22 - Petitioner

AMITY LAW SCHOOL MOOT COURTTEAM
SOCIETYCODE: 22- PETITIONER

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023
AMITY LAW SCHOOL MOOT COURT SOCIETY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2023
Before
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SAHARA
WRIT PETITION NO.: /2023
AAZAD & ANR.………………………………………………PETITIONER
V.
REPUBLIC OF SAHARA…………………………………...……RESPONDENT
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF SAHARA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

PAGE 1 OF 33
CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................. 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................................. 3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..................................................................................................... 6
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................................ 7
ISSUES RAISED ............................................................................................................................ 8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................................... 9
ARGUMENT ADVANCED ............................................................................................................ 11
WHETHER THE PETITION IS MAINATAINABLE BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT……11
WHETHER NOTIFICATION ISSUED ON 5TH FEBRUARY 2021 BY THE STATE OF

KARUNADU IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIOS
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SAHARA? ................................................ 14
I. The notification dated 5th February issued by the State of Karunadu is in violation
of Article 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Sahara……………14
II. The said Government Order raises significant concerns regarding its
compatibility with the concept of secularism…………………………………………………15
WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB BY SAHABI IS THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS

PRACTICE AS PER SAHABI PERSONAL LAW OR NOT? ....................................................... 20
I. Reasonable restrictions on Fundamental Rights……………………………………………20
II. Freedom of Religion Subject to Public Order…………………………………………………20
III. Religious Freedom Subject to Morality………………………………………………………….20
IV. The Holy Quran Mandate………………………………………………………………………………21
V. Essential Religious Practice…………………………………………………………………………..21
WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF POLYGAMY AND NIKAH HALALA AS PRACTISED BY THE

SAHABIS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SAHARA?.............................................................................................................................24
I.The practice of polygamy and nikah halala followed by Sahabis…………………..24

II.The practices of Polygamy and Nikah Halala suffers from unreasonable
classification………………………………………………………………………26
III. The practices of Polygamy and Nikah Halala are manifestly arbitrary…………..27
IV. The practices of Polygamy and Nikah Halala are in violation of Article 15 of the
Constitution of India………………………………………………………………28
V. The practices of Polygamy and Nikah Halala are in violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India………………………………………………………………29
VI. Personal laws and Part III of the Constitution……………………………………..31
PRAYER..................................................................................................................................... 32

PAGE 1 OF 33
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR : All India Reporter
Art. : Article
& : And
Const. : Constitution
Ed. : Edition
Hon'ble : Honorable
Moot Proposition : Moot Proposition
Ors. : Others
Para : Paragraph
Sched. : Schedule
SC : Supreme Court
SCC : Supreme Court Cases
SCR : Supreme Court Reports

PAGE 2 OF 33
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
1. Anwar Ali Sarkar v State of West Bengal 1952 SC75………………….…………..26

2. Bijoe Immanuel v State of Kerala (1986) 3 SCC 615…………………………...14,22
3. Chief Administrator cum Jt. Secretary, Government of India v. D. C. Dass, AIR 1999
SC 186…………………………………………………………………...……………..12
4. City Corner v. P.A. to the Collector, AIR 1976 SC 143…………………...……….12
5. Clerks of Calcutta Tramways v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 SC
78……………………………………………………………………………………………….......................12
6. Divisional Manager A.P.S.R.T.C v. P. Lakshmoji Rao, AIR 2004 SC
1503…………………………………………………………,……………………..…………………………13
7. Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, AIR 1954 SC 520……………………...……………11
8. Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi 1982 AIR 1473…………………………….30
9. Ganga Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 3123………………...……………..11
10. Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corp. Ltd. v P. P Suresh 2019 9 SCC
710………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…………..…27
11. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112……………………...………13
12. K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1………………….……...14,27,29
13. Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another,
(2000) 6 SCC359…………………………………………………………………….13
14. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597……………….…….………....31

15. Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1969) 1 SCC
853……………………………………………………................................................,………………….....18
16. Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2016) 7 SCC 353……………………………………....………………………………..18
17. Mohan Lal v. Management, Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC

1253...…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..12
18. Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys,
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 256…………………………………………………..……………………………………23
19. N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196…………………...…………….11
20. Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84……………………………..………….……...31
21. .National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India

PAGE 3 OF 33
(2014) 5 SCC 438……………………………………………………………….………..14
22. Nergesh Meerza 1981 AIR 1829…………………………………..…………….…...28

23. Nirma Ltd v. Lurgi Lenteges Energietechnik Gmbh,
AIR 2002 SC 3695………………………………………………………………..……..12
24. Punjab State Electricity Board v. Darbbara Singh, AIR 2006

387……………………………………………………………………………..…… 12
25. S R Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 831……………………...16,17
26. Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India(2012) 6 SCC
1…………………………………………………………………………….………..19
27. Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1……………………….….......18,27,31
28. Siemens Eng & Mfg Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785…....................…….12
29. Suresh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2005 SC 3120…………………....…12
30. Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University (1996) 3 SCC 545…………………………….19
31. Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India,
(2009) 7 SCC 561…………………………………………………...……………...……..11
32. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011…………………..………..………30

33. Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Mehra (1976) 2 SCC
1…….…………….……………………………………………………………………...………………………..17
BOOKS
1. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexis, 8th ed., 2018).
2. D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India (Lexis Nexis, 8th ed., 2012).
3. D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (Lexis Nexis, 23rd ed. 2018)
4. V.N. Shukla, Constitution Law of India (13th ed. 2008).
5. Pramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon (2nd ed. 2021).
STATUTES
1. The Constitution of India

2. Karnataka Education Act, 1983
3. Karnataka Educational Institutions (Classification, Regulation, and Prescription of
Curricula, etc) Rules, 1995

PAGE 4 OF 33
INTERNET SOURCES & OTHER ARTICLES
1. Omar, Shagufta. “Dissolution of Marriage: Practices, Laws and Islamic Teachings.”

Policy Perspectives, vol. 4, no. 1, 2007, pp. 91–117. JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42909165. Accessed 21 Oct. 2023.PRS Legislative
Research,https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2021/IT%2520Act,%25
202000.pdf (Last visited on January 10, 2023)
2. Sri Abhigna Pillalamarri, Nikah Halala: Law in Theory v. Law in Practice, 4 Issue 3
Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 1313 (2021)
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ijlmhs11&div=120&
id=&page=
3. Brooks, Thom. “The Problem with Polygamy.” Philosophical Topics, vol. 37, no. 2,
2009, pp. 109–22. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43154559.
Accessed 21 Oct. 2023.
4. Benard, Cheryl. “Appendix B: HIJAB AS A CASE STUDY.” Civil Democratic Islam:
Partners, Resources, and Strategies, 1st ed., RAND Corporation, 2003, pp. 57–60.
JSTOR,http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mr1716cmepp.12.
Accessed 21 Oct. 2023.

PAGE 5 OF 33
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Counsel for the Petitioner, most humbly and respectfully, submit that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this
instant special leave petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces”

PAGE 6 OF 33
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATE
The State of Karunadu is a part of the Republic of Sahara which is a diverse and
populous nation, known for its cultural and religious diversity.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1. Among its citizens, the Sahabi community, comprising 15% of the population,
adheres to the Sahabi religion.
2. Nighat, a 19-year-old Sahabi woman, who diligently balances her education
and family responsibilities, faces a dilemma when her college, Karunadu
Women’s Viduli College, enforces a ban on wearing the hijab.
3. Aggrieved by this ban, she seeks help from the NGO ‘Aazad’ and files a Public
Interest Litigation, contending that the hijab ban infringes on the Right to
Freedom of Religion guaranteed in the Republic of Sahara’s Constitution. The
Karunadu High Court, however, rules in favor of the educational institutions.
4. The Republic of Sahara is a diverse and populous nation, known for its cultural
and religious diversity. Among its citizens, the Sahabi community, comprising
15% of the population, adheres to the Sahabi religion.
5. Nighat, a 19-year-old Sahabi woman, who diligently balances her education
and family responsibilities, faces a dilemma when her college, Karunadu
Women’s Viduli College, enforces a ban on wearing the hijab.
6. Meanwhile, Nighat enters into marriage with Dr. Khizar Khan but faces
challenges in her personal life. Khizar, under family pressure, marries another
woman, Tahira, leading to a strained marriage. Eventually, Khizar divorces
Nighat and marries Tahira, who later seeks a divorce.
7. Khizar and Nighat wish to reconcile but hesitate due to the requirement of
practicing nikah halala. They secretly remarry and have a child.
8. When they visit their families, they are ostracized and accused of living in sin.
Nighat appeals to the courts for justice, challenging the practice of nikah
halala.

PAGE 7 OF 33
ISSUES RAISED
~ ISSUE – I ~
WHETHER THE APPEAL IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT?
~ ISSUE – II ~
WHETHER NOTIFICATION ISSUED OD 5TH FEBRUARY 2021 BY THE STATE OF

KARUNADU IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIOS OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SAHARA?
~ ISSUE – III ~
WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB BY SAHABI IS THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AS

PER SAHABI PERSONAL LAW OR NOT?
~ ISSUE – IV ~
WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF POLIGAMY AND NIKAH HALALA AS PRACTICED BY THE

SAHABIS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SAHARA?

PAGE 8 OF 33
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE- I
It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that under Article 136 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Sahara, any person, aggrieved by any order or
decision of any court in Republic of Sahara can approach the Supreme Court
through a Petition for Special Leave. The petitioners have exhausted all the
available local remedies and has the necessary locus standi to approach this
Hon'ble bench. Therefore, the petitioners humbly submit that all grounds
required for the grant of a Special Leave for appeal are satisfied and hence, this
Hon’ble Court adjudicate the same.
ISSUE- II
The notification issued by the State Government of Karunadu on 5th February

is violative of provisions enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of
Sahara. The notification given to the educational institutions on the dress code
where the students were asked to refrain from wearing hijab while attending
college and must adhere to the uniform prescribed by the institution is in
violation of Article 19, 21, 25, 26, 15 and is in contravention to articles 13 and
14. The State Government is destroying the secular aspect of the country which
is the basic structure of the Constitution of the Republic of Sahara by imposing
restrictions upon the religious practices of students. Therefore, the restrictions
imposed through the notification dated 5th February are opposed to the
constitutionally protected rights and are not religion-neutral in its very nature.
ISSUE – II
The Petitioner most humbly submits that the practice of Polygamy and Nikah
Halala are against Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The practice
of polygamy and nikah halala do not satisfy the twin tests under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, therefore it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The
practice of polygamy and nikah halala do not come under the purview of the

PAGE 9 OF 33
condition required for the restriction to apply under Article 15 of the Constitution
of India. The practice of of polygamy and nikah halala do not follow the due
process of law as mandated by the Constitution of India, thereby violating Article
21.
ISSUE – III
The respondent’s detailed arguments encompass several key aspects. They

emphasize the unique character of Indian secularism, which separates religion
from the state’s secular activities while promoting equality among all faiths. The
right to religious freedom, as enshrined in Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution,
is considered fundamental but subject to limitations, such as public order and
morality. The respondent contends that the practice of wearing a hijab should not
be unreasonably restricted unless it poses a substantial threat to public order or is
inherently immoral. They reference Quranic verses to support the significance of
the hijab in Islam as a religious practice centered on modesty and righteousness.
Legal precedents, including the Bijoe Emmanuel case and the Multani case, are
cited to underline the importance of accommodating sincere religious beliefs even
when they appear to conflict with cultural or national symbols. Lastly, the
respondent references the Indian Air Force Muslim Airman case, emphasizing the
need for context-specific evaluation of religious practices, supporting the
accommodation of the hijab as an essential religious practice for Sahabi women.
In essence, the respondent argues for the protection of the Sahabi women’s right
to wear the hijab as an integral aspect of their religious beliefs under the Indian
Constitution.

PAGE 10 OF 33
ARGUMENT ADVANCED
ISSUE 1:WHETHER THE APPEAL IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THIS

HONOURABLE COURT?
1.1 The Appellant has Locus Standi to approach this Hon’ble Court
1. Article 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant in discretion Special leave to
Appeal from any judgement, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause
or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.We
respectfully propose that the authority granted by Article 136 can be invoked in
response to any ruling or directive that results in injustice to any party. To fulfill
this requirement, the authority vested in Article 136 remains unrestricted. 1
2. The Petitioner sincerely implores this Hon’ble Court to rectify this situation and
consider the case for further examination.
1.2 Even if it is assumed the Petition is not maintainable, this Hon’ble Court can
still hear the matter.
3. To facilitate our argument, if we were to assume that the present petition is not
legally admissible, we respectfully assert that this Hon’ble Court's authority is
broad enough to encompass a scenario in which, even if the appeals are deemed
inadmissible, the Supreme Court can still deliberate on their substance.2
4. Therefore, we kindly urge this Hon’ble Court to promptly intervene in this
situation to prevent any further injustice to the Appellants.
1.3 Scope of powers of this Hon’ble Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
5. The Supreme Court has the authority to utilize its powers under Article 136 to deliver
justice and rectify any injustices.3Regarding the extent of Article 136, the Supreme Court
has determined that it is a residual authority that permits the Supreme Court, at its
discretion, to intervene in the judgments or orders of any court or tribunal in India.4
6. In the case of Ganga Kumar v. State of Bihar5, the Supreme Court has established that it
1
Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, AIR 1954 SC 520
2
Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India ,(2009) 7 SCC 561
3
N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196
4
N Suriyakala v. A Mohan Doss & ors. (2007) 9 SCC 196
5
Ganga Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 3123

PAGE 11 OF 33
is within the prerogative of the Supreme Court to intervene in the High Court's factual
determinations if the High Court has acted in a perverse or otherwise improper manner.
1.4 The instant petition satisfies all grounds required for an appeal under Article 136
7. It is humbly submitted that if special leave is granted and the same is restricted to a
particular question, the Court is not constrained in any manner to restrict itself to hearing
onlythose matters6, insofar as an opportunity of being heard is giving to the opposite party
also7.Hence, it is submitted that this Hon’ble Court can dwell into all matters, including
question offact and decide this matter on merits grant justice.
8. The Supreme Court has exercised its Jurisdiction under Article 136 under the following
circumstances-
1. When the Tribunal ostensibly fails to exercise its patent jurisdiction.8
2. When there is an apparent error on the face of the decision9.
3. The tribunal has erroneously applied well-accepted principles of jurisprudence10
4. The tribunal acts against the principles of Natural Justice11, or has

approached the question in a manner likely to cause injustice12
1.5 Exhaustion of Remedies:
9. In the context of the present case, it is imperative to note that the Appellants have
duly fulfilled the requirement of exhausting all available remedies at the local
level, having pursued their case before a Divisional Bench of the High Court and
subsequently before a higher bench of the same Court.13 Consequently, the sole
remaining recourse for the petitioners lies with this Hon'ble Court. Therefore, it is
respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court bestows justice upon the petitioners.
6
Suresh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2005 SC 3120
7
Pubnjab State Electricity Board v. Darbbara Singh, AIR 2006 SC 387
8
Chief Administrator cum Jt. Secretary, Government of India v. D. C. Dass, AIR 1999 SC 186
9
Siemens Eng & Mfg Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785
10
Clerks of Calcutta Tramways v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 78
11
City Corner v. P.A. to the Collector, AIR 1976 SC 143
12
Mohan Lal v. Management, Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1253
13
Nirma Ltd v. Lurgi Lenteges Energietechnik Gmbh, AIR 2002 SC 3695

PAGE 12 OF 33
1.6 Grounds of rejection:
10. In the matter at hand, it is readily apparent, at an initial examination, that the
Petitioners do not have any valid justifications upon which the current application
for special leave could be dismissed under the guidelines set forth by the Supreme
Court.14As per the ruling in Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and
Another15, the rejection of a petition seeking special leave to appeal may occur for
various reasons, including, but not limited to, the following:
(i) If the Petition is time-barred;
(ii) If the Petition is presented with defects;
(iii) If the petitioner lacks the requisite locus standi to file the petition;
(iv) If the petitioner's behavior disqualifies them from receiving any favor from the
court;
(v) If the question raised by the petitioner is unsuitable for consideration by this Court
or does not warrant the attention of the Apex Court.
11. In the instant case, it is obvious on a prima-facie level that the petitioners have no
grounds on which the instant petition for special leave could be rejected.
1.7 Reliefs that could be granted by this Hon’ble Court.

12. Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court possesses the authority to grant
any relief that is deemed essential and suitable in light of the specific facts and
circumstances of the case.16 Furthermore, the Supreme Court may also invoke its powers
under Article 142 for this purpose.17 Therefore, it is respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble
Court issue orders that can rectify the injustice being suffered by the petitioner.
14
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587
15
Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2000) 6 SCC 359
16
Divisional Manager A.P.S.R.T.C v. P. Lakshmoji Rao, AIR 2004 SC 1503
17
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112

PAGE 13 OF 33
ISSUE 2: WHETHER NOTIFICATION ISSUED ON 5TH FEBRUARY 2021 BY THE STATE OF

KARUNADU IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SAHARA?
2.1 The notification dated 5th February issued by the State of Karunadu is in violation
of Article 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Sahara
13. The notification dated 8th February issued by the State of Karunadu presents a
narrative that wearing the hijab is not an essential religious practice in Islam.
Consequently, it prescribes or authorizes the prescription of a dress code or
uniform to students in alignment with this narrative. This approach raises
significant concerns regarding the potential violation of students’ fundamental
rights, specifically their right to freedom of conscience and the right to practice
their religious faith, both of which are constitutionally guaranteed under Article
25, as established in the case of Bijoe Immanuel vs. State of Kerala18
14. The Petitioner submits that it is important to recognize that one’s personal
appearance and choice of dressing fall within the ambit of the “freedom of
expression,” as highlighted in the case of National Legal Services Authority vs.
Union of India19. This freedom, along with the right to privacy, as established in
K. S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India20 , is a matter of individual choice and is
constitutionally protected.
15. It is further submitted that the Government Order and the actions of the college,
to the extent that they prohibit students from wearing the hijab within the
educational institutions, are indeed in direct conflict with fundamental rights
constitutionally guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Indian
Constitution.
16. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression,
which encompasses the right to express one’s beliefs, including through personal
18
(1986) 3 SCC 615
19
(2014) 5 SCC 438
20
(2017) 10 SCC 1

PAGE 14 OF 33
appearance and clothing choices. Restricting students from wearing the hijab infringes
upon this right as it curtails their ability to express their religious beliefs through their
clothing.
17. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution ensures the right to life and personal liberty. This
right encompasses an individual’s autonomy and personal choices, including matters
of religion and attire. Prohibiting the hijab in educational institutions can be seen as an
undue intrusion on the personal liberty of students, particularly when it pertains to their
religious practices and beliefs
18. Therefore, it is clear that the Government Order and the actions of the college
restricting the wearing of the hijab are at odds with these constitutionally enshrined
rights. It is imperative that these fundamental rights are respected and protected while
also seeking a balance that ensures the preservation of the secular and inclusive
character of educational institutions.
2.2. The said Government Order raises significant concerns regarding its compatibility
with the concept of secularism
19. The said Government Order raises significant concerns regarding its compatibility
with the concept of secularism, which is a fundamental and integral component of the
Indian Constitution. Secularism in India is rooted in the ancient philosophical concept
of “Sarva Dharma Sambhava,” which translates to “All Religions are the same” and
emphasizes that “All Paths lead to the same destination.” This concept was
championed by Mahatma Gandhi and has its origins in the teachings of great Indian
thinkers like Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda. It embodies the idea of
equality among diverse religious beliefs, recognizing that all religions ultimately lead
to the same spiritual destination.
20. In contrast to the Western concept of secularism, which often involves the separation
of Church and State, the Indian Constitution embraces a form of positive secularism.
Positive secularism means that the state protects all religions equally and accords equal
respect to all faiths. It grants individuals the freedom to practice, profess, and
propagate their religion without discrimination.

PAGE 15 OF 33
21. This indigenous concept of secularism in India is designed to provide individuals with
the liberty to follow their personal beliefs. As Mahatma Gandhi articulated in 1946 in
Harijan, “I swear by my religion. I will die for it. But it is my personal affair. The State
has nothing to do with it. The State will look after your secular welfare, health,
communication, foreign relations, currency, and so on, but not my religion. That is
everybody’s personal concern.” Even though the terms ‘Socialist’ and ‘Secular’ were
officially added to the Preamble of the Constitution in 1976 by the 42 nd Amendment,
the essence of secularism was deeply ingrained in the foundational principles of our
constitutional philosophy from the very beginning.
22. The petitioner further submits that it is evident that the Government Order, which
restricts students from wearing the hijab, raises questions about its alignment with the
concept of secularism as enshrined in the Indian Constitution. Secularism, as
understood in India, calls for the protection and equal treatment of all religions,
allowing individuals to freely practice their faith. The Government Order, in limiting
religious expression through clothing, may be seen as conflicting with these principles
of secularism.
23. In the case of S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India21, The Honourable Supreme Court of
India articulated several crucial principles that shed light on the concept of secularism
as a fundamental feature of the Indian Constitution. The Nine Judge Bench pronounced
the following:
i. Neutral State, not Hostile to Religion: Secularism in India does
not imply that the State should be hostile to religion. Instead, it
should maintain a stance of neutrality. The State is expected to
treat all religions equally and not favour or discriminate against
any particular faith.
ii. Freedom to Profess and Practice Religion: Every individual has

the freedom to profess and practice their own religion. It is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, and it cannot
21
AIR 1994 SC 1918

PAGE 16 OF 33
be claimed that a person ceases to be secular simply because they

are a devout follower of a particular religion, be it Hinduism,
Islam, or any other faith.
iii. Separation of Religion and Politics: The neutrality of the State is

compromised when religion is exploited for political purposes
and when political parties use religious sentiments for their own
political ends. The mixing of politics and religion is discouraged
to preserve the secular character of the State.
iv. Secularism as a Basic Feature: The Court emphasized that

secularism is considered a basic feature of the Indian
Constitution. This means that secularism is an integral and non-
negotiable element of the Constitution’s framework, and it should
be upheld and protected as such.
These principles, as established in the S.R. Bommai case, underscores the significance
of secularism in India and the necessity for the State to maintain neutrality with regard
to religious matters. It also highlights the importance of preventing the exploitation of
religion for political purposes to preserve the secular fabric of the nation.
24. In the case of Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ram Das Mehra,22 the
Supreme Court of India provided a defining perspective on the concept of secularism,
both in philosophical and utilitarian terms. The Court articulated that the role of the
State should be characterized by neutrality and impartiality when it comes to extending
benefits to all citizens, irrespective of their caste or creed. The court further
emphasized the State’s role in preserving and promoting a secular society where
individuals are treated equally, regardless of their religious background. It places a
responsibility on the State to create an environment where religious diversity is
respected and where no individual faces disadvantages due to their religious beliefs or
practices.
22
(1976) 2 SCC 17

PAGE 17 OF 33
25. The actions of the State and the college may be challenged on the grounds of violating
the “doctrine of proportionality” by imposing a ban on the hijab within the
educational institutions without adequately exploring less restrictive alternatives. This
legal principle is crucial in ensuring that measures taken by the State are proportionate
to the objectives they seek to achieve. The doctrine of proportionality essentially
requires that when the State takes action that may limit fundamental rights, it should
consider less restrictive means to accomplish its goals. The two significant cases ,
Modern Dental College vs. State of Madhya Pradesh23 and Mohd. Faruk vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh24 , emphasize the importance of this principle.
26. The impugned Government Order can be challenged on the grounds of ‘manifest
arbitrariness,’ as elucidated in the case of Shayara Bano vs. Union of India25.
‘Manifest arbitrariness’ refers to a decision or action that is highly unreasonable and
not based on rational or justifiable grounds. It is crucial to highlight that the
Government Order may misinterpret the legal positions in these cases and rely on a
demonstrably incorrect interpretation. If the Order’s basis contradicts the established
legal positions or if it misrepresents the precedents, it could be deemed arbitrary and
legally unsustainable.
27. It is further submitted that the Karnataka Education Act, 1983, and its associated rules
do not provide statutory authorization for the prescription of a dress code or uniform
in educational institutions. It claims that prescribing a dress code falls under the realm
of ‘police power,’ which neither the government nor the college can exercise without
specific legal enablement.
28. Additionally, the petitioner challenges the competency of Rule 11 of the Karnataka
Educational Institutions (Classification, Regulation, and Prescription of Curricula,
etc) Rules, 1995 (hereafter ‘1995 Curricula Rules’) to the extent that it addresses the
prescription of uniforms. It maintains that this rule lacks the requisite legal authority
and is, therefore, inadequate to support the imposition of a uniform or dress code.
23
(2016) 7 SCC 353
24
(1969) 1 SCC 853
25
10 (2017) 9 SCC 1

PAGE 18 OF 33
29. In essence, it is to be highlighted that there is no legal basis within the existing
framework for mandating a dress code or uniform in educational institutions. It implies
that the government or schools must have clear statutory backing to enforce such
measures, which, as of now, is purportedly absent.
30. This legal perspective can be invoked to question the validity of any governmental or
institutional action that imposes a dress code or uniform in the absence of specific
statutory provisions authorizing such actions. It suggests that any such impositions
may be legally questionable if not explicitly supported by relevant legislation or
regulations.
31. It is submitted that the prohibition of wearing the hijab in educational institutions not
only impinges upon the autonomy of women but also constitutes a violation of Article
14, as it amounts to gender-based discrimination, which is expressly prohibited by
Article 15 of the Indian Constitution. This prohibition has additional ramifications,
particularly concerning the right to education, as it effectively bars students who
choose to wear the hijab from entering these institutions. The government and
educational institutions are not only expected to be neutral but are also responsible for
fostering an environment of diversity and inclusiveness. This approach aligns with the
fundamental spirit of the Indian Constitution, which cherishes diversity and
heterogeneity in all aspects of life while discouraging conformity and homogeneity.
32. Further, Notable cases like Valsamma Paul vs. Cochin University26 , Society for
Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of India27 , and Navtej Singh Johar
vs. Union of India28 have consistently emphasized the importance of embracing
diversity, inclusiveness, and upholding the fundamental principle of non-
discrimination, particularly in educational institutions.
26
(1996) 3 SCC 545
27
(2012) 6 SCC 1
28
AIR 2018 SC 4321

PAGE 19 OF 33
ISSUE 3: WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB BY SAHABI IS THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS
PRACTICE AS PER SAHABI PERSONAL LAW OR NOT?
3.1 Reasonable restrictions on Fundamental Rights
33. The right to freedom of religion is enshrined in Article 25(1) of the Indian
Constitution. While this fundamental right guarantees every individual the
freedom to practice and profess their faith, it is essential to recognize that this
freedom is subject to certain limitations, including public order, morality, and
other provisions of the Constitution. In light of these constitutional principles, we
contend that the practice of wearing a hijab by Sahabi women is a protected
religious practice that should not be subject to unwarranted restrictions.
3.1.1 Freedom of Religion Subject to Public Order
34. Article 25(1)29 guarantees the right to freedom of faith; however, this freedom is
explicitly subject to considerations of public order. Public order is a legitimate
concern for the state, as it is its duty to maintain peace and order to ensure that
people can exercise their fundamental rights without disruption. Any regulation
or prohibition on religious practices is justified when there is a threat to public
order. In such cases, the state is empowered to place restrictions on religious
practices to prevent disturbances, such as processions or gatherings that may
disrupt public order. A ban on the wearing of the hijab can only be justified if it
poses a significant risk to public order or communal harmony. In the absence of
such a threat, any restriction on this religious practice would be contrary to the
principles of the Indian Constitution.
3.1.2 Religious Freedom Subject to Morality
35. The Constitution also subjects the freedom of religion to considerations of

morality. It is essential to note that no state can allow immoral acts to be carried
out under the guise of religious freedom. While religion aims at the moral well-
being of individuals, there have been instances in which religious practices have
29
Constitution of India

PAGE 20 OF 33
resulted in immoral acts. The state has a constitutional duty to prevent and
regulate such immoral practices. For instance, the Constitution empowers the
state to declare certain practices as illegal, such as the Devadasi system and Sati
system, on moral grounds. The same principles apply to any religious practice
that is deemed immoral and contrary to public morality.
36. The practice of wearing the hijab by Sahabi women is a protected religious
practice under the Indian Constitution. Any restriction or prohibition of this
practice must meet the constitutional standards, including considerations of
public order and morality. Such restrictions should only be imposed if there is a
clear and substantial threat to public order or if the practice is inherently
immoral. It is the duty of the state to balance these considerations while
respecting the fundamental right to freedom of religion, as guaranteed by Article
25 of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, petitioner argues that the ban on
wearing the hijab in this context is unconstitutional and should be revoked to
ensure the protection of religious freedom.
3.2 The Holy Quran Mandate
37. The Quran, the holy book of Islam, contains explicit references to the practice of
wearing the hijab. These Quranic verses provide a solid foundation for legal
arguments in favor of the right to wear the hijab within the context of Islamic
religious beliefs. These verses stress the significance of modesty and the hijab as
essential elements of Islamic faith.
38. The Quran serves as the central religious text for Muslims worldwide and forms
the basis of Islamic teachings. In this context, it is paramount to highlight the
Quran’s unequivocal instructions regarding the hijab. For instance, Quran 7:26
emphasizes that Allah has provided raiment as a means to cover one’s shame and
adorn oneself righteously. This verse underscores that such acts are among the
Signs of Allah, intended to guide and admonish believers. Therefore, the hijab is
portrayed as a divine commandment to maintain modesty and righteousness in

PAGE 21 OF 33
attire.30
39. Quran 24:31 is particularly significant in outlining the guidelines for believing
women. It underscores the importance of lowering one’s gaze and guarding
modesty, emphasizing that women should not display their beauty or ornaments
except what is ordinarily visible. Furthermore, it specifically instructs women to
draw their veils over their bosoms, highlighting the act of veiling as a means of
safeguarding their modesty. The verse also specifies the individuals in front of
whom a woman may display her beauty, thereby promoting an atmosphere of
privacy and protection for women.31
40. The Quran's guidance is not limited to women alone, as Quran 33:59 explicitly
instructs the Prophet to convey to wives, daughters, and the women of the
believers the necessity of drawing their cloaks close when going abroad. The
objective is to make them recognizable while ensuring that they are not annoyed.
This verse emphasizes the dual principles of recognition and respect, recognizing
the distinctive attire of believing women and respecting their choice to adhere to
these religious mandates. 32
41. These Quranic verses provide a strong foundation for legal arguments in favor of
the right to wear the hijab as an integral part of Islamic faith. They underscore
the hijab’s role in promoting modesty, protecting women, and emphasizing the
obligation to recognize and respect the religious practices of believing women.
3.3 Essential Religious Practice
42. In the case of Bijoe Emmanuel vs State of Kerala33 , the Supreme Court of India
upheld the right of students belonging to the Jehovah’s Witnesses denomination
to abstain from singing the national anthem, as it was claimed to contradict their
religious faith. This decision serves as a precedent in recognizing the importance
30
Quran 7:26
31
Quran 24:31
32
Quran 33:59
33
AIR 1987 SC 748.

PAGE 22 OF 33
of accommodating religious beliefs and practices, even if they appear to be in

conflict with national symbols or practices. In the context of the Sahabi women
wearing the hijab, this case demonstrates that the Indian legal system has a
history of respecting religious freedoms, even if it involves exemptions from
practices that may be seen as integral to the cultural or national identity. The
Bijoe Emmanuel case establishes a legal precedent that religious beliefs and
practices, when sincerely held, must be accommodated, even if they seem to be
in conflict with national or cultural symbols. Therefore, in the case of Sahabi
women wearing the hijab, which is considered an essential religious practice,
they should be granted the same accommodation, especially if it does not pose a
direct threat to public order or safety. The Indian legal system recognizes the
importance of respecting religious beliefs, as exemplified in this case.
43. The Supreme Court of Canada, in the Multani case34 , upheld the right of a Sikh
student to wear a Kirpan while attending class, without causing harm to others.
This case sets an international precedent for recognizing and accommodating
religious practices within the educational context. The court’s decision
emphasizes the importance of balancing the protection of religious freedoms
with the safety and well-being of others. The Multani case underscores the
principle that religious practices can be accommodated in educational
institutions as long as they do not pose a direct threat to the safety or well-being
of others. Applying this precedent to the Sahabi women’s right to wear the hijab,
it should be recognized as an essential religious practice that can be
accommodated in educational settings, provided it does not create any harm or
danger to others. This approach aligns with the broader principles of respecting
religious freedoms, as demonstrated in this international case.
44. In 2016, the Supreme Court of India upheld the discharge of a Muslim airman
from the Indian Air Force for keeping a beard, distinguishing the case from that
of Sikhs who are allowed to maintain beards. This case highlights the need for a
nuanced examination of religious practices, taking into account the specific
34
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 256

PAGE 23 OF 33
circumstances and requirements of different religious communities. The Indian

Air Force Muslim Airman case emphasizes the importance of considering the
specific context and requirements of different religious practices. In the case of
the Sahabi women wearing the hijab, it is crucial to recognize that this practice is
considered essential within their religious community. Therefore, it should be
evaluated on its own merits and not compared to practices from other religious
communities. This case underscores the need for a fair and context-specific
assessment of religious practices, and it supports the argument that the wearing
of the hijab should be accommodated as an essential religious practice for Sahabi
women.
ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF POLYGAMY AND NIKAH HALALA AS PRACTISED

BY THE SAHABIS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SAHARA?
4.1 The practice of polygamy and nikah halala followed by Sahabis
45. The Petitioner most humbly submits that the practice of Polygamy and Nikah
Halala are against Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Polygamy as
the name suggests means a system of marriage whereby one person has more
than one spouse. It can be of two types. One is polygyny where a man marries
more than one woman, and the other is polyandry, where a woman marries more
than one man. In Islam, limited polygyny is permitted and polyandry is
completely prohibited. Polygamy is a practice wherein a man is allowed to marry
more than one wife, with the condition that he treats his wives with justice, and
takes the decision with Taqwa or God Consciousness.
46. The word “nikah halala” nowhere appears in the Holy Quran and thus, refers to
an un-Islamic impermanent nikah obligated upon the wife who has been a victim
of reckless pronouncement of irrevocable three divorces by her husband. 35
35
Nikah Halala: A Practice Prevalant and a Practice Challenged, (2019) PL (HR) April 84

PAGE 24 OF 33
47. Nikah Halala is made up of two words – nikah meaning marriage and halala
meaning making something permissible or halal. This is a practice followed by a
small community of the Islamic religion where a woman, divorced by her
husband by triple talaq, has to go through a certain procedure if she wants to
remarry the same person she got divorced with.
48. The procedure includes getting married to another man and consummating the
marriage, later getting divorced again. Only after consummating the marriage
and getting a divorce can she remarry her former husband.
49. The word “nikah halala” nowhere appears in the Holy Quran and thus, refers to
an un-Islamic impermanent nikah obligated upon the wife who has been a victim
of reckless pronouncement of irrevocable three divorces by her husband. 36
50. Nikah Halala is made up of two words – nikah meaning marriage and halala
meaning making something permissible or halal. This is a practice followed by a
small community of the Islamic religion where a woman, divorced by her
husband by triple talaq, has to go through a certain procedure if she wants to
remarry the same person she got divorced with.
51. The procedure includes getting married to another man and consummating the
marriage, later getting divorced again. Only after consummating the marriage
and getting a divorce can she remarry her former husband.
52. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a fundamental right that guarantees

equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Equality before the law
states that no one is above the law, and no one can claim special privileges or
immunities. This principle ensures that the law is applied uniformly to all
individuals. Equal protection of the law mandates that the law should be equal
36
Nikah Halala: A Practice Prevalant and a Practice Challenged, (2019) PL (HR) April 84

PAGE 25 OF 33
and fair in its application. It ensures that the State cannot arbitrarily discriminate
against any individual or group.
53. The Practice of Nikah Halala and Polygamy among Sahabis violate the rights
granted to the women under Article 14. They are being discriminated on the basis
of gender which is unfair. The men of the same community are not subjected to
this discrimination. They are permitted to marry four women under the law,
while women are prohibited to do so.
54. The twin test under Article 14 states that-

 The classification must be based on Intelligible differentia
 Intelligible differentia must have a rational nexus with respect to the
object to be sought by the statute.
4.2 The practices of Polygamy and Nikah Halala suffers from unreasonable
classification
55. In instances wherein the laws have been held violative of Article 14 because there
either was a classification without a difference, or the bias of classification was
irrelevant to the purposes of the Act.37
56. In the case E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974)38, the Supreme Court
emphasized that Article 14 prohibits arbitrariness in state action. It held that the
State cannot act arbitrarily, and any decision it takes must be reasonable and non-
discriminatory.
57. In Anwar Ali Sarkar v State of West Bengal39 a twofold test was prescribed to
determine the permissibility of a classification. It held that the classification must
be founded on an intelligible differentia, and the differentia must have a rational
nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute in question.
37
V N Shukla’s Constitution of India, 13th Edition, 2022
38
1974 AIR 555
39
1952 SC 75

PAGE 26 OF 33
58. The Petitioners, with all due respect to the intention with which this practice was
permitted in the past would like to state that the society has evolved over the
years and so should the law, to uphold the rights of its citizen and in this case the
women who suffer due to the practice of polygamy. The same goes with the
practice of Nikah Halala. It is only the woman who has to get married to another
man, consummate her marriage with him, divorce him and then remarry her
former husband. There is no reasonable classification in this matter.
4.3 The practices of Polygamy and Nikah Halala are manifestly

arbitrary
59. In Shayara Bano v Union of India40 it was held by the Court that any law that is
manifestly arbitrary and is unreasonable, capricious, irrational, without adequate
determining principle or excessive and disproportionate is in violation of Article 14 of
the Constitution.
60. In light of the same, it is prudent to contend that the impugned Rules are manifestly
arbitrary because they do not satisfy the proportionality test as laid out in Puttaswamy.41
In Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corp. Ltd. v P. P Suresh 42 the Supreme Court held
that for the infringement to be proportional, it must be through the least restrictive
alternatives.
61. The classification so made is unreasonable as it applies only to women of the

community and not the men. The lack of a compelling state interest or a legitimate social
welfare goal in upholding Nikah Halala and polygamy emphasizes their
unconstitutional character. These customs do not fulfill any valid public objective; they
do not contribute to societal well-being, public order, or ethical conduct. Instead, they
perpetuate gender disparity, subjecting women to subordinate positions and
undermining their dignity and independence.
40
Shayara Bano v Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4609
41
Supra Note 45
42
Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corp. Ltd. v P. P Suresh 2019 9 SCC 710

PAGE 27 OF 33
4.4. The practices of Polygamy and Nikah Halala are in violation of Article 15 of the
62. Article 15 of the Indian Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of

religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. It ensures equality of opportunity and
treatment to all citizens. The Petitioner submits that the practices of polygamy
and nikah halala are in violation of Article 15 of the Constitution of India.
63. In the case of Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981)43 the Supreme Court held that
Air India’s policy of terminating the service of an air hostess on her first
pregnancy was discriminatory and violated Article 15. The court emphasized that
gender-based discrimination in employment is unconstitutional.
64. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Madhavrao (1981)
emphasized that a woman’s right to maintenance and financial support under
Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) was not limited to her
marital status, emphasizing the principle of gender equality enshrined in Article
15.
65. The architects of the Indian Constitution, with their foresight, incorporated
Article 15 with the aim of eliminating social evils and advancing gender parity.
Practices such as polygamy and Nikah Halala are incongruous with this
constitutional directive. By regarding women as inferior and subjecting them to
arbitrary decisions imposed by external parties, these customs contravene the
fundamental right to be free from discrimination as guaranteed by Article 15.
66. The Petitioner is not disputing the fact that Article 15 has its limitations as no
fundamental right is absolute. The reasonable restrictions under Article 15,
should be justifiable in the pursuit of substantive equality. The practice of of
polygamy and nikah halala do not come under the purview of the condition
required for the restriction to apply. These customs do not serve any valid
43
1981 AIR 1829

PAGE 28 OF 33
objectives related to societal well-being, public order, or moral values. Rather,

they sustain gender inequality by treating women as subordinates, curtailing
their individual choices and freedoms solely on the basis of their gender.
4.5 The practices of Polygamy and Nikah Halala are in violation of Article 21 of the
67. The Petitioner submits that the practice of polygamy and nikah halala violates
article 21 guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Article 21 of the Constitution
of India states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to the procedure established by law. Article 14, 19 and 21 are
mutually exclusive in nature. It guarantees the fundamental right to life and
personal liberty, emphasizing that this right is not merely confined to an
existence, but extends to the right to privacy and the right to lead a life with
dignity
68. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)44 , commonly referred to as the

“Right to Privacy Case,” was heard by a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court of
India. In this case, the court examined the scope and interpretation of the right to
privacy as it relates to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the
right to life and personal liberty. The court, in a unanimous decision, held that the
right to privacy is indeed a fundamental right and is protected under Article 21.
The court recognized that privacy is an intrinsic part of personal liberty and
freedom. The judgment discussed the various facets of privacy, including
informational privacy, bodily privacy, and decisional autonomy. It emphasized
that the right to privacy includes the right to make choices and decisions about
one’s personal life without unwarranted interference from the state or others.
69. The practices of polygamy and nikah halala violate the right to privacy
guaranteed under Article 21. They infringe upon the right of a woman to bodily
privacy and her decisional autonomy. The woman is prohibited from practicing
polygamy and the nikah halala has to be done by the wife only and not the
44
AIR 2017 SC 4161

PAGE 29 OF 33
husband. Women are not allowed to make choices and decisions with respect to
her life.
70. In the case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi45 that any act which damages
or injures or interferes with the use of any limb or faculty of a person, either
permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21.
The court further highlighted that the right to life includes the right to live with
human dignity.
71. In legal precedent of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997)46 , the Supreme Court
acknowledged the fundamental right to lead a life with dignity, safeguarded by
Article 21. The Court underscored that the right to life encompasses the
entitlement to the safeguarding of one’s dignity against all types of harassment
or bias, particularly within the professional domain.
72. The dignity of a women is lost when a man marries another women or more than
one woman when she is still alive and married to him. This happens in the case
of polygamy. Under the practice of nikah halala, not only the man divorces her,
but also, the woman is the one who has to go through the entire process of getting
married to another man, consummate he marriage with him, divorce him and
then only get married to her former husband. The woman has to undergo all this
while the man is not under any such compulsion.
73. The practice of polygamy and nikah halala violate article 19(1)(a) of the
constitution of India which guarantees the right to freedom of speech and
expression. The woman is not allowed to voice out her opinion if she agrees or
disagrees to her husband marrying another woman with respect to polygamy. In
the case of the practice of nikah halala, she cannot marry her husband who
divorced her without following the procedure.
45
1982 AIR 1473
46
AIR 1997 SC 3011

PAGE 30 OF 33
74. The case of Maneka Gandhi v Union of India47 established that Articles 14, 19,
and 21 of the Indian Constitution are interconnected, creating what is commonly
known as the ‘Golden Triangle.’ These articles must be analyzed collectively and
cannot be assessed independently. Therefore, a violation of Article 14 and Article
19 inherently results in a breach of Article 21. In the particular case under
consideration, the clear contravention of Article 14 and Article 19 implies a
corresponding infringement of Article 21.
4.6. Personal laws and Part III of the Constitution
75. In the 2017 case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India48, a significant legal dispute
emerged, rekindling the ongoing tension between Part III of the Constitution and
Religious Personal Laws. Many viewed this case as a pivotal moment to address
the conflict between religious Personal Laws and Constitutional Rights. The Court
ultimately declared triple talaq as unconstitutional, basing its decision on an
analysis aligned with Part III of the Constitution. Additionally, the ruling called
for a reevaluation of the Narasu Appa Mali49 judgment.
76. It was a landmark judgement with respect to the rights of women. The practice
of triple talaq was declared unconstitutional. Nikah halala is a consequence of
triple talaq, therefore when the former is declared unconstitutional, the latter
must be declared unconstitutional as well.
47
AIR 1978 SC 597
48
(2017) 9 SCC 1
49
AIR 1952 Bom 84

PAGE 31 OF 33
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, authorities cited and arguments

advanced, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the Republic of Sahara be
pleased to:
a) The notification issued on 5th February 2021 by the State of Karunadu is

unconstitutional for being violative of the provisions of the Constitution of
the Republic of Sahara and shall be struck down.
b) The wearing of hijab by Sahabi is an essential religious practice as per
Sahabi Personal Law.
c) The practice of polygamy and Nikah Halala as practised by the Sahabis
violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Sahara.
AND/ OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
Place: Delhi, India Sd/-

COUNSELS FOR PETITIONER

PAGE 32 OF 33

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AMITY LAW SCHOOL MOOT COURTTEAM

SOCIETYCODE: 22- PETITIONER

AMITY LAW SCHOOL MOOT COURT SOCIETY

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SAHARA

WRIT PETITION NO.: /2023

AAZAD & ANR.………………………………………………PETITIONER

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................................. 3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..................................................................................................... 6

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................................ 7

ISSUES RAISED ............................................................................................................................ 8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................................... 9

ARGUMENT ADVANCED ............................................................................................................ 11

WHETHER THE PETITION IS MAINATAINABLE BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT……11

WHETHER NOTIFICATION ISSUED ON 5TH FEBRUARY 2021 BY THE STATE OF

WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB BY SAHABI IS THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS

WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF POLYGAMY AND NIKAH HALALA AS PRACTISED BY THE

I.The practice of polygamy and nikah halala followed by Sahabis…………………..24

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

AIR : All India Reporter

Moot Proposition : Moot Proposition

SCC : Supreme Court Cases

SCR : Supreme Court Reports

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1. Anwar Ali Sarkar v State of West Bengal 1952 SC75………………….…………..26

14. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597……………….…….………....31

17. Mohan Lal v. Management, Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

(2014) 5 SCC 438……………………………………………………………….………..14

22. Nergesh Meerza 1981 AIR 1829…………………………………..…………….…...28

24. Punjab State Electricity Board v. Darbbara Singh, AIR 2006

32. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011…………………..………..………30

1. The Constitution of India

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

INTERNET SOURCES & OTHER ARTICLES

1. Omar, Shagufta. “Dissolution of Marriage: Practices, Laws and Islamic Teachings.”

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

BRIEF SUMMARY OF EVENTS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

WHETHER NOTIFICATION ISSUED OD 5TH FEBRUARY 2021 BY THE STATE OF

WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB BY SAHABI IS THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AS

WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF POLIGAMY AND NIKAH HALALA AS PRACTICED BY THE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

The notification issued by the State Government of Karunadu on 5th February

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

The respondent’s detailed arguments encompass several key aspects. They

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

ISSUE 1:WHETHER THE APPEAL IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THIS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1. When the Tribunal ostensibly fails to exercise its patent jurisdiction.8

2. When there is an apparent error on the face of the decision9.

3. The tribunal has erroneously applied well-accepted principles of jurisprudence10

4. The tribunal acts against the principles of Natural Justice11, or has

1.5 Exhaustion of Remedies:

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1.6 Grounds of rejection:

(i) If the Petition is time-barred;

(ii) If the Petition is presented with defects;

1.7 Reliefs that could be granted by this Hon’ble Court.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER