From Violent Crises to Insurgency: Religion and Politics in Northern Nigeria in Historical

Perspectives

A.O. Adesoji,
Department of History,
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria
aadesoji2@yahoo.com
aadesoji@oauife.edu.ng
+2348033779798
Presented at the Workshop organised by The Citizenship Initiative, University of South
Florida’s College of Arts and Sciences, Tampa, 13th to 15th November 2012
Theme: Northern Nigeria: The Dynamics of Social and Political Conflict

Introduction
The pervasive influence of religion on Nigerians irrespective of their ethnicity or location cannot
be over-emphasized. But unlike the liberality that characterized religion and religious practices
in the south and dating back to the period of the introduction of Christianity in the country, the
North has been characterized by intense religiosity that bothered mostly on extremism. The
attendant violent crises aided by the manipulation of ethnic differences, growing illiteracy,
unemployment and abject poverty have raised the stake, resulted in increased ethno-religious
consciousness and militated against the nation-building process.

Violent religious crises which became recurrent beginning from 1980 were preceded by clashes
between the Quadriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods in the North which continued till the 1980s
as well as the protests and resentment generated by attempts by the Northern regional power to
spread Islam to central Nigeria in the 1950s and 1960s. 1 Accounting for these crises are such
factors as contest for the religious space characterized by desire to spread or imposed religious
beliefs, its resistance by opposing groups and protest over global developments with religious
implications.

The outbreak of the Maitatsine crisis, first in 1980 in Kano and subsequently in 1982 in Kaduna
and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi was significant in that it resulted in wanton
destruction of lives and property, took religion to a far greater dimension in terms of its intensity,
and sowed the seed of future more volatile crises as seen in the outbreak of the Boko Haram
insurgency beginning from 2009 and the Kala Kato riot of December 2009.2

1
Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and secular Ideology (Rochester: Rochester Press,
1998), 5; J.N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Niels
Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in Middle Belt Christianity (London: British Academic Press, 1994)
2
Cyril O. Imo, Religion and the Unity of the Nigerian State (Stockholm: Almqvist &Wiksell, 1995), 21-23; Omar
Farouk Ibrahim, “Religion and Politics: A View from the North” in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye
Oyediran (Eds.), Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida (Ibadan: Vantage
Publishers International, 1997), 512-516; Pat Ama Tokunbo Williams, “Religion, Violence and Displacement in
Nigeria”, Journal of Asian and African Studies 32(1997), 33-49; A.O. Adesoji, “Restoring Peace or Waging War:
Security Agencies’ Management of Ethno-Religious Uprisings in Nigeria”, African Security Review 19(3) (2010), 2-19
Islamic fundamentalism is mostly restricted to northern Nigeria. Although this could be
explained in terms of the dominance of Islam and its adherents in the region, it could imply the
prevalence of factors and circumstances that made the region prone to extremism. Among such
factors and circumstances are poverty and illiteracy, the existence and seeming proliferation
of radical Islamic groups, and recurrent violent religious crises.

Religious Exclusivism in the North: Fundamental Causes

The successful jihad of Usmanu dan Fodio of the early nineteenth century which ensured a
massive conversion and transformed a substantial part of northern Nigeria to a caliphate was the
height of Islamic influence in Nigeria. 3 Following the British conquest of the Caliphate, the
original hostility of the Muslim informed by the fear of losing their political hold eventually
wane. Their ambivalent attitude notwithstanding, the British colonial officers, according to
Falola, were firm in their belief that any irrational treatment of the Muslims would stand in the
way of colonial objectives. The Muslim elite were regarded as being more intelligent, civilized
and preferred above Western-educated elite who were regarded as arrogant and impatient. Thus
the British promoted the cause of Islam and its elite as a way of minimizing the influence of
Western-oriented elite. Specifically, rather than antagonize the emirs and the political class in the
North, they were assured that there would be no colonial interference in Islam. They were also
given power over granting access to Christian missionaries who evangelized and resided in their
areas. The cautious attitude of the British also informed its decision not to press hard for the
introduction of western education in the North. 4 With the consolidation of Islam during the
period of colonial rule, the end of colonial rule in 1960 strengthened the Muslim elite’s hand in
creating an Islamic identity for modern Nigeria

Although the presence of the British prevented the further spread of Islam through wars, the
privileged position enjoyed by Islam over Christianity particularly in the North prepared the
ground for the elite commitment to the spread of Islam and the identification of Nigeria as a
member of the Muslim world. The creation of a Muslim umma,(community) united by religion
was further consolidated by the creation in 1961 of the Jama’atu Nasril Islammiya (Society for
the Victory of Islam) whose influence extended to the South from 1970. 5 Other associations and
groups had since emerged while different brands of Islam had also spread with some of them
assuming fanatical or fundamentalist position in their relationship with other Muslims in
particular and the Nigerian state generally. The increasing politicization of religion that started in
the colonial era generated conflict and controversies and this effectively polarized the country
along religious lines. This included the Sharia debate in the Constituent Assemblies in 1978 and
1988 as well as the controversy over Nigeria’s membership of the Organization of Islamic
Conference in 1986.6

Whereas Islam penetrated to Nigeria through the North, Christianity came through the South.
While missionary works were successful in the south, progress was slow in the north despite
3
Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London: Longman 1967); Abdullahi Smith, “A Neglected Theme of West
African History: The Islamic Revolution of the 19 th Century” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 2 (1961),
169-185; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria: The Sokoto Caliphate and its Enemies, 1804-1906
(London: Longman, 1971)
4
Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 24-31
5
Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 29-30; Ibrahim, :Religion and Politics, 509-512
6
Ibrahim, Religion and Politics,518-520
their efforts. A combination of factors such as the deep-seated fear of Christianity by the Islamic
elite who regarded it as a subversive religion, the thought of some missionaries about the
superiority of Christianity over Islam, the assumption by some missionaries of a link between
Islam and evil as well as the cautious and ambivalent attitude of the representatives of the Royal
Niger Company and later Lord Lugard limited the spread of Christianity in the north. 7
Meanwhile the colonial administration remained protective of Islam until the period of Sir
Donald Cameron from 1931 to 1935 when the pressure on the Christian missions was relaxed.
But their activities were restricted to the Sabon-Gari (Strangers’ quarters or new city) outside of
the town wall, a development that encouraged the spread of Christianity mostly among the
immigrant population8

Arising from the spread and contact by Islam and Christianity in Nigeria, the tendencies for
rivalry manifested with each struggling to gain converts and the control of the Nigerian state
itself. While Islam remains dominant in the north and Christianity in the east, the west has a
strong presence of the two religions. Characteristic of the west however was the long history of
peaceful coexistence among the two religions and their adherents although competition is not
uncommon among the two.9 Despite the secular policy pursued by colonial administrators like
Sir Donald Cameron and Sir Arthur Richards and which emergent Nigerian elite promised to
recognize, it was obvious that the desire to spread their faith was paramount in the minds of the
adherents. The case of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the first and the only premier of the northern region is
very apt. While reassuring Christian groups of their safety and freedom to practice their religion,
his government did not set out to separate the state from Islam. Not only was he at the forefront
of the Islamization of the north almost demanding a theocratic state, he personally proselytized
in the North-central region dominated mostly by Christians obviously to halt the spread of
Christianity and turn the north into a religiously homogenous region. In the process, he triggered
anti-Islam and anti-Hausa-Fulani protest in the region especially among the Tiv. His ambition
ultimately was to expand Islam to cover the south 10. Evidently, religion was a major issue in the
era of party politics in the North particularly with the emergence of the Northern Peoples’
Congress, a party strictly limited to the north and united by Islam under Sardauna Alhaji
Ahmadu Bello.

Unlike the Western-oriented Christian elite who had historically supported the idea of a secular
Nigerian state and the application of Western laws, many Muslims especially the ulama continue
to argue for the adoption of Sharia. Their argument centered on the recognition of the worth and
relevance of Sharia which was why the British colonialists allowed it in the north but banned it
in other parts of the country with large Islamic population. Thus the dominance of Western laws
in the country including the north beginning from the colonial period did not go down well with
the Muslims particularly in the north. This explains why Sharia became a major religious and
political issue after the mid-1970s.11
7
E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1979), 25
8
Donald Cameron, The Principle of Native Administration and Their Application. (Lagos, 1934), 13
9
Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 37
10
Pat Williams & Toyin Falola, Religious Impact on the Nation State: The Nigerian Predicament (Aldershot: Avebury,
1995), 19-20;Raymond Hickey, “The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings in Nigeria: A Note,” African Affairs 83(331) (1984),
251-256
11
Ibid, 38-40
The compromise of the secularity of the Nigerian state dated back to the period before the
attainment of political independence but became more pronounced thereafter. It had also
manifested in different forms with successive governments outdoing one another in the
patronage of religion while at the same time professing to uphold the state secularity. The
government of the old Northern and Western regions started government involvement in
religious matters by establishing the Nigerian Pilgrim Licensing Board and the Pilgrim Welfare
Board in April and May 1958 respectively. Hitherto, pilgrimage was a private affair. Whereas
the Nigerian Pilgrim Licensing Board was established to supervise the activities of travel
agencies and to organize and guide pilgrims for pure hajj purpose, the Board was set up in the
west to assist the pilgrims with currency exchange, immigration, arrangements for
accommodation and transport and to protect and safeguard their interests and welfare. 12 Although
this was a demonstration of a sense of responsibility on their parts, it had political dimension. For
Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, it was an opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to Islam and
impress his friends in the Muslim World. For Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Christian, the step was
calculated to forestall the formation of a rival political party, the Muslim Congress Party, at a
time when the 1959 federal elections were near.13

From a very limited role of only appointing the Amirul Hajj in 1957, the federal government
became fully involved in pilgrimage matters with the nationalization of the Pilgrim Welfare
Board in 1972 and its transformation into Nigerian Pilgrims Board, a permanent structure
established by a decree in 1975. This board had the sole authority to arrange transport, set costs
and otherwise oversee the pilgrimage traffic. 14 This was in addition to huge subsidy spent on
pilgrims and the cost of maintaining government team usually sent to oversee the conduct of the
pilgrimages.15 The continued politicization of the Hajj operation resulted in the demand by
Christians for their pilgrimages to be included in the administrative purview of the Board
established originally to cater for Muslim pilgrims 16 Also, the promulgation of Decree No. 6 of
1989 by General Ibrahim Babangida administration replaced the Nigerian Pilgrims’ Board with
the Nigerian Pilgrims’ Commission to cater exclusively for Muslims. 17 The continued agitation
of Christians following the failure of the court case which they instituted against the Decree led
to the dissolution of the Commission in January 1991 and the endorsement by the Federal
Government of the individual state arrangement for pilgrimages with the Federal Government
providing only medical and consular services and coordinating the pilgrimages. But many of the
states continued to maintain pilgrims’ welfare boards for both Christians and Muslims.

The meddling in religious matters also manifested in other forms like the proposals by the
administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari to establish an advisory board on Islamic Affairs in the
office of the President and to appoint presidential assistants for Christians and Muslims affairs.
The establishment of the Advisory Council on Religious Affairs (ACRA) by a decree in June

12
Williams & Falola, Religious Impact on the Nation State, 25
13
Ibid
14
Williams, “Religion, Violence and Displacement in Nigeria, 42
15
Imo, Religion and the Unity of Nigeria,50-51
16
Suberu, “Religion and Politics, 479
17
Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Nigerian Pilgrims’ Commission Decree No. 6, 1989”. Supplement to Official Gazette,
76, No. 8, 8 February 1989, pp. A$1-48
1987 by the Ibrahim Babangida administration translated this proposal into a reality. 18 With
equal membership from people affiliated with Islam and Christianity, the Council was charged
with recommending methods to achieve religious harmony. 19 But persistent opposition
particularly by Christians despite an amendment giving greater autonomy to the Council rather
than to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and eliminating the post of deputy chairman, whose
subordinate connotations were particularly offensive to Christians, made the body ineffective.
The perception of the body by Christians, as a potential avenue for official intervention in the
internal affairs of Christian groups informed their opposition. 20 Other manifestations included the
favoured appointments of Muslims into government by most leaders, civil or military, in post-
independent Nigeria, the Federal Government directive banning the importation of Salman
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses into the country, declaration of holidays for religious festivities, the
donation of state money for the erection of church buildings and mosques and the realization of
other religious goals, and the funding of Chaplaincies in the Military. The Shagari
administration, for instance, donated Ten Million naira each to Christians and Muslims to build
places of worship in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory.21

Two most significant developments which represent the climax of government patronage of
religion was the promotion of Sharia and Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of Islamic
Conference, (OIC). Although an important feature of the Northern region political and legal
system during the colonial era, Sharia was gradually eroded and eventually subordinated to
Western laws at the twilight of independence but it remained part of the northern regional
constitution having been written into it since 1956.22 Perhaps arising from the struggle to give it a
more powerful legal bite and extend its influence, the Sharia courts attained appellate status at
the state level under the rule of Generals Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo. Whereas
the Federal Sharia Courts of Appeal was not instituted, the status of these Islamic courts at the
state level was incorporated into the 1979 Constitution. 23 Also, the jurisdiction of the state Sharia
Courts of Appeal was limited to civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal law. 24
But under Decree No. 26 of 1986 and the Reviewed Constitution of 1988, the jurisdiction of the
Sharia Court was expanded to embrace all civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic law.
The determined opposition of the non-Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly who sought
to expunge all provisions for Islamic courts in the new constitution and the Federal
Government’s decision to remove the issue from the purview of the Assembly eventually
produced a compromise on the Sharia issue. But then, the 1989 Constitution not only retained the
states’ option of Sharia Courts of Appeal, it upheld the expansion of their jurisdiction to all non-
personal civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic law.

Although Christians’ fear about the Sharia were considerably allayed by the fact that, under the
1989 Constitution, non-Muslims were no longer subject to Sharia particularly with the deletion
18
Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Advisory Council on Religious Affairs, Decree No. 30, 1987,” Supplement to Official
Gazette,74, No. 64, 16 November 1987, pp. A 229-31
19
Williams, “Religion, Violence and Displacement in Nigeria, 43
20
Suberu, “Religion and Politics, 482-483
21
Ibid, 481, 488-496; Imo, Religion and the Unity of Nigeria,35,50-53
22
Falola, Violence in Nigeria,39, 77
23
Williams, “Religion, Violence and Displacement in Nigeria, 42
24
Federal Republic of Nigeria, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Act, including the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, Lagos, section 242(1)
of section 242(2)(e) of the 1979 Constitution, the Sharia provisions in the 1989 Constitution
went a step ahead of the provision in the 1979 Constitution. 25 Beyond the fear of islamization,
Christian opposition to the system of Sharia courts also arose from an unease about public
funding of what they perceived to be essentially religious courts. Essentially, the Sharia debates
of the 1970s and the 1980s particularly at the Constituent Assemblies and in the media had
continued in other forms since the return of civil rule in 1999 and the introduction of Sharia in
twelve of the nineteen northern states with varying manifestations. 26 Arguably, the adoption of
the Sharia meant the existence of dual legal systems in those states as well as the adoption of
state religion contrary to the provision of section 10 of the 1999 Constitution. While its adoption
was seen as a political phenomenon that would soon ‘fizzle out’, its implementation so far had
also generated some ironies.27 Some of the governors that adopted it in their states had to face
trial for corrupt practices while they were in office. Also, with the exception of three amputations
for theft carried out in the very early days of Sharia implementation, the political ambition and
calculation of the governors hindered them from actually implementing some of the hard
decisions of the Sharia Courts like stoning to death for zina and severe forms of qisas. Rather the
persons on whom such sentences were imposed were quietly dealt with in other ways.28

Nigeria was surreptitiously enlisted as the forty-sixth member of the Organization of Islamic
Conference, (OIC) in 1986. Hitherto Nigeria has had an observer status in the organization since
1969 when its major meeting, the Summit of Conference of Kings and Heads of State and
Government of Islamic Countries was attended by a delegation led by Sheik Abubakar Gumi as
representatives not of the state of Nigeria but its Muslim population. 29 The body whose creation
was part of a larger movement to create a strong Islamic forum for discussing development and
fighting the West has as its main purposes the promotion of Islamic solidarity among member
states, consolidation of cooperation among its members in all vital feeds, elimination of racial
segregation, safeguarding of the Islamic holy places and supporting the Palestinian struggle for
the liberation of their territory.30 Nigeria’s membership of OIC has proved to be the single most
important factor in polarizing and politicizing religious cleavages to unprecedented degrees in
Nigeria. Christians saw it as an unprecedented and dangerous attempt to elevate Islam to the
status of a state religion while Muslims justified it on the basis of the economic and political
advantages that would accrue, and compared it with other bodies like the United Nations,
Organization of African Unity (now African Union), Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) and the Non-Aligned Movement, all of which Nigeria is a member. 31
Following the failure of a twenty-member Committee set up by the General Ibrahim Babangida
25
This section had empowered the Sharia Court of Appeal of a state to decide questions of Islamic personal law
where all parties to the proceeding(whether or not they are Muslims) have requested to be tried under such law.
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree No 12 1989,Section 261
26
Vincent O. Nmehielle, “Sharia Law in the Northern States of Nigeria: To Implement or Not to Implement, the
Constitutionality is the Question” Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004), 730-759;Philip Ostien , “Nigeria’s Sharia
Criminal Codes” in Philip Ostien (ed.), Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria, 1996-2006: A Sourcebook Vol.
IV, )Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2007), 171-203
27
This statement was credited to President Olusegun Obasanjo during his visit to Harvard University after Zamfara
State’s proclamation in 1999, see Nmehielle, “Sharia Law in the Northern States of Nigeria, 754
28
Ostien , “Nigeria’s Sharia Criminal Codes” 203
29
Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 93-94
30
Ibid; Williams & Falola, Religious Impact on the Nation State, 23-24
31
Williams & Falola, Religious Impact on the Nation State, 23-24; ? Suberu, “Religion and Politics, 480-481; Falola,
Violence in Nigeria, 97-101
administration to examine the implications of the country’s membership, the government could
not make any formal response other than giving assurance that it would not jeopardize the
country’s unity. Although government has not officially withdrawn its membership perhaps in
order to satisfy Muslims, it has not played an active role in the OIC either as a way of satisfying
Christians. Neither is it advertising its participation in the organization.32

Significantly, assaults on Nigeria’s secularity have occurred more under military administrations
than under civilian ones perhaps because the military administrations were in power longer than
civilian regimes. Among the military administrations, religious problems attained an unparalleled
prominence under the administration of Ibrahim Babangida in the mid-1980s. Yet, it is this
administration which touted most the secularity of the state in Nigeria. 33 The position of his
administration could be understood from its interpretation of the concept of secularity. While
formally upholding secularity as a concept, it explicitly rejected any interpretation of the concept
that opposes official involvement in religious affairs. Beyond condemning what he described as a
negative interpretation of secularity which had unnecessarily placed the nation in a position of
either neglecting religion outright as a factor in our national life or treating it with benign
neglect, General Babangida promised to continue to discharge all its current obligations to the
major religions in the belief that religion as a normative tool can play a significant role in solving
the numerous problems and combating the socials ills plaguing the country if correctly handled.34

Northern Nigeria: A Hotbed of Violent Crises

Religious crises are recurrent in Nigeria. Obviously a product of intolerance among various
groups in the country despite long period of interactions, its effects on peaceful coexistence and
nation-building have been catastrophic. Although often cloaked in religious garb, its ethnic
dimensions have generated tremendous ripples. The common but overbloated assumption that
different ethnic groups particularly the major ones are coterminous with some major religious
leanings explains the ethnic dimension hence the label ethno-religious crises. Beyond showing
the seeming religious disposition of Nigerians, the crises are also a measure of the extent to
which ethnic and religious differences have been manipulated obviously to achieve one political
goal or the other. More importantly, they are manifestations of internal divisions within religious
groups, the increasing re-definition of identity and the tendency towards religious
fundamentalism. Whereas the southern part of the country had witnessed a few of these crises,
they are mostly endemic in Northern Nigeria.

The Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola and
1985 in Bauchi marked the beginning of ferocious religious conflicts and crises in Nigeria. 35 But
Nigeria was not completely free of religious troubles before 1980. Following the Usmanu dan
Fodio jihad of 1804 whose outcome, the Sokoto caliphate existed until its conquest by the British
in 1903, there were the clashes between the Quadriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods which
32
Williams & Falola, Religious Impact on the Nation State, 24; Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 102
Williams & Falola, Religious Impact on the Nation State, 23-24; Suberu, “Religion and Politics, 479
33
Williams, “Religion, Violence and Displacement in Nigeria, 43
34
Suberu, “Religion and Politics, 481-482
35
Elizabeth Isichei, The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria, 1980-1985:A Revolt of the Disinherited, Journal of Religion in
Africa xvii (3) (1987), 194-208; Omar Farouk Ibrahim, Religion and Politics: A View from the North in Larry
Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene & Oyeleye Oyediran, (eds), Transition Without End (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers
International, 1997), 511-512
continued in different forms until the 1980s, and the protest and bitterness generated by the
attempts by the northern regional power to spread Islam to central Nigeria in the 1950s and
1960s.36 This development generated the fears among the minorities ab initio. But unlike the
earlier crises, incidents of religious violence since 1980 have not only increased in number and
intensified, they have also spread.37 Following the Maitatsine crises or interspersing them were
several other crises. These included the Kano metropolitan riot of October 1982, the Ilorin riot of
March 1986, University of Ibadan crisis of May 1986, the nation-wide crisis over Nigeria’s
membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in January/February 1986, the
Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/Funtua religious riots of March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of
March 1988, the nation-wide acrimonious debate on Sharia at the Constituent Assembly in
October/November 1988, the Bayero University crisis of 1989, the Bauchi/Katsina riots of
March/April 1991, the Kano riot of October 1991, the Zangon-Kataf riot of May 1992, the Kano
civil disturbance of December 1994 and the Jos crisis of April 1994. 38 Similarly between 1999
and 2008, twenty eight other conflicts were reported, the most prominent being the Shagamu
conflict of July 1999 and the recurrent Jos crisis of 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2008. 39 The same crisis
recurred again in January 2010 and has continued under different guises since then. The list did
not cover the initial Boko Haram crisis of July/August 2009 in Maiduguri and three other states,
and the Kala Kato riot of December 2009 in Bauchi. The insurgency phase of the Boko Haram
crises started in June 201140

Virtually all these crises have been explained or justified by one reason or the other. Where it
was not borne out of the need to checkmate the excesses of some groups or prevent them from
being a security threat or contain their spread as was the case with the Maitatsine riots, 41 it arose
out of the conversion drive by one religious group and the resistance by another religious group
into its perceived stronghold. This was the case with the Kano riot of 1991 during which the
Muslims complained of preferential treatment in the approval of conduct of a religious crusade
by the Christians and the use of Kano Race Course earlier not approved for the Muslims for a
similar programme.42 In some other cases, it was the seemingly unresolved indigene-settler
problem that was at its root. The Zangon-Kataf riots and the recurrent Jos crises fall into this

36
Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 5; J.N Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1973); Niels Kastfelt, Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Study in Middle Belt Christianity (London: British
Academic Press, 1994) *pp.
37
Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 5
38
Imo, Religion and the Unity of the Nigerian Nation, 21-23; Ibrahim, Religion and Politics, 512-516; Enwerem, An
Assessment of Government’s Formal Response to Ethnic/Religious Riots, 1980-1990s, in Ernest E. Uwazie, Isaac O.
Albert & Godfrey N. Uzoigwe, (eds.), Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria, (Maryland, U.S.A.:
Lexington, 1999), 124
39
Ismail Omipidan, “Why North is on Fire: The Inside Story”, Sunday Sun, 2 August 2009, 5-6; Anthony Akaeze,
“From Maitatsine to Boko Haram” Newswatch 28 October 2009
40
Raymond Mordi, “Nigeria at 52: Up on the Insecurity Index” Tell (Lagos), 8 October 2012, 51
41
Isaac Olawale Albert, Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Kano in Onigu Otite and Isaac Olawale Albert, (eds),
Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1999),285-
286; Muhammed Tawfiq Ladan, The Role of Youth in Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflicts: The Kaduna/ Kano Case
Study in Ernest E. Uwazie, Isaac O. Albert & Godfrey N. Uzoigwe, (eds), Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict
Resolution, 101
42
Albert, Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Kano, 291-292; Williams, Religion, Violence and Displacement in
Nigeria,33-49
category.43 Yet in some others, it was the growing religious fundamentalism aided by frustrated
dreams and disappointing patronage by the political class as in the Boko Haram case. 44 Although
almost all the crises have been subsumed under religion and explained by religious factors, it was
clear that other extraneous and underlying factors bothering on economic
disequilibrium/inequality, envy, naked poverty among youths who easily became willing tools in
the hand of patrons and the unhealthy contest for political offices have all played dominant
part.45 The assertion that all ethno-religious crises have underneath them the perceived
domination by supposedly external or illegitimate groups is therefore very right in this regard.46

A major feature of these crises was the often tremendous human and material losses which apart
from not being compensated are usually glossed over, with victims being left to bear the full
weight. Four of these crises stand out in this regard. These are the Maitatsine chain of riots, the
Zangon-Kataf riots, the recurrent Jos riots and the Boko Haram insurgency. The Kano Maitatsine
rising alone claimed about five thousand lives and properties worth several millions of naira
were destroyed.47 The death tolls in Bulumkutu, Yola and Bauchi were also tremendous. 48
Similarly the Zangon-Kataf crises claimed several lives. 49 Even when there is no official figure
yet, the recurrent nature of the Jos crises and the catastrophic nature of the Boko Haram
insurgency make them some of the worst in the history of Nigeria. 50 More importantly, owing to
the extensive nature of the crises, their frequency, the aggressive nature of the people involved
and their resistance which often result in prolonged battle, the strength and capacity of the
security agencies have been tasked to the maximum. Oftentimes, the deployment of the military
was due to the inability of the police to cope with the enormity of the crises.
43
Nereus I Nwosu, Religion and Crises of National Unity in Nigeria, African Study Monographs, 17(3) (1996),141-
152; Williams, Religion, Violence and Displacement in Nigeria, 43-47; Ibrahim, The State and Religion in Nigeria,
39-66 ; Human Rights Watch, Jos: A City Torn Apart, 13 (9)(a), (2001), 22-23;Egodi Uchendu, Religion and Nation-
Building in Nigeria, Nigeria Heritage 13 (2004), 132-144; Human Rights Watch, Revenge in the Name of Religion:
The Cycle of Violence in Plateau and Kano States, 17( 8a), (2005),7-10
44
Paul M. Lubeck, Islamic Protest under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: Yan Tatsine Explained, in J. D.Y. Peel & C.C.
Stewart (eds.) Popular Islam South of the Sahara, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 369-390;
Omipidan, Why North is on Fire, 5; Shaykh Habibulah Adam al-Ilory, “Islamic Sect’s Activities are Political” Tell
(Lagos) 31 August 2009, 23
45
Ibrahim, Religion and Politics,521-524; Imo, Religion and the Unity of the Nigerian Nation, 28-29; Human Rights
Watch, Revenge in the Name of Religion,48; Tajudeen Sulaiman, The Fire This Time, Tell(Lagos)15 December 2008,
20-26
46
Ibrahim, The State and Religion in Nigeria, 51; Ladan, The Role of Youth in Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflicts,
105
47
Isaac O. Albert, The Role of Communication in the Escalation of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Ernest E.
Uwazie, Isaac O. Albert & Godfrey N. Uzoigwe, (eds), Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria,
31;Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of tribunal of inquiry into kano disturbances (Maitatsine), 43; Falola,
Violence in Nigeria, 137
48
Isichei, “The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria” 194 ; Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 137
49
Niels Kastfelt, Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on the Political Culture in Northern Nigeria, African Affairs, 88(350)
(1989), 83-90; Nwosu, Religion and Crises of Na./tional Unity in Nigeria, 146; Williams, Religion, violence and
Displacement in Nigeria, 46; Uchendu, Religion and Nation-Building in nigeria, 139
50
Human Rights Watch, Revenge in the Name of Religion, 1-2; Chiawo Nwankwo & Francis Falola, Boko Haram:
Another 140 Kids, Women Rescued,-780 Killed in Maiduguri Alone-Red Cross,-Victims Given Mass Burial, The
Punch,3 August 2009, 2; James Bwala, Boko Haram: Government Committee of Enquiry Submits Report, Sunday
Tribune, 25 October 2009;Pam Ayuba, 326 Dead in Jos Crisis Says Police, The Nation, 26 January 2010
http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/33941/1/326-dead-in-Jos-crisis-say-police/Page1.html
From Violent Crises to Insurgency: Factors for Transformation
Underlying the growth of fundamentalism in Nigeria are such factors as hardline position on
religious beliefs, practices, and doctrines; social and economic dislocation; and the political
patronage of religion. Growing global Islamic fundamentalism has provided ideological support
and motivation to local groups where it has not provided materials and training supports.

Limited economic opportunities arising out of but not limited to high level of illiteracy and
growing poverty compounded by pervasive and extreme government corruption is a major factor
in the rise of insurgency in Northern Nigeria. Poor or inadequate access to quality education,
obviously a product of the obsession with Islamic education and the restriction of access to
western education, produced a situation where a preponderant of the northern youths were not
adequately prepared for technical and bureaucratic position. 51 Therefore, Northern states are the
poorest in Nigeria with a very high level of youth unemployment. 52 Beyond transforming the
character of youth in the north, it increases the risk of belonging or associating with radical or
fundamental movements, more so as it provides opportunities to strike against the secular federal
state which has ‘denied’ them opportunities ab initio. Although the problem of unemployment is
not restricted to the north given Nigeria’s anemic economy, its impact is much felt in Northern
Nigeria. Most of the unemployed and mostly unemployable youths therefore find themselves in
the employ of gangsters, thugs and politicians. Other youths mostly in the south are drawn into
militant bands engaging in robbery, kidnapping and bombing petroleum facilities.53

The role of partisan politics and political patronage in the sustenance of the sect is obvious. It
would appear that the introduction of Sharia in some northern states beginning in 1999
encouraged some closeness between Yusuf and some of the ruling and/or aspiring politicians, as
their decision aligned with his plan to promote strict adherence to Islamic law, but he was
perhaps disappointed, as the type of Sharia that was introduced across some northern states fell
short of the standard that he had expected. He could have thought that the officeholders were not
serious Muslims, or their knowledge of Western education was hindering or limiting them. His
fraternization with politicians possibly informed his willingness to use his group to assist them to
secure political power, which would in turn be used to protect and advance his career. 54 His
disappointment following his abandonment could have hastened his desire to effect a change
through violence. Mohammed Yusuf stated that he was invited to Yobe State during the buildup
to the 2003 elections in the wake of Sharia implementation in some northern states. When the
election did not assume the direction that his host thought it would take, his group was
abandoned to its fate before the state government ordered its members to leave the state. His
relationship with the political elite explains why on one occasion when he was arrested, his
release was facilitated by a politician who obviously supported him and/or his ideology. 55 When
it is considered that the Maitatsine riots broke out during the tenure of a civilian president in
51
Paul M. Lubeck, “Nigeria: Mapping the Shari’a Restorationists Movement” in Robert Hefner (ed.), Sharia Politics:
Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011) 244-279
52
Paul Lubeck, Ronnie Lipschutz & Erik Weeks, The Globality of Islam: Sharia as a Nigerian “Self-Determination”
Movement Working Papers number 106, University of California, Santa Cruz, 2003
53
Emeka Emmanuel Okafor, “Youth Unemployment and Implications for Stability of Democracy in Nigeria” Journal
of Sustainable Development in Africa, 2011:358-373
54
Ismail Omipidan, “Why North is on Fire” Sunday Sun (Lagos)2 August 2009, 5-6
55
Ibid
1980, the link of the rise of Yusuf to political patronage could be understood. The thesis that
politicians who patronized religious leaders for support or protective charms used them as a tool
and later discarded them or unleashed them on innocent people best describes Yusuf’s
situation.56 It goes along with the explanation that politicians were mostly the backers of the
murderous groups who needed the group members’ violent disposition to achieve their political
and, by extension, economic ends.57

Similarly, the inability or reluctance to tackle Sharia operators and checkmate the fanatical sects
and armed gangs could be evidence of political patronage, political laxity and rivalries, or a
combination of both. The patronage of religion by the political elite could explain the situation
where the elite in government vacillate in making decisions or are indecisive on issues that
require prompt action. This perhaps was evident in the case of Yusuf, just as it is with other
potentially dangerous groups. In contrast, the state’s failure to check the growth of Marwa’s
movement and arrest Marwa owed to political laxity and power rivalries among politicians and
security agents. Rivalry between Kano State, controlled by the People’s Redemption Party
(PRP), and the federal government, led by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the Second
Republic and for which Marwa became a useful pawn, contributed to the dimensions and
outcome of the Maitatsine crisis in Kano.58 The desire by NPN to take over Kano led it to attempt
unorthodox means to portray the PRP government as incompetent and weak, as well as create
credibility problems for it. Marwa fit into this plan and enjoyed heavy patronage from the NPN.
Beyond the initial reluctance of the federal police force to check the menace that Marwa’s group
represented, politics played with the inquiry into the Maitatsine crisis in Kano by both the federal
and state governments marred its credibility.

The existence of “street boys” (unemployed youths) and armed gangs like the Almajirai, Yan
Tauri, Yan Daba, Yan Banga, and Yan Dauka Amarya in Northern Nigeria has made some parts
of the north, like Kano, hot spots. These gangs are mostly the product of a desire to resort to
violence as a coping mechanism, characteristic of the structural adjustment years. Yan Tauri,
which has a longer history and is described as economic opportunists, and professional
mercenary soldiers, who are prepared to offer their services to whoever hires them, together
constitute a handy instrument, which could be used by anybody to start a civil disturbance. 59
Their existence aids fundamentalism considerably.

Beyond the usual approach of brutally suppressing insurgence and constituting tribunal or
commission of enquiry, government has not taken concrete steps toward addressing the problem.
Before the Maitatsine risings, Marwa was a law unto himself. This attitude earned him

56
Shayk Habibulah Adam al-Ilory, “Islamic Sect’s Activities are Political” Tell (Lagos), 31 August 2009, 23
57
Okey Muogbo, “Another Boko Haram Sect Uncovered” Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan), 5 August 2009.
58
Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 139-14024-31

59
Isaac O. Albert,” Kano: Religious Fundamentalism and Violence in G. Herault and P. Adesanmi eds. Jeunes,
Culture de la Rue et Violence Urbaine en Afrique, edited by. Ibadan: IFRA & African Books Builders Ltd.1997),285-
325; Emmanuel M. K Dawha,. ‘Yan daba, ‘Yan banga and ‘Yan daukar amarya: A Study of Criminal Gangs in
Northern Nigeria. Ibadan: IFRA. 1996), 4-14; Yunusa Zakari Ya’u, The Youth, Economic Crisis and Identity
Transformation: The Case of the Yandaba in Kano in Attahiru Jega (ed.), Identity Transformation and Identity
Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (Uppsala and Kano: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and Centre for
Research and Documentation, 2000), 161-178
deportation and imprisonment, yet he still led one of the bloodiest riots in the history of Nigeria.
The experience of Yusuf was not markedly different. After the Maitatsine riot of 1980 and the
seemingly uncoordinated trial of his arrested followers, many of them were released on the basis
of what Isichei identified as their sheer numbers and the uncertainty about the most appropriate
charge to level against them. The last batch of 923 was pardoned on 1 October 1982, in what was
later blamed as misguided clemency.60 With the swelling of the prisons following the Boko
Haram incident, the usual complaints of how to handle them have begun again. 61 Implicitly, it
would appear that once a fundamentalist escapes being killed during the suppression of his
insurrection, he can as well be sure that he will take part in the next one, other things being
equal. This non-deterrence has arguably encouraged a culture of impunity and promoted a circle
of violence; hence the recurrence of religious-related crises in Nigeria.

The preponderance of foreign elements among relatively large followings characterized the
groups. These foreign elements, mostly from Chad and Niger, together with other members,
could have had their interest sustained by their commitment to the groups’ cause, belief in a
righteous heavenly reward for their zeal, as well in the leadership, and, in the case of Boko
Haram, the demagoguery, of Yusuf. While pointing to the inability to properly define identity in
the north, the involvement of foreign elements indicates the extent to which militants could go to
recruit followers.

Aiding the influx of foreign elements was the porosity of the Nigerian borders. This has made it
possible for foreigners who share ethnic and religious affinities with Nigerians to slip into the
country and enlist or otherwise join the fanatics’ army. As posited by Kazah-Toure, 62 a Hausa
man from Niger Republic carrying a Nigerian passport and illegally settled in Katsina State is
considered a better indigene than an Igbo man born, bred, working, and paying tax in the same
state. Obviously, ethnic, linguistic, and religious affinities breed the unity on the one hand and
explain the difference on the other. The usual response of the Nigerian state has been to deport
the identified foreigners, who easily find their way back. For those not identified, business
continues as usual. A more comprehensive response should have included a better policing of the
border, a better motivation of the immigration officers to check corruption and aiding of illegal
border crossing and a better arming of officials to engage the deviant and strongheads. Similarly,
comprehensive national civic registration as was started in 2004 with detailed security features
and a strict enforcement of compulsory birth and death registration by the National Population
Commission would have generated basic citizenship data for effective monitoring and control of
movement into the country. Although the 2004 experiment failed (because of a combination of
corruption and poor political will), it was worthwhile. Even when some foreigners would still
have registered under the scheme, their monitoring would have been better enhanced. The poor
definition of national identity and culture, even among Nigerians, given the prevalence of
divisive tendencies, has not provided a base upon which to build a virile national citizenship with
national outlook and pride as a basis for opposing destructive religious and ethnic-induced cross-
border affinities.

60
Isichei, “The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria, 191
61
Ademola Adedeji 1000 Boko Haram Members in Prison, Awaiting Trial-Mustapha. The Punch (Lagos), 14
October 2009, 11
62
Toure Kazah-Toure, “A Discourse on the Citizenship Question in Nigeria” Democracy and Development: Journal
of West African Affairs 4(1)2004,41–61.
Boko Haram Insurgency: Defining Features and Modus Operandi
Characteristically running through the fundamentalists’ doctrines are the declaration that the
government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a dagut or taagut (evil), unworthy of allegiance
on the part of good and upright Muslims; sustained attacks on police posts and personnel;
encouragement of members to drop out of schools; and the declaration that working in any form
of government employment is unlawful. Given its perspective and approach to the application of
strict Islam, though with some colorations, the Boko Haram movements is broadly defined as a
fundamentalist group. Viewed from a cognitive perspective, fundamentalism expresses
exclusivity, particularity, literality, and moral rigour. Viewed from a cultural theological
framework, it expresses opposition to religious and cultural liberalism in defence of orthodoxy
and religious traditions. From a social movement perspective, it represents organizational and
ideological uniqueness, in regard to other types of religious movements. It stresses the authority
of scripture and the necessity of righteous living, and places emphasis on right doctrine and the
necessity of organized warfare against the forces of modernism. 63 Thus, the Boko Haram
insurgency represent the climax of ferocious conflicts and crises supposedly induced by religion
but influenced by extraneous considerations. Running through these uprisings and riots is the
disposition toward violence; followers saw those outside their groups, irrespective of ethnic and
religious affiliations, as enemies that must be crushed.

Known by various names such as Ahlusunna wal’ jamma hijra, the Nigerian Taliban, and the
Yusufiyya.64and now popularly referred to as Boko Haram, it would appear that the group has no
specific name for itself, but following its resurgence after its suppression in 2009, it referred to
itself as “The Group of the People of Sunnah, Call, and Jihad” and claimed affinity with the
North African branch of Al-Qaeda.65 With the death of its former leader, Mohammed Yusuf in
the hands of security men in 2009, the group has been vociferous in their attack on security
personnel in particular and the general populace especially those considered to be spying on
them or reporting them to security personnel as well as political leaders that they fell out with
using diverse means such as gun attacks, improvised explosives (IED) and suicide bombings. It
will also appear that the group which operate in cells under sector leaders or commander and
which has adopted guerilla method hardly relate directly with the new leader Abubakar Shekau.
Of particular interest was the growing attack on prison facilities obviously to free their detained
members.

Concluding Notes: For How Long?

Since Nigerian independence in 1960, Northern Nigeria has remained the fertile ground of ethno-
religious violence. At independence, Nigeria inherited a secular state erected on the shaky sand
63
N.D. Danjibo,. Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The “Maitatsine” and “Boko Haram” Crises in
Northern Nigeria. 2009 http://www..ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/N-
_D_DANJIBO_Islamic_Fundamentalism_and_Sectarian_Violence_The_Maitatsine_and_Boko_Haram_Crises_in_
Northern_Nigeria.pdf.; Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, and Dermot A. Lane, eds. The New Dictionary of
Theology. Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press.1993
64
Sola Fasure, 2009. A Loaded Season of Violence. The Nation on Sunday (Lagos), 2 August 2009, p. 2.; Ismail
Omipidan, 2009a. 2009a “Revealed! How Yusuf’s Father Began Boko Haram Ideology in the 1960s” Saturday Sun
(Lagos), 26 September,48
65
Agency Reporter. “ Boko Haram Posters Flood Borno” The Punch (Lagos), 23 October 2010.
of religious intolerance and ethnic jingoism. The politicization and manipulation of ethnic and
religious factors by the Northern elite made violence inevitable in the region. The exploitation
and breeding of ignorant “street boys” (unemployed youths) and armed gangs like the Almajirai,
Yan Tauri, Yan Daba, Yan Banga, and Yan Dauka Amarya and infiltration of Northern Nigeria
by militant groups from the neighbouring countries have not only provided the ready tools of
insurgencies but also made some parts of the north, like Kano, Bauchi and Maiduguri, to remain
hot spots. The usual approaches of brutal suppression and establishment of tribunals whose
report are neither made public nor implemented by the Federal Government leave so much doubt
about the readiness of the Government to tackle the problem headlong.

Worsening is the breaking revelation of the involvement of the Borno (and possibly Yobe and
other states in the North East) political elite across the divide of political parties in the Boko
Haram web. Beyond serving to confirm the old thesis of the influence of political undertone,
sympathy, patronage or collaboration, it is an indication of how long the insurgency may linger
particularly if political solution is not considered alongside other options.