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1. Introduction
Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that uses cryptography to ensure
transmission and access security (Du et al., 2017). With the characteristics of
decentralization, stability, security, traceability and immutability, blockchain has
attracted the attention of the business community. According to a PwC survey, 84% of
companies are dabbling in blockchain (Rooney, 2018). The World Economic Forum (2015)
predicts that 10% of the world’s GDP will be stored on the blockchain network by 2027.
Although it has great potential, blockchain implementation is still risky, with technical and
operational challenges (Babich and Hilary, 2020). It is still uncertain whether blockchain
can bring competitive advantages to companies. On the one hand, blockchain has inherent
technical problems, such as scalability, which will increase storage space and reduce
propagation speed (Yin et al., 2019), and the proof method of work needs a lot of energy to
calculate, which will waste too much energy (Zheng et al., 2018). On the other hand, great
The study is funded by funds from National Key R&D Program of China (No. 2020YFA0908600) and
International Journal of Operations
from National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72241432 and 72002151 and 72091210/ & Production Management
72091214). © Emerald Publishing Limited
0144-3577
Conflict of interest: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. DOI 10.1108/IJOPM-11-2022-0711
IJOPM specific investments are required to align blockchain with companies’ strategies and
operations (Durach et al., 2021). Additionally, the Black-box effect and lack of
standardization also hinder companies from achieving profits from blockchain
implementation (Babich and Hilary, 2020). Therefore, it is an important research
question to explore the relationship between blockchain implementation and company
performance.
Blockchain can be implemented in many fields, among which supply chain (SC)
management is one of the most promising application scenarios (Babich and Hilary, 2020).
Blockchain enables information shared across SC members to be more credible and
immutable, which provides solutions to numerous challenges to complex supply
networks at a time when SC agility, speed and transparency are critical (Cole et al.,
2019). Hastig and Sodhi (2020) posited that blockchain implementation improves SC
traceability, which further facilitates sustainability and SC coordination. Martinez et al.
(2019) claimed that the implementation of blockchain in order management can reduce the
average lead time and improve SC visibility. Deloitte (2020) predicts that the proportion of
commercial applications of blockchain in the SC will increase from 5% to 54% in the next
five years. Companies including Amazon, IBM and Maersk are exploring use cases for
this technology in their SCs (Babich and Hilary, 2020; Rooney, 2018). IBM and Maersk use
blockchain to improve logistics and shipping (Box, 2018). Nestle and other food giants
have implemented blockchain to trace food contamination in SCs (Rooney, 2018). Nike is
exploring blockchain for SC data collection and uses Hyperledger to upload SC data to
blockchain (Haig, 2020). In addition, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) white
paper also published many successful blockchain-based SC cases (WTO, 2019). In China,
large companies have applied blockchain in managing their complex SC networks. For
example, JD.com has improved the overall information transmission efficiency with its
enormous number of suppliers and consumers through the BaaS platform (https://baas.
jd.com/). Lenovo has developed a shared ledger based on blockchain to solve the problems
of e-procurement and order information processing between suppliers and distributors
(https://brand.lenovo.com.cn/).
SC networks can be regarded as complex adaptive systems (CASs) (Choi et al., 2001;
Yeoman and Santos, 2019; Zhao et al., 2019). CASs is a self-organizing system, which evolves
and develops continuously through links between agents and adapting to the environment
(Choi et al., 2001). In a complex SC network, blockchain implementation can change the
relationship between SC partners (Babich and Hilary, 2020) and create new business models
(Lumineau et al., 2021), while adapting to the complex internal and external environment for
coordinated convolutions. Compared with the centralized information system, the
decentralized blockchain can support the dispersed and globally distributed SC partners,
improve the autonomy and spontaneity of the agents and promote the complex SC’s self-
organizing behavior (Swierczek, 2023). This paper would explore how blockchain play a role
in complex SC networks based on the CASs perspective. Specifically, it would explore the
mechanism of how blockchain implementation impacts company stock reaction by
considering the contingency effect of business diversification, SC concentration and
environmental complexity.
First, business diversification is a key issue in strategic management and represents
internal complexity (Tang et al., 2019). Previous research has examined the effects of business
diversification in different aspects. However, there is still a gap in the relationship between
business diversification and blockchain implementation (Su and Tsang, 2015). On the one
hand, business diversification increases complexity and leads to higher internal coordination
costs. Companies would have more difficulties monitoring the business processes (Su and
Tsang, 2015; Tang et al., 2019). On the other hand, the decentralization and sharing
characteristics of blockchain may solve the potential problem of business diversification
because it can play a positive role in information transfer and resource sharing between Blockchain and
multiple business units (Wang et al., 2021). Therefore, there is a need to verify the impact of shareholder
business diversification on the value of blockchain implementation.
Second, from the operational point of view, although great attention has been paid to
value
blockchain implementation in SCs, previous research mainly focused on blockchain technical
characteristics and overlooked SC characteristics (Babich and Hilary, 2020; Hastig and Sodhi,
2020). With the wide application of new-generation technologies, SCs have become more
intelligent but also more complex (Hastig and Sodhi, 2020; Lam et al., 2019; Olsen and Tomlin,
2020). The complex SC involves many suppliers and customers, which may affect the value of
blockchain implementation (Fosso Wamba et al., 2020). SC concentration (including supplier
and customer concentration) emphasizes the reduction of network complexity (Giannoccaro
et al., 2018; Kim, 2017). A complex SC not only reduces operational efficiency, it is also a
precursor to SC disruption (Bozarth et al., 2009). Blockchain can make information sharing
between SC members more credible and immutable, and more likely to be leveraged to solve
challenges in complex networks (Cole et al., 2019). Therefore, more empirical evidence is
needed to explore the influence of SC concentration on the value of blockchain
implementation.
Third, firms need to configure their business to adapt to the ever-changing and complex
environment (Azadegan et al., 2013). According to the CASs perspective, the external
environment influences the adaptive behavior of agents in the network (Choi et al., 2001; Zhao
et al., 2019). Traditionally, firms rely on contractual and relational tools to coordinate
diversified business units and govern transactions with SC partners. They have to make
specific investments if the environment is complex and uncertain, which leads to high
transaction costs (Lumineau et al., 2021). Blockchain technology is considered as a useful
governance tool in the complex environment (Lam et al., 2019). The decentralized and
traceable characteristics of blockchain can help firms to obtain reliable information and
establish a technology-driven trust relationship with upstream and downstream partners
(Lumineau et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2021). Extra resource investments due to environmental
complexity would be economized if firms implement blockchain in their operations.
Therefore, we further explore how blockchain implementation influences shareholder value
in a complex environment.
In summary, two pertinent research questions are explored in this study: (1) Does
blockchain implementation improve stockholder value? (2) Do business diversification, SC
concentration and environmental complexity affect the relationship between blockchain
implementation and stockholder value? The empirical analysis is based on 138 blockchain
implementation announcements of listed companies on the Chinese A-share stock market.
The time frame is from January 2015 to December 2021. The results show that blockchain
implementation has a positive impact on stockholder value, and this impact will be
moderated by business diversification, SC concentration and environmental complexity.
In the post hoc analysis, we further explore the impact of blockchain implementation on long-
term operational performance.
The findings will make the following contributions. First, our research shows the effect of
blockchain implementation on shareholder value varying from business diversification, SC
concentration and environmental complexity. Specifically, companies with higher
diversification have brought more significant stock returns to blockchain implementation.
Interestingly, customer concentration and supplier concentration have different moderating
effects on blockchain implementation and stock market reaction. Companies with lower
customer concentration gain more positive shareholder value with blockchain
implementation. However, the stock market reaction to blockchain implementation is not
affected by supplier concentration. In addition, the implementation of blockchain in a low-
complex environment will have a higher positive impact on stock returns. The research
IJOPM results may help to solve the dilemma of blockchain implementation in the upstream and
downstream of the SC and guide the follow-up research. Second, this paper provides evidence
of the different effects of blockchain implementation on short- and long-term performance.
Our research gives further evidence that blockchain implementation can lead to positive
stock returns in the short term but hurts long-term operational performance. In addition, in
the post hoc analysis, this paper provides initial evidence that the moderator effect of
customer concentration on long-term operating performance is opposite to that of short-term
performance. This finding seems to be particularly critical for blockchain implementation in
complex SC networks and provides preliminary evidence for future research. Third, this
research gives a more comprehensive explanation of the mechanisms of blockchain
implementation from the CASs perspective and contributes to the theory by adding a
technology component to CASs. The theoretical findings help to explain how firms
implement blockchain to gain competitive advantages by simultaneously considering
internal operational complexity and external environmental complexity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will review the relevant
literature. Section 3 will develop the research hypotheses. Section 4 will outline the
methodology with a brief description of blockchain announcements and samples. Section 5
will present the research results. Section 6 will present the post hoc analysis, followed by
discussions and implications in Section 7.
2. Theoretical background
2.1 Blockchain and its implementation
With the characteristics of openness, tamper-proof modification, anonymity, decentralization
and traceability, blockchain can improve information credibility and transparency, realize
the trusted transaction process and reduce cost (Du et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2019). Studies on
seeking the impact of blockchain implementation have recently emerged (Fosso Wamba et al.,
2020; Hastig and Sodhi, 2020). For example, Danese et al. (2021) discovered that the
application of blockchain in product counterfeiting can effectively prevent counterfeiting.
Pun et al. (2021) discussed how the government can incentivize manufacturers to implement
blockchain to deal with counterfeiting challenges. Chod et al. (2020) discovered that
blockchain implementation can help a company get favorable finance terms at a lower signal
cost. Wang et al. (2021) built a transparent and fair SC data contribution mechanism through
blockchain to promote data sharing. Kurpjuweit et al. (2021) claimed that blockchain is
expected to increase the competitiveness of additive manufacturing and reduce
logistics costs.
From a financial view, previous studies have shown that investors will respond
positively to IT investment (Bose and Leung, 2019; Nishant et al., 2017). Similar to IT
investment, blockchain announcements can also send a positive signal to investors and
stakeholders that companies have realized the potential advantages of blockchain applied
in business models (Klockner et al., 2022). In addition, institutional investors are usually
concerned about data security (Bose and Leung, 2019), and the decentralization and
traceability of blockchain contribute to information transmission between companies,
which can reduce data fraud problems (Danese et al., 2021) and prevent counterfeiting
(Chod et al., 2020; Pun et al., 2021). Some empirical evidence also shows the positive effect of
blockchain implementation. Klockner et al. (2022) validate the financial performance
improvement due to blockchain implementation from a case, project and company
perspective. Cheng et al. (2019) and Cahill et al. (2020) found a positive investor reaction to
blockchain announcements.
Despite the great progress of blockchain implementation in recent years, previous studies
also proved that implementing blockchain is still risky, with technical and operational
challenges (Babich and Hilary, 2020). First, scalability is an inherent technical problem of Blockchain and
blockchain. Each transaction adds another block to the history of all transactions, and each shareholder
block carries the complete history of all transactions (Yin et al., 2019). Second, privacy is
another important issue. Hackers can infer the actual transaction output with 80% accuracy
value
(Li et al., 2020). Once a hacker enters the blockchain, all customer information will be exposed
because the information is permanently stored. Third, the proof of work method needs a lot of
power to perform the calculation. Therefore, blockchain will waste power energy excessively
(Zheng et al., 2018). Additionally, the Black-box effect and lack of standardization also hinder
companies from implementing blockchain (Babich and Hilary, 2020).
Previous literature used different research methods, such as mathematical modeling,
survey, and case study to explore the opportunities and challenges of blockchain
implementation (Chod et al., 2020; Pun et al., 2021). For example, Ziolkowski et al. (2020)
analyzed the decision-making problems of blockchain systems through case studies. Danese
et al. (2021) used a multiple-case study to explore how to design a blockchain system to
prevent counterfeiting. Kurpjuweit et al. (2021) combined inductive in-depth interviews and
Delphi methods to discuss the impacts and obstacles of blockchain implementation. Chod
et al. (2020) explored the benefits to different types of companies or SCs brought by
blockchain implementation through a parsimonious model. Falcone et al. (2021) adopted
situation-based investigations to understand managers’ views and wishes concerning
blockchain implementation. However, empirical evidence regarding whether and to what
extent blockchain implementation will affect company performance is still lacking.
3. Hypothesis
3.1 The direct effect of blockchain implementation on shareholder value
As an emerging technology, blockchain can not only bring competitive advantages by
reshaping processes and promoting new business models (Babich and Hilary, 2020; Hastig
and Sodhi, 2020), it can also solve the obstacles that exist in other technologies (Chanson et al.,
2019). The aggregation of blockchain eliminates the need for personal trust and can increase
mutual trust based on high-quality information (Babich and Hilary, 2020). Blockchain also
enables companies to track the entire order process and improve operational visibility (Hastig
and Sodhi, 2020). Martinez et al. (2019) found that blockchain implementation reduces the
average order time and improves operational efficiency. Danese et al. (2021) claimed that
blockchain applied in product counterfeiting can effectively prevent counterfeiting. Chod
et al. (2020) hold that blockchain ensures the verifiability of transactions so that small and
medium-sized companies can transmit high-quality information and obtain favorable
financing conditions.
Previous studies have shown that the announcement of IT plans can generate stock
market value (Nishant et al., 2017). Therefore, we believe that the market will react positively
to blockchain implementation. Abnormal returns refer to the stock return difference between
implementing blockchain or not (Lam et al., 2019). Previous studies have also shown that
blockchain implementation can bring positive stock market returns. Cheng et al. (2019) found
an overly positive investor reaction to blockchain mania. Cahill et al. (2020) found that the
stock market reaction to blockchain correlates with Bitcoin price. Klockner et al. (2022)
validate the financial performance improvement due to blockchain implementation from a
case, project and company perspective. Although hypothesis 1 is not novel, we propose it as
the basic baseline of the follow-up research questions (Schmidt et al., 2020).
H1. The market will react positively to blockchain implementation.
Blockchain H1 H4
Shareholder value
Implementation
H5b
H5c H5a
H3a H3b H2
Internal Complexity
Figure 1.
Research model
Source(s): Authors own creation
4.2 Methodology
We use the event study method proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) to evaluate the impact
of blockchain implementation on shareholder value. The event study method is widely used
in operation management, such as SC glitches (Schmidt et al., 2020), SC strategic cooperation
(Liu et al., 2020) and SC scandals (Jacobs and Singhal, 2020). To avoid the lag effect caused by
the too-short estimation period and confusion of other events caused by the too-long
estimation period, this study chooses a 200-day estimation period, starting on day 210 and
ending on day 11 (Jacobs and Singhal, 2020; Schmidt et al., 2020).
We adopt the Fama-French four-factor model to calculate abnormal returns (ARs) (Jacobs
and Singhal, 2020).
Rit ¼ αi þ Rft þ βi1ðRmt Rft Þ þ βi2 SMBt þβi3 HMLt þ βi4 UMDt þ εit (1)
To investigate the impact of events on the overall security pricing, it is also necessary to
calculate the average abnormal return (ARit):
1 XN
ARit ¼ ARit (3)
N i
For a given period [t1 ; t2], the cumulative abnormal return (CARit) is estimated:
Xt2
CAR ½t1 ; t2 ¼ t¼t
ARit (7)
1
The test statistic for a j-day event period, TS j is derived like that for a single day:
Pt2
t¼t AR it
TS j ¼ 1 (8)
b ARit pffij
S
To ensure the accuracy of the results, this study calculates the median and percent positive
abnormal returns and uses a nonparametric test to supplement t test. Wilcoxon signed-rank
test is also used to determine whether the median of abnormal return is significantly different
from zero. The generalized sign test is used to determine whether the percentage of the
positive abnormal returns is different from 50%.
5. Results
5.1 Market reaction to blockchain implementation
We adopt the Fama-French four-factor model to calculate the ARs of blockchain
implementation announcements on the announcement Day 0 and conduct a t test and two
nonparametric tests. Table 2 presents daily ARs and CARs. For 138 announcements, the ARs
IJOPM for day 0 are significantly positive at the 1% level. The Day 0 median AR is 0.97%,
significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. The percent positive ARs for day 0 is 55.80%,
as 55.80% of companies experience a positive abnormal stock return. For the two-day event
period (1,0), the mean CARs are 1.06%, significantly greater than 0 at the 1% level. And
52.17% of companies experience a positive abnormal stock return. Overall, the results
indicate that the stock market reacts positively to blockchain implementation.
Where Salesi;j;t means the company i’s sales to major customer j in the most recent fiscal year t.
Salesit means the total sales of the company i in the most recent fiscal year t.
Supplier Concentration (SC_ Concentration). The measurement for supplier concentration
is similar to that of customer concentration, in which sales are replaced by purchases
(Campello and Gao, 2017; Patatoukas, 2012).
P5
Purchasesi;j;t
j¼1
Supplier concentrationit ¼ (10)
purchasesi;t
Customer Concentration HHI (CCHHI_ Concentration). Since the above measurements do not
consider the number of major customers, we follow the method mentioned in Patatoukas
(2012) and use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the number of major
customers and their importance to the company’s sales.
X5 2
Salesi;j;t
Customer concentration HHI it ¼ (11)
j¼1
Salesi;t
Control variables comprise Market-to-book (MTB), Firm Size (Firm_size), Firm Growth
(Growth), Financial Leverage (Leverage), Inventory turnover (Inventory), R&D intensity
(RD), Industry size (Indus_size) and Bitcoin price (Bitcoin), which are mentioned in
previous literature that may affect shareholder value (Jacobs and Singhal, 2020; Schmidt
et al., 2020; Xia et al., 2016). Companies with a larger size, higher growth, higher R&D
intensity, MTB_ratio and lower financial leverage may have more financial resources and
superior technological skills to support blockchain technology (Xiong et al., 2021).
Inventory turnover can measure the operational efficiency of a business, which
determines how reliant a business is on emerging technologies such as blockchain
(Xiong et al., 2021). Industry size might affect the extent of benefits that firms can capture
from new technology implementation (Shou et al., 2021). Referring to previous studies, we
also use Bitcoin price as a control variable (Cheng et al., 2019; Klockner et al., 2022). In
addition, we control industry (two-digit SIC codes) and time (Year) effect. We also control
industry (two-digit SIC codes) and time (Year) effect. Table 3 presents the measurement
details for hypothesized and control variables.
The regression model is:
ARi ¼ β0 þ β1 BD Diversificationi þ β2 CC Concentrationi þ β3 SC Concentrationi
þ β4 EC Complexityi þ β5 Bitcoini þ β6 Inventoryi þ β7 MTBi þ β8 RDi
þ β9 Firm sizei þ β10 Growthi þ β11 leveragei þ β12 Indus sizei þ β13 Ind i þ β14 Year i
þ εi
(16)
1. CAR 1
2. CC_ 0.019 1
Concentration
3. SC_ 0.012 0.322*** 1
Concentration
**
4. BD_ 0.202 0.033 0.031 1
Diversification
5. EC_ 0.020 0.067 0.051 0.040 1
Complexity
6. Bitcoin 0.157* 0.064 0.152* 0.053 0.097 1
7. Inventory 0.036 0.157* 0.274*** 0.055 0.200** 0.034 1
8. MTB_ratio 0.126 0.0650 0.063 0.111 0.027 0.018 0.168** 1
9. RD 0.180** 0.188** 0.171** 0.066 0.158* 0.031 0.124 0.236*** 1
10. Firm_size 0.029 0.244*** 0.030 0.196** 0.014 0.011 0.080 0.450*** 0.432*** 1
11. Leverage 0.031 0.179** 0.052 0.049 0.026 0.073 0.042 0.114 0.234*** 0.575*** 1
12. Growth 0.021 0.119 0.148* 0.056 0.028 0.124 0.035 0.020 0.061 0.074 0.100 1
13. Industry_ 0.170** 0.159* 0.009 0.123 0.341*** 0.0660 0.065 0.136 0.252*** 0.380*** 0.464*** 0.146* 1
Size
mean 0.010 0.261 0.307 0.572 0.864 11941.213 646.037 3.046 0.058 21.596 1.141 0.239 27.219
SD 0.037 0.159 0.171 0.474 0.110 11868.064 3707.500 2.587 0.052 1.320 1.320 0.407 1.460
Note(s): *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Source(s): Authors own creation
Blockchain and
value
shareholder
Correlation matrix
Table 4.
IJOPM The VIFs of all models presented in Table 5 are less than 3.0, indicating that there is no
multicollinearity. Model 1 contains only control variables, and we add explanatory and
control variables in Models 2–5. Business diversification is significantly positively related to
the dependent variable, suggesting that the stock returns of blockchain implementation are
more positive for companies with higher business diversification. Thus, H2 is supported. The
results indicated that the customer concentration is significantly negative at the 1% level,
indicating that the stock market reaction to blockchain implemented by companies with
lower customer concentration is more positive than that of companies with higher customer
concentration. Thus, H3a is supported. Supplier concentration is positive but not
significantly different from zero. Therefore, H3b is not supported. Environmental
complexity is significantly negative to ARs, suggesting that the stock market reaction to
blockchain implementation is more positive for companies with lower environmental
CC_ 0.055 **
0.060**
0.505**
Concentration (2.09) (2.26) (2.19)
SC_ 0.013 0.020 0.137
Concentration (0.54) (0.89) (0.57)
BD_ 0.017** 0.017** 0.070
Diversification (2.23) (2.24) (0.74)
EC_Complexity 0.101** 0.125*** 0.376**
(2.20) (2.77) (2.43)
EC*CC 0.503*
(1.94)
EC*SC 0.178
(0.67)
EC*BD 0.096
(0.91)
Bitcoin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.22) (1.20) (1.21) (1.29) (1.19) (1.24) (1.19)
Inventory 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.08) (0.73) (0.07) (0.32) (0.02) (0.73) (0.56)
MTB_ratio 0.004** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005***
(2.23) (2.79) (2.24) (2.19) (2.29) (2.92) (2.96)
RD 0.210** 0.235** 0.198** 0.186** 0.213** 0.200** 0.195**
(2.26) (2.55) (2.06) (2.03) (2.34) (2.18) (2.13)
Firm_size 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.010** 0.009** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(2.65) (3.36) (2.57) (2.13) (2.90) (3.12) (3.07)
Leverage 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005
(0.49) (0.28) (0.58) (0.61) (0.52) (0.61) (1.14)
Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.09) (0.13) (0.16) (0.23) (0.10) (0.10) (0.01)
Industry_Size 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.008* 0.009** 0.012***
(0.99) (1.39) (1.00) (0.65) (1.97) (2.34) (2.95)
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
dummies
_cons 0.264* 0.340** 0.260* 0.229 0.257* 0.297** 0.428**
(1.80) (2.28) (1.76) (1.58) (1.78) (2.05) (2.50)
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
R2 0.076 0.104 0.070 0.108 0.107 0.177 0.188
F 1.435 1.587* 1.384 1.615** 1.610** 1.983*** 1.962***
Table 5. Note(s): *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Regression analysis Source(s): Authors own creation
complexity. Thus, H4 is supported. We add customer concentration, supplier concentration, Blockchain and
business diversification and environmental complexity in Model 6, the results are the same as shareholder
those in Model 2–5. In model 7, the results indicated the stock market reaction to blockchain
implementation is more positive for companies with lower customer concentration in a lower
value
complex environment. Thus, H5b is supported.
Results are consistent with those reported using the four-factor model. As presented in Panel
A in Table 6, the mean (median) of the ARs on day 0 is 1.44% (1.01%), significantly greater
In the second-stage regression stage, we add IMRi as an explanatory variable in the model
(17) (Heckman, 1979). Thus, the second-stage regression model is:
ARi ¼ β0 þ β1 BD Diversificationi þ β2 CC Concentrationi þ β3 SC Concentrationi
þ β4 EC Complexityi þ β5 Bitcoini þ β6 Inventoryi þ β7 MTBi þ β8 RDi
þ β9 Firm sizei þ β10 Growthi þ β11 leveragei þ β12 Indus sizei þ β13 IMR þ β14 Ind i
þ β15 3 Year i þ εi
(18)
where β1−15 are obtained by the maximum likelihood estimation method. Show the results of
the second-stage regression estimations model. As a robustness test, we also use the
Heckman two-step procedure to test the results of different expected return models as the
dependent variable. The results presented in Table 8 were the same as Table 5 and Table 7
which did not include IMR. The IMR coefficients were not significant, indicating that our
sample was not biased by self-selection.
5.3.3 Alternative moderator variables. We conducted additional analysis to examine the
effect of business diversification, SC concentration and environmental complexity on
blockchain implementation and market reaction. The robust check is presented in Panel A
of Table 9. In Models 1 and 2, we use the Herfindahl index to measure major customers’ and
suppliers’ importance to companies’ annual sales. The results of Models 1–2 are similar to those
of Models 2–3 in Table 5, indicating that the results are robust. In model 3, we use the Herfindahl
index to measure business diversification. Contrary to the entropy method, the higher the index,
the lower the diversification level. The stock returns of blockchain implementation are more
positive for companies with higher business diversification, further indicating the robustness of
the results. In model 4, we use the mean environmental complexity in the most recent fiscal year
as a robustness test. The result is similar to Table 5, indicating that the results are robust.
Table 8.
IJOPM
model results
Heckman two-step
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Blockchain Fama- Fama- Market- Market-
announcement Four-factor Four-factor French French Market Market adjusted adjusted
decision model model model model model model model model
First stage Second stage
Probit (1) Random effects (2)
Table 9.
Performance-industry-matched
Change 102 0.03% 1.52% 52.94% 62 5.65% 4.44% 64.53% 30 1.54% 2.68% 57.67% 30 5.02% 5.11% 63.33%
in the 0.017 0.269 0.495 3.111*** 2.766*** 2.159** 0.760 0.751 0.548 2.768** 2.808*** 2.739***
level of
NET
Change 102 0.24% 0.12% 51.96% 62 0.62% 0.96% 66.13% 30 0.11% 0.44% 46.67% 30 0.48% 1.09% 66.13%
in the 0.529 0.526 0.297 0.8965 1.812* 2.413** 0.159 0.195 0.183 0.466 1.306 1.278
level of
ROA
Change 101 1.68% 0.14% 50.50% 62 2.70% 1.06% 61.29% 29 0.68% 0.14% 43.33% 29 2.74% 1.06% 60.00%
in the 0.829 0.069 0.000 1.4413 1.553 1.651* 0.639 0.812 0.548 1.262 1.059 0.913
level of
ROS
Change 102 3.24% 0.30% 51.96% 62 1.55% 0.82% 54.84% 30 1.12% 1.26% 40.00% 30 1.47% 0.27% 50.00%
in the 0.772 1.213 0.297 0.4692 0.137 0.635 0.237 0.710 0.913 0.268 0.483 0.000
level of
SOA
Performance-industry-size-matched
Change 100 0.31% 0.36% 51.00% 61 4.38% 3.22% 57.38% 28 0.39% 1.27% 53.57% 29 4.52% 2.94% 70.00%
in the 0.1357 0.75 0.100 2.371** 2.187** 1.024 0.187 0.228 0.189 2.768** 2.714** 0.371
level of
NET
Change 100 0.06% 0.42% 54.00% 61 0.29% 0.75% 62.29% 28 0.34% 0.51% 39.29% 29 0.15% 1.01% 55.17%
in the 0.1171 0.591 0.700 0.411 1.110 1.793* 0.496 0.182 0.945 0.142 0.703 1.793*
level of
ROA
Change 100 0.97% 0.21% 51.00% 61 2.43% 1.11% 59.02% 27 1.37% 0.21% 39.29% 28 2.72% 1.11% 55.17%
in the 0.4649 0.23 0.100 1.2967 1.433 1.280 1.141 1.116 0.945 1.228 1.114 0.371
level of
ROS
(continued )
Blockchain and
value
shareholder
different periods
performance in
Table 10.
Operational
IJOPM
Table 10.
Panel A: From year 2 to year 0 Panel B: From year 0 to year 2 Panel C: From year 1 to year 0 Panel D: From year 0 to year 1
Obs Mean Median % POS Obs Mean Median % NEG Obs Mean Median % POS Obs Mean Median % NEG
Change 100 6.14% 0.02% 50.00% 61 2.90% 2.03% 44.26% 28 1.42% 0.56% 46.43% 29 3.32% 1.93% 37.93%
in the 2.229** 1.021 0.000 0.8678 0.822 0.768 0.285 0.250 0.189 0.590 1.222 1.114
level of
SOA
Performance-size-matched
Change 94 1.16% 0.08% 48.94% 59 4.78% 3.08% 62.71% 28 0.32% 0.82% 53.57% 29 5.18% 3.60% 65.52%
in the 0.735 0.387 0.103 2.502** 2.295** 1.823* 0.151 0.159 0.189 2.780** 2.541** 1.486
level of
NET
Change 94 0.26% 0.03% 50.00% 59 0.28% 0.28% 55.93% 28 0.76% 0.43% 53.57% 29 0.29% 1.13% 62.07%
in the 0.587 0.526 0.000 0.398 1.102 0.781 1.134 1.002 0.189 0.262 1.178 1.114
level of
ROA
Change 94 0.94% 0.09% 50.00% 59 3.31% 1.23% 57.63% 27 0.51% 0.09% 42.86% 28 2.26% 1.23% 55.17%
in the 1.006 0.481 0.000 1.813* 1.766* 1.042 0.421 0.023 0.567 0.929 0.897 0.371
level of
ROS
Change 94 4.24% 0.64% 55.32% 59 1.99% 2.10% 42.37% 28 2.82% 0.97% 39.29% 29 0.72% 1.33% 44.83%
in the 1.826* 1.099 0.928 0.6477 1.011 1.042 0.569 0.342 0.945 0.116 0.508 0.371
level of
SOA
Note(s): *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Source(s): Authors own creation
technologies are competing, their interoperability has not yet been fully established, which Blockchain and
may increase the complexity of the technology system. Second, given the novelty of shareholder
blockchain technology, special trust mechanisms of the technology need to be established.
Although blockchain can sometimes address the issue of trust, it is still based on
value
technological concepts such as distributed systems and trust protocols, rather than specific
individuals, organizations and societies (Babich and Hilary, 2020). Companies may need to
implement protection mechanisms, which will incur additional operating costs (Klockner
et al., 2022).
We further explore how business diversification, SC concentration and environmental
complexity affect the relationship between blockchain implementation and operational
performance. The results presented in Table 11 indicated that the negative effect of
blockchain implementation on operational performance is more negative for companies with
higher customer concentration. Contrary to the short-term stock price, customer
concentration has a negative moderating effect on long-term operating performance. The
coefficient of business diversification and environmental complexity is insignificant,
indicating that the operational performance of blockchain implementation is not affected
by business diversification and environmental complexity.
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Corresponding author
Minhao Gu can be contacted at: minhaogu@tju.edu.cn
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