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Daubert versus Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (509U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 1993)

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Daubert versus Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (509U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 1993)

Introduction

Daubert versus Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals case was in the United States Supreme

Court, referenced when federal courts admit expert testimony. The Supreme Court ruling

formulated the Daubert standard, which determines how court judges assess scientific testimony

given by expert witnesses. Parents of Daubert and Eric filed a suit against Merrell Dow, a

pharmaceutical company. In this case, the plaintiff could not prove that Bendectin caused

congenital disabilities.

Case details

In this case, Daubert and Eric were the plaintiffs, and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals were

the defendants. Daubert was missing three fingers and a part of his right hand, while Eric was

missing one hand and one leg was shorter. Their parents filed a lawsuit against Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals for their children's malformations. The parents argued that their children's

defects were caused by Bendectin, a drug that the company made. Bendectin is an anti-nausea

drug their mothers ingested during their first two months of pregnancy. Merrell moved the case

to federal court and sought summary judgment. Its motion went to the question of causation, and

its content was that it does not cause congenital disabilities, and the plaintiffs could not produce

any admissible evidence.

The defendant's claim contended that Bendectin does not cause birth defects in children.

To support their claim, they presented the court with an affidavit from an expert on the risks of

exposure to chemical substances, physician Steven Lamm. According to Steven Lamm, he had

reviewed over thirty studies on Bendectin and human congenital disabilities involving more than
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130,000 patients. Those studies did not find Bendectin capable of causing defects in fetuses.

Therefore, based on his review, he concluded that using Bendectin during pregnancy does not

cause congenital disabilities. The plaintiff did not contest this published record regarding the

effects of Bendectin and congenital disabilities.

The plaintiffs responded to this motion with experts of their own with impressive

credentials. These experts used live animals and test tubes that found a connection between

congenital disabilities and Bendectin. In addition, based on their lab studies of the drug's

chemical structure and reanalysis of published research studies on epidemiology, they concluded

that Bendectin could cause malfunctions in babies.

Findings

The court found the defendant's evidence admissible because it was scientific and

acceptable in the field it belonged to. Their evidence established that no published studies proved

that Bendectin and birth defects were linked. Again, quoting the United States versus Kilgus, the

defendant's evidence was based scientifically and acceptable in science.

The court found the plaintiff’s evidence to be inadmissible. Their evidence was not up to

standards as it relied on vast data from epidemiological data about Bendectin and lacked

epidemiological evidence to prove the cause of birth defects. The live animals, test tubes, and

laboratory chemical structure analysis did not present the issue of the cause of the birth defects.

According to Frye versus the United States, the judges articulated that scientific expert opinion

was ruled out because it is not acceptable in the scientific community. Their evidence was ruled

out since it did not meet the required standards and was not peer-reviewed. Quoting the United

States versus Solomon, the judges declared that a specialist point of view based on methods that
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diverge from accepted ways recognized by officials in the field could not be submitted as a

reliable technique. Based on these findings, the court established that the plaintiffs' evidence

lacked enough basis to accept specialist evidence. Therefore, after their evidence was dismissed,

the plaintiff could not prove the causation of these defects.

The court stated that the Court of Appeal that looked at the risk of Bendectin did not

admit reanalysis of research studies that were not published or peer-reviewed. The courts found

unpublished reanalysis problematic compared to published and peer-reviewed research studies

supporting the position. The court stated that published and peer-reviewed studies had undergone

careful examination by science professionals and had more weight, hence admissible. The court

contented that reanalysis is acceptable when it is subjected to verification by others in the

scientific community. The court dismissed the plaintiff's reanalysis as unpublished and was

generated for use in the case. The court concluded that the plaintiff could not prove causation at

the trial. As established in Frye, general acceptance can be used to admit scientific evidence. The

opinion states that the court can use its expert witness to perform a 403 test to weigh its scientific

evidence.

Some concerns were raised that moving away from Frye's standard can result in a free-

for-all. The court found that presenting contrary evidence and cross-checking evidence can

reduce those risks. In case of a mistake during this process, the court cleared that it can be

corrected when giving the verdict. The court went ahead to differentiate between the legal search

for truth and the scientific inquiry. They stated that legal disputes could be set on and that

science is flexible. In addition, the court also said that if the judge is responsible for checking

scientific evidence, he may take some meaningful information away from the jury. The judges
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also noted that the rules of evidence are to resolute legal disputes and not search for global

understanding.

The court held that general acceptance is not needed as a condition of evidence rules and

that Rule 702 gives the judge the responsibility of ensuring reliable testimony. Consequently,

the Supreme court reversed the court of appeal opinion, and the case was returned to proceed.

The opposers accused the court of going beyond the question raised by the parties and continued

to argue that Frye was not revoked by Rule 702. Following the Daubert opinion, Rule 702 was

amended to contain factors brought up in the Daubert opinion, which became the standard for

scientific evidence admission. Many states have adopted the Daubert standard in the United

States as the standard for the admission of scientific evidence.

Importance and Impact On The Practice Now.

As a result of this decision, scholars have claimed that the Daubert standard for expert

testimony should be used in the administrative process. Some scholars have rejected the use of

the Daubert standard, arguing that using judges to examine the scientific evidence presented in

court is different from using judges to examine the testimony of scientific experts contributed to

the jury. In a 2015 law review article, David Berstain argued that judges’ interference with

scientific evidence has a lot of risks in decision-making by having them make not just evident

judgments but also intertwined decisions that are not within the judicial field of expertise.

This case was crucial in the generation of the general acceptance standard. The standard

was first created during the Frye case and has been used to determine the admission of scientific

evidence. The general standard has also helped define expert testimony rules in court. The

general acceptance standard states that any evidence should be scientific and should have
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scientific and be backed by scientific knowledge for it to be admissible in court. In addition, the

evidence should contain theoretical explanations and be subjected to scrutiny and testing.

As a result of this case, the judges formulated Rule 702. Rule 702 contains the initial

assessment of the scientific method and the scientific reasoning behind the testimony. This rule

was also developed to determine whether the testimony is scientifically correct and if the logic

and methodology can be applied to the facts in the case.

The principle in the Daubert case was applied in the case of Kumho Tire Company versus

the Carmichael case in 1999, where evidence from a technician was in question. In this case, a

tire of a van driven by Carmichael burst, and the van overturned, causing the demise of a

commuter and injuries to others. Carmichael filed a lawsuit against Kumho Tire Company

because the tire was defective. As the technician was testifying, the only cause of the tire defect

he presented to the court was a manufacturing defect, and he could not find any other reason.

The court admitted the evidence on the ground that Daubert did not use technical evidence but

scientific evidence.

The Daubert standard was also applied in the case of General Electric Company versus

Joiner in 1997. Joiner was working as an electrician around transformers. While working,

dielectric fluid got into his eye, mouth, and arms. Later he was discovered to have lung cancer

that he claimed was a result of toxic in the liquid. He sued General Electric claiming that

exposure to the poisonous fluid promoted his cancer. Joiner had been a smoker for a long time,

and there was also a history of cancer in his family. General Electric argued that there was no

evidence that the fluid caused his cancer, and scientific evidence showed that the toxic fluid

speeded up his cancer. These are some of the effects of the Daubert case and how it has affected

the practice.