A New Elite Framework For Political Sociology

A New Elite Framework for Political Sociology
Author(s): G. Lowell Field, John Higley and Michael G. Burton

Source: Revue européenne des sciences sociales, T. 28, No. 88 (1990), pp. 149-182
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6. LOWELL FIELD, JOHN HIGLEY, MICHAEL G. BURTON
A NEW ELITE FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
References to elites are ubiquitous in contemporary discussions

of politics. Journalists and commentators speak routinely of elite
circles, elite opinions, and elite conflicts when discussing events in
Washington or Moscow, Beijing or Paris. Social scientists and
historians just as routinely assign elites pivotal roles in analyzing
political regimes, revolutions, social movements, democratic transi-
tions and breakdowns, changing ideologies, and changing policies.
Elites are thus at the core of the widely noted emphasis on "politi-
cal" causation in contemporary political sociology, though analysts
may use such roughly synonymous terms as leaders, rulers, power
groups, power networks, parties, state actors, and ruling class
fractions. Indeed, elites and elite-like entities bulk so large in
popular and academic writing about politics today that one is entitled
to speak of a "paradigm shift" from societally-centered pluralist
and Marxian approaches toward an elite-centered approach.
This is not to say, however, that elite theory is flourishing. By
and large, scholars have not followed up on the attempts of the
early elite theorists - Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Vilfredo Pareto
(1848-1923), and Robert Michels (1876-1936) - to use the elite concept
as the centerpiece in a general theory of political continuity and
change (Zuckerman, 1977). Leaders of the paradigm shift in macro-
political analysis give little or no evidence that they see themselves
as working within the tradition of the early elite theorists, grounding
their work instead in the insights of Weber or Marx (e.g., Tilly 1975,
1978; Bendix 1978; Skocpol 1979; Mann 1986; Giddens 1987). And
though scholars often speak of "elite theory," no widely recognized
body of interrelated concepts and propositions warranting the label
exists. Thus, in assessing the "elitist paradigm" recently, Moyser and
Wagstaffe (1987, p. 1) observed that it "...suffers from argument
and confusion over key terms, a relative dearth of testable hypotheses,
a failure clearly to separate normative from empirical theory and,
not least, the lack of a firm data base in which the latter could be
solidly grounded."
The work of the early elite theorists promised more. Realizing
that promise requires reconsidering and extending their basic con-
tentions about: the inevitability of elites, the importance of variations
in elite structure and functioning for political continuities and
changes, and the interdependent relationship between elites and muss
150 G. LOWELL FIELD, J. HIGLEY, M.G. BURTON
publics in all modern societies. Taken together, these

suggest a decidedly more realistic theory of politics th
utopian democratic and Marxian theories against which Mo
and Michels reacted. But each contention needs elaboration
the sense in which elites are inevitable in modern societies; to
specify how elites vary and with what political consequences; and
to reformulate the interdependence of elites and mass publics.
In attempting to provide these elaborations we outline a new
elite framework for political sociology. As in classical elite theory,
elites are the key explanatory concept. But in our framework:
(1) they are treated as a strictly factual, rather than sometimes
normative, category, (2) politically decisive variations in national elite
structure and functioning are situated within broad and changing
parameters of mass political orientations as societies undergo socio-
economic development, and (3) explanatory claims are limited to
major continuities and changes in the political regimes of most larger
nation-states during the modern historical and contemporary periods.
The result is a general model of the main relationships between
elites, mass publics, and political regimes in the modern world.
The Inevitability of Elites
Classical elite theory insisted that a distinct "ruling class,"

"governing elite," or set of "oligarchies'1 dominates the politics of
all societies. This proposition flatly rules out seriously egalitarian
outcomes, meaning that political choices center mainly on the desir-
ability of some ruling groups over others and on ways of modifying
or transforming the less desirable ones. Both factual and normative
reasons for the inevitability of elites were given. Mosca emphasized
the ability of small minorities to out-organize and outwit large
majorities, but he added that elite individuals usually have "a
certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority" over those
they govern (1939, p. 53, passim). Pareto claimed that in a condition
of unrestricted social mobility the elite would be the most talented,
though in real societies elites tend to be persons (1) who are more
adept at using the two bases of rulership, force and persuasion, and
(2) who enjoy important advantages, such as inherited wealth and
family connections, which give them the upper hand in politics and
other politically relevant activies (see Finer 1966, p. 52). Michels
(1911, 1962) rooted the inevitability of elites in the imperatives of
all larger organizations: Any such organization needs leaders and
experts in order to operate efficiently, and as these individuals gain
control of funds, information flows, promotions, and most other
aspects of organizational functioning, power is concentrated in
their hands. This is all the more inevitable, Michels added, because
A NEW ELITE FRAXflSWORK FOR POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 151
the ignorance, apathy, and narrowly self-interested behavior of

and-file members make them easy prey for elite manipulation.
Because these explanations mixed factual and normative con-
siderations, classical elite theory has often been viewed as heavily
ideological (e.g., Jack 1975; Beetham 1977). Following Harold
Lasswell's (1961) lead, however, most scholars now use the elite
concept to designate a strictly factual category - people who are
powerful and/or privileged for whatever reason (Sartori 1987, p. 168).
As a way of denoting ruling or ascendant groups, the elite concept
is' less abstract and disembodied than such alternative concepts as
ruling class or state actors. As George Marcus (1983, p. 25) points
out, elite theory is the only macro theory in political sociology that
is defined on a "small-group, personal level of conceptualization."
It concentrates on small, specifiable groups of people who can
plausibly be viewed as sources or at least key agents of political
continuity and change, who possess some important degree of internal
organization, and who often can be mapped and described in con-
siderable detail.
In line with Michels, many scholars now view elites as arising
from the imperatives of organizational structure and functioning
(Burton and Higley 1987a), though Michels' dim view of rank-and-
file capacities is typically not part of this reasoning. While the
members of any large organization probably share some broad
understandings and interests, they rarely agree on how to allocate
specific tasks and statuses or on particular policies and actions. Thus,
large organizations are always in danger of ruinous internal conflicts.
This makes their structures and processes inherently arbitrary: They
are created and maintained by persons who happen to occupy
strategic decisionmaking locations but who can seldom convince all
other organizational participants of the Tightness of their decisions.
To survive and prosper, therefore, large organizations require hierar-
chical systems of communications through which decisions flow
from those who make them to those who implement them, and
hierarchical systems of rewards and punishments to ensure that
decisions are obeyed. If we call people who command these hierar-
chies elites, we can say that organization beyond some minimum size
and complexity necessarily creates elites. Furthermore, because large
organizations are themselves concentrations of power in the wider
society, people commanding them normally have disproportionate
societal power and influence. In short, elites are inevitable in
societies with any significant amount of large-scale organization.
Michels made the self-interested behavior of elites the focal point
of his analysis, detailing the many reasons why party, trade union,
and other mass organization leaders cling to their positions, and
describing the tactics they use. Generalizing his analysis, we can say
that elites' overriding interest is in perpetuating their organizational
statuses and power. The practical result is that elites are primarily
152 G. LOWELL FIELD, J. HIGLEY, M.G. BURTOK
concerned to contain and manage the intra-organizational conflicts

and inter-organizational encroachments that regularly threaten the
survival and effectiveness of the organizations they command. This
is normally a full-time job which sharply limits the time and energy
elites can give to the broader social categories and movements they
are affiliated with outside their immediate organizational domains.
Furthering the aims of a social class, an ethnic community, a
religious movement, or some other broad category must usually
take a back seat to coping with intra- and inter-organizational threats
to their power bases. Among much else, this means we cannot
reliably infer elite interests and behavior from their social back-
grounds, educations, class memberships, and religious or ethnic
affiliations (Parry 1969, pp. 97-105). Elite interests are more personal
and organizationally specific, and elite behavior is more managerial
and defensive than is commonly recognized (see Higley, Field and
Groholt 1976, pp. 59-102).
We define elites as persons who are able, by virtue of their
strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national poli-
tical outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principal
decisionmakers in the largest or otherwise most pivo tally situated
organizations in a society. The national political outcomes they
affect are the basic stability or instability of political regimes, the
more specific democratic or authoritarian forms regimes take, as
well as regimes1 main policies. Elites affect these political outcomes
"regularly" in that their individual points of view and possible
actions are seen by other influential persons as important factors
to be weighed when assessing the likelihood of continuities and
changes in regimes and policies. This does not mean that the typical
elite person affects every aspect of regime operation and policy, but
rather that he or she is able to take influential actions on those
aspects that are salient to his or her interests and location (Merritt
1970, p. 105). Elites affect these political outcomes "substantially"
in the sense that, without their support or opposition, an outcome
salient to their interests and locations would be noticeably different.
In addition to their strategic positions in powerful organizations,
this ability of elites to affect political outcomes regularly and sub-
stantially distinguishes them from other persons and categories in
a society: A lone political assassin can, like an elite person, affect
political outcomes substantially, but not regularly. A citizen voting
in democratic elections can, like an elite person, affect outcomes
regularly, but not substantially. Only elites can affect political out-
comes regularly and substantially.
Finally, a national elite consists of all the persons who occupy
strategically influential positions in a society's major organizations
and who can therefore throw significant amounts of organizational
power into the political fray. Most scholars now operationally define
national elites as top position-holders in the largest or most resource-
A NEW ELITE FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 153
rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional

munications, and cultural organizations and movements in
(see Putnam 1976; Higley and Moore 1981; McDonough 1981; Dye
1983; Burton and Higley 1987a; Hoffmann-Lange 1987; Moyser and
Wagstaffe 1987). Thus, a national elite contains persons and groups
who hold widely varying attitudes and allegiances toward the exist-
ing social, economic, and political order, including as it does the
holders of key positions in powerful dissident or rebellious organiza-
tions and movements. National elites in large contemporary societies
like the United States or the Soviet Union, probably contain 5,000-
10,000 people (see, e.g., Dye 1983; Lane 1988); in somewhat smaller
societies like West Germany or Australia the number is probably
1,000-5,000 (see, e.g., Hoffmann-Lange 1987; Higley, Deacon, and
Smart 1979); whereas in quite small societies like Norway or Den-
mark, and most historical societies, national elites probably encom-
pass only several hundred individuals (see, e.g., Higley, Field, and
Groholt 1976; Pedersen 1976).
Given this inclusive conception of national elites, relating variations
in their structure and functioning to major political outcomes - the
second key contention of classical elite theory - involves (1) identify-
ing the basic configurations that national elites take, and (2)
specifying the major political consequences of these configurations.
Variations in National Elites and Political Regimes
The broad configurations of national elites and their variations

among societies and within societies over time were a key focus
of classical elite theory. Pareto (1935, para. 2254) stressed the "order"
or "system" of elites and how it overrides the "conscious will" of
elite individuals in shaping their actions. Mosca (1939, p. 51) con-
tended that, "The varying structure of ruling classes has a prepon-
derant importance in determining the political type, and also the
level of civilization, of the different peoples." Accordingly, both
theorists discussed the relative openness and social homogeneity of
national elites, observing that they vary greatly in their cohesion,
consciousness, and conspiratorial capacity. But these analyses were
vitiated by the use of extremely vague concepts - Mosca referred
to the "spiritual unity," "energy," and "practical wisdom" of different
elites, while Pareto spoke of elite and nonelite concentrations of
"sentiments" and "residues."
The classical theorists nevertheless saw the need for identifying
basic elite types. Mosca contrasted the elites of feudal societies,
which elite status rested on heredity and military valor, with t
elites of modern bureaucratic societies, in which status rested
primarily on wealth, however acquired (Mosca 1939, pp. 70-87).
Pareto contrasted a "Byzantine" elite type found in strongly
154 G. LOWELL FIELD, J. HIGLEY, M.G. BURTOX
centralized and dictatorial regimes with a "pluto-democ

in modern industrial societies (see Finer 1968). But these simple
distinctions were too grounded in pre-twentieth century history to
be useful today. Moreover, the characteristics of each elite type
were so intertwined with the supposedly resulting characteristics of
political regimes as to constitute circular reasoning: Elite and regime
types amounted to the same thing.
Unfortunately, few scholars since Mosca and Pareto have addressed
the need for a typology of national elites. Raymond Aron (1950)
distinguished between "Western" and "Soviet" elites, but he also
acknowledged profound differences between such Western elites as
the British and the French, and his distinction has no place for the
elites of non-Western but also non-communist countries. Con-
centrating on elite structure and composition in Germany sinc
1870, Dahrendorf (1967) distinguished among "authoritarian", "tot
tarian," "liberal," and "cartel" elites, but his typology's anchora
German affairs has militated against its wider application. Put
(1976, pp. 115-21) synthesized diverse elite studies to identify ten-
dencies toward "consensual," "competitive," and "coalescent" national
elites, but he concluded that evidence for and against each type is
"too sparse and impressionistic for confident generalization" (p. 121).
A few other scholars have offered essentially similar typologies (see
Burton and Higley 1987a), but the broad framework we are
constructing requires a fresh approach.
Configurations of National Elites
Recent studies highlight two basic but parallel dimensions in the

structure and functioning of national elites: the extent of structural
integration, and the extent of value consensus. Structural integration
involves the relative inclusiveness of formal and informal networks
of communication and influence among the persons, groups and
factions in a national elite ((Kadushin 1968, 1979; Higley and Moore
1981). Value consensus involves the relative agreement among these
persons, groups and factions about formal and informal rules and
codes of political conduct and about the worth of existing political
institutions (Prewitt and Stone 1973; Di Palma 1973). Focusing on
these dimensions, we can distinguish three basic configurations of
national elites:
1. Disunified: Structural integration and value consensus are mini-

mal in the sense that communication and influence networks do not
cross factional lines in any comprehensive way; factions disagree
on the rules and codes of political conduct and on the worth of
existing institutions. Accordingly, elites tend to distrust each other
deeply, to perceive political outcomes in zero-sum or "politics-as-
war" terms (Sartori 1987, p. 224), and to engage in unrestrained,
often violent, struggles for dominance.
2. Consensually Unified: Structural integration is inclusiv

sense that overlapping and interconnected communication and
influence networks encompass all elite factions and no single faction
dominates these networks; value consensus is also inclusive in the
sense that, while factions regularly and publicly oppose each other
on ideological and policy questions, they share an underlying con-
sensus about rules of the game and the worth of existing political
institutions. Accordingly, factions tend to compete in terms of a
"restrained partisanship" (DiPalma 1973), to cooperate tacitly to
contain especially explosive issues and conflicts, and to perceive
decisional outcomes in positive-sum or "politics-as-bargaining" terms
(Sartori 1987, p. 224).
3. Ideologically Unified: Structural integration is inclusive in the
sense that communication and influence networks encompass all
elite factions but run mainly through, and are sharply centralized in,
a dominant faction and the party or movement it leads; value con-
sensus is also inclusive in the sense that factions publicly express
no deep ideological or policy disagreements and instead conform
their public statements to a single, explicit ideology whose policy
implications are officially construed by the uppermost leaders of the
dominant faction. Accordingly, elite factions publicly manifest a
monolithic ideological unity.
These configurations are ideal or pure types which "represent

the standards, parameters, or models against which... concrete
instances can be compared in terms of greater or lesser proximity"
(Sartori 1976, p. 145). In reality, national elites appear to vary
along a continuum while nevertheless clustering around three
fundamentally distinct forms. Disunified elites range from a thor-
oughly disunified, chaotic extreme, such as Lebanese or Ugandan
elites in recent years, through an array of more organized, but still
basically disunified configurations - such as the dichotomous divi-
sions into highly antagonistic leftist and rightist camps of most
European elites during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and
of all Latin American elites during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries; or again, the trichotomous divisions into distinct leftist,
centrist, and rightist camps of most European elites during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, and of most Latin American
elites since about World War II. Next along the continuum are
consensually unified elites whose unity varies from tenuous, as in
the Philippines before Marcos, or in Malaysia, Tunisia and perhaps
Mexico today; to firmly established, as in Britain, the U.S., or the
Netherlands for long periods; to virtually unchallenged, as in Sweden,
Norway, Australia and New Zealand in recent decades. Finally,
assorted elites display ideological unity in lesser or greater degrees,
ranging from the Yugoslav and other East European elites since the
1960s, as well as the Soviet and Chinese elites very recently, to the
more tightly unified Soviet and German elites under Stalin and Hitler,
respectively.
The basic elite configurations and their real world re

be explored in greater detail, which requires more conc
and more research. But the complexity and secretiveness of elite
structure and functioning probably forever preclude an exhaustive
charting of national elite configurations. To an irreducible degree,
the configurations are theoretical or heuristic constructs which serve
to link more directly and completely observable phenomena (see
Wilier and Webster 1970; Gibbs 1972). In our framework, these
phenomena are: (1) certain political regime patterns which persist
over time despite changing configurations of mass publics and
therefore appear to be produced by the elite configurations, and
(2) certain circumstances, events, and processes in which the elite
configurations seem to originate. We now specify the political regime
patterns apparently associated with these configurations.
Types of Political Regimes
The stability and instability of political regimes is one of the

most visible and important variations among societies in the modern
world, and scholars have given the subject much attention (e.g.,
Upset 1960; Eckstein 1966; Huntington 1968; Castles 1974; Lijphart
1977; Linz 1978; Macridis 1986). Regime instability has several
meanings, including: (1) a high incidence of political violence in the
form of revolts, riots, strikes, mass demonstrations, and individual
actions; (2) frequent changes in the makeup of governing coalitions
and cabinets; (3) the occurrence of coups d'etat or other government
overthrows (Sanders 1981). The first two meanings, however, are
insufficiently discriminating - nearly all regimes would more or
less regularly qualify as unstable in one or both respects. Only
the third meaning, suitably elaborated, distinguishes unstable regimes
in a more clear-cut and theoretically useful fashion.
An unstable regime is thus one in which government executive
power is subject to irregular seizures, serious attempted seizures, or
widely expected seizures by open force. Concrete indicators of an
unstable regime are revolutions, uprisings, or coups d'etat aimed at
changing the personnel controlling government executive offices and
not primarily orchestrated by extra-national forces. A regime may
be classified as unstable during periods when such seizures occur,
are seriously attempted, or are regarded by informed observers as
likely possibilities. If any of these indicators obtain, a regime's cur-
rent mode of functioning, whether "democratic" or "authoritarian"
or something else, is almost certain to be temporary.
Ordinarily, regime instability is clear-cut: Irregular, forcible power
seizures are sufficiently frequent and visible, or expectations of them
are sufficiently palpable, that the analyst can readily recognize an
unstable regime. Thus Malloy (1985, p. 367) identifies some 186
irregular power seizures in Bolivia since the country's independence
in 1825; Veliz (1967, p. 278) counts 80 successful military coups in
18 Latin American countries between 1920 and 1966; Grund

tabulates 64 irregular seizures of executive power in Black
nations between 1964 and 1968 alone; and Macridis (1986, p. 225
26 coups in 16 countries of Tropical Africa between 1970-
Similarly, a widespread expectation among informed observ
irregular power seizures are likely possibilities is usually a
For example, coups were considered likely throughout the
Third Republic's existence, and close observers of regimes t
recently emerged from democratic transitions see many of
still subject to coups. When such expectations are widely he
a political regime, they should be taken as evidence of inst
except in the circumstances specified below.
In European history unstable political regimes usually to
form of strictly traditional monarchies. Royal courts enco
most elite persons not in hiding, prison, or exile, and instabili
manifest in constant intrigues and usurpations aimed at using
monarchical power for factional or personal elite interests. More
recently, various institutional patterns have coexisted with regime
instability, including some that are formally representative and demo-
cratic. The key feature of these more recent patterns is that the
military and associated civilian elites exercise de facto control over
a regime's prospects. They have shown themselves willing, or are
widely thought willing, to alter or overthrow by force any govern-
ment that threatens their interests. So long as this situation persists,
existing political instituions have few binding effects on elite and
mass actors as they advance and defend their interests.
Political regimes lacking these features arc stable - irregular,
forcible seizures of government executive power have not occurred
or been seriously attempted and are not widely expected by informed
observers. But there are two basic types of stable regimes. One is
the stable representative regime in which factions maneuver and
compete for government executive power by appealing to various,
somewhat conflicting mass interests and categories. The degree ol
representativeness varies widely, however. In one variant, compet-
ing factions merely take turns wielding government executive power
via their alternating dominance of a parliament or other deliberative
body which is elected periodically by a sharply restricted electorate.
Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is an example.
In another variant, members of a dominant ethnic or other cultural
group enjoy political representation and participation while excluding
one or more, perhaps larger, subordinate groups. Examples are the
American South until recently, and South Africa throughout its
independent existence. But today, a stable representative regime is
usually indicated by successive, peaceful transfers of government
executive power among competing factions on the basis of periodic
and contested elections involving universal suffrage, as happens in
the Western democracies.
158 G. LOWELL FIELD, J. HIGLEY, M.G. BURTO.V
The other basic type of stable regime may be ter

representative. In this type, formally representative p
tutions and processes may or may not exist, but repres
are not actively practiced. Though elections may be held, they are
not seriously contested and their outcomes do not determine the
holders of government executive office or influence the main lines
of government policy. Executive power is instead transferred among
successive elite persons and groups via secret deliberations among
the highest officials of the regime. In the main variant of this type,
one party or movement monopolizes all political positions, and the
public expression of conflicting interests and opinions is consistently
repressed in favor of its ideology. Examples are the Soviet Union
from the late 1920's, Nazi Germany after 1933, and China after 1949.
In a second variant, criticisms of the regime and its policies are
allowed limited public expression, but government offices are never-
theless monopolized by a single party or movement and there is
no serious practice of representative politics. Examples are the
Soviet Union, as well as most East European countries until 1989,
and perhaps Iran since 1981.
These regime distinctions comprise empirical or extracted types
(Sartori 1976, pp. 145-6). Their features are "extracted" from and
are intended to cover one class of observable phenomena, the ways
in which transfers of government executive power occur in all larger
nation-states of the modern world: irregularly through force or
threat of force, the unstable regime; regularly and peacefully through
contests articulating the conflicting interests of at least some mass
categories, the stable representative regime; irregularly but also
peacefully via secret deliberations of some hegemonic group without
articulating the conflicting interests of mass categories, the stable
unrepresentative regime. Regimes usually display some mixture
of these features, but we can plausibly classify most regimes as
preponderantly of one or another type, especially when their longer-
term patterns are examined.
In line with elite theory's basic contention that variations in elite
structure and functioning are decisive for major political outcomes,
our framework causally associates national elite configurations with
political regime types as follows:
Elite Configuration Regime Type
Consensually unified
Ideologically unified-
Disunificd
As the causal variable, a nation

a regime type. A central questio
elite configurations come abou
Origins of the Elite Configurations
We stressed earlier that the national elite configurations we

distinguish are at base theoretical or heuristic constructs. While one
can and should seek to chart, clarify and elaborate these configura-
tions through research, any particular configuration's existence pro-
bably cannot be demonstrated conclusively by direct empirical
observation. Ultimately, the elite configurations must be judged by
their ability to account for the observable functioning of political
regimes. However, unless we can tie the configurations to other
observable phenomena, their linkage to regimes remains uncom-
fortably speculative; regime patterns could as well result primarily
from mass influences or external forces. We must therefore specify
the circumstances, events, and processes in which the elite con-
figurations originate. Then, an analyst can, after classifying a regime
as unstable, stable representative, or stable unrepresentative, look to
see whether the specified origin of the elite configuration that
plausibly accounts for the regime pattern can be identified in a
society's political record. Moreover, and especially important, iden-
tifying the origins of different elite configurations contributes a set
of dynamics to an otherwise static classification scheme.
The disunified, consensually unified, and ideologically unified
configurations of national elites appear to originate only in a few
sets of circumstances, events, and processes. Once created, moreover,
each configuration strongly tends to persist despite many other
changes in a society's makeup and functioning - elite transformations
from one configuration to another are rare. It follows that the
distinctive regime characteristics associated with each elite confi-
guration are equally persistent, with changes from one regime type
to another depending on a prior elite transformation. Putting aside
the outcomes of international warfare, the elite configurations have
originated in six ways.
Each of the national elite configurations has a "foundational"
origin in nation-state formation. Forming a nation-state from dispa-
rate, at least partially autonomous political entities typically involves
the forcible repression and subjugation of some elites by other elites
who end up dominating the new nation-state (sec Colcman 1971,
pp. 89-93; Tilly 1975). Unremitting fears, hatreds, and conflicts of
the sort that define disunified elites arc the usual result. This
happened in all the European nation-states that emerged at the end
of the medieval period, in all the nation-states that formed after the
Spaniards and Portuguese were driven from Latin America, and in
nearly all the postcolonial nation-states of Africa, the Middle East,
and Asia during the contemporary period. Indeed, nation-state
formation has so frequently left a legacy of elite disunity and
resulting regime instability as to constitute the modal pattern of
politics in the modern world (Higlcy and Burton 1989).
Much less frequently, certain consensually unifi

originated with nation-state formation. Where native
in a colonial or otherwise dependent territory have
opportunities to practice cooperative and conciliatory politics in
"home rule" governments and/or in large and complex independence
movements, consensually unified elites have sometimes emerged coter-
minous with the attainment of national independence. Clear exam-
ples are elites in Britain's American colonies before and during the
War of Independence, elites in Britain's New Zealand, Canadian, and
Australian colonies during the nineteenth century, as well as Indian
and Israeli elites who forged consensus and unity while waging long
and politically complex struggles for national independence. Simi-
larly, though very rarely, consensually unified elites have originated
in the evolution of small, geographically-isolated, and thoroughly
agrarian "citizen-communities1* (which, strictly speaking, contain no
elites) into more hierarchically organized nation-states. Arguably, the
Swiss national elite orignated this way - through the evolution of
small cantonal "citizen-communities" dating from the medieval
period - as did the consensually unified elites in some tiny inde-
pendent island states like Iceland. Where a consensually unified
elite originates with nation-state formation or with the evolution of
a citizen-community, a stable representative political regime is
established, and it persists as long as no transformation to a different
elite configuration occurs.
In rare instances, ideologically unified elites have likewise origi-
nated in the formation of an independent nation-state: where native
or settler elites in colonial territories have fought each over during
a larger struggle for national independence and a particularly
doctrinaire, tightly organized faction has triumphed, eliminating
other factions and imposing its ideology and organization on all
segments of the newly independent nation-state. An example is the
victory by the Vietminh movement and the creation of an ideologically
unified elite in North Vietnam after the French defeat in 1954. As
this case illustrates, where an ideologically unified elite dates from
the formation of an independent nation-state, the elite configuration
and its attendant stable unrepresentative regime strongly tend to
persist.
The long-term persistence of elite configurations that orignatc
with nation-state formation highlights the pivotal importance of
elite cooperation or conflict during that formative process. But
while initial elite configurations usually last over long periods, sub-
sequent elite transformations sometimes occur, and they account for
most major, lasting political changes in nation-states.
Elite transformations from disunity to consensual unity have
happened in two ways. The first is an elite settlement in which the
warring factions of a disunified national elite suddenly and deliber-
ately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their
most basic disagreements, thereby achieving consensual unity and
laying the basis for a stable representative regime (see Bur

Higley 1987b). Examples are: England's Glorious Revolution in
1688-89, Sweden's constitutional settlement in 1809, Mexico's forma-
tion of a relatively inclusive and consensually-based elite structure
in 1929, Costa Rica's constitutional settlement in 1948, the explicit
pacts negotiated by Colombian and Venezuelan elites in 1957-58, and
Spain's constitutional settlement in 1978-79. Successful elite settle-
ments occur only in extraordinary circumstances whose key features
are a legacy of protracted but inconclusive elite conflict, a sudden
crisis threatening the worsening of that conflict, an organization of
elite factions which facilitates effective negotiations among their
principal leaders, and considerable elite freedom from mass pres-
sures against the compromises settlements require.
The other kind of transformation from disunity to consensual
unity is an elite convergence in which some warring factions in a
disunified elite discover that by forming a broad electoral coalition
they can mobilize a reliable majority of voters, win elections
repeatedly, and thereby protect their interests against the attacks
of dissident and hostile elite factions by dominating government
executive power. Successive electoral defeats may convince the major
dissident and hostile elite factions that to avoid permanent exclusion
from government executive power they must moderate their dis-
tinctive ideological and policy positions and compete broadly for
votes. Such moderation gradually bridges the deep ideological
chasms that mark disunified elites, and all important factions come
to hold a tacit consensus about rules of the game and the worth of
existing institutions while competing on the basis of a restrained
partisanship. Examples are Norway and Denmark during the first
third of this century, when radical social democratic and trade union
elites moderated their positions to defeat previously dominant con-
servative and liberal elite factions, as well as West Germany, France,
Italy, and Japan during the last thirty years, when previously
disaffected socialist and/or communist elites moderated their ideo-
logical postures and policy programs to attract voters outside their
customary class constituencies.
Elite transformations from disunity to ideological unity occur
only through revolutions: Some extremist elite group seizes power,
liquidates pre-existing elites, centralizes political activity in the party
or movement it leads, and enforces its ideology as the only frame-
work for political expression. Examples are Russia 1917-21, Italy
1922-26, Germany 1929-33, and perhaps Iran 1979-81. As these
examples indicate, elite transformations from disunity to ideological
unity have occurred through both egalitarian and anti-egalitarian
revolutions. From the standpoint of elite theory, revolutions simply
replace one set of elites with another (Pareto 1935, paras. 792-812).
However, our framework extends this insight by holding that revo-
lutions are not always "elite circulations" pure and simple; in fact,
they sometimes constitute elite transformations from one distinct
162 G. LOWELL FIELD, J. HIGLEY, M.G. BURTON'
configuration, disunity, to another distinct configurati

unity (Higley, Burton, and Field 1989). Accordingly,
result of revolutions is a stable unrepresentative regim
its nomenclature implies, remains in place (barring defe
national warfare or other externally-induced overthrow
if a further elite transformation occurs.
Six indigenous origins of national elite configurations are
thus specified: three "foundational" origins coterminous with nation-
state formations ,and three "transformational" origins involving elite
settlements, elite convergences, or revolutions in societies with dis-
unified elites. Each origin needs detailed analysis, which is what
elaborating and applying our framework principally involves. Here
we want to observe that this specification of elite origins, if corrobo-
rated by further investigation, implies sharp limits on the possibilities
for indigenous and fundamental political change in societies. Elite
settlements, elite convergences, and revolutions together account for
roughly a score of national elite transformations among independent
nation-states during the past 300 years. In virtually all other nation-
states during this long period - in most of Europe until recently, and
in most of Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia down to
today - disunity has been the original and persisting elite configu-
ration.
Of course, the open-endedness of history prevents flat statements

about future possibilities, and our specification implies several other
conceivable outcomes. Elite transformations could occur from either
consensual or ideological unity to disunity, or from consensual to
ideological unity and vice versa. Exploring some recent or current
cases that may exemplify these additional possibilities - the possibi-
lity that the Filipino elite moved from consensual unity to disunity
under the Marcos regime and its eventual overthrow, or the dramatic
possibility that the Soviet and several East European elites are today
moving from ideological to consensual unity, or perhaps to disunity -
are key tasks in further elaborating the framework.
These relationships between national elite configurations and
regimes help account for much of the historical and contemporary
political record. But our framework does not assume that elites
alone run the political show. It is necessary to outline the roles that
mass publics also play, and this entails developing elite theory's third
basic contention about the interdependence of elites and mass publics.
The Interdependence of Elites and Mass Publics
The classical elite theorists dwelled heavily on the relationship

between elites and masses, stressing two key processes: elite circu-
lation and elite mobilization of mass support. They viewed elite
circulation - the altering of elite social composition through gradual
A XEW ELITE FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 163
or sudden movements of persons from mass to elite statuses a

versa - as crucial for a society's political stability and overall
vitality. Mosca thought elites should embody a balance of the major
'social forces" in society: elites having this balance operate effective
"mixed" types of governments and are highly durable; those lacking
it are challenged and sometimes overthrown by emerging counter-
elites organizing previously excluded social forces. More cynically
but to similar effect, Pareto claimed that effective elite rule and self-
perpetuation require continually coopting the ablest of the masses:
an elite whose ranks are open to such individuals not only deprives
the masses of potential leaders but it regularly replenishes itself
with more daring and innovative members. For his part, Michels
though that oligarchies' effectiveness and entrenchment are enhanced
by the bureaucratization of mass organizations, which facilitates
"careers open to talent" whereby able individuals gradually climb
to elite positions and distance themselves from rank-and-file interests.
Several generations of scholars have adopted this emphasis on
elite circulation, investigating the open or closed character of elites
as measured by their social origins, educational and occupational
profiles, ethnic, religious, regional and other affiliations (for research
summaries, see Parry 1969; Putnam 1976; Welsh 1979; Czudnowski
1981). This research reveals much about the workings of stratifica-
tion systems and about long-term continuities and occasional revo-
lutionary upheavals in societies. Equally important, it traces the
gradually decreasing social distance between elites and mass publics
as societies modernize, a change that presumably makes elites more
responsive to mass discontents but may also prevent them from
acting effectively when masses oppose distasteful but necessary
policies (Field and Higley 1973, p. 35).
While elite circulation is important, elite mobilization of mass
support is in our view the more central aspect of the relationship
between elites and mass publics. What we inherit from the
classical theorists is a valuable strategic conception of this aspect,
but no workable scheme for applying it. Mosca stressed that
elites cannot ignore mass pressures or "passions"; they need
a legitimizing myth or "political formula" which resonates with mass
inclinations and justifies elite dominance (Mosca 1939, pp. 70-73ff.).
And Pareto elaborately classified the universal human interests and
non-rational sentiments elites must reflect and appeal to if they are
to perpetuate their statuses. But Mosca used the fundamentally
ambiguous concept of "social type" to distinguish mass publics and
their receptivity to elite political formulas, while Pareto's classifi-
cation of the behavioral "residues" that manifest non-rational senti-
ments in elites and mass publics alike is so inhospitable to practical
application that it borders on the mystical (Finer 1966).
Classical elite theory's strategic conception of elite-mass inter-
dependence is nevertheless sound: To carry out major initiatives
and to perpetuate their statuses, elites need mass support. To win
164 G. LOWELL FIELD, J. H1GLEY, M.G. BURTON"
this support, elites must frame their appeals in accord with

mass interests and political orientations. These mass interests and
orientations are not created by elites but arise instead from some
combination of human nature and life circumstances, though elites
can often activate or muffle mass interests and orientations through
well-couched appeals. But fundamentally, the necessity for elites
to conform their appeals for support with independently existing
mass interests and orientations limits what they can do or get away
with. Failure to win mass support frequently shortens elite tenures
or, at least, undermines elite effectiveness. In sum, mass interests
and orientations constitute parameters within which elites can safely
and effectively act. These parameters normally leave elites a range
of choices, and the choices they make tend to be decisive for poli-
tical outcomes.
On any wide reading of history, this is an intuitively plausible and
elegantly simple conception of the relationship between elites and
mass publics. The main problem lies in giving content to mass
interests and political orientations. In our view, the most parsi-
monious yet concrete solution is a modified version of the Marxian
scheme which sees the organization and experience of work as under-
lying and creating the basic interests and political orientations of
mass publics. This assumes that at work people regularly experience
power relations and power exercises which shape their broad interests
and political orientations. Of course, other life experiences also
shape mass interests and orientations, especially location in various
ethnic, gender, and age categories, as well as threats to individual
and group survival in hostile environments; and these other expe-
riences can override the effects of work relations. Nevertheless, as
a gross historical and global generalization it is a highly plausible
starting point to hold that work organization and experience have a
more basic and continuous impact on how people perceive their
worlds politically than any other aspect of life. Transforming this
generalization into a workable scheme that fits many or all societies
requires (1) distinguishing basic types of work organization and
experience, (2) sketching the broad interests and political orientations
that attach to each type, and (3) charting the main historical and
contemporary patterns of change in the composition of work-forces
and thus in the mix of interests and orientations they display. These
are complex and controversial matters, so nothing more than a way
of framing them is attempted here.
We distinguish three main forms of work which generate three
distinctive sets of mass interests and political orientations:
I. Autonomous work: Typified historically by peasant agriculture
and artisanship, its performance requires constant attention to the
material environment (e.g., terrain, weather, crops, artifacts), and its
organization requires little or no supervision by socially remote
persons. Power relations are normally embedded in family, village,
or other small-group structures and norms and are not clearly seen
as power relations per se. Autonomous workers correctly pe

power-wielding by socially remote persons as unnecessary t
conduct of their work and family lives. They are thus incli
a negative, distrustful, and uncomprehending orientation t
power and the powerful, unless such exigencies as a need to
off marauders dictate otherwise.
2. Manual Industrial Work: Typified historically by routinized work
in large factories, its performance and organization require close
supervision by foremen, bosses, and other socially remote persons
according to routines that largely determine what the worker does
and over which he or she has little control. Because these power
relations are normally distinct, highly structured, and sharply
coercive, and because the work usually lacks intrinsic interest, manual
industrial workers tend to hold a fundamentally alienated, often
actively hostile orientation toward power and the powerful.
3. Bureaucratic and Service Work: Typified historically by manage-
rial, professional, clerical and sales work in or around large and
impersonal organizations, it requires paying close attention to socially
remote persons and groups: in order to organize and direct their
work and work-related behavior, as managers, officials, and pro-
fessionals constantly try to do; or to mesh one's own work and
work-related behavior with that of co-workers, clients and customers,
as clerks, salespersons, and providers of personal services routinely
try to do. In short, bureaucratic and service work involves inter-
dependent decisionmaking in which the worker regularly uses large
or small amounts of power to manipulate others and is in turn
manipulated by them. Such workers thus tend to view power and
power hierarchies "managerially," as necessary, if often distasteful
and confining, tools for getting work done.
With relevant labor force statistics, we can roughly estimate the

proportions of workforces engaged in autonomous, manual industrial,
and bureaucratic and service work. Most simply, we can estimate
the proportion of autonomous workers by adding together all paid
and unpaid agricultural workers and all those working outside agri-
culture in artisan and other midget enterprises, such as proverbial
"Mom and Pop stores," which afford much work autonomy (see
Field 1967, pp. 44-45). Standard occupational categories can then
be used to divide the remainder of a workforce into wage-earning
manual industrial workers ("Craft, production, process, and con-
struction workers" are the usual labels) and salaried bureaucratic
and service workers ("Professional-technical, administrative and
managerial, clerical, sales, and service workers"). But while we can
easily estimate the sizes of these workforce components, the mass
interests and political orientations presumably associated with them
are more nearly theoretical or heuristic constructs. They are not
directly or fully observable, though specially designed attitude surveys
and excavation of the enormous literature on work and work-
166 C. LOWELL FIELD, J. HIGLEY, M.G. BURTOX
generated interests and orientations would likely uncover many

indications of their existence. Treated as constructs, the interests
and orientations are useful if they link (1) the actual composition
of workforces, with (2) such observable mass political behavior as
social movements and political alignments, revolutionary upheavals,
and electoral trends.
As it unfolded in Western history, socioeconomic development is
usefully conceived as involving four distinct configurations of work-
forces and therefore of mass interests and political orientations. In
so far as these configurations were successively experienced by all
Western countries (plus Japan) that have "developed" and become
prosperous, they may be viewed as "levels" of mass political develop-
ment, although there is no basis for arguing that they are necessary
levels through which societies must pass. The levels are apt descrip-
tive devices, not components of some "stage theory" (see Tilly 1984).
Data for the United States and Japan in Figures 1 and 2, respecti-
vely, show the basic pattern of workforce change that all Western
countries experienced during the past two or three centuries: (1) a
steady decline in the proportion of autonomous workers (hereafter
the "autonomous component"); (2) a concomitant steady increase
in the proportions of manual industrial and bureaucratic and service
workers over most of the period (hereafter the "manual industrial"
and "bureaucratic-service" components); and (3) a recent levelling
off, even incipient shrinkage, of the manual industrial component
concomitant with continued growth of the bureaucratic-service com-
ponent (to roughly 60 percent of the American workforce by 1980).
Vertical broken lines in Figures 1 and 2 designate the four work-
force configurations or levels of mass political development that
appear to have been significant in the course of American and modern
Japanese history, as well as in other countries whose workforce
configurations followed essentially the same pattern. Thus, countries
like the U.S. and Japan moved from an "undeveloped" Level 1 to a
"developing" or "pre-industrial" Level 2 when the manual industrial
component amounted to 5 percent of the workforce (somewhat before
1820 in the U.S. and about 1890 in Japan). Once that component
reached 10 percent, they moved to an "industrial" Level 3 (about
1850 in the U.S. and 1915 in Japan). Finally, when the bureaucratic-
service component reached 40 percent, they entered a "developed"
or "post-industrial" Level 4 (roughly 1940 in the U.S. and 1975 in
Japan).
Because such terms as underdeveloped/developing/ developed and
pre-industrial/industrial/post-industrial are widely used without clear
referents, there is merit in attaching them to the above empirically-
defined workforce configurations or levels. When tied to the mass
interests and political orientations that apparently derive from dif-
ferent types of work, these configurations or levels uncover several
patterns of mass political behavior which appear to limit and other-
wise influence the actions elites can safely or effectively take.
A XEW ELITE FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 167
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a general model of the possibilities for political contin
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our framework,
A New Elite Model of Political Continuity and Change
By interrelating the four workforce configurations and the three

national elite configurations in our framework, Figure 3 shows the
regime types and the elite transformations and consequent regime
changes that can occur among societies following part or all of the
Western socioeconomic pattern. We have already considered and
given examples of virtually all elements of the model, so we con-
centrate here on the dynamic interplay of these elements and on
how they open and close political possibilities.
In undeveloped Level 1 societies nearly all workers - 90 percent
or more - are in the autonomous workforce component. The
preponderant mass political orientation is therefore basically egali-
tarian, embodying the negative, distrustful, and uncomprehending
attitudes that autonomous workers typically hold toward overt power
hierarchies and power-wielders. In all but the most exceptional
circumstances, this allows only one political possibility: a nascent
state based in a warrior aristocracy or other dominant formation
whose members use their superior weapons, fighting skills, and
communications to subjugate the mass population while exempting
themselves from productive labor. Bureaucratic organization is
sporadic and largely ineffective. Members of the dominant group
are only loosely organized politically, usually recognizing but not
regularly obeying some emperor or king. The result is an unstable
traditional regime - the main political form in medieval European
societies until more extended and complex state bureaucracies
emerged after about 1500. Equivalent regimes existed in many Level
1 societies during earlier historical periods and in other parts of the
world (see Mann 1986).
Political regimes have taken two other forms in Level 1 societies,
but both are exceedingly rare (thus the broken lines in Figure 3). One
form, already noticed, is the small, geographically-isolated and sub-
stantially independent citizen-community in which members of a
citizen class, nearly all of them subsistence peasants or farmers and
artisans, participate directly and more or less equally in govern-
ment, militia, and other common arrangements. Examples are various
small and isolated tribes, some medieval Swiss cantons, a few
British "charter colonies" of seventeenth century North America,
and conceivably some small island states like Iceland in more recent
times. The other, even rarer possibility is initiated by a mass-based
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revolution in a Level 2 society: bureaucratic organizations

producing rapid reversion to Level 1 and, during a short and
interval, a radical-egalitarian regime exists - in which power
not in established elites but in the most extreme agitators and
whose radically egalitarian views represent the only ideologica
tion one can safely take in public (Brinton 1938). Examples are the
Jacobins' rule at the height of the French Revolution between 1792
and 1794, and the situation in most areas of Russia between 1917 and
1921. In all such cases, however, bureaucratic hierarchies are soon
reconstituted by whatever group manages to consolidate power, the
workforce moves back to a Level 2 configuration, and organiza-
tionally-based elites operating a recognizable political regime reappear.
In developing or pre-industrial Level 2 societies most workers are
still engaged in autonomous work, but there are also local concentra-
tions of disaffected and severely exploited manual industrial workers
(5-9 percent of the total workforce), together with comparably small
concentrations of better-off bureaucratic and service workers. Though
the autonomous workers bitterly resent intrusions by the powerful
into their self-contained worlds, and though they retain a basically
egalitarian political orientation, they are kept subordinate by an
armed landowning class. Apart from sporadic local uprisings, usually
promptly repressed, they are quiescent and not readily mobilized
by elites. By contrast, the small concentrations of alienated manual
industrial workers crowded into urban slums manifest their
discontents more actively and continuously through strikes, riots and
other rebellious actions. But they too are normally repressed by
force and constant policing. Thus, the most likely political possibi-
lity at Level 2 is simply ongoing struggles for political ascendancy
among rival delite factions of a disunified national elite, with mass
categories being occasionally mobilized by one side or another but
generally playing little role. The result is an unstable regime whose
specific institutional form may last only so long as the currently
ascendant elite faction retains control.
However, struggles between rival factions in a disunified elite
occasionally produce other outcomes in Level 2 societies. One is
the sudden and deliberate elite settlement which rapidly effects an
elite transformation from disunity to consensual unity, followed by
a change from an unstable to a stable representative regime. The
autonomy elites usually enjoy at Level 2 makes the settlement a
distinct possibility, but it requires extraordinary circumstances and
elite choices. As already noted, examples are England's Glorious
Revolution in 1688-89 and Sweden's constitutional settlement in 1809,
both of which occurred at Level 2. But given the pervasive egalitarian
orientation of mass publics in Level 2 societies, a combination of
elite struggles and international pressures can lead to another out-
come: a mass-based, levelling revolution which destroys existing
bureaucratic hierarchies and elites, causes retrogression to the Level
1 workforce configuration, and ushers in a radical-egalitarian interval
in which power is up for grabs. If a dogmatic, tightly-org

previously peripheral elite group seizes power and reconsti
tical and other institutions in its own image, the society s
back to Level 2, albeit with an ideologically unified elite op
stable unrepresentative regime in place of the earlier unst
A clear example is the Russian Revolution and its afterm
other hand, if elites associated with the earlier regime rea
selves and reconstitute some version of traditional institutions, the
society returns to Level 2 and the old struggle aming elite factions
for ascendancy resumes, albeit with great bitterness flowing from
the revolutionary trauma. The aftermaths of the English and French
revolutions illustrate this possibility.
In industrial Level 3 societies, manual industrial workers comprise
10 to perhaps 30 percent of the workforce, the bureaucratic-service
component is necessarily as large or larger, while 40 percent or more
remain in the autonomous component. This configuration precludes
a mass-based levelling revolution: principally because many auto-
nomous workers, while retaining a negative, basically egalitarian
orientation toward governmental and other outside power-wielders,
acquire property when urbanization depopulates the countryside,
and they start thinking in property-owners1 terms. They feel threat-
ened by the levelling rhetoric and programs of elites and movements
representing the large category of disaffected manual industrial
workers, and they thus form, together with the large component of
generally anti-egalitarian bureaucratic-service workers, an effective
barrier against levelling revolution. This is why, contrary to Marx's
prediction and fondest hope, there is no clear instance of a mass-
based, levelling revolution in a Level 3 society.
Conversely, these same considerations help explain why mass-
based, anti-egalitarian or "fascist" revolutions are possible in Level 3
societies. Where elite disunity, an unstable regime, and other faci-
litative circumstances exist, extreme right-wing elites drawing support
from relatively prosperous and propertied autonomous workers, as
well as from many bureaucratic and service workers, may seize power
to forestall the levelling revolution threatened by elites and activists
mobilizing the manual industrial component. Upon gaining power,
these extremists liquidate or subjugate other elites and impose their
ideology and party organization as the only framework for political
expression, thereby effecting an elite transformation from disunity
to ideological unity and the construction of a stable unrepresentative
regime. Examples are Germany and Italy during the interwar period,
when both countries were at Level 3.
The much more likely possibility in Level 3 societies, however,
is simply a bitter but inconclusive political struggle among elites
mobilizing the three roughly equivalent, class-like workforce com-
ponents, with none of the contending forces gaining the upper hand
for long. Where such elites already possess consensus and unity, as
in the Anglo-American societies, Sweden, and the Netherlands during
their passage through Level 3, political conflicts are explos

are nevertheless kept from undermining the stable represe
regimes already in place. But where elites are disunified, as in
Germany before Hitler, Italy before Mussolini, and in France and the
Iberian countries during their passage through Level 3, political
conflicts are unrestrained and they produce deeply unstable regimes
marked by plots, coups, and virtual civil war.
The relatively extensive and ideologically intransigent mass organi-
zations and movements that disunified elites create and lead in
Level 3 societies make elite transformations from disunity to con-
sensual unity via sudden and deliberate elite settlements unlikely,
because elites can seldom make the concessions settlements require
and still retain enough mass support to hold onto their organiza-
tional positions. Nevertheless, in exceptional circumstances affording
much elite secrecy and temporary demobilizations of mass publics,
settlements are possible at Level 3. Examples are the secret agree-
ments reached by Venezuelan elites in 1958 and by Spanish elites
in 1978-79, each occurring immediately after the downfall of a
discredited authoritarian regime. In short order, Venezuelan and
Spanish elites achieved consensual unity and began to operate stable
representative regimes (Peeler 1985; Karl 1986; Gunther 1986).
In the absence of an elite settlement or an anti-egalitarian revo-
lutionary upheaval, the close approach of Level 3 societies with
disunified elites and unstable regimes to the Level 4 configuration -
involving further decline in the autonomous component, a levelling-off
of the manual industrial component, and continued growth of the
bureaucratic-service component - makes possible the beginning of
an elite convergence from disunity to consensual unity. Previously
antagonistic right-wing and centrist factions may choose to cooperate
in order to mobilize a reliable electoral majority consisting of most
bureaucratic-service workers and many property-owning autonomous
workers, thereby protecting their interests by dominating govern-
ment executive office. This attenuates previously unrestrained elite
power struggles. But the efforts by elites mobilizing the still large
and disaffected manual industrial component to block and sabotage
government actions through strikes, demonstrations, and riots permit
only a precarious stabilization of the previously unstable regime
(Field and Higlcy 1978). As already noted, examples arc the forma-
tion of dominant center-right elite coalitions and the resulting partial
stabilization of regimes in West Germany during the 1950s, in France
after 1961, and in Italy and Japan from the early 1960s - all of which
were by then at the threshold to Level 4.
Societies reach the post-industrial, developed or Level 4 configu-
ration when bureaucratic and service workers comprise 40 percent
of a workforce. Initially at Level 4, the manual industrial com-
ponent is nearly of equivalent size and the autonomous component
makes up 20 to 30 percent. But both these components subsequently
decline as bureaucratic and service workers increase to 50 and then
60 percent of the workforce. With these further c

managerial political orientation of bureaucratic-send
in which power and power hierarchies are viewed as
unpleasant, aspects of work in complex organization
more or less pervasive. This is because most families come to have
at least one bureaucratic or service worker among their members;
because the sheer number, greater education, and generally more
strategic locations of bureaucratic-service workers enable them to
spread their perceptions and values throughout the culture; and
because the technically and organizationally complex nature of much
remaining manual industrial and autonomous work greatly dilutes
the distinctive political orientations associated with such work at
earlier levels.
The changes in mass publics at Level 4 diminish political conflict

between the previously distinct workforce components and weaken
the parties and movements based in them. Elites increasingly make
catchall appeals for votes, with the major factions differing mainly
on the details of essentially similar programs and policies. A first
possibility is thus completion of any convergence that may have
begun among previously disunified elites in a society closely approach-
ing Level 4. As developments in Norway and Denmark just before
World War II illustrate, and as recent trends in France, Italy, and
Japan show, dissident left-wing elites may moderate their ideologies
and programs in order to attract voters outside their traditional
manual industrial base, thereby becoming fundamentally allegiant to
the established social and political order. What was only a pre-
cariously stable regime therefore becomes stable representative in
the full sense.
Ideologically unified elites in societies reaching Level 4 experience

rapid impoverishment and discrediting of their fixed, "official"
ideologies. In the "complex, pervasively bureaucrat ized workforce
configuration of Level 4, any such ideology generates too many
contradictions to retain its plusibility for the elites who mani-
pulate it and for much of the mass public. Thus, in societies
that closely approach or enter Level 4 with ideologically unified elites
and stable unrepresentative regimes, an elite transformation and
a consequent change in regime type is likely. But elite transforma-
tion and regime change to what? Of the two alternative patterns
in our framework, a transformation to consensual elite unity and
change to a stable representative regime seems more likely because
the elite already has a strong structural unity and it may be possible
to perpetuate this unity without further pretending there is some
"right" ideological prescription about which all elite persons agree.
Thus elite factions may gradually learn to cooperate according to
generally accepted rules and codes of political conduct, while at the
same time making cautious appeals to different mass publics for
support on the basis of increasingly distinct ideological and policy
positions. Accordingly, the regime they operate remains stable and
becomes more genuinely representative, though representa

still fall far short of contemporary Western standards. This is a
plausible way of capturing and projecting current changes among
elites and regimes in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and some other
East European societies which are now situated at or beyond the
threshold to Level 4.
Finally, we must consider the political possibilities that open up
in Level 4 societies with well-established consensually unified elites
and stable representative regimes. Due to the attenuation of conflicts
between previously distinct workforce components, already discussed,
an initial possibility is unprecedented political stability based on
a broad "welfare statist" policy consensus among elites and a
quiescent set of mass publics preoccupied with the fruits of material
affluence (Field and Higley 1980). This "halcyon" political condition
- quite apparent in the U.S. and Britain during the 1950s and early
1960s, and in Northwest Europe and Australasia during the 1960s
and early 1970s - lasts for perhaps a generation. It disorients elites,
lulling them into complacent and blandly optimistic outlooks (Field
and Higley 1986).
Over the longer run, the Level 4 configuration creates ominous
new problems and conflicts which are apparently rooted in spreading
employment uncertainties and insecurities among much of the mass
public. Because the output of bureaucratic-service workers is hard
to define and measure, it is frequently unclear whether more or fewer
of them are needed. To protect and advance their employment
prospects in this uncertain situation, bureaucratic and service workers
increasingly try to judicializc and democratize organizational pro-
cesses, justifying these measures with a strongly "anti-elitist" rheto-
ric and political stance. The consequence, after a society has been
at Level 4 for some time, is a more or less concerted attack by many
members of the bureaucratic-service component on elite power in
organizational and even societal contexts. While this stops well short
of a revolutionary uprising, partly because bureaucratic and service
workers have difficulty conceiving of practical alternatives to exist-
ing organizational and other hierarchies, it fragments political
alignments, introduces much volatility into electoral politics, and
leaves elites without firm bases of support. Such a "post-halcyon"
political phase has been apparent in the Level 4 societies mentioned
above since the mid-1960s or early 1970s (Field and Higley 1986).
Accompanying the spreading employment insecurities in these
"mature" Level 4 societies is the emergence of a distinct "under-
class" or camp of "outsiders" for whose labor there is no pressing
need in a technologically and organizationally sophisticated economy.
Consisting primarily of unskilled persons from some ethnic and other
disadvantaged categories, but also of "dropouts" from more advan-
taged categories, these persons arc unemployed or underemployed
more or less permanently and have in this sense been pushed
"outside" the work-based social structure. Their plight produces

deep demoralization which is manifest in a host of destructive, anti-
social behaviors. As outsider actions increasingly affect those
employed "inside" the work-based social structure, sympathy for
outsiders diminishes and substantial political conflict develops
between the two population camps. Because the Level 4 configuration
fails to generate enough plausibly "necessary" work to absorb and
satisfy all those seeking it, this conflict has no solution and it prompts
a shift in dominant political sentiment away from welfare statist
policies that do little to ameliorate the employment-based discon-
tents and actions of outsiders. Many "insiders" begin to espouse
less generous, more draconian measures for dealing with the
"outsiders." Threatened by those who lead and mobilize this shift
in dominant political sentiment, and disillusioned by the short-
comings of the welfare statist policies they once enthusiastically
embraced, elites become more divided and more inclined to pursue
unrealistic, semi-utopian panaceas. Thus the last possibility that
can so far be identified in Level 4 societies is spreading political and
intellectual disarray among elites, together with the pursuit of more
or less fantastic goals signalling much desperation and a serious
loss of nerve.
To what extent does this model apply to societies that deviate

from the Western socioeconomic pattern? We stressed at the outset
our refusal to assume that all societies must or will duplicate the
Western pattern. Indeed, duplication is virtually impossible today,
if only because advances in techniques of material production, as
well as the concentration of much of this production in the Western
societies themselves, virtually preclude manual industrial components
in the 25-30 percent range such as emerged historically at Level 3.
Thus most non-Western societies will either remain in a fairly typical
Level 2 configuration, probably involving disunified elites and
unstable regimes, but also allowing possibilities for elite settlements
and levelling revolutions; or they will move promptly from Level 2
to Level 4, albeit with a larger autonomous component and a much
larger camp of "outsiders" than seen to date in Wrestern Level 4
societies. But since this jump from Level 2 to a substantially new
Level 4 configuration has occurred only in a few small, resource-rich
non-Western societies (e.g., Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates), the
political possibilities it will open up can only be guessed.
Conclusions
We began by observing that although social scientists and others

routinely assign central importance to elites in their discussions of
politics, no worked-out theory of elites and politics is generally
recognized. We have tried to present the framework for such a
theory, calling it a "new elite framework" because, while grounded
in the basic contentions of classical elite theory, it fundamen

reformulates and extends those contentions. Unlike Mosca and
especially Pareto, we do not claim to be building a universal theory
of politics analogous to some theories in physics or biology. Our
framework and the theory it promises will not eliminate the need
for statesmen to use common sense or for scholars to conduct detailed
investigations, even in matters where the scheme appears to produce
strict, deductively formulated answers. We doubt that politics can
ever be completely contained within a deductive framework or
theory. Nevertheless, political analysis needs the direction and
purpose provided by a general framework that identifies basic
patterns and essential dynamics.
In the analysis of politics and much else this function has long
been served by societally-based pluralist and Marxian theories.
Under the diffuse, but still quite pervasive, influence of these theo-
retical viewpoints, generations of scholars have applied their best
research efforts to measuring the social determinants of political out-
comes - public opinion, stratification systems, mass cultures and
belief svstems. If elite actions entered the picture at all they
were treated as epiphenomenal, as reflecting more basic processes
such as social differentiation or contradictions between forces and
relations of production. Political change was envisioned as moving,
either through many incremental steps or through a few revolutionary
leaps, toward an ideal society in which everyone would be substan-
tially equal and would live the enriched lives that in earlier periods
were available only to the privileged and wealthy few. Ultimately,
the whole world would become democratic in a thoroughly repre-
sentative or even a fully participatory sense.
Over the last two decades scholars increasingly recognized the
inadequacies of pluralist and Marxian theories and cither modified
these schemes or abandoned them altogether. Predominantly, they
shifted toward more politically-based analyses, most often using "the
state1* as a key concept. But this shift occurred without the gui-
dance of a framework comparable in scope and scale to pluralist and
Marxian theories. Indeed, many scholars today doubt that a useful
general scheme can be devised. They prefer to conduct detailed
historical studies of one or several countries, and they assume a
degree of indeterminacy that is distinctly at odds with previous
theorizing. A major source of this indeterminacy is that elites are
being brought in - seemingly idiosycratic elite skills, resources and
choices arc often seen as playing a central role in shaping outcomes.
Our new elite framework complements and advances these trends
in political sociology. It flatly rejects as Utopian and misguided all
visions of evolution toward pure democracy in complex societies.
And, contrary to images of a thoroughly representative democracy,
it contends that elites, driven as they are by immediate managerial
178 C. LOWELL FIELD, J. HIGLEY, M.G. BURTON
and defensive interests, never accurately or systematical

the makeups and interests of mass publics, even though elit
ships change constantly due to advancing age, political miscalcula-
tions, and many other circumstances. Our framework portrays elite
power in the most advanced democracies as at once more con-
centrated than pluralist theories suggest, and more diffused than
Marxist theories claim. And by placing the advanced democracies
in historical and global context, the framework offers a way out of
the largely parochial and unproductive debate over the nature of
Western national power structures. Moreover, in contrast to a
strong tendency of earlier theories to assume that the advanced
democracies evolved in fairly uniform fashion, and did so quite some
time ago, our approach stresses three distinct paths to stable
democracy and highlights the fact that a number of Western countries
are recent arrivals.
Our framework also offers a more promising approach to politics

in non-Western, non-democratic countries. Neither pluralist or
Marxian theories account for the oscillations between authoritarian
and democratic regimes in many developing countries since World
War II: pluralist-inspired expectations during the 1950s of wide-
spread democratic evolution were dashed by a wave of authorita-
rianism in the 1960s; and in the 1970s and 1980s, when this "bureau-
cratic-authoritarianism" was being interpreted as a semi-permanent
condition arising from dependency status within the capitalist world
economy, many such regimes fell in a wave of democratic transitions.
Regarding contemporary state-socialist regimes currently under-
going change, our framework identifies what has been their most
distinctive feature - an ideologically unified elite - and it specifies
what is required for a fundamental regime change, namely an elite
transformation to consensual unity, producing a stable representative
regime, or to disunity, producing an unstable regime. Regarding
developing countries that have tended to oscillate between authori-
tarian and democratic regimes, our framework identifies the under-
lying basis of this oscillation - elite disunity - and it specifies how
this pattern of instability could be broken: by an elite transformation
to consensual unity, either through an elite settlement or an elite
convergence, which would usher in a stable representative regime; or
by an elite transformation to ideological unity through revolution,
establishing a stable unrepresentative regime.
We think this new framework effectively positions elite theory
to address many of the central concerns of political sociology. The
contemporary political world is hardly a democratic one, and poli-
tical continuities and changes are more independent of society-wide
determinants than existing frameworks recognize. Looking at elite
rather than mass phenomena is therefore a more useful route to
political explanation. However, one must guard against going too
far in this direction, and our framework does not depict elites as
alone determining outcomes. For reasons and in ways that

tried to delineate, mass interests and orientations limit elite a
and elites who ignore these mass limits do not remain elite
long.
Department of Political Science

University of Connecticut
Department of Sociology
University of Texas at Austin
Department of Sociology
Loyola College in Maryland
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A New Elite Framework For Political Sociology - Elite Paradigm

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Author(s): G. Lowell Field, John Higley and Michael G. Burton

A NEW ELITE FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

References to elites are ubiquitous in contemporary discussions

publics in all modern societies. Taken together, these

The Inevitability of Elites

Classical elite theory insisted that a distinct "ruling class,"

the ignorance, apathy, and narrowly self-interested behavior of

concerned to contain and manage the intra-organizational conflicts

rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional

Variations in National Elites and Political Regimes

The broad configurations of national elites and their variations

centralized and dictatorial regimes with a "pluto-democ

Configurations of National Elites

Recent studies highlight two basic but parallel dimensions in the

1. Disunified: Structural integration and value consensus are mini-

2. Consensually Unified: Structural integration is inclusiv

These configurations are ideal or pure types which "represent

The basic elite configurations and their real world re

Types of Political Regimes

The stability and instability of political regimes is one of the

18 Latin American countries between 1920 and 1966; Grund

The other basic type of stable regime may be ter

As the causal variable, a nation

Origins of the Elite Configurations

We stressed earlier that the national elite configurations we

Much less frequently, certain consensually unifi

laying the basis for a stable representative regime (see Bur

configuration, disunity, to another distinct configurati

Of course, the open-endedness of history prevents flat statements

The Interdependence of Elites and Mass Publics

The classical elite theorists dwelled heavily on the relationship

or sudden movements of persons from mass to elite statuses a

this support, elites must frame their appeals in accord with

as power relations per se. Autonomous workers correctly pe

With relevant labor force statistics, we can roughly estimate the

generated interests and orientations would likely uncover many

" l - - \ \ i \ V : " "?

Within these mass parameters, however, much room remai

A New Elite Model of Political Continuity and Change

By interrelating the four workforce configurations and the three

-v ^-^ ^^ (^ ^> V U *J *J O5 O I I ''* O. O. U I

1 3Si J ;^ fall :i: Mill

revolution in a Level 2 society: bureaucratic organizations

in which power is up for grabs. If a dogmatic, tightly-org

their passage through Level 3, political conflicts are explos

60 percent of the workforce. With these further c

The changes in mass publics at Level 4 diminish political conflict

Ideologically unified elites in societies reaching Level 4 experience

becomes more genuinely representative, though representa

"outside" the work-based social structure. Their plight produces

To what extent does this model apply to societies that deviate

We began by observing that although social scientists and others

in the basic contentions of classical elite theory, it fundamen

and defensive interests, never accurately or systematical

Our framework also offers a more promising approach to politics

alone determining outcomes. For reasons and in ways that

Department of Political Science

Aron, Raymond. 1950. "Social Structure and Ruling Class." British

Castles, Francis G. 1974. Political Stability. Milton Keynes (UK): Open

- 1980. Elitism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Gibbs, Jack P. 1972. Sociological Theory Construction. Hinsdale, IL:

Higley. John, Michael G. Burton, and G. Lowell Field. 1989. "Revolutions

-v ^-^ ^^ (^ ^> V U J J O5 O I I ''* O. O. U I