Al-Buti and the Syrian Revolution

Al-Buti and
The Syrian Revolution

Bachar Bakour
© Bachar Bakour 2020

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Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Bakour, Bachar
Al-Buti and The Syrian Revolution / Bachar Bakour.
ISBN 978-967-0526-81-2
eISBN 978-967-0526-82-9
1. Religion and state--Syria.
2. Syria--History--Civil War, 2011-.
I. Title.
322.1095691
 Acknowledgements

F irst and foremost, I would like to thank Allah, the Almighty, the
biggest and the richest source of my strength and knowledge.
Without His infinite blessings, this work would not have been
possible.
And it is my utmost pleasure to thank my dear parents, family
members and loving and supportive wife, who granted me the gift of
their unwavering belief in my ability to accomplish this goal. Thank
you for your support and patience.
I also wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to the great
teachers of al-Fatḥ Islamic Institute in Damascus. Foremost among
them are Shaykh Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr, ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Bizm (mufti
of Damascus) and Mr. Māhir Abū al-Dhahab. Their continuous
support and encouragement cannot be underestimated.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Abdelaziz
Berghout, who supervised my PhD project (this book) at International
Islamic University Malaysia. His insightful comments and careful
guidance kept me on the right track.
May Allah grant you all the best reward. Amen.
 List of Tables

1. The number of Syria’s Islamic organizations,

institutions and mosques, in contrast to secular
centers.
2. The number of mosques distributed in Syria’s
governorates.
3. The seven issues as regards extreme
movements/parties.
4. The seven issues as regards moderate
movements/parties.
5. Ten issues against al-Būṭī.
6. Arguments for al-Būṭī.
7. On al-Būṭī—Regime relation.
8. Overall evaluation of al-Būṭī’s argument on the
revolution.
 List of Figures

1. Syrian demography.
2. Al-Būṭī’s distinguished scholarly works.
3. Al-Būṭī’s seven issues with Islamists.
4. Breakdown of deaths in Syrian conflict.
5. Registered Syrian refugees.
6. Syria’s scenario planning.
7. Al-Būṭī’s discourse on the revolution.
8. Al-Būṭī’s vision of fitnah.
9. Ulū al-amr triple identity.
10. Obedience—traditions components.
11. Ruler as essential to the community.
12. Obedience in the rights/duties dichotomy.
13. The practical attitude of ulema toward corrupt
political authority.
14. Obedience to contemporary leaders.
15. The three-level obedience.
16. How to handle contemporary corrupt rulers.
 Foreword

T his book sheds light on a very crucial moment in the development

of contemporary Syria, where the brutal war claims daily innocent
lives and displaces millions of people scattering them unjustly around
the world. Dr. Bachar has taken a difficult task of examining the views
of al-Būṭī on the Syrian Revolution of 2011, which is still unfolding. He
presented a sound analysis of the case at hand showing objectively
the position of al-Būṭī; a work that is not easy and demanding in the
current context and complicated situation. Undoubtedly, the
knowledge and experience of the author, being himself a young
Syrian scholar, has helped tremendously in making this work more
reflective of al-Būṭī’s position. I have had the opportunity to work with
the author closely and I record my utmost gratitude and
congratulations to him for indulging in such a fruitful effort resulting in
a thesis/academic book. I am sure that this work will open new
horizons for further in-depth and extended studies on the matter at
hand.
Al-Būṭī is one of the Muslim scholars who left their indelible traces
in the contemporary Islamic thought leaving a huge legacy of ideas
and views on various issues of Islamic thought and civilisation. His
depth, sound views, prolific style of writing, evidence-based
arguments and sense of high Islamic scholarship and intellectualism
are evident and self-explanatory. In other words, one may confess
that his works, regardless of our stands on them, have enriched the
contemporary Islamic discourse and debates making many
interesting submissions while leaving several grey areas of
contention.
 One area that resulted in debate and argument is al-Būṭī’s view
on the Syrian Revolution. This is exactly what the author attempted to
analyze giving the reader an opportunity to see the various differing
and sometimes contradicting views of pro and against al-Būṭī’s
positions.
In general, first theoretical attempt, religion and state a topic of
more merit and interest especially in our critical times. Throughout
the course of human history there are many evidences reflecting
clearly the dynamic relation between religion and state; be it at the
level of individual or society or large structures of civilisation. Put
more emphatically, the institution of religion and the institution of state
have been in the forefront of the human struggle towards establishing
advanced cultures and societies. Through historical evidences and
pattern of development, one may conclude that these two pillars were
present in the civilizing processes showing their crucial function in
any advanced human association.
The relations between religion and state are more prevalent in the
details of human life as we witness their indelible traces in all spheres
of life from the work of the ordinary people, to the complicated work
of scientists, artists and philosophers to the demanding work of
statesmen and great leaders guiding and managing governments,
societies and people.
Generally speaking, religion may be seen, in this context, as a
source of guidance, worldview, enlightenment, way of life and a
metaphysical system that provides a coherent philosophy and theory
of life. Whereas, the state may be considered as a tool and means of
human governance and societal management. It is supposed to be
an operational apparatus in the hand of society to govern itself and
manage its societal developmental activities.
Religion, in the revealed sense of the term, is the word of God
with its cosmic, metaphysical, axiological, legalistic and
eschatological principles and realities. Religion in the bigger design
of God is a source of guidance and salvation. It is projected, in the
revealed text, especially Islam, as vision and method for self and
communal empowerment and civilisational development.
 Today, more than any time in the history of mankind, we may
clearly see how these two institutions influence the core edifice of
human life and association at both waves; the negative and the
positive. Indeed, dealing with issues of religion and state, from an
applied and practical perspective, puts a heavy burden on
researchers requiring sound judgements and brave stands.
In many instances of life, the dilemma in dealing with issues of
religion and state might not be so much of the system of religion and
its higher values and teachings or the system of state and its
mechanisms and tools but is so much of the people’s orientation and
manipulation of both. It is the people who use religion and state for
positive and value-added impacts or vice versa.
In this context, the optimal state of affairs happens when there is
a reconciliation between the religion and state leading to pulling
together the efforts, powers and value added of both in the service of
society. This is the best and ideal situation of cooperation and
interaction between religion and state. This type of good relation
between religion and state demands intellectual maturity and sound
consciousness. I can safely say, it almost a rare currency in the very
many models of governance and religiosity in the world. I can concur
that such a positive integration of religion and state working for the
sake of the society and humanity, not self-inflicted interests, may
happen only when we have wise state leaders and wise religious
leaders. However, in real-life situations, one finds several forms of
relations between religion and state.
There are instances when religion is used to create theocracies
leading to religious destructive rule. There are also times when
religion is used to justify the authoritarian, autocratic and tyrannical
rule leading to dictatorship and demonization of religion itself along
with the society.
One also may mention the instances when religion is secularized
and manipulated within the secular model of governance to justify the
secular principles of governance and impose the secular way of life
on people. This might be seen in most advanced and powerful
secular states in our world today when the leaders and institutions
use religion to justify their self-interests, economic policies,
international relations agendas and waging wars against countries
and people in the name of religion.
Here, religion is made as a tool for the advancement of self-
interests of the state junta through employing the susceptible
religious leaders and scholars for their own objectives. In other
words, the state uses the religion and its susceptible leaders to
dominate and impose their desires and grips. This happens when
they manipulate the state apparatus for certain unreligious gains and
objectives.
Last but not least, I once again thank the author, who has
certainly exerted a good effort to come up with this book in its current
content and composition. It is of more merit and interest in its own
area of expertise. I hope this work will bear fruits and help
academicians, researchers and people, in general, understand the
positions and views of al-Būṭī on the Syrian Revolution. I hope those
who are evaluating al-Būṭī rely on sound evidences and real
arguments rather than on whims and mere speculations.
Abdelaziz Berghout
International Islamic University Malaysia
 Preface

T he year 1990 has significantly impacted my life for a couple of

reasons. First, it was the year I started my religious and Arabic
studies at al-Fatḥ Islamic Institute, one of the most prominent sharia
institutions, founded in Damascus in 1956.[1] From 1990 to 1996, I
learned in depth the traditional branches of sharia and Arabic and
completed a few courses on science. To its credit, al-Fatḥ has laid
great stress on providing students with the necessary means for
excellent learning and distinguished scholarship. My further pursuit
of academic learning owes a great deal to this formative period of my
life.[2]
The second reason is that, in the 1990s (and even before that),
you could barely find a Syrian student of sharia, or anyone with a
basic religious orientation, who was not at least slightly interested in
what Shaykh Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍ ā n al-Būṭī had written or
said. So, it was normal for al-Būṭī’s best-selling books, news,
activities and lectures to reach my eyes or ears and thus kindle my
interest in him. Although the bulk of my time was devoted to my
studies, I tried to browse through as many of his writings as I could in
the little free time I had.
Having graduated from al-Fatḥ with distinction in 1996, I pursued
further education at al-Azhar University to obtain a BA in sharia.
Simultaneously, I completed a four-year BA in Arabic at the same
university.[3] In this period of my life, I began to focus on reading
books dealing with intellectual issues, and al-Būṭī of course was at
the top of the list. Of all his qualities, there are two in particular that
captured my attention.
 First, he was a systematic author with a purely structured mind.
In the wide-ranging matters that he addressed, he followed a certain
pattern, taking his reader into a step-by-step discussion. He initially
gave introductory remarks explaining the nature, parameters and
ideological background of the issue or theory in question, and then
provided an account of the arguments of his intellectual opponents, if
any. After that, he presented his own argument within the framework
of the wider Islamic scholarship, frequently referring to the Qur’an,
Sunnah and opinions of leading classical and contemporary sharia
scholars. This is partly due to his logical and polemical competence.
Second, he is a skilled orator and literary figure, and therefore
the broad range of his writings and talks are literary in tone, which
arguably gives an added strength to his popularity locally and
internationally.
In 2008, as part of an initial arrangement for pursuing my PhD at
the University of Alberta in Canada, I met Professor Ibrahim M. Abu-
Rabi‘[4] with the help of my shaykh, Ḥusām Farfūr.[5] The proposed
research was to study the post-independence Syrian religious
scholars by focussing on the life and thought of al-Būṭī.
In 2010, one year before the Syrian revolution broke out, I met al-
Būṭī over dinner at Shaykh Farfūr’s house. After being introduced to
him by our host, I talked to al-Būṭī about my doctoral dissertation and
about using him as a case study, with Abu-Rabi‘ as my future
supervisor. Al-Būṭī, delighted, wished me the best in my ambitious
research.
Truly “man proposes and God disposes.” With the outbreak of
uprisings in Syria in mid-March 2011, and the premature death of
Abu-Rabi‘ a few months later, I had to reconsider my calculations,
changing, therefore, the university and amending the research topic.
I decided to direct my research into the fluctuating, mostly
strained relations between religion and state, maintaining al-Būṭī as
a case study. A new state of affairs dictated a shift in thinking and
response.
The popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) witnessed the re-emergence of religion in social and political
debates. In Syria, for example, with the government’s heavy-handed
policy to suppress protests, numerous debates and discussions were
held on issues such as foreign conspiracy, Wahhabi/Salafi jihadists,
political obligation/obedience to the ruler, and rebellion.

Particularly on the question of obedience, I had gone through

many talks and discussions with a lot of friends, colleagues and
scholars. At the time, I admit I was unable to attain a clear vision or
view on that matter; yet I felt there is a lack of awareness of relevant
contemporary socio-political concepts that were missing amid the
hustle of discussions.
With the adoption of civic and political ideas of secularism,
democracy, liberty, the sovereignty of people, parliamentary
constitutionalism etc., in combination with the abolition of the Islamic
caliphate in 1924, the question of obedience demands a fresh
treatment.
While most Syrian scholars, whether senior or junior, dealt with
the general notion of obedience through the mentality of the
medieval times, other thinkers decided to cut themselves off from
traditional outlook altogether. Needless to say, al-Būṭī, right from the
very beginning, threw himself into the center of this religio-intellectual
crisis, initiating a storm of protest against the “peculiar” position he
declared.
Further, another driving reason for this study, it is not hard to see
how the contemporary Arab and Muslim governments, before and
after the Arab Spring, systematically manipulated the religious
discourse to legitimize their rule.[6] Fatwas were issued to fit the
demands of the state/the ruler and on the basis of the pragmatic
nature of politics. Again, I refer here to the Syrian case, as I have
been an eyewitness. The regime perfectly knew that for defusing the
rising popular tension, the role of ulema cannot be underestimated.
Hence, orders were given to the Ministry of Awqāf, with all its
subsidiaries, to adopt the official rhetoric and take necessary
measures to debunk the counter opinion.[7] This study is a cry to
snatch religion from the jaws of politics.
Finally, this study, far from being an apologia or condemnation of
al-Būṭī, is a serious attempt to clear up the controversy about his
position and, on the other hand, to offer a contemporary balanced
treatment of the obedience question that takes into consideration the
rights/duties of both the ruler and the ruled and thus promotes values
of equality and social justice for the Muslim community of today.
 Introduction

M uslim countries, during the colonial period, underwent major

changes in many areas: social, political, educational, cultural,
ethical, and more critically, religious. In the 1940s and 1950s, Syria
was subjected to an enormous political and economic change as it
achieved its independence from France in 1946. The post-colonial
Syria witnessed many military coups, and the Ba‘th Party has been
in power in the country since 1963. Syria was governed by Hafez al-
Assad, who ruled from 1970 until his death in the year 2000. Ever
since, it has been under the rule of his son, Bashar.
With the adoption of the post-colonial nation state in Syria, Islam
ceased to be the general framework for the state, even though
enjoying some authority for the society. Sunni ulema who previously
were an integral part of decision-making process became now
tractable officials who wait for orders from on high.[8] Some of them,
appropriately called “state jurists,”[9] were expected to issue fatwas
fitting to the demands of the state/the ruler and on the basis of the
pragmatic nature of politics.
Other ulema, nevertheless, refused to be a tool in the hand of
politicians and tried to distance themselves from formal religious
ceremonies organized by the Ministry of Awqāf, the bureaucratic
apparatus of the state.[10]
In the twentieth century, Syrian ulema faced different challenges
of the secularist system which are meant to undermine their religious
authority and power bases. These challenges include “the
secularization of law, the expansion of state control over religious
institutions, and the modernization-democratization of education.”[11]
 In spite of the state constraining procedures, ulema remained a
major player in the social-religious scene. The conflation (or conflict)
of religion and state in Syria appears vividly in the catastrophic
Syrian revolution, which broke out in mid-March 2011. The revolution
created a deep schism among Sunni Muslim ulema who played a
prominent role in encouraging/discouraging protests.
Al-Būṭī (1929-2013),[12] a well-known Sunni scholar, refused to be
one of those who recognized and gave a hand to protestors. To al-
Būṭī, this wave of popular uprising would surely create chaos and
sedition, opening the door to massive collateral damage and
bloodshed among innocent Muslims and non-Muslims.
Thus, he viewed the revolution as both religiously illegitimate and
politically oriented, thereby creating an ongoing debate not only in
Syria but also in the Arab as well as the Muslim world. A great
number of scholars, authors and essayists, Syrian and non-Syrian,
have interpreted al-Būṭī’s stance as a full support of the regime
referring to his earlier similar position against the Muslim
Brotherhood Movement in Syria in the 1980s. Others, however,
argue that al-Būṭī is an independent scholar who was following his
ijtihad, be it for the benefit of the regime or against it. In other words,
al-Būṭī’s opinion, from a purely religious point of view, does not
necessarily espouse the government’s appalling crimes.
I have noted that the rhetoric on both sides lacks a clear and full
picture of al-Būṭī’s discourse on the revolution due to either
misinterpretations or widespread rumors, which resulted in partial or
inaccurate judgment. Therefore, the book offers the first sustained
treatment of this ongoing religio-political issue by exploring its multiple
dimensions and various ramifications. This complex intersection of
religion and politics can be seen in the following discussed topics: the
prominent role Islam plays in public Syrian life and how Ba‘th Party
leaders attempted to cloak themselves in the mantle of Islam to ensure
legitimacy and widen the ground for their rule; al-Būṭī’s criticism of
revolutionary tactics and the instrumentalization of religion by Islamists
who, according to him, seek the ascendancy of Islam via political
means and, when necessary, resort to violent methods to create their
version of the “Islamic state”; the varied responses of Syrian religious
scholars toward initial protests that ushered in a full-scale revolution;
evaluation of al-Būṭī-regime relation in order to discover whether the
position he takes reflects regime alliance or independent opinion. More
importantly, after providing a detailed account of al-Būṭī’s discourse on
the revolution, the book critically examines the concept of ṭā‘at al-ḥākim
(obedience to a ruler), along with the notion of fitnah (both lying at the
heart of al-Būṭī’s argument) re-situating “obedience” in its rightful
context in the contemporary Islamic political thought within the
rights/duties of both the ruler and people.
 II
This study is basically qualitative as it is an inquiry process of
understanding and exploring al-Būṭī’s stance on the Syrian
revolution. Sources are divided into two types: primary and
secondary.
Primary sources include al-Būṭī’s books, booklets, pieces, Friday
sermons, videos and fatwas.
Secondary sources are of three categories. The first includes
materials dealing with the multi-dimensional role that Islam plays in
the Syrian society, in particular during al-Būṭī’s time, by delineating
the major Islamic groups and institutions in the post-independence
era. Of course, the significance of this type of materials is basically
contextual, as they help to generally assess al-Būṭi within the context
of his socio-political, historical and religious environment.
The second includes writings exploring and discussing, from
different perspectives, al-Būṭī’s view on jihad, political Islam and the
Syrian revolution. Also, eleven in-depth personal interviews were
conducted. Interviewees, whether for or against al-Būṭī, were
selected on the basis of three criteria: to be well-acquainted with al-
Būṭī’s thought through his books or lectures; to possess a fairly good
knowledge of sharia, and to be fair-minded. Interview questions are
divided into three levels: ground-mapping questions, which are
general and introductory questions to “open up” the discussion;
dimension-mapping questions, which are specific questions to focus
more narrowly on the research subject; and perspective-widening
questions, which aim to uncover more layers of understanding and
greater richness of the subject.
The third includes research books, dissertations, journal articles
as well as book chapters focusing on Arab Spring/the Syrian
revolution. These sources, putting the issue in a wider context, help
to clarify, test and, even challenge, varied views taken by al-Būṭī and
his critics. For instance, while explaining his viewpoint, al-Būṭī refers
to a “foreign conspiracy” led by Israel, which determines to create
division and chaos in Syria. He too gives a pre-warning that peaceful
demonstrations, exploited by evil doers, will create social upheaval
and sedition opening the door to massive bloodshed among Syrian
people. Later on, as the revolution yielded some of its secrets, al-
Būṭī’s fears and concerns seemed to have been true.
I have also carried my own observations and first-hand
experience, as I have been immersed in the Syrian religious scene
for nearly three decades. Following the outbreak of the revolution in
2011, I remained in Syria for four years before I moved to Malaysia.
To synthesize the above different materials, thereby creating in-
depth understanding and holistic reading of al-Būṭī’s case, the study
adopts inductive method together with textual and contextual
analysis.
First, relevant data, from the array of the above sources, is
collected on al-Būṭī (personal-educational background, socio-political
and religious environment, discourse on the revolution etc.). Then
data analysis, textual and contextual, is employed in order to identify
patterns and clues that make sense for the research phenomenon.
 III
For the purpose of this study, key concepts and terms are defined
and clarified. Generally, revolution is defined as a “rapid,
fundamental change in the social structures as well as in the state’s
personnel, institutions, and foundation of its legitimacy,
accomplished from outside the legal channels and accompanied in
part by a movement from below.”[13]
Initial uprisings in Syria, mid-March 2011, carried the potential for
the revolution. At the outset, peaceful demonstrators endured
months of arrests, torture, murder and rape before pulling the trigger
and escalating protests into a revolution. Nevertheless, the attempt
to replace the regime with a government by outside forces has
proven elusive. The regime’s brutal crackdown has spawned a
protracted war mixing regional power struggles, sectarian violence,
in addition to radical religious fringes. Sorrowfully, the Syrian
revolution has transformed into a proxy war/large scale civil war (see
chapter four).
The term state refers to “a sovereign internationally recognized,
and geographically defined territory with a population and a
government.”[14] The nation state is defined as “a sovereign state of
which most of the citizens or subjects are united also by factors
which define a nation, such as language or common descent.”[15]
“State” and “nation state,” however, are frequently used
interchangeably.[16]
The adoption of the post-colonial nation state in the Arab and
Muslim World created a complex and multifaceted problem. “This is
so because the paradigm of “Islamic Governance,” developed
through centuries of Islamic rule, and the modern
state of the West are incompatible if not altogether contradictory.”[17]
Wael Hallaq identifies five “form-properties” of the nation/modern
state. The essential components of a state are fundamentally
incompatible with traditional Islamic governance.[18]
Sharia, frequently used in the book, denotes “the total sum of
rules that God ordains for His servants encompassing their belief,
worship, morality, dealings and all other affairs relating to various
aspects of their lives, with the overriding objective of maintaining
their well-being in this world and in the hereafter.”[19]
At the heart of the book discussion, a bundle of concepts is
mentioned. The “ruler” is identified as the unjust or oppressive
Muslim ruler who has never shown any signs of clear and definite
disbelief. As will be shown in the following chapters, numerous
hadith reports clearly and unequivocally direct that Muslim subjects
have to obey rulers, with special reference to those who are deemed
oppressive and corrupt.[20]
According to other reports, Muslims must render “obedience” to
their emir as long as the latter adheres to sharia and follows the
Book of Allah.[21] other reports, on the other hand, order Muslim
subjects to listen and obey their rulers, even if they do evil.[22]
Further, when it comes to disobeying Allah, no compromise or
concession is made, as the well-known authentic tradition states,
“There is no obedience to a creature if it entails disobeying Allah.”[23]
Based on that, obedience means that Muslims, while maintaining
patience, cannot stage an armed rebellion against their unjust or
oppressive rulers unless they have shown signs of clear and definite
disbelief. So, both the just Muslim ruler and the disbelieving one lay
outside the focal point. Jurists unanimously oblige that obedience is
rendered to the former, and rebellion maybe launched against the
latter.
Rebellion/revolt against the ruler refers specifically to an act of
armed insurrection. According to Guenter Lewy, a prominent scholar
on revolutions and their relationship with religion, revolution aims to
change the political system; yet rebellion tends to, “lack an ideology
that differs from the values prevailing in the society in question.”[24]
“In essence, a political rebellion, although an act of defiance, does
not concern itself with changing the status quo, but rather merely
changing the face of the institution and not the ideology the
institution is routed in.”[25]
Needless to say, rebellion in the book context has nothing
to do with a nonviolent revolution which embraces peaceful
demonstrations that call for freedom and justice in addition to civil
disobedience to challenge the government.
 Most probably, rebellion results in fitnah, which means here
illegitimate fighting or conflict that is bound, as growing more violent,
to create a social chaos and political disorder both allowing to
indiscriminate killing and bloody massacres of Muslims. (See
discussion on fitnah in chapter six.)
To avoid fitnah and sedition, Muslims, according to a myriad of
Prophetic traditions, should refrain from participating or supporting
any of the contending parties.[26] Instead, they are advised to
manage their own mundane and religious affairs.[27] In this book, the
quietist ulema are those who, while maintaining a teaching and
academic career, have not made any public or formal statement that
clarifies their position in order not to aggravate the situation. They,
however, may have expressed their opinion in private or semi-private
meetings.
As far as Islam and politics is concerned, al-Būṭī defines “political
Islam” as the subjugation of Islam, with all its principles and rules, to
various political visions and aspirations.[28] Of course, al-Būṭī rejects
this concept yet accepts the “Islamic politics” or the “political systems
of Islam,” the normative expression of the political aspect of Islam,
which is defined as to run the state affairs according to the rules of
sharia.[29]
In contrast, al-Būṭī places more reliance on da‘wah,[30] which is
technically defined as “to propagate Islam to all people, in all times
and places, via suitable means and methods.[31] In the Qur’an
(16:125), the Prophet (ṣ) is asked to continue his efforts, calling on
people to follow the path of his Lord, utilizing wisdom and goodly
exhortation and delivering his argument in a kindly manner. Part of
the required wisdom is to establish an institutionalized da ‘ wah that
“relates to many activities we do in our life, like establishing
universities, as well as educational foundations; writing da‘wah
books; founding publishing houses and presses; making use of the
mass media; preparing the climate for discussion and dialogue.”[32]
 IV
Organization of the Book
This book is divided into six chapters and conclusion: the first
chapter deals with how the religion of Islam as a driving force has
played a prominent role in shaping the life of the Syrian Muslim
society. Then it gives a brief account of major religious groups and
institutions in post-independence Syria (Muslim Brotherhood
Movement, Sufi orders, Salafism, religious institutions). Particular
reference is made to Muslim Brotherhood (its influential figures,
charity projects and their bloody clash with al-Assad regime).
The second chapter provides biographical information outlining
the major stages of al-Būṭī’s life, career and a brief account of his
contribution to Islamic scholarship.
The third chapter explores al-Būṭī’s critical view on contemporary
Islamists who, according to al-Būṭī, have misapplied the Islamic law
and sacrificed da‘wah in favor of political expediency. The book
discovers seven issues with Islamists, taken by al-Būṭī, and attempts
to examine whether or not they are applicable to major contemporary
movements.
The fourth chapter briefly discusses whether Arab Spring was a
spontaneous reaction, initiated by ordinary people or designed and
planned by foreign powers. Then it outlines main causes and
consequences of the Syrian revolution on the one hand, and
addresses the varied responses of Syrian religious scholars toward
initial protests on the other hand.
The fifth chapter presents in detail al-Būṭī’s argument on the
Syrian revolution, together with varied responses and opinions. Also,
al-Būṭī regime relation is investigated.
The sixth chapter, testing the validity of al-Būṭī’s argument on the
revolution, explores obedience to a ruler through a contextual-
linguistic analysis of the obedience verse and traditions, re-situating
“obedience” in its rightful context in the contemporary Islamic political
thought within the rights/duties of both the ruler and the ruled. Then it
throws light on the concept of fitnah related to traditions in question.
Finally, a summary of mains findings is provided.
 Religion and State in Syria

Introduction

S ince assuming dominance in Medina, Islam remained the

commanding source of ideas and laws and the governing
doctrine of both the state and the society. This was particularly
applicable to the era of the rightly guided caliphate and, in varying
degrees, to later Muslim successive rulership.[33] With the abolition of
the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, a power vacuum was created
accompanied by a loose bundle of ethnic, religious and territorial
political identities.[34]
The adoption of the post-colonial nation state in the Arab and
Muslim World created a complex and multifaceted problem. Contrary
to the nation state, Muslims generally believe in a certain sense of
solidarity among the ummah (the entire Muslim community), a
transnational union.
At the heart of this predicament lie the following questions: To
what extent is the modern state compatible with the Islamic
perception of governance? With the geographical confines of the
nation state, should the universalist notion of the ummah be
abandoned altogether? How can Islamists operate within the specific
political context of the nation state? How did modern intellectuals
respond to the widely circulated civic and political ideas of
secularism, capitalism, democracy, liberty, the sovereignty of people,
parliamentary constitutionalism etc.?[35] Although Islam, in the post-
colonial nation state, was no longer a reference point for the state, it
was still enjoying some authority for the society.
This chapter sheds light on how Islam as a driving force has
played a prominent role in shaping the public life of the Syrian
society in the latter part of the twentieth century with particular
reference to the tenure of Hafez al-Assad then his son Bashar, who
used to cite Islam and send messages, religious in tone, to maintain
legitimacy and ensure stability.
Then the chapter gives a brief account of major religious groups
and institutions in post-independence Syria and their unstable
relationship with the regime. Particular reference is made to the
Muslim Brotherhood Movement (its influential figures, charity
projects and their bloody clash with al-Assad regime).
 Islamic Revival in Post-Independence Syria: Outline
Syria is a country of religious diversity. The overwhelming majority of
the Syrian population is Sunni, which accounts for about three
quarters of the Muslim population. Most of the Sunnis are Arabs,
though some are Kurds. The next largest group, the Alawis, a Shia
subset, is concentrated in the north-western province of Latakia.
Druze, the third largest group, live in the province of Suwaydā‘.
Isma‘ilis, also a Shia offshoot, are mainly found in the districts of
Salamiyah and Masyaf, both administratively belonging to the
province of Hama. Last but not the least come Christians, who
comprise nearly a tenth of the Syrian population and belong to a
variety of denominations (Orthodox, Catholic, Maronite, Protestant,
Nestorian and Syriac).[36] For decades, followers of these sects lived
side by side with mutual respect and cooperation.[37]
 Figure 1.1: Syrian demography.
As a predominant religion, Islam has deep roots in the Syrian soil
playing a prominent role in shaping the social life as well as the
culture of Syrian people. For centuries, dozens of madrasahs
(religious schools) permeated Syrian cities, where thousands of
students received a free study of all branches of Islamic education.[38]
Islam, in addition to being a religious and spiritual belief, is
meant to be a coherent system of life, a social order, a philosophy of
life, a system of economic principles and a rule of government.
Therefore, it creates a standard by which both the individual and the
society lead an honest, sober and a God-fearing life.

The emphasis on Islam as a driving force in various aspects of

life, in particular, the political domain, can be easily noticed in the two
following Syrian cases: In 1937, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kayyālī, the then
Minister of Education and Justice, delivered a speech in which he
said:
Gentlemen, we need to prepare for our children a
distinguished culture, we need to this ummah, a religion
which protects it from the disadvantages of modernity. We
need a code of ethics to protect our children… We need to
prepare our children to be pious men so as to serve their
homeland.[39]
This case constitutes an element of moral, religious and
educational demands, which make up no less than 82 percent of 104
public interventions by the Syrian ulema (petitions, press releases,
delegations sent to government officials) recorded between 1948
and 1963 in the OFA press survey.[40]
The second case is the declaration of Islam as the state religion.
In 1950, Muṣṭafā al-Sibā‘ī, the Muslim Brotherhood’s first general
supervisor (al-murāqib al-‘āmm), was chosen as a member of the
committee that was entitled to draft the Syrian constitution. To
declare Islam as the state religion was the most controversial issue
raised.[41] Al-Sibā‘ī emphasized the necessity of such a declaration,
since faith is needed to conquer Syria’s difficulties, and the
enshrining of Islam in the constitution would stimulate the people
toward greater attachment to the state.
Further, al-Sibā‘ī argued that this important initiative would
increase Syria’s commercial markets in the Islamic countries and
further economic assistance. As for Syria’s Christians, he noted,
Islam had the highest respect for Christianity and did not interfere in
matters of personal status.[42]
Syria’s representative institutions would never cease to exist:
“Our parliament, deputies, laws, and way of life will all remain, but
they will be reinforced by loftiness of spirit, purity of hand, moral
probity and human nobility.”[43] Then he concluded, “The only reason
for establishing a state religion is to colour the state with a spiritual,
moral hue so that regulations and laws will be carried out under the
impetus of a deep, spiritual driving force.”[44]
Also, al-Sibā‘ī argued that to declare Islam as the state religion
does not necessarily mean to impose the Islamic law upon people;
the Parliament cannot be forced to accept any undesirable
constitution.[45] When he was asked about a probable application of
ḥudūd,[46] al-Sibā‘ī answered in the negative, then added:
We never think of that, because Islam [when legalizing
such punishments] applies them to a perfect Muslim who
lives in a perfect society. This perfection, however, means
filled stomachs, clothed bodies, common education, and
sufficient means of provision for everyone. If, for example,
an act of stealing happens, after all these conditions in
question have been met, then it refers to a clearly naked
perversion of habitual criminals.[47]
Therefore, Islam seeks to intimidate such persons, who are not
deterred by anything. Moreover, for fixed punishments to be applied,
Islam has stipulated conditions rarely existent in reality; an indication
that these punishments have to do more with prevention, and
caution, rather than with application and enforcement.[48]
As far as public life and social activities are concerned, Islam
also gained a foothold. In 1936, a delegation of al-Tamaddun al-
Islāmī society[49] visited the Prime Minister to complain about what
they considered as increasingly indecent scenes displayed in the
cinema, which in turn threaten the moral fabric of Syrian society. The
government, quick in response, issued a public code of ethics and
distributed it among its various departments.[50]
Upon assuming power in 1970, Hafez al-Assad undertook
measures toward economic liberalization of the Syrian system. They
included removing limits on the size of private enterprises, dropping
import restrictions on a number of goods, cutting back public sector
control of foreign trade, and promising the private sector further
future concessions.[51] These moves were meant to earn the trust of
urban bourgeoisie and Damascene merchants, who largely belong to
Syria’s religious class.[52]
Appreciating the deep Islamic sentiments in Syrians, Hafez was
aspiring to widen the ground for his rule by mounting a new path of
co-existence between religion and state. Therefore, he tried, within
the boundaries of his secular nationalist discourse, to win over the
top ulema as this would decrease people’s reservations about his
legitimacy as president of a country dominated by Sunni Muslims.[53]
He thus declared himself the president of all Syrian people, rather
than a leader of a certain group or sect.[54]
This declaration was attested by his keenness to regularly attend
the two major Muslim ids at mosques and make a pilgrimage to
Mecca. Every year until his death in 2000, he used to invite senior
ulema (Sunni, Shia and Druze) to a banquet in Ramadan.
When Bashar al-Assad took over the presidency in 2000,[55] he, in
the footsteps of his father, probably even more, assumed himself to
be a leader faithful to Islam, acting on its behalf. It was reported that
among his first steps after taking office was the repeal of the
prohibition issued by his father in early 1982 against schoolgirls to
wear headscarves in educational institutions.[56] He established close
ties with influential religious scholars by attending their Friday
sermons (sometimes paying a sudden, low-profile visit) and holding
hours-long personal meetings with them.[57] His motto in many of his
meetings with ulema was “Teach people the 'Islam' that Allah sent
down, free from others’ projections.”[58]
In late 2002, Bashar made a high-profile visit to ‘Umar ibn al-
Khaṭṭāb Mosque in Hama and al-Tawḥid Mosque in Aleppo, where
he attended prayers on the last Friday of Ramadan and the Eid al-
Fitr prayer respectively.[59] He probably wanted to send a conciliatory
message to the remnant Islamist community of the two big cities.
A further accommodating decision was taken in 2003 thereby
allowing soldiers to pray in army bases.[60] Four years later, the
military academy invited shaykhs to lecture cadets for the first time.
[61]
Similarly, at the Ba‘th Party Conference of June 2005, the Syrian
regime declared that it would be a grave mistake not to give
Islamists a platform to express their views given that frustration only
leads to fundamentalism. This from a regime that claimed to
champion moderate Islamic revival.[62]
What also partakes to Islamic attachment is that ulema are held
in high esteem by lay and educated people who would seek their
advice on religious and social matters. Probably, this high status is of
particular importance in electoral campaigns where the role of ulema
is not to be underestimated. Donors, wealthy businessmen running
for parliamentary elections are keen to be seen in the company of
celebrated shaykhs or scholars to maintain or to improve their
reputation.[63] Sometimes a shaykh of influential religious group or
institute is co-opted into a list of certain candidates to ensure
success, like the case of ‘Abd al-Salām Rājiḥ (al-Fayhā’ list) and
Muḥammad Ḥabash (al-Shām list), both coming from Kuftārū
Institute.[64]
Religious education in Syria is another distinguishing mark of the
rising Islamic trend. Over the last four decades, sharia institutions
have significantly increased in number in all Syrian cities attracting
thousands of local as well as international students. Syria, it should
be maintained, has gained an unrivalled reputation for being a
religious destination for thousands of overseas students seeking to
learn and study Islamic knowledge, thereby leading a peaceful and
virtuous life. Such students are particularly welcomed and well
received by the local populace. It must be stressed here that the
injection of moderate line of thinking in combination with reliable
taught textbooks accounts for a massive influx of foreign students to
study at Syrian religious institutions.
 In this context, I would like to cite two examples. First, one of my
students at the Fatḥ Institute who is Algerian told me that in Algeria,
one of the things for which a shaykh or imam is to be credited was to
learn at a religious institute in Syria, notably, the Fatḥ Institute, since
the spirit of moderation, open-mindedness and balanced thought are
a top priority there.[65]
Second, in November 2008, David Miliband, the then Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, came to Syria and
had a meeting with the Minister of Endowments, Dr. Muḥammad
‘Abd al-Sattār al-Sayyid. Miliband moaned and groaned about the
turbulent and hard time the UK has been experiencing because of
some extremists, who are young, British-born Muslims.
Then he added that the British government is desperate for
peace and security at home. Prior to this dream being realized,
however, those poor, brainwashed young Muslims must be taught
different Muslim learning by qualified, enlightened, and moderate
scholars who need to be Syrian. “The British government,” said
Miliband, “is aware that most religious leaders and scholars who
have studied in Syria are free from a variety of charges of extremist
ideas and of dubious ties with terrorist organizations.”[66]
The point I want to make here, which mirrors the above
eagerness for religious study, is that Islamically oriented books lie in
the center of buyers' attention, and thus are, by far, the best-selling
books in book shops. In the 1900s, during the annual book fair held
in al-Assad National Library, I used to see hundreds of students who
pursue religious studies carry piles of sharia books; a scene
repeated every day during the book fair. Books with secular
knowledge, however, never enjoyed even half of such heightened
attention.[67]
Finally, al-Shām[68] is hailed as a place of exceptional religious
merit as related by dozens of reliable traditions.[69] Of course, ulema
and lay people of this holy area feel, wittingly or unwittingly, proud to
show their religious passion, translating this spiritual holiness and
divine blessing into virtuous and devotional acts.[70]
The two following tables reflect the mounting attachment to
Islamic values or identities in Syrian cities in comparison to secular
institutions and centers.[71]
Islamic Islamic Active Secular Theatres
Syria organizations schools mosques cultural (secular)
(including and institutes
charitable) Institutes
total 584 (290) 976 Over 9,000[72] 79 5

members 72,751 72,000 several several

families women thousand thousand
(active)
outcome 842 million 416,000 27 performances
Syrian Liras lessons/week
distributed
Table 1.1: The number of Syria’s Islamic organizations,
institutions and mosques, in contrast to secular centers.
Source: al-Hayat, June 18, 2005 and the Syrian Ministry of Awqāf, studies and statistics
December 31, 2007 and December 31, 2008.

Governorates Number of mosques Under Permits in Not

construction process constructed
with permits
Formal Informal
Damascus 371 122 11 17 7
Damascus 182
suburbs

Aleppo 450 1280 36 6 2

Latakia 85 3 6 __

Tartus 8 109 10 2 2

Homs 150 421 __ __ __

Hama 91 670 23 15 __
 Governorates Number of mosques Under Permits in Not
construction process constructed
with permits
Formal Informal

Idlib 74 960 34 114 __

Dayr al-Zour 27 1225 30 25 20

Al-Raqqah 19 435 23 6 5

Al-Hasakah 53 850 10 5 4
Al-Qunaytirah __ 73 7 4 2

Dar‘a 61 230 42 25 20

Total 1569 7162 324 241 80

Table 1.2: The number of mosques distributed in Syria’s governorates.

Source: from Ministry of Awqāf, 31-12-2007
 Major Religious Groups and Institutions
in Post-Independence Syria: Overview
Muslim countries, under the sway of the colonial period, underwent
profound transformation in almost all areas: social, political,
educational, cultural, ethical and, more critically, religious.[73] In the
1940s and 1950s, Syria was subject to enormous political and
economic change as it achieved its independence from France in
1946, right after the end of World War II.[74] The post-colonial period
witnessed many military coups, and the Ba‘th Party, originally
established in Syria in the early 1940s, has been in power in the
country since 1963. Syria is governed by Bashar al-Assad, who
inherited the presidency from his late father, Hafez al-Assad, who
ruled from 1970 until his death in 2000.
The Ba‘th Party ruled in both Syria and Iraq; it ruled in Iraq from
1961 until the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime by American
forces in March of 2003. From the very beginning, the Ba‘th Party
defined itself as a secular Arab socialist and nationalist party with the
goal of liberating the Arab world from colonialism, freeing the
economy from dependence on outside powers, and unifying the Arab
world under the banner of nationalism and socialism.[75]
It is possible to delineate the following Islamic communities and
parties that have emerged in Syria since 1946:
1. Muslim Brotherhood Movement.
2. Sufi orders.
3. Salafis.
4. Religious associations and institutions.
The Muslim Brotherhood Movement[76]
The significance of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimūn), founded by the Egyptian shaykh Ḥasan al-Bannā in
1928, cannot be underestimated. Extending far beyond its national
borders, the movement has played an active role in social, political,
and religious life in several Arab countries, like Sudan, Jordan,
Kuwait, Yemen and, of course, Syria. The writings of al-Bannā and
Sayyid Quṭb became widely known throughout much of the Arab as
well as the Muslim World.
More importantly, Muṣṭafā al-Sibā‘ī, the Syrian Brotherhood’s
founder and first general supervisor (al-murāqib al-‘āmm) had a
close contact with al-Bannā in Cairo.[77] In the Post-Second World
War, the Arab World adopted different paths: the nationalist path and
the Islamic path. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leaders, like their
Egyptian counterparts, sought to spread the message of Islam as a
religious and spiritual belief, a coherent system of life, a social order,
a system of economic principles, and a rule of government. The
1944 Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, made up of several merged
societies and organizations, as will be shown later, opened offices in
all Syrian Governorates.[78]
Al-Sibā‘ī identifies three goals the movement pursues: (1) to
bring up a generation that, while carrying the message of Islam, truly
represents its belief and ethics; (2) to defend Islam as a call, state
and system, avert aggression against the Muslim World, and stop
the oppressors, rulers or subjects; (3) to raise awareness among
people in terms of belief, education, culture, and livelihood, so as to
live according to the Islam-drawn path.[79] The way to achieve these
goals, al-Sibā‘ī argues, is to set right the individual, the family and
the society, as well as to struggle against the occupation.[80]
Socially speaking, the movement sought to become actively
involved by reaching a variety of Syrian sectors and arenas:
education, learning, labors, free public services and committees’
activities.[81] For example, they opened a public Islamic library in
Homs; a number of free schools for all ages, including schools for
the illiterate, in addition to students’ scholarships, trips, conferences,
[82]
lectures,[83] and health clubs.[84]
Being a legitimate part of the political system, the Muslim
Brotherhood participated in the elections of 1947 competing with
Communists, Ba‘thists and others. Several seats in the parliament
including ministerial positions were held by them.[85]
During the period between 1947 and the Ba‘th coup in 1963,
Syrian religious scene in general, and the Muslim Brotherhood in
particular, faced a number of challenges: Ḥusnī al-Za‘īm (d. 1949),[86]
who, ideologically inspired by the secularizing model of Turkey’s
Ataturk, managed to restrict the authority of the Islamic law and
replace it with a secular, civilian law,[87] and to outlaw the Muslim
Brotherhood[88]; more similar provocative procedures were followed
by Adīb al-Shīshaklī (d. 1964), who angered not only Muslim
Brotherhood but also the Ba‘th and the Communist parties.[89]
The Ba‘th Party’s seizure of power in 1963 with its secular,
nationalist and socialist orientations put religious leaders, especially
those associated with the Brotherhood, on alert. Following in the
steps of its predecessors, the Ba‘th Party forbade preaching and
religious learning outside the mosques, increased its involvement in
the appointment of ulema to religious institutions in the country, took
over the management of Waqf institutions and did not hesitate to
arrest or even execute ulema who demonstrated against it.[90]
As a result, several clashes broke out between Muslim
Brotherhood and the Ba‘th: the 1964 Hama revolt, led by Marwān
Ḥadīd, which ended in the death of dozens of activists[91]; the 1965
Damascus violence due to Hama rebellion, and 1967 riots erupting
among the Sunni population all over Syria, which was suppressed by
the regime.[92]
With Hafez al-Assad taking power in 1970, a number of
combined developments gave the Muslim Brotherhood more
determination to adopt a policy of armed revolt against the Ba‘th
regime: “Al-Assad’s plan to eliminate the clause in the Syrian
constitution stating that Islam is the religion of the president and the
source of all jurisprudence”[93]; the government’s intervention in 1976
in the Lebanese civil war against the Palestinians and their
Lebanese Muslim allies; the government’s growing corruption; and,
above all, the increased power of President Hafez al-Assad’s
community of Alawis, a religious minority who constituted only 10
percent of the Syrian population.[94]
In 1976, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to bring down al-Assad
regime and establish an Islamic State. Receiving support coming
mostly from several cities in northern Syria dominated by the Sunni
community, they initiated violent attacks against the regime’s
institutions. This Islamic revolt was cracked down by formidable
military resources and security forces that indiscriminately jailed and
killed thousands of people in several cities, with Hama having the
lion’s share. Moreover, and in order to deter this violent opposition,
the regime declared in 1980 that any connection with the Muslim
Brotherhood would be punishable by death.[95]
Due to this heavy blow that came to an end in 1982, with
seemingly utter failure of this armed revolt, the movement activists
either met their deaths, were sent to prison, or fled the country.[96] A
few years later, however, the regime tried to mount a new path of co-
existence by making various steps improving its attitude toward
Islamic common manifestations: veil for women, participation in
Muslim festivals, increased the number of religious schools, religious
preaching inside the mosque with special reference to Qur’anic
teaching and memorization circles bearing the name of the president
(Ma‘āhid al-Asad li taḥfīẓ al-Qur’ān) proliferating in the whole
country.[97]
More importantly, the regime released a good number of the
members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been in prison since
the 1980s. They were released in several presidential amnesties in
1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000.[98] After the rise of Bashar
al-Assad to power in June 2000, several reconciliation attempts
between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood were reported;
however, none seemed to have prospered.[99]
Muṣṭafā al-Sibā‘ī (1915-1964)
Born in Homs to a distinguished family of ulema, al-Sibā‘ī was a
religious scholar, an educator, an orator, a writer and a political
thinker. His father, who taught him sharia and Arabic,[100] was a
mujahid himself, a staunch supporter of national liberation
movements.[101] Imbued with a desire for a national independence,
al-Sibā‘ī, very young, used to spearhead anti-occupation campaigns.
[102]

In 1933, al-Sibā‘ī went to Egypt to study at al-Azhar University,

where he obtained a doctorate in sharia. His life in Cairo, no doubt,
left a huge impact on his future religio-intellectual life, for he was
associated with Ḥasan al-Bannā, and, therefore, a member of the
Muslim Brotherhood, as well as involved in political activism. Both
his religious and political passion found expression in participating in
anti-British demonstrations. As a result, and in fear of constituting a
potential danger to their interests, the British jailed him for six
months, then handed him over to the French, who imprisoned him in
Lebanon for thirty months.[103]
Upon his release in 1943,[104] al-Sibā‘ī returned to Syria, where
he, besides organizing and leading mass demonstrations calling for
an armed revolt against the French occupation, participated in
founding charitable and Islamic societies: al-Rābiṭah al-Dīniyyah
(The Religious Bond) in Homs and al-Shubbān al-Muslimūn (Muslim
Youths) in Damascus.[105] As for Shabāb Muḥammad (Muḥammad’s
Youths), which was created before 1939,[106] al-Sibā‘ī helped
consolidate it but did not create it. This society, al-Sibā‘ī noted, was
later on joined by several similar societies: al-Shubbān al-Muslimūn,
Dār al-Arqam (Aleppo) and Makārim al-Akhlāq al-Islāmiyyah (Beirut),
in addition to various organizations in Jerusalem, London and Paris.
[107]

In 1944, with a view to accomplishing an Islamic and a moral

reformation in the Syrian public sphere, al-Sibā‘ī merged the above-
mentioned societies creating by which the basis of a new umbrella
organization, the Muslim Brotherhood Movement.[108] As famously
known, he was the Brotherhood’s first general supervisor (al-murāqib
al-‘āmm).[109] He endeavored to strengthen this movement socially
and politically and, for this purpose, edited the Brotherhood’s
publications al-Manār and al-Muslimūn.[110]

‘Iṣām al-‘Aṭṭār (1927-)

‘Iṣām al-‘Aṭṭār, a writer, a literary figure, a poet, an accomplished
orator, a thinker and a political activist, was born in Damascus to a
notable family of leading ulema, jurists and traditionists.[111] His father
supported the Ottoman sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II, and, because of this,
was exiled to Istanbul during the First World War and returned to
Syria after the war. Surprisingly, Najāh al-‘Aṭṭār, his sister, is the
Syrian vice president and of the strongest supports of the Syrian
regime. As a child, he studied the Qur’an, sharia, with particular
attention to Arabic Literature.[112]
Al-‘Aṭṭār joined Muḥammad’s Youth, a movement that eventually
formed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. In 1945, he first met Muṣṭafā
al-Sibā‘ī, who was greatly admired by the unique personality and the
brilliant mind of al-‘Aṭṭār, and, thus, entrusted him with big
responsibilities that can only be held by an ambitious person like
al-‘Aṭṭār.[113]
In the early 1950s, al-‘Aṭṭār and al-Sibā‘ī strongly opposed the
constitution of Syria requiring the state to be based on Islam. They
were, however, strong supporters of the constitutional article
specifying that the Syrian president must be Muslim.[114]
As referred above, al-Shīshaklī in 1951 provoked the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood by putting into jail first Ma‘rūf al-Dawālībī, the
prime minister, because of his opposing ideas, and then al-Sibā‘ī,
who sought to free his friend al-Dawālībī. In a more provoking
manner, al-Shīshaklī dissolved the Brotherhood movement.[115]
Ridden with anger and resentment, al-‘Aṭṭār severely criticized
the dictatorship of al-Shīshaklī, on every possible occasion. He
escaped arrest by fleeing to Egypt, where he developed close ties
with leading members of the Egyptian Brotherhood, including Sayyid
Quṭb and many others.[116] Four years later, and upon his father’s
serious illness, al-‘Aṭṭār returned to Syria.
When the Ba‘th Party came to power in 1963, al-‘Aṭṭār was
among the powerful voices against this new totalitarian regime. He
continued his Friday sermons against the government in Damascus
and was placed under house arrest a few times.[117] After leaving
Syria to perform Hajj in 1964, al-‘Aṭṭār was denied entry to Syria. He
lived in exile in Lebanon. In 1964, he was appointed the new general
supervisor of the Muslim Brotherhood.[118]
In 1968, al-‘Aṭṭār moved to Germany, where he led the
Brotherhood from exile. While in Germany, he had a falling out with
the Brotherhood’s local leadership, which had become fractured as a
result of the Islamic insurgency against Hafez al-Assad in the 1970s.
Al-‘Aṭṭār sought peaceful means without having recourse to violence,
and attempted to leave the leadership of the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood more than once. In 1973, he left his position as the
Brotherhood’s general supervisor and founded a movement to help
European Muslims learn about Islam.[119]
During al-Assad’s reign, al-‘Aṭṭār was offered several times to
return to Syria held in high esteem and full respect. “I rejected all
these offers,” al-‘Aṭṭār said. “On the personal level, the government
was ready to grant me everything I wanted, which was not an issue
to me at all. On the national level, however, the government high-
ranking officials did not express their readiness to open any
discussion about freedom and human rights. This was the discussion
between me and the Syrian ambassador, Sulaymān Haddād in
Germany.”[120]
Al-‘Aṭṭār survived several assassination attempts both in Syria
and Germany. In 1981, one of these attempts caused the death of
his wife, Banān al-Ṭanṭāwī, the daughter of ‘Alī al-Ṭanṭāwī, al-‘Aṭṭār’s
ever-greatest teacher. The so-called Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt
and Libya enjoys al-‘Aṭṭār’s full support; needless to say, so does the
2011 Syrian revolution.[121]
As a brief assessment of the movement, the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood in a critical period was like a house divided against
itself. While Hama leaders violently launched an armed attack
against the Ba‘th rule, Damascene leadership, headed by al-‘Aṭṭār,
inclined to adopt a compromise agreement identifying a common
thread between the movement and the regime. In the mid-1970s, the
northern wing of the organization had gained the upper hand over
the Damascene branch.[122] In retrospect, al-‘Aṭṭār’s espousal of
peaceful strategy proved to be more prudent and thoughtful,
because when the action is foolish, reaction ought to be sensible.
Whether in Egypt or Syria, the Brotherhood Movement
represents a broad spectrum of opinions, from puritanical, including
approval of violent acts in some circumstances, running contrary to
the Islamic norms and principles, to liberal, including respect for the
other’s opinion and conviction, both in religious and mundane
matters.

Sufi Orders
The word for “order” in Arabic is ṭarīqah, which literally means “path”
or “way,” that is, the spiritual path that leads ultimately to the
experience of divine reality. This path was, initially, practiced by
individual Sufis. However, with the passage of time and as
communities of followers gathered around their masters, ṭarīqah
came to designate the master’s entire ritual system. Nowadays,
ṭarīqah refers to the social organization and the various devotional
exercises constituting a ritual and structural basis of the order.[123] In
all Sufi orders, followers are engaged in central activities like regular
meetings for dhikr (remembering Allah) namely, recitations of
prayers, poems and selected Qur’anic verses.
As far as Syria is concerned, it is difficult to identify, in a few
pages devoted to Sufism, every main Sufi order with its many
various branches as well as sub-branches. Moreover, zāwiyahs,
takiyyahs and ḥaḍrahs are widespread in Syria’s rural and urban
areas. A Sufi order maybe adopted by both the elite and laypeople.
[124]
Three widely spreading Sufi orders are observed: Naqshbandī,
Shādhilī and Rifā‘ī, in addition to less-dominating orders such as
Qādirī and Tījānī.

The Naqshbandī Order

The Naqshbandī order, bearing the name of Bahā’ al-Dīn Shāh
Naqshband (d. 1389) from Bukhārā,[125]is considered one of the most
prominent and widespread orders in Muslim Asia, Turkey and other
countries.[126] It was first introduced to Syria by Mawlānā Khālid al-
Naqshbandī[127] (d.1827) who was of Kurdish origin, but lived and
died in Damascus.[128] With the help of thousands of his murīds
(disciples) throughout all Syria, al-Naqshbandī worked on spreading
Sufism in general and the Naqshbandī order in particular, heart and
soul. Ibn ‘Ābidīn (d. 1836),[129] the most recognized authority on
Ḥanafī jurisprudence of his time, and Prince ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā’irī
(d. 1883)[130] were among his most important and famous students.
[131]

The Naqshbandī order was particularly influential after being

adopted by two famous religious institutions, the Khaznawī and
Kuftārū schools, which work on disseminating the order’s
characteristics and features. The Khaznawī school is located in the
Jazeerah area, northern Syria. It took its name from the Kurdish ‘Iz
or Aḥmad al-Khaznawī, who studied Arabic and sharia disciplines in
Turkey, then returned to his hometown and became involved in
teaching and education.[132] After his death, his son ‘Abd al-Ghanī
took over, who died after a while, then his son, Muḥammad Ma‘shūq
al-Khaznawī became responsible for the school.[133] It is claimed that
the Khaznawī family, who, abusing their position as custodians of the
school, amassed a substantial amount of donated money and many
huge lands as well as a variety of profitable local projects for their
benefit.[134]
‘Abd Allāh al-Jarīzī, a former follower of the Khaznawīs, has
written a book in which he aggressively criticizes their fraudulent
behavior along with numerous exaggerated doctrines and
expressions of faith, hardly described as Islamic. For example, he
speaks of the murīd being obliged, when starting dhikr, to have
rābiṭah,[135] which means to bring to mind either the image of the
shaykh or his high spiritual status. This is an indispensable condition
for an effective, accepted dhikr.[136] Also, he refers to their typical
begging for madad (spiritual help) from previous leading Sufi
masters.[137]
A Khaznawī shaykh or master, al-Jarīzī argues, enjoys a
privileged status: no one has the right to question him or to show any
objections, even in the case of forbidden acts. Rather, total
submission, with blind imitation, is required.[138] In this context,
Khaznawīs assert that a quietist, submissive disciple before his
master is like a corpse in the hands of a corpse washer.[139]Another
drawback of the Khaznawīs is their frequent citation of fabricated
traditions to give support to certain Sufi attitudes or opinions,[140]
which is typical of many Sufis.
Due to several reasons—partly political, partly social—the
powerful, ostensibly united Khaznawī family was gradually
disintegrating, a plight that overshadowed the school as well.[141] In
fairness to this order, however, it is worth mentioning that al-Jarīzī’s
book, while unveiling such publicly unknown facts about the
Khaznawīs, refers to the major influential trend. This new reforming
trend began with the open-minded Ma‘shūq al-Khaznawī, who did
his best to remedy the situation by propagating reviving projects,
delivering sermons and writing books. He founded Markaz Ihyā’ al-
Sunnah (Revival of the Sunnah Center), whose prime target is to
correct erroneous beliefs of his family. Ma‘shūq was killed in 2005.
[142]

Kuftārūs are the second Naqshbandī-oriented group, founded by

Shaykh Muḥammad Amīn Kuftārū (d. 1938), whose religious
teachings and dhikr exercises would be held at a small mosque
named Abū al-Nūr on the slope of Mount Qasioun.[143] After Kuftārū’s
death, his son Aḥmad Kuftārū, who became the grand mufti of Syria
in 1964 until his death in 2004, very much expanded this nascent
da‘wah (preaching) by a number of ways, culminating with the
establishment of Abū al-Nūr Religious Center, called later Shaykh
Aḥmad Kuftārū’s Center in 1971,[144] which became one of the most
famous, and probably one of the largest, Islamic educational centers
in Syria.

Aḥmad Kuftārū adopted a strategy of alliance with the state

before the coup of 1963 and developed it after the rise of Alawi
officers.[145] In 1957, during a parliamentary election in the district of
Damascus, Kuftārū sided with the Ba‘thist candidate, Riyāḍ al-Mālikī
against the Muslim Brother Muṣṭafā al-Sibā‘ī.[146] Many viewed this
support as nothing but opportunism.
One cannot move to the second order without reference to
Shaykh Aḥmad al-Ḥabbāl (d. 2009),[147] a publicly acknowledged
great walī,[148] one of forty Abdāl of al-Shām,[149] and the architect of
majālis al-ṣalāh ‘alā al-Nabī (gathering for a particular mode of dhikr
invoking divine blessings and prayers on the Prophet (ṣ)). Although
being of Rifā‘ī ancestry, al-Ḥabbāl was Naqshbandī following his
father, Sālih, who took it from little-known Shaykh ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-
Ṭarābulsī.[150]

Shādhilī Order
This order takes its name from Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (d. 1258),
who was born in Morocco.[151] Together with its branches,
Shādhiliyyah is spread over a large part of the Muslim World.[152] The
most celebrated twentieth-century Shādhilī shaykh in Syria, as well
as the neighbouring countries is doubtless Shaykh Muḥammad al-
Hāshimī (d. 1961),[153] who was born in Tilimsān, Algeria.[154]
However, due to an increasing irritation of French occupation to
ulema of his country, he moved to Syria, where he settled and
studied sharia under famous ulema.[155]
His spiritual masters include Muḥammad ibn Yallis al-Tilimsānī,
[156]
and Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā ibn ‘Alīwah.[157] Al-Hāshimī gained in
popularity, as he devoted himself to spiritual upliftment, and heart
purification in theory and practice, reflecting on his pious soul, and
nice and lovely character. His lectures at the Umayyad Mosque and
elsewhere were well attended.[158]
Also, he founded zāwiyahs (designated place for a spiritual
development) in Damascus and surrounding areas. Quite many
people from different social sectors derived from his scholarly
lectures and his exemplary model of behavior.[159] Of his murīds
(disciples) who worked on spreading Sufism so widely, ‘Abd al-
Raḥmān al-Shāghūrī and Sa‘īd al-Burhānī are the most noted.
Shaykh ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Shāghūrī (d. 2004) is considered one
of the most leading figures of the Shādhiliyyah-Darqāwiyyah order in
Syria after al-Hāshimī.[160] Born in Homs, al-Shāghūrī studied a
variety of religious disciplines (jurisprudence, Qur’anic commentary
and Arabic) under the most eminent shaykhs of his time, like Badr al-
Dīn al-Ḥasanī, known as al-Muḥaddith al-Akbar, ‘Alī al-Daqir, Ḥusnī
al-Baghāl and others.[161] Al-Shāghūrī’s attachment to Sufism began
at an early age, as he used to attend in Homs dhikr gathering, and
frequently visit Shaykh Yūsuf Jandal of Rifā‘ī order. In Damascus, al-
Shāghūrī kept al-Hāshimī’s company for thirty years.[162] While being
a sober Sufi who faithfully adhered to sharia-bound Sufism, al-
Shāghūrī was strongly critical of any excessive Sufi doctrine or act
that runs against the Qur’an and Sunnah.
On many occasions, he would spare no effort in exposing the
deficient character of pseudo-Sufism.[163] Once he was asked about
those who, out of severe devotionalism and to prove the genuine
message of Islam, stab themselves with a sword without causing any
apparent bodily harm. He replied, “Rather, they should search for a
gone-astray person to guide, an ignorant one to teach or a sick
person to whom you recite certain Qur’anic verses as a means of
remedy…a Sufism is to act according to the Qur’an and Sunnah.”[164]
In addition to his Sufi tendency, al-Shāghūrī is a skilled poet by
nature. He composed short and long poems on many themes and
various occasions. Of course, his Sufism-oriented poetry is the
predominant genre.[165]
Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-Burhānī (d. 1967) was born in Damascus to
poor yet committed parents.[166] He learned diverse branches of
sharia knowledge from many shaykhs, such as ‘Atā’ Allāh al-Qāsim,
Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥasanī, Maḥmūd al-‘Aṭṭār.[167] Having come to know al-
Hāshimī, he had a close association with him thereby having
khalwah (spiritual retreat), and immersing himself in dhikr under the
shaykh’s guidance. In 1945, he became imam and preacher of al-
Tawbah Mosque, where he would run religious, spiritual and
educating courses as well as dhikr circles, attended by a large
number people, lay and educated.[168] More, he would organize and,
sometimes lead, congregational meetings, at mosques and
elsewhere across the Syrian land, devoted to the utterance of al-
ṣalāh ‘alā al-Nabī.[169] Like his fellow al-Shāghūrī, al-Burhānī
denounces any kind of Sufism that departs from the norm.
 It may not be exaggerated by saying that the spiritual impact of
the Shādhilī shaykh Muḥammad al-Hāshimī and that of his two pre-
eminent disciples has gone far beyond the national border (Iraq,
Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Turkey, Europe and America).[170] On
their death, they left thousands of far-flung murīds and followers, like
Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Ya‘qūbī, Muḥammad Bashīr al-Qahwajī, Shukrī
al-Luḥafī, Muḥammad Sāliḥ al-Ḥamwī, Nuh Ha Mim Keller, Abū al-
Hudā al-Ḥusaynī and Abū al-Nūr Khurshīd, to mention but a few.
Qādirī Order
Founded by Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Gīlānī (or al-Kīlānī) (d. 1166),
[171]
the Qādirī order is considered one of the oldest Sufi orders in the
Muslim world. Mount ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, located in the southwestern part
of al-Ḥasakah Governorate, in northeastern Syria, is the most Qādirī-
dominated area.[172] The mountain is named after ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, a
descendant of ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Gīlānī, who was a military
commander in Saladin’s army.[173]
He took the mountain as a dwelling place and died on it. His
grave became a place of pilgrimage for many Qādirī followers.[174]
Presently, Shaykh ‘Ubayd Allāh ibn Aḥmad al-Kask of al-Gīlānī’s
ancestry is regarded as one of the current leading Qādirī masters.[175]
He lives in ‘Āmūdā city, in southern al-Ḥasakah, and runs a Sufi
religious school attended by a great number of students.[176] Further,
it has been noted that every day many people come to ‘Āmūdā to
enter the Qādirī order.[177]
Before being opted to the ṭarīqah, however, a would-be Qādirī
murīd has to be fully persuaded of the Qādirī order as a spiritual path
and Shaykh ‘Ubayd Allāh as a master. Then he should, by declaring
adherence to sharia, be a committed Muslim who keeps away from
forbidden things.[178] Some of the Qādirīs, after finishing dhikr, do a
special kind of dance. Others indulge in quite extreme acts, like
stabbing themselves with a sword or a lance, but the ulema among
them do not prefer that.[179]
The Rifā‘ī Order
The Rifā‘ī order, founded by Shaykh Aḥmad al-Rifā‘i (d. 1182),[180] is
deeply rooted in Syria. Among its leading masters are two: (1)
Muḥammad Hāshim Abū Ṭawq (d. 1962),[181] who was born in
Damascus. He erected his own zāwiyah at al-Mīdān quarter, where
he used to receive his murīds.[182] Strangely enough, it was widely
reported that he would raise snakes and recite special prayers or
supplications over them, making them entirely subject to his orders.
[183]
(2) Maḥmūd al-Shuqfah (d. 1979).[184] Born in Hama, al-Shuqfah
devoted his life as a preacher, an educator, as well as a practicing
Sufi. He ran a number of charitable societies and religious schools in
Hama. As regards the Rifā‘ī order, he took it from Shaykh ‘Abd al-
Raḥmān al-Sabsabī in 1964.[185] Being immensely popular in Hama,
al-Shuqfah won a seat in the Parliament in 1947. He used to hold
various dhikr circles, including those praising the Prophet (ṣ) and
recalling his laudable traits.[186]

Tījānī Order
It was established by the Algerian Aḥmad Tījānī (d. 1815),[187] who
claimed that he saw Prophet Muḥammad (ṣ) in a dream in 1782 and
was commanded by him to establish his own order, which spread
widely across the Western Africa.[188]
In Syria, in the 1930s, the Tījānī order generated so much
controversy among ulema far more than any other Sufi order did.
This controversy began with Jam‘iyyat al-Gharrā’[189] (al-Gharrā’
Society), which made it mandatory for students of the Society’s
affiliated schools to start their day with the Fātiḥ prayer,[190] which is
an innovation in religion.[191]
More, as stated by fatwas from many well-known ulema, Syrian
and non-Syrian,[192] the fundamental books of this order, widely
recognized and circulated among its adherents, contain very
controversial statements and beliefs, sometimes blasphemous.
According to al-Jawāhir, “as a single utterance of the Fātiḥ prayer is
equal to 6,000 utterances of any other ordinary dhikr or prayer, big or
small.”[193] More blatantly, according to al-‘Ifāḍah al-Aḥmadiyyah, the
Fātiḥ prayer is considered “Allah’s word.”[194] A number of anti-Tījānī
pamphlets and booklets were freely distributed in schools, mosques
and elsewhere.[195]
 In spite of objections coming from various directions to the Tījānī
order’s bizarre views, Shaykh ‘Alī al-Daqir, one of the two founders
of al-Gharrā’ Society, never changed his mind,[196] For this reason
and others, his partner Hāshim al-Khaṭīb decided to leave the
society.[197] Probably, because of its clearly bad history, the Tījānī
order now has few followers in the Syrian Sufi scene.
Whether in Syria or elsewhere, Sufi orders have two features in
common: in some cases, after the death of their master, close
murīds, including his sons, dispute over succession. This occurred
after the death of Aḥmad al-Khaznawī and Shaykh ‘Abd al-Raḥmān
al-Shāghūrī.[198] A Sufi order is hardly ever free from excessive ritual
practices or Islamically disapproved innovations.

Salafism[199]
Salafism is a reform movement founded by Muḥammad ‘Abd al-
Wahhāb (d. 1792)[200] in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula. As
known, Salafism was directly inspired by the works of Ibn Taymiyyah
(d. 1328).[201] However, in some cases, it departed from his ideas.
This movement has a formative impact on many Muslim thinkers and
movements across the Muslim world.
The first one who introduced Salafism to Syria was the
Damascus-born Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (d. 1914), a leading
religious reformer, a recognized authority in Hadith discipline, and a
prolific writer.[202] Ironically, al-Qāsimī used to be a Sufi of the
Naqshbandī order who studied books of Sufism under his shaykh
Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Khānī. Then, for some reason, in the
1880s he abandoned the Naqshbandī order,[203] criticizing Sufis of his
time because of their un-Islamic beliefs and practices.[204] Further,
contrary to ulema of his time, who strictly adhered to one of the four
madhhabs (legal schools of thought), al-Qāsimī, influenced by
Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s thought,[205] enthusiastically called for ijtihad
(independent legal reasoning), not confining oneself to one madhhab
but rather advocating that the most commendable and fitting legal
opinion, be it within the famous legal schools or not, should be taken.
This becomes more obvious when such fresh juristic opinions are
able to cope with new conditions and needs of life, with all its diverse
aspects and increasingly growing complexities.[206] In spite of being a
Salafi, however, al-Qāsimī accepted some practices, that usually go
against Salafi current trend, like celebrating the birthday of the
Prophet (ṣ); reciting Qur’anic verses for the sake of evoking divine
mercy on the dead; visiting the graves of ulema and righteous
people.[207] Foremost among al-Qāsimī’s students are Muḥammad
Bahjat al-Bītār, Hāmid al-Taqī, Muḥammad al-Bizm, Muḥibb al-Dīn
al-Khatīb and Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī.[208]
Al-Qāsimī’s innovative ideas are believed to have been a
forerunner of what was later on named “anti-madhhabism,” a
movement represented by modern Wahhabis/Salafis, who, while
rejecting the notion of fidelity to specific legal schools, insist on the
right to return to the primary texts of Islam (Qur’an and Sunnah), re-
interpret the traditions without being bound by the interpretations of
classical jurists and mix between the various schools in order to
reach the most prudent and useful results. Al-Albānī and al-Shāwīsh
are considered the most popular scholars who championed anti-
madhhabism as well as other Salafi doctrines in the later part of the
twentieth-century Syria.
Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (d. 1999) was born in Albania
but when aged nine he moved to Syria with his family.[209] Al-Albānī
placed a particular importance on the works of Ibn Taymiyyah,
Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā.[210] And in a more strident
fashion than that of al-Qāsimī, he defended
anti-madhhabism, which caused quite a stir among his
contemporaries.
For example, al-Būṭī wrote a book entitled al-Lā madhhabiyyah
akhṭar bid‘ah tuhaddid al-sharī‘ah al-Islāmiyyah (Anti-madhhabism is
the most dangerous innovation threatening Islamic law).[211] The
thrust of the book’s argument runs as follows: It is extremely serious
to claim that following one particular madhhab is forbidden,[212] and
thus it is an innovation that ought to be rejected.
Then he goes on saying that since those who are unqualified to
exercise ijtihad and derive rules directly from the Qur’an and Sunnah
are logically and legally invited to follow, as to legal matters, one of
the qualified known mujtahids[213]. This was exactly the case in the
early Islamic era. Many of the Ṣaḥābah (the Prophet’s Companions),
as well as the Tābi‘ūn (“Followers” or post-Ṣaḥābah generation) who
lacked a legal ability to reach ijtihad used to follow those who
enjoyed such a needed capacity.[214]
A follower, while not being obliged to stick for a long time to one
particular mujtahid, may choose another and follow his madhhab.[215]
In a chapter named “al-Taqlīd is unavoidable,” al-Būṭī furnishes
several legally and rationally evidences to support his argument.[216]
Muḥammad ‘Ῑd ‘Abbasī,[217] one of al-Albānī’s supporters, wrote a
refutation of al-Būṭī’s work called al-Madhhabiyyah al-muta‘aṣṣibah
hiya al-bid‘ah[218] (The fanatic madhhabism is the innovation).
According to al-Būṭī, this critique, far from being professional, tended
to be an ad hominem attack lacking the minimum of an ethical and
cogent argument.[219]
Al-Albānī’s version of rigid, uncompromising Salafism made him
enter into another battle of ideas with Shaykh ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Abū
Ghuddah (d. 1997),[220] a noted Syrian jurist and traditionist. Abū
Ghuddah wrote Kalimāt fī kashf abāṭīl wa iftirā’āt[221] (Words unveiling
fabrications and lies) as a response to dozens of fabricated
statements and ideas attributed to him by al-Albānī as well as al-
Shāwīsh. Al-Albānī in turn published Kashf al-niqāb ‘ammā fī kitāb
Abī Ghuddah min abāṭīl wa iftirā’āt[222] (Unmasking fabrications and
lies of Abū Ghuddah’s Book).
 Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh (d. 2013), born in Damascus, was al-Albānī’s
right-hand man. He derived sharia from a number of ulema, including
Muḥammad Bahjat al-Bītār and, of course, al-Albānī.[223] He was an
active member of the Syrian MB, and had close ties with Muṣṭafā al-
Sibā‘ī and Iṣām al-‘Aṭṭār.[224] Also, al-Shāwīsh engaged himself in
politics and in 1961, he became an MP.[225] In 1950, he founded al-
Maktab al-Islāmī, a leading publishing house that published
numerous classical Islamic books, especially Salafi literature, with
Ibn Taymiyyah’s works at the top of the list.[226] And it has been
admitted that al-Albānī’s publications gained wide currency in much
of the Arab World: Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Jordan and Egypt.
[227]

Among other Syrian ulema who were inspired by the teachings of

Salafism acquiring different expressions and emphasis are Ḥāmid al-
Taqī (d. 1967)[228]; Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb (d. 1969),[229] a celebrated
writer, a journalist and an editor. He founded al-Fatḥ as well as al-
Zahrā’ magazines, in addition to al-Maṭba‘ah al-Salafiyyah (al-
Salafiyyah Press) and al-Maktabah al-Salafiyyah[230] (al-Salafiyyah
Bookshop); Shu‘ayb al-Arna’ūṭ (d. 2016) and ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Arna’ūṭ
(d. 2004),[231] both being outstanding experts in the field of hadith,
who published and edited dozens of hadith-related collections;
Muḥammad ibn Luṭfī al-Sabbāgh (1930-); Ḥusayn Salīm Asad
(1932-); Khālid ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-‘Ik (d. 1999).[232]
Religious Associations and Institutions
Religious associations and institutions, which increased in number
over the last four decades, reflect people’s strong attachment to
Islam. The main aim of these non-governmental charitable
associations is to provide students with traditional religious learning
on the one hand and to stop the rising tide of modernist aberrations
destroying the moral fabric of Muslim society on the other.
The following are the most famous associations: (1) Jam‘iyyat al-
Gharrā’, founded in 1924 by ‘Alī al-Daqir and Hāshim al-Khaṭīb,[233]
which established five primary schools and six religious
institutions[234]; (2) Jam‘iyyat al-Tawjīh al-Islāmī, founded before 1953
by Shaykh Ḥasan Ḥabannakah, which established Ma‘had al-Tawjīh
al-Islāmī[235]; (3) Jam‘iyyat al-Anṣār al-Khayriyyah, founded before
1953 by Shaykh Aḥmad Kuftārū, which established Abū al-Nūr
Religious Center, later called Shaykh Aḥmad Kuftārū’s Center in
1971[236]; (4) Jam‘iyyat Dār al-Ḥadīth, founded before 1954 by
Muḥammad al-Maktabī[237]; (5) Jam‘iyyat al-Fatḥ al-Islāmī, founded
by Shaykh Muḥammad Sāliḥ Farfūr in 1956, which established al-
Fatḥ Islamic Institute[238]; (6) Jam‘iyyat Shaykh Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥasanī,
founded in 1959 by Badr al-Dīn ‘Ābidīn[239]; (7) Jam‘iyyat al-Furqān
al-Khayriyyah, founded in 1967 by Badr al-Dīn ‘Ābidīn, which
established Ma‘had Jam‘iyyat al-Furqān.[240]
In addition, there are state-run sharia secondary schools,
reaching 130 in 2010.[241] On May 2, 1972, Hafez al-Assad issued a
decree by which certificates from these schools were made officially
equivalent to their non-sharia counterparts,[242] thus allowing their
students admission to all Syrian universities.
It is famously known that the most influential and active religious
institutions in Syria are al-Fatḥ Islamic Institute and Kuftārū Center,
which have, for decades, graduated thousands of local and
international students leaving an indelible mark on almost every
corner of the world.[243]
The agenda of these wide-social-root institutions is primarily
driven by educational purposes, and remote from Islamist activism
adopted by the Muslim Brothers. For decades, the institutions did not
appear to have had any clash or trouble with the Syrian authority,
because of their declared policy of indifference to politics or Islamist
agenda, the root cause making governments extremely
apprehensive about any Islamic action. The institutions’ leaders used
to act, and still, under the guidance and dictation of the Ministry of
Awqāf.
On April 4, 2011, shortly after the uprising, Bashar al-Assad
issued a presidential decree (48) by which al-Fatḥ and Kuftārū
institutes, along with al-Sayyidah Ruqayyah (a Shia ḥawzah),
became an officially recognized university called al-Shām Higher
Institute for Arabic and Religious Studies, which issues university
degrees up to doctorate level. As a remarkable move, this institute,
besides being the first Sunni-Shia academic institution in Syria, it
brings tremendous relief to an untold number of students whose
bachelor’s degrees, issued by formerly private institutes, did not get
any official recognition.
It has been claimed, however, that it is nothing but marsūm al-
thawrah (decree of the revolution) meaning that the decree has been
issued as a policy of appeasement. In other words, the government
decided to buy the silence of these particularly prominent Sunni
institutes.
Prof. Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr, the president of al-Fatḥ branch,
replied that whether this claim was true or not, he did not care about
it. Nevertheless, he did not condone the regime’s crimes. On Friday
prayers and TV Interviews, he voiced objections to such brutality
through his own way which does not provoke the regime. He added
that what is happening is not the proper way of revolting against the
president. Rather, it is aggravating the situation. The real jihad is to
endeavor to teach students moderate and proper Islamic education.
[244]

Jamā‘at Zayd (the Zayd Group), founded by Shaykh ‘Abd al-

Karīm al-Rifā‘ī, who initiated his da‘wah from Zayd ibn Thābit al-
Anṣārī Mosque in Damascus in the 1950s, is one of the most
dominant organizations to address the growing demand for religious
education that was spreading among the educated youth.[245] The
aim of al-Rifā‘ī was to promote the role of the mosque by offering
university-like teachings in weekly study circles where students
were, besides religious learning, exposed to moral and spiritual
education.[246] From the 1990s onward, Zayd’s teaching activities
were steadily flourishing in several mosques, “four of which are
invested with special status because of their imposing size and the
personality of their preachers, who form the collective leadership of
the movement.”[247] Zayd ibn Thābit al-Anṣārī Mosque (Sāriyah, the
second son of al-Rifā‘ī), ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Rifā‘ī Mosque (Usāmah,
elder son al-Rifā‘ī), al-Īmān Mosque (Na‘īm al-‘Iriqsūsī, hadith
specialist) and al-Ḥamzah wa al-‘Abbās Mosque (Nadhīr Maktabī,
orator and poet).
Up to the 2011 revolution, the Zayd leaders, in particular Usāmah
and Sāriyah, were establishing a good relationship with the regime.
They used to have occasional visits to top officials in the government
and intelligence units. A couple of times, before and after presidency,
Bashar al-Assad attended Usāmah’s Friday sermon at ‘Abd al-Karīm
al-Rifā‘ī Mosque.[248] Also, Usāmah was strongly nominated to hold
the post of the grand mufti.[249] However, in the aftermath of the
revolution, this honeymoon ended with arrest, torture, and even
murder of Zayd protesters as they were joining anti-regime rallies,
with Usāmah himself being injured during a confrontation between
Zayd and regime forces at al-Rifā‘ī Mosque in 2011.[250]
Jamā‘at al-Qubaysiyyāt (the Qubaysī Group), named after its
eponym Munīrah al-Qubaysiyyah, is a Muslim female revivalist
organization sweeping Syria and, to a great extent, the neighboring
countries. Since its inception in the 1970s,[251] the organization has
set itself a specific agenda with a view to generally restructuring the
framework of female substandard religious learning on new
foundations, in order to return to Muslim women the flagship role
they previously assumed in the Muslim society. Little is known about
this movement, and widespread rumors are circulating about its
activities and practices.[252] The Qubaysiyyāt run dozens of nursery,
primary and secondary schools and a variety of enterprises.[253] It is
known that the movement, from the beginning, has distanced itself
from any political action or relations with the regime.[254]
For over four decades, the aforementioned da‘wah-oriented
Islamic groups and institutions have adopted a strategy of
compromise with the Ba‘thist regime, which in turn allowed a societal
space to them to advance their educational, and charitable system.
In paradox, this co-opted policy has kept the Ba‘thist Syria
officially “secular,” yet in reality has created an extensive and
integrated network of Islamic revivification, thereby reversing the
effect of the regime’s secularizing trend.
On various occasions, I heard al-Buṭī hinting to this fact by
saying, “I have travelled to many Arab and Muslim countries; indeed,
Syria is the only country in which Islam is rooting and gaining
strength.”
 Al-Būṭī: His Life and Contribution
to Islamic Thought

Life

M uḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī was born in 1929 in the

Turkish village of Jelika on Būṭān Island in the Kurdish region of
modern Turkey. Fed up with Ataturk’s secularizing policy, al-Būṭī’s
father, Mullah Ramaḍān (d. 1990), moved with his family to
Damascus.[255] Al-Būṭī’s mother died when he was thirteen, and since
his stepmother was of Turkish origin, al-Būṭī was fluent in Turkish.[256]
Shaykh Mullah Ramaḍān, according to al-Būṭī, was a person of
great piety and devotion who used to engage himself in religious
rituals and practices, like frequent recitation of the Qur’an,
performing supererogatory prayers, memorizing daily-repeated
religious formulas (awrād), remembering Allah.[257] At every
opportunity, the father would remind his family of Allah, His infinite
mercy, generosity, as well as His punishment. Every Monday and
Thursday, after the Dawn Prayer, he would call the family for dhikr
gathering in which different kinds of formulas were recited for the
sake of remembering Allah, praising Him and invoking His refuge.
This regular gathering was maintained by al-Būṭī even after the
father’s death.[258] Such observable spiritual attachment of the father
left a deep mark on the son’s life and thought, as can be seen in his
book Hādhā wālidī[259] (This is my father).
Besides being a rich source of spiritual and devotional
inspiration, the father taught his son traditional Islamic knowledge,
like the principles of Islamic creed, the biography of the Prophet (ṣ)
in addition to Arabic syntax and morphology.[260] To Shaykh Mullah
Ramaḍān, seeking and studying religious knowledge is the way that
guides to Allah. Once he said to al-Būṭī, very young, “O my son, you
should know that if the only way that takes you to Allah was to collect
garbage from public places, I would let you be a dustman. Yet, I
have found that the way to Allah is to know Him and study His
religion.”[261]
Therefore, the father took his son to the celebrated Shaykh
Ḥasan Ḥabannakah (d. 1978),[262] a very influential religious leader
and scholar who was running a variety of religious classes at Manjak
Mosque in al-Mīdān, which was later transformed into Ma‘had al-
Tawjīh al-Islāmī (Institute of Islamic Orientation), where al-Būṭī
studied Qur’anic commentary, Hadith, theology, Shāfi‘ī
jurisprudence, legal theory, logic and rhetoric until 1953. [263]
Like his
father, al-Būṭī was an active supporter of Ḥabannakah’s campaign
for the position of grand mufti in the 1960s.[264]
Badī‘ al-Zamān Sa‘īd al-Nūrsī (d. 1960), the Kurdish anti-
Kemalist Islamic leader and thinker in late Ottoman and republican
Turkey, is another intellectual and spiritual guiding figure in al-Būṭī’s
life. Al-Būṭī was probably the first who introduced al-Nūrsī to the
Arab reader through an article entitled, “Sa‘īd al-Nūrsī: U‘jūbat al-
thawrah al-Islāmiyyah fī Turkiyyah” (Sa‘īd al-Nūrsī: The Miracle of
the Islamic Revolution in Turkey).[265] The following paragraph
reflects to what extent al-Būṭī was greatly fascinated with al-Nūrsī’s
da‘wah methodology and thought.
When I write these words I feel that I am illustrating how
the life of a Muslim who is faithful to his Islamic belief, and
of a preacher who is honest in his mission, and of a
scholar who is dedicated in his work ought to be...
However, this is not the only reason why I am engulfed
with this immense sense of emotion and happiness as I
narrate the life of this great missionary. It could be that I
find in his great life, which is characterized by dedication,
pious efforts and selflessness, that which we no longer find
in the lives of most other Islamic ulema and preachers
today.[266]
 In the later part of his life, particularly in 1921 onward, Sa‘īd al-
Nūrsī abandoned the political action all together immersing himself in
da‘wah among the youth through his widely circulated Rasā’il al-nūr
(The Light Epistles).[267] His statement “I seek refuge with Allah from
Satan and politics”[268] expresses his remorse for earlier engagement
in politics. The “new Sa‘īd,” as he called himself, with a focus on
da‘wah efforts became by far more effective and productive, than the
“old Sa‘īd,” regarding character-building and enhancing the religious
identity in the Turkish society.[269]
Influenced by al-Nūrsī, al-Būṭī distanced himself from all activities
that have to do with politics, including establishing or affiliation with
Islamist-political parties. At the age of eighteen, al-Būṭī got married
to the sister of his father’s second wife, who was older than him. He
had been unwilling to get married at such a young age. However, at
his father’s request, and fearing for disobedience to him, he
contentedly agreed.[270]
 Career
In 1954 al-Būṭī travelled to Cairo to continue his studies at al-Azhar
University, Sharia College. A year later, he returned to Syria and
taught in secondary schools.[271] Also, he was appointed to the
Faculty of Sharia, Damascus University. Then he returned to al-
Azhar to pursue his PhD project in Islamic jurisprudence, which he
attained with honors in 1965.[272] His academic position at the
Damascus University flourished as he was appointed the dean of the
Sharia Department in 1977 then the Chair of Theology Department.
[273]
Throughout his four-decade-career as a university professor, al-
Būṭī lectured in theology, jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence,
the legal theory, as well as Islamic contemporary thought.
As far as public activity is concerned, al-Būṭī had indeed a hectic
schedule. Until he was assassinated in 2013, al-Būṭī had committed
himself to a weekly sermon in al-Rifā‘ī Mosque, and later on, in the
Umayyad Mosque.[274] His brilliantly introduced thematic series of
lectures which were held twice a week in Tinkiz Mosque, then due to
lack of space, in al-Īmān Mosque, are broadcast on various satellite
channels. Hundreds of people, school teachers and university
professors would attend his Friday sermons and lectures. Others
would come from a long distance to listen to his speeches. For more
than two decades, al-Būṭī had a weekly Qur’an and Sunnah
commentary program on the Syrian TV channel. [275]
Al-Būṭī, to be maintained, never lived on the margin of the
society. Rather he proved to be an active intellectual who kept
himself busy with main matters and problems facing the Muslim
community today. For example, his series of pamphlets on the crisis
in the Muslim World, under the title Abḥāth fī al-qimmah (Issues of
Prime Importance), became to be very popular among Muslims,
especially the youth. In this series, al-Būṭī attempts to prescribe the
most effective medicine for the treatment of the current problems
facing the Muslims.
Al-Būṭī also made statements and opinions on all the most
relevant and burning issues, such as Islam vs modernity,
predestination, veiling, education, civilization, freedom, democracy,
secularism, nationalism, jihad, Marxism etc. No wonder, al-Būṭī for
nearly four decades was dominating the Syrian religious sphere
being at the forefront of Sunni Islam.
 Al-Būṭī as Defender of Islam
Undoubtedly, modern/liberal Arab thought is a by-product of the
cultural encounter between Islam and the West. Whether in Syria or
elsewhere, Western-oriented intellectuals stubbornly call for
an emphatic, full application of modern Western dictates to
the Islamic world on the one hand, and making substantial
adjustments to long-held Muslim social and cultural norms,
especially those in the domain of Islamic law, on the other. At a time
when the Arab public discourse was increasingly dominated by
nationalist, communalist as well as modernistic trends, al-Būṭī
presented himself as a public religious intellectual whose central aim
was to defend the position of Islamic traditions and principles.
Al-Būṭī vs Tīzīnī
Al-Ṭayyib Tīzīnī, born in Homs in 1943, is a famous Marxist
philosopher, a thinker, and a writer, who obtained a PhD in
Philosophy from Germany. Tīzīnī is a professor of Politics and
Philosophy at Damascus University, and a member of the Arab
Writers Union, Syria.[276] Tīzīnī is one of the intellectuals who aspired
to create a new project that critically reads and re-interprets the
history and traditions of Arab and Islamic thought putting them in a
new perspective so as to be able to face modern challenges and
complexities of life.
For this purpose, Tīzīnī has authored several works, like Mashrū‘
ru’yah jadīdah li al-fikr al-‘Arabī fī al-‘aṣr al-wasīṭ (A New Vision
Project of the Arab Thought in the Medieval Time),[277] al-Fikr
al-‘Arabī fī bawākīrih wa āfāqih al-ūlā[278] (The Arab Thought in its
Early Times and Horizons) and al-Naṣṣ al-Qur’ānī amām ishkāliyyat
al-bunyah wa al-qirā’ah[279] (The Qur’anic Text Before the Problem of
Structure and Reading) challenging the authority of traditional
Qur’anic interpretation and advocating, instead, a contemporary
reading based on totally different methodological precepts, such as
historicism and Marxist philosophy.
In addition, Tīzīnī on his merit is one of few modernist/liberal
thinkers who engaged in a fruitful dialogue with traditionalist or neo-
traditionalist ulema, like al-Būṭī; a step badly needed in times of a
growing mistrust and hostility between these two camps. Al-Būṭī-
Tīzīnī intellectual debates, held on various occasions, represent a
sort of calm, scholarly debate, in which each party, while criticizing,
arguing, proving and disproving, bears in mind that “the sparkle of
truth comes out of conflicting ideas” and thus avidly seeks to reach
that truth, no matter who appears to make possession of it.
The following is a brief description of the Būṭī-Tīzīnī debate
organized by the National Union of Syrian Students in 1997-1998
which is published in a book entitled al-Islām wa al-‘aṣr: Taḥaddiyāt
wa āfāq (Islam and the Contemporary World: Challenges and
Horizons),[280], within a “Dialogues for a new Century” series.

1. Tīzīnī: Islam manifests itself through two
epistemologically different levels: revelation
and interpretation. The distinction between
them depends on the fact that the divine
word once reaches people via the
Messenger (ṣ), it becomes a human word.
Because humans are unable to grasp the
divine word, as it is, the separation between
the two words seems to be necessary. And
therefore, it is justified—at the identified
human level—to speak of naṣṣ tanzīl
(revealed text) and naṣṣ ta’wīl (interpreted
text). So the holy text, upon getting down
from a divine to a human abode, went
fragmented as to its meaning. In other
words, the meanings of Qur’anic verses are
as so diverse and multiple as those who
interpret them with their different social
positions: (individuals, groups, classes),
different educational levels, as well as their
various ideologies and ethnicities. This is
not strange. Instead, what may seem
strange is not to act upon that, because
human multiplicity is the norm. Allah says,
“Had your Lord willed, He would have
1. Al-Būṭī: This perception tells that the content
of Qur’an (its meanings, decisions, rules etc.),
while stored in al-Lawḥ al-Maḥfūẓ (the
Preserved Tablet), i.e. in a pre-revelation
period, had been of a purely divine level. Once
descended to the earth, and conveyed by the
Prophet (ṣ), this divine transcendent level
turned human, in order to lend itself to
numerous ways of under-standing, social
conditions, ideologies and so on… (i) One may
ask that, given this contrast between the two
levels, why did not Allah right from the very
beginning make His “transcendent” word
match the lower human level or, alternatively,
elevate people’s under-standing to the level of
His divine book? (ii) The Qur’an, as argued,
has been made open to a wide variety of
opinions, schools, and philosophies, and, like
flowing water, does not enjoy any fixed or
specific meaning. That is, all readings and
interpretation are accepted. If this is correct,
then what is the point of many Qur’anic verses
giving warnings and threats of eternal
punishments to those who disobeyed and, on
the hand, promising a good reward to those
who obeyed? In other words, a
made mankind one nation” (Qur’an, Hūd:
118).[281]
2. Tīzīnī asserting the multiplicity of the
meaning the Qur’anic text quotes Prophet
Muḥammad (ṣ) as saying, “The Qur’an has
various meanings, so take the better one or
(the best).”[283]
3. To support the call for modernization of
Islam (Qur’an, Sunnah, or Islamic law),
Tīzīnī cites the following famous legal rule:
tataghayyar al-aḥkām bi taghayyur al-
azmān (Legal rules are subject to change
on account of changing times). Thus, this
legal change is done according to changing
men, women, children, human relations.
[285]
believer/disbeliever or obedient/disobedient
dichotomy, in the classification of the Qur’an,
should have no basis at all, because both
parties interpret the Qur’an according to their
own “authorized” understanding.
(iii) Where in the Qur’an can a revealed
text/interpreted text notion, be applied? Let us
take “the Elephant” sura (chapter) as an
example. “Have you not seen how you Lord
did with the Men of the Elephant? Did He not
make their guile to go astray? And He loosed
upon them birds in flights, hurling against them
stones of baked clay and He made them like
green blades devoured.” (Qur’an, al-Fīl: 1-5).
As an interpreted text, the story this sura tells
is quite understood to us. As a revealed text,
however, what different meaning does it carry?
Nothing, of course. This sura recalls an
incident that actually happened in Mecca in
what later was famously known as the “Year of
the Elephant,” the Prophet’s year
of birth. Thereupon, what the sura signifies is
exactly the same, whether to be a revealed
text or interpreted text.[282]
2. Al-Būṭī: I have never heard of this tradition
or found it in any of collections of Prophetic
sayings.[284]
3. Al-Būṭī: This juristic rule is quite correct but
widely misunderstood. It means that rules of
sharia are of flexible, and adaptable nature;
However, they are grounded on the principle of
al-Maṣlaḥah (consideration of public interests),
which is derived from the Qur’an.[286] That is,
legal rules can be changed on the basis of a
certain sharia code or system that accounts for
this change. If a change is not sanctioned even
remotely by the Qur’an or Sunnah, then is not
accepted.
For example, under the circumstances of
illness or hardship, prayer or ritual obligations
can be abridged or performed in a fashion that
is easier and more appropriate to the sick
person, so as to mitigate the adversities of the
present, difficult situation. A traveler may, if
he/she wills, break the fast, and make up later
on. This mitigated law is basically established
 in order to make life easier and more
endurable.[287]
Furthermore, In sharia there exist what is
known as Aḥkām al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah
(rules pertaining to discretionary justice). The
basis of these rules is found in the Qur’an and
Sunnah, but the various applications of them
are left to the prudence of the head of state
who, while exercising his authorized right,
ought to consider the best possible legal
decision that considers Muslims interests.[288]

This is an example of a civilized, intellectual dialogue in the

Syrian intellectual scene between proponents of secularist/ liberalist
trend and representatives of traditional Islam.
Furthermore, as Syria in the 1960s and 70s had been exposed to
the threat of Communist waves, al-Būṭī felt it necessary to have a
sound grasp of this ideology, which points a finger of suspicion to
religion as “the opium of people” vigorously denying the existence of
Allah. Having immersed himself in reading and studying Marxist-
Communist various writings, al-Būṭī came up with his seminal work
Naqḍ awhām al-māddiyyah al-jadaliyyah[289] (Shattering the Illusions
of Dialectical Materialism), which seriously questions the very
philosophical-historical foundations of Communism.
Secularism also came under al-Būṭī’s scrutiny and critical
evaluation. According to him, there is a neutral secularism giving
space for all religions to express their views and doctrines, and a
hostile secularism with strong tendency to combat the very idea of
religiosity or one specific religion.[290] Al-Būṭī wrote a historical-
scientific critique of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution too.[291]
In all his critiques, al-Būṭī, with a structured mind, follows a step-
by-step discussion. First, he gives introductory remarks explaining
the nature, parameters, as well as the ideological background of the
issue or theory under discussion, and then he provides a faithful and
full account of the arguments of his intellectual opponents. After that,
he presents his arguments within the framework of the wider Islamic
scholarship, frequently referring to the Qur’an, the Sunnah and the
opinions of the leading classical and modern authorities, as well as
making use of his outstanding knowledge of historical-philosophical-
cultural underpinnings of modern Western ideologies.
 Works: A Brief Synopsis
Alongside his successful academic career, al-Būṭī proved to be a
distinguished writer, who occupies a central position at the
intersection of two types of writings: ‘ilm shar‘ī (religious knowledge)
and fikr mu‘āṣir (contemporary thought). His seventy books,
booklets, essays, and treatises, ranging from theology and
philosophy to jurisprudence and Sufism, and from Qur’anic and
hadith studies, to literary themes, as well as a host of contemporary
religious, social, and intellectual issues, have gained currency at
home and abroad.
The following is a brief thematic account of al-Būṭī’s publications:
i. Theology: Kubrā al-yaqīniyyāt al-kawniyyah: Wujūd al-
khāliq wa waẓīfat al-makhlūq[292] (The Greatest
Cosmological Certainties: the Existence of the Creator
and the Role of the Creature) is considered as one of al-
Būṭī’s masterpieces. The book has gone through thirty
editions and is taught as a textbook in many universities
as well as academic institutions in Syria and elsewhere.
The book deals with Muslim vs non-Muslims’ scientific
methods as how to reach an established reality; various
arguments for the existence of Allah; prophethoods; and
the metaphysical world. On the other hand, his book al-
Insān musayyar am mukhayyar[293] (Is Man Free or
Fated?) addresses fate, predestination, and free will,
one of the most puzzling and controversial matters in the
philosophical-theological discourse. Setting the record
straight, al-Būṭī, over and over again, articulated, in
academic and non-academic circles, the Islamic point of
view on this matter.
The thrust of his argument runs as follows: Allah is
omniscient; nothing may escape from His infinite
knowledge; Allah’s foreknowledge neither abolishes
man’s free will nor eliminates his choice; human actions
fall into two categories: voluntary and involuntary, both of
which are created by Allah. Man is only responsible for
 the former; man is equipped with innate ability to
distinguish good from evil, and right from wrong, so that
man may freely choose between them.
His book al-Madhāhib al-tawḥīdiyyah wa al-falsafāt al-
mu‘āṣirah[294] (The Monotheistic Muslim Sects and
Contemporary Philosophies), discusses the origin and
development of ‘ilm al-kalām, the rise and doctrines of
various Muslim sects. Then the book goes further
exploring the modern Western philosophies and
ideologies: dialectical and historical materialism,
existentialism, the Evolution Theory, and secularism.
ii. Islamic jurisprudence: Al-Būṭī’s two-volume book
Qaḍāyā fiqhiyyah mu‘āṣirah[295] (Contemporary Juristic
Issues) investigates issues like, usury, moral rights, organ
transplantation, naturalization and long-term residency
and in the abode of disbelief etc. Also, he authored
Muḥāḍrāt fī al-fiqh al-muqāran[296] (Lectures on
Comparative Jurisprudence), and Mas’alat Taḥdīd al-
nasil: wiqāyah wa ‘ilāj[297] (Birth Control: Prevention and
Remedy) a socio-legal study of various kinds of
contraceptive methods and abortion.
iii. Legal theory: Al-Būṭī in his remarkable book Ḍawābiṭ al-
maṣlaḥah fī al-sharī‘ah al-Islāmiyyah (Parameters of the
Public Interest in Islamic Law),[298] formerly a PhD thesis,
seeks to lay down the parameters and typology of
maṣlaḥah (consideration of public interests) on the basis
of the traditional methodology of the Islamic legal theory
(uṣūl al-fiqh), as well as the ordering of the three legal
categories of the higher objectives and intents of sharia.
[299]
The book critically examines the concept of al-
maṣlaḥah (interest) or manfa‘ah (utility) focusing on its
key features as delineated by ancient and medieval
philosophers and Muslim jurists.
iv. Qur’anic studies: Al-Būṭī devoted four works in this
regard. Manhaj al-ḥaḍārah al-insāniyyah fī al-Qur’ān[300]
(The Perspective of Human Civilization in the Qur’an).
 Setting the stage for a great civilization is necessarily
grounded in the development of a greater and deeper
awareness of the identities and distinguishing features of
each component, that is, man, life and the universe. The
book attempts to answer the following questions: What is
the Qur’anic perception of civilization? What are its
essential elements? Why has the Islamic civilization
petrified while the Western civilization has flourished?
Manhaj tarbawī farīd fī al-Qur’ān (The Unique Educational
Outlook in the Qur’an),[301] exploring certain Qur’anic
principles and values related to the realm of education.
Al-ḥubb fī al-Qur’ān wa dawr al-ḥubb fī ḥayāt al-insān
(Love in the Qur’an and its Role in Man’s Life),[302] and Lā
ya’tīh al-bāṭil (Falsehood Never Approaches the Qur’an),
[303]
seeking to dispel certain misconceptions about the
Qur’an.
v. Sufism: As the prime objective of “true” Sufism is to
purify one’s soul and refine his manner for the sake of
getting closer to Allah, al-Būṭī following the footsteps of
his father, laid much emphasis on the Sufi path. He wrote
a five-volume commentary on Ibn ‘Atā’ Allāh al-
Sakandari’s al-Ḥikam (Aphorisms or the Book of
Wisdom), one of the most popular works on the literature
of Sufism.
vi. The Prophet’s (ṣ) biography: Going beyond mere
narration of the Prophet’s (ṣ) life, al-Būṭī in his widely
read Fiqh al-sīrah al-Nabawiyyah,[304] sought to draw as
many lessons and principles as possible with reference to
a variety of jurisprudential rulings which can be derived
from the biography of the Prophet (ṣ).
vii. Islamic da‘wah: His book Hākadhā falnad‘u ilā al-
Islām[305] (This is How to Call to Islam) provides a
blueprint for a theoretically and practically viable Islamic
call discussing its essential elements, methods as well as
major obstacles facing da‘wah mission and discourse.
viii. Religion vs philosophy: Two books have been referred
to above al-madhāhib al-tawḥīdiyyah wa al-falsafāt al-
mu‘āṣirah (The Monotheistic Muslim Sects and
Contemporary Philosophies) and Naqḍ awhām al-
māddiyyah al-jadaliyyah (Shattering the Illusions of
Dialectical Materialism).
ix. Contemporary intellectual issues: Making a substantial
contribution to this field, al-Būṭī responded to as a host of
contemporary pressing matters to religion, civilization,
society, and culture.
1. His book al-Salafiyyah: Marḥalah zamaniyyah
mubārakah lā madhhab Islāmī[306] (Salafism: A
Blessed Historical Phase, Not an Islamic Legal
School) carefully evaluates Salafism through its
general trends and adopted doctrines.
2. In al-Lā madhhabiyyah akhṭar bid‘ah tuhaddid al-
sharī‘ah al-Islāmiyyah[307] (Anti-Madhhabism is the
Most Dangerous Innovation Threatening Islamic
Law), al-Būṭī argues that it is extremely serious to
claim that following one particular madhhab is
something forbidden.
3. Hādhihi mushkilātuhum[308] (These are Their
Questions) clarifies a number of problematic issues
presented by non-Muslim researchers.
4. Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā[309] (And These are Our
Problems) addresses various problems within
Muslim society.
5. The much-debated al-Jihād fī al-Islām: Kayfa
nafhamuh wa kayfa numārisuh[310] (Jihad in Islam:
How to Understand it and Practice it) examines
types of jihad; the driving force behind waging
“armed jihad” against non-Muslims; the abode of war
vs the abode of Islam; the political dimension of
dhimmah in Islam; the revolt against the ruler: is it
considered as rebellion, aggression or jihad?; the
 fate of democracy under Islamic rule; and the legal
ruling for committing apostasy.
6. As regards gender issues, al-Būṭī in his treatise Ilā
kull fatāh tu’min bi-Allāh[311] (To Every Girl Who
Believes in Allah) and book al-Mar’ah bayna ṭughyān
al-niẓām al-Gharbī wa laṭā’if al-tashrī‘ al-rabbānī[312]
(Women Between the Tyranny of the Western
System and the Mercy of the Islamic Law) discusses
the rights and duties of Muslim women in Islam,
compared to their counterparts in the West; gender
equality; polygamy; divorce; the headscarf; wife-
beating; women’s political participation; and the so-
called misogynistic Prophetic sayings.
7. Yughāliṭūnak idh yaqūlūn[313] (They Are Deceiving
You by Saying…) aims at clearing up several points
of misunderstanding about Islam.
8. Al-Islām wa al-‘aṣr: taḥaddiyāt wa āfāq[314] (Islam and
the Contemporary World: Challenges and Horizons)
is, as mentioned above, an interesting debate
between al-Būṭī and Tīzīnī on whether or not the
Qur’an is or should be part of social reality and
subordinated to social consciousness.
x. Literature: Being a highly skilled literary figure, al-Būṭī
left two compelling literary works which gained in
popularity:
1. Mammū zayn,[315] a very tragic love story between
Mammū and Zayn, written by Aḥmad al-Khānī, a
Kurdish poet, and translated by al-Būṭī. It is a love
which was sown on earth and ripened in heaven.
2. Siyāmind, ibn al-adghāl[316] (Siyāmind, the Jungle
Boy), which is also a tragic story of an orphan boy
who, due to considerable maltreatment by his close
relatives, decided to leave the house and live in the
jungle with animals. To Siyāmind, animals appeared
to be by far a better companion than humans.
 Al-Būṭī’s Distinguished Scholarly Achievement
Al-Būṭī’s remarkable insight and depth of knowledge in Islamic
scholarship basically appears in ten areas divided into six
categories, in order of priority: ‘aqīdah, the cornerstone of Muslim
belief whose defense comes first; al-sīrah, which has to do with the
life of the Prophet (ṣ); the discipline of al-fiqh wa uṣūl al-fiqh,
theoretical and practical guide to Muslims as to the knowledge of
orders and prohibitions, delineated by Allah and His Messenger (ṣ);
topics of polemical orientation stimulating heated debates (jihad and
Salafism); critical issues (Sufism and gender), normal topics
(civilization).
 Figure 2.1: Al-Būṭī’s distinguished scholarly works.

‘Aqīdah
Theology: Al-Būṭī, departing from the traditional approach, started
his book Kubrā al-yaqīniyyāt al-kawniyyah with an introduction
comparing research methods applied by Muslim and Western
scholars; an indispensable introduction to those who need to study
theology and metaphysics. The aim of al-Būṭī here is to add a new
dimension to the study of ‘ilm al-kalām or ‘aqīdah by creating a well-
established systematic foundation for it, though not verifiable by
empirical research or experiment. No wonder, his Kubrā al-yaqīniyyāt
al-kawniyyah is a significant landmark in the field of Muslim theology.
As for other the philosophical controversial issues “fate,
predestination, theodicy and free will,” al-Būṭī skillfully synthesizes
related materials putting them in a fresh perspective for the
contemporary reader.
Philosophy: being a competent Muslim philosopher, al-Būṭī,
reminiscent of medieval al-Ghazālī, first studied and examined the
modern atheist Western philosophies and ideologies (dialectical and
historical materialism, existentialism, and Darwin’s Theory of
Evolution). Then he refuted their philosophical-historical
underpinnings using the same rational arguments. In doing this, he
created a major obstacle to the rising tide of the Communism in
Syria in the 1960s and 70s and the rest of the Arab-Muslim World.
Al-Sīrah
The biography of the Prophet (ṣ): The Jurisprudence of the
Prophetic Biography is considered is an original contribution to the
literature of sīrah. In addition to highlighting the significance of
studying the Prophetic biography for accurate understanding of Islam
and the scholarly methods of sīrah narration, the book derives from
the events in the Prophetic life jurisprudential rulings, lessons, and
principles, and also deals with common misconceptions in the works
of Orientalists.
Al-fiqh wa uṣūl al-fiqh
Jurisprudence: Al-Būṭī studied many traditional and contemporary
legal cases consulting not only his adopted Shāfi‘ī school but also
offering a balanced treatment of other legal schools. While
investigating the historical-legal-contextual status of the issue in
question, al-Būṭī endeavored to make out of myriad legal opinions of
jurists of the past a valid tool that helps find a pragmatic solution for
the newly arisen problems.
The legal theory: Ḍawābiṭ al-maṣlaḥah fī al-shar ī ‘ah al-
Islāmiyyah puts al-Būṭī in a different category from other scholars.
The book investigates the concept of maṣlaḥah against a
philosophical and religious background with particular reference to
the boundaries and typology of maṣlaḥah, as well as the arbitrary
application of maṣlaḥah that never considers the authoritative texts.
With this in mind, maṣlaḥah becomes well-defined and articulate in
order to decide whether a particular case permissible or not.
Polemical works
Jihad: regardless of agreeing with al-Būṭī’s arguments on a number
of hot issues related to jihad, his book is a kind of thought-provoking
writing that is bound to generate much debate among the
intelligentsia notably the Islamist thinkers.
Salafism: Al-Būṭī expressed a critical appraisal of Salafism, carefully
evaluating this phenomenon through its general trends and adopted
doctrines. Besides being a sincere call to have an open and calm
dialogue, the book is unique in filling several needs left open in the
existing literature.

Critical issues
Gender: Al-Būṭī devoted a great many pages, ranging from whole
books to various smaller pieces, to gender issues, discussing a
barrage of questions: the rights and duties of Muslim women in
Islam, compared to their counterparts in the West; gender equality;
polygamy; divorce; the headscarf; wife beating; women’s political
participation; and the so-called misogynistic Prophetic sayings. In
addressing nearly all hot topics relating to Islam and gender, the
author provides the reader with an insightful research and an in-
depth treatment with an interdisciplinary combination of Islamic
source texts and contemporary sociological investigation.
Sufism: Al-Būṭī’s five-volume book on Ibn ‘Atā’ Allāh al-
Sakandari’s al-Ḥikam (Aphorisms or the Book of Wisdom) is a
compelling commentary on one of the most widely read works on the
literature of Sufism. In this book, al-Būṭī attempted to give credit to
these concise, comprehensive and sublime sayings by directly
linking their ethical and spiritual implications to a range of Qur’anic
verses, Prophetic traditions, as well as main theological themes.
Normal topics
Civilization: in this field, al-Būṭī gave the first sustained treatment of
the Qur’anic perception of civilization. Contrary to other writers who
dealt with a few fractions, al-Būṭī presented a panoramic view of the
Qur’anic blueprint for a prosperous, long-lasting civilization. Having
done this, al-Būṭī paved the way to adequately answer two oft-
repeated questions: Why has the Islamic civilization petrified while
the Western civilization has flourished? What is the antidote to the
revival of the Islamic civilization?
 Al-Būṭī’s Discourse on
Islamist Movements

Introductory Concepts

A fter the abolition of the Islamic caliphate in 1924, many Islamic

movements emerged with the aim of reviving the Muslim ummah
and restoring Muslim societies to their heydays.[317] Islam, to these
movements, should guide personal, social, as well as political life. Ever
since, “political Islam” or “Islamism”[318] has gained popularity and
become a reference point for a wide range of political groups and
movements that “believe that a systematic implementation of the sharia
will once again restore global leadership and moral sovereignty to
Muslims. They envisage an Islamic state as the vehicle that will re-
implement sharia in the lives of Muslims and re-establish Islam as a
global force.”[319]
Al-Būṭī defines politics lexically as to run affairs in a wise way, and
technically as to deploy socio-economic and cultural relations to reach
power. Then he observes that William James’s Pragmatism, which
allows the adoption of any approach or belief as long as the success of
its practical application is ensured, has been a dominant feature of
politics.[320]
Further, identifying Islam-politics relations, al-Būṭī distinguishes
between two concepts: “the Islamic politics” or “the political systems of
Islam,” defined as to run the state affairs according to the rules of
sharia, and the “political Islam” signifying that Islam, with the totality of
its principles and norms, is made subjugated to various visions of
politics. While the former concept is and has been the normative
expression of the political aspect of Islam, the latter grants politics a
dominant position over Islam. And of course this domination is flatly
rejected.[321]
 “Islamists,”[322] a term frequently used by al-Būṭī, or, at times,
“Islamist groups,”[323] refers to those who tend to intermingle da‘wah with
politics, and, when reaching power, impose rules of sharia from on high,
[324]
in addition to adopting extreme views leading to doing violent acts.
In this context, al-Būṭī names the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt[325] and
Syria,[326] and Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr.[327] Elsewhere, he depicted as “Islamists”
Jamā‘at al-Tablīgh, which, to their credit, propagates da‘wah in the
Prophet’s (ṣ) footsteps, with no focus on political activism.[328]
So, al-Būṭī basically means by the word “Islamists” the first category
and like-minded ones, without, however, differentiating between
“movement” (the Muslim Brotherhood) and “party” (Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr). It is
extremely hard, one has to admit, to set clear boundaries between the
two terms given their socio-religious and political ramifications. “Islamist
movements” (or groups) have multiple forms and faces, ranging from
civil society organizations providing health services, to extreme terrorist
networks, as well as apolitical missionary activists. What they all have
in common is the claim that Islam is the source of their identity and
behavior.[329] On the basis of their thought, and behavior, “Islamist
parties” are political formations that have accepted to play according to
the rules of the political game and thus participated in the electoral
system.[330] They also advocate social justice, pluralism, democratic and
liberal reforms, as well as human rights.[331]
Unlike Islamist movements, some Islamist parties, like the AKP,
might not claim affinity with Islam “but could pursue ‘Islamic politics’ by
acting in conformity with the religious demands and concerns of the
people.”[332] Driven by internal factors, some Islamist movements tend to
form parties, while others do not.[333]
On the other hand, to draw a line between the Islamic political
“moderation” and “extremism” is both arduous and controversial.
Nevertheless, to some Western writers, Islamists may become
moderate or more moderate as a result of their inclusion in pluralist
political processes, advocacy of freedom and human rights, as well as a
non-violent and rational stance to promote Islam.[334] Another way of
evaluating a particular Islamist movement/party as moderate or extreme
is to consult al-Būṭī’s seven issues with Islamists, as shown in this
chapter.
Da‘wah is a key issue in al-Būṭī’s treatment of Islamist activism.
According to al-Būṭī, the feasibility of the Islamic state project is closely
connected with da‘wah rather than with politics. Da‘wah in essence, he
argues, is a kind of worship by which a believer draws near to Almighty
Allah, a practice of the best kind of servitude to the Lord. The real
dā‘iyah (caller) is the one who burns with zeal for fulfilling the Prophetic
saying “If one man is guided on the right path (i.e. converted to Islam)
through you, it would be better for you than (a great number of) red
camels.”[335] Filled with hope, dā‘iyah tries to win over the heart and the
mind, and then waits for the fruits of his da‘wah, that is, to see good
morals and acceptable behavior prevalent among the individuals at all
levels.[336]
Basically, dā‘iyah, al-Būṭī maintains, should be overwhelmed by
feelings of compassion and mercy to all human beings with all their
different religions, tendencies as well as inclinations. And this can only
happen when dā‘iyah sacrifices his personal interests for the others’
own benefit and goodness. This is proven by the Qur’an, such as “We
have not sent you but as a mercy toward all beings” (Qur’an, al-Anbiyā’:
107) and “My Mercy embraces all things” (Qur’an, al-A‘rāf: 156).
In contrast, al-Būṭī notes, the bulk of the activities of contemporary
Islamist movements is mainly related to the following matters:
discussion of new arising issues of Muslims and the problems are
facing; analysis and evaluation of their local governments as well as
those of the Muslim World; thinking, and planning of a variety of tactics
by which they could reach the seat of power.[337] Al-Būṭī asks whether
such activities fall into the Qur’anic concept of da‘wah, “Call to the path
of your Lord with wisdom and fine admonition, and argue with them in
the most courteous manner” (Qur’an, al-Naḥl: 125).[338]
It is lamentable that nowadays a huge gap exists between those
politically oriented Islamists who keep themselves busy with their
“Islamic state” project and those poor people who have gone astray or
fallen prey to different modern atheistic-secular ideologies.[339]
 Major Issues in the Rhetoric of Islamists
Al-Būṭī is critical of what he sees as revolutionary tactics and the
manipulation of religion by Islamists who usually seek the ascendancy
of Islam via political means. It is true that both al-Būṭī and Islamist
movements are in agreement about social reform being an ultimate
target, yet they are at variance with the adopted approach.[340]
Instead of following the demanding and long journey of da‘wah with
its various paths and forms, many Islamists prefer to take a short cut by
seizing state power, and consequently imposing Islam from on high.[341]
To al-Būṭī, this move from da‘wah to politics, which attracts most of the
Islamists today, is the blight of the Islamist project. This project will
ultimately obscure the bright reality of Islam through creating in people’s
minds a dreadful image about it.[342]
Al-Būṭī further notes that the majority of those who are involved in
Islamist activities and who primarily focus on the social system and the
applied economic rules of Islam endeavor to remove rulers by every
possible means, including resorting to violence, Communism, and other
leftist ideologies.[343] Consequently, leftist groups, as well as non-Muslim
communities, sees Islam, championed by Islamists, as a mere
collection of laws and rules that have to do with establishing ḥudūd,[344]
abolishing usury, closing nightclubs and so on, going under the
common name of sharia.[345] When these superior rules replace the
secular-atheist ones in a given society, this society will become Islamic
and its individuals good Muslims![346] Those Islamists, al-Būṭī argues,
are not concerned whether or not Islam should have, in the first place, a
solid foundation in the people’s mind and soul, which is actually the
essence of Islam.[347]
Rather than rushing for the Islamic state, al-Būṭī contends, we
should presently think of how to rectify our bad soul and be true
servants of Allah. This is the Muslim obligation today.[348] “Currently, we
cannot plan for establishing an Islamist society, because Muslims have
divided themselves among various groups and adopted different
doctrines and ideologies,”[349] al-Būṭī says. Further, non-Muslim people
feel suspicious of anything that has to do with Islam. So, how can we
think of establishing an Islamic state in a society that is yet to be
described as really Islamic? Is it possible to think of creating the “lid”
before the “container”?[350]
 On the other hand, al-Būṭī maintains that it was the “educational”
Islam, rather than the “political,” which conquered the early Muslims’
heart and remolded their soul by way of a gradual and constant process
of self-purification that never happened overnight. Thereupon, all
various challenges and obstacles were removed by the force of
Muslims’ firm intellectual belief coupled with passionate love, and
glorification of Islam.[351]
In al-Jihād fī al-Islām, al-Būṭī explores and discusses three
ideological concepts, championed by certain Islamist groups, with a
view to giving a religious rationale for the armed struggle with rulers and
governments, the greatest stumbling block in the way of the Islamic
state.
Takfīr of Rulers[352]
Takfīr, meaning “the act of excommunicating Muslims or branding them
as infidels and apostates,” is a religio-political concept, which was first
introduced by the Kharijites in the seventh century,[353] then gained
currency in modern Islamist-militant groups. As far as the scope of takfīr
is concerned, fanatic guilds apply it differently. While some apply it only
to the ruler and state, others, by extension, see the whole society
contaminated by it.[354] In addition, takfīr of rulers who have corrupted
the moral fibre of society is considered a significant step that serves as
a religious and an ethical ground for further moves, that is, revolting
against those rulers, deposing them, and, if necessary, assassinating
them.
No doubt this matter, with its social and religious ramifications, is of
paramount importance driving al-Būṭī to devote a rather lengthy study
for it in his controversial book al-Jihād fī al-Islām.[355] First, he defines
the ruler as the Muslim ruler who has never shown any signs of clear
and definite disbelief.[356] Then he identifies three legal ways for a
person to come to power: election; nomination by a previous ruler if
people accept this nominee; or to take control by force if the present
ruler is dead. But if the ruler is still alive and legally legitimate, then the
opposer is considered as rebellious and has to be fought.[357]
According to the majority of jurists, if someone assumes power or
sovereignty through one of these three ways, he is a legitimate ruler
who cannot be deposed or removed even if he commits acts of
oppression and injustice.[358] To support this juristic point of view, al-Būṭī
quotes several leading medieval scholars of theology and law, like, al-
Nasafī, al-Bājūrī, ibn Nujaym, and al-Nawawī.[359] The reason for this
rule is to avoid chaos, that is, removing the ruler in a military coup is
most likely to cause widespread bloodshed and upheaval. The evil and
harm of removing him will be far greater than what occurs if he remains.
[360]

This legal opinion is based on various authentic traditions, like the

tradition that says, “Whoever hates certain acts on the part of his ruler,
let him be patient; because if he abandons the ruler by only a handspan
and dies, he dies in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance (jāhiliyyah)” (al-
Bukhārī and Muslim). And another tradition in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim narrated by
Ḥudhayfah ibn al-Yamān, which says, “There will appear after me rulers
who neither follow my guidance, nor establish my Sunnah; there will be
among them men whose hearts are like those devils in the bodies of
men!” Ḥudhayfah asked, ‘How should I behave, O Messenger of Allah if
I reach that time?’ He replied, ‘Listen and obey the emir, even if he
beats your back and usurps your wealth.’”[361] According to these
reports, it is prohibited to revolt against the evil-doing ruler.
In contrast, the opposite viewpoint, held by some Islamists, depends
on the following assumption: Rulers have plunged into a state of
disbelief because they do not follow Allah’s rules (orders and
prohibitions). And their negligence comes right under the Qur’anic
warning, “Those who do not judge in accordance with what Allah has
revealed are indeed unbelievers” (Qur’an, al-Mā’idah: 44). Thereupon, it
is juristically allowed to stage an uprising against those rulers and
remove them.[362]
To investigate this position, al-Būṭī sets the parameter of what
accounts for disbelief, as recorded in the classical books of Islamic law.
Every Muslim who affirms a denial of one of the basic tenets of Islam
(for example the articles of faith, the five pillars of Islam and so forth) or
does what obviously goes against the basic Islamic teachings, e.g. to
bow before an idol, is unanimously considered as kāfir (disbeliever).[363]
According to this commonly recognised category, the ruler’s non-
observance of Allah’s commands and prohibitions does not necessarily
lead to a state of disbelief. In other words, the ruler’s ulterior motive for
not following a particular divine rule is obscure. Probably, the ruler is
either overcome by carnal desires and personal interests that prevent
him from being a committed follower; or lacks stimulus to do this and
that; or explicitly denies and rejects it. So, unless one of these reasons
is unequivocally identified, all bear the same degree of possibility.[364]
The point which al-Būṭī was trying to clarify is that the above-quoted
verse (Qur’an, al-Mā’idah: 44) is exclusively applicable to the third case,
that is, to stubbornly refuse to live by the basic tenets of Islam, as
revealed in the Qur’an. But, if a Muslim, while truly admitting Allah as a
sovereign, does not observe religious as well as other duties, revealed
in the Qurān, out of ignorance, or lack of impetus, they do not deserve
to be branded as kāfir, because they are confirmed believers, who still
profess strong conviction in the Muslim basic beliefs, yet who also lend
themselves to acts of wrongdoing or transgression. This is precisely
what the two further verses (Qur’an, al-Mā’idah: 45, 47) stand for.[365]
Then al-Būṭī goes on saying that takfīr should not be applied without
basis or else great numbers of Muslims (parents, empowered officials
and employers) will be rendered disbelievers because they at times do
not follow Allah’s rules themselves, or prevent those who work under
them from obeying Allah.[366] We have never heard that those who
pronounce takfīr on rulers do the same to a father who orders his
daughter to remove her head-scarf, or asks his son to work in an
interest-based bank, or to a trader who orders his partner to cheat or
make an illegal contract. Strangely enough, takfīr is only directed to
rulers![367]
Targeting the Oppressors’ Helpers
After scrutinizing the takfīr-dogma of some jihadist-Islamist groups, al-
Būṭī goes further to discuss another associated point, known as qatl
a‘wān al-ẓalamah (killing of the oppressors’ helpers). They argue that
since our rulers have been declared as disbelievers or apostates,
everyone who helps them or works under their guidance (e.g. soldiers,
policemen, government officials, and workers) will deserve to be killed
like his ruler. According to al-Būṭī, this fatwa from a legal point of view is
baseless, for such group of people is not allowed to be chased,
harmed, or killed just because they work in government departments or
institutions of such and such ruler, even if this ruler deserves to be a
“disbeliever.”[368] In addition, the appellation of Islam or īmān cannot be
taken away from them for the above reason.
To back his opinion, al-Būṭī cites the story of the Companion, Ḥāṭib
ibn Abī Balta‘ah, who wrote a letter informing the Quraysh about the
Muslim move to attack them. Of course, what he did is seen as an act
of help to disbelievers. When questioned as to his motive, Ḥāṭib replied,
“I was a man closely connected with the Quraysh, but I did not belong
to this tribe, while the other emigrants with you had their relatives in
Mecca who would protect their dependents and property. So, I wanted
to compensate for my lacking blood relations with Quraysh by doing
them a favor so that they might protect my dependents. I did this
because of neither disbelief nor apostasy nor preferring disbelief to
Islam.”[369] The Prophet (ṣ) did not consider Ḥāṭib to be outside the fold
of Islam or inflict any punishment on him. Rather, he asked him to
repent. If this is the judgment about Ḥāṭib, then, a fortiori, to be applied
to this kind of people who on every occasion display their commitment
to Islam.[370]
The Question of Tatarrus
This concept that runs unchecked in the contemporary jihadists’
discourse allows the killing of Muslims (and by extension non-Muslim
combatants) when they are used by the enemy as “human shields.”
One of the most important contemporary works by Salafi-Jihadist
ideologue on tatarrus is the 2008 book Human Shields and Modern
Jihad by al-Qaeda leader Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī, who attempts to reinterpret
tatarrus for a contemporary setting.[371]
To establish legal proofs of their use of tatarrus, they claim a
reliance on a juridical precedent assuming that if an enemy uses
innocent Muslims as a human shield, it is permissible for the Muslim
army to fire on the enemy and thereby kill the innocent human shields.
Similarly, if removing those rulers can only happen if a group of
innocent people is killed here and there, then let it be done, on the
basis of the legal rule mā lā yatimm al-wājib illā bihi fa huwa wājib (The
essential act for completing an obligatory becomes an obligation in
itself).[372]
Al-Būṭī, of course, takes issue with the understanding and
application of this jurisprudential principle, as it is used as a pretext for
the shedding of much innocent blood. Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111),[373] al-Būṭī
argues, is presumably the first to discuss this concept as he was
elaborating the idea of public interest (al-maṣlaḥah al-mursalah) as an
accepted legal source when Qur’anic and Prophetic texts are silent in
case this al-maṣlaḥah reaches the degree of absolute necessity
(ḍarūrah).[374]
Then providing the question of tatarrus as an example, al-Ghazālī
argues that suppose a Muslim army faces the infidels who use Muslim
captives as a human shield. If the Muslim army does not fire on the
enemy (and this, of course, entails the killing of the human shield as
well), then the enemy will defeat the army and exterminate the entire
Muslim community, including Muslim captives. According to al-Ghazālī,
the Muslim soldiers may in this particular instance fire on the enemy,
and thereby kill the innocent human shield, as the entire Muslim
community is faced with the threat of annihilation.[375]

According to this very special case, al-Būṭī, in the footsteps of al-

Ghazālī, contends that it is permissible to kill the Muslim human shield if
al-maṣlaḥah of doing this act is characterized by three essential co-
existing preconditions: ḍarūriyyah—the absolute necessity of saving the
whole Muslim community by averting the harm of the enemy; qaṭ‘iyyah
—the Muslim army is absolutely certain that the killing of the Muslim
human shield will allow the destruction of the enemy; kulliyyah—the
entirety of Muslim nation will be wiped out if the enemy shielded by
Muslim captives is not attacked. If one precondition, however, is not
there, the killing of the human shield is prohibited.[376]
So, although being mafsadah (harm) in itself, the killing of those
innocent Muslims became allowable in order to avoid a much greater
mafsadah, which is the annihilation of the whole Muslim community.
This is attested by two legal maxims: the consideration of the lesser of
the two evils and private sacrifice or loss may be inflicted to save a
public sacrifice.
Al-Būṭī carries on arguing that the above limitations of this juristic
instance, which are adopted by all various later scholars of law,[377] are
absent when applied by some Islamist groups. In other words, the
enemy in the cited case is meant to be the infidels or disbelievers, not
Muslim rulers; and, alternatively, the resulting harm, if the human shield
is not fired, should befall all Muslims rather than a certain Muslim group.
[378]
So, the question of tatarrus has been misunderstood and misapplied
by those jihadists.[379]
Figure 3.1: Al-Būṭī’s seven issues with Islamists.
 The Wrong with Creating Islamist Parties
Al-Būṭī identifies various problems associated with creating or joining
Islamist parties:
i. The relationship among party members, which over the time
goes stronger and deeper than that of the rest of the Muslim
community, is ultimately based on a sort of partisan attitude. And
this interest group neither serves to unite Muslims altogether nor
fosters the Qur’anic principle “The believers indeed are
brothers” (Qur’an, al-Ḥujurāt: 10)[380];
ii. Needless to say, Islam, a vital and shaping force in personal and
public life, is deeply embedded in numerous societies.
Therefore, the call for Islamist party formation is per se an
enterprise of considerable attraction. Al-Būṭī has no doubt that if
he announces the launch of a new Islamist party, hundreds of
thousands of Muslims will hasten to join it; however, in addition
to the party’s faithful members, a group of sycophants as well as
of devious politicians will jump on the bandwagon who, for the
sake of political gain, are ready to grow their beards and show
commitment to Islamic norms. Once assuming power, they turn
their backs to this poor Islamist party.[381] “This is not a fantasy,”
al-Būṭī goes on. “Actually, there is no Islamist party but half of its
members or more are of this kind of people who, having joined
the party, came to a well-trodden path toward achieving their
own political interests”[382];
iii. Islamic activists are placed into a face-to-face encounter with
other conflicting parties. This encounter is bound to create
political polarization where Islamists have only two choices:
either to make an identification with a particular political party or
to keep themselves aloof. In the latter case, joint attack from
other parties is anticipated.[383] Affected by these conflicting
currents, those Islamists feel obliged to move from da‘wah
 propagators to political activists who are determined to win a
decisive victory against their opponents[384];
iv. Da‘wah, al-Būṭī argues, is eliminated by political activity rather
than enhanced by it. “As a political activist, I fail to convince the
president or any government official that my advice to him is
sincere and for the sake of Allah, because both of us are
political rivals who run for office. Yet, when realizing that I am
not interested in power, he is likely to listen to me.”[385] Does it
harm Islam not to be a ruler yourself, if guidance and soul
purification have dwelled in people’s hearts including the ruler
himself? Or does it benefit Islam to be a ruler while corruption is
prevalent and minds are in deviation?[386] Is Islam merely a rule
placed on a throne or conviction firmly embedded in the heart?
[387]
Al-Būṭī askes. These are the major drawbacks of
transformation from da‘wah to Islamist-political action, as
delineated by al-Būṭī.
To al-Būṭī, gains for Islam can be obtained by the focus on the
presence of Islamic norms and teachings in the public rather than in the
political sphere or politicians’ suspicious activities. Politics has proved
to be more of a hindrance to Islamic da‘wah than help.[388]
 Al-Nūrsī’s Experience
Badī‘ al-Zamān Sa‘īd al-Nūrsī (d. 1960), the Kurdish Islamic leader and
thinker, who left an unmistakable imprint on al-Būṭī’s intellectual and
spiritual life, participated himself in political action and came out with
the first-hand experience, recalled by al-Būṭī.[389] After over two decades
of political engagement and activity, al-Nūrsī in 1921 decided to desert
politics altogether and dedicate the rest of his life to da‘wah instead.[390]
Showing remorse for earlier involvement in politics, al-Nūrsī said, “I
seek refuge in Allah from Satan and politics.”[391]
Al-Nūrsī, al-Būṭī maintains, left politics for three reasons: 1-Whoever
wants to exercise da‘wah through the political domain is bound to side
with one of the different conflicting non-Islamist political trends against
the rest. 2- dā‘iyah has sometimes to overlook certain faults of the
members with whom he forms a political coalition. 3- Unlike da‘wah
reaching out every body, politics is mainly concerned with specific
people to bring material gains.[392]
Based on his personal experience, al-Nūrsī considers the above
three “inevitable” results of political involvement as contrary to the
fundamental concept of “sincerity” one seeks when working in da‘wah.
[393]

Evidently, this gloomy vision of politics tells, to an extent, why al-

Būṭī, in spite of frequent offers,[394] remained resolutely opposed to
creating his own political party based on “moderate” Islam. Once he
turned down a proposal to represent Muslim forces in the National
Progressive Front of Syria. In justification of the decline, al-Būṭī
explained that this representation meant that Islam would share
influence and power with the rest of the Front’s members. By
implication, the central role of Islam would be reduced to a mere
political competitor, and this would bring Islam to its own destruction.[395]
Then al-Būṭī adds that Islam is the common denominator in the
Front’s various members, who consider Islam a sense of belonging,
historical, cultural, or national, if not religious. Therefore, Islam as a
common identity, so to speak, should not be reduced to a political
opponent.[396]
 Critical Evaluation
The Applicability of the Seven Issues
Five Islamist movements and parties are selected, including al-Būṭī’s
attacked groups: (Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr, the Muslim Brotherhood, jihadists, the
AKP, and Ḥizb al-Nahḍah). These selected samples, from Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey, represent the opposite ends of the
Islamic political spectrum. Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr was founded by Taqī al-Dīn al-
Nabhānī in Jerusalem in 1953.[397] This party appears to have the lion’s
share of al-Būṭī’s condemnation, due to the party’s deep immersion in
political action, deviant dogmatic attitudes, and dubious relations with
foreign colonialism.[398]
Based on its books and publications, the party’s top priority is to
restore the Islamic caliphate after removing the disbelieving rulers.[399] If
the caliphate is not re-instituted, all Muslim countries, including Mecca
and Medina, will remain to be deemed the abode of kufr (disbelief).[400]
Strangely enough, and unlike the majority of Islamist groups, Ḥizb al-
Taḥrīr never pays any attention to Islamic moral and spiritual education.
[401]
Da‘wah, to the party, is exclusively practiced through the prism of
Politics.[402] No wonder such heretical beliefs, among many, lie in the
heart of al-Būṭī’s attack.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and most influential Islamist
organization, reflects a myriad of differing outlooks, opposing doctrines,
in addition to various groups, moderate and extremist. For example, two
key Egyptian extreme “jihadist” groups, al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah and
Jamā‘at al-Jihād[403] emerged out of the Muslim Brotherhood adopting
the thought of its main ideologue, Sayyid Quṭb.[404]
Influenced by his radical reinterpretation of several Islamic
concepts, takfīr and jihad, while seeking to establish the Islamic state
with immediate implementation of sharia, view the regime, its
employees, as well as the rest of the society as infidels.[405] Similar to al-
Qaeda, they gravely misinterpreted and misused the question of
tatarrus.[406]
Al-Qaeda, the quintessence of contemporary Salafi-jihadist
movements[407] holds most of the above issues. For example, its rhetoric
draws inspiration from takfīr of rulers, removing them,[408] targeting those
who give assistance to the enemy,[409] and the question of tatarrus.
Reference is made above to the book Human Shields and Modern
Jihad by al-Qaeda leader Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī, who uses tatarrus for the
permissibility of killing Muslim civilians.[410]
In Algeria, two principal armed Islamist groups were, in varying
degrees, involved in the horrific violence Algeria witnessed in the 1990s
after a military intervention put an end to an electoral process in 1992,
which was to bring FIS[411] to power: Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed
Islamic Group, GIA) and Armée Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation
Army, AIS).[412] In contrast to the AIS, which excommunicated a certain
group, the GIA considered the whole institutions of the Algerian state
(agencies, ministries, legislative and parliamentary assemblies, police,
and army) to be renegades.[413] Any person who, one way or another,
gave support to the regime made himself a target. “Given that the
struggle was against the system as a whole, not against this or that
individual or this or that group, it became permissible to attack anyone
or anything that sustained the system.”[414] So, refusing to distinguish
between active enemies and neutral observers, the GIA, in particular, is
believed to be the principal perpetrator of the indiscriminate massacres
of civilians.[415]In areas where the GIA held sway, sharia rules were
imposed.[416]
One may include that most of the above seven doctrines proved to
be a common denominator among radical Islamist movements that are
hell-bent on making a drastic social and religious reform and enforcing
da‘wah via political activism.
The issue Movement/Party
Ḥizb MB Al- al-Takfīr wa Jamā‘at al- The Th
al- (particularly Qaed al-Hijrah Jihād GIA AI
Taḥrī applicable a (offshoot of (offshoot of
r to Quṭb’s the the
thought and Brotherhood Brotherhood
the ) )
Brotherhood's
Secret
Apparatus)

Ruthless and √ √ √ √ √ √ √
hasty pursuit
of the Islamic
state
takfīr of rulers √ √ √ √ √ √ √
 Armed √ √ √ √ √ √ √
struggle
against the
regime
targeting the ? √ √ √ √ √ ?
oppressors
helpers
Arbitrary ? ? √ ? √ ? ?
application of
the question of
tatarrus
imposing rules √ √ √ √ √ √ ?
of sharia from
top-down
Main focus on √ √ √ √ √ √ √
the political
domain of
Islam
Table 3.1: The seven issues as regards extreme movements/parties.
In sharp contrast, these views, which indicate a rigid and narrow
interpretation of Islam, are absent from the agenda of other moderate
Islamist formations. For example, Justice and Development Party (AKP),
founded in 2001 by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current president of
Turkey, makes no reference to any of the above ideas. Despite a
genealogy that dates back to the tradition of Turkey’s Islamist political
trend, the party does not prefer to describe itself as an “Islamist.” Instead,
the AKP adopts a policy to accelerate Turkey’s EU membership, promote
co-existence, democratic and liberal reforms, and to integrate Turkey into
the global economy and overall alignment with the West.[417]
When he won the race for mayor of Istanbul in 1994, Erdogan earned
a reputation for a clean, effective, and competent management of the city’s
affairs.[418] ‘Abd Allāh al-Nafīsī, a Kuwaiti professor of political science, met
Erdogan after becoming the prime minister in 2003. “Now you are the
prime minister who can make a substantial change in the country. I have
seen in the streets of Istanbul obscene practices that injure Muslims’
feelings. So, what are you going to do?” Al-Nafīsī asked. “My prime
concern now is the economic growth of the country and to bring Turkey
back to the lab of the Islamic World. As for these obscene practices, they
existed even at the Prophet’s (ṣ) time. The Prophet (ṣ), however, rather
than eliminating them, first worked on building up the foundations of Islam
in the society. This is what we are going to do.” Erdogan answered.[419]
 Ḥizb al-Nahḍah (Renaissance Party), founded in 1981 by Rāshid al-
Ghannūshī, advocates freedom, social justice, pluralism, democracy,
human rights and rebuilding the Tunisian character culturally and
intellectually.[420] A gradualist approach in advocating social and political
change is adopted too.[421] “We accept the notion of citizenship as the basis
of rights, so all citizens are equal whether they are Islamist or not
Islamist.”[422] Al-Ghannūshī declares.
Wasat Party, founded in 1996 as a moderate offshoot of the Muslim
Brotherhood, emphasizes the civilizational and cultural aspects of Islam
prevalent in the Egyptian society and supports liberal democracy, free and
fair elections, freedom of thought and expression. Among the party’s
founding members are three Christians, including the prominent Protestant
intellectual, Rafiq Ḥabīb.[423]
As Mohammad Ayoob aptly notes, the major Islamist political
movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Jamaat-e-Islami
and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam in Pakistan, Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia and
the Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) in Malaysia, have all by and large
functioned within the parameters set by regimes which are usually
unsympathetic to the Islamist cause.[424]
The Muslim Brotherhood is a case in point. From the 1970s onwards,
the movement, working within the Egyptian system, fielded candidates for
parliamentary elections either as independents or under the banner of
other parties. For instance, in 1984, the Muslim Brothers made an alliance
with the secular Wafd Party, where they won 15 percent of the vote with
eight seats solely belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood.[425] In 1987, an
Islamic Alliance was reached with the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal
Party under the slogan al-Islām huwa al-ḥall (Islam is the Solution). They
stressed on accommodation with gradual implementation of sharia.[426]
A similar moderate position on various societal and political matters is
shared by Party for Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco,[427]
the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan,[428] and Freedom and Justice Party
(FJP) in Egypt.[429]
The issue Movement/Party
 The Egyptian Wasat The Ḥizb al- The The The
MB Party AKP Nahḍah PJD IAF FJP
(particularly
applicable to
the period of
the 1970s
onwards)

Ruthless and hasty × × × × × × ×

pursuit of the Islamic
state
Takfīr of rulers × × × × × × ×

Armed struggle × × × × × × ×
against the regime

Targeting the × × × × × × ×
oppressors’ helpers
Arbitrary application × × × × × × ×
of the question of
tatarrus
Imposing rules of × × × × × × ×
sharia from top-down
Main focus on the × × × × × × ×
political domain of
Islam

Table 3.2: The seven issues as regards Moderate movements/parties.

The above seven issues with Islamists identified by al-Būṭī appear
to be shared by all extreme Islamist groups of today. To judge or
evaluate an Islamist movement/party as moderate or extreme, these
doctrines are the best yardstick. It is evident that al-Būṭī’s discourse is
well grounded in the original Islamic sources, historical experiences of
the ummah and realistic situations of today’s Islamic world. His
approach encompasses elements of objectivity and evidence-based
analysis. We can claim that he was able to establish a useful framework
of analysis in assessing the Islamist’s positions.
 Islamist Parties: Redundant or Essential?
As cited above, al-Būṭī assumes that setting up an Islamist party is not
recommended, for basically three reasons: political or group
partisanship,[430] direct and inevitable encounter with other contending
parties, and political activism seems to eliminate rather than enhance
the cause of da‘wah.
Interestingly, al-Būṭī’s loathing of Islamist parties has parallels in
Salafī thought[431] and contemporary writers like, al-Mubārakfūrī, India,
[432]
Ṣubḥī Sa‘īd, Egypt,[433] and Kalīm al-Ṣiddīqī, Pakistan.[434] The
argument of this trend runs as follows:
i. The very idea of parties is rejected as the Qur’an and Sunnah
repeatedly condemn disunity and call for a united Muslim nation.
[435]
There is only one party: Allah’s Party. Thus, being a clear
sign of religious division, Islamist parties are forbidden.[436]
ii. It is dictated by parties that personal loyalty and allegiance
should go exclusively for the interest of the party, and this kind
of partisanship is of course at variances with Islam. Loyalty is for
Islam alone.[437]
iii. Most Islamist parties vigorously pursue governance and the
presidency, with an attempt to remove the rulers at any cost.
And this goes against a collection of hadith reports counselling
Muslims not to run for imārah or rebel against rulers.[438]
iv. Competitive parties are by nature bound to resort to unethical
means to win. Not surprisingly, each party develops a strategy
that presents its merits vs the demerits of political opponents.[439]
In contrast, a great number of eminent intellectuals like al-
Qaraḍāwī,[440] Huwaydī,[441] ‘Amārah,[442] and al-‘Awwā[443] from Egypt, as
well as al-Ghannūshī[444] from Tunisia and al-Turābī[445] from Sudan[446]
support the multi-party system with particular reference to the Islamist
party across the political spectrum. They argue that Allah has created
human beings with a whole range of different beliefs, languages,
customs, interests etc. Parties are not an exception from this natural
diversity.[447]
On the other hand, it is a religious obligation upon the ummah to
command the right and forbid the evil before the corrupt ruler, and,
according to al-Qaraḍāwī, this duty nowadays is best achieved through
“political forces” (parties). Governments may get rid of individuals or
small groups, yet cannot ignore or belittle dissident voices of parties
with deep embedment in the society.[448] Further, the widely recognized
legal maxim al-aṣl fī al-ashyā’ al-ibāḥah (the rule for things and natural
utilities is permissibility) tacitly approves the notion of parties, for
fundamental sources of sharia are not in opposition to party formation.
[449]

There is no issue, the pro-parties camp contends, to have multiple

parties, Islamist and non-Islamist, within the Islamic state, provided the
adherents of the non-Islamist party maintain healthy relations with Islam
and do not intend to demolish its central tenets or have dubious ties
with hostile countries or organizations.[450]
Historically speaking, within the body of the Islamic state in Medina,
there existed the party of People of the Book, Jews and Christians,
together with the party of hypocrites. The constitution of Medina[451]
established the freedom of faith and opinion, the inviolability of human
life and property thus achieving a breakthrough in the political and civil
life of the world of that time.
Furthermore, Kharijites broke away from the mainstream Muslim
community after ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib accepted the arbitration.[452] This
group used to hold fanatical inclinations, like the status of grave sinners
who should be regarded, if not repented, as infidels richly deserving of
death; any leader guilty of sin must be deposed. Nevertheless, Alī
neither excommunicated Kharijites, expelled them from prayer in
mosques, nor started fighting them.[453] He only remarked, “They are a
group of people who rebelled against us.”[454] If the right of existence
and freedom of expression are granted to opposition or parties who
have violent views, different from those held by the caliph, then, a
fortiori, to be extended to Islamist parties.
Reconsidering the antagonists’ argument, the protagonists further
argue that the Qur’an and Sunnah denounce only schismatic
differences that come out of partisan attitude or end up in conflict and
sedition. Islamist Parties, however, are a product of natural difference
that, although speaking a common language of shared references,
appreciate juristic nuances within the boundaries of sharia political
system.[455] Comparatively speaking, these parties are schools of
opinion in the realm of politics, similar to the traditional schools of
jurisprudence, which are held a healthy phenomenon.[456]
As regards the question of loyalty (party/group partisanship), a
distinction should be made between loyalty to Allah, His Messenger (ṣ),
and the believers,[457] which is taken for granted, and having a sense of
belonging to a certain group, association or party. This belonging seems
accepted if it is not in opposition to the teachings of Islam. What is
forbidden, rather, is to show loyalty to disbelievers or to pledge
unconditional allegiance to one’s party under all circumstances.[458]
Additionally, it is permitted to run for presidential elections if candidates
seem to be competent and work for establishing justice, with employing
the rules of sharia and are not acting out of political expediency.[459]
Further, al-Būṭī’s argument that political action abolishes da‘wah
effort can be applied to radical Islamists whose extreme religious views
create a major obstacle to the cause of da‘wah. However, the case with
moderate groups seems different, especially when the party leaders,
like the AKP and Ḥizb al-Nahḍah, hold an accommodating approach to
other secular or non-religious groups, and, on the other hand, follow the
gradual Islamization of society from “the bottom-up.” In doing so, they
do not sacrifice da‘wah for politics; instead, they make politics
subservient to da‘wah.
For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, in spite of their
undeniably deadly mistakes, served the cause of da‘wah via non-
governmental organizations, social service networks, charitable
endowments, and publishing enterprises.[460] In Syria, the MB opened a
public Islamic library in Ḥoms, a number of free schools for all ages,
including schools for the illiterate, as well as students’ scholarships,
trips, conferences, lectures, and health clubs.[461]
From the foregoing discussion, one may argue that the existence of
parties holding different interpretations within the realm of political
theory is an indication of a rich, flexible, and adaptable mindset, which
is necessary for the interests of mankind and enhancing their
conditions. More importantly, a multi-party system is an effective
mechanism by which people are more able to maintain rights and
freedom and, on the other hand, are empowered to raise their voices
against governments’ tyrant policies and procedures.
 The Question of Tatarrus Re-examined
Al-Būṭī, as mentioned earlier, claims that strict limitations and co-
existing conditions of the applied principle of tatarrus (ḍarūriyyah,
qaṭ‘iyyah, kulliyyah) formulated and elaborated by al-Ghazālī, are
wholeheartedly echoed by all jurists who came later on.[462] At a general
level, this is true; eminent ulema, such as al-Qurṭubī in his well-known
commentary of the Qur’an,[463] and al-Zarkashī in his book al-Baḥr al-
muḥīṭ[464] have discussed the deep attachment of these pre-conditions to
tatarrus. Yet at a more specific level, this claim lacks a little bit of
accuracy.
Although the condition of ḍarūrah regarding the issue of tatarrus
runs through the classical books of fiqh (jurisprudence), its volume and
boundaries are expressed in varying degrees: “fear of the eradication of
the foundation of Islam, the majority of the Muslims and those of power
among them”[465]; “fear of the defeat of the Muslims”[466]; “the majority of
the…”[467]; “when the Muslim army is in engagement with the enemy.”[468]
Most of fiqh books, however, refer to a genuine fear of common defeat,
killing, or harm befalling the Muslim nation.[469] This potentially extreme
fear or anxiety, expressed by medieval jurists from different conceivable
angles, can be categorized as ḍarūrah (necessity) or ḥājah (need).
Muḥammad Khayr Haykal in his invaluable work al-Jihād wa al-qitāl
fī al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah, argues that the case of ḍarūrah which drives
the Muslim army to fight the enemy shielded by Muslims is to be
assessed by the ruler depending on different circumstances and
conditions. In other words, going into the battle could be of vital
necessity due to a special case, allowing the killing of a large number of
Muslim human shields. In contrast, as the case has fallen short of the
level of ḍarūrah, the ruler might find it more proper to declare the
cancellation or the halt of the battle because the enemy is shielded by
humans who might be one person of ahl al-dhimmah (protected
people), musta’min,[470] or even though the enemy’s people, women and
children.[471]
On the other hand, not all jurists hinge on the concept of ḍarūrah as
regards the permissibility of the killing of the human shield. According to
al-Thawrī, and the majority of Ḥanafī as well as Mālikī school jurists, it
is permissible to kill the shield in cases where ḍarūrah is absent, e.g.
when there is no declared state of war, or when the enemy can be
reached via means rather than by the killing of the shield.[472] They base
their view on “the execution of the duty of fighting the enemy”[473] “in
order not to close the door of jihad”[474] “to avert general harm by a
private one.”[475] At the opposing camp stand the majority of Shāfi‘ī and
Ḥanbalī ulema, with the Ḥanafī jurist, al-Ḥasan ibn Ziyād, who strictly
prohibit to kill the shield in this case.[476]
It is worth noting that the argument of Ḥanafīs and Mālikīs appears
to be weak and their supporting juristic rules being inapplicable to the
case in point. The door of jihad will not be closed if the shielded enemy
in this rarely existing example remains alive. There are many other
cases across the world where jihad can be carried out.
Further, Islam places a great emphasis on the sanctity of life to the
extent that killing one innocent person is equated with the crime of
killing all mankind. “Because of this did We ordain to the Children of
Israel that if anyone slays a human being, for anything other than in
punishment of murder or for spreading corruption on earth, it shall be as
though he had slain all mankind; and that if anyone saves a human life,
it shall be as though he had saved all mankind.” (Qur’an, al-Mā’idah:
32). Not only is the life of a living person sanctified but also the life of a
fetus in a mother’s womb unless its continued existence might harm the
life of the mother.
To promote life, its creation, and subsistence is placed in the center
of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah (the major aim of sharia): the preservation and
protection of religion, of life, of mind, of property and of progeny, or
offspring.[477] Therefore, to kill the innocent Muslim human shield in the
absence of ḍarūrah is not a juristically justifiable cause.
 Da‘wah: Bottom-Up vs Top-Down Approaches
The political ideology of radical Islamist movements is to overrun the
existing regimes, by any means, to create the Islamic state, and to push
through the formal implementation of sharia in the society from on high,
that is, from the top down. Al-Būṭī, however, promotes the gradual
Islamization of society through the preaching efforts of dedicated
individuals and groups to transform society from “the bottom up” rather
than imposing Islam from “the top down.” He observes that the modern
Islamist movements, following the example of Western secular
ideologies and political-revolutionary trends, seek to make society
adhere to their adopted doctrines even by force, after taking the
necessary step, which is to seize power.[478]
Showing the fallacy of such emulation, al-Būṭī contends that to
assume power, in the ladder of Islamic action, comes as a result of real
conviction about Islam that is fixed in people’s hearts and minds. By
contrast, to the leaders of other ideologies and trends, power is a key
by which they can force their beliefs and systems.[479]
One may argue that to impose or indoctrinate an idea is a practice
of coercive persuasion and mind control. The genuine adoption of any
faith or idea should be based on a firmly held belief, a belief that is
clearly recognized by the intellect, and entirely endorsed by the heart. It
is only this adoption that Islam holds as legitimate and valid. To
illustrate this fact, one may refer to the early Muslim converts in Mecca.
Since announcing their new faith, they had undergone brutal torture and
increasing physical and psychological pressure to renounce the
Message of Islam. What made them uncompromising was, indeed, a
deep and passionate attachment to their newly adopted faith.
It is important to recall al-Būṭī’s accurate remark that it was the
“educational” Islam, not the “political”, which conquered the early
Muslims’ heart and remolded their soul by way of a gradual and
constant process of self-purification. Of course, this never happened
overnight.[480] This precisely explains the reason why Islam can never be
imposed from top-down. Islam can only be implemented by the
grassroots who voluntarily and sincerely embrace it.
When the society is transformed in the long run through da‘wah
activity, only then would it be possible to proclaim an Islamic state. More
crucially, and contrary to what is held by current Islamist groups, the full
implementation of sharia, or immediate enforcement of specific rules of
it, such as the punitive law, requires the prior establishment of a society
whose members, like the early Muslims, have become deeply attached
to the spirit of Islam.
During the Meccan phase, which lasted thirteen years, themes in
focus were: the assertion of the oneness of Allah, of the Resurrection
and Hereafter, of ethics and righteous conduct, recounting the stories of
previous prophets and past communities. At that time, most of the
religious rituals had not been prescribed yet, as the primary aim was to
strengthen the core beliefs of Islam in new converts’ hearts. This
priority, therefore, needs to be considered by individuals and groups
who are involved in the Islamic da‘wah. Addressed people should be
approached in a gradual and moderate manner, so Islam would
become well established and instilled in their hearts and behavior.[481]
To promote Islam through da‘wah rather than politics is the core of
al-Būṭī’s argument in this chapter. And this argument, in addition to the
foregoing analysis and discussion, seems to be sustained by Ḥasan al-
Bannā, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who remorsefully
commented on Maḥmūd al-Naqrāshī’s assassination,[482] “I wish I had
not let the Muslim Brotherhood get engaged in politics. If I were to go
back in time, I would have confined myself to teaching people the
Islamic morals and education.”[483]
Similarly, Ḥassān Ḥatḥūt, a well-known Muslim Brother Professor,
aptly notes, “My opinion is that the Muslim Brothers should not have
rushed into the political field, in particular, assuming power. Let us leave
the bone to the dogs, and instead busy ourselves with the
transformation of the entire Egyptian people into a believing nation that
obeys Allah not only in rituals but also in other aspects of life, especially
ethics and spiritual dimension.”[484]
 Overview of the Syrian Revolution
and the Response of Sunni Ulema

T his chapter, preliminary to the next, briefly discusses whether

Arab Spring was a spontaneous reaction, initiated by ordinary
people or designed and planned by foreign powers. Then the
chapter outlines main causes and consequences of the Syrian
revolution on the one hand and addresses the varied responses of
Syrian religious scholars toward initial protests on the other.
 The Arab Spring: Spontaneous or Manipulated?
The “Arab Spring,” a term widely popularized by the mass media,
was a wave of anti-government uprisings and armed rebellions in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at the tail end of 2010, after a
Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to
protest his work conditions.[485] The breeding ground for change was
as varied as the countries in which the events
took place.[486] Nevertheless, there were common grievances and
causes: dictator leaders, government corruption, high rates of
unemployment, deteriorating living standards and growing inequality,
and the like.[487]
The term “spring” was first known as a reference to Eastern
Europe during the anti-communist revolutions of 1989, when
seemingly impregnable Communist regimes began to collapse due
to mass popular protests in a domino effect. Shortly, most countries
in the former Communist bloc adopted democratic political systems
with a market economy.[488]
However, the popular uprisings in (MENA) seem to be
proceeding from winter to winter without any spring intervention.
“Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen entered an uncertain transition period,
Syria and Libya were drawn into a civil conflict, while the wealthy
monarchies in the Persian Gulf remained largely unshaken by the
events. The use of the term the 'Arab Spring' has since
been criticized for being inaccurate and simplistic.”[489]
Observers in the Middle East and the West have raised the issue
of whether or not protests in (MENA) were spontaneous or
manipulated by foreign powers.
For example, Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Contemporary Islam
at Oxford, argues that both elements be involved: significant outside
help assisted in the development of the oppositional skills of the
cyber-dissidents,[490] and the United States was involved in shaping
the role of the military, but the mass movements were expressions of
powerful popular discontent.[491]
Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, the president of International Union of Muslim
Scholars (IUMS), denies the conspiracy theory yet admits the fact
that the West, with its considerable influence, will try to interfere in
the popular uprisings in (MENA) and change the course of events to
serve its interests.[492]
One may argue that, at the beginning, they were largely
spontaneous, not linked to a particular political party or an
ideological current; however, a hidden hand at work in the region can
be detected.
Whether to view it a conspiracy theory or not, what is happening
now in the Middle East cannot be understood in isolation from the
fact that there is certainly a predetermined effort to create division
and chaos in the Middle East. For instance, “KIVUNIM,” a document
written in 1982 by Oded Yinon, an Israeli journalist, clearly shows the
Zionist Plan for the Middle East through the break-up of the Muslim
countries into religious sectarianist divisions, as part of an Israeli
expansionist project.[493] This is obviously happening today with the
balkanization of Iraq and Libya into small states and the use of
trained insurgents sent into places like Syria to cause unrest and civil
war.
In 2006, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during a visit
to Tel Aviv spoke of “creative chaos” to forge a “New Middle East.”[494]
“This ‘constructive chaos’—which generates conditions of violence
and warfare throughout the region—would in turn be used so that the
United States, Britain, and Israel could redraw the map of the Middle
East in accordance with their geo-strategic needs and objectives.”[495]
The term “creative chaos” coincided with a flurry of activity on a
project called the “Broader Middle East and North Africa.”[496] It is not
hard a see linkage between the current turmoil in the region and this
plan for redrawing a New Middle East.
 The Syrian Revolution: Causes and Consequences
The Origin of the Conflict
A conflagration can develop rapidly from a spark falling on a dry
brush. This is how the catastrophic Syrian revolution broke out in
mid-March 2011. The key catalyst came from a small southern town
of Dar‘a, where a few schoolboys who, influenced by the wave of the
“Arab Spring,” painted anti-government slogans on a school wall.[497]
Consequently, the teenagers got arrested and tortured by members
of Political Security Directorate.[498] In a peaceful demonstration,
residents of Dar‘a voiced their grievances demanding the release of
their kids. Instead of appropriate handling, the secret service fired on
protestors. Meanwhile, Syrian people flooded into the streets
showing solidarity with their countrymen of Dar‘a.[499]
At the outset, non-violent demonstrators endured months of
arrests, torture, murder, and rape before pulling the trigger[500] and
escalating protests into a full-scale civil war.[501] For at least the first
four months, there was neither armed revolt, as admitted by Bashar
al-Assad himself,[502] nor calls for overthrowing the regime; only
demands for more freedom, dignity, social reform etc.
Initially, Bashar, still enjoying popular support, could have
rescued the situation by paying a visit to Dar‘a and making an
apology for what his cousin ‘Ātif Najib foolishly did.[503] His much-
anticipated speech before the Parliament on March 30, 2011,
appeared unsatisfactory.[504] Subsequent speeches on April 16 and
June 20 were equally the same. Any faith in the president as a savior
began to evaporate.[505]
The Syrian government, nevertheless, made several
concessions: Lifting the Law of Emergency, in place since 1962, yet
replacing it with no less restrictive “Anti-Terrorist Law,”[506] the end of
the one-party system, and giving more freedom. These reforms,
however, after almost a year of bloodshed, failed to convince people
in the street. In the meantime, the regime’s forces, supported by the
mysterious Shabbīḥah militia, cracked down violently on the growing
number of protests across the country. The funerals of murdered
demonstrators became a focal point for further protests and, when
people were killed on those demonstrations, a snowball effect took
place.[507]
The regime’s ferocious repression resulted in a brutal, protracted
war, mixing regional power struggles, sectarian hatred,[508] and
radical religious groups.[509] What began as “Arab Spring” uprising
against an autocratic regime has mushroomed into a brutal proxy
war that has drawn in regional and world powers.
The official narrative claims that protests were, right from the
start, led by armed criminal gangs, who are intended on stirring up
sectarian divisions within Syria’s heterogeneous population.[510] One
may argue that if there is a conspiracy theory masterminding those
protests, then a fortiori the regime is an integral part of this
conspiracy. The security forces and Syrian military[511] initially opened
fire on defenseless demonstrators, on the one hand, and foreign
support was sought on the other. Iran[512] and Russia have propped
up the regime and gradually increased their support, providing it with
an edge that has helped it manage the confrontations with
protesters. The government has also enjoyed the support of
Lebanon’s Shia Hizbullah movement, whose fighters have provided
important battlefield support.[513] The movement’s particular
intervention has heightened the “sectarianization” of the conflict
providing an emotional rallying point for popular mobilization.[514]
It is clear that the regime’s brutality coupled with its allies’
intervention served to expand the circle of participants in the
revolution/conflict.[515] A UN commission of inquiry, investigating
alleged human rights violations since March 2011, has evidence that
those on both sides of the conflict have committed war crimes—
including murder, torture, rape and enforced disappearances.
Government and rebel forces have also been accused by
investigators of using civilian suffering, such as blocking access to
food, water and health services, as a method of war.[516]

Understanding the Regime Survival

The pertinent question is: How has the Syrian regime, in contrast to
other Arab regimes, managed to survive the enormous challenges
facing it?[517] All predictions of the regime’s imminent overthrow
proved to be wishful thinking. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader
Muḥammad Riyāḍ al-Shaqfah stated that Bashar would fall “in the
next few months.”[518] The U.S. State Department has called
President al-Assad a “dead man walking.”[519] A few elements in
assessing the regime’s survival are briefly stated.
First, from the beginning of the conflict, protesters lacked unity
and a clear command structure. Fighters banded on their own into a
wide range of units, and many soldiers were untrained and lacked
weapons appropriate for fighting the Syrian army with its tanks and
heavy weaponry.[520]
Second, opposition parties in exile also suffer from divisions and
fragmentation based upon ethnic, religious, regional, socioeconomic,
and other differences.[521] The Syrian National Council (SNC), formed
in Istanbul in August 2011, claims to speak for the entire opposition
but has been struggling to contain divisions within its own ranks as
well as to unite with competing opposition parties. The United States
and Europe recognize the SNC as the rightful leader of the
opposition and have sought to build up its legitimacy and authority,
but they continue to wring their hands over its internal weaknesses.
[522]

Third, another source of regime strength lies in the fact that while
turmoil has come to the suburbs and the slums of Aleppo and
Damascus, the revolution has not ignited among urban Syrians,
including the Sunni bourgeoisie of the big cities. Most big city
residents have chosen to remain on the sidelines and not support
the protests, fearing that this leap would result in political instability,
and this, in turn, would cause serious harm to the economic benefits
the urban bourgeoisie enjoy.[523]
Fourth, the international community’s lack of will to intervene in
Syria.[524] According to analysts and political commentators, Syria’s
ethical and logistic support from Iran and Hizbullah, Russia and
China, in addition to Syria’s proximity to Israel is an important factor
to consider.[525] Fearing that direct military involvement could have
sucked in the Israelis and blown up the region, the US and NATO
stayed out.[526] More, Western powers had been reluctant to accept
“no-fly zone” scenario,[527] or even to establish protective
“humanitarian corridors” around border areas.
Consequences
There is no doubt that after six years of conflict, internal and
external, the Syrian revolution has turned into a humanitarian crisis.
By June 2013, the UN said 90,000 people had been killed in the
conflict. However, by August 2014 that figure had more than doubled
to 191,000, and continued to climb to 220,000 by March 2015,
according to activist and the UN.[528]

Figure 4.1: Breakdown of deaths in Syrian conflict.

Almost 4 million people have fled Syria since the start of the
conflict, most of them women and children. It is one of the largest
refugee exoduses in recent history. Neighboring countries have
borne the brunt of the refugee crisis, with Lebanon, Jordan and
Turkey struggling to accommodate the flood of new arrivals.[529]
 Figure 4.2: Registered Syrian refugees.
The exodus accelerated dramatically in 2015, as conditions in
Syria deteriorated. A further 7.6 million Syrians have been internally
displaced within the country, bringing the total number forced to flee
their homes to more than 11 million—half the country's pre-crisis
population. Overall, an estimated 12.2 million need humanitarian
assistance in Syria, including 5.6 million children, the UN says.[530]
Economically speaking, there is widespread de-industrialization
and large-scale capital divestment due to destruction, looting and the
flight of capital, with a total economic loss of USD 84.4 billion during
the first two years of the revolution, which is equal to 142 percent of
GDP in 2010. At a growth rate of 5 percent per annum in the future,
it will take the country 30 years to recover this loss.[531]
GDP declined by 3.7 percent in 2011, by 28.9 percent in 2012
and by a further 6.8 percent in the first quarter of 2013 resulting in a
loss of USD 38.4 billion, or 45 percent of total economic losses.[532]
As the formal economy has imploded there has been a growth in
informality, rent-seeking operations, criminal enterprise and the
economics of violence that will plague post-conflict economic
regulation, reform, equity and development.[533]
 The educational system is in serious crisis as almost 3,000
schools were damaged, while another 1,992 provide shelter for
internally displaced people. The school attendance rate has dropped
to 46.2 percent, with a shortage of teachers.[534]
 Ulema and the Regime in the Aftermath of the Revolution:
Control or Compromise?
After the collapse of the Islamic caliphate in 1924, Islam ceased to
be the general framework for the state, even though enjoying some
authority for the society. Post-caliphate Arab states searched for a
replacing identity under the banner of secularism, socialism, or
nationalism. Islam, as a common identity, was relegated to the role
of “bureaucratic Islam.” Ulema who previously were an integral part
of decision-making process became now tractable officials who wait
for orders from on high.
The nation state, faced with waves of new Islamist trends,
created its own religious discourse spearheaded by the so-called
state jurists.[535] They were required to refute the other discourse and,
at the same time, issue fatwas fitting to the demands of the state or
the ruler and on the basis of the pragmatic nature of politics. Other
ulema, nevertheless, refused to be a tool in the hand of politicians
and tried to distance themselves from formal religious ceremonies
organized by the Ministry of Awqāf, the bureaucratic apparatus of the
state.[536]
During early days of protests, the regime, behaving in a
conciliatory manner, made a few moves: reversing a decision that
bans teachers from wearing the niqab (face veil that reveals only a
woman’s eyes) at government-run schools; closing a recently
opened casino in Damascus[537]; giving citizenship to 220,000 Kurds
in the north-east, who had effectively been rendered stateless since
the early 1960s[538]; launching of the Islamic satellite Nūr al-Shām; in
addition to the establishment of al-Shām Higher Institute for Arabic
and Religious Studies. Yet, these reforms were not enough to put an
end to heightened protests, due to the government’s continued
policy of bloodshed.
As is the case with other people, when ulema are faced with a
revolutionary wave, they make three different choices driven by
religious determination or utilitarian motivation.[539]
Anti-regime Ulema
In Dar‘a, where the uprising broke out, ulema used to organize and
spearhead the protests, like Shaykh Aḥmad Ṣayāṣna, the imam of
al-‘Umarī Mosque, and Rizq Aba Zayd, the mufti of Dar‘a, who due
to the regime’s bloody repression of demonstrations announced his
resignation.[540] Both of them, however, were blackmailed into
appearing on television in order to brand the revolt as “armed
rebellion” driven by “foreign conspiracy.”[541] Afterwards, the two
shaykhs left the country.
The eighty-one-year-old Ḥasan Ṣārī, one of the most celebrated
shaykhs of Latakia, sided with the revolution. In spite of his age, he
took part in demonstrations with his mosque Ṣūfān being a main
hotbed of protests. Ṣārī was placed under house arrest for
assaulting one of the security forces.[542] In the provinces of Homs
and Idlib,[543] scholars who turned against the regime were much
greater in number. Their responses varied: resignation from religious
posts, leading the armed opposition, as well as leaving the country
for fear of death threats.
In Damascus and Aleppo, the two major governorates, the divide
among religious elite grew even more noticeable. While senior ulema
sided with the regime, others supported the popular arrest and a
third party chose to remain quietist. Apart from the suburbs and
slums, the heart of the two cities did not witness open insurrection,
especially in the first year of the revolution. This is because of heavy-
handed security measures, lack of enthusiasm from some Sunni
bourgeoisie who want to ensure that their enterprises remain secure
and stable.[544]
Nevertheless, there are dozens of senior ulema of the two big
cities who vocally criticized government’s bloody policy. Foremost
among them are (i) the two leaders of Jamā‘at Zayd: Usāmah al-
Rifā‘ī and his brother Sāriyah, who had to leave the country due to
death threats, (ii) Muhamūd al-Ḥusaynī, the dismissed director of
Aleppo’s Endowment, (iii) Shaykh Muḥammad abū al-Hudā al-
Ya‘qūbī, the preacher of al-Ḥasan Mosque and the lecturer in the
Umayyad Mosque, who called for jihad against the regime, (iv) and
more importantly, the celebrated senior Shaykh Krayyim Rājiḥ, and
(v) Rātib al-Nabulsī, the popular preacher, who preferred to leave
Syria to escape the regime pressure. [545]
 Dissenting ulema with an Islamist-political orientation like Mu‘ādh
al-Khaṭīb, the former president of the Syrian National Coalition, and
professor ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Rashīd were silenced through temporary
imprisonment. After their release, they left the country and became
active figures against the government.[546]
Pro-regime Ulema
Foremost among scholars who gave wholehearted support to the
regime is Grand Mufti Aḥmad Ḥassūn. On many occasions, he
described the popular unrest erupting into revolution as “foreign
conspiracy” inspired by qanawāt al-fitnah (seditious satellite
channels)—that is, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. On March 2013, after
two years of the revolution, Ḥassūn issued a fatwa calling the sons
of Syria to join the army and fight for the government.[547] On April 11,
2015, Ḥassūn issued a more controversial fatwa calling the regime
officials to wipe out every area from which shells are fired.[548] Of
course, the fatwa was followed by a new wave of airstrikes.
The other strong advocate of the regime is the Minister of
Religious Endowments (Awqāf), Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Sattār al-
Sayyid, who, for seven years, has gone to extraordinary lengths in
implementing the regime agenda. As mosques appeared to be the
starting-point of protests, ulema were ordered by the Ministry to foil
any plans for organising anti-regime demonstrations launching from
mosques. Further, they were to manipulate religious rhetoric with the
aim of convincing the general public that these demonstrations are
nothing but a response to a wicked foreign plan seeking to break up
the national unity.
Ever since the revolution broke out, there have been numerous
articles, workshops, sessions, TV interviews, as well as conferences
held and organized by the Ministry of Awqāf. The main purpose of
these activities is to stand up against the outside vicious attack of
seditious ulema (Qaraḍāwī and a few Saudi shaykhs) who urged the
Muslim youth around the world to go to Syria for jihad against the
blasphemous regime.[549]
For example, the five-volume Fiqh al-azmah: al-Islām bayna al-
mafāhīm wa al-muṣṭalaḥāt (Understanding the Crisis: Islam Between
Concepts and Terms), under the auspicious of the Ministry of Awqāf,
is an anthology that aims to demolish the ideological underpinnings
of the enemies’ discourse (Wahhabism, Salafism and the Muslim
Brotherhoods). In this crisis, religion, according to al-Sayyid, has
been manipulated to sanction certain acts and fatwas inspired by the
extremist Salafī thought, which overshadowed the moderate Islam of
bilād al-Shām.[550]
The book analyzes and deconstructs different concepts like,
jihad, takfīr, jihad al-nikāḥ, the revolt against the ruler, as well as the
history of Wahhabism, Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhoods. “This
book,” al-Sayyid claims, “forms the basis for Islamic concepts, and
disproves crimes committed in the name of Islam. Our battle is
against the most vicious thought—that is, Wahhabi-Kharijite thought,
the Zionists’ ally.”[551]
More importantly, on April 23, 2014, Bashar al-Assad delivered a
long speech before hundreds of ulema (senior and junior, male and
female) at the Peoples’ Palace.[552] It is quite interesting to note that
most of the present audience did not have prior knowledge about the
meeting. As they already converged at the ministry for a regular
session, they were, all of a sudden, taken to al-Sha‘ib Palace to
meet the president![553]
Al-Assad speech, as seen by the Ministry, “Accurately diagnoses
the diseases of the Arab and Muslim nation, whether on the
domestic level (chaos among the Muslim youth) or the foreign one
(Western conspiracy against Islam). Then he offers solutions to
remedy our nation in the light of the sound understanding of Islam.
Hence, it has become a road map for da‘wah activities.”[554]
The speech main points are as follows:
1. Sectarian violence is a creation of the West, which aims to
take the ummah apart. The remedy is the correct
understanding of religion.
2. The war of terms and its danger to the ummah; the
importance of accurate usage of terms in marinating belief,
religion, as well as the country.
3. Political Islam and its danger to the ummah; to bring it down
is a great service to missionary Islam. "We are Muslims, not
Islamists."
 4. Understanding the crisis vs understating al-fitnah (the
sedition).
5. The call to reject the superficial understanding of the Qur’an;
to cling to the Qur’an in all aspects of life.
6. The main cause of this crisis is the absence of morality.
7. To focus on the practical example in the light of the Prophet’s
(ṣ) biography.
8. To maintain the unity of the country and its resources is a
religious and national duty. Acts of vandalism are carried out
by the enemies of the country.
9. National unity is the basis of the steadfastness of the Syrian
society in facing the enemies.
10. The role of the pulpit and its importance in raising
awareness in the society.
11. The importance of dialogue in reaching the truth.
12. Arabism and Islam are a central pillar of the security
and unity of the Arab-Muslim society; to separate them is a
despicable plot.
13. The Family is the basic unit of the society; if it is
healthy, the ummah is healthy too.
14. Schools and religious institutes are a fortress of
religion and the homeland;
15. The role of bilād al-Shām in protecting Islam.
16. The positive role of ulema during the crisis, in terms
of facing the challenges, in particular combating the thought
of takfīr.[555]
I think this speech is a turning point in religion-state relations in
Syria, which needs a separate study to investigate its various
dimension against the backdrop of the Syrian revolution.
Other influential ulema like Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr[556] (President of
al-Fatḥ Institute) and Muḥammad Sharīf al-Ṣawwāf (President of
Kuftārū Institute) are believed to be adopting a pro-regime discourse,
yet in a less outspoken manner than that of Ḥassūn and al-Sayyid.
They were requested to participate in nearly all meetings and
conferences held by the Ministry of Religious Endowments that aim
to give ethical support to the regime and discredit the counter
opinion.
The two shaykhs, who chose to remain in Syria, recognize that if
they announce disobedience or sever ties with the government, their
long-established institutions are likely overnight to meet their doom:
closure or destruction.
Throughout my frequent discussions with Shaykh Farfūr, I got the
impression that al-Fatḥ and Kuftārū, the most prominent Sunni
religious institutes, are playing a leading role in this critical phase.
The major presence of both institutions in Damascus poses, to some
extent, a religious challenge to waves of conversion to Shi‘ism in
Syria. The diverse public activities and seminars held by the
institutes are an indication that the “Sunni” Islamic action is still at
work, although weak and vulnerable.[557]
The two institutes are branches of al-Shām Higher Institute for
Arabic and Religious Studies, which was issued by a presidential
decree (48) on April 4, 2011, shortly after the outbreak of the
uprisings. Over the past six years 2012 to 2018, hundreds of
students of different studies have graduated with recognized
certificates from the Ministry of Higher Education. According to
Shaykh Farfūr, this is a victory per se.[558]
On the other hand, some people consider the post-revolution al-
Shām Higher Institute as a policy of appeasement; that is, the
government decided to buy the silence of these particularly
prominent Sunni institutes, which enjoy broad-based popular
mobilization. [559]
Quietist Ulema
The third type of top ulema chose to remain silent,[560] such as ‘Abd
al-Fattāḥ al-Bizm,[561] mufti of Damascus; Na‘īm al-‘Iriqsūsī, who
decided to leave his post as a Friday sermon preacher in Damascus
in order to escape security pressure; Prof. Wahbah al-Zuḥaylī (d.
2015), the prominent prolific jurist author; Prof. Nūr al-Dīn ‘Itr, a
leading traditionist; and Shaykh Nadhīr Maktabī, the preacher of al-
Ḥamzah wa al-‘Abbās Mosque (Damascus).[562]
 Clarifying his adopted position, al-Bizm says that being silent
does not mean that one should stay at home and cancel his public
engagement. He argues that he holds a fatwa office at the Ministry of
Awqāf, where he receives a great number of legal enquiries, most of
whom are a product of the crisis. People come and ask him about
what and how to cope with this dilemma. “I have to give them an
honest answer that does not render them implicated in either side of
the conflict.”[563] Further, al-Bizm holds religious lectures every day in
mosques and elsewhere, in addition to his administrative task as the
principal of al-Fatḥ Institute.[564] “I am not going to suspend all of that
and stay at home or leave the country,” al-Bizm said. “To me, this is
not the appropriate handling of the crisis. I have been offered to live
abroad with my family, but I declined. We are here and this is our
country.”[565]
 Al-Būṭī’s View on the
Syrian Revolution

T he Syrian revolution of 2011 created a deep schism among

Sunni Muslim ulema who played a prominent role in encouraging
/discouraging protests. Al-Būṭī, who viewed the revolution as
religiously illegitimate and politically motivated by foreign powers,
created an ongoing debate not only in Syria but also in the Arab as
well as the Muslim world. Exploring al-Būṭī’s view, this chapter
provides a detailed account of his argument. Then, for broader
understanding, the varied responses and opinions, together with in-
depth interviews, will be explored. Integral to the research
investigation is to critically evaluate whether al-Būṭī was a pro-
regime scholar, who used to confer religious legitimacy upon al-
Assad dynasty for decades.
 Making Sense of Al-Būṭī—Regime Relation
According to numerous ulema and writers,[566] al-Būṭī’s distinguished
career and celebrated religious status, were stained by his close ties
with the Syrian regime and praise of the leaders of the Ba‘th Party.
He is described as “a strategic ally of a secularist regime
championing nationalism and socialism.”[567] Some of his books are
“clearly designed to grant Islamic legitimacy to the regime of Hafez
al-Assad.”[568]
With the al-Būṭī’s disapproval of the revolution, besides various
circulated misconceptions, this old stigma became even more
confirmed. This section presents an account on how and why al-Būṭī
developed this relation with the government and then attempts to
answer the following significant questions: Did al-Būṭī start this
relation himself? Did he get any personal benefit out of it? What was
al-Būṭī’s approach to rulers? Did this jurist-ruler contact bring any
fruits for the Syrian society in general? Did al-Būṭī ever criticize the
regime?
First of all, it is very important to note that al-Būṭī, citing al-
Ghazālī and other Medieval Muslim intellectuals, argues that when
the Muslim leader or ruler asks someone, learned or lay man, to
come to office, the latter has to obey, and when counsel is sought
from him he needs to sincerely give it.[569] And if the contact with the
ruler is driven by any sort of worldly gains, it is undesirable even
when done in the name of da‘wah (propagating the faith) or
commanding the right and forbidding the evil. However, the case is
completely different if sincere advice coupled with reminding the
ruler of the fear of Allah is the driving force.[570] Moreover, al-Būṭī’s
father, Shaykh Mullah strongly supports this religious position and
considers offering advice to the ruler to be one of the best acts of
worship to Allah.[571]
On the other hand, Shaykh Mullah does not see it allowed, on
the basis of clear traditions, to revolt against the ruler in any case
unless he has shown obvious and definite signs of disbelief. The
ruler’s injustice or indecent behavior, he maintains, by no means
justifies any act of revolt against him.[572] Therefore, both the father
and the son denounced the Muslim Brotherhoods’ rebellious move
against Hafez al-Assad in 1970s, with assassinations of prominent
Alawi leaders and attacks on government and Ba‘th Party offices,
police stations, as well as army units.[573]
Following the massacre at the Artillery Academy in Aleppo in
1979,[574] the Ministry of Information requested from al-Būṭī to appear
on television to state what sharia says about this incident. Having
had a permission from his father, al-Būṭī on TV said that this incident
does not fall into any of the legal categories of killing, for those
causalities had not been found apostate, rebellious or criminals.[575]
A few years later, at the climax of violent turmoil throughout Syria
in the 1980s al-Būṭī was asked to give a speech on the occasion of
welcoming the next century, the 15th of the Hijra, in which he was to
address President Hafez al-Assad. With the father's permission, al-
Būṭī agreed. The speech, according to al-Būṭī, was hailed as a great
success, thanks to the directions of the father.[576] Some years later,
after the government removed strict censorship on Islamic
publications, and lifted the ban on wearing the headscarf in state
institutions, al-Būṭī, invited to give a talk on TV, took the opportunity
to thank the “hidden hand of these achievements,” President Hafez
al-Assad.[577]
In 1985, following the first book fair in Syria held at al-Assad
National Library, the president saw a report on the best-selling
Muslim authors, foremost among them was al-Būṭī. The president,
therefore, felt eager to read some of al-Būṭī’s books.[578] Having been
impressed by what he read, in particular, al-Būṭī’s remarkable Naqḍ
awhām al-māddiyyah al-jadaliyyah (Shattering the Illusions of
Dialectical Materialism), Hafez al-Assad asked for a meeting with al-
Būṭī. This was the first meeting, followed by a series of occasional
lengthy meetings, the shortest of which lasted five hours.[579]
It is worthwhile here to mention that al-Būṭī committed himself to
a set of rules on how to approach rulers: (i) He never asks to meet
the ruler for any benefit, personal or public.[580] (ii) When al-Būṭī is
requested to see the ruler for the sake of giving advice or performing
a legitimate task, he, as a religious obligation, has to obey.[581] (iii) Al-
Būṭī spares no effort to gently admonish the ruler, remind him of
Allah, as well as of the awesome responsibility he bears, whether in
private or public.[582] (iv) Al-Būṭī may praise the ruler for
commendable acts which he attests, whether people are aware of
them or not.[583] (v) Al-Būṭī never speculates about the destiny of the
ruler or any person on the Day of Judgment; however, as he thinks
well of Allah regarding himself and others, he tends to take the
positive side.[584] (vi) According to the Prophetic saying “The best
jihad is to speak a word of truth in front of a tyrannical ruler,” the
proper way of advising the ruler is to do so in his presence rather
than his absence. Also, the phrase “tyrannical ruler” does not
indicate an aggressive admonishing manner. Allah instructs Moses
and his brother Aaron to speak to Pharaoh mildly (Qur’an, Ṭāhā: 44).
[585]

No doubt that frequent religious, social and intellectual meetings

created a sort of strong bond between Hafez al-Assad and al-Būṭī.
Gains from this contact were far from being personal. Many times,
al-Assad asked al-Būṭī whether he had any want or wish to be met.
Al-Būṭī’s want was to help set free a large number of Muslim
Brotherhood prisoners on the one hand, and to allow to those living
in exile to come back on the other, a wish soon implemented.[586]
For decades, al-Būṭī served as a mediator between high-ranking
officials in the government and lay people for the advantage of the
latter. As a reformer in social and political sphere, al-Būṭī on many
occasions took issue with the regime: the problem of one-party
system and restricted freedom, the government’s ban on prayer in
the army, the Ministry of Education’s decision to remove face-veiled
teachers from public schools, broadcasting the notorious wa mā
malakat aymānukum serial by the Syrian National TV, the arbitrary
change of the Islamic education curricula in schools and so on.[587]
It is admitted by all interviewees that al-Būṭī did not, and actually
refused to, receive any material benefit from his long relation with al-
Assad. Majd Makkī, however, interprets this benefit on a moral basis
—that is, al-Būṭī’s widespread scholarly prestige and religious
leadership.[588] The regime was working on elevating the social and
religious status of al-Būṭī by making him, for example, the preacher
of the Umayyad Mosque, and the head of the league of al-Shām
ulema in 2012.[589] I recall here al-Būṭī’s exclusive access to the
Syrian TV channel via his weekly Qur’an and Sunnah commentary,
which aired on Wednesdays in the 1990s.
In addition, al-Būṭī, with no justified reason, used to exaggerate
praising the regime and its leader in his speeches, which is, of
course, a drawback.[590] According to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannakah,
al-Būṭī had been advised by friends and professors not to commend
Ba‘thist leaders, but he did not listen; however, al-Būṭī’s
commendation, Ḥabannakah admits, did not bring any worldly gain
to him.[591] Similarly, Kurayyim Rājiḥ, the grand shaykh of Qur’an
reciters in Syria, repeatedly admonished al-Būṭī not to praise the
regime. According to him, al-Būṭī surprisingly believed Hafez al-
Assad to be a person of virtue and integrity![592]
According to some critics, one of the things that brought al-Būṭī
to this conviction is that, for many years, he had been under the
influence of brain washing process undertaken by security figures
who were working on beautifying the image of the regime in his
mind. In this context, Majd Makkī[593] and Mūsā al-‘Umar[594] refer to
Muḥammad Nāṣīf Khayr Baik (d. 2015), the close Alawi adviser to
Hafez al-Assad and the deputy vice-president for security affairs.
 Al-Būṭī’s Five-Point Discourse on the Revolution
While many Syrian Sunni ulema have risen up against the regime of
President Bashar al-Assad, al-Būṭī, along with a few shaykhs, chose
to take a different route provoking a major controversy. A great
number of scholars, authors, and essayists, Syrian and non-Syrian,
have interpreted this route as a full support of the regime. Others,
however, argue that al-Būṭī’s opinion, from a purely religious point of
view, does not espouse the regime at all let alone its brutality.
The following is a detailed account of al-Būṭī’s position:
Foreign Conspiracy
Al-Būṭī firmly believes in a “foreign conspiracy” that determines to
create division and chaos in Syria in every possible means.[595] In this
regard, he refers to “KIVUNIM,” document showing the Zionist Plan
for the Middle East through the break-up of the Muslim countries into
religious sectarianist divisions.[596] Therefore, peaceful anti-regime
demonstrations calling for reform and freedom are very likely to be
infiltrated by wicked persons who seek to move the protestors away
from their direction into undesirable results.[597] On the basis of sadd
al-dharā’i’ principle (blocking means to an excepted evil or unlawful
end), these protests, although allowable per se, become forbidden
because of the accompanying unlawful results.[598] This principle, al-
Būṭī goes on, is derived from the following Qur’anic verse “Do not
revile those whom they invoke instead of Allah, lest they revile Allah
out of spite, and in ignorance” (Qur’an, An‘ām: 118). So, despite the
inherent enormity of idol worshipping, Muslims are prohibited from
insulting idol worshippers, due to the likelihood that the associators
would insult Allah as a result.[599]
Also, sadd al-dharā’i‘ principle is derived from Prophetic
traditions asking Muslims to refrain from fitan (disorder and turbulent
social and political circumstances) and keep away from conflicting
parties. For example, the Prophet (ṣ) said, “There will be a tribulation
during which one who is lying down is better than one who is seated;
the one who is seated is better than one who is standing; the one
who is standing is better than one who is walking; and the one who
is walking is better than one who is seeking it out.” Abū Barakah
said, “O Messenger of Allah, what do you advise me to do then?” He
said, “Whoever has camels, then let him go to his camels; whoever
has sheep, then let him catch up with his sheep; and whoever has
land, then let him go to his land. And whoever does not have any of
that, then let him betake himself to his sword, crush its blade with a
rock, and then save himself as much as he is able to do so.”[600]
Al-Būṭī, nevertheless, maintains that if pro-regime
demonstrations tend to be provocative and likely to cause similar
illegitimate results, they too share the same legal ruling; that is, they
are forbidden as well.[601]
To al-Būṭī, firing peaceful protestors is doubtless not allowed
even in case the soldier is forced to shoot them under death threat.
[602]
He repeatedly issued this fatwa on TV and various speeches.[603]
When a remorseful soldier who opened fire on protesters asked what
to do, al-Būṭī answered, “If you do not know whether or not you have
injured or killed someone, there is no harm. You just need to repent,
and pray to Allah that those you have injured, if any, may forgive
you; however, if you are sure you have killed someone, you need to
pay al-diyah (bloodmoney) to the deceased family if you have
identified him. If not, then you need to fast two months, and never do
this again.”[604]
Moreover, al-Būṭī received a question about soldiers who had
entered houses for inspection and overstepped the boundaries of
morality. He said that such deviant soldiers are counted as ṣā’il
(assailant) and thus can be fought and killed.[605]
Demonstrations Exploited
As al-Būṭī argues, demonstrators while marching the streets with
legitimate demands are responding to calls from unknown sources
which are intended to incite sedition in the Syrian society. And those
who are engaged in jihad in the Syrian soil are fighting under
anonymous flag or leadership, for they know neither those setting up
the plan nor what their plan is.[606]
And this kind of fighting goes against the Prophet’s (ṣ) tradition
that warns, “Whoever fights taḥta rāyah ‘ummiyyah[607] (under the
banner of unknown leadership), and is killed then his death is similar
to that of pre-Islamic ignorance (jāhiliyyah).”[608] Elsewhere, al-Būṭī
identifies Mossad and CIA as among the flag-holders or those who
are masterminding the protests in Syria.[609]
More seriously, some fanatic religious groups are attacking and
killing indiscriminately, and this is also prohibited by the Prophet (ṣ),
who said, “Whoever rebels against my ummah, killing its righteous
and wicked alike, not sparing the believers nor upholding his pledge
of security, then he is not of me nor am I of him.”[610]
Armed Rebellion Prohibited
Al-Būṭī, following the majority of earlier ulema, prohibits the armed
revolt against al-ḥākim al-Muslim al-ẓālim (the Muslim ruler who
commits acts of oppression and injustice).[611] He quotes leading
medieval scholars of theology and law, like, al-Nasafī, al-Bājūrī, ibn
Nujaym, and al-Nawawī.[612] It is indisputable that the amount of harm
that would result from rebelling against this oppressive ruler is far
greater than when he remains in power.[613]
To back his opinion, al-Būṭī refers to traditions ordering the
Muslim community to put up with the evil-doing ruler, such as the
tradition that instructs, “Whoever hates certain acts on the part of his
ruler, let him be patient; because if he abandons the ruler by only a
handspan and dies, he dies in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance
(jāhiliyyah).”[614] Another tradition, in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim narrated by
Ḥudhayfah ibn al-Yamān, says, “There will appear after me rulers
who neither follow my guidance nor establish my Sunnah; there will
be among them men whose hearts are like those devils in the bodies
of men!” Ḥudhayfah asked, ‘How should I behave, O Messenger of
Allah if I reach that time?’ He replied, ‘Listen and obey the emir, even
if he beats your back and usurps your wealth.’”[615]
It is only allowable, al-Būṭī insists, to use force to depose the
ruler if he has shown signs of clear and definite disbelief, according
to the famous tradition by ‘Ubādah ibn al-Ṣāmit, who says, “We
made an oath of allegiance to the Messenger of Allah to listen and
obey whether we are enthusiastic or apathetic, in difficult or easy
times, even when others are given preference over us. And we
would not fight against the ruler unless you have seen clear disbelief
for which you have a proof from Allah.”[616] For example, al-Būṭī
counts Muammar Qaddafi as a ruler who plunged into an obvious
state of kufr, after he claimed that the word qul (say) at the beginning
of the sura al-Ikhlās and other verses is redundant and thus must be
deleted. So, the armed revolt against Qaddafi is permitted.[617]
What if the ruler does not belong to the mainstream Sunni
Muslims? The enquirer alludes to Bashar al-Assad who is among the
Alawi sect.[618] Al-Būṭī responds that there is no harm if the ruler
follows a sect whose adherents profess Islam as long as he does not
commit kufr bawāḥ (outright disbelief) as the Prophet (ṣ) warns.[619]
None of the earlier Muslim sects, like Murji’ah, al-Qadariyyah, al-
Ḥashawiyyah and al-Mu‘tazilah, has been held as disbelievers.[620]
Another enquirer, nevertheless, objects that in early Muslim
history there have been cases of armed revolt against Muslim rulers,
such as al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr and others who
spearheaded a military campaign against Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiyah on
the one hand and Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr and al-Sha‘bī vs al-Ḥajjāj al-
Thaqafī on the other. Those eminent scholars, rather than just
holding demonstrations, have risen up against Muslim rulers of their
time.[621] Clarifying this point, al-Būṭī argues that, according to leading
historians and jurists, the revolt against Yazīd took place before a
pledge of allegiance was given to him by all members of the Muslim
community. In other words, while Yazīd was calling Muslims to
endorse his bay‘ah (allegiance), al-Ḥusayn and al-Zubayr, in addition
to people of al-Ḥijāz, and the majority of the Iraqis, rejected him as a
ruler and fought him.[622] As regards the case of Ṣāliḥ ibn al-Ash‘ath,
who revolted against ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān, it is deemed a kind
of rebellion, which is in contrast to demonstrations, public outcries
and the like.[623]
Further, al-Būṭī does not consider protestors’ verbal demands of
overthrowing the ruler as an actual revolt in the juristic sense, if this
is not part of a plot resulting in taking up arms; however, these
demands are forbidden because they are bound to unleash friction,
and resistance coupled with killing and bloodshed.[624]
Bottom-up Reform
Reform, like corruption, begins with the grass roots then goes
upward to leaders and decision makers. Al-Būṭī quotes hadith report,
narrated by al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, which says, “As you are, so your
leaders will be.”[625] That is, leaders’ and rulers’ actions, whether
good or bad, are a reflection of their subjects’ actions.[626] In any
society, to call for reformation and transformation, one needs to
address both sides together. It is not accepted to focus on one party
and ignore the other.[627]
As regards calls for government reforms, there are two
conditions: the call for reform should be coming from within our
ummah as an independent Muslim country, rather than being a
response to foreign requests. Allah says, “Believers, do not take for
your intimate friends, men other than your own folk. They will spare
no effort to corrupt you. They love to see you in distress. Their
hatred has already become apparent by [what they say with] their
mouths, but what their hearts conceal is even much worse” (Qur’an,
Āl ‘Imrān: 118).[628]
The second condition is that the call for reform does not start
from street protests but rather via civilized avenues. Why? Let us
suppose we are 100 protestors demanding for reform and a better
social change. Is it guaranteed that while marching the streets, we
remain the same people who are demanding and speaking out?
Based on previous experience, slogans and calls are likely to be
hijacked by a group of people with a hidden agenda who drive the
demonstrations away from its target.[629] Al-Būṭī notes.
Alternatively, al-Būṭī proposes that at first people need to stop
holding demonstrations and go back to their homes. By doing this, ill-
intentioned persons will be left alone and thus they will miss the
chance of taking advantage of people’s legitimate demands for
reform. Then a popular follow-up committee representing the Syrian
mosaic society is created. This committee is empowered to check
that the regime’s reform promises are put into practice. If the
committee has encountered obstacles on the part of the government,
then several other avenues will be pursued.[630]
Avoidance of Fitnah
According to al-Būṭī, the best approach to coping with this fitnah is
not to follow or respond to unknown calls or foreign schemes and
instead mind our own business.[631] In other words, we must not ignite
this fitnah by taking part in it or aligning ourselves to any of the
opposing parties. What we need to do is to undertake self-reform,
rectify our faults, and purify our hearts and souls from various ills. [632]
Al-Būṭī further quotes several sayings in which the Prophet (ṣ)
counsels Muslims to stand aloof at the time of fitnah. For example,
he says, “If you have seen overwhelming stinginess, satisfied whims
and desires, this world being preferred (to the Hereafter), and every
person proud of his opinion, then mind your own business and leave
the affair of the masses.”[633] Also, another saying instructs that when
fitnah breaks out, one is required to break his sword, and remain
aloof until he dies.[634] So, al-Būṭī notes that if people, obeying the
Prophet’s (ṣ) prudent advice, had never participated in disturbances
in the streets, and worked rather in educating themselves and
members of their household, then turmoil would have been lifted,
fitnah-mongers, as well as agents of evil foreign plots, would have
been detected.[635]
Elsewhere, al-Būṭī gives ominous warnings about the nightmare
scenario painted for Syria which consists of three phases:
The first phase is to stage non-violent demonstrations calling
for freedom, and social reform. Then, due to action and
reaction, protestors are expected to call for deposing the
regime, and consequently, sabotage, killing, as well as
collateral damage will be the inevitable result.
The second phase is a chain of attacks and counter attacks
will be escalating into a full-scale civil war.
Then comes the third phase when those foreign benevolent
conspirators are invited to intervene in the struggle to put an
end to this civil war by balkanizing it into five religious
sectarianist divisions.[636]
According to al-Būṭī, the way to get out of this escalating
upheaval, Muslims have to commit themselves to istighfār wa
tawbah (to ask Allah’s forgiveness and repent to Him) as the Qur’an
advises (Hūd: 3; al-Nūr: 31).[637]
Figure 5.1: Syria’s scenario planning.[638]
Figure 5.2: Al-Būṭī’s discourse on the revolution.
Figure 5.3: Al-Būṭī’s vision of fitnah
 Arguments Challenging Al-Būṭī’s View
Anti-Būṭī writings vary in terms of their validity and credibility. Thus,
they fall into four categories:
The First Category
Writings showing, to a certain degree, serious academic and
scholarly discussion on particular points directly related to the Syrian
revolution, like political Islam, rebellion, fitnah. They attempt to
undermine al-Būṭī’s argument by uncovering facts which are
unknown or unclear to al-Būṭī. They include three articles:
1. Muḥammad al-Ya‘qūbī, a celebrated Syrian shaykh and a
former lecturer in the Umayyad Mosque and preacher of al-Ḥasan
Mosque, writes an article entitled “Ilā al-Duktūr al-Būṭī: Afiq min
sukrik” (To Prof. al-Būṭī: Sober up from your drunkenness).[639] Al-
Ya‘qūbī is surprised that al-Būṭī is rejecting the revolution on the
basis of two “delusions”: the issue of revolt against a ruler, and a
foreign conspiracy against Syria.[640]
Bashar al-Assad, al-Ya‘qūbī adds, is responsible for the untold
death toll, and massive destruction of mosques, universities, houses
etc., in addition to claiming divinity and forcing peoples to prostrate
themselves to his picture. Aren't these crimes enough to depose him
and renounce our oath of allegiance? Therefore, the revolt against
al-Assad becomes an obligation; to give him support is extremely
prohibited.[641]
As for the “foreign conspiracy,” al-Ya‘qūbī comments that Syrians
are aware of it and will never become subjugated to the international
will. “International conspiracies in the region have been under way
since the early days of the Islamic state, but our people will never
accept to be enslaved, humiliated, and killed in the name of
defending the homeland against these international conspiracies,
part of which being the regime itself.”[642] Rather, what is happening in
Syria is an Alawi-Shia conspiracy to slay the mainstream Sunnis and
protect the Israeli interests. The regime, as the revolution has
revealed, proved to be a faithful servant of the West, which protects
the state of Israel and implements its policies.[643]
 Al-Ya‘qūbī adds that into al-Shām, Jesus will descend, and from
Iran, the anti-Christ will come out. And al-Ghūṭah[644] will be Fusṭāṭ al-
Muslimīn (Muslims’ place of assembly) during the time of the Great
Battle. Al-Ghūṭah’s heroes now are paving the way (to that day) with
their acts of valor.[645] Elsewhere, al-Ya‘qūbī does not see al-Būṭī as
eligible to exercise ijtihad in this particular case because of two
reasons: (1) being close to many government officials, al-Būṭī is
acquainted with only one side of the story—that is, the regime’s
official account—and does not accept any news coming from the
other side. (2) His antagonism to the Salafi-Islamist trends drove him
to create an alliance with Allah’s enemy to kill them. He believed in
the regime’s narration claiming that all Syrian rebels are Wahhabis
who came to destroy the graves of the righteous. Thereupon, due to
a lack of clear and complete picture of what was actually going on
the ground, al-Būṭī’s ijtihad is not commendable or praiseworthy
anyway.[646]
Further, al-Ya‘qūbī asserts that Syria is believed to be a secular
state, as reiterated by the president, which is per se a legitimate
cause to raise an armed rebellion against the regime. This regime, to
be maintained, has been in various ways hostile to Islam for fifty
years, with abundant evidences. Surprisingly, al-Būṭī, blind to this
obvious fact, sees Syria the best country in which Islam has
flourished.[647]
2. Mu‘taz al-Khaṭīb, a Syrian author and researcher in Islamic
Studies, makes a distinction between “the state jurist” and “the
revolution jurist.” While the former makes it mandatory to obey the
ruler, prohibits the armed revolt against them, and rejects the
modern means of political action and opposition, the latter attempts
to formulate a comprehensive Islamic system vs the Socialist and
Capitalist thought and further rediscovers the traditional Islamic-
political heritage in the light of modern ideas about state, politics,
democracy, and freedom.[648]
Al-Būṭī, according to al-Khaṭīb, represents the traditional jurist or
“the state jurist,” who applies early perceptions of jurisprudence
which became crystallized during the former caliphate to the modern
state, such as the compulsory obedience to the ruler, the prohibition
of deposing him, putting up with his bad behavior, as well as
promoting the notion of fitnah.[649] As for al-Būṭī’s fatwa on the
forbidden rebellion against the Muslim ruler, however corrupt or
dissolute, al-Khaṭīb notes that on the basis of such fatwa, the ruler’s
legitimacy comes solely from his outward belief, rather than from
performing the rights and duties.[650]
In addition, al-Khaṭīb contends that the key issue occupying al-
Būṭī’s mind and governing all his perceptions and attitudes is the
Western plot against Islam and its determination to create a
fragmented Islamic civilization.[651] Being obsessed with this Western
conspiracy, al-Būṭī is correctly viewed as “the state jurist.” The
reason is that he absolutely forbids the armed revolt against the
ruler, reduces the role of opposition to merely giving advice to the
authority, suspends all rights on the pretext of foreign conspiracies.
[652]
Further, he claims that the state may protect freedom under the
condition that the opposition is not following any foreign dictates. If
this happens to be the case, then freedom must be inhibited.[653]
Strikingly, al-Būṭī, who submits to political authority and dare not
question it at all, addresses only lay people and questions their
actions that are alone to be adapted and modified. And this explains
his contradictory positions as he feels bound to change his opinion
just to suit the regime’s changing attitudes.[654]
As far as demonstrations are concerned, al-Būṭī, according to al-
Khaṭīb, who has degraded protesters and accused them
of manipulating mosques for evil goals,[655] remained silent about
those soldiers who have fired at protesters,[656] and considered
demonstrations as Divine punishment for corruption.[657] Besides, al-
Būṭī, quoting al-Nawawī, presupposes that to rebel against the ruler
is unanimously illegal, as held by early Muslim scholars.[658] Al-Khaṭīb
comments that al-Būṭī seems to be selective as there is actually a
variety of opinions concerning this matter in the classical juristic
books.[659] Al-Khaṭīb also notes that al-Būṭī, before the outbreak of
the revolution, did not count peaceful verbal protests as a kind of
revolt against the ruler, in contrast to how he saw them later on.[660]
3. Unlike al-Būṭī, who counts what is happening in Syria as
fitnah, Aḥmad Ibrāhīm considers it jihad.[661] To support his
argument, he cites medieval jurists and scholars of the legal theory,
like al-‘Iz ibn ‘Abd al-Salām, al-Qarāfī, al-Jaṣāṣ, and Ibn ‘Ābidīn, who
are in agreement that it is allowed to put one’s self at high risk either
to make religion formidable and powerful or to command the right
and forbid the evil before oppressive rulers, as the Prophet (ṣ) said,
“The best Jihad is to speak a word of truth in front of a tyrannical
ruler.”[662]
The Second Category
This category presents critical writings void of argumentation.
Instead of debating how and why al-Būṭī’s opinion is weak and
invalid, they follow ready-made accusations against him. They
include four articles:
1. Ḥilmī al-Qā‘ūd, an Egyptian thinker and writer, argues in al-
Thawrah fī Sūriyah bayna Buthaynah wa al-Būṭī (The Revolution in
Syria between Buthaynah and al-Būṭī)[663] that both Buthaynah
Sha‘bān, the political and media adviser to the president, and al-Būṭī,
though belonging to a completely different position, seem to be in
line as regards the Syrian revolt.[664] In her conference following Dar‘ā
massacre, Buthaynah spoke of several presidential corrective
measures emphasizing on the amicable relationship between the
people and the government.[665] Al-Būṭī, on a TV speech, March 25,
2011 strongly advised Syrian people not to follow calls from
anonymous sources with the intention of creating sedition and
upheaval in Syria.[666] According to al-Qā‘ūd, al-Būṭī branded
demonstrators as traitors and disbelievers and claimed that most of
the protesters do not pray.[667]
2. Ghāzī al-Tawbah, a Palestinian journalist, wrote an article
named “Ṣifāt al-‘ālim: al-Būṭī namūdhajan ma‘kūsan” (Characteristics
of religious scholars: al-Būṭī as an opposite example).[668] To the
writer, the main features of a genuine Muslim scholar are embodied
in two concepts: rabbāniyyah, namely a faithful adherence to the
Islamic principles, total submission to Allah, in addition to
maintaining a very poor relationship with the ruler; and al-inḥiyāz ilā
al-ummah wa qaḍāyāhā—that is, to be on the Muslim community’s
side, busying oneself with its main causes and concerns.[669] Al-Būṭī,
seen by al-Tawbah, remained in close contact with former president
Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar for forty years, praising the
Syrian regime and endorsing its secular tendency. But when the
revolution broke out in 2011, he publicly stood against it. Therefore,
he proved himself to be in an inverted position of true ulema.[670]

3. Usāmah al-Mallūḥī, the Head of the Syrian Salvation

Organization, proposes that al-Būṭī, from the 1980s onwards, closely
aligned himself with the regime.[671] For decades, al-Būṭī was actively
promoting the so-called religion of fear; fear of everything rather than
Allah, fooling a whole generation. Al-Būṭī, while maintaining every
false and static aspect of religion, closed the door to the renewal of
fiqh (jurisprudence). [672]
According to al-Mallūḥī, al-Būṭī after the revolution committed
grave errors together: He claimed that fighters are fighting under an
anonymous flag or leadership, and it is not so; he is responsible for
frequent incitement to the killing of demonstrators and jihadists; he
provided justification for pro-regime militias to prostrate themselves
to al-Assad’s picture;
he described those who killed, raped, tortured, and violated
all sanctities (i.e. the Syrian army) as the Prophet’s (ṣ) Companions!
[673]

4. Yāsir al-Zayyāt, an Egyptian liberal, takes the opportunity to

criticize al-Būṭī in an article named “al-Būṭī wa al-Islām al-qadīm wa
al-thawrah” (Al-Būṭī, the old Islam and the Revolution).[674] The writer
portrays al-Būṭī as an ultra-conservative scholar who, throughout his
academic career, used to stand against a variety of revivalist ideas
and movements (Marxism, Existentialism, Democracy, Nationalism
and Wahhabism).[675] With his pro-regime stand, al-Būṭī appeared to
represent Syrian-Bourgeois Islam. This Islam, embodied in religious
institutions, charitable societies besides da‘wah movements, lives as
a minority and receives a VIP treatment of the regime as long as it is
intelligently monitored and politically static.[676]
The Third Category
There are writers who, taking advantage of the escalating Syrian
revolution, attempted to show the reader the intellectual fallacy or
weakness of various earlier positions held by al-Būṭī. With a few
exceptions, most of the discussed ideas in these articles do not
show relevance to the current debate on al-Būṭī.
They include two articles:
1. Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Atāsī, a Syrian writer, after introducing a
biography about al-Būṭī, informs his reader of some intellectual
disputes between al-Būṭī and influential figures (Ṭayyib Tīzīnī,
Muḥammad ‘Abduh, and Gamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī) or ideologies
(Marxism, Nationalism).[677] Then the writer gives a brief discussion
on al-Būṭī’s handling of Allah’s sovereignty, works of literature that
offend religions, as well as the existence of jinn.[678]
On the other hand, and this is what is relevant, the writer focuses
on al-Būṭī’s relation with the regime, and assumes that al-Būṭī’s
eminence, at home and abroad, is based on his considerable
scholarly achievements (books, essays, lectures etc.) coupled with
the regime’s backing and promotion. For years, at Hafez al-Assad’s
request, al-Būṭī enjoyed access to a wide audience in a weekly
program of the Syrian National TV.[679]
The writer further argues that the regime while combating
political-Islamist trends was in need of religious authority which,
besides gaining credibility among the grassroots, is likely to dispute
with those trends. To maintain credibility, this authority, while should
not go far in supporting the political power, is required to pay
homage to this power to earn its trust.[680]
2. Aḥmad Khayrī al-‘Umarī, an Iraqi writer, assumes that al-Būṭī
belongs to a traditional religious trend emanating from the medieval
Ash‘arī school, which dominated for a long time.[681] Propagating
some Sufi dogmatic practices (seeking help from the Prophet (ṣ) and
notable saints) and the rigid adoption of madhhabism (mainly al-
Shāf‘ī) represent the hallmark of this trend.[682] Behind the façade of
al-Būṭī’s “rationality,” there hide Sufi superstitious beliefs thereby
causing intellectual damage to the ummah.[683] No wonder that al-
Būṭī was hostile to a couple of trends: the reformist-revivalist school
championed by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abduh, as
well as the Salafism movement.[684]
The Fourth Category
Although those who criticize al-Būṭī differ in approach and ferocity,
they have never gone as far as branding him as a disbeliever. Yet,
Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī, a Syrian ultra-Salafī, has done that. His piece
is nothing but a crude polemic devoid of scholarly criticism, or
rational argument. Al-Ṭarṭūsī, who adopts a different path from al-
Būṭī, who is anti-Salafī, spares no effort to strip his opponent off
every virtue or merit.[685]
He quotes phrases and statements made by al-Būṭī in praise of
Hafez and Bashar, and, by twisting his citations and committing the
fallacy of generalization, declared al-Būṭī as kāfir and renegade.[686]
Al-Nuṣayriyyūn sect, to which al-Assad family belongs, is held by
Muslim scholars as heretic. So, al-Būṭī not only applauded the
notorious infidel Hafez al-Assad, but also elevated his status to that
of the righteous, even worse, to that of the prophets![687]
Table 5.1: Ten issues against al-Būṭī.
 Arguments Clarifying Al-Būṭī’s View
Authors of the following four articles have something in common;
they are basically intended to clarify the position taken by al-Būṭī and
put it into context. They do not necessarily agree with or support al-
Būṭī’s choice. As we will read, one of the authors, ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-
Hādī, makes it clear that he wants to do justice to al-Būṭī, though he
openly rejects some of his adopted views on the revolution.
Four articles are presented here.
1. Muwaffaq al-Khālid, in his article “Waqfah bayna al-Shaykh
Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī wa muntaqidīh,”[688] explains that
al-Būṭī’s critics come from two different directions: the liberal-leftist
lobby and the Salafi group, with whom al-Būṭī had earlier intellectual
heated debates. Followers of both sides, taking the advantage of the
current storm of protest against al-Būṭī, spared no effort to attack al-
Būṭī and distort his image in every possible means.[689] The writer
further argues that the only gains al-Būṭī made from his contact with
al-Assad regime were, far from personal, to help set free a large
number of Muslim Brotherhood prisoners on the one hand, and to
allow to those living in exile to come back on the other.[690]
After the revolution, there appeared movements calling for
reform, and are directed by unknown groups or organizations
disguised behind screens, and satellite TV channels. Al-Khālid
admits that the idea of reform is doubtless necessary, yet “what is
the program of it?” “And who is going to run it?” he asks. Those who
call for reform are in accord with bringing down the regime, although
they come from opposing camps: Islamist, liberals, leftist, as well as
human activists.[691]
Al-Khālid also notes that only a few months before the revolution,
al-Būṭī spoke out against specific government policies in the media
and education. Paradoxically, those who dare not voice objections to
these policies at that time have now the audacity to criticize al-Būṭī
severely.[692]
2. Naṣūḥ al-Shāmī, in “al-Thawrah fī sharak al-istibdād” (The
Revolution Caught in the Tyranny Trap)[693] argues that passions and
emotions, in times of popular revolutions, usually run high holding
sway over rational thought to the extent that other dissident opinions
are to be deemed as supportive of corrupt governments and dictator
regimes. Thus, al-Shāmī sternly warns against what he calls “a
tyrant revolution,” which in turn brings about the so-called
revolutionary takfīr.[694]
This “revolutionary takfīr,” which is more dangerous than religious
takfīr, never accepts the other opinion. So, when al-Būṭī decided to
swim against the stream following his own adopted path, he became
an object of immeasurable derision and contempt.[695] “Unfortunately,
the rebels tend to suppress ulema and damage their reputation, if
the latter say contrary to what is held by the street.”[696]
Then al-Shāmī goes on saying that homeland is for everyone,
and none has the right to silence others who follow different views.
[697]
Usually, during periods of bewildering turmoil, the folks, not the
brains, get extremely puzzled about how to distinguish between right
and wrong attitudes.[698] Sometimes, the educated and great
intellectuals, due to the sensitivity of the situation, feel bound not to
declare the ulterior motive behind their adopted position. And this
motive can only be detected by someone who is able to read
between the lines. Of course, lay people are not up to that level; only
those of big minds can do it.[699]
Also, before the revolution, al-Būṭī, held in trust and credibility,
had served as a connecting link between high-ranking officials in the
government and other lay people to the advantage of the latter.[700]
Furthermore, according to al-Shāmī, the reason why al-Būṭī urged
people to keep indoors and not participate in protests was to protect
them from potential genocide.[701]
In another article “Manhaj al-‘ulamā’ al-rabbāniyyīn fī muwājahat
al-azamāt” (Pious Scholars’ Approach to Crises)[702] al-Shāmī links
the current Syrian crisis with that of Ataturk’s Turkey. Although
grounds for the revolt against Ataturk are religiously sanctioned,
Sa‘īd al-Nūrsī, the renowned scholar, refused to be one of ulema
who recognized and gave further aid to protestors.[703] To al-Nūrsī,
this wave of popular uprising would, sooner or later, create chaos
and sedition opening the door to massive bloodshed among innocent
Muslims. This was also the real purpose behind al-Būṭī’s
misunderstood attitude.[704]
3. Muḥammad al-‘Ajamī makes a critical appraisal of the
situation.[705] He contends that the blanket of vagueness about al-Būṭī
comes from two sources: the media and shallow understanding of
his actual position.[706] The one-sided media, such as Al-Jazeera and
Al-Arabiya, combined with the viewer’s poor sound judgment, played
an important role in distorting al-Būṭī’s image by twisting his words
and taking his statements out of context. For example, it was
reported by the media that al-Būṭī labeled all protestors as “rubbish”;
however, when the writer carefully scrutinized the case and watched
al-Būṭī’s original video, he came to realize that al-Būṭī was referring
to a particular group of evil-intentioned protestors who wanted to
exploit peaceful demonstrations for their own gains.[707]
As for the second source, the shallow understanding and the
bewildered mind during the tribulation, al-‘Ajamī says that his basic
intent is to emphasize the importance of using common sense and
rational thinking when passing judgment on others.[708] Al-Būṭī, to be
maintained, is a towering Muslim figure who had been in a position
of trust for decades. So, to point a finger of suspicion at him after this
upheaval raises the question whether the yardstick applied to judge
others is really valid.[709]
To al-‘Ajamī, al-Būṭī is not a scholar who sought sycophantic
goals by virtue of his ties with the regime. He lived a clearly simple
life and did not have any of the worldly enjoyments (villa, farm, shop,
bank account or car).[710] As for the scenario of the Syrian
government putting pressure on al-Būṭī to take its declared position,
it is far-fetched. [711] According to al-‘Ajamī, the reason is that others,
less famous than al-Būṭī, have taken a hardline stance against the
government, yet have never been under arrest. The government
tries to avoid taking harsh measures against celebrities like al-Būṭī,
as this will cause considerable embarrassment to it before the
international community.[712]
The only plausible explanation is that al-Būṭī was following his
purely adopted ijtihad, irrespective of whether he is right or wrong.
Al-‘Ajamī, in the footsteps of al-Shāmī and al-Khālid, believes that al-
Būṭī, by taking this seemingly bizarre attitude, was keen on avoiding
any potential danger or serious harm that might befall those innocent
protestors.[713]
4. ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Hādī, a Somalian author, first provides a
very brief account of al-Būṭī’s rich intellectual legacy contributing
substantially to the Muslim scholarship. His books and essays reflect
deep rational and, logical thinking, as well as a dispassionate
tendency.[714] Then, in the second part of the article, he tries to do
justice to al-Būṭī by putting his attitude, which the author himself
rejects, into the right context. He makes a few remarks: (i) No one
can deny al-Būṭī’s great knowledge and status. Those who know al-
Būṭī very well cannot claim that he failed to stand for the truth or
espoused a false opinion while knowing it is so. (ii) Due to his
hardline against the current Islamist movements, al-Būṭī distanced
himself from their activities and achievements. This remoteness, of
course, resulted in ill-informed views about these movements. (iii)
The regime had kept al-Būṭī in a confined space allowing limited
exposure to others’s scholarly works, in particular, those Muslims
living in the West. (iv) Al-Būṭī warned that attempts to bring down the
regime will have serious repercussions on the whole country. (v) The
revolution, according to al-Būṭī, is inspired by foreign powers rather
than being a product of domestic force. Israel will exploit this
revolution to the maximum and weaken the Syrian regime, Israel’s
de facto fiercest opponents in the region. (vi) Leading farsighted
ulema, like ‘Abd al-Karīm Bakkār, did not accept to brand the Syrian
regime as infidel. This despotic regime, they note, has caused much
suffering to its Syrian people, including Alawis. Hence, it is not fitting
to claim that it is a revolt against an infidel regime, or a Sunni vs
Alawi war.[715]
When he was asked about sharia’s view on Alawi sect,
al-Būṭī answered that a great number of those of various
“excommunicated” sects are actually not aware of the very details of
their doctrine. Rather, they are ill-informed imitators who know what
is common among all nations.[716] If al-Būṭī, al-Hādī asserts, had seen
or known any blasphemous act by Hafez and his son, he would not
have remained silent.[717]
 As for his praise of al-Assad family, al-Hādī explains that what al-
Būṭī commended were specific acts he witnessed himself [718]or
reported by the media. And many ulema now are involved in a
similar kind of praise to kings and presidents of today. They pray for
their success in Friday sermons and applaud them in every occasion
for charitable donations or other society services etc.[719]
Nevertheless, those “benevolent” kings and presidents are seen by
opposing Islamists as nothing but a tool in the hand of the U.S. and
Zionism. So, some of those ulema who have denounced al-Būṭī for
praising the Syrian presidents are also caught in the act![720]
 Table 5.2: Arguments for al-Būṭī.

Misconceptions Attributed to al-Būṭī

The purpose of this section is basically to remove common
misperceptions about al-Būṭī which are likely to create an obstacle to
providing a fair treatment about his perspective. Admittedly, the
media has played a prominent role in damaging al-Būṭī’s reputation
through misrepresentation and misquotation. Thereupon, a
substantial number of educated and lay people, in Syria and
elsewhere, have taken these widespread fabricated statements at
face value and never attempted to dig for the truth. And the above-
presented writings against al-Būṭī are laden with these
misconceptions.
For example, al-Būṭī was assumed to have said that all
protestors did not pray. However, he maintained that he was
referring to a certain group of people who had been waiting at the
Umayyad Mosque courtyard and did not join Friday prayer. When the
prayer was over, they infiltrated among the congregation and began
to shout out against the government. This is what happened in the
first week of demonstrations.[721]
Similarly, al-Būṭī labeled some, not all, protestors as “rubbish,”
i.e. those evil-intentioned protestors and fitnah-mongers whose
intention is to instigate violence between demostrators and the
security forces.[722] Further, contrary to reports about al-Būṭī being
silent or indifferent to violence towards protestors, it has been cited
in this chapter, that he, on several occasions, forbade this act and
criminalized soldiers who killed innocent protestors.[723] In addition,
nowhere can be found a phrase attributed to al-Būṭī that he saw
Basel al-Assad in Paradise after his death.[724] Another claim holds
that al-Būṭī elevated the status of the regime’s army to that of the
Prophet’s (ṣ) Companion. In fact, al-Būṭī uttered this statement yet
linked it with the condition that the army must show sincere
repentance and commitment to the Lord’s orders.[725]
More seriously, al-Būṭī, according to various media outlets,
allowed to prostrate one’s self to al-Assad’s picture. Notwithstanding,
a deliberate change of al-Būṭī’s fatwa has been made. Al-Būṭī
received an enquiry about a case of coercive prostration to the
president’s picture. He answered, “Consider this picture a carpet,
stand on it and prostrate yourself to Allah.”[726] In other words, it is
legally allowed for a Muslim, under the compulsion of the death
threat, to do such an act that does not nullify his/her strong belief in
Allah. On another occasion, when pro-regime youth did the same
thing of their own volition to create a tense atmosphere, al-Būṭī
commentated that they committed a blasphemous act and thus
plunged into a state of obvious disbelief.[727]
 Is Al-Būṭī a Pro-Regime Scholar?
Due to the many religious and political ramifications of this matter, it
is hard to give an undisputable answer about al-Būṭī being on the
side of the Syrian regime, against it, or somewhere in the middle. To
draw nearer to the accurate answer, however, a brief outline of al-
Būṭī’s discourse will be provided, and then followed by a discussion
on the characteristics of a scholar of the sultan.
Al-Būṭī, for four decades, adopted attitudes which are likely to be
interpreted as a pro-regime stance:
He forbade all kinds of armed revolt against the dictator
Muslim ruler.
He took unfavourable stances against contemporary Islamist
movements who were opposing the rulers.
He praised Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar.
When the revolution erupted, he disallowed anti-regime
demonstrations and advised people to stay at home to
maintain national unity and, more importantly, to protect
protestors from any threat posed by the regime forces.[728]
He criticized the opposition publicly and the regime privately.
[729]

He made politically oriented and short-sighted statements

that go directly to the benefit of the regime. Here are three
examples: (i) On Saturday, March 17, 2012, two huge blasts
hit the heart of Damascus, killing at least 27 people and
wounding dozens of civilians in an attack on intelligence and
security buildings.[730] On the following day, before his prayer
over the casualties, al-Būṭī rushed without any evidence to
hold the Syrian National Coalition, headed by Burhan
Ghalioun, responsible for the attack![731] (ii) In May 30, 2012 a
horrific crime was committed in the village of Houla, near
Homs, that left 108 civilians killed, including 49 children and
34 women. In spite of concrete evidences pointing to the
responsibility of the government,[732] al-Būṭī acquitted the
Syrian army which, according to him, is supposed to be
 maintaining the security of citizens. Rather, he accused some
gangs from Lebanon who infiltrated the country to sow the
seeds of sectarianism therein![733] (iii) Elsewhere, in a Friday
sermon, al-Būṭī announced the death of the Organization of
Islamic Countries due to its passive role in the Syrian crisis
and surprisingly, claimed that both Russia and China are now
the heirs of this dead organization, because of their active
support to Syria![734] Of course, these poor unfounded
opinions are an indication of al-Būṭī’s naive outlook of politics
and to what extent states and politicians manipulate facts
and exploit current events for their own interests.[735]
By contrast, there are other fatwas and views held by al-Būṭī
which are against the regime’s interests:
As shown earlier in this chapter, al-Būṭī time after time spoke
against the regime’s reckless policies.
He not only disallowed anti-regime demonstrations, but also
those in support of the government if they tend to be
provocative and are likely to cause chaos and strife.[736]
He prayed ṣalāt al-ghā’ib[737] over protestors of the town of
Dar‘a who were fired by the army, and wished for them to
attain the status of martyrs.[738]
Earlier-cited fatwa about the prohibition of opening fire on
peaceful protestors.[739]
He unequivocally condemns bloodshed and killing from both
sides: the government and the opposition forces.[740]
He strongly denounced those who prostrated themselves to
al-Assad’s picture and labeled them as outright disbelievers.
[741]

Al-Būṭī’s particular view on the revolt against the ruler, along with
his discourse against Islamist movements, are a product of an
independent opinion with no concern about how to gratify the wishes
of the regime.[742] Of course, it cannot be denied that these two
opinions have come as godsend for present autocratic presidents
and kings who, joyful with the quietistic nature of such legal
discourse, are empowered to solidify their authoritarian rulership
and, at the same time, slam the door for political activities in the face
of Islamists.
Additionally, according to al-Būṭī, he only praised the ruler for
commendable acts which he attests, whether others are aware of
these acts or not. This praise is meant to encourage the ruler to do
more of similar good acts.[743]

Pro-regime Justification Anti-regime stance

stance (before and after the revolution)
(before and
after the
revolution)
He prohibited conducive to fitnah, chaos and He, on various occasions, spoke
armed rebellion sedition against the regime’s policies and
against the ruler procedures
He praised al- Praising certain commendable acts He prayed over protestors of the
Assad and his which he witnessed. And this town of Dar‘a
son Bashar praise is meant to be a source of
encouragement

He forbade anti- 1. Infiltration by evil-intentioned He forbade pro-regime

regime persons demonstrations if provocative
demonstrations 2. Protestors’ life will be put at risk

In post- Public criticism of the regime will He prohibited opening fire at

revolution, he cause more public agitation which peaceful protestors
criticized the in turn will lead to more casualties
opposition
publicly and the
regime privately
He had antipathy He has seven issues with He condemned bloodshed and
toward Islamist Islamists, discussed in chapter killing from both sides
movements who three
had been on
collision with
rulers
He made He strongly denounced those who
politically prostrated themselves to al-
oriented short- Assad’s picture and thus
sighted excommunicated them
statements

Table 5.3: On al-Būṭī Regime relation

 The second critical point to investigate are the characteristics of
the scholar of the sultan/state jurist. Al-Būṭī, particularly in the post-
revolution era, is described as the “scholar of the sultan,”[744] or in
modern language, “state jurist,”[745] and “pro-regime.” This particular
medieval epithet carries certain qualities that stigmatize sycophantic
scholars who indulge themselves in flattery and fancy
talks to win favor from rulers. A lot of traditions and reports discredit
such doomed scholars setting them apart from true ulema. For
instance, in one tradition, the Prophets (ṣ) says, “Whoever comes to
the ruler falls into fitnah,”[746] meaning that fitnah is involved if the
purpose of contacting the ruler is to appease or cajole him, rather
than giving him sincere advice or commanding the right and
forbidding the evil before him.[747] Elsewhere, the Prophet (ṣ) warns,
“Amirs will appear after me. Whoever goes to them, believes their
lies and helps them in their oppression is not of me nor am I of
him.”[748] And “whoever approves of their bad deeds and imitates
them (is blamed and punishable).”[749] Many other traditions and āthār
give similar warnings.
Taken from these traditions and others, the scholar of the
sultan/state is portrayed as someone who:
initiates relations with the sultan;
seeks personal gain;
often holds an official position;
creates or misapplies fatwas to fit the sultan’s/state’s policy;
always appeases the sultan and gratifies his wishes;
praises the sultan and never criticizes or admonishes him.[750]
According to the above summary table, most of these illaudable
traits are missing. Also, al-Būṭī, as mentioned earlier, used to meet
al-Assad at the request of the latter, spare no effort to gently
admonish him, remind him, in private or public, of the awesome
responsibility he bears. Al-Būṭī never asked for something personal
or held an official position in the state religious apparatus. Taking all
that into account, it is highly questionable to label al-Būṭī as a
scholar of the sultan.
 Evaluating Al-Būṭī’s Argument
via the Concept of “Obedience”

Introduction

T he previous chapter and the present one constitute the backbone

of the book. Chapter five presented a detailed description of the
rationale behind al-Būṭī’s position on the Syrian revolution, putting
the issue in a wider perspective, by exploring varied responses to al-
Būṭī. Also, the controversial nature of al-Būṭī regime relation was
critically evaluated. I felt it necessary to tackle this issue before I
began to discuss and analyze al-Būṭī’s view in chapter six. Because
the way we view al-Būṭī (whether a pro-regime or an independent
scholar) is bound to shape the following, or probably the entire,
discussion. If al-Būṭī is held to be a sycophant, then every piece of
his argument is interpreted as conferring religious legitimacy upon
the Syrian government. If he is viewed the otherwise, then other
trajectories are possible.
This chapter tests the validity of al-Būṭī’s argument presented in
the previous chapter. The core of his argument rests on the notion of
obedience to a ruler (derived from the obedience verse and
obedience traditions). Al-Būṭī relies heavily on these traditions to
delegitimize the rebellion against the Syrian regime. Further, he
quotes a unanimous agreement among ulema about the prohibition
of rebellion.
On the other hand, he cites several sayings in which the Prophet
(ṣ) counsels Muslims to stand aloof at the time of fitnah and not take
part in it. In addition, jihadists, local and foreign, are fighting under an
anonymous flag, and the Prophet (ṣ) disallowed such fighting.
 For getting a bird’s-eye view on the question of obedience, the
research will initially throw light on the essential need for political
authority, as described in the realm of political-ethical philosophy.
Then the research will go into the heart of the issue by examining
the two basic sources of obedience: the obedience verse and how to
be understood in the context of parameters defined by the Qur’an on
the one hand. And, on the other hand, the genre of obedience
traditions will be explored from a fresh perspective, re-situating
“obedience” in its rightful context in the contemporary Islamic political
thought within the rights/duties of both the ruler and the ruled. After
that, the research will throw light on the concept of fitnah related to
traditions in question, as well as discussing the fight under
anonymous flag or leadership.
 The Need for Authority
The state, according to Plato, arises “out of the needs of mankind;
no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants.”[751] This was
echoed by his student, Aristotle, who argues in Politics[752] that
human beings are by nature political animals, who tend to live
together. Later on, the essentiality of power became an established
reality among medieval Muslim scholars of literature, political-ethical
philosophy, and sociology, like al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 869),[753] Ibn Abī al-Rabī‘
(d. 885),[754] al-Fārābī (d. 950),[755] Ibn Sīnā, Avicenna (d. 1037),[756] as
well as Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406).[757]
It is acknowledged that human life, be in political or nonpolitical
society, needs to have a kind of organized structure. “Authority” of
course is the most entitled to do this fundamental task by which
peoples’ affairs are better administered.[758] Given this, a sort of
“political differentiation,” is naturally created with a distinction made
between two groups: a ruling party with political authority and
decision making; and subjects who have to obey orders.[759]
Admittedly, the question of “obedience” is one of the state’s basic
rights to maintain its existence and stability. Acts of disobedience
and rebellion are one of the major factors leading to the state
dissolution. Ibn Khaldūn aptly notes that the absence of obedience
was the obstacle to creating well-organized societies among pre-
Islam Arabs, who refused to give subservience to each other
because of their rough nature, pride and ambition to leadership.[760]
Political authority, to be noted, is named by professors of law
“the guardian state” because it establishes security and stability at
home, and protects its individuals from foreign assaults.[761]
Further, Islam strongly supports the pressing need for authority.
(i) A Prophetic tradition states, “It is inevitable for people to have
imārah (emirate), whether it is good or bad.”[762] (ii) ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib,
who said, “(The affairs) of people are only set right by the existence
of emir, whether good or bad.”[763] (iii) Even when three persons
decide to set out on a journey, they need, as a religious obligation, to
choose one of them as their leader.[764]
 The caliphate, taking over the role of Prophethood, “is
responsible for guarding the religion and managing the affairs of his
world.”[765] Without caliphate or imamate, neither religious obligations
nor the objectives of sharia can be carried out. Thus, numerous
Muslim scholars, throughout the history of Islam, unanimously call
for the imperative caliphate.[766]
Professors of political sciences, referring to the duties of the state
and its limits, have also discussed the acquired rights of individuals,
such as freedom, equality, dignity, security etc.[767]
 Making Sense of the Obedience Verse
“O believers, obey Allah, and obey the Messenger and ulū al-amr
(those in authority) among you. If you are in dispute over anything,
refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you truly believe in Allah and
the Last Day” (Qur’an, al-Nisā’: 59). This verse, linking obedience to
ulū al-amr with obedience to Allah and His Messenger (ṣ), is
considered the cornerstone in the obedience discourse. It has been
widely cited to have a calming influence on angry mobs who have
decided to overthrow their dictator leaders/governments. Some
Syrian ulema,[768] including al-Būṭī, view President Bashar al-Assad
as one of the ulū al-amr, and, hence, he is to be obeyed. To evaluate
whether or not this frequent citation is in place, it is necessary to
have a sound grasp of the verse through the following remarks.
What Ulū al-Amr Stands For
The term ulū al-amr refers to either ulema, or emirs of battles, or
emirs in general.[769] Given the word by nature is open to multiple
interpretations, the choice of emirs or rulers should not take
precedence over other choices.
Other commentators, however, rather than selecting a certain
category, prefer a general application of ulū al-amr that incorporates
all those who have been vested with authority, be it public or private
(emirs, sultans, judges, ulema, muftis etc.), provided that their
position of authority is legally sound and valid. Al-Shawkānī, for
example, notes, “Ulū al-amr includes leaders, sultans, judges and
every one with legally accredited authority, rather than the authority
of ṭāghūt (Satan/a false deity).”[770] Contemporary thinkers, like
Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Ḥasan al-Turābī, are quite explicit about the
key element of free choice of the ruler by the ummah.[771]
Lexically speaking, the fixed plural form of ulū al-amr[772] may
subscribe to the general applicability of the term. It alludes to a
sense of corporate responsibility of those of authority to work hand in
hand under the umbrella of sharia for the promotion of the best
interests of the Muslim community at all levels. In other words, ulū al-
amr ultimately contains the three powers, legislative (ulema, muftis,
as the exponents of Islamic law), executive (rulers, sultans, emirs),
and judiciary (judges).

Characteristics of Ulū al-Amr

On the basis of obedience verse plus the previous verse (no. 58),[773]
those of ulū al-amr are identified with three distinguishing features:
fulfilment of trust, maintaining justice, and referring to Allah and His
Messenger (ṣ) as regards disputable matters.[774] Underlining their
importance, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib is quoted as saying, “It is the duty of
the leader to rule according to what Allah has revealed, and fulfill
trusts. If he has done that, Muslims have to listen and obey and be
responsive to him.”[775]
The ummah, therefore, is obliged to render obedience to ulū al-
amr who have discharged the three duties, with particular reference
to fulfilling justice. Unjust or corrupt rulers, nevertheless, who failed
to recognize all or some of those features, specified by the Qur’an,
cannot be subsumed under the category of ulū al-amr. Instead, their
appropriate epithet, according to al-Zamakhsharī, the well-known
Qur’anic commentator, is al-luṣūṣ al-mutaghallibah (the dominant
thieves).[776] Further, some jurists, like Abū Ḥanīfah, go as far as to
completely reject the authority of corrupt caliphs and judges, due to
the absence of the quality of justice.[777]
The Verse’s Contextual Circumstance
It is extremely important to understand the circumstances that
accounted for the revelation of the verse. This contextual
information, outside the text, broadens readers’ horizon in terms of
specifying general words, placing limitation to the absolute, and,
more importantly, pinpointing the exact meaning of the verse,
intended by the author.[778] The incident, therefore, that brought about
the revelation of obedience verse serves a practical example of how,
when differences of understanding among leaders and their
followers occur, the case should be referred to the guidance of the
Qur’an and Sunnah.
In one of the battles, the emir who has a sense of humor was
trying to test the obedience of his soldiers. So, he asked them to
collect pieces of firewood and set fire on them. Then, when done, he
ordered the soldiers to throw themselves into the fire claiming that
his command must be obeyed, according to the Prophet’s (ṣ)
instruction. After moments of reluctance combined with a dispute,
the soldiers decided to disobey the emir and consult the Prophet (ṣ)
instead. Later on, the Prophet (ṣ) answered, “If you had entered the
fire, you would not have got out of it, for obedience is only in that
which is (legally) valid and reasonable.”[779]
In the light of the story, the verse directs that when a dispute
arises among the ruler and the ruled, a referral is to be passed to
Allah and His Messenger (ṣ). As a result, obedience to ulū al-amr
“applies to that which is known of God’s law, that which is not
covered by a statement of prohibition and that which is not subject to
prohibition when referred to God’s law.”[780]
Moreover, the jurist Ibn al-Qayyim, quoting the verse, puts the
question of obedience in a new fashion. He argues that the duty to
obey the ruler is derived from the duty to obey jurists, and the duty to
obey the jurists is derived from the duty to obey the Prophet (ṣ).
Therefore, the jurists are obeyed to the extent that they obey the
Prophet (ṣ), and the rulers are obeyed to the extent that they obey
the jurists. Ultimately, the jurists are the ones who must be obeyed,
as they are the experts on the religious law.[781]
Based on the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that obedience to
ulū al-amr in the Qur’anic perception has to be understood in the
context of justice, fulfilling trusts, in addition to admitting sovereignty
as belonging to Allah alone, and implementing the guidance of His
Messenger (ṣ). Moreover, the common identity of ulū al-amr is best
embodied in a joint effort of the three powers: legislation, law
enforcement, and adjudication. Rulers are expected to consult ulema
or muftis about the legal status of various issues. The latter, in turn,
obey legitimate commands of the former and help them implement
sharia rules. Judicial power, on the other hand, joins forces with the
other two powers for the benefit of the ummah. Viewed as a single
entity, ulū al-amr decidedly banishes autocratic power as well as
other systems of political tyranny.

Figure 6.1: Ulū al-amr triple identity.

 Obedience Traditions Analyzed
A myriad of traditions clearly and unequivocally direct that Muslim
subjects have to obey rulers, whether substantively just or unjust,
regardless of their physical, racial, or ethnic attributes.[782] What is the
reason behind this Prophetic instruction? Why cannot Muslims rebel
unless in certain cases, like extremely open sins or blatant disbelief?
What is meant by the words “emir,” or “imam” and “al-jamā‘ah”
(community) in these reports? And why do they come together? Is
“obedience” absolute or conditional?

Figure 6.2: Obedience-traditions components.

For the purpose of answering these questions, this research

examines the literature of obedience traditions in the well-known
collections of hadith: Ibn al-Athīr’s Jāmi‘ al-uṣūl fī aḥādīth al-Rasūl,
which incorporates the famous six fundamental hadith books (al-
Muwaṭṭa’, al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, al-Tirmidhī and al-
Nasā’ī); Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī’s al-Jāmi‘ li shu‘ab al-īmān; and al-
Haythamī’s Majma‘ al-zawā’id.
What “Emir,” and “Imam” Signify
Taken from ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib’s statement, cited above in this
chapter[783] and other tradition, the words “emir,” or “imam” means the
ruler who accomplishes the objectives of sharia, carries out ḥudūd
(fixed penalties), combats the enemy, and protects the land. This
ruler who has executed his duties can be good and moral, which is
the norm of behavior, or bad and corrupt.
Historically speaking, leaders of the Umayyad and Abbasid
caliphate were able, with a position of domination, to fulfill these
duties, although some of them seemed to have been despotic and
unjust.[784] Also, the sultanate states,[785] which usurped power from
the caliphate and were in search of legitimacy, committed
themselves to sharia, performing jihad, supressing intra-wars, as
well as serving the community’s socio-economic needs.[786]
On the correlation between the ruler and the community, linked
together by “obedience,” al-Jāḥiẓ notes that the leader who is vested
with single sovereignty is similar to the imam in prayer who alone is
followed and obeyed. And with the absence of other political
competitors, opinion is one, harmony achieved, and the community
affairs put right. And if the community is there, the enemy is no more,
with fanciful thoughts and ideas coming to an end.[787]
So, as people in prayer follow their imam, the community should
obey their political authority and never rebels against it. If voluntary
“obedience” is pledged, the community becomes unified. That is to
say, the private will gets integrated into the general will, and the
private interest is hidden behind the general interest. Consequently,
as Rousseau puts it, “Each of us puts his person and all his power in
common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our
corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of
the whole.”[788]
In order to maintain this political-social unification on the one
hand and ensure that scores of religious duties run smoothly on the
other, Muslim subjects are advised to endure the injustice of the
ruler. The ruler, to be argued, is akin to the thread that holds together
the beads of the necklace. If the thread breaks, the beads come
loose all over the place. This clearly explains why many Prophetic
traditions correlate between the existence of the ruler and of the
community.[789]

Figure 6.3: Ruler as essential to the community.

Historically speaking, al-Ṭabarī narrates that Sa‘īd ibn Zayd was
asked about when Abū Bakr was installed as caliph. He replied, “The
same day when the Prophet passed away; they hated that part of the
day would pass without being one single community.”[790] This report
indicates that political authority to the early Muslim community is a
matter of considerable significance.
A Muslim during times of sedition and turmoil is required to cling
to his community and imam.[791] Also, dire warnings and threats of
excommunication are directed to those Muslims who, having
committed acts of disobedience to their leader, departed from the
Muslim mainstream community.[792]
Further, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd advised those who were
complaining about their unjust governor, al-Walīd ibn ‘Uqbah of the
Umayyads, “Be patient, for the injustice of the imam that remains fifty
years is better than harj that lasts one month!” When asked about
the meaning of harj, ibn Mas‘ūd answered, “Killing and lying.”[793]
“The Prophet’s vicegerent,”[794] is an honorific title given to a just
ruler or sultan who, in the footsteps of the Prophet (ṣ), is responsible
for guarding religion and running the affairs of the present life. In a
report, Allah honors those who dignify the sultan, while those who
insult him are humiliated.[795] “Sultan here applies to the just and
good one, and cannot be understood in an absolute sense, as
learned from another report telling that to dignify and honor the just
sultan is a kind of Allah’s glorification.[796] In addition, emirate, as
described by the Prophet (ṣ), is amānah (trust), and, on the Day of
Judgment, is conducive to shame and regret, except those who
handle it in a right manner.[797] So, corrupt and despotic rulers are
nothing but betrayers who are “the most despised ones by Allah, and
the most distant from Him.”[798]
Some argue, however, that rulers or sultans, whether just or
tyrant, should be held in reverence, because “the sultan is Allah’s
shadow on earth.”[799] This tradition, with extremely weak narrations,
[800]
exclusively refers to a sultan of fair and good character. In other
words, since Allah is always just, the sultan, His shadow, is expected
to spread justice among the society members and defend its cause,
cost what it may. If he happens to be autocratic or morally corrupt,
then how come he represents the shadow of the Lord upon earth?
Obedience
A host of Prophetic traditions, as referred to earlier, puts particular
emphasis on obedience to rulers as the backbone of the Muslim
state. Another social element that accounts for obedience lies in the
fact that Arabs before Islam had not been accustomed to the system
of the emirate. So, when some Companions seemed to have disliked
the notion of obedience, the Prophet (ṣ) gave instructions that
obedience of his appointed emirs is directly related to his obedience.
And the converse applies as well.[801]
According to some traditions, Muslims must render “obedience”
to their emir as long as the latter adheres to sharia and follows the
Book of Allah.[802] Nevertheless, other reports, from which this
condition is absent, order Muslim subjects to listen and obey their
rulers, even if they do evil. In this case, punishment will fall upon the
rulers, and subjects will be free from it.[803] So, these reports create a
moral distance between the actions of the rulers and their subjects.
As long as Muslims show obedience, they are not held responsible
to Allah for the injustice of rulers. Rulers solely are liable for their
misdeeds.[804]
More importantly, from a rational and realistic perspective, this
obedience is, one may argue, akin to an emergency procedure that
aims to uphold order and stability in the Muslim society, both
indispensable for pursuing and serving basic human needs. So, the
despotism of the ruler, viewed as a fait accompli, ought to be
endured, and obedience given until the time is ripe for change.
Muslim subjects, however, should bear in mind the well-known
genuine tradition “There is no obedience to a creature if it entails
disobeying Allah.”[805] Hence, when it comes to disobeying the Lord,
no compromise or concession is made.
Furthermore, scholars of hadith, farsighted, have situated the
chapter of obedience traditions within other chapters. Being of an
opposite nature, these chapters contain materials (traditions and
reports) that, to a certain extent, run counter to the question of
“obedience.” They include “the rights of subjects on the ruler,” “the
punishment of the unjust ruler and treating the subjects leniently,”
“the obligation of forbidding the evil before emirs,” “no obedience to a
creature if it entails disobeying the Creator,” “speaking the truth
before the imams,” and “how to advise the imams.”[806]
Contextually, the purpose of this order is meant to draw the
reader’s attention to the fact that “obedience” has to be understood
in relation to these sister chapters rather than in isolation.
“Obedience,” therefore, is conditional and contextual, the rights of
the ruler versus the rights of people, the ruler is held responsible to
the ummah, and has, when departing from the norms, to be
admonished and his evil denounced. To recall “obedience” alone is a
systematic error giving the impression that Islam grants unrestricted
authority to rulers, whether good or corrupt, while absolutely
demanding unquestioning obedience from their subjects.

Figure 6.4: Obedience in the rights/duties dichotomy.

The Community
“Community” is a term which is hard to demystify or set clear
boundaries for it, especially after the collapse of the Ottoman
caliphate leading to the break-up of the ummah into countless small
groups and movements with secular-nationalist and social
orientations. Yet, on the basis of tradition and historical reports, a
certain degree of ambiguity might be lifted. “Community” is defined
as Muslim group who follow one imam.[807] That is to say, they pledge
allegiance to one authority which protects their civil and religious
rights and administers their affairs, and without which the existence
of the community is under the threat of collapse.
The year 41 AH, when al-Ḥasan ceded the caliphate to
Mu‘āwiyah, was named “the community year,” for “they were
reunited under one emir after division.”[808] Needless to say, the union
of the Muslim community is an uncompromising demand that anyone
who tries to disturb it or break it up is allowed to be fought and even
killed.[809] One of the useful lessons of history is the nation’s political
unity, strong or weak, is considered a major obstacle to schismatic
projects and plots.
The caliphate, though weak and politically disintegrated, was still
seen as a symbol of collective consciousness of Muslims across the
world. Thus, all rulers of the Sultan States, on the periphery of the
caliphate territories, enthusiastically showed commitment to this
symbolic union of the caliph.[810]
 Deconstructing the “Absolute” Obedience
This section, supplementary to the previous one, is intended to
solidify the fact that “obedience” of the ruler in Islam is conditional
and contextual. And, Muslims, under certain circumstances, must
voice against unjust leaders. Writings or materials casting doubt on
this reality are far from the correct stance, such as speculum
principum. Speculum principum, or mirror for princes, is a genre of
political writing, introduced from Persian and Greek, which offers
guidance to rulers or kings, providing standards of conduct and
ideals of rulership. Wisdom literature, works of moral exhortation,
ethical treatises, and testaments, are included as well.[811]
Experts on this genre of Islamic political thought have remarked
that while books on mirrors offered valuable insights into the
evolution of medieval governance, they often present an image of a
ruler that enhanced his legitimacy and prolonged sovereign power.
[812]
Empowered by Qur’anic and traditional texts, absolute obedience
to power is recalled with the use of analogies, metaphors and fables.
In al-Ṭurṭūshī’s Sirāj al-mulūk, a chapter is devoted to the issue
of obedience. One reads statements like “imam’s obedience is
compulsory for subjects”; “the sultan obedience is associated with
the obedience of Allah”; “to glorify the sultan, just or unfair, is a kind
of glorifying Allah”[813]; “disobedience to imam destroys the pillars of
Islam”; “subjects have no choice but to obey imams”; “obedience is
associated with love.”[814] Elsewhere, and for the purpose of
politicizing the transcendent and deifying the political power, an
analogy is drawn between an inappropriate case of one country
governed by two sultans, similar to a world with two gods.[815] And, if
the sultan were removed from the earth, people, in the sight of Allah,
would be of complete uselessness.[816]
According to al-Jāḥiẓ, and al-Māwardī, quoting the Persian
Ardashir I, the happiness of subjects relies on how much they render
obedience to kings.[817] A report sternly warns that those who attempt
to degrade the sultan will be humiliated by Allah before they die.[818] It
is interesting to note that the term “sultan” in another narration of this
report is identified as the Qur’an and Sunnah and makes no
reference to rulers or kings.[819]
It is clear that the above-quoted examples of advice books are
grossly exaggerated, for they promote obedience, blind, absolute
and passive, serving the cause of dictatorship, reminiscent of
Hobbes’ conception of social contract theory.[820]
Contrary to its concept and limited application, as dictated by
basic Islamic sources, obedience in advice literature is essentially a
central value that is demanded from subjects who, under no
circumstances, may display civil obedience to the sultan/ruler and
abandon their oath of allegiance. Political obedience should be
counter balanced by the principle of commanding the right and
forbidding the evil.
A famous report, by ‘Ubādah ibn al-Ṣāmit, combines this dual
responsibility. It says, “We made an oath of allegiance to the
Messenger of Allah (ṣ) to listen and obey whether we are
enthusiastic or apathetic, in difficult or easy times, and even if others
are given preference over us. And we would not fight against the
ruler unless you have seen clear disbelief for which you have a proof
from Allah. And we speak the truth for the sake of Allah,
wherever we are, fearing no one’s reproach.”[821]
Further, total submissiveness to corrupt rulers goes directly
against a well-known report attributed to the Prophet (ṣ), “The best
Jihad is to speak a word of truth in front of a tyrannical ruler.”[822] And
against the other report that goes, “The prince of martyrs are
Ḥamzah ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib, and a person who spoke the truth
before a tyrant and consequently got killed.”[823] Classical Islamic
books are full of stories about courageous ulema who confronted
caliphs and gave them warnings for their wrongdoing.[824]
In addition, what serves as an indication of a non-passive nature
of obedience is the legal license to fight to defend oneself against
acts of injustice, even if the transgressor is the ruler himself. This
fight, far from rebellion, does not run contrary to the tradition
instructing Muslims to listen and obey those in power, “even if they
strike your back and usurp your wealth.”[825] The message of this
tradition is that although you have to obey unjust rulers, you should
not let them take your property by force if you can successfully put
up resistance. And if you are killed, then you enjoy the status of
martyrs, as stated in several traditions.[826] These limits placed on
obedience to evil rulers tend to question their authority and weaken
their legitimacy giving ultimately some excuse to the ruled for
rebellion.
Losing sight of these presented facts and juristic rulings, some
Orientalists argue that the Muslim caliphate is of autocratic
character. For example, Thomas Arnold contends that the caliphate
“placed unrestricted power in the hands of the ruler and demanded
unhesitating obedience from his subjects.”[827] To support his
argument, Arnold provided several obedience traditions,[828] with no
reference to even a single narration about the counter-obedience
traditions! The same opinion is shared by William Muir[829] and
Duncan B. MacDonald.[830] As for rebellion in Islamic jurisprudence,
Gibb argues that Muslim jurists adopt quietism and reject any right to
rebel against an unjust imam.[831]
It must be stressed that, since the outbreak of the first fitnah
among the Companions down the centuries, the practical attitude of
many ulema toward corrupt political authority has not been only of
“obedience and patience” but also of “opposition and resistance.”
The position of disobedience covers a variety of postures
representing the opposite ends of the spectrum: denouncing the
sinful acts in one’s heart; staying at home and remaining aloof;
suspension of public lectures; neither visiting the sultan’s court nor
accepting his prizes; in addition to giving moral support to the rebels,
[832]
or even taking part in it.[833]
 Figure 6.5: The practical attitude of ulema toward corrupt political authority.
In both attitudes, a connecting link of obedience to sharia is
observed. That is, those who have chosen to put up with despotic
rulers are professing their obedience to Allah and His Messenger (ṣ)
as much as those who adopted the principle of commanding the right
and forbidding the evil, with all its variant stages and modalities.
Viewed from the foregoing, One may argue that al-Būṭī’s
discourse has overlooked or tacitly denied the above-varied
responses of dissenting ulema, except to speak out against the
oppressive ruler in his presence.[834] It is understood that al-Būṭī
closes the door of armed rebellion for fear of the outburst of fitnah.
However, he should have let other scenarios wide open, and even
pushed ahead with their enactment. Quite many ulema met
President Bashar during the first months of protests to show him the
true picture of what was going on and do something to salvage the
situation. Actually, what they heard from the president was nothing
but empty promises and hollow reform programs.[835] Given such an
apparent indifference, al-Būṭī’s adoption of the soft strategy of
“speak out against the ruler in his presence” is of little avail and
clearly shows that his proposed reaction is out of proportion with the
action.
 The Ummah: A Source of Authority
It is acknowledged that leadership or caliphate is a two-party
contract: the ummah and the ruler with the former conferring
legitimacy to the latter. In addition to his responsibility to Allah, the
ruler is held responsible to the ummah, the true holder of the rights.
By virtue of the contract, people are entitled to advise, question and
finally depose the ruler if he has proven morally corrupt and
negligent in his duties.[836] The position of rulership is considered as
trust (Qur’an, al-Nisā’: 58).
Thus, being the trustee of the rights of people, the ruler must be
reliable and honest to preserve the rights of people and not violate
them. After becoming the caliph, Abū Bakr made a memorable
speech, “O People! I have been appointed as caliph over you, even
although I am not the best among you. If I do well, help me; if not,
straighten me up… Obey me as long as I obey Allah and His
Messenger (ṣ). If I disobey them, then no obedience is due to
me.”[837] The ruler does not govern by an invisible force or divine
right; he is merely a normal person who derives legitimacy from
people who elected him.
 The Three-Level Obedience
This section, considered to be one of the main findings of the
research, resituates the obedience of contemporary rulers in its
rightful context in political Islamic thought. The foregoing discussion
on obedience in the Qur’an and Sunnah allows three types of
obedience shifting from idealism to realism: According to features
and conditions of political obedience as delineated in the Qur’an, ulū
al-amr (including rulers) must be obeyed provided they treat their
subjects equitably, discharge trusts, and when judge, they refer to
sharia as a guiding principle. It is the ideal obedience that comes out
of love and deference to fair rulers, such as the obedience of the
Prophet (ṣ) and the four rightly guided caliphs.
Prophetic traditions, nevertheless, have gone beyond this
utopian Qur’anic concept that did exist for three decades of early
Islam (also a few times of sporadic periods of Muslim history) as
foreseen in a tradition.[838] Other traditions speak of three different
periods: Prophethood and the caliphate coupled with mercy, kingship
characterized by oppression, then powers of despotism, brutality,
and open moral laxity.[839]
Given the steadily moral decline in different aspects of human
life, especially in the political sphere, traditions, putting obedience in
a wider realistic perspective, offer Muslims as varied cures and
remedies as possible to cope with coming powers lying outside the
narrow scope of the obedience verse. While the Qur’an slams the
door of obedience in faces of morally corrupt rulers, the Sunnah
keeps it wide open treating different cases of political power ranging
from the pure image of the caliphate to different levels of adulterated
rulership.
To glance through the literature of obedience traditions, one
notes that the boundary of putting up with bad rulers sometimes
narrows, such as in a case of clear-cut sin,[840] and sometimes
stretches out as far as a clear-cut disbelief.[841] Another tradition does
not permit an armed revolt against the ruler if he continues to pray
himself,[842] or to have the prayer performed.[843] Some Muslim
thinkers have taken this tradition at face value; others have
interpreted the exclusive reference to “prayer” as a representation of
the entire faith of Islam,[844] or a practical example of the ruler’s valid
authority and of his commitment to Allah’s law.[845] As far as the
magnitude of persecution is concerned, a Muslim is required to listen
and obey even if his back is beaten and his wealth usurped.[846] This
is because persecutors are “people of devils’ hearts in human
bodies.”[847] So, obedience helps to avoid further anticipated harm
from ruthless men of power.
Given such realistic attitude toward rulership in Sunnah, two
distinctly different phases are recognized:
The first phase: Islam, up to the collapse of the caliphate in
1924, remained a moral, legal, social, as well as political reference
point in Muslim societies across the world. Despite ethical and
cultural differences between the caliphate and successive Sultanate
States, there existed continuity in their Islamic legacy and tradition.
Pious or bad caliphs/sultans, even usurpers recognized Islam as a
comprehensive way of life and endeavored, in varying degrees, to
put into action some or all of the three defining characteristics of ulū
al-amr.[848] None of them made an attempt to challenge or abolish the
Islamic governance of the state. “Thus, for the believer, there was a
continuum of Muslim power and success which, despite the
vicissitudes and contradictions of Muslim life, validated and
reinforced the sense of a divinely mandated and guided community
with purpose and mission.”[849] Out of necessity and for the smooth
running of life, Muslim subjects were required to obey unjust/impious
rulers of this phase.
The second phase: With Ataturk’s dissolution of the caliphate in
1924 and his secular policies, Islam ceased to be the general
framework and the Muslim World entered into a state of disbelief.[850]
This blasphemous move, marking the second phase, was further
strengthened by the Western colonial period creating profound
transformations in all areas: social, political, educational, cultural,
ethical, as well as religious. In the era of the modern-state, most
Arab leaders replaced the Islamic identity with secular, communist,
along with nationalistic ideologies. Yet, they used to cite Islam and
send messages, religious in tone, to maintain legitimacy and ensure
stability.[851]
 Even worse, they have committed a variety of religious, social
and ethical crimes: While some of the rulers lend themselves to an
outright disbelief, whether via ideas or actions,[852] others appeared to
have been agents of foreign powers, in particular, the State of Israel.
[853]
They further endeavored to steal natural resources, maintain
policies of bribery, poverty, obscurantism etc., and combat Islamic
awakening in every possible way, apparent and hidden. Most of
them assumed power by force[854] and try to keep their position
through electoral fraud (99.99%), no red lines left to be crossed.
Undeniably, the extent of criminality of such bunch of crooks by
no means can be compared with maltreatments of earlier Muslim
leaders of the first phase. With this in mind, some contemporary
Muslim intellectuals, like Rāshid al-Ghannūshī,[855] ‘Abd Allāh al-
Nafīsī,[856] Ibrāhīm Zayn,[857] Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Mīsāwī[858] and
Ḥākim al-Muṭayrī[859] contend that obedience should not be rendered
to those leaders. According to al-Ghannūshī, they are dictators,
morally corrupt, servants of enemies of Islam, and bloodthirsty. “Had
they been our ulū al-amr, we would have obeyed them.”[860] Then he
aptly notes that, contrary to contemporary presidents and kings,
earlier rulers—although deviant—were respecting Islamic teachings
and recognizing Islamic law as a general framework.[861]
Conversely, al-Būṭī, in the footsteps of the vast majority of
traditional ulema, regards the term “ruler,” with its connotations, to be
applied equally to all those of authority from early days of Islam till
the present time. He does not seem to be aware of the above three
categories of Muslim rulership, nor of the far-reaching implications of
the last phase, which we are in. On that account, al-Būṭī cites the
Qur’an (the obedience verse) and Sunnah (the obedience traditions)
in support of obedience to the ruler (Bashar in this context).
Here, I have two points to make:
First, it is absolutely right that our leaders must be cast out from
ulū al-amr grouping, as al-Ghannūshī and his colleagues believe.
Ulū al-amr is a supreme Qur’anic rank, granted to those who have
implemented human moral values (justice, trust, dignity etc.) and
admitted sharia as a frame of reference.
 The notion of ulū al-amr, which lies at the heart of the actual
Islamic political power, is underpinned by qualities of justice, equality,
freedom, co-existence, trust, civilizational project and so on. The era
of the Prophet (ṣ), and of the four caliphs, as well as certain cases
afterwards, are the epitome of ulū al-amr. However, the political
experience of Muslims down the centuries has produced different
kinds of powers that are not subsumed under ulū al-amr, such as
leaders of tyranny, corruption, despotism, usurpation, secularism,
nationalism, or communism. Of course, their remoteness varies;
while rulers of the first phase are closer to ulū al-amr, leaders of our
phase remain further.
Second, I contend that a minimal amount of obedience needs to
be considered to contemporary rulers. The Sunnah, shortly
mentioned above, treats rulers’ despotism from a wider realistic point
of view. So, it includes rulers of the first phase, with the possibility of
reaching those of the second one as well. It is hard to prove that the
entire body of numerous obedience traditions, pointing to common
features of corrupt rulership, ought to apply exclusively to rulers of
the first phase. The reason is that those features and proposed
Prophetic remedies for them are absolute in time, and cannot be
restricted to a certain period of history without reliable evidence.[862]
Further, as repeatedly stated, from a rational and realistic point of
view, this obedience is essential for keeping order and stability,
which are in turn indispensable for pursuing and serving basic
human needs. So, if we refuse to obey the legitimate and socially
approved orders of those leaders, it is likely to be read as a
forerunner of mutiny and insurgency, and consequently, the prospect
of civil war looms large. It is a sort of obedience generated by an
extreme emergency, not by love or respect,[863] similar to obeying
someone who pointed a gun at your head. Appropriately, it is the
obedience of al-luṣūṣ al-mutaghallibah (the dominant thieves), as
coined by al-Zamakhsharī.[864]
Figure 6.6: Obedience to contemporary leaders.
Figure 6.7: The three-level obedience.
 Contextualizing the Armed Rebellion
The discussion below evaluates al-Būṭī’s argument over al-kufr al-
bawāḥ (blatant disbelief), and the jurists' consensus on the
prohibition of rebellion. Then the discussion further throws light on
the preconditions (social and geo-political circumstances) for
rebellion, in particular the contemporary one. Finally, viable
alternatives to rebellion are offered.
Issues of Disbelief and Consensus
As mentioned in the previous chapter, al-Būṭī forbids rebellion
against evil-doing Muslim rulers, except in case of blatant disbelief.
This is the instruction of the reliable tradition that says, “Illā an taraw
kufran bawāḥan” (unless you have seen clear disbelief).[865] Quoting
al-Nawawī, al-Būṭī affirms jurists' unanimous agreement about this
matter.[866]
Al-Būṭī seems to be selective in the way he presents this
controversial legal issue, with the impression that the Muslim jurists
ultimately accepted quietism and rejected any right to take up arms
against corrupt rulers. Actually, earlier jurists have different
approaches to the treatment of rebellion in Islamic law. While some
scholars generally allow mounting a military coup against deviant
rulers (whether reaching the level of kufr or not), others restrict it to a
situation when the ruler has gone to extreme deviation from the
norms of sharia.[867] A third party, held by the majority of ulema, finds
it mandatory to militarily depose the ruler only in case of displaying
clear and definite disbelief.[868]
Additionally, the word kufr in the tradition “Illā an taraw kufran
bawāḥan” means either “disbelief,” or “disobedience.”[869] One of the
tradition variant narrations clearly refers to the second interpretation
with the word ma‘ṣiyatan in place of kufran.[870] Of course, al-Būṭī
made no reference to this interpretation, which allows the revolt
against the ruler who committed acts of disobedience and did not go
as far as the stage of kufr. This is on the one hand.
On the other hand, al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ argues that Abū Bakr ibn
Mujāhid, a celebrated expert on the art of variant readings of the
Qur’an, is believed to be the first one who claimed a consensus
among ulema on the prohibition of armed rebellion against unjust
rulers.[871] This claim does not seem to be based on a firm ground.
How can we then understand the early rebellions of the Companions
(e.g. al-Ḥusayn, and ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr)[872] and jurists (e.g. a
considerable number of jurists participated in the revolt led by ‘Abd
al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ash‘ath against al-Ḥajjāj)?[873]
Similarly, Abū Ḥanīfah, the founder of Ḥanafī school, permitted
the revolt against rulers who lacked the quality of justice, and
therefore morally supported the revolt led by Zayd ibn ‘Alī ibn al-
Ḥusayn against the Umayyads in 122 AH, and the later one led by
Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah, against the Abbasids in 143 AH.[874]
In this regard, al-Awzā‘ī says, “We have tolerated Abū Ḥanīfah as to
every matter except [his opinion on] the sword.”[875]
In 145 AH, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan, known as al-
Nafs al-Zakiyyah, led a rebellion in Medina. Malik b. Anas, the
famous founder of the school, was asked about the legality of giving
the bay‘ah (pledge of allegiance) to al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah. He
responded that it was legal because the bay‘ah given to the caliph
al-Manṣūr was obtained under duress and therefore was invalid.[876]
Furthermore, as will be noted later in the chapter,[877]
jurisprudential texts of the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools on the issue of
baghy clearly state that acts of injustice from the part of imam may
account for an armed rebellion against him. So, such historical
practices and juristic opinions easily break Ibn Mujāhid’s assumed
consensus.
Prerequisites for Rebellion
Whatever legal position on rebellion is taken, special attention must
be devoted to the fact that the rebels must acquire sufficient force to
stage all-out rebellion against the ruler without creating fitnah,[878] and
carefully consider the present vs the expected harm.[879] If the latter is
assumed to outweigh the former, then the revolt is not permitted.
Anything less than properly armed and fully supported revolt would
be a reckless move. This judgment is well captured in “the lesser of
the two evils” principle.
 Khaled Abou El Fadl aptly notes that Muslim jurists argue that
order and stability are primary functional values, without which it
would not be possible to fulfill any other value. From a pragmatic and
functional perspective, order and stability and the avoidance of fitan
are prerequisites for the pursuit of higher moral values.[880] Therefore,
if order and stability are often feared to be disrupted or eliminated by
rebellion, then the status quo, though repugnant, should be
maintained. This political realism of sharia is well-embodied in a
famous statement attributed to ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ that goes, “An
oppressive ruler is better than ceaseless sedition.”[881] Nevertheless,
this historical maxim, derived from a Prophetic report,[882] does not
negate rebellion all together, as it may appear to be. If rebellion on
an evil and amoral government is believed to possibly achieve
success with socio-political-military calculations are considered, then
it is allowed and even obligatory, as noted by eminent jurists like al-
Ḥulaymī,[883] and al-Dāwūdī.[884]
Furthermore, Ibn Khaldūn in his Muqaddimah[885] refers to the
concept of ‘aṣabiyyah[886] as a necessary vehicle for social change.
[887]
This force, he remarks, is indicated in the Prophetic tradition
“God sent no prophet who did not enjoy the protection of his
people.”[888] He argues that if prophets, who are the most likely to
perform miracles, need ‘aṣabiyyah, then, a fortiori, it is to be
stipulated for ordinary people.[889]
Ibn Khaldūn noted cases in history when aspiring revolutionaries
and jurists who, out of religious zeal to reform the evil, rallied
tribesmen around them and undertook a revolt against unjust emirs.
Underestimating or ignoring the significance of ‘aṣabiyyah, they
ended up either defeated or killed together with their followers and
sympathizers.[890]
Rulers and dynasties are strongly entrenched. Their
foundations can be undermined and destroyed only
through strong efforts backed by the group feeling of tribes
and families, as we have mentioned before. Similarly,
prophets in their religious propaganda depended on
groups and families, though they were the ones who could
have been supported by God with anything in existence, if
 He had wished, but in His wisdom He permitted matters to
take their customary course.[891]
Ibn Khaldūn’s message foretells the religious revolution against
injustice is doomed to failure if not backed by ‘aṣabiyyah.
Contemporary Rebellion
Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, the renowned Islamist thinker, puts Khaldūn’s
‘aṣabiyyah in a contemporary socio-political context in his book al-
Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah wa mas’alat al-taghyīr (The Islamist
Movement and the Question of Change).[892] He argues that prior to
taking military action against corrupt governments, revolutionary
Islamist movements must be well-aware of the social and political
ramifications and whether the environment is ripe for change.[893] This
awareness is better illustrated with the following fundamental
questions: To what extent are people ready to sacrifice and
participate in the rebellion? To what extent have they lost faith in the
ruler? What is the degree of their reaction to the movement’s
alternative project? Are the living standards very low? Does the
geographical position of the country provide protection to the
revolutionaries?[894] Are there any social forces (tribesmen, sects,
parties, syndicates etc.) which may join the revolution? What is the
likelihood of foreign military intervention to support the regime? Are
there regional or international forces which might create an alliance
with the movement?[895]
Al-Ghannūshī admits that the change equation nowadays seems
burdensome. The reason is simple; we live in an era of globalization
where regional system became intimately related to the international
community, which is governed by foreign forces. These forces are, of
course, unsympathetic to Islam.[896]
Furthermore, al-Ghannūshī makes special reference to the
significance of the principle of commanding the right and forbidding
the evil and how to extend its simple form (to speak out against the
unjust ruler) to more elaborated ones, like protest petitions,
demonstrations, general strikes, a boycott of corrupt institutions, tax
resistance etc. This kind of “peaceful jihad,”[897] still immature among
Muslims, is similar to Gandhi’s nonviolent strategy, by which he was
able to overcome the most ferocious empires of his time.[898]
 To elaborate a little on the efficacy of “peaceful jihad” it is useful
to note that nonviolent resistance methods offer a better alternative
to violent methods in achieving strategic objectives.[899] On the one
hand, commitment to nonviolent methods enhances its domestic and
international legitimacy and encourages more wide-ranging
participation in the resistance. On the other hand, government
violence against nonviolent movements is more likely to backfire
against the government.[900]
Stephen Zunes, professor of Politics and International Studies at
the University of San Francisco, gives perceptive remarks on the
merit of non-violent resistance in his article about the conflict in
Syria.[901] First, he argues that historically speaking, when a peaceful
movement resorts to violence, it is because of frustration, anger, or
the feeling of hopelessness. And it is rarely done as a clear strategic
choice. If armed resistance is organized in a strategic way, then it is
a big mistake. The reason, according to Zunes, is that successful
armed revolutions have historically taken a longer time to bring down
dictator regimes than unarmed civil insurrections.[902]
Then he goes on explaining that clinging to peaceful means
increases the moral strength of accommodating opposition to win
people to its side. He says, “The chances of bringing down Assad
will be greatly enhanced if Syrians are forced to choose not between
two savage forces, but between a repressive regime and more
inclusive representative movement.”[903]
More importantly, Zunes identifies two limitations as regards the
armed struggle: decreasing the number of participants in the
opposition, since most citizens are unwilling to risk their lives, and
playing to the strength of an authoritarian regime, which commands
the arena of military force.[904]
Regrettably, as far as the Syrian revolution is concerned, the
above invaluable insights have been consigned to oblivion. From the
very beginning, rebels and fighters lacked unity, strategic vision and
a clear command structure,[905] as well as appropriate and enough
weapons vs the regime’s tanks and heavy weaponry, with the aid of
Iran and Hizbullah, Russia and China. Instead of unifying and
focusing on al-Assad’s regime, they were competing for each other
holding varied opinions and agendas, similar to their patrons: Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the U.A.E., Turkey and other regional states,
all have different visions for the opposition and support different
factions.[906]
Opposition parties in exile, unable to create a strong
organizational capacity, suffer from various ethnic, religious, and
socioeconomic divisions.[907] By contrast, the regime was able to
mobilize crushing military force and proved resilient.
Finally, the Israel’s predetermined effort, backed by the U.S. and
the international community, to divide Syria into small entities with
ethnic and religious conflicts. After five years of growing violent
conflict, Syria has lapsed into a non-stop, full-scale civil war with an
indescribable humanitarian crisis.[908]
I must point out here the observable fact that the turmoil is, and
ought to be, the dual responsibility of the regime and the opposition,
with, however, the former having the lion’s share. A little
acquaintance with immediate causes of the Syrian revolution[909]
suffices to point the finger of suspicion to the regime as the key
driver and motivator of rebellion.
For instance, The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was established in
late-July 2011 with the aim of protecting peaceful demonstrations
and also creating armed resistance against al-Assad’s army and
security forces.[910]
A leader of one FSA group active across northern Syria says,
“Picking up guns was not what we had in mind when we first took to
the streets. But we were being slaughtered like lambs simply for
peacefully protesting, what choice did we have? I myself saw two
children no older than six die in front of my eyes. First, we had to
protect our people and second, we realized the regime was not
backing down. We had to commit to the next step.”[911]
 The Term Fitnah Reconsidered
Fitnah, intimately related to anarchy, chaos, and upheaval, is
strongly condemned in multiple Prophetic traditions. According to
these traditions, Muslims, during fitnah, should refrain from
participating or supporting any of the contending parties. Instead,
they are counseled to manage their own mundane and religious
affairs.[912] Is this non-involvement policy required in all fighting
cases? And should the “remain silent” or “stand aloof” order be
understood in an absolute sense?
Fitnah Definition
The primary signification of the verb fatana is “to melt gold or silver
with fire to purify it.”[913] Then it was extended to mean “to put to the
test, to afflict (in particular as a means of testing someone's
endurance); to disrupt the peace of a community; to tempt, to
seduce, to allure, to infatuate.”[914] Thus, one says that something
caused one to enter fitnah, generally meaning an affliction whereby
some good or evil quality is put to the test.[915] Remarkably, fitnah in
English dictionaries is narrowly defined as “a state of trouble or
chaos”[916] and “rebellion, especially against a rightful ruler.”[917]
According to the broad Arabic definition, scores of mundane
temptations are held as sources of fitnah, such as money, women,
offspring, sickness, health and power. Whatever happens to people
in this life, whether good or bad, is meant to be a sort of test (Qur’an,
al-Baqarah: 155; al-Anbiyā’: 35).[918] At a specific level, however,
what fitnah traditions, in hadith literature and the language of hadith
scholars, refer to is illegitimate fighting or conflict that is bound, to
create social chaos and political disorder, resulting in the
indiscriminate killing of Muslims.
Al-Bukhārī, for example, under Kitāb al-fitan (Book of al-Fitan),
narrates a collection of traditions that create a close link between
fitnah and harj (civil war, conflict, and massacres) ultimately
rendering both the terms synonymous.[919] In addition, al-Bukhārī
cites other traditions which averts Muslims from fitnah or harj, such
as to obey corrupt rulers and maintain patience with them,[920]
Muslims should not take up arms (without just cause),[921] or fight
against each other.[922] “Selling weapons during fitnah” (i.e. fighting)
is one of the frequently discussed topics in books of hadith and
Islamic law.[923]
Fitnah-creating Fighting
The fitnah-creating fighting that Muslims must avoid is applicable to
different cases: When the party of right or legitimate cause becomes
indistinguishable from that of the wrong one;[924] when parties illegally
fight for power with the absence of a leader;[925] when those engaged
in war do not know the motive for fighting;[926] when conflicting parties
are unjust with no credible religious interpretation;[927] when war is
mainly driven by tribalism, whim, or any worldly reason;[928] rebellion
against a just ruler or a corrupt one with the likelihood of creating
more chaos and bloodshed.[929]
However, to remain silent or stay indoors is meant to be taken in
a relative rather than absolute sense. As al-Ṭabarī correctly
observes, if [good] Muslims were required to stand aloof during
discord, then the corrupt would benefit from this state of quietness
and passivity by usurping others’ property and shedding their blood.
[930]

Jurists and scholars of hadith argue that it is permitted to

participate in fighting to support the rightful party if recognized.[931]
Also, fighting between two Muslim parties on the basis of a justified
legal cause coming out of their ijtihad, does not violate the tradition
that prohibits intra-Muslim wars.[932]
No doubt that the ulema have tremendous responsibilities in
times of crisis. They are required to raise their voice against injustice
and corruption, whether committed by the ruler or subjects, in
fulfilment of the duty of commanding the right and forbidding the evil.
They also need to clarify to ordinary confused people points of
ambiguity making distinct the right from the wrong. Ḥudhayfah ibn al-
Yamān is quoted as saying, “Fitnah does not harm you as long as
you know about your religion. It is fitnah when the distinction
between the right and the wrong is blurred, and you do not know
which one to follow; that is the fitnah.”[933]
 Of course, those who feel that they are likely to fall prey to the
fitnah trap, whether educated or lay people, must abstain from all
sorts of activities and practices that may aggravate the social and
political tensions. Also, there are various degrees of avoiding al-
fitnah; each suits a particular case.[934] Therefore, the opinion that
holds fitnah-abandoning traditions applicable to all circumstances
seems hardly convincing.[935]
On the other hand, it is completely disallowed, according to the
vast majority of jurists, to fight with or against any of the clashing
parties, as this participation will certainly add fuel to the flames of
fitnah.[936] A substantial body of hadith reports lay a particular
emphasis on the physical absence from the battlefield of fitnah-
creating fights.[937] However, one is allowed, if attacked, to fight in
self-defense.[938]
Fitnah in the Syrian Context
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, the dilemma Syria
has been going through for eight years is indeed a pernicious fitnah
that ushered in countless multileveled fitan. First, the Syrian
predicament is heralded in a hadith report referring it as fitnah that
would break out as a result of boys’ playful doing.[939] Second, the
fitnah of Syria has proved to be the mother of all fitan covering the
various above meanings: trials, affliction, disruption, temptation,
distress and hardship.
All Syrians have been subject to raging tests and trials that
appear distinctly and vividly in the dichotomous relationship between
pro-regime/anti-regime demonstrators, civilians/the military, the
regime/the opposition, victims/victimizers, the innocent/the guilty,
local media/foreign media and ulema/lay people. Foremost among
the fallouts of fitnah are, the catastrophic harm and collateral
damage; the transformation of Syria into a bloody battlefield by major
global players; the intrusion of extreme, and fanatic religious thought
with adherents who have committed horrendous massacres; the
deep schism shattering one single entity or group (the regime, the
opposition, ulema, family, friends etc.), bewilderment caused by the
lies and half-truths of thousands of footages, pictures and reports of
the mass media (national and international) that ultimately cast the
ill-informed viewers into a wilderness of confusion and perplexity;[940]
the substantial number of casualties, prisoners, and refugees, due to
the fitnah-fighting between two logistically and militarily unequal
forces; a vast array of sycophants, war and rumor-mongers, criminal
gangs, such as kidnappers, robbers etc., to mention but a few.
However, there are intellectuals who flatly refuse to name what is
happening in Syria as fitnah. According to them, fitnah exists when
the right and the wrong are indistinguishable. Once the fog has
cleared, and the truth becomes clear there is no longer fitnah.
Although generally true, it is a narrow interpretation constituting only
one thread of the broader concept of fitnah as analyzed above. On
the other hand, a differing opinion persists on fitnah to ensure
complete distraction and non-involvement in the war. To stake a
middle ground, men of learning, competence and prudence, while
conscious of fitnah, need to actively work on taking apart its
components, through adhering to the truth, warning from acts of evil,
counseling all parties and the like.
Fitnah and Tyranny
Political authority, noted earlier, is named “the guardian state”
because it is assumed to establish security and stability at home,
and protects subjects from foreign assaults.[941] Yet, if the authority
chooses to make a deal with the devil, it deserves the name of “the
rogue state.”
In fact, political tyranny is the crucial factor, which breeds fitnah
and maintains its endurance. Today’s Arab uprisings have naturally
resulted from many years of widespread, systematic injustice, social
inequality, religious persecution etc. carried out by present regimes
and their security forces.[942]
In Syria, for example, during the first four months, there was
neither armed revolt, as admitted by Bashar al-Assad himself,[943] nor
calls for overthrowing the regime; only demands for more freedom,
dignity, social reform etc.[944]
Yet, at the outset, the security forces, supported by the
Shabbīḥah militia,[945] cracked down violently on the increasing
number of defenseless demonstrators across the country.[946] “The
funerals of murdered demonstrators became a focal point for further
protests and, when people were killed in those demonstrations, a
snowball effect took place.”[947] In addition, the Syrian regime was
initially backed by Lebanon’s Shia Hizbullah, whose fighters were
providing important battlefield support.[948] Undoubtedly, the regime’s
savage brutality forced protestors to pull the trigger and to shift from
calls for reform and freedom to demands for bringing down al-
Assad’s regime, leading ultimately to an indescribably destructive
fitnah.
As far as rebellion discourse is concerned, ulema should be
aware of this dual responsibility. That is, they need to cite obedience
traditions to calm down the former, but, at the same time, they have
to sternly warn the latter about the fatal consequences of their
barbarous behavior on the basis of commanding the right and
forbidding the evil, from its mildest model to its harshest one.
Centuries ago, Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, the leading Ḥanafī jurist and
the Qur’an commentator, was very critical of ulema who, adopting a
shortsighted strategy, named the principle of “commanding the right
and forbidding the evil” as fitnah, if it involves holding weapons. They
also claimed the Sultan cannot be condemned if he commits acts of
injustice, and kills innocent people.[949] On account of forsaking this
fundamental principle, ungodly men, even Magi and enemies of
Islam, dominated, fortified borderline cities were gone, injustice
prevailed, territories destroyed etc.[950]
Wittingly or unwittingly, al-Būṭī used to devote a substantial
amount of his discourse to issues that largely rest with “people”
alone rather than with people and the regime together. He spoke of a
foreign conspiracy which will break up the national unity via peaceful
demonstrations; jihadists are fighting under anonymous flags, and
this type of fight is condemned by the Prophet (ṣ); indiscriminate
attacks by fanatic religious groups; armed rebellion against evil-
doing Muslim rulers is prohibited to avoid bloodshed and upheaval;
reform begins with the grass roots upward to leaders; people are
required to keep indoors and not participate in protests; the purity of
Syrian soil has been tainted with tiding waves of Salafi-puritan
thought. In contrast, he hardly accused the Syrian government of
spawning the cycle of violence.
 Al-Būṭī’s imbalanced discourse, politically manipulated by the
Syrian government, was treating fitnah and seeking to uproot its
causes from one side of the coin. He advised that demonstrators go
back home, rebellion be halted and rebels lay down their arms,
reform is bottom-up and so on, without involving the regime as the
actual major player in this dirty political game.
The real fitnah then is the one that is born out of the
practices of repressive regimes: killing, terrorization,
intimidation, kidnapping, arresting, and torture. It is not
fitting in sharia to have things mixed and hold people
responsible for that which they neither did, said, nor
accepted. We have to attribute fitnah to its real
perpetrators and makers.[951]
Therefore, popular protests and demonstrations of the Arab
Spring are not considered fitnah as much as a by-product of
decades of bloody tyranny and oppression. Many ulema nowadays
are forcibly employing the religious obedience to block avenues of
fitnah. Rather, the avoidance of fitnah should be primarily sought
from promoting the concepts of social justice, freedom, democracy
and political responsibility.
 Fighting Under Anonymous Leadership
Al-Būṭī argues that rebels or jihadists in Syria are fighting under
anonymous flag or leadership and this type of fight is condemned by
the Prophet (ṣ) who is quoted as saying, “Whoever fights taḥta rāyah
‘ummiyyah (under the banner of unknown leadership), and is killed
then his death is similar to that of pre-Islamic ignorance
(jāhiliyyah).”[952] In other words, al-Būṭī means that fighters, following
a path about which they have no knowledge, lack a united
military/strategic command, without a clear vision of their motivating
factor, as well as the identity of the target enemy.
The quoted tradition goes as follows, “Whoever fights under
rāyah ‘ummiyyah (unknown/anonymous flag), raging for the sake of
tribalism, calling to tribalism, or supporting tribalism, and is
killed…”[953] It refers to a specific kind of fight that advocates blind
tribalism or partisanship, without recognizing the right from the
wrong.[954] So, the tradition speaks of a situation that is largely absent
in the Syrian war. This is on one hand.
On the other hand, there exist fighters, local and foreign, who are
fighting on Syrian soil under numerous number of flags driven by
different motivating factors, religious or mundane. (i) There are, for
example, moral soldiers who, unwilling to open fire on defenseless
demonstrators, decided to defect from the army[955] and join the
fledgling Free Syrian Army.[956] (ii) Others were obliged to fight to
defend themselves and their wealth against the assaults of the
regime’s army and its closest allies, Iran and Hizbullah. In both
cases, fighters had been cast to a position of self-defense, which is
similar, to some extent, to daf‘ al-ṣā’il (repelling the assailant).
(iii) A broad range of insurgents, reflecting the varied socio-
religious background of Syrians, rose in revolt against Bashar al-
Assad, who, according to them, has been found fāsiq (corrupt and
unjust) at best or kāfir (disbeliever) at worst and hence no longer a
legitimate ruler.
In this case, the fight relies on a plausible religious interpretation,
and those involved in it cannot be condemned as combating under a
blind flag or leadership. From a legal point of view, baghy (rebellion)
is defined as to rise in revolt against a just ruler with no justifiable
religious cause. If there exists, however, a relative moral claim to
take up arms or, alternatively, the ruler is deemed evil, like al-Assad,
then the both cases do not fall into the category of baghy, and those
involved in fighting are not assuming the role of bughāh.[957]
Ibn Nujaym, a leading Ḥanafī jurist, writes, “If they (revolts)
explain a legitimate cause for fighting (e.g. the imam has been
doubtless unjust to them or to others), then they are not bughāh. [In
such case], the imam should not be aided against them, even
Muslims have to support this group until he does justice to them.”[958]
It is quite clear, from the text and other similar ones in Ḥanafī and
Mālikī schools,[959] that acts of injustice from the part of imam may
account for an armed rebellion against him. Therefore, one may infer
that such legal view of jurists, under the issue of baghy, marks a
departure from the prevalent discourse stating that armed revolt
cannot be mounted against a morally bad or evil ruler.[960]
Additionally, as the state security apparatus began increasing
violent attacks to suppress dissent, this allowed for numerous Sunni
jihadi factions to operate in Syria, such as ISIS[961] and Jabhat al-
Nuṣrah,[962] Katā’ib Aḥrar al-Shām,[963] Suqūr al-Shām[964] etc. Charles
Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute,[965] estimates that
“by 2015, at least 150,000 insurgents within as many as 1,500
operationally distinct groups were involved in differing levels of
fighting across Syria, some within broader umbrellas and fronts and
other existing entirely independently.”[966]
Reasons for foreign fighters’ participation vary: a significant body
of jihadists decided to join the conflict with their fellow Sunni Syrians
against Iran, Hizbullah and foreign Shia militia, who have been
playing an active role in providing training, advice and fighting side
by side with al-Assad regime.[967] Many are simply young
revolutionaries from the region who have been caught up in the spirit
of the Arab Spring. They participated in successful revolutions in
their own countries and are now looking to help their Syrian
counterparts succeed.[968] On the other hand, a great number of
foreign fighters came to Syria with a view to establishing the Islamic
State or the caliphate.[969] Other prospective jihadists infiltrated into
Syria as a result of its prophesied place in Islamic apocalyptic
discourse.[970] There are also foreign elements operating in Syria with
no clear rationale for their jihad.[971]
The ideology of the myriad armed groups, Syrian and foreign, is
driven by Islamist, Salafi, as well as secular and nationalist
orientation reflecting the two ends of the spectrum.[972] Obviously, on
the basis of the above categorizations, not all fighters are operating
under anonymous leadership or lacking insight about the cause of
their fighting, contrary to al-Būṭī’s claim. While a multitude of
insurgents were fighting out of self-defense, many foreign jihadists
came to protect Sunnis from the Shias’ atrocities. The flag here, far
from anonymous, is to defend one’s honor, property, and, more
importantly, the life of fellow Sunni Muslims.
ARGUMENT EVALUATION EXPLANATION
1. Foreign conspiracy will Valid in theory It is true that there exists a conspiracy
break up the national unity theory masterminding some of those
of Syria via peaceful protests; however, the regime has proved
demonstrations. Thus, on to be a major player in it. The regime’s
the basis of sadd al-dharā’i‘, ferocious repression has allowed to a
demonstrations are not brutal, protracted war mixing regional
allowed. power struggles and sectarian hatred.
Both sides should assume responsibility
with the regime having the lion’s share.
2. Armed rebellion against Valid This is the opinion of the vast majority of
evil-doing Muslim ruler is scholars.
prohibited, to avoid
bloodshed and upheaval.

3. Quoting al-Nawawī, al- Controversial Earlier jurists have different approaches

Būṭī affirms a unanimous to the treatment of rebellion.
agreement among ulema
about the prohibition of
armed rebellion.
ARGUMENT
4. Jihadists are fighting
under anonymous flags
without a clear vision of their
motivating factor. The
Prophet (ṣ) disall-owed such
fighting.
5. What is happening in
Syria is fitnah. And
according to many hadith
reports, Muslims, during
fitnah, should refrain from
participating or supporting
any of the contending
parties.
Instead, they are counseled
to manage their own affairs
and undertake self-reform.
6. Bashar al-Assad is one of
ulū al-amr.
7. According to al-Būṭī, calls
for reformation should
address both sides: grass
roots and leaders. Also,
reforms should come from
within the Muslim
community (not a response
to foreign requests) and be
implemented via civilized
avenues rather than street
protests.
8. After the outbreak of the
revolution, al-Būṭī used to
criticize the opposition
publicly and the regime
privately. His justification is
to not aggravate the
situation.
EVALUATION EXPLANATION
Partly valid Al-Būṭī’s perception may apply to certain
categories of fighting. Actually, there exist
fighters, local and foreign, who are
fighting on Syrian soil under numerous
number of flags driven by different
motivating factors, religious or mundane.
While some fighters, for example, are
cast to a position of self-defense (similar
to daf‘ al-sā’il), others rely on a plausible
religious interpretation. In both cases,
they cannot be condemned as combating
under blind flags or lacking a clear vision
of what they are doing.
Inaccurate Al-Būṭī seeks to uproot the causes of
diagnosis fitnah from one side of the coin. He
advised that demonstrators go home,
rebellion be halted and rebels lay down
their arms. Reform is bottom-up and so
on, without involving the regime as the
actual creator of fitnah.
Invalid This Qur’anic title of ulū al-amr is granted
to those who have had distinguishing
features, with particular reference to
fulfilling justice. It can never apply to
dictators, and morally corrupt leaders.
Untenable With the government’s continued policy of
bloodshed and brutal crackdown, people
in the street will not be convinced by any
reform initiatives. Post-revolution reforms
are meant to send messages, conciliatory
in tone.
Naive position Given the regime’s early violent
crackdown on peaceful protestors;
military intervention of Iran, Hizbullah,
and Russia (the regime’s strategic allies);
as well as the regime’s indifference to all
political solutions, al-Būṭī’s justification is
considered bizarre.
Table 6.1: Overall evaluation of al-Būṭī’s argument on the revolution
 Conclusion

I n previous pages, I endeavored to examine and analyze al-Būṭī’s

view on the Syrian revolution of 2011 together with relevant issues
such as how al-Būṭī sees political Islam and why he criticizes
Islamist movements, and explored al-Būṭī’s relationship with the
Syrian regime. Here is a summary of the outcome and main findings
of the study.
First of all, while probing al-Būṭī’s life, character and education, I
found that two inspirational figures left an unmistakable imprint on al-
Būṭī’s intellectual and spiritual life with special reference to his
stance on rebellion and political Islam: (1) Mullah Ramaḍān, al-Būṭī’s
father, who refused to stage an armed rebellion on the ruler and
condemned the manipulation of da‘wah for political ascendency and
(2) Badī‘ al-Zamān Sa‘īd al-Nūrsī, the Kurdish Islamic leader and
thinker, who participated in political action and came out with first-
hand experience. After over two decades of political engagement
and activity, al-Nūrsī in 1921 decided to desert politics altogether and
dedicate the rest of his life to da‘wah instead.

As regards rebellion, al-Nūrsī refused to be one of ulema who

recognized military action against Ataturk. To al-Nūrsī, this armed
revolt would create chaos and sedition, opening the door to massive
bloodshed among innocent Muslims. As we have noted, this
particular mindset of al-Nūrsī has been wholeheartedly echoed by al-
Būṭī, who provided further juristic-historical elaborations.
While exploring al-Būṭī’s discourse on political Islam and
Islamists, the study discovered seven issues directed against
movements in terms of their activities and ideology. Those issues,
after close examination, seem to be well-grounded in the original
Islamic sources, historical experiences of the ummah and realistic
situations of today’s Islamic world. Therefore, the seven issues are
worth being taken as a yardstick against which a clear distinction is
made between extreme and moderate Islamist movements.
The study highlights a point of particular importance concerning
al-Būṭī’s animosity toward setting up an Islamist party. I pointed out
that al-Būṭī’s rationale for this matter has been largely shaped by al-
Nūrsī’s experience, which is, in fact, a product of personal
experience that happened in the 1920s rather than based on
statistical evidence or any data-collection methods. Islamist parties,
the study contends, are a system accredited by Islamic principles,
and a reality imposed by changing circumstances of the Muslim
nation in history, culture, and politics.
Further, the study, under close scrutiny of al-Būṭī’s relationship
with the Ba‘thist regime, concludes that al-Būṭī is more of an
independent scholar than a sycophant or an ally of an autocratic and
secularist regime, irrespective of being right or wrong in his adopted
opinion. This conclusion is line with the result of the interviews. It is
acknowledged even by critics that al-Būṭī, who worked as a mediator
between high-ranking officials in the government and laypeople for
the advantage of the latter, never gained any personal interest.[973]
More crucially, an analysis of the question of “obedience,” the
backbone of al-Būṭī’s argument, came up with the following:
i. “Ulū al-amr” of the obedience verse (Qur’an, al-Nisā’:59) is a
generic term that incorporates all those who have been
vested with authority, be it public or private (rulers, judges,
ulema, muftis etc.), provided that their position of authority is
legally sound and valid. This term is identified with three
distinguishing features: fulfillment of trust, maintaining justice,
and referring to Allah and His Messenger (ṣ) as regards
disputable matters. Therefore, the obedience of ulū al-amr in
the Qur’anic perception has to be understood in the context
of justice, fulfilling trusts, in addition to admitting sovereignty
as belonging to Allah alone, and implementing the guidance
of His Messenger (ṣ).
 ii. From a rational and realistic perspective, the obedience of
corrupt or tyrant rulers is similar to an emergency procedure
that aims to uphold order and stability in the Muslim society,
both indispensable for pursuing and serving basic human
needs. The despotism of the ruler, viewed as a fait accompli,
is ought to be endured, and obedience given until the time is
ripe for change. “Obedience,” however, is conditional and
contextual, the rights of the ruler versus the rights of people,
the ruler is held responsible to the ummah, which has the
right to question him according to the principle of
commanding the right and forbidding the evil.
iii. The practical attitude of ulema toward authoritarian political
authority is not only of “obedience and patience” but also of
“opposition and resistance.” The position of disobedience
covers a variety of postures representing the opposite ends of
the spectrum.
iv. Given the steady moral decline in different aspects of human
life, especially in the political sphere, Prophetic traditions,
putting obedience in a wider realistic perspective, offer
Muslims as varied cures and remedies as possible to cope
with coming powers lying outside the narrow scope of the
obedience verse. So, while the Qur’an slams the door of
obedience in faces of morally corrupt rulers, the Sunnah
keeps it wide open, treating different cases of political power
ranging from the pure image of the caliphate to different
levels of adulterated rulership.
v. From a pragmatic and functional perspective, order and
stability and the avoidance of fitan are prerequisites for the
pursuit of higher moral values. Therefore, if these are often
feared to be disrupted or eliminated by rebellion, then the
status quo, though repugnant, should be maintained. This
political realism of sharia is well-embodied in a famous
statement attributed to ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ that goes, “An
oppressive ruler is better than ceaseless sedition.”[974]
Revolution is easy to begin but very hard to stop. Thus, we
must ensure it achieves its goals of freedom, justice, dignity,
 and equality. As Nelson Mandela said, “Revolution is not just
a question of pulling a trigger; its purpose is to create a fair
and just society.”[975]
A point of considerable significance has to be considered by
contemporary revolutionaries before taking any action: the concept
of “militarization.” It is a process which involves militarization of all
state resources (economy, army, security, the media etc.). This is
one of the strategic tactics of autocratic leaders in order to
consolidate their power and maintain hegemony over the society.
When the angry masses rise in revolt, they find themselves in an
encounter with all these militarized apparatuses.[976] This is
appropriately applicable to the Syrian case. Syria is known to be a
mukhābarāt state, where security agencies, in conjugation with
trusted elements of the military, has dominance in controlling people
and in defending the regime against perceived threats, internal and
external. Unfortunately, rebels never failed to consider this critical
point.
There are modern peaceful means and mechanisms of how to
deal with autocratic governments and rulers, like constitutional
insulation and non-violent popular pressure: peaceful
demonstrations, pressure groups, civil disobedience etc. In addition,
special attention must be drawn to the impact of the Internet and
other social networks in mobilizing non-violent public support to bring
down dictator governments. In the Tunisian and Egyptian case, the
formidable role of private corporations such as Google, Yahoo,
Facebook, and Twitter cannot be underestimated.
In my opinion, such a variety of procedures stand as a viable
alternative to the dichotomy between absolute obedience to the ruler
and armed rebellion; two options proved not to be workable
anymore.
Figure 7.1: How to handle contemporary corrupt rulers.
 Shortcomings of al-Būṭī’s Discourse on the Revolution
It is perfectly understood that al-Būṭī banned peaceful
demonstrations[977] and closed the door of armed rebellion for fear of
the outburst of pernicious sedition that would ultimately shatter Syria
into small sectarian states. As later events have revealed, the
horrible scenario[978] (with its three phases) which al-Būṭī had been
warning about proved to be true. At the time of writing this chapter
(June 15, 2017), the third phase of the scenario (dividing Syria into
five smaller sectarianist states), became a recurrent theme at the
negotiation table. The study, nevertheless, has discovered particular
points of view in al-Būṭī’s discourse which have been found lacking
in balanced treatment and convincing arguments.
1. In the manner of numerous religious scholars of Syria, al-
Būṭī repeatedly spoke of the necessary obedience to the
ruler (referring to Bashar al-Assad) citing the obedience
verse and traditions. Yet, as pointed out by the study, al-
Assad, and like-minded presidents, is anything but our ulū
al-amr. The criminal and corrupt nationalist, Communist, or
secular rulers of today who fail to recognize distinguishing
features specified by the Qur’an are not, and cannot be,
subsumed under the category of ulū al-amr. Instead, their
appropriate epithet is al-luṣūṣ al-mutaghallibah (the
dominant thieves).
I reiterate that a minimal amount of obedience to
contemporary leaders needs to be considered. Why? As
repeatedly stated, from a rational and realistic point of view,
this obedience is essential for keeping order and stability,
which are in turn indispensable for pursuing and serving
basic human needs. So, if we refuse to obey the legitimate
and socially approved orders of those leaders, it is likely to
be read as a forerunner of mutiny and insurgency, and
consequently, the prospect of civil war looms large. It is
obedience generated by emergency, not by love or respect,
similar to obeying someone pointing a gun at your head.
2. Al-Būṭī, wittingly or unwittingly, used to devote a substantial
amount of his discourse to issues that largely rest with
“people” alone rather than with people and the regime
together. He spoke of a foreign conspiracy which would be
determined to sow discord via peaceful demonstrations;
jihadists fighting under an anonymous flag, and this type of
fight being condemned by the Prophet (ṣ); indiscriminate
attacks by fanatic religious groups; armed rebellion against
evil-doing Muslim rulers being prohibited to avoid bloodshed
and upheaval; reform beginning with the grass roots upward
to leaders; people being required to keep indoors and not
participate in protests; the purity of Syrian soil having been
tainted with tiding waves of Salafi-puritan thought. In
contrast, he hardly in public accused the Syrian government
of spawning the cycle of violence.
3. In treating fitnah, al-Būṭī sought to uproot its causes from
one side of the coin. He advised that demonstrators go back
home, rebellion be halted and rebels lay down their arms,
reform is bottom-up and so on, without involving the regime
as the actual major player in this dirty political game.
4. Al-Būṭī argued that rebels or jihadists in Syria are fighting
under an anonymous flag or leadership and this type of
fighting is condemned by the Prophet (ṣ). On the one hand,
the tradition, misquoted by al-Būṭī, refers to a specific kind of
fighting that advocates blind tribalism or partisanship, without
recognizing right from wrong. So, the tradition speaks of a
situation that is largely absent in the Syrian war. On the other
hand, not all fighters, local and foreigners, are operating
under anonymous leadership. While a multitude of
insurgents was fighting out of self-defense, many foreign
jihadists came to protect Sunnis from the Shias' atrocities.
The flag here, far from anonymous, is to defend one’s honor,
property, and, more importantly, the life of one’s Muslim
brother. A third type is made up from a broad range of
insurgents who rose in revolt against Bashar al-Assad, who
is considered as either a fāsiq (corrupt and unjust) at best or
 a kāfir (disbeliever) at worst and hence no longer a
legitimate ruler. In these above cases, particularly the last
category, the fight relies on a plausible religious
interpretation, and those involved in it cannot be condemned
as combating under a blind flag or leadership.
5. For two years up to his assassination in 2013, al-Būṭī used
to criticize the opposition publicly and the regime privately,
which is indicative of unbalanced handling of the crisis.
Justifying his position, he said, "Before the revolution, I used
to criticize the regime publicly. If I do the same now, it is
likely to add more fuel to the already sensitive and critical
situation Syria is going through; that is, this public criticism of
the regime will cause more public agitation which in turn will
lead to more casualties.”[979] This reason is reminiscent of the
proverb “An excuse is sometimes uglier than guilt.” Given
the regime’s early violent crackdown on peaceful protestors,
military intervention of Iran, Hizbullah and Russia (the
regime’s strategic allies), as well as the regime’s indifference
to all political solutions, al-Būṭī’s justification is absolutely
bizarre.
6. Finally, al-Būṭī, throughout his Friday sermons and lectures,
made shortsighted statements which reflect a naïve
understanding of the cunning nature of politics. Certainly, the
regime has exploited these statements to the maximum. For
instance, in a Friday sermon, al-Būṭī announced the death of
the Organization of Islamic Countries due to its passive role
in the Syrian crisis and surprisingly claimed that both Russia
and China are now the heirs of this dead organization
because of their active support to Syria!
Therefore, ulema have to be well-aware of various aspects of
political manipulation, overt and covert. Truly, if you do not know evil,
you are likely to fall prey to it. As the famous Arabic verse goes,
‫ﺷ ِ ّر ﻟَ ِﻛ ْن ِﻟﺗ َ َوﻗّﯾ ِﮫ‬
ّ ‫اﻟﺷر ﻻ ِﻟﻠ‬
‫ﱠ‬ ُ‫ﻋ َر ْﻓت‬
َ
I recognize evil not for the sake of it but rather to avoid it.
‫اﻟﻧﺎس ﯾﻘَ ْﻊ ﻓﯾ ِﮫ‬
ِ َ‫اﻟﺷر ﻣن‬
‫ﱠ‬ ِ ‫َو َﻣ ْن ﻟَ ْم ﯾَ ْﻌ ِر‬
‫ف‬
Whoever does not recognize evil will fall into it.
 Suggestions and Further Studies
1. The research has briefly studied al-Būṭī’s seven issues with
Islamists. It is recommended to undertake a thorough
research based on this preliminary study. Every issue is
worth a single research that, besides examining its religious
premises, relates it to the discourse and the current status
quo of contemporary Islamist movements/parties across the
Islamic world.
2. It is recognized that fatwas are subject to change and
modification depending on several determining elements
(like time, locality, situation, custom, and intention). The mufti
(jurisconsult), prior to issuing any particular fatwa, must
carefully and wholly consider the circumstances surrounding
it.[980]
As I said elsewhere, a “fatwa is not like an iron garment that
everyone, in all times and places, has to wear, be it fitting or
not. It is rather made of elastic materials, so to speak, so as
to fit each individual alone, and to respond to every single
problem with its particular dimensions.”[981] Since that is so, a
rebellion which is allowed in a state could be disallowed
elsewhere due to different variable and invariable factors.
Therefore, I believe that contemporary rebellion should be
examined as case studies. Each particular country is given
careful consideration of multiple socio-economic and political
factors: What kind of injustice is befalling people? How are
revolutionaries going to confront the ruler? To what extent
are people ready to sacrifice and participate in the rebellion?
To what extent have they lost faith in the ruler? Are people's
living standards very low? Does the geographical position of
the country provide protection to the revolutionaries? Are
there any social forces (tribesmen, sects, parties, syndicates
etc.) which may join the revolution or side with the regime?
What is the likelihood of foreign military intervention to
support the regime? Are there regional or international
 forces which might create an alliance with the regime? What
are the potential consequences of the rebellion?
3. I suggest an in-depth research which studies the correlation
between the concept of fitnah (sedition), and political
obedience on the basis of traditional juristic and hadith
sources as well as the historical experience of the ummah,
past and present. It is extremely important to shed light on
how tyranny operates as a basic source breeding fitnah and
maintaining its durability, as can be easily noticed in today’s
Arab uprisings.
4. With the initial uprising in Syria, the Ministry of Awqāf was
required to undertake an immediate and formidable task: to
foil or manage protests launching from mosques following
Friday sermon, marshal the ministry’s full forces and sources
to implement the official rhetoric of the government and
debunk the argument of the opposition and seditious ulema.
The ministry’s manipulative role, which I believe has worked
out to a degree, deserves a thorough research.
5. An investigation should address the apparent contradiction
of jurists’ statements on the legal status of rebellion against
unjust rulers. When some jurists discuss rebellion under the
category of baghy, they hold it allowable; however, when
examining rebellion in other juristic categories, they consider
it disallowable.
1
 In-Depth Interviews

T o provide a sufficiently full picture of the research subject, and for a more critical appraisal of al-
Būṭī’s view on the Syrian revolution, eleven in-depth personal interviews were conducted.
Interviewees, whether proponent or against al-Būṭī, were selected on the basis of three criteria: to be
well-acquainted with al-Būṭī’s thought by reading his books or attending his lectures; to possess a fairly
good knowledge of sharia; and to be fair-minded; three indispensable standards for a constructive in-
depth interview.
 List of the interviewees’ names on al-Būṭī
Interviewees’ Nationality Academic position Type of Date Location
name[982] interview
Tan Sri Prof. Malaysian Distinguished Professor of the Faculty of Islamic Revealed Knowledge Face-to- February Gombak,
Dr. Mohd and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) face 19, 2016 Selangor,
Kamal IIUM
Hassan

Khiḍr Shaḥrūr Syrian Director of Damascus Suburbs Endowments and Associate Professor Face-to- March Pullman
of the Department of Uṣūl al-Fiqh, al-Fatḥ Islamic Institute face 15, 2016 KLCC
Hotel
Muḥammad Syrian Professor of Uṣūl al-Fiqh, al-Fatḥ Islamic Institute Face-to- March Pullman
Dayrī face 15, 2016 KLCC
Hotel
Safīr al-Jarād Syrian Head of Islamic Studies and Da‘wah, al-Fatḥ Islamic Institute Face-to- March Pullman
face 21, 2016 KLCC
Hotel
‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Syrian Mufti of Damascus and principal of al-Fatḥ Islamic Institute (primary Face-to- March Pullman
al-Bizm and secondary level) face 24, 2016 KLCC
Hotel
Zulkifli Malaysian Mufti Wilayah Persekutuan Face-to- June 9, JAWI,
Mohamad al- face 2016 KLCC
Bakrī
Ibrāhīm Zayn Sudanese Dean of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, IIUM Face-to- June 17, Gombak,
face 2016 Selangor,
IIUM
Ḥusām al-Dīn Syrian President of al-Fatḥ Islamic Institute Face-to- May 31, Pullman
Farfūr face 2016 KLCC
Hotel
Muḥammad Tunisian Associate Professor, Department of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh, IIUM Face-to- January Gombak,
al-Ṭāhir al- face 27, 2017 Selangor,
Mīsāwī IIUM
Majd Makkī Syrian Top opposition shaykh. He is a researcher at the College of Islamic Face-to- February Gombak,
Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University. face 24, 2017 Selangor

Sāriyah al- Syrian Top opposition shaykh who lives in Turkey. He is a member of E-mail July 20,
Rifā‘ī the Shām Scholars Association. interview 2019

Interview questions were divided into three types:

 Ground Mapping Questions
They are general and introductory questions to “open up” the subject.
1. How long have you known al-Būṭī?
All interviewees have known al-Būṭī for many years, ranging from 24 to 50 years.
2. How many of al-Būṭī’s books, and articles etc. have you read?
Shaḥrūr, Dayrī, Farfūr, Mīsāwī and Sāriyah have read most of al-Būṭī’s books; al-Jarād has
read 19 books; Hassan, al-Bizm, Zulkifli and Makkī have read a few of his books. Zayn
does not remember how many.
3. Generally, what is your opinion of al-Būṭī’s writings?
Most interviewees agree that al-Būṭī is a scholar with creative thinking who makes a
balance in addressing both the intellect and the spirit. To Hassan, the significance of al-
Būṭī’s thought lies in the fact that the latter examines the contemporary problems facing
Muslims. Also, he always goes back to the Qur’an and Sunnah. The other important thing is
the idea of anti-madhhabism, which, to al-Būṭī, poses a great danger. We in Southeast Asia
believe in holding to a certain madhhab, especially Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah.
Farfūr argues that al-Būṭī is a scholar of deep religious knowledge, particularly in his specialized
field, the legal theory, in addition to his acquaintance with contemporary issues. His books combine
several intellectual qualities: in-depth treatment of the subject, accuracy, critical analysis, as well as
logical inference. Also, Farfūr notes (like the rest of interviewees) that while some of al-Būṭī’s writings
are purely rational and address the intellect, others are spiritually oriented. Such combination is rarely
found together in one person, like al-Ghazālī. Therefore, Farfūr was the first to call al-Būṭī the “al-
Ghazālī of this time.”
Dayrī and Mīsāwī particularly refer to al-Būṭī’s literary orientation; a quality easily noticed in his talks
and writings which captures the reader's attention. The latter further adds that al-Būṭī is endowed with
logical and polemical competence, together with knowledge of some philosophical issues.
According to al-Jarād, al-Būṭī’s books are classified into three categories: while his writings on fiqh,
and sharia are excellent, other books describing the Islam-West relations need to be reconsidered as
they lack an accurate description. As for books on relations between the ruler and the ruled, and Islamic
governance, al-Jarād has reservations on their credibility.
To Sāriyah, al-Būṭī’s scholarly writings are characterized with precision yet his intellectual and ijtihad
books seem to be different.
 Dimension Mapping Questions
They are specific issues to focus the participant more narrowly on the research phenomenon.
1. What does sharia say about participation in peaceful protests calling for freedom with
political and social reform?
In his response, Shaḥrūr counts protests as prohibited acts. “In Islam, there is nothing
called protests, whether peaceful or not. We have been suffering from the first protest that
occurred in our history. It is the protest against ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, which was claimed to
have been peaceful, and then turned absolutely violent. Ever since, the door of resultant
fitnah has been wide open.” Then he adds that what is stated in reliable books of fiqh and
history is to obey the ruler and listen to him. Further, protests mean chaos and this chaos, in
turn, comes as an advantage to many parties, Islamist and non-Islamist, as well as arms
dealers who make full use of it. And when collateral damage happens, no one claims
responsibility. Shaḥrūr goes on, “I have come to this opinion after five years of the Syrian
crisis. I have seen myself how the protests began and how they ended. Those who
shouted: silmiyyah (peaceful) are the same people who took up arms later on.” This is why
Shaḥrūr believes protests are forbidden.
On the other hand, Dayrī argues that socially and ethically, peaceful protests are an
acquired right of the people. These protests, which are held everywhere in the world, have
the power to bring down ministers, and change acts and legislations. They are an effective
mechanism to have your say. From a legal point of view, protests have roots in Muslim
history. Dayrī recalls here the first protest in Mecca, where the Companions, with the
Prophet’s (ṣ) knowledge, held a rally to express their monotheistic belief demanding their
right to embrace Islam. Disbelievers of Mecca started beating them and throwing stones at
them. “Those who see protests disallowed are required to suggest an alternative.” Dayrī
concludes.
Al-Jarād not only subscribes to the permissibility of protests as long as they are peaceful,
not politicized and without foreign intervention, but also sees demonstrations demanding for
usurped rights as a religious obligation. He cites two precedents of protests in early Islam.
For example, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, during Abū Bakr’s era, urged people not to buy the
expensive meat in order to make it cheap. This is a kind of opposition. Also, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd
al-‘Azīz came from Palestine to al-Shām to protest before al-Walīd ibn ‘Abd al-Malik saying
that al-Ḥajjāj is an oppressor, and unjust. Many emirs and lay persons supported ‘Umar ibn
‘Abd al-‘Azīz, including the scholar Ibn Abī Lahī‘ah.
Zayn says that Islam, in many texts, allows for the Muslim to command the right and forbid
the evil. This great Islamic principle covers many concepts, including freedom and reform.
Peaceful demonstrations are an aspect of this principle and the ruler has to know that
demonstrators are doing their duty. In a one-party state or country, people are only allowed
to express their opinion through the prism of the ruling party. In such countries, protests are
not allowed.
Mīsāwī subscribes to non-violent protests which subsume under “commanding the right and
forbidding the evil,” belittles the opinion of those who ban protests and asks them to provide
an alternative. He says, “Leaders are neither prophets nor infallible beings. Protests are a
method of voicing objections to widespread tyranny, dehumanization, stealing natural
resources and so on.”
While al-Bizm is suggesting a better and more civilised alternative, to create a committee
from all groups and sects introducing points of concern to those in power. Farfūr
distinguishing between two cases notes, “In countries whose culture and conditions respect
protests where no problems or bloodshed might occur, it is ok, although, I do not fully
approve protests, because they tend to be demagogic. Whereas in countries where
peaceful protests might turn violent by colliding with security forces leading to killing, this is
not allowed as I see it. And the removal of hardship and injury should take precedence over
the giving of the benefit.”
 Both Zulkifli and Makkī hold peaceful demonstrations allowable too. Sāriyah supports the
permissibility of demonstrations unless it is known for sure that the ruler will kill the
demonstrators.
2. What does sharia say about mounting an armed revolt against the oppressive Muslim ruler?
Hassan considers the magnitude of oppression. Classical jurists are in the opinion that as
long as the ruler is still preserving the responsibility of prayer and pillars of sharia, then you
have to follow. If you need to bring about a change, you have to do it in a proper way. When
the government reaches the level of brutality, and barbarity to the point that you cannot take
it anymore, then you need to respond violently. But you have to think whether your
response leads to something good or worse. What needs to be considered is the level of
tyranny that allows retaliation.
Shaḥrūr, following the mainstream Sunni view, contends that after an oath of allegiance is
given to the ruler, it is not allowed to revolt against him unless in a case of clear disbelief, as
hadith reports are clear about this issue. And this is why most of the Companions did not
depose Yazīd and al-Hajjāj. Only Shias, Khārijites, and Yazīdīs allow armed revolt against
the unjust ruler.
In a case of a ruler’s blatant disbelief, Dayrī points out that this act, far from being personal,
is considered as abandoning the ummah’s cause altogether. Therefore, we are obliged to
fight such a ruler if conditions allow the rebellion with the least possible casualties. If the
time is not ripe, we should not be reckless. We have to wait.
Drawing from the lessons of the Syrian civil war, al-Bizm argues that people need to endure
the ruler’s injustice, because it is most likely that this armed revolt will cause much
bloodshed. “This is what is happening in Syria,” al-Bizm explains. “There is a proverb that
goes, ‘The eye cannot resist the needle.’ We have a stick or gun, yet they have tanks and
fighters. How can we fight them!? Further, countries claiming to back the opposition are
providing weapons to the extent that make the war endure. It is a wicked conspiracy. I have
been aware of that from the very beginning. I warned but many did not listen. What we can
do is to sincerely advise those in power. This is what I have done in all my meetings with
the president. I have been frank to the maximum and never flattered him.”
To Zayn, sharia permits rebellion against the unjust ruler on the basis of commanding the
right and forbidding the evil. However, in Muslim political history, jurists argue that if
rebellion is assumed to bring about a worse situation (chaos, bloodshed), Sunni jurists, in
particular Ḥanbalī school, advise that people have to be patient and obey their ruler as long
as his orders revolve round permissible things.
Zayn further remarks that there should be case studies which address, for example, the
kind of injustice befalling upon people, identify those who are confronting the rulers, what
are their action plan and the consequences of the rebellion etc.
Zayn aptly notes, “Whoever reads the Qur’an and the Prophet’s (ṣ) traditions realizes that it
is obligatory for the Muslim to confront injustice. This is a common principle. But, to create a
specific juristic rule to do a certain action, we need a case study.”
Putting the whole issue in a contemporary perspective, al-Jarād maintains that jurists of the
past, when addressing armed revolts, were speaking of a legitimate ruler who came to
power through a legal way and was appointed by ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd,[983] supported by the
army and governed his people according to sharia rules. So, the rules of armed revolt
applies to the ruler with these conditions.
Nowadays, nonetheless, most of our rulers lack such pre-conditions. Most of them came to
power via a military coup, relegated the Qur’an and Sunnah to the lowest position, and
considered themselves as masters and their subjects as slaves. This is the opinion of many
scholars of political Islam. Al-Jarād continues, that presently we cannot judge the ruler’s
behaviors, to be good or bad, on the basis of allowing prayers to be observed or not.
Actually, all rulers attend religious ceremonies.
“Rulers,” says al-Jarād, “are two kinds: just and corrupt. While the revolt against the former
is forbidden, it is allowed against the latter if various conditions are in favor of the rebels.
 With this in mind, those who refuse rebellion against oppressive rulers, depending on the
old concept of this matter, are required to reconsider their views.”
Emphasizing the element of educating the revolters, al-Jarād argues that before taking any
action, the revolters have to be exposed to al-ḥaqq wa al-istiḥqāq (rights and claiming),
meaning to know their rights and to learn how to properly claim these rights. Otherwise,
they are no better then rioters.
Finally, al-Jarād raises a point of considerable significance that has to be considered by
revolutionaries. He recalls the opinion of some jurists who disallowed the revolt due to the
concept of “militarization.” This term, defined by contemporary intellectuals, means “to
militarize all the resources of the state (economy, army, security, the media etc.) in order to
maintain power.”[984] So, when the angry masses rise in revolt they find themselves in an
encounter with all these militarized apparatuses. Without doubt, when the two parties,
militarily unequal, confront each other, there will be substantial collateral damage, and
finally, the revolters will fail.[985]
Mīsāwī makes a distinction between two different phases: earlier jurists discussed rebellion
within the general framework of Islam or the caliphate. So, all Muslim rulers, whether
assuming power via selection of ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd, or by the nomination of previous
rulers, were admitting Islam as their religious identity. They never brought or accepted any
ideology as a replacing identity. Even Fatimids took Islam as a guiding principle. However,
in the era of the nation state, this issue must be studied from a different perspective. Most
Arab leaders replaced the Islamic identity with secular, communist, or nationalistic
ideologies. They did not care about Islam for strategic interests and legitimizing their rule.
Given this ideological shift, Mīsāwī goes on, that ulema who deal with rebellion from a
traditional point of view lack awareness of contemporary changes in our society. By
contrast, Islamists or scholars of contemporary Islamic political thought who have absorbed
the new cultural-ideological changes do not ban the idea of opposition to leaders or
sometimes, mounting armed revolt against them. You find that in writings of Muḥammad
Salīm al-‘Awwā, Muḥammad ‘Amārah, al-Ghannūshī, Ḥasan al-Turābī, al-Mawdūdī and so
on. This outlook has become one of the hallmarks of contemporary Islamic-political thought.
According to Mīsāwī, in Islamic-political thought, leaders should not rule others who dislike
them, let alone discussing issues of corruption, injustice and tyranny. What leaders of the
post-colonial nation state have in common is absolute tyranny!
To Makkī and Sāriyah, armed rebellion is generally not permitted, yet the former
recommends that every state has to be taken as a case study in order to reach a reliable
opinion.
3. If armed revolt is not permitted, would that not somehow solidify political tyranny, especially
if the Muslim ruler turns unjust and oppressive?
While Shaḥrūr seems to accept this repugnant outcome on account of greater harm
resulting from a revolt, Hassan admits it if the revolt is forbidden altogether. And it is not.
Zayn, on the other hand, believes that rebellion is not forbidden, and there is no evidence
for that. In his words, “Scholars said that, because the consequences of the rebellion are
bad, we do not call for it. In other words, they neither forbid it nor permit it. Orientalists
called this position of Sunni jurists 'quietism,' which is, to me, an accurate word.”
To Dayrī, al-Bizm, and Makkī, the “commanding the right and forbidding the evil” principle
(in its various forms and stages) is the Islamic antidote for tyranny. Dayrī correctly observes,
“This procedure is meant to stop the ruler from going into tyranny and oppression. If the
ummah falls short of carrying out this duty, the ruler will be a new Pharaoh.”
Sāriyah warns that scholars who give support to unjust rulers are bound to legitimize
tyranny.
Farfūr affirms that it is the responsibility of the subjects to provide advice to their leaders, as
the Prophet (ṣ) says, “Religion is naṣīḥah (sincere advice). We said, ‘To whom?’ He said,
‘To Allah, His Book, His Messenger, as well as the leaders of the Muslims and their
common folk.’” This advice, however, has etiquette: to advise politely, privately, and
 sincerely. Those who advise the ruler must not do that out of revenge, or for the sake of
creating fitnah.
To Mīsāwī, tyranny has become a natural product of the closure of armed revolt.
4. Do you believe that al-Būṭī’s adopted position toward the revolution is based on solid
religious grounds?
Six interviewees answered in the affirmative. Sāriyah agrees with al-Būṭī to some extent.
Dayrī further laments that al-Būṭī did not counsel the rest of the ulema on such a big issue.
Had he done so, he could have based his opinion on a collective ijtihad of the union of
ulema. Usually, rulers do not belittle or ignore decisions and positions coming out from the
union of ulema. The public also listens to what ulema agree about. But, when they differ,
some people make their own choices; others get confused.
Al-Jarād who recognizes that al-Būṭī endeavored to save people’s life, believes that al-
Būṭī’s opinion is political rather than legal, weak rather than strong. Similarly, Mīsāwī
wonders whether the ruler, al-Būṭī is talking about, is a real Muslim who genuinely practises
Islam. Mīsāwī reiterates earlier that most of the present leaders who govern on the basis of
nationalism and communism proved to be hostile to Islam. And when they realized that
Islam has deep roots in our societies, they adopted a policy of accommodation and
hypocrisy.
Zayn attempts to locate al-Būṭī’s position in the context of the driving force. Al-Būṭī was
attempting to identify and diagnose a specific situation. Foreign conspiracy is going to hijack
peaceful protests, and open the door to great fitnah etc… As a jurist, this is how al-Būṭī
sees it.
Let us suppose, Zayn continues, that another jurist who holds a different view says, “I do
not believe in this conspiracy; no evidence for it; protesters have the right to do so, and the
regime has to listen to their demands.” I do not think al-Būṭī will count this counter opinion
as against sharia. He will say, “It is a viewpoint.”
In other words, while al-Būṭī seem to block means to an unlawful end, other scholars tend to
open them by saying that so and so ruler does not govern according to Islam, they are
indifferent to sharia, the people refusing a life of humiliation want to die for the cause of
establishing the right. For example, is there anyone who claims that Ḥusayn, who rebelled
against Yazīd, committed a forbidden act!?
Makkī contends that al-Būṭī, following his own ijtihad, was looking at one side of the coin.
He belittled the other opinion. Giving an example, Makkī recalls that during the early days of
the Syrian revolution, a group of top Syrian ulema formed the Shām Ulema Association[986]
with a view to bringing down the regime. Surprisingly, al-Būṭī commented on their decision
by saying, "They have come up with a new religion!" And he added that this new religion is
not known by al-Nawawī or al-Māwardī. “This is an exclusivist statement made by al-Būṭī.”
Makkī says. Then he clarifies that this legal issue is a matter of opinion, and not a novel
idea or a new religion.
Even more, Makkī argues, acts of injustice of rulers during al-Nawawī's time never went as
far as tampering with the basic principles of the religion and replacing them with other
ideologies. “Now, it has become clear to us that this ruler, Bashar, is a tool to do that.” Also,
al-Būṭī, who was keen on maintaining national unity, should have realized that it was
because of the regime, that national unity was destroyed and sectarianism became
widespread in society.
Then Makkī goes on arguing that al-Būṭī did not have a balance in his discourse. For
example, al-Būṭī is claimed to have issued a fatwa on the forbiddance of opening fire at
protestors, which is true. However, to Makkī, this fatwa is of little significance when
compared to the repeated Friday sermons in which al-Būṭī declared his moral support to the
regime.
5. Do you think that al-Būṭī, with regards his stand on the revolution, was following his own
independent ijtihad or was he a sycophant?
Ten interviewees believe al-Būṭī was following his own independent ijtihad, irrespective of
being right or wrong. To Sāriyah, al-Būṭī belongs to a third category. Al-Būṭī, he argues, is a
scholar with naive character who fell into the trap of the regime.
Giving details about the assumed sycophancy of al-Būṭī, Shaḥrūr states that ulema of the
past had differing views on maintaining relations with rulers. While some absolutely ban this
relationship, others allowed it if the scholar carries out the duty of commanding the right and
forbidding evil, without resulting in any personal gains.
According to Shaḥrūr, al-Būṭī’s contact with Hafez al-Assad, and his son, was of the second
type. For example, many scholars living in exile (like ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah) were
allowed to go back to Syria. Years ago, al-Būṭī complained to Hafez al-Assad about pictures
of half-naked women in public advertisements. Soon, the pictures were taken down. Also,
he used to ask al-Assad to make decisions in favor of religious institutions. One year before
the outbreak of the crisis, al-Būṭī strongly criticized the Minister of Education and the Media
for their unsympathetic policies against Islam. On the other hand, Shaḥrūr, Dayrī, al-Bizm
and Farfūr affirms that al-Būṭī never had any of the advantages which scholars of the sultan
usually get. He refused to accept a brand-new Mercedes, a gift from Hafez. Al-Būṭī lived a
plain and simple life. He did not have a car, or surplus money. He never held any official
position either. Given all that, how can he be labelled as the scholar of the sultan? Shaḥrūr
asks.
By contrast, Makkī believes that al-Būṭī’s gain from his long contact with the regime was,
morally speaking, his widespread scholarly prestige and religious leadership. The regime
was working on elevating the social and religious status of al-Būṭī by making him, for
example, the preacher of the Umayyad Mosque,[987] and the head of the union of Bilād al-
Shām ulema in 2012. It is unfortunate, Makkī notes, that al-Būṭī not only linked his destiny
with the regime but also the destiny of Islam as well. One can see that in many of his Friday
sermons.
 Perspective-Widening Questions
These questions are expected to uncover more layers of meaning and greater richness of the research
subject.
1. According to some researchers, the word caliph or ḥākim (ruler) in traditions pertaining to
the obedience to “unjust” rulers does not apply to the present-day rulers or more accurately
to presidents. What do you think?
Zayn, Mīsāwī, al-Jarād and Sāriyah strongly agree with this viewpoint. Yet, Shaḥrūr, al-
Bizm, Farfūr as well as Makkī does not accept it as a reliable opinion. Shaḥrūr argues that
those with political agendas would advocate such a notion. He says, “We judge others
according to their outward sayings and actions. Only Allah, not us, knows their inward
situation. Further, the Prophet (ṣ) said, ‘Pray behind the good and the bad.’ The
Companions prayed behind al-Hajjāj. Therefore, I see no difference between the past and
present rulers. In both cases, rulers observe prayer and allowed other rituals to be held.”
Hassan, Dayrī and Zulkifli, who seem uncertain or confused, think the issue deserves
further research.
2. Do you agree with those who argue that it is not allowed to revolt against the ruler, even in
case of kufr (disbelief), if such a move is likely to cause bloodshed and chaos, on the basis
of the famous legal maxim "The removal of hardship and injury should take precedence over
the giving of benefit"?
Ten interviewees agree, yet, Shaḥrūr adds that revolting against the ruler who has
announced clear disbelief, remains permissible even though it leads to bloodshed.
3. There are many reliable traditions which order Muslims not to play any part during fitnah
(sedition/tribulation) and keep away from those involved in it. What they need to do instead
is to undertake self-reform, rectify their faults, and purify their hearts and souls from various
ills. What does “fitnah” here mean?
The order to stand aloof should be understood in a relative sense. Al-Bizm, for example,
says that this attitude does not mean to stay at home and leave your job. Zayn, on the other
hand, argues when people fight, you have to have an opinion about it and act upon it, in
particular when fighting is between two groups of believers. The Qur’an is clear about this
issue, "If two parties of the believers fight, put things right between them; then, if one of
them is insolent against the other, fight the insolent one till it reverts to Allah's
commandment." (Qur’an, al-Ḥujurāt: 9). While calling for not remaining neutral, I do not
mean to participate in fighting, because this leads to more chaos.
In addition, Zayn maintains that fitnah in books of hadith (like al-Bukhārī and Muslim) has
nothing to do with the current situation. The dilemma we are going through is a fight for
power for various reasons, national, personal, racial etc. So, traditions of fitnah and the
order to keep away is not applicable here.
According to Dayrī, if the dense fog is affecting the road and visibility is poor, then we have
to stop and wait. When the fog has cleared, we continue. Similarly, when fitnah breaks out
preventing us from making sound judgment or form a clear picture of what is going on, the
best solution is to stand aloof. This is in line with Shaḥrūr and al-Jarād. Dayrī goes on
saying that, relatively speaking, things that appear clear to some people might be a source
of puzzlement to others—two different cases in need of different approaches. In the first
case, one may or should take part in the fighting, while in the other, he may distance himself
from all parties.
Farfūr, contends that even if the matter becomes clear, the name of fitnah is not removed
altogether. For example, the war between ‘Alī and Mu‘āwiyah is still named fitnah, although
the vast majority of ulema are aware of the fact that ‘Ali was in the right.
Mīsāwī argues that traditions of fitnah should not be understood in isolation from many
Qur’anic verses and traditions asking Muslims to undertake the duty of commanding the
right and forbidding evil.
To Makkī, there is a direct link between the outburst of fitnah and the existence of the tyrant
ruler who creates mischief. He recalls here one of the lexical meanings of fitnah, which is
 torture and persecution. Allah says, “(It is) the day when they will be tormented at the Fire”
(Qur’an, al-Dhāriyāt: 13) and “Those who persecute the believers, men and women”
(Qur’an, al-Burūj: 10). So, our rulers are the mother of fitnah, and are to be held responsible
for all that is happening now to the people. Also, each one of us must have a clear stand on
truth vs falsehood, supporting the former and fighting the latter.
Sāriyah defines fitnah as the fighting between Muslim groups.
4. Presently, there are modern peaceful means and mechanisms on how to deal with
governments and rulers, such as protests, peaceful demonstrations, civil disobedience, and
pressure groups. In your opinion, can such methods replace armed revolt, which is likely to
have fatal consequences?
Here we have diverse views. For Shaḥrūr, all these means are forbidden as it creates
further problems. Criticism, rather, should be directed through rightful channels like
parliaments, where MPs can speak out against the government or before the president.
Mīsāwī, Dayrī, Farfūr, Makkī and Sāriyah consider these methods as better alternatives.
Dayrī further notes that, with the passage of time, they could be aborted or suppressed by
despotic rulers. Thus, new means and techniques needs to be devised.
Al-Bizm allows the above means as long as they do not result in the destructive
consequences of armed rebellion. Zulkifli and Zayn who generally accepts them too,
explains that each county has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Zayn goes on
saying that, for example, in Sudan, in 1964, people went for a popular uprising, practising
all these means and as a result, Ibrāhīm ‘Abbūd, the military ruler, had to leave. In 1985,
another uprising was able to remove Ja‘far al-Numayrī from power. But, these means,
created by the nation state, work at times (Tunisia) and at times, fail (Libya, Egypt, Yemen
and Syria). We need to consider the specific case of each country.
To Hassan, democratic institutions as means of solving problems are better. He is in favor
of peaceful change through education and reforms in political institutions. In al-Jarād’s
opinion, in this digital age a new means of rebellion can be found in social networking
applications, like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. They played an influential role in
bringing down Mubarak’s regime. Unlike these applications, protests have fared well in
some countries and failed in others.
 Results of the Interviews: Themes

1 Assessment of al-Būṭī’s intellectual legacy.

All agree that al-Būṭī is a scholar with creative thinking. All agree Two refer to al-Būṭī’s One argues that al-Būṭī’s
that some of literary excellence. arguments on the relation
al-Būṭī’s between Islam and the
books are West and political Islam lack
purely accurate diagnosis. One
rational; thinks al-Būṭī’s intellectual
others are and ijtihad books are not as
spiritually good as his other scholarly
oriented. writings.

2 The legal status of peaceful protests.

Six see protests as permissible. One counts One suggests a better One argues protests
protests as alternative—a committee become forbidden if they
prohibited. introducing points of potentially result in violence
concern to those in power. or destruction or (according
to another) if it is surely
known the ruler will kill
protestors.

3 Armed rebellion.

Six hold it disallowed unless in a case of clear disbelief. The Three make One sees it permitted, yet One suggests contemporary
ruler’s injustice ought to be endured, against the chaos and a distinction another links the rebellion should be
upheaval of rebellion. between the permissibility with the examined as case studies.
past and magnitude of oppression.
present
rulers. While
the former
took Islam
as a guiding
principle, the
latter
replaced it
with un-
Islamic
ideologies.

4 Things to be considered prior to rebellion.

All interviewees stipulate certain preconditions before rebellion with careful One argues that before One raises the concept of
consideration of the present vs the expected harm. If the time is not ripe, taking any action, rebels “militarization,” a major
people should not be reckless. should know their rights obstacle in the face of
rebels.
 and how best to get it
granted.

5 To forbid rebellion is to solidify political

tyranny.

Five refer to the “commanding the right and forbidding the Two admit to One believes rebellion is One admits this, if rebellion
evil” principle as the Islamic antidote for tyranny. this not forbidden. is forbidden altogether. But
outcome. this is not the case.

6 Is al-Būṭī’s view based on solid religious grounds?

Six answered in the affirmative. One thinks One argues that al-Būṭī One argues that al-Būṭī’s
One laments that al-Būṭī did not counsel the rest of the al-Būṭī’s should have taken into position is to be explored in
ulema on such a big issue. One agrees with al-Būṭī to a opinion is consideration the context and intent.
degree. political necessary distinction
rather than between earlier and
legal, weak present rulers.
rather than
strong.
Another
contends
that al-Būṭī
was looking
at one side
of the coin.

7 Does al-Būṭī’s view represent an opinion

or a sycophancy?

Ten interviewees believe al-Būṭī was following his own independent ijtihad,
irrespective of being right or wrong. One thinks al-Būṭī is a naive scholar
victimized by the regime.
All interviewees believe al-Būṭī never had any material
benefit from his contact with the regime. One, however,
speaks of a moral benefit which al-Būṭī was enjoying for
years, that is, his widespread scholarly prestige and
religious leadership conferred by the regime.

8 Do Obedience traditions apply to present-day leaders?

 Four said, Four said, no. Three do not know and
yes. suggest further research.

9 If the removal of a disbelieving leader is anticipated to cause bloodshed and

chaos, then no action should be taken.

Ten agree. One disagrees.

10 Do people have to remain aloof during

fitnah?

Three argue when fitnah breaks out with the inability to form One believes One argues that the One advises what is clear to
a clear picture of what is going on, the best solution is to stay the traditions Prophetic order to stand some might be a puzzlement
aloof. One did not give an answer. on fitnah and aloof should be to others—two different
the order to understood in a relative cases in need of two
keep away is sense. different approaches. In the
not first case, one may or should
applicable to take part in fighting, while in
the current the other, he may distance
tussle for himself from all parties.
power.

11 Peaceful demonstrations, civil disobedience, and pressure groups are

better options to rebellion.

Eight agree. Two of them suggest conducting case studies One One believes democratic One believes Facebook,
for each country. considers institutions as means of Twitter and WhatsApp to be
them solving problems is a new and more effective
forbidden. better alternative. options.
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[1]
Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’ and David J. Goa. Eds. A Religious Institution in Contemporary
Syria: The Fatih Islamic Institute and Its Religious Scholars (Alberta: Chester Ronning
Centre for the Study of Religion and Public Life and ECMC Chair in Islamic Studies,
University of Alberta, 2011).
[2]
See my study experience at al-Fatḥ, Bashar Bakkour, “The Road to Damascus,” in Abu-
Rabi’ and Goa. Eds. A Religious Institution in Contemporary Syria…, 232-240.
[3]
According to the 1994 academic agreement between al-Fatḥ Institute and al-Azhar
University, undergraduates may study the first three academic years at the former, and the
fourth year at the latter, graduating with a BA from al-Azhar. So, the Arabic program
operated under this agreement, while the sharia program was delivered entirely at al-Azhar.
[4]
Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‘ held Edmonton Council of Muslim Communities Chair in Islamic
Studies in the Department of History and Classics at the University of Alberta. He died
suddenly of a heart attack in a hotel room in Amman on July 2, 2011.
[5]
Farfūr is a top Syrian scholar and the President of post-graduate studies at al-Fatḥ
Islamic Institute.
[6]
On the use of religion out of expediency, before the year 2010 (the Arab revolutions), see
Sonia Alianak’s book Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium. (New
York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007); John Esposito, The Islamic Threat Myth or Reality?
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 79-81; 84-88. For the post-2010 era, see Kenneth
Perkins, “Playing the Islamic Card: The Use and Abuse of Religion in Tunisian Politics,” in
The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects, edited by Nouri
Ganea. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 58-80; Mu‘taz al-Khaṭīb, “al-Faqīh
wa al-dawlah fī al-thawrāt al-‘Arabiyyah,” Tabayyun. No. 3/9 (Summer 2014): 63-84. On the
use of religion during the medieval period, see Sihām al-Mīsāwī, Islām al-Sāsah. (Beirut:
Dār al-Ṭalī‘ah, 2008).
[7]
Refer to chapter four in this regard.
[8]
Thomas Pierret, Religion and State in Syria. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013).
[9]
On the nation state and its jurists, see al-Khaṭīb, “al-Faqīh wa al-dawlah…,” 72-73.
[10]
See Pierret,
[11]
Pierret, 4.
[12]
Al-Būṭī was horrifically assassinated in a bomb attack while delivering a regular religious
lecture in al-Īmān Mosque (Damascus), with reportedly over forty-two casualties, on March
21, 2013.
[13]
Ryan King Little, “Does Revolution Breed Radicalism? An Analysis of the Stalled
Revolution in Syria and the Radical Forces since Unleashed,” (MA thesis, University of
South Florida, 2014), 1. This definition of revolutions is taken from Mohsen Milani’s 1988
book on The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic.
(Westview special studies on the Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). See
different definitions of revolution in Gizachew Tiruneh, “Social Revolutions: Their Causes,
Patterns, and Phases,” Sage, vol. 4, no. 3 (July-September 2014): 5; Adam Alrowaiti,
“Same Revolution, Different Outcome: Why Did the Syrian Regime Survive the Arab
Spring?” (MA thesis, Utah State University, 2016), 8.
[14]
Patricia J. Campbell, Aran MacKinnon, Christy R. Stevens, An Introduction to Global
Studies. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 32.
[15]
Catherine Soanes, The Oxford Compact English Dictionary. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 749.
[16]
Campbell, et al. 32.
[17]
Lama Abu Odeh, “Review of Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and
Modernity’s Moral Predicament,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 46, no. 1
(2014), 216.
[18]
Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament.
(Columbia University Press, 2012).
[19]
Sayed Haneef, Ethics and Fiqh for Daily Life: An Islamic Outline. (International Islamic
University Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur, 2005), 35.
[20]
See these reports in al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. (Vols. 18). (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘ah al-
Miṣriyyah, 1930), 12: 222; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-uṣūl fi aḥādīth al-Rasūl. (Vols. 12).
(Damascus: Maktabat al-Ḥalwānī, 1969), 4:61-72.
[21]
Ibn al-Athīr, 4:61-62.
[22]
Ibid., 4: 64-65.
[23]
Ibid., 8:416.
[24]
Quoted in Dov Asher Brandis, “The 1979 Iranian Revolution: The Revolutionary
Revolution” (Bachelor’s degree, University of Arizona, 2009), 5.
[25]
Ibid. 5-6.
[26]
See extensive literature of these traditions in Ibn al-Athīr,10: 3-101.
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Ma‘a al-Būṭī fī qaḍāyā al-sā‘ah. Interview with al-Būṭī. 2013. Nūr al-Shām TV. No. 7.
Retrieved July 29, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aa85yz7VRhw&list=PL01kYZIehH-
pJIR03iFhveTFll6Ba_er6&index=7.
[29]
Ibid.
[30]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1995), 41-63.
[31]
‘Alī al-Murshid, Mustalzamāt al-da‘wah fī al-‘aṣr al-ḥāḍir. (Egypt: Maktabat Līnah, 1989),
21.
[32]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 30.
[33]
On the idealism of the caliphal state, and whether or not the application of sharia rules
remained in operation afterwards, see al-Būṭī, Yughāliṭūnak idh yaqūlūn. (2nd ed.)
(Damascus: Dār al-Fārābī, 2000), 6-30; Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Islām wa al-‘ilmāniyyah
wajhan li wajh. (7th ed.). (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1997), 153-165; Sa‘īd al-‘Utaybī,
Maqālāt fī al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah. (Riyadh, Majallat al-Bayān, 1434 AH), 110-130. All
authors affirm, with various historical evidences, the fact that sharia was indeed the
reference point in the post-caliphal era, though not as perfectly and purely as it had been in
early Islamic days.
[34]
On the collapse crisis and different responses of ulema of the Arab and Muslim world,
see Muḥammad. M. Ḥusayn, al-Ittijāhāt al-waṭaniyyah fī al-‘adad al-mu‘āṣir. (Vols. 2). (3rd
ed.). (Cairo: Maktabat al-‘Ādāb, 1980), 2: 5-93; Zakī al-Mīlād, “Ṣadmat zawāl al-khilāfah
al-‘Uthmāniyyah fī al-fikr al-Islāmī fī al-‘ishrīnāt,” al-Ijtihād, no. 45-46 (2000): 275-294.
[35]
For a treatment of these questions and concerns, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in
the Liberal Age, 1798-1939. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Ibrahim Abu-
Rabi‘, Contemporary Arab Thought. (London: Pluto Press, 2004); Antony Black, The History
of Islamic Political Thought. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 324-346.
[36]
For regional distribution of these religious and ethnic groups, see Nikolaos van Dam,
The Struggle for Power in Syria. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), 1-14.
[37]
For Muslim-Christian relations in Syria, see Annika Rabo, “‘We are Christians and we
are equal citizens’: perspectives on particularity and pluralism in contemporary Syria,” Islam
and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol, 23, no. 1 (January 2012): 79-93; Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr,
“Muslim and Christian relations in Syria,” in Abu-Rabi’ and Goa. Eds. A Religious Institution
in Contemporary Syria…, 32-55. On the similarity of syllabuses of the Christian and Muslim
religious education programs in Syria, see Monique C. Cardinal, “Religious education in
Syria: Unity and difference,” British Journal of Religious Education, vol. 31, no. 2, (March
2009): 91-101. And for Sunni-Shia unity, see Aḥmad Maẓhar al-‘Aẓmah, “Fī sabīl al-tawḥīd
al-ṭā’ifī bi munāsabat dhikrā ‘āshūrā’ wa al-hijrah.” al-Tamaddun al-Islāmī, vol. 20, 10th year.
(Ṣafar 1364 AH): 386-383.
[38]
For a rich source on these schools, see ‘Ābd al-Qādir al-Nu‘aymī, al-Dāris fī akhbār al-
madāris. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1990).
[39]
This speech is in al-Tamaddun al-Islāmī magazine, No. 1, 3rd year. (Rabī‘ al-Awwal
1356 AH): 6.
[40]
Pierret, 170-171.
[41]
The intellectual battle about this matter is reported in ‘Adnān Zarzūr, Muṣṭafā al-Sibā‘ī:
al-Dā‘iyah al-mujaddid. (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), 241-275.
[42]
Quoted in Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the ‘Struggle for Syria’,
1947-1958 Between Accommodation and Ideology,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 3
(May 2004): 142-143.
[43]
Ibid., 143.
[44]
Ibid.
[45]
Johannes Reissner, IdeologieundPolitik der Muslim brüder Syriens: von den
Wahlen1947 biszumVerbotunterAdibaš-Šīšaklī. Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz, 1980, translated
from German by Mohammad Atasi. (Beirut: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 2005), 382-383.
[46]
Fixed and mandatory punishments, based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, for certain crimes
(theft, banditry, adultery, an unfounded accusation of adultery, the drinking of alcohol,
apostasy).
[47]
Reissner, 383.
[48]
Ibid.
[49]
It was founded in 1932. Ibid., 120.
[50]
“Mukāfaḥat Khalā‘at al-sīnamā,” al-Tamaddun al-Islāmī, no. 1, 2nd year. (Rabī‘ al-Awwal
1355 AH): 47-48.
[51]
Line Khatib, Islamic and Islamist Revivalism in Syria: The Rise and Fall of Secularism in
Ba‘thist Syria. (Canada, n.d.), 60.
[52]
Ibid.
[53]
Radwan Ziadeh. (May 2008). The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and the Concept of
“Democracy.” Paper presented at a conference on Political Islam and Democracy—What do
Islamists and Islamic Movements want? Organized by Center for the Study of Islam and
Democracy, Washington, DC. 2.
[54]
Khatib, 60.
[55]
It is to be recalled here that the constitution was amended in order to lower the minimum
age for the presidency from 40 to 34. For a critical assessment of Bashar's tenure, see
Shmuel Bar, “Bashar’s Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview,” Comparative
Strategy, vol. 25 (2006): 353-445; Najib Ghadbian, “The New Asad: Dynamics of Continuity
and Change in Syria,” Middle East Journal, vol. 55, no. 4 (2001): 625-641.
[56]
Eyal Zisser, “Syria, the Ba‘th Regime and the Islamic Movement: Stepping on a new
path?” in Political Islam, edited by Barry Rubin. (vols. 3). Routledge, 2007. 2: 472.
[57]
Shaykh al-Būṭī and Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr are among those who would sit in private with
the president for hours.
[58]
On several occasions, I heard Shaykh Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr ascribing this statement to
the president, with confirmation from Shaykh ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Bizm, mufti of Damascus.
[59]
Eyal Zisser, Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years in Power. (London:
I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2007), 55; Syrian TV (November 29, 2002).
[60]
Zisser, “Syria, the Ba‘th Regime…, 2: 478.
[61]
Khatib, 130.
[62]
Ibid., 129-130. More significant moves were also mentioned by the author. 130-131.
[63]
See Pierret, 152-155.
[64]
Ibid., 153.
[65]
Bashar Bakkour, “The Road to Damascus,” in Abu-Rabi’ and Goa. Eds. A Religious
Institution in Contemporary Syria…, 233.
[66]
Ibid. Now after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the situation changed, and
Syria, alas, became a breeding ground for many extremist groups who professedly came to
bring down the regime!
[67]
See in Khatib, 170-171, statements by publishing house owners attesting to my
observation.
[68]
It is defined today as Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Palestine.
[69]
See, for example, Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Albānī, Takhrīj aḥādīth faḍā’il al-Shām wa
Dimashq. (Ma‘ārif: Riyadh, 2020).
[70]
A great number of foreign friends, colleagues and students who lived in Damascus for
some time have expressed to me how nostalgic they feel for the blessed days they spent in
al-Shām.
[71]
The two tables are taken from Khatib, 129, who in turn takes them from sources
provided in the caption.
[72]
This number has been affirmed by my friend Shaykh Aḥmad Samir al-Qabbānī, Director
of Damascus Endowments. In 2011, he told me that the number of mosques in Syria had
reached 10,000.
[73]
For different Muslim response to this colonial challenge, see Ibrahim Abu-Rabi‘,
Contemporary Arab Thought. (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 126-140.
[74]
See Umar Abd Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria. (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), 47-
54.
[75]
On the roots of the Syrian Ba‘th Party, see Nabil M. Kaylani, “The Rise of the Syrian
Ba‘th, 1940-1958: Political success, party failure,” International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, vol. 3, no. 1. (January 1972): 3-23; Gordon H. Torrey, “The Ba‘th: Ideology and
Practice,” Middle East Journal, vol. 23, no. 4 (Autumn 1969): 445-470. About the effects of
Ba‘th ideology on the Syrian society, see Robert Olson, “The Ba‘th in Syria 1947-1979: An
Interpretative Historical Essay (Part One),” Oriento Moderno, Anno 58, No. 12 (December
1978): 645-681. The part two appeared in Oriento Moderno, Anno 59, no. 6 (June 1979):
439-474. For a comprehensive treatment of Ba‘th Party, see David Roberts, The Ba'th and
the Creation of Modern Syria. (New York: Routledge, 2014). First published in 1987.
[76]
For various historical, and analytical studies about the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
(besides cited references), see ‘Alī Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Bayānūnī. “The Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood: Experience and Prospect,” in The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political
Islam, edited by Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‘. (London: Pluto Press; Alberta: The University of
Alberta Press, 2010), 231-240; Hanna Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren.” MERIP Reports
12.9 (November-December 1982):12-20, 34, 36; Hrair Dekmejian, “Syria: Sunni
Fundamentalism against Baathi Rule.” Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab
World. Syracuse, N.Y., 1985. 109-125; Judith Perera, “The Shifting Fortunes of Syria’s
Muslim Brothers,” Middle East (London) (May 1985): 25-28; Patrick Seale, The Struggle for
Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958. (London: Oxford University Press,
1965); Raphael Lefevre, Ashes of Hama: the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. (London: Hurst,
2013); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and
Urban Rebellion in an authoritarian-Populist Regime,” in Islamic Resurgence in the Arab
World, edited by Ali E. Hillal Dessouki. (New York, 1982), 138-169; Thomas Mayer, “The
Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961-1982,” Orient 24 (December 1983): 589-609; Umar Abd
Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria. (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983).
[77]
Hrair Dekmejian, “Sibā‘ī, Muṣṭafā,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic
World, edited by John Esposito. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4: 71; Fādī Aḥmad
al-Masālimah, “Muṣṭafā al-Sibā‘ī: al-Dā‘iyah al-Rā’id wa al-‘Ālim al-Mujāhid.” (November 4,
2008). Al-Aluka Network. Retrieved March 7, 2014
http://www.alukah.net/culture/0/3964/#ixzz2vGhL S3r5
[78]
Zarzūr, 135.
[79]
Ibid., 163-164.
[80]
Ibid., 164.
[81]
Ibid., 169-173.
[82]
Reissner, 135-137.
[83]
Zarzūr, 169.
[84]
Ibid., 172. On the benefit of charitable and social services of religious associations in
Syria, see Khatib, 172-173.
[85]
Reissner, 202-215, 232; Zarzūr, 233-235.
[86]
According to Umar Abd Allah, 1949 al-Za‘īm’s coup was sponsored by the CIA and
engineered from the American Embassy in Damascus. On al-Za‘īm’s biography, see Sami
Moubayed, Steel & Silk: Men & Women Who Shaped Syria 1900-2000. (Seattle: Cune,
2005), 350.
[87]
‘Alī al-Ṭanṭāwī, Dhikrayāt ‘Alī al-Ṭanṭāwī. (Vols. 8). (2nd ed.). (Jeddah: Dār al-Manārah,
1989) 7:12; Reissner, 326.
[88]
Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the ‘Struggle for Syria’, 1947-1958
Between Accommodation and Ideology,” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 40. No. 3 (May 2004):
139.
[89]
Teitelbaum, 149-150; Zarzūr, 282.
[90]
Zisser, “Syria, the Ba‘th…,” 43-66.
[91]
See Umar Abd Allah, 103-106; “Ahamm al-ḥarakāt wa al-jamā‘āt al-dīniyyah fī Sūriyah.”
(April 22, 2011). Al-Sakīnah Web. Retrieved March 15, 2014.
http://www.assakina.com/center/parties/7574.html.
‘Iṣām al-‘Aṭṭār, former Muslim Brotherhood leader, expressed his disapproval of Hamah
revolt against the regime, adopting a peaceful strategy instead. A TV interview with al-‘Aṭṭār
on “Liqā’ al-yawm.” (July 24, 2007). Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 8, 2014.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3OX sqdOXg7s
[92]
Liad Porat, “The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Asad Regime.” Brandies
University: Crown Center Middle East Studies. No. 47 (December 2010): 3.
[93]
Ibid.
[94]
Philip Khoury, “Muslim Brotherhood in Syria,” in John Esposito. Ed. The Oxford
Encyclopedia…, 3: 192.
[95]
Zisser, “Syria, the Ba‘th…,” 2: 462.
[96]
Ibid.
[97]
Ibid., 2: 466
[98]
Ibid., 2: 467.
[99]
Ibid., 2: 470-474.
[100]
Al-Masālimah, cf. Moubayed, 340-341.
[101]
Zarzūr, 86-87.
[102]
Ibid., 136. Cf. Umar Abd Allah, 97.
[103]
Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, al-A‘lām. (Vols. 8). (15th ed.). (Beirut: Dār al-‘Ilm li al-Malāyīn,
2002), 7:231; Umar Abd Allah, 97-98.
[104]
Reissner, 149.
[105]
Al-Masālimah,
[106]
Zarzūr, 125.
[107]
Quoted in ibid., 129.
[108]
Zarzūr, 134; Reissner, 129, 131.
[109]
Al-Masālimah,
[110]
Dekmejian, 4:71.
[111]
Ashraf ‘Īd al-‘Antablī, “‘Iṣām al-‘Aṭṭār: Jihād wa ghurbah.” IkhwanWiki. Retrieved March
7, 2014.
http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title= ‫ ر _ﻋﺻﺎ ماﻟﻌطﺎ‬.
A lengthy biography that is based on various sources, including several TV interviews with
al-‘Aṭṭār. Cf. Moubayed, 180-181.
[112]
Al-‘Antablī,
[113]
Ibid.
[114]
Ibid.
[115]
Zarzūr, 287.
[116]
Al-‘Antablī,
[117]
Ibid.
[118]
Ibid.
[119]
Ibid.
[120]
‘Iṣām al-‘Aṭṭār, TV interview.
[121]
Ibid.
[122]
Khoury, 3: 192.
[123]
John Voll, “Sūfī Orders,” in John Esposito. Ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia…, 4: 109.
[124]
For a good treatment of the history of Sufism in Syria, past and present, see ‘Abd Allāh
al-‘Askarī, Tārīkh al-Taṣawwuf fī Sūriyah: al-Nash’ah wa al-tatawwur: al-Zamān, al-makān,
al-insān. (n.p., 2008).
[125]
‘Umar Riḍā Kaḥḥālah, Mu‘jam al-mu’allifīn. (Vols. 4). (Damascus: Mu’assasat al-
Risālah, 1993), 3: 696.
[126]
See Hamid Algar, “Naqshbandīyah,” in John Esposito. Ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia…,
3: 226-229; J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998); Hassan Abu Hanieh, Sufism and Sufi Orders: God’s Spiritual Paths
Adaptation and Renewal in the Context of Modernization. (Jordan: Economic Printing Press,
2011), 165-174.
[127]
Al-Ṭanṭāwī, 1:78.
[128]
Al-Ziriklī, 2:294; Algar, 3: 227-228; Nizār Abāzah, al-Shaykh Khālid al-Naqshbandī:
al-‘Ālim al-mujaddid. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1994).
[129]
Al-Ziriklī, 6:42.
[130]
Ibid., 4:45.
[131]
Abāzah, al-Shaykh Khālid al-Naqshbandī…, 24-29.
[132]
‘Abd Allāh al-Jarīzī, al-Khaznawiyyah khidā‘ wa taḍlīl. (n.p., n.d.), 6.
[133]
Ibid.
[134]
‘Iṣām Khūrī, “al-Madrasah al-Khaznawiyyah...; al-Jarīzī, 6.
[135]
Rābiṭah is placed right in the center of Naqshbandī doctrine. Khālid al-Naqshbandī
vigorously defends it, claiming that while deeply rooted in sharia, it never goes against
Islamic norms and principles. See his argument in Abāzah, al-Shaykh Khālid al-
Naqshbandī..., 6.
[136]
Al-Jarīzī, 13.
[137]
Ibid., 23.
[138]
Ibid., 28, 35.
[139]
Ibid., 36; for a good account of this matter, see ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Dimashqiyyah,
Naqshbandiyyah: ‘Arḍ wa taḥlīl. (n.p., 1991), 69-77.
[140]
See al-Jarīzī, 94-98.
[141]
Khūrī, “al-Madrasah al-Khaznawiyyah...”
[142]
“Ahamm al-ḥarakāt wa al-jamā‘āt al-dīniyyah fī Sūriyah,” (April 22, 2011). Al-Sakīnah
Web. Retrieved March 15, 2015.
http://www.assakina.com/center/parties/7574.html.
[143]
Retrieved March 21, 2015. http://www.abunour.net.
[144]
Ibid.
[145]
Pierret, 48.
[146]
Zarzūr, 344-345; Pierret, 48-49.
[147]
Muḥammad al-Ya‘qūbī, “Barakat al-Shām al-‘ālim al-rabbānī al-shaykh Aḥmad al-
Rifā‘ī,” (October 23, 2010). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=speeches&pg_id=346.
[148]
Holy person, who is, due to constant obedience and passionate devotion, very close to
Allah.
[149]
Abdāl, literally “Substitutes,” are one of the degrees in the Sufi hierarchical
order of saints, who, unknown by the masses, participate by means of their powerful influence,
granted by Allah, in the preservation of the order of the universe. According to a tradition, Abdāl
have their residence in al-Shām. To their merit and intercession are due necessary rains, victories
over enemies, and the averting of general calamities. There are several other traditions
referring to them. However, scholars of hadith cast doubt on their authenticity. See Ibn al-
Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, al-Manār al-munīf. (Ḥalab: Maktab al-Maṭbū‘āt al-Islāmiyyah, 1970),
136-137.
[150]
Al-Ya‘qūbī, “Barakat al-Shām…”
[151]
Al-Ziriklī, 4:305; Johansen, J. “Shādhilīyah,” in John Esposito. Ed. The Oxford
Encyclopedia…, 4: 37-38.
[152]
See Johansen, 4: 37-38.
[153]
See Mokrane Guezzou, Shaykh Muḥammad al-Hashimi: his life and works. (UK: Viator
Books, 2009); M. Riḍā al-Qahwajī, al-‘Allāmah Muḥammad al-Hāshimī: Murabbī al-sālikīn.
(n.p., 2004).
[154]
M. Muṭī‘ al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Nizār Abāzah, Tārīkh ‘ulamā’ Dimashq fī al-qarn al-rābi‘ ‘ashar.
(vols. 2). (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1986), 2: 747.
[155]
Ibid., 2:748; al-Qahwajī, 109-120.
[156]
Al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Abāzah, 1:427; al-Qahwajī, 121-124.
[157]
Al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Abāzah, 2:748; al-Qahwajī, 125-133.
[158]
Al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Abāzah, 2:749; al-Qahwajī, 163-165.
[159]
Al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Abāzah, 2:749; al-Qahwajī, 167-180.
[160]
Muḥammad al-Ya‘qūbī, “Qabasāt min ḥayāt al-shaykh ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Shāghūrī.” A
biography written in the life of ‘al-Shāghūrī and an introduction to his posthumous divan of
poems on divine and Prophetic love, Dīwān al-ḥadā’iq al-nadiyyah fī al-nasamāt al-rūḥiyyah.
(n.p., 2005), 29-34. See also Nizār Abāzah, ‘Ulamā’ Dimashq wa a‘yānuhā fī al-qarn al-
khāmis ‘ashar. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2007), 501-506.
[161]
Al-Ya‘qūbī, “Qabasāt min…" 30-31; Abāzah, ‘Ulamā’ Dimashq wa a‘yānuhā..., 502.
[162]
Al-Ya‘qūbī, “Qabasāt min…" 30-31.
[163]
Al-Ya‘qūbī, “Qabasāt min…" 33; Abāzah, ‘Ulamā’ Dimashq wa a‘yānuhā..., 503.
[164]
Al-Ya‘qūbī, “Qabasāt min…" 33.
[165]
Ibid.
[166]
Al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Abāzah, 2: 794; M. ‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Farfūr, A‘lām Dimashq fī al-qarn al-
rābi‘ ‘ashar al-hijrī. (Damascus: Dār al-Mallāh, 1987), 266.
[167]
Al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Abāzah, 2: 795.
[168]
Ibid., 2: 795-796.
[169]
Ibid., 2: 799.
[170]
Al-Qahwajī, 81.
[171]
Trimingham, 40-44; al-Ziriklī, 4: 47.
[172]
‘Iṣam Khūrī, “al-Madrasah al-Qādiriyyah fī Sūriyah.” al-Ḥiwār al-mutamaddin. No. 2724
(July 2009). Retrieved March 21, 2014.
http://www. ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=179543.
[173]
Jamāl al-Dīn Fālih al-Kīlānī, al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Kīlānī. (Baghdad: Miṣr Murtaḍā
Foundation, 2011), 430.
[174]
Khūrī, “al-Madrasah al-Qādiriyyah...”
[175]
Ibid.
[176]
Ibid.
[177]
Ibid.
[178]
Ibid.
[179]
Ibid.
[180]
Al-Ziriklī, 1:174; Kaḥḥālah, 1:213; Spencer, 37-40.
[181]
Al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Abāzah, 2: 768.
[182]
Ibid.
[183]
Ibid.
[184]
Khaldūn Makhlūṭah, “al-Shaykh Maḥmūd al-Shuqfah al-Ḥamwī,” (October 10, 2009).
Islam Syria. Retrieved April 2, 2014.
http://www.islam syria.com/cvs.php?action=details&CVID=131.
[185]
Ibid.
[186]
Ibid.
[187]
Kaḥḥālah, 1: 288.
[188]
Abu Hanieh, 175.
[189]
Founded by ‘Alī al-Daqir and Hāshim al-Khaṭīb in the 1920s. See al-Ṭanṭāwī, 1:185-
186; Reissner, 118.
[190]
Certain version praising the Prophet and invoking Allah’s blessings on him. See it in al-
Ṭanṭāwī, 7:76.
[191]
Ibid.
[192]
Among them were the eminent shaykhs ‘Alī al-Ṭanṭāwī and Bahjat al-Bītār, both Syrian;
the Mauritanian Muḥammad al-Khiḍr; and former grand mufti of Egypt Muḥammad Bakhīt
al-Muṭī‘ī. See Al-Ṭanṭāwī, 7:77.
[193]
Ibid., 7: 77-78.
[194]
Ibid., 7: 79.
[195]
Ibid., 7: 77.
[196]
Ibid., 7: 80. See al-Daqir’s written statement about this matter in al-Ḥāfiẓ, and Abāzah,
2: 595.
[197]
Reissner, 118.
[198]
According to ‘Umar Dhū al-Nūn, al-Shāghūrī’s close relative. Conversation with the
author. March 23, 2014.
[199]
For different perspectives of Salafism, see ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Abd al-Khāliq, al-Uṣūl al-
Islāmiyyah li al-da‘wah al-Salafiyyah. (Cairo, 1965); Abū Yūsuf Ibn Bakr, Muhāḍarāt fī al-
Salafiyyah. (Egypt, 1990); Emad Aldin Shahin, “Salafiyah,” in John Esposito. Ed. The
Oxford Encyclopedia…, 3:463-469; Khouloud Al Nounou, “Salafism: Its Meaning, Mainly in
the Thought of Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti,” (MA thesis, Hartford Seminary, 2008);
Mufarriḥ ibn Sulaymān al-Qawsī, al-Mawqif al-mu‘āṣir min al-manhaj al-Salafī fī al-bilād
al-‘Arabiyyah: Dirāsah naqdiyyah. (Riyadh: Dār al-Faḍīlah, 2002); Muḥammd Ḥāmid al-
Nāṣir, ‘Ulamā’ Dimashq fī al-qarn al-‘ishrīn wa juhūduhum fī īqāẓ al-ummah wa al-tasaddī li
al-tayyārāt al-wāfidah. (‘Ammān: Dār al-Ma‘ālī, 2003); Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, Islamic
Beliefs and Doctrine According to Ahl al-Sunnah: A Repudiation of Salafi Innovations.
(Chicago: As-Sunna Foundation of America, 1996). And his book “Salafi” Movement
Unveiled. (California: As-Sunna Foundation of America, 1997); Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān
al-Būṭī, al-Salafiyyah: Marḥalah zamaniyyah mubārakah lā madhhab Islāmī. (10th ed.).
(Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2008); Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī, al-Salafiyyah bayna al-‘aqīdah al-Islāmiyyah
wa al-falsafah al-Gharbiyyah. (Alexandria, 1991).
[200]
Al-Ziriklī, 7:257.
[201]
Ibid., 1:144.
[202]
Al-Ziriklī, 2:135; Nizār Abāzah, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī. (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam,
1997); M. Ibn Nāṣir al-‘Ajamī. Ed. Imām al-Shām fī ‘aṣrih: Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī. (Kuwait:
Idārat al-Thaqāfah al-Islāmiyyah, 2009).
[203]
Al-‘Ajamī, 23; Abāzah, Jamāl al-Dīn…, 187-188.
[204]
Abāzah, Jamāl al-Dīn..., 319-321.
[205]
Ibid., 310.
[206]
See Ibid., 301-346.
[207]
Ibid., 323-325.
[208]
Al-‘Ajamī, 229-299.
[209]
Abāzah, ‘Ulamā’ Dimashq wa a‘yānuhā..., 393.
[210]
Ibid., 394.
[211]
The book was published in Damascus in 1969 by Dār al-Fārābi. The third edition was
published in 1985.
[212]
Al-Būṭī, al-Lā madhhabiyyah..., 16.
[213]
One who is competent to reason from the main texts of Islam, and fashion new rules.
[214]
Al-Būṭī, al-Lā madhhabiyyah..., 16. See examples on 109-111.
[215]
Ibid., 16.
[216]
Ibid., 94-117.
[217]
Born in Damascus in 1938, a writer and preacher. See his biography in Ayman Dhū al-
Ghinā, “Tarjamah mūjazah li faḍīlat al-shaykh Muḥammad Īd ‘Abbāsī.” (January 11, 2011).
Al-Aluka Network. Retrieved April 13, 2014.
http://www.alukah.net/culture/0/28931/#ixzz30GdXblkd.
[218]
(‘Ammān: al-Maktabah al-Islāmiyyah, 1970). Al-Būṭī in al-Lā madhhabiyyah…, 155
asserts that the actual author of the book is not ‘Abbāsī but al-Albānī with two of his
students, Maḥmūd Mahdī al-Istanbūlī and Khayr al-Dīn Wānlī.
[219]
See al-Būṭī, al-Lā madhhabiyyah…, 152-196.
[220]
See his biography in Abāzah, ‘Ulamā’ Dimashq wa a‘yānuhā..., 309-312.
[221]
(Halab: Maktab al-Maṭbū‘āt al-Islāmiyyah, 1974).
[222]
In 1975.
[223]
Ayman Dhū al-Ghinā, “Raḥīl al-shaykh al-mujāhid Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh.” (June 3, 2013).
Al-Aluka Network. Retrieved April 13, 2014.
http://www. alukah.net/culture/0/55481/#ixzz2zQGAAuL8.
[224]
Ibid.
[225]
Ibid.
[226]
Ibid.
[227]
Abāzah, ‘Ulamā’ Dimashq wa a‘yānuhā…, 394.
[228]
Al-Farfūr, A‘lām Dimashq fī al-qarn…, 69.
[229]
Ibid., 237.
[230]
Ibid.
[231]
See his biography in Ayman Dhū al-Ghinā, “‘Abd al-Qādir al-Arna’ūṭ: al-Muḥaddith al-
ḥāfiẓ wa al-imām al-qudwah.” (January 20, 2007). Al-Aluka Network. Retrieved April 13,
2014.
http://www.alukah.net/Culture/0/300/ #ixzz30GdmMpx8.
[232]
Ayman Dhū al-Ghinā, “A‘lām al-Iṣlāh wa al-Da‘wah al-Salafiyyah fī Sūriyah.” E-mail to
the author. May 29, 2014.
[233]
Al-Ṭanṭāwī, 1: 185-186; Reissner, 118.
[234]
Muḥammad al-Bakhīt, “al-Ta‘līm al-dīnī fī madīnat Dimashq,” (MA thesis, Ma‘had al-
Da‘wah al-Jāmi‘ī li al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyyah: Beirut, 2009), 71.
[235]
Ibid., 74.
[236]
Retrieved March 2014. http://www.abunour.net.
[237]
Al-Bakhīt, 75.
[238]
Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‘ and David J. Goa. Eds. A Religious Institution in Contemporary
Syria: The Fatih Islamic Institute and its Religious Scholars. (Alberta: Chester Ronning
Centre for the Study of Religion and Public Life and ECMC Chair in Islamic Studies,
University of Alberta, 2011).
[239]
Al-Bakhīt, 76.
[240]
Ibid., 68.
[241]
Ibid., 119
[242]
Ibid., 98.
[243]
I have taught at both institutions for several years.
[244]
Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr, conversation with the author, Damascus, 2011 and Kuala Lumpur,
May 31, 2016. On al-Fatḥ and the revolution, see my article, Bachar Bakour, “Regime or
Revolution? The Dilemma of Syria’s Religious Institutions: The Example of the Fatih
Institute,” Politics, Religion & Ideology, vol. 21, no. 2 (June 2020): 232-250. DOI:
10.1080/21567689.2020.1763317
[245]
Pierret, 54.
[246]
Ibid., 54-57.
[247]
Ibid., 89.
[248]
Based on personal information.
[249]
According to Shaykh Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr, interview August 22, 2015.
[250]
See Pierret, 230-232.
[251]
“Al-Shaykh Kuftārū yataḥaddath ‘an khafāyā ‘ālam al-Qubaysiyyāt fī Sūriyah.” (May 10,
2007). alarabiya.net. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/05/10/34306.html.
[252]
Ibid; “al-Qubaysiyyāt ḥarakah Islāmiyyah nisā’iyyah ghāmiḍah ‘udwātuhā yazidna ‘an
70 alfan.” (May 3, 2006). alarabiya.net. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2006/05/03/23408.html.
[253]
“Al-Shaykh Kuftārū…”
[254]
For more information on the female Muslim activities in Syria, see Gisele Fonseca
Chagas, “Muslim Women and the Work of Da‘wah: The female branch of the tariqa
Naqshbandiyya-Kuftariyya in Damascus-Syria,” in Islamic Political and Social Movements,
edited by Barry Rubin. (vols. 3). Routledge, 2013. 3: 229-243; and Hilary Kalmbach, “Social
and Religious Change in Damascus: One Case of Female Islamic Religious Authority,”
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 35 (1), 37-57; Khatib, 167-168.
[255]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhā wālidī. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1995), 29; “Nubdhah ‘an ḥayāt
al-‘allāmah al-imām al-shahīd Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī” (a biography read and
approved by al-Būṭī himself), Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved July 24, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=mufty&pg_id=1992.
[256]
“Nubdhah ‘an ḥayāt al-‘allāmah…”
[257]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhā wālidī, 18.
[258]
Ibid., 64-65.
[259]
See ibid., 65-68.
[260]
Ibid., 57.
[261]
Ibid., 59.
[262]
Pierret, 44-46.
[263]
“Nubdhah ‘an ḥayāt al-‘allāmah…
[264]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhā wālidī, 129-130.
[265]
Al-Būṭī, Min al-fikr wa al-qalb, New ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fārābī, 1997), 315-348. The
article was originally published in 1961.
[266]
Andreas Christmann, “Islamic Scholar and Religious Leader: A Portrait of Shaykh
Muhammad Sa‘id Ramadan al-Būti,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 9, no. 2
(1998): 152.
[267]
Al-Būṭī, Min al-fikr wa al-qalb…, 332.
[268]
Ibid., 333.
[269]
See Ibid., 333-346.
[270]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhā wālidī, 61.
[271]
“Nubdhah ‘an ḥayāt al-‘allāmah...
[272]
Ibid.
[273]
Ibid.
[274]
Based on my personal information.
[275]
Ibid.
[276]
Al-Ṭayyib Tīzīnī. Retrieved May 5, 2014.
http://www.discover-syria.com/news/4735.
[277]
Damascus: Dār Dimashq, 1981.
[278]
Damascus: Dār Dimashq, 1982.
[279]
Damascus: Dār al-Yanābī‘, 1997.
[280]
Edited by ‘Abd al-Wāḥid ‘Ulwānī. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998).
[281]
Ibid., 110-111.
[282]
Ibid., 180-186.
[283]
Ibid., 103.
[284]
Ibid., 178.
[285]
Ibid., 107-108.
[286]
See a good account of al-maṣlaḥah in Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim.
(Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2005). 76-82.
[287]
Al-Būṭī and Tīzīnī, 195-196.
[288]
Ibid., 198.
[289]
Al-Būṭī, Naqḍ awhām al-māddiyyah al-jadaliyyah. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1978).
[290]
See his books al-Madhāhib al-tawḥīdiyyah wa al-falsafāt al-mu‘āṣirah. (Damascus: Dār
al-Fikr, 2008). 319-524; and Yughāliṭūnak idh yaqūlūn. (2nd ed.). (Damascus: Dār al-Fārābī,
2000). 33-75.
[291]
Al-Būṭī, Al-madhāhib al-tawḥīdiyyah …, 295-318.
[292]
Al-Būṭī, Kubrā al-yaqīniyyāt al-kawniyyah: Wujūd al-Khāliq wa waẓīfat al-makhlūq.
(Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2009). The first edition appeared in 1969.
[293]
Al-Būṭī, al-Insān musayyar am mukhayyar. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1997).
[294]
Al-Būṭī, al-Madhāhib al-tawḥīdiyyah wa al-falsafāt al-mu‘āṣirah. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr,
2008).
[295]
Al-Būṭī, Qaḍāyā fiqhiyyah mu‘āṣirah. (Damascus: Dār al-Fārābī, 2004).
[296]
Al-Būṭī, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-fiqh al-muqāran. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1981).
[297]
Al-Būṭī, Mas’alat Taḥdīd al-nasil: wiqāyah wa ‘ilāj. (Damascus: Dār al-Fārābī, 1976).
[298]
Al-Būṭī, Ḍawābiṭ al-maṣlaḥah fī al-sharī‘ah al-Islāmiyyah. (Damascus: Dār al-Risālah,
1973).
[299]
Sharia, as a whole, was primarily instituted for the promotion of the best interests of
human beings (maṣāliḥ al-‘ibād). These interests are traditionally perceived in three legal
categories: (i) ḍarūriyyāt (necessary interests). They comprise five universal principles:
preservation and protection of religion, of life, of mind, of private property and of progeny, or
offspring. The existential purpose of Sharia is for the protection and promotion of these five
areas of human life, and nothing in its legal rulings can conceivably run counter to these
principles or any of their implications, since they are absolutely necessary for the proper
function of life. (ii) ḥājiyyāt (supporting needs). They are required by the necessary interests
for their smooth operation and implementation. (iii) taḥsīniyyāt (complementary interests).
They provide additional rules, leading to the moral and spiritual progress of the individual
and society. See al-Būṭī, Ḍawābiṭ al-maṣlaḥah…, (Damascus: Dār al-Risālah, 1973), 73-
109; Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 168-180.
[300]
Al-Būṭī, Manhaj al-ḥaḍārah al-insāniyyah fī al-Qur’ān. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1981).
[301]
Al-Būṭī, Manhaj tarbawī farīd fī al-Qur’ān. (Damascus: al-Fārābī. n.d.).
[302]
Al-Būṭī, al-Ḥubb fī al-Qur’ān wa dawr al-ḥubb fī ḥayāt al-insān. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr,
2009).
[303]
Al-Būṭī, Lā ya’tīh al-bāṭil. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2007).
[304]
Al-Būṭī, The Jurisprudence of the Prophetic Biography, translated by Nancy Roberts
(Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2007). (Original work published 1991).
[305]
Al-Būṭī, Hākadhā falnad‘u ilā al-Islām. (Damascus: al-Fārābī. n.d.).
[306]
Al-Būṭī, al-Salafiyyah: Marḥalah zamaniyyah mubārakah lā madhhab Islāmī.
(Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1988).
[307]
Al-Būṭī, al-Lā madhhabiyyah akhṭar bid‘ah tuhaddid al-sharī‘ah al-Islāmiyyah.
(Damascus: Dār al-Fārābi, 1969). The third edition was published in 1985.
[308]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhihi mushkilātuhum. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1990).
[309]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1995).
[310]
Al-Būṭī, Jihad in Islam: How to Understand it and Practise it, translated by Munzer Adel
Absi (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2006). (Original work published 1993).
[311]
Al-Būṭī, Ilā kull fatāh tu’min bi-Allāh. (Damascus: al-Fārābī, n.d.).
[312]
Al-Būṭī, Women Between the Tyranny of the Western System and the Mercy of the
Islamic Law, translated by Nancy Roberts (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2007). (Original work
published 1996).
[313]
Al-Būṭī, Yughāliṭūnak idh yaqūlūn. (Damascus: Dār al-Fārābī, 2000).
[314]
Edited by ‘Abd al-Wāḥid ‘Ulwānī. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998).
[315]
Al-Būṭī, Mammū zayn. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1982). The first edition was in 1957.
[316]
Al-Būṭī, Siyāmind, ibn al-adghāl. (Damascus: Dār al-Fārābī, 1988).
[317]
For a comprehensive bibliography on the subject, see Yvonne Y. Haddad, John o. Voll,
and John L. Esposito, The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and
Bibliography. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991).
[318]
The term is loaded with numerous dimensions and various ramifications. See M.
Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept,” Totalitarian Movements
and Political Religions, vol 8, no. 1, (2007): 17-33; Martin, R.C. & Barzegar, A. Islamism:
Contested Perspectives on Political Islam. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
[319]
Muqtedar Khan, “What is Political Islam?” (March 10, 2014). E-International Relations.
Retrieved July 25, 2015. http://www.e-ir.info/2014/ 03/10/what-is-political-islam/. See Aḥmad
Moussalli. Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity,
Legitimacy, and the Islamic State. (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1999); M. A.
Muqtedar Khan, “Islamic States,” in Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, edited by
Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan. (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2004).
[320]
Ma‘a al-Būṭī fī qaḍāyā al-sā‘ah. interview with al-Būṭī. (2013). Nūr al-Shām TV. No. 7
Retrieved July 29, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aa85yz7VRhw&list=PL01kYZIehH-pJIR03iFh
veTFll6Ba_er6&index=7.
[321]
Ibid.
[322]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1993), 172; and his book Wa
hādhihi mushkilātunā. (4th ed.). (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1995), 48, 58.
[323]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 45, 49.
[324]
Ibid., 45-47.
[325]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 171.
[326]
Ibid., 172.
[327]
Hishām ‘Ilīwān and Fādī al-Ghūsh. al-Būṭī, wa al-jihād wa al-Islām al-siyāsī. (Beirut:
Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li Tanmiyat al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2012), 131-132.
[328]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 48.
[329]
Esen Kirdiş, "Between Movement and Party: Islamic Political Party Formation in
Morocco, Turkey and Jordan" (PhD dissertation, the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis,
2011), 13-14.
[330]
For example see Mohammed Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” in Political
Islam, edited by Barry Rubin. (vols. 3). Routledge, 2007. 1: 51.
[331]
As will be shown, Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr, although an Islamist party, never subscribes to any of
these values.
[332]
Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 8.
[333]
Kirdiş, vii argues that movement with a vanguard mobilization strategy, in which a small
group of leaders frame the cause and mobilize masses around an Islamic identity, tend to
establish parties. In contrast, movements with a grassroots mobilization strategy in which
the aim is to construct mass consciousness through grassroots activities tend to remain
outside of formal politics, eschewing party formation.
[334]
For discussions on Islamist moderation, see Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation:
Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007);
Jillian Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation
Hypothesis,” World Politics, vol. 63, no. 2 (April, 2011): 347-376; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham,
“The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party,”
Comparative Politics, vol. 36, no. 2 (January, 2004): 205-228.
[335]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 64.
[336]
Ibid.
[337]
Ibid., 43.
[338]
Ibid.
[339]
Ibid., 44.
[340]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 45-47.
[341]
Ibid., 47.
[342]
Ibid., 48.
[343]
Al-Būṭī, al-Islām wa al-‘aṣr: taḥaddiyāt wa āfāq, edited by ‘Abd al-Wāḥid ‘Ulwānī.
(Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), 20.
[344]
Fixed penalties for certain crimes.
[345]
Al-Būṭī, al-Islām wa al-‘aṣr …, 20. See ‘Ilīwān and al-Ghūsh, al-Būṭī, wa al-jihād..., 124-
125.
[346]
Al-Būṭī, al-Islām wa al-‘aṣr…, 21.
[347]
Ibid.
[348]
Al-Būṭī’s lecture on establishing an Islamic state. (November 29, 2010) at Masjid Sultan
Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah, Shah Alam, Malaysia. Retrieved October 10, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rY0pAiu5jmE.
[349]
Ibid.
[350]
Ibid.
[351]
Al-Būṭī, al-Islām wa al-‘aṣr…, 25-28; ‘Ilīwān and al-Ghūsh, al-Būṭī wa al-jihād..., 126.
[352]
For contemporary treatments of takfīr phenomenon, see Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Zāhirat al-
ghulu fī al-takfīr. (3rd ed.). (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1990); and his book Min fiqh al-dawlah
fī al-Islām. (3rd ed.). Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2001), 101-114; ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannakah,
Baṣā’ir li al-Muslim al-mu‘āṣir. (3rd ed.). (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2000), 186-199;
Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Dustūr al-waḥdah al-thaqāfiyyah bayna al-Muslimīn. (3rd ed.).
(Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1998), 225-232; Sālim al-Bahnasāwī, al-Ḥukm wa qaḍiyyat takfīr
al-Muslim. (Al-Manṣūrah: Dār al-Wafā’, 1994). On traditions warning against reckless takfīr,
see Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, al-Musnad. (Vols. 52). (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1993-2001),
10: 158; al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. (Vols. 18). (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Miṣriyyah,
1930), 2: 49.
[353]
John Alden Williams, “Khawārij,” in John Esposito. Ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia…, 2:
418-420.
[354]
Ibrāhīm Karawān, “Takfīr,” in John Esposito. Ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia…, 4: 179.
[355]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 147-175.
[356]
Ibid., 147. This condition, al-Būṭī says, is taken from the famous tradition by ‘Ubādah
ibn al-Ṣāmit, who says, “We made an oath of allegiance to the Messenger of Allah to listen
and obey whether we are enthusiastic or apathetic, in difficult or easy times, and even if
others are given preference over us. And we would not fight against the ruler unless you
have seen clear disbelief for which you have a proof from Allah.” Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Bukhārī,
al-Jāmi‘ al-ṣaḥīḥ. (Vols. 4). (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Salafiyyah, 1400 AH), 4:313.
[357]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 148.
[358]
Ibid., 148-149.
[359]
Ibid., 149-150.
[360]
Ibid., 149.
[361]
Ibid., 151.
[362]
Ibid., 154, 156.
[363]
Ibid., 155.
[364]
Ibid., 156-157. It is recorded in books of jurisprudence that if there exist seventy reports
unanimously giving a verdict that so-and-so is kāfir, yet one report (even of weak
transmission), states the otherwise, then both the muftī and the judge have to adopt the
latter. Muḥammad Ibn ‘Ābidīn, Ḥāshiyat Ibn‘Ābidīn. (Vols 6). (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1992), 1: 82. This is in line with al-Būṭī’s analysis that if any doubt is
entertained, takfīr has to be suspended.
[365]
In his comment of these verses, Ibn ‘Abbās is quoted as saying, “Whoever denies what
is revealed by Allah, he is kāfir. And whoever recognises it, yet did not act according to it,
he is a wrongdoer and a transgressor.” Ismā‘īl Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘aẓīm.
(Damascus: Dār al-Khayr, 1990), 2: 70; Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmi‘ li aḥkām al-
Qur’ān. (Vols. 24). (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2006), 7: 497).
[366]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 157.
[367]
Ibid., 158.
[368]
Ibid., 159.
[369]
Ibid., 160. This story is narrated by al-Bukhārī and Muslim.
[370]
Ibid., 160-161.
[371]
An English translation of this book can be found at the following link. Retrieved
September 27, 2015.
http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream /handle/10066/4607/AYL20080410.pdf.
On legal discussion about tatarrus, see Asma Afsaruddin. Ed. Islam, the State, and Political
Authority: Medieval Issues and Modern Concerns. (US: Plagrave, 2011), 231-232; Anver M.
Emon. Ed. Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 205-206; Marco Lombardi, and Ean Ragab, el at.
Eds. Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism.
(Milan: IOS Press, 2014), 76-77; Jack Barclay, “Al-Tatarrus: al-Qaeda’s Justification for
Killing Muslim Civilians,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, no. 34 (September 2010): 6-9.
[372]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 162. According to Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī, the permissibility of
tatarrus depends on the following: Firstly, he says that if abstaining from operations in which
Muslims are being used by the enemy as shields would put the wider community in greater
danger then it would be the duty of the mujahidin to mount their attack. Secondly, he warns
that the alternative—that is, abstaining from an attack to spare Muslim civilians—constitutes
“a dysfunction in the duty of jihad,” which is one of the most important duties a Muslim can
perform and an individual imperative if the situation is one in which Muslim land is under
occupation. Thirdly, he stresses that if abstaining from an operation under such
circumstances leads to a non-Muslim enemy further occupying Muslim land, then the result
may be “a spoiling of the religion,” as Muslims are forced or induced to adopt non-Muslim
beliefs and practices. Thus, he argues that while potentially harming other Muslims during
an attack on the enemy is unpalatable, the mujahidin would be “preventing a general harm
by doing a specific harm,” and thus on balance their actions would be praiseworthy. Barclay,
“Al-Tatarrus: al-Qaeda’s…,” 7.
[373]
Al-Ziriklī, 7:22.
[374]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 163. See al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā min ‘ilm al-uṣūl. (al-
Madinah al-Munawwarah: al-Jāmi‘ah al-Islāmiyyah, 1413 AH), 2: 487-490.
[375]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 163.
[376]
Ibid., 164.
[377]
Actually, as will be shown later, it is, to a degree, a matter of disagreement.
[378]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 165.
[379]
Ibid.
[380]
Ma‘a al-Būṭī fī ḥayātih wa fikrih, interview with al-Būṭī. 2009. Al-Shām TV. No. 4.
Retrieved February 8, 2014.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=UZSHtD9jQ0w&list=PLScN5nWtR4PMWhnMW_E69llOKkar-u6PH&index=9.
This partisan tendency is found in the thought of the Syrian Brother, Sa‘īd Ḥawwa. See
examples of his statements in ‘Abd Allāh al-Nafīsī, al-Fikr al-ḥarakī li al-tayyārāt al-
Islāmiyyah. (Al-Kuwait: al-Rabī‘ān, 1995), 39-40.
[381]
Ibid.
[382]
Ibid.
[383]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 52.
[384]
Ibid.
[385]
Ma‘a al-Būṭī fī qaḍāyā al-sā‘ah …; see al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 55.
[386]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 55.
[387]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 184-185.
[388]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 54-55.
[389]
Al-Būṭī’s speech on al-Nūrsī, politics and Islamist movements. (February 3, 2008). At a
symposium on al-Nūrsī’s al-Khuṭbah al-Shāmiyyah, organized by al-Fatḥ Institute and the
Ministry of Awqāf, Damascus. Retrieved May 5, 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y-FXyOxb7Os.
[390]
Al-Būṭī, Min al-fikr wa al-qalb…, 332.
[391]
Ibid., 333.
[392]
Al-Būṭī’s speech on al-Nūrsī…
[393]
Ibid.
[394]
Ma‘a al-Būṭī fī ḥayātih wa fikrih…
[395]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 66; See ‘Ilīwān and al-Ghūsh, al-Būṭī, wa al-jihād..., 126-
127.
[396]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 66.
[397]
http://hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/AR/def. Retrieved May 16, 2016. See ‘Abd al-Raḥmān
Dimashqiyyah, Ḥizb al-taḥrīr. (Istanbul: Maktabat al-Ghurabā’, 1997), 10-15.
[398]
‘Ilīwān and al-Ghūsh, al-Būṭī, wa al-jihād..., 131-132.
[399]
The party’s publications are clear about this central issue. See for example Sa‘y al-
ummah naḥwa al-khilāfah. (Egypt, 2014); Manhaj Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr fī al-taghyīr. (Beirut: Dār al-
Ummah, 1989), and Nidā’ ḥārr ilā al-Muslimīn. (Khartoum: 1965). Cf. al-Nafīsī, al-Fikr al-
ḥarakī…, 21.
[400]
Manhaj Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr…, 4-8; Dimashqiyyah, Ḥizb al-taḥrīr, 46-47. For a refutation of
this weak opinion, see Rā’id Abū Ūdah, "Fikr Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr," (MA thesis, al-Jāmi‘ah al-
Islāmiyyah, Gaza, 2009), 15-18.
[401]
Manhaj Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr…, 28; al-Nafīsī, al-Fikr al-ḥarakī…, 20-21; Dimashqiyyah, Ḥizb
al-taḥrīr, 13-14, 37.
[402]
Rā’id Abū Ūdah, 28.
[403]
On these two groups, see David Zeidan, “Radical Islam in Egypt: A comparison of two
groups,” in Political Islam, edited by Barry Rubin. (vols. 3). Routledge, 2007. 2: 33-44; ‘Alī
al-Waṣīfī, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn bayna al-ibtidā‘ al-dīnī wa al-iflās al-siyāsī. (Dār al-
Mashāriq, 2010), 259-261; ‘Abd al-Salām Faraj, al-Jihād: al farīḍah al-ghā’ibah. (Amman,
1982). English translation in Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of
Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East. (Macmillan Pub Co, 1986).
In this pamphlet, Faraj, a former Muslim Brotherhood and the founder of Jamā‘at al-Jihād,
calls for the establishment of the Islamic state and urges Muslims to carry out a militant
jihad against Muslim rulers who do not implement sharia.
[404]
On Quṭb and his extreme views, see Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Waqfah ma‘a Sayyid Quṭb.
(Alexandria: Dār al-Wafā’, 2000); Mu‘taz al-Khaṭīb. Ed. Sayyid Quṭb wa al-takfīr. (Cairo:
Madbūlī, 2009); al-Waṣīfī, 269-288; John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical
Islamism. (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2010); James Toth, Sayyid Quṭb: The Life
and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013);
Yvonne Y. Haddad, “Sayyid Quṭb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” in Voices of Resurgent
Islam, edited by John Esposito. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 67-99; Thameen
Ushama, “Sayyid Quṭb: Life, Mission and Political Thought,” in Contemporary Islamic
Political Thought, edited by Zeenath Kausar. (Kuala Lumpur, IIUM, 2005), 229-266.
[405]
Ibid., 36-37.
[406]
Al-Sayyid Imam al-Sharīf, a leading ideologue of al-Jihad, made important revisions of
militant rhetoric in The Document for the Guidance of Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World,
serialized in al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, November 2007. One of al-Sharīf’s major
criticisms of these radical groups is the misapplication of tatarrus principle.
[407]
On their ideology and thought, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global Threat:
Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle East policy, Vol. 8, no. 4 (December, 2001): 18-38.
[408]
Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's
Justification for September 11,” in Political Islam, edited by Barry Rubin. (vols. 3).
Routledge, 2007. 1: 370.
[409]
Ibid., 1: 380-381.
[410]
Barclay, 6-9; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 1: 383.
[411]
Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front).
[412]
Mohammed Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria,” in
Political Islam, edited by Barry Rubin. (vols. 3). Routledge, 2007. 2: 357-381. The two
groups, of course, were aspiring for an Islamic state. 2: 364; and for the GIA see
Mohammed Hafez, “From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of
GIA Violence in Algeria,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited
by Quintan Wiktorowicz. (Indiana: Indiana University Press), 37-60.
[413]
Ibid., 365.
[414]
Ibid., 371.
[415]
See tables showing the targets and methods of Islamists during the insurgency from
1992 to 1998 in Ibid., 2: 367-370.
[416]
Ibid., 2: 370.
[417]
Deborah Sontag, “The Erdogan Experiment,” The New York Times, May 11, 2003.
Retrieved March 4, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/ magazine /the-erdogan-
experiment.html. Thomas Carroll, “Justice and Development Party: A Model for Democratic
Islam?” (2004). Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. Retrieved March 4, 2016.
https://www.meforum.org /meib/articles/0407_t1.htm. For analyses of the AKP and its
victory in the 2002 elections, see Soli Özel, “After the Tsunami,” Journal of Democracy, vol.
14 (April 2003): 80-94; and Ziya Önis and E. Fual Keyman, “A New Path Emerges,” Journal
of Democracy, vol. 14 (April 2003): 95-107.
[418]
Carrol,
[419]
Retrieved March 20, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FgU8g 6EYX8c.
[420]
See Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, Min tajribat al-ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah fī Tūnis. (Tunisia: Dār
al-Mujtahid, 2011; Muḥammad al-Ḥāmidī, Ashwāq al-ḥurriyyah: Qiṣṣat al-ḥarakah al-
Islāmiyyah fī Tūnis. (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1992), 80.
[421]
Emad Eldin Shahin, “Ghannūshī, Rāshid al-,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic
World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Retrieved January 3, 2016.
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0269.
[422]
Aidan Lewis, “Profile: Tunisia's Ennahda Party,” (October 25, 2011) BBC NEWS.
Retrieved June 5, 2016.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15442859.
[423]
Mohammed Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” in Political Islam, edited by
Barry Rubin. (vols. 3). Routledge, 2007. 1: 51. For details see Joshua A. Stacher, “Post-
Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party,” Middle East Journal, vol.
56 (Summer 2002), 415-432.
[424]
Ibid., 50. Muslim democracy has taken shape in the political process providing a model
for pragmatic change. On this issue, see Vali Nasr, “The Rise of Muslim Democracy,”
Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 2 (April 2005), 13-27. See also David Philips, From
Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition. (New Jersey: Transaction
Publishers, 2008). This book represents case studies of six Muslim organizations which
abandoned violence to pursue their goals through a peaceful political process: the Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt, Hamas, Hizbullah, the Kurdistan Workers Party of Turkey, the
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, and the Free Aceh Movement of Indonesia.
[425]
Erica Devine, “Is Islam the Solution? The Muslim Brotherhood and the Search for an
Islamic Democracy in Egypt,” (Honors Thesis, Providence College, U.S, 2011), 31. Cf.
Ayoob, 50-51.
[426]
See Kristen Stilt, “Islam is the Solution?: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood,” Texas International Law Journal, vol. 46, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 73-108. Retrieved
May 25, 2015.
http://www.tilj.org/content /journal/46/num1/Stilt73.pdf.
[427]
Amr Hamzawy, “Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its
Discontents,” Carnegie Endowment, no. 93 (July 2008). Retrieved May 27, 2016.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp93_hamzawy_pjd_final.pdf.
[428]
Shadi Hamid, “The Islamic Action Front in Jordan,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam
and Politics, edited by John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 544-558; Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in
Jordan and Yemen. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[429]
Said Shehata, “Profile: Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party,” BBC News. Retrieved May
27, 2016.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15899548.
[430]
Al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah, a vivid example of extremely partisan attitude, excommunicates
Muslims who do not follow their group or accept their ideas. See al-Waṣīfī, 259-261; Sālim
al-Bahnasāwī, al-Ḥukm wa qaḍiyyat takfīr al-Muslim, 27-36. This is, of course, contrary to
the thought of al-Ikhwān who consider themselves part of the mainstream Muslim
community rather than the only Muslim community.
[431]
See for example Bakr ibn ‘Abd Allāh Abū Zayd, Ḥukm al-intimā’ ilā al-firaq wa al-aḥzāb
wa al-jamā‘āt al-Islāmiyyah. (Saudi Arabia: n.p., 1410 AH). Eminent Salafī scholars, like
al-‘Uthaymīn, Fawzān, al-Albānī, prohibited creating or joining Islamist parties. See their
fatwas on this site:
http://www.alrbanyon.com/vb/showthread.php?t=5029. Retrieved April 5, 2016.
However, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Abd al-Khāliq, an eminent Salafī, supports different kinds of
political blocs, on the basis of “public interest.” That is, they are neither imposed nor
prohibited by Islamic sources. See his book al-Muslimūn wa al-‘amal al-siyāsī. (Kuwait: Dār
al-Salafiyyah, 1985), 27-28.
[432]
Ṣafī al-Raḥmān al-Mubārakfūrī, al-Aḥzāb al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Islām. (Rābiṭat al-Jāmi‘āt
al-Islāmiyyah: Maṭba‘āt al-Madīnah, 1987).
[433]
Ṣubḥī Sa‘īd, al-Ḥākim wa uṣūl al-ḥukm fī al-niẓām al-Islāmī. (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr
al-‘Arabī, 1985). His opinion is presented in al-Ghannūshī’s al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘āmmah fī al-
dawlah al-Islāmiyyah. (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1993), 287-288.
[434]
Al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘āmmah…, 288.
[435]
See detailed discussion on this the argument in Abū Zayd, 89-95; al-Ghannūshī, al-
Ḥurriyyāt al-‘āmmah…, 257; Ṣalāḥ Ṣāwī, al-Ta‘addudiyyah al-siyāsiyyah fī al-dawlah al-
Islāmiyyah. (Cairo: Dār al-I‘lām al-Dawlī, 1992), 42-43; al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah…,
153.
[436]
Al-Mubārakfūrī, 35.
[437]
Abū Zayd, 93-94; al-Mubārakfūrī, 46; Ṣāwī, 44.
[438]
Ṣāwī, 44-45.
[439]
Al-Mubārakfūrī, 48; Ṣāwī, 45.
[440]
Al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah…, 147-160.
[441]
Fahmī Huwaydī, al-Islām wā al-dīmuqrāṭiyyah. (Cairo: al-Ahrām, 1993).
[442]
Muḥammad ‘Amārah, Hal al-Islām huwa al-ḥall? (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1995), 86-92;
al-Islām wā ḥuqūq al-insān. (Kuwait: ‘Ālam al-Ma‘rifah, 1985), 90-92.
[443]
Muḥammad Salīm al-‘Awwā, Fī al-niẓām al-siyāsī li al-dawlah al-Islāmiyyah. (Cairo: Dār
al-Shurūq, 2006), 73-75.
[444]
Al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘āmmah …, 248-196.
[445]
Ḥasan al-Turābī, al-Siyāysah wa al-ḥukm. (Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2011),
159-192.
[446]
Huwaydī, 76, states that 200 Muslim thinkers expressed their support of political
pluralism in a statement published in a book Ro’yah Islāmiyyah mu‘āṣirah. (Cairo: Dār al-
Shurūq, 1992).
[447]
Al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah…, 153.
[448]
Ibid., 149.
[449]
Ṣāwī, 75.
[450]
Al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah…, 148; al-‘Awwā, 74; Huwaydī, 82-83.
[451]
Read the full text of the constitution in M.A Ṣalāḥī, Muhammad: Man and Prophet. (UK:
Islamic Foundation, 2002), 239-242.
[452]
Kharijites emerged in 657 CE at the battle of Ṣiffīn, a site on the Euphrates between
Syria and Iraq, where Alī was fighting to assert his authority over Mu‘āwiyah, the governor
of Syria. When Alī agreed to submit his quarrel with Mu‘āwiyah to arbitration, a group of his
followers accused him of rejecting the words of the Qur’an “If two parties of the faithful fight
each other, then conciliate them. Yet if one is rebellious to the other, then fight the insolent
one until it returns to Allah’s command” (Qur’an, al-Ḥujurāt: 9). ‘Uthmān, they believed,
deserved death because of his faults; Alī was the legitimate caliph. As Mu‘āwiyah with his
supporters had rebelled against Alī, it is wrong to come to terms with them; they rather must
be fought. Upon agreeing to arbitrate, Alī committed a grave sin of rejecting the Qur’anic
verse, excluding himself from the true community of the faithful. They held that Allah had
given his ḥukm (ruling or judgment) and “judgment is Allah’s alone” (i.e. Allah, not man, has
the authority to decide affairs) became their watchword. See Laura Vaglieri, “The Patriarchal
and Umayyad Caliphates,” in The Cambridge History of Islam, edited by Holt, Lambton and
Lewis. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 1A:68-69; John Alden Williams,
“Khawārij,” in John Esposito. Ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia…, 2:418; Jeffrey Kenney,
“Khawarij,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, edited by Juan Campo and Gordon Melton. (New York:
Checkmark Books, 2009). 431.
[453]
Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, al-Sunan al-kubrā. (Vols. 10). (Beirut: al-Ma‘rifah, n.d.) 8:184; Ibn
Abī Shaybah, al-Muṣannaf. (Vols. 16). (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1989)14:305.
[454]
Ibn Abī Shaybah, 14:309. Alī’s statement starts with “Qawm” (group or people), and,
not as famously known, with “Ikhānunā” (our brothers), as narrated in Ismā‘īl Ibn Kathīr, al-
Bidāyah wa al-nihāyah. (Vols. 20). (Cairo: Dār Hajar, 1998), 10: 591. Under scrutiny, this
second version is found very weak or rejected. see
https://islamsyria.com/site/show_consult/625. Retrieved April 11, 2016.
[455]
Ṣāwī, 50-51; Huwaydī, 41-42; al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah…, 153.
[456]
Al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah…, 151-152; Ṣāwī, 51.
[457]
As mentioned in the Qur’an, al-Mā’idah: 55.
[458]
Al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah…, 156.
[459]
See Ṣāwī, 55-58.
[460]
Ayoob, 51.
[461]
Reissner, 135-137; Zarzūr, 169-172. For more information on this topic, see Janine A.
Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt,
Jordan, and Yemen. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004).
[462]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 165.
[463]
Al-Qurṭubī, 19: 333.
[464]
Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ. (Vols. 6). (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-
Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1992), 6: 78-80.
[465]
See examples in ‘Alī al-Shuḥūd, al-Khulāsah fī aḥkām al-tatarrus. (n.p., 2011), 46.
[466]
Al-Kamāl ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr. (Vols. 10.) (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.),
5:448.
[467]
Ibn ‘Arafah al-Dasūqī, Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqī. (Vols. 4). (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), 2: 178.
[468]
Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn. (Vols. 12). (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1991), 10: 246.
[469]
See al-Mawsū‘ah al-fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah, “tatarrus.” (Vols. 45.) (Kuwait: Wizārat al-
Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1983), 10: 137; Muḥammad Khayr Haykal, al-Jihād wa
al-qitāl fī al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah, (Vols. 3). (2nd ed). (Beirut: Dār al-Bayāriq, 1996), 2: 1330.
[470]
Non-Muslim temporarily admitted to Muslim territory and enjoying full protection of life,
property and freedom.
[471]
Haykal, 2: 1331.
[472]
Al-mawsū‘ah al-fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah, “tatarrus.” 10: 137; Haykal, 2: 1335-6.
[473]
Abū Bakr al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‘ al-ṣanā’i‘. (vols. 7). (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah,
1986), 7: 101; Haykal, 2: 1336.
[474]
Al-Kamāl ibn al-Humām, 5: 448-9; Haykal, 2: 1336.
[475]
Al-Kamāl ibn al-Humām, 5: 448; al-Mawsū‘ah al-fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah, “tatarrus.”
10: 137.
[476]
Al-mawsū‘ah al-fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah, “tatarrus.” 10: 137; Haykal, 2: 1336.
[477]
See al-Būṭī, Ḍawābiṭ al-maṣlaḥah…, 73-109; Hallaq, A History of Islamic…, 168-180.
[478]
Al-Būṭī, Wa hādhihi mushkilātunā, 49.
[479]
Ibid., 50.
[480]
Al-Būṭī, al-Islām wa al-‘aṣr…, 25-28.
[481]
On the importance of adopting the gradual moderate approach in da‘wah, see Ibn
Taymiyyah, majmū‘ fatāwā ibn Taymiyyah. (Vols. 37). (al-Manṣūrah, Dār al-Wafā’, 2005),
20: 36; al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 41. The article “Dawlat al-Islām lā tabda’ bī al-
ḥijāb,” by Fahmī Huwaydī, an Egyptian thinker, presents a valid argument for the 'bottom-
up' approach. See his book al-Islām wā al-dīmuqrāṭiyyah. (Cairo: al-Ahrām, 1993), 215-221.
[482]
On December 8, 1948, al-Naqrāshī, the Prime Minister, issued a decree whereby
dissolving the MB movement. After twenty days, he was assassinated by the Brotherhood's
Secret Apparatus. See details about the incident in Aḥmad ‘Ādil Kamāl, al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-
ḥurūf. (Cairo: al-Zahrā’, 1989), 277-289; ‘Abd al-Raḥīm ‘Alī, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn. (Cairo:
al-Hay’ah al-Miṣriyyah li al-Kitāb, 2011), 431-471. Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, the founder of the
Tunisian Ḥizb al-Nahḍa, admits that acts of violence carried out by current Islamist groups
have had fatal consequences on the Islamic da‘wah. See his book al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah
wa mas’alat al-taghyīr. (London: al-Markaz al-Maghāribī, 2000), 80.
[483]
TV Interview with Farīd ‘Abd al-Khāliq, al-Bannā’s associate and a member of the
constitute body of Muslim Brotherhood. “Shāhid ‘alā al-‘aṣr.” (March 3, 2004). Al Jazeera.
Retrieved October 30, 2015.
https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=kbo6RR2hhjU.
[484]
Ḥassān Ḥatḥūt, al-‘Iqd al-farīd: ‘Ashr sanawāt ma‘a al-imām Ḥasan al-Bannā 1942-
1952. (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2000), 112.
[485]
For socio-political, historical, economic, and cultural analyses of the Tunisian
Revolution and its far-reaching impact, see Nouri Ganea. Ed. The Making of the Tunisian
Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013);
Amor Boubakri, “Interpreting the Tunisian Revolution: Beyond Bou’azizi,” in Routledge
Handbook of the Arab Spring, edited by Larbi Sadiki. (New York, London: Routledge, 2015),
65-76; Sami Zemni, “ The Roots of the Tunisian Revolution: Elements of a Political
Sociology,” in Routledge Handbook…, 77-88; Corinna Mullin, “Tunisia’s Revolution and the
Domestic-International Nexus,” in Routledge Handbook…, 89-104; Habib Ayeb, “Social and
Political Geography of the Tunisian Revolution: The Alfa Grass Revolution,” Review of
African Political Economy, vol. 38, no. 129 (2011): 467-479.
[486]
For a general explanation of rebellion, see Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel. (Princeton:
Princton University Press, 1970); James Davies, “Towards a Theory of Revolution,”
American Sociological Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (Febraury 1972): 5-19.
[487]
The 2002 Arab Human Development Report provides a detailed account and scathing
assessment of the economic, demographic, social and political conditions in the Arab world
in the period leading up to the uprisings. See Same E. Baroudi, “The 2002 Arab Human
Development Report: Implications for Democracy,” Middle East Policy, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring
2004): 132-141; and James Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know,
(2nd ed.). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 4-7; 25-27. The book includes
discussions on similar and different motivating factors of the Arab Spring countries. Cf.
Filipe R. Campante and Davin Chor, “Why was the Arab World Poised for Revolution?
Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring,” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 2012):167-187; Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab
Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya,” In The New Arab
Revolt: What Happened, What It Means, and What Comes Next. (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 2011), 320-328; Elfatih A. Abdel Salam, “The Arab Spring: Its origins,
evolution and consequences… four years on,” Intellectual Discourse, vol. 23, no. 1 (2015):
119-139.
[488]
Abdullahi Ayoade Ahmad, “The Political Situation and the Role of the West in the Arab
Uprisings,” International Journal of Social Science and Humanities, vol. 4, no. 2, (2016):
473.
[489]
Primoz Manfreda, “What is the Arab Spring?” About.com. Retrieved Oct. 10, 2015.
http://middleeast.about.com/od/humanrightsdemocracy/a/Definition-Of-the-Arab-Spring.htm.
[490]
The United States as well as several European countries, was either aware of or
directly involved in the training of bloggers and activists in the Middle East and North Africa
as early as 2003-2004. Government-financed institutions and NGOs in both the United
States and Europe welcomed cyber-dissidents from Tunisia, Egypt, and virtually all the
other Arab countries. These institutions and NGOs cooperated directly with major American
corporations, including Google and Yahoo, as well as Twitter and Facebook. The evidence,
which has been verified and confirmed, reveals that the Western countries were not only
aware of the activities and mobilizing efforts of the cyber-dissidents but had identified the
leaders and studied their profiles and objectives. Tariq Ramadan, Islam and the Arab
Awakening. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 24. For further information on the role
of the social media as an instrument of mobilization and revolutionary contagion, see
Theodor Tudoroiu, “Social Media and Revolutionary Waves: The Case of the Arab Spring,”
New Political Science, vol. 36, no. 3. (2014): 346-365; Azam Obeid, “Social Media Impact
on Arab Spring, a Comparison Study between Four Middle Eastern Countries,” (MA thesis,
Hawaii Pacific University, 2015); Zachary Steinert-Threlkeld, “Essays on Protest
Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes,” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, 2016).
On the basis of daily data on protests gathered from countries of (MENA), the author argues
that “protest mobilization correlates with coordination from individuals on the periphery of
their country's social networks, rather than those who are prominent.” xviii.
[491]
Ramadan, Islam and the Arab…, 23-66.
[492]
Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, Fiqh al-thawrah. (Cairo: Dār al-Kalimah, 2013), 47-53.
[493]
This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM (Directions), A Journal for
Judaism and Zionism, Issue No, 14-Winter, 5742, (February 1982), Editor: Yoram Beck.
Published by the Department of Publicity/The World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem. The
document was translated into English by Professor Israel Shahak, “Greater Israel: The
Zionist Plan for the Middle East,” Massachusetts: Association of Arab-American University
Graduates, Inc. Belmont, 1982).
[494]
Samir Rihami, “Iraq’s Revolutionary Cul-de-Sacs” in Public Administration and Policy in
the Middle East, edited by Alexander R. Dawoody et al. (New York: Springer, 2015), 116.
[495]
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, “Plans for Redrawing the Middle East: The Project for a
“New Middle East,” (November 18, 2006) Global Research. Retrieved October 10, 2015.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/plans-for-redrawing-the-middle-east-the-projec t-for-a-new-
middle-east/3882.
[496]
Rihami, 116.
[497]
Before this major incident of Dar‘a (March 6, 2011), two less influential incidents took
place: in the north-eastern city of al-Hasakah, (January 26, 2011), and in the Damascus
famous Souq al-Hamidiyyah, (February 17, 2011). Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-
Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency. (London: Hurst & Company
Publishers Ltd, 2015), 12. Cf. Gelvin, 126.
[498]
According to abundant reports, the children were tortured in a number of methods,
including nail plucking. This savage behavior was overseen by ‘Ātif Najib, the President’s
cousin, who was the head of the Political Security Directorate in Dar‘a at the time.
[499]
Lister, The Syrian Jihad…, 12-13. Among sources exploring different potent factors for
the revolution in Syria, see Stephen Starr, Revolt in Syria: Eye-witness to the Uprising.
(London: Hurst, 2012); Omar S. Dahi and Yasser Munif, “Revolts in Syria: Tracking the
Convergence Between Authoritarianism and Neoliberalism,” Journal of Asian and African
Studies, vol. 47, no. 4 (August 2012): 323-332; Christopher Phillips, “Syria's Torment,”
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 54, no. 4 (August-September 2012): 67-82; Alex
Ortiz, The Syrian Conflict and its Grave Origins: From Civil Uprising to War: Surveying
Domestic and Regional Political Relations in Syria. (LAP Lambert Academic Publishing,
2014); Aisha Al-Rashdi, “Fomenting a Sectarian Crisis? Bashar Al-Assad’s Reforms of
2000s and their Impact on the 2011 Syrian Uprising,” (MA Thesis, Leiden University, 2014).
[500]
The regime, fearful of the power of nonviolent opposition in neutralizing the power of
the government, was desperately trying to provoke resistance into acts of violence. As
Stephen Zunes aptly notes the regime was “recognizing that the Syrian people were far
more likely to support a regime challenged by an armed insurgency than through a largely
nonviolent civil insurrection." Stephen Zunes, “Supporting Unarmed Civil Insurrection in
Syria,” in The Syria Dilemma, edited by Nader Hashemi, Danny Postel. (Massachusetts,
The MIT Press, 2013), 107-108. On the militarization of the uprising, see Emile Hokayem,
Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2013), 81-92.
[501]
On the brutality of the regime toward demonstrators and other pockets of resistance,
see Gelvin, 128-130; Hani Sayed, “Fear of Arrest,” in The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End
of an Old Order? edited by Bassam Haddad, et al. (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 210-224;
Samar Yazbek, The Crossing: My Journey to the Shattered Heart of Syria, translated by
Nashwa Gowanlock, and Ruth Ahmedzai Kemp. (London: Ebury Press, 2016); Samar
Yazbek, A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution, translated by Max
Weiss. (London: Haus Publishing, 2012).
Worse, the regime’s barbarity and ruthlessness toward prisoners knows no boundaries. A
chilling Amnesty International Report (February 7, 2017) exposes the cold-blooded killing of
thousands of prisoners in Saydnaya prison, near Damascus According to this report, (based
on interviews with 84 witnesses, including guards, detainees, and judges) as many as
13,000 people were hanged in five years at this prison. At least once a week between 2011
and 2015, groups of up to 50 people were taken out of their prison cells for arbitrary trials,
beaten, then hanged in the middle of the night and in total secrecy. Most of those hanged
were civilians believed to have been opposed to the government. Retrieved February 8,
2017.
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/syria-13000-secretly-hanged-saydnaya-military-
prison-shocking-new-report.
[502]
(2012) Retrieved October 9, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= LYLpZ-b501c.
[503]
Al-Assad’s regime never showed willingness to deal with the crisis peacefully. See
Hokayem, 40-41.
[504]
For a linguistic analysis of this speech, see Kellie Stirling, “Dictatorship is democracy:
the persuasive power of performance, repetition, and silence in Arabic political
speechmaking in Assad's Syria,” (MA thesis, The University of Utah, 2014).
[505]
David Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad. (Yale: Yale University Press,
2012). An exploration of al-Assad’s failed leadership, and his transformation from bearer of
hope to reactionary tyrant.
[506]
“Al-Assad lifts unpopular emergency law, special court,” (April 21, 2011) CNN.
Retrieved October 5, 2015.
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/ meast/04/21/syria.unrest/index.html.
[507]
Christopher Phillips, “Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring,” In After the Arab Spring: Power Shift
in the Middle East, edited by Nicholas Kitchen. (London School of Economics and Political
Science, 2012), 39. On the Shabbīḥah, see Aron Lund, “Chasing Ghosts: The Shabihah
Phenomenon,” in The 'Alawis of Syria: War, Faith and Politics in the Levant, edited by
Michael Kerr and Craig Larkin. (London: Hurst & Company Publishers Ltd, 2015), 207-224;
Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War. (Washington:
The Institute for the Study of War, 2013), 16-18.
[508]
On the sectarian conflict’s origins, development and consequences, see Christopher
Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2 (2015):
357-376; Friederike Stolleis. Ed. Playing the Sectarian Cards: Identities and Affiliations of
Local Communities in Syria. (Beirut: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015); Tareq Hawari, “Syria's
Civil War and the Sectarian Violence Dilemma: A Study on the Development of the Sunni-
Alawite Struggle,” (MA thesis, Western Illinois University, 2016); Craig McCrea Browne,
“The Salience of Sectarianism: Making Sect Stick in Syria and Iraq,” (MA thesis,
Georgetown University, 2015); Fabrice Balanche, Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War. (The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018). A geopolitical study featuring 70 original
maps.
[509]
Rafizadeh Majid, “The Syrian Civil War: Four Concentric Forces of Tensions,” (PhD
Dissertation, University of South Florida, 2014). The research examines the Syrian conflict
in its four levels: domestic, regional and international, and non-state actors. For a different
perspective of the prolonged Syria's conflict, see William Todman, “Capitalising on collective
punishment: Siege tactics in the Syrian conflict,” (MA thesis, Georgetown University, 2016).
The thesis, instead of focusing on sectarian identities or military interventions, investigates
siege tactics factor. Based on survey responses from residents of besieged areas, and
interviews with diplomatic and humanitarian officials, the study argues that an exploration of
siege tactics highlights various factors that contributed to the intractability of the fighting.
Further, the thesis examines the emergence of the war economy in Syria. The data exposes
the significant financial gains that armed actors have due to the siege policy. Many armed
groups sought the continuation of siege warfare and endeavored to foil any attempt to truce
agreements that could limit their profit.
[510]
See Hawari, 37-50; Fabien Merz, (May 2014): “Adversarial Framing: President Bashar
al-Assad’s Depiction of the Armed Syrian Opposition,” Journal of Terrorism Research, vol.
5, no. 2 (May 2014): 30-44.
[511]
It is worthwhile to draw attention to the ethnic stacking of the Syrian military. A recent
study has showed that Alawis form 80 percent of the officer corps, and 70 percent of the
army’s 200 thousand career soldiers, although Sunnis form the majority of its 300 thousand
conscripts. Hicham Bou Nassif, “Generals and Autocrats: Coup-proofing and Military Elite’s
Behavior in the 2011 Arab Spring,” (PhD thesis, Indiana University, 2014), 175. On the eve
of the 2011 uprising, most of those holding sensitive posts (intelligence, military) were
Alawis. See tables on the most recent available data on ethnic stacking in the Syrian armed
forces. Ibid., 177-186; and ‘Azmī Bishārah, al-Ṭā’ifah al-ṭā’ifiyyah, al-ṭawā’if al-
mutahayyalah. (Doha, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2018), 361-371.
[512]
For understanding why Iran backs Syria, see Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory
of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect. (New York: Prometheus Books, 2014),
145-166; Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, "Iranian Strategy in Syria," a joint report
by AEI’s critical threats project & Institute for the study of war. May 2013.
[513]
See Megan Catherine Corro, “The Arab Uprisings and the Unveiling of the Shiite
Crescent,” (MA thesis, Georgetown University, 2013). It examines Iran and Hizbullah’s
support of the Assad regime within the context of the growth of the Shiite Crescent in the
region.
[514]
Aaron Reese, Sectarian and Regional Conflict in the Middle East. (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for the Study of War, 2013), 7. Cf. Hawari, 37-50.
[515]
Rafizadeh Majid, “The Syrian Civil War: Four Concentric Forces of Tensions,” (PhD
thesis, University of South Florida, 2014).
[516]
“Syria: The story of the conflict,” (March 11, 2016) BBC. Retrieved October 5, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 See also the report of Human Rights
Watch, “He Didn’t Have to Die”: Indiscriminate Attacks by Opposition Groups in Syria.
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0315_ForUpload.pdf.
[517]
Adam Alrowaiti, “Same Revolution, Different Outcome: Why Did the Syrian Regime
Survive the Arab Spring?” (MA thesis, Utah State University, 2016). A comparative analysis
of variables of the Libyan vs the Syrian case. The thesis explores four main reasons that
ensured Syrian regime’s survival: the character of the Syrian dictator, the role of the Syrian
military institution, the structure of the Syrian society, and the role of foreign intervention.
[518]
Joshua Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime is Likely to
Survive to 2013,” Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 72.
[519]
Ibid.
[520]
Max J. Rosenthal, “The Neverending Spring: How Syria's Revolution Became A
Stalemate,” (January 21, 2014). The Huffingtonpost. Retrieved October 5, 2015.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/21/syrian-civil-war-arab-spring_n_4550626.html. Cf.
Little, 77-84.
[521]
On the shifting heterogeneous nature of the Syrian opposition, see Gelvin, 132-134.
For an assessment of Sunni jihadist organizations in Syria, see Lister, The Syrian Jihad…,
[522]
Landis, 74. Cf. Gelvin, 132-134. Musa al-Gharbi, “Syria Contextualized: The Numbers
Game,” Middle East Policy, vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 56-67. The article re-examines
claims, often statistical in nature, taken by rebels or opposition activists to discredit and
morally weaken the regime.
[523]
Eyal Zisser, “Can Assad’s Syria Survive Revolution?,” The Middle East Quarterly, vol.
20, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 69-70. Cf. Hilary Weitze, “Civil War Incentives, Identities, and
Group Allegiances in Syria’s Contested Provinces: A Case Study on Civil War,” (MA thesis,
The City University of New York, 2015).
[524]
On the question of military intervention, see Brian Haggerty, “Safe Havens in Syria:
Missions and Requirements for an Air Campaign,” (MA Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2014); Asli Bali and Aziz Rana, “Why There is No Military Solution to the Syrian
Conflict,” in Hashemi and Postel. Eds. The Syria Dilemma…, 29-44; Salah Razzaq Oudah,
“The Debate over U.S. Military Intervention in Syria: A Policy Analysis,” (MA thesis,
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2013); Shadi Hamid, “Syria is Not Iraq: Why the
Legacy of the Iraq War Keeps Us from Doing the Right Thing in Syria,” in Hashemi and
Postel. Eds. The Syria Dilemma…,19-28; Christoph Reuter, “The Price of Inaction in Syria,”
in Hashemi and Postel. Eds. The Syria Dilemma…, 195-206. Reuter argues that the
international non-intervention in Syrian would just play into the hands of al-Assad, who has
nothing to win, but plenty to destroy. On the legality of third-state assistance, see Tom Ruys,
“Of Arms, Funding and 'Nonlethal Assistance'-Issues Surrounding Third-State Intervention
in the Syrian Civil War,” Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 13, no. 1 (April 2014): 13-
53.
[525]
See Alrowaiti, 55-60.
[526]
Michael J. Totten. “Year Four: The Arab Spring Proved Everyone Wrong,” (July/August
2014). World Affairs. Retrieved October 1, 2015.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/year-four-arab-spring-proved-everyone-wrong.
Cf. Landis, 75-76; Phillips, “Syria’s Bloody Arab…,” 40-41.
[527]
On the international buffer zone plea, see Mary Kaldor, “A Humanitarian Strategy
Focused on Syrian Civilians,” in Hashemi and Postel. Eds. The Syria Dilemma…, 157-158.
[528]
“Syria: The Story of the Conflict.”
[529]
“Syria: The Story of the Conflict”, see statistics at
http://data.unhcr.org /syrianrefugees/regional.php. Retrieved October 1, 2015.
[530]
“Syria: The Story of the Conflict.” For further information, see David S. Sorenson, Syria
in Ruins: The Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War. (California: Praeger Security International,
2016). The book addresses the following: the factors contributing to the civil war, the growth
of ISIS in the region, the international response to the Syrian crisis, as well as considering
the possible ends of this tragedy.
[531]
“The Syrian Catastrophe: Socio-economic Monitoring Report,” The Syrian Center for
Policy Research, UNRWA, (January 2013), 5.
[532]
Ibid., 6.
[533]
Ibid.
[534]
Ibid., 5.
[535]
About the nation state and its jurists, see Mu‘taz al-Khaṭīb, “al-Faqīh wa al-dawlah fī al-
thawrāt al-‘Arabiyyah,” Tabayyun. No. 3/9 (Summer 2014): 72-73.
[536]
Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah wa mas’alat al-taghyīr, 40-41. For
details as regards the Syrian regime vs Sunni ulema, see Thomas Pierret, Religion and
State in Syria. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
[537]
“Syria reverses ban on Islamic face veil in schools” (April 6, 2011) Al Arabiya News.
Retrieved July 21, 2015. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/ 2011/04/06/144466 .html.
[538]
Lister, The Syrian Jihad…, 55.
[539]
On these choices and their driving forces, see Gordon Tullock, “The Paradox of
Revolution,” Public Choice, Vol. 11, no. 1 (September 1971): 89-99.
[540]
(April 23, 2011) Retrieved July 22, 2015.
http://www.islamtoday.net/albasheer/artshow-12-149530.htm.
[541]
Al-Ikhbāriyyah al-Sūriyyah TV. (May 10, 2011). The regime accused both men of being
the brains behind the Dar‘a uprising and of orchestrating alleged terrorist operations against
security forces by Salafist radicals. They were charged with obtaining financial resources
and weapons from Saudi-based Salafists, calling for jihad, instigating demonstrations,
issuing a fatwa branding Syrian security forces as “Zionists,” and paying volunteers to
attack security forces and burn down Ba’ath party headquarters. Reinoud Leenders &
Steven Heydemann, “Popular Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and Threat, and the Social
Networks of the Early Risers,” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (July 2012): 152. The
regime's allegations are debunked in the article, 151-154.
[542]
(August 7, 2011). Retrieved January 7, 2015.
http://thawrtalsoryienalahrar.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_7771.html.
[543]
On the nature of rebel forces in Homs and Idlib, see Weitze, 3-5, 19-22 respectively.
[544]
Zisser, “Can Assad’s…,” 69-70.
[545]
Based on personal information.
[546]
See Pierret, 224.
[547]
(March 3, 2013). Retrieved July 16, 2015.
http://syria-news.com/readnews.php?sy_seq=157610.
[548]
(April 13, 2015) Retrieved July 20, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=q1Y-epbbeP8.
[549]
See for example, Nahj al-Islām, no. 130, 34th year. (May 2013): 6-12; no. 131, 35th
year. (July 2013): 14-25, 35-98; no 134, 35th year. (April 2014): 12-20; no. 136, 36th year.
(October 2014): 6-10; no 137, 36th year. (January 2015): 12-20.
[550]
Nahj al-Islām, no. 134, 35th year. (April 2014): 6.
[551]
Ibid.
[552]
(April 25, 2014) Retrieved July 20, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=fEdxmY84sKM.
[553]
This is according to several of my colleagues who attended the meeting. One of them
is Shaykh Wa’il al-Bizm, son of ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Bizm, mufti of Damascus. He said, “Even
my father knew nothing about this meeting.”
[554]
Fiqh al-azmah. (Damascus: The Ministry of Awqāf, 2014), 3: 8.
[555]
Ibid., 8-10.
[556]
Based on my prolonged and close contact with Shaykh Farfūr, I do not believe him to
be a pro-regime scholar, yet his adopted strategy, which included a frequent appearance in
regime media outlets, drove many people to put him into this category. Al-Fatḥ Institute
leaders were faced with the dilemma of ‘you are either with us or against us.’ By his
conciliatory approach (or preventive measure), Shaykh Farfūr is making an earnest effort
not to give the regime any excuse to destroy or close the institute.
[557]
In Damascus and Kuala Lumpur, I had several discussions, short and lengthy, with
Shaykh Ḥusām al-Dīn Farfūr about the Syrian crisis. However, the formal interview with him
was conducted in Kuala Lumpur, May 31, 2016.
[558]
Ibid.
[559]
Shaykh Farfūr responded to this claim, as mentioned in chapter one.
[560]
Silence or quietism here means that these scholars while maintaining teaching and
academic career have not made any public or formal statement that clarifies their position in
order not to aggravate the situation. They, however, may have expressed their opinion in
private or semiprivate meetings.
On quietism, see Patricia Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2004), 135-137.
[561]
Others consider al-Bizm a pro-regime scholar as he is still in his fatwa office and at
times participates in meetings organized by the Ministry of Awqāf.
[562]
Based on personal information.
[563]
‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Bizm, interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, March 24, 2016.
[564]
Ibid.
[565]
Ibid.
[566]
For example, Ghāzī al-Tawbah, “Ṣifāt al-‘ālim: al-Būṭī namūdhajan ma‘kūsan.” (2012).
Retrieved September 27, 2014.
http://www.metransparent.com/old/texts/mohamed_ali_el_attasi_sheikh_bouti.htm
http://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions; Muḥammad al-Atāsī, “al-Faqīh wa al-
sulṭān: al-shaykh al-Būṭī namūdhajan.” (November 9, 2004). Retrieved January 7, 2015.
[567]
Pierret, 78.
[568]
Zisser, “Syria, the Ba‘th…,” 2:468.
[569]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhā wālidī, 139.
[570]
Ibid.
[571]
Ibid., 140.
[572]
Ibid., 139.
[573]
Christmann, 152.
[574]
For information on this incident, see Van Dam, 91-92.
[575]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhā wālidī, 140.
[576]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhā wālidī, 141; Christmann, 153.
[577]
Al-Būṭī, Hādhā wālidī, 141-142; Christmann, 153.
[578]
Ma‘a al-Būṭī fī ḥayātih wa fikrih, interview with al-Būṭī. 2009. Al-Shām TV. No.3.
Retrieved February 8, 2014.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GEAL3d1p5k&list=PLScN5nWtR4PM
WhnMW_E69llOKkar-u6PH&index=11.
[579]
Ibid.
[580]
Al-Būṭī, Ilā huwāt al-akhīlah al-kādhibah, Friday sermon. (April 4, 2011). Retrieved July
21, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readrticle&pg_id=10101&page1=1U.
[581]
Ibid.
[582]
Ibid.
[583]
Ibid.
[584]
Ibid.
[585]
Fiqh al-azmah, (Damascus: The Ministry of Awqāf, 2014), 2: 154.
[586]
Ibid.
[587]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 7, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=15150
[588]
Majd Makkī, a researcher at the College of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa
University, interview by the author, Gombak, Selangor, February 24, 2017.
[589]
Ibid.
[590]
See his book Hādhā mā qultuh amām ba‘ḍ al-ruasā’ wa al-mulūk. (Damascus: al-
Fārābī, 2002), 73-75.
[591]
‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannakah, al-Wālid al-dā‘iyah al-murabbī al-shaykh Ḥasan
Ḥabannakah. (Jeddah: al-Bashīr, 2003), 133.
[592]
Kurayyim Rājiḥ, interview by the author, Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia. February 25,
2017.
[593]
Makkī, interview…
[594]
Mūsā al-‘Umar, “Kunt ṣadīqan li al-Būṭī,” (February 1, 2013). Retrieved Feb 10, 2015.
https://www.zamanalwsl.net/readNews.php?id=35423.
[595]
Al-Būṭī’s speech. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDg7xpLLuhw.
The chapter four provides materials supporting the conspiracy theory.
[596]
Al-Būṭī’s speech. (2011). Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvk4PgsWQd4.
[597]
Al-Būṭī’s speech at Damascus University, (July 20, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved
March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=Lessondetails&pg_id=16794&bk_id=746U.
[598]
Ibid.
[599]
Ibid; al-Būṭī’s speech. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0eKfdRaLxU.
[600]
Al-Būṭī’s speech. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0eKfdRaLxU.
The tradition is narrated by Muslim and Abū Dāwūd. See Ibn al-Athīr, 10: 11.
[601]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 22, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=16075&back=8928U.
[602]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (June 5, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=13060&back=8928U.
[603]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (June 14, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=14026&back=8913.
[604]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (June 23, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=14375.
[605]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (June 14, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?
page=readFatwa&pg_id=13962&back=1983U.
[606]
Al-Būṭī’s speech. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDg7xpLLuhw.
al-Būṭī’s speech. (April 24, 2011). Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvk4PgsWQd4
[607]
To al-Būṭī, the word ‘ummiyyah means “unknown.”
[608]
Al-Būṭī’s speech. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDg7xpLLuhw.
al-Būṭī’s speech. (April 24, 2011). Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvk4PgsWQd4.
The tradition is narrated by Muslim and al-Nasā’ī. See Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 70.
[609]
Al-Būṭī’s Friday sermon, (August 5, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved May 20, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPnj6HeHgwc.
[610]
Al-Būṭī’s speech. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDg7xpLLuhw.
[611]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 148-149; al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 7, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām.
Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=14778
[612]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 149-150.
[613]
Ibid, 149.
[614]
Ibid., 151. Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 7, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=14778.
The tradition is narrated by al-Bukhārī and Muslim. See Ibn al-Athīr,4: 69.
[615]
Abū al-Ḥusayn Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. (Vols. 18). (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Miṣriyyah,
1930), 12: 238.
[616]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…, 147. The tradition is narrated by al-Bukhārī, 4:313.
[617]
Al-Būṭī, Min sunan Allāh fī ‘ibādih. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2011), 115; al-Būṭī’s fatwa,
(July 10, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=15451&back=8928U.
[618]
The Alawis are adherents of an Islamic sect, the origin of which can be traced back to
9th-century Iraq. They are believed to be an offshoot of early Shia Islam with ancient
Iranian, Christian, and Gnostic influences. Alawism is a recent designation which rose to
prominence in the 20th century. However, the term Nuṣayriyyah was the frequently used
title in both Oriental and Western sources. It traces back to the eponymous founder of the
sect, Muḥammad Ibn Nuṣayrī al-Namīrī. Many Alawi beliefs and rites are still kept secret by
the community, being revealed only to initiate male members. One key element in their faith
is the belief in a divine triad that has manifested itself to the Alawi community in seven
cycles. For many centuries, the Alawis were an economically weak, socially marginalized,
and persecuted group whose heartland was western Syria. The public rise of the community
began with the establishment of the French mandate over Syria after World War I and
reached its zenith when the ‘Alawi Hafez al-Assad became president of Syria in 1971.
Stephan Procházka, “The ‘Alawis,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia. September 2015.
Retrieved December 21, 2016.
http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-
9780199340378-e-85.
Throughout their long history, the Alawis have always been considered by Sunni ulema as
infidels. See fatwas issued by Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmū‘ fatāwā ibn Taymiyyah…, 35:149; and
Ibn ‘Ābidīn, 4: 244. For further reading, see Fabrice Balanche, La Région Alaouite et le
Pouvoir Syrien. (Paris: Karthala, 2006); Meir M. Bar-Asher, and Aryeh Kofsky. The
Nuṣayrī-‘Alawī Religion. An Enquiry into Its Theology and Liturgy. (Leiden, The Netherlands,
and Boston-Köln: Brill, 2002); Yaron Friedman. The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs: An Introduction to the
Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria. (Leiden, The Netherlands,
and Boston: Brill, 2010); Michael Kerr, Craig Larkin. Eds. The ‘Alawis of Syria: War, Faith
and Politics in the Levant. (London: Hurst & Company Publishers Ltd, 2015).
[619]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 7, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=15180&back=8928U.
[620]
Ibid.
[621]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 13, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=15814&back=8928U.
[622]
Ibid.
[623]
Ibid.
[624]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 10, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?
page=readFatwa&pg_id=19318&back=8928U.
Cf. Al-Būṭī, Min sunan Allāh…, 115.
[625]
This tradition should not be attributed to the Prophet; it is very weak at best and forged
at worst. See al-Ḥalab ‘Alī, Ibrāhīm al-Qaysā, Mawsū‘at al-ḥadīth wa al-āthār al-ḍa‘īfah wa
al-mawḍū‘ah. (Vols. 15). (Riyadh: al-Ma‘ārif, 1999), 7: 356.
[626]
See traditions and sayings about this concept in Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭūshī, Sirāj al-mulūk.
(Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyyah al-Lubnāniyyah,1994), 367-469. Some medieval scholars go
further and count the unjust ruler as punishment for corrupt society. See Ḥasan al-Baṣrī with
reference to al-Ḥajjāj in Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa…, 12: 544.
[627]
Al-Būṭī’s Friday sermon, (June 17, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved May 20, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readSpeech&pg_id=14205&bk_id=42U.
[628]
Al-Būṭī’s speech at Damascus University, (July 20, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved
March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=Lessondetails&pg_id=16794&bk_id=746U.
[629]
Ibid.
[630]
Al-Būṭī’s speech. (April 24, 2011). Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvk4PgsWQd4
[631]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (June 14, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?
page=readFatwa&pg_id=13857&back=1983U.
[632]
Ibid.
[633]
Al-Būṭī, Waṣāyā Rasūl Allāh lanā fī al-harj wa al-marj, Friday sermon. (April 29, 2011).
Retrieved July 21, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readSpeech&pg_id=11422&bk_id=42
The tradition is narrated by al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd and Ibn Māja. See Ibn al-Athīr, 10:3.
[634]
Ibid. See similar traditions in Ibn al-Athīr, 10: 3-101.
[635]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (June 14, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?
page=readFatwa&pg_id=13748&back=1986U
[636]
Al-Būṭī’s speech, (June 6, 2011). Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3RTCQ-NHOQ&feature=youtu.be.
[637]
Al-Būṭī, al-Makhraj min al-masā’ib ‘indamā tuhdiq binā, Friday sermon. (June 3, 2011).
Retrieved July 21, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?
page=readSpeech&pg_id=13529&bk_id=42U.
[638]
As later events have revealed, this horrible scenario proved to be true. Now, the third
phase of the scenario has become a recurrent theme at the negotiation table. It is likely to
be suggested as a perfect solution to a chronic problem.
[639]
Muḥammad al-Ya‘qūbī, “Ilā al-Duktūr al-Būṭī: Afiq min sukrik,” (May 5, 2013).
islamsyria.com. Retrieved July 21, 2015.
http://www.islamsyria.com/portal/article/show/3513.
[640]
Ibid.
[641]
Ibid.
[642]
Ibid.
[643]
Ibid.
[644]
Al-Ghūṭah refers to the suburbs round Damascus, in particular the eastern side. See
Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī, Ghūṭah Dimashq. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1984).
[645]
Ibid.
[646]
Muḥammad al-Ya‘qūbī, “Halal-Duktūr al-Būṭī mujtahid fī ra’yih wa lahu ajr?” (August 12,
2012). Retrieved July 21, 2015.
http://syria.nur.nu/2012/08/12/3332.
[647]
Muḥammad al-Ya‘qūbī, “al-Būṭī fī ‘ālam al-‘awhām,” (August 8, 2012). Retrieved July
21, 2015.http://syria.nur.nu/2012/08/18/3363.
[648]
Mu‘taz al-Khaṭīb, “al-Faqīh wa al-dawlah fī al-thawrāt al-‘Arabiyyah,” Tabayyun. No. 3/9
(Summer 2014): 76.
[649]
Ibid.
[650]
Ibid.
[651]
Mu‘taz al-Khaṭīb, “al-Dīn wa al-sulṭah wa al-‘ulamā’ wa qaḍāyā al-taghyīr: al-Būṭī
namūdhajan,” al-Ḥayāh. No. 17823 (January 21, 2012): 16.
[652]
Ibid.
[653]
Ibid.
[654]
Ibid.
[655]
Ibid., al-Khaṭīb, “al-Faqīh…,” 70.
[656]
Al-Khaṭīb, “al-Faqīh…,” 72.
[657]
Ibid., 79.
[658]
Ibid., 80.
[659]
Ibid.
[660]
Ibid., 82.
[661]
Aḥmad Ibrāhīm, “Laysa fitnah bal jihād,” Retrieved May 5, 2015.
http://www.islamsyria.com/portal/article/show/2088.
[662]
Ibid.
[663]
Ḥilmī al-Qā‘ūd, “al-Thawrah fī Sūriyah bayna Buthaynah wa al-Būṭī,” (2014). Retrieved
October 21, 2014.
http://islamtoday.net/albasheer/services/saveart-14-148625.htm.
[664]
Ibid.
[665]
Ibid.
[666]
Ibid.
[667]
Ibid.
[668]
Ghāzī al-Tawbah, “Ṣifāt al-‘ālim: al-Būṭī namūdhajan ma‘kūsan,” (2012). aljazeera.net.
Retrieved September 27, 2014.
http://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions.
[669]
Ibid.
[670]
Ibid.
[671]
Usāmah al-Mallūḥī, “al-Qawl al-faṣl fī al-Būṭī,” (March 24, 2013). Retrieved May 5,
2015.
http://new.almokhtsar.com/node/125125.
[672]
Ibid.
[673]
Ibid.
[674]
Yāsir al-Zayyāt, “al-Būṭī wa al-Islām al-qadīm wa al-thawrah,” (2013). Retrieved
October 21, 2014.
http://therepublicgs.net/2369.
[675]
Ibid.
[676]
Ibid.
[677]
Muḥammad al-Atāsī, “al-Faqīh wa al-sulṭān: al-Shaykh al-Būṭī namūdhajan,”
(November 9, 2004). Retrieved January 7, 2015.
http://www.metransparent.com/old/texts/mohamed_ali_el_attasi_sheikh_bouti.htm
[678]
Ibid.
[679]
Ibid.
[680]
Ibid.
[681]
Aḥmad Khayrī al-‘Umarī, “Hal yanbaghī iḥrāq ‘ulamā’ al-salāṭīn? Al-Būṭī namūdhajan,”
(June 8, 2011). Retrieved May 5, 2015.
http://www.quran4nahda.com/?p=2570.
[682]
Ibid.
[683]
Ibid.
[684]
Ibid.
[685]
Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī, “Hādhā huwa al-Būṭī fa iḥdharūh,” (February 29, 2011). Retrieved
Feb 10, 2015.
http://www.abubaseer.com
[686]
Ibid.
[687]
Ibid.
[688]
Muwaffaq al-Khālid, “Waqfah bayna al-shaykh Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī wa
muntaqidīh,” (July 29, 2011). Retrieved September 8, 2011.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readrticle&pg_id=17670&page1=1U.
[689]
Ibid.
[690]
Ibid.
[691]
Ibid.
[692]
Ibid.
[693]
Naṣūḥ al-Shāmī, “al-Thawrah fī sharak al-istibdād,” (August 8, 2011). Retrieved
September 8, 2011.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readviestor&pg_id=18814&page1=1U.
[694]
Ibid.
[695]
Ibid.
[696]
Ibid.
[697]
Ibid.
[698]
Ibid.
[699]
Ibid.
[700]
Ibid.
[701]
Ibid.
[702]
Al-Shāmī, “Manhaj al-‘ulamā’ al-rabbāniyyīn fī muwājahat al-azamāt,” (2011). Retrieved
October 18, 2014.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readResearch&pg_id=34672.
[703]
Ibid.
[704]
Ibid.
[705]
Muḥammad al-‘Ajamī, “Mawqif al-Duktūr al-Būṭī mimmā yajrī fī Sūriyah fī mīzān al-‘aql,”
n.d. Retrieved September 8, 2011.
http://www.azahera.net/showthread.php?p=42213#post42213U.
[706]
Ibid.
[707]
Ibid.
[708]
Ibid.
[709]
Ibid.
[710]
Ibid.
[711]
Ibid.
[712]
Ibid.
[713]
Ibid.
[714]
‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Hādī, “Shaykhunā al-ḥabīb al-‘allāmah al-Ductūr al-Būṭī bayna al-
qādiḥīn wa al-mādiḥīn,” (March 23, 2013). Retrieved January 8, 2015.
http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/opinion/89324.
[715]
Ibid.
[716]
Ibid.
[717]
Ibid.
[718]
For example, al-Būṭī said about Hafez al-Assad that the unrevealed side of his life was
better than that of the public one (sarīratuh khayrun min ‘alāniyuatih). Then he added that
this comes directly from his personal information about al-Assad, who, during his final
years, was maintaining the five obligatory prayers and a particular kind of dhikr
(remembrance of Allah). Al-Būṭī, Hādhā mā qultuh…, 62.
[719]
Al-Hādī, “Shaykhunā…”
[720]
Ibid.
[721]
Al-Būṭī, “al-Tabarru’ min muntāj lā akhlāqī,” (May 6, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved
January 8, 2016.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readrticle&pg_id=11805&page1=8.
Retrieved January 8, 2016.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6F5xaw9KZ0&index=2&list=PL01kYZIehH-rBqCRVxzk-
fW_6z_6QkAn9.
[722]
Retrieved January 8, 2016.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nJebOBkm9Q&list=PL01kYZIehH-rBqCRVxzk-
fW_6z_6QkAn9&index=7.
[723]
See these fatwas by al-Būṭī (June 5, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=13060&back=8928U;
fatwa in (June 14, 2011. Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=14026&back=8913;
fatwa in (June 23, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=14375; fatwa in
(June 14, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?
page=readFatwa&pg_id=13962&back=1983U.
[724]
I have checked al-Būṭī’s speech on Basel al-Assad and did not find any reference to
this phrase. al-Būṭī, Hādhā mā qultuh…, 99-115.
See also this video. Retrieved January 11, 2015.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdmNsnw-uiw&index=6&list=PL01kYZIehH-rBqCRVxzk-
fW_6z_6QkAn9.
[725]
Retrieved January 11, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FgTjGlROeek.
[726]
Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL01kYZIehH-rBqCRVxzk-fW_6z_6QkAn9.
[727]
Ibid.
[728]
“I do not want demonstrators to end up either in the prison or in the grave.” This is what
al-Būṭī told Shaykh ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Bizm, mufti of Damascus, interview by the author,
Kuala Lumpur, March 24, 2016.
[729]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 7, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved January 8, 2016.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=15150
Al-Būṭī justifies that by saying that before the revolution, he used to criticize the regime
publicly. If he does the same now, it is likely to add more fuel to the already sensitive and
critical situation Syria is going through. That is, the public criticism of the regime will cause
more public agitation which in turn will lead to more casualties.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=15150
[730]
Retrieved January 8, 2016.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17413000.
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/17/201172.html.
[731]
Retrieved January 8, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVbnVu0fAOU.
[732]
UN investigators reported that witnesses and survivors stated that the massacre was
committed by pro-government Shabbīḥah militia coming from surrounding areas. “Part of
the victims had been killed by artillery shells, now that points ever so clearly to the
responsibility of the government. Only the government has heavy weapons, has tanks, has
howitzers.” U.N. peacekeeping chief Herve Ladsous said. Stephanie Nebehay, “Most Houla
victims killed in summary executions: U.N.” reuters.com (May 29, 2012). Retrieved March 3,
2017.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-un-idUSBRE84S10020120529.
[733]
Al-Būṭī, Niqāṭ thalāth dhāt ahammiyyah kubrā, Friday sermon. (June 1, 2012).
Retrieved March 3, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BaCH0ziGb5I.
[734]
Al-Būṭī, al-Ta‘āwun ‘unwān gharīb fī mujtama‘ātinā, Friday sermon. (February 17,
2012). Retrieved July 21, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages/download.php?
file=../Component/Sound/boti/Friday_Speake/Friday_2012/Word/20120302.doc
[735]
Shaykh ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Bizm, mufti of Damascus, also believes al-Būṭī, in various
opinions and positions, had poor and simplistic understanding of the manipulation of politics
and the regime, of course, benefited from this weak side to the maximum, interview by the
author, Kuala Lumpur, March 24, 2016.
[736]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 22, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=16075&back=8928U.
[737]
To pray over an absent corpse.
[738]
Naseemalsham.com. Retrieved February 8, 2016.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readviestor&pg_id=31290&page1=8.
[739]
For example, see his fatwa, (June 5, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=13060&back=8928U.
[740]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (October 27, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=25178
[741]
Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL01kYZIehH-rBqCRVxzk-fW_6z_6QkAn9.
[742]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 7, 2011). Naseemalsham.com. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=15150.
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (October 27, 2011). Naseemalsham.com. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=25178.
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (June 14, 2012). Naseemalsham.com. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=33897&back=8928.
[743]
Al-Būṭī, Ilā huwāt al-akhīlah al-kādhibah, Friday sermon. (April 4, 2011). Retrieved July
21, 2015.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readrticle&pg_id=10101&page1=1U.
[744]
For example, the two earlier cited pieces: Muḥammad al-Atāsī’s critique, “al-Faqīh wa
al-sulṭān: al-Shaykh al-Būṭī namūdhajan” (The Jurist and the Sultan: Shaykh al-Būṭī as an
Example) and Aḥmad Khayrī al-‘Umarī’s provocative title “Hal yanbaghī iḥrāq ‘ulamā’ al-
salāṭīn? Al-Būṭī namūdhajan” (Should the Sultans’ Scholars be Burned? Al-Būṭī as an
Example).
[745]
Like Mu‘taz al-Khaṭīb in his article “al-Faqīh wa al-dawlah…,” 63-84.
[746]
Narrated by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd and al-Tirmidhī. See Ibn al-Athīr, 11: 787.
[747]
Ibn Mufliḥ al-Maqdisī, al-ādāb al-shar‘iyyah. (Vols. 3). (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah,
1999). 3: 459. The author discusses scholars’ different opinions whether creating or
maintaining a relation with the ruler is absolutely blameworthy, or blameless. A third opinion
sees it allowable even commendable if the motive is not based on personal matters.
[748]
Narrated by Aḥmad, and al-Tirmidhī. See Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 75.
[749]
Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 242-243.
[750]
Al-Ghazālī referred to some of these various manners of sycophantic behavior. See his
book al-Iḥyā’. (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2005), 82-83.
[751]
Plato, The Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett, (America: Anchor Books, 1980),
63.
[752]
Aristotle, Politics, translated by Benjamin Jowett, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1920), 1253 a, p. 28.
[753]
Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasā’il al-Jāḥiẓ. (Vols. 4). (Beirut: Maktabat al-Hilāl, 2002), 3: 99.
[754]
Ibn Abī al-Rabī‘, Sulūk al-mālik fī tadbīr al-mamālik. (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1983), 175.
[755]
Al-Fārābī, Ārā’ ahl al-Madīnah. (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1985), 117.
[756]
Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, n.d.), 4: 60-61.
[757]
Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah. (Tunisia: Dār al-Qayrawān, 2006), 1:69-71.
[758]
See Ibid., 1: 71.
[759]
‘Abd Allāh Nāṣīf, al-Sulṭah al-siyāsiyyah. (Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah, 1983), 4.
[760]
Ibn Khaldūn, 1: 263. For details on the significance of political obedience to authority,
see Hānī al-Mughallis, al-Ṭā‘ah al-siyāsiyyah fī al-fikr al-Islāmī. (Virginia: The International
Institute of Islamic Thought, 2014), 36-40.
[761]
Imām ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Imām, al-Ṭāghiyah, ‘Ālam al-Ma‘rifah Series. No. 183. (Kuwait: al-
Majlis al-Waṭanī, 1994), 15.
[762]
Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī, al-Mu‘jam al-kabīr. (Vols. 25). (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn
Taymiyyah, 1983), 10:1620163; abū al-Ḥasan al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-zawā’id. (Vols. 10).
(Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1994), 5: 222.
[763]
Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, al-Jāmi‘ li shu‘ab al-īmān. (Vols. 14). (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd,
2003), 10:15.
[764]
Narrated by Abū Dāwūd, and Aḥmad. See al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-awṭār. (Lebanon: Bayt
al-Afkār, 2004), 1699.
[765]
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyyah. (Kuwait: Dār Ibn Qutaybah, 1989),
3.
[766]
On the necessity of setting up a caliphate, see a detailed explanation and several
quotes of leading jurists in Muḥammad al-Rayyis, al-Naẓariyyāt al-siyāsiyyah al-Islāmiyyah.
(7th ed.). (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, 1976), 128-143.
[767]
Imām, 17.
[768]
I heard a number of shaykhs quoting this verse, including Khiḍr Shaḥrūr during my
interview with him. Pullman KLCC Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. March 15, 2016.
[769]
Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī. (Vols. 26). (Cairo: Dār Hajar, 2003), 7: 176-182; al-Qurṭubī,
6: 423-433; Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, I‘lām al-muwaqqi‘īn ‘an Rabb al-'ālamīn. (Riyadh:
Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1423 AH), 2:15-16; Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-manthūr fī al-tafsīr bi
al-ma’thūr. (Vols. 16). (Cairo: Dār Hajar, 2003), 4: 504-506; al-Mughallis, 112-114.
[770]
Badr al-Dīn al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr. (4th ed.). (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah, 2007), 308.
This is also Abū Ḥayyān’s preference, who puts an emphasis on the legitimate leadership.
Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ. (Vols. 8). (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth, 2002), 3: 396; and Muḥammad
al-Ṭāhir ibn ‘Āshūr, Tafsīr al-taḥrīr wa al-tanwīr. (Tunisia: Dār Suḥnūn, 1997), 5: 98; and
Muḥammad ‘Abduh, who associates ulū al-amr with ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd (emirs, rulers,
ulema, military commanders, leaders and so on). Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-manār.
(Vols. 12). (Cairo: al-Manār, 1328 AH), 5: 181. Cf. Sayf al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Ismā‘īl, al-
Naẓariyyah al-siyāsiyyah min manẓūr ḥaḍārī Islāmī. (Amman: The Academic Centre for
Political Studies, 2002), 325.
[771]
Quoted in al-Mughallis, 112.
[772]
Ulū al-amr always comes in the plural form. It has no singular that is derived from the
same root. Majd al-Dīn al-Fayrūzabādī, al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ. (8th ed.). (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-
Risālah, 2005), 1349; al-Zabīdī, Tāj al-‘arūs min jawāhir al-qāmūs. (Vols. 40). (Kuwait:
Wizārat al-Irshād, 1965-2001), 40: 379; al-Qurṭubī, 6: 432.
[773]
“Allah commands you to deliver whatever you have been entrusted with to their rightful
owners, and whenever you judge between people, to judge with justice. Most excellent is
what Allah exhorts you to do. Allah hears all and sees all” (Qur’an, al-Nisā’: 58).
[774]
Features of ulū al-amr are clearly highlighted in Qur’anic exegeses, such as Abū al-
Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf ‘an ḥaqā’iq al-tanzīl. (3rd ed.). (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah,
2009), 242; al-Qurṭubī, 6: 423, 428-430; al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ…, 308; Muḥammad Abū al-
Su‘ūd, Irshād al-‘aql al-salīm. (Vols. 9). (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, n.d.), 2: 193;
and Ibn ‘Āshūr, 5: 96.
[775]
Ibn Abī Shaybah, 11: 244; al-Qurṭubī, 6: 429; al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-manthūr…, 4: 501.
[776]
Al-Zamakhsharī, 242. Abū al-Su‘ūd, 2: 193. For other similar commentators’ statements
excluding corrupt rulers from ulū al-amr, see al-Mughallis, 112-114.
[777]
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, 1:86; al-Zamakhsharī, 95.
[778]
On the significance of this genre, see Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-
Qur’ān. (vols. 4). (Cairo: Dār Maktabat al-Turāth, 1957), 1: 22-23; 2: 200; Mannā‘ al-Qaṭṭān,
Mabāḥith fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān. (7th ed.). (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1995), 74-78.
[779]
The incident is stated in al-Suyūṭī, Lubāb al-nuqūl fī asbāb al-nuzūl. (Beirut: Mu’assasat
al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah, 2002), 80-81; Abū al-Ḥasan al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-nuzūl. (Al-
Dammām: Dār al-Iṣlāḥ, 1992), 159. It is also in al-Bukhārī, 3: 160; Muslim, 12: 223, and
other hadith collections, as well as most of the available books of tafsīr, like al-Qurṭubī, 6:
430-431; al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-manthūr…, 4: 502; Ibn ‘Āshūr, 101-102. Cf. al-Mughallis, 189-
192.
There is another incident that caused the revelation of the verse. al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-
manthūr…, 4: 502-503. Yet, according to the rules of the science of hadith, it is rejected for
a number of methodological flaws in it. See al-Wāḥidī, 159-160 (editor’s footnote).
[780]
Sayyid Quṭb, In the Shade of the Qur’an. (Vols. 18). Translated into English by ‘Ādil
Ṣalāḥī. (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 2004), 3:166.
[781]
Ibn al-Qayyim, I‘lām al-muwaqqi‘īn, 2:16. Cf. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and
Violence in Islamic Law. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 130-131.
[782]
See these reports in al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 222; Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 61-72; al-
Bayhaqī, al-Jāmi‘…, 10: 5-30; al-Haythamī, 5:216-225; Abou El Fadl, 112-118; Khalid al-
Zafīrī, Ḍawābiṭ mu‘āmalat al-ḥākim (Saudi Higher Education: al-Jāmi‘ah al-Islāmiyyah,
2009), 145-176; Jamāl Abū Farḥah, al-Khurūj ‘alā al-ḥākim fī al-fikr al-siyāsī al-Islāmī.
(Cairo: Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah al-‘Arabiyyah, 2004), 28-30.
[783]
See it in al-Bayhaqī, al-Jāmi‘…, 10: 15; Ibn Abī Shaybah, 14: 305.
[784]
Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhāj al-sunnah al-Nabawiyyah. (Vols. 9). (Riyadh: Imam Muḥammad
ibn Sa‘ūd Islamic University), 1:547.
[785]
On the nature of the sultanate states and their social system, see al-Faḍl Shalaq, “al-
Kharāj wa al-iqṭā‘ wa al-dawlah: Dirāsah fī al-iqtiṣād al-siyāsī li al-dawlah al-Islāmiyyah,” al-
Ijtihād, no. 1 (1988): 152-174. On discussion about their legal status and the political
realism of Islamic law, see al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām…, 44; al-Faḍl Shalaq, “al-Faqīh wa al-
dawlah al-Islāmiyyah: Dirāsah fī kutub al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyyah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 3 (1989): 15-
101. A study of the political opinion of al-Māwardī, Abū Ya‘lā al-Ḥanbalī, and al-Juwaynī
about the sultanate states; Riḍwān al-Sayyid, “Ru’yat al-khilāfah wa bunyat al-dawlah fī al-
Islām,” al-Ijtihād, no. 13 (1991): 39-45; and Ibrāhīm Bayḍūn, “al-Mamālīk wa ma’ziq al-
shar‘iyyah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 22 (1994): 39-55; Omid Safe, The Politics of Knowledge in
Premodern Islam: Negotiating Ideology and Religious Inquiry. (The University of North
Carolina Press, 2006). The book focuses on Saljūqs, their promotion of social order, and the
establishment of intellectual institutions, particularly the madrasa and khānqāh. Also, it
discusses the role of political treatises by scholars, notably al-Ghazālī, to legitimize the
Saljūqs’ state.
[786]
Al-Faḍl Shalaq, “al-Jamā‘ah wa al-dawlah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 3 (1989): 71-80.
[787]
Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasā’il…, 3:99. Cf. al-Māwardī, Adab al-dunyā wa al-dīn. (Beirut: Dār Iqra’,
1985), 149.
[788]
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978),
1, 6.
[789]
See these traditions in al-Haythamī, 5:215-225; Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḥulaymī, al-Minhāj fī
shu‘ab al-īmān. (Vols. 14). (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2003), 3:179.
[790]
Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī. (Vols. 11). (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1962), 3:207.
[791]
Ibn al-Athīr, 10:45.
[792]
Traditions are in Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 69-70; al-Haythamī, 5: 219. See Ibn Taymiyyah’s
comment on these traditions in Minhāj al-Sunnah…, 1:557.
[793]
Al-Ṭabarānī, 10: 162-163.
[794]
Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyyah, 3; Ibn Khaldūn, 1:334-335.
[795]
Ibn Ḥanbal, 34:79; al-Haythamī, 5:215.
[796]
Al-Haythamī, 5:215; Ibn al-Athīr, 6: 572; Ibn Abī Shaybah, 17: 380.
[797]
Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 56.
[798]
Ibid., 4: 55.
[799]
Al-Bayhaqī, al-Jāmi‘…, 10: 15.
[800]
See a good study of the tradition narration in Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Idlibī, " Mā siḥḥat ḥadīth
al-sulṭān ẓill…" (December 3, 2014). Rābiṭat al-‘ulamā’ al-Sūriyyīn. Retrieved July 21, 2015.
http://www.islamsyria.com/portal/consult/show/787.
[801]
Badr al-Dīn al-‘Aynī, ‘Umdat al-qārī. (Vols. 25). (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilimiyyah,
2001), 14: 305. Cf. Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhāj al-Sunnah…, 1:547; Ibn Khaldūn, 1: 263; Ibn
Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, 8: 254; ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Abū Sulaymān, al-‘Unf wa idārat al-ṣirā‘ al-siyāsī.
(Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2002), 29-30; Ḥākim al-Muṭayrī,
Taḥrīr al-insān wa tajrīd al-ṭughyān. (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah li al-Dirāsāt wa al-
Nashr, 2009), 181-184.
[802]
Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 61-62.
[803]
Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 64-65; al-Haythamī, 5:220.
[804]
Abou El Fadl, 113.
[805]
Ibn Ḥanbal, 1:333; al-Rayyis, 358-359. Other similar traditions are in Ibn al-Athīr, 8:416;
al-Haythamī, 5:225-229.
[806]
See, for example, Muslim, 12: 211-230; al-Tirmidhī, Sunan al-Tirmidhī. (vols. 6). (Beirut:
Dār al-Risālah, 2002), 3:500-503; al-Nasā’ī, Sunan al-Nasā’ī. (Amman: Bayt al-Afkār al-
Dawliyyah, n.d.), 437-442; Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah. (Cairo: Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d.), 954-
955; al-Haythamī, 5:207-231; al-Bayhaqī, al-Jāmi‘…, 9:459; 10:82; Ibn Ḥibbān, Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn
Ḥibbān. (Vols. 18). (Damascus: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1993), 10: 411-431.
[807]
This definition, which is al-Ṭabarī’s preference, is the most proper one. It accounts for
the strong link many reports create between “imam or emir” and “community,” which means
that community is closely connected with single political authority. Also, the absence of this
authority necessarily leads to the disintegration of the community. If this happens, Muslims
are required to keep away from all conflicting parties and stay aloof. Ibn al-Athīr, 10: 85. See
other definitions in Shāṭibī, al-I‘tiṣām. (Amman: Dār al-Athariyyah, 2008), 3: 294-311; Ibn
Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī. (Vols. 13). (Riyadh, 1421 AH), 13: 37.
[808]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa…, 11:148.
[809]
Muslim, 12: 242.
[810]
See Shalaq, “al-Jamā‘ah wa al-dawlah,” 55; 66-67.
[811]
Marlow, L. 2013. “Mirrors for Princes,” In The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic
Political Thought, edited by Gerhard Bowering. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2013), 348-350.
[812]
Al-Mughallis, 347-385; Kamāl ‘Abd al-Laṭīf, Fī tashrīḥ uṣūl al-istibdād. (Beirut: Dār al-
Ṭalī‘ah, 1999); Muḥammad Dumj, Marāyā al-umarā’. (Beirut: Mu’assasat Bahsūn, 1994), 9;
‘Izz al-Dīn ‘Allām, “Mulāḥaẓāt ḥawl al-ra‘iyyah' fī al-adab al-siyāsī al-sulṭanī,” al-Ijtihād, no.
22 (1994): 17-38. A study on 'subjects' their portrayal, categories, rights and duties; Riḍwān
al-Sayyid, “al-Fiqh wa al-fuqahā’ wa al-dawlah: Ṣirā‘ al-fuqahā’ ‘alā al-sulṭah wa al-sulṭan fī
al-‘aṣr al-mamlūkī,” al-Ijtihād, no. 3 (1989): 129-160. A study on al-Ṭurṭūsī’s book Tuḥfat al-
Turk.
[813]
This is against the tradition that refers only to the just imam. al-Haythamī, 5:215; Ibn al-
Athīr, 6: 572; Ibn Abī Shaybah, 17: 380.
[814]
Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭūshī, Sirāj al-mulūk. (Cairo: Dār al-Miṣriyyah al-Lubnāniyyah, 1994),
342-245.
[815]
Ibid., 198.
[816]
Ibid., 199.
[817]
Abū ‘Uthmān al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Tāj fī akhlāq al-mulūk. (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Amīriyyah,
1914), 2; al-Māwardī, Naṣīḥat al-mulūk. (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Falāḥ, 1983), 115.
[818]
Al-Ṭurṭūshī, 245; al-Māwardī, Naṣīḥat…, 53.
[819]
Al-Ṭabarānī, 11: 114; Ibn al-Jawzī, Manāqib Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. (Cairo: Dār Hakar,
1409 AH), 654.
[820]
See Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986); Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986).
[821]
Ibn al-Athīr, 1: 253.
[822]
Ibn Ḥanbal, 31: 125; Ibn al-Athīr, 1: 333.
[823]
Muḥammad al-Ḥākim, al-Mustadrak. (Vols. 5). (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥaramayn, 1997), 3: 234.
[824]
See examples in al-Rayyis, 355-358.
[825]
Muslim, 12: 238; Ibn al-Athīr, 10: 45.
[826]
Abū Farḥah, 31. Cf. al-Zafīrī, 347-405.
[827]
Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 47.
[828]
Ibid., 48-50.
[829]
William Muir, The Caliphate. (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 600.
[830]
Duncan B. MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and
Constitutional Theory. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), 58.
[831]
Quoted in Abou El Fadl, 12.
[832]
Abū Ḥanīfah, the celebrated jurist, permits the rebellion against corrupt rulers. He
argues that it is obligatory to carry out “commanding the right and forbidding the evil,” via
verbal counsel and warning. If this does not work, then by the sword. And it is reported that
Abū Ḥanīfah encouraged the rebellions against the Umayyads by Zayd ibn ‘Alī ibn al-
Ḥusayn, in the year 122 AH and, later on, against the Abbasids by Muḥammad al-Nafs al-
Zakiyyah, in the year 143 AH. For legal and historical details on Abū Ḥanīfah’s opinion, see
Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān. (Vols. 5). (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth, 1992), 1:86-89;
al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād. (Vols. 15). (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī), 13:384-
386; Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, Tārīkh al-madhāhib al-Islāmiyyah. (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr
al-‘Arabī, n.d.), 348-349.
[833]
See Abou El Fadl, 68-99; Haykal, 1: 122; al-Rayyis, 352-353; Huwaydī, 85-95; Ḥākim
al-Muṭayrī, al-Ḥurriyyah aw al-ṭūfān. (2nd ed.). (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah li al-
Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 2008), 141-161; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religion and Politics
Under the Early ‘Abbāsids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunnī Elite. (Leiden: Brill, 1997),
70-81; ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Badrī, al-Islām bayna al-‘ulamā’ wa al-ḥukkām. (Saudi Arabia: al-
Maktabah al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1965).

[834]
See for example Fiqh al-azmah, 2: 154.
[835]
This is according to several scholars including ‘Kurayyim Rājiḥ, the grand shaykh of
Qur’an reciters in Syria, interview by the author, Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia. February
25, 2017.
[836]
See al-Rayyis, 216-219, 338-342. He quotes leading jurists and theologians who agree
that the ruler never has privileges elevating him above the law or enjoys immunity from
being brought to justice. Cf. Muḥammad Salīm al-‘Awwā, Fī al-niẓām al-siyāsī li al-dawlah
al-Islāmiyyah. (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2006), 226-227; al-Muṭayrī, al-Ḥūriyyah aw al-ṭūfān,
21-26; ‘Uthmān, Riyāsat al-dawlah… 435-438; Fatḥī al-Duraynī, Khaṣā’iṣ al-tashrī‘ al-Islāmī
fī al-siyāsah wa al-ḥukm. (Damascus: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1987), 183, 344; Ḥasan al-
Turābī, al-Siyāsah wa al-ḥukm. (Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2011), 97-120; ‘Alī
Ḥasanīn, Riqābat al-umma ‘alā al-ḥākim. (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1988); Huwaydī, 103-
104.
[837]
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa…, 9: 415.
[838]
It says, “The caliphate is thirty years, then followed by kingship.” Ibn Ḥanbal, 36: 248.
Cf. another tradition, 30: 356. On the difference between the caliphate and kingship, see
Muḥammad ibn Sa‘d, Kitāb al-ṭabaqāt al-kabīr. (vols. 11). (Cairo: al-Khānjī, 2001), 3:285;
Ibn Khaldūn, 1: 332-334; Abū al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, al-Khilāfah wa al-mulk, translated into
Arabic by Aḥmad Idrīs. (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1978).
[839]
Abū Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī, al-Musnad. (vols. 16). (2nd ed.). (Damascus: Dār al-Ma’mūn,
1990), 2: 177-178.
[840]
Al-‘Asqalānī, 13: 10; Haykal, 1: 122; Ibrāhīm Salqīnī, Qitāl al-fitnah bayna al-Muslimīn.
(Damascus: al-Nawādir, 2012), 313.
[841]
Al-Bukhārī, 4:313; Ibn al-Athīr, 1: 253.
[842]
Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 68.
[843]
Ibid., 4: 66.
[844]
Al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘āmmah fī al-dawlah…, 183.
[845]
Al-Nafīsī, ‘Indamā yaḥkum al-Islām. (Kuwait: Āfāq, 2013), 162.
[846]
Muslim, 12: 238; Ibn al-Athīr, 10: 45.
[847]
Ibid.
[848]
Umayyads and Abbasids, as well as the later sultanate states and major Muslim
empires (Sunni Ottomans in West Asia and Eastern Europe, the Shia Safavids in Persia
and the Sunni Mughals in the Indian subcontinent) were all operating under the framework
of the Islamic law, performing jihad, suppressing intra-wars, and serving the community’s
socio-economic needs. See Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhāj al-Sunnah, 1:547; Muhammad Qasim
Zaman, Religion and Politics Under the Early ‘Abbāsids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunnī
Elite. (Leiden: Brill, 1997); On sultanate states, see al-Faḍl Shalaq, “al-Kharāj wa al-
iqṭā‘…,”152-174; Riḍwān al-Sayyid, “Ru’yat al-khilāfah wa bunyat al-dawlah fī al-Islām,” al-
Ijtihād, no. 13 (1991): 39-45; and Ibrāhīm Bayḍūn, “al-Mamālīk wa ma’ziq al-shar‘iyyah,” al-
Ijtihād, no. 22 (1994): 39-55; Omid Safe, The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam:
Negotiating Ideology and Religious Inquiry. (The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
The book focusses on Saljūqs and their promotion of social order.
[849]
John Esposito, Islam and Politics. (4th ed.). (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1998), 28.
[850]
Haykal, 1: 138-139.
[851]
Sonia Alianak’s book Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium.
(New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007) furnishes various examples of Arab leaders’ use of
Islam out of expediency. For example, King Hussein of Jordan (17-22), Saudi Royal family
(67-72), Saddam Hussein (95-103), Hafez al-Assad (135-138), Gamal Abdel Nasser (169-
170), Anwar Sadat (179-180), Hosni Mubarak (195, 196). On Muammar Qaddafi and Jaafar
Nimeiri’s manipulation of religion, see 79-81; 84-88 respectively in John Esposito, The
Islamic Threat Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). As for Tunisian
leaders, see Kenneth Perkins, “Playing the Islamic Card: The Use and Abuse of Religion in
Tunisian Politics,” in The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects,
Prospects, edited by Nouri Ganea. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 58-80.
On the issue of how governments, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, have incorporated
Islam into their broader foreign policy agenda, see Peter Mandaville and Shadi Hamid,
“Islam as Statecraft: How Governments Use Religion in Foreign Policy” Foreign Policy at
Brookings, November 2018.
[852]
Like Qaddafi, who claimed that the word qul (say) at the beginning of the sura al-Ikhlās
and other verses is redundant and thus must be deleted. Also. Habib Bourguiba, the first
President of Tunisia from 1957 to 1987, who spared no effort to attack the pillars of Islam
and make fun of Islamic norms and principles. See Muḥammad al-Zamzamī, al-Islām al-
jarīḥ fī Tūnis; al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah wa mas’alat al-taghyīr, 40-41.
[853]
According to a number of recent media releases, notably from Israeli leaders, and
commentators, the Syrian regime seemed to have been involved in a robust relation with
Israel, and the destiny of the latter heavily depends on the necessary survival of the former.
See evidences at “Al-Ittijāh al-mu‘ākis.” (January 1, 2016). Al Jazeera. Retrieved February
8, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XXcp3sNFPks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2McfT4Gbvw.
[854]
From a realistic point of view, the majority of jurists recognized the legitimacy of the
usurper who came to power by force rather than through a proper contract. See Haykal, 1:
165-202; al-Mawsū‘ah al-fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah, “al-Imāmah al-kubrā.” 6: 224-225; al-
Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-jihād. (Vols. 2). (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 2009), 2: 1033, 1062; Abou El
Fadl, 13, 158; al-Zafīrī, 77-81; Rabbā‘, 101-102; al-Rayyis, 353-355. I think, in the light of
new-arising issues and conditions, the idea of accepting the authority of mutaghallib
(usurper) needs to be reexamined. See al-Mughallis, 251-252.
[855]
Al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘āmmah fī al-dawlah…, 183.
[856]
Al-Nafīsī, ‘Indamā yaḥkum al-Islām, 161-163.
[857]
Ibrāhīm Zayn, the Dean of Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human
Sciences, IIUM, interview by the author, Gombak, Selangor, Malaysia. June 17, 2016.
[858]
Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Mīsāwī, Associate Professor, Department of Fiqh and Usul
Fiqh, IIUM, interview by the author, Gombak, Selangor, Malaysia. January 27, 2017.
[859]
Ḥākim al-Muṭayrī, al-Ḥurriyyah aw al-ṭūfān…, 315-316.
[860]
Al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘āmmah fī al-dawlah…, 183.
[861]
Ibid.
[862]
See these reports in al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 222; Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 61-72; al-
Bayhaqī, al-Jāmi‘…, 10: 5-30; al-Haythamī, 5:216-225.
[863]
A tradition describes the relationship between evil-doing rulers and their subjects as
that which is based on mutual hatred and curse. When the Prophet was asked whether this
tense atmosphere allows rising against those rulers, he answered, “No, as long as the
prayer is maintained.” Ibn al-Athīr, 4:66.
[864]
Al-Zamakhsharī, 242.
[865]
Al-Būṭī, al-Jihād fī al-Islām…,147. The tradition is narrated by al-Bukhārī, 4:313.
[866]
Al-Būṭī’s speech at Damascus University, (July 20, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved
March 8, 2015.
[867]
For example, when the ruler does not pray or fast or allows observably immoral acts
and sins.
[868]
See a detailed account about this issue in Kāmil Rabbā‘, Naẓariyyat al-khurūj fī al-fiqh
al-siyāsī al-Islāmī. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2004); Salqīnī, 274-326; al-Mawsū‘ah
al-fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah, “al-Imāmah al-kubrā,” 6: 219-221; Haykal, 1: 119-128; Rushdī
‘ulyān, al-Islām wa al-khilāfah. (Baghdad: Maṭba‘at al-Salām, 1976), 73-81; Muḥammad
Ra’fat ‘Uthmān, Riyāsat al-dawlah fī al-fiqh al-Islāmī. (Dubai: Dār al-Qalam, 1986), 408-421;
Ṣalaḥ al-Dīn Dabbūs, al-khalīfah: tawliyatuh wa ‘azluh: Dirāsah muqāranah bi al-nuẓum al-
dustūriyyah al-gharbiyyah. (Iskandariyyah: Mu’assasat al-Thaqāfah al-Jāmi‘iyyah, 1998);
Muḥammad Ṭāhā Badāwī, Ḥaqq muqāwamat al-ḥukūmāt al-jā‘irah fī al-masīḥiyyah wa al-
Islām. (Iskandariyyah: 1953); al-Zafīrī, 466-549; Abou El Fadl.
[869]
Al-‘Asqalānī, 13: 10; Salqīnī, 313; Haykal, 1: 122; Abū Farḥah, 33. Surprisingly, al-
Nawawī, al-Būṭī quoted to strengthen his opinion, tends to embrace the second
interpretation. al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 229.
[870]
Ibid.
[871]
Al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ, Ikmāl al-mu‘lim li fawā’id Muslim. (Vols. 9). (Egypt: Dār al-Wafā’, 1998),
6: 247. al-Nawawī also ascribes the consensus to Abū Bakr ibn Mujāhid, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ
Muslim, 12: 229.
[872]
Abou El Fadl, 68-69; al-Mughallis, 221-223. Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa…, 11: 466-569
(al-Ḥusayn); 12: 177-185 (Ibn al-Zubayr).
[873]
Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, 6: 334-341; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa…, 12: 305-310; Abou
El Fadl, 70-72; al-Mughallis, 225-230.
[874]
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, 1:86-89; Abū Zahrah, 348-349; Abou El Fadl, 72-73.
[875]
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, 1:86.
[876]
Abou El Fadl, 75; cf. al-Mughallis, 236.
[877]
In the section: fighting under anonymous leadership.
[878]
Al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 229; al-‘Asqalānī, 13:11; al-Zafīrī, 637-644;
Haykal, 1: 122-124; Abū Farḥah, 52-54; al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-jihād, 2: 1049-1052.
[879]
Abū Farḥah, 53.
[880]
Abou El Fadl, 27. Cf. al-Rayyis, 347-348.
[881]
Ibn ‘Asākir, Tārīkh Dimashq. (Vols. 80). (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997), 36: 184. See a
similar statement by ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd in al-Ṭabarānī, 10: 162-163. It is also reported
that "A period of sixty years of a tyrant ruler is better than one night without a sultan." These
reports hint to the fact that peoples’ various affairs are best run under the state authority
headed by the ruler and that order and stability are normally ensured by the existence of the
ruler or leader, whether just or not. See Ibn Taymiyyah, al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah. (Jeddah:
Mujamma‘ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, n.d.), 232-234. Cf. al-Rayyis, 135-137; al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām
al-sulṭāniyyah, 3.
[882]
The Prophet is quoted as saying, “The corrupt emirate is better than harj.” When asked
about the meaning of harj, the Prophet replied, “Killing and lying.” al-Ṭabarānī, 10:162-163.
[883]
Al-Ḥulaymī, 9: 184.
[884]
Al-‘Asqalānī, 13: 8.
[885]
Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, translated from Arabic by Franz Rosenthal. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967).
[886]
‘Aṣabiyyah (group feeling) refers to one's group support and solidarity who, in a sense
of shared purpose, sustain him in his goal and effort. "The group with which a human being
feels most closely connected is primarily that of his relatives, the people with whom he
shares a common descent. But as a feeling and a state of mind the ‘aṣabiyyah can also be
shared by people not related to each other by blood ties but by long and close contact as
members of a group. Ibn Khaldūn’s use of the term is noteworthy because it has been much
used in Muslim literature in a different meaning. Islam generally condemned ‘aṣabiyyah as a
quality and state of mind. It is traditionally considered to mean ‘bias,’ or, more specifically,
blind support of one's group without regard for the justice of its cause.” Franz Rosenthal’s
introduction, 46-47. For more linguistic and contextual explanation of the term, see Asyiqin
Ab Halim, “The Application of Ibn Khaldūn’s Theory of ‘Aṣabiyyah to the Modern Period with
Special Reference to the Malay Muslim Community in Malaysia,” (PhD thesis, University of
Birmingham, Birmingham 2012), 116-120.
[887]
Ibn Khaldūn, 127.
[888]
Ibid.
[889]
Ibid.
[890]
Ibid., 127-128. Ibn Taymiyyah also condemned early rebellions that proved to have
been misguided and resulted in more harm. See his book Minhāj al-Sunnah…, 4: 527-530.
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī recounts a long list of rebellions in the first two centuries of Islam,
led by rebels of the Prophet’s ancestry. Curiously, all of these rebellions ended in utter
failure causing the killing of their leaders. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn.
(Beirut: al-Maktabah al-‘Aṣriyyah, 1990), 1: 150-176.
[891]
Ibid., 127.
[892]
Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah wa mas’alat al-taghyīr. (London: al-
Markaz al-Maghāribī, 2000). He treated this issue in chapter seven, 79-98.
[893]
Ibid., 80.
[894]
It is important here to refer to the significance of geographical location when it comes to
armed rebellion. Geographical isolation, as experts contend, makes countries less
vulnerable to revolutionary waves. However, countries that are surrounded by other
countries are often subject to the influence of disturbing forces of their neighbors. Little, 32-
34. Cf. Thomas Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory and
Justice. (3rd ed.). (London: Prentice Hall College, 1990). Syria seems to belong to the latter
category. It is bordered by Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and of course Israel. These states
were “drawn by post-World War Western powers. The result is a smattering of religious,
social, ethnic, tribal and political divisions arrayed across grossly heterogeneous nation
states.” Little, 33.
[895]
Al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥarakah…, 80-81.
[896]
Ibid., 81.
[897]
In the contemporary political language, “peaceful jihad” is a nonviolent resistance,
defined as is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological,
economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of
omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both. Quoted in Maria J. Stephan and
Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,”
International Security, vol. 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 9. Scholars have identified numerous
nonviolent methods (protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social non-
cooperation, and nonviolent intervention etc.) Gene Sharp researched and catalogued 198
methods of nonviolent actions and gave historical examples of each method in his
informative work, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. (Vols. 3). (Boston: Porter Sargent
Publishers, 1973).
[898]
Al-Ghannūshī, al-Ḥarakah…, 108.
[899]
See the study conducted by Stephan and Chenoweth, 7-44. This study explores the
strategic effectiveness of violent and nonviolent campaigns in conflicts between nonstate
and state actors using aggregate data on major nonviolent and violent resistance
campaigns from 1900 to 2006. Findings show that major nonviolent campaigns have
achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent resistance
campaigns. 8.
[900]
Ibid., 8-9.
[901]
Stephen Zunes, “Supporting Unarmed Civil Insurrection in Syria,” in Hashemi and
Postel. Eds. The Syria Dilemma…, 101-118.
[902]
Ibid., 103.
[903]
Ibid., 109.
[904]
Ibid., 110.
[905]
See Little’s contentious point of view on the lack of leadership among Syrian
moderates, rather than among radicals, like ISIL, who were able to move to the forefront.
Little, 77-81.
[906]
Ibid., 84.
[907]
Landis, 74. On the shifting heterogeneous nature of the Syrian opposition, see Gelvin,
132-134.
[908]
For information on this dilemma, see chapter four.
[909]
See chapter four.
[910]
Charles Lister, “The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand,” Center for
Middle East Policy, no. 26 (November 2016).
[911]
Ibid., 4.
[912]
See extensive literature of these traditions in Ibn al-Athīr, 10: 3-101; Haykal, 1: 149-
151.
[913]
Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon. (Vols. 6). (Beirut: Librairie du Liban,
1968), 6: 2334; For further definitions, see ‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Idrīsī, Fiqh al-fitan. (Riyadh:
Maktabat Dār al-Mihāj, 1428 AH), 23-27.
[914]
Elsaid M. Badawi, Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur'anic
Usage. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 692. Fitnah in the Qur’an has twelve meanings. See them in
Majd al-Dīn al-Fayrūzabādī, Baṣā’ir dhawī al-tamyīz. (Vols. 6). (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A‘lā li al-
Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1992), 4: 166-169.
[915]
Lane, 6: 2334.
[916]
Retrieved March 23, 2016. www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/fitna.
[917]
Retrieved March 23, 2016.
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fitna.
[918]
See Salqīnī, 42-46.
[919]
Al-Bukhārī, 4:312-327.
[920]
Ibid., 4: 312-313.
[921]
Ibid., 4: 315.
[922]
Ibid., 4: 316-317. See al-‘Asqalānī, 13: 34-35.
[923]
See for example al-Bukhārī, 2:89; Muḥammad al-Sarkhasī, Sharḥ al-Siyar al-kabīr.
(Vols. 4). (Beirut, al-Sharikah al-Sharqiyyah, n.d.), 4:1140. See Salqīnī, 115.
[924]
Haykal, 1: 146; al-‘Asqalānī, 13: 34.
[925]
Haykal, 1: 146-147; Salqīnī, 203.
[926]
Haykal, 1: 146; Salqīnī, 205.
[927]
Haykal, 1: 146; Rabbā‘, 194.
[928]
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, 5: 282; Abū Farḥah, 62; Salqīnī, 207; Haykal, 1: 146.
[929]
Abū Farḥah, 62.
[930]
Ibid.
[931]
Al-‘Asqalānī, 13: 37.
[932]
Ibid.
[933]
Ibn Abī Shaybah, 14: 66; Salqīnī, 114; cf. al-‘Asqalānī, 13: 35.
[934]
See degrees of avoiding fitnah in Salqīnī, 448-466.
[935]
About different views on abstaining from fitnah see al-‘Asqalānī, 13: 34; Salqīnī, 437-
445.
[936]
Haykal, 1: 149-153; Salqīnī, 328-337.
[937]
See Ibn al-Athīr, 10: 3-101; Ibn Abī Shaybah, 14: 5-231.
[938]
See legal details about this matter in Haykal, 1: 154-162; Salqīnī, 486-469.
[939]
‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Ṣan‘ānī, al-Muṣannaf. (Vols. 11). (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī,
1983).11:361.
[940]
On the role of media outlets, see Obaida Fares, “Pro-Regime versus Oppositional
Media: During the Revolution 2011-2013,” in Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring,
edited by Larbi Sadiki. (New York, London: Routledge, 2015), 187-196. For multiple
examples of pro and anti-regime media discrepancies, see Stephen Starr, Revolt in Syria:
Eye-witness to the Uprising. (London: Hurst, 2012), 55-78; Tara Pardue Lackey, “Is Quality
All the Same? A Comparative Study of Print and Television Coverage of the Syrian
Conflict,” (MA thesis, Iowa State University, 2015.); Chams Eddin, “The Assad Regime’s
Propaganda: Manipulation Through Messaging at the Beginning of the Arab Spring Uprising
in Syria,” (MA thesis, Georgetown University, 2013). The thesis analyzes how the official
media of the regime and its allies disseminated misinformation on the protests during the
first sixteen months of the Syrian uprising, from March 2011 to July 2012: Nermin Moufti,
“Encoding Resistance: Graphic Design and Media Control in the Syrian Uprising,” (MA
thesis, OCAD University, 2012). "The project used a reflexive design methodology that
integrated elements of graphic design and journalism as visual means of resistance against
media hegemony." iii.
[941]
Imām, 15.
[942]
‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī counts despotic tyranny as the main cause of the eruption
of revolution. Ṭabā’i‘ al-istibdād. (Cairo: Kalimāt ‘Arabiyyah, 2011), 118. Cf. al-Mughallis,
448-450; Ṭāhā Jābir al-‘Alwānī, Ta’ammulāt fī al-thawrāt al-‘Arabiyyah. (Beirut: Markaz ṣinā
‘at al-Fikr, 2011), 26.
[943]
(2012) Retrieved October 9, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYLpZ-b501c.
[944]
Residents of the small southern town of Dar‘a marched to protest the arrest and torture
of some teenagers who, influenced by the wave of “Arab Spring,” painted anti-government
slogans on a school wall. This is how the Syrian uprising broke out in mid-March 2011. See
Gelvin, 126.
[945]
On the Shabbīḥah, see Aron Lund, “Chasing Ghosts: The Shabihah Phenomenon,” in
The 'Alawis of Syria: War, Faith and Politics in the Levant, edited by Michael Kerr and Craig
Larkin. (London: Hurst & Company Publishers Ltd, 2015), 207-224.
[946]
On the brutality of the regime toward protests and its strategies of isolating and
punishing pockets of resistance, see Gelvin, 128-130; Hani Sayed, “Fear of Arrest,” in The
Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? edited by Bassam Haddad, et al.
(London: Pluto Press, 2012), 210-224; Samar Yazbek, The Crossing: My Journey to the
Shattered Heart of Syria, translated by Nashwa Gowanlock, and Ruth Ahmedzai Kemp.
(London: Ebury Press, 2016); Samar Yazbek, A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the
Syrian Revolution, translated by Max Weiss. (London: Haus Publishing, 2012).
[947]
Phillips, “Syria’s Bloody Arab…,” 39.
[948]
See Megan Catherine Corro, “The Arab Uprisings and the Unveiling of the Shiite
Crescent,” (MA thesis, Georgetown University, 2013). It examines Iran and Hizbullah’s
support of the Assad regime within the context of the growth of the Shiite Crescent in the
region.
[949]
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, 2: 320.
[950]
Ibid. cf. al-‘Alwānī, 72-73.
[951]
Al-Raysūnī, 44.
[952]
Al-Būṭī’s speech. Retrieved March 8, 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDg7xpLLuhw. Al-Būṭī’s speech. (April 24, 2011).
Retrieved March 8, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvk4PgsWQd4.
[953]
The tradition is narrated by Muslim and al-Nasā’ī. See Ibn al-Athīr, 4: 70; al-Ṭabarānī,
2: 163.
[954]
This is how the tradition is interpreted by the majority of scholars. See, for example, al-
Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 238; Sharaf al-Dīn al-Ṭībī, al-Kāshif ‘an ḥaqā’iq al-Sunan.
(Riyad: Maktabat al-Bāz, 1997), 2561. ‘Ummiyyah also is identified by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī
as tribal blind support. See Ibn Abī Shaybah, 14: 22.
[955]
It is worthwhile to draw attention to the ethnic stacking of the Syrian military. A recent
study has showed that Alawis form 80 percent of the officer corps, and 70 percent of the
army’s 200 thousand career soldiers, although Sunnis form the majority of its 300 thousand
conscripts. Nassif, 175. So, most defections came from conscript soldiers, yet within officer
corps, defection rate has been negligible. Cf. Dorothy Smith Ohl, “The Soldier’s Dilemma:
Military Responses to Uprisings in Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, and Syria,” (PhD Dissertation, the
George Washington University, 2016), 275-395.
On the other hand, it is useful here to refer to Terence Lee's significant work, Defect or
Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia. (Johns Hopkins
University: JHU Press, 2015). The book explains how and under what conditions armed
forces defect from repressive regimes when popular protests broke out. The author draws
from the experience of Asia and examines four case studies of popular resistance: the
Philippines and Indonesia—both successfully engaged military support to bring down
authoritarian rule, in contrast to China and Myanmar, where protest movements became
violently suppressed by military forces.
[956]
Lister, The Syrian Jihad…, 55; “The Free Syrian Army…”
[957]
Rabbā‘, 205; Abou El Fadl, 124-125; Salqīnī, 190-195; al-Mughallis, 255-257.
[958]
Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-rā’iq. (Vols. 7). (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Arabiyyah al-
Kubrā, n.d.), 5: 151-152. Al-Zayla‘ī, however, argues that other people should not aid the
imam against the wronged group (who are not bughāh) and vice versa—that is, they stay
aloof. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Zayla‘ī, Tabyīn al-ḥaqā’iq. (Vols. 6). (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Amīriyyah,
1314 AH), 3: 294.
[959]
Al-Mughallis, 255-257.
[960]
Ibid., 256-257.
[961]
Lister, The Syrian Jihad…, 119-278.
[962]
Lister, The Syrian Jihad…, 51-118; Charles Lister, “Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra,” Center
for Middle East Policy, no. 24 (July 2016).
[963]
Lister, “Profiling Jabhat…,” 26-29.
[964]
Elizabeth O'Bagy, “Jihad in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War. (September 2012), 23.
[965]
Lister had a chance to manage nearly two years of face-to-face engagement with the
leaderships of over 100 Syrian armed opposition groups. He tracks the evolution of the
insurgency month by month, from March 2011 to September 2015.
[966]
Lister, The Syrian Jihad…, 2.
[967]
Marwān Qabalān, al-Mu‘āraḍah al-musallaḥah al-Sūriyyah: Wuḍūḥ al-hadaf wa ghiyāb
al-ru’yah. (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2013), 13-21. Allegations
regarding the participation of members of the Iranian military and Hizbullah militants had
begun in September 2011. In 2012, these claims were substantiated by official admission
from Iran's IRGC, General Muḥammad ‘Alī Ja‘farī that Iranian security forces were in Syria.
Lister, The Syrian Jihad…, 88-90.
[968]
O'Bagy, 19.
[969]
Ibid., 19.
[970]
Lister, The Syrian Jihad…, 3. See Mariam Karouny, "Apocalyptic Prophecies Drive Both
sides to Syrian Battle for End of Time," (April 2014). reuters.com. Retrieved January 21,
2017.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-prophecy-insight-idUSBREA3013420 140401.
[971]
For significant studies on foreign fighters in Syria, see Justin D. Dragon, “Western
foreign fighters in Syria: an empirical analysis of recruitment and mobilization mechanisms,”
(MA thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015); David Dews, “Identity
and Islamist Radicalisation: The Foreign Fighters of Europe,” (MA thesis, Uppsala
University, 2016).
[972]
See the spectrum of religious ideology of insurgent groups in Syria in O'Bagy, 16-19.
[973]
In contrast, according to one interviewee, al-Būṭī’s gain from his long contact with the
regime was, morally speaking, his widespread scholarly prestige and religious leadership.
That is, the regime was working on elevating the social and religious status of al-Būṭī by
making him, for example, the preacher of the Umayyad Mosque, and the head of the union
of Bilād al-Shām ulema in 2012.

[974]
Ibn ‘Asākir, 36: 184.
[975]
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela. (New
York, London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 308.
[976]
I recall here that the armed forces’ decision to side with the protests in Tunisia and
Egypt was instrumental in the success of the uprising. By contrast, the suppression of
demonstrations by armed forces in Bahrain and Syria prolonged the life of the regime in
both countries. Therefore, “the main factor determining the success or failure of mass revolt
is the military's response.” Lee, 2.
[977]
“I do not want demonstrators to end up either in the prison or in the grave.” This is what
al-Būṭī told Shaykh ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Bizm, mufti of Damascus, interview by the author,
Kuala Lumpur, March 24, 2016. This statement clearly indicates that al-Būṭī was keen to
protect the life of protestors (and, by extension, their relatives, friends, etc.) from the
potentially dreadful torture of the security forces.
[978]
See the scenario in chapter five.
[979]
Al-Būṭī’s fatwa, (July 7, 2011). Nasīm al-Shām. Retrieved January 8, 2016.
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readFatwa&pg_id=15150.
[980]
For a detailed account of fatwa, see Ibn al-Qayyim, I'lām al-muwaqqi‘īn 'an Rabb
al-‘ālamīn. (Damascus: Dār al-Bayān, 2000). 2: 13-24.
[981]
Bakour, Bachar. “The Permanent and Changing Side of Sharia.” International Journal of
Muslim World Studies, (IIUM), vol. 14, no. 1, (2016): 39.
[982]
Names are listed according to the interview date.
[983]
Those qualified to elect or depose a caliph on behalf of the Muslim community.
[984]
This is appropriately applicable to the Syrian case. Syria is known to be a state of
intelligence, where the security of intelligence services, in conjugation with trusted elements
of the military, has dominance in controlling people and in defending the regime against
perceived threats, internal and external. "Hafez al-Assad had largely established the
mukhābarāt state in Syria, having created a tangled matrix of overlapping security agencies
during his time in power." David W. Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad. (Yale:
Yale University Press, 2012), 5.
There were four independent intelligence agencies that make up the Syrian security
apparatus: Department of Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence Directorate, General
Intelligence Directorate, Political Security Directorate. Each agency has several branches
that are aligned both regionally and functionally. And every agency maintains a branch in
each of Syria’s provinces.
 Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War. (Washington:
The Institute for the Study of War, 2013), 54. Further, “Each intelligence agency operates its
own network of prisons, in which most detainees have been subjected to some form of
torture, and many have died in detention.” Ibid., 55. Cf. Stephen M. Strenges, “Staring
Down the Mukhabarat: Rhizomatic Social Movements and the Egyptian and Syrian Arab
Spring,” (MA thesis, University of South Florida, 2015); Hokayem, 33-38.
[985]
I recall here that the armed force's decision to side with the protests in Tunisia and
Egypt was instrumental in the success of the uprising. By contrast, the suppression of
demonstrations by armed forces in Bahrain and Syria prolonged the life of the regime in
both countries. Therefore, “The main factor determining the success or failure of mass
revolt is the military's response.” Terence Lee, Defect or Defend: Military Responses to
Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia. (Johns Hopkins University: JHU Press, 2015), 2.
[986]
Among those who joined was the celebrated Shaykh Kurayyim Rājiḥ.
[987]
In January 30, 2008.
[988]
This is a different version of my name.