Page 45-47, 50

1. I believe the ideological differences along with fear and suspicion are the biggest
factors leading to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance. Of course, the great power
rivalry and the different economic interests ultimately aided the breakdown of the
Grand Alliance. This is because most of the decisions taken from either side
stemmed from their ideological points of view and interests: the fears of the USA
originated from their disapproval and dislike of Communism, as well as (and
especially) from the rising probability of a global Communist takeover. Thenceforth,
the United States’ primary goal was to bring Communism to a halt as much as
possible, if not entirely. The USSR on the other hand, saw USA’s foreign policy and
Marshall Plan as a direct threat and act to deliberately undermine them. They called
USA’s expansionism and introduction of a new currency as ‘dollar imperialism’, in
which they would be able to sway European countries to become capitalist societies
and abolish communism. Apart from this, Stalin wanted physical, geographical
security. He was terrorized at the thought of allowing Germany even just a mere
sliver of a chance at attacking a third time, which made the USSR see USA’s dollar
imperialism as aggressive. From these fears, actions were taken to prevent what
either side thought the worst to be. Therefore, ultimately everything stems from the
ideological differences between the USSR and USA. All the fears come from their
differences in ideologies, and from their fears, economic and aggressive actions were
taken.
P48-49:

USSR USA

2. Naturally both sides have their faults. The USSR should not have broken its promises
made in the Yalta conference, particularly those regarding Poland and the Eastern
European liberated by the Red Army’s ability to have free elections. In addition to
this, it is true that the Soviet Union was expanding itself using Salami Tactics to
takeover more of Eastern Europe by the end of 1948, as well as setting up a Stalinist-
style 1-party state with no individual freedoms and no true elections in those
countries. This was perceived as aggressive and expansionist from the US’s point of
view, which is understandable. But the USA should not have pushed the USSR’s
buttons by provoking them. The United States knew how much fear Stalin had of
another attack from the West – which was ultimately the essence of the reason for
his expansionism, to create a buffer zone- yet was so obsessive in its halting
communism that they lacked this consideration. They also left out the USSR in a lot
of the agreements and decisions, as well as set up their one state in Germany :
Trizonia, without the USSR. This increased the suspicions the USSR had. The
obsession the US had with getting rid of communism made them ignore evidence
contrary all actions of the USSR as being ideological. All in all, the US provoked the
USSR with a new currency, the Marshall Plan and the dropping of the atomic bomb
(as well as the arms race). Of course, Stalin’s actions and intentions were not pure
and without-fault: the USSR had conquered the majority of Eastern Europe and
stripped them of food, resources, a stable currency, decent living conditions and
individual freedom; my point is simply that Stalin’s actions started out as a means for
 defending the USSR from possible attacks, it was the US’s interpretation and
obsession with getting rid of communism which then triggered Stalin’s seemingly
aggressive actions. They were both aggressive towards one another, it was only the
USA which started it first.

P51-54:
3. My view on the breakdown of the Grand Alliance and the Cold War is halfway
between the post-revisionist view and the revisionist view. I do believe the USSR has
their faults and obviously played their part in the breakdown of the Grand Alliance,
but the USA’s aggression can be considered the catalyst of what triggered the chain
reaction of seemingly aggressive acts from both sides. I do also understand the
United States and the motivations behind their actions, which is why I partly have a
post-revisionist view on the situation.