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com

Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 278–284

www.elsevier.com/locate/nucet

Key results of commissioning activities for the emergency and scheduled

cooldown system of the AES-2006 unit with the V-392M reactor plant
D.B. Statsura a,∗, A.G. Volnov a, V.N. Shkalenkov b, K.V. Zhirnov b, R.M. Topchian b
a Branch of JSC “Concern Rosenergoatom” “Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant” Promyshlennaya zona Yuzhnaya 1, Novovoronezh, Voronezh reg., 396071,
Russia
b JSC “Atomenergoproekt”, 7 Bakuninskaya str., build. 1, Moscow 107996, Russia

Available online 15 November 2017

Abstract
The paper describes the combination of safety and normal operation functions adopted in the AES-2006 design, as illustrated by a
two-channel structure of active safety systems, showing the major innovative solutions and their differences from earlier designs, such as:
– The use of a pump-ejector assembly in the primary circuit emergency and scheduled cooldown and spent fuel pool cooling system;
– The emergency and scheduled cooldown and spent fuel pool cooling system is designed as two fully independent channels (each
channels consists of two legs, each channel leg has a capacity of 100%);
– The redundancy rate is 2 × 200%.
Differences in the emergency and scheduled cooldown systems are considered for the V-392M и V-320 designs. Compliance with the
acceptance criteria is shown based on test results, including additional tests performed in different modes during the commissioning of the
Novovoronezh NPP II Unit 1 with the V-392M reactor plant. A description and a pattern are provided for the full-scale simulator tests to
justify the long-term performance of the pump-ejector assembly scheduled for 2017, including an inspection of the water-jet pump nozzle
inner surface condition and the water-jet pump service life tests followed by an examination for possible damage and visible defects on the
nozzle surface.
As a result of the innovations, the overall reliability of safety systems has been improved. The successful completion of the life tests of
the pump-ejector assembly of the emergency and planned cooling system made it possible to confirm the reliability and efficiency of the
water-jet unit used for the first time in the NPP safety systems.
Copyright © 2017, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by
Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Keywords: Redundancy; Combination of functions; Reliability; Safety case; Tests; Ejector; Emergency cooldown; Fuel cooling.

Introduction When designing systems that are part of the active part
of safety systems, in order to increase the functional reliabil-
The NvNPP II Unit 1, the main unit of the AES-2006 ity, it was decided to adopt the principle of combining safety
design with the V-392M RP, was commissioned on February and normal operation functions. The design implements cir-
27, 2017. cuit solutions that make it possible to put operating channels
into safety function execution mode without activation com-
∗ Corresponding author.
mands, or switching mechanisms, or with a minimum amount
E-mail addresses: StatsuraDB@nvnpp1.rosenergoatom.ru (D.B. of switching valves only. This principle significantly reduces
Statsura), VolnovAS@nvnpp1.rosenergoatom.ru (A.G. Volnov), undetected failures [1–5].
Shkalenkov_VN@aep.ru (V.N. Shkalenkov), Zhirnov_KV@aep.ru (K.V. The development of the principle of combining functions
Zhirnov), Topchian_RM@aep.ru (R.M. Topchian). made it possible to adopt simple technological solutions that
Peer-review under responsibility of National Research Nuclear University
MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute).
ensure the execution of a number of successive safety func-
Russian text published: Izvestiya vuzov.Yadernaya Energetika (ISSN tions in the course of accident evolution by a single set of
0204–3327), 2017, n.3, pp. 55–65. mechanisms (e.g., supplying water into the active zone at high
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nucet.2017.11.001
2452-3038/Copyright © 2017, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by Elsevier
B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
 D.B. Statsura et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 278–284
and low pressures), which eliminates the need for additional
switch over operations which are failure sources, reduces the
number equipment items, pipelines, fittings, locks, etc.
One of the differences of the AES-2006 design with the
V-392M RP from serial NPPs with VVER-1000 reactors as
well as from the AES-92 project is a two-channel structure of
active safety systems. This is also one of the main differences
between the NvNPP II design and the LNPP-2 design.
The compliance with the no-single-point-of-failure princi-
ple in the V-392M RP (AES-2006) design was substantiated
by analyzing both the reliability of active security systems
and the allowable outage time for channels of these systems.
Possible failures of the third channel of safety systems are due
to the presence of passive systems that duplicate the execu-
tion of safety functions associated with heat removal from the
reactor core, i.e., the secondary hydraulic accumulators (HA-
2) and the passive heat removal system (PHRS) via steam
generators [6,7,8].
One of the main innovative design solutions is the use of
a pump-ejector assembly (a bunch of a high pressure pump
and a water jet pump) in the primary circuit emergency and
scheduled cooldown and spent fuel pool cooling system; the
functional properties of the assembly are equivalent to the
combined action of low and high pressure pumps in other
NPP designs [7,8,9-11].
This scheme differs favorably from the known solutions,
since it makes it possible to increase the overall reliability
of safety systems, reducing the load on the emergency diesel
generator, to reduce the number of stages of automatic diesel
generator start, and to reduce the amount of valves and inter-
locks.
AES-2006 emergency and planned cooldown system
compared with V-320 analogous system
The emergency and planned cooldown and spent fuel pool
cooling system (JNA) consists of two completely independent
identically equipped channels.
Each channel consists of:
- Emergency and scheduled cooling heat exchanger
11(12)JNA10(20)АС001;
- Low pressure axial pump 11(12)JNA11(21)AP001;
- High pressure axial pump 11(12)JNA12(22)AP001;
- Water-jet pump 11(12)JNA12(22)BN001;
- Reverse and safety valves, shut-off and control valves;
- Pipelines.
The system channel consists of two legs that reserve each
other (except for the emergency primary circuit makeup func-
tion in “small break” modes). Each channel leg has a capacity
of 100%. One leg of the channel is connected between the
drain line check valves of the primary hydraulic accumulator
system, supplying boron solution to the reactor collection and
pressure chambers; the second leg is attached to the hot and
cold legs of the MCC loop. Any of the channel legs can work
on the spent fuel pool cooling circuit. The primary coolant
279
is taken from the hot legs (two DN300 connectors on Loops
2 and 4) for scheduled cooldown and from the cold legs of
the same MCC loops for repair cooldown. The coolant is
taken from the MCC loops with no connected piping of the
emergency and scheduled cooldown and spent fuel pool cool-
ing system, which ensures reliable circulation of the cooled
coolant through the reactor core.
In case of emergency cooldown with loss of integrity of
the primary circuit, water supply to the reactor in the initial
period is carried out from the spent fuel pool with further
transition to supplying from the containment pit.
The main purpose of the leg with one high-pressure pump
and one water-jet pump is to feed the reactor in small break
modes when the primary circuit pressure is below 8 MPa. In
this mode, the water-jet pump plays the role of hydraulic
resistance and ensures the functioning of the high-pressure
pump in the functional area of the head-capacity curve.
An additional purpose of this leg is to reserve the leg
with a low-pressure pump (in case of failure) in the following
modes:
- Emergency reactor makeup low pressure;
- Emergency reactor plant cooling down;
- Scheduled reactor plant cooling down;
- Reactor plant cooling down for maintenance.
The leg with one high-pressure pump and one water-jet
pump reserves the spent fuel pool cooling system.
In these modes, the water-jet pump works for its intended
purpose, i.e., to increase the flow rate supplied by the high-
pressure pump.
Spent fuel pool cooling mode: In normal operation mode,
fuel cooling in the SFP is provided by one of the SFP cool-
ing system channel (FAK10-20). JNA is a backup system: it
ensures fuel cooling in the SFP when the FAK10-20 system
equipment (Fig. 1) is removed out of service for repair. When
the core is completely unloaded in the SFP, the required tem-
perature is maintained by the joint operation of one channel
of the FAK10-20 system and one channel of the JNA system.
Reactor water reserve maintenance and emergency
cooldown mode: In case of large break accidents (the rup-
ture of a pipeline larger than 100 mm in diameter, including
the rupture of the main circulation pipeline with a diameter
of 850 mm), heat removal from the core and maintenance of
the required coolant inventory in the reactor are provided by
continuous circulation of boron solution with the help of the
primary circuit emergency and scheduled cooldown and spent
fuel pool cooling system.
At the starting point of the accident, boron solution is sup-
plied to the reactor from the SFP. Sometime after the begin-
ning of the accident, the water level in the SFP drops to such
a minimum value that the pumps switch to work from the pit.
By this time, a sufficient supply of boron solution is created
in the pit due to the blowdown from the primary circuit (in-
cluding the water reserve of the hydraulic accumulators of the
passive core flooding systems), which is necessary to ensure
the cavitation-free operation of the pumps. After switching
280 D.B. Statsura et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 278–284
Fig. 1. Simplified diagram of the JNA and FAK10-20 system channels.
Fig. 2. Water-jet pump basic diagram.
from the SFP to the pit, the JNA system ensures continu-
ous residual heat removal in a closed loop through the heat
exchanger.
In a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in the primary cir-
cuit, water supply to the reactor at a pressure of 7.9–2.5 MPa
is provided by the high-pressure pump (the booster pump for
the water-jet pump). When the pressure drops below 2.5 MPa,
the low-pressure pump is connected. The water-jet pump is
connected by opening a check valve at a pressure of less than
1.5 MPa in the primary circuit from the spent fuel pool and
a pressure of less than 1.35 MPa from the pit.
Scheduled cooldown mode: In this mode, with a tempera-
ture in the primary circuit up to 150 °C and a pressure be-
low 1.96 MPa, the first circuit is cooled by the JNA system.
The coolant of the primary circuit is taken from the hot part
of MCC Loops 2 and 4 and is supplied through the DN300
pipeline and the heat exchanger to the pump suction to ensure
the coolant circulation. When the high-pressure pumps work
together with the water-jet pumps (Fig. 2), the cooled coolant
returns to the cold parts of Loops 1 and 3, whereas when the
low-pressure pumps work, the cooled coolant returns through
the pipelines connecting the ECCS tanks to the reactor lower
chamber.
Repair cooldown mode: Here the core heat removal is car-
ried out with the reactor cover taken off, at a primary coolant
temperature up to 70 °С. The coolant is taken from the cold
part of MCC Loops 2 and 4. With the help of the system
channels, the coolant is cooled and returned to the hot legs
of Loops 1 and 3 or to the pipelines connecting the ECCS
tanks to the reactor upper chamber.
Water supply to sprinkler nozzles: To reduce the parameters
(pressure and temperature) inside the containment, if the SFP
cooling system fails to supply boron solution to the sprinkler
nozzles, the low-pressure pumps of the JNA system can be
used.
There are five main differences between the emergency
and scheduled cooldown systems for the V-392M and V-320
designs (Table 1):
– For emergency operation modes of the V-392M design,
the water supply requirements are more stringent, because
instead of the flow range, specific values are indicated,
the deviation from which should not exceed 10% (exceed-
ing the value indicated in the table is unacceptable, as it
requires additional justification by the brittle strength cri-
terion of the RP equipment);
– The emergency boron solution reserve for the V-392M de-
sign is stored in the SFP (at the same time, the SFP volume
is used above the level required for the safe storage of fuel
assemblies);
– The redundancy ratio is 3 × 100% for the V-320 design and
2 × 200% for the V-392M design (in addition to the emer-
gency makeup function of the primary circuit in “small
break” mode—in the pressure range of 8–2.5 MPa).
– In the V-392M design, as contrasted with the V-320
project, the system performs the SFP cooling function dur-
ing the complete core unloading into the SFP together with
its cooling system, and also reserves the SFP cooling sys-
tem in case of its failure;
– In the V-392M design, the system reserves the sprinkler
system when it fails to perform the function of reducing
the parameters under the containment.
Test results
During the commissioning of the AES-2006 unit with the
V-392M RP, the following modes were tested:
- Connection of the system to the reactor, especially when
the reactor is unsealed, for scheduled or repair cooldown;
- Residual heat removal from the core to the final absorber
and the primary circuit cooling down at a rate of up to
30 °C/h to temperature of 60–70 °C;
- Maintaining the reactor temperature no higher than 70 °C
during PPM and fuel overloading, and specifically at a
planned water level recession in the reactor;
- Maintaining the reactor temperature no higher than 100 °C
24 h after the reactor shutdown in response to the “primary
 D.B. Statsura et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 278–284 281

Table 1.
Comparison of requirements for the V-320 and V-392 M external systems.

V-320 V-392М
Supplying boron solution (BS) by high-pressure pumps during emergency cooling
Pressure (MPa) Flowrate (m3 /h) Pressure (MPa) Flowrate (m3 /h)
9, with a decrease up to 1.5 130 6.8, with a decrease up to 0 From 0 to 636.5
When the SG pipelines are ruptured, boron solution is supplied to BS supply to the primary circuit (emergency reserve for the
the reactor at a flow rate of at least 250 m3 /h (provided by two operation of the ECCS active part with a volume of 750 m3 ) is
safety channels). At the initial moment, boron solution is supplied at carried out at a concentration of 16 g/dm3 . The use of a
3
a concentration of 40 g/dm with a further transition to supplying pump-ejector assembly (a bunch of a high-pressure pump and a
BS at a concentration of 16 g/dm3 from the pit-tank. water-jet pump), a low-pressure backup pump for the function of
supplying BS to the primary circuit at low pressures in the primary
circuit.
Supplying boron solution (BS) by low-pressure pumps during emergency cooling
Pressure (MPa) Flowrate (m3 /h) Pressure (MPa) Flowrate (m3 /h)
2.1, with a decrease to 0.098 230, with an increase 2.5, with a decrease up to 0 0 with an increase up
up to 750 to 900 (from the
SFP) or up to 874
(from the pit)
Boron solution is supplied from the emergency pit-tank Boron solution is supplied from the emergency pit-tank (emergency
reserve for the operation of the ECCS active part with a volume of
750 m3 ), then the transition is made to supplying from the pit
Scheduled cooldown
Pressure (MPa) Flowrate (m3 /h) Pressure (MPa) Flowrate (m3 /h)
2.1, with a decrease to 0.098 230–750 2.1, with a decrease to 0.098 800
One operating channel is enough. The difference between the Two pumps for one operating channel The difference between the
temperatures of the coolant and water supplied to the primary circuit temperatures of the coolant and water supplied to the primary circuit
does not exceed 30 °C does not exceed 30 °C

Fig. 3. Circulation diagram in emergency operation (exemplified by the first channel).

circuit leak” signal and stabilization of its condition (re-
circulation mode), taking into account the design response
of the ECCS and systems of emergency heat removal via
the secondary circuit;
- Maintaining the temperature in the SFP no higher than
45 °C and no higher than 60 °C when the core is com-
pletely unloaded.
According to the test results, the acceptance criteria were
achieved.
In one of the modes (water supply to the sealed primary
circuit by the pump-ejector assembly from the SFP), it was
found that there is no water supply under a backpressure of
more than 7.4 MPa in the primary circuit (Table 2) from the
pump-ejector assembly, and the acceptance criteria are not
met. In this connection, OKB “Gidropress” carried out addi-
tional design-basis justifications and clarified the requirements
for the backpressure-flowrate dependence of boron solution
supplied to the primary circuit by the pump-ejector assembly.
282 D.B. Statsura et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 278–284

Fig. 4. Test facility schematic diagram: 1—water-jet pump; 2—circulation pump; 3—mechanical filter; 4—heat exchanger; 5—volume compensator; 6—control
valves; 7—reverse valves; 8—stop valves; P—pressure measurement; T—temperature measurement; F—flowrate measurement.

Table 2.
Testing the 11JNA12 channel pump-ejector assembly during water supply from the SFP to the sealed
primary circuit.

Acceptance criteria Test results

Primary circuit Pump-ejector unit Pump-ejector unit Deviation (%)
backpressure (MPa) flowrate (m3 /h) flowrate (m3 /h)

1.12 582.0 570 –2.1

1.13 573.9 558.6 –2.6
1.15 557.8 531.5 –4.7
1.20 517.0 48.1 –6.9
1.3 431.8 386 –10.6
1.33 404.6 347 –14.2
1.35 386.5 322 –16.7
1.40 341.3 313 –8.3
1.46 288.8 311 7.7
1.5 280.6 277.9 –0.96
1.8 252.8 271.693 7.47
2.8 230.8 250.246 8.43
3.8 206.5 227.77 10.3
4.8 180.1 200.54 11.35
5.8 150.4 167.37 11.28
6.8 114.8 113.553 –1.09
7.8 56.6 – –
7.86 39.6 – –
Note: The volumetric flow rate values of the coolant supplied to the primary circuit, may differ in absolute
magnitude from those given in the table by no more than 10%.

To justify the pump-ejector assembly service life, addi-
tional tests were performed at the request of Rostekhnadzor
for the absence of cavitation erosion effects on the water-jet
pump flowpath. The tests of the reduced pump model (1: 2,25)
for 30 days, carried out by the manufacturer of the Turboin-
stitut water-jet pump to determine the pump wet end wear
due to cavitation erosion, were considered inadequate [8].
The tests of the water-jet pump were carried out on the
SFP cooling circuit for 72 h in accordance with the pattern
shown in Fig. 3 [7,8].
The testing success criteria [12-15] were determined as
follows:
– Absence of visible cavitation erosion marks on the water-
jet pump flowpath surfaces;
– Unchangeability of the head-capacity curve (the criteria of
unchangeability—flow values determined by the flowme-
ter installed at the water-jet pump outlet—are within the
measurement accuracy).
The following parameters were controlled during testing:
 D.B. Statsura et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 278–284
– Water temperature in the SFP;
– Water level in the SFP;
– Water-jet pump flowrate;
– Booster pump flowrate;
– Booster pump head/suction pressure.
The tests were carried out at the cold trial stage in Novem-
ber 2015.
An inspection of the internal surfaces of the water jet pump
was carried out using a video endoscope; radiographic and
ultrasonic testing was also carried out.
According to the testing results, there were no signs of
erosion of the flowpath; the water-jet pump flowrate remained
unchanged during the tests.
Taking into account additional tests, the main criticisms of
the JNA system were accommodated and a license for operat-
ing Unit 1 was obtained. However, under the valid operating
license, a special requirement was specified to confirm the
water-jet pump operability at a backpressure of 1.0–1.4 MPa.
The pump operation in this range of backpressure is possible
only when the pump flowrate is equal to the flowrate through
the leak (pressure “hovering” condition). According to ex-
perts, this range of backpressure corresponds to the “hidden”
cavitation mode, and the head-capacity curve of the water jet
pump in this condition is unstable [7–10,16,17].
The duration of this condition is estimated as short-term
(up to an hour), since the operator, according to the emer-
gency response instructions for such situations, should reduce
the primary pressure below 1.0 MPa and transfer the water-jet
pump to the safe operating area.
To resolve the expertise comments and relevant require-
ment of license validity conditions, an additional test program
was prepared for the circuit to simulate the water-jet pump
operation at a backpressure of 1.0–1.4 MPa. The tests were
carried out in March 2016 at the “first criticality” stage be-
fore starting to heat the primary circuit, prior to achieving
minimum controlled reactor power (MCRP). The coolant was
taken from the hot legs of Loops 2 and 4 at atmospheric pres-
sure in the primary circuit. The backpressure was simulated
by supplying the coolant to the primary circuit through the
bypass lines with orifice gages.
In testing the water jet pump, an increased vibration of
the pipelines was detected. However, the water-jet pump op-
erability at backpressure within 16 h is confirmed, according
to the inspection results, there were no signs of erosion of
the flowpath.
Thus, the tests confirmed the absence of cavitation ero-
sion effects on the water-jet pump flowpath; the test success
criteria were achieved.
Additional tests
In November 2016, under the current operating license,
the following requirement was made: “The enterprise must
justify the life characteristics of the pump-ejector assembly at
the test simulator.” To fulfill this requirement, the technical
283
Table 3.
Media parameters during the water jet pump life tests.
Parameter Value
Working fluid Borated water
pH From 4.2
Operating temperature (°C) 70
Operating pressure at the water-jet pump inlet Up to 6.81
(abs.) (MPa)
Pumped (passive) working fluid pressure at the Up to 0.136
water-jet pump inlet (abs.) (MPa)
Pressure at the water-jet pump outlet (abs.) (MPa) Up to 1.49
Flowrate at the water-jet pump outlet (m3 /h) Up to 470
Pumped (passive) working fluid flowrate at the Up to 260
water-jet pump mixing chamber (m3 /h)
assignment “Carrying out the water-jet pump life tests” was
prepared and agreed with JSC “Atomenergoproekt”.
The scope of the water-jet pump life tests includes as fol-
lows:
– Preliminary test of the inner surfaces of the water-jet noz-
zle for damage and visible defects on the nozzle surface
(visual control using photo and video shooting without dis-
assembling the pump);
– Operating time before failure in the amount of 30 days
on the operating parameters (Table 3 corresponding to the
water-jet pump operating mode with water supply to the
primary circuit from the pit (life tests) at the test simulator
(Fig. 4);
– Test of the inner surfaces of the water-jet nozzle for dam-
age and visible defects on the nozzle surface (visual control
using photo and video shooting without disassembling the
pump);
To carry out the tests, it is planned to use centrifugal and
water-jet pumps made for the NvNPP II Unit 2.
The result of the work should be an experimental confir-
mation of the water jet pump operability for 30 days under
its operating conditions, which fully correspond to the oper-
ating conditions of the AES-2006 unit with the V-392M RP
in emergency mode with water supply to the primary circuit
from the pit.
Conclusions
The successful completion of the life tests of the pump-
ejector assembly of the emergency and planned cooling sys-
tem makes it possible to confirm the reliability and efficiency
of the water jet unit used for the first time in the NPP safety
systems.
The introduction of the approved assembly in designing
new NPPs will reduce both equipment costs and time required
for design and justification.
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