See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/377213560

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: Emerging Threats and Pakistan’s

Counterstrategies

Article in Mankind Quarterly · January 2023

DOI: 10.46469/mq.2023.64.2.2

CITATIONS READS

0 14

2 authors, including:

Dalbir Ahlawat
Macquarie University
21 PUBLICATIONS 53 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Dalbir Ahlawat on 08 January 2024.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition
ISSN: 0025-2344

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: Emerging Threats and

Pakistan’s Counterstrategies
Arif Ahmad∗ Dalbir Ahlawat†

Abstract

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the subsequent takeover by the Taliban, the
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified its efforts with a primary objective of establishing Sharia law in Pakistan.
While posing a grave threat to the country’s security, the TTP has displayed a heightened level of organizational
strength and has carried out lethal terrorist attacks on both military and civilians across the nation. To counter the
strategic maneuvers of the TTP, Pakistan has followed a two-pronged approach of negotiations and military operations.
However, these efforts have fallen short of countering the TTP threat effectively. The findings of this study suggest
that Pakistan is likely to continue countering the TTP primarily through military operations. The primary objective of
this article is to outline the factors contributing to the resurgence of the TTP and to assess the strategies implemented

T
by Pakistan in response to this threat. This research utilizes qualitative research methods, involving the analysis
of research articles, newspapers, reports, and statements from government officials. The paper recommends that
to mitigate the challenges, Pakistan should address the root causes of terrorism, strengthen governance structures,
engage in constructive dialogue with various stakeholders, and foster regional cooperation.

Keywords: Taliban, Counterterrorism, Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

AF
1 Introduction
The emergence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007 as an umbrella organization of various factions
of the Pakistani Taliban can be attributed to a complex interplay of several factors. Major among these were
Pakistan’s support to the US against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the ripple effects of the Afghanistan
war, the radical ideology of the Taliban, the lack of consistency in government policies in Pakistan, and the
failure of security agencies to take stock of the realities on the ground. Specifically, Pakistan’s turnaround
DR

in supporting the US against the Taliban, whom Pakistan had supported from 1994 to 2001, provoked
resentment in different groups that had previously fought on the instructions of Pakistan’s military along
with the Taliban against the Soviet forces from 1979 to 1989 (Akhtar & Ali, 2022). These groups, realizing
Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and its shared Islamic identity, sympathized with the Taliban’s struggle
against the foreign forces.
Facing an intense war in Afghanistan, some of the Taliban fighters in the guise of refugees crossed
into Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and neighboring regions (Hassan, 2022). These
fighters mobilized Afghan refugees and local people, and coordinated with other groups in Pakistan to fight
against the foreign forces. During that time, drone strikes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border caused
heavy casualties, with a total of 114 drone strikes between 2004 and 2010 resulting in the deaths of 1,210
individuals, of whom 32 percent were innocent civilians and children (Bergen & Tiedemann, 2010). This
outraged the local community and made the aggrieved people join radical religious groups to seek revenge
or fight back against the Pakistani state that supported the foreign forces in Afghanistan.
The TTP’s ideology was an extremist interpretation of Islam, which served as a justification for their
armed struggle against perceived adversaries both foreign and domestic. This radical ideology attracted
sympathetic individuals to their cause (Abbas, 2008). Poor governance structure in Pakistan helped the TTP
to impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law, particularly in areas like FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
∗
Arif Ahmad is an HDR student at the Department of Media, Communications, Creative Arts, Language, and
Literature, Macquarie University, Australia; corresponding author email: arif.ahmad@students.mq.edu.au
†
Dr. Dalbir Ahlawat is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University,
Australia; Email: Dalbir.ahlawat@mq.edu.au

221
Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

(KPK), where poverty combined with ethnic affinities made the local population vulnerable to Taliban
recruitment drives (Afridi et al., 2014). Public opinion in these regions was further mobilized with the call
of charismatic leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud to bring the supporters under
their banner and provide strategic guidance (Biberman & Zahid, 2019).
Pakistan officially supported the United States, while unofficially it provided shelter to certain
individuals and indirectly supported the Afghan Taliban (Siddiqa, 2011). This dual approach, reflecting the
lack of a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy, created a vacuum that prompted some groups to initiate
Jihad in Pakistan.
Against this backdrop, this article traces the genesis of the TTP and delves into the underlying factors
fueling TTP’s resurgence. Additionally, it evaluates the complexities posed by this resurgence and analyzes
the countermeasures initiated by the Pakistani government to address these challenges. To achieve these
goals, the discussion employs the framework of counterterrorism theory. This approach provides valuable
insights into the dynamics of terrorism and ways to antagonize it. Furthermore, this article sheds light on
the multifaceted challenges posed by the resurgent TTP within the broader landscape of counterterrorism
measures in Pakistan.

T
2 Genesis of TTP
The US declaration of War on Terror in 2001 and Pakistan’s unconditional support to fight against the
Taliban in Afghanistan raised serious concerns among several jihadist and sectarian elements in Pakistan
and in reaction, they initiated violent attacks on Pakistani forces in FATA and neighboring regions. With
AF
time, these elements gradually came together in 2007 to establish a council referred to as “Shura” in Pashto.
This council effectively brought together 27 different groups sharing the same religion and ideology under
one unified banner, ultimately forming Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Sulaiman, 2008). TTP was officially
established under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. Its leadership comprised individuals with prior combat
experience against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, who were aggrieved by drone strikes and were averse to
Pakistan’s support for the United States. While many TTP members hailed from regions such as KPK, FATA,
tribal agencies, Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand, the
group also had a notable presence among Punjabis, Arabs, Uzbeks, Afghans, and others (Siddique, 2023).
The precise number of TTP members remains unknown. In 2015, reports suggested their numbers
DR

ranged from 8,000 to 10,000, which surged to 14,000 by 2020 (Oxford Analytica, 2021). TTP relies on
diverse sources of funding, including donations from sympathizers nationally and internationally, proceeds
from illicit activities like kidnapping for ransom, robbery, extortion, and funds from terrorist organizations.
Most TTP members come from the economically disadvantaged middle class, characterized by lower
education levels and strong religious affiliations (Jamal & Ahsan, 2015).
Initially active mainly in FATA and the KPK regions, TTP faced drawbacks and organizational
weaknesses. However, due to the oversight of security agencies, the group became more cohesive, gaining
control over all seven agencies in FATA and seven out of nine districts in the Malakand division (Fillingham,
2009). Gaining popular support among the masses, the intensity and number of TTP terrorist attacks
surged significantly which was reflected in a dramatic increase in incidents of killing, rising from 12 in 2007
to 31 in 2008, 118 in 2009, and 321 in 2010, targeting not only military personnel but also civilians and
politicians (SATP, 2022). These attacks spanned various locations and institutions in Pakistan, including
schools, colleges, universities, mosques, police stations, markets, offices, and airports.
Responding to the escalating threat, Pakistan launched two major military operations: Operation
Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 and Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad in 2017 (Ahlawat & Izarali, 2022). These operations
targeted TTP militants, which resulted in the “neutralization” (killing) of many TTP members, forcing
others to cross into Afghanistan (Naz, 2020). These military operations significantly reduced terrorist
activities in Pakistan as the TTP terrorist attacks declined to 47 in 2017 and 20 in 2018 (Javed et al.,
2022). Table 1 shows that over a five-year period prior to military operations, there were a total of 37,580
reported deaths. However, there was a notable decrease in terrorism-related fatalities following the military
operations, with the number of deaths declining to 3,497 between 2017 and 2021.

222
Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

Table 1: Terrorism deaths before and after the military operations of 2014 and 2017 (from SATP, 2022).

before military operation after military operation

Year Deaths Year Deaths
2008 6683 2017 1269
2009 11317 2018 693
2010 7342 2019 365
2011 6050 2020 506
2012 6188 2021 664
Total 37580 Total 3497

3 Resurgence of TTP
Following the military operations, the TTP’s activities were notably diminished. Yet, a significant shift

T
occurred with the US forces’ departure from Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. This event proved to be a
crucial turning point, engendering a power vacuum and providing a sanctuary for the TTP and its associates.
Internal rifts and leadership crises within the Taliban in Afghanistan weakened its control over the border
regions and allowed the TTP to operate more freely. Furthermore, the failure of the Pakistani government
to implement effective counterterrorism strategies and reforms, such as addressing the root causes of
AF
radicalization, improving governance and service delivery, enhancing civil-military coordination, and engaging
in dialogue with moderate elements of the TTP, cumulatively led to a resurgence of the TTP.
The Pakistani government celebrated the exit of the US forces from Afghanistan as breaking “the
shackles of slavery” (Muzaffar, 2021) and anticipated that the Taliban regime would rein in the TTP
activities in Pakistan. To this end, the Pakistani government initiated direct negotiations with the TTP
(Sheikh, 2022). As part of these negotiations, Pakistan released many TTP members from prisons who had
previously been involved in terrorist attacks and also allowed many TTP members to enter Pakistan from
Afghanistan and settle in the FATA region. Unfortunately, the negotiations between the government and
TTP failed. The negotiations only provided the TTP with the space and time to become more organized
DR

and launch attacks (Ahmed, 2022). In addition, the growing distrust between the Taliban and the Pakistani
government further boosted the TTP’s morale and it started to perpetrate well-planned attacks on Pakistani
military personnel and installations, both from Pakistan and Afghan soils (Wolf, 2023). The TTP, inspired
by the Taliban’s capture of power in Afghanistan, aimed to establish an Afghan-style Sharia government
in Pakistan. The TTP claimed that to achieve this goal, it had the resources to attack different parts of
Pakistan at its choosing and time (Gillani, 2023).
Taking advantage of the above factors, the TTP accelerated terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan
within a few months of the US withdrawal. This surge resulted in a total of 365 deadly attacks in 2022,
causing the tragic loss of 229 civilians and 379 security force members (SATP, 2022). Notable incidents
include an attack in Miran Shah, North Waziristan, in which three security personnel were killed and five
were injured. The TTP also targeted a counterterrorism center in Bannu and held the officials hostage for
two days (The Express Tribune, 2022), and carried out a suicide attack in Islamabad in a highly secure and
sensitive area, resulting in the death of a policeman and injuries to several others (Shahzad, 2022). The
number of attacks was heightened by September 2023 when over 200 TTP fighters launched an attack on
security forces in Chitral, a region bordering Afghanistan and China through the Wakhan Corridor, and
captured several villages (Hussain, 2023). This event reignited the debate on the reasons for the TTP’s
resurgence in Pakistan.
In addition, despite the TTP’s emergence being evident and acknowledged by the local people, the
security agencies and the ruling government remained somewhat passive rather than countering it effectively
(Sayed, 2021). Consequently, on August 13, 2022, protests erupted in Swat and other regions of KPK
in response to the Taliban’s return from Afghanistan. Demonstrators blocked several roads, disrupted

223
Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

vehicular traffic, and voiced concerns about militant regrouping in the hills of Swat. The protesters pledged
to resist the imposition of the TTP’s violent ideology on the local population (The Express Tribune, 2022).
Notwithstanding this, the security forces and law enforcement agencies, despite being present in that region,
took only limited measures to counter the reemergence of the TTP.

4 Demands of the TTP

The TTP presents a flexible set of demands which it adapts to the changing circumstances, largely due to
being a conglomerate of various Taliban factions, the more important ones being Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (TTP-JA), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Swat (TTP Swat), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
Mohmand Agency (TTP Mohmand), Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) located in Khyber Agency, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen
Pakistan (JuM), and Hizb-ul-Ahrar (HuA). The coexistence of these diverse groups, each with its distinct
aims and agendas, adds a layer of complexity to the TTP’s demands (Kidwai, 2022). It is worth emphasizing
that the TTP adheres to a Deobandi-Wahabi sectarian ideology which is inspired by a broad spectrum of
objectives, including the pursuit of Jihad, the establishment of an Islamic emirate, and resistance to foreign
influence. As such, TTP at present pursues a variety of aims that are at odds with the government and the

T
military establishment.
The TTP contends that the Pakistani government is plagued by corruption, incompetence, and a
departure from the fundamental principles of Islam. It advocates for the nationwide implementation of
Sharia law, viewing it as the exclusive remedy to address the abysmal state of affairs in Pakistan. The TTP
perceives the existing democratic structure as tainted and incapable of dispensing justice and meeting the
AF
needs of the people (Giustozzi, 2023). Thus, it supports doing away with the democratic framework and
imposing Sharia law throughout Pakistan. The TTP’s goal is to supplant Pakistan’s current Constitution
with Sharia law to establish an Islamic State. It argues that since Pakistan was founded in the name of
Islam, its constitution should be founded on Islamic principles (Palmer & Holtz, 2023). In the wake of the
Afghan Taliban’s rise to power, TTP intensified its attacks. However, studies in Swat have revealed that
instead of bringing order, the TTP disrupted the lives of the local residents during their rule there. They
imposed their own brand of Islamic laws, including a ban on women’s education and voting, they carried
out public executions, killed people and hanged their bodies in public places. This resulted in a significant
loss of lives, and it took a decade to restore peace in the region (Khan, 2021).
DR

The TTP vehemently opposes the KPK – FATA merger of 2018, as it seeks to maintain influence in
these regions (Usman, 2022). It also demands the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from FATA and nearby
regions and the cessation of all military operations against the TTP. Some TTP factions support the Afghan
Taliban while others lend support to Baluchistan separatist movements (Azam, 2020). Yet other demands
include the release of all imprisoned TTP members and leaders, Pakistan severing its ties with the US and
other Western countries, and recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as a legitimate government.
The TTP has threatened to continue its attacks on Pakistan until these demands are met.

5 Pakistan’s strategies to counter TTP

During its formative stage in 2007, the TTP was relatively weak and lacked a strong coherent organizational
structure (Jadoon, 2021). However, the government’s stance on the TTP remained ambiguous and was
characterized by a fluctuating policy of congagement, which means containing and engaging as it considered
appropriate (Sanaullah, 2020). This wavering approach inadvertently contributed to TTP’s growth and
increased organizational proficiency. The TTP adopted various means to expand its influence, including the
use of illegal FM radio channels, the distribution of propaganda materials like DVDs, CDs and newspapers,
and the launching of websites to disseminate its version of good governance (Qazi, 2011). In October 2007,
while perpetrating terrorist attacks in different parts of Pakistan, the TTP gained control of Swat Valley and
from there extended its influence across Pakistan. In Swat, the local population endured violence, terrorism,
a ban on women’s education, and the imposition of strict laws. Facing excessive restrictions from the TTP,
a significant portion of the populace relocated to neighboring areas.

224
Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

To counter the above activities and facilitate the return of the residents to their usual place of
residence, the military undertook several operations in the Swat region against the TTP. Initially, Operation
Rah-e-Haq was launched in 2007 to regain control of the region. However, as the security situation
deteriorated further, a more extensive military campaign, known as Black Thunderstorm, was executed in
2009 with the objective of eliminating the TTP presence in Swat. Subsequently, in 2009, another military
operation called Rah-e-Rast was initiated to clear Swat of militants. The residents of the region got caught
between the Pakistan army and the TTP, and a significant number of people were compelled to flee the
area (Salim & Khan, 2019). Notwithstanding the pressure on the TTP militants to surrender or flee the
region, terrorist attacks persisted.
In 2014, a devastating TTP attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar killed 149, including 132
children, and wounded more than 100. To counter the TTP offensive, the military launched Operation Zarb-
e-Azb in 2014 to dismantle the TTP’s sanctuaries, leaders, and networks (Khan, 2017). These operations
resulted in the death and capture of many TTP members, while others sought refuge in Afghanistan.
Although these efforts provided some relief to Pakistan, the challenge of terrorism persisted. To mitigate
the existing issues, the government implemented a National Action Plan (NAP) in 2015, which outlined a
comprehensive framework for combating terrorism and extremism, including legal, administrative, political,
economic, social and religious measures (NACTA, 2014). Simultaneously, the government initiated peace

T
talks such as the Murree Dialogue in 2015 with some factions of the TTP that were willing to renounce
violence and accept the constitution of Pakistan.
During this formative phase (2007-2014), the TTP conducted an average of 1,514 terrorist attacks
each year, resulting in an average of 6,497 fatalities (Table 2). Witnessing a surge in violent attacks by
the TTP, the military launched another major campaign, Operation Radul Fasad, in 2017. This operation
AF
resulted in the deaths of thousands of militants and civilians and the displacement of millions of people. The
TTP also suffered from internal divisions and leadership crises, as several factions broke away or defected to
other groups and some of its members crossed the border into Afghanistan. The TTP lost its presence even
in its strongholds in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Swat Valley, and other tribal areas. This led to
relative peace for the next three years in these regions.

Table 2: Terrorism assessment Pakistan, 2007-2022 (SATP, 2022).

Year Number of fatal terror- Number of people

DR

ist attacks killed

TTP formative phase 2007-2014 12114 (1514 / year) 51978 (6497 / year)
Military operations phase 2015-2017 1770 (590 / year) 6751 (2250 / year)
Post-military operations 2018-2021 760 (190 / year) 2227 (556 / year)
relative peace phase
TTP reemergence phase 2022 365 (in one year) 959 (in one year)

Following these military operations, the TTP seemed to have been contained, and there were no
major terrorist attacks in Pakistan. However, a resurgence of the TTP began in 2021, driven by various
factors including the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, a relaxation
in army operations and anti-terrorism laws, and political instability in Pakistan. The TTP exploited the
security vacuum and political turmoil in Afghanistan to regroup and reorganize its ranks. It also benefited
from the release of hundreds of its fighters from Afghan prisons by the Taliban. Thus, a rejuvenated TTP
increased its attacks on Pakistani security forces and civilians along the border areas, especially in KPK.
To expand its operations throughout the country, the TTP announced its reunification with several
splinter groups that had left it earlier, such as Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizb-ul-Ahrar. At that time the TTP
claimed to have more than 10,000 fighters under its command (Center for International Security and
Cooperation, 2022). These factors collectively contributed to the TTP’s renewed capacity to carry out
attacks anywhere in Pakistan. Disturbingly, statistics from 2022 demonstrate that Pakistan experienced
a total of 365 terrorist attacks, signifying a striking 108 percent increase in terrorism incidents over the

225
Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

year before (Dawn, 2023). These TTP attacks targeted not only security personnel but also civilians. Once
again, the TTP exhibited a high degree of organizational strength and acquisition of advanced weaponry
and launched attacks not only in FATA but throughout various regions of Pakistan (Khattak, 2022).
The question of how Pakistan plans to counter the TTP remains of significant importance. Previously,
Pakistan had pursued a dual strategy, involving both military operations and dialogue, in its efforts to deal
with the TTP threat. While military operations have achieved some success, their impact has been limited
and temporary. Notably, TTP leaders often sought refuge in Afghanistan during these military campaigns,
only to return after the military operations had concluded (Mir, 2022). In parallel, Pakistan also explored
dialogue as a means to address the TTP issue. This approach involved the release of TTP prisoners and
suspension of active military operations against the group. However, this dialogue encountered substantial
challenges, primarily stemming from the shifting demands of the TTP, internal divisions within the group,
and a pervasive lack of trust in the negotiation process. These factors collectively posed significant obstacles
to achieving a lasting solution through dialogue (Dnes, 2021).

6 Pakistan’s response to TTP resurgence

T
Pakistan held high expectations that the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan would be a strategic ally and
would assist Pakistan in countering the TTP. If not full cooperation, at least it would not allow the TTP to
use Afghan territory as a base for attacks in Pakistan and would exert pressure on TTP factions to cease
their terrorist activities within Pakistan (Ullah, 2022). However, the subsequent resurgence of the TTP
AF
and the failure of political dialogues between Pakistan and the TTP, at the behest of the Afghan Taliban,
exacerbated the issue. Consequently, discussions have reignited about the strategies that Pakistan could
employ to counter the TTP threat.
Historically, Pakistan’s approach to dealing with the TTP has been characterized by ambiguity and
knee-jerk reactions. The approach has often been influenced both by the ruling political parties and by
military leaders. For instance, during the tenures of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) (2008-2013) and
later the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) (2013-2018), the prevailing policy involved countering
the TTP through significant military campaigns (Khan et al., 2023). Conversely, during the Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) (2018-2022) government, the emphasis shifted towards dialogue with the TTP, and
DR

military operations came under scrutiny.

The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM, a coalition of 11 political parties) in power from April
2022 to August 2023 criticized the policies of its predecessor Imran Khan’s government, particularly labeling
negotiations with the TTP as a mistake. Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Rana Sana Ullah, announced in the
national assembly and media briefing that a military operation against the TTP would be carried out both
within Pakistan and across the border in Afghanistan (AP, 2023). To prevent TTP operations from Afghan
soil, Pakistan already undertook several operations on Afghan territory, including a major drone attack
in April 2022 on possible TTP hideouts in eastern Afghanistan which killed dozens of civilians. Another
operation killed TTP cofounder and senior commander Omar Khalid Khorasani in August 2022 in a roadside
blast in eastern Afghanistan. These and related actions breached Afghanistan’s sovereignty and strained the
Taliban-Pakistan relations (Ahlawat & Izarali, 2022). Thus, Pakistan receives only limited cooperation from
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
On the domestic front, the government has rejected any demands or conditions put forward by the
TTP for negotiations and reiterated its stance that only those who surrender unconditionally and accept the
constitution of Pakistan will be considered for dialogue. This signals Pakistan’s preparedness to initiate
military operations as a means to restore peace amidst the recent surge of TTP attacks (Shaheen & Tarique,
2022). However, it is cardinal to acknowledge the complexity of the situation and the necessity for a
comprehensive approach to effectively address the TTP threat while ensuring lasting peace and stability in
Pakistan. Conducting military operations, particularly in settled areas, is a challenging endeavor that can
have adverse effects on the lives of innocent civilians. The collateral damage resulting from such operations
often leads to the perception of security forces inflicting intentional harm on civilians (Noor et al., 2022).

226
Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

Notwithstanding the above contingencies and intentions, Pakistan has its own limitations. To sustain
counterterrorism operations within Pakistan, the government lacks adequate funding and advanced air
power. To address these issues, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto visited the United States to
seek financial support to bolster his government’s efforts to counter the TTP threat (Fouriezos, 2022).
Notwithstanding the United States’ lack of commitment to upgrade Pakistan’s F16 fighter planes and
provide financial support, the Pakistan Army Chief Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah still appears to be inclined
towards military operations against the TTP (Oxford Analytica, 2022).
Thus, before launching any military operation against the TTP, the Pakistani government and military
must carefully consider a range of critical questions. Major among these are an evaluation of the factors that
led to previous operation failures, an assessment of the successes achieved, a determination of the extent to
which past operations against terrorist attacks decreased the efficacy of the TTP, and a prudent analysis
of concerns regarding the TTP finding safe havens in Afghanistan during military campaigns (Ahmed &
Ahlawat, 2021). More important, can Pakistan sustain its fight against the TTP in the long term?
The impact of previous military operations on terrorist activities remains a subject of debate. While
these operations have disrupted terrorist networks and targeted their leaders, it is crucial to analyze how
other countries have addressed similar situations in the past. Collateral damage, civilian casualties, and
the displacement of innocent civilians can inadvertently contribute to a long-term upsurge in terrorism.

T
Therefore, a well-considered and comprehensive strategy is imperative to address the TTP threat while
minimizing harm to civilians and fostering sustainable peace in the region (Lesani Sangachin et al., 2021).
To achieve this, Pakistan needs to develop the argument against terrorism, deconstruct the narratives of
TTP, establish rehabilitation and aftercare programs for surrendered terrorists, and also at the same time
sensitize the youth to abjure violence and contribute to national development instead (Ahlawat & Thaakar,
2021).
AF
7 Conclusion
The activities of TTP in Pakistan have been an intricate and ever-changing challenge. The government’s
response to the TTP has varied over time, influenced by political considerations and strategic demands.
As a result, the creation, emergence, decline, and resurgence of the Taliban have given rise to many
questions and concerns. The ongoing attacks by the TTP remain one of the most formidable challenges for
DR

Pakistan. While past military operations against the TTP have brought temporary peace to Pakistan, the
recent resurgence of the TTP following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, and its escalating terrorist
activities, underscore the necessity for a stronger and more sustainable solution. Military operations have
been undertaken in the past to quell terrorism, but considering the limited long-term success of previous
operations, Pakistan must explore alternative strategies and approaches to effectively address the TTP issue
as the challenges posed are intricate, multifaceted, and severe. Therefore, Pakistan should prioritize the
development of comprehensive and resilient solutions that go beyond traditional methods. This may involve
engaging in dialogue, addressing the root causes of extremism, strengthening governance and institutions,
and promoting regional cooperation to effectively counter the TTP and ensure lasting peace and stability in
the region (Izarali & Ahlawat, 2021). Pakistan should seek assistance from the international community,
particularly from neighboring countries, in countering the TTP. Collaborative efforts and support from
neighboring nations can significantly enhance Pakistan’s ability to tackle this complex challenge and promote
peace and security in the region.

References
Abbas, H. (2008). A profile of tehrik-i-taliban pakistan. Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel, 1 (2), 1–4.

Afridi, M. K., Yousufi, M., & Khan, M. (2014). Military operation as a response to terrorism: A case
study of malakand division pakistan. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5 (20), 2000–2006. doi:
10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n20p2000

227
Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

Ahlawat, D., & Izarali, M. R. (2022). Security implications for india and pakistan from the taliban regime
since the us withdrawal from afghanistan. Perspectives on Terrorism, 16 (5), 20–33.

Ahlawat, D., & Thaakar, K. (2021). Kashmir imbroglio resolved: Strategic options for pakistan. Journal
of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 4 (2), 137–151. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/
JIPA/Display/Article/2493118/kashmir-imbroglio-resolved-strategic-options-for
-pakistan/

Ahmed, Z. S. (2022). The taliban’s takeover of afghanistan and pakistan’s terrorism problem. Islamabad
Policy Research Institute, 22 (01), 70–86. doi: 10.31945/iprij.220104

Ahmed, Z. S., & Ahlawat, D. (2021, Oct 17). Can india and pakistan cooperate with the taliban? https://
nationalinterest.org/feature/can-india-and-pakistan-cooperate-taliban-195064.

Akhtar, S., & Ali, A. (2022). Indian factor in pakistan’s policy towards afghanistan. In G. Ali (Ed.),
Pakistan’s foreign policy. contemporary developments and dynamics (pp. 111–127). Routledge. doi:
10.4324/9781003250920

T
(AP), A. P. (2023). Taliban’s afghan defense boss calls pakistani accusation provocative. https://
www.rferl.org/a/taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-ttp-provocative/32204053.html.

Azam, M. (2020). Mapping militant manifestations in balochistan. IPRI Journal, 20 (2), 53–87.

Bergen, P., & Tiedemann, K. (2010, Feb 24). The year of the drone: An analysis of us drone strikes in
AF
pakistan, 2004-2012. New America Foundation.

Biberman, Y., & Zahid, F. (2019). Why terrorists target children: Outbidding, desperation, and extremism
in the peshawar and beslan school massacres. Terrorism and Political Violence, 31 (2), 169–184.

Center for International Security and Cooperation. (2022). Tehrik-i-taliban pakistan. https://cisac.fsi
.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

Dawn. (2023, Jan 1). 2022 ends with deadliest month for security forces after decade: Re-
DR

port. https://www.dawn.com/news/1729229/2022-ends-with-deadliest-month-for-security
-forces-after-decade-report.

Dnes, A. (2021). Taliban soft or hard makes no difference. The Economists’ Voice, 18 (1), 137–141. doi:
10.1515/ev-2021-0019

Fillingham, Z. (2009, Aug 7). The pakistan taliban. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111682/

2009.08%20The%20Pakistan%20Taliban.pdf.

Fouriezos, N. (2022, Dec 21). Pakistan’s foreign minister pitches more global aid and investment—and
“less chaos”. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/pakistans-foreign
-minister-pitches-more-global-aid-and-investment-and-less-chaos/.

Gillani, S. S. H. (2023). An analysis of the impact of terrorism in afghanistan on pakistan after taliban
takeover of 2021. Pakistan Review of Social Sciences, 4 (1), 15–40.

Giustozzi, A. (2023). Jihadism in pakistan. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Hassan, Y. U. (2022). Taliban and al-qaeda: The unbreakable relationship. Strategic Analysis, 46 (2),
211–219. doi: 10.1108/OXAN-ES274382

Hussain, Z. (2023, Sept 13). The ttp’s new battleground. https://www.dawn.com/news/1775603/

the-ttps-new-battleground.

228
Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

Izarali, M. R., & Ahlawat, D. (2021). Contextualizing terrorism, security, and development in south asia. In
M. R. Izarali & D. Ahlawat (Eds.), Terrorism, security and development in south asia: National, regional
and global implications (pp. 12–13). London: Routledge.

Jadoon, A. (2021). The evolution and potential resurgence of the tehrik-i-taliban pakistan. United States
Institute of Peace. Washington DC.

Jamal, S., & Ahsan, M. (2015, Jan). Tehrik-i-taliban pakistan: Analyzing the network of terror. http://
www.ir-ia.com/reports/IRIA-TTP.pdf. (IRIA Report No. 6)

Javed, M. T., Shafiq, M., & Azhar, M. (2022). A saga of decisive combat of pakistan army in north
and south waziristan (2009-2016). Global Strategic & Securities Studies Review , 7 (2), 61–72. doi:
10.31703/gsssr.2022(vii-ii).08

Khan, I. (2021). Afghanistan under the shadows of taliban and implications for pakistan and regional
security. Pakistan Social Sciences Review , 5 (4), 455–469. doi: 10.35484/pssr.2021(5-iv)35

Khan, U. (2017). Re-shift in russian policy towards pakistan: Balancing the unbalanced. http://www.issi

T
.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Final_IB_Aroosa_dated_07-4-2016.pdf. (Institute of
Strategic Studies)

Khan, U. M., Rashid, A., Bazai, F., Mir, F., Rehman, R., & Dasthagir, G. (2023). Pakistan people’s
party (ppp) counter-terrorism strategies in fata and swat from 2008-2013. Journal of Positive School
AF
Psychology , 7 (6), 824–835.

Khattak, D. (2022). Pakistanis brace for bloody year as ttp ends cease-fire. https://www.rferl.org/
a/pakistan-taliban-ttp-cease-fire-attacks-analysis/32202135.html. (Radio Free Europe /
Radio Liberty)

Kidwai, S. A. (2022). Rivalry between the taliban and iskp: The collision of terror. India Quarterly , 78 (4),
544–557.

Lesani Sangachin, M. A., Zarneshan, S., Mohebbi, M., & Zamani, S. G. (2021). Countering religious
DR

extremism in international law: A reflection on the challenges and obstacles. International Studies Journal,
18 (3), 121–142.

Mir, A. (2022). Pakistan’s twin taliban problem. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/

pakistans-twin-taliban-problem. (United States Institute of Peace)

Muzaffar, M. (2021, Aug 17). Taliban have broken ‘the shackles of slavery,’ says pakistan pm im-
ran khan. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/south-asia/taliban-pakistan-imran-khan
-afghanistan-b1903821.html. (Independent)

(NACTA), N. C. T. A. (2014). National action plan, 2014. https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/.

Naz, S. (2020). Pakistan’s military strategy: Challenges and response. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1 (1),
58–73.

Noor, S., Ali, A., & Shehzad, F. (2022). Military operations: As an agent of the minimization of terrorist
threats in peshawar, kpk. Pakistan Vision, 23 (2), 46–55.

Oxford Analytica. (2021). Pakistani taliban are redefining their goal. https://doi.org/10.1108/
OXAN-DB261472. (Expert Briefings)

Oxford Analytica. (2022). Pakistani taliban threat will rise sharply. https://doi.org/10.1108/OXAN
-ES274382. (Expert Briefings)

229
 Mankind Quarterly, 64(2), 221-230 2023 Winter Edition

Palmer, A., & Holtz, M. (2023). The islamic state threat in pakistan: Trends and scenarios. https://
www.csis.org/analysis/islamic-state-threat-pakistan-trends-and-scenarios. (Center for
Strategic and International Studies)

Qazi, S. H. (2011). Rebels of the frontier: Origins, organization, and recruitment of the pakistani taliban.
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 22 (4), 574–602.

Salim, A., & Khan, P. (2019). Contextualizing military operations in pak-afghan borderland & district swat
to contain fomenting insurgencies. Central Asia(84), 89–111. (Summer)

Sanaullah. (2020). Civilians’ survival strategies during the taliban’s insurgency (2007-9), pakistan: A look at
the consequences. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 32 (1), 26–52. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2020.1840892

(SATP), S. A. T. P. (2022). Terrorism. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/.

Sayed, A. (2021). The evolution and future of tehrik-i-taliban pakistan. https://carnegieendowment

.org/2021/12/21/evolution-and-future-of-Tehrik-i-Taliban-Pakistan-pub-86051.
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

T
Shaheen, L., & Tarique, M. (2022). Searching peace through war: The presentation of pakistan govt talks
with tehrik taliban pakistan in national press. Information & Media, 93 , 77–92.

Shahzad, A. (2022, Dec 24). Suspected militants heading for pakistani govt target blow
themselves up. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/four-police-wounded-car
AF
-explosion-islamabad-checkpoint-police-2022-12-23/. (Reuters)

Sheikh, F. (2022). The ttp negotiations: An examination of 2021 peace talks (Vol. 2) (No. 1). https://
nexgen-forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TIRR-2.1_Sheikh_TPP.pdf.

Siddiqa, A. (2011). Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy: Separating friends from enemies. Washington
Quarterly , 34 (1), 149–162. doi: 10.1080/0163660x.2011.538362

Siddique, Q. (2023). Tehrik-i-taliban pakistan: Emerging threats and pakistan’s counterstrategies. Danish
Institute for International Studies, Report 12.
DR

Sulaiman, S. (2008). Empowering ‘soft’ taliban over ‘hard’ taliban: Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strat-
egy. Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), 6 (15). https://www.world-check.com/media/d/
content_pressarticle_reference/Sulaiman_TerrorismMonitor_July08.pdf.

Tribune, T. E. (2022, Dec 20). 25 militants killed in bannu ctd operation: Ispr. https://tribune.com.pk/
story/2391959/25-militants-killed-in-bannu-ctd-operation-ispr.

Ullah, Z. (2022). Contextualising the taliban redux (2021): Is the taliban takeover of afghanistan a pyrrhic
victory for pakistan? Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33 (7), 1177–1202.

Usman, S. M. (2022). Fata merges into pakistan’s national system. South Asian Survey , 29 (1), 103–118.
doi: 10.1177/09715231221075126

Wolf, S. O. (2023, Jan 10). Sadf comment no. 249. https://doi.org/10.48251/SADF.ISSN.2406

-5617.C249. (South Asia Democratic Forum)

230

View publication stats