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Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 270–277

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Dynamic stability of the VVER-1200 power unit

I.N. Gusev, V.R. Kazanskiy∗, I.L. Vitkovsky
“Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant”, Branch of JSC “Concern Rosenergoatom”, 1 Promyshlennaya zona Yuzhnaya, Novovoronezh, Voronezh Region
396072, Russia
Available online 11 November 2017

Abstract
The paper presents the results of critical experiments to study the dynamic stability of a power unit with the VVER-1200 reactor conducted
as part of the pre-commissioning activities at the pilot operation stage of Novovoronezh NPP II’s unit 1.
The following dynamic tests were conducted:
– trip of one main feedwater pump (MFP) with no standby MFP starting to operate at the power level of 100% Nnom , involving a detailed
analysis of the variation in the process parameters of such mode and the process dynamics, and an assessment of the test results on a
full-scale simulator;
– trip of one out of four reactor coolant pump sets (RCPS) in operation at the power level of 100% Nnom and the reactor plant safety
assessment in the context of the reactor core thermal reliability;
– turbine generator (TG) load shedding to the auxiliary level with assessments for the behavior of the key reactor plant characteristics.
The paper presents records for transients and safety-related process parameters, and describes the operation of the unit components and
essential controls in the dynamic test process. A conclusion is made based on an analysis of the test results that the VVER-1200 unit has a
high dynamic stability.
The results of the dynamic stability studies for unit 1 of Novovoronezh II make it possible to provide a number of recommendations for
further designs, including specifically the following:
– accelerated warning protection (AWP) should be used instead of power reduction and limiting for modes with tripped main feedwater
pumps;
– generator-grid timing devices should be used for modes with the unit operating for auxiliary power supply;
– Russian-developed software and hardware tools should be fully switched to in implementing both normal operation and safety control
systems, since the adjustment of protection and interlocking algorithms used in the AREVA software and hardware package introduced at
Novovoronezh II requires the developer’s authorization which involves substantial time and financial expenditures.
Copyright © 2017, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by
Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Keywords: Dynamic stability; Tests; Reactor; Steam generator; Turbine generator; Control; Pump; Power; Pressure; Flow rate; Level.

Introduction limits for the variation of process parameters without scram

Dynamic stability of an NPP unit during transients is the
capability of systems and components to maintain the design
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: GusevIN@nvnpp1.rosenergoatom.ru (I.N. Gusev),
kazanskiyvr@nvnpp1.rosenergoatom.ru (V.R. Kazanskiy).
Peer-review under responsibility of National Research Nuclear University
MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute).
Russian text published: Izvestiya vuzov. Yadernaya Energetika (ISSN
0204-3327), 2017, n.3, pp. 22-32.
and the unit disconnection from the grid [1].
Modern NPPs have thousands of monitored and controlled
interdependent process parameters capable of varying rapidly
and within broad intervals even in conditions of normal opera-
tion [2]. Such variations can be caused, e.g., by trips of nonre-
dundant components or off-peak load and the subsequent par-
tial or full unit curtailment. Dozens of safety-related param-
eters are monitored by the unit’s automated process control
system (APCS) and are capable to trigger the reactor scram
directly [3–5].

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nucet.2017.10.004
2452-3038/Copyright © 2017, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by Elsevier
B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
 I.N. Gusev et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 270–277
This, undoubtedly, makes it critical to ensure and improve
the dynamic stability of power units.
One of the ways to improve the dynamic stability of an
innovative unit with the VVER-1200 reactor, with [6–9] taken
into account, is to optimize its control algorithms involving
trips of nonredundant key components, including the devel-
opment and implementation of proposals for adjusting the ef-
fective process protections and interlocks based on the expe-
rience of pre-commissioning activities at the power ascension
stages.
The skills of coping with the unit malfunctions with fail-
ures of key components were developed in the operating per-
sonnel of Novovoronezh NPP based on a full-scale simulator
(FSS) put into operation two years before the unit startup.
The simulation of conditions with the trip of one main
feedwater pump (MFP) and the failure of the standby pump
on the FSS to operate included generation of the process pro-
tection signal for the MFPs in operation to trip in response
to the permissible feedwater flow rate having been exceeded
at the pump outlet, leading to the loss of levels in the steam
generators, trip of all reactor coolant pumps (RCP) and the
resultant scram.
With regard for the FSS simulation results and taking into
account [10–14], the conditions during preparations for the
tests with the MFP trip at the 100% power level, the protec-
tion settings for the MFP trip were changed:
– from 8.3 to 8.0 MPa for the pressure protection at the MFP
discharge end;
– from 2050 to 2100 m3/h for the feedwater flow rate pro-
tection;
– from 90 to 300 s for the delay of the MFP to trip in
response to the discharge end flow rate increase.
Tests with trip of one MFP and the standby MFP failure
to start at the 100% Nnom power level
After the trip of MFP-1, the following operation sequence
of the power reduction and limiting (PRL) systems and the
automatic power regulator (APR) was recorded:
– in response to the MFP trip, the PRL started to operate
and began to reduce the reactor power using the first-order
warning protection (WP-1) circuits, while the APR tripped
stopping to control the control and protection system (CPS)
rods in response to the operation of WP-1;
– the PRL stopped to reduce the reactor power at the 79th s
with the neutron power being N = 74.5%; the APR started
to operate to control the CPS rods in the “N” mode and
was keeping the neutron power at that level.
The PRL operation led to the reactor power having been
reduced from 100% to 74.5% Nnom for 75 s. The reactor
power reduction rate during the PRL operation was 0.34%/s.
The position of the regulating 12th CPS rod group changed
from the initial 83–43%. The 11th CPS rod group went down
271
to 95% (Fig. 1) and then moved back to the position for the
operation of the upper limit switches (ULS).
The electrical parts of the turbine regulation system (TRS)
changed over to the “RD” mode in response to the APR trip
and initiated the turbine generator (TG) power reduction. The
power was decreasing from 1157 to 835 mW for 176 s. In the
end state, the TG power stabilized at 830 mW. Meanwhile,
the pressure in the main steam header (MSH) varied between
6.66 MPa and 6.84 MPa. The primary circuit pressure varied
between 15.34 MPa and 16.02 MPa being regulated by the
operation of the pressurizer’s tubular heating elements (THE).
The initial pressure level in the primary circuit was reached
by the 385th s.
The level in the feedwater deaerator varied between 2.19 m
and 2.66 m being regulated by the main level regulator
(MLR1,2). The position of MLR1 was between 2% and 59%
and that of MLR2 was between 0% and 36%. The position
of the starting level regulator (SLR) during the tests was 47%
(Fig. 2).
The pressure in the feedwater deaerator varied between
0.68 MPa and 0.86 MPa. The fast-acting steam dump valve
with discharge to the deaerator (BRU-D1) started to operate
at the 266th s at a pressure of 0.7 MPa, and BRU-D2 started
to operate at the 290th s at a pressure of 0.69 MPa. The
BRU-D1 position was between 0% and 43%, and the BRU-
D2 position was between 0% and 21%.
The level in low pressure reheater (LPR) 2 was regulated
by MLR1,2 and was between 2.0 m and 4.2 m. The MLR1
position was between 3% and 70%, and the MLR2 posi-
tion was between 6% and 28%. The SLR position was 50%
throughout the tests.
The steam pressure in the auxiliary header (AH) during the
tests was between 0.68 MPa and 0.86 MPa, and no auxiliary
BRUs were in operation.
The level in the turbine condenser increased from initial
0.9–1.12 m and stabilized at 0.93 m at the test end.
Prior to the trip of MFP1, the total flow rate at the MFP
discharge end was 7422 m3 /h. The flow rate in the tripped
MFP1 decreased to zero for 7 s. The flow rates in MFPs
2,4,5 increased to between 1953 and 2046 m3 /h (in each
MFP) and was maintained by the level regulators (LR) in
the steam generators (SG) in the MFP discharge end feedwa-
ter rate maintenance mode. As the result of the reactor power
reduction, the flow rates at the MFP discharge end stabilized
at 1700 m3 /h (in each MFP). At the 220th s, after the level
in SG-3 increased to the rated value, the level regulators in
the SG changed over to the SG level maintenance mode. The
pressure at the MFP discharge end did not go down to below
8.18 MPa. At the end of the tests, the MFP discharge end
pressure was about 9 MPa. As the result of the tests, the time
delay for the MFP trip in response to the flow rate being in
excess of 2100 m3 /h is recommended to be set at not less
than 300 s.
During the transient, the levels in SGs 1–4 varied between
2.38 m and 2.81 m (Fig. 3). The positions of the starting SG
LRs were between 26% and 28%. The positions of the main
SG LRs were between 30% and 82%.
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Fig. 1.. Reactor power variation and positions of the CPS rod groups in the power reduction process: 1, 2 – groups 10, 11; 3 – group 12; 4 – reactor power.

Fig. 2.. Deaerator level and positions of the deaerator level regulators: 1 – deaerator level; 2 – SLR position; 3 – MLR2 position; 4 – MLR1 position.

Fig. 3.. SG levels: 1 – SG-1; 2 – SG-2; 3 – SG-3; 4 – SG-4.

 I.N. Gusev et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 270–277
The level in the pressurizer varied between 8.1 m and
6.8 m in accordance with the average primary coolant tem-
perature and stabilized at 7.2 m. The primary circuit makeup
rate varied between 36 and 50 m3 /h. The primary circuit blow-
down rate during the tests was 30 m3 /h.
As the result of analyzing the variation of process param-
eters in the mode under consideration, the process dynamics
and the results of this FSS test, a conclusion can be made that
the use of AWP in this mode would be a preferred option as
compared to power reduction through PRL. The reason is that
a faster reactor power reduction through the AWP leads to the
imbalance between the reactor and TG power being securely
eliminated and the main unit regulators, including the SG
feeder assembly, stabilizing much faster the secondary distur-
bances caused by the MFP trip and the AWP operation. Such
mode allows the reactor and TG power to be balanced as fast
as possible.
It is required to assess the effects of such power reduction
on the operating conditions of main regulators which need
to be no worse than during the PRL power reduction. Such
balance of controlling actions and controls, as we see it, is
much more reliable and offers a much greater potential for
ensuring the dynamic stability of the power unit.
On the other hand, OKB Gidropress was rational enough
in having rejected the second option (use of AWP) due to the
cost minimization, though the new unit is expected to have
an innovative approach also to issues of dynamic stability in
modes with the trip of key components.
Tests with trip of one RCPS out of four in operation at
100% Nnom power level
When the reactor coolant pump set (RCPS) tripped, its
rundown time was 64 s. The following AWP, PRL and APR
operation sequence was recorded:
– the AWP operated in response to the RCPS trip;
– the APR tripped stopping to control the CPS rods in re-
sponse to the AWP operation;
– the AWP group dropped to the level of the lower limit
switch (LLS) operation, and the reactor power decreased
from 99.4% to 54.6% Nnom for 2.2 s as recorded by the
neutron flux control equipment (NFCE);
– the reactor power started to increase thanks to the power
and temperature reactivity effects;
– 6 s after the AWP started to operate, its signal was can-
celled, and the APR started to operate in the “N” mode
with the preset power level equal to 56.7% Nnom;
– by the 13th s, the APR reduced the reactor power to 57.8%
Nnom acting on the 12th CPS rod group which dropped
from 85% to 82% and did not change further its position
until the test end;
– thanks to the APR operation, the reactor power decreased
to 53.4% Nnom; meanwhile, the APR, beginning at the
22th s, increased the reactor power and stabilized it at
57.3% Nnom by the 104th s acting on the AWP group;
the AWP position at the test end was 112 cm (30%);
273
– the PRL operated and tripped at the time the AWP group
dropped and did not contribute to the action on the CPS
rods.
The maximum temperature at the fuel assembly (FA) outlet
during the transient reached 335.3 °C, and the linear power
density margin increased from 39 to 175 W/cm.
In response to the AWP signal, the TRS electrical parts
reduced the TG power from 1101 to 470 mW, then changed
over to the “RD” mode and stabilized, in the end state, the
TG power at 613 mW. The MSH pressure varied between
6.78 MPa and 7.12 MPa. No fast-acting steam dump valves
with discharge to the condenser (BRU-K) were in operation
(Figs. 4 and 5).
The temperature in the hot leg of loop 3 was decreasing
from 325 to 282 °C and stabilized at 285.8 °С.
The pressurizer level varied between 8 m and 6.83 m fol-
lowing the average primary coolant temperature. The makeup
rate did not vary during the tests. The blowdown rate was
30 m3 /h and did not vary in the course of the tests.
The pressure in the primary circuit varied between
15.4 MPa and 16.0 MPa and was regulated by the pressurizer
THE operation. At the end of the tests, the primary circuit
pressure was close to the initial value. The variation in the
maximum coolant temperature value at the FA outlet is shown
in Fig. 6.
The level in SG-3 (the loop with the tripped RCPS) varied
between 2.42 m and 2.79 m and was close to the rated value
(2.7 m) by the test end. The level regulator in SG-3 changed
over to the starting mode, the MLR of SG-3 closed by the
40th s, and the level in SG-3 was further regulated by SG-3 s
SLR, being between 0% and 25%. The feedwater flow rate
in SG-3 after the MLR closure decreased to zero by the 56th
s.
The levels in SG-1,2,4 were between 2.55 m and 2.82 m,
approaching the rated value (2.7 m) by the test end. The
position of the main level regulators in SG-1,2,4 was between
16% and 51%. The starting level regulators in SG-1,2,4 were
26% opened throughout the test. The feedwater flow rate in
SG-2,4 decreased from the initial value to between 1000 and
1400 m3 /h to each SG at the test end.
The level in the feedwater deaerator was controlled by
MLR1 and varied in a range of 2.38 m to 2.58 m. The posi-
tion of MLR1 varied between 32% and 68% and was about
35% at the test end. The deaerator MLR position was 51%
in all tests.
The pressure in the feedwater deaerator varied in the limits
of 0.7–0.72 MPa and was regulated by the steam extraction
for the deaerator and by the operation of BRU-D2. BRU-D2
started to open at the 85th s and its position was 39.5% at
the test end.
The pressure in the auxiliary header was regulated by the
operation of fast-acting steam dump valves with discharge
to the auxiliary header (BRU-SN1) and was at a level of
0.7 MPa. The BRU-SN1 position was about 16%.
The level in LPR-2 was between 2.5 m and 4 m. The
position of MLR1 for LPR-2 varied between 18% and 84%
274 I.N. Gusev et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 270–277

Fig. 4.. Reactor power and position of CPS rod group 12 and the AWP group: 1 – group 12; 2 – reactor power; 3 – AWP group.

Fig. 5.. TG load and MSH pressure: 1 – TG power; 2 – MSH pressure.

Fig. 6.. Maximum coolant temperature value at FA outlet.

 I.N. Gusev et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 270–277 275

Fig. 7.. TG speed during the TG load shedding to the auxiliary level.

Fig. 8.. Reactor power and positions of the CPS rod groups: 1 – position of CPS rod group 12; 2 – reactor power; 3 – AWP group position; 4 – position of
CPS rod group 11.

and was about 30% at the test end. MLR2 of LPR-2 was
32% opened at the beginning of the tests and then closed.
The position of the SLR for LPR-2 was about 48%.
The level in LPR-4 was increasing to 1.4 m.
A conclusion can be made that the RCPS trip mode is safe
for the reactor facility in terms of the core thermal reliability.
TG load shedding to the auxiliary level
– the AWP started to operate in response to the trip of the
unit switches, the AWP group dropped onto the ULS, and
the reactor power decreased from 98% to 56.7% Nnom as
recorded by the NFCE;
– the PRL started to operate in response to the trip of the unit
switches and was reducing the reactor power using WP-
1 acting on CPS rod groups 12 and 11; the 12th group
dropped 40%, and the 11th group dropped 92%;
– the APR tripped stopping to control the CPS rods in re-
sponse to the AWP operation.

The APR in the initial state was in the “T” mode, and the
TRS electrical parts were in the “RM” mode. The tests were
started with the trip of the 500 kV gas-insulated switchgear
unit switches from the MCR.
The maximum turbine overspeed was 3100 rpm, and the
minimum reduction was 2910 rpm. The unit auxiliary load
was 65 mW. The TRS electrical parts kept the turbine speed
at a level of 3000 rpm, but there were self-oscillations of
±20 rpm recorded with a step of 18–20 s (Fig. 7).
It is recommended that the turbine speed regulator settings
should be adjusted.
The following sequence of the AWP, PRL and APR oper-
ation was recorded:
By the 116th s, the neutron power was equal to
N = 39.8%. The APR started to control the CPS rods in
the “N” mode and was keeping the neutron power at that
level by acting on the AWP group. With the AWP position
being 18%, the reactor operator switched the APR over to the
11th CPS rod group. After the 11th CPS rod group reached
the ULS, the reactor operator changed the APR control over
to the 12th CPS rod group. At the end of the tests, the AWP
group position was 24%, group 11 was on the ULS, and the
position of group 12 was 85%.
As the result of the PRL operation, the reactor power de-
creased from 56.7% to 40% Nnom for 68 s (Fig. 8). The reactor
power reduction rate during the PRL operation was 0.25%/s.
276 I.N. Gusev et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 270–277
Fig. 9.. Pressure above the core and in the MSH: 1 – in the MSH; 2 – above the core.
The BRU-K opened in response to the TG load shedding
signal for one or two seconds after the unit switches tripped.
The maximum BRU-K opening was 80%. The MSH pressure
was between 6.8 MPa and 7.23 MPa and was stabilized by
the BRU-K operation at 7.0 MPa. At the end of the tests, the
BRU-K position was between 23% and 37%.
The pressurizer level varied between 7.68 m and 5.6 m
depending on the primary coolant temperature and the pres-
surizer level regulator operation. The makeup rate varied be-
tween 12 and 70 m3 /h. The primary circuit blowdown rate
during the tests was 30 m3 /h.
The pressure in the primary circuit (Fig. 9) was between
15.9 MPa and 14.9 MPa depending on the average primary
coolant temperature and the pressurizer THE operation. In the
end state, the primary circuit pressure was close to the initial
level (15.9 MPa).
At the time of the load shedding and the pressure increase
in SG-1–4, there were false level reductions observed in SG-
1 (to 2.45 m at the minimum), as indicated by the low-base
level meters. Further, the measured levels in SG-1–4 were
between 2.53 m and 2.79 m. At the sixth second, the auxiliary
feedwater pump (AFP) started to operate in response to the
false level reduction in SG-1 to “–150 . It is recommended
that there should be an 8 s delay in the AFP operation in
response to the SG level reduction to “–150 .
The positions of the MLRs for SG-1–4 were between 56%
and 10%. Further, the positions of the SLRs for SG-1–4 dur-
ing the tests were 29%. The level in the feedwater deaerator
varied between 2.4 m and 2.6 m being regulated by MLR1
(10LCA20AA201). The position of MLR1 was between 26%
and 64%. The position of the SLRs during the tests was 50%.
The pressure in the feedwater deaerator was between
0.68 MPa and 0.75 MPa. The position of BRU-D1 was be-
tween 0% and 73%, and the position of BRU-D2 was between
0% and 58%.
The level in LPR-2 was regulated by MLR1 being between
1.2 m and 3.6 m. The position of MLR1 was between 0%
and 48%. The SLR position was 50% throughout the tests.
The level in LPR-4 was increasing from 0.12 to 1.57 m
and then came back to the initial value.
The pressure in the auxiliary header during the tests was
between 0.74 MPa and 0.76 MPa with the BRU-SN1 being
16% opened.
No emergency power supply systems for the primary and
secondary channels operated. The design does not stipulate
the EPSS operation during the TG load shedding to the aux-
iliary level which was confirmed by the tests.
Conclusion
A set of 20 dynamic tests conducted at unit 1 of
Novovoronezh NPP II at the power ascension stage as part of
its pilot commercial operation have confirmed a high dynamic
stability of the unit.
The following can be recommended for future designs.
1. Use of AWP instead of PRL for modes with the MFP
trip.
2. Use of generator-grid timing devices for modes with the
unit auxiliary operation.
3. Full switchover to Russian-developed software and hard-
ware tool in the implementation of both normal opera-
tion and safety control systems, since the adjustment of
protection and interlocking algorithms based on the soft-
ware and hardware package from AREVA (ЕС) used at
Novovoronezh II requires the developer’s authorization
 I.N. Gusev et al. / Nuclear Energy and Technology 3 (2017) 270–277 277

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