Ross’s Ethics

William David Ross (b. 1877), a British Aristotelian scholar and moral philosopher, presented a rule-deontological theory
In his book The Right and the Good (Oxford 1938). Though influenced by rule utilitarianism, Ross has
rejected the utilitarian precept that an action is validated as right by its consequences. The outcomes of an
act, however, beneficial and pleasant they may be for many individuals, may not determine its rightness.
And though he was deontologist himself like Kant, Ross considers the latter’s absolute principles to be too
rigid. He perceives that not only do such principles fail to demonstrate sensitivity with regard to the
complexities of actual situations, but they also conflict with one another in some instances. Is it morally
justified, for example to lie to (or withhold the truth from) someone who has no right to know about it?
Does a questioner have the right to know the truth which is not due him? One can discern from these
questions Ross’s apparent trouble with Kant’s absolutism.

Rules and Moral properties:

Despite Kant’s absolutism, however, Ross has perceived the ethical significance of rules in the medical context,
Although moral rules should not be so absolute and inflexible that there are no exceptions whatsoever (Pahl 1981;
Munson 1979). Moral rules serve as guidelines in such a way that they must be adjusted or modified, if not set aside
in some situations depending upon our perception of what is right and good. Consider, for example, the predicament
of whether or not one should lie to a terminally ill patient about his or her condition. Knowing that it would cause
him/her useless anguish and apprehensions, should we tell the patient the truth? Are we not violating the patient’s
trust in us to act morally and to speak the truth, should we withhold it and lie to her?

In the light of these problems, Ross has recognized that there are exceptions for every rule, and in some
situations the latter must be set aside. Absolute rules are often insensitive to the consequences of an act; at times,
not only are they in conflict with one another but they are also inflexible that they become to ever-changing
situations. “Always tell the truth.” But suppose the truth kills the patient, or at least hasten his death?

Right and good are distinct, indefinable, and irreducible adjective qualities, in Ross’s view. Rightness belongs to acts,
independent of motives; hence we speak of good motives. For Ross an act is that which is done, while an action
is the doing of an act. Thus, the doing ( that is the carrying out or execution) of a right act can be the result of a
morally bad motive or inversely, the doing of a wrong act can originate from a good motive.

For Ross then, rightness and goodness are the only two moral properties. Neither can be explained nor replaced by
other properties. When we say an act is right, rightness is a moral property of that act. But it is not identical with the act
per se, precisely because as pointed out earlier, a right act can originate from a morally bad motive. In considering the
rightness of an act, as well as the goodness of a motive, we also have to determine the nonmoral properties or circums-
tances surrounding the act as such. Upon seeing a physician giving someone an injection, for instance, I have to determine
what the injection is and why he is injecting and why the physician is giving the injection (these are the nonmoral
properties, the circumstances).

Once I have determine these nonmoral properties, then I can say he is performing a right or a wrong act. If he is
injecting the right drug (what) to cure the patient’s illness (why) because it is his duty as a physician to do so (why he
is doing it), then his act (injecting the patient) is right. But suppose the physician deliberately injecting the wrong drug
in order to kill the patient, because the latter happens to be his mortal nemesis? Here it becomes increasingly clear
why Ross claims that rightness, as the moral property of an act, is not identical with the act itself (act of injecting). If it
were, then all physician’s acts of injecting people (either with the wrong drug or with a bad motive would be right.

ACTUAL DUTY and PRIMA FACIE DUTY:

If and when moral rules come into conflict in particular situations, how are we to determine which one applies?
To resolve this question, Ross makes a distinction between an actual duty and a prima facie duty (Pahl, 1981). The
former is one’s real duty in a given situation. It is the action one ought to choose from among many other actions.
The latter (which in Latin means “at first view,” or so far as it appears) is one that directs o commands what one ought
T o perform when other relevant factors are not taken into account. More often than not there are several prima facie
duties in a particular circumstance.
Let us illustrate:
I have promised to lend money to a friend in dire need. It is thus my prima facie duty to hand over the money
On the day agreed upon. But suppose for instance, that before I do so, I find that I need the money because my other
had suffered from an attack of asthma, and needs to be hospitalized. Face with two conflicting prima facie duties,
I must now decide on which one is my actual duty in such a situation. According to Ross, “Do whichever act is more
of a duty.” In other words my actual duty in the situation is determined by an examination of the weight of both
prima facie duties in conflict. Which is one stronger of the two? Here one can see that the prima facie duty of
promise-keeping (as I have done for my friend) is not absolute, for it can be overridden by a stronger prima facie
duty under some conditions (such as my duty to an ailing mother in serious condition).

David Ross offers us two principles by which to resolve cases of conflicting duties:
1.) First, act in accordance with the stronger, more stringent or more severe prima facie duty.
2.) Second, act in accordance with the prima facie duty, which has a greater balance of rightness over wrongness
 compared to other prima facie duties.
Ex.: How am I to determine my actual duty in a given situation when there are conflicting prima facie duties? If a
terminally patient asks “Am I going to die?” I have a prima facie duty to tell him the truth. But I also have
the prima facie duty to give him comfort, peace of mind and to spare him from needless suffering.

Ross holds that

a.) one and only one of these two prima facie duties is my actual duty;
b.) I know each of them to be a prima facie duty;
c.) I can only have an opinion ( a personal conviction or perception to the best of my knowledge) about which
is more of a duty” (more crucial, more serious) and therefore, my actual duty.
So, if I can save a person from killing himself by lying to him then my prima facie duty to lie in order to save him
is my actual duty; my prima facie duty to lie is more stringent than my prima facie duty to tell him the truth and
allow him to kill himself.

The problem with Ross’s twofold principle is that he does not tell us how we can determine when one
particular prima facie duty is “more stringent” than another; nor does he give us a rule for settling he greater
balance of prima facie rightness over wrongness between two conflicting duties. For Ross we have to rely on
our moral intuitions (hence, this view is also known as intuitionism) as the ultimate guide in particular cases.
What to do then in such a situation would be:
a.) learn and discern the facts jn the case
b.) consider the possible consequences of our actions;
c.) reflect on our prima facie duties: then
d.) decide on the best course of action under the circumstances.

Ross has listed down seven (7) types of prima facie duties:
a.) duty of fidelity
b.) duty of reparation
c.) duty of gratitude
d.) duty of justice
e.) duty of beneficence
f.) duty of self-improvement
g.) duty of nonmaleficence (i.e., noninfliction of harm)

Durty of Fidelity: We should be faithful to our duties, obligation, vows,or pledges; this likewise refers to one’s
Loyalty to a worthy cause, telling the truth as the situation demands it, keeping actual and
implicit promises, and not representing fiction as truth.
Treachery, deception, hypocrisy, trickery, double-dealing, insincerity, betrayal, lying,