 54 to the Union of India on December 14, 1964. The appellant tried to bring out in his
revision applications that the financial condition of the 3rd respondent was extremely precarious as
would be evidenced by documents, copies whereof were annexed to his petition.
7. The 3rd respondent filed a counter statement to the revision application in April 1965.
8. In March 1966 the appellant received the comments of the Andhra Pradesh Government on his
revision applications.
9. The appellant filed rejoinder to the counter statements of the 3rd respondent in May 1965 and to
the comments of the Andhra Pradesh Government in April 1966. 10. He also asked for the grant of a
personal hearing before the decision of the case which was not given. Ultimately, his applications
were rejected by orders quoted hereinabove.
11. Various grounds of appeal were taken in the application for special leave to appeal preferred by
the appellant. An, attempt has been made therein to show that respondent No. 3 had no experience
in asbestos mining, that its financial position was very unsatisfactory and that its application for
mining lease was not in proper form. 12. A complaint was also made that in rejecting the applicant's
revision applications the Union of India was bound to give reasons for its decision as it was
exercising quasi judicial powers under s. 30 of the Act read with r. 54 and 55, the principles of
natural justice and fairplay requiring the divulgence of the grounds were violated and that a personal
hearing should have been given to the appellant before the disposal of the revision applications.
HELD: (i) In exercising its powers of revision under r. 55 the Central Government discharges
functions which are quasi- judicial. The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory
powers of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this court
under Article 136 Both the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no
reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word 'rejected' or
'dismissed'. In such a case this Court can probably only exercise its appellate jurisdiction
satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its
conclusion on the merits of the case. This would certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing
with the appeal. If the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the application of one
party and rejecting that of others, as it must, and the Central Government adopts the reasoning of
the State Government, this Court may proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient
for the purpose of upholding the decision. But when the reasons given in the order of the State
Government are scrappy or nebulous and the Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the
same, this Court, in appeal may have to examine. The case de novo (NAYE SIRE SE), without
anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government The same difficulty would arise
where the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not
and the Central Government gives its decision without specifying those reasons which according to it
are sufficient to uphold the order of the State Government. That is why in such circumstances, what
is known as a 'speaking order' is called for. A 'speaking order' is all the more necessary in the case
of a decision under r. 55 because there is provision for new material being placed before the Central
Government which was not there before the State Government, and further, because the decision,
affecting important rights of parties, is given in a summary manner without a hearing being allowed
to the parties. A party is entitled to know why the decision has gone against him.
JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2596 and 2597 of 1966.
Appeals by special leave from the Orders dated May 2, 1966 and June 22, 1966 of the Government
of India, Ministry of Mines and Metals, New Delhi on application is filed by the appellant under Rule
54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. These two appeals by special leave, are
Iimited to the question as to whether in dismissing a revision and confirming the order of the State of
Andhra Pradesh, the Union of India was bound to make a speaking order.
The preamble to the Act shows that its object was to provide for the regulation of mines and the
development of minerals under the control of the Union of India. Under s. 4(1) no person can
undertake any prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with
the terms and conditions of a prospecting license or a mining lease granted under the Act and the
Rules. Under sub s. (2) of the section "No prospecting license or mining lease shall be granted
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules mad. , there under.
S.5 lays down certain conditions which a person desiring to have a mining lease must fulfill. S. 8
provides for the period for which a mining lease may be granted. Under s. 10(1) an application for a
mining lease has to be made to the State Government concerned in the prescribed form. Sub- s. (3)
of S.10 runs as follows:
"On receipt of an application under this section, the State Government may, having regard to the
provisions of this Act and any rules made there under, grant or refuse to grant the license or lease."
Under sub-s. (2) Of s. 11 a person whose application for a license is received earlier than those of
others shall have a preferential right for the grant thereof over the others. The proviso to this sub-
section enacts that where applications are received on the same day, the State Government, after
taking into consideration the matters specified in sub-s. (3) May grant the mining lease to such one
of the applicants as it may deem fit. Sub s. (3) specifies the matters referred to in sub-s. (2) And they
are as follows: -
a) Any special knowledge or experience in, prospecting operations or mining operations, as the case
may be, possessed by the applicant;
b) The financial resources of the applicant;
c) The nature and quality of the technical staff employed or to be employed by the applicant; and
(d) such other matters as may be prescribed.
R. 55 originally framed in 1960 was amended in July 1965. Under the amended r.55 the position is
as follows:-
"(1) On receipt of an application for revision under r. 54, copies thereof shall be sent to the State
Government and to all the impleaded parties calling upon them to make such comments as they
may like to make within three months of the date of issue of the communication and if no comments
are received within that period, it is to be presumed that the party omitting to make such comments
has none to make.
(2) On receipt of the comments fromany party under Sub-rule (1), copies thereof have to be, sent to
the other parties calling upon them to make further comments as they may like to make within one
month from the date of the issue of the communication.
(3) The revisionapplication, the communications containing comments and counter comments
referred to in sub-rules (1) and (2) shall constitute the record of the case.
(4) After considering the records referred to in sub-rule (3), the Central Government may confirm,
modify or set aside the order or pass such other order in relation thereto as it may deem just and
proper."
Reference may also be made to Ramayya v. State of Andhra (2 and Annamalai v. State of Madras
(3). To the same effect is the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Joseph v. Superintendent of Post
Offices, Kottayam (1). We have already commented that the order of the Central Government in this
case is couched in the same language aswas used in the case before this court in M.P. Industries v.
Union(5) in August 1965.
The other or others In effect, the parties are given a right to bring forth material which was not before
the State Government. It is easy to see that an unsuccessful party may challenge the grant of a
lease in favour of another by pointing out defects or demerits which did not come to the knowledge
of the State Government. The order in this case does not even purport to show that the comments
and countercomments, which were before the Central Government in this case, had been
considered. It would certainly have been better if the order of 22nd June 1966 had shown that the
Central Government had taken into consideration all the fresh material adduced before it and for the
reasons formulated they thought that the order of the State Government should not be disturbed.
In the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of the Central Government passed on 22nd
June, 1966 are set aside. The Central Government is directed to decide the review applications
afresh in the light of the observations made. The appellant will get his costs throughout from the 3rd
respondent. G.C. Appeals allowed

State the facts and principles of law laid down in A. K. Kraipak & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India &
Ors on 29 April, 1969
In the Supreme Court of India; WP (C) No.541/2019; Petitioner - A. K. Kraipak & ors. etc.;
Respondents - Union of India & ors.
Date of Judgement: 29th April 1969
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Hidayatullah, C.J., J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N.
Grover and Vashishtha Bhargava, JJ.
ACT: Applicability of the Principles of Natural Justice to Administrative proceedings;
Violation of principles by first authority; Effect on ultimate decision.
Background
Natural justice is a great harmonising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure
justice an over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of
administrative actions (Maneka Gandhi V UOI). Natural justice is a concept of common law and
represents higher procedural principles developed by judges. It enjoys no express constitutional
status.
In India the principles of natural justice are firmly grounded in Articles 14 and 21 of the constitution.
With the introduction of concept of substantive and procedural due process in Article 21, all that
fairness which is included in Article 21. The violation of natural justice results in arbitrariness,
therefore violation of natural justice is violation of equality clause of Article 14.
Facts of the case
 In 1966, the Indian Forest Service was constituted, the selection for which was to be made
from among the officers serving in the forest department of the state.
 Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1952 provides that the central government shall after
consulting the government of the state concerned including that of Jammu & Kashmir to
make rules for regulation of recruitment and conditions of the services of persons appointed
to those All India Services.
 According to Rule 4(1) of Indian Forest Service (recruitment) rules, central government was
given power to recruit to the service from amongst the member of state forest service and a
special selection board consisting of chairman of UPSC, Inspector general of Forests of the
Government of India, Joint Secretary, Chief secretary of the concerned state governments
and Chief Conservator of Forests of the concerned state government.
 Regulation 5 deals with the preparation of the list of suitable candidates.
 The selection board was to be headed by chief conservator of the forest of the state while
the final selections were to be made by the UPSC.
 In the state of J&K, a person by the name of Naquishbund was appointed as the acting chief
conservator of forest and hence was appointed to the said post by overlooking the seniority
of three officers: Basu, Baig and Kaul.
 Two persons senior to him had been superseded and the petition was brought by some
gazetted officers serving in Forest department of J&K to the Indian Forest.
 Meanwhile, the selections committee had to recommend the names and it so happened that
they had recommended the name of the person in which Naquishband was appointed as the
ex-officio chairman but excluding the three senior officials, who had been superseded.
 The recommendations of the Board were submitted to the UPSC and was accepted by them.
 On the basis of the recommendations of the commission, the impugned list was published
and Naquishbund name was placed at the top of the list of selected officers.
 It must be noted that Naquishbund was also one of the candidates seeking to be selected to
All India Forest Service. Though he did not sit in the selection board at the time his name
was considered for selection but he did sit in the board and participated in its deliberations
when the names of Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered for selection and was also
involved while preparing the list of selected candidates in order of preference, as required by
Regulation 5.
 However the list prepared by the selection board was not the last word in the matter of
selection in question. That list along with the record of the officers in the concerned cadre
selected as well as not selected had to be sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry
of Home Affairs had forwarded that list with its observations to the commission and the
commission has examined the records of all the officers before making its recommendations.
  All of them felt aggrieved by the selection made from among the officers serving in forest
department of J&K to the Indian Forest Service.
 Aggrieved, the Gazetted officers association, J&K along with the interested parties brought a
petition to court challenging the selections notified as being violative of Article 14 and 16 of
constitution and further ground that the selections in question were made in contraventions
of principles of natural justice.
Issues
 Assuming that the proceedings in the present case are administrative in nature, whether the
principles of natural justice applied to administrative proceedings?
 Whether there was violation of such principles of natural justice?
 Whether there were grounds for setting aside the selection of all the officers?
Arguments Advanced
Contentions of Petitioners
 The petitioners contended that Rule 4 and Regulation 5 prescribes that the selections should
be made after “adjudging” the suitability of the officers belonging to the state service. The
word “adjudge” means “to judge or decide” indicates that the power conferred in the
selections board was quasi-judicial power.
 It was contended on their behalf that such a power is a judicial power and not an
administrative one and it has to be exercised in accordance with the rules of natural justice,
the violation of which has been rightly claimed.
 Naquishband, being a candidate of the Indian Forest Service cannot be an adjudicator of the
same.
Contentions of Respondents
 The respondents argued that the power exercised by the selection board is not a quasi-
judicial but administrative power. To support tis contention, it was further admitted that the
proceedings before the selection board were not quasi-judicial because the board was not to
decide about any “right”. The duty of the board was merely to select officers who in their
opinion were suitable for the Forest service. He interpreted the word “adjudge” as being
“found worthy of selection”.
 Also the selections board was merely recommendatory body. Final recommendations were
made by UPSC. Therefore grievances of the petitioners have no real basis. Keeping in mind
the validity of the administrative actions taken, all that has to be seen is whether the final
decision is just or not.
 And finally, in the form of argument, it was also contended that the mere fact that one of the
members the board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the whole
selection process.
Supreme Court observations and decision
The court held that the selections made by the Selection Committee were in violation of the
principles of natural justice because there was a real likelihood of a bias for the mere presence of
the candidate on the Selection Board may adversely influence the judgement of other members.
Along with it court further added:
 The rules of natural justice are embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or to prevent
miscarriage justice. If that is their purpose, there is no reason why they should not be made
applicable to administrative proceedings also.
 The Supreme court held that though the action of making selection for government service is
administrative, yet the selection committee is under a duty to act judicially.
 The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quit thin and
is being obliterated.
 The court found that the power exercised by the Selection board as an administrative one
and tested the validity of the selection on that basis. It was held that the concept of rule of
law would lose its importance if the instrumentalities of the state are not charged with the
 duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner in a welfare state like India,
where the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate.
 In Manaklal case the court had made it clear that the test was not actual but a reasonable
apprehension bias. It held that it is difficult to prove the state of mind. Therefore in deciding
the question of bias ordinary course of human conduct is taken into consideration. Owing to
this, the court observed that there was a personal interest on part of Naquishbund to keep
out his rivals in order to secure his position without further challenge and so he cannot said
to be impartial, fair and just while making the selection.
 The court held that the basic principle of “nemo judex in causa sua” was violated by
appointing Naquishband as a member of the selection board. Though he did not participate
in the deliberations of the board when his name was being considered yet the very fact that
he was a member of the selection board and that too holding the post of the chairman had a
significant impact on the decisions of the selection board. Also he participated in the
deliberations when the claims of his rivals i.e., Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered. He was
also present when the list of selected candidates in order of preference was being made.
Hence it was very clear that from the very inception of the selection process, at every stage
of his participation in the selection process, there was a conflict between his interest and
duty. Under such circumstances, the court could not believe that Naquishbund could have
been unbiased.
 In this case, for the first time, without the assistance of any foreign judgement, the Supreme
court had decided that principles of natural justice were applicable not only to judicial
functions but also to administrative functions.
 This case makes it clear that impartiality in adjudication is required not only in judicial
decision but also in administrative matters. The principle of natural justice would apply on
administrative functions also and struck down the selection process on ground of violation of
principles of natural justice.
 It was held that the selections made by the selection committee were in violation of principles
of natural justice.
Appraisal of the point of law
 It is necessary to understand the scope of principles of natural justice. It can be described as
“judicial fairness in decision making” and its main aim to secure justice or prevent
miscarriage of justice. It is a branch of public law and is held to be very formidable weapon
that can be wielded to secure justice. The definition of the term “natural justice” is difficult to
be given but its essential characteristics can be enumerated in two maxims
 Audi alteram partem and
 Nemo judex in causa sua
 The first maxim literally meaning “hear the other side” provides that before taking a decision
other party must be heard. De Smith says “No propositions can be more clearly established
than that a man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property until he has a fair opportunity of
answering the case against him.
 The right to fair hearing has always been used as a base onto which a fair administrative
procedure comparable with due process of law can be built. In Ridge v Baldwin, the House of
Lords held by majority that the power of dismissal of an employee couldn’t be exercised
without giving reasonable opportunity of being heard and without observing the principle of
natural justice.
 The second phrase literally means that “No man shall be a judge in his own case”. The
maxim ensures that the adjudicator must not have any interest or bias in the case which he
is deciding. As the famous saying goes “justice should not only be done but must be seen to
have been done”. In case of a judicial body, the independence and impartiality of the judge is
an absolute condition, because without these qualities the public confidence which is their
real strength would weaken. In the opinion of the court, a precondition to decide for or
against one party without proper regard to the true merits is bias. Bias can be of three types
 i.e., personal bias, pecuniary bias or official bias. In the cases of bias what the aggrieved
party has to prove is the likelihood of bias and not the real existence of the same.
 In the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav v State of Haryana(1987 AIR 454) the court observed
“we agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence
that no man can be a judge in his own case and that if there is likelihood of bias it is in
accordance with natural justice and common sense that the judge likely to be biased should
be incapacitated from sitting.
 The court in Manak lal v Dr Prem Chand held “the test is not whether in fact, a bias has
effected the judgement, the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably
apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against
him in the final decision of the tribunal.
 In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v Mohammed Nooh(1958 AIR 86)the officer who held
departmental inquiry and passed the order, himself gave evidence and thus acted as
prosecutor and the judge. Das Chief Justice delivering the majority judgement said that the
rules of natural justice were grossly violated.
 In the case of Rattan lal v Managing Committee(1993 AIR 2155) was a witness as well as
one of the three members of an inquiry committee against Rattanlal. The court set aside the
dismissal order of Rattanlal on the ground that the proceedings were vitiated because of
bias of one of the members.
Therefore what emerges from this case is that although the courts are making distinctions between
the quasi-judicial and administrative powers but at the same time there is one common element of
fair procedure in both the cases which can be referred to as the duty to act fairly. This duty arises
from the same general principles, as to the rules of natural justice.
In the words of Krishna Iyer “Once we understood the soul of the rule as fair play in action-and it is
so- we must hold that it extends to both the fields. After all administrative power in a democratic set-
up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into
unilateral injustice.”
Thus we agree that many a times the impact of administrative decision can be greater than that of a
judicial decision. As in the present case, the decision made with bias and without the applicability of
rules of natural justice would have adversely affected the careers of the officers not selected. In such
circumstances leaving the administrative actions out of the clutches of rules of justice would
determine rule of law. Hence in conclusion it is observed that “No authority can absolve itself from
the liability to act in a lawful manner”. Thus the development of administrative law in India and has
strengthened the rule of law in this country.
In Suresh Koshy George v The University of Kerala,(1969 AIR 198) the court observed that the rules
of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a
given case must be depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the
framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of
persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some
principle o natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of
that was necessary for just decision on the facts of that case.

LC-131
Administrative Law with The Right to Information act, 2005
LL.B.(Part II)(Second Semester)Examination, 2020
Attempt 5 questions in all.
All questions carry 20 marks each.
What do you understand Laissez Faire ? Discuss the history of development of
Administrative Law from Laissez Faire to Modern Welfare State.
Laissez-faire is a French phrase that translates to “allow to do.” It refers to a political ideology that
rejects the practice of government intervention in an economy. Further, the state is seen as an
obstacle to economic growth and development. The basic purpose of the laissez-faire economy is to
promote a free and competitive market that demands the restoration of the order and natural state of
liberty that humans emerged from. A laissez-faire economy is thus characterized by the free
movement of forces of supply and demand, free from any form of intervention by a government, a
price-setting monopoly, or any other authority.
Government intervention can occur through the following:
1. Protectionism
Protectionism refers to any government regulation or policy that limits international trade.
Protectionist policies foster domestic production and help the working class, but are detrimental to
the overall growth rate of the economy, as they hinder competition.
2. Antitrust laws
Antitrust laws oppose monopolies, trusts, and other organizations or practices that don’t allow higher
participation from potential entrepreneurs. While such laws seem to add to the concept of laissez-
faire, they go against the Darwinist idea of survival of the fittest that laissez-faire prescribes.
Laissez-faire policies serve as a motivation for the producer to hone its products in response to the
standards set by the market. The price system is such that the output and consumption levels are
solely determined by the varied decisions made by households and firms through transactions in the
marketplace.
Advantages of Laissez-faire
1. Autonomy
A laissez-faire economy gives businesses more space and autonomy from government rules and
regulations that would make business activities harder and more difficult to proceed. Such an
environment makes it more viable for companies to take risks and invest in the economy. Moreover,
it provides companies with a greater incentive to try and maximize profits.
2. Innovation
Driven by the need to provide their products with market advantage, companies are compelled to be
more creative and innovative in their approach. The practice leads to technological advancement in
addition to economic growth.
3. Absence of taxes
Lastly, the absence of taxes leaves companies and employees alike with greater spending power. It
also discourages corruption that can arise as a result of bureaucrats with limited knowledge but
immense regulatory power.
Disadvantages of Laissez-faire
1. Income inequality
According to Thomas Hobbes, the presence of absolute autonomy in a state-of-nature economy
creates a situation of chaos for both producers and consumers. Such an economy can lead
to inequality of income and wealth that may contribute to a vicious cycle wherein inheritance plays a
key role in financial placement within society. As put forward by Adam Smith, monopolies can
emerge wherein they control supply, charge higher prices, and pay lower wages to workers.
2. Failure to represent the interests of the entire society
A laissez-faire economy fails to be representative of the interests of all sections of a society; it may
cater only to the majority or the affluent class. Thereby, public goods with positive externalities such
as education and healthcare may not be equally distributed in society, whereas goods with negative
externalities may be over-consumed.
Laissez-faire is now more an adjective to denote the prevalence of its associated features. In
isolation, the economic theory can lead to huge gaps in wealth, injustices, and in some cases,
recession. In the late 19th century, most economies in the West were dominated by liberal policies
encouraged by laissez-faire.

Define Delegated Legislation; Explain various controls over delegated legislation.

Discuss the various principles of Natural Justice and its exceptions.

“Natural justice is a sense of what is wrong and what is right.” The main purpose of natural justice is
to prevent the act of miscarriage of justice.
Basically, natural justice consists of 3 rules.
The first one is “Hearing rule” which states that the person or party who is affected by the decision
made by the panel of expert members should be given a fair opportunity to express his point of view
to defend himself.
Secondly, “Bias rule” generally expresses that panel of expert should be biased free while taking the
decision. The decision should be given in a free and fair manner which can fulfil the rule of natural
justice.
And thirdly, “Reasoned Decision” which states that order, decision or judgement of the court given
by the Presiding authorities with a valid and reasonable ground.
Purpose of the principle
 To provide equal opportunity of being heard.
 Concept of Fairness.
 To fulfil the gaps and loopholes of the law.
 To protect the Fundamental Rights.
 Basic features of the Constitution.
 No miscarriage of Justice.
The principles of natural justice should be free from bias and parties should be given fair opportunity
to be heard and all the reasons and decision taken by the court should be informed by the court to
the respective parties.
Supreme court said that arriving at a reasonable and justifiable judgement is the purpose of judicial
and administrative bodies. The main purpose of natural justice is to prevent the act of miscarriage of
justice.
A committee i.e. “Ministers Power” gave 3 essentials procedure related to the principles of natural
justice.
 No one should be a judge in his own matter.
 No one can be condemned unheard.
 The party is entitled to know each and every reason and the decision taken by the
authority.
When it can be claimed?
Natural justice can be claimed when acting judicially or quasi-judicial like panchayat and tribunals
etc. as well. It includes the concept of fairness, basic moral principles and various different kinds of
biases and why the natural justice is required and what all special cases or situation it includes
where the principles of natural justice will not be applicable.
Rules of Natural Justice
 NEMO JUDEX IN CAUSA SUA
 AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM
 REASONED DECISION
Nemo Judex In Causa Sua
“No one should be a judge in his own case” because it leads to rule of biases. Bias means an act
which leads to unfair activity whether in a conscious or unconscious stage in relation to the party or a
particular case. Therefore, the necessity of this rule is to make the judge impartial and given
judgement on the basis of evidence recorded as per the case.
Audi Alteram Partem
It simply includes 3 Latin words which basically means that no person can be condemned or
punished by the court without having a fair opportunity of being heard.
In many jurisdictions, a bulk of cases are left undecided without giving a fair opportunity of being
heard.
The literal meaning of this rule is that both parties should be given a fair chance to present
themselves with their relevant points and a fair trial should be conducted.
This is an important rule of natural justice and its pure form is not to penalize anyone without any
valid and reasonable ground. Prior notice should be given to a person so he can prepare to know
what all charges are framed against him. It is also known as a rule of fair hearing. The components
of fair hearing are not fixed or rigid in nature. It varies from case to case and authority to authority.
Reasoned Decision
Basically, it has 3 grounds on which it relies:-
 The aggrieved party has the chance to demonstrate before the appellate and revisional
court that what was the reason which makes the authority to reject it.
 It is a satisfactory part of the party against whom the decision is made.
 The responsibility to record reasons works as obstacles against arbitrary action by the
judicial power vested in the executive authority.

Exceptions to Principles of Natural Justice:

The principles of natural justice can be excluded either expressly or by necessary implication,
subject to the provisions of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
During Emergency:
In India, it has been generally acknowledged that in cases of extreme urgency, where interest of the
public would be jeopardized by the delay or publicity involved in a hearing, a hearing before
condemnation would not be required by natural justice or in exceptional cases of emergency where
prompt action, preventive or remedial, is needed, the requirement of notice and hearing may be
obviated. Therefore, if the right to be heard will paralyze the process, the law will exclude it. No one
can claim the right to be heard during the time of an emergency. The Emergency Power Act, 1934
authorized the Government to make a regulation under the Act through which a person can be
detained without any reason for the safety and security of the country.
In Mohinder Singh Gill vs. CEC, 1978 SCR (3) 272 case, in Firozhpur Constituency
Parliamentary Election counting was been going on. One candidate was having a very good
lead but before the declaration of the results, in mob violence in some segments ballot
papers and boxes were been destroyed. The ECI acting under Article 324, 329 without giving
any notice or hearing to the candidates cancelled the Election and ordered for fresh Election.
The SC rejected the claim of notice and Audi alteram partem and held that in case of
emergency, Audi Alteram Partem can be excluded.
Statutory Exclusion:
A ground on which hearing may be excluded is that the action of the Administrative in question is
legislative and not administrative in character.
In Charan Lal Sahu vs UOI, [1990] 1 SCC 613 (Bhopal Gas Disaster case) the constitutional
validity of the Bhopal Gas Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, which had authorized
the Central Government to represent all the victims in matters of compensation award, had
been challenged on the ground that because the Central Government, owned 22 percent
share in the Union Carbide Company and as such it was a joint tortfeasor and thus there was
a conflict between the interests of the government and the victims. The court negative the
contention and observed that even if the argument was correct the doctrine of necessity
would be applicable to the situation because if the government did not represent the whole
class of gas victims no other sovereign body could so represent and thus the principles of
natural justice were no attracted.
Confidentiality:
Exclusion of natural justice can also take place when confidentiality is demanded and is necessary
to be maintained.
In Malak Singh v. State of P&H, [1981] 1 SCC 420 case, the SC held that the maintenance
of Surveillance Register by the Police is a confidential document and neither the person
whose name is entered in the Register nor any other member of the public can have excess
to it. Furthermore, the Court observed that observance of the principles of Natural justice in
such a situation may defeat the very purpose of surveillance and there is every possibility of
the ends of justice being defeated instead of being served.
Impracticability:
Natural justice can be followed and applied when it is practicable to do so but in a situation when it is
impracticable to apply the principle of natural justice then it can be excluded.
In Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhash Chandra, AIR 1970 SC 1269 </strong>case,
the Board conducted the final tenth standard examination. At a particular centre, where there
were more than a thousand students, it was alleged to have mass copying. Even in
evaluation, it was prima-facie found that there was mass copying as most of the answers
were the same and they received the same marks. For this reason, the Board cancelled the
exam without giving any opportunity of hearing and ordered for fresh examination, whereby
all students were directed to appear for the same. Many of the students approached Patna HC
challenging it on the ground that before cancellation of the exam, no opportunity of hearing
had been given to the students. The HC struck down the decision of the Board in violation of
Audi Alteram Partem. The Board unsatisfied with the decision of the Court approached the
SC. The SC rejected the HC judgment and held that in this situation, conducting hearing is
impossible as a thousand notices have to be issued and everyone must be given an
opportunity of hearing, cross-examination, rebuttal, presenting evidence, etc. which is not
practicable at all. So, the SC held that on the ground of impracticability, hearing can be
excluded.
In R. Radhakrishnan V. Osmania University, where the entire MBA entrance examination was
cancelled by the university because of mass copying, the court held that notice and hearing
to all candidates is not possible in such a situation, which had assumed national proportions.
Thus the court sanctified the exclusion of the rules of natural justice on the ground of
administrative impracticability.
Legislative actions:
When the law-making body itself propounds that this principle will not be applicable in the said
statute, then this principle is not applicable in the cases which will come under the particular statute.
In Charan Lal Sahu vs. UOI, [1990] 1 SCC 613 case, the constitutional validity of the Bhopal
Gas Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 was involved. This legislation provides for
details of how to determine claims and pay them. The affected parties approached the SC and
contended that no hearing was provided to them and it was violative of Audi Alteram Partem.
The SC held, “For legislation by Parliament no principle of natural justice is attracted,
provided such legislation is within the competence of the Legislature.”
Academic Evaluation:
Where the nature of authority is purely academic, then no right of hearing can be claimed. The
academic administration can take any action towards the students or the staff members if they feel
that things are not working properly inside the institution. And it cannot be challenged until and
unless the contrary is proved.
In Jawaharlal Nehru University v. B.S. Narwal, [1980] 4 SCC 480 case, B.S Narwal, a student
of JNU was removed from the rolls for unsatisfactory academic performances without being
given any pre-decisional hearing. The Supreme Court held that the very nature of academic
adjudication appears to negative any right of an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, if the
competent academic authorities examine and asses the work of a student over a period of
time and declare his work unsatisfactory, the rules of natural justice may be excluded. The
Supreme Court held the suspension valid.
In Karnataka Public Service Commission v. B. M. Vaidya Shankar, AIR 1992 SC 952 case,
where a candidate appearing for a civil service examination wrote her number, not only on
the first page of the answer book but also on all the pages of the answer book contrary to the
specific instructions given to candidates, which were also printed on the first page of the
answer book. The Court held that the Public Service Commission is justified in not evaluating
her answer book. No hearing was required to be given to such a candidate.
In Board of High School v. Kumari Chitra Srivastava, AIR 1970 SC 1039 case, where student
was not allowed to appear at an examination on the ground of shortage of attendance, the
Court set aside the order on the ground that no notice was given to her before taking action
in the matter. The Court brushed aside the Board’s argument that no useful purpose would
have been served.
Contractual Arrangement:
In case of termination arrangement in contract, principle of natural justice are not applicable.
In State of Gujarat V. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust, 1994 SCC (3) 552 case, the Supreme Court
held the principles of natural justice are not attracted in case of termination of an
arrangement in any contractual field. Termination of an arrangement/agreement is neither a
quasi-judicial nor an administrative act so that the duty to act judicially is not attracted.
Inter-Discliplinary Action:
In Inter-Disciplinary action like suspension etc. there is no requirement to follow the principle of
natural justice.
In S. A. Khan vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1152 case, Mr. Khan an IPS Officer holding
the post of Deputy Inspector General of Haryana; Haryana Govt., was suspended by the
Haryana Government due to various complaints against him. Thus, he approached the
Supreme Court on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice as he was not
given an opportunity to be heard. The SC held that the suspension being interim-disciplinary
action, there is no requirement to afford hearing. It can be ordered without affording an
opportunity of hearing.
Government Policy Decision:
For developmental policy decision, there is no need to follow principles of natural justice.
In Balco Employees’ Union Vs UOI, [2002] 2 SCC 333 case, the Supreme Court was of the
view that in taking of a policy decision in economic matters at length, the principles of
natural justice have no role to play. In this case, the employees had challenged the
government’s policy decision regarding disinvestment in public sector undertaking. The
court held that unless the policy decision to disinvest is capricious, arbitrary, illegal or
uninformed and is not contrary to law, the decision to disinvest cannot be challenged on the
ground of violation of the principles of natural justice.
No Right Of The Person Is Infringed:
Where no right has been conferred on a person by any statute nor any such right arises from
common law the principles of natural justice are not applicable.
In Andhra Steel Corpn. V. A.P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1991 SC 1456 case, the
Electricity Board had withdrawn the concession in electricity rate without any notice and
hearing to the appellant. The Court held that a concession can be withdrawn at any time
without affording any opportunity of hearing to affected persons except when the law
requires otherwise or the authority is bound by promissory estoppels. Therefore, where an
order of extension was cancelled before it became operational or the order of stepping up
salary was withdrawn before the person was actually paid or the services of the probationer
terminated without charge the principles of natural justice are not attracted.
In J.R. Vohra v. Indian Export House, AIR 1985 SC 475 case, the Court held that where no
right has been conferred upon a person by any statute nor any such right arises from
common law, the principles of natural justice are not applicable.
Interim Preventive Action:
If the action of the administrative authority is a suspension order in the nature of preventive action
and not a final order, the application of the principles of natural justice may be excluded.
In Abhay Kumar V.K. Srinivasan, AIR 1981 Delhi 381 case, the institution passed an order
debarring the student from entering the premises of the institution and attending classes till
the pendency of a criminal case against him for stabbing a co-student. This order was
challenged on the ground of denial of natural justice. The Delhi High Court rejecting the
contention held that such an order could be compared with an order of suspension pending
enquiry which is preventive in nature in order to maintain campus peace and hence the
principles of natural justice shall not apply.
Public interest:
Any act or thing done against the interest of the general public will be held void ab initio. As being a
democratic country, the laws are made for the benefit of the public. Hence, if there is a hidden
interest of the public in any issue, then the principle of Audi Alterem Partem will be excluded.
‘Useless Formality’ Theory:
‘Useless formality’ is yet another exception to the application of the principles of natural justice.
Where on the admitted or undisputed facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only
one penalty is permissible, the Court may not insist on the observance of the principles of natural
justice because it would be futile to order its observance. Therefore, where the result would not be
different, and it is demonstrable beyond doubt, order of compliance with the principles of natural
justice will not be justified.
In Aligarh Muslim University v. Manssor Ali Khan, AIR 2000 SC 2783 case, a rule provided
that if an employee remained absent without permission for a particular period of time, it
would result in automatic termination of his employment. As Manssor remained absent for
more than five years without permission, his post was deemed to have been vacated.
Manssor challenged this on the ground that the rules of natural justice were violated, as he
was not given an opportunity to be heard before the post was declared to be vacant. The
Supreme Court rejected the argument and held that there was no prejudice to Manssor in the
facts of the case. If Manssor had been heard it would not have made any difference.
Conclusion
The principles of natural justice have been adopted and followed by the judiciary to protect public
rights against the arbitrary decision by the administrative authority. One can easily see that the rule
of natural justice include the concept of fairness: they stay alive and support to safeguard the fair
dealing.
So at all the stages of the procedure if any authority is given off the judicial function is not purely
accepted but the main motive of the principal is to prevent the miscarriage of justice. It is supreme to
note that any decision or order which violates the natural justice will be declared as null and void in
nature, hence one must carry in mind that the principles of natural justice are essential for any
administrative settlement to be held valid.
The principle of natural justice is not confined to restricted walls the applicability of the principle but
depends upon the characteristics of jurisdiction, grant to the administrative authority and upon the
nature of rights affected of the individual.

What do you understand by Habeas Corpus writ ? What are the differences between
Prohibitory and Certiorari writs ?

Explain the meaning of Administrative discretion. How can Judicial control be established
over Administrative discretion ?
Phillip Cooper defines administrative discretion as the “power of an administrator to make significant
decisions that have the force of law, directly or indirectly, and that are not specifically mandated by
the Constitution, statutes, or other sources of black letter law”
Administrative discretion is an informal unilateral practice and is therefore unprotected by the
protections inherent in structured procedure. Discretion in simple words means choosing among the
different alternatives available without respect to any predetermined criterion, irrespective of how
fanciful that choice may be. Discretion is the quality of having or showing discernment or good
judgment. Discretion means the liberty to act according to one's pleasure, or at one's own will.
Administrative discretion thus means the authority vested in the Executive, the public officials who
administer the government, to perform certain functions, make certain decisions at their own
judgment, and exercise certain powers. Discretion is defined as the right of someone to make
choices or the quality of someone who is careful about what they do or say. An example of discretion
is the ability of a juror to determine a verdict. An example of discretion is not talking about politics at
family dinners. It is important not only for the individualization of the administrative power but
also because in the dynamic nature of modern state it is humanly impossible to lay down a guideline
for every imaginable eventually. Equally true, however, is that absolute power is a merciless master.
The main grounds for reviewing the administrative discretion, may be classified as under:
Ultra-Vires
 The doctrine of ultra-vires states that a person or authority acting under statutory power
can do only those things which are statutorily authorised.
 In case of failure to do so, the doctrine permits the courts to strike down the decision
made by the bodies exercising the public functions.
Abuse of Power
 It has been seen that administrative bodies do not exercise their discretionary power for
the purpose intended to by the legislature.
 All these factors amount to the abuse of discretionary powers and become ground for
judicial review.
Proportionality
 The doctrine of proportionality is emerging as a new ground of challenge for judicial
review of administrative discretion.
 It is a recognised general principle of law evolved with a purpose to maintain a proper
balance between any adverse effects which its decision may have on the rights, liberties
or interests of persons and the purpose it pursues.
 The doctrine of proportionally endavours to confine the exercise of discretionary powers
of administrative authority to mean which are proportioned to the object to be pursued.
 The courts while invoking the doctrine of proportionality may quash the exercise of
powers in which there is not a responsible relationship between the objective which is
sought to be achieved and the means used to that end.
Unreasonable Exercise of Discretionary Power
 The term unreasonableness embraces a wide variety of defects including misdirection,
improper purpose, disregard of relevant considerations and advertence to immaterial
factors.
Irrationality
 The term irrationality and 'unreasonableness' are often used interchangeably.
 However, irrationality may be said to be only one facet of unreasonableness.
 A decision is said to be irrational if it is unreasoned; if it is lacking ostensible logic or
comprehensible justification.
Procedural Impropriety
 Procedure 'deals with the structure' of decision making and not the quality or impact of
the decision themselves.
 Another important concern of the procedural justice is to promote the quality, accuracy
andrationality of decision-making process.
 In case there is procedureal impropriety, the court can interfere.
Jurisdictional Error
 The court have held that the administrative authority cannot go into the question of
validity of substantive law or procedure laid down in the statute or the rules
framedthereunder since it itself is creature of statute.
 The doctrine of ultra-vires permits the courts to strike down decision made by
administrative bodies exercising public functions, if they exceed the jurisdiction provided
in the statute under which they exercise their powers.
Acting under Dictation
  The cardinal principle of administrative law is that an authority entrusted with a discretion
must not, in the purported exercise of its discretion, act under the dictation of another
body.
Malice or Malafide
 It is not only the power but the duty of the court to ensure that all authorities exercise their
powers properly, lawfully and in good faith.
 If the powers are exercised with oblique motive, in bad faith or for extraneous or irrelevant
considerations, there is no exercise of power known to the law and action cannot be
termed as, action in accordance with law.
Colourable Exercise of Powers
 The courts have used this doctrine to denounce an abuse of discretion which speaks that
under the 'colour' or 'guise' or power conferred for one purpose, the authorities seek to
achieve something else which is not authorised to do so under the law in question.

Write short notes on the following:

Act of State
Right to Information
Contractual liability of Government
Statutory immunity

What is the utility of Public Corporations in the context of Modern System of Administration ?
To whom are they responsible ? Explain.

Describe the construction, work and power of the state information commission under the
Right to Information Act, 2005.
The State Information Commission (SIC) is a quasi-judicial body. Right to Information Act
provides provisions for creation of State Information Commission.
State Information Commission – Members, Appointment
 The Right to Information Act of 2005 provides for the creation of not only the Central
Information Commission but also a State Information Commission at the state level.
 Accordingly, all the states have constituted the State Information Commissions through
Official Gazette Notifications.
 The State Information Commission is a high-powered independent body that inter-alia
looks into the complaints made to it and decides the appeals.
 It entertains complaints and appeals pertaining to offices, financial institutions, public
sector undertakings, etc., under the concerned state government.
 The Commission consists of a State Chief Information Commissioner and not more than
ten State Information Commissioners.
 They are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a committee consisting of
the Chief Minister as Chairperson, the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly
and a State Cabinet Minister nominated by the Chief Minister.
 They should be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in
law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or
administration and governance. They should not be a Member of Parliament or Member
of the Legislature of any State or Union Territory. They should not hold any other office of
profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business.
Term of Office of SIC
 They hold office till the age of 65 or 5 years. The information commissioner is eligible for
the post of state chief information commissioner but can be in office for a maximum of 5
years including his tenure of information commissioner.
State Information Commission – Quasi-Judicial Powers and Functions
The quasi-judicial powers and functions of the State Information Commission are:
 The Commission must receive and inquire into a complaint from any person
  The Commission can order an inquiry into any matter if there are reasonable grounds
(suo-moto power).
 While inquiring, the Commission has the powers of a civil court in respect of civil matters
 During the inquiry of a complaint, the Commission may examine any record which is
under the control of the public authority and no such record may be withheld from it on
any grounds. In other words, all public records must be given to the Commission during
inquiry for examination.
 The Commission has the power to secure compliance with its decisions from the public
authority.
 The Commission submits an annual report to the State Government on the
implementation of the provisions of this Act. The State Government places this report
before the State Legislature.
Removal of State Chief Information Commissioner from Office
 Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the State Chief Information Commissioner or a
State Information Commissioner shall be removed from his office only by order of the
Governor on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the Supreme Court, on a
reference made to it by the Governor, has on inquiry, reported that the State Chief
Information Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner, as the case may be, ought
on such ground be removed.
 The Governor may suspend from office, and if deemed necessary prohibit also from
attending the office during the inquiry, the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State
Information Commissioner in respect of whom a reference has been made to the Supreme
Court under sub-section (1) until the Governor has passed orders on receipt of the report of
the Supreme Court on such reference.
 Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Governor may by order remove
from office the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner if
the SIC:
o is adjudged an insolvent; or
o engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the duties of his
office; or
o has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of the Governor,
involves moral turpitude; or
o is, in the opinion of the Governor, unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of
mind or body; or
o has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his
functions as the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information
Commissioner.
o If the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner in
any way, concerned or interested in any contract or agreement made by or on behalf
of the Government of the State or participates in any way in the profit thereof or in
any benefit or emoluments arising therefrom otherwise than as a member and in
common with the other members of an incorporated company, he shall, for the
purposes of sub-section (1), be deemed to be guilty of misbehavior.

Explain the fact and principle of law laid down in Bhagat Raja Vs Union of India AIR 1967 SC
1606.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of AK Kirpauk and others vs Union
of India and others AIR 1970.

What is the Doctrine of Pith and Substance?

Doctrine of Pith and Substance
The Constitution of India has divided the extent of legislative powers between the Centre and states
by way of the Seventh Schedule.
 The Seventh Schedule specifies the subject matters and divides the power to make laws
between the Centre and the State.
o List I or the Union List contains matters where the Centre has the power to make
laws, e.g. Defence, Foreign affairs and Currency.
o List II or the State list contains the subjects where the State has the power to make
laws, e.g. public order, health and sanitation.
o List III or the Concurrent List contains subjects where both the Centre and the State
have powers to legislate, e.g. Education, Forests and Administration of Justice.
 Although their spheres of influence are well established in the Seventh Schedule, there
often arise conflicts as to whether the Centre or the State, as the case may be, is
encroaching upon the sphere of the other. To deal with this conflict, the courts in India
have evolved a few doctrines and the age-old doctrine of pith (essence of something) and
substance (essential part of something) is one among them.
Doctrine of Pith and Substance Origin
It is widely believed that the origin of the doctrine of pith and substance lies in Canada and it was
introduced in a case named Cushing v. Dupuy in the year 1880. The doctrine later made its way
to India and is firmly supported by Article 246 of the Constitution and the Seventh Schedule. In India,
it has evolved to become a celebrated doctrine that became the basis of many landmark Supreme
Court judgements.
Cushing v. Dupuy, 1880
On 19 July 1877, the brewing company McLeod, McNaughten and Léveillée became insolvent, and
Dupuy became its official assignee under a writ of attachment in insolvency. Cushing,
a notary, produced a contract of sale executed as a notarial instrument dated 14 March 1877,
by which the firm had agreed to sell its plant and effects to him, and demanded their delivery to him.
On the same March date, a lease had also been executed by which Cushing agreed to lease back
the same assets to the principals of the firm for three years.
In his petition, Cushing asserted that he had taken possession of the assets in March, but no
removal took place, and the assets remained in the possession of the firm.
The question posed to the lower courts, which attracted much discussion in their deliberations, was
whether the transaction was a valid sale within the meaning of ss. 1027 and 1472 of the Civil Code
of Lower Canada.
The Courts below:
In the Superior Court on 5 October 1877, Cushing's petition was granted. This ruling was
subsequently reversed on 22 March 1878 by the Court of Queen's Bench. In the appellate
decision written by Dorion CJ, and concurred in by Cross and Tessier JJ., it was held that the
sale was not a genuine but a simulated sale, intended to create a security on the assets and thus
avoid the delivery of possession that was essential for the validity of a pledge under ss. 1966–1970
of the Civil Code.
On 22 June 1878, the Court of Queen's Bench refused Cushing leave to appeal its judgment, on the
grounds that, under s. 128 of the Insolvent Act of 1875,[2] its decision was final. Cushing then
petitioned the Privy Council directly for special leave to appeal, which was granted on 27 November
1878, reserving to Dupuy the power to question whether jurisdiction existed as to whether to
entertain such appeal.
The following points were raised in the appeal:
 Did the Insolvent Act take away the right of appeal to the Privy Council that had
previously been granted by art. 1178 of the province's Code of Civil Procedure?
 Was the power of the Crown, by virtue of its prerogative, affected by that Act?
Judgment of the Privy Council[edit]
The ruling of the Quebec Court of Queen's Bench was upheld by the Board, in a judgment
delivered by Sir Montague Smith.
What is the Doctrine of Pith and Substance?
The doctrine states that within their respective spheres the state and the union legislatures are made
supreme, they should not encroach upon the sphere demarcated for the other.
 However, if one among the state and the Centre does encroach upon the sphere of the
other, the courts will apply the Doctrine of Pith and Substance.
 If the pith and substance i.e., the true object of the legislation pertains to a subject within
the competence of the legislature that enacted it, it should be held to be intra vires
although it may incidentally encroach on the matters not within the competence of the
legislature.
Important ingredients that constitute the Doctrine of Pith and Substance
 The Doctrine is applied when the subject matter of List I of the Seventh Schedule is in
conflict with the subject matter of List II.
 The reason behind adopting this doctrine is that otherwise every law will be declared
invalid on the ground that it encroaches upon the subject matter of another sphere.
 The doctrine examines the true nature and substance of the legislation in order to
determine which List it belongs to.
 It takes into consideration whether the State has the power to make a law that
encroaches on a subject matter from another list.
The doctrine was first applied and upheld by the Supreme Court in the FN Balsara case. This is one
of the major landmark cases in which an explanation regarding Article 14 was given. F.N. Balsara
petitioner in the present case assailed the validity of the Bombay prohibition act 1949. The petition
was filed by Balsara after the High court rejected his arguments to invalidate the act. The high court
in its judgment dated 22 August 1950 invalidated some sections of the act. F.N. Balsara filed an
appeal under Article 132 of the constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights. This act
prohibited the citizens to manufacture liquor, possessing, import or export liquor. Sell or buy liquor.
Advertising the use of liquor was also prohibited. This act prohibited the use of all substances which
contain alcohol. Petition filed by F.N Balsara was heard by a five-judge bench.
PLEAS OF PETITIONER
That Balsara (petitioner) should be given assent to use his right to keep whisky, brandy, wine mixed
with medicine etc, and to use them and also to import and export them within the custom limit of that
area.
That the government may not obstruct under prohibition act in the use of his personal rights and may
not take any action against him for the right to keep whisky, brandy, wine with medicine etc also they
can export or import.
JUDGMENT
The judgement given by high court and Supreme Court are as follows:
High court
The high court stated that, agreeing with some of the petitioner’s allegations and not agreeing with
some others, declared some provisions of the act as legal while some other are being illegal.
Aggrieved with the decision of HC both state govt. as well as Balsara with the permission of HC, filed
appeals before the SC against that decision that was stated by high court.
Supreme Court
It was observed by the SC that the state legislative has the power to completely prohibit the keeping,
selling and using intoxication wine under the entry 31 in the list (ii) defined . There is, therefore, no
dispute b/w the jurisdiction of the state and the state . The exemption allowed to the soldiers of the
army , the messes of the land forces and water ships can therefore, not be declared illegal under
sec.37
The SC, therefore, declared as illegal those provisions of the Bombay prohibition ac which were
regarding keeping alcohol , wine and toiletry goods selling and buying the and also using them etc.
and the rest of the provisions were declared as legal it was declared then an act by declaring certain
provisions there of an illegal, cannot be wholly declared as illegal. The appeal no. 182 was
sufficiently admitted while appeal no. 183 was rejected.
The doctrine of pith and substance has provided the Indian constitutional scheme with much-needed
flexibility because in the absence of this doctrine every other law would have been declared invalid
because it incidentally encroaches upon the sphere of another legislature. Apart from its applicability
in cases related to the competency of the legislature as mentioned in Article 246, the Doctrine of Pith
and Substance is also applied in cases related to Article 254, which deals with the repugnancy in
laws made by Parliament and laws made by the State Legislatures. The doctrine is employed in
such cases to resolve the inconsistency between laws made by the Centre and the State
Legislature.
Conclusion
Despite the vivid segregation of powers among the Centre and the states, it is quite inevitable that
ancillary encroachments are bound to take place during the enactment of laws. The powers
demarcated as per Section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 was so rigid and stringent that
it gave no scope to the application of the doctrine of pith and substance. Subsequent to the framing
of the Indian Constitution in 1949, when such incidental encroachment of legislative powers take
place, courts with the aid of the doctrine of pith and substances decide the validity and legitimacy of
an enactment.
Frequently Asked Questions about Doctrine of Pith and Substance
What is the basic purpose of doctrine of pith and substance?
The doctrine places emphasis on the fact that it is the real subject matter which is to be challenged
and not its incidental effects on another field. Pith denotes the ‘essence of something’ or the ‘true
nature’, while substance states ‘the most significant or essential part of something’.
What is the significance of the doctrine of pith and substance in infrastructure
development?
Pith and Substance means the true nature of law. The real subject matter is challenged and not its
incidental effect on another field. The doctrine has been applied in India also to provide a degree of
flexibility in the otherwise rigid scheme of distribution of powers.

What is the meaning of Res Extra Commercium in judiciary?

“Thing outside of commercial intercourse.”Things not subject to ownership, commerce, or trade,
such as the high seas or air.

Res Extra Commercium is a legal maxim, used in India, with the following meaning: Res extra
commercium means things beyond commerce, i.e., which cannot be brought or sold, such as public
roads, rivers, titles of owners etc.

Explaining the doctrine of res extra commercium in Khody Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
[1995] 1 SCC 574, the Supreme Court observed:
(a) There cannot be a business in crime;
(b) What is res extra commercium would be trade or business in liquor when it is completely
prohibited;
(c) The State can create a monopoly to do the business itself or through an agency in terms of article
19(6) or otherwise;
(d) Restrictions and limitations on the trade or business in potable liquor can be both under article
19(6) or otherwise;
(e) When the State permits trade or business in the potable liquor with or without limitation, the
citizen has the right to carry on trade or business subject to the limitations, if any, and the State
cannot make a discrimination between the citizens who are qualified to carry on the trade or
business.

Explain the fact and principles of law laid down in Khoday Distilleries Ltd vs State Of
Karnataka on 19 October, 1994; Equivalent citations: 1995 SCC (1) 574, JT 1994 (6) 588
Whether citizens enjoy a fundamental right to trade or carry on business in liquor under
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
Court : Supreme Court of India
Brief : Upon hearing the parties to the case, the Court held that, Article 19(1)(g) does not entitle
citizens to carry on trade or business in activities which are immoral and criminal and in articles or
goods which are obnoxious and injurious to health, safety and welfare of the general public. In other
words, all those which fall within the category of res commercium are reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(1)(g). These restrictions are issued by the Statein pursuance of its obligation under Article
47 and hence cannot be called in question before the Court. Therefore, the Court clarified that, right
to carryon trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) is not an absolute right and hence the citizens
cannot enjoy right to trade in liquor.
Citation : REFERENCE: 1995 SCC (1) 574 PARTIES
Petitioner: Khoday Distilleries Ltd
Respondent: State of Karnataka
JUDGMENT SUMMARY: Khoday Distilleries Ltd v. State of Karnataka
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/10/1994 JUDGES:VenkatachalliahM.NVerma, Jagdish SaranSawant,
P.B. Ramaswamy, K., Jeevan ReddyB.P
SUBJECT: The judgment revolves around the question of whether citizens enjoy a fundamental
right to trade or carry on business in liquor under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?
FACTS: The petitioners in the present case fall under 3 categories, whose right to carry on trade
and business in liquor was restricted either by judicial pronouncement or by legislation.
Those who filed an SLP after being aggrieved by the decision of the HC where the validity of the
following legislations was challenged:
 Karnataka Excise (Distillery and Warehouse) (Amendment) Rules, 1989,
 Karnataka Excise (Manufacture of Wine from Grapes) (Amendment) Rules, 1989,
 Karnataka Excise (Brewery) (Amendment) Rules, 1989,
 Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) (Amendment) Rules, 1989
 Karnataka Excise (Bottling of Liquor) (Amendment) Rules, 1989
The second category are those who were aggrieved by the decision of the Kerala HC, where the
Court upheld the validity of the State government’s order to cancel all foreign liquor licences issued
under Rule 13(3) of the Kerala Foreign Liquor Rules, 1974 to Hotels, Restaurants and Tourist
Homes.
The third category involves the petitions that were dismissed by the Andhra Pradesh HC upon
holding the validity of the following legislations:
Andhra Pradesh Foreign Liquor and Indian Liquor Rules, 1970
A.P (Regulation of Wholesale Trade, Distribution and Retail Trade in Indian Liquor and Foreign
liquor, Wine and Beer) Act, 1993.
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS:
The Indian Constitution:
 Article 136(1):Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its
discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence
or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of
India
 Article 19(1)(g):to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business
 Article 47:The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living
of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in
particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for
medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.
ISSUES:
Whether citizens enjoy a fundamental right to trade or carry on business in liquor under Article 19(1)
(g) of the Constitution?
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT: The petitioners contended that,
  If the law on the subject is considered to be law under Article 19(6), it has to be on the basis
that a citizen had got a fundamental right to trade in liquor. If the law is that a citizen has no
fundamental right, then Article 19(6) cannot be applied because the said Article applies only
to those rights which a citizen possesses. What a citizen cannot do under Article 19(1), the
State cannot do under Article 19(6).
 A State cannot do an activity which is forbidden by the Directive Principles of State Policy
which in the present case is Article 47.
 Entry 51 of List IIunder 7th Schedule states that, “Duty of Excise on intoxicating liquor for
human consumption” which means that, unless a complete exclusion is brought under Article
47, right to carry on trade, business in liquor is guaranteed.
 Substances like tobacco which are more harmful to health than alcohol and they are being
sold freely while the restrictions apply only for liquor sale.

The respondents cited the following judgments and presented their justification.
 In State of Bombay v. EN.Balsara wherein the Court held that, total prohibition on potable
liquor would be reasonable.
 In Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissionerit was held
that, it cannot also be denied that the State has the power to prohibit trades which are illegal
or immoral or injurious to the health and welfare of the public. Laws prohibiting trades in
noxious or dangerous goods or trafficking in women cannot be held to be illegal as enacting
a prohibition and not a mere regulation. The nature of the business is, therefore, an
important element in deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions.
 In State of Assam v. A.N. Kidwai, Commissioner of Hills Division the Court held that, no
person had any absolute right to sell liquor, and the purpose of the Act and the Rules was to
control and restrict the consumption of intoxicating liquors, such control and restriction being
obviously necessary for the preservation of public health and morals, and to raise revenue.
The Judgement:
Upon hearing the parties to the case, the Court held that, Article 19(1)(g) does not entitle
citizens to carry on trade or business in activities which are immoral and criminal and in
articles or goods which are obnoxious and injurious to health, safety and welfare of the
general public. In other words, all those which fall within the category of res extra
commercium are reasonable restrictions under Article 19(1)(g). These restrictions are issued
by the Statein pursuance of its obligation under Article 47 and hence cannot be called in
question before the Court. Therefore, the Court clarified that, right to carryon trade or
business under Article 19(1)(g) is not an absolute right and hence the citizens cannot enjoy
right to trade in liquor.

The doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamabaugwala
1957 SCR 874 having regard to the obnoxious nature of trade.

In Fatehchand Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra [1977] 2 SCC 670, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1976 holding that every systematic, profit oriented
activity, however sinister, suppressive or socially diabolic, cannot, ipso facto, exalt itself into trade.
Indian government for the first time requested the apex court to classify tobacco as res extra
commercium i.e. things beyond commerce. The move is part of government’s effort to tame the
tobacco companies challenging the governmental authority to regulate the industry in general public
interest.

LD-131 CV-19
(094) LLB Part II (Second Semester)
 Evaluation of Administrative Law in Modern State.
Evaluation of Administrative Law in Modern State.
Administrative law, the legal framework within which public administration is carried out. It derives
from the need to create and develop a system of public administration under law, a concept that may
be compared with the much older notion of justice under law. Since administration involves the
exercise of power by the executive arm of government, administrative law is of constitutional and
political, as well as juridical importance. (juridical is relating to judicial proceedings and the
administration of the law.)
There is no universally accepted definition of administrative law, but rationally it may be held to cover
the organization, powers, duties, and functions of public authorities of all kinds engaged in
administration; their relations with one another and with citizens and nongovernmental bodies; legal
methods of controlling public administration; and the rights and liabilities of officials. Administrative
law is to a large extent complemented by constitutional law, and the line between them is hard to
draw. The organization of a national legislature, the structure of the courts, the characteristics of a
cabinet, and the role of the head of state are generally regarded as matters of constitutional law,
whereas the substantive and procedural provisions relating to central and local governments
and judicial review of administration are reckoned matters of administrative law. But some matters,
such as the responsibility of ministers, cannot be exclusively assigned to either administrative or
constitutional law. Some French and American jurists regard administrative law as including parts of
constitutional law.
The law relating to public health, education, housing, and other public services could logically be
regarded as part of the corpus of administrative law; but because of its sheer bulk it is usually
considered ancillary. (Essential Meaning of ancillary
formal : providing something additional to a main part or function : EXTRA)

One of the principal objects of administrative law is to ensure efficient, economical, and just
administration. A system of administrative law that impedes or frustrates administration would clearly
be bad, and so, too, would be a system that results in injustice to the individual. But to judge whether
administrative law helps or hinders effective administration or works in such a way as to
deny justice to the individual involves an examination of the ends that public administration is
supposed to serve, as well as the means that it employs.
In this connection only the broadest generalities can be attempted. It can be asserted that all states,
irrespective of their economic and political system or of their stage of development, are seeking to
achieve a high rate of economic growth and a higher average income per person. They are all
pursuing the goals of modernization, urbanization, and industrialization. They are all trying to provide
the major social services, especially education and public health, at as high a standard as possible.
The level of popular expectation is much higher than in former ages. The government is expected
not only to maintain order but also to achieve progress. There is a widespread belief that wise and
well-directed government action can abolish poverty, prevent severe unemployment, raise
the standard of living of the nation, and bring about rapid social development. People in all countries
are far more aware than their forefathers were of the impact of government on their daily lives and of
its potential for good and evil.
The growth in the functions of the state is to be found in the more-developed and in the less-
developed countries; in both old and new states; in democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian
regimes; and in the mixed economies of the West. The movement is far from having reached its
zenith. With each addition to the functions of the state, additional powers have been acquired by the
administrative organs concerned, which may be central ministries, local, provincial, or regional
governments, or special agencies created for a particular purpose.
What do you mean by Delegated Legislation ? Describe the Parliamentary control over
delegated legislation.

Discuss the right of hearing in the context of Supreme Court decision.

What do you mean by Injunction ? Discuss the various types of Injunctions.

Write notes on the following:

Limitations of discretionary powers.
Promissory estoppel
Legal position of Damodar Valley Corporation
Legal position of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

Discuss the contractual liability of State

Explain the fact and principle of law laid down in Bhagat Raja Vs Union of India AIR 1967 SC
1606

State the fact and principles of law laid down in the case of Harishankar Bagla Vs State of
M.P. AIR (1954) SC 465.

Discuss the position and jurisdiction of Central Vigilance Commission.

State the fact and principles of law laid down in the case of D.A.V. College Trust And
Managing ... vs Director Of Public Instructions on 17 September, 2019
Facts of the Case
The case at hand is a civil petition brought before the Supreme Court of India by schools and
colleges. In that case, the respondent commenced proceedings according to the Right to Information
Act, 2005; while the appellant argued that they did not fall under the meaning of ‘public authority’ in
accordance with section 2(h). The appeal is filed for the determination of significantly funded non-
governmental organizations by a reasonable government within the framework of public authority.
In the instant case, D.A.V. College, Sector 10, Chandigarh, M.C.M.D.A.V. College, Sector 36,
Chandigarh, and D.A.V. Senior Secondary School, Sector 8, Chandigarh are various colleges.
These establishments have been set up by society and are evidently seeking financial help from the
Union Territory, Chandigarh, to the amount of 95 percent. It was asserted that 95 percent of the
grant-in-aid was previously lowered to 45 percent. The appellant complained that the Director of
Public Instructions, U.T. Chandigarh, had initiated proceedings under the Act against the appellant,
whereas they are not covered by the term ‘public authority’ as used in Section 2(h)(d) of the Act.
Correspondingly, the other trust-managed organizations too were tasked with making numerous
different institutions public. Documentation on the annual fee structure of the divergent classes /
educational programs/diplomas/scholarship programs/add-on courses offered and also asked for
more information on advertising/notices issued by D. A. V. College, Sector 10, and Chandigarh for
the 2007-08 sessions concerning college admissions. However, the appellants have taken the
position that their institution is not covered by the Act, as it is not a ‘public authority.’
Issues of the Instant Case
The paramount issue claimed here was whether, under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, NGOs
substantially funded by the government fall within the scope of ‘public authority.’ In contrast, the
Supreme Court had to determine whether the appellants were massively supported by the state in
this case.
Arguments of the Parties
The appellants opined that, as per the beginning section of the clause, public authorities could be
deemed solely to be the authorities, bodies, or institutions particularly worried about self-
governance. The purpose of the act, thereupon, was to cover only the government and its tools, not
NGOs such as universities and schools.
Furthermore, it was alleged that if any person or organization falling beyond the jurisdiction of
clauses (a) to (c) (those established under the Constitution or the Parliament or the Government of
the State) were to be brought within the framework of public authority, it would have to be explicitly
informed of the status mentioned in clause (d). Besides, the government did not significantly fund the
schools and/or colleges, as provided by Section 2(h) of the Legislation.
On the other hand, it is advocated on behalf of the respondents that the reading of Section 2(h)
expressly illustrates that there is, in addition to the four categories alluded to in the first part, an
inclusive portion comprising I the entity owned, regulated or significantly funded; (ii) the non-
governmental organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds given by the
responsible Government.
Judgment
The court made reference to the previous case of P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology &
Ors[1], which is an interpretative clause dealt with the meaning of the phrase “means and includes.”
The use of the word ‘means’ suggests a challenging and easy interpretation of the definition and that
no other meaning can be obtained from it, but it implies that a wider and more progressive
interpretation of the definition can be inferred when paired with the word ‘includes.’ The Court
analyses the usage in Section 2(h) of the Act of the word ‘means’ which suggested ‘exhaustive and
full’ meanings of the first four classes of public authorities, using the term ‘includes’ in the second
part of the provision which indicated that the legislature wished to define more narrowly the last two
groups of government authorities.
The Court, therefore, reasoned that in sub-paragraphs I and (ii) identifying entities and NGOs
owned, regulated, or predominantly funded by the Government, various types of public authorities
must be constituted.
Responding to the question of whether cooperative societies will fall within the framework of that
statute, it referred to the case of Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. and Ors. V. St. of Ors
and Kerala[2]. It was ascertained that the institutions and non-governmental organizations specified
in sub-clauses I and (ii) above constituted different categories of public authorities, in addition to the
four previous categories referred to in section 2(h) of the Legislation.
Finally, the Supreme Court argued that the company should obtain a large amount of finance to
come within the category of ‘substantially supported’ and it provides no more than 50 percent. In the
case of Appellant No.1, it was found that even though government funding accounted for 45 percent
of the total funding, it still financed almost 95 percent of the teaching staff’s salary, which is a critical
element of the educational institution and forms the foundation for its functioning.
It was therefore determined that these colleges/schools are largely funded and are a public authority
within the purview of section 2(h) of the Act. Nevertheless, the court ruled, like the other appellants,
that the High Court did not take into account whether or not they were substantially supported and
instead instructed them to ascertain the same.

What is State liability in law?

Liability of State for the tortious acts of its servants known as tortious liability. of State makes it liable
for the acts of omission and commission, voluntary or involuntary and brings it before Court of Law in
a claim for non liquidated damages for such acts. This liability is also a branch of Law of Torts.
What is tortious liability of state in administrative law?
The concept of tortuous liability of State means that the state is liable for the acts of its servants. ...
Liability of government is fixed under Article 300 of the Constitution. Union of India and State can
sue and be sued in the same way as the Dominion of India and Provinces before the
commencement of the Constitution.
Tortious liability of State:
The concept of tortuous liability of State means that the state is liable for the acts of its servants.
State has to act through human agencies in carrying out various functions. So the important question
which arises is whether the State can be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees. Under
the English the old position was that the Crown enjoyed immunity from the wrongs committed in tort.
In other words, Crown could not be sued for the torts of its servants. This was largely based on the
concept ‘King can do no wrong’. However, with increase of government’s function this concept was
abolished by Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. This Act placed the government in the same position as
the subjects. As far as Indian position is concerned the doctrine of ‘King can do no wrong’ was never
accepted in India. Liability of government is fixed under Article 300 of the Constitution. Union of India
and State can sue and be sued in the same way as the Dominion of India and Provinces before the
commencement of the Constitution. In order to effectively appreciate the concept of tortuous liability
of State the concept of sovereign and non-sovereign functions is to be understood.
Sovereign and non-sovereign functions
When East India Company arrived in India it was essentially a trading entity. The purpose of the
company was to trade in India. Subsequently, it obtained the Diwani rights from Mughals and
acquired dual character i.e. (1) trading company and (2) sovereign. Later, the company was granted
the right to acquire territories and maintain army on behalf of the Crown. By virtue of Government of
India Act, 1858 the Crown took sovereignty from the company. The Act allowed the Secretary of the
State in Council to sue and be sued. Similar provisions were found in Government of India Act, 1915
and 1935. Because of dual character of East India Company there was distinction between
sovereign and non-sovereign functions. In respect of sovereign functions the company was not liable
while in respect of non-sovereign functions the company was liable.
In P & O Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State, (1868) 5 Bom HCR App 1 court held that if
a particular act can be done by private persons then it does qualify for sovereign functions. Court
recognized that there is a clear distinction between acts done in exercise of sovereign powers and
acts done in conduct of undertakings which might be carried on by private individuals without having
such powers delegated to them. The court classified the acts of Secretary of State in (1) sovereign
functions and (2) non-sovereign functions. The court clarified that in respect of sovereign functions
Secretary of State was not liable. This observation of the court was followed in catena of decisions.
In Nobin Chunder Dey v. Secretary of State for India, ILR (1875) 1 Cal 11 plaintiff applied for a
licence of ganja shop and he deposited certain amount. The licence was denied. He sued the State
for refund of amount and claimed damages. Court held that the grant of licence of run ganja shop
was a sovereign function and action was not maintainable.
After the commencement of the Constitution the Supreme Court was confronted with this question
in State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati, AIR 1962 SC 933. In this case the jeep was owned by the
State of Rajasthan for official use of Collector. The driver of the jeep while bringing the jeep back
from workshop drove it negligently and injured a pedestrian who subsequently died. The court held
the State vicariously liable for rash and negligent act of the driver. Supreme Court rejected the notion
that ‘King can do no wrong’ and stated that such notion is not applicable in India. Keeping in mind
the socialistic pattern of society and large number of functions of the Government State should be
held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its servants. However, later in Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram
Jain v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 1039 Supreme Court diluted the observation in Vidyawati case.
Court categorically held that of the tortious act is committed by public servant in exercise of
sovereign functions then the State will not be liable however, if the act is done in exercise of non-
sovereign functions the State will be liable in tort.
Law laid down in Kasturi Lal’s case held ground for quite some time. However, in later decisions,
Supreme Court did not follow the law laid down in Kasturi Lal’s case. Court always distinguished the
facts of this case from other cases. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that Kasturi Lal’s case has
not been specifically overruled till date. In N. Nagendra Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1994) 6
SCC 205 Supreme Court held that the concept of sovereign immunity cannot be a defence where
the State is involved in commercial activities. Such concept can also not apply where officers of
State are guilty of interfering with life and liberty of citizens. In all such cases the State should be
held vicariously liable and constitutionally bound to compensate and indemnify the wronged person.
The court observed that the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign functions does not
exist anymore. This distinction is contrary to modern thinking. Thus, the demarcating line between
sovereign and non-sovereign functions has disappeared. It must be noted that after expansion of
scope of Article 21 and evolution of compensatory jurisprudence under Article 32 and 226 the
concept of sovereign and non-sovereign function has become outdated. Kasturi Lal’s case, though
not specifically overruled, has lost its vigour and significantly eroded. Recent judicial trend is in
favour of holding State liable for tortious acts committed by its servants.
State the fact and principles of law laid down in the case of Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation company vs Secretary Of State For India on 8 September, 1910; Equivalent
citations: (1911) ILR 38 Cal 230
 Name of the case: Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company v. Secretary of
State for India
 Citation: (1861) 5 Bom. H.C.R. App. I,p.1
 Year: 1861
 Plaintiff: Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company
 Defendant: Secretary of State for India
 Bench: Peacock C.J, Jackson J, Wells J
 Important sections: It’s a pre-constitution case. Section 65 of the Government of India Act,
1858 equated the liability of the Secretary of State for India with that of the East India
Company.
 Acts: Government of India Act, 1858. (Pre-constitution case, still applicable, based on
Vicarious Liability, Law of Torts)
 Court: Supreme Court of Calcutta

Abstract: In India the story of the birth of the doctrine of exemption begins with the selection of
Peacock C.J. in Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India The
judgment was given great distance back in 1861 when the notion “The King can do no wrong” was
still prevalent under English Common Law and thus, the King wasn’t to blame for the wrongs of its
servants. The classic decision on the subject is that the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Co. v. Secretary of State for India, as this was the first case during which the excellence between
sovereign functions and non-sovereign functions was made. This crucial embodiment of common
law decision still has some valid crucial headings and influence most of the present times relating to
vicarious liability and disputes to establish liability on a sole individual or group of the organization.
Summary of facts: A servant of the plaintiff Company was proceeding from Garden Beach of
Calcutta in an exceeding carriage drawn by a pair of horses belonging to the plaintiff, and driven by
the coachman in their course of employment. While the coach was passing along Kidderpore
Dockyard which could be a government dockyard of which the Superintendent of Marine is that
the head, certain workmen in Government employment were engaged in riveting a bit of iron funnel
casing. It weighed about 300 kilos and eight or 9 feet long and about 2 feet high. The boys carrying
the load were walking along the centre of the road. The coachman summoned warning to the
boys who were carrying the iron. The boys attempted to induce out of the way, those ahead tried to
travel to 1 side , and people behind tried to travel to the opposite. The consequence of this was the
loss of your time, which brought the carriage shut down to them, before that they had left the centre
of the road.
They got frightened at the closeness of the carriage and unexpectedly dropped the iron and fled.
The iron fell with a decent clamour which began the offended parties ponies which immediately
hurried forward brutally and fell on the iron prompting wounds to at any rate one pony. The suit was
brought by the offended party Company to recoup Rs. 350/ – because of the harm, and
subsequently the case against the Secretary of State was on the base that a worker of the
government finished the careless demonstration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not acts of the Company come under the exercise of sovereign powers of the
State?
2. What was the degree of risk of the East India Company for the convoluted demonstrations of
its workers submitted in the course of their work all things considered?
3. Whether the Secretary of State was responsible for the damage occasioned by the
negligence of the govt. servants, assuming them to own been guilty of such negligence?
Reasons for the Court and Ratio Decidendi:
1. Where a demonstration is done in exercise of sovereign forces, there would be resistance, and no
activity would lie. However, since the East India Company had a double limit and were at simply the
once really exchanging for their own and were that occupied with exchanges halfway for the
necessities of State and somewhat for their own, they may be responsible for the unjust
demonstration of any worker of theirs if such act was exhausted the course of an exchange
detached with the activity of sovereign capacities.
2. Thinking about the realities of this case, the labourers utilized by the govt at the dockyard weren’t
doing anything inside the activity of sovereign forces, however that the demonstration was
exhausted the lead of an endeavour which could be carried on by a non-open individual without
having sovereign forces assigned to him, which the archipelago Company would are obligated, and
thus the Secretary of State for India was additionally to fault for the careless demonstrations of its
workers.
3. Mishaps like these, whenever brought about by the carelessness of workers utilized by the govt,
the Malay Archipelago Company, would be subject and a similar risk is appended to the Secretary of
State.
Significance of the Case:
 The observations which were made while deciding this case- whether the Secretary of the
State was personally liable, influenced the courts for years to come back, both before coming
into force of the Constitution and thereafter.
 Even after the Constitution came into force, there was no substantial departure from the
road of thought enunciated within the P & 0 Steamship case.
 The excellence between sovereign and non-sovereign functions within the context of
vicarious liability of the State in tort originated as a result of the reading of this judgment by
various courts.
 It absolutely was a judgment of far-reaching importance and has always been cited because
of the leading case on the topic.
 No doubt, in the course of your time, the scope of the expression “sovereign functions” came
to be considerably narrowed down and there was greater readiness, on the part of various
courts, to take many Governmental acts as “non-sovereign”. This has considerably
reduced the sensible importance of this distinction, which, however, still continues to survive,
theoretically.
 The Courts approved the excellence made by Peacock C J between Sovereign and Non-
sovereign functions, but they also mentioned that it’s difficult to think about the judgment to
be relevant today because the scope of sovereign function of the State has widened.
Judgement:
The plaintiffs claim that the Secretary of State was allowed to succeed. Also, the East
India Company wasn’t the sovereign although certain sovereign powers had been delegated to
them and that they couldn’t, therefore, claim immunity in every case.

Write short notes on the Judicial Review of Administrative Action

What is Judicial Review?
As the word itself says, review by the judiciary of statutes, administrative actions, Ordinances,
Orders, bye-laws, rules, regulations, notifications, customs or usages to check that whether or not
they are in consonance with and doesn’t curtail the provisions of Constitution and declare them void
to the extent of its inconsistency if they are derogatory with Constitution.
Why Judicial Review?
India is a democratic country and the essence of democracy lies in concepts like Rule of law,
Principle of Natural Justice, Separation of Power (and many other principles) and these principles
have been captured in the Indian Constitution under various provisions like Article 14, Article
22, Article 50 respectively.
The Supreme Court (SC) is the guardian of the Constitution in the sense that remedies against any
unconstitutional act and infringement of Fundamental Rights by any part of the government can be
enforced by invoking the jurisdiction of SC and thus, in order to protect the Constitution and its
subjects from whims and fancies of other organs of the government, constitution’s makers equipped
judiciary with the power of judicial review so that it can a check on other two or organs and the
balance of power can be maintained.
Thus, the power to review the action of administrative authority has been envisaged in appellate
courts under Article 13 (law inconsistent with Part III are void), Article 32 (power of SC to issue
writs), Article132 (appeal against HC order in SC), Article 226 (power of High Courts to issue
writs), Article 227(superintendence of High Court over District courts and tribunals), so that the
actions of executive bodies can be confined within the Constitutional limits.
What is the technique for Judicial Review ? What are the remedies for ensuring
administrative actions by the Civil Courts in India ?
Along with many other techniques availed to individuals to file grievances against unlawful
administrative actions to the judiciary, writs is one of the most famous methods used by the
public to seek redressal from the judiciary. Other methods for ensuring that administrative
actions live the test of the constitution are:
 Appeal: Filing an appeal to SC against the decision of HC (A.132);
 Judiciary’s opinion: Administrative bodies are allowed to seek judiciary’s opinion an certain
actions;
 Injunctions and declarations: Injunctions and declarations can be granted by judiciary
under Specific Relief Act, 1963;

o In law, an injunction is an order by a court to one or more of the parties in a civil

trial to refrain from doing, or less commonly to do, some specified act or
acts (the former kind of injunction is called prohibitory or preventive, the latter
mandatory). The usual purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status quo in
situations in which further acts of the specified type, or the failure to perform
such acts, would cause one of the parties irreparable harm (i.e., harm that
cannot be adequately remedied by an award of monetary damages). Preliminary, or
temporary, injunctions are usually issued before the start of a trial; they expire upon
resolution of the proceeding or at an earlier specified time. Permanent, or perpetual,
injunctions may be issued at the end of a trial as part of the court’s final judgment;
they usually enjoin (or mandate) the specified act or acts permanently or for as long
as the relevant circumstances obtain. A temporary restraining order is an unusual
type of preliminary injunction that is issued without a hearing and sometimes without
notice to the party against whom it is directed; it is valid for only a short period (no
 more than two weeks) or until such time as a formal hearing on a preliminary
injunction may be conducted.

o In order to be granted an injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is likely to

suffer irreparable harm without it, that the injunction’s benefit to him outweighs its
burden on the defendant, that the injunction is in the public interest, and (in the case
of a preliminary injunction) that he is likely to succeed in the eventual trial. Failure to
comply with an injunction can result in a charge of contempt of court.

o Preliminary and permanent injunctions may be sought to prevent the bulldozing of a

historic building, the pollution of a public water supply, the infringement of a
copyright, the manual recounting of ballots in a presidential election, or the
enforcement of a constitutionally suspect law or executive order. In the area of family
law, injunctions may be used to end harassment by an abusive domestic partner or
to force payment of child support. In the 1970s and ’80s, mandatory injunctions were
used to achieve racial integration in public schools through busing.
 A declaratory decree is a decree declaring the right of the plaintiff. The declaratory
judgment clearly states that the right of the plaintiff in an already complicated transaction.
Under this, the court declares some existing rights in favor of the plaintiff and it exists only if
the plaintiff is denied of his particular rights which he is basically entitled to. After the specific
relief is obtained by the plaintiff against the defendant by the plaintiff who denied the plaintiff
from his rights. A declaratory judgment does not itself order any action by a party or imply
damages or an injunction although it may be accompanied by one or more other remedies.

 Section 34, Specific Relief Act

o Section 34 of the Special relief act of 1963 deals with the discretion of chords as to
declaration of status or right. It is the cold discretion of the court as a true declaration
of status or write any person and tell that to any legal character or any right to any
property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his
title to such character or right.
o The court may in its discretion make there in a declaration that is so entitled and the
plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief provided that no court shall
make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a
mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
 Compensation: Compensation or Damages under various statutory provisions and
constitutional provisions, damages (monetary compensation) can be claimed against
unjust administrative actions; The words compensation and damages are frequently used
in contracts, in cases of accidents, libel, personal injury cases and in other cases which are
civil in nature in the court of law. Though, there is a significant difference between the two
but they are often used together and interchangeably in civil litigation leading to confusion
between the both. It is significant to note that in both these cases money is paid to another
party for making good for the loss. When an agreement becomes enforceable by law it
attains the status of a valid contract as per the Contract Act, 1872. A contract is a legal
promise to perform obligations for a consideration and when a party breaks such promise,
the other party may suffer losses for non-performance of the promised obligations. For such
losses, compensation or damages or both can be claimed by availing the legal remedies
available. The expression compensation may include a claim for damage but compensation
is more comprehensive. Damages are awarded for suffering injury while compensation
stands on a higher footing. Compensation aims to place the injured party back in a position
as if the injury has not taken place by way of pecuniary relief for the caused injury. Therefore,
the commutation of compensation cannot be mathematically precise but will definitely be
 broader than that of the assessment of damages. When there is a breach of contract, if sum
to be paid in case of such breach is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case
of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty then the
party complaining of such breach will be entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is
proved to have been caused thereby and to receive from the party who breached the
contract a reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case
may be, the penalty stipulated for.
 Contractual obligations: If there is a breach of contractual obligations between the
Government and individual, then judicial and quasi judicial mechanism is in place to move to.
All the above mentioned techniques are employed in accordance with the conditions of the case and
legal grounds of making such grievance.
There are five kinds of writs specified in the constitution. All the appellate courts have the authority to
issue writs in the nature of:
 Habeas Corpus;
 Mandamus;
 Prohibition;
 Quo Warranto; and
 Certiorari.
The word “in the nature of” has been emphasised by the author because it is important to
understand that though the concept of writs has been imported in Indian constitution from England,
but it is not Indian courts are not bound by all the technicalities of this English concept. Judiciary
construe them as per the requirement and interest of the nation keeping in view the underlying
principle of “ensuring constitutionality” of administrative actions and statutes.
Habeas Corpus
The literal translation of this latiin term is “you must have the body”. This writ provided a quick and
effective remedy to the citizens against illegal and unlawful detention. By this writ, courts order the
person or authority who has detained a person, to present such person in front of the court so that
court can delve into the authenticity, jurisdiction and merit of such detention. The main purpose of
this writ is to equip the judiciary to protect fundamental rights of detenu, envisaged in Article 21
(Protection of Life and Liberty) and Article 22 (Protection against illegal detention) of the
Constitution.
A detention can be unlawful if:
 If it is not in consonance with the statutes;
 If the due procedure established by the statutes is not followed while detaining a person;
 There is no authority or law to detain such person;
 The law which provides for such detention is in derogation with the constitution; and
 If such law is ultra vires on the part of the legislature.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus can be filed against the State as well as against the individual .

Mandamus
It is a command issued by the court to an authority instructing it to perform or not to perform a task
which it is legally bound to do. The writ of mandamus can be issued to any kind of authority for any
kind of matter like: administrative, legislative, quasi-judicial, judicial. It can also be issued to undo a
wrongful act which is against the law.
The main element to grasp here is, a writ of mandamus can only be issued when the authority in
question owes a legal duty to the petitioner. Writs can’t be issues when there is no such legal and
public duty. HCs can’t issue writs under A.226 for make and modify laws to the law making authority.
Quo Warranto
The meaning of this phrase is, “what authority do you have?”. This writ calls upon the holder of a
public office to prove to the court that under what authority he is holding the public office in question.
This writ tends to provide protection against the executive action of illegal appointments in public
office, but also to protect the public from being deprived of the office they are entitled to.
The writ can only be issued in respect of the office of public character and not private. The following
ingredients are required for court to issue quo warranto writ:
 The office in question shall be of public nature, created under the Constitution or some other
law; and
 The person holding such office is not legally qualified to hold such office and his holding of
such office is in clear infringement of laws.[vi]
Prohibition and Certiorari
These writs can be issued to anybody, independent of the nature of the function they discharge, if
there is merit in the grounds presented in the writ petition.A writ of certiorari can only be issued by
appellate courts to inferior courts and tribunals who to transmit to the courts the record of the
proceedings and decided or is due for scrutiny and if deemed fit, then to quash it too.
A writ of certiorari is usually exercised when an inferior court has acted in ultra vires manner. A few
situations can be:
 Acted without any jurisdiction or presumed jurisdiction where it didn’t existed;
 Transcending its jurisdiction;
 Acting in disregarding the due procedure of law and rule of law or acting against the principle
of natural justice where there is no procedure explicitly laid down thus leading to injustice[vii].
Both certiorari and prohibition writs are issued on the same grounds, but the stage of
proceeding in which they are issued is different. Certiorari is issued when the body in question
has already given the verdict and the appellate court wants to quash that verdict but prohibition is
issued when the matter has not yet been decided by the body in question and courts want to prohibit
it from deciding it as it doesn’t fall under its jurisdiction. This is also the only difference between a
writ of certiorari and of prohibitive nature.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF VAISH
DEGREE COLLEGE SHAMLI Vs. LAKSHMI NARAIN, Air 1976 Sc 888;
(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of Allahabad High Court affirming
the decree of the First Additional Civil and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar by which the
plaintiff/respondent's suit for injunction was decreed.(to officially decide or order that something must
happen:)

(2.) The appeal arises in the following circumstances. The appellant which is the Executive
Committee of Vaish Degree College in the District of Muzaffarnagar was registered under the
Registration of Co-operative Societies Act as an institution for imparting education. The affairs of the
College were managed by the Executive Committee of the Vaish College which is the appellant in
this case. In the year 1967 the Vaish Degree College which is the appellant in this case. In the year
1967 the Vaish College was affiliated to the Agra University and as a consequence thereof the
College agreed to be governed by the provisions of the Agra University Act and the statutes and
Ordinances made thereunder. With the establishment of the Meerut University some time in the year
1965 the Vaish Degree College got affiliated to the Meerut University. The plaintiff/respondent was
appointed as Principal of the College on permanent basis with effect from July 1, 1964 and his
appointment as Principal of the College on permanent basis with effect from July 1, 1964 and his
appointment as Principal was formally approved by the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University. Two
years later it appears that differences arose between the Executive Committee of the College and
the plaintiff/respondent resulting in allegations and counter-allegations and culminating in a notice
served by the Executive Committee on October 24, 1966 on the plaintiff/respondent directing him not
to discharge the duties of the Principal and another letter was sent to defendant No. 4 a member of
the staff of the College to officiate as Principal in place of the plaintiff/respondent. This was followed
up by a counter-notice by the plaintiff/respondent to the Executive Committee that the notice sent to
him was illegal and the respondent also asked defendant No. 4 not to assume charge of the
Principal. On March 12, 1967, the Executive Committee by a resolution terminated the services of
the plaintiff/respondent with effect from October 24, 1966 and this resolution was amended by
another resolution on March 29, 1967. Even before the formal resolution terminating the services of
the plaintiff/respondent was passed it appears that the plaintiff had filed the present suit on October
28, 1966 before the Court of the First Additional Civil and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar which was
transferred for disposal to the Court of the Munisif, Kairana.

2A. The plaintiff's case (supra) was that on being affiliated to the Agra University and thereafter to
the Meerut University and adopting the provisions of the Acts and the statutes of the said
Universities the appellant College became a statutory body and had no jurisdiction to terminate the
services of the plaintiff/respondent without seeking the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor.
The plaintiff further submitted that after his appointment he entered into an agreement with the
Executive Committee in accordance with the statutes of the University and the appellant was bound
by the terms and provisions of the statutes under which his services could not be terminated without
the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The plaintiff therefore, contended that his removal from
service was without jurisdiction and he must be deemed to have continued in service. He also made
some allegations of bias and mala fides against the Executive Committee and some other persons
with which we are not concerned in this appeal. The plaintiff accordingly prayed for an injunction
restraining the defendants from interesting with his duties as the Principal of the College. It appears,
however, from the record that after the notice given to the plaintiff/respondent by the Executive
Committee the plaintiff was benefit of all his powers and in spite of his attempts to get into the
College and work as Principal he was not allowed to do so which led to some criminal proceedings
also. It is, therefore, clear that at least after the resolution of the Executive Committee was passed
terminating the services of the plaintiff he has not been working as Principal of the College up-till
now. This position is not disputed before us by counsel for the parties.

(3.) The defence was that the Executive Committee was not a statutory body and therefore, was not
bound by the statutes and the provisions of the University Acts although as a matter of convention it
had agreed to follow the same. The defendant/appellant also denied the allegations of the
plaintiff/respondent that the Executive Committee had entered into any agreement or contract of
service with the plaintiff/respondent. The defendant further alleged that as the plaintiff/respondent
remained habitually and perpetually absent from his duties without the permission of the concerned
authority the defendant/appellant was compelled to dispense with the services of the
plaintiff/respondent. In fact the plea taken by the defendant was that the plaintiff himself by his
remaining perpetually absent from duties abandoned the service and had put an end to the contract
of service and therefore he could not be heard to say that the contract of service still subsisted.;

The Supreme Court has held as under :

"The relief of declaration and injunction under the provisions of Specific Relief Act is purely
discretionary and the plaintiff cannot claim it as of right." The Supreme Court has clearly held that a
contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against an employer. The remedy is to
sue for damages. This is so because the provisions of Section 14(1)(a) would be applicable after the
declaration is given under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, to the effect that the contract of
personal service is subsisting. Section 41 specifically provides that an injunction cannot be granted
to prevent breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. The
effect of a declaration under Section 34 is that, it states what the rights of the parties are, without
containing any coercive order. The declaration is not a direction for specific enforcement of the
contract. The Court merely declares that the contract having been illegally terminated continues to
subsist. The specific performance of the contract by way of a permanent injunction can only be
granted, if the provisions of section 14 read with Section 41 are not applicable. Otherwise, the
remedy of the plaintiff lies in a claim for damages.
Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of The State Of Rajasthan vs
Mst. Vidhyawati And Another on 2 February, 1962. Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR 933, 1962 SCR
Supl. (2) 989
FACTS OF THE CASE
1. Lokumal was a temporary employee of the State of Rajasthan, as a motor driver on probation. In
February 1952, he was employed as the driver of a Government jeep car, registered as No. RUM 49,
under the Collector of Udaipur. The said car was given for necessary repairs at a workshop.
2. After the repairs were finished, Lokumal, while driving the car back along a public road, in the
evening of February 11, 1952, knocked down one Jagdishlal, who was walking on the footpath by the
said of the public road in Udaipur city, causing him multiple injuries, including fractures of the skull
and backbone, resulting in his death three days later, in the hospital where he had been removed for
treatment.
3. The plaintiffs who are Jagdishlal’s widow, Vidyawati and a minor daughter, aged three years, through
her mother as next friend sued the said Lokumal and the State of Rajasthan for damages for the tort
aforesaid. They claimed the compensation of Rs. 25,000/- from both the defendants.
4. The suit was majorly contested by the state of Rajasthan, i.e. defendant no. 2 and defendant no. 1,
Lokumal, remained ex parte. The present suit has been contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
by the State of Rajasthan, as the appellant on the ground that it was not liable for the tortious act of its
employee.
Procedural History:
 The Trial Court, after an elaborate discussion of the evidence, decreed the suit against the first
defendant ex-parte and dismissed it without costs against the second defendant. On appeal by the
plaintiffs, the High Court of Rajasthan allowed the appeal and decreed the suit against the second
defendant also, with costs in both the Courts.
 The State of Rajasthan applied for and obtained the necessary certificate “that the case fulfills the
requirements of Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India”. The High Court rightly observed that an
important point of law of general public importance, namely, the extent of the liability of the State, in
tort, was involved.
 But in view of the fact that both the Courts below have agreed in finding that the first defendant was
rash and negligent in driving the jeep car resulting in the accident and the ultimate death of Jagdishlal,
it is no more necessary to advert to all the questions raised by way of answer to the suit, except the
one on which the appeal has been pressed before us.
ISSUES RAISED
 Whether the state, earlier to the commencement of Constitution, Art. 300, be liable in a similar
situation akin to the state of Rajasthan.
 Whether the rash and negligent driving of Jeep car, which led to the claim in the suit was being
maintained “in exercise of sovereign power” and not as part of any commercial activity of the State.
RULES APPLICABLE
 Article 133(1), Constitution of India, 1950
 Article 294, Constitution of India, 1950
 Article 295 Constitution of India, 1950
 Article 300 Constitution of India, 1950
 Section 2(1), Crown Proceedings Act, 1947
JUDGMENT AND CONCLUSION
 The position of law, obtaining both prior and subsequent to 1858, the position obtaining under Article
300 of the Constitution and the facts and circumstances leading to the formation of the State of
Rajasthan, were all reviewed by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati, The act of the
 driver was not an act in the exercise of a sovereign function. The Court said that the employment of
driver of a jeep car for the use of a civil servant was an activity which was not connected in any
manner with the sovereign power of the State at all. In this case, court rejected the plea of immunity
of the State and held that the State was liable for the tortious act of the driver like any other employer.
 The Court has very aptly decided the instant case and formed a strong precedent for many more cases
that arose with respect to the vicarious liability of the state for the acts of its employers.

Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of SMT NILABATI BEHERA
ALIAS LALITA BEHERA V STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS, AIR 1993 SC 1960

The Landmark judgement of Supreme court of India which changed the course of
custodial deaths in India.
Title Of the case: SMT NILABATI BEHERA ALIAS LALITA BEHERA V STATE OF ORISSA
AND OTHERS, AIR 1993 SC 1960
Bench: Justice Jagdish Sharan Verma, Justice A.S. Anand, Justice, N. Venkatachala
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judgment: 24th March 1993
Applicable law: Constitution of India: Article 21, 32
Issue of this case: Whether the constitutional courts of India grant the remedy of monetary compensation
on violation of fundamental rights in relation to the principle of sovereign immunity while these courts
exercising their jurisdiction under Article 32 and 226 of the constitution of India.
Facts of the case– In the instant case, a letter was sent by Smt. Nilabati Behera to the Supreme Court stating
that her twenty-two-year-old son, Suman Behera had died in police custody after being inflicted with several
injuries. The honourable court took suo moto action and converted it into a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Indian constitution. The petitioner claimed compensation for the violation of her son’s fundamental right to life
guaranteed under Article 21. The Orissa police had arrested Suman Behara for investigation involving the
offence of theft and he was detained at the police outpost. The very next day, his dead body was found near the
railway track. The lacerations on his body indicated towards an unnatural death.
The Court Held– The court observed through the facts and pieces of evidence of the case with arguments
of both the counsels that there was no cogent evidence of any search by the police to find Suman Behara and of
his escape from police custody. The police also reached much later to the take charge of the body, after it was
reported by railwaymen, which raised questions as to its credibility. Further, a doctor before the court deposed
that the injury was caused by a blunt object, which may have been lathi blows. All the injuries found on his
body could not have been caused by a train accident. The court also drew the distinction between the
liabilities of the State in public law as opposed to private law. It clearly mentioned that a proceeding
under Article 32 before the Supreme Court or any High Court is a remedy available in public law and
the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply in case of public law. It is only a defence in private
law based on tort. It also stressed that it would be highly unjust to expect a person socio-economically
disadvantaged person to pursue ordinary civil proceeding under the private law. And the Apex Court
held that the Petitioner awarded a compensation of Rs.1,50,000 and a sum of Rs.10,000 to be paid to the
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. The Supreme Court also ordered the State of Orissa to initiate
criminal proceedings against those who killed Suman Behara.
Through the decision of this case, therefore made sure that the state could no longer escape liability in Public
law and had to be compelled to pay compensation when it committed such gross violation of one’s
fundamental rights as well as the very basic human rights.

Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Saheli, A Women'S
Resources ... vs Commissioner Of Police, Delhi ... on 14 December, 1989. Equivalent citations: 1990 AIR
513, 1989 SCR 488
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 32--Tortious acts of employees-Responsibility of State--Death of person
due to beating by police official--State directed to pay compensation.
HEADNOTE:
Torts: Vicarious Liability--Death of child due to beating by Police--State directed to pay compensation to
mother. In the Writ Petitions filed on behalf of two women, who were severely beaten by the alleged landlord,
in collusion with the local police, in their attempts to get the rooms occupied by them vacated, the petitioners
prayed for directions to the respondents to pay exemplary charges to one of the women for the death of her son
but to injuries inflicted on him by the police. It was alleged that the landlord's son, accompanied by the Station
House Officer and other police personnel severely beat the woman, and her nine year old son, who was
clinging to her to protect her, as a result of which the child suffered severe injuries and died in the hospital. A
medico-legal case was registered. The case was investigated by the Inspector of Crime Branch, who submitted
his report according to which there was a high level conspiracy of the police with the accused in getting the
rooms occupied by the women vacated and opposed grant of bail as it was a clear case under Section 302/120B
I.P.C. A counter-affidavit on behalf of Respondent No. 1 was filed stating that the Station House Officer
himself took part in the beatings and the minor child was also not spared and the child sustained severe injury
in the left leg, which was opined as a grievous one, and that the injuries inflicted on the child caused fever and
pneumonitis, resulting in the death of the child, and a case under Sections 308/34 I.P.C. which was later altered
to 304/34 I.P.C. was registered and one of the accused arrested. Disposing of the Writ Petitions, this Court
Facts
The petitioner filed a Public Interest Litigation on behalf of Kamlesh Kumari and Maya Devi. The two women
lived in the same house in different rooms with their husbands and children. Their husbands were not usually
at home as they were truck drivers. During their time in the house there were two changes in ownership. Puran
Chand, and his sons Shambu Dayal and Prakash Chand, being the third in the line of owners, who claimed to
have purchased the house. They had been successful at illegally evicting the tenants of the house but Kamlesh
and Maya did not leave. Kamlesh got a stay order against her forceful eviction from a Court and continued to
live there. In October 1987, the so-called landlord cut off water and electricity. On 2nd, 4th and
12th November 1987, the Station House Officer of Anand Parbat Police Station, Lal Singh called Kamlesh
Kumari and warned her to leave the premises. On 13th November, the Sub Inspector of Anand Parbat Police
Station threw out Maya Devi from the house and took away Kamlesh Kumari’s children while she had gone to
consult with her lawyer. Her children had been put in lock up. With her lawyer’s help, she was able to get them
out. The same day, at night, Kamlesh was attacked by Shambu Dayal. On 14th November, Shambu Dayal,
Prakash Chand, Lal Singh (in civilian clothes) and Sham Lal (sub inspector in uniform) beat Kamlesh, tore off
her clothes and molested her. Her son Naresh had clung to his mother, but Lal Singh threw him on the floor,
and he got injured.
Kamlesh was dragged to the police station and a criminal case of trespass was imposed on her, after which she
was sent to Tihar Jail. After she was released, Naresh soon died due to his injuries and the fever and
pneumonitis those injuries had caused. The report submitted by Puran Singh, Inspector, Crime Branch Delhi
stated that the whole incident was a high-level conspiracy to get the tenants out of the house.
The instant writ petitions were moved to the Supreme Court. The writ demanded exemplary damages for the
death of Naresh.
Issues
 Whether the Delhi Administration can be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of the Delhi
Police.
Judgement
The bench, Justice B.C. Ray and Justice Ratnavel Pandian, found that it is settled law that the State is
responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. Thus, the Delhi Administration was responsible for the tort
committed by the S.H.O, Lal Singh. This verdict concurred with the opinion given in Joginder Kaur v. Punjab
State (1969 ACJ 28) and State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati (1962 Supp (2) SCR 989) where the Court said that
State must be held vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of its employees and must pay damages. The Court
also pointed out the verdict in People’s Union of Democratic Rights v. Police Commissioner, Delhi
Headquarters; where the Court gave the family of a laborer, who was beaten at the hands of Delhi Police
officers, compensation worth Rs 50,000.
The Court awarded Kamlesh Kumari an amount of Rs. 75,000 which had to be paid by the Delhi
Administration for battery, assault, false imprisonment, physical injuries, and death. The Court said that the
damages for assault, battery and false imprisonment are largely for the mental pain, distress, indignity, loss of
liberty and death. The Delhi Administration was also allowed to recover the cost of the damages from the
officers found responsible. Since the police officers were not there before the bench, the Court ordered that no
observation in the case can be used for the criminal case against the officers.
This case shows that although administrative and, law and order functionaries may fail to do their duties and at
time outright abuse their power, the Courts will take notice of the same and provide the necessary relief for
those that have suffered.

Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain vs
The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 29 September, 1964. Equivalent citations: 1965 AIR 1039, 1965 SCR (1)
375
The Common Law maxim “Rex Non-Potest Peccare” (The King can do no wrong) and the rule that the
Crown was not answerable for the torts committed by its servants hold no good in the Indian system of
governance. The democratic and federal structure develops interaction between the State and the citizens of
India, may it be in the form of trading with government companies, or interacting with the public authorities
such as the police, or the bureaucrats, etc. and this interaction makes it crucial that the State should be made
liable for the acts of its officers, committed in the course of conduct which may cause harm to any of the
citizens.
Ralia Ram was one of its partners of a firm which dealt in bullion and other goods at Amritsar. It was duly
registered under the Indian Partnership Act. On the 20th of September, 1947 Ralia Ram arrived at Meerut by
the Frontier Mail to sell gold, silver, and other goods in the Meerut market. Whilst he was passing through the
Chaupla Bazaar with this object, he was taken into custody by three police constables. His belongings were
then searched and he was taken to the Kotwali Police Station. He was detained in the police lock-up there and
his belongings were seized from him and kept in police custody. Then he was released on bail, and sometime
thereafter the silver seized from him was returned to him. Ralia Ram made repeated demands for the return of
the gold but he could not recover the gold from the police officers, he filed the present suit against the
respondent in which he claimed a decree that the gold seized from him should either be returned to him or in
the alternative, its value should be ordered to be paid to him. The alternative claim thus made by him consisted
of Rs. 11,075-10-0 as the price of the gold and Rs. 355 as interest by way of damages as well as future interest.
It was urged by the respondents that they were not liable to return either the gold, or to pay its money value as
the gold in question had been taken into custody by one Mohammad Amir, who was then the Head Constable,
and it had been kept in the police Malkhana under his charge. Mohd. Amir, however, misappropriated the gold
and fled away to Pakistan soon thereafter. He had also misappropriated some other cash and articles deposited
in the Malkhana before he left India. The respondent further alleged that a case under section 409 of the Indian
Penal Code as well as s. 29 of the Police Act had been registered against Mohd. Amir, but he had not been
apprehended. Alternatively, it was pleaded by the respondent that this was not a case of negligence of the
police officers and that even if negligence was held proved against the said police officers, the respondent
State could not be said to be liable for the loss resulting from such negligence.
The trial court gave judgment in favor of the appellant and since the gold in question could not be ordered to
be returned to the appellant, a decree was passed in its favor for Rs. 11,430-10-0.
The respondent challenged the correctness of this decree by an appeal before the Allahabad High Court and it
was urged on its behalf that the trial Court was in error regarding both the findings recorded by it in favor of
the appellant. These pleas have been upheld by the High Court. It was found that no negligence had been
established against the police officers in question and that even if it was assumed that the police officers were
negligent and their negligence led to the loss of gold, that would not justify the appellant’s claim for a money
decree against the respondent. The appellant then moved to the Supreme Court by an appeal. They urged that
the High Court was in error in both the findings recorded by it in favor of the respondent. The first finding is
one of fact and the second is one of law.
Issues
Two substantial questions arose between the parties:
 One was the question of finding whether the police officers in question were guilty of negligence in
the matter of taking care of the gold which had been seized from Ralia Ram.
 And the second was the question of law that whether the respondent, State of Uttar Pradesh should be
held liable to compensate the appellant for the loss caused to it by the negligence of the public
servants employed by the respondent.
Judgement
The Supreme Court in the present case, after considering all the evidence and appeals rose from the side of
appellants, observed that “The powers to arrest a person, to search him, to seize property found with him, are
powers conferred on specified officers by statute and are powers which could be properly characterized as
sovereign powers. Therefore, though the negligent act was committed by the employees of the respondent-
State during their employment, the claim against the State could not be sustained, because, the employment in
question was of the category which could claim the special characteristic of sovereign power.”
Further justifying the reasons given by the High Court in the decision said that on the basis that the act which
gave rise to the claim for damages had been done by a public servant who was authorized by a statute to
exercise his powers, and the discharge of the said function can be referred to the delegation of the sovereign
power of the State, and as such the criminal act which gave rise to the action, could not validly sustain a claim
for damages against the State. It will thus be clear that the basic principle enunciated by Peacock C. J. in 1861
has been consistently followed by judicial decisions in dealing with the question about the State’s liability in
respect of negligent or tortious acts committed by public servants employed by the State.
Recalling the decision in the Vidhyawati case, this court stated that, in dealing with such cases, it must be
borne in mind that when the State pleads immunity against claims damages resulting from injury caused by
negligent acts of its servants, the area of employment referable to sovereign powers must be strictly
determined. Before such a plea is upheld, the Court must always find that the impugned act was committed in
the course of an undertaking or employment which is referable to the exercise of sovereign power or the
exercise of delegated sovereign power; and in the Vidhyawati case, the alleged actions could not claim such a
status. The employment of a driver to drive the jeep car for the use of a civil servant is itself an activity that is
not connected in any manner with the sovereign power of the State at all. That is the basis on which the
decision must be deemed to have been founded; and it is this basis which is absent in the case before us.
Taking a narrow view of the basis on which the area of the state immunity against such claims must be limited,
the court observed that “The Governments of the States, as well as the Government of India, naturally and
legitimately enter into many commercial and other undertakings and activities which have no relation with the
traditional concept of Governmental activities in which the exercise of sovereign power is involved. It is
necessary to limit the area of these affairs of the State about the exercise of sovereign power so that if acts are
committed by Government employees about other activities which may be conveniently described as non-
governmental or non-sovereign, citizens who have a cause of action for damages should not be precluded from
making their claim against the State.“

Liability of the State for the torts committed by its servants is based on three principles:

1. Respondeat superior (let the principal be liable.)

2. Quifacit per alium facit per se (he who acts through another does it himself).

3. Socialisation of Compensation.
The principle of vicarious liability of the state was used in Kasturilal vs. State of UP . Kasturilal Ralia
Ram Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh case talks about State liability for tortious acts of its servants which
is based on Article 300(1) of Constitution of India.
Vicarious liability is a form of strict, secondary liability that arises under the common law doctrine of
agency – respondeat superior – the responsibility of the superior for the acts of their subordinate, or, in
a broader sense, the responsibility of any third party that had the "right, ability or duty to control" the
activities of a violator. The liability is placed, not on the tortfeasor, but rather on someone who is
supposed to have control over the tortfeasor.
The most common form of vicarious liability that we come across is the liability arising out of a ‘Master
– Servant’ relationship. This is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR"
(in which the MASTER - the archaic term for an employer - must respond for the torts of its
SERVANTS - the archaic term for employees). The principle says that a master is jointly and severely
liable for any tort committed by his servant while acting in the course of his employment.
Sovereign functions are those actions of the state for which it is not answerable in any court of law. For
instance, acts such as defence of the country, raising and maintaining armed forces, making peace or
war, foreign affairs, acquiring and retaining territory, are functions which are indicative of external
sovereignty and are political in nature. Therefore, they are not amenable to jurisdiction of ordinary civil
court. The State is immune from being sued, as the jurisdiction of the courts in such matters is impliedly
barred.

Explain and discuss the facts and principles of law laid down in the case of N.Nagendra Rao & Co vs
State Of A.P on 6 September, 1994. Equivalent citations: 1994 AIR 2663, 1994 SCC (6) 205
Facts:
In this case, the appellant N. Nagendra & Co. carried on a business in fertiliser and foodgrains under licence
issued by the appropriate authorities. Its premises were visited by the Police Inspector, Vigilance Cell and huge
stocks of fertilisers, foodgrains and even non-essential goods were seized. On the report submitted by the
Inspector, the District Revenue Officer in exercise of powers under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities
Act, 1955 Act directed the fertiliser to be placed in the custody of Assistant Agricultural Officer for
distribution to needy and the foodgrains and non- essential goods in the custody of Tehsildar for disposing it
off immediately and depositing the sale proceeds in the Treasury. The AAO did not take any steps to dispose
of the fertiliser. The appellant made application that since no steps were being taken the fertiliser shall
deteriorate and shall be rendered useless causing huge loss to him. Request was made for diverting the
fertiliser either to the places mentioned by the appellant as the demand was more there or to release it in his
favour for disposal and deposit of the sale price. But neither any order was passed by the DRO nor any action
was taken by the AAO. In the meanwhile, the appellant’s licence was cancelled. After repeated requests, the
collector ordered that the goods be returned to the appellants. However, the AAO did not comply with the
orders. After repeated consultations with various minsters, when the appellants finally obtained the stock, it
was spoiled both in quality and quantity.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the present case, the non-disposal of the goods seized under various control orders issued under the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 caused a loss to the appellants. The trial court held that the state while
performing its duty under a statute has been negligent and issued a decree for the payment of a total value of
Rs.1,06,125 towards the damaged stock with interest thereon at the rate of 6% . However, this order was struck
down by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which decided the case on the ratio of Kasturilal case. The
appellants appealed against the High Court judgement and thus, approached the Supreme Court. The High
Court granted certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India as the case involved “substantial
questions of law, of general importance.”
The issues under consideration in this case were:
 Whether the employees of the state were negligent in disposing the goods.
 Whether the seizure of the goods in exercise of statutory powers under the said Act immunises the
State, completely, from any loss or damage suffered by the owner.
The Supreme Court examined in depth the various principles of law and dealt with the concept of sovereign
immunity in detail. The issue of whether the employees of the state were negligent in disposing the goods is
one question that had to be proven on the basis of facts. Once the court was convinced that the state’s
employees were negligent, the issue that next arose was whether the state must be held vicariously liable for
the acts of its employees.
The issue was looked into in the light of the principle of sovereign immunity. The state seized the goods under
a statue and if this function can be said to be a sovereign function performed by the state.
To analyse the case, a concurrent reading of Vidhyawati and Kasturilal is called for.
CONCLUSION
In the case of N. Nagendra Rao, the Supreme Court upheld the view in Vidyawati case and distinguished
Kasturilal. The court held that barring functions such as administration of justice, maintenance of law
and order and repression of crime etc. which are among the primary and inalienable functions of a
constitutional Government, the State cannot claim any immunity. The act of seizure of goods for the
public interests is under the welfare state functions and not under the primary functions.
With respect to the principle of vicarious liability, it was held that if the officers can be sued personally for
negligence and misfeasance in discharge of public, there is no rationale for the proposition that even if the
officer is liable the State cannot be sued. Now, since the doctrine has become outdated and sovereignty rests
with the people, the state cannot claim any immunity. Thus, the State of Andhra Pradesh was directed to
pay the appellants the amount as decided by the trial court with costs.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India,
AIR 1958 SC 36.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs Union Of India on 1 November, 1957
Equivalent citations: 1958 AIR 36, 1958 SCR 828
Background:
The Parshotam Lal Dhingra case is related to Service law Jurisprudence of India. The case covers the
interpretation of Articles 310 and 311 of the Indian Constitution related to persons serving under the Union or
State. In the instant case, the Appellant ranking was reduced from Class II post to Class III due to the adverse
remarks contained in the report were revealed. Later, the question evolved was whether Article 311(2)
provides safeguards to employees in case of reduction in ranking or not.
Facts:
 In 1924 the appellant joined the railway services as a Signaller. As a result of selection, he was
promoted as Section Controller in 1942 and then as Deputy Chief Controller in 1950, all the three post
belongs to III Class Railway Services. Later, appellant Mr. Parshotam Lal as Officiating Chief
controller was appointed for II Class Railway service category and took charge of the post from Shri
Ram.
 Later, Sri Gauri Shankar, S.S.T.E.I. Head Quarters, made an adverse remark in Sri Dingra’s secret
character book which was endorsed by one high Officer on the basis of which General Manager
(Railway) Sri. Karnail Singh had reduced the appellant rank to its previous post which was under
Class III category and said his reduction would not affect his further promotion.
 Further, Appellant made an appeal to the General Manager for reconsideration of his order but his
appeal was dismissed.
 In the meantime, the appellant filed a writ petition under article 226 in the Punjab High Court. Where
court held that, reduction in rank of applicant is a kind of punishment and he was not given proper
opportunity of being heard, hence his appeal was admitted and his reduction in rank was declared
illegal. Against the judgment of High Court, respondent made an appeal before the bench Divisional
who dissented with the decree and said such reduction is permissible. Later, the appeal in for SLP was
presented before Supreme Court for reconsideration of the decision made by the Punjab High Court.
Issues involved:
 Whether the reduction in rank of Parshotam Lal Dhingra was according to the provisions of Article
310 and 311 of the Constitution?
 Whether the appellant was competent person for the post?
Related provisions:
 Article 310 of the Indian Constitution- Tenure of office of a person serving the Union or the State
 Article 311 of the Indian Constitution- Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed
in civil capacities under the Union or the State
 Article 311(1)- No civil servant is to be dismissed or removed by an authority by which he was
appointed.[i]
 Article 3112)- Provides, that no civil servant can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except
after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and must be given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.
Judgement:
 In accordance with the opinion of the majority, court held that although Parshotam Dhingra was
working as an officiating Assistant Controller Railway Telegraph, hence he is not entitled to get the
protection of Article 311 because the provisions are for the civil servants who are permanently
employed in certain posts[x]. Thus, protection is not for officiating post who just perform the
prescribe duty. Moreover, the appellant had no right to continue in that post, as the term of such
appointment was based on terminable notice given by the government; therefore, his reduction did not
operate as there is no forfeiture of any right and could be prescribed a reduction in rank by way of
punishment. Also, his reduction does not amount to dismissal as the chance of promotion was asserted
by the General Manager. Thus, it is concluded that appellant was not reduced in rank by way of
punishment and therefore, the protection of Article 311(2) does not apply in the case.
 In the minority opinion stated that the protection given under Article 311 should not be limited within
some rules and regulation but it should be seen that such reduction in rank is due to some punishment
and should come under the protection clause.
 As a result, the appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi:
 The appointment of a Government servant to a permanent post may be substantive or on officiating
basis and must be entitled to hold a lien on the post conferred.
 Article 310 covers only those persons who are permanent members of the specified services or who do
not hold permanent post therein, do not hold their respective offices during the pleasure of the
President and the Governor, as the case may be. Article 310(1), has adopted the English Common law
rule called Doctrine of Pleasure.
 Further, Article 311 is limited to persons who are permanent members of the service or who hold
permanent civil post, then the constitutional protection given by clause (1) and (2) will not extend to
persons who officiate in a permanent post or in a temporary post and consequently such person will be
liable to be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to which they were appointed. Further,
people who are merely officiating in the posts cannot be said to ‘hold’ the post, as they only perform
the duties of those posts. Also, Article 311 is a restriction on doctrine of pleasure.
Concepts highlighted:
 The English ‘doctrine of pleasure’ adopted from common law principle is limited by provisions of
Article 311 of the Constitution
 Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution apply to permanent service holder of the post and for an
officiating post.
 To seek the protection of Article 311 it is an essential condition that the person must be competent
person of the post and must hold the post as specified.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in Managing Director Ecil vs B. Karunakar (Ii)
on 12 January, 1994. Equivalent citations: 1994 SCC, Supl. (2) 391
JUDGMENT:

ORDER

1.This appeal is posted before us pursuant to the opinion rendered by the Constitution Bench in Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar1. In this case, the respondent was an Engineer working in the
ECIL. He was charged with passing of a spurious EC. T.V. as one made by the Electronics Corporation
(employer) under the brand name 'Ajanta'. On the basis of the complaint made by the purchaser, an inquiry was
instituted against the respondent. At the conclusion of the inquiry, he was dismissed from service by the
Corporation by its order dated 27-4-1987. The respondent challenged the same by way of a writ petition in the
High Court. The ground taken by him in the writ petition was that the complainant, Shri RajKumar was not
tendered for cross-examination though his testimony was relied upon by the Corporation and the Enquiry
Officer against him. The learned Single Judge negatived the same by holding that while it is true that the said
witness was not tendered for cross-examination by the respondent, it cannot be said to have prejudiced him
inasmuch as he has obtained an affidavit from the said person retracting his earlier statement. The learned
Single Judge remarked that even if the witness had been tendered for cross-examination, he could not have
made more beneficial statements than those contained in the said affidavit in favour of the respondent. The
learned Single Judge, evidently with a view to satisfy himself as to the truth of the charges, noted the essential
features of the case against the respondent and held that the defence put forward by the respondent was rightly
rejected. Accordingly, he dismissed the writ petition. The respondent thereupon filed a writ appeal wherein he
urged, for the first time that the enquiry report not having been supplied to him, the enquiry is vitiated. Indeed,
this appears to be (1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704: JT (1993) 6 sc 1 the only
point urged in the appeal. The Division Bench purporting to follow the decision of this Court in Union of India
v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan', allowed the appeal and made the following observation: "We make it clear that the
respondent is at liberty to continue the inquiry against the appellant from the stage not held to be vitiated." A
further observation was made that the Corporation may consider whether it is just, expedient and worthwhile to
proceed with the inquiry at this distance of time. It is against the said judgment that the present appeal was
preferred and actually this was the leading case in which the opinion of the Constitution Bench was rendered.
It has been held by the Constitution Bench that the principles of natural justice do require that a copy of the
enquiry report is supplied to the charged officer though it is not necessary to give him a notice indicating the
proposed penalty. But, it has been held, this requirement will be held obligatory only from the date of the
judgment in Ramzan Khan case 2, viz., 20-11-1990. In this case, it may be noted, the order of dismissal of the
respondent is far earlier to the said date. In the circumstances, the dismissal order cannot be said to be vitiated
by nonfurnishing of the Enquiry Officer's report. So far as the merits are concerned, the only contention urged
before the Single Judge was in our opinion, rightly repelled and, therefore, there is no ground for interference
with the order of dismissal.

2.In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside
and the order of learned Single Judge is restored.

3.It is brought to our notice that pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench, the respondent was restored
to service and that he was also paid 50% of the back wages. Shri H.N. Salve, learned counsel for the
Corporation fairly stated that the Corporation is not interested in recovering the back wages already paid nor is
it going to make a claim with respect to emoluments paid for the period the respondent served subsequent to
the order of the Division Bench of the High Court.

4. There shall be no order as to costs.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay vs M/S
Abdulbhai Faizullabhai & Ors on 10 March, 1976. Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 1455, 1976
SCR (3) 591.
Facts of the case:
The facts of the case are based in a locality in Bombay called Nag Devi. In the neighbourhood with a
population of about 5000, a considerable number of the locality members were working in hardware stores.
Most businesses had less than the statutorily mandated number of workmen. An association of hardware store
employers and a union of workmen was formed as a result of this density of businesses and for the protection
of worker’s rights and collective bargaining power. The well-maintained relationship between the workmen
and the employers manifested itself in ex gratia payments for many years up until 1965. The annual payment
of this bonus had been rooted as a right in the minds of these workers. However, in the year 1965, the
employers decided to stop the payments and as a response, the workmen claimed a right to bonus. To settle the
dispute, a Board of Arbitrators was set up under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act to arbitrate upon
twelve demands, including 4 months’ wages as bonus, put forward by the union of workmen, Mumbai Kamgar
Sabha. This demand was rejected and the union’s continuous efforts led to conciliation. The intervention by
the Deputy Commissioner of Labour did not change the mindset of the employers and the demand for
bonus/dispute was eventually referred to an Industrial Tribunal which in limine dismissed the workers’
demand as being barred by res judicata, in view of the decision of the Arbitration Board.
The Tribunal in addition. held that bonus so far paid having been founded on tradition and custom, did not fall
within the four-corners of the Bonus Act which is a complete code and came to the conclusion that the workers
were not entitled bonus.
Summary of the decision and judgment

Issue 1: The Union has locus standi

Article 226 has been viewed from a narrow perspective, for the assertion of individual rights alone. This
traditional view was changed with this judgment to address collective grievances. Being an industrial dispute,
the role of the union was merely for the purpose of representing the common issues faced by the workmen.
The counsel for the Appellants argued that Section 36(1) and (4) of the Act, Rules 29 and 36 of the Central
Rules under the Act and Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act recognizes the capacity of unions. Indeed,
organized labour inevitably calls for unionization. The appeal was hence regarded as one by the workmen
impleaded through the union.
Issue 2: Payment of Customary Bonus within the Bonus Act
In cases of customary or traditional payments, it is necessary to examine whether the payment has been
consistently paid for a long period, independent of earning profits, at a uniform rate. The Bonus Act is
comprehensive and no kind of bonus can gain legal recognition if it falls outside the scope of the Act. The
payments in question are customary and were part of the terms of the employment. Indeed, the Act being a
complete code would include this kind of payment as well.
The plea by the respondents that the payments were profit-based was rejected as the real foundation of the
right to bonus claimed by the workmen was directly attributable to custom, usage and condition of service. The
fact that the hardware stores were largely profitable does not imply that the payment of bonus was based on
earning profits. Moreover, with respect to uniformity, the quantum of profits and bonus vary from
establishment to establishment. Hence, uniformity cannot be expected from the point of view of the
conglomerate of stores. The appellants’ contention that uniform conditions of service must be applied was
rejected. It is pertinent to note that ex gratia payments for the period before the Bonus Act were admitted by
the respondents.
The Counsel for the respondents contended that customary bonus has been linked to festivals according to
precedents of the Court. Contrary to this, the Court was satisfied that the omission to mention a festival does
not detract the claim of customary bonus. The Court relied on Management of Churakulam Tea Estate v.
Workmen, M/s. Ispahani Ltd. v. Employees’ Union and Management of Bombay Co. Ltd. v.
Workmen to establish the root of customary bonus.
To understand the scope of the Act, the Court examined the Full Bench formula in Jalan Trading Co. Pvt.
Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union, the Commission Report and the pattern of bonus prevalent in the industry,
which ultimately converged to the conclusion that the purpose of the payment of Bonus Act was to regulate
profit-based bonus, with incidental incursions into other claims like customary bonus. The Court decided that
the Bonus Act primarily deals with profit-based bonus, but other related claims such as customary bonus are
not considered void.There is no categorical provision in the Bonus Act nullifying all other kinds of bonuses,
nor does such a conclusion arise by necessary implication.
Establishments employing less than 20 workers are excluded under the Act and the appellants fell outside the
grace of the statute for this reason alone. The Court reiterated that the gravitational pull of the judicial
construction of Part IV of the Constitution influenced their decision. The judgment in Ghewar Chand leaves
room for the non-statutory play of customary bonus. While the ruling of a superior court is binding, certain
observations, generalizations and sub-silentio determinations must be judiciously examined.
Issue 3: Plea of res judicata rejected
The plea of constructive res judicata is based on the ‘might and ought’ doctrine. The extension of this doctrine
to industrial law has been met with some doubt. Industrial law is typically governed by conciliation,
adjudication and methodologies of peaceful industrial relations, where collective bargaining and pragmatic
justice claim precedence over formalized rules based on individual contests, specific causes of action and
findings.
The dangers of constructive res judicata are to be noted with respect to writ petitions under Article 226. The
Court held that the Bonus Act does not bar claims to customary bonus or those based on usages and conditions
of service. The claim was initially rejected due to legal bars however, being the wings of justice; the judiciary
must move past these bars and decide cases based on merits
Dismissing the appeal.

Analysis:
This landmark judgment not only laid an essential precedent in industrial law, but it also paved the way for
Public Interest Litigations that can be initiated by groups with common grievances. The payment of bonus has
been recognized as a legal right and as a means to maintain industrial peace and progress. The bone of
contention in this matter was whether the Bonus Act excludes the payment of customary bonus. The Court
analyzed this against the industrial standards and in tune with the developments. Ultimately, it was his concern
over protecting the constitutional mandate for the welfare of workers that led Justice Krishna Iyer to adjudge
the case in favour of the appellants. For weaker societal segments, the law will fail them if deficiencies creep
into pleadings. He placed importance on pursuing the best course to justice and seeing the bigger picture rather
than focusing on procedural shortcomings. There is not much difficulty in recognizing customary bonus under
industrial law, given that proper averments and sufficient proof is available.
Bonus is a word of many connotations. Traditional bonus has its emergence from long, continued usage and
has manifested into a right. It acts as a gesture of goodwill and maintains industrial peace and harmony. From
the perspective of industrial law jurisprudence, the Bonus Act does not operate as a bar to different species of
the claim. Where two judicial choices are available to a judge, between the construction in conformity and the
social philosophy of Part IV, the latter is given preference. The case was decided based on proper legal
reasoning, a deep understanding of the history behind the enactment, and the underlying purpose of the Act.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in Ashok Kumar Pandey vs The State Of West
Bengal on 18 November, 2003.
This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short 'the Constitution') has been filed
purportedly in public interest. The prayer in the writ petition is to the effect that the death sentence imposed
on one Dhananjay Chatterjee @ Dhana (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused'. Dhananjoy Chatterjee
was the first person who was judicially executed in India in the 21st century for murder. The execution
by hanging took place in Alipore Jail, Kolkata, on 14 August 2004. He was charged in 1990 for the
crimes of rape and murder of Hetal Parekh, a 15-year-old school-girl. ) by the Sessions Court, Alipur,
West Bengal, affirmed by the Calcutta High Court and this Court, needs to be converted to a life sentence
because there has been no execution of the death sentence for a long time.
It was observed as follows:
"It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will
alone have as locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering
from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political
motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL, brought before the
Court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold".
Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary
has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested
interest and/ or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon is the armory or law for
delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be
used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public
injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to
see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for
personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must now
allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the
pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are
actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be
thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.
Based on the above backgrounds, we do not think this a fit case which can be entertained and that too,
under Article 32 of the Constitution and is accordingly dismissed, but without costs.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in Narmada Bachao Andolan vs State Of M.P.
& Anr on 11 May, 2011.
Civil Appeal No.2082 of 2011(Appellant:Narmada Bachao Andolan and Respondents: State of M.P.) with
Civil Appeal Nos.2083-2097 of 2011(Appellants: State of M.P. and Respondents: Narmada Bachao Andolan)
Civil Appeal Nos. 2098-2112 of 2011(Appellant: Narmada Hydro-Development Corporation and
Respondents: Narmada Bachao Andolan) with Civil Appeal No. 2115 of 2011(Appellants: State of M.P. and
Respondents: Narmada Bachao Andolan)

Civil Appeal No. 2116 of 2011(Appellant: Narmada Hydro-Development Corporation and Respondents:
Narmada Bachao Andolan)
All these appeals relate to the establishment of the Omkareshwar Dam on the Narmada river in Madhya
Pradesh. As these appeals are inter-connected and have been filed against interim orders passed by the
High Court in the same writ petition, they have been heard together and disposed of by a common
judgment.
However, for convenience Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116 of 2011 are dealt with first.
These appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 21.2.2008 passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 4457 of 2007, `Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of
Madhya Pradesh & Anr.', wherein the High Court as an interim measure, has issued directions, inter-alia, for
allotment of agricultural land to the displaced persons in lieu of the land acquired for construction of the dam
in terms of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (hereinafter called as `R & R Policy') as amended on
3.7.2003. The High Court direction applied even to those oustees who had already withdrawn the
compensation, if such oustees opt for such land and refund 50% of the compensation amount received by them.
The balance cost of the allotted land would be deposited by the allottees in 20 equal yearly installments as
stipulated in clause (5.3) of the R & R Policy, and to treat a major son of the family whose land has been
acquired as a separate family for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land.
Case Brief: The Omkareshwar dam is one of the large dams being constructed in the Narmada valley. 30 villages
and nearly 8000 families are affected by this dam. The dam is being constructed by the NHDC (Narmada Hydro-
Development Corporation) – which is a joint venture of the State Government and the Central Government
undertaking – the NHPC. On the 28th of March 2007, the State Government permitted
filling of the reservoir. It was to prevent a large-scale disaster of submergence of thousands
of families without proper rehabilitation and resettlement and the flagrant violation of the R&R Policy by the
GOMP and the Project authorities that the Narmada Bachao Andolan approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court
on the 30th of March 2007 and obtained a stay on reservoir filling. The Supreme Court later permitted reservoir
filling up to 189 meters but no further, and directed that the High Court to decide the matter on merits.
The High Court stated that it is a fundamental right of the oustees under Article 21 of the Constitution to be made
better-off after displacement. The High Court held that the oustees may be made better-off by various means,
whether by the allotment of land, or employment, or other schemes. However, the High Court held that "If the
Government assures land, but later does not offer land, it will be the duty of the Court to enforce the right". The
Madhya Pradesh High Court directed that every farmer, encroacher, and adult son of farmer must be provided
agricultural land for land with a minimum allotment of 5 acres of irrigated land, as per the R&R Plan, R&R Policy
and GOI approvals. The High Court also directed that every adult son of such cultivator must be also allotted such
land, even if he is not a titleholder. The bench also directed that the present water level of 189 meters cannot be
raised until the R&R of all the oustees of the project including the allotment of land is completed. The High Court
also directed the State overnment to pay Rs. 10,000 to the petitioner – the Narmada Bachao Andolan as
costs.
The High Court directed that all other grievances such as non-inclusion of houses, persons and denial of other grants
may be taken to the Grievance Redressal Authority (GRA) by the 31st of March 2008, and the GRA would have to
decide the same by the 14th of June 2008.
Facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are as follows:
(A) The Narmada river starts at Amarkantak. It flows through Madhya Pradesh for 1077 km, then forms a
common boundary in Maharashtra for 74 km (35 km with MP and 39 km with Maharashtra) and then passes
through Gujarat for 161 km before meeting the Arabian Sea after a total length of 1312 km. The Narmada
Water Disputes Tribunal apportioned the water in the Narmada between Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat,
Maharashtra and Rajasthan, subject to review after 45 years.
(B) The State of Madhya Pradesh, conducted a survey in 1955 for the establishment of hydro-power projects in
the Narmada basin at different sites including Barwaha (Omkareshwar Project). In 1983, Narmada Valley
Development (Irrigation) Department (hereinafter called NVD) was set up and further studies were conducted
for the establishment of hydro-power projects.
(C) The Omkareshwar Dam - an intra-state project for generating 520 mega watts of power, which also
involved the irrigation of 1.47 lakh hectares of agricultural land, was approved by the State Government, with
an assessment that on the completion of the project, 30 villages would be submerged at the full reservoir level
i.e. 196.60 mtrs.
(D) The Government of Madhya Pradesh framed a rehabilitation and resettlement policy in 1985 (hereinafter
called `R & R Policy') for the oustees of all the Narmada projects in the State. The said policy was amended
from time to time as is evident from the R & R Policies dated: 9th June, 1987; 5th September, 1989; 7th June,
1991; and 27th August 1993.
The said policy provided for the allotment of a minimum of 2 hectares of agricultural land; irrigation facilities
at government cost;
grant-in-aid for small and marginal farmers and SC/ST families; and to meet the entire cost of the allotted land.
The policy further provided that the allotment of agricultural land would be carried out much in advance,
before dam construction reached crest level. The land required for allotment would be procured in the common
area from the farmers having holdings of more than 4 hectares of land.
The State authorities obtained environmental clearance for the Omkareshwar project from the Ministry of
Environment and Forest on 13.10.1993. The Ministry of Welfare granted clearance on 8.10.1993. The
Planning Commission also granted clearance on condition of compliance with welfare and environmental
clearances vide order dated 25.5.2001.
The Central Electricity Authority accorded techno-economic clearance under the provisions of Electricity
(Supply) Act, 1948 on 24.7.2001. The Government of India approved and granted financial concurrence from
Public Investment Board of the Planning Commission for this project on 17.5.2002. Forest clearance was
granted on 20.8.2004 under the provisions of Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 for the
diversion of 5829 hectares of forest lands. Therefore, there had been various statutory and non-statutory
clearances from the authorities.
(E) The R & R Policy further stood amended on 3.7.2003, to the effect that agricultural land would be offered
to the oustees "as far as possible"; and not to those who would make application in writing to receive
compensation for their acquired land.
(F) Construction of the Omkareshwar dam began in 2002 and stood completed in October, 2006. A large
number of families had been uprooted on construction of the dam upto its 190 mtrs. height. For the dam site, a
huge area of land had been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called
as `Act 1894').
The displaced persons were allegedly not offered the land under the R & R Policy, as amended on 3.7.2003,
rather compensation for their land was deposited in their accounts.
(G) Narmada Bachao Andolan, respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as `NBA'), an action group, had been
espousing the grievances of displaced persons by filing Public Interest Litigations (hereinafter called `PIL')
before the High Court/further to this Court from time to time and a large number of orders had been passed by
the courts to redress the grievances of the oustees. When the decision was taken to raise the height of the dam,
NBA filed writ petition No.4457 of 2007 before the High Court seeking a number of reliefs, inter-alia, to stop
all eviction; directions for serving of life supplies such as drinking water and electricity; not to take any other
coercive measures, to stop closure of the radial gates of the Omkareshwar dam above crest level of EL 179.60
M; and to stop the blocking of the sluice gates below crest level, until all Project Affected Families (hereinafter
called `PAFs') were rehabilitated as per the R & R Policy. Further reliefs sought included the issuance of
appropriate directions for an assessment by the Grievance Redressal Authority (hereinafter called `GRA') for
the Omkareshwar Project of the status of relief and rehabilitation of the oustees affected at Full Reservoir
Level (hereinafter called `FRL') and Back Water Level (hereinafter called `BWL') within a stipulated period.
(H) During the pendency of the writ petition in pursuance of the orders passed by the High Court from time to
time, a large number of reports/interim reports were furnished by the authorities concerned. The High Court
after considering the said reports and submissions advanced on behalf of the parties passed the impugned
judgment and order dated 21.2.2008. The High Court issued a large number of directions as interim measures,
including the direction for allotment of land in lieu of land acquired and to treat the major sons of the family,
as independent families for the purpose of allotment of agricultural land. Hence, these appeals.
CONCLUSIONS/RESULT:
(i) Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116/2011 filed by the State of M.P. and NHDC These appeals involved two issues
namely, (i) allotment of land in lieu of land acquired; and (ii) entitlement of major son to get the allotment of
land as a separate family. So far as the first issue is concerned, in respect of the same, we hold that in view of
the provisions contained in R & R Policy, the State Authorities are under an obligation to allot the land to the
oustees "as far as possible". In case an oustee has not accepted the compensation/SRG or has any grievance in
respect of area/quality/location of land allotted or for any other entitlement, he may approach the GRA and the
GRA will adjudicate upon the issue and pass an appropriate order in individual cases after giving an
opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned. Needless to say, the person aggrieved by the order of GRA
shall be entitled to approach the High Court for appropriate relief.
However, in case of private person, the application/petition would be in the name of that individual person
duly supported by his affidavit.
So far as the issue of entitlement of major son for allotment of land as a separate family is concerned, our
conclusion is in the negative. In other words, there is no such entitlement.

Civil Appeal No.2082 of 2011 filed by the Appellant:Narmada Bachao Andolan involved three issues namely
(i) entitlement of land to the landless labourers; (ii) applicability of NWDT Award in the Omkareshwar dam
project; and (iii) entitlement of allotment of land to the oustees of five villages already submerged. Our
conclusion in respect of Issue Nos. (i) & (ii) is in the negative. However, on Issue No.(iii), the oustees shall be
entitled for the relief as given to the oustees on Issue No. (i) in Civil Appeal Nos. 2115-2116/2011.

Civil Appeal Nos. 2083-2097/2011 and 2098-2112/2011 These appeals have been preferred by the State of
M.P. and NHDC in respect of acquisition of land of five villages, wherein the State wants to withdraw the
acquisition proceedings. Our conclusion is that in the fact-situation of the case, the State is entitled to abandon
the land acquisition proceedings in exercise of its power under Section 48 of the Act 1894. However, it shall
not apply to 167 dwelling units on the said land. Such persons whose dwelling units are acquired shall be
entitled for the benefit of R & R Policy to the extent provided therein. The State shall establish the roads etc.
after raising the height of the Bandh as proposed by the Authorities.

What do you understand by term administrative discretion?

Discretion, in its literal sense, means choosing amongst the various available alternatives. However in terms of
administrative law, administrative discretion means choosing from amongst the various available alternatives
but keeping in view law, rules of reason and justice and not according to personal whims. Administrative
discretion is a means to get the aim of welfare state. India also had adopted the welfare concept. So the power
of administrative discretion had also conferred for administrative officers. Administrative discretion was given
to get the inclusive growth. t is necessary for individualization of the administrative power. Any intensive
form of government cannot function without the exercise of some discretion by the officials.
The West Encyclopedia of American Law has defined Administrative Discretion as “The exercise of
professional expertise and judgment, as opposed to strictadherence to regulations or statutes, in making a
decision or performing official acts or duties. Administrative discretion provides space for creativeness within
administrative spheres and in actions of public authorities. That is, when using discretionary authority,
officials must take into account the social interest.
In public administration, administrative discretion refers to the flexible exercising of judgment and decision
making allowed to public administrators. Regulatory agencies have the power to exercise this type of
discretion in their day-to-day activities, and there have been cases where regulatory agencies have abused this
power. Administrative law can help these agencies get on the path of following regulations, serve the public,
and in turn, a reflection of the public's values and beliefs.
There is a need for administrative law because the interest of public could be at risk if various agencies were
not following laws and regulations. Administrative law is important because without it, it could lead to
arbitrary and unreasonable use of such discretion, which may lead to destruction of basic principles of
administrative law. Although this type of discretion isn't laid out in the job-description of a bureaucrat/public
servant, it is necessary because citizens use these bureaucratic institutions every day; such as the D.M.V. ,
public schooling, and numerous others. Street-level bureaucrats have to deal with the provision of service
as well as translating vaguely worded mandates into specific cohesive and comprehensive language to organize
protocol.
Administrative discretion allows agencies to use professional expertise and judgment when making decisions
or performing official duties, as opposed to only adhering to strict regulations or statuses. For example, a
public official has administrative discretion when he or she has the freedom to make a choice among potential
courses of action. The failure to exercise reasonable judgment or discretion is abuse of discretion.

State the facts and principles of law laid down in The Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs J.M.
Muhammad Ismail Rowther on 6 February, 1940. Equivalent citations: (1940) 1 MLJ 639.
JUDGMENT by Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.
History: The assessee is a resident of Koothanalloor, in the Tanjore District in the Madras Presidency. He
derives income from immovable properties which he possesses in British India and in Saigon in Indo-China,
and from a business which he carries on in partnership in Saigon. For the year 1937-38 he was assessed to
income-tax in this country on a total income of Rs. 62,599. This amount included a sum of Rs. 62,006, which
the Income-tax Officer held represented a remittance to British India of profits made in Saigon during the year
of account. The assessee objected to the assessment. He contended that he had been over-assessed to the
extent of Rs. 60,000. For the two years which ended with 31st March, 1936, the assessee's profits in Saigon
amounted to $59,290. Of this he remitted $39,834 during the year of account to the Bank of Mysore, Mysore
City, and there purchased Mysore Government bonds of the face value of Rs. 60,000. The actual price paid for
these bonds was Rs. 69,416. The whole of this amount was paid out of the moneys remitted from Saigon. For
two months the bonds remained in the custody of the Bank of Mysore, but in January 1937 the assessee caused
them to be sent to the Madras branch of the Imperial Bank of India for safe custody. Subsequently, he arranged
with the Kumbakonam branch of the Imperial Bank of India for an overdraft for the purpose of purchasing
immovable property worth Rs. 33,000. The security consisted of the Mysore Government bonds which the
assessee had purchased out of the remittance from Saigon. The assessee says that the Income-tax authorities
have no right to treat the bonds as representing a remittance of profits, and at his request the Commissioner of
Income-tax has referred to this Court for decision the following questions of law:

Issues:
(i) Whether there was any material before the Assistant Commissioner to justify his conclusion that that the
Mysore Government bonds purchased by the petitioner in Mysore did not represent his capital?
(ii) If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative whether under a proper construction of Section 4(2)
of the Act a sum of Rs. 60,000 representing the face value of the bonds was liable to be assessed or only the
amount of Rs. 33,000 which the petitioner had obtained on an overdraft against the security of the bonds.

The Court is not here concerned with the case where a person, in order to avoid the payment of Income-tax
converts his foreign profits into foreign securities and then proceeds to realize them in British India.
For the reasons indicated, I would answer the first question in the negative. In these circumstances no answer
need be given to the second question.
The assessee having succeeded is entitled to his costs, Rs. 250, and to the return of his deposit of Rs. 100.