LANDMARK

CASES
Case Digests 2018-2019

UST LAW REVIEW

LANDMARK CASES
(Case Digests 2018-2019)

Prepared by:

ALARICE V. REYES
Jurisprudence Editor

MA. ARCHE I. DELOS SANTOS

Associate Jurisprudence Editor

GABRIEL D.R. ADORA

Executive Editor

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CONTENTS

POLITICAL LAW
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOTR), MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY (MARINA), and
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD (PCG) v. PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM SEA TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION,
HERMA SHIPPING & TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ISLAS TANKERS SEATRANSPORT CORPORATION,
MIS MARITIME CORPORATION, PETROLIFT, INC., GOLDEN ALBATROSS SHIPPING CORPORATION,
VIA MARINE CORPORATION, and CARGOMARINE CORPORATION .................................................................. 8
G.R. No. 230107, 24 July 2018, EN BANC (Velasco, Jr., J.) .................................................................................. 8
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. EVANGELINE C. CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN, IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, .......................................................................................... 13
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 101 AND ANTONIO L. TIU G.R. No. 223451, 14 March 2018, FIRST DIVISION
(Tijam, J.) ................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ......................... 18
ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ORDER AND
DANGEROUS DRUGS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND REVISION OF CODES AND MGEN. JOSE V. BALAJADIA, JR.
(RET.) IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS ............................................................................... 23
HON. JONATHAN A. DELA CRUZ and HON. GUSTA VO S. TAMBUNTING, as MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES and as Taxpayers v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., in his capacity as the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, in his capacity as the SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his
capacity as the SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; and HON.
ROSALIA V. DE LEON, in her capacity as the NATIONAL TREASURER ........................................................... 27
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO ....................................................................................................................................................... 33
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT.................................................... 39
CONGRESSMAN HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, et al. v. ......................................................................................... 43
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA et al. HONORABLE ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., in his
personal and official capacity as Representative of the 2nd District of the Province of Bataan v.
HONORABLE (PAQUITO) N. OCHOA, JR., et al. G.R. No. 199802 & 208488, 03 July 2018, EN BANC
(Bersamin, J.) ........................................................................................................................................................................... 43
REY NATHANIEL C. IFURUNG v. HON. CONCHITA C. CARPIO MORALES IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, HON. MELCHOR ARTHUR H. CARANDANG, HON. GERARD ABETO MOSQUERA, HON.
PAUL ELMER M. CLEMENTE, HON. RODOLFO M. ELMAN, HON. CYRIL ENGUERRA RAMOS IN THEIR
CAPACITIES AS DEPUTIES OMBUDSMAN, AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN .............................. 46
ERIC F. ACOSTA AND NATHANIEL G. DELA PAZ v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et al. ............................... 51
REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, et al. ......................... 53
G.R. No. 243522, 19 February 2019, EN BANC (Carandang, J.) ...................................................................... 53
ANG NARS PARTY-LIST et al. v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. .............................................................. 58

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LEILA M DE LIMA v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE..................................................................................... 61
G.R. No. 227635, 15 October 2019, EN BANC (Bersamin, C.J.) ....................................................................... 61
MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF DENR............................................................................ 64
G.R. Nos. 202897, 206823 & 207969, 06 August 2019, EN BANC (Hernando, J.) .................................. 64
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, et al., v. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD ................................................................................. 68
FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA, et al., v. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA and.......................................... 68
LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD .............................................................................................................................................. 68
G.R. Nos. 230642 and 242954, 10 September 2019, EN BANC (Reyes, J. Jr., J.)....................................... 68
RE: CONSULTANCY SERVICES OF HELEN P. MACASAET ..................................................................................... 81

LABOR LAW
HONGKONG BANK INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (HBILU) v. HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION LIMITED .................................................................................................................................................... 87
G.R. No. 218390, 28 February 2018, THIRD DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J.) ....................................................... 87
RAYMOND A. SON, RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, AND WILFREDO E. POLLARCO v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO
TOMAS, FR. ROLANDO DELA ROSA, DR. CLARITA CARILLO, DR. CYNTHIA LOZA, FR. EDGARDO
ALAURIN, AND COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND DESIGN FACULTY COUNCIL ................................................ 91
MARSMAN & COMPANY, INC. v. RODIL C. STA. RITA ............................................................................................. 94
REYMAN G. MINSOLA v. NEW CITY BUILDERS, INC. AND ENGR. ERNEL FAJARDO ................................. 98
MARIA CARMELA P. UMALI v. HOBBYWING SOLUTIONS, INC. ...................................................................... 101
GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MS. JUDITH JOCELYN
MARTINEZ v. SEC. CESAR L. VILLANUEVA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
GOVERNANCE COMMISSION FOR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
UNDER THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT), MR. EMMANUEL L. BENITEZ (IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE GSIS FAMILY BANK), AND ATTY. GERALDINE MARIE BERBERABE-MARTINEZ
(IN HER CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE GSIS FAMILY BANK)
.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 104
EFREN JULLEZA v. ORIENT LINE PHILIPPINES, INC., et al. .............................................................................. 108
FARMER-BENEFICIARIES BELONGING TO THE SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG BAGUMBONG,
JALAJALA, RIZAL, represented by their President, ............................................................................................... 110
TORIBIO M. MALABANAN v. HEIRS OF JULIANA MARONILLA ....................................................................... 110

CIVIL LAW
JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS III v. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL ....................................................................... 114
G.R. No. 217910, 03 September 2019, EN BANC (Leonen, J.) ...................................................................... 114
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO ............................................................... 122

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LARA’S GIFTS & DECORS, INC. v. MIDTOWN INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC. ...................................................... 127
G.R. No. 225433, 28 August 2019, EN BANC (Carpio, J.) ................................................................................ 127
DANA S. SANTOS v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS ........................................................................................................ 132
G.R. No. 214593, 17 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Reyes, A., Jr., J.) ............................................................ 132
ESTRELLA ABID-BABANO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ...................................................................................... 135
G.R. No. 201176, 28 August 2019, EN BANC (Bersamin, C.J.) ...................................................................... 135

TAXATION LAW
AGUSAN WOOD INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ......................................................................................................................... 138
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES G.R. No. 234531,
10 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.) .............................................................................................. 138
CITY OF DAVAO and BELLA LINDA N. TANJILI, in her official capacity as City Treasurer of Davao City
v. RANDY ALLIED VENTURES, INC.............................................................................................................................. 141
COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ............................................................................................................ 144
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. G.R. No. 207039, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C.
Reyes, Jr., J.) ........................................................................................................................................................................... 144

CRIMINAL LAW
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOMAR SISRACON Y RUPISAN, MARK VALDERAMA Y RUPISAN,
ROBERTO CORTEZ Y BADILLA, LUIS PADUA Y MITRA AND............................................................................ 148
ADONIS MOTIL Y GOLONDRINA G.R. No. 226494, 14 February 2018, SECOND DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 148
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. .................................................................................................................................. 151
RENATO CARIÑO Y GOCONG AND ALVIN AQUINO Y RAGAM G.R. No. 232624, 09 July 2018, SECOND
DIVISION, (Reyes, Jr., J.) ................................................................................................................................................... 151
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VENERANDO GOZO Y VELASQUEZ, ......................................................... 156
G.R. No. 225605, 23 July 2018, THIRD DIVISION (Martires, J.) ................................................................... 156
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO Y ANTICLA................................................... 159
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ..................................................................................................................................... 162
THRU PRIVATE COMPLAINANT BRIAN VICTOR BRITCHFORD v. SALVADOR ALAPAN ...................... 162
G.R. No. 199527, 10 January 2018, THIRD DIVISION, (Martires, J.) .......................................................... 162
MARIA C. OSORIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ............................................................................................ 165
MELITA O. DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ............................................................................. 169
G.R. No. 199930, 27 June 2018, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.) ................................................................ 169
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. .............................................................................. 174

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HON. MA. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, et al................................... 174
G.R. No. 189800, 09 July 2018, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, Jr., J.) ............................................................... 174
INMATES OF NEW BILIBID PRISON v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA G.R. No. 212719, 25 June 2019,
EN BANC (Peralta, J.) ......................................................................................................................................................... 179
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO......................................... 183
FELICITAS D. NACINO, HELEN E. RAMACULA, and THE VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, INC. v. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ............................................................................... 189
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX ........................................................................................................................ 193
G.R. No. 229677, 02 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.) ............................................. 193
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE CUBAY y UGSALAN ......................................................................... 195
G.R. No. 224597, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.) ...................................................... 195

COMMERCIAL LAW
BDO UNIBANK, INC. v. ANTONIO CHOA .................................................................................................................... 199
G.R. No. 237553, 10 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.) ...................................................................... 199
ABS-CBN PUBLISHING, INC. v. DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF TRADEMARKS ..................................... 201
VICENTE HENSON, JR. v. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. ................................................................... 205
G.R. No. 223134, 14 August 2019, EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.) .............................................................. 205
COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ............................................................................................................ 208
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. G.R. No. 207039, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C.
Reyes, Jr., J.) ........................................................................................................................................................................... 208
TERP CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. ................................................................................................................ 211
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK............................................................................................ 211
G.R. No. 221771, 18 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.) ....................................................... 211

REMEDIAL LAW
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO and JULIUS L. LACANILAO ................ 215
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. .................................................................................................................................. 219
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), MANUEL M. LAPID, et al. G.R. No. 229656, 19 August 2019,
SECOND DIVISON (J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.) ............................................................................................................................ 219
ROWENA SANTOS y COMPRADO and RYAN SANTOS y COMPRADO v. ....................................................... 222
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ...................................................................................................................................... 222
G.R. No. 242656, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.) ........................................................... 222

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 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO UNTIAN, JR. .................................... 226
VANTAGE LIGHTING PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ATTY. JOSE DIÑO, JR. ................................................................. 230
VENSON R. ANG v. ATTY. SALVADOR B. BELARO, JR. ......................................................................................... 232

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POLITICAL LAW

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 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOTR), MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY
(MARINA), and PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD (PCG) v. PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM SEA
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, HERMA SHIPPING & TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ISLAS
TANKERS SEATRANSPORT CORPORATION, MIS MARITIME CORPORATION, PETROLIFT,
INC., GOLDEN ALBATROSS SHIPPING CORPORATION, VIA MARINE CORPORATION, and
CARGOMARINE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 230107, 24 July 2018, EN BANC (Velasco, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Time is of the essence when it comes to oil spill response. Whether this will be taken in the
context of damage to the environment and its inhabitants or from a monetary perspective, the
conclusion will be the same. Court cannot simply submit to respondents' proposition that
compensation for damages and oil spill response are two unrelated subjects that cannot be tackled
in a single piece of legislation. To the Co rt s mind, oil spill response and containment is directly
connected to compensation for damages brought about by the incident.

FACTS
Due to the numerous oil spills in the Philippines, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9483,
otherwise known as the “Oil Pollution Compensation Act of .”

R.A. No. 9483 established the oil pollution management fund, which mandated operators
of tankers and barges to contribute 10 centavos per liter of every delivery or transshipment of
oil. The fund was aid to be used to finance clean-up operations and activities related to oil
pollution cases.

The respondents of this case, owners and operators of oil/petroleum tankers and barges
(respondents) assailed the constitutionality of RA 9483, claiming that the 10 centavos obligation
to the fund violates their right to equal protection of the law.

ISSUE
Is R.A. No. , otherwise known as the “Oil Pollution Compensation Act of ”
constitutional?

RULING
YES. Philippine Petroleum Sea, et al. argued that since R.A. No. 9483 was passed to
implement the 1992 Civil Liability and the 1992 Fund Conventions, the creation of the OPMF
must be found in said Conventions for it to be validly included in R.A. No. 9483. Otherwise,
according to Philippine Petroleum Sea, et al., its inclusion in said law is constitutionally infirm
for being a proscribed rider.

At first glance, one might easily agree with Philippine Petroleum Sea, et al.’s proposition.
The title of R.A. No. 9483 is phrased in this manner:

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE

1992 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION

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 DAMAGE AND THE 1992 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE,
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

On the basis thereof, Philippine Petroleum Sea, et al. drew the Court's attention to the two
mentioned Conventions and examined both documents to see that the OPMF cannot be found
therein. Concisely, the respective subject matters of the two Conventions are as follows:

The 1992 Civil Liability Convention governs the liability of shipowners for oil
pollution damage. The Convention lays down the principle of strict liability for
shipowners and creates a system of compulsory liability insurance. The shipowner is
normally entitled to limit its liability to an amount which is linked to the tonnage of its
ship.
The 1992 Fund Convention, which is supplementary to the 1992 Civil Liability
Convention, establishes a regime for compensating victims when the compensation
under the applicable Civil Liability Convention is inadequate. The International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, generally referred to as the 1992 Fund, was set up
under the 1992 Fund Convention. The 1992 Fund is a worldwide intergovernmental
organization established for the purpose of administering the regime of compensation
created by the 1992 Fund Convention. By becoming Party to the 1992 Fund Convention,
a State becomes a Member of the 1992 Fund. The IOPC Funds headquarters is based in
London.

Indeed, the thrust of the 1992 Civil Liability and the 1992 Fund Conventions is to impose
upon covered ship-owners strict liability for pollution damage arising from oil spills and to
provide compensation for the victims thereof. On the other hand, the questioned OPMF governs
the immediate containment, removal, and clean-up operations in oil pollution cases and provides
for the conduct of research, enforcement, and monitoring activities of relevant agencies. On the
basis thereof, it would appear that the Conventions and the OPMF cover two different subject
matters — that is, providing compensation versus pollution containment and clean-up — as
asserted by Philippine Petroleum Sea, et al. Thus, prima facie, one would easily agree with
respondents' contention.

Such a simplistic, if not myopic, view is not the proper measure to determine whether a
provision of law should be declared as unconstitutional. To determine whether there has been
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title, the Court has repeatedly laid down the rule that —

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes

should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index
of the act.

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 Also, in Sumulong v. Comelec, the Court held that all that can reasonably be required is
that the title shall not be made to cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair
intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection, viz.:

As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States: "We must give the
constitutional provision a reasonable construction and effect. The constitution requires
no law to embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. Now the
object may be very comprehensive and still be without objection, and the one before us
is of that character. But it is by no means essential that every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishment of the general object should be either referred to
or necessarily indicated by the title. All that can reasonably be required is that the title
shall not be made to cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair
intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection."

Thus, following those jurisprudential guides, it would be improper for the Court to make
a superficial reading of the texts of the conventions in order to determine whether the inclusion
of Section 22 in R.A. No. 9483, which was enacted to implement these Conventions, is infirm. A
more in-depth analysis of the conventions is necessary. A review of the Conventions reveals that
they do not only cover damage claims by affected individuals but also all amounts encompassed
by the term "pollution damage" which is defined therein.

The equal protection guaranty under the Constitution means that "no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place and in like circumstances." However, this clause does not
preclude classification as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. In Abakada
Guro Party List v. Purisima, the Court elucidated, thus:

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

The Court ruled that "tankers and barges hauling oil and for petroleum products in
Philippine waterways and coast wise shipping routes" from other sea-borne vessels does not
violate the equal protection clause. For one, the purpose of the subject legislation is the
implementation of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention. Both
Conventions only expressly cover "sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo x x x." This alone already forecloses
any argument against the validity of the alleged classification since the implementation by RA

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9483 of the subject Conventions necessarily carries with it the adoption of the coverage and
limitations employed in said texts.

Philippine Petroleum Sea, et al.'s proposition that since all vessels plying Philippine
waters are susceptible to accidents which may cause oil spills, all should be made to contribute
to the OPMF. While all vessels, channels, and storage facilities that carry or store oil are capable
of causing oil pollution, this does not make them "similarly situated" within the context of the
equal protection clause.

Aside from the difference in the purposes behind their existence and navigation, it is
internationally recognized that oil tankers pose a greater risk to the environment and to people.
As a matter of fact, these types of vessels have long been considered as a separate class and are
being given a different treatment by various organizations.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), expounding on the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, highlighted that the SOLAS includes
special requirements for tankers. Citing an example, the IMO stated that "[f]ire safety provisions
x x x are much more stringent for tankers than ordinary dry cargo ships, since the danger of fire
on board ships carrying oil and refined products is much greater." The IMO likewise mentioned
some of the measures specifically required of oil tankers, such as making it mandatory for
tankers to have double hulls, as opposed to single hulls, the phasing-out of single-hull tankers,
and designating protective locations of segregated ballast tanks, among others, in order to
ensure their safety. In fact, Annex I of the revised Marpol 73/78 sets forth the numerous technical
and safety requirements for oil tankers. This list is not exhaustive as there are numerous
regulations and requirements applicable only to the subject vessels. What these shows, however,
is that a vessel that carries oil in bulk has been recognized and is treated as a separate class of
vessel. This sufficiently justifies the segregation done by Congress.

It bears to stress that "[i]n the exercise of its power to make classifications for the
purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying
a wide range of discretion." Concomitantly, neither should the Court adopt such a restrictive —
if not counterproductive approach — in interpreting and applying the equal protection
guarantee under the Constitution. To do otherwise would be to unduly restrict the power of
Congress in enacting laws by unjustifiably imposing erroneously stringent requirements and
excessively high standards in the crafting of each and every piece of legislation, depriving our
lawmakers of the much-needed elbowroom in the discharge of their functions.

As regards Philippine Petroleum Sea, et al.'s contention that since R.A. No. 9483 came
about because of the spate of oil spillage at the time of its enactment, this violates the
requirement that the classification must not be limited to existing conditions only, the argument
does not hold water. A statute or provision thereof is said to be limited to existing conditions
only if it cannot be applied to future conditions as well. Here, the Court disagreed with the
Philippine Petroleum Sea, et al.'s proposition. Suffice it to state that enacting a piece of legislation
as a response to a problem, incident, or occurrence does not make it "limited to existing
conditions only." Assessing whether a statute or provision meets said requirement necessitates
a review of the provision or statute itself and not the cause or trigger for its enactment. To
require otherwise would be to improperly tie the hands of our legislature in enacting laws

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designed to address the various matters, incidents, and occurrences that may arise in a highly-
dynamic and unpredictable society.

Viewed within the purview of R.A. No. 9483, it can easily be seen that the statute also
applies to future conditions as it covers any and all oil spills that may occur within Philippine
waters.

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 ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. EVANGELINE C. CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN, IN HER
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 101 AND ANTONIO L. TIU
G.R. No. 223451, 14 March 2018, FIRST DIVISION (Tijam, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's speech or
utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due
functioning of the (legislative) process." To participate in or respond to media interviews is not an
official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the
process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and legislate
without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is
not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under
the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution.
Contrar to Trillanes stance therefore he cannot in oke parliamentary immunity to cause
the dismissal of Ti s Complaint

FACTS
Antonio Trillanes (Trillanes), as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed
Proposed Senate Resolution No. 826 (P.S. Resolution No. 826) directing the Senate's Committee
on Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations to investigate, in aid of legislation, the
alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey Makati City Hall II Parking Building, the
reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall Building at the average cost of
P240,000.00 per square meter, and related anomalies purportedly committed by former and
local government officials.
Trillanes alleged that former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto Mercado (Mercado) helped
former Vice President Jejomar Binay (Binay) acquire a luxurious estate in Batangas.
Furthermore, Trillanes alleged that the overpricing of the Makati City hall was because of the
refusal of Binay’s wife to relinquish their kickbacks from Makati infrastructure projects.
Trillanes also alleged that Binay owned multiple properties and uses private respondent
Antonio Tiu (Tiu) as a dummy owner. In lieu of these statements, Tiu filed a complaint for
damages against Trillanes before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Tiu maintains that the statements damaged his reputation as a businessman as it caused
a steep drop of the stock value of his businesses. Tiu added that the statements made by Trillanes
were not absolutely privileged as they were not made in the discharge of Trillanes’ duties as a
senator.
Trillanes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was denied by the RTC. Trillanes
then brought his case to the Court via a certiorari petition.

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ISSUE
Were Trillanes’ statements covered by parliamentary immunity?

RULING
NO. The Court ruled that the statements made by Trillanes were not covered by
parliamentary immunity.
The issue of what parliamentary immunity encompasses, in relation to a lawmaker's
speech or words spoken in debate in Congress, has been addressed as early as 1966 in the case
of Nicanor T. Jimenez v. Bartolome Cabangbang, where the Court succinctly held:
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate
therein"-that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either
in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their
duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
In Jimenez, a civil action for damages was filed against a member of the House of
Representatives for the publication, in several newspapers of general circulation, of an open
letter to the President which spoke of operational plans of some ambitious officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) involving a "massive political build-up" of then Secretary of
National Defense Jesus Vargas to prepare him to become a presidential candidate, a coup d'etat,
and a speech from General Arellano challenging Congress' authority and integrity to rally
members of the AFP behind him and to gain civilian support. The letter alluded to the plaintiffs,
who were members of the AFP, to be under the control of the unnamed "planners," "probably
belong(ing) to the Vargas-Arellano clique," and possibly "unwitting tools" of the plans.
Holding that the open letter did not fall under the privilege of speech or debate under the
Constitution, the Court declared:
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According
to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication
to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of

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 Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Albeit rendered in reference to the 1935 constitutional grant of parliamentary immunity,
the Jimenez pronouncement on what constitutes privileged speech or debate in Congress still
applies. The same privilege of "speech or debate" was granted under the 1973 and 1987
Philippine Constitutions, with the latter Charters specifying that the immunity extended to
lawmakers' speeches or debates in any committee of the legislature. This is clear from the
"speech or debate" clauses in the parliamentary immunity provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions which respectively provide:
Section 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the session of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place.
Section 9. A Member of the National Assembly shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance
at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the same; but the National Assembly
shall surrender the Member involved to the custody of the law within twenty-four hours
after its adjournment for a recess or its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease
upon its failure to do so. A Member shall not be questioned or held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Assembly or in any committee thereof.
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Clearly, settled jurisprudence provides sufficient standards and guidelines by which the
trial and appellate courts can address and resolve the issue of parliamentary immunity raised by
Trillanes. The Court was unconvinced that Trillanes has presented an "exceptionally compelling
reason" to justify his direct application for a writ of certiorari with the Court.
Even assuming arguendo that direct recourse to this Court is permissible, the petition
must still be dismissed.
Trillanes admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing Tiu as former VP
Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda Binay, in response to
media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate.
With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is evident that Trillanes’ remarks fall outside the
privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees.
They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be
successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge or performance of Trillanes’
duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process.

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 The Speech or Debate Clause under the 1935 Constitution "was taken or is a copy of Sec.
6, Clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States." Such immunity has come to this
country from the practices of the Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the
United States.
The U.S. Supreme Court's disquisition in United States v. Brewster on the scope of the
privilege is of jurisprudential significance:
Johnson thus stands as a unanimous holding that a Member of Congress may be
prosecuted under a criminal statute provided that the Government's case does not rely on
legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts. A legislative act has consistently been
defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business before it. In sum, the
Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry only into those things generally said or done in the
House or the Senate in the performance of official duties and into the motivation for those acts.
It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many activities other
than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. These include a
wide range of legitimate "errands" performed for constituents, the making of appointments with
Government agencies, assistance in securing Government contracts, preparing so-called
"newsletters" to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress. The
range of these related activities has grown over the years. They are performed in part because
they have come to be expected by constituents, and because they are a means of developing
continuing support for future elections. Although these are entirely legitimate activities, they are
political in nature, rather than legislative, in the sense that term has been used by the Court in
prior cases. But it has never been seriously contended that these political matters, however
appropriate, have the protection afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Careful examination
of the decided cases reveals that the Court has regarded the protection as reaching only those
things "generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
before it," Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, at 204, or things "said or done by him, as a representative,
in the exercise of the functions of that office," Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).
It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the
lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress,
extraneous to the "due functioning of the (legislative) process." To participate in or respond to
media interviews is not an official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn
duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able
to discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's
participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," outside the
ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution.
Contrary to Trillanes’ stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary immunity to cause the
dismissal of Tiu’s Complaint. The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a
lawmaker, but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.
The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators and
Congressmen into "super-citizens" whose spoken words or actions are rendered absolutely
impervious to prosecution or civil action. The Constitution conferred the privilege on members

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of Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for the public good." It was intended to protect
them against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing their decision-making
prerogatives. Such grant of legislative privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose
and plain language. Indeed, the privilege of speech or debate, which may "(enable) reckless men
to slander and even destroy others," is not a cloak of unqualified impunity; its invocation must
be "as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department." As the Court emphasized in Pobre, "the parliamentary non-accountability thus
granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own
benefit, but to enable them, as the people's representatives, to perform the functions of their
office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall."

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 REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 221103, 16 October 2018, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but rather
maintains the balance of power between the members from the Judicial and Legislative
departments as envisioned by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the
three Justices is meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved and do away with the
impression that party interests play a part in the decision-making process.
Indeed, Reyes is nitpicking in claiming that Rule 6(a) unduly favors the Justices because
under the same rule, it is possible for four members of the House of Representatives and only one
Justice to constitute a quorum. Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not make the Justices
indispensable members to constitute a quorum but ensures that representatives from both the
Judicial and Legislative departments are present to constitute a quorum.

FACTS
Regina Reyes (Reyes) had two pending cases before the House of Representatives
Electoral tribunal (HRET). Reyes alleged that Rule 6 of the 2015 Revised Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (2015 HRET Rules) was unconstitutional as it gives the
Justices, collectively, denial or veto powers over the proceeding by simply not attending the
hearing.
Additionally, Reyes alleged that the 2015 HRET Rules grant more powers to the Justices
than the legislators by requesting the presence of at least one Justice to constitute a quorum.
Reyes argued that this rule violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by conferring
the privilege of being indispensable members upon the Justices.
Furthermore, Reyes likewise alleges that Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules
unconstitutionally expanded the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as it
gives it power to determine if there was a valid proclamation or a proper oath, as well as the
opportunity to entertain cases between the election period and assumption of office. Reyes
alleges that the Constitution and the 2011 HRET Rules stated that petitions shall be filed within
15 days from the proclamation of the winner while the 2015 HRET Rules requires that petitions
shall be filed within fifteen days from June 30 or the actual assumption of office, whichever is
later. This contradiction results to the undue power given to the COMELEC.
Reyes stated that the application of the 2015 HRET Rules to all pending cases will
prejudice her cases before the HRET.

ISSUES

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 Are the alleged provisions of the 2015 HRET unconstitutional?

RULING
NO. The Court ruled for the constitutionality of the alleged provisions and dismissed the
petition. The Court ruled that the allegation pertaining to the requirement under Rule 6 of the
2015 HRET Rules that at least one Justice should be present to constitute a quorum violates the
equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution and gives undue power to the Justices over the
legislators is without merit.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the composition of the HRET.
It states:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and all the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
In accordance with this organization, where the HRET is composed of three Justices of
the Supreme Court and six members of the House of Representatives, it is clear that the HRET is
a collegial body with members from two separate departments of the government: The Judicial
and the Legislative departments. The intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to make
the tribunal an independent, constitutional body subject to constitutional restrictions. The origin
of the tribunal can be traced back from the electoral commissions under the 1935 Constitution
whose functions were quasi-judicial in nature. The presence of the three Justices, as against six
members of the House of Representatives, was intended as an additional guarantee to ensure
impartiality in the judgment of cases before it.
The main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment,
first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress,
was to ensure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting
members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely:
(a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having
the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of
Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission
or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the
adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and

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 (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives
as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive
and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but rather
maintains the balance of power between the members from the Judicial and Legislative
departments as envisioned by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of
the three Justices is meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved and do away
with the impression that party interests play a part in the decision-making process.
Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence of at least one Justice and four
members of the Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices are
present, at least two members of the House of Representatives need to be present to constitute
a quorum. Without this rule, it would be possible for five members of the House of
Representatives to convene and have a quorum even when no Justice is present. This would
render ineffective the rationale contemplated by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions
for placing the Justices as members of the HRET. Indeed, Reyes is nitpicking in claiming that Rule
6(a) unduly favors the Justices because under the same rule, it is possible for four members of
the House of Representatives and only one Justice to constitute a quorum. Rule 6(a) of the 2015
HRET Rules does not make the Justices indispensable members to constitute a quorum but
ensures that representatives from both the Judicial and Legislative departments are present to
constitute a quorum. Members from both the Judicial and Legislative departments become
indispensable to constitute a quorum. The situation cited by Reyes, that it is possible for all the
Justice-members to exercise denial or veto power over the proceedings simply by absenting
themselves, is speculative. As pointed out by the HRET, this allegation also ascribes bad faith,
without any basis, on the part of the Justices.
The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution also provides that
"[t]he senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." This means that only a
Justice can chair the Electoral Tribunal. As such, there should always be one member of the
Tribunal who is a Justice. If all three Justice-members inhibit themselves in a case, the Supreme
Court will designate another Justice to chair the Electoral Tribunal in accordance with Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Contrary to Reyes’ allegation, Rule a of the HRET Rules does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The equal protection clause is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The Court has explained that the equal protection clause of the Constitution allows
classification. The Court stated:
x x x. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required

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 of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the
Supreme Court and the members of the House of Representatives. There are only three Justice-
members while there are six Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence, there is a valid
classification. The classification is justified because it was placed to ensure the presence of
members from both the Judicial and Legislative branches of the government to constitute a
quorum. There is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Reyes alleges that the HRET unduly expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Reyes
states that Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives. According to Reyes, Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides for
the requisites to be considered a member of the House of Representatives, as follows:
(1) a valid proclamation;
(2) a proper oath; and
(3) assumption of office.
In addition to these requisites, Rule 17 fixed the time for the filing of an election protest
within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of office,
whichever is later. Reyes alleges that these Rules will allow the COMELEC to assume jurisdiction
between the time of the election and within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date
of actual assumption of office, whichever is later. Further, the requirements of a valid
proclamation and a proper oath will allow the COMELEC to look into these matters until there is
an actual assumption of office.
Under the 2015 HRET Rules, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This is clear
under the first paragraph of Rule 15.
HRET's jurisdiction is provided under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that "[t]he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members." There is no room for the COMELEC to assume
jurisdiction because HRET's jurisdiction is constitutionally mandated.
The reckoning event under Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules, being dependent on the
taking of oath and the assumption of office of the winning candidate, is indeterminable. It is
difficult, if not impossible, for the losing candidate who intends to file an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to keep track when the winning candidate took his oath of office or

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when he assumed office. The date, time, and place of the taking of oath depend entirely upon the
winning candidate. The winning candidate may or may not publicize his taking of oath and thus
any candidate intending to file a protest will be in a dilemma when to file the protest. The taking
of oath can happen any day and any time after the proclamation. As to the assumption of office,
it is possible that, for one reason or another, the winning candidate will not assume office at the
end of the term of his predecessor but on a later date that is unknown to the losing candidate.
However, the Court took judicial notice that in one of its Resolutions, the HRET amended Rules
17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules. As amended, Rules 17 and 18 now read:
RULE 17. Election Protest. - A verified protest contesting the election or returns of
any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within fifteen (15)
days from June 30 of the election year, if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or
before said date. However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the
election year, a verified election protest shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the
date of proclamation.
RULE 18. Quo Warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto on the ground of
ineligibility may be filed by any registered voter of the congressional district concerned,
or any registered voter in the case of party-list representatives, within fifteen (15) days
from June 30 of the election year, if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before
said date. However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the election
year, a verified petition for quo warranto shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the
date of proclamation. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner,
while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
The amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules were made "with respect to
the reckoning point within which to file an election protest or a petition for quo warranto,
respectively, in order to further promote a just and expeditious determination and disposition
of every election contest brought before the Tribunal[.]" The recent amendments, which were
published in The Philippine Star on 26 September 2018 and took effect on 11 October 2018,
clarified and removed any doubt as to the reckoning date for the filing of an election protest. The
losing candidate can determine with certainty when to file his election protest.

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 ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
ORDER AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND REVISION OF CODES AND
MGEN. JOSE V. BALAJADIA, JR. (RET.) IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS
G.R. No. 234608, 03 July 2018, EN BANC, (Gesmundo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during
inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under
which the said power is invoked.

FACTS
Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio III), a first-year law student of the University of Sto.
Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity)
of the same university. Following the incidents, several Senate Resolutions (SRs) were filed in
order to investigate Horacio III’s death to aide legislation.
The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs chaired by Senator Panfilo
Lacson (Senator Lacson) together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and
Constitutional Amendment and Revision of Codes, invited Arvin Balag (Balag) and several other
persons to a Joint Public Hearing to discuss and deliberate, among others, the aforementioned
SRs.
Balag, however, did not attend the hearing. On the same date, Spouses Carmina T. Castillo
and Horacio M. Castillo, Jr., parents of Horacio III, filed a Complaint for Murder and violation of
Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049, before the Department of Justice (DOJ) against several
members of the AJ Fraternity, including Balag.
Senator Lacson then issued a Subpoenas to Balag, requiring him to attend the legislative
hearing. Balag attended the hearing, but refused to answer the questions, invoking his right
against self-incrimination. As a result, Balag was cited in contempt and held in detention by the
sergeant of arms. Balag then filed a petition with the Court to annul his contempt order.

ISSUE
Should the Court hear Balag’s petition?

RULING
NO. The court found that the case was moot and academic as Balag was already released
from detention. However, the Court decided to delve into the matters of the case as they are of

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great importance. In this case, the petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be
addressed by Court: what is the duration of the detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate?
The contempt order issued against Balag simply stated that he would be arrested and
detained until such time that he gives his true testimony, or otherwise purges himself of the
contempt. It does not provide any definite and concrete period of detention. Neither does the
Senate Rules specify a precise period of detention when a person is cited in contempt.
The Court found that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt
by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault v. Nazareno (Arnault), it
was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject
of investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed
testimony called relates to that subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative
inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised.
Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of
contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.
Further, the Court ruled that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two
instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of
Senate Rules state:
Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the
conclusion of the inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the consideration
of its Report.
The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members.
Concurring and dissenting reports may likewise be made by the members who
do not sign the majority report within seventy-two (72) hours from the
approval of the report. The number of members who sign reports concurring
in the conclusions of the Committee Report shall be taken into account in
determining whether the Report has been approved by a majority of the
members: Provided, That the vote of a member who submits both a concurring
and dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the majority unless
he expressly indicates his vote for the majority position.
The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions,
shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in
the next Order of Business.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of
Business, shall be referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the
Calendar.
As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after
the conduct of the legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in

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the Senate Rules because it mandates that the committee begin the consideration of its Report
within fifteen days from the conclusion of the inquiry. The said Committee Report shall then be
approved by a majority vote of all its members; otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report
shall be the subject matter of the next order of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate.
Evidently, the Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or
disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate whether
or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of business. At that point,
the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be released. As
the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.
Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one
Congress. As stated in Neri v. Senate, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills
and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration
of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while
the Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon
that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.
In Arnault, there have been fears that placing a limitation on the period of imprisonment
pursuant to the Senate's power of contempt would "deny to it an essential and appropriate
means for its performance." Also, in view of the limited period of imprisonment, "the Senate
would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the
contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed xxx."
The Court found that these fears are insufficient to permit an indefinite or an unspecified
period of imprisonment under the Senate's inherent power of contempt. If Congress believes
that there is a necessity to supplement its power of contempt by extending the period of
imprisonment beyond the conduct of its legislative inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of
the last session, then it can enact a law or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal of a
witness to testify or produce papers during inquiries in aid of legislation. The charge of contempt
by Congress shall be tried before the courts, where the contumacious witness will be heard. More
importantly, it shall indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which may include a fine and/or
imprisonment, and the period of imprisonment shall be specified therein. This constitutes as the
statutory power of contempt, which is different from the inherent power of contempt.
Congress' statutory power of contempt has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as
reflected in the cases of In re Chapman and Jurney v. MacCracken. Similarly, in this jurisdiction,
the statutory power of contempt of Congress was also acknowledged in Lopez. It was stated
therein that in cases that if Congress seeks to penalize a person cited in contempt beyond its
adjournment, it must institute a criminal proceeding against him. When his case is before the
courts, the culprit shall be afforded all the rights of the accused under the Constitution. He shall
have an opportunity to defend himself before he can be convicted and penalized by the State.

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 Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised Penal
Code, which penalizes the refusal of a witness to answer any legal inquiry before Congress, to
wit:
Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its
committees or subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees,
subcommittees or divisions. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from two
hundred to one thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment shall be imposed
upon any person who, having been duly summoned to attend as a witness before the
National Assembly, (Congress), its special or standing committees and subcommittees,
the Constitutional Commissions and its committees, subcommittees, or divisions, or
before any commission or committee chairman or member authorized to summon
witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse, to obey such summons, or being present before
any such legislative or constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed under
affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents,
or records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of their
functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall restrain another
from attending as a witness, or who shall induce disobedience to summon or refusal to
be sworn by any such body or official.
Verily, the said law may be another recourse for the Senate to exercise its statutory power
of contempt. The period of detention provided therein is definite and is not limited by the period
of the legislative inquiry. Of course, the enactment of a new law or the amendment of the existing
law to augment its power of contempt and to extend the period of imprisonment shall be in the
sole discretion of Congress.
Moreover, the apprehension in Arnault – that the Senate will be prevented from
effectively conducting legislative hearings during recess – shall be duly addressed because it is
expressly provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during
legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until
the termination of the legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the
Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling
even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected
because their detention shall not be indefinite.
In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry
are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during
the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be
exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to
its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness.
In addition, if the Congress decides to extend the period of imprisonment for the
contempt committed by a witness beyond the duration of the legislative inquiry, then it may file
a criminal case under the existing statute or enact a new law to increase the definite period of
imprisonment.

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Jurisprudence Team
 HON. JONATHAN A. DELA CRUZ and HON. GUSTA VO S. TAMBUNTING, as MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and as Taxpayers v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., in
his capacity as the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, in his
capacity as the SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as the SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALIA V. DE LEON, in her
capacity as the NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 219683, 23 January 2018, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Even if Jacomille focused on the legality of the procurement of the MVPSP because of the
inadequacy of the funding for the project under the 2013 GAA, the Court nonetheless determined
and declared therein that the 2014 GAA contained an appropriation for the MVPSP, and held that
the MVPSP could be validly implemented using the funds appropriated under the 2014 GAA. With
Jacomille having thus fully examined and definitively ruled upon the existence of sufficient funding
for the MVPSP, both for procurement and implementation, the pronouncement therein on the
applicability of the appropriation under the 2014 GAA for the MVPSP - a question of law now
constituted stare decisis that precluded further contention on the same matter.

FACTS
In 2013, The Land Transportation Office (LTO), the agency required to issue motor
vehicle license, formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) to
supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants.
Bidding ensued, and JKG-Power Plates was awarded as supplier for the license plates.
However, it was only after a year, in 2014, that the contract for MVPSP was signed and JKG Power
plates was instructed to deliver. The Senate Committee on Public Services, conducted an inquiry
on the reported delays and the Commission on Audit (COA) issued Notices of Disallowances on
the ground that the transaction had been irregular and illegal.
Jonathan Dela Cruz and Gusta Tambunting (collectively referred to as petitioners)
instituted a special civil action as members of the House of Representatives and as Taxpayers.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the implementation of the MVPSP using funds
appropriated under the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA), arguing that the transfer of the
appropriation for the MVPSP under the GAA 2014 and its application and implementation is
unconstitutional.

ISSUE
Was the use of appropriation under 2014 GAA for the implementation of the MVPSP
constitutional?

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Jurisprudence Team
RULING
YES. The Court ruled that there was an appropriation for the MVPSP under the 2014 GAA;
and that the use of such appropriation for the implementation of the MVPSP was constitutional.
In Jacomille v. Abaya (Jacomille), the Court, upholding the legality of the procurement of
the MVPSP, opined that whatever defects had attended its procurement were "cured" by the
appropriation for the full amount of the project under the 2014 GAA.
Even if Jacomille focused on the legality of the procurement of the MVPSP because of the
inadequacy of the funding for the project under the 2013 GAA, the Court nonetheless determined
and declared therein that the 2014 GAA contained an appropriation for the MVPSP, and held that
the MVPSP could be validly implemented using the funds appropriated under the 2014 GAA.
With Jacomille having thus fully examined and definitively ruled upon the existence of sufficient
funding for the MVPSP, both for procurement and implementation, the pronouncement therein
on the applicability of the appropriation under the 2014 GAA for the MVPSP - a question of law
– now constituted stare decisis that precluded further contention on the same matter.
The implementation of the MVPSP was properly funded under the appropriation
for Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services in the 2014 GAA; hence,
no unconstitutionally transfer of funds took place.
The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) serves as the primary
policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating, and administrative
entity of the Executive Branch of the Government in the promotion, development and regulation
of dependable and coordinated transportation networks as well as fast, safe, efficient, and
reliable transportation services. As a line agency of the DOTC, the LTO is tasked, among others,
with the registration of motor vehicles, as well as wit the preparation and issuance of motor
vehicle number plates.
Pursuant to its legal mandate, the LTO formulated and adopted the MVPSP in order to
supply new standardized license plates for all motor vehicles. LTO Memorandum Circular No.
(MC) VPT-2013-1772 outlined the underlying purposes behind the MVPSP.
In this connection, the DOTC was given the following appropriation for 2014:
Operations Personnel Maintenance Capital Total
Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenses
MFO 2: 314,981,000 4,528,397,000 375,000 4,843,753,000
Motor
Vehicle
Registration
and Driver's

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Jurisprudence Team
 Licensing
Regulatory
Services

The Court held that the appropriation for motor vehicle registration naturally and
logically included plate-making inasmuch as plate-making was an integral component of the
registration process. Plate-making ensured that the LTO fulfilled its function to "aid law
enforcement and improve the motor vehicle registration database."
The inclusion of the MVPSP in the line item for the MF02 was further explained in Details
of the FY 2014 Budget:
Operations Personnel Maintenance Capital Outlays Total
Services and
Other
Operating
Expenses
MFO 2: Motor 314,981,000 2,038,797,000 375,000 2,354,153,000
Vehicle
Registration
and Driver's
Licensing
Regulatory
Services
Motor vehicle 148,236,000 1,378,945,000 375,000 1,527,556,000
registration
system

Although the Details of the FY 2014 Budget seemed to present a discrepancy from the
main text of the 2014 GAA given that the total allotment indicated for the MF02 was only
, , , , and a separate allocation of , , , appeared for Motor vehicle
registration system, the discrepancy can be easily clarified by referring to the 2014 NEP, and
the letter of respondent former DOTC Secretary Joseph Emilio Aguinaldo Abaya.
To explain, the NEP provides the details of spending for each department and agency by
program, activity or project (PAP), and is submitted by the President to Congress along with a
budget message. Upon the submission of the NEP to Congress, the NEP morphs into the General
Appropriation Bill.
Under the 2014 NEP, the MF02 had the following proposed budget:

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Jurisprudence Team
 Operations PS MOOE CO TOTAL
by MFO
MF02: 314,981,000 2,039,297,000 375,000 2,354,653,000
Motor
vehicle
registration
and driver's
licensing
regulatory
services

The proposed budget for the MF02 stated in the 2014 NEP, which was only
, , , . , would be inadequate to fund the implementation of the MVPSP. Thus, on
September 1, 2013, respondent Secretary Abaya wrote to DBM Secretary Florencio B. Abad to
request the modification of the 2014 NEP by way of a realignment to increase the MF02 budget
by , , , . for the LTO Plate Standardization Program
The same requested increase in the LTO's 2014 budget in order to cover the MVPSP was
discussed during the hearings before the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives. Likewise, the records of the hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance
confirmed that the purpose for the increase in the LTO's 2014 budget was the implementation
of the MVPSP.
That Congress approved the request for the , , , . increase was indubitable.
This is borne out by the fact that the final amount appropriated for MF02 under the 2014 GAA
aggregated to , , , . (i.e., , , , . , , , . . We can see that
such final increased amount was almost exactly identical to the total appearing in Details of the
FY 2014 Budget. Indeed, the legislative intent to fund the MVPSP under the 2014 GAA was
manifest. The Court, in interpreting the 2014 GAA, considered the figures appearing in the main
text as controlling over the attached details. The general provisions of the 2014 GAA expressly
so provided, viz.:
Sec. 3. Details of the FY 2014 Budget. The details of the budgetary programs
and projects authorized herein, attached as Annex A (Volumes 1 and 2)
"Details of the FY 2014 Budget" shall be considered as an integral part of this
Act. Said amounts and details should be consistent with those indicated
herein. In case of discrepancy, the amounts provided herein shall be
controlling.
Considering that Congress appropriated , , , . for the MF inclusive of
the requested increase of , , , . for the purpose of funding the LTO s MVPSP, the
inescapable conclusion is that the 2014 GAA itself contained the direct appropriation necessary
to implement the MVPSP. Under the circumstances, there was no unconstitutional transfer of

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Jurisprudence Team
funds because no transfer of funds was made to augment the item Motor Vehicle Registration and
Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services to include the funding for the MVPSP.
The item Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services did not
constitute a lump-sum appropriation. Starting in 2014, the National Government adopted the
system of "Performance Informed Budgeting" in the preparation and presentation of the
National Budget.
Under the system of Performance Informed Budgeting, the PAPS are grouped or aligned
into the Major Final Outputs (MFOs). However, the groupings do not mean that there are no
longer any line-items. As explained in Belgica v. Executive Secretary, line-items under
appropriations should be "specific appropriations of money" that will enable the President to
discernibly veto the same. On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to
ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of
appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount
for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This treatment not only
allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also
ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. In Araullo v. Aquino III, the Court has
expounded the term item as the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation
law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. Accordingly,
the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a
program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class.
There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object
of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the
President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item
to which that expense category belongs to.
The petitioners' contention that the MF02 constituted a lump-sum appropriation had no
basis. The specific appropriations of money were still found under Details of the FY 2014
Budget which was attached to the 2014 GAA. They specified and contained the authorized
budgetary programs and projects under the GAA, as follows:
Operations Personnel Maintenance Capital Outlays Total
Services and Other
Operating
Expenses
MFO 2: Motor 314,981,000 2,038,797,000 375,000 2,354, 153,000
Vehicle
Registration
and Driver's
Licensing

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Jurisprudence Team
 Regulatory
Services
Motor vehicle 148,236,000 1,378,945,000 375,000 1,527,556,000
registration
system

As gleaned from the Details of the FY 2014 Budget, the MFOs constituted the expense
category or class; while the last and indivisible purpose of each program under the MFOs were
enumerated under the Details of the FY 2014 Budget. In particular, the specific purpose provided
under the MF02 was an appropriation for a Motor vehicle registration system. Such specific
purpose satisfied the requirement of a valid line-item that the President could discernibly veto.

32
Jurisprudence Team
 REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
G.R. No. 237428, 19 June 2018, EN BANC (Tijam, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the
limitation that the appointee should possess none of the disqualifications but all the qualifications
required by law. Where the law prescribes certain qualifications for a given office or position, courts
may determine whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent which, his right or
title thereto may be declared void.
Sereno s arg ment ho e er dangero sl disregards that the filing of SALN is not only a
requirement under the law, but a positive duty required from every public officer or employee, first
and foremost by the Constitution. In other words, the violation of SALN laws, by itself, defeats any
claim of integrity as it is inherently immoral to violate the will of the legislature and to violate the
Constitution.

FACTS
In May 2018, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno) was found guilty of unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Chief Justice and was subsequently disqualified. Hence, Sereno file
a motion for reconsideration.
Sereno claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard by an
impartial tribunal. She reiterates that the six Justices ought to have inhibited themselves on the
grounds of actual bias, of having personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, and of having
acted as a material witness in the matter in controversy. Respondent also argues denial of due
process when the Court supposedly took notice of extraneous matters as corroborative evidence
and when the Court based its main Decision on facts without observing the mandatory procedure
for reception of evidence.
She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an
impeachable officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be annulled absent any allegation
of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-barred; and that
respondent was and is a person of proven integrity.
The Office of the Solicitor General OSG reiterates that Sereno’s repeated failure to file
her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and her non-submission thereof to the
JBC which the latter required to prove the integrity of an applicant affect respondent's integrity.
The OSG concludes that respondent, not having possessed of proven integrity, failed to meet the
constitutional requirement for appointment to the Judiciary.

33
Jurisprudence Team
ISSUE
Should Sereno be disqualified from the position of chief justice by reason of non-
integrity?

RULING
YES. Carefully weighing the arguments advanced by both parties, this Court found no
reason to reverse its earlier Decision.
Sereno is in error for claiming denial of due process. Sereno refuses to recognize the
Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and over her person on the ground that Sereno, as a
purported impeachable official, can only be removed exclusively by impeachment. Reiterating
this argument, Sereno filed her Comment to the Petition, moved that her case be heard on Oral
Argument, filed her Memorandum, filed her Reply/Supplement to the OSG's Memorandum and
now, presently moves for reconsideration. All these representations were made ad
cautelam which, stripped of its legal parlance, simply means that she asks to be heard by the
Court which jurisdiction she does not acknowledge. She asked relief from the Court and was in
fact heard by the Court, and yet she claims to have been denied of due process. She repeatedly
discussed the supposed merits of her opposition to the present quo warranto petition in various
social and traditional media, and yet she claims denial of due process. The preposterousness of
her claim deserves scant consideration.
Sereno also harps on the alleged bias on the part of the six Justices and that supposedly,
their failure to inhibit themselves from deciding the instant petition amounts to a denial of due
process. Mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially
when the charge is without basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
has to be shown. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered sufficient justification for the
inhibition of a Member of this Court, mere suspicion is not enough. Sereno’s allegations on the
grounds for inhibition were merely based on speculations, or on distortions of the language,
context and meaning of the answers given by the concerned Justices as resource persons in the
proceedings of the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives. These matters were
squarely resolved by the Court in its main Decision, as well as in the respective separate opinions
of the Justices involved.
Indeed, the Members of the Court's right to inhibit are weighed against their duty to
adjudicate the case without fear of repression. Respondent's motion to require the inhibition of
those Justice who concurred to the main Decision, would open the floodgates to the worst kind
of forum shopping, and on its face, would allow Sereno to shop for a Member of the Court who
she perceives to be more compassionate and friendly to her cause, and is clearly antithetical to
the fair administration of justice.
The Court reaffirmed its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This
authority is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by the Constitution under Section 5,
Article VIII which states that:

34
Jurisprudence Team
 Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only to
certain public officials or that excludes impeachable officials therefrom. In Sarmiento v.
Mison, the Court ruled:
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in
the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later,
Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to
which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional
provisions themselves.
The Constitution defines judicial power as a "duty" to be performed by the courts of
justice. Thus, for the Court to repudiate its own jurisdiction over this case would be to abdicate
a constitutionally imposed responsibility.
This is not the first time the Court took cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an
impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyoand Estrada v.
Desierto, the Court assumed jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition that challenged Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the presidency.
Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result
in the ouster of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster", while
impeachment affords "removal."
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or
title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire
into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or
exercise of the office.
Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to
determine whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or
election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the
impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official from office.
The OSG's quo warranto petition challenged Sereno’s right and title to the position of
Chief Justice. He averred that in failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth
as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court,
Sereno could not be said to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every

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Jurisprudence Team
aspiring member of the Judiciary. The OSG questioned the Sereno’s eligibility for appointment as
Chief Justice and sought to invalidate such appointment. The OSG's petition, therefore, is one
for quo warranto over which the Court exercises original jurisdiction.
As the Court previously held, "where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform the duties
by the person sought to be ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action."
The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in
paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the
qualifications of the President and Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. With
this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
Sereno, however, argues that quo warranto petitions may be filed against the President
and Vice-President under the PET Rules "only because the Constitution specifically permits"
them under Section 4, Article VII. According to respondent, no counterpart provision exists in
the Constitution giving the same authority to the Court over the Chief Justice, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman. Sereno asserts that the Constitution made a
distinction between elected and appointive impeachable officials, and limited quo warranto to
elected impeachable officials. For these reasons, Sereno concludes that by constitutional design,
the Court is denied power to remove any of its members.
The Court was not convinced. The argument acknowledges that the Constitution
allows quo warranto actions against impeachable officers, albeit Sereno limits them to the
President and Vice-President. This admission refutes the very position taken by Sereno
that all impeachable officials cannot be sued through quo warranto because they belong to a
"privileged class" of officers who can be removed only through impeachment. To be
sure, Lecaroz, etc. did not distinguish between elected and appointed impeachable officers.
Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a counterpart provision to paragraph
7 of Section 4, Article VII for members of this Court or the Constitutional Commissions does not
mean that quo warranto cannot extend to non-elected impeachable officers. The authority to
hear quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable officers emanates from Section 5(1)
of Article VIII which grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without qualification as to the
class of public officers over whom the same may be exercised.
Contrary to Sereno’s claim, Section of Article VII is not meant to limit the Court's quo
warranto jurisdiction under Article VIII of the Constitution. In fact, The Court held that "[t]he
power wielded by PET is "a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to the courts of
law, expressly provided in the Constitution." Thus, the authority under Section 4 of Article VII to
hear quo warranto petitions assailing the qualifications of the President and Vice-President is
simply a component of the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under Article VIII. This finds
support in the nature of quo warranto as a remedy to determine a person's right or title to a
public office, which is not confined to claims of ineligibility but extends to other instances or
claims of usurpation or unlawful holding of public office.

36
Jurisprudence Team
 While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the
limitation that the appointee should possess none of the disqualifications but all the
qualifications required by law. Where the law prescribes certain qualifications for a given office
or position, courts may determine whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent
which, his right or title thereto may be declared void.
This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise jurisdiction over quo
warranto petitions. And as Estrada and the PET Rules show, impeachable officers are not
immune to quo warranto actions. Thus, a refusal by the Court to take cognizance of this case
would not only be a breach of its duty under the Constitution, it would also accord respondent
an exemption not given to other impeachable officers. Such privilege finds no justification either
in law, as impeachable officers are treated without distinction under the impeachment
provisions of the Constitution, or in reason, as the qualifications of the Chief Justice are no less
important than the President's or the Vice-President's.
Sereno’s insistence that she could not be removed from office except through
impeachment is predicated on Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. It reads:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a quo
warranto action questioning an impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office. These
qualifications include age, citizenship and professional experience - matters which are
manifestly outside the purview of impeachment under the above-cited provision.
Furthermore, Section 2 of Article XI cannot be read in isolation from Section 5(1) of
Article VIII of the Constitution which gives the Court its quo warranto jurisdiction, or from
Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Constitution which designates the Court as the sole
judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President.
As this Court intoned in its Decision, to take appointments of impeachable officers beyond
the reach of judicial review is to cleanse them of any possible defect pertaining to the
constitutionally prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding.
Underlying all constitutional provisions on government service is the principle that
public office is a public trust. The people, therefore, have the right to have only qualified
individuals appointed to public office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as
proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to correct a public wrong
arising from defective or void appointments. Equity, however, will not suffer a wrong to be
without remedy. It stands to reason, therefore, that quo warranto should be available to question
the validity of appointments especially of impeachable officers since they occupy the upper

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Jurisprudence Team
echelons of government and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on matters of law
and policy.
Quo warranto is not a figment of imagination or invention of this Court. It is a mandate
boldly enshrined in the Constitution where the judiciary is conferred original jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other branches of the government. Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the
constitutional remedy prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions relating to qualifications,
eligibility and entitlement to public office. US Supreme Court Justice Scalia once said: "If it is in
the Constitution, it is there. If it is not in the Constitution, it is not there." There is nothing in Our
Constitution that says that impeachable officers are immuned, exempted, or excluded from quo
warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined therein is the status of an officer as
such. No amount of public indignation can rewrite or deface the Constitution.
Sereno insists that the filing of SALNs bears no relation to the Constitutional qualification
of integrity. For her, the measure of integrity should be as what the JBC sets it to be and that in
any case, the SALN laws, being malum prohibitum, do not concern adherence to moral and ethical
principles.
Sereno’s argument, however, dangerously disregards that the filing of SALN is not only a
requirement under the law, but a positive duty required from every public officer or employee,
first and foremost by the Constitution. The SALN laws were passed in aid of the enforcement of
the Constitutional duty to submit a declaration under oath of one's assets, liabilities, and net
worth. This positive Constitutional duty of filing one's SALN is so sensitive and important that it
even shares the same category as the Constitutional duty imposed upon public officers and
employees to owe allegiance to the State and the Constitution. As such, offenses against the SALN
laws are not ordinary offenses but violations of a duty which every public officer and employee
owes to the State and the Constitution. In other words, the violation of SALN laws, by itself,
defeats any claim of integrity as it is inherently immoral to violate the will of the legislature and
to violate the Constitution.
Integrity, as what this Court has defined in the assailed Decision, in relation to a judge's
qualifications, should not be viewed separately from the institution he or she represents.
Integrity contemplates both adherence to the highest moral standards and obedience to laws
and legislations. Integrity, at its minimum, entails compliance with the law.

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Jurisprudence Team
 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 210838, 03 July 2018, EN BANC (TIJAM, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The COA's insistence that industrial peace is not a determining factor under the principles
of the SSL in fixing the compensation of DBP's employees, is correct. The grant of a wider latitude
to DBP's BOD in fixing remunerations and emoluments does not include an abrogation of the
principle that employees in the civil service "cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers
in the private sector to secure concessions from their employees." While employees of chartered
GFIs enjoy the constitutional right to bargain collectively, they may only do so for non-economic
benefits and those not fixed by law, and may not resort to acts amounting to work stoppages or
interruptions. There is no other way to view the GFPA, other than as a monetary benefit collectively
wrung by DBP's employees under threat of disruption to the bank's smooth operations.

FACTS
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government financial institution created
and operating under its own charter, was faced with labor unrest in 2003 due to its employees'
insistence that they be paid their benefits which includes Amelioration Allowance (AA), Cost of
Living Allowance (COLA) and the Bank Equity Benefit Differential Pay (BEBDP), for the year that
the Department of Budget and Management Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM CCC
No. 10) was declared ineffective by the Court for non-publication.
The employees' group and DBP arrived at an agreement to put an end to the division
causing disruptions in bank operations. DBP approved a one-time grant called the Governance
Forum Productivity Award (GFPA) to DBP's officers and employees. An audit team was
subsequently constituted to look into the legality of the GFPA and found it without legal basis
and recommended its refund.
DBP received Notice of Disallowance disallowing the grant of the GFPA. According to
COA's Legal and Adjudication Team, industrial peace may not be used as a legal and sufficient
basis in granting monetary awards. Furthermore, the GFPA partakes the nature of a compromise
agreement and circumvents the rule that only a settled claim may be a subject of compromise.
COA's Fraud Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO) upheld the disallowance. The FAIO
ruled that the power of DBP's Board to fix the remuneration and emoluments of its officials and
employees is subject to required prior presidential approval. It held that the power of DBP's BOD
to enter into a compromise agreement has no basis in law. Furthermore, the subsequent
payment of the AA was a separate matter that does not render the disallowance of the GFPA moot
and academic.

ISSUE

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 Did the COA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in disallowed the GFPA?

RULING
NO. There is no quibbling over the fact that labor unrest impelled the DBP, in the interest
of industrial peace, to grant the GFPA to its employees. In the COA's view, it was not within the
board's powers to grant a monetary award or benefit as a result of labor negotiations. The DBP,
on the other hand, points to Section 9 of its charter in arguing that its BOD was authorized to
compromise claims against it, pertinently:
Sec. 9. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall
have, among others, the following duties, powers and authority:
(e) To compromise or release, in whole or in part, any claim of or settled liability
to the Bank regardless of the amount involved, under such terms and conditions it may
impose to protect the interests of the Bank. This authority to compromise shall extend to
claims against the Bank.
Emphasizing further that its charter grants it a free hand in the fixing of compensation
and allowances of its officers and employees, DBP cites Section 13 thereof:
Sec. 13. Other Officers and Employees. -The Board of Directors shall provide for an
organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation
of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions
in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive
job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be
comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be
subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without
prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and
profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standard. The Bank
shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the
principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758, as amended).
Notably, while Sec. 13 of DBP's charter exempts it from existing laws on compensation
and position classification, it concludes by expressly stating that DBP's system of compensation
shall nonetheless conform to the principles under the SSL. From this, there is no basis to conclude
that the DBP's BOD was conferred unbridled authority to fix the salaries and allowances of its
officers and employees. The authority granted DBP to freely fix its compensation structure under
which it may grant allowances and monetary awards remains circumscribed by the SSL; it may
not entirely depart from the spirit of the guidelines therein.

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 The policy requiring prior Presidential approval upon recommendation from the
Secretary of Budget as provided in PD 1597, with respect to the grant of allowances and benefits,
was re-affirmed by the Congress in 2009 through Joint Resolution No. 4, also known as the Salary
Standardization Law III which provides that the "coverage, conditions for the grant, including the
rates of allowances, benefits, and incentives to all government employees, shall be rationalized
in accordance with the policies to be issued by the President upon recommendation of the
Department of Budget and Management." This policy mirrors MO No. 20 issued earlier in 2001,
which directed the heads of government-owned and controlled corporations, government
financial institutions (GFIs), and subsidiaries exempted from the SSL to implement pay
rationalization in all senior officer positions.
What made the GFPA granted by the DBP to its officers and employees in 2003 unique
was that it was the product of a compromise arrived at after negotiations between DBP
employees and management referred to as a governance forum. The COA considered the process
undertaken as labor negotiations.
It appears that DBP misconstrued its authority to compromise. Sec. 9 (e) of its charter
authorizes its BOD to compromise or release any claim or settled liability to or against the bank.
To interpret the provision as including contested benefits that are demanded by employees of a
chartered GFI such as the DBP is a wide stretch. To reiterate, its officers and employees'
remunerations may only be granted in the manner provided under Sec. 13 of its charter and
conformably with the SSL.
The COA's insistence that industrial peace is not a determining factor under the principles
of the SSL in fixing the compensation of DBP's employees, is correct. The grant of a wider latitude
to DBP's BOD in fixing remunerations and emoluments does not include an abrogation of the
principle that employees in the civil service "cannot use the same weapons employed by the
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employees." While employees of
chartered GFIs enjoy the constitutional right to bargain collectively, they may only do so for non-
economic benefits and those not fixed by law, and may not resort to acts amounting to work
stoppages or interruptions. There is no other way to view the GFPA, other than as a monetary
benefit collectively wrung by DBP's employees under threat of disruption to the bank's smooth
operations.
All told, the grant of GFPA was indeed an ultra vires act or beyond the authority of DBP's
BOD. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA when it disallowed the GFPA on
the basis of a compromise agreement to settle a labor dispute.
A refund of the GFPA would not be in order. The present petition is bereft of findings of
bad faith on the part of the DBP with regard to the grant of the GFPA. Even the COA argued that
the disallowance of the GFPA was a distinct matter from the legality of the AA because the
disallowance of the GFPA boiled down to the propriety of the compromise between DBP and its
employees. To remedy an ongoing labor dispute in 2003, the DBP's BOD relied in good faith on
its interpretation of statutory authority to fix the compensation structure of the bank's officials
and employees vis-a-vis its statutory power to enter into a compromise in protection of the
bank's interests. It acted under the honest belief that its charter conferred its authority to settle

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contested employees' benefits in the interest of the bank. Hence, DBP is no longer required to
refund the GFPA distributed.
It is settled that Government officials and employees who received benefits or
allowances, which were disallowed, may keep the amounts received if there is no finding of bad
faith and the disbursement was made in good faith. On the other hand, officers who participated
in the approval of the disallowed allowances or benefits are required to refund only the amounts
received when they are found to be in bad faith or grossly negligent amounting to bad faith.

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 CONGRESSMAN HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, et al. v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA et al.
HONORABLE ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., in his personal and official capacity as
Representative of the 2nd District of the Province of Bataan v.
HONORABLE (PAQUITO) N. OCHOA, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 199802 & 208488, 03 July 2018, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions exacted by the State from persons and
properties pursuant to its sovereignty in order to support the Government and to defray all the
public needs. Every tax has three elements, namely: (a) it is an enforced proportional contribution
from persons and properties; (b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and (c) it is
levied for the support of the Government. Taxes are classified into national and local. National taxes
are those levied by the National Government, while local taxes are those levied by the LGUs.
In view of the foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes,
Section 284 has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national
taxes, like the customs duties.

FACTS
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code (LGC), in order to guarantee the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs. The LGC provides that the
LGUs shall have a share in the national taxes.
The share of the LGUs, heretofore known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has
been regularly released to the LGUs. According to the implementing rules and regulations of the
LGC, the IRA is determined on the basis of the actual collections of the National Internal Revenue
Taxes (NIRTs) as certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Mandanas, et al. allege that certain collections of National Internal Revenue Taxs by the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) - specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs) and documentary
stamp taxes (DSTs) - have not been included in the base amounts for the computation of the IRA;
that such taxes should form part of the base from which the IRA should be computed because
they constituted NIRTs; that, consequently, the release of the additional amount of
, , , . to the LGUs as their IRA for FY should be ordered; and that for the
same reason the LGUs should also be released their unpaid IRA for FY 1992 to FY 2011, inclusive,
totaling , , , . 3. Congressman Enrique Garcia, Jr. seeks to compel the computation
of the just share of the LGUs on the basis of all national taxes. His petition insists on a literal
reading of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. He avers that the insertion by Congress
of the words internal revenue in the phrase national taxes found in the LGC caused the
diminution of the base for determining the just share of the LGUs, and should be declared
unconstitutional; that, moreover, the exclusion of certain taxes and accounts pursuant to or in
accordance with special laws was similarly constitutionally untenable; that the VA Ts and excise

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taxes collected by the BOC should be included in the computation of the IRA; and that the
respondents should compute the IRA on the basis of all national tax collections, and thereafter
distribute any shortfall to the LGUs.

ISSUE
Were the existing shares given to the LGUs by virtue of the GAA consistent with the
constitutional mandate to give LGUs a 'just share" to national taxes?

RULING
NO. Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution textually commands the allocation to the
LGUs of a just share in the national taxes.
Section 6, when parsed, embodies three mandates, namely: (1) the LGUs shall have a just
share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just
share shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
Congress has sought to carry out the second mandate of Section 6 by enacting Section
284, Title III (Shares of Local Government Units in the Proceeds of National Taxes), of the LGC.
The Court agreed with Garcia’s contention that Congress has exceeded its constitutional
boundary by limiting to the NIRTs the base from which to compute the just share of the LGUs.
Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional lawmaking
remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase national internal
revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national
taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987
Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU
comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a
statute there should be no departure). Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby
curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.
Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions exacted by the State from persons and
properties pursuant to its sovereignty in order to support the Government and to defray all the
public needs. Every tax has three elements, namely: (a) it is an enforced proportional
contribution from persons and properties; (b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty; and (c) it is levied for the support of the Government. Taxes are classified into
national and local. National taxes are those levied by the National Government, while local taxes
are those levied by the LGUs.
What the phrase national internal revenue taxes as used in Section 284 included are all
the taxes enumerated in Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended
by R.A. No. 8424, viz.:
Section 21. Sources of Revenue. - The following taxes, fees and charges are
deemed to be national internal revenue taxes:

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 (a) Income tax;
(b) Estate and donor's taxes;
(c) Value-added tax;
(d) Other percentage taxes;
(e) Excise taxes;
(f) Documentary stan1p taxes; and
(g) Such other taxes as arc or hereafter may be imposed and collected by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In view of the foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes,
Section 284 has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national
taxes, like the customs duties.
Strictly speaking, customs duties are also taxes because they are exactions whose
proceeds become public funds. According to Garcia v. Executive Secretary, customs duties is the
nomenclature given to taxes imposed on the importation and exportation of commodities and
merchandise to or from a foreign country. Although customs duties have either or both the
generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving purposes,
it is often difficult to say which of the two is the principal objective in a particular instance, for,
verily, customs duties, much like internal revenue taxes, are rarely designed to achieve only one
policy objective. We further note that Section 102(00) of R.A. No. 10863 (Customs Modernization
and Tariff Act) expressly includes all fees and charges imposed under the Act under the blanket
term of taxes.
It is clear from the foregoing clarification that the exclusion of other national taxes like
customs duties from the base for determining the just share of the LGUs contravened the express
constitutional edict in Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution.

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 REY NATHANIEL C. IFURUNG v. HON. CONCHITA C. CARPIO MORALES IN HER CAPACITY
AS THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. MELCHOR ARTHUR H. CARANDANG, HON. GERARD ABETO
MOSQUERA, HON. PAUL ELMER M. CLEMENTE, HON. RODOLFO M. ELMAN, HON. CYRIL
ENGUERRA RAMOS IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS DEPUTIES OMBUDSMAN, AND THE OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 232131, 24 April 2018, EN BANC (Martires, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The intent of the framers of the Constitution in qualifying that the salary and rank of the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same as that of the chairman and the members of the
constitutional commissions, was for the purpose of having a government classification as to salary
and a point of reference as to rank.

The regular rotation or cycle that is explicitly provided in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution
and inherently unique to the constitutional commissions is an argument that works heavily against
the position of Ifurung that the limitations on the term of office of these commissions equally apply
to the Ombudsman and his deputies.

FACTS

Rey Nathaniel C. Ifurung (Ifurung), who claims to be a taxpayer, a concerned Filipino

citizen, and a member of the Bar, invokes the jurisprudence laid down by the Court in Funa v.
Villar, in asserting that he has locus standi to file the instant petition. He avers that he is seeking
the correction of a recurring statutory wrong and a declaration from the Court that the positions
held by the respondents are vacant. Respondents are the incumbent officials of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Ifurung alleges that Sec. 8(3), in relation to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides that in
case of a vacancy at the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or
permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman and his deputies, the newly appointed
Ombudsman and his deputies shall be appointed to a full term of seven years, is constitutionally
infirm as it contravenes Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8 and 10 of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
He avers that like all constitutionally created positions, i.e., President, Vice-President, Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives and Members of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the Commission on
Audit (COA), the successor to the positions of the Ombudsman and deputies should serve only
the unexpired term of the predecessor. Hence, petitioner insists that the incumbent Ombudsman
and deputies have been overstaying in their present positions for more than two years
considering that their terms have expired on 1 February 2015.

ISSUE
Is Section 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 11 in
relation to Sections 8 and 10, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine constitution and applicable
jurisprudence?

RULING

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 NO. Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is not unconstitutional.

Ifurung anchors his challenge on the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 in the
belief that because the Ombudsman and the deputies have the same rank and salary as the
chairman and the members of the constitutional commissions, their term of office, following the
Court's disquisition in Gaminde, shall always be seven years counted from 2 February 1987 and
seven years thereafter, and not the full term of seven years.

It must be stressed that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission.
Sec. 1, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution specifically enumerates the independent constitutional
commissions in the Philippines, viz: the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA.

A commission is defined as "a board or committee officially appointed and empowered

to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or relation."

In contrast, the present Office of the Ombudsman, albeit composed of the Ombudsman to
be known as Tanodbayan, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, the Deputy for the Visayas,
the Deputy for Mindanao, the Deputy for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Office (MOLEO), and the Special Prosecutor, is not a collegial body. The Ombudsman and the
deputies do not resolve cases by a majority of all its members but rather are confined within the
sphere of their respective jurisdiction, i.e., the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, for cases involving
public officials and employees assigned in Luzon; the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, for those
assigned in Visayas; the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, for those assigned in Mindanao; the
Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO, for those assigned in the military and the police; and the Special
Prosecutor, in the conduct preliminary investigation and prosecution of criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Overall Deputy, on the one hand, oversees and
administers the operations of the different offices under the Office of Ombudsman while the
Ombudsman is the final approving authority on the disposition of cases before the sectoral
offices, i.e., Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, MOLEO, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution in qualifying that the salary and rank of the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same as that of the chairman and the members of the
constitutional commissions, was for the purpose of having a government classification as to
salary and a point of reference as to rank.

The words "salary" and "rank" were utilized by the framers in their ordinary and common
usage. The word "salary" is defined as "a reward or recompense for services performed. In a
more limited sense, a fixed periodical compensation paid for services rendered." The word
"rank," on the other hand, "is often used to express something different from office. It then
becomes a designation or title of honor, dignity or distinction conferred upon an officer in order
to fix his relative position in reference to other officers in matters of privilege, precedence, and
sometimes of command, or by which to determine his pay and emoluments." From these
definitions, it is obvious that neither the words "salary" nor "rank" even remotely includes the
"term of office," which is the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right,
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.

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 It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that the words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident
that the legislature, or in this case the framers of the fundamental law, intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. It is presumed that
the framers and the people meant what they said when they said it, and that this understanding
was reflected in the Constitution and understood by the people in the way it was meant to be
understood when the fundamental law was ordained and promulgated. Index animi sermo or
"speech is the index of intention" and verba legis non est recedendum or "from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."

It must be underscored that the framers of the Constitution in Sec. 10, Art. XI limited
to rank and salary the similarity between the Ombudsman and the deputies on one hand, and the
chairman and the members of the constitutional commission on the other. Applying the basic
precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, it is beyond cavil that pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. XI, it is only with reference to "salary" and
"rank" that the Ombudsman and his deputies should be similar to the chairman and the members
of the constitutional commission. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an
end to what is implied.

The regular rotation or cycle that is explicitly provided in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution
and inherently unique to the constitutional commissions is an argument that works heavily
against the position of Ifurung that the limitations on the term of office of these commissions
equally apply to the Ombudsman and his deputies.

In Republic v. Imperial, the Court held that this particular provision of the 1935
Constitution, when taken together with the prescribed term of office for nine years without
reappointment, evidences a deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership
of the COMELEC, by having subsequent members appointable only once every three years. With
these periods it was the intention to have one position vacant every three years, so that no
President can appoint more than one commissioner, thereby preserving and safeguarding the
independence and impartiality of the Commission as a body, we may add, for the impartiality
and independence of each individual commissioner's tenure was safeguarded by other
provisions in the same Article X of the fundamental charter. Moreover, the rotation of the
commissioners' appointments at regular and fixed intervals of three years was a deliberate plan,
was shown by the history of the provision and by selection of the fixed term of nine years for all
subsequent appointees, since no other term would give such a result.

The of the Constitution is clear and explicit:

(a) the Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve the term of seven years;

(b) that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not be reappointed; and

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 (c) the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

Contrary to the position of the petitioner, Sec. 11, Art. XI by itself is clear and can stand
on its own. Notably, the framers plainly provided for a seven-year term of the Ombudsman and
the deputies. For sure, nowhere in the Constitution can it be gathered that the appointment to
any vacancy for the position of Ombudsman and the deputies shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor. This can only mean that it was the intent of the framers that the
appointment to the positions of the Ombudsman and the deputies, whether it be for the expired
or unexpired term of the predecessor, shall always be for a full term of seven years. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the
law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Where the law is free from ambiguity,
the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions where none is provided from
considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may it
engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated.

More importantly, it can be easily deduced from the decrees issued by President Marcos
preceding the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution that the
appointment of the Tanodbayan and the deputies shall be for a full term of seven
years regardless of the reason for the vacancy in the position.

The Court was not persuaded with Ifurung’s assertion that in case of a vacancy for
reasons other than the expiration of the term in the other constitutionally created offices, the
successor shall serve for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In an attempt to fortify his
assertion, he cites the term of the Office of the President, the Vice-President, the Senators, and
the Members of the House of Representatives.

Ifurung failed to consider that there are other offices created under the 1987 Constitution
where the successor is not limited to hold office for the unexpired term of the predecessor.

It is a legal teaching that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed
by the fundamental law. And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the
Constitution, it is the judiciary's solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same. The Court has
punctiliously reviewed the 1987 Constitution and its jurisprudential declarations but found
nothing that would at the very least tenuously support the argument of the petitioner that Sec.
8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is unconstitutional.

Pertinent to Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is only as to the rank and salary
that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same with the chairman and members,
respectively, of the constitutional commissions.

Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in
any vacancy for the positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a result of the
expiration of the term or death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor,
the successor shall always be appointed for a full term of seven years.

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 Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year
term of office of the first appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned from 2
February 1987, but shall be reckoned from their date of appointment. Accordingly, the present
Ombudsman and deputies shall serve a full term of seven years from their date of appointment
unless their term is cut short by death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability.

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 ERIC F. ACOSTA AND NATHANIEL G. DELA PAZ v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et al.
G.R. No. 211559, 211567, 212570, 215634, 15 October 2019, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the ownership or possession of a

firearm a property right. Persons intending to use a firearm can only either accept or decline the
go ernment s term for its se

The grant of license, however, is without prejudice to the inviolability of the home. The right
of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures remains paramount, and the government,
in the guise of regulation, cannot conduct inspections of applicants for firearm licenses unless
armed with a search warrant.

FACTS
Licensed firearm owners Eric F. Acosta (Acosta) and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz (Dela Paz) filed
before the Supreme Court (SC) a Petition for Prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of

a) Sections 4(g), 10, 26 and 39(a), all of Republic Act No. 10591;
b) Sections 4.4(a), 4.10(b), 7.3, 7.9, 7.11.2(b), 10.3, 26.3, 26.4, and 39(1)(a) of the
2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations; and
c) the requirement of signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for
Inspection in the pro forma application form for firearm registration,

for violating Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

On the same day, Peaceful Responsible Owners of Guns, Inc. (PROGUN), a registered
nonstock, nonprofit corporation that aims to represent the interests of legitimate and licensed
gun owners in the Philippines, filed its own Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction, questioning the requirement for applicants for a firearm license to waive their right
to privacy and allow the police to enter their dwellings, in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Guns and Ammo Dealers Association of the Philippines (Guns and Ammo Dealers),
allegedly “an umbrella organization of about members who are authorized firearms dealers
in the Philippines,” also filed its Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari. All cases were later
consolidated.

In the main, petitioners argue that Republic Act No. 10591 and its Implementing Rules
and regulations unduly restrict their right to bear arms, their right to property, and their right to
privacy. The government, through the Philippine National Police, counters that the keeping and
bearing of arms is a mere privilege, not a right. Thus, whoever seeks to obtain a firearm license
has to either accept or decline the government’s term for the use and possession of the firearm.

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ISSUES

(1) Does signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection violate Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution on the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures?

(2) Is the requirement of a license to own and operate a firearm a violation of petitioner’s
right to bear arms?

RULING

(1) YES. The inspection requirement under Republic Act No. 10951, as interpreted by the
Philippine National Police in the Implementing Rules, cannot be considered a reasonable search.
What constitutes a “reasonable search” depends on whether a person has an “expectation of
privacy”, which society regards as reasonable. The presence of this expectation of privacy and
society’s perception of it as reasonable render the State’s intrusion a “search” within the meaning
of Article III, Section 2, and which intrusion thus requires a search warrant. There is a legitimate,
almost absolute, expectation of privacy in one’s residence. Further, signing the Consent of
Voluntary Presentation for Inspection would allegedly be an invalid waiver, as it is not given
freely, voluntarily, and knowingly by the applicant who would just sing it, lest the application not
be approved.

(2) NO. The bearing of arms in our jurisdiction was, and still is, a mere statutory privilege,
heavily regulated by the State. None of our Constitutions ever provided the right to bear arms.
The bearing of arms was considered a mere option, and a citizen then desiring to obtain a firearm
“must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose.” At present, the bearing of
arms remains a “mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right.”

With the bearing of arms being a mere privilege granted by the State, there could not have
been a deprivation of petitioners’ right to due process in requiring a license for the possession
of firearms. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution is clear that only life, liberty, or property is
protected by the due process clause. It is settled that the license to possess a firearm is not
property. Like any other license, the license to possess a firearm is “neither a property nor a
property right.” As a mere “permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,” it does
not act as “a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted.”

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 REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, et al.
G.R. No. 243522, 19 February 2019, EN BANC (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit the period for which it can
extend the same.

FACTS
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days. Both Houses expressed their full support
to the Proclamation, under the Senate P.S. Resolution No. 388 and House Resolution No. 1050,
finding no cause to revoke the same. In a Decision dated July 4, 2017, the Court in Representative
Edcel C. Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Salvador C. Medialdea, et al., found sufficient factual bases for the
issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and declared it constitutional
On July 18, 2017, the President requested Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, which extended Proclamation No. 216 until December 31,
2017.
In a letter dated December 8, 2017, the President again asked both the Senate and the
House of Representatives to extend the Proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018
to December 31, 2018.In a Decision dated February 6, 2018, this Court in Representative Edcel C.
Lagman, et al. v. Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, et al.,found sufficient factual bases for the
second extension of the Proclamation from January 1 to December 31, 2018, and declared it
constitutional.
Before the expiration of the second extension of Proclamation No. 216 or on December 4,
2018, Secretary Lorenzana in a letter to the President, recommended the third extension of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1, 2019 up to December 31, 2019. Likewise, the AFP Chief
of Staff General Carolito G. Galvez, Jr. and Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Director-
General Oscar D. Albayalde recommended the further extension of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year
beginning January 1, 2019 up to December 31, 2019, based on current security assessment for
the total eradication of the Local Terrorist Groups (LTG), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Bangsamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Daulah Islamiyah (DI), and other lawless armed groups and the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army Terrorists (CNTs), their foreign and
local allies, supporters, financiers, in order to fully contain the continuing rebellion in Mindanao.
Acting on these recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 6, 2018 to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, requested for the third extension of Proclamation No.

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216 from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019. The President cited the following essential facts
to extend the proclamation:
(a) The Abu Sayyaf Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Daulah Islamiyah
(DI), and other terrorist groups (collectively labeled as LTG) which seek to promote global
rebellion, continue to defy the government by perpetrating hostile activities during the
extended period of Martial Law. At least four (4) bombings/ Improvised Explosive Device
(IED) explosions had been cited in the AFP report.

(b) The DI forces continue to pursue their rebellion against the government by
furthering the conduct of their radicalization activities, and continuing to recruit new
members, especially in vulnerable Muslim communities.

(c) While the government was preoccupied in addressing the challenges posed by
said groups, the CTG, which has publicly declared its intention to seize political power
through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with
Communist rule, took advantage and likewise posed serious security concerns

(d) Abu Sayyaf Group factions in Sulu continue to pursue kidnap for ransom activities
to finance their operations

On December 12, 2018, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session,
adopted Resolution No. 6, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao for another period of one (1) year from
January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019."
Lagman, et al. argues that there no longer exist sufficient factual basis for the extension
of martial law in Mindanao because no actual rebellion persists in Mindanao. Further,
Proclamation No. 216 has become functus officio and the extension is no longer necessary,
considering the deaths of the leaders of the ASG and the Maute brothers, and the cessation of
combat operations and the liberation of Marawi City. They further aver that the third extension
violates the constitutional proscription against a long duration of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.The constitutional limitations on the period of
martial law must be for a short or limited duration, which must not exceed sixty (60) days, and
should the third extension be granted, the martial law regime would have lasted 951 days.

ISSUES
(1) Whether there exists sufficient factual basis for the extension of martial law in
Mindanao

(2) Whether the Constitution limits the number of extensions and the duration for
which Congress can extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

(3) Whether Proclamation No. 216 has become functus officio with the cessation of
Marawi siege that it may no longer be extended.

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 (4) Whether how Congress approved the extension of martial law is a political
question and is not reviewable by the Court.

RULING
(1) YES. The sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law in Mindanao
must be determined from the facts and information contained in the President's request,
supported by reports submitted by his alter egos to Congress. These are the bases upon which
Congress granted the extension. The Court cannot expect exactitude and preciseness of the facts
and information stated in these reports, as the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency and
reasonableness thereof. While there may be inadequacies in some of the facts, i.e., facts which
are not fully explained in the reports, these are not reasons enough for the Court to invalidate
the extension as long as there are other related and relevant circumstances that support the
finding that rebellion persists, and public safety requires it.

The Court need not make an independent determination of the factual basis for the
proclamation or extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court is not a fact-finding body required to decide of the correctness of the factual
basis for the declaration or extension of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
It would be impossible for the Court to go on the ground to conduct an independent investigation
or factual inquiry, since it is not equipped with resources comparable to that of the Commander-
in-Chief to ably and properly assess the ground conditions.

Thus, in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law,
the Court needs only to assess and evaluate the written reports of the government agencies
tasked in enforcing and implementing martial law in Mindanao.

In finding sufficiency of the factual basis for the third extension, the Court gives due
regard to the military and police reports which are not palpably false, contrived and untrue;
consider the full complement or totality of the reports submitted, and not make a piecemeal or
individual appreciation of the facts and the incidents reported. The President's decision to
extend the declaration and the suspension of the Writ, when it goes through the review of the
Legislative branch, must be accorded a weightier and more consequential basis. Under these
circumstances, the President's decision or judgment call is affirmed by the representatives of the
People.

Essential to the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is rebellion defined under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. And it was
emphasized in Lagman v. Medialdea that: It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of
rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government;" and that by nature, "rebellion is
x x x a crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori,
within predetermined bounds." We understand this to mean that the precise extent or range of
the rebellion could not be measured by exact metes and bounds.

Rebellion, within the context of the situation in Mindanao, encompasses no definite time
nor particular locality of actual war and continues even when actual fighting has ceased.
Therefore, it is not restricted as to the time and locality of actual war nor does it end when actual

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fighting has ended. The state of rebellion results from the commission of a series or combination
of acts and events, past, present and future, primarily motivated by ethnic, religious, political or
class divisions which incites violence, disturbs peace and order, and poses serious threat to the
security of the nation. The ultimate objective of the malefactors is to seize power from the
government, and specifically "for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of
land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives."

(2) NO. The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit the period for
which it can extend the same.

This Court in the case of Lagman v. Medialdea explained the only limitations to the
exercise of congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension:

a) the extension should be upon the President's initiative;

b) it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands
of public safety; and

c) it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition
of any citizen.

The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on Congress to determine the duration of
the extension.

The Constitutional limits/checks set by the Constitution to guard against the whimsical
or arbitrary use of the extra ordinary powers of the Chief Executive under Section 18, Article VII
are well in place and are working. At the initial declaration of the martial law, the President
observed the 60-day limit and the requirement to report to Congress. In this initial declaration
as well as in the extensions, the President's decision was based on the reports prepared by the
different specialized agencies of the Executive branch charged with external and internal
security of the whole country. These were the same reports submitted to Congress which were
deliberated on, no matter how brief the time allotment was for each of the law makers'
interpellations. Yet the evidence or basis to support the extension of martial law passed through
the scrutiny of the Chief Executive and through several more of the House of Representatives
and the Senate. The Court must remember that We are called upon to rule on whether the
President, and this time with the concurrence of the two Houses of Congress, acted with
sufficient basis in approving anew the extension of martial law. We must not fall into or be
tempted to substitute Our own judgment to that of the People's President and the People's
representatives.

(3) NO. Proclamation No. 216 has not become functus officio with the cessation of the
Marawi siege.

While Proclamation No. 216 specifically cited the attack of the Maute group in Marawi
City as basis for the declaration of martial law, rebellion was not necessarily ended by the

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cessation of the Marawi siege. Rebellion in Mindanao continues, as shown by the violent
incidents stated in reports to the President and was made basis by the Congress in approving the
third extension of martial law. These violent incidents continuously pose a serious threat to
security and the peace and order situation in Mindanao.

Martial law in Mindanao should not be confined to the Marawi siege. Despite the death of
Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have continued to rebuild their
organization through the recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry on the
rebellion. Clashes between rebels and government forces continue to take place in other parts of
Mindanao. Kidnapping, arson, robbery, bombings, murder - crimes which are absorbed in
rebellion - continue to take place therein. These crimes are part and parcel of the continuing
rebellion in Mindanao.

(4) YES. The manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question that is not
reviewable by the Court.

In the case of Lagman v. Pimentel III, it was held that:

No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress the right
to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings, to wit:

Section 16. (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days In Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole, this
constitutionally-vested authority is recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority
to each House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules.
As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and
interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
power as will constitute a denial of due process.

In other words, the Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the
absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted rules
of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution.

Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules,
the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, et al.
explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of
quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there must be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained.

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 ANG NARS PARTY-LIST et al. v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.
G.R. No. 215746, 08 October 2019, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

After a review of compensation rates under R.A. No. 6758, any change in compensation rates
should be done by enacting a new law. Any such change amends an existing law, and such
amendment cannot be done by a mere joint resolution because a joint resolution cannot amend a
law. Joint Resolution No. 4 which seeks to change or revise the Compensation and Position
Classification System established by existing law, cannot take effect without an amendatory law.
The revisions prescribed in Joint Resolution No. 4 are not authorized by any existing law.

As to the salary grade of nurses, R.A. No. 9173 provided for the new salary grade of nurses,
starting at salary grade 15 as the minimum. R.A. No. 9173 cannot be amended by a mere resolution.
An implementing resolution, like Joint Resolution No. 4, not being a separate law itself, cannot
amend prior laws. Such implementing resolution can only implement the Salary Standardization
Law, not repeal its enabling law or prior laws.

FACTS

On October 21, 2002, R.A. No. 9173 was approved, Section 32 of which provides that the
minimum base pay of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not be lower than
salary grade as prescribed under R.A. No. , otherwise known as the “Compensation and
Classification Act of ”.

Joint Resolution No. was approved, authorizing the President of the Philippines “to
modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base
Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and For Other Purposes.”
Thereafter, Executive Order (EO) No. 811 was signed to implement the Resolution, Section 6 of
which provides that the position titles and salary grade assignments of the entry levels of Nurse
I is modified from 10 to 11.

Rep. Paquiz wrote a letter to then Secretary Enrique T. Ona (Secretary Ona) of the
Department of Health (DOH) and to then Secretary Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) inquiring about the non-implementation of
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 mandating that the salary base pay for nurses shall be Salary Grade
15.

Finding the replies unsatisfactory, Ang Nars filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the validity of Section 6 of EO 811, with prayer for the Court to compel the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Budget and Management, and the Secretary of Health to implement
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173, otherwise known as the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002.

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ISSUE

Did the Joint Resolution No. 4 (Series of 2009) of the Senate and the House of
Representatives amend Section 32 of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002?

RULING

NO. The Senate's definition of a joint resolution states that it is no different from a bill.
However, under Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only a bill can be enacted into
law after following certain requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution. A joint
resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact the joint resolution into a law even if it
follows the requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution for enacting a bill into a law.

In any event, neither the Rules of the Senate nor the Rules of the House of Representatives
can amend the Constitution which recognizes that only a bill can become a law.

A bill is vastly different from a joint resolution. First, a bill to be approved by Congress
must pass three (3) readings on separate days. There can be no deviation from this requirement,
unless the President certifies the bill as urgent. In contrast, Congress can approve a joint
resolution in one, two or three readings, on the same day or on separate days, depending on the
rules of procedure that the Senate or the House may, at their sole discretion, adopt.

Second, the Constitution requires that before a bill is approved, printed copies of the bill
in its final form must be distributed to Members of the Senate and House three days before its
passage. There can be no deviation from this requirement, unless the President certifies the bill
as urgent. In contrast, a joint resolution can be approved on the same day, or several days after,
the final printed copies are distributed to Members of the Senate and the House, depending on
the rules of procedure that the Senate or the House may, at their sole discretion, adopt.

Third, a bill approved by Congress must be presented to the President for his signature
or veto. There can be no deviation from this. In contrast, a joint resolution approved by Congress
does not require the President's signature or veto, unless the Senate or the House, in their
respective rules of procedure, at their sole discretion, requires such presentation to the
President.

Fourth, upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment is allowed, and voting on the bill
shall immediately be taken. There can be no deviation from this requirement. In contrast, there
is no such requirement in approving a joint resolution, unless the Senate and the House, at their
sole discretion, adopt such requirement.

Fifth, the procedure in enacting a bill into law is permanently fixed as prescribed by the
Constitution and cannot be amended by any act of Congress. In contrast, the procedure for

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passing a joint resolution is adopted separately by the Senate and the House, and can be changed
at any time by the Senate or the House, respectively.

After a review of compensation rates under R.A. No. 6758, any change in compensation
rates should be done by enacting a new law. Any such change amends an existing law, and such
amendment cannot be done by a mere joint resolution because a joint resolution cannot amend
a law.

Joint Resolution No. 4 which seeks to change or revise the Compensation and Position
Classification System established by existing law, cannot take effect without an amendatory law.
The revisions prescribed in Joint Resolution No. 4 are not authorized by any existing law.

As to the salary grade of nurses, R.A. No. 9173 provided for the new salary grade of
nurses, starting at salary grade 15 as the minimum. R.A. No. 9173 cannot be amended by a mere
resolution.

An implementing resolution, like Joint Resolution No. 4, not being a separate law itself,
cannot amend prior laws. Such implementing resolution can only implement the Salary
Standardization Law, not repeal its enabling law or prior laws. Joint Resolution No. 4 can only
recommend to the President in accordance with the authority given to the DBM under R.A. No.
6758.

Thus, the amendatory language in paragraph 16 of Joint Resolution No. 4 cannot revise
the salary grades in the Salary Standardization Law or in any other law like R.A. No. 9173. The
amendatory language in said paragraph 16 can only amend prior congressional resolutions
inconsistent with Joint Resolution No. 4.

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 LEILA M DE LIMA v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE
G.R. No. 227635, 15 October 2019, EN BANC (Bersamin, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the 1981
constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our version of presidential immunity
unique. Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided for immunity at two
distinct points in time: the first sentence of the provision related to immunity during the tenure of
the President, and the second provided for immunity thereafter. At this juncture, we need only
concern ourselves with immunity during the President's tenure, as this case involves the incumbent
President. As the framers of our Constitution understood it, which view has been upheld by relevant
jurisprudence, the President is immune from suit during his tenure.
Accordingly, the concept is clear and allows no qualifications or restrictions that the
President cannot be sued while holding such office.

FACTS

Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte (Duterte) was elected as the 16th President of the
Philippines. A key agenda of the Duterte Administration was the relentless national crackdown
on illegal drugs. This prompted several human rights advocates to heavily criticize the strategies
and devices forthwith adopted by law enforcement agencies in pursuing the crackdown. Among
the vocal critics of the crackdown was Sen. Leila De Lima (De Lima).

Sen. De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate calling a stop to the
alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the crackdown, and urging her
colleagues in the Senate to conduct investigations of the alleged victims.

In response, President Duterte issued a number of public statements against Sen. De

Lima, including denunciations of her corruption and immorality. The statements prompted her
to initiate this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against President Duterte.

Sen. De Lima traces this personal presidential animosity towards her to the time when
she first encountered President Duterte while he was still the City Mayor of Davao and she the
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights investigating the existence of the so-called
"Davao Death Squad".

Sen. De Lima concludes that taking all the public statements of the President into
consideration the issuance of the writ of habeas data is warranted because there was a violation
of her rights to privacy, life, liberty, and security, and there is a continuous threat to violate her
said rights in view of President Duterte's declaration that he had been "listening to them, with
the help of another country."

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 Also, the petition argues that President Duterte is not entitled to immunity from suit,
especially from the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data because his actions and
statements were unlawful or made outside of his official conduct.

ISSUE
May the incumbent Chief Executive be held liable to the court even for the limited
purpose under the Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data?

RULING

NO. The petition must be dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of
immunity from suit.
A careful study of the development of the doctrine of Presidential immunity from suit
shows that the presidential immunity from suit as recognized and applied in the USA differs from
the doctrine recognized in this jurisdiction.
The existence of the immunity under the 1987 Constitution was directly challenged in
Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, but the Court steadfastly held that Presidential immunity from
suit remained preserved in our current system.
While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the
1981 constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our version of presidential
immunity unique. Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided for
immunity at two distinct points in time: the first sentence of the provision related to immunity
during the tenure of the President, and the second provided for immunity thereafter. At this
juncture, we need only concern ourselves with immunity during the President's tenure, as this
case involves the incumbent President. As the framers of our Constitution understood it, which
view has been upheld by relevant jurisprudence, the President is immune from suit during his
tenure.
Unlike its American counterpart, the concept of presidential immunity under our
governmental and constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to
an official act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. The lack
of distinctions prevents us from making any distinctions. The Court should still be guided by our
precedents. Accordingly, the concept is clear and allows no qualifications or restrictions that the
President cannot be sued while holding such office.
Sen. De Lima maintains that presidential immunity does not lie because President
Duterte's attacks against her are not part of his official duties and functions; that before
presidential immunity applies, there must first be a balancing of interest; and that the balancing
favors her because her right to be protected from harassment far outweighs the dangers of
intrusion on the Office of Chief Executive.
Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the
President. The immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it
applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions as
President. Furthermore, no balancing of interest has ever been applied to Presidential immunity
under our jurisprudence.

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 Finally, Sen. De Lima asserts that for every right violated, there must be a remedy. No
one can dispute the validity of her assertion. We agree with her, but at the same time we must
remind her that this ruling will not deny her any available remedy. Indeed, the Constitution
provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except an ordinary suit before
the courts. The Chief Executive must first be allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either
through resignation or removal by impeachment. Being a Member of Congress, the petitioner is
well aware of this, and she cannot sincerely claim that she is bereft of any remedy.
The Court dismisses the petition for the writ of habeas data on the ground that
respondent Rodrigo Roa Duterte as the incumbent President of the Philippines is immune from
suit during his incumbency.

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 MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF DENR
G.R. Nos. 202897, 206823 & 207969, 06 August 2019, EN BANC (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Water is not a mere commodity for sale and consumption but a natural asset to be protected
and conserved. Sanitation is its corollary constant, as a poor state of sewerage systems is one of the
pillars of people's miseries. We have a collective responsibility to preserve water resources and
improve sanitation facilities for future generations.

In all, nothing in Sections 7 and 8 of the Clean Water Act or its IRR115 states or, at the very
least, implies that the former is a condition precedent of the latter. From the foregoing, it is
apparent that the obligation imposed on MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water by Section 8, as
implemented by Rule 8 of DAO No. 05-10, to connect the existing sewerage lines is mandatory and
unconditional. After the expiration of the five-year compliance period, the obligatory force of
Section 8 becomes immediate and can be enforced against MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water
without subordination to the happening of a future and uncertain event.

FACTS

The Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Environmental Management Bureau-Region III (EMB-RIII) filed a complaint before the DENR's
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) charging MWSS and its concessionaires, Maynilad and
Manila Water, with failure to provide, install, operate, and maintain adequate Wastewater
Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in the degraded quality and
beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water leading to Manila Bay, and which has directly
forestalled the DENR's mandate to implement the operational plan for the rehabilitation and
restoration of Manila Bay and its river tributaries.

Likewise, the Regional Directors of the DENR EMB National Capital Region (NCR) and
Region VI-A (RVI-A) instituted their complaints before the PAB. They similarly charged MWSS,
Maynilad, and Manila Water with failure to (a) provide, install, or maintain sufficient WWTFs
compliant with the standards and objectives of the Clean Water Act; (b) construct Sewage
Treatment Plants and Sewerage Treatment Facilities (STPs & STFs) for treatment of household
wastes; and, ultimately, (c) perform its obligations under the said law. According to the EMB-
NCR and EMB-RVI-A, the test results of water samples taken from Manila Bay showed that the
quality of water near the area has worsened without improvement in all parameters.

The SENR issued a Notice of Violation (NOV). The NOV determined MWSS, Maynilad and
Manila Water's violation of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, in that they have not provided,
installed, or maintained sufficient WWTFs and sewerage connections satisfactory enough in
quantity to meet the standards and objectives of the law, notwithstanding court orders and the
lapse of the five-year period provided by the Clean Water Act.

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 After the requisite technical conference before the PAB, MWSS, Maynilad and Manila
Water submitted their respective answers to the charges. MWSS led the defense and averred that
they were compliant with the law. Maynilad and Manila Water also asserted the supremacy of
the Concession Agreements executed with MWSS containing service targets for water supply,
sewerage, and sanitation within specific milestone periods spread over the twenty-five year
concession period. They sought refuge under Section 7 of the Clean Water Act which first
requires the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to prepare and effect a national
program on sewerage and septage management to guide the MWSS and/or its concessionaries
in implementing the law. They also claimed other factors contributing to the continued pollution
of Manila Bay and its river tributaries. They likewise put forth their respective proposals, on-
going projects, and accomplishments relative to the performance of their obligations under the
Agreements.

ISSUES

(1) Did the Orders of the SENR dated October 7 and December 2, 2009 comply with the
requirements under Section 28 of the Clean Water Act and Section 19 of Executive Order No.
192?
(2) Were MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water deprived of procedural due process when
the Secretary of the DENR imposed a fine on them for violation of the Clean Water Act?
(3) Did MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water violate Section 8 of the Clean Water Act?
(4) Did the ruling in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay supersede the five-year
compliance period stated in Section 8 of the Clean Water Act and extended MWSS, Maynilad and
Manila Water's compliance therewith until the year 2037?

RULING

(1) YES. The SENR's Orders are appealable to the Office of the President. PAB has
exclusive jurisdiction over the adjudication of pollution cases, and all other matters related
thereto, including the imposition of administrative sanctions. The PAB also exercises specific
jurisdiction over certain environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act. However, the
Orders of the SENR are different from the issuances of the PAB. While under its 1997 rules, the
PAB had jurisdiction to impose the fine or administrative sanction on all cases of pollution, it is
Section 2848 of the Clean Water Act and its IRR, Rule 28 of DAO No. 2005-10, which must be
correctly applied. It was already in effect in 2009 and specifically bestows upon the Secretary of
the DENR, upon recommendation of the P AB, in cases of commission of prohibited acts under
and violations of the Clean Water Act, the power to impose fines, order the closure, suspension
of development or construction, or cessation of operations, or, where appropriate disconnection
of water supply. The herein assailed Orders dated October 7 and December 2, 2009 were not
issued by the P AB but by the SENR. Thus, we affirm the appellate court's holding in CA-G.R. SP
No. 112041 that the appropriate remedy from the Orders of the SENR is an appeal to the Office
of the President.

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 (2) NO. The NOV stated the charges against MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water, gave a
directive to attend the technical conference for simplification of issues and stipulations of facts,
and apprised them of the liability imposed on violators under Section 28 of the Clean Water Act.
Hence, MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water were notified of the charges against them, were given
an opportunity to be heard during a technical conference, and were informed of the penalty for
possible violations of the Clean Water Act. It is clear that violation under the provision of the
Clean Water Act or R.A. 9275, particularly Section 8 has a penalty of fines ranging from PhP
10,000.00 to PhP 200,000.00 per day of violation may be imposed against them.

(3) YES. Water Management is a Public Trust. The Court aims to put an additional strain
upon the duty of the water industry to comply with the laws and regulations of the land. It aims
to put an additional strain upon the duty of the water industry to comply with the laws and
regulations of the land.

The Clean Water Act, is a sweeping piece of legislation consolidating into a coherent
whole the fragmented aspects of quality water management. This purpose is to "formulate a
holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that water quality
management issues cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological
protection, water supply, public health and quality of life." Section 8 under Chapter 2 of the Clean
Water Act on Water Quality Management System provides the Domestic Sewage Collection,
Treatment and Disposal. Section 8 thus imposes the following obligations, dissected as follows:

1. The setting of the obligation is prefaced by stating a day certain for its complete
performance-period of within five years from effectivity of the Clean Water Act. 96

2. The actors here are "the agencies vested to provide water supply and sewerage
facilities and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities
(HUCs)."

3. The prestation set by law is the "[connection of] the existing sewage line found
in all subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports and recreational
facilities, hospitals, market places, public buildings, industrial complex and other similar
establishments including households to available sewerage system.

Section 7 is not a condition precedent to compliance with Section 8. It is not worded as a

condition precedent of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act. What jumps out of the two provisions is
that both provide for different and disconnected compliance periods reckoned from the
effectivity of the Clean Water Act. If Section 7 is indeed a condition precedent of the obligation in
Section 8, the law should have reckoned the enforcement of the obligation in Section 8 from the
time the obligation in Section 7 has been fulfilled. In all, nothing in Sections 7 and 8 of the Clean
Water Act or its IRR115 states or, at the very least, implies that the former is a condition
precedent of the latter. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the obligation imposed on MWSS,
Maynilad and Manila Water by Section 8, as implemented by Rule 8 of DAO No. 05-10, to connect
the existing sewerage lines is mandatory and unconditional. After the expiration of the five-year
compliance period, the obligatory force of Section 8 becomes immediate and can be enforced

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against MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water without subordination to the happening of a future
and uncertain event.

(4) NO. An attempt to view this disposition in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
as an extension of the period of performance by MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water of their
obligations under Section 8 of the Clean Water Act is a long shot. For one, Section 8 requires
MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water or "the agency vested to provide water supply and sewerage
facilities and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities (HUCs) as
defined in Republic Act No. 7160, in coordination with LGUs, to connect the existing sewage line
found in all subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports and recreational
facilities, hospitals, market places, public buildings, industrial complex and other similar
establishments including households to available sewerage system" within five (5) years from
effectivity of the Clean Water Act or from May 6, 2004. The meat of this case is the fact of delay
by MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water in complying with the mandate under Section 8, whereas
the matter involved in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay is the urgency of rehabilitation
of Manila Bay. An attempt to view this disposition in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
as an extension of the period of performance by MWSS, Maynilad and Manila Water of their
obligations under Section 8 of the Clean Water Act is a long shot. The meat of this case is the fact
of delay in complying with the mandate under Section 8, whereas the matter involved in MMDA
v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay is the urgency of rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

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 OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, et al., v. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD
FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA, et al., v. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA and
LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD
G.R. Nos. 230642 and 242954, 10 September 2019, EN BANC (Reyes, J. Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. This is supported by
a survey of the history of the Philippine education which shows that the supervision and regulation
of legal ed cation is an E ec ti e f nction F rther the Co rt s e cl si e r le-making power
provided by the Constitution covers the practice of law and not the study of law or legal education.
The Court exercises judicial power only. The Rules of Court also does not support the argument that
the Court directly and actually regulated legal education. Hence, the LEB cannot usurp the alleged
primary and direct jurisdiction of the Court over legal education.
But while jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and directly to the political
departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be in the context of reasonable
supervision and regulation, and must be consistent with academic freedom and the right to
education, the Court finds certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which by its plain
language and meaning, go beyond legal ed cation and intr de pon the Co rt s e cl si e
jurisdiction and should therefore be struck down for being unconstitutional.
The Court also finds that certain provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016, creating the PhilSAT,
violates the academic freedom of law schools. Specifically, these provisions are those which exclude
and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach the prescribed passing score from being admitted
to any law school in the Philippines. These provisions usurp on the right and duty of the law school
to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students
However, the Court finds that PhilSAT does not transgress the petitioners right to
education. The Court deemed it sufficient to state that PhilSAT is a minimum admission standard
that is rationally related to the interest of the State to improve the quality of legal education and,
accordingly, to protect the general community.
The Court also found various issuances of LEB to have violated the academic freedom of law
schools for encroaching on their freedom to determine admission policies, for infringing on the
instit tion s right to select its teachers and to determine the competence of their faculty members
and for interfering with the discretion of law schools regarding their respective curriculum,
particularly on their respective apprenticeship program.

FACTS
Presented by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account of
the poor performance of law students and law school in the bar examinations, the Congress
passed into law R.A. No. 7662 which created the Legal Education Board (LEB). LEB is an

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executive agency which was made separate from the Department of Education, Culture, and
Sports (DECS), but attached thereto for budgetary purposes.
R.A. No. 7662 gave LEB the power to accredit law schools as well as withdraw and
downgrade the accreditation status of law schools it they fail to maintain the standards set by
the LEB for accreditation status.
Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the
LEB issued a number of orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances. Among these orders
was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016).
LEBMO No. 7-2016 aims to improve the quality of legal education by requiring all those
seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school
admission test, known as the PhilSAT. PhilSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic
potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. The cut off or passing score shall be 55%
correct answers or such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB. LEBMO No. 7-2016
further provides that passing the PhilSAT is required for admission to any law school. However,
honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are enrolling within two years
from college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the PhilSAT for purposes of
admission to the basic law course. Since the issuance of LEBMO No. 7-2016, the PhilSAT has been
administered for four times already.
Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhilSAT on April 16, 2017, Oscar B.
Pimentel, et al. (Pimentel, et al.) as citizens, lawyers, taxpayers, and law professors filed a Petition
for Prohibition principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be declared unconstitutional and that the
creation of the LEB be invalidated together with all its issuances, most especially PhilSAT, for
encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning admissions to the practice of
law. In addition, they also questioned the constitutionality of LEB’s powers to prescribe the
qualifications and compensation of faculty members and to adopt a system of continuing legal
education. At the same time, they also averred that the PhilSAT violates the academic freedom of
law schools and the right to education.
They were joined by others as petitioners-in-intervention. These petitioners-in-
intervention argued that PhilSAT violates the right to liberty and pursuit of happiness of the
student-applicants. They added that PhilSAT violates the equal protection clause as it is an
arbitrary form of classification not based on substantial distinctions. They also contended that
the PhilSAT violates the right of all citizens to quality and accessible education, violates academic
freedom, and is an unfair academic requirement. It was also their position that the PhilSAT
violates due process as it interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or course
of study and R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers.
Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by Francis Jose Lean
Abayata et al. (Abayata, et al.), as law students who failed to pass the PhilSAT together with
others as current law students who failed to take the PhilSAT. They averred that Section 7(e),
7(g), and 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the power of the Court to regulate admission to the
practice of law. They professed that they were not against the conduct of law school admission
test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the PhilSAT as the power to do so allegedly belongs

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to the Court. It was also their contention that the PhilSAT violates academic freedom as it
interferes with the law school’s exercise of freedom to choose who to admit.
LEB, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that certiorari and
prohibition are not proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662, which was
enacted pursuant to the State’s power to regulate all educational institutions, and as such, there
could be no grave of discretion. The OSG contended that the Court’s power to regulate admission
to the practice of law does not include regulation of legal education. The OSG urged that PhilSAT
is no different from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court already upheld
as a valid exercise of police power in Tablarin v. Gutierrez.

ISSUES
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over legal education?
(2) Does supervision and regulation of legal education constitute exercise of police
power by the State?
(3) Do the powers of LEB provided by R.A. No. 7662 violate the Court’s jurisdiction
over the practice of law?
(4) Do the powers of LEB provided by R.A. No. 7662 violate the academic freedom of
law schools and the right to education?

RULING
(1) NO. Contrary to petitioners’ claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction
over legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court
invoked by petitioners support their argument.
First, a survey of the history of the Philippine education shows that the supervision and
regulation of legal education is an Executive function. Legal education in the Philippines was
institutionalized in 1734 with the establishment of the Faculty of Civil Law in the University of
Santo Tomas.
In 1908, the University of the Philippines was created through Act No. 1870. The
curriculum adopted by the UP College of Law became the model of the legal education curriculum
of the other law schools in the country.
In 1917, under Act No. 2706, the Secretary of Public Instruction was specifically
authorized to prepare and publish, from time to time, in pamphlet form, the minimum standards
required of law schools and other schools giving instruction of a technical or professional
character.
In 1924, a survey of the Philippine education and of all educational institutions, facilities
and agencies was conducted through Act No. 3162, which created the Board of Educational

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Survey. Among the factual findings of the survey was that schools at that time were allowed to
operate with almost no supervision at all. This led to the conclusion that a great majority of
schools from primary grade to the university are money-making devices of persons who
organize and administer them. Thus, it was recommended that some board of control be
organized under legislative control to supervise their administration.
Consistent with these statutory precursors, the 1935 Constitution expressed in no
uncertain terms that "all educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to
regulation by the State." This was followed by several other statutes. For one, a Board of National
Education was created with the task of formulating, implementing and enforcing general
educational policies and coordinating the offerings and functions of all educational institutions.
However, the said Board was abolished and instead, a Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports
(MECS) was organized to supervise and regulate educational institutions. Thereafter, MECS
became DECS but its power to supervise all educational institutions remained unchanged.
DECS then promulgated DECS Order No. 27, Series of 1989 (DECS Order No. 27-1989), in
close coordination with the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of
Law Professors and the Bureau of Higher Education. DECS Order No. 27-1989 specifically
outlined the policies and standards for legal education, and superseded all existing policies and
standards related to legal education. Afterwards, R.A. No. 7662 was enacted and the LEB was
created which was given the tasks to regulated and supervise law schools.
This historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent
exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas
of education, including legal education.
Second, the Court’s exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the
study law.
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the
1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure were
repealed and were instead converted as the Rules of Court which the Court can alter and modify.
The Congress, on the other hand, was given the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
on pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law promulgated by
the Court.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution is no less certain in reiterating the Court's
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and the
admission to the practice of law. The 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence
of the judiciary by giving it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration
of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense
that it took away from the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and the

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integration of the Bar. It therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the power to promulgate
such rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary."
Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as
vesting upon the Court the authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be
admitted to the practice of law, to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in
unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of
the Bar.
The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law
is a judicial function because it requires:
(1) previously established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and
(3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles.
From the foregoing, it can be acknowledged that legal education or the study of law is not
the practice of law. The former is merely a preparatory to the latter. Furthermore, the definition
of practice of law as defined in Cayetano v. Monsod, no matter how broad, cannot be further
enlarged to cover the study of law.
Third, the Court exercises judicial power only.
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "the Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The Court exercises judicial power only
and should not assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the basic postulate being the
separation of powers.
Moreover, neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as
an exercise of the Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of
the two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with
its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the
Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.
Fourth, the Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and
actually regulated legal education.
While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice
of law exists under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions,
the Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually regulates legal education.
Instead, the 1964 Rules of Court concerned only the practice of law, admission to the bar,
admission to the bar examination, bar examinations, and the duties, rights and conduct of
attorneys. The 1997 Rules of Court is no different as it contained only the rules on attorneys and
admission to the bar under Rule 138, the law student practice rule under Rule 138-A, the
integrated bar in Rule 139-A and disbarment and discipline of attorneys in Rule 139-B.

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 Notably, it is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to
take the bar examinations, had placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by law
schools. Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which law schools
apparently are willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating future bar examinees.
It is in this regard that the relationship between legal education and admissions to the bar
becomes unmistakable. This, however, does not mean that the Court has or exercises jurisdiction
over legal education. Compliance by law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a
recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law — that no
person shall be allowed to take the bar examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the
Philippine Bar without having taken and completed the required core courses.
Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on
law student practice manifest the Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over legal
education. The Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access to
justice of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited practice
of law pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. In allowing the law
student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner, what the Court regulates
and supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law student before
any trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic — an
activity rightfully falling under the definition of practice of law.
(2) YES. Early Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to promote
the general welfare and public interest; to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as
may promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each
inhabitant; to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state and to establish for
the intercourse of citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to
prevent conflict of rights.
The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens" and has an interest
in prescribing regulations to promote the education, and consequently, the general welfare of
the people. The regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the
tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Thus, the enactment of education laws,
implementing rules and regulations and issuances of government agencies is an exercise of the
State's police power.
However, the exercise of such police power is not absolute.
First, the exercise of police power over education must merely be supervisory and
regulatory, not control.
Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 4 (1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation
of all educational institutions

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 As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and private schools in
education is complementary in relation to each other, and primordial in relation to the State as
the latter is only empowered to supervise and regulate. The exercise of police power in relation
to education must be compliant with the normative content of Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution. Thus, the exercise of police power over education must merely be
supervisory and regulatory.
The State's supervisory and regulatory power is an auxiliary power in relation to
educational institutions, be it a basic, secondary or higher education. This must necessarily be so
since the right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of youth-rearing, do not inure to the
State at the first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and naturally to the parents. The
responsibility to educate lies with the parents and guardians as an inherent right, over which the
State assumes a supportive role. Withholding from the State the unqualified power to control
education also serves a practical purpose — it allows for a degree of flexibility and diversity
essential to the very reason of education to rear socially responsible and morally upright youth
and to enable them, also, to come in contact with challenging ideas.
In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood
that what it enjoys is a supportive power, that is, the power of oversight over all educational
institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not to interfere.
Second, to be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of
police power must be “reasonable” as provided by the Constitution.
The import of the word "reasonable" was elaborated in Council of Teachers and Staff of
Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education. In the said case, the Court
clarified that the framers of the 1987 Constitution meant that the supervision mandated upon
the State refer to external governance, as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to
the respective school boards. The addition of the word “reasonable” also was meant to
emphasize that State supervision and regulation of legal education cannot amount to control.
Third, the exercise of police power over education must be consistent with academic
freedom.
Fundamental in constitutional construction is that the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole. Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone
provision, but must be read in conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions relating to
education which include, in particular, the clause on academic freedom.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides that academic freedom shall
be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom has traditionally been
associated as a narrow aspect of the broader area of freedom of thought, speech, expression and
the press. It has been identified with the individual autonomy of educators to "investigate,
pursue, and discuss free from internal and external interference or pressure." Thus, academic
freedom of faculty members, professors, researchers, or administrators is defended based on the
freedom of speech and press.

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 Furthermore, academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also
by the students themselves, as affirmed in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong where
the records of the deliberations of the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly stated that
academic freedom is both enjoyed both by the faculty and the students. Jurisprudence has so far
understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's right to enjoy in school the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the academic freedom of the
institution itself is recognized and constitutionally guaranteed. The landmark case of Garcia v.
The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology enumerated the internal conditions
for institutional academic freedom, that is, the academic staff should have de facto control over:
(a) the admission and examination of students;
(b) the curricula for courses of study;
(c) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and
(d) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure.
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being part of their
academic freedom. The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and regulation over
education, can only impose minimum regulations.
Last, the exercise of police power over education must be consistent with the right to
education.
The 1987 Constitution speaks quite elaborately on the right to education. Section 1,
Article XIV provides:
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at
all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV, are
(1) to protect and promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps towards making
such quality education accessible.
"Quality" education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness, relevance and
excellence of the education given to meet the needs and aspirations of the individual and society.
In order to protect and promote quality education, the political departments are vested with the
ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions. This
authority should be exercised within the parameters of reasonable supervision and regulation.
On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education
regardless of social and economic differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps" signifies
that the State may adopt varied approaches in the delivery of education that are relevant and
responsive to the needs of the people and the society.

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 Furthermore, deliberations of the framers also provide that while there is a right to
quality higher education, such right is principally subject to the broad academic freedom of
higher educational institutions to impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive education is not and should not be taken to
mean as a right to be admitted to educational institutions.
With the basic postulates that jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and
directly to the political departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be in the
context of reasonable supervision and regulation, and must be consistent with academic freedom
and the right to education, the Court now proceeds to address whether the assailed provisions
of R.A. No. 7662 and the corresponding LEB issuances fall within the constitutionally-permissible
supervision and regulation of legal education.
(3) YES. Certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which by its plain language and
meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude upon the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction and
should therefore be struck down for being unconstitutional.
First, one of the general objectives of legal education under Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No.
7662 is to "increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society." This objective is reiterated by the LEB in LEBMO No.
1-2011, Section 7, Article II. The plain language of Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section
7 (2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 are clear and need no further interpretation. This provision goes
beyond the scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal education, and, instead
delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. This objective is a direct
encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and
legal assistance to the underprivileged and should, thus, be voided on this ground.
Second, Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 mandates the State to: (1) undertake
appropriate reforms in the legal education system; (2) require proper selection of law students;
(3) maintain quality among law schools; and (4) require legal apprenticeship and continuing
legal education. Pursuant to this policy, Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power to
establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar examinations. It is clear
from the plain text of Section 7 (g) that another requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship
program, is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly interferes
with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law
and admissions thereto.
Third, Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 provides power to LEB to adopt
a system of continuing legal education. By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal
education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the
power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. The same
encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which
includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law.
As to Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives the LEB the power to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission, the Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making

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power and the power of the LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under
Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.
LEB’s power to prescribe minimum standards for “law admission” pertain to admission
to legal education and not to the practice of law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part
must be read together with the other parts, to the end that the general intent of the law is given
primacy. Construing the LEB's power to prescribe the standards for law admission together with
the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law schools, leads to the logical
interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe admission requirements
only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to the practice of law.
Furthermore, Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to
prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and
regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum requirements not
amounting to control.
Also, evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the minimum standards
for law admission, an aptitude test may be administered by the LEB although such is not made
mandatory under the law. This is exercised by the LEB through the PhilSAT. The Court finds that
the PhilSAT constitutes a valid exercise of the police power by applying the test of
reasonableness, i.e., the concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful means, is employed. The
subject of the PhilSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable that the State
has an interest in prescribing regulations promoting education and thereby protecting the
common good. Improvement of the quality of legal education, thus, falls squarely within the
scope of police power. The PhilSAT, as an aptitude test, was the means to protect this interest.
Moreover, by case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an aptitude test as
a reasonable police power measure in the context of admission standards into institutions of
higher learning in Tablarin.
(4) YES. The Court finds that certain provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016, creating the
PhilSAT, violates the academic freedom of law schools.
LEBMO No. 7-2016 includes provisions which exclude and disqualify those examinees
who fail to reach the prescribed passing score from being admitted to any law school in the
Philippines. In mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct answers shall be
admitted to any law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law school to
determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to apply such
criteria on a case-by-case basis. It also mandates law schools to absolutely reject applicants with
a grade lower than the prescribed cut-off score and those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The
token regard for institutional academic freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the applicants
had been "pre-selected" without the school's participation. The right of the institutions then is
constricted only in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the
interpretation that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to
that of the State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and
regulation. The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the

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first instance and in accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such
discretion in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants.
Additionally, PhilSAT cannot be treated the same with the our local NMAT and the Law
School Admission test (LSAT) administered in the United States.
While both the PhilSAT and NMAT seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT score is
evaluated by the medical schools in relation to their own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score,
the NMAT score is not the sole determining factor on whether or not an examinee may be
admitted to medical school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for evaluating
applicants for admission to a college of medicine. Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to
determine how much weight should be assigned to an NMAT score relative to the schools' own
admissions policy.
Similar to the NMAT, LSAT is only one of the several criteria for evaluation for law school
admission. It is just one of the methods that law schools may use to differentiate applicants for
law school. The American Bar Association actually allows a law school to use an admission test
other than the LSAT and it does not dictate the particular weight that a law school should give to
the results of the LSAT in deciding whether to admit an applicant.
Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is
reasonably related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal
education. This aptitude test, however, should not be exclusionary, restrictive, or qualifying as
to encroach upon institutional academic freedom. Thus, the Court nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016
insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within two
years as a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter to
institutional academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016, being free from any taint of
unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect.
However, the Court finds that PhilSAT does not transgress the petitioners’ right to
education. The Court deemed it sufficient to state that PhiLSAT is a minimum admission standard
that is rationally related to the interest of the State to improve the quality of legal education and,
accordingly, to protect the general community.
Apart from the PhiLSAT, the LEB also imposed additional requirements for admission to
law schools under LEBMO No. 1-2011. Specifically, it requires the student to earn minimum
number of units in English, Mathematics and Social Science subjects to be admitted in law school.
It further requires applicants to the Masters of Law Ll. M. or equivalent master’s degree in law
or juridical science to have a Bachelor of Laws (Ll. B.) or Juris Doctor (J.D.) degree. These
provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for itself its admission
policies. With regard to foreign students, a law school is completely bereft of the right to
determine for itself whether to accept such foreign student or not, as the determination thereof
now belongs to the LEB.
LEBMO No. 1-2011 also prescribes minimum qualifications of faculty members. It
requires the members of the faculty of a law school to, at the very least, possess a Ll.B. or a J.D.
degree and to be members of the Philippine Bar. It even required these faculty members to

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commence their studies in graduate schools of law within a period of five (5) years from the
promulgation of the said order. It also provided for qualifications for the deans of law schools.
Failure of law schools to follow these requirements would lead to the downgrading of their
accreditation status or worse, closure.
The Court finds that these requirements are minimum reasonable requirements.
However, the Court finds the manner by which the LEB had exercised this power through its
various issuances unreasonable. On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria,
while admitting that the masteral degree requirement is a "laudable aim" of the LEB,
nevertheless adds that the LEB-imposed period of compliance is unreasonable given the
logistical and financial obstacles.
Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain
of downgrading, phase-out and closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the previous
requirement under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which merely prefer faculty members who are
holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's authority to review the strength or
weakness of the faculty on the basis of experience or length of time devoted to teaching violates
an institution's right to set its own faculty standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial
requirements that infringe on the institution's right to select its teachers which, for instance, may
be based on expertise even with little teaching experience. Moreover, in case a faculty member
seeks to be exempted, he or she must prove to the LEB, and not to the concerned institution, that
he or she is an expert in the field, thus, usurping the freedom of the institution to evaluate the
qualifications of its own teachers on an individual basis.
Also, while the LEB requires of faculty members and deans to obtain a master of laws
degree before they are allowed to teach and administer a law school, respectively, it is ironic that
the LEB, under Resolution No. 2019-406, in fact considers the basic law degrees of Ll.B. or J.D. as
already equivalent to a doctorate degree in other non-law academic disciplines for purposes of
"appointment/promotion, ranking, and compensation."
In this connection, the LEB also prescribes who may or may not be considered as full-
time faculty, the classification of the members of their faculty, as well as the faculty load,
including the regulation of work hours, all in violation of the academic freedom of law schools.
The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the
LEB deems that there is gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors
or instructors under Section 41.2 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011. In this regard, the LEB is actually
assessing the teaching performance of faculty members and when such is determined by the LEB
as constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law
school's right to determine for itself the competence of its faculty members.
Lastly, while the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7 (g) on
legal internship, as plainly worded, cannot immediately be interpreted as encroaching upon
institutional academic freedom, the manner by which LEB exercised this power through several
of its issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates upon law schools how such
apprenticeship and internship programs should be undertaken. These issuances unduly

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interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its curriculum, particularly its
apprenticeship program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond mere supervision and regulation.
In summary, a number of LEB’s issuances have violated the academic freedom of law
school. These issuances, however, do not violate the petitioners’ right to education.

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 RE: CONSULTANCY SERVICES OF HELEN P. MACASAET
A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC, 16 July 2019, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As expressly stated in Section 4 of EO No. 423, "full authority" must be delegated in writing
to the authorized official by the Head of the Procuring Entity. Being a special authority availed as
an exception to the general rule on public bidding, the written "full authority" must refer specifically
to the particular contract that is being entered into through the alternative method of
procurement. The Joint Memorandum prepared for then Chief Justice Sereno and signed by Atty.
Ocampo and Mr. Davis cannot be considered as a delegation by the Supreme Court En Banc of full
authority to Atty. Candelaria to act and sign on behalf of the Supreme Court. The Joint
Memorandum was not even addressed to the Supreme Court En Banc it was prepared only for
then Chief Justice Sereno. Thus, the other members of the Supreme Court were not informed of the
subject Contracts of Services. The Supreme Court En Banc was notified of the existence of the
Contracts of Services only upon the filing of the letter-request of Atty. Gadon. Since the other
members of the Supreme Court En Banc were clearly unaware of the Contracts of Services with Ms.
Macasaet, it is obvious that the power to enter into such contracts was not delegated to anyone.
The Supreme Court En Banc could not have delegated the power to enter into such contracts which
it did not know even existed.

FACTS
The Enterprise Information Systems Plan (EISP) is intended to serve as the framework of
the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) initiatives of the Judiciary. INDRA
Sistemas S.A. (INDRA) was designated to provide Management and Consultancy Services for the
development of the Judiciary's ICT Capability as part of the Judicial Reform Support Project
financed by the World Bank.

In a resolution, the Court approved the EISP submitted by INDRA. However, such budget
did not include a budget for the judiciary-wide technical infrastructure, nationwide connectivity,
and network security, which are prerequisites to the nationwide implementation of the EISP and
on-going ICT projects like the eCourts. Thus, there was a need to hire the services of an ICT
consultant to review the status of the implementation of the EISP and related ICT and
computerization projects.

In its 2013 Memorandum, the Bids and Awards Committee for Consultancy Services
(BAC-CS) considered the procurement as highly technical in nature and primarily requires trust
and confidence owing to the fact that the EISP is a priority program of the Court. The BAC-CS
recommended three (3) consultants who may be considered by the Supreme Court for the
procurement of consultancy services.

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 After reviewing and evaluating the three proposed consultants by the BAC-CS, former
Chief Justice Sereno, Atty. Ocampo from the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ), and Atty. Davis from
the Management Information Systems Office (MISO), found Ms. Macasaet to be the most
qualified. Their recommendation that Ms. Macasaet be hired for the procurement was approved
by the then Chief Justice. The Supreme Court, ostensibly represented by its then Chief
Administrative Officer Atty. Eden T. Candelaria (Atty. Candelaria), entered into a six-month
Contract of Services with Ms. Macasaet.

Subsequently, Atty. Ocampo stated in a 2014 Memorandum that there was a need for a
technical and policy consultant for the implementation of the Updated EISP Work Plan. Atty.
Ocampo proposed to directly negotiate a six-month contract with the consultant, basing his
proposal on Section 53.7 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act), where a procuring entity can forego
public bidding and directly negotiate a six-month contract with a consultant, who will perform
work that is highly technical, proprietary, primarily confidential or policy determining.

The BAC-CS stated that in addition to the consultant previously engaged, the other
consultants named in their previous memorandum should also be considered for the
procurement of the consultancy services. Acting on the memorandum of the BAC-CS in this
regard, Atty. Ocampo and Mr. Davis determined that Ms. Macasaet was the most qualified among
the three proposed consultants. This Joint Memorandum was approved by then Chief Justice
Sereno. However, the records are bereft of any explanation as to how the three (3) consultants
were chosen by the BAC-CS.

Mr. Davis and Atty. Ocampo stated that there was a continuing need for the services of a
consultant to provide technical advice and assistance in the first year implementation of the plan
and in developing ICT policies to support it. Thus, they recommended the extension of Ms.
Macasaet's contract, which was approved by then Chief Justice Sereno. Thereafter, the Contract
of Services was extended five more times, for a total of six extensions of six months for every
extension. In total, the Court entered into a Contract of Services with Ms. Macasaet for a total of
eight times.

ISSUE
Were the Contracts of Services entered into by the Court by negotiated procurement as
represented by Atty. Candelaria with Ms. Macasaet legal?

RULING
NO. Based on the facts and applicable laws and regulations, all the Contracts of Services
should be declared void ab initio.

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 Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court "shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof." Thus, the administrative
powers of the Court — which include entering into government contracts in the exercise of these
powers of administration — are vested in the members of the Supreme Court sitting en banc, as
a collegial body. The Supreme Court is first and foremost a collegial body, with one vote for each
Justice, including the Chief Justice, in all judicial or administrative matters for decision. The
Supreme Court exercises its functions through the Court En Banc or its Divisions. As the Court is
a collegial body, absent a proper authorization by the Court En Banc, even the Chief Justice who
is primus inter pares cannot act on his or her own.

While the powers are vested in the Supreme Court as a collegial body, such powers may
be delegated by the Supreme Court En Banc. The delegation of these administrative powers over
all courts and its personnel was done through a resolution issued by the Supreme Court En Banc.
In particular, A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) authorized the Divisions, the Chief Justice, and the
Chairpersons of the Divisions, to act on certain administrative matters to relieve the Supreme
Court En Banc from additional burden brought about by the considerable number of
administrative matters or judicial cases.

Similarly, in A.M. No. 10-1-10-SC, the Supreme Court En Banc authorized the Clerk of
Court En Banc, the Court Administrator, the Chief Justice, and the Chairpersons of the Divisions
to approve certain procurement requests, subject to certain threshold amounts. A.M. No. 10-1-
10-SC also stated which procurement requests must be approved by the Supreme Court En Banc.

While the Chief Justice may approve procurement requests if it meets the threshold
amount approved by the Supreme Court En Banc through its resolution, this authority to approve
is still delegated by the Supreme Court En Banc and is not inherent in the position of Chief Justice.
Without such delegated authority from the Supreme Court En Banc, the Chief Justice simply
cannot approve any procurement requests on behalf of the Supreme Court. It is with more reason
that the Chief Justice cannot approve procurement contracts, as distinguished from procurement
requests, without the delegated authority from the Supreme Court En Banc.

Based on the foregoing, the power to enter into such contracts was clearly not delegated by the
Supreme Court En Banc to the Chief Justice. Thus, the Contracts of Services should have been
authorized by the Supreme Court En Banc which has administrative power over all courts and
personnel thereof, and not merely by the then Chief Justice. A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised)
expressly provides that those administrative matters not referred in the said resolution shall be
acted upon by the Court En Banc.

The records fail to show that Atty. Candelaria was authorized in writing by the Supreme
Court En Banc to act as signatory of the Court in entering into these Contracts of Services with
Ms. Macasaet. In fact, Atty. Candelaria herself admitted that she was not given any express full
written authority by then Chief Justice Sereno to sign the Contracts of Services with Ms. Macasaet.

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 Atty. Candelaria stated that since the then Chief Justice had already approved the contract
with Ms. Macasaet and the Office of the Chief Justice had already prepared the contract, she took
it as an "implied authority" to sign on behalf of the Court. Even assuming for the sake of argument
that there was an "implied authority," such is not the "full authority " in writing required under
Sections 4 and 5 of Executive Order (EO) No. 423.

It is clear from E.O. No. 423 that it is the Head of the Procuring Entity who is authorized
to enter into binding government contracts, when such contracts are entered into through
alternative methods of procurement such as directly negotiated contracts like the Contracts of
Services with Ms. Macasaet. This authority may be delegated, but this must be done only "in
writing" with "full authority" to give "final approval and/or to enter into" the contract delegated
to such duly authorized official.

Since the alternative method of procurement is an exception to the general rule that
procurement shall be through public bidding, the written "full authority" cannot be general, but
must refer specifically to the particular contract being entered into through the alternative
method of procurement. It is an exception because the policy of the government is to conduct
public bidding in all procurements in order to extend equal opportunity to all eligible and
qualified private parties to participate in government procurement. As such, the law explicitly
requires the Head of the Procuring Entity to be responsible for such government contract.

In this case, the Procuring Entity is the Supreme Court. The Head of the Supreme Court is
the Supreme Court En Banc. Thus, any government contract below P500 Million entered into by
the Supreme Court through alternative methods of procurement should be approved by the
Supreme Court En Banc as Head of the Procuring Entity. The requirement of a written authority
is to ensure that the Head of the Procuring Entity or his or her respective duly authorized
representative is responsible and accountable for the government contracts entered into on
behalf of the Procuring Entity, and prevent unauthorized officials from signing and approving
contracts. In this case, however, the written authority delegated to Atty. Candelaria, the alleged
authorized official, is non-existent.

As expressly stated in Section 4 of EO No. 423, "full authority" must be delegated in

writing to the authorized official by the Head of the Procuring Entity. The Joint Memorandum
prepared for then Chief Justice Sereno and signed by Atty. Ocampo and Mr. Davis cannot be
considered as a delegation by the Supreme Court En Banc of full authority to Atty. Candelaria to
act and sign on behalf of the Supreme Court. The Joint Memorandum was not even addressed to
the Supreme Court En Banc — it was prepared only for then Chief Justice Sereno. Thus, the other
members of the Supreme Court were not informed of the subject Contracts of Services. The
Supreme Court En Banc was notified of the existence of the Contracts of Services only upon the
filing of the letter-request of Atty. Gadon. Since the other members of the Supreme Court En Banc
were clearly unaware of the Contracts of Services with Ms. Macasaet, it is obvious that the power
to enter into such contracts was not delegated to anyone. The Supreme Court En Banc could not
have delegated the power to enter into such contracts which it did not know even existed.

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 While the Supreme Court En Banc may delegate its administrative powers to another
such as its Divisions, the Chairpersons of the Divisions or the Chief Justice — as it has done in
A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) — the delegates may no longer re-delegate the authority or
power delegated to them. Therefore, even assuming that the Supreme Court En Banc delegated
to the then Chief Justice the power to enter into the government contracts with Ms. Macasaet,
then Chief Justice Sereno could no longer re-delegate such authority. Atty. Candelaria failed to
show any written authority from the then Chief Justice authorizing her to enter into the said
Contracts of Services. Atty. Candelaria attached several Memoranda where authority was given
to her to sign for and in behalf of previous Chief Justices. This is not the full written delegation of
authority required by Section 4 of E.O. No. 423. Evidently, any written authority, if ever such
authority could be delegated by a Chief Justice, should have been given by then Chief Justice
Sereno, who was the Chief Justice at the time the contracts were entered into with Ms. Macasaet,
and not by any other previous Chief Justices. Previous Chief Justices had no authority to sign,
much less delegate the authority to sign, government contracts after their term of office.

The approval of then Chief Justice Sereno of this Joint Memorandum was merely for the
execution of the Contract of Services to proceed. This is not the full written authority required
by law since this written authority should specify not only the particular contract to be signed,
but more importantly, the name of the authorized signatory to whom the delegation of power is
being entrusted. There is no delegation whatsoever of any authority to Atty. Candelaria or to any
other official to execute and sign the Contract of Services on behalf of the Court En Banc or even
on behalf of then Chief Justice Sereno.

Indisputably, there was a blatant violation of Section 4 of EO No. 423. Thus, these
Contracts of Services must be declared invalid and not binding on the Government as expressly
mandated in Section 5 of EO No. 423.

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LABOR LAW

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 HONGKONG BANK INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (HBILU) v.
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED
G.R. No. 218390, 28 February 2018, THIRD DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Although jurisprudence recognizes the validity of the exercise by an employer of its
management prerogative and will ordinarily not interfere with such, this prerogative is not
absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by law, collective bargaining agreement, and general
principles of fair play and justice. Indeed, being a product of said constitutionally-guaranteed right
to participate, the CBA is, therefore, the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply
with its provisions.
In the present controversy, it is clear from the arguments and evidence submitted that the
Plan was never made part of the CBA. As a matter of fact, HBILU vehemently rejected the Plan's
incorporation into the agreement.

FACTS
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC), submitted its Financial
Assistance Plan (Plan) to the BSP for approval. The Plan allegedly contained a credit
checking proviso stating that "[r]epayment defaults on existing loans and adverse information
on outside loans will be considered in the evaluation of loan applications."
Meanwhile, petitioner Hongkong Bank Independent Labor Union (HBILU), the incumbent
bargaining agent of HSBC's rank-and-file employees, entered into a CBA with the bank covering
the period from April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2012.
When the CBA was about to expire, the parties started negotiations for a new one. During
the said negotiations, HSBC proposed amendments to align the wordings of the CBA with its BSP-
approved Plan. Particularly, HSBC proposed the deletion of Credit Ratio clause of the CBA.
HBILU vigorously objected to the proposed amendments, claiming that their insertions
would curtail its members' availment of salary loans. HSBC withdrew its proposed amendments
and, consequently, the credit ration clause remained unchanged. Despite the withdrawal of the
proposal, HSBC sent an e-mail to its employees on April 20, 2012 concerning the enforcement of
the Plan, including the Credit Checking provisions thereof. The e-mail reads:
HBILU member Vince Mananghaya (Mananghaya) applied for a loan under the provisions
of Article XI of the CBA. His first loan application in March 2012 was approved, but adverse
findings from the external checks on his credit background resulted in the denial of his
September application. HBILU then raised the denial as a grievance issue with the National
Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). It argued that the imposition of an additional
requirement-the external credit checking prior to approval of any loan application under Article
XI of the CBA-is not sanctioned under the CBA.

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 NCMB held that HSBC, as an employer, has the right to issue and implement guidelines
for the availment of loan accommodations under the CBA as part of its management prerogative.
Aggrieved, HBILU elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), which sustained the findings in
toto.

ISSUE
Can HSBC validly enforce the credit-checking requirement under its BSP-approved Plan
in processing the salary loan applications of covered employees even when the said requirement
is not recognized under the CBA?

RULING
NO. Workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making process
of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their
rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-
management councils: Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor
management councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said
establishment.
Although jurisprudence recognizes the validity of the exercise by an employer of its
management prerogative and will ordinarily not interfere with such, this prerogative is not
absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by law, collective bargaining agreement, and
general principles of fair play and justice. Indeed, being a product of said constitutionally-
guaranteed right to participate, the CBA is, therefore, the law between the parties and they are
obliged to comply with its provisions.
A collective bargaining agreement or CBA is the negotiated contract between a legitimate
labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided
these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where
the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
In Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMJT) v. Court of Appeals, this
Court was emphatic in its pronouncement that the CBA during its lifetime binds all the parties.
The provisions of the CBA must be respected since its terms and conditions constitute the law
between the parties. And until a new CBA is executed by and between the parties, they are duty-
bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing agreement.
In the present controversy, it is clear from the arguments and evidence submitted that
the Plan was never made part of the CBA. As a matter of fact, HBILU vehemently rejected the

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Plan's incorporation into the agreement. Due to this lack of consensus, the bank withdrew its
proposal and agreed to the retention of the original provisions of the CBA. The subsequent
implementation of the Plan's external credit check provisions in relation to employee loan
applications under Article XI of the CBA was then an imposition solely by HSBC.
In this respect, the Court is of the view that tolerating HSBC's conduct would be
tantamount to allowing a blatant circumvention of Article 253 of the Labor Code. It would
contravene the express prohibition against the unilateral modification of a CBA during its
subsistence and even thereafter until a new agreement is reached. It would unduly license HSBC
to add, modify, and ultimately further restrict the grant of Salary Loans beyond the terms of the
CBA by simply adding stringent requirements in its Plan, and having the said Plan approved by
BSP in the guise of compliance with the MoRB.
What further convinced the Court that the external credit check as well as the manner of
its enforcement is a new imposition by HSBC is the fact that the bank made no attempt to rebut
HBILU's evidence that the former's requirements for the grant of salary loans changed only after
the April 20, 2012 email blast. HBILU sufficiently proved that prior to the April 20, 2012 email,
members of the bargaining unit were using only four (4) documents in applying for a loan, to wit:
1) Application for Personal Loan Form;
2) Authority to Deduct Form;
3) Set-Off of Retirement Fund Form; and
4) Promissory Note Form.
Thereafter, management imposed a new set of requirements, which includes the
"Authority to Conduct Checks Form." As testified to by Mananghaya, he only signed the first four
(4) requirements for his March 2012 loan. However, for the September 2012 loan, he was asked
to complete a new set of documents which included the Authority to Conduct Checks Form. Too,
even the email itself states that said credit checking requirement, among others, is to be strictly
enforced effective May 2012. Though HSBC claims that credit checking has been the bank's long-
standing policy, it failed to show that it indeed required such before its covered employees could
avail of a salary loan under the CBA prior to April 20, 2012-the date of the email blast.
Thus, no other conclusion can be had in this factual milieu other than the fact that HSBC's
enforcement of credit checking on salary loans under the CBA invalidly modified the latter's
provisions thereon through the imposition of additional requirements which cannot be found
anywhere in the CBA.
If it were true that said credit checking under the Plan covers salary loans under the CBA,
then the bank should have negotiated for its inclusion thereon as early as the April 1, 2010 to
March 31, 2012 CBA which it entered into with HBILU. However, the express provisions of said
CBA inked by the parties clearly make no reference to the Plan. And even in the enforcement
thereof, credit checking was not included as one of its requirements. This leads the Court to
conclude that HSBC originally never intended the credit checking requirement under the Plan to
apply to salary loans under the CBA. At most, its application thereto is a mere afterthought, as

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evidenced by its sudden, belated, and hurried enforcement on said salary loans via the disputed
email blast.
In other words, it appears that, based on its actuations, HSBC never intended to apply the
credit checking item under the Plan to salary loans under the CBA. Otherwise, it would have
enforced such requirement from the moment the salary loans provisions under the old CBA were
implemented, which it did not. It may be that said requirement was being applied to other types
of loans under the Plan, but based on the evidence presented, Court cannot say the same for
salary loans under the CBA.
The minority argues that primacy is being accorded to the CBA over the Plan approved
by the BSP. Such, however, is not the case. We are not saying that the Plan should yield to the
CBA. The point that we are driving at in this lengthy discussion is that on the basis of the evidence
presented, Court is convinced that the credit checking provision of the Plan was never intended
to cover salary loans under the CBA. Otherwise, HSBC would have implemented such the moment
said salary loans under the previous CBA were made available to its covered employees. Thus,
HSBC cannot now insist on its imposition on loan applications under the disputed CBA provision
without violating its duty to bargain collectively.
If the Court allows this practice of leaving to HSBC the determination, formulation, and
implementation of the guidelines, procedures, and requirements for the availment of salary
loans granted under the CBA, which guidelines, procedures, and requirements unduly restrict
the provisions of the CBA, this Court would in effect be permitting HSBC to repeatedly violate its
duty to bargain collectively under the guise of enforcing the general terms of the Plan.

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 RAYMOND A. SON, RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, AND WILFREDO E. POLLARCO v. UNIVERSITY
OF SANTO TOMAS, FR. ROLANDO DELA ROSA, DR. CLARITA CARILLO, DR. CYNTHIA LOZA,
FR. EDGARDO ALAURIN, AND COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND DESIGN FACULTY COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211273, 18 April 2018, FIRST DIVISION (Del Castillo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Thus, going by the requirements of law, it is plain to see that petitioners are not qualified to
teach in the undergraduate programs of UST. And while they were given ample time and
opportunity to satisfy the requirements by obtaining their respective master's degrees, they failed
in the endeavor. Petitioners knew this - that they cannot continue to teach for failure to secure their
master's degrees - and needed no reminding of this fact; "those who are seeking to be educators are
presumed to know these mandated qualifications."

From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for
maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to
be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications.

FACTS

University of Santo Tomas (UST) is an educational institution operating under the

authority of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The rest of the herein respondents
are impleaded as officers and administrators of the school. Petitioners Raymond A. Son (Son),
Raymond S. Antiola (Antiola), and Wilfredo E. Pollarco (Pollarco) are full time professors in UST.

Petitioners did not possess the required Master's degree, but were nonetheless hired by
UST on the condition that they fulfill the requirement within the prescribed period. Petitioners
enrolled in the Master's program, but were unable to finish the same. In spite of their failure to
obtain the required Master's degree, they continued to teach even beyond the period given for
completion thereof.

In 2010, CHED issued a Memorandum directing the strict implementation of the

minimum qualification for faculty members of undergraduate programs, particularly the
Master's degree and licensure requirements. Acting on the Memorandum, UST wrote the
petitioners and other affected faculty members, informing them of the university's decision to
cease re-appointment of those who failed to complete their Master's degrees, but allow a written
appeal from the concerned faculty members who are due for thesis defense/completion of their
Master's degrees.

Petitioners did not make a written appeal, operating under the belief that they have been
vested tenure under the CBA for their continued employment despite failure to obtain the
required Master's degree. Petitioners received termination letters for failure to obtain the
required Master's degree. Petitioners filed a labor case against the respondents for unfair labor
practice. The Labor Arbiter (LA) found for petitioners and declared respondents guilty of illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice, as well as malice and bad faith in illegally dismissing the
former. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling. The National Labor Commission (NLRC)
affirmed the LA’s Decision.

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ISSUE

Did the CA err in ruling that petitioners were validly dismissed?

RULING

NO. As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate

program professor's field of instruction has been in place. Thus, when the CBA was executed
between the parties in 2006, they had no right to include therein the provision relative to the
acquisition of tenure by default, because it is contrary to, and thus violative of, the 1992 Revised
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that was in effect at the time. As such, said CBA
provision is null and void, and can have no effect as between the parties. "A void contract is
equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a
juridical relation.” Under the Civil Code,

When the CHED Memorandum came out, it merely carried over the requirement of a
masteral degree for faculty members of undergraduate programs contained in the 1992 Revised
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. It cannot therefore be said that the requirement of a
master's degree was retroactively applied in petitioners' case, because it was already the
prevailing rule with the issuance of the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

Thus, going by the requirements of law, it is plain to see that petitioners are not qualified
to teach in the undergraduate programs of UST. And while they were given ample time and
opportunity to satisfy the requirements by obtaining their respective master's degrees, they
failed in the endeavor. Petitioners knew this - that they cannot continue to teach for failure to
secure their master's degrees - and needed no reminding of this fact; "those who are seeking to
be educators are presumed to know these mandated qualifications."

From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for
maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to
be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners cannot
therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not possess the required master's
degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain professors without the necessary
master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as
the law is concerned, respondents are in violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the
practice of hiring unqualified teaching personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of
petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.

Latin for 'in equal fault,' in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or
are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties,
when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto. Under the pari
delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no
action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds
expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis."

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 It cannot be said either that by agreeing to the tenure by default provision in the CBA,
respondents are deemed to be in estoppel or have waived the application of the requirement
under the CHED Memorandum. Such a waiver is precisely contrary to law. Moreover, a waiver
would prejudice the rights of the students and the public, who have a right to expect that UST is
acting within the bounds of the law, and provides quality education by hiring only qualified
teaching personnel. Under Article 6 of the Civil Code, "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver
is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law." On the other hand, there could be no acquiescence -
amounting to estoppel - with respect to acts which constitute a violation of law. "The doctrine of
estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra
vires." "[N]o estoppel can be predicated on an illegal act."

It cannot be said either that in requiring petitioners to file a written appeal, respondents
are guilty of bad faith and malice for practically forcing the former to renounce their tenure.
There is no tenure to speak of in the first place.

The State through Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (The Education Act of 1982) delegated the
administration of the education system and the supervision and regulation of educational
institutions to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (now Department of Education).
Accordingly, in promulgating the Manual of Regulations, DECS was exercising its power of
regulation over educational institutions, which includes prescribing the minimum academic
qualifications for teaching personnel.

In 1994 the legislature transferred the power to prescribe such qualifications to the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). CHED's charter authorized it to set minimum
standards for programs and institutions of higher learning. The Manual of Regulations continued
to apply to colleges and universities and suppletorily the Joint Order until 2010 when CHED
issued a Revised Manual of Regulations which specifically applies only to institutions involved
in tertiary education.

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable.
The operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to
ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching
skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human
activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared
teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required
to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.

Conditions of employment of non-academic non-teaching school personnel, including

compensation, hours of work, security of tenure and labor relations, shall be governed by the
appropriate labor laws and regulations.

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 MARSMAN & COMPANY, INC. v. RODIL C. STA. RITA
G.R. No. 194765, 23 April 2018, FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court has upheld the transfer/absorption of employees from one company to another,
as successor employer, as long as the transferor was not in bad faith and the employees absorbed
by a successor-employer enjoy the continuity of their employment status and their rights and
privileges with their former employer.
It is imperative to point out that the integration and transfer was a necessary consequence
of the business transition or corporate reorganization that Marsman and CPDSI had undertaken,
which had the characteristics of a corporate spin-off. To recall, a proviso in the Memorandum of
Agreement limited Marsman's function into that of a holding company and transformed CPDSI as
its main operating company. In business parlance, a corporate spin-off occurs when a department,
division or portions of the corporate business enterprise is sold-off or assigned to a new corporation
that will arise by the process which may constitute it into a subsidiary of the original corporation.

FACTS
Marsman temporarily hired Sta. Rita as a warehouse helper. After the contract expired,
Marsman rehired Sta. Rita as a warehouseman and placed him on probationary status. Marsman
then confirmed Sta. Rita's status as a regular employee. Later, Sta. Rita joined Marsman
Employees Union (MEU), the recognized sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
Marsman's employees.
Sometime in July 1995, Marsman purchased Metro Drug, now Consumer Products
Distribution Services, Inc. (CPDSI), a company that was also engaged in the distribution and sale
of pharmaceutical and consumer products, from Metro Pacific, Inc. The similarity in Marsman's
and Metro Drug's business led to the integration of their employees.
Concomitant to the integration of employees is the transfer of all office, sales and
warehouse personnel of Marsman to Metro Drug and the latter's assumption of obligation with
regard to the affected employees' labor contracts and Collective Bargaining Agreement. The
integration and transfer of employees ensued out of the transitions of Marsman and CPDSI into,
respectively, a holding company and an operating company.
CPDSI contracted its logistic services to EAC Distributors (EAC). CPDSI and EAC agreed
that CPDSI would provide warehousemen to EAC's tobacco business which operated in EAC-Libis
Warehouse. Parenthetically, EAC's use of the EAC-Libis Warehouse was dependent upon the
lease contract between EAC and Valiant Distribution (Valiant), owner of the EAC-Libis
Warehouse. Hence, EAC's operations were affected when Valiant decided to terminate their
contract of lease.

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 This sequence of events left CPDSI with no other option but to terminate the employment
of those assigned to EAC-Libis Warehouse, including Sta. Rita.
Sta. Rita filed a complaint in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against
Marsman for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted the petition. The NLRC reversed
the LA’s Decision and found that there was no employer-employee relationship between
Marsman and Sta. Rita. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the NLRC Decision. The Court of
Appeals held that Marsman was Sta. Rita's employer because Sta. Rita was allegedly not part of
the integration of employees between Marsman and CPDSI.

ISSUE
Was there an employer-employee relationship between Marsman and Sta. Rita at the
time of Sta. Rita's dismissal?

RULING
NO. The issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists in a given case
is essentially a question of fact. As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with
greater force in labor cases. This petition however falls under the exception because of variance
in the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. Indeed, on
occasion, the Court is constrained to wade into factual matters when there is insufficient or
insubstantial evidence on record to support those factual findings; or when too much is
concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.
To reiterate the facts, undisputed and relevant to the disposition of this case, Marsman
hired Sta. Rita as a warehouseman when it was still engaged in the business of distribution and
sale of pharmaceutical and consumer products. Marsman paid Sta. Rita's wages and controlled
his warehouse assignments, acts which can only be attributed to a bona fide employer. Marsman
thereafter purchased Metro Drug, now CPDSI, which at that time, was engaged in a similar
business. Marsman then entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with MEU, its bargaining
representative, integrating its employees with CPDSI and transferring its employees, their
respective employment contracts and the attendant employment obligation to CPDSI. The
planned integration was then carried out sometime in 1996, as admitted by Sta. Rita in his
pleading.
It is imperative to point out that the integration and transfer was a necessary
consequence of the business transition or corporate reorganization that Marsman and CPDSI had
undertaken, which had the characteristics of a corporate spin-off. To recall, a proviso in the
Memorandum of Agreement limited Marsman's function into that of a holding company and
transformed CPDSI as its main operating company. In business parlance, a corporate spin-off
occurs when a department, division or portions of the corporate business enterprise is sold-off
or assigned to a new corporation that will arise by the process which may constitute it into a
subsidiary of the original corporation.

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 The spin-off and the attendant transfer of employees are legitimate business interests of
Marsman. The transfer of employees through the Memorandum of Agreement was proper and
did not violate any existing law or jurisprudence.
Jurisprudence has long recognized what are termed as "management prerogatives."
In SCA Hygiene Products Corporation Employees Association-FFW v. SCA Hygiene Products
Corporation, the Court held that:
The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees have been
traditionally identified as a management prerogative subject to limitations found in the
law, a collective bargaining agreement, or in general principles of fair play and justice.
This is a function associated with the employer's inherent right to control and manage
effectively its enterprise. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must
also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve
its purpose cannot be denied. x x x.
Analogously, the Court has upheld the transfer/absorption of employees from one
company to another, as successor employer, as long as the transferor was not in bad faith and
the employees absorbed by a successor-employer enjoy the continuity of their employment
status and their rights and privileges with their former employer.
Sta. Rita's contention that the absence of his signature on the Memorandum of Agreement
meant that his employment remained with Marsman is merely an allegation that is neither proof
nor evidence. It cannot prevail over Marsman's evident intention to transfer its employees.
To assert that Marsman remained as Sta. Rita's employer even after the corporate spin-
off disregards the separate personality of Marsman and CPDSI. It is a fundamental principle of
law that a corporation has a personality that is separate and distinct from that composing it as
well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. [39] Other than Sta. Rita's
bare allegation that Michael Leo T. Luna was Marsman's and CPDSI's Vice-President and General
Manager, Sta. Rita failed to support his claim that both companies were managed and operated
by the same persons, or that Marsman still had complete control over CPDSI's operations.
Moreover, the existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders without
more, is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or
other public policy considerations.
Verily, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil also finds no application in this case
because bad faith cannot be imputed to Marsman. On the contrary, the Memorandum of
Agreement guaranteed the tenure of the employees, the honoring of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed in June 1995, the preservation of salaries and benefits, and the enjoyment of
the same terms and conditions of employment by the affected employees.
Sta. Rita also failed to satisfy the four-fold test which determines the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. The elements of the four-fold test are:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employees;

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 (2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employee's conduct.
There is no hard and fast rule designed to establish the aforesaid elements. Any
competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. Identification cards,
cash vouchers, social security registration, appointment letters or employment contracts,
payrolls, organization charts, and personnel lists, serve as evidence of employee status.
The Memorandum of Agreement effectively transferred Marsman's employees to CPDSI.
However, there was nothing in the agreement to negate CPDSI's power to select its employees
and to decide when to engage them.
To prove the element on the payment of wages, Sta. Rita submitted forms for leave
application, with either Marsman's logo or CPDSI's logo. Significantly, the earlier leave forms
bore Marsman's logo but the latest leave application of Sta. Rita already had CPDSI's logo. In any
event, the forms for leave application did not sufficiently establish that Marsman paid Sta. Rita's
wages. Sta. Rita could have presented pay slips, salary vouchers, payrolls, certificates of
withholding tax on compensation income or testimonies of his witnesses. The submission of his
Social Security System (SSS) identification card (ID) only proved his membership in the social
insurance program. Sta. Rita should have instead presented his SSS records which could have
reflected his contributions, and the name and address of his employer. Thus, Sta. Rita fell short
in his claim that Marsman still had him in its payroll at the time of his dismissal.
As to the power of dismissal, the letter dated January 14, 2000 clearly indicated that
CPDSI, and not Marsman, terminated Sta. Rita's services by reason of redundancy.
Finally, Sta. Rita failed to prove that Marsman had the power of control over his
employment at the time of his dismissal. The power of an employer to control the work of the
employee is considered the most significant determinant of the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. Control in such relationships addresses the details of day to day work
like assigning the particular task that has to be done, monitoring the way tasks are done and
their results, and determining the time during which the employee must report for work or
accomplish his/her assigned task. The Court likewise takes notice of the company IDs attached
in Sta. Rita's pleading. The "old" ID bore Marsman's logo while the "new" ID carried Metro Drug's
logo. The Court has held that in a business establishment, an identification card is usually
provided not only as a security measure but mainly to identify the holder thereof as a bona
fide employee of the firm that issues it. Thus the "new" ID confirmed that Sta. Rita was an
employee of Metro Drug, which, to reiterate, later changed its name to CPDSI.
Having established that an employer-employee relationship did not exist between
Marsman and Sta. Rita at the time of his dismissal, Sta. Rita's original complaint must be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the part of the Labor Arbiter to take cognizance of the case.
For this reason, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised.

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 REYMAN G. MINSOLA v. NEW CITY BUILDERS, INC. AND ENGR. ERNEL FAJARDO
G.R. No. 207613, 31 January 2018, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Accordingly, it is not uncommon for a construction firm to hire project employees to perform
work necessary and vital for its business. Suffice it to say, in William Uy Construction Corp. and/or
Uy, et al. v. Trinidad, the Court acknowledged the unique characteristic of the construction industry
and emphasized that the laborer's performance of work that is necessary and vital to the employer's
construction business, and the former's repeated rehiring, do not automatically lead to
regularization.
In the case at bar, Minsola failed to advert to any particular act showing that he was
actually dismissed or terminated from his employment. Neither was there any single allegation that
he was prevented or barred from returning to work.

FACTS
New City Builders, Inc. (New City) is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the
Philippines engaged in the construction business, specializing in structural and design works.
New City hired Minsola as a laborer for the structural phase of its Avida Tower 3 Project
Subsequently, the structural phase of the Avida 3 was completed. Thus, Minsola received a notice
of termination. New City re-hired Minsola as a mason for the architectural phase of the Avida 3.
Meanwhile, upon reviewing Minsola's employment record, New City noticed that Minsola
had no appointment paper as a mason for the architectural phase. Consequently, New City
instructed Minsola to update his employment record. However, the latter ignored New City's
instructions, and continued to work without an appointment paper. Minsola was again
summoned to the office of New City to sign his appointment paper. Minsola adamantly refused
to comply with the directive. He stormed out of the office, and never reported back for work.
Minsola filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal, claiming that he was a regular employee
of New City as he rendered work for more than one year and that his work as a laborer/mason
is necessary and desirable to the former's business. He claimed that he was constructively
dismissed by Ne
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA found that
Minsola was a project employee who was hired for specific projects by New City. The NLRC
reversed the LA's ruling. The NLRC found that Minsola was a regular employee. The Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the NLRC's decision. The CA ruled that Minsola was a project employee.

ISSUE
Was Minsola constructively dismissed by New City?

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RULING

NO. Minsola is a Project Employee of New City. Essentially, the Labor Code classifies four
(4) kinds of employees, namely:
(i) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer;
(ii) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the employees' engagement;
(iii) seasonal employees or those who perform services which are seasonal in
nature, and whose employment lasts during the duration of the season; and
(iv) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal
employees. Jurisprudence has added a fifth kind — fixed-term employees or those hired
only for a definite period of time.
In a project-based employment, the employee is assigned to a particular project or phase,
which begins and ends at a determined or determinable time. Consequently, the services of the
project employee may be lawfully terminated upon the completion of such project or phase.
For employment to be regarded as project-based, it is incumbent upon the employer to
prove that
(i) the employee was hired to carry out a specific project or undertaking, and
(ii) the employee was notified of the duration and scope of the project.
In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word "project"
as a means to prevent employees from attaining regular status, employers must prove that the
duration and scope of the employment were specified at the time the employees were engaged,
and prove the existence of the project.
In the case at bar, Minsola was hired by New City Builders to perform work for two
different phases in the construction of the Avida 3. The records show that he was hired as a
laborer for the structural phase of the Avida 3 from December 16, 2008 until August 24, 2009.
Upon the completion of the structural phase, he was again employed on August 25, 2009, by New
City, this time for the architectural phase of the same project. There is no quibbling that Minsola
was adequately informed of his employment status (as a project employee) at the time of his
engagement. This is clearly substantiated by the latter's employment contracts, stating that:
(i) he was hired as a project employee; and
(ii) his employment was for the indicated starting dates therein, and will end on
the completion of the project.

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 The said contract sufficiently apprised Minsola that his security of tenure with New City
would only last as long as the specific phase for which he was assigned.
In Gadia v. Sykes Asia, Inc., the Court explained that the "projects" wherein the project
employee is hired may consist of:
(i) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of
the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from
the other undertakings of the company; or
(ii) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation."
Accordingly, it is not uncommon for a construction firm to hire project employees to
perform work necessary and vital for its business. Suffice it to say, in William Uy Construction
Corp. and/or Uy, et al. v. Trinidad, the Court acknowledged the unique characteristic of the
construction industry and emphasized that the laborer's performance of work that is necessary
and vital to the employer's construction business, and the former's repeated rehiring, do not
automatically lead to regularization.
Accordingly, it is all too apparent that the employee's length of service and repeated re-
hiring constitutes an unfair yardstick for determining regular employment in the construction
industry. Thus, Minsola's rendition of more than one year of service and his repeated re-hiring
are not badges of regularization.
In labor law, constructive dismissal, also known as a dismissal in disguise, exists "where
there is cessation of work, because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay" and other benefits.
There must be an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. It may likewise,
exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego
his continued employment."
In the case at bar, Minsola failed to advert to any particular act showing that he was
actually dismissed or terminated from his employment. Neither was there any single allegation
that he was prevented or barred from returning to work. On the contrary, it was actually Minsola
who stormed out of New City's office and refused to report for work. It cannot be gainsaid that
there is no illegal dismissal to speak of where the employee was not notified that he had been
dismissed from employment nor was he prevented from returning to his work.

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 MARIA CARMELA P. UMALI v. HOBBYWING SOLUTIONS, INC.
G.R. No. 221356, 14 March 2018, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Since extension of the period is the exception, rather than the rule, the employer has the
burden of proof to show that the extension is warranted and not simply a stratagem to preclude the
worker's attainment of regular status. Without a valid ground, any extension of the probationary
period shall be taken against the employer especially since it thwarts the attainment of a
fundamental right, that is, security of tenure.
In the instant case, there was no valid extension of the probationary period since the same
had lapsed long before the company thought of extending the same.

FACTS
Maria Carmela P. Umali (Umali) alleged that she started working for the Hobbywing
Solutions, Inc. (Hobbywing), an online casino gaming establishment, as a Pitboss Supervisor. Her
main duties and responsibilities involve, among others, supervising online casino dealers as well
as the operations of the entire gaming area or studio of the respondent company. She, however,
never signed any employment contract before the commencement of her service but regularly
received her salary every month.
After seven months since she started working for the Hobbywing, Umali was asked to
sign two employment contracts. The first employment contract was for a period of five months,
and the second contract was for a period of three months. She signed both contracts. Umali was
informed by Hobbywing that her employment has already ended and was told to just wait for
advice whether she will be rehired or regularized. She was also required to sign an exit clearance
from the company apparently to clear her from accountabilities. She was no longer allowed to
work thereafter. Thus, Umali filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Hobbywing.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The National Labor
Relations Commission NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and ruled that Umali was illegally
dismissed. The court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the NLRC and ruled that Umali was
validly dismissed.

ISSUE
Was Umali validly dismissed?
RULING
YES. The petition was granted and the Court reverse the ruling of the CA. In the instant
case, the Court finds that the CA misapprehended facts and overlooked details which are crucial
and significant that they can warrant a change in the outcome of the case.

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 In finding that there was no illegal dismissal, the CA echoed the ruling of the LA that Umali
failed to establish the fact of dismissal. It held that Umali failed to present evidence manifesting
the intention of the Hobbywing to sever relations with her. Absent any overt act on the part
Hobbywing, it ruled that there can be no dismissal to speak of. It also found credible Hobbywing’s
claim that it was Umali who refused to accept the offer of continued employment with the
company.
The CA missed the point that the Hobbywing employed a scheme in order to obscure the
fact of Umali’s dismissal. The CA would have recognized this ploy if it only delved deeper into the
records and facts of the case.
It is beyond dispute that Umali started working for Hobbywing on June 19, 2012 as a
probationary employee and that there were two employment contracts signed by the parties.
The parties, however, held conflicting claims with respect to the time when the contracts were
signed. Umali is claiming that there was no contract before the commencement of her
employment and that she was only asked to sign two employment contracts on January 19, 2013,
after having rendered seven months of service. On the other hand, Hobbywing maintains that
there was a contract of probationary employment signed at the beginning of Umali’s service and
another one signed on November 18, 2012, extending the probationary period purportedly to
give Umali a chance to improve her performance and qualify for regular employment. The LA
and the CA, however, opted to believe Hobbywing’s claim that the contract of probationary
employment was signed and extended on time. Having taken this theory, it is easy to dispose the
case by concluding that no dismissal had taken place.
There was, however, a single detail which convinced the Court to take a second look at
the facts of case. Umali consistently reiterates that she was made to sign two contracts of
probationary employment, one covering the period from June 19, 2012 to November 18, 2012,
and the other purportedly extending the probationary employment from November 19, 2012 to
February 18, 2013, only on January 19, 2013. To support her claim, she alleged that she was able
to note the actual date when she signed the contracts, right beside her signature. And indeed,
attached with the position paper submitted by the respondent itself, copies of the two contracts
of employment signed by the petitioner clearly indicates the date "01.19.13" beside her
signature.
This substantiates Umali’s claim that the documents were signed on the same day, that
is, on January 19, 2013. Further, while the first contract was undated, the Probation Extension
Letter was dated January 10, 2013, which was way beyond the end of the supposed probationary
period of employment on November , , therefore validating Umali’s claim that she had
already worked for more than six months when she was asked to sign an employment contract
and its purported extension. Surprisingly, Hobbywing never explained the disparity in the dates
on the actual copies of the contracts which were submitted as annexes and that alleged in its
position paper as the time they were signed by Umali.
This brings to the conclusion that the contracts were only made up to create a semblance
of legality in the employment and severance of the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent,
the significant details left unexplained only validated the petitioner's claim that she had served

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way beyond the allowable period for probationary employment and therefore has attained the
status of regular employment.
It is an elementary rule in the law on labor relations that a probationary employee
engaged to work beyond the probationary period of six months, as provided under Article 281
of the Labor Code, or for any length of time set forth by the employer (in this case, three months),
shall be considered a regular employee. This is clear in the last sentence of Article 281. Any
circumvention of this provision would put to naught the State's avowed protection for labor.
It bears stressing that while in a few instances the Court recognized as valid the extension
of the probationary period, still the general rule remains that an employee who was suffered to
work for more than the legal period of six months of probationary employment or less shall, by
operation of law, become a regular employee. In Buiser v. Leogardo, the Court stated, thus:
Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six months. The exception
to this general rule is when the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as
when the same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of
work to be performed by the employee.
Since extension of the period is the exception, rather than the rule, the employer has the
burden of proof to show that the extension is warranted and not simply a stratagem to preclude
the worker's attainment of regular status. Without a valid ground, any extension of the
probationary period shall be taken against the employer especially since it thwarts the
attainment of a fundamental right, that is, security of tenure.
In the instant case, there was no valid extension of the probationary period since the
same had lapsed long before the company thought of extending the same. More significantly,
there is no justifiable reason for the extension since, on the basis of the Performance Evaluation
dated February 1, 2013, the petitioner had a commendable performance all throughout the
probationary period.
Having rendered service even after the lapse of the probationary period, Umali had
attained regular employment, with all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. Clothed with
security of tenure, she may not be terminated from employment without just or authorized cause
and without the benefit of procedural due process. Since Umali’s case lacks both, she is entitled
to reinstatement with payment of full backwages, as correctly held by the NLRC.

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 GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MS.
JUDITH JOCELYN MARTINEZ v. SEC. CESAR L. VILLANUEVA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNANCE COMMISSION FOR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS UNDER THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT), MR. EMMANUEL
L. BENITEZ (IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE GSIS FAMILY BANK), AND ATTY.
GERALDINE MARIE BERBERABE-MARTINEZ (IN HER CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE GSIS FAMILY BANK)
G.R. No. 210773, 23 January 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations without original
charters are covered by the Labor Code, not the Civil Service Law. However, non-chartered
government-owned or controlled corporations are limited by law in negotiating economic terms
with their employees. This is because the law has provided the Compensation and Position
Classification System, which applies to all government-owned or controlled corporations, chartered
or non-chartered.

FACTS
President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) issued Executive Order No. 7, which
placed an indefinite moratorium on increases in salaries and benefits of employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions.
On June 6, 2011, President Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 10149, or the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011. The law created the Governance Commission for Government-Owned
or Controlled Corporations (Governance Commission), defined as "a central advisory,
monitoring, and oversight body with authority to formulate, implement, and coordinate
policies" in its governed sector.
Emmanuel Benitez (Benitez), GSIS Family Bank's president, then wrote the Governance
Commission to seek clarification on several issues, namely: (1) GSIS Family Bank's impending
collective bargaining negotiations with its employees; (2) its authority to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement with the GSIS Union; and (3) its employees' right to strike.
On March 8, 2013, the Governance Commission replied that as a government financial
institution, GSIS Family Bank was unauthorized to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
with its employees "based on the principle that the compensation and position classification
system is provided for by law and not subject to private bargaining."
The Governance Commission further clarified that the right to strike of GSIS Family
Bank's employees was not guaranteed by the Constitution, as they were government officers and
employees.

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 Thereafter, counsel for the GSIS Union sent GSIS Family Bank a demand letter for the
payment of Christmas bonus to its members, as stipulated in their Collective Bargaining
Agreement. GSIS Union accused GSIS Family Bank of evading its contractual obligation to its
employees by invoking the Governance Commission's opinion that it was no longer authorized
to grant incentives and other benefits to its employees, unless authorized by the President of the
Philippines.
GSIS Union alleged that Republic Act No. 10149 does not apply to GSIS Family Bank, as it
was a private bank created and established under the Corporation Code. It asserted that even if
the Government Service Insurance System owned a majority of GSIS Family Bank's outstanding
capital stock, the change in ownership of shares did not automatically place the bank under the
operation of Republic Act No. 10149.
For GSIS Family Bank's refusal to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement, the
GSIS Union filed a Complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, and later, a
Notice of Strike.
Some bank employees also filed their own Complaints before the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. They aimed to compel
GSIS Family Bank to abide by the provisions of their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement.
On January 30, 2014, GSIS Union filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for
Certiorari, asserting that GSIS Family Bank is a private bank; thus, it is not covered by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 10149.

ISSUE
Can GSIS Family Bank, a non-chartered government-owned or controlled corporation,
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees?

RULING
NO. Under Section 3(o) of Republic Act No. 10149, a government-owned or controlled
corporation is:
(1) established by original charter or through the general corporation law;
(2) vested with functions relating to public need whether governmental or proprietary
in nature; and
(3) directly owned by the government or by its instrumentality, or where the government
owns a majority of the outstanding capital stock.
Possessing all three (3) attributes is necessary to be classified as a government-owned or
controlled corporation.

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 There is no doubt that GSIS Family Bank is a government-owned or controlled
corporation since 99.55% of its outstanding capital stock is owned and controlled by the
Government Service Insurance System.
The right of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and negotiations is
guaranteed by the Constitution under Article XIII, Section 3. But while the right to self-
organization is absolute, the right of government employees to collective bargaining and
negotiation is subject to limitations.
Relations between private employers and their employees are subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws, labor, and welfare legislation. Beyond these requirements, private
employers and their employees are at liberty to establish the terms and conditions of their
employment relationship. In contrast with the private sector, the terms and conditions of
employment of government workers are fixed by the legislature; thus, the negotiable matters in
the public sector are limited to terms and conditions of employment that are not fixed by law.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are
within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
Republic Act No. 10149 defines a non-chartered government-owned or controlled
corporation as a government-owned or controlled corporation that was organized and is
operating under the Corporation Code. It does not differentiate between chartered and non-
chartered government-owned or controlled corporations; hence, its provisions apply equally to
both.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10149 also categorically states, "Any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, no [government-owned or controlled corporation] shall be exempt from the
coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System developed by the [Governance
Commission] under this Act."
Furthermore, Republic Act No. 10149 directed the Governance Commission to develop a
Compensation and Position Classification System, to be submitted for the President's approval,
which shall apply to all officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether chartered or non-chartered.
On March 22, 2016, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 203, which approved
the compensation and classification standards and the Index of Occupational Services
Framework developed and submitted by the Governance Commission.
When it comes to collective bargaining agreements and collective negotiation
agreements in government-owned or controlled corporations, Executive Order No. 203
unequivocally stated that while it recognized the right of workers to organize, bargain, and
negotiate with their employers, "the Governing Boards of all covered [government-owned or
controlled corporations], whether Chartered or Non-chartered, may not negotiate with their
officers and employees the economic terms of their [collective bargaining agreements]."

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 Thus, considering the existing law at the time, GSIS Family Bank could not be faulted for
refusing to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with GSIS Union as it lacked the
authority to negotiate economic terms with its employees. Unless directly challenged in the
appropriate case and with a proper actual controversy, the constitutionality and validity of
Republic Act No. 10149, as it applies to fully government-owned and controlled non-chartered
corporations, prevail.

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 EFREN JULLEZA v. ORIENT LINE PHILIPPINES, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 225190, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court gives more weight to the reports of the ship captain, company-designated
physician, and petitioner's own doctor, all of which are silent on the fact that he slipped and fell.
Other than his allegation and the unnotarized statement of his companion, Julleza failed to present
any evidence to support his claim that he met an accident on December 19, 2012.
Since Julleza failed to prove his alleged accident, he is not entitled to the benefits under his
CBA, which only grants benefits if the disability is a result of an accident. However, Julleza is still
entitled to the disability benefits under the POEA-SEC.

FACTS
Julleza was employed by Orient Line et al. as bosun on board MV Orient Phoenix for a
period of nine months. Subsequently, Julleza allegedly slipped while cleaning the cargo hold
under bad weather condtion. He was not immediately brought to the hospital for medical
attention.
Upon return to the Philippines, the company-designated physician certified that Julleza
was suffering from bilateral nephrolithiasis and lumbar spondylosis. Julleza was then informed
that the disability grading is Grade 8, i.e. loss of 2.3 lifting power of the trunk.
Thereafter, Julleza also consulted an independent physician, which diagnosed Julleza as
unfit for doing further strenuous duties. Subsequently, he filed a complaint for illness allowance,
disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses and damages.
However, Orient Line et al. argued that the nephrolithiasis is not work related as certified
by the company-designated physician. The company likewise contended that the illness or injury
did not result from an accident, as there was no confirmation or validation of such incident
except only the self-serving statements.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Julleza was entitled to permanent total disability
benefits following their CBA. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the
ruling of the lower court. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the NLRC decision.

ISSUES
(1) Did Julleza comply with the conflict-resolution procedure under the CBA?
(2) Is Julleza entitled to disability benefits?

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RULING
(1) NO. The company-designated physician, who saw Julleza for medical check-up for at
least 10 instances issued his medical findings on April , , or days from Julleza’s
repatriation on December 25, 2012.
Unsatisfied, Julleza consulted an independent doctor on May 4, 2013. His own doctor saw
him twice and issued his Medical Report subsequently on June 29, 2013. Given the conflict
between the findings of the two doctors, the provision of the CBA regarding the resolution of
such conflict applies. In Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc. the Court ruled that the
seafarer is required to comply with the conflict-resolution procedure, which was the same under
the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) and the CBA.
Further, with regard to the procedure for referral to a third doctor, jurisprudence has set
that it is the duty of the seafarer to signify his intent to refer the conflict between the findings of
the company-designated physician and that of his own doctor to a third doctor. After notice from
the seafarer, the company must then commence the process of choosing the third doctor.
Here, after receipt of his own doctor's medical report, Julleza did not show any proof that
he sent the medical report to respondents and signify to the Orient Line that he would like to
refer the conflicting medical findings to a third doctor. The CA was therefore correct that absent
compliance with the conflict-resolution procedure, the findings of the company-designated
physician should prevail over that of the seafarer's doctor.
(2) YES. An accident has been defined in NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. Illescas
as “any unexpected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence; any
unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or death; some
untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events.”
Here, support for Julleza's claim that he met an accident comes only from his own
handwritten statement and that of his peer who issued unnotarized statements. The totality of
the foregoing evidence attached to the records convinces the Court that the CA was correct in
ruling that petitioner was not involved in an accident. The Court gives more weight to the reports
of the ship captain, company-designated physician, and petitioner's own doctor, all of which are
silent on the fact that he slipped and fell. In fact, the reports of both doctors reveal that Julleza
had been experiencing back pain since August 2010 and his back pain got worse on December
19, 2012, a few days before the end of his contract, when he was carrying heavy objects.
The back pain, which he had been experiencing as far back as August 2010, and which
worsened while he was carrying heavy objects, was not an unlooked-for mishap, occurrence, or
fortuitous event. It did not arise from an unusual circumstance. It did not arise from a calamity,
casualty, catastrophe, disaster or an undesirable or unfortunate happening as it would seem to
have developed through time given the nature of his work.
However, Julleza is still entitled to benefits, not under the CBA, but under the POEA-SEC
since his injury did not arise from an accident.

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 FARMER-BENEFICIARIES BELONGING TO THE SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG
BAGUMBONG, JALAJALA, RIZAL, represented by their President,
TORIBIO M. MALABANAN v. HEIRS OF JULIANA MARONILLA
G.R. No. 229983, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In order to be not considered agricultural land, and hence, not covered under the CARP, the
land must not have been classified:
(a) as mineral or forest by the DENR and its predecessor agencies; and
(b) for residential, commercial or industrial use in town plans and zoning ordinances as
approved by the BLURB and its preceding competent authorities prior to June 15, 1988. Therefore,
the forest land referred to in Section 3 (c) of RA 6657, as amended is to be understood as referring
to forest land declared to be such by the DENR, i.e., primary classification as forest, and not its
secondary classification by the LGUs.
The Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in upholding the DAR Secretary's
ruling excluding:
(a) portions of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 164410 to 164415 (inclusive), 164417 and
(164430) 422059 on the basis of their HSRC-approved reclassification as forest conservation zone
since only forest lands primarily classified by the DENR are exempt from CARP coverage pursuant
to Section 3 (c) of RA 6657, as amended; and
(b) portions of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 164414,164415, 164416, 164417, and
(164430) 422059 on the basis of their secondary reclassification as agro-industrial since agro-
industrial lands are within the ambit or coverage of the definition of agricultural land, and as such,
covered by the CARP.

FACTS
Following the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 27, portions of the lands owned
by Juliana Maronilla (Juliana) were placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) program. Thus, certificates of land transfer (CLTs) were issued in favor of Farmer-
Beneficiaries belonging to the Samahang Magbubukid and other farmer-beneficiaries (FBs).
Subsequently, the President of the Philippines directed the issuance of emancipation
patents (EPs) to FBs of the OLT program. Accordingly, EPs over the subject lands were issued by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which were thereafter registered (EP Titles) with the
Register of Deeds of Rizal (RD-Rizal).
Thereafter, Juliana voluntarily offered the subject lands for sale to the DAR pursuant to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The DAR acquired the remaining portions
undistributed under P.D. No. 27 and issued certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) in favor

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of the FBs. The corresponding titles (CLOA titles) were issued in the latter's favor which partially
cancelled Juliana's titles.
Sometime in March 1996, Juliana passed away. Her heirs filed an application for retention
of a portion of the subject lands, which was granted. Contrarily, FBs sought the recall/revocation
of the said Order insofar as the parcels of land already apportioned to them are concerned, but
the same was denied.
Meanwhile, the heirs filed an Application for Exemption Clearance from CARP coverage
(exemption case) of a portion of the subject lands. They claimed that the lands had been classified
as mineral, forest, residential, institutional, commercial or agro-industrial, and as such, cannot
be considered as agricultural lands within the contemplation of R.A. No. 6657 or P.D. No. 27.
The DAR Secretary issued an Exemption Order. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the DAR Secretary's ruling that the lands covered by the Exemption Order are outside
the coverage of P.D. No. 27 and the CARP as they have been classified as agro-industrial,
residential, institutional, or forest/forest conservation.

ISSUE
Are the subject portions excluded from CARP coverage?

RULING
NO. The CARP covers all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. Section 3 (c) of R.A.
No. 6657, as amended, defines agricultural land as referring to "land devoted to agricultural
activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."
DAR AO No. 1, Series of 199085 clarified this definition of agricultural land. It states that
in order to be excluded under the CARP, the land must not have been classified:
(a) as mineral or forest by the DENR and its predecessor agencies; and
(b) for residential, commercial or industrial use in town plans and zoning ordinances as
approved by the BLURB and its preceding competent authorities prior to June 15, 1988.
Therefore, the forest land referred to in Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, is to
be understood as referring to forest land declared to be such by the DENR, i.e., primary
classification as forest, and not its secondary classification by the LGUs. Consequently,
reclassification by LGUs of agricultural lands into "forest conservation zones," which is in the
nature of a secondary classification, does not have the effect of converting such lands into forest
lands as to be exempt from CARP coverage.

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 Moreover, Section 4 (d) of RA 6657, as amended provides that the law covers "all private
lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that
can be raised thereon."
The Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in upholding the DAR Secretary's
ruling excluding:
(a) portions of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 164410 to 164415 (inclusive), 164417 and
(164430) 422059 on the basis of their HSRC-approved reclassification as forest conservation
zone since only forest lands primarily classified by the DENR are exempt from CARP coverage
pursuant to Section 3 (c) of RA 6657, as amended; and
(b) portions of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 164414,164415, 164416, 164417, and
(164430) 422059 on the basis of their secondary reclassification as agro-industrial since agro-
industrial lands are within the ambit or coverage of the definition of agricultural land, and as
such, covered by the CARP.
However, anent the lands in item (a), they may nonetheless be exempt from CARP
coverage if they are actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, forest reserves,
reforestation, or watersheds under Section 10 (a) of RA 6657, as amended upon determination
of the Office of the DAR Secretary.

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CIVIL LAW

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 JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS III v. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
G.R. No. 217910, 03 September 2019, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To be entertained by the Court, a facial challenge requires a showing of curtailment of the

right to freedom of expression. In other words, it must be based on actual facts, sufficiently for a
proper joinder of issues to be resolved. So when faced with speculations situations that have not
yet fully ripened into clear breaches of legally demandable rights or obligations the Court shall
refrain from passing upon the case. It is the parties' duty to demonstrate actual cases or
controversies worthy of judicial resolution.

Here, Falcis has no actual facts that present a real conflict between the parties of this case.
No factual antecedents existed prior to the filing of the Petition apart from the passage of the Family
Code. Falcis has never applied for a marriage license. He has never even visited the premises of
respondent's office, or of anyone acting under its authority. Falcis has never bothered to show that
he himself acted in any way that asked respondent to exercise any kind of discretion. Indeed, no
discretion was ever exercised by respondent. Without an exercise of discretion, there could not have
been abuse of discretion, let alone one that could conceivably be characterized as "grave."

FACTS

Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before the Supreme Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to "declare
Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46
(4) and 55 (6) of the Family Code."

Falcis argues that his Petition complied with the requisites of judicial review. As to
standing, he claims that his standing consisted in his personal stake in the outcome of the case,
as he "is an open and self-identified homosexual" who alleges that the Family Code has a
"normative impact" on the status of same-sex relationships in the country. He was also allegedly
injured by the supposed "prohibition against the right to marry the same-sex," which prevents
his plans to settle down in the Philippines.

Falcis justifies the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by citing, in addition to the
alleged transcendental importance of the issues he raised, the supposed lack of need for trial
concerning any factual issues. He also insists that the constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the
Family Code were the very lis mota of his case.

According to Falcis, a facial challenge on Articles 1 and 2 is permitted as these two (2)
provisions regulate fundamental rights such as "the right to due process and equal protection,
right to decisional and marital privacy, and the right to found a family in accordance with
religious convictions." Because there is allegedly no necessity to limit marriage as only between

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a man and a woman, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are supposedly unconstitutional for
depriving Falcis of his right to liberty without substantive due process of law.

Finally, Falcis claims that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny the existence of
"individuals belonging to religious denominations that believe in same-sex marriage" and that
they have a "right to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions." He claims
that the religious weddings conducted by these denominations have been denied civil
recognition "unlike the religious convictions of Catholics and Muslims."

The Supreme Court ordered the Civil Registrar General to comment on the Petition. The
Civil Registrar General, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment (Ad
Cautelam), praying for the dismissal of the Petition since it was not in the nature of a class suit,
but was instead personal only to Falcis. Because of this, it claims that Falcis failed to show injury-
in-fact and an actual case or controversy, but was rather seeking an advisory opinion that the
Court cannot issue.

LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church), Reverend Crescencio "Ceejay" Agbayani,
Jr. (Reverend Agbayani), Marlon Felipe (Felipe), and Maria Arlyn "Sugar" Ibañez (Ibañez) —
collectively, Falcis-intervenors — whose counsel was Falcis himself, filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention, adopting by reference the arguments
raised by Falcis in his Petition. Subsequently, they filed their Petition-in-Intervention, which is a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the same reliefs as those in
Falcis' Petition.

The Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Petition-in-Intervention.
Thereafter, preliminary conference and oral arguments were conducted. Memoranda were then
filed in compliance with the Court’s Resolution.

ISSUES

(1) Does the mere passage of the Family Code create an actual case or controversy
reviewable by the Court?
(2) Does the self-identification of Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member of the LGBTQI+
community give him standing to challenge the Family Code?
(3) Does the Petition-in-Intervention cure the procedural defects of the Petition?
(4) Is the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance warranted?

RULING

(1) NO. The Petition before the Court does not present an actual case over which it may
properly exercise its power of judicial review. Fundamentally, for the Court to exercise the
immense power that enables it to undo the actions of the other government branches, the
following requisites must be satisfied:

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 (1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of
judicial determination;
(2) the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to raise the
constitutional issue;
(3) the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, thus ripe for
adjudication; and
(4) the matter of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case, or that
constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, the Court fixed the point at which a legal issue matures into an
actual case or controversy — at the pre-occurrence of an "overt act." By the mere enactment of
the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened
into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In addition, the Court stated in Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic
of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, "[t]hat the law or act in question is not yet
effective does not negate ripeness." This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there
must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.

Proceeding from this, the Petition cannot be entertained as a facial challenge to Articles
1, 2, 46 (4), and 55 (6) of the Family Code. A facial challenge is "an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities." It is distinguished from "as-
applied" challenges, which consider actual facts affecting real litigants.

To be entertained by the Court, a facial challenge requires a showing of curtailment of the

right to freedom of expression. In other words, it must be based on actual facts, sufficiently for a
proper joinder of issues to be resolved. So when faced with speculations — situations that have
not yet fully ripened into clear breaches of legally demandable rights or obligations — the Court
shall refrain from passing upon the case. It is the parties' duty to demonstrate actual cases or
controversies worthy of judicial resolution.

The need to demonstrate an actual case or controversy is even more compelling in cases
concerning minority groups. In Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, this Court
acknowledged that the LGBTQI+ community has historically "borne the brunt of societal
disapproval" due to religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.

Thus, LGBT discrimination has a long history and serves as a remnant of the colonial era
when the most powerful nations used laws as mechanisms of control over morality and
standards of behavior. This is not to say that there is a universal experience for the LGBTQI+
community. Therefore, any entity that attempts to speak for and on behalf of a diverse

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community must be able to adequately thread the needle in representation of them, assisting the
Court's understanding with sufficient facts that would enable it to empower, and not further
exclude, an already marginalized community.

Here, Falcis has no actual facts that present a real conflict between the parties of this case.
All told, Falcis’ -page initiatory pleading neither cites nor annexes any credible or reputable
studies, statistics, affidavits, papers, or statements that would impress upon this Court the
gravity of his purported cause.

Even Falcis' choice of respondent exposes the lack of an actual case or controversy. He
claims that he impleaded the Civil Registrar General as respondent because "it is the
instrumentality of the government that is tasked to enforce the law in relation with marriage."
Lest Falcis himself forget, what he asserts as ground for the allowance of his suit is the existence
of grave abuse of discretion; specifically, grave abuse of discretion in the enactment of the Family
Code. Civil Registrar General was not involved in the formulation or enactment of the Family
Code. It did not participate in limiting the definition of marriage to only opposite-sex couples.
That is the province and power of Congress alone.

No factual antecedents existed prior to the filing of the Petition apart from the passage of
the Family Code. Falcis has never applied for a marriage license. He has never even visited the
premises of respondent's office, or of anyone acting under its authority. Falcis has never
bothered to show that he himself acted in any way that asked respondent to exercise any kind of
discretion. Indeed, no discretion was ever exercised by respondent. Without an exercise of
discretion, there could not have been abuse of discretion, let alone one that could conceivably be
characterized as "grave."

Despite seeking access to the benefits of marriage, Falcis miserably fails to articulate what
those benefits are, in both his filed pleadings and his submissions during oral arguments. More
than being the "foundation of the family," the state of marriage grants numerous specific rights
and privileges that affect most, if not all, aspects of marital and family relationships, such as those
granted by the Family Code and the Civil Code. Marriage has consequences in criminal law as
well. The State's interest in marriage and married persons extends to taxation. Even the Labor
Code and other labor laws are influenced by the institution of marriage. Aside from influencing
provisions in substantive law, the status of marriage is also recognized in the Rules of Court.
Marriage likewise affects the application of other special laws, such as the National Health
Insurance Act of 2013, the Insurance Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10607, and others.

Yet, orienting same-sex relationships towards a state-sanctioned marriage cannot be

attuned solely to its benefits and advantages. This approach usually ignores the burdens
associated with marriage. As a legally-binding relationship that unites two (2) individuals,
marriage becomes an "enabling constraint" that imposes certain duties on married couples and
even limitations on their actions. In civil actions, spouses are generally joint parties in a case
irrespective of who incurred the obligation. In criminal actions, the court may also cite in

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contempt the spouse of a drug dependent who refuses to cooperate in the treatment and
rehabilitation of the drug dependent.

Thus, the claim for a state-sanctioned marriage for same-sex couples should come with
the concomitant willingness to embrace these burdens, as well as to submit to the State certain
freedoms currently enjoyed outside the institution of marriage. Yet, Falcis has miserably failed
to show proof that he has obtained even the slightest measure of consent from the members of
the community that he purports to represent, and that LGBTQI+ persons are unqualifiedly
willing to conform to the State's present construct of marriage.

Limiting itself to four (4) specific provisions in the Family Code, the Petition prays that
the Court "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence,
nullify Articles 46 (4) and 55 (6) of the Family Code." However, should the Court rule as the
Petition asks, there will be far-reaching consequences that extend beyond the plain text of the
specified provisions.

A significant number of provisions under current marriage arrangements pertain to

benefits to or burdens on a specific sex (and are therefore dependent on what is assigned at birth
based on the appearance of external genitalia). As our current laws are confined to a
heteronormative standard, they do not recognize the existence and specificities of other forms
of intimacy.

For instance, an incident of marriage granted by the law to spouses, specifically to wives,
is the option to adopt their husbands' surname under the Civil Code.

In case of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or of a donor,
the Family Code specifies that, to establish paternity and filiation, the husband must consent to
the procedure in a written instrument prior to the child's birth.

The Family Code also contains provisions that favor the husband over the wife on certain
matters, including property relations between spouses. For one, the administration over the
community property belongs to the spouses jointly, but in case of disagreement, the husband's
decision prevails.

Our penal laws likewise contain sex-specific provisions. While a woman who commits
adultery shall be punished with imprisonment, a man who commits adultery shall only suffer the
penalty of destierro. Further, a husband who engages in sex with a woman who is not his wife
does not incur criminal liability if the sexual activity was not performed under "scandalous
circumstances."

In labor law, Republic Act No. 8187, otherwise known as the Paternity Leave Act of 1996,
provides that "every married male employee in the private and public sectors shall be entitled

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to a paternity leave of seven (7) days with full pay for the first four (4) deliveries of the legitimate
spouse with whom he is cohabiting."

Said litany of provisions are not even the entirety of laws relating to marriage. Falcis
would have the Court impliedly amend all such laws, through a mere declaration of
unconstitutionality of only two (2) articles in a single statute. The Court cannot do what Falcis
wants without arrogating legislative power unto itself and violating the principle of separation
of powers.

Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn
state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that
may arise. Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more
inclusive and egalitarian arrangements that the State can acknowledge.

(2) NO. Falcis has no legal standing to file his Petition. Legal standing is a party's
"personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement." Interest in the case "means a material interest, an interest
in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest." Much like the requirement of an actual case or controversy, legal
standing ensures that a party is seeking a concrete outcome or relief that may be granted by
courts.

Here, Falcis asserts that he, being an "open and self-identified homosexual," has standing
to question Articles 1, 2, 46 (4), and 55 (6) of the Family Code due to his "personal stake in the
outcome of the case." Falcis’ supposed personal stake in the outcome of this case is not the
direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would endow him with standing. Mere
assertions of a "law's normative impact"; "impairment" of his "ability to find and enter into long-
term monogamous same-sex relationships"; as well as injury to his "plans to settle down and
have a companion for life in his beloved country"; or influence over his "decision to stay or
migrate to a more LGBT friendly country" can neither be recognized by the Court as sufficient
interest nor can they constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement.

During the oral arguments, Falcis asserted that the very passage of the Family Code itself
was the direct injury that he sustained. Falcis presents no proof at all of the immediate,
inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to him. His fixation on how the Family Code is the
definitive cause of his inability to find a partner is plainly non sequitur. Similarly, anticipation of
harm is not equivalent to direct injury. Falcis fails to show how the Family Code is the proximate
cause of his alleged deprivations.

If the mere passage of a law does not create an actual case or controversy, neither can it
be a source of direct injury to establish legal standing. It does not escape the Court's notice that
the Family Code was enacted in 1987. This Petition was filed only in 2015. Falcis, as a member
of the Philippine Bar, has been aware of the Family Code and its allegedly repugnant provisions,
since at least his freshman year in law school. It is then extraordinary for him to claim, first, that

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he has been continually injured by the existence of the Family Code; and second, that he raised
the unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code at the earliest possible opportunity.

(3) NO. The Petition-in-Intervention cannot cure the plethora of the original Petition’s
defects, and must also be dismissed. It should also be noted that such Petition was also authored
by Falcis after the Office of the Solicitor General pointed out the procedural flaws in his original
Petition.

Intervention requires: (1) a movant's legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) a
showing that the intervention will not delay the proceedings; and (3) a claim by the intervenor
that is incapable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. Here, while petitioners-
intervenors have legal interest in the issues, their claims are more adequately decided in a
separate proceeding, seeking relief independently from the Petition.

Even if the Petition-in-Intervention is not a sham foisted by Falcis upon the Court, it still
does not satisfy the requirements of justiciability. Falciss-intervenors invoke "third-party
standing" as their basis for filing suit. But the requisites of third-party standing are absent here.

For a successful invocation of third-party standing, three (3) requisites must concur:
(a) the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a
"sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
(b) the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and
(c) there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or
her own interests."

Regarding injury-in-fact, LGBTS Christian Church claims that its ability to recruit,
evangelize, and proselytize is impaired by the lack of state recognition of the same-sex marriage
ceremonies it conducts as part of its religion. But there is no legally demandable right for a sect
or denomination's religious ceremonies to be given State imprimatur. Likewise, and in a manner
similar to Falcis, the Family Code has not been shown to be the proximate cause of petitioners-
intervenors' alleged injury.

As to the requirement of some hindrance to a third party's ability to protect its own
interests, petitioners-intervenors claim that "the relative silence in constitutional litigation of
such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United
States may also be construed as a hindrance." This is a direct quotation from White Light
Corporation v. City of Manila, where there was an actual, demonstrable dearth of special interest
groups involving patrons of White Light Corporation's businesses. Here, petitioners-intervenors
presented no proof that there is "relative silence in constitutional litigation" from groups
concerned with LGBTQI+ causes that entitles them to raise arguments on behalf of third parties.

Falcis’ choice of remedy further emphasizes his ignorance of basic legal

procedure. Falcis' presentation of his case makes it patently obvious that his proper remedy is

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not Rule 65, but rather, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court has been categorical that, in certain instances, declaratory relief is proper
should there be a question of the constitutionality of a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation.

Here, considering that there is an abysmal dearth of facts to sustain a finding of an actual
case or controversy and the existence of a direct injury to Falcis, a petition for declaratory relief
resolved after full-blown trial in a trial court would have been the more appropriate remedy.

An equally compelling and independently sufficient basis for dismissing this Petition is
Falcis' violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

(4) NO. Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the

doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear
threats to constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to the Court, but the decisive factor is not
merely the presence of "special and important reasons," but the nature of the question presented
by the parties.

Still, it does not follow that the Court should proceed to exercise its power of judicial
review just because a case is attended with purely legal issues. Even if the Court were to go out
of its way in relaxing rules and proceed to resolve the substantive issues, it would ultimately be
unable to do so, as Falcis himself failed to present even an iota of evidence substantiating his
case.

The Court sympathizes with Falcis with his obvious longing to find a partner. Yet, the time
for a definitive judicial fiat may not yet be here. This is not the case that presents the clearest
actual factual backdrop to make the precise reasoned judgment our Constitution requires.

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 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO
G.R. No. 221029, 24 April 2018, EN BANC (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in an alien land.
The Court did not heed the argument that Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine
law, which prohibits absolute divorce.

FACTS
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage by
virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are
in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related
to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26
of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree, they obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.

ISSUE
Should the divorce decree obtained by Manalo be recognized in the Philippines?

RULING
YES. The Court denied the petition and partially affirmed the CA decision by remanding
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings on Japanese divorce law. Divorce, the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute

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divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. In this jurisdiction, the
following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Article 26 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of paragraph
2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. The aim was that it would
solve the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered
married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under
their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.
In 2005, the Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained
a favorable decree.
The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.

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 The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
The Court ruled that a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law
after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or
her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation
of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "in order that it would not appear anymore that
[she] is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer
married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Dorn already recognized a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, respectively.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law.
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse
can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay, et al. and Medina v. Koike.
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national,
was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the marriage between
her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and
a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, the Court held:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same
reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be
proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The

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Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al. and Garcia v. Recio, the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing
the case, the Court referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence
to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When the
Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse
and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not
stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live
together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil
status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The Court did not heed the argument that Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision,
it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner
or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instances, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of
the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter's national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her
alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who
have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are
alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based
merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is

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utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality
in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar
to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.[56] In filing for divorce based on these grounds,
the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting
that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment
that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of
her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the
Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would
have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they
specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers
to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is
duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If the
Court disallowed a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in
the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born
out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely,
these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child,
if the Court will hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the
principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to
be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying
State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.

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 LARA S GIFTS & DECORS, INC v. MIDTOWN INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC.
G.R. No. 225433, 28 August 2019, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To summarize, the guidelines on the imposition of interest as provided in Eastern Shipping
Lines and Nacar are further modified for clarity and uniformity, as follows:
With regard to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e, a
loan or forbearance of money, goods, credits or judgments, the interest due shall be that which is
stipulated by the parties in writing, provided it is not excessive and unconscionable, which, in the
absence of a stipulated reckoning date, shall be computed from default, i.e., from extrajudicial or
judicial demand in accordance with Article 1169 of the Civil Code, UNTIL FULL PAYMENT, without
compounding any interest unless compounded interest is expressly stipulated by the parties, by law
or regulation. Interest due on the principal amount accruing as of judicial demand shall
SEPARATELY earn legal interest at the prevailing rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, from the time of judicial demand UNTIL FULL PAYMENT.
2. In the absence of stipulated interest, in a loan or forbearance of money, goods, credits or
judgments, the rate of interest on the principal amount shall be the prevailing legal interest
prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which shall be computed from default, i.e., from
extrajudicial or judicial demand in accordance with Article 1169 of the Civil Code, UNTIL FULL
PAYMENT, without compounding any interest unless compounded interest is expressly stipulated
by law or regulation. Interest due on the principal amount accruing as of judicial demand shall
SEPARATELY earn legal interest at the prevailing rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, from the time of judicial demand UNTIL FULL PAYMENT.
3. When the obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, goods, credits or
judgments, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed in the
discretion of the court at the prevailing legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
pursuant to Articles 2210 and 2011 of the Civil Code. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the amount of the claim or damages is established with reasonable certainty,
the prevailing legal interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made extra judicially or
judicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) UNTIL FULL PAYMENT, but when such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date of the judgment of the trial court (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed
to have been reasonably ascertained) UNTIL FULL PAYMENT. The actual base for the computation
of the interest shall, in any case, be on the principal amount finally adjudged, without compounding
any interest unless compounded interest is expressly stipulated by law or regulation.

FACTS

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 Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. is engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, and
exporting handicraft products. On the other hand, Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc. Midtown
Industrial Sales, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling industrial and construction materials,
and Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. is one of its customers.
Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc. alleged that from January 2007 up to December 2007,
Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. purchased various industrial and construction materials in the total
amount of P1,263,104.22. The purchases were on a sixty (60)-day credit term, with the condition
that 24% interest per annum would be charged on all accounts overdue, as stated in the sales
invoices.
Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. paid for its purchases by issuing several Chinabank postdated
checks. However, the checks bounced when deposited on their maturity dates. After repeated
demands, Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. replaced the bounced checks with new postdated Export
and Industry Bank checks. However, the checks were likewise dishonored for being "Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds," and subsequently, for "Account Closed."
Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc. sent a demand letter dated 21 January 2008, which was
received by Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. the following day. Still the latter failed to pay, prompting
Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc. to file on 5 February 2008 a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Prayer for Attachment against Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc.
In its Answer, Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. admitted the purchase but claimed that most of
the deliveries made were substandard and of poor quality.
Trial court rendered a Decision, ordering Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. to pay Midtown
Industrial Sales, Inc. the amount of P1,263,104.22 plus interest fixed at 24% per annum to be
computed from February 5, 2008, the date of judicial demand, until the judgment obligation is
fully paid; attorney s fees; costs of suit. The trial court held that Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. failed
to prove that the deliveries made by Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc. did not comply with the
required specifications. On the other hand, the amount of P1,263,104.22 claimed by Midtown
Industrial Sales, Inc. was supported by the sales invoices and postdated checks. The trial court
also held that the stipulated 24% interest per annum on overdue accounts is not unconscionable.
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Decision of the trial court. On the 24% interest per
annum imposed, the CA found implausible Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc. s claim that it was placed in
a disadvantageous position since it had numerous transactions with Midtown Industrial Sales,
Inc. prior to the purchases made in 2007, hence it could have negotiated for more favorable
terms.
ISSUES
(1) Is the interest rate fixed at 24% per annum void?
(2) If not, should the said rate be applied only until finality of judgment?

RULING

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 (1) NO. In Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Cathay Pacific Steel
Corporation, the Court upheld the validity of interest rate fixed at 24% per annum that was
expressly stipulated in the sales invoices. The Court held that construction company is presumed
to have full knowledge of the terms and conditions of the contract and that by not objecting to
the stipulations in the sales invoice, it also bound itself to pay not only the stated selling price
but also the interest of 24% per annum on overdue accounts and the 25% of the unpaid invoice
for attorney's fees.
In the present case, Lara’s Gifts & Decors, Inc., which has been doing business since 1990
and has been purchasing various materials from Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc. since 2004,
cannot claim to have been misled into agreeing to the 24% interest rate which was expressly
stated in the sales invoices. Besides, the Supreme Court has already ruled in several cases that
an interest rate of 24% per annum agreed upon between the parties is valid and binding and not
excessive and unconscionable. Thus, the stipulated interest per annum is binding on Lara’s
Gifts & Decors, Inc.
(2) The amount of P1,263,104.22 representing the principal amount plus stipulated
interest at 24% per annum should be computed from 22 January 2008, the date of extrajudicial
demand, until full payment.
On the other hand, legal interest on the 24% per annum interest due on the principal
amount accruing as of judicial demand, at the rate of 12% per annum should be computed from
the date of judicial demand on 5 February 2008 until 30 June 2013, and thereafter at the rate of
6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until full payment.
If the rate of interest is stipulated, such stipulated interest shall apply and not the legal
interest, provided the stipulated interest is not excessive and unconscionable. The stipulated
interest shall be applied until full payment of the obligation because that is the law between the
parties, pursuant to Arts. 1159 and 1956 of the Civil Code.
In Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA and Nacar v. Gallery Frames, Paragraph 3 of the guidelines
on the computation of interest failed to qualify that for loans or forbearance of money, the
prevailing legal interest should only apply in the absence of stipulated interest.
This omission resulted in several rulings of the Court, which imposed the stipulated
interest on the adjudged amount until finality of the decision BUT applied the prevailing legal
interest in lieu of the stipulated interest from finality of the decision until full payment of the
obligation. This is in direct contravention of the law, particularly Article 2209 of the Civil Code,
which mandates that when a debtor incurs a delay in obligations to pay a sum of money, the
indemnity for damages shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon.
To repeat, the stipulated interest remains in force until the obligation is satisfied. In the
absence of stipulated interest, the prevailing legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas shall apply. Moreover, there should be no compounding of interest, whether stipulated
or legal, unless compounding is expressly agreed upon in writing by the parties or mandated by
law or regulation.

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 To summarize, the guidelines on the imposition of interest as provided in Eastern
Shipping Lines and Nacar are further modified for clarity and uniformity, as follows:
With regard to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e, a loan or forbearance of money, goods, credits or judgments, the interest due
shall be that which is stipulated by the parties in writing, provided it is not excessive and
unconscionable, which, in the absence of a stipulated reckoning date, shall be computed
from default, i.e., from extrajudicial or judicial demand in accordance with Article 1169
of the Civil Code, UNTIL FULL PAYMENT, without compounding any interest unless
compounded interest is expressly stipulated by the parties, by law or regulation. Interest
due on the principal amount accruing as of judicial demand shall SEPARATELY earn legal
interest at the prevailing rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, from the
time of judicial demand UNTIL FULL PAYMENT.
2. In the absence of stipulated interest, in a loan or forbearance of money, goods,
credits or judgments, the rate of interest on the principal amount shall be the prevailing
legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which shall be computed
from default, i.e., from extrajudicial or judicial demand in accordance with Article 1169
of the Civil Code, UNTIL FULL PAYMENT, without compounding any interest unless
compounded interest is expressly stipulated by law or regulation. Interest due on the
principal amount accruing as of judicial demand shall SEPARATELY earn legal interest at
the prevailing rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, from the time of judicial
demand UNTIL FULL PAYMENT.
3. When the obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, goods,
credits or judgments, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed in the discretion of the court at the prevailing legal interest prescribed by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, pursuant to Articles 2210 and 2011 of the Civil Code. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages until the demand
can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the amount of the claim
or damages is established with reasonable certainty, the prevailing legal interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made extra judicially or judicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code) UNTIL FULL PAYMENT, but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date of the judgment of the trial court (at which time the quantification of damages may
be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained) UNTIL FULL PAYMENT. The actual base
for the computation of the interest shall, in any case, be on the principal amount finally
adjudged, without compounding any interest unless compounded interest is expressly
stipulated by law or regulation.
Thus, Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. is ordered to pay Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc. the
following:

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 1. ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED SIXTY THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FOUR PESOS and 22/100 (P1,263,104.22) representing the principal amount plus
stipulated interest at 24% per annum to be computed from 22 January 2008, the date of
extrajudicial demand, until full payment.
2. Legal interest on the 24% per annum interest due on the principal amount
accruing as of judicial demand, at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of judicial
demand on 5 February 2008 until 30 June 2013, and thereafter at the rate of 6% per
annum from 1 July 2013 until full payment.
3. The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees, plus legal
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum to be computed from the finality of this
Decision until full payment.
4. Cost of the suit.

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 DANA S. SANTOS v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS
G.R. No. 214593, 17 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Reyes, A., Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the
following questions shall be valid: The validity of a marriage or a legal separation. Further, Article
of the Ne Ci il Code pro ides Acts e ec ted against the pro isions of mandator or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Here, compromise agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property relations vis-a-
vis their children, as Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] compromise comprises only
those objects which are definitely stated therein, or which by necessary implication from its terms
should be deemed to have been included in the same." As held by the appellate court, the agreement
makes no mention of the marital ties between [Leodegario] and [Dana] but is limited only to their
property relations vis- a-vis their children.

FACTS
Dana and Leodegario first met each other in 1982, in a wake, through a common friend.
Their relationship developed into a romance. Soon, the couple began living together. Their
cohabitation produced four children.
However, heated arguments and suspicions of infidelity marred their marriage so much
that Dana and Leodegario filed a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership,
which was granted.
Finally, Leodegario filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, alleging
psychological incapacity on the part of Dana. In her Answer, Dana alleged that Leodegario filed
the petition in order to marry his paramour, with whom he had a son.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The court held that Dana was afflicted with grave, incurable, and juridically
antecedent Histrionic Personality Disorder.
Dana filed a Notice of Appeal but she withdrew it and instead filed a Petition for Relief
from Judgment with the RTC alleging that extrinsic fraud and mistake prevented her from
presenting her case at the trial. The trial court denied Dana's petition, ruling that there was no
sufficient allegation of fraud or mistake in the petition.
Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). After a further
exchange of pleadings, the appellate court referred Dana's petition to the Philippine Mediation
Center.
Under the auspices of the appellate court mediator, Dana and Leodegario entered into a
compromise agreement, where they agreed to transfer the titles to their conjugal real properties
in the name of their common children. Dana moved for the archival of the case.

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 Thereafter, Dana filed a Manifestation alleging that Leodegario was not complying with
the compromise agreement. She reiterated this allegation in her Motion to Reopen and/or
Reinstate the Petition. Ordered by the appellate court to comment on the Motion to Reopen,
Leodegario countered that he has complied with the essential obligations under the compromise
agreement. He, subsequently, filed a Manifestation showing such compliance. Thus, the CA
rendered the first assailed Resolution denying Dana's Motion to Reopen.
Undaunted, Dana filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for
Decision (with Plea to Preserve Marital Union), asserting that the compromise agreement was
never intended to settle the issue of the validity and subsistence of her marriage to Leodegario.
The appellate court found the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision
unmeritorious. It held that the marital ties between Dana and Leodegario had been severed by
the trial court's decision; hence, the compromise agreement did not involve the validity of their
marriage but only their property relations.

ISSUE
Did the compromise agreement involve the validity of the marriage of Leodegario and
Dana?

RULING
NO. When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a
contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a
determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately
executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its
terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance, execution
becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
However, like any other judgment, a judgment upon compromise which is contrary to law
is a void judgment; and a void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. It does not
divest rights, and no rights can be obtained under it; all proceedings founded upon a void
judgment are equally worthless.
On the other hand, Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provides that no
compromise upon the validity of a marriage or a legal separation shall be valid. Further, Article
of the New Civil Code provides: “Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.”
The petition which gave rise to these proceedings is for the declaration of nullity of Dana
and Leodegario's marriage. It was erroneous for the appellate court to terminate Dana's suit -
which puts in issue the validity of her marriage - by virtue of the execution of the compromise
agreement which only covers the property relations of the spouses.

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 The Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled that the scope of the compromise
agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property relations vis-a-vis their children, as
Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] compromise comprises only those objects which
are definitely stated therein, or which by necessary implication from its terms should be deemed
to have been included in the same." As held by the appellate court, the agreement makes no
mention of the marital ties between [Leodegario] and [Dana] but is limited only to their property
relations vis- a-vis their children.

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 ESTRELLA ABID-BABANO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 201176, 28 August 2019, EN BANC (Bersamin, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The requirement under Republic Act No. 6713 and similar laws that the sworn statement of
assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) to be filed by every government official must include assets,
liabilities, and net worth of the spouse of the filer is construed not to include the assets, liabilities,
and net worth of spouses whose property regime during the marriage is by law or by agreement
prior to the marriage one of complete separation of property.
Article 38 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws specifically defines their regime of property
relations as Muslims to be one of complete separation of property. In view of Section 38 of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, the exemption of Babano from the disclosure requirement should be clear
and undisputed.

FACTS
The Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PACG) issued a Resolution recommending the
suspension of Department of Education (DepEd) Regional Director Estrella Abid Babano
(Babano) for violation of Section 7, R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8, R.A. No. 6713 for her failure to
disclose in her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) certain motor vehicles
belonging to her husband, himself a public servant required to file his own SALN. The Office of
the President (OP) upheld the recommendation and ordered the suspension of Babano.
Babano appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that both Babano and her husband
were Muslims whose property regime was that of complete separation of property as provided
by Presidential Decree No. 1083 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws). The CA denied the petition and
affirmed the ruling of the OP in toto.

ISSUE
Is the non-inclusion by Babano in her SALN of the vehicles owned by and registered in
the name of her husband correct?

RULING
YES. Babano and her husband were Muslims. She was his second wife. Article 38 of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws specifically defines their regime of property relations as Muslims
to be one of complete separation of property. Article 4216 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
lays down the effect of the regime of complete separation of property for Muslim spouses, and
each spouse fully exercises all acts of ownership and administration over his or her own
exclusive property, without any need for consent from the other spouse. In view of Section 38 of

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the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the exemption of Babano from the disclosure requirement
should be clear and undisputed. As such, Babano's non-disclosure in her SALN of the properties
pertaining to her husband and held by her husband outside of her own household with him was
not actionable.
Interestingly, similar consequences apply even to non-Muslim marriages whose property
regime is one of complete separation. Under the Civil Code, which also has suppletory application
to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the consequence of the property regime of complete
separation is found in Article 214. As the foregoing legal provisions indicate, each spouse in
marriages covered by the regime of complete separation of property may exercise complete
dominion over his or her exclusive estate. No permission or consent is required before one
spouse can exercise acts of ownership or administration. Logically, under the regime of complete
separation of property, each spouse may unilaterally acquire or dispose property without
notifying the other spouse. Moreover, a spouse cannot prevent or interfere with the ownership,
disposal, possession, administration, and enjoyment of exclusive property by the other spouse,
including all fruits and earnings arising therefrom. The owner-spouse can even bind or
encumber his or her own exclusive property without the conformity or knowledge of the other.
Thus, to still require a public official or employee to include in his or her SALN the
separate property of his or her spouse is inequitable as well as cumbersome.

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TAXATION LAW

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 AGUSAN WOOD INDUSTRIES, INC. v.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
G.R. No. 234531, 10 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

With the amendments introduced by E.O. No. 273, the responsibility of collecting forest
charges, as well as the invoicing thereof, was transferred from the BIR to the Forest Management
Bureau. Also, references to the CIR and the Department of Finance now refer to the Director of the
Forest Management Bureau and the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, respectively.
This transfer of responsibility was further echoed in Republic Act No. 7161. Thus, while
considered as internal revenue taxes, the jurisdiction as regards collection and invoicing of forest
charges is vested upon the Forest Management Bureau under the DENR. This is supported by E.O.
No. 273 itself as it was stated that the transfer was implemented for tax administration purposes
only, particularly tax collection.
Alternatively put, the reforms introduced are for tax administration only, deputizing certain
agencies to collect certain taxes. Subsequent amendment to the 1977 NIRC, which is the 1997 NIRC,
retained this transfer.
Verily, the transfer of the entire chapter on charges on forest products to the Revised
Forestry Code, as well as the duties and responsibilities of the BIR to the DENR did not, in any way,
change the nature of forest charges as internal revenue taxes.

FACTS
In 1995, Agusan Wood Industries, Inc. (AWII) was able to cut a total of 5,891 cubic meters
of logs from its concession area in Agusan del Sur. Accordingly, it paid P6,459,523.45 as forest
charges for the retrieval of the logs on December 29, 1995.
However, AWII failed to retrieve the cut logs prior to and even after the expiration of its
Timber License Agreement despite payment of the forest charges. It appears that AWII assigned
its right to collect the refunds and/or tax credit of the forest charges it previously paid to its
sister company, International Timber Corporation (ITC).
In 1998, AWII requested for the refund and/or tax credit of the forest charges for the
5,890.41 cubic meters of logs cut from their logging area amounting to P6,459,523.45 before the
DENR-Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 13, CARAGA, Butuan City.
In a Memorandum Order dated, the DENR-RED ruled that as there was no pertinent
regulation that may be made applicable to tax credit of forest charges; the request falls under the
discretionary power of the DENR Secretary.
As a consequence, AWII requested for a refund and/or tax credit of the subject forest
charges with the DENR Secretary. It asserted that the forest charges it paid was subject to the

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condition that prior cut logs were hauled, retrieved, or removed from the concession area; and
failing which, it is entitled to refund and/or tax credit. The request was denied.

ISSUE
Are forest charges considered internal revenue taxes?

RULING
YES. The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines or Presidential Decree No. 389, Series
of 1974 (P.D. No. 389) was enacted to codify forestry laws in the Philippines, including the
imposition of forest charges. Shortly thereafter, the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines
(Revised Forestry Code) or P.D. No. 705, Series of 1975 (P.D.No. 705) amended P.D. No. 389. The
latter specifically recognized forest charges as taxes and imposed the responsibility of collecting
and invoicing the same upon the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
On the other hand, the nature of forest charges as internal revenue taxes was affirmed in
the 1977 NIRC, which considered the same as one of the "Miscellaneous Taxes" and thereby
devoted a whole chapter for it.
Subsequently, the 1977 NIRC was practically overhauled by Executive Order No. 273,
Series of 1987 (E.O. No. 273). Among others, the whole chapter pertaining to forest charges was
effectively transferred to the Revised Forestry Code
With the amendments introduced by E.O. No. 273, the responsibility of collecting forest
charges, as well as the invoicing thereof, was transferred from the BIR to the Forest Management
Bureau. Also, references to the CIR and the Department of Finance now refer to the Director of
the Forest Management Bureau and the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
respectively.
This transfer of responsibility was further echoed in Republic Act No. 7161. Thus, while
considered as internal revenue taxes, the jurisdiction as regards collection and invoicing of forest
charges is vested upon the Forest Management Bureau under the DENR. This is supported by
E.O. No. 273 itself as it was stated that the transfer was implemented for tax administration
purposes only, particularly tax collection.
Accurately, what E.O. No. 273 removed from the 1977 NIRC and shifted to the Revised
Forestry Code involves provisions pertaining to mere tax collection, namely: (a) mode of
measuring forest products, invoicing, and collection of charges thereon; and (b) mode of
measuring different forest charges.
Alternatively put, the reforms introduced are for tax administration only, deputizing
certain agencies to collect certain taxes. Subsequent amendment to the 1977 NIRC, which is the
1997 NIRC, retained this transfer.

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 Verily, the transfer of the entire chapter on charges on forest products to the Revised
Forestry Code, as well as the duties and responsibilities of the BIR to the DENR did not, in any
way, change the nature of forest charges as internal revenue taxes.
In this case, AWII paid for forest charges on December 29, 1995. However, its claim for
refund and/or tax credit for erroneous payment was filed only on October 29, 1998 before the
DENR Secretary. Not only was the claim filed out of time, but also it was lodged before the wrong
agency. As it stands, AWII failed to discharge the burden of proving strict compliance. Hence, its
claim for refund and/or tax credit is forever barred.

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 CITY OF DAVAO and BELLA LINDA N. TANJILI, in her official capacity as City
Treasurer of Davao City v. RANDY ALLIED VENTURES, INC.
G.R. No. 241697, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Local business taxes are taxes imposed by local government units on the privilege of doing
business within their jurisdictions. To be sure, the phrase "doing business" means some "trade or
commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit."
Particularly, the LBT imposed pursuant to Section 143 (t) is premised on the fact that the persons
made liable for such tax are banks or other financial institutions by virtue of their being engaged
in the business as such.
In this case, it is clear that RAVI is neither a bank nor other financial institution. In order to
be considered as an NBFI under the National Internal Revenue Code, banking laws, and pertinent
regulations, the following must concur:
(a) the person or entity is authorized by the BSP to perform quasi-banking functions;
(b) the principal functions of said person or entity include the lending, investing or
placement of funds or evidence of indebtedness or equity deposited to them, acquired by them, or
otherwise coursed through them, either for their own account of for the account of others; and
(c) the person or entity must perform the activities enumerated in the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions on a regular and recurring,
not on an isolated basis.

FACTS
Randy Allied Ventures, Inc. (RAVI) is one of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF)
holding companies established to own and hold the shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC). The
Supreme Court declared in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic (COCOFED)
that CIIF companies, including RAVI, and the CIIF block of SMC shares as public funds necessarily
owned by the Government.
Subsequently, RAVI filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a claim for refund or credit
of erroneously and illegally collected local business taxes (LBT) for the taxable year 2010. It
claimed that the City of Davao erroneously and illegally collected LBT, corresponding to its
dividends from its SMC preferred shares, on the mistaken assumption that it is a non-bank
financial intermediary (NBFI).
The RTC denied the claim for refund or credit. It held that being a financial intermediary,
RAVI’s income from dividends and interests is subject to LBT under the Local Government Code
of 1991 (LGC). On the contrary, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) held that RAVI is a holding
company and not an NBFI subject to LBT. Subsequently, the CTA En Banc ruled that RAVI cannot
be considered an NBFI for failing to meet the requisites provided under the General Banking

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Law, Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, and the National Internal
Revenue Code. It also held that the COCOFED case already settled that RAVI, as a CIIF company,
and the SMC shares it holds are government properties, hence, beyond the City of Davao's power
to tax.
The City of Davao filed its Motion for Reconsideration and was denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE
Is RAVI a non-bank financial intermediary subject to local business taxes under the LGC?

RULING
NO. LBT are taxes imposed by local government units on the privilege of doing business
within their jurisdictions. To be sure, the phrase "doing business" means some "trade or
commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit."
Particularly, the LBT imposed pursuant to Section 143 (t) is premised on the fact that the persons
made liable for such tax are banks or other financial institutions by virtue of their being engaged
in the business as such.
In this case, it is clear that RAVI is neither a bank nor other financial institution. In order
to be considered as an NBFI under the National Internal Revenue Code, banking laws, and
pertinent regulations, the following must concur:
(a) the person or entity is authorized by the BSP to perform quasi-banking functions;
(b) the principal functions of said person or entity include the lending, investing or
placement of funds or evidence of indebtedness or equity deposited to them, acquired by them,
or otherwise coursed through them, either for their own account of for the account of others;
and
(c) the person or entity must perform the activities enumerated in the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions on a regular and recurring,
not on an isolated basis.
As observed in the COCOFED case, RAVI is a CIIF holding company. The SMC preferred
shares held by it are considered government assets owned by the National Government for the
coconut industry. As held in the same case, these SMC shares as well as any resulting dividends
or increments from said shares are owned by the National Government and shall be used only
for the benefit of the coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry. Thus,
RAVI's management of the dividends from the SMC preferred shares, including placing the same
in a trust account yielding interest, is not tantamount to doing business whether as a bank or
other financial institution, i.e., an NBFI, but rather an activity that is essential to its nature as a
CIIF holding company.

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 Moreover, while RAVI's stated primary purpose in its Amended Articles of Incorporation
is couched in broad terms as to allow some functions similar to an NBFI, this does not necessarily
mean it is engaged in the same business. Verily, the power to purchase and sell real and personal
property, including shares, and to receive dividends thereon, are common provisions to all
corporations, including holding companies like RAVI which undertake investments. The mere
fact that a holding company makes investments does not ipso facto convert it to an NBFI.
Otherwise, there would be absolutely no distinction between a mere holding company and
financial intermediaries.

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 COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v.
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC.
G.R. No. 207039, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The objective of RMO No. 1-2000 in requiring the application for treaty relief with the ITAD
before a party's availment of the preferential rate under a tax treaty is to avert the consequences
of any erroneous interpretation and/or application of treaty provisions, such as claims for
refund/credit for overpayment of taxes, or deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment.
This apparent conflict between which should prevail was settled in the case of Deutsche
Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Since the RP-US Tax Treaty does not provide for any other prerequisite for the availment of
the benefits under the said treaty, to impose additional requirements would negate the availment
of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.

FACTS
Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. (IGC) is a non-resident foreign corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the United States of America. The IGC
owns 30% of the total outstanding and voting capital stock of McCann Worldgroup Philippines,
Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
engaged in the general advertising business.
In 2006, McCann's Board of Directors declared cash dividends in the total amount of
P205,648,685 in favor of its stockholders of record. The IGC received cash dividends from
McCann in the amount of P61,694,605. McCann withheld a Final Withholding Tax (FWT) at the
rate of 35% on IGC's cash dividends and remitted the payment of the FWT in the amount of
P21,593,111 to Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).
In 2008, the IGC filed an administrative claim for refund or issuance of Tax Credit
Certificate (TCC) in the amount of P12,338,921, representing the alleged overpaid FWT on
dividends paid by McCann to IGC. The IGC averred that as a non-resident foreign corporation, it
may avail of the preferential FWT rate of 15% on dividends received from a domestic
corporation under Section 28(B) (5) (b) of the Tax Code.
The CIR failed to act on IGC's claim for refund or issuance of TCC. This prompted the IGC
to file a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA ordered the CIR to
refund or to issue a TCC in favor of IGC in the amount of P12,338,921, representing the overpaid
FWT on cash dividends for taxable year 2006. Hence, this petition.
To support its contention, the CIR argued that: (1) the IGC failed to file a Tax Treaty Relief
Application (TTRA) with the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) 15 days before it paid the tax on dividends, in accordance with Revenue

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Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000; and (2) the IGC, being an unlicensed corporation, has
no capacity to sue in Philippine courts in accordance with the Corporation Code.

ISSUE
Was the IGC effectively deprived of its right to claim a tax refund by failing to file a TTRA
with the ITAD?

RULING
NO. In the case of CBK Power Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court
emphasized the binding effect of international treaty which the Philippines entered into, thus:
The Philippine Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The time-honored international principle of pacta
sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the
states that enter into the agreement. In this jurisdiction, treaties have the force and effect of law.
Specifically, the RP-US Tax Treaty is just one of a number of bilateral treaties which the
Philippines has entered into and to which it is expected to observe compliance therewith in good
faith. As explained by the Court, the purpose of these international agreements is to reconcile the
national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties in order to help the taxpayer avoid
simultaneous taxation in two different jurisdictions. More precisely, the tax conventions are
drafted with a view towards the elimination of international juridical double taxation, which is
defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in
respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods.

On the other hand, the mandatory wording of RMO No. 1-2000, reads:
III. Policies:
2. Any availment of the tax treaty relief shall be preceded by an application by
filing BIR Form No. 0901 (Application for Relief from Double Taxation) with ITAD at least
15 days before the transaction i.e., payment of dividends, royalties, etc., accompanied by
supporting documents justifying the relief.
The objective of RMO No. 1-2000 in requiring the application for treaty relief with the
ITAD before a party's availment of the preferential rate under a tax treaty is to avert the
consequences of any erroneous interpretation and/or application of treaty provisions, such as
claims for refund/credit for overpayment of taxes, or deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment.
This apparent conflict between which should prevail was settled in the case of Deutsche
Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, where the Court lengthily discussed

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that the obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO
No. 1-2000, thus:
Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment
of tax treaty relief as required by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to
the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by good faith in complying with
a tax treaty. The denial of the availment of tax relief for the failure of a taxpayer to apply within
the prescribed period under the administrative issuance would impair the value of the tax treaty.
At most, the application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the
entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief.
The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of
RMO No. 1-2000. Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on
international relations, and unduly discourages foreign investors. While the consequences
sought to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure, these may be
remedied through other system management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty.
But we cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for failure to strictly
comply with an administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty relief.
Since the RP-US Tax Treaty does not provide for any other prerequisite for the availment
of the benefits under the said treaty, to impose additional requirements would negate the
availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.

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CRIMINAL LAW

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOMAR SISRACON Y RUPISAN, MARK VALDERAMA Y
RUPISAN, ROBERTO CORTEZ Y BADILLA, LUIS PADUA Y MITRA AND
ADONIS MOTIL Y GOLONDRINA
G.R. No. 226494, 14 February 2018, SECOND DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is well-established that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all
that is necessary to show that she has indeed been raped. A victim of rape would not come out in
the open if her motive were anything other than to obtain justice. Her testimony as to who abused
her is credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused,
as in this case where the accusations were raised by private complainant against her own father.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime of
rape.

FACTS
AAA, a fifteen-year-old girl and the President of a youth group was about to go home
when she passed by the basketball court. She saw Jomar Rupisan, Mark Rupisan, Roberto Cortez,
Luis Padua and Adonis Golondrina (collectively referred to as respondents). Respondents then
invited AAA to an apartment and gave her a shot of liquor. Then after, AAA allegedly felt dizzy.
Respondents then took her to a papag and took turns inserting their penis into AAA’s vagina.
AAA’s brother, BBB, allegedly arrived at the scene and took her to a clinic in Camp Crame.
From Camp Crame, they proceeded to the Office of the Prosecutor. Thereafter, BBB was told to
identify the suspects and pointed at respondents.
Respondents were charged by the Regional Trial Court with the crime of Rape. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling.

ISSUE
Are respondents guilty of the crime of Rape?

RULING
YES. Article 266-A, 1st paragraph of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 and R.A. 8369, to
which the appellants stand charged provides the following:
The elements of rape committed under Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are:
(a) that the offender, who must be a man, had carnal knowledge of a woman, and

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 (b) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.
In this case, all the elements of the crime of rape have been properly established by the
prosecution and aptly appreciated by the RTC and the CA.
In reviewing rape cases, the following well entrenched principles are used as guide:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
The determination of the credibility of the offended party's testimony is a most basic
consideration in every prosecution for rape, for the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is
sufficient to sustain the verdict of conviction. As in most rape cases, the ultimate issue in this
case is credibility. In this regard, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the question as it heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during trial. The exceptions to the rule are when such
evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstance of weight and substance which could affect the result of
the case. None of these circumstances are present in the case at bar to warrant its exception from
the coverage of this rule.
It is well-established that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says, in effect,
all that is necessary to show that she has indeed been raped. A victim of rape would not come
out in the open if her motive were anything other than to obtain justice. Her testimony as to who
abused her is credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the
accused, as in this case where the accusations were raised by private complainant against her
own father.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime of
rape. First, [AAA] testified that Jomar went on top of her and, against her will, inserted his penis
in her vagina. After having carnal knowledge with [AAA], Jomar told the others "sino ang
susunod?" Thus, another man of heavier weight went on top of [AAA] and inserted his penis in
her vagina. [AAA] identified that it was Jomar who carried him to another room and placed her
in a "papag" because she heard him say, "dito na, dito na." It should be emphasized that [AAA]
testified that she was familiar with Jomar's voice because she knew him and the other appellants
since childhood. [AAA] used to invite these appellants in their house whenever there were
occasions and sometimes in going to videoke. Hence, this Court agrees with the findings of the
court a quo as regards [AAA]'s positive identification of Jomar, through his voice, as one of the
persons who raped her. The court a quo said in this wise:

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 [AAA] testified, in a manner that is clear, candid and with unmistakable certainty, that at
the time, date and place of the incident, by means of force and intimidation and while she is
unconscious and deprived of reason, the accused took part in sexually molesting her. During the
Court hearing, the victim pointed to each of the accused being tried as the ravishers. Yet all of
these accused on trial could not ascribe any ill motive on the part of [AAA] that might have
implied her to institute the present action.
[AAA] was detailed in her narration and remained consistent even on rigid cross-
examination. She testified on all incidents that transpired from the beginning until the end of her
ordeal. That was, from the time when she was made to go with the group of the accused to the
apartment up to the time when she was eventually rescued by her brother [BBB] and the
barangay tanods. A candid and honest narration by the victim of how she was abused must be
given full faith and credit for they contain earmarks of credibility. When the testimony of the
victim is simple and straightforward, the same must be given full faith and credit. The
determination of the outcome of every rape case, hinges upon the credibility of the complainant's
testimony.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the
credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court because of its unique position
to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand
while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts. The trial judge has the advantage of
actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses.
Hence, the judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies and findings of fact are accorded
great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial
court's assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to
have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's
findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the
trial court.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
RENATO CARIÑO Y GOCONG AND ALVIN AQUINO Y RAGAM
G.R. No. 232624, 09 July 2018, SECOND DIVISION, (Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is equally important to note that a conviction for robbery with homicide need not be
proven solely through direct evidence of the malefactor's culpability. Rather, the offender's guilt
may likewise be proven through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are
present:
(i) there must be more than one circumstance;
(ii) the inference must be based on proven facts; and
(iii) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of
the accused.
Imperatively, all the circumstances taken together must form an unbroken chain of events
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the author of the crime. To rule otherwise, would lead to the pernicious situation wherein felons
would be set free to the detriment of the judicial system, and thereby cause danger to the
community.

FACTS
In 2002, Leonardo Advincula (Advincula) was driving a taxi, and traversing when he was
flagged down by Renato Cariño (Cariño). Cariño asked Advincula to follow a Nissan Sentra.
Jimmy Caporado (Caporado), a security guard, noticed a Nissan Sentra and the taxi
behind it. Upon passing by Caporado, the driver of the Nissan Sentra, who Caporado recognized
as Mirko Moeller (Moeller), a resident of the said subdivision, opened the car window to inform
the former that the passenger inside the taxi was his visitor. During this time, Caporado noticed
that Moeller was with Alvin Aquino (Aquino). Obeying Moeller's instructions, Caporado flagged
down the taxi cab to take the driver's license, and then let the taxi pass.
Moeller, the victim, alighted from the Nissan Sentra and approached the taxi to pay for
Cariño's fare. Advincula drove away without a passenger. The next morning, Nena Taro (Taro),
the housemaid of Moeller arrived at the latter's home and saw Moeller dead and lying face down
in front of the swimming pool.
Months after the incident, Cariño and Aquino (collectively referred to as accused-
appellants) were arrested in Baguio City. The police also tracked down the stolen Nissan Sentra
in Isabela, after Cariño pointed to its location. Cariño also surrendered the keys of the Nissan
Sentra. During the trial, Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez), Medico-Legal Officer, testified that
the victim's cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage, as a result of traumatic injuries in the
head. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the accused-appellants for the crimes of Robbery

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with Homicide, and Carnapping. The RTC concluded that there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence to convict them. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the RTC.

ISSUE
Did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crimes of Robbery
with Homicide, and Carnapping?

RULING
YES. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, the
prosecution must prove the existence of the following elements, namely,
(i) "the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
(ii) the property taken belongs to another;
(iii) the taking is [with] animo lucrandi; and
(iv) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed."
Notably, the phrase "by reason of the robbery," covers a situation where the killing of the
person is committed either before or after the taking of personal property. It is imperative to
establish that "the intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery.” Remarkably, homicide is said to be committed:
(i) "to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit;
(ii) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
(iii) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or
(iv) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime."
Thus, a conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main
purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery. Consequently, once it has been established with certainty that a person was killed on
the occasion of the robbery, the accused may be convicted of robbery with homicide.
It is equally important to note that a conviction for robbery with homicide need not be proven
solely through direct evidence of the malefactor's culpability. Rather, the offender's guilt may
likewise be proven through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are
present:
(i) there must be more than one circumstance;
(ii) the inference must be based on proven facts; and

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 (iii) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt
of the accused.
Imperatively, all the circumstances taken together must form an unbroken chain of events
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the author of the crime. To rule otherwise, would lead to the pernicious situation wherein
felons would be set free to the detriment of the judicial system, and thereby cause danger to the
community.
In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding the day, when the victim was robbed and
killed, lead to an unbroken chain of facts, which establish beyond reasonable doubt the accused-
appellants' culpability, to wit:
i. At 10:39 p.m. of August 28, 2002, security guard Caporado saw Moeller pass
through Gate 1 of Corinthian Gardens Subdivision in his Nissan Sentra. Moeller was
accompanied by Aquino, who Caporado recognized and identified in open court.
ii. The Nissan Sentra was trailed by the R&E taxi driven by Advincula.
iii. Caporado recognized Cariño as the passenger of the taxi.
iv. Advincula, the driver of the taxi, confirmed that Cariño was his passenger. He
testified that he dropped off Cariño at the house of a foreigner in Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision.
v. Moeller's Nissan Sentra was seen to have exited Gate 4 of Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision at around 12:00 midnight on August 29, 2002.
vi. In the morning of August 29, 2002, Taro, the victim's housemaid, found the latter at
the backyard of his home, lifeless.
vii. A dumbbell was found near the body of the victim.
viii. The Medico-Legal Report showed that Moeller died due to intra-cranial
hemorrhage, which was caused by a blow inflicted using a hard and blunt object.
ix. During their arrest, Cariño and Aquino were caught in possession of a camera, video
camera and charger.
x. Taro confirmed that the said items belonged to Moeller.
xi. Cariño admitted to the police officers that the Nissan Sentra was in Isabela. True
enough, the said vehicle was recovered in the said location.
xii. SPO4 Jeresano testified that the accused-appellants admitted that the Nissan Sentra
belonged to Moeller.
xiii. Aquino even surrendered the keys of the Nissan Sentra to the police.

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 The fact that the accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Moeller prior to his
demise was clearly confirmed through the testimony of the prosecution witnesses Caporado and
Advincula.
Moreover, the accused-appellants' unexplained possession of the stolen articles gave rise
to the presumption that they were the taker and the doer of the robbery. This presumption
applies considering that
(i) the property was stolen;
(ii) the crime was committed recently;
(iii) the stolen property was found in their possession; and
(iv) they were unable to explain their possession satisfactorily.
It must be noted that during their arrest, the police officers found Moeller's camera, video
camera and charger in their hideout. They were unable to offer any satisfactory and believable
explanation justifying their possession of the subject articles. All that they did to rebut this
presumption was to question the ownership of the said articles. This defense fails considering
that Taro identified the said items and confirmed that they indeed belonged to Moeller. Her
familiarity with the said items cannot be doubted considering that she was the personal maid of
the victim for several years, and had cleaned the said items on a regular basis.
Carnapping is defined and penalized under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things."
Notably, the elements of carnapping are:
(i) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;
(ii) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and
(iii) the taking is done with intent to gain. Essentially, carnapping is the robbery
or theft of a motorized vehicle.
Significantly, the taking of the motor vehicle is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. The
intent to gain or the animus lucrandi, being an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking
of the motor vehicle. Notably, "[a]ctual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the
intent to gain." Likewise, the term gain is not limited to a pecuniary benefit, but also includes the
benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.
Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent already constitutes
gain.

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 In the case at bar, the prosecution proved the existence of all the elements of carnapping
beyond reasonable doubt. The Nissan Sentra, which was owned by Moeller, was stolen by the
accused-appellants from the victim's house, and brought to Isabela. To eradicate all traces of its
previous ownership, the accused-appellants even changed the vehicle's plate number. However,
despite their attempt to conceal their crime, the police discovered that the retrieved vehicle bore
the same engine and chassis number as the victim's stolen vehicle.
Likewise, the police found the stolen vehicle in Isabela, no less from the information
supplanted by Cariño himself. Certainly, Cariño's knowledge about the vehicle's exact location
shows his complicity in its taking. Added to this, Cariño was in possession of the car keys, which
he surrendered to the police.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VENERANDO GOZO Y VELASQUEZ,
G.R. No. 225605, 23 July 2018, THIRD DIVISION (Martires, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As outlined in Pruna, the prosecution has the burden to prove the age of the offended party
and the lack of opposition to the testimonial evidence on the part of the accused should not be taken
against him. It is noteworthy that in the present case, there was no testimonial evidence that Gozo
could have objected to. In addition, the trial court is required to make a categorical finding of the
victim's age. Here, however, the RTC simply opined, based on its observation, that AAA could not
have been more than 12 years of age. Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove with sufficient and
appropriate evidence that AAA was below 12 years of age.

FACTS
AAA was staying in the restaurant where her father BBB worked as a stay-in cook. When
it was time for her to sleep, she went up to the second floor of the restaurant. Thereafter,
Venerando Gozo (Gozo), who also worked in the restaurant as a stay-in janitor, decided to follow
her inside the room. There, he began his advances and started molesting AAA. At first, Gozo
inserted his fingers into AAA's vagina but because his lust was not satiated, he eventually
inserted his penis into the victim's genitals. After he was through abusing her, he instructed AAA
not to tell anyone because it would cause a fight between him and BBB.
Nevertheless, AAA immediately told BBB about the incident when he arrived. They then
went to the police station to report what happened and proceeded to the hospital for physical
examination. The genital physical examination revealed that AAA had fresh shallow lacerations
in her hymen at the 3, 6, and 9 o'clock positions.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Gozo of statutory rape. The trial court noted
that AAA candidly and convincingly narrated how Gozo had defiled her. It quoted her testimony
where she recalled how he had inserted his penis and fingers into her vagina. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision

ISSUE
Did the court a quo gravely err in convicting Gozo despite the prosecution's failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING
NO. The appeal has no merit. In convicting the accused for statutory rape, the prosecution
has the burden to prove the following elements:

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 (1) the age of the complainant;
(2) the identity of the accused; and
(3) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. In turn,
conviction may result on the basis of the victim's sole testimony, provided it is credible,
natural, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
In her testimony, AAA was straightforward and categorical in identfying Gozo as the one
who abused her. Despite her youthful innocence, AAA repeatedly said that Gozo inserted his
finger and penis into her vagina. Through the help of anatomically correct dolls, she pointed to
the body parts Gozo had inserted into her vagina even if she did not know what they were called.
AAA was steadfast that Gozo truly inserted his penis leaving no doubt that she was unduly
robbed of her purity and innocence. Notwithstanding the RTC's clarificatory questions, she was
never confused and unequivocally recalled how Gozo had molested her.
AAA's testimony alone is sufficient to prove Gozo's identity as the molester and to confirm
that he had carnal knowledge of the victim. It is axiomatic that the findings of the trial courts as
to the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are afforded great weight and are left
undisturbed, unless there are facts of substance or value which may have been overlooked and
could materially affect the outcome of the case.[16]
Gozo assails AAA's testimony to be incredible and contrary to human experience. He
notes that given his bigger build, it would have been natural for AAA's genitals to bleed and not
only turn red after he allegedly inserted his fingers. Thus, Gozo believes that such absurdity
negatively affects AAA's testimony and raises the possibility that she was indeed coached.
The Court, however, finds that AAA's testimony was not inconsistent with the physical
evidence. Lack of bleeding of the victim's genitals is not an element of rape. This bears
significance considering that the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape;
as a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis is capable of consummating the sexual
act and, thus, constitutes rape. In fact, contrary to Gozo's position, physical evidence
corroborates AAA's tale of defloration as it was discovered during the medical examinations that
she had fresh lacerations in her vagina.
Considering the element of the victim's age, the trial court ruled that although the
prosecution failed to present evidence as to AAA's age, Gozo should still be held guilty of
statutory rape. It ratiocinated that upon observation of the victim while testifying, she could not
have been more than 12 years old.
In People v. Pruna (Pruna), the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either
as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, viz:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party;
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice
to prove age;

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 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost,
destroyed, or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother
or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony
of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused;
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him; and
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
In the present case, no documentary evidence such as a birth certificate or other authentic
documents were offered to prove AAA's age and there was no explanation why none was
presented. Neither was their testimonial evidence from the concerned individuals to establish
her age as only the medico-legal testified as to AAA's age. While the medico-legal may have
testified as to her age, he was not among the individuals enumerated in Pruna who may testify
in case the birth certificate or authentic documents were lost or otherwise unavailable. In
addition, his testimony as to AAA's age was hearsay as he had no personal knowledge because
BBB merely relayed the said information to him. Thus, it is readily apparent that the prosecution
miserably failed to prove AAA's exact age.
As outlined in Pruna, the prosecution has the burden to prove the age of the offended party
and the lack of opposition to the testimonial evidence on the part of the accused should not be
taken against him. It is noteworthy that in the present case, there was no testimonial evidence
that Gozo could have objected to. In addition, the trial court is required to make a categorical
finding of the victim's age. Here, however, the RTC simply opined, based on its observation, that
AAA could not have been more than 12 years of age. Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove with
sufficient and appropriate evidence that AAA was below 12 years of age.
Thus, the designation of the crime Gozo committed should be corrected from statutory rape
to simple rape, consistent with the Criminal Law principle that doubts should be resolved in
favour of the accused.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO Y ANTICLA
G.R. No. 218702, 17 October 2018, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court in Umapas considered the severity of the declarant's wounds to reasonably
presume that she uttered her words under the belief that her own death was already imminent. The
Court therein held that "[t]here is ample authority for the view that the declarant's belief in the
imminence of her death can be shown by the declarant's own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of her wounds, statements made in her presence, or by the opinion of
her physician."

In the present case, Evelyn made the declarations just as she was pulled out of the fire, with
blood coming out of her forehead, when she was having difficulty breathing, and with second- and
third-degree burns affecting 74% of the total surface area of her body. Considering the foregoing
facts along with the principle enunciated in Umapas that the declarant's belief in the imminence
of her death can be shown by the nature and severity of the declarant's wounds then the Court is
convinced that the second requisite for a dying declaration is sufficiently met.

FACTS

Evelyn Santos (Evelyn) and Alicia Mercado (Alicia), were partners who lived together in
Bulacan. Patrick Mercado (Patrick) was the nephew of Alicia. He was enrolled at the nearby STI
College in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and used to live in the same house.

One night, Patrick was in the house, having come home from school. After a few hours,
the house of Evelyn and Alicia was reported to be on fire. While the house was burning, Evelyn
and Patrick were observed on the terrace supposedly trying to find a way to escape the blaze.
Through the help of neighbors, Evelyn and appellant were brought out of the burning house.
Evelyn looked weak and unable to walk as she was badly burnt.

Witnesses declared that as soon as Evelyn was carried out to safety, she promptly accused
and pointed to Patrick as the person responsible for attacking her and Alicia as well as for setting
the house on fire. Specifically, Evelyn claimed that Patrick hit her and Alicia with a baseball bat
then set them on fire. Despite medical attention, Evelyn succumbed to her injuries and died.
Based on the declarations of Evelyn, Patrick was charged for the killing of Evelyn and Alicia.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Patrick of the crime of Double Murder, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE
Did the CA err in convicting Patrick despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING

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 NO. In questioning his conviction, Patrick harps on his defense of denial, and the
supposed weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. He argues that the testimony of Dacallos
that there was a bloodied man who came out of the house as it was on fire should be believed
over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to Evelyn's dying declarations.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily
crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A
denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is
independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime
and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible.
The failure of the prosecution to present the baseball bat allegedly used and to prove the
presence of the gasoline is of no moment. The evidence presented and the testimonies of the
prosecution s witnesses were more than sufficient to establish Patrick’s guilt for the crime
charged. These testimonies specifically recounted the dying declarations/part of the res
gestae of Evelyn Santos which prove that Patrick hit the victims with a baseball bat before placing
them and the house on fire. Furthermore, the failure to present the baseball bat actually did not,
in any way affect, the strength of the prosecution's evidence. In this connection, both the RTC
and CA correctly held that the evidence of the prosecution – as independently assessed –
sufficiently established the guilt of Mercado.
As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence because
it is "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of
his impending death would make a careless and false accusation”
For a "dying declaration" to be admissible in court, the following requisites must concur:

(a) That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant's death;

(b) That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a
consciousness of an impending death;

(c) That the declarant is competent as a witness; and

(d) That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.

The Court, in People v. Umapas, explained and expounded on how each of the four
requisites is to be understood. Thus:
Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible,
thus:
First, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to
matters both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it.
Statements involving the nature of the declarant's injury or the cause of death; those
imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for

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 the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the
act are admissible.
Second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the
consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying
declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered
by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death
in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the
approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is
whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending.
Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant
would not have been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations
will not be admissible. Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could
not have been competent to be a witness had he survived, the presumption must be
sustained that he would have been competent.
Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide; murder,
or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
The first and fourth requisites are undoubtedly present in this case. With regard to the
third requisite, since there was no evidence presented to show that Evelyn could not have been
competent to be a witness had she survived, the presumption that she would have been
competent would be sustained in accordance with the foregoing rule discussed in Umapas. The
Court holds, therefore, that the third requisite is sufficiently met.
With regard to the second requisite, the Court in Umapas considered the severity of the
declarant's wounds to reasonably presume that she uttered her words under the belief that her
own death was already imminent. The Court therein held that "[t]here is ample authority for the
view that the declarant's belief in the imminence of her death can be shown by the declarant's
own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of her wounds, statements
made in her presence, or by the opinion of her physician."
In the present case, Evelyn made the declarations just as she was pulled out of the fire,
with blood coming out of her forehead, when she was having difficulty breathing, and with
second- and third-degree burns affecting 74% of the total surface area of her body. Considering
the foregoing facts – along with the principle enunciated in Umapas that the declarant's belief in
the imminence of her death can be shown by the nature and severity of the declarant's wounds
– then the Court is convinced that the second requisite for a dying declaration is sufficiently met.
Without doubt, therefore, the dying declarations of Evelyn to numerous witnesses that it
was Mercado who had attacked her and her partner and eventually set their house on fire are
admissible in evidence.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THRU PRIVATE COMPLAINANT BRIAN VICTOR BRITCHFORD v. SALVADOR ALAPAN
G.R. No. 199527, 10 January 2018, THIRD DIVISION, (Martires, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An accused who has been sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine only and is found to be
insolvent and could not pay the fine for this reason, cannot be compelled to serve the subsidiary
imprisonment provided for in article 39 of the Revised Penal Code.
Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure
to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the
RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

FACTS
Salvador Alapan (respondent) and his wife Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were charged with
eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed
P400,000.00 from petitioner Brian Victor Britchford (Britchford) with a promise that they would
pay the said amount within three months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight
postdated checks.

When the checks matured, Britchford deposited then at the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), which informed him that the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account
against which the hecks were drawn was closed.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC), convicted respondent of eight counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment considering that respondent's act
of issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time offender.
On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna because she did not participate in the issuance of
the dishonored. Respondent failed to pay the fine imposed by the MTC. Hence, Britchford filed
an appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which was denied. The Court of appeals (CA)
affirmed the ruling of the RTC dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as the crime does not
provide for a subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.

ISSUE
May Britchford assail the penalty imposed in the judgment of conviction?

RULING
NO. In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the
authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. This power is expressly
provided in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised Administrative Code. Without
doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.

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 Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private complainant is limited
only to the civil liability arising from the crime. Thus, in Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, the Court
ruled:
Thus, the Court ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State
through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of
the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such
appeal.
In this case, respondent was convicted of eight counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for which
he was imposed the penalty of fine. Thus, the penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal aspect of the case. On the
other hand, the indemnification for the face value of the dishonored checks refers to the civil
aspect of the case. Consequently, Britchford could not appeal the imposition of fine as penalty
which was not even questioned by the People through the OSG. "While a private prosecutor may
be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted
to adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be tantamount to
giving the private prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to
the provisions of law.” Hence, the CA properly dismissed the petition for review.
Another reason which militates against Britchford’s position is the lack of provision
pertaining to subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of conviction. People v. Fajardo, in
relation to Republic Act. No. 5465 which amended Article 39 of the RPC, discusses the rationale
behind the necessity for expressly imposing subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of
conviction, viz:
The first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine
mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary
personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:
Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part, which deals with the
execution and service of penalties, provides:
ART. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty shall execute except by
virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with
any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.
It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones Law, the Act of
Congress of the United States of America approved on August 29, 1916, which was still in force
when the order appealed from was made, that no person may be deprived of liberty without due

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process of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense incorporated in article 78 of the
Revised Penal Code prescribing that no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final
judgment. As the fact show that there is no judgment sentencing the accused to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay the fine imposed upon him, because the said subsidiary
imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that the court could not
legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. A contrary holding would be a
violation of the laws aforementioned. That subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no
doubt, for, according to article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon the accused and
served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay on account of insolvency. There is not a
single provision in the Code from which it may be logically inferred that an accused may
automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case where he has been sentenced
merely to pay a fine and has been found to be insolvent. Such would be contrary to the legal
provisions above-cited and to the doctrine laid down in United States vs. Miranda (2 Phil., 606,
610), in which it was said: "That judgment of the lower court fails to impose subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency for indemnification to the owner of the banca, but only
imposes subsidiary punishment as to the costs. In this respect the judgment is erroneous and
should be modified."
An accused who has been sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine only and is found to
be insolvent and could not pay the fine for this reason, cannot be compelled to serve the
subsidiary imprisonment provided for in article 39 of the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should only a fine be imposed
and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the Circular does not
sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for the same must still comply
with the law.
Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of
failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without
violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

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 MARIA C. OSORIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 207711, 02 July 2018, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of "other
similar deceits" under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar
deceits" in Article 3 l 5(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code has been interpreted in Guinhawa v.
People as limited to acts of the same nature as those specifically enumerated. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, "other similar deceits" cannot be construed in the broadest sense to include all
kinds of deceit:

All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case. Osario, in
soliciting Gabriel 's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that its
proceeds would be used to pay for Gabriel 's insurance premiums. This false representation is what
induced Gabriel to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since
Osario deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment in another
company, Gabriel 's insurance policies lapsed.

FACTS
Josefina Gabriel (Gabriel) was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Sometime in
December 2000, Maria (Osorio) visited Gabriel's store and introduced herself as an agent of the
Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (Philam Life). As proof, Osorio
presented her company ID and calling card. During their meeting, Osorio offered insurance
coverage to Gabriel. Gabriel told Osorio to come back at a later date as she needed more time to
think about the offer. Gabriel availed Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and Excelife Gold Package and
consistently paid the quarterly premiums from February 2001 to November 2001. Gabriel also
availed of an investment plan in Phillam Life.

A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to non-
payment of premiums. When Gabriel confronted Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel
that she would take responsibility. Gabriel found out that her investment plan was not with
Philam Life, but is with the Philippine Money Investment Asset Management (PMIAM). Gabriel
confronted Osorio and asked for a refund of her initial investment. Gabriel then visited the
Philam Life office to see Osorio but she was nowhere to be found. Philam Life referred Gabriel to
a certain Atty. Cabugoywho sent a demand letter to Osorio.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa. It ruled that Gabriel was induced to part with her money through
Osorio's misrepresentation that it would be invested in Philam Life, a company with an
established reputation. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE

Is Osario guilty of Estafa?

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RULING

YES. There are different modalities of committing the crime of estafa under Article
315(2)(a). The false pretense or fraudulent representation referred to under the first element
exists when the accused uses a fictitious name, pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or when the accused
commits other similar deceits.

There is no evidence to prove that Osario committed any of these acts when she obtained
Gabriel's money. Osario neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself as an agent of
Philam Life. During her first meeting with Gabriel, Osario presented her company ID and calling
card as proof of her identity and employment. Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values
and Compliance Department, even admitted during trial that Osario had been a Philam Life agent
as of December 2000.

In estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the
element of deceit consisting of the false pretense or representation must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Otherwise, criminal liability will not attach. In Aricheta v. People, the accused
was charged of estafa for selling property that she had previously sold to a third party. She
allegedly misrepresented to the buyer that she was still the owner at the time of the sale. In
acquitting the accused, this Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged false
representation she made:

As can be gleaned from the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged
with Estafa for allegedly selling to private complainant the subject property knowing fully
well that she had already sold the same to a third party. From this, it is therefore clear
that the supposed false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to private
complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when she sold it to private
complainant.

The question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the alleged false representation or false pretense contained in the
information.

As above explained, the alleged false representation or false pretense made by

petitioner to private complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when
she sold it to private complainant. To prove such allegation, the prosecution should first
establish that the property was previously sold to a third party before it was sold to
private complainant. The prosecution utterly failed to do this. The fundamental rule is
that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. It made this allegation but it failed
to support it with competent evidence. Except for private complainant's bare allegation
that petitioner told her that she (petitioner) sold the property to another person, the
records are bereft of evidence showing that the property was indeed previously sold to a
third person before it was sold again to private complainant. What was shown by the
prosecution and admitted by the defense is the fact that the property is being currently
occupied by a person other than private complainant. This fact does not prove that the

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 property was previously sold to another person before being sold again to private
complainant.

In this case, although there is no proof that Osario used a fictitious name or pretended to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting
Gabriel's money, Osario should nevertheless be held criminally liable for misrepresenting to
Gabriel that the latter's money would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management and that its
proceeds may be utilized to pay for Gabriel's insurance premiums.

Gabriel accepted the investment opportunity offered by Osario due to the promise that
her money would be invested in Philam Life, a company with which she had existing insurance
policies. She parted with her funds because of the representation that her investment's earnings
would be conveniently channeled to the payment of her insurance premiums. As a result of
petitioner's representations, Gabriel no longer saw the need to pay for the succeeding insurance
premiums as they fell due. Moreover, Osario’s issuance of Philam Life receipts led Gabriel to
believe that her money was already as good as invested in the company.

The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of
"other similar deceits" under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other
similar deceits" in Article 3 l 5(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code has been interpreted in Guinhawa
v. People as limited to acts of the same nature as those specifically enumerated. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis, "other similar deceits" cannot be construed in the broadest sense to
include all kinds of deceit:

All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case. Osario,
in soliciting Gabriel's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that
its proceeds would be used to pay for Gabriel's insurance premiums. This false representation is
what induced Gabriel to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance
premiums. Since Osario deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the
investment in another company, Gabriel's insurance policies lapsed.

The present case is different from money market transactions where dealers are usually
given full discretion on where to place their client's investments. In MERALCO v. Atilano, the
Court explained the nature of money market transactions and the corresponding liabilities that
dealers may face when dealing with their clients' investments:

[I]n money market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where

investments are to be placed, absent any agreement with or instruction from the investor
to place the investments in specific securities.

Money market transactions may be conducted in various ways. One instance is

when an investor enters into an investment contract with a dealer under terms that
oblige the dealer to place investments only in designated securities. Another is when
there is no stipulation for placement on designated securities; thus, the dealer is given
discretion to choose the placement of the investment made. Under the first situation, a
dealer who deviates from the specified instruction may be exposed to civil and criminal

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 prosecution; in contrast, the second situation may only give rise to a civil action for
recovery of the amount invested.

Although Osario was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, she may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code.

As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged.
This rule proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. An exception to this is the rule on
variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states:

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 MELITA O. DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199930, 27 June 2018, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An evaluation of the jurisprudence on the matter reveals the following guidelines in the
determination of the reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz.:
1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the date
of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a
particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime
should first be determined.
Considering that the memorandum circulars took effect prior to the commission of the
violations by the Del Rosario, it would be unwarranted to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman
could not have known of her omissions on the due dates themselves of the filing of the SALNs.

FACTS
In 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman brought a complaint charging the Melita Del
Rosario (Del Rosario) with the violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713; dishonesty; grave
misconduct; and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for her failure to file her
detailed sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net worth (SALN) for the year 1990 and 1991.
Del Rosario filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of prescription of the offenses, which
was granted by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). The State appealed to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), which upheld the assailed orders of the MeTC.
Undeterred, the State elevated the decision of the RTC to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that
the RTC had erred in ruling that the eight-year prescriptive period for violation of Section 8 of
R.A. No. 6713 commenced to run on the day of the commission of the violations, not from the
discovery of the offenses. The Sandiganbayan overturned the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE
Did the period of prescription of the offenses charged against the Del Rosario start to run
on the date of their discovery instead of on the date of their commission?

RULING
NO. The Court ruled that the appeal has merit.

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 In applying the discovery rule, the Sandiganbayan relied on the rulings handed down in
the so-called Behest Loans Cases, whereby the prescriptive period was reckoned from the date
of discovery of the offenses. The Sandiganbayan explained that it would be difficult for the Office
of the Ombudsman to know on the required dates of filing of the failure to file the SALNs on the
part of the erring public officials or employees; and that to suggest that the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the Office of the Ombudsman and any other concerned agency should come
up with a tracking system to ferret out the violators of R.A. No. 6713 on the dates of the filing of
the SALNs would not only be burdensome, but highly impossible. The Sandiganbayan erred in
applying the discovery rule to the petitioner's cases.
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 mandates the submission of the sworn SALNs by all public
officials and employees, stating therein all the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests of their spouses, and of their unmarried children under 18 years of age living
in their households. Paragraph (A) of Section 8 sets three deadlines for the submission of the
sworn SALNs, specifically: (a) within 30 days from the assumption of office by the officials or
employees; (b) on or before April 30 of every year thereafter; and (c) within 30 days after the
separation from the service of the officials or employees.
R.A. No. 6713 does not expressly state the prescriptive period for the violation of its
requirement for the SALNs. Hence, Act No. 3326 – the law that governs the prescriptive periods
for offenses defined and punished under special laws that do not set their own prescriptive
periods– is controlling. Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not
more than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years;
(c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more,
but less than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six
years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years.
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
The complaint charging the Del Rosario with the violations was filed only on October 28,
2004, or 13 years after the April 30, 1991 deadline for the submission of the SALN for 1990, and
12 years after the April 30, 1992 deadline for the submission of the SALN for 1991. With the
offenses charged against the petitioner having already prescribed after eight years in accordance
with Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the informations filed against the Del Rosario were validly
quashed.
The relevant legal provision on the reckoning of the period of prescription is Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, to wit:

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 Section 2. Prescription of violation penalized by special law shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the violation be not
known at the time from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
Under Section 2, there are two modes of determining the reckoning point when
prescription of an offense runs. The first, to the effect that prescription shall "run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law," is the general rule. We have declared in this regard
that the fact that any aggrieved person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue
or of the facts out of which his right arises does not prevent the running of the prescriptive
period. The second mode is an exception to the first, and is otherwise known as the discovery
rule.
Under the rulings in the Behest Loans Cases, the discovery rule, which is also known as
the blameless ignorance doctrine, stipulates that:
x x x the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion
of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline
to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable
means of knowing the existence of a cause of action.
The application of the discovery rule was amply discussed in the 2014 ruling
in Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Carpio-Morales, which cited a number
of rulings involving violations of R.A. No. 3019. The Court said therein:
We recognized the impossibility for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known
the violation of RA 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made in view of
the fact that the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries
of the loans."
An evaluation of the jurisprudence on the matter reveals the following guidelines in the
determination of the reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz.:
1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the
offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form
the date of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a
particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime
should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered
is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from
the date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof
or should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the
exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery
thereof.

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 Conformably with the foregoing, the Court cannot apply the discovery rule or the
blameless ignorance doctrine to the criminal charges against Del Rosario. The guidelines
summarized in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Carpio-Morales already settled
how to determine the proper reckoning points for the period of prescription. Whether it is the
general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular case depends on the availability
or the suppression of information relative to the crime should first be ascertained. If the
information, data, or records from which the crime is based could be plainly discovered or were
readily available to the public, as in the case of the petitioner herein, the general rule should
apply, and prescription should be held to run from the commission of the crime; otherwise, the
discovery rule is applied.
Secondly, when there are reasonable means to be aware of the commission of the offense,
the discovery rule should not be applied. To prosecute an offender for an offense not prosecuted
on account of the lapses on the part of the Government and the officials responsible for the
prosecution thereof or burdened with the duty of making sure that the laws are observed would
have the effect of condoning their indolence and inaction.
The Court concurred with the observations of the RTC to the effect that the offenses
charged against the Del Rosario were not susceptible of concealment. As such, the offenses could
have been known within the eight-year period starting from the moment of their commission.
Indeed, the Office of the Ombudsman or the CSC, the two agencies of the Government invested
with the primary responsibility of monitoring the compliance with R.A. No. 6713, should have
known of her omissions during the period of prescription.
Thirdly, the Sandiganbayan's opinion that it would be burdensome and highly impossible
for the CSC, the Office of the Ombudsman and any other concerned agency of the Government to
come up with a tracking system to ferret out the violators of R.A. No. 6713 on or about the time
of the filing of the SALNs is devoid of persuasion and merit.
The CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman both issued memorandum circulars in 1994
and 1995 to announce guidelines or procedures relative to the filing of the SALNs pursuant to
R.A. No. 6713. Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 95-13 (Guidelines/Procedures on the
Filing of Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Networth and Disclosures of Business Interests and
Financial Connections with the Office of the Ombudsman Required under Section 8, Republic Act
No. 6713) publicized that the Office of the Ombudsman would create a task force that would
maintain a computerized database of all public officials and employees required to file SALNs,
and that such task force would monitor full compliance: with the law. The circular further
provided that: "The administrative/personnel division shall likewise prepare a report indicating
therein the list of officials and employees who failed to submit their respective statements of assets,
liabilities and net worth and disclosures of business interests and financial connections."

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 Considering that the memorandum circulars took effect prior to the commission of the
violations by the Del Rosario, it would be unwarranted to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman
could not have known of her omissions on the due dates themselves of the filing of the SALNs.
What we need to stress is that the prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 was long enough for
the Office of the Ombudsman and the CSC to investigate and identify the public officials and
employees who did not observe the requirement for the submission or filing of the verified
SALNs – information that was readily available to the public.

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 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v.
HON. MA. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 189800, 09 July 2018, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In the 1999 and 2011 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
et al. v. Hon. Desierto, et al., the Court ruled that the prescriptive period began to ran from the date
of discovery of the subject transactions and not from the time the behest loans were transacted. In
the 2011 Desierto case, the Court ruled that the "blameless ignorance" doctrine applies considering
that the plaintiff at that time had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action.
Applying this to the present case, the date of discovery was April 4, 1994, the date of the
Terminal Report that was submitted to President Fidel V. Ramos. Thus, insofar as the 1982 to 1985
loan transactions are concerned, the complaint was filed on time and without a doubt, within the
prescriptive period.

FACTS
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of sugarcane milling. In 1971, BISUDECO obtained a loan with Philippine
National Bank (PNB) for the issuance of a stand-by letter of credit. Allegedly, at this time,
BISUDECO had no sufficient capital and collateral. When BISUDECO failed to comply with the
conditions imposed on the grant of loan, that it must have sufficient capital and collateral, it
caused modifications in the guarantee conditions. However, BISUDECO still failed to comply.
PCGG claims that despite continuously incurring losses in its milling operations resulting
to capital deficiency, BISUDECO was extended by PNB undue and unwarranted accommodations
from 1977 to 1985 by way of grant amounting to almost 1 Billion Pesos.
In 1987, PNB's rights, titles and interests were transferred to the Philippine Government
through a Deed of Transfer, including the account of BISUDECO. In 1994, after study and
investigation, the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee (Committee) found that the loan
accounts of BISUDECO were behest loans due to the following characteristics: a) the accounts
were under collateralized; and b) the borrower corporation was undercapitalized.[13]
Thus, in 2005, PCGG filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against private respondents
(in their capacities as members of PNB's Board of Directors and Officers of BISUDECO) for
violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The Ombudsman dismissed the Complaint on the grounds of lack of probable cause and
prescription.

ISSUE

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 Did the Ombudsman act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing PCGG's Complaint on the ground of (a) prescription and (b) lack of
probable cause?

RULING
NO. At the outset, it should be stressed that R.A. No. 3019, Section 11 provides that all
offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten years. This period was later increased
to fifteen years with the passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 195, which took effect on March
16, 1982.
When the subject transactions took place, the period of prescription for all offenses
punishable under R.A. No. 3019 was ten years. As to which of the two periods should apply, the
Court in People v. Pacificador explained that in the prescription of crimes, the period which
appears more favorable to the accused is to be adopted
The loan transactions subject of this case were granted by the PNB to BISUDECO from
1977-1985. Applying this Court's pronouncement in Pacificador, the period of prescription for
offenses committed prior to the passage of B.P. Blg. 195 is ten years. The new 15-year period
cannot be applied to acts done prior to its effectivity in 1982 because to do so would violate the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. Transactions entered into and consummated prior to the
effectivity of B.P. Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982 are exempt from its amendments. The new 15-year
period shall only be applied to acts done after its effectivity.
While R.A. No. 3019 is silent as to when the period of prescription begins to run, R.A. No.
3326, specifically Section 2 thereof fills the gap. Section 2 provides in part:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. x
xx
In the 1999 and 2011 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, et al. v. Hon. Desierto, et al., the Court ruled that the prescriptive period began to ran from
the date of discovery of the subject transactions and not from the time the behest loans were
transacted. In the 2011 Desierto case, the Court ruled that the "blameless ignorance" doctrine
applies considering that the plaintiff at that time had no reasonable means of knowing the
existence of a cause of action
Applying this to the present case, the date of discovery was April 4, 1994, the date of the
Terminal Report that was submitted to President Fidel V. Ramos. The Terminal Report classified
the subject BISUDECO loans as behest loans. Records show that the PCGG filed its affidavit-
complaint before the Ombudsman only on January 28, 2005 or a little more than 10 years from
the date of discovery. Clearly, the crimes imputed to private respondents for loans transacted in
the years 1971 to 1981 have already prescribed. As to the loans covered by the years 1982 to
1985, the 15-year prescriptive period shall apply since B.P. Blg. 195 was then already in effect.

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Thus, insofar as the 1982 to 1985 loan transactions are concerned, the complaint was filed on
time and without a doubt, within the prescriptive period.
It bears stressing, however, that the crux of the present petition is the propriety of the
Ombudsman's dismissal of PCGG's complaint on the ground that there was no probable cause to
indict respondents for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019.
As a general rule, courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts.[28]
When the Ombudsman dismissed the case for lack of probable cause, it explained that the
Complaint and its supporting papers failed to establish probable cause both as to the commission
of the crime and the guilt of the private respondents, to wit:
As to the other loans/accommodations extended by PNB to BISUDECO, the
complaint and its supporting papers do not show the individual or collective
participation of the respondents in the acts complained of. As a matter of fact, they do not
show the names of the members of the PNB Board who approved said loans/
accommodations in favor of BISUDECO. Paragraph "16" of the complaint merely provided
the names of the members of the PNB Board at the time of the application and approval
of the loans, and its Annex "K" listed the names of the PNB Board from 1964 to 1986.
Moreover, there is no copy of the PNB Board Resolution in the record. The Board
Resolutions referred to by the complainant in the complaint are actually excerpts of the
Minute of the Board Meetings during which the Resolutions were approved. Thus, we
cannot make a presumption that all the members of the PNB Board from 1964 to 1986
unanimously approved the loan in favor of BISUDECO.
To recapitulate, the private respondents were charged with violation of Sections 3(e) and
(g) of R.A. No. 3019 which provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
To justify an indictment under Section 3(e), the following elements must concur:

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 (1) the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with
the former;
(2) he or she causes any undue injury to any party, whether the government or a
private party;
(3) the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of
his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(4) such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and
(5) the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
On the other hand, Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 lists the following elements:
(1) the accused is a public officer;
(2) he or she enters into a contract or transaction, on behalf of the Government;
(3) such contract or transaction is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Government, regardless of whether or not the public officer profited therefrom.
Private respondents Mapa and Enrile, in their respective Comments, maintain that the
complaint failed to state the particular acts for which they are individually or collectively liable
as Directors of PNB. PCGG, however, insists that there is probable cause to hold the private
respondents liable and that it was capricious for the Ombudsman to require that they indicate
the participation of every private respondent in the commission of the offense- preliminary
investigation not being the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence.
In the case of Buchanan v. Viuda De Esteban, probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.
A careful perusal of the records reveals that the only basis of PCGG for imputing liability
on private respondents is the fact that the latter were members of PNB's Board of Directors at
the time the loan transactions were entered into. While it is true that a finding of probable cause
does not require a finding of guilt nor absolute certainty, PCGG cannot merely rely on the private
respondents' membership in the Board to hold the latter liable for the acts complained of.
In the case of Kara-an v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled that approval of a loan
during incumbency as director does not automatically establish probable cause absent a showing
of personal participation in any irregularity as regards approval of the loan.
As a general rule, a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from those who
represent it. Its officers are solidarily liable only when exceptional circumstances exist, such as
cases enumerated in Section 31 of the Corporation Code. The liability of the officers must be
proven by evidence sufficient to overcome the burden of proof borne by the plaintiff.

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 Personal liability will only attach to a director or officer if they are guilty of any of the
following:
(1) willfully or knowingly vote or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation;
(2) gross negligence; or
(3) bad faith.
PCGG failed to allege in the complaint and in the present petition the particular acts of
private respondents which constitutes a violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. It is
not sufficient for PCGG to merely provide a list of names of the PNB Board members for the years
covering the subject loans absent proof of the latter's individual participation in the approval
thereof.
In its Resolution dated June 23, 2006, the Ombudsman likewise observed that the affiant
seemed to have no personal knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. The relevant portion
of the resolution reads as follows:
Finally, it appears that the Affiant has no personal knowledge of the allegations in the
complaint as its penultimate paragraph states that "The foregoing may be attested to by, among
others, PCGG Legal Counsel Orlando L. Salvador and/or PCGG Director Danilo R. Daniel, PCGG
members of the TWG that examined the foregoing accounts." None of the above-mentioned
personalities executed an Affidavit to attest to the allegations in the complaint.[38]
Insofar as criminal liability of the BISUDECO officers is concerned, the Court likewise
rules in the negative. Private respondents Ojeda, De Vera, Lukban, Tan, Recato, Dychiao, Borja
and Cea (deceased) are not criminally liable under Section 3(g) and (e).
Although the Court has ruled in previous cases that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, the particular act or
omission constituting the offense charged must still be alleged in the complaint otherwise it
would amount to nothing more than a fishing expedition. Simply put, the evidence adduced by
PCGG was not sufficient to establish probable cause.
It is not sound practice to depart from the policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's
exercise of discretion to determine whether or not to file information against an accused. As cited
in a long line of cases, the Court has pronounced that it cannot pass upon the sufficiency or
insufficiency of evidence to determine the existence of probable cause. The rule is based not only
upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the Court will be clogged with
an innumerable list of cases assailing investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman
with regard to complaints filed before it, to determine if there is probable cause.

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 INMATES OF NEW BILIBID PRISON v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA
G.R. No. 212719, 25 June 2019, EN BANC (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a
penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions have
the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction
on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention
and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
FACTS
In 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending
Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC). R.A. No. 10592
seekes to rehabilitate the correction system and in effect, diminished some of the penalties of the
prisoners fit for the criteria established. A year later, in 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition was filed against respondents DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas by
convicted prisoners (Petitioners) in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP).
Petitioners filed the case as real parties-in-interest and as representatives of their
member organizations and the organizations' individual members, as a class suit for themselves
and in behalf of all who are similarly situated. They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592
are penal in nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in
accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it implements. They
are puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR) and the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) to retroactively apply the law when the prisoners' records
are complete and the distinctions between the pertinent provisions of the RPC and R.A. No.
10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners submit that the simple standards added by the new law,
which are matters of record, and the creation of the Management, Screening and Evaluation
Committee (MSEC) should not override the constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and
due process of law aside from the principle that penal laws beneficial to the accused are given
retroactive effect.
ISSUE
Should R.A. No. 10592 be given retroactive effect?
RULING
YES. The Court granted the petition. Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article
22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be
given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the
exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws.
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws
which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched. It has been
sanctioned since the old Penal Code.

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 According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the
offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice."
Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC
applies to said Code and its amendments, as well as to special laws.
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one. Penal laws and laws
which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for
their violation.
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense
committed against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to
pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the term "penal
statutes" all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish penalties for their
violation, and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty
upon their commission.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment.
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not
procedural rules. Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not make it
penal in nature.
The Court concurred with petitioners’ assertion that Article of the RPC applies because
R.A. No. 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC as
Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to the RPC
that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot be applied
retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties lighter should be
considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.
While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a
penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions
have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further
reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to
the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the
RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works
to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease
in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making
more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of time off to
which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending their sentence and
increasing their punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the
RPC.

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 In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL,
respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would indicate the need for "new
procedures and standards of behavior" to fully implement the law by the BUCOR (as to persons
serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to accused who are under preventive
detention). It is alleged that the amendments introduced are substantial and of utmost
importance that they may not be implemented without a thorough revision of the BUCOR and
the BJMP operating manuals on jail management. In particular, the establishment of the MSEC is
said to be an administrative mechanism to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR
superintendents and the BJMP jail wardens must follow uniform guidelines in managing,
screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct of prisoners prior to their recommendation to
the heads of the two bureaus on who may be granted time allowances. Respondents fail to
persuade the Court.
Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to stay
in the place of his confinement despite the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in
Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere modifications of the RPC that
have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the issuance of the challenged IRR. In view of this,
the claim of "new procedures and standards of behavior" for the grant of time allowances is
untenable.
It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was enacted, prisoners
have already been entitled to deduct the period of preventive imprisonment from the service of
their sentences. In addition, good conduct time allowance has been in existence since August 30,
1906 upon the passage of Act No. 1533. Said law provided for the diminution of sentences
imposed upon convicted prisoners in consideration of good conduct and diligence. Under Act No.
1533 and subsequently under Article 97 of the RPC, the time allowance may also apply to
detention prisoners if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned
to them. Such prerequisite was removed by R.A. No. 10592.
Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations, as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of Public Instruction, the wardens or officers in charge of Insular or
provincial jails or prisons were mandated to make and keep such records and take such further
actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Act No. 1533.When the RPC took effect
on January 1, 1932, the Director of Prisons was empowered to grant allowances for good conduct
whenever lawfully justified.
With the effectivity of R.A. No. 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority is now vested on
the Director of the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden of a provincial, district,
municipal or city jail.
Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the recommending
body for the grant of GCTA and TASTM. They are tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the
behavior and conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify whether
said prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring activities The creation of the
MSEC, however, does not justify the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the
amendatory law was its formation set as a precondition before its beneficial provisions are

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applied. What R.A. No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG are
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations on the classification system for good conduct
and time allowances, as may be necessary to implement its provisions.Clearly, respondents went
outside the bounds of their legal mandate when they provided for rules beyond what was
contemplated by the law to be enforced.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government
under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the issuance of the assailed
IRR and even before the enactment of R.A. No. 10592, a Classification Board had been handling
the functions of the MSEC and implementing the provisions of the RPC on time allowances. While
there is a noble intent to systematize and/or institutionalize existing set-up, the administrative
and procedural restructuring should not in any way prejudice the substantive rights of current
detention and convicted prisoners.
Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of behavior in
granting GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In essence, the definition of what constitutes "good
conduct" has been invariable through the years, thus:
Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on his behavior or
conduct while in prison. Likewise, the certificate/diploma issued upon successful completion of
an educational program or course (i.e., elementary, secondary and college education as well as
vocational training) forms part of the record. These considered, the Court cannot but share the
same sentiment of Roxas et al. It is indeed perplexing why it is complex for respondents to
retroactively apply R.A. No. 10592 when all that the MSEC has to do is to utilize the same
standard of behavior for the grant of time allowances and refer to existing prison records.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO
G.R. Nos. 225642-43, 17 January 2018, THIRD DIVISION (Martires, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Court simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved
Filipino woman. Court, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's
dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently
intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.
In this way, the testimony of a private complainant of rape can be evaluated without gender
bias or cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an
accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the
testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. Thus, in order for to affirm a conviction for rape, it is necessary to believe beyond
reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.

FACTS
AAA was watching a beauty contest with her aunt at Davao City. The contest was being
held at a basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. The only lights available were
those coming from the vehicles around.
She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room She was not able to reach
the comfort room because Juvy Amarela (Amarela) was already waiting for her along the way.
Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was shocked and was no match to
the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day care center. He punched her
in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed her. She tried to resist him
but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He placed himself on top of
her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement. She shouted
for help and then three men came to her rescue so Amarela fled.
The three persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions
with her. So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no
longer around, she proceeded on her way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who
brought her first to the Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home.
Dumandan stayed behind So Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt's
house instead.
AAA then said that Racho brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was
told to lie down. When she refused, Racho boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by
kicking him but he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself
on top of AAA. Racho then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. After consummating the act,
Racho left her. AAA went home and told her mother about what happened to her. They reported
the matter to the police and eventually Amarela and Racho were arrested.

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 The Regional Trial Court convicted Amarela and Racho with the crime of Rape, the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto.

ISSUE
Are Amarela and Racho guilty of Rape?

RULING
NO. More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual"
depredation, rape cases are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private
complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent
repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her
natural instinct to protect her honor. However, this misconception, particularly in this day and
age, not only puts the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice.
The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the
case of People v. Taño, the Court affirmed the conviction of three armed robbers who took turns
raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo
Labrador, said:
It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they
have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural
instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended party would have
positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.
This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then
would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual
assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved
Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's
dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and
confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.
In this way, the testimony of a private complainant of rape can be evaluated without
gender bias or cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions
because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course,
that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Thus, in order for to affirm a conviction for rape, it is necessary to
believe beyond reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.
In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost
invariably, to the credibility and story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes
constrained to rely on the observations of the trial court who had the unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
and at times unfriendly, examination. It has since become imperative that the evaluation of

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testimonial evidence by the trial court be accorded great respect by this Court; for it can be
expected that said determination is based on reasonable discretion as to which testimony is
acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief. Although we put a premium on the factual
findings of the trial court, especially when they are affirmed by the appellate court,[17] this rule
is not absolute and admits exceptions, such as when some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, and misinterpreted.
Certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses are:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the
stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness
of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the
case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded. And third, the rule is even more
stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable
doubt lingers and the Court was not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following
circumstances, particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the
version of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony
in court; (2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and
she only saw him for the first time; her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought
under the stage against her will; and the medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries
and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.
First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the crowd
at the beauty contest and made it easy for Amarela to grab her without anyone noticing:
It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex
parte are usually incomplete and inadequate. The Court usually brush aside these inconsistencies
since they are trivial and do not impair the credibility of the rape victim. In this case, however,
the version in AAA's affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the
first instance, AAA claims that she was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court,
she says that she was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are
hesitant to believe AAA's retraction because it goes into whether it was even possible for
Amarela to abduct AAA against her will.
Taking into account AAA's initial claim that Amarela pulled heaway from the vicinity of
the stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against
her will. Thus, AAA's version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled
away from the crowd watching the beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice
if AAA was being taken away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room

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when she was grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement reflect another story that
differs from her court testimony? To our mind, AAA's testimony could have been concocted to
just make her story believable rather than sticking to her original story that Amarela introduced
himself and pulled her away from the stage. We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a
minor detail because it casts some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth that she was
abducted against her will before she was raped.
The Court found it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the
whole incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was
not illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's face
From AAA's testimony, it is unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting
conditions in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified
Amarela while she was being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to
clarify as to how she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care
enter was dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again
draw reservations from AAA's testimony. Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor
is the prosecution's primary responsibility. The identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must
be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not
to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the
crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal
beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked,
and then raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience.
AAA would like the Court to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA,
and place himself on top of her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically
impossible for two human beings to move freely under a stage, much more when the other
person is trying to resist sexual advances. Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela
pulled her to the makeshift stage without any sign of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was
being held against her will, AAA could have easily called for help or simply run away.
Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of
the medico-legal officer. The medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that
AAA had no pertinent physical findings /or physical injuries.
A medico-legal's findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged rape
victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the medical
examination on AAA, she diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a blunt force or
penetrating trauma.
A specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish consensual from non-
consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the frequency of lacerations
and whether they are located in different positions) to determine whether the sexual act was
consensual or not. If the frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of the vaginal
orifice, then it would be a good indicator that there was sexual abuse. On the other hand, if the

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lacerations are found in a specific area, it could indicate forced rape, but could also suggest
consensual intercourse.
In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions
of the hymen. Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the
probability that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's
thighs-when she said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have had
consensual intercourse.
Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the
will of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a
female is alleged and shown to be without her consent. Carnal knowledge of the female with her
consent is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law
of giving consent. The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior
to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and
refusals, prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial
coercion.
Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, the burden
of proof is never shifted and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.
Whether the accused's defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It is
fundamental that the prosecution's case cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both
criminal cases. This means that both Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone
testimony. When we rely on the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases, we require
that her testimony be entirely credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For when certain parts would
seem unbelievable, especially when it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the victim's
testimony as a whole does not pass the test of credibility. Since we doubt AAA's account on how
she was raped by Amarela, we have to consider her testimony against Racho under the same
light.
In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's house,
but instead forced her to go inside a house along the way. While inside the house, Racho
supposedly boxed AAA's abdomen, undressed himself, placed himself on top of AAA, and
inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left AAA to go home by
herself.
The Found it odd that AAA was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Godo
Dumandan's house to seek help. Instead, she was brought to the Racho residence where she told
Neneng Racho what happened. Again, instead of reporting the incident to the police, AAA insisted
that she be brought to her aunt's house nearby. This is way beyond human experience. If AAA
had already told other people what happened, there was no reason for her not to report the
incident to the proper authorities.
Faced with AAA's doubtful narration before she went home alone, the Court is inclined to
believe Racho's version that they parted ways when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home.
The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether

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AAA's ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must
do its part to convince the court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources
of the government to present a logical and realistic account of every alleged crime, and they
should, to the best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a conviction. What happened
cannot be ascertained based on the lone testimony of AAA. It should have been the prosecution's
duty to properly evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho.

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 FELICITAS D. NACINO, HELEN E. RAMACULA, and THE VOLUNTEERS AGAINST
CRIME AND CORRUPTION, INC. v. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 234789-91, 03 September 2019, EN BANC (Jardeleza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight. Among the elements constitutive of
the offense of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack
of precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of
mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law. A conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the
accused.
To charge Napeñas with reckless imprudence would be to charge under his responsibility the
consequences of all incidents that contributed to the death of the 44 SAF members, even those beyond
what he and his team may or should have reasonably foreseen during the planning and execution of
Oplan Exodus which is not fair.

FACTS
The Committee Report in the Mamasapano Incident published by the Senate briefly narrated
the tragic fall of the 44 elite Special Action Force (SAF), brought about by police operation Oplan
Exodus, which was an operation to pursue “Marwan” and “Usman”, two internationally wanted
terrorists and mass murderers.
This report, along with others, led to the filing of charges, three of which were the
aforementioned complaints lodged with the Ombudsman. The complainants were mostly parents of
the members of the SAF who were killed in the conduct of Oplan Exodus. These complaints which the
Ombudsman previously dismissed essentially contained the same allegations and called for Aquino,
Purisima, and Napeñas to be held guilty of 44 counts of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide.
With regard to Aquino, it was alleged by Felicitas Nacino et al. (Nacino, et al.) that he acted
with gross and inexcusable negligence in approving the said plan, knowing that it was flawed, in the
sense that he approved the recommendation on the dates on which the operation shall be conducted.
He also allowed then suspended PNP Chief Purisima to participate not only in the planning of Oplan
Exodus but also in the running of the operation, and even in giving information and intelligence while
the operation was still ongoing. Complainants also attributed negligence to Aquino for not lifting a
finger "to rescue his soldiers" as Commander-in-Chief.
With respect to Purisima, while Nacino et al. alleged that he had already been charged with
usurpation of authority before the Sandiganbayan, they nonetheless insisted that he is criminally
negligent and thus should be held liable for the death of the 44 SAF members because as per his
instructions, knowledge of Oplan Exodus was kept from the Secretary of the Department of Interior

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and Local Government (DILG) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) until such time when the SAF
was already engaging hostile forces, which is in disregard of the requirements of lateral coordination
which is mandated by law. Furthermore, they alleged that at the crucial stage of the crisis, Purisima
also kept providing inaccurate and ambiguous information from unreliable sources, which resulted
in eventual erroneous decisions.
Finally, as regards Napeñas, Nacino et al. alleged that as with Purisima, Napeñas should be
found criminally negligent and liable for the death of the 44 SAF members because he unlawfully took
orders from Purisima, knowing fully that the latter was divested of the legal right to issue orders to
his subordinates by virtue of his suspension, and that he negligently, imprudently, unskillfully, and
without any forward vision, planned Oplan Exodus.
According to Nacino et al., all of the above circumstances, taken together, indubitably
established probable cause that the accused acted with inexcusable negligence and imprudence that
make them probably guilty of reckless imprudence, as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Ombudsman, however, ruled that no probable cause exists to charge Aquino, Purisima
and Napeñas with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. It ratiocinated that even if they were
negligent, the proximate cause of the death of the 44 SAF members, as well as the wounding of the
15 SAF troopers, was the intentional act of shooting by hostile forces that included members of the
Moro-Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and Private
Armed Groups (PAGs). Such act by these hostile forces constituted an efficient intervening cause in
their purported negligence during the planning, preparation, and actual implementation of Oplan
Exodus which may not necessarily be considered as within their full control, whether with a prior
and timely coordination with government forces. The Ombudsman held that, at best, the purported
criminal negligence on the part of Aquino, Purisima and Napeñas were only contributory. Hence, this
petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE
Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the complaints for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide filed
against Aquino, Purisima and Napeñas?

RULING
NO. It is fundamental that criminal responsibility is personal and that in the absence of
conspiracy, one cannot be held criminally liable for the act or default of another. The factors that led
to the tragic ending of Oplan Exodus may be attributed to the SAF alone. In fact, the Senate Report
discussed the SAF's failure to conduct adequate intelligence, planning, and coordination with the AFP.
First, the topography of the area of operations was not adequately considered. Second, while
intelligence in the possession of the PNP prior to the launch of Oplan Exodus indicated that there
were more than 1,000 hostile troops at or near the target area, the SAF deployed only 392 personnel
for the entire operation, with almost a quarter of them positioned to guard the main supply route

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that was far away from the theatre of action. Third, the SAF were not aware that the MILF had mortar
capability, as revealed by the surviving SAF trooper. Had they known of this fact, the complexion of
their preparations would have been different. Fourth, the SAF failed to coordinate with the AFP prior
to the launch of the operations. The coordinating instructions of Oplan Exodus provide that "lateral
coordination with friendly forces before, during and after the operation is highly encouraged,"
instead of mandatory.
On top of poor planning and execution, the Senate Report also observed that Oplan Exodus
broke the chain of command, was not followed to the details, was badly coordinated, and had badges
of failure from the very start.
It is the foregoing missteps that ostensibly placed the SAF troopers in a compromising
situation, as in fact they suffered grievously in the hands of various armed groups in the battlefield
and were direly met with heavy casualties. As the foregoing lapses may be attributed to the SAF, with
Napeñas at its helm, it is Napeñas alone who may be liable for a charge of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide.
Napeñas alleged in his consolidated counter-affidavit that Aquino ordered, headed, and
stamped his approval on the high-risk operations conducted against Marwan and Usman, and even
gave orders to Purisima to the effect that the said terrorists should not get away. Moreover, in one
Senate inquiry, Napeñas alleged that Aquino participated in the planning and preparation for the
operation by approving the suggested alternative date of execution and ordering the increase in the
number of troops and coordination with the AFP. However, these acts barely qualify Aquino as an
active player in the entire scheme of the operations, more so point to any criminal negligence on his
part. While the Senate report suggest Aquino's accountability under the doctrine of command
responsibility, it could not be said that the policy direction for Oplan Exodus came from Aquino
inasmuch as it is the SAF's function to serve arrest warrants and conduct counter-terrorism
operations against local and international terrorist groups. There is no evidence to the effect that the
policy direction to arrest Marwan and Usman came from Aquino.
Moreover, the President of the Republic of the Philippines is not part of the chain of command
of the PNP. Under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6975, the command and direction of the PNP is
vested in the Chief of the PNP. That the PNP chain of command does not include the President is
further confirmed by the PNP BOT Report itself. The President's power over the PNP is subsumed in
his general power of control and supervision over the executive department of the government, and
this is supported by existing jurisprudence.
The Court also does not find probable cause to charge Purisima of the same offense. Full
responsibility over the operation was lodged on Napeñas. The actions of Purisima enumerated by the
Senate did not put in motion the sequence of events that eventually led to the death of the 44 SAF
members. Purisima's presence during the Malacañan briefing communicating with Napeñas during
the operation, and providing updates to Aquino have nothing to do with the planning and
implementation of Oplan Exodus. He may have offended the law in that respect, but the Court is not
convinced that his participation per se placed in motion the series of events that eventually led to the
death of the 44 SAF members, and for which he should be prosecuted for reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide.
There was negligence on the part of Napeñas in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus,
but the confluence of other factors contributing to its tragic ending prevents the same from finding

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probable cause to charge him with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide. In negligence
or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight. Among the elements constitutive of the offense of
reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable
lack of precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring
an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law. A conscious
indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of the frame
of mind of the accused.
To charge Napeñas with reckless imprudence would be to charge under his responsibility the
consequences of all incidents that contributed to the death of the 44 SAF members, even those
beyond what he and his team may or should have reasonably foreseen during the planning and
execution of Oplan Exodus—which is not fair. There is no guarantee of police officers' safety even in
developed countries possessed of sophisticated crime-fighting technology.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX
G.R. No. 229677, 02 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: first, to accuse a man of
rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; second,
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution, and third, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.
In this case AAA s testimon as replete ith material inconsistencies and improbabilities She
backtracked on whether or not the door was locked, even admitting that she could not remember
whether the door had a lock at all. AAA did not testify that she was denied the capacity to move or even
sho t hile she as left alone in XXX s room Th s AAA had the opport nit to call for help and a chance
to escape, but she did nothing. Moreover, it was unnatural for a rape victim who claimed to have been
detained overnight by her rapist not to have immediately if not spontaneously uttered a single word to
her mother right after she got rescued.

FACTS
AAA testified that she first met XXX sometime in February 2000, in the restaurant where she
used to work. Later in October 2000, they met again in an appliance store where she worked. They
entered into a conversation and eventually talked about whether or not AAA was looking for
apartment because XXX had a spare room. AAA agreed to transfer to the former’s room, and
eventually moved there without agreeing on a rental rate.
One morning, XXX asked AAA to fix the bedding in his room, to which the latter obliged.
However, while she was doing so, XXX suddenly barged, closed the door, and held her shoulders. AAA
tried to wrestle away but XXX covered the former’s nose with his hand which emitted an odor that
made her weak and dizzy. She felt XXX laying her down and undressing her. Then, XXX mounted her,
held her body, and thrust his penis into her vagina, and made pumping motions. After satisfying his
lust, appellant put on his clothes and left. On the same day, XXX came back and poked a firearm on
her, forced her to lie down, undressed her, and committed the same act again. XXX warned her not to
tell anyone. It was only two days after when AAA was able to confide the incidents to her mother.
According to XXX, however, when AAA started sleeping in the rented apartment, they made
love twice during her stay. XXX denied having drugged and raped AAA. He claimed that it was unlikely
that the so-called rape incidents took place inside his apartment since there were other people there.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found XXX guilty of two (2) counts of rape, and the Court of Appeals
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming XXX’s conviction for rape?

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RULING
YES. Under Article 266-A (1)(a), rape requires two elements: first, that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and second, that the offender accomplished such act through force,
threat, or intimidation.
It is not denied by XXX that he had carnal knowledge of AAA, thus, what needs to be resolved
is whether or not force or intimidation was employed by XXX as a means by which he succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of AAA.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: first, to accuse a man
of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; second,
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution, and third, the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.
In this case, AAA’s testimony was replete with material inconsistencies and improbabilities.
She backtracked on whether or not the door was locked, even admitting that she could not remember
whether the door had a lock at all. AAA did not testify that she was denied the capacity to move or
even shout while she was left alone in XXX’s room. Thus, AAA had the opportunity to call for help and
a chance to escape, but she did nothing. Moreover, it was unnatural for a rape victim who claimed to
have been detained overnight by her rapist not to have immediately if not spontaneously uttered a
single word to her mother right after she got rescued.
Moreover, when XXX went to AAA’s house to propose marriage after the rape incidents, AAA’s
mother allowed him to enter the house without showing any sign of anger toward him. Thus, while
the Court has previously ruled that the existence of a romantic relationship between two (2) persons
does not discount the commission of rape since it can be committed by one spouse against the other,
in this case, AAA’s credibility is seriously being put in question vis-à-vis other testimonies. This
plainly indicates that AAA was not honest after all about the rape charges she initiated against the
appellant.
In light of the foregoing considerations, XXX’s defense of consensual sexual intercourse was
likely to be true than not.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE CUBAY y UGSALAN
G.R. No. 224597, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In People v. Amogis this Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere
attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor
and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment
appellant's evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape
committed against a woman who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her
tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in the middle and
charged him with rape.
The short and long of it is this: The evidence on record indubitably show that then eighteen (18)
year old AAA, albeit she is a deaf-mute with low capacity to learn formal sign language, is in truth,
mentally capable of giving or withholding consent.

FACTS
Dante Cubay was charged with 44 counts of rape under separate Informations. At a Special
Education Dormitory (SPED) in Bukidnon, he unlawfully had sexual intercourse with 18-year-old
[AAA], against her will. Complainant is a congenital deaf mute. Cubay is the school watchman
assigned at XXX Elementary School, XXX SPED Center, and the SPED dormitory, where [AAA] is
currently staying.
Cubay denied the charges. He admitted he had sexual congress with complainant for more
than forty-four times but asserted they were all consensual. He argued that complainant filed the
rape charges only because her pregnancy and illicit affair with him brought embarrassment to her
family.
The trial court found Cubay guilty of 44 counts of rape.
On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for finding him guilty of 44 counts of rape despite
the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintained that the prosecution was able to prove
to a moral certainty that appellant had carnal knowledge of complainant for 44 times through force,
threat, or intimidation. Her consistent and positive identification of appellant as the man who raped
her prevails over appellant's self-serving denial and uncorroborated sweetheart theory.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE
Was the prosecution able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the forty-four (44) counts of
rape?

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RULING
NO. The thing speaks for itself. On the whole, AAA's testimony is noticeably terse, vague,
equivocal, and seriously wanting in details pertaining to the presence of the essential element of force
or intimidation. AAA's testimony only bears the element of carnal knowledge.
That AAA pushed appellant when he "undressed, touched my body . . ., I was afraid" is at best
equivocal. Again, this hardly equates with "force or intimidation" within the penal provision defining
and penalizing rape.
For one, the act of pushing did not emanate from appellant but from AAA. For another,
"pushing" is equivocal subject to different interpretations depending on the attendant circumstances.
It may mean a gentle "no," "not yet," "wait," "I am shy," "not here," and many more possible
interpretations or meanings. One thing is sure though: under the attendant circumstances, it cannot
be deemed sufficient proof of resistance or unconsented sex.
In People v. Amogis this Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere
attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor
and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment
appellant's evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape
committed against a woman who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of
her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in the middle
and charged him with rape.
The short and long of it is this: The evidence on record indubitably show that then eighteen
(18) year old AAA, albeit she is a deaf-mute with low capacity to learn formal sign language, is in
truth, mentally capable of giving or withholding consent.
For even though AAA is a deaf-mute and certified to be only at Grade 2 level in formal sign
language education does not mean she is suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation which has the effect of hindering her capacity to give consent.
In another vein, AAA's broadly sweeping statement that "I was raped . . . in September,
October, November, December, and January" is a conclusion of law. On this score, we have
consistently ruled that the victim's bare statement that the accused raped her again on the succeeding
dates is a conclusion of law which cannot serve as sole basis for appellant's conviction.
Prescinding therefrom, appellant should be acquitted in these cases.
To emphasize, sexual intercourse here between appellant and AAA happened at least forty-
four (44) times over only a period of five (5) months. And through all these times, AAA never
complained. She did not even want to leave the dormitory where all her forty-four (44) sexual
encounters with appellant happened. She was even seen by one of her teachers "eating snacks with
appellant," hence her aunt BBB, also a SPED teacher, proposed to AAA's grandfather to pull AAA from
the dormitory and make her live with her (BBB) because she did not want ugly rumors to spread.
Too, AAA testified she did not go with her grandfather the first time the latter came to pull
her out from the dormitory because "he might scold her." For what? If we put it in context, it was
because of the "ugly rumor spreading" about her and appellant.

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 Finally, AAA revealed the supposed rape (forty-four [44] counts altogether) only when her
relatives discovered she was pregnant.
The foregoing circumstances taken singly or collectively, are exculpatory evidence which
compel no less than a verdict of acquittal.

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COMMERCIAL LAW

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 BDO UNIBANK, INC. v. ANTONIO CHOA
G.R. No. 237553, 10 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A trust receipt transaction imposes upon the entrustee the obligation to deliver to the
entruster the price of the sale, or if the merchandise is not sold, to return the same to the entruster.
It is explained in Gonzales v. Hongkong & Shai Banking Corporation that there are two obligations
in a trust receipt transaction: the first, refers to money received under the obligation involving the
duty to turn it over to the owner of the merchandise sold, while the second refers to merchandise
received under the obligation to "return" it to the owner. A violation of any of these undertakings
constitutes estafa defined under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as provided by Sec. 13 of
Presidential Decree 115.
Although the pieces of evidence show that Choa signed the Trust Receipt Agreements, they
do not show that he signed them in his personal capacity. Without any evidence that respondent
personally bound himself to the debts of the company he represented, the Court cannot hold him
civilly liable under the Trust Receipt Agreements.

FACTS
An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Antonio Choa
(Choa), then president and general manager of Camden Industries, Inc. (Camden). He was
charged with violating the Trust Receipts Law (TRL) to the prejudice of BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO).
The witnesses of the prosecution testified, among others, that per Civil Case No. 70098, entitled
“CAMDEN Industries Inc Eq itable PCI Bank Pasig civil case), BDO supposedly owed Camden
the judgment award of P M. On the other hand, BDO’s claim against Camden/accused is P M
plus.
Subsequently, Choa filed his Comment. Afterwards, Choa filed a Motion for Leave to file
Demurrer to Evidence, attached to which was his Demurrer to Evidence. In both pleadings, Choa
argued that Camden and the bank are mutually creditors and debtors of each other.
Consequently, their obligations are extinguished proportionately by operation of law. Since the
P20M plus being claimed by the bank is more than offset by the P90M plus judgment against the
bank, there is no basis for the claim of violation of the TRL. Contrarily, the prosecution filed its
Opposition asserting that the pleading was not timely filed and that it should be denied for lack
of basis, maintaining that Choa’s civil liabilities could not have been offset by the judgment award
granted to Camden in the Pasig civil case.
Consequently, the trial court issued an Order granting Choa’s Demurrer to Evidence.
Based on the records and the witnesses’ testimonies, it found that the prosecution failed to
establish Choa’s debt. From these findings, the trial court declared that the case is subject to
compensatory action, which is civil in nature.
Thus, BDO filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari. Affirming the trial court’s Orders,
the CA denied the petition. Hence, BDO filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

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ISSUE
Did the CA err in ruling that the trial court judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when he issued the Order granting Choa’s Demurrer to Evidence?

RULING
YES. A trust receipt transaction imposes upon the entrustee the obligation to deliver to
the entruster the price of the sale, or if the merchandise is not sold, to return the same to the
entruster. It is explained in Gonzales v. Hongkong & Shai Banking Corporation that there are two
obligations in a trust receipt transaction: the first, refers to money received under the obligation
involving the duty to turn it over to the owner of the merchandise sold, while the second refers
to merchandise received under the obligation to "return" it to the owner. A violation of any of
these undertakings constitutes estafa defined under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
as provided by Sec. 13 of Presidential Decree 115.
In granting Choa’s Demurrer to Evidence, the trial court consequently acquitted him of
violation of the TRL. The Decision was based on grounds that:
(1) BDO owed Camden, which was represented by Choa, P90M while Camden owed BDO
P20M, and both amounts can be legally compensated;
(2) BDO failed to provide evidence that Choa was liable from P7.8M (approx.) as alleged
in the Information, or that this amount formed part of the P20M trust receipt; and
BDO failed to provide evidence of Choa’s criminal intent in not paying or turning over
the goods.
On the first ground, the Court ruled that the Pasig civil case is irrelevant in this case.
Again, the issue in this case is whether Camden violated the Trust Receipt Agreements when it
failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale of the goods to BDO, or to return the goods should the
merchandise remain unsold. Moreover, the Pasig civil case, which held BDO as a judgment debtor
of Camden, has yet to attain finality. As such, it cannot be the basis of a judgment.
On the second ground, the prosecution was able to show how it computed the amount of
P7.8 (approx.). The trial court, then, cannot rule that the prosecution was not able to provide
evidence. In addition, whether this amount formed part of the alleged P20M trust receipt is
irrelevant. That is not the issue in this case, which deals with the violation of the TRL.
On the third ground, Criminal intent is irrelevant in prosecuting the violation of the TRL.
A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a criminal
offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but more to the public interest.
Thus, in granting the Demurrer to Evidence, the trial court judge committed grave
abuse of discretion. Its Orders, therefore, should be reversed. As a consequence, the Court
resolved the merits of the case based on BDO Unibank’s evidence. Although the pieces of
evidence show that Choa signed the Trust Receipt Agreements, they do not show that he
signed them in his personal capacity. Without any evidence that Choa personally bound
himself to the debts of the company he represented, the Court cannot hold him civilly
liable under the Trust Receipt Agreements.

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 ABS-CBN PUBLISHING, INC. v. DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF TRADEMARKS
G.R. No. 217916, 20 June 2018, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

ABS-CBN Publishing itself admitted in its petition that its application/registration with the
IPO under Application No. 4-1994-096162 was already "deemed abandoned." ABS-CBN Publishing,
in allowing this abandonment, cannot now come before the Court to cry foul if another entity has,
in the time that it has abandoned its trademark and in full cognizance of the IPC and the IPO rules,
registered its own.
Also, as correctly pointed out by the ODG, this abandonment is the very reason why ABS-
CBN Publishing lost its rights over its trademark, and that it is also the reason why, after twenty
years from the initial application and after actual use of the applicant mark, the petitioner once
again came before the IPO to apply for registration.

FACTS
In 2004, ABS-CBN Publishing filed with the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines
(IPO) its application for the registration of its trademark "METRO" (applicant mark)
The intellectual property office denied the application as the mark is identical to three
others. ABS-CBN Publishing appealed to the Office of the Director General (ODG) of the IPO. The
OFG upheld the denial.
ABS-CBN Publishing filed before the Court of Appeals its "Motion for Extension of Time
(To File Petition for Review)" In the second motion, the petitioner asked the appellate court for
another extension of the deadline. Meanwhile, CA granted ABS-CBN Publishing first motion
praying for an extension of time to file its petition for review, subject to the "warning against
further extension." Thus, the Court of Appeals extended the deadline only once.
Relying on the appellate court's favorable response to its second motion for extension
(which was not acted upon by the Court of Appeals), ABS-CBN Publishing failed to file its petition
for review on the deadline. Hence, the CA denied the petition.

ISSUE
Was the ODG correct in refusing to register the applicant mark for being identical and
confusingly similar with the cited marks already registered with the IPO?

RULING

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 YES. According to Section 123.1(d) of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines
(IPC), a mark cannot be registered if it is "identical with a registered mark belonging to a
different proprietor or a mark with an earlier filing or priority date," in respect of the following:
(i) the same goods or services, or (ii) closely related goods or services, or (iii) if it nearly
resembles such a mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
To determine whether a mark is to be considered as "identical" or that which is
confusingly similar with that of another, the Court has developed two (2) tests: the dominancy
and holistic tests. While the Court has time and again ruled that the application of the tests is on
a case-to-case basis, upon the passage of the IPC, the trend has been to veer away from the usage
of the holistic test and to focus more on the usage of the dominancy test. As stated by the Court
in the case of McDonald's Corporation vs. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc., the "test of dominancy is now
explicitly incorporated into law in Section 155.1 of the Intellectual Property Code which defines
infringement as the 'colorable imitation of a registered mark x x x or a dominant feature
thereof.'"
In using this test, focus is to be given to the dominant features of the marks in question.
In the 1954 case of Co Tiong Sa vs. Director of Patents, the Court, in using the dominancy test,
taught that:
But differences of variations in the details of one trademark and of another are
not the legally accepted tests of similarity in trademarks. It has been consistently held
that the question of infringement of a trademark is to be determined by the test of
dominancy. Similarity in size, form, and color, while relevant, is not conclusive. If the
competing trademark contains the main or essential or dominant features of another, and
confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement takes place.
The Court, in Skechers, U.S.A., Inc. vs. Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corp., and in once
again using the dominancy test, reiterated Del Monte Corporation vs. Court of Appeals in saying
that "the defendants in cases of infringement do not normally copy but only make colorable
changes." The Court emphasized that "the most successful form of copying is to employ enough
points of similarity to confuse the public, with enough points of difference to confuse the courts."
In other words, in committing the infringing act, the infringer merely introduces
negligible changes in an already registered mark, and then banks on these slight differences to
state that there was no identity or confusing similarity, which would result in no infringement.
This kind of act, which leads to confusion in the eyes of the public, is exactly the evil that the
dominancy test refuses to accept. The small deviations from a registered mark are insufficient to
remove the applicant mark from the ambit of infringement.
In the present case, the dominant feature of the applicant mark is the word "METRO"
which is identical, both visually and aurally, to the cited marks already registered with the IPO.
As held by the ODG-and correctly at that -
There is no dispute that the subject and cited marks share the same dominant
word, "Metro". Even if, as the Appellant (petitioner herein) points out, the second cited
mark owned by Metro International contains an accompanying device, and the third cited

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 mark contains the terms "Philippine Daily Inquirer", the dominant feature of the subject
and cited marks is still clearly the word "Metro", spelled and pronounced in exactly the
same way. The identity between the marks would indubitably result in confusion of
origin as well as goods.
Also, greater relevance is to be accorded to the finding of Examiner Icban on the confusing
similarity between, if not the total identity of, the applicant and cited marks. Examiner Icban, in
reiterating with finality her earlier findings, said that the applicant and cited marks are "the same
in sound, spelling, meaning, overall commercial impression, covers substantially the same goods
and flows through the same channel of trade," which leads to no other conclusion than that
"confusion as to the source of origin is likely to occur."
The findings of Examiner Icban, reviewed first by the Director of the Bureau of
Trademarks, and again by the Director General of the IPO, are the result of a judicious study of
the case by no less than the government agency duly empowered to examine applications for the
registration of marks. These findings deserve great respect from the Court. Absent any strong
justification for the reversal thereof-as in this case-the Court shall not reverse and set aside the
same. As such, the prior findings remain: the applicant mark, "METRO," is identical to and
confusingly similar with the other cited marks already registered. By authority of the Sec.
123.l(d) of the IPC, the applicant mark cannot be registered. The ODG is correct in upholding the
Decision of both the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks and Examiner Icban.
This ruling stands despite the specious arguments presented by the petitioner in the
current petition. ABS-CBN Publishing asserts that it has a vested right over the applicant mark
because Metro Media Publishers, Inc. (Metro Media), the corporation from which the petitioner
acquired the applicant mark, first applied for the registration of the same under the old
Trademark Law, and since then, actually used the applicant mark in commerce. The petitioner
belabors the point that under the old Trademark law, actual use in commerce is a prerequisite
to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark and a trade name. ABS-CBN Publishing even
went on further in asserting that its actual use of the applicant mark enabled it to automatically
acquire trademark rights, which should have extended even upon the promulgation of the IPC in
1998.
Two things must be said of this argument.
First, there is no question that ABS-CBN Publishing’s predecessor already applied for the
registration of the applicant mark "METRO" on November 3, 1994 under Class 16 of the Nice
classification. It was docketed as Application No. 4-1994-096162. There is likewise no question
that as early as 1989, Metro Media has already used the applicant mark "METRO" in its magazine
publication. At that point, Metro Media exercised all the rights conferred by law to a trademark
applicant.
Second, however, ABS-CBN Publishing itself admitted in its petition that its
application/registration with the IPO was already "deemed abandoned." ABS-CBN Publishing, in
allowing this abandonment, cannot now come before the Court to cry foul if another entity has,
in the time that it has abandoned its trademark and in full cognizance of the IPC and the IPO
rules, registered its own.

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 Also, as correctly pointed out by the ODG, this abandonment is the very reason why ABS-
CBN Publishing lost its rights over its trademark, and that it is also the reason why, after twenty
years from the initial application and after actual use of the applicant mark, the petitioner once
again came before the IPO to apply for registration. The ODG said:
Even then, it must be emphasized that absolute certainty of confusion or even actual
confusion is not required to refuse registration. Indeed, it is the mere likelihood of confusion that
provides the impetus to accord protection to trademarks already registered with the IPO. The
Court cannot emphasize enough that the cited marks "METRO" (word) and "METRO" (logo) are
identical with the registrant mark "METRO" both in spelling and in sound. In fact, it is the same
exact word. Considering that both marks are used in goods which are classified as magazines, it
requires no stretch of imagination that a likelihood of confusion may occur. Again, the Court
points to the finding of Examiner Icban which was reviewed and upheld twice: one by the
Director of the Bureau of Trademarks and another by the Director General of the IPO.

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 VICENTE HENSON, JR. v. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 223134, 14 August 2019, EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court deemed it necessary to abandon the ruling in Vector that an insurer may file an
action against the tortfeasor within ten (10) year from the time the insurer indemnifies the insured.
Following the principles of subrogation, the insurer only steps into the shoes of the insured. No new
obligation was created between the insurer and the wrongdoer. The rights of a subrogee cannot be
superior to the rights possessed by a subrogor. Therefore, for purposes of prescription, the insurer
inherits only the remaining period within which the insured may file an action against the
wrongdoer. The indemnification of the insured by the insurer only allows it to be subrogated to the
former' s rights, and does not create a new reckoning point for the cause of action that the insured
originally has against the wrongdoer.
However, Vector is still applicable in this case because the Court's abandonment of the
Vector doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. Hence, as the amended complaint impleading Henson was filed on April 21, 2014, which
is within ten (10) years from the time respondent indemnified Copylandia for its injury/loss, i.e., on
November 2, 2006, the case cannot be said to have prescribed

FACTS
From 1989 to 1999, National Arts Studio and Color Lab (NASCL) leased the front portion
of a two-storey building owned by Vicente Henson Jr. (Henson). In 1999, NASCL gave up its lease
and instead leased the right front portion and the entire second-floor of the building. Meanwhile,
Copylandia Office Systems Corp. (Copylandia) moved in to the ground floor.
On May 9, 2006, a water leak occurred in the building causing injury to the various
equipment of Copylandia. As the said equipment were insured, Copylandia filed a claim with its
insurer, UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. (UCPB). UCPB paid the claim and, as subrogee,
demanded from NASCL for the amount of the payment it made. Since the demand proved to be
futile, UCPB filed a complaint for damages against NASCL.
Meanwhile, Henson transferred ownership of the building to Citrinne Holdings, Inc.
(CHI), where he was a stockholder and President. UCPB amended its complaint impleading CHI
as a defendant to the case. Thereafter, UCPB filed a motion praying Henson, instead of CHI, be
impleaded as a defendant to the case. CHI opposed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
arguing that since UCPB’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it must be brought within four
(4) years from its accrual on May 9, 2006.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the cause of action of UCPB has not yet expired.
Since UCPB was merely enforcing its right of subrogation, the prescriptive period is ten (10)
years based on an obligation created by law, to be reckoned from the date of Copylandia's

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indemnification on November 2, . As such, UCPB’s claim has yet to prescribe when it sought
to include Henson as party defendant on April 21, 2014. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Has the claim of UCPB against Henson already prescribed?

RULING
NO. The courts a quo cited Vector Shipping Corporation v. American Home Assurance
Company (Vector) in making their decisions. In Vector, Vector Shipping Corporation (VSC)
entered into a contract of affreightment with Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) for the transport of
the latter’s goods. Caltex insured its goods with American Home Assurance Company American
Home . During the transport, VSC’s ship collided with another vessel and sank resulting to the
total loss of Caltex’s goods. American Home fully indemnified Caltex for its law. Thus, American
Home was subrogated to the right of Caltex against VSC. The said case reached the Court with
the issue of whether the action of American Home against VSC had prescribed. The Court ruled
that American Home’s action against VSC was upon an obligation created by law and not upon a
written contract between VSC and Caltex. This is because the subrogation of American Home to
the rights of Caltex was by virtue of the express provision of law embodied in Art. 2207. Since
the action of American Home against VSC was upon an obligation created by law, American Home
may bring suit against VSC within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued or
when American Home indemnified Caltex pursuant to Art. 1142 of the New Civil Code.
However, the Court deemed it necessary to abandon the ruling in Vector that an insurer
may file an action against the tortfeasor within ten (10) year from the time the insurer
indemnifies the insured. Following the principles of subrogation, the insurer only steps into the
shoes of the insured. No new obligation was created between the insurer and the wrongdoer.
The rights of a subrogee cannot be superior to the rights possessed by a subrogor. Therefore, for
purposes of prescription, inherits only the remaining period within which the insured may file
an action against the wrongdoer. The indemnification of the insured by the insurer only allows
it to be subrogated to the former' s rights, and does not create a new reckoning point for the
cause of action that the insured originally has against the wrongdoer.
Be that as it may, it should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
Vector doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. Thus, the Court set the following guidelines relative to the application
of Vector and the instant decision Decision vis-a-vis the prescriptive period in cases where the
insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer based on a quasi-delict:

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 1. For actions of such nature that have already been filed and are currently pending before
the courts at the time of the finality of this Decision, the rules on prescription prevailing at
the time the action is filed would apply.
2. For actions of such nature that have not yet been filed at the time of the finality of this
Decision:
a. For cases where the tort was committed and the consequent loss/injury against
the insured occurred prior to the finality of this Decision, the subrogee-insurer is
given a period not exceeding four (4) years from the time of the finality of this
Decision to file the action against the wrongdoer; provided, that in all instances,
the total period to file such case shall not exceed ten (10) years from the time the
insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured.

b. For cases where the tort was committed and the consequent loss/injury against
the insured occurred only upon or after the finality of this Decision, the Vector
doctrine would hold no application. The prescriptive period is four (4) years from
the time the tort is committed against the insured by the wrongdoer.
In this case, it is undisputed that the water leak damage incident, which gave rise to
Copylandia's cause of action happened on May 9, 2006. As this incident gave rise to an obligation
classified as a quasi-delict, Copylandia would have only had four (4) years, or until May 9, 2010,
within which to file a suit to recover damages. Thus, when UCPB impleaded Henson as defendant,
on April 21, 2014, prescription should have already set it in.
However, it must be recognized that the prevailing rule applicable to the pertinent events
of this case is Vector. Pursuant to the guidelines stated above, specifically under guideline 1, the
Vector doctrine would then apply. Hence, as the amended complaint impleading Henson was
filed on April 21, 2014, which is within ten (10) years from the time respondent indemnified
Copylandia for its injury/loss, i.e., on November 2, 2006, the case cannot be said to have
prescribed applying the Vector doctrine.

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 COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v.
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC.
G.R. No. 207039, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 7042 provides:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
d) The phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, service contracts,
opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or
distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for
a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the
management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in
the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of,
commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization: Provided,
however, That the phrase "doing business" shall not be deemed to include mere investment
as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business,
and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to
represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing a representative or distributor
domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own
account.
Inferring from the afore-cited provision, mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign
corporation in a duly registered domestic corporation shall not be deemed "doing business" in the
Philippines. It is clear then that the IGC's act of subscribing shares of stocks from McCann, a duly
registered domestic corporation, maintaining investments therein, and deriving dividend income
therefrom, does not qualify as "doing business" contemplated under R.A. No. 7042. Hence, the IGC is
not required to secure a license before it can file a claim for tax refund.

FACTS
Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. (IGC) is a non-resident foreign corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the United States of America. The IGC
owns 30% of the total outstanding and voting capital stock of McCann Worldgroup Philippines,
Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
engaged in the general advertising business.
In 2006, McCann's Board of Directors declared cash dividends in the total amount of
P205,648,685 in favor of its stockholders of record. The IGC received cash dividends from
McCann in the amount of P61,694,605. McCann withheld a Final Withholding Tax (FWT) at the

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rate of 35% on IGC's cash dividends and remitted the payment of the FWT in the amount of
P21,593,111 to Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).
In 2008, the IGC filed an administrative claim for refund or issuance of Tax Credit
Certificate (TCC) in the amount of P12,338,921, representing the alleged overpaid FWT on
dividends paid by McCann to IGC. The IGC averred that as a non-resident foreign corporation, it
may avail of the preferential FWT rate of 15% on dividends received from a domestic
corporation under Section 28(B) (5) (b) of the Tax Code.
The CIR failed to act on IGC's claim for refund or issuance of TCC. This prompted the IGC
to file a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA ordered the CIR to
refund or to issue a TCC in favor of IGC in the amount of P12,338,921, representing the overpaid
FWT on cash dividends for taxable year 2006. Hence, this petition.
To support its contention, the CIR argued that: (1) the IGC failed to file a Tax Treaty Relief
Application (TTRA) with the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) 15 days before it paid the tax on dividends, in accordance with Revenue
Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000; and (2) the IGC, being an unlicensed corporation, has
no capacity to sue in Philippine courts in accordance with the Corporation Code.

ISSUE
Does the IGC have the capacity to sue in Philippines courts?

RULING
YES. Section 133 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 133. Doing business without a license. — No foreign corporation transacting business
in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain
or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
The aforementioned provision bars a foreign corporation "transacting business" in the
Philippines without a license access to our courts. Thus, in order for a foreign corporation to sue
in Philippine courts, a license is necessary only if it is "transacting or doing business" in the
country. Conversely, if an unlicensed foreign corporation is not transacting or doing business in
the Philippines, it can be permitted to bring an action even without such license.
Apparently, it is not the absence of the prescribed license, but the "doing of business" in
the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our
courts. The operative phrase is "transacting or doing business."

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 The threshold question therefore is whether the IGC was doing business in the
Philippines when it collected dividend earnings from sources within the Philippines. The
Corporation Code provides no definition for the phrase "doing business."
In the old case of The Mentholatum Co. v. Mangaliman, the Court discussed the test to
determine whether a foreign company is "doing business" in the Philippines, thus:
No general rule or governing principle can be laid down as to what constitutes "doing" or
"engaging in" or "transacting" business. Indeed, each case must be judged in the light of its
peculiar environmental circumstances. The true test, however, seems to be whether the foreign
corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was
organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. The term
implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent,
the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to,
and in progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization.
The foregoing definition found its way in R.A. No. 7042, otherwise known as the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991, which repealed Articles 44-56, Book II of the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987. Said law enumerated not only the acts or activities which constitute "doing
business," but also those activities which are not deemed "doing business." Thus, Section 3 (d)
of R.A. No. 7042 provides:
SEC. 3. Definitions. —
d) The phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, service contracts,
opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives
or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the
country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty (180) days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm,
entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity
of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance
of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization: Provided, however, That the phrase "doing business" shall not be deemed to
include mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly
registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; nor having a
nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing
a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in
its own name and for its own account.
Inferring from the afore-cited provision, mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign
corporation in a duly registered domestic corporation shall not be deemed "doing business" in
the Philippines. It is clear then that the IGC's act of subscribing shares of stocks from McCann, a
duly registered domestic corporation, maintaining investments therein, and deriving dividend
income therefrom, does not qualify as "doing business" contemplated under R.A. No. 7042.
Hence, the IGC is not required to secure a license before it can file a claim for tax refund.

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 TERP CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK
G.R. No. 221771, 18 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The authority of the board of directors to delegate its corporate powers may either be: (1)
actual; or (2) apparent. Actual authority may be express or implied. Express actual authority refers
to the corporate powers expressly delegated by the board of directors. Implied actual authority, on
the other hand can be meas red b his or her prior acts hich ha e been ratified by the
corporation or hose benefits ha e been accepted b the corporation
Terp Constr ction s s bseq ent act of t ice pa ing the additional interest Escalona
committed to during the term of the Margarita Bonds is considered a ratification of Escalona s acts
Terp Constr ction s onl defense that the ere erroneo s pa ments since it ne er obligated itself
from the start cannot stand. Corporations are bound by errors of their own making.

FACTS
Terp Construction planned to develop a housing project called the Margarita Eastville
and a condominium called Margarita Plaza. To finance the projects, Terp Construction, Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation, and Planters Development Bank agreed to raise funds through
the issuance of bonds worth P400 million called the Margarita Project Participation Certificates
(Margarita Bonds).
The three companies entered into a Contract of Guaranty in which they agreed that Terp
Construction would sell the Margarita Bonds and convey the funds generated into an asset pool
named the Margarita Asset Pool Formation and Trust Agreement. Planters Bank, as trustee,
would be the custodian of the assets in the asset pool with the corresponding obligation to pay
the interests and redeem the bonds at maturity. Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation, as
guarantor, would pay investors the value of the bond at maturity plus 8.5% interest per year.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank purchased Margarita Bonds for P100 million
and asked for additional interest other than the guaranteed 8.5% per annum based on the letters
written by Terp Construction Senior Vice President Alberto Escalona (Escalona).
Terp Construction began constructing Margarita Eastville and Margarita Plaza. After the
economic crisis in 1997, Terp suffered unrealized income, hence, it could not proceed with the
construction. When the Margarita Bonds matured, the funds in the asset pool were insufficient
to pay the bond holders.
Banco Filipino sent a demand letter to Terp Construction alleging that it was entitled to
a 15.5% interest. The latter, however, refused to pay. Terp Construction filed a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of interest, damages and attorney’s fees against Banco Filipino, alleging that
it only agreed to pay the seven percent (7%) additional interest on the condition that all the asset
pool funds would be released to Terp. Banco Filipino, on the other hand, alleged that it was

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induced into buying the Margarita Bonds after Terp Construction, through its senior vice
president’s letters, committed to pay 15.5% interest.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued a decision in favor of Terp Construction, ruling that
the acts of Escalona, the senior vice president, were not binding on the corporation since they
were not ratified. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals (CA) found unmeritorious Terp
Construction’s defense that the letters were unauthorized acts of Escalona.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in ruling that Terp Construction Corporation expressly agreed to be bound
to Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank for additional interest in the bonds it purchased?

RULING
NO. The authority of the board of directors to delegate its corporate powers may either
be: (1) actual; or (2) apparent. Actual authority may be express or implied. Express actual
authority refers to the corporate powers expressly delegated by the board of directors. Implied
actual authority, on the other hand, “can be measured by his or her prior acts which have been
ratified by the corporation or whose benefits have been accepted by the corporation.”
Terp Construction’s subsequent act of twice paying the additional interest Escalona
committed to during the term of the Margarita Bonds is considered a ratification of Escalona’s
acts. Terp Construction’s only defense that they were “erroneous payments” since it never
obligated itself from the start cannot stand. Corporations are bound by errors of their own
making.
Escalona likewise had apparent authority to transact on behalf of petitioner. In Yao Ka
Sin Trading v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "although an officer or agent acts without, or
in excess of, his actual authority if he acts within the scope of an apparent authority with which
the corporation has clothed him by holding him out or permitting him to appear as having such
authority, the corporation is bound thereby in favor of a person who deals with him in good faith
in reliance on such apparent authority, as where an officer is allowed to exercise a particular
authority with respect to the business, or a particular branch of its continuously and publicly, for
a considerable time."
Apparent authority is ascertained through:
(1) the general manner by which the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having
power to act or, in other words, the apparent authority with which it clothes him to act in general,
or
(2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or constructive
knowledge thereof, whether within or without the scope of his ordinary powers.

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 Here, Banco Filipino relied on Escalona’s apparent authority to promise interest
payments over and above the guaranteed 8.5%, considering that Escalona was Terp
Construction’s then senior vice president. His apparent authority was further demonstrated by
Terp Construction paying Banco Filipino what Escalona promised during the Margarita Bonds’
term.

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REMEDIAL LAW

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO and JULIUS L. LACANILAO
G.R. No. 240053, 09 October 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the
Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is
compelling reason. The Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally construe
procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice.
Here, a strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant
of reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim, is
vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and Julius.
Hence, the taking of testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in
order.

FACTS
Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Believing that
the job was a ray of hope, Mary Jane resorted to borrowing money for placement fee from her
relatives.
Mary Jane, together with Cristina, eventually left the Philippines for Malaysia. However,
to Mary Jane's dismay, she was informed upon their arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for
her was no longer available. After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to
Indonesia with a promise that she will have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Upon Mary Jane's
arrival in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly
carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was accordingly charged and convicted
with drug trafficking before the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. She was
sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary Jane is detained at the Wirogunan Penitentiary in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested. Thereafter, they were
charged with qualified trafficking in person and were likewise charged in two separate
Informations with the crime of illegal recruitment and estafa filed before the trial court.
Representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to
Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane. She executed a document known as "Sinumpaang
Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso".
On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian
Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian
Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and

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her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius. A few hours before the scheduled
execution of Mary Jane, the President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo, granted her an
indefinite reprieve. The Indonesian authorities however imposed conditions relative to the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony.
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories." It averred that the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories is
allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the country and will
not be able to testify personally before the court due to her imprisonment. The OSG averred that
Cristina and Julius will still have an opportunity to examine Mary Jane by propounding their own
set of written interrogatories through the designated consular officer who will be taking the
deposition; moreover, they were not precluded from objecting to the questions and answers.
Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before
and not during the trial. Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their
right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section
14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
The trial court granted the prosecution's motion. Undeterred, Cristina and Julius filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the Resolution
of the trial court. Aggrieved, the OSG filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in granting the writ of Certiorari?
(2) May Mary Jane's testimony be validly acquired through deposition by written
interrogatories?

RULING
(1) YES. A writ of Certiorari is limited in scope and narrow in character. It is available
only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion. In other words, Certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors
of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. Thus, any alleged
errors committed by the trial court within the bounds of its jurisdiction and in the exercise of its
discretion are mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not by a petition for Certiorari.
It must be emphasized that the errors imputed against the trial court by Cristina and
Julius in their Petition for Certiorari pertained only to its appreciation of the factual milieu, and
the application of pertinent law and rules. Plainly, their Petition for Certiorari did not contain
factual allegations that can support a finding of grave abuse of discretion. These alleged errors,

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if at all, amounted only to erroneous exercise of the lower court's judgment, an error of judgment,
not an error of jurisdiction, which does not justify Cristina's and Julius's resort to a Certiorari
proceeding.
Indubitably, there was absence of any proof that the grant of the taking of deposition
through written interrogatories by the trial court was made in an arbitrary, whimsical, and
capricious manner. There was no patent abuse of discretion which was so gross in nature
thereby amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. What was only apparent in the instant
case was that the trial court properly considered the extraordinary circumstances surrounding
the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to applicable rules and jurisprudence. Clearly, there was an
honest effort on the part of the trial court to support its ratiocination and conclusion based on
facts and law.
(2) YES. In denying the State's motion for deposition through written interrogatories and
effectively requiring the presence of Mary Jane before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the
CA appeared to have strictly and rigidly applied and interpreted Section 15, Rule 119 without
taking into consideration the concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as well
as the prejudice that will be caused.
The peculiar circumstances obtaining in the present case made it impossible for Mary
Jane to appear before the RTC. Just like when Mary Jane was recruited by Cristina and Julius and
taken advantage of because of her poor condition, the same scenario is being repeated because
Cristina and Julius are again taking advantage of Mary Jane's dire circumstances which they
themselves put her in, by depriving her opportunity to speak and obtain justice for herself. The
Court of Appeals did not take into account the fact that the case of the prosecution against
Cristina and Julius can only be erected through the testimony of Mary Jane herself.
Moreover, there are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to
serve substantial justice because of any of the following reasons:
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property;
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(c) the merits of the case;
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules;
(e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and
(f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a
deposition of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final
judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of
such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who
is unable to testify in open court because he is imprisoned in another country.

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 Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the
Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is
compelling reason. The Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally construe
procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice. A strict application of the
procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of reprieve by the Indonesian
authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of
the pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and Julius. Hence, the taking of
testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.
Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional
right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius. True, Cristina and Julius have no
opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However,
the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample
opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the
first purpose of their constitutional right.
Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized
exceptions to the right to confrontation. In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state that Mary
Jane's deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her dying declaration. There is no
doubt that Mary Jane will be answering the written interrogatories under the consciousness of
an impending death - or execution by a firing squad to be exact.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), MANUEL M. LAPID, et al.
G.R. No. 229656, 19 August 2019, SECOND DIVISON (J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

On July 31, 2018, a definitive ruling on the concept of inordinate delay was laid down by the
Court En Banc in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan as follows:
(2) For purposes of determining inordinate delay, a case is deemed to have commenced from
the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation.
Cagang, thus, abandoned People v. Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman should set reasonable
periods for preliminary investigation and delays beyond this period will be taken against the
prosecution.
In line with the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Lapid, et al., supposedly due to
inordinate delay.
The case against Lapid, et al., was commenced on May 2, 2011, upon the filing by the FIO of
the complaint. The fact-finding investigation, having preceded the fling of the formal complaint is
excluded in determining the extent of the delay.

FACTS
The criminal case relates to the “P Million Fertilizer Scam” in the Department of
Agriculture (DA). In 2004, the Department of Budget and Management issued a Special Allotment
Release Order with Notice of Cash Allocation to the DA for the purchase of farm
inputs/implements for congressional districts or local government units in line with Ginuntiang
Masaganang Ani (GMA) Program of the DA.
On May 24, 2004, and under the GMA Program, the Provincial Government of Pampanga
purchased 3,880 bottles of Macro-Micro Foliar Fertilizers from Malayan Pacific Trading
Corporation (MPTC).
Allegedly, the Field Investigation Office-Task Force Abono (FIO) of the Ombudsman
investigated this procurement, and issued subpoenas duces tecum to several government offices.
On May 2, 2011, the FIO filed before the Ombudsman a complaint against the several
officials of the Provincial Government of Pampanga, including its governor Manuel Lapid (Lapid),
as well as against the official of MPTC, the respondents Ma. Victoria Aquino-Abubakar (Aquino-
Abubakar), and Leolita Aquino (Aquino). Dexter Vasquez (Vasquez), as proprietor of the DA, was
also impleaded in the complaint.
On September 18, 2013, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Lapid, et al., for
violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 for having disregarded the

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procurement law and its implementing rules in purchasing the fertilizers. On November 4, 2015,
an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan against the six respondents.
On January 8, 2016 and prior to arraignment, Lapid moved to dismiss the criminal case
on the ground of alleged inordinate delay of eight years in the fact-finding investigation,
preliminary investigation, and filing of the case. The Sandiganbayan ruled the right to a speedy
disposition of cases had been violated, and dismissed the criminal case. Hence, the present
certiorari petition.

ISSUE
Did the Ombudsman commit inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of the
preliminary investigation?

RULING
NO. On July 31, 2018, a definitive ruling on the concept of inordinate delay was laid down
by the Court En Banc in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan as follows:
(1) The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial.
The former may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law while the
latter may be invoked before any tribunal as long as the respondent may already be prejudiced
by the proceeding.
(2) For purposes of determining inordinate delay, a case is deemed to have commenced from
the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation.
Cagang, thus, abandoned People v. Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation and delays beyond this period will be taken
against the prosecution.
(3) Courts must determine which party carries the burden of proof.
If it has been alleged that there was delay within the time periods (i.e., according to the
time periods that will be issued by the Ombudsman), the burden is on the defense to show that
there has been violation of their rights to speedy disposition of case or to speedy trial. The
defense must prove:
(a) that the case took much longer than was reasonably necessary to resolve and
(b) that efforts were exerted to protect their constitutional rights.
If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution
has the burden of justifying the delay. The prosecution must prove:
(a) that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and case prosecution;

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 (b) the delay was inevitable due to the complexity of the issues and volume of
evidence; and
(c) accused was not prejudiced by the delay.
(4) Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical.
Courts must consider the entire context of the case, the amount of evidence and the
complexity of issues involved. An examination of the delay is no longer necessary to justify the
dismissal of the case if the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice.
(5) The right to speedy disposition of cases (or the right to speedy trial) must be timely
raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the
statutory or procedural periods, otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right.
In line with the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Lapid, et al., supposedly due to
inordinate delay.
The case against Lapid, et al., was commenced on May 2, 2011, upon the filing by the FIO
of the complaint. The fact-finding investigation, having preceded the fling of the formal complaint
is excluded in determining the extent of the delay. The panel found probable cause to indict
Lapid, et al., for violation of Section 3(e), in relation to Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, on September
18, 2013, or two years and four months from the fling of the complaint. The panel's
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman on June 3, 2014. Thus, from the filing of the
formal complaint until the Ombudsman's approval of the Resolution finding probable cause
against Lapid, et al., the length of time consumed for the preliminary investigation was three
years and one month.
It is well to recall that the complaint involved 17 accused relating to a scam in the
disbursement of government funds under the GMA Program involving several congressional
districts or local government units nationwide. In this case, the lapse of four years and six
months, reckoned from the filing of the complaint, was justified due to the complexity of the issue
involved requiring a thorough study of the case to determine with probability who should be
indicted.
In sum, delay becomes inordinate only in the presence of arbitrary, vexatious and
oppressive actions or inactions that are discernible from the proceedings. No such delay
attended the Ombudsman's proceedings that would warrant the dismissal of the criminal case
against herein respondents.

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 ROWENA SANTOS y COMPRADO and RYAN SANTOS y COMPRADO v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 242656, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Here, the police officers were also able to strictly comply with the requirements laid down
in Section 21 (1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165).

FACTS
Two separate criminal Information were filed against Rowena Santos (Rowena) and Ryan
Santos (Ryan) for violation of Section 11, Article II or (R.A. No. 9165). Several police officers
attended an operational briefing at the Intelligence Section of Naga City Police in connection with
the implementation of three search warrants issued against Gomer Aquiban (Gomer), Rowena,
Ryan, Ronnie Santos (Ronnie) and Romeo Santos (Romeo).
Thereafter, the team, composed of around ten members proceeded to Sagrada Familia,
Naga City. Upon arrival, Police Officer 1 Joker Albao (PO1 Albao) went to the house of Ryan and
promptly informed the latter of the search warrant. Ryan was handcuffed and was transferred
to the room of Rowena where both accused were informed of the contents of the warrant.
While converged at Rowena's house, they waited for the arrival of the mandatory
witnesses: Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Perry Boy Solano (Solano), media
representative Adiel Auxillo (Auxillo), and Barangay Kagawad Ma. Celina Breñis (Breñis). In the
presence of Police Officer 3 Louie Ordoñez (PO3 Ordoñez), Rowena and the mandatory
witnesses, the police officers began searching and found several assorted cellphones, some cash,
and empty plastic sachets of sachet.
They likewise found money and sachets of shabu in Ryan’s house which PO1 Albao
marked in the presence of Ryan, the mandatory witnesses, and police officers. PO3 Ordoñez
prepared the Receipt of Property Seized and Certification. The mandatory witnesses also affixed
their respective signatures on both documents. The entire inventory proceeding was also
photographed.
They proceeded to the Naga Police Station for booking and recording. PO3 Ordoñez
turned all the seized items over to Police Officer 3 August Florece (PO3 Florece).

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 PO3 Florece brought the specimens to the provincial crime laboratory for examination.
The laboratory examination of the seven items yielded a positive result for the presence of
dangerous drugs.
Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found Rowena and
Ryan (petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

ISSUE
Is the chain of custody rule complied with?

RULING
YES. At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised in the Petition are factual and
evidentiary in nature, which are outside the Court's scope of review in Rule 45 petitions. Still, the
Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming petitioners' guilt for violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
The petitioners argue that the corpus delicti had not been fully established and that the
chain of custody rule was not followed, thus the integrity of the dangerous drugs was not ensured
and their identity was not established with moral certainty.
The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs
under Section 21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti and
an unbroken chain of custody.
The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links that should be established
in the chain of custody of the confiscated item:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.

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 In this case, the prosecution was able to prove all the links that should be established in
the chain of custody.
Moreover, the police officers were also able to strictly comply with the requirements laid
down in Section 21. They conducted the physical inventory and photography of the seized items
in the presence of petitioners, a representative from the media, a representative of the DOJ and
a barangay official at the place where the search was conducted.

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LEGAL ETHICS

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 RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO UNTIAN, JR.
A.C. No. 5900, 10 April 2019, EN BANC (J. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Lawyers, aside from being competent and adept in dealing with the intricacies of the law,
must also be individuals of honor and virtue. Legal knowledge and ability, without the guidance of
morals and justice, is a dangerous tool, which may harm, instead of uplift others.
Atty. Untian, Jr.'s responsibilities and expectations are even more heightened because he is
a law professor. He should be a beacon of righteous and conscientious conduct. Atty. Untian, Jr., as
a molder of minds of soon-to-be lawyers, should guide his students to behave and act in a manner
consistent with the lofty standards of the legal profession. Instead, he abused his position of
authority creating an offensive and uncomfortable atmosphere in school.

FACTS
The Complaint requested the Court to investigate the alleged sexual harassments that
Atty. Untian, Jr. had committed against students of Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro City
(Xavier), particularly Antoinette Toyco (Toyco), Christina Sagarbarria (Sagarbarria) and Lea Dal
(Dal).
Toyco claimed that Atty. Untian, Jr. initially expressed amorous interest when he sent her
flowers anonymously through another law student. She stated that thereafter, Atty. Untian, Jr.
would often text her through the phone of another law student. Toyco noted eventually that Atty.
Untian, Jr. texted her through his own phone where he would send romantic messages, poems,
love notes and sweet nothings. She said that Atty. Untian, Jr. also invited her to go to Camiguin
with another law student but she turned it down. Toyco explained that while she was never
sexually assaulted, Atty. Untian, Jr.'s unwelcome advances made her feel degraded as she could
not easily ignore Atty. Untian, Jr. for fear of reprisal.
On the other hand, Sagarbarria narrated that Atty. Untian, Jr. showed her a photograph
revealing only the face of a woman and asked her if she knew who the woman in the picture was.
After she realized that the woman in the picture looked like her, Atty. Untian, Jr. revealed the
entire photograph revealing a naked woman and teased her within hearing distance of other law
students. Sagarbarria denied that she was the woman because she had a distinctive mark on her
back for the past six years. She averred that the incident caused her depression, fearing what
other law students may think of her.
Meanwhile, Dal recounted that in one of her recitations during Atty. Untian, Jr.'s class, she
clarified a question propounded to her saying "Sir, come again?" Atty. Untian, Jr. retorted "What?
You want me to come again? I have not come the first time and don't you know that it took me
five minutes to come, and you want me to come again?" She later learned that Atty. Untian, Jr.
would narrate the said incident to almost all of his classes. Dal felt offended that she was

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subjected to such sexually charged language and the fact that her embarrassment was retold in
other classes.
Atty. Untian, Jr. lamented that the complaints for sexual harassment was made by
disgruntled students who failed their classes for the 2001-2002 school year as manifested by the
fact that the incidents happened years apart but the complaints were made all at the same time.
Atty. Untian, Jr. denied sending flowers and text messages with romantic undertones to
Toyco. He highlighted that it was in fact her who gave him gifts during Valentine's Day in 2002.
Atty. Untian, Jr. added that he texting "luv u" and "miss u" are friendly text messages sent without
malice especially considering that they were misspelled.
As to Sagarbarria's allegations, Atty. Untian, Jr. countered that he confiscated the
photograph from another student and jokingly showed it to her in the spirit of their open and
uninhibited relationship. He noted that Sagarbarria is his niece and they were previously close
as they would oftentimes exchange discussions on sensitive and mature matters as adults
without any malice. Atty. Untian, Jr. claimed that she was never humiliated when he showed her
the photograph because she even gamely lowered down her pants to prove that it was not her in
the photograph because unlike her, the naked woman did not have any tattoo.
On the other hand, Atty. Untian, Jr. explained that Dal answered disrespectfully when she
was called for recitation uttering "Come again?" He posited that to inject humor during class, he
responded "Never use slang language in my class because you might be misinterpreted. What do
you mean by 'come again?' It takes me several minutes before I come again." Atty. Untian, Jr.
expounded that the joke was directed at himself and that Dal never showed any resentment or
showed any sign of humiliation as she even laughed at the joke and continued to sit in front of
the class.
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Salvador Hababag (Commissioner
Hababag) recommended that Atty. Untian, Jr. be suspended from the practice of law for two
years. He observed that Atty. Untian, Jr. was given all the opportunity to explain his side in the
investigation that Xavier had conducted. Commissioner Hababag reminded that lawyers must be
of good moral character and must continue to possess it so long as he is part of the legal
profession.
In its Resolution, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)
affirmed with modification the recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. It resolved to disbar
Atty. Untian, Jr. on the ground of gross immoral conduct.

ISSUES
(1) Do Atty. Untian, Jr.'s actions towards the students concerned constitute sexual
harassment as defined by R.A. No. 7877 and the pertinent rules and regulation?
(2) Should Atty. Untian, Jr. be held administratively liable?

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RULING
(1) YES. R.A. No. 7877 defines education related sexual harassment as sexual harassment
committed by a teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainer or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in an education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the same
is accepted by the object of the act. In particular, it is committed:
1. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;
2. Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the
offender;
3. When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the
granting of honors and scholarships or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits,
privileges or considerations; or
4. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment
for the student, trainee or apprentice.
R.A. No. 7877 does not require that the victim had acceded to the sexual desires of the
abuser. Further, it is not necessary that a demand or request for sexual favor is articulated in a
categorical manner as it may be discerned from the acts of the offender. In addition, sexual
harassment is also committed in an educational environment when the sexual advances result
in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. In short, it is not necessary that there was
an offer for sex for there to be sexual harassment as a superior's conduct with sexual
underpinnings, which offends the victim or creates a hostile environment would suffice.
Atty. Untian, Jr.'s actions towards the students concerned definitely constitute sexual
harassment as defined by R.A. No. 7877 and the pertinent rules and regulation.
A reading of Atty. Untian, Jr.'s Answer would show that he substantially admitted the
accusations against him, although providing a justification for them. Clearly, Atty. Untian, Jr.
abused the power and authority he possessed over the complainants. His sexually laced conduct
had created a hostile and offensive environment which deeply prejudiced his students. In what
was supposed to be a safe place for them to learn and develop, they were instead subjected to
unwarranted sexual advances.
(2) YES. Atty. Untian, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years and ten
(10) years from teaching law in any school effective upon the finality of this Resolution, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. On the other hand, Canon 7
mandates that lawyers shall, at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Further, Rule 7.03 of the CPR commands lawyers not to engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, or behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

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 Much is expected of lawyers in that it does not suffice that they are persons of integrity
and values, but must also appear to be so in the eyes of the people, and of God. Notwithstanding
the relativity of morality, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of
social responsibility — they must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. In other
words, members of the bar are measured in a more demanding light because their actions or
inactions not only affect themselves, but also the legal profession and the public's trust and
respect for the law. As such, any errant behavior on the part of the lawyer, whether in a public
or private capacity, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
It must be remembered that lawyers are both preachers and stewards of law, justice,
morals and fairness in that they are duty-bound to propagate observance and deference thereto.
It is not enough that they know right from wrong, just from unjust, moral or immoral, because
they must not only speak of such ideals, but must also live by them. Lawyers, aside from being
competent and adept in dealing with the intricacies of the law, must also be individuals of honor
and virtue. Legal knowledge and ability, without the guidance of morals and justice, is a
dangerous tool, which may harm, instead of uplift others.
Atty. Untian, Jr.'s responsibilities and expectations are even more heightened because he
is a law professor. He should be a beacon of righteous and conscientious conduct. Atty. Untian,
Jr., as a molder of minds of soon-to-be lawyers, should guide his students to behave and act in a
manner consistent with the lofty standards of the legal profession. Instead, he abused his
position of authority creating an offensive and uncomfortable atmosphere in school.
Further, it is even more disappointing that Atty. Untian, Jr. fails to acknowledge the
consequences of his actions and disregard the hurt Sagarbarria, Toyco and Dal may have felt. He
generally claimed that they did not express any distress, embarrassment, or humiliation during
the incidents complained of. It must be stressed that as their law professor, Atty. Untian, Jr.
exercised moral ascendancy over them. Thus, it is within reason that the concerned students
could not have readily expressed disgust or annoyance over a person in authority. It takes
courage and strength to stand up and speak against any form of sexual harassment. This is
especially true considering that in most cases, the offender wields power, authority, or influence
over the victim.

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 VANTAGE LIGHTING PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ATTY. JOSE DIÑO, JR.
A.C Nos. 7389 & 10596, 02 July 2019, EN BANC (Jardeleza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As an officer of the Court, Atty. Diño has a paramount duty to protect the court's integrity
and assist it in the administration of justice according to law. He should not espouse a belief that
the judicial system can be bought, much less contribute to the perpetuation of such belief.
Unfortunately, instead of relying on the merits of his clients' cause, Atty. Diño represented to his
clients that the judicial system can be bribed. This inexcusable, shameful and unlawful act of Atty.
Diño, by itself, constitutes gross misconduct.
The Court also found that Atty. Diño violated Canon 8 of the CPR when he filed a disbarment
case to harass the new counsels of Vantage. By resorting to such harassment tactics against the
opposing counsel, he failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues.

FACTS
Vantage Lighting Philippines, Inc. (Vantage) employed the services of Atty. Jose Diño, Jr.
(Atty. Diño) in order to file a complaint against PHCP Co. and Hitachi Plant Engineering Co. Ltd,
and to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in their favor.
Atty. Diño, as counsel, facilitated the prosecution of the case. He requested the
disbursement of certain amounts in order to bribe the judge to whom the case was raffled to.
Atty. Diño informed Vantage that it had to pay P150,000 to the judge to whom the civil complaint
of Vantage would be raffled for the issuance of a TRO.
Atty. Diño informed Vantage that if it is unable to give him the cash before 2:00 o'clock
that same afternoon, Atty. Diño will just advance the P20,000 to the judge to whom the case
would be raffled. Thinking that the payment for the TRO is just a regular legal expense, Vantage
agreed to reimburse the P20,000 to Atty. Diño who promised that the P20,000 would be returned
to Vantage if the TRO would not be issued. Since the TRO was not issued, Vantage sent its
messenger to pick up the P20,000 from Atty. Diño who refused to return the same and declared
that he would just apply the amount to his legal fees.
Atty. Diño also asked for another P65,000 for the issuance of the TRO. Vantage, however,
informed him that the P65,000 was re-deposited after Atty. Diño intimated that no TRO would
be issued. Then, Atty. Diño called Vantage in anger, threatening that Vantage will be sorry if they
fail to pay his fees and reimburse him the amount of P130,000 which he allegedly gave to the
fixers as payment to the judge. Due to non-payment of the money advanced by Atty. Diño to fix
the issuance of a TRO, he withdrew his services as counsel for Vantage and filed several civil,
criminal, and administrative complaints against the officers and legal counsel of the company.

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 On the other hand, Vantage instituted a disbarment case against Atty. Diño. Vantage
alleged that Atty. Diño clearly violated the Code for Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Investigating Commissioner and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended
the disbarment of Atty. Diño.

ISSUE
Should Atty. Diño be disbarred from the practice of law?

RULING
YES. By representing to his clients that he can secure the issuance of a TRO by bribing the
judge P150,000.00, Atty. Diño violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Canon 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
In Dongga-as v. Cruz-Angeles, the Court suspended respondents-lawyers from the
practice of law for three years because they represented to their client that they could find a
"friendly" court, judge, and public prosecutor to ensure a favorable ruling in the client's
annulment case. Their representation undermined and/or denigrated the integrity of the
national prosecution service and the courts, in violation of the CPR.
As an officer of the Court, Atty. Diño has a paramount duty to protect the court's integrity
and assist it in the administration of justice according to law. He should not espouse a belief that
the judicial system can be bought, much less contribute to the perpetuation of such belief.
Unfortunately, instead of relying on the merits of his clients' cause, Atty. Diño represented to his
clients that the judicial system can be bribed. This inexcusable, shameful and unlawful act of Atty.
Diño, by itself, constitutes gross misconduct.
The Court also found that Atty. Diño violated Canon 8 of the CPR when he filed a
disbarment case to harass the new counsels of Vantage. By resorting to such harassment tactics
against the opposing counsel, he failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleagues.
In view of Atty. Diño‘s acts of professional malpractice and gross misconduct, the Court
found that Atty. Diño’s conduct warrants disbarment from the practice of law.

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 VENSON R. ANG v. ATTY. SALVADOR B. BELARO, JR.
A.C. No. 12408, 11 December 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The act of notarization is not an ordinary routine but is imbued with substantive public
interest It con erts a pri ate doc ment into a p blic doc ment res lting in the doc ment s
admissibility in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is therefore
entitled to full faith and credit on its face and by law. It is the duty of notaries public to observe
utmost care in complying with the formalities intended to protect the integrity of the notarized
document and the act or acts it embodies.
Contrary to the findings of the IBP, the questioned signatures were different from Atty.
Belaro s specimen signat res on file ith the RTC e en to the naked e e Nonetheless Att Belaro
is not exculpated from administrative liability. As observed by the IBP, the Extrajudicial Settlement
bore his notarial seal. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly states that, when not in use, the
official seal of the notary public must be kept safe and secure and shall be accessible only to him or
the person duly authorized by him. Here, Atty. Belaro utterly failed to sufficiently provide any
laudable explanation why his notarial seal was found in the documents.

FACTS
The late Peregrina Dela Rosa (Peregrina) owned a parcel of land with a building erected
thereon and she appointed complainant Venson R. Ang (Venson) as administrator of the subject
property. Upon Peregrina’s demise, the property was inherited by Venson and his siblings. The
siblings never partitioned the property or assigned their rights to any of the co-owners.
Venson and his siblings were surprised to learn that Peregrina’s title to the subject
property was already cancelled by virtue of an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs
with Waiver of Rights (Extrajudicial Settlement). The same was notarized by respondent Atty.
Salvador Belaro, Jr. (Atty. Belaro) before whom Venson and his siblings purportedly personally
appeared and subscribed therein. Aside from the Extrajudicial Settlement, other documents such
as a Deed of Absolute Sale and Acknowledgement Receipt were likewise found to be notarized
by Atty. Belaro. As a result, Venson filed the instant letter-complaint.
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order directing the parties to file their
respective verified position papers. The parties filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss before the SBD
seeking the dismissal of the complaint claiming it arose from misapprehension of facts.
In the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, the signatures of
Atty. Belaro appear to be falsified. Despite the alleged forgery, his notarial seal was used in the
documents. Based on this, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent Atty.
Belaro failed to properly secure the same since no other person was allowed to use it other than
him. The Investigating Commissioner therefore found Atty. Belaro negligent in the performance
of his duties and obligations as a notary public. He thus recommended that Atty. Belaro be

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 suspended from the practice of law for six months and ineligible for being commissioned as
notary public for one year.
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification be instead meted the
penalty of revocation of his existing commission, disqualification from appointment as notary
public for two years and suspension from the practice of law for three months.

ISSUE
Is Atty. Belaro liable for breach of notarial law and for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

RULING
YES. The act of notarization is not an ordinary routine but is imbued with substantive
public interest. It converts a private document into a public document resulting in the
document’s admissibility in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is therefore entitled to full faith and credit on its face and by law. It is the duty of
notaries public to observe utmost care in complying with the formalities intended to protect the
integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts it embodies.
Contrary to the findings of the IBP, the questioned signatures were different from Atty.
Belaro’s specimen signatures on file with the Regional Trial Court even to the naked eye.
Nonetheless, Atty. Belaro is not exculpated from administrative liability. As observed by the IBP,
the Extrajudicial Settlement bore his notarial seal. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly
states that, when not in use, the official seal of the notary public must be kept safe and secure
and shall be accessible only to him or the person duly authorized by him. Here, Atty. Belaro
utterly failed to sufficiently provide any laudable explanation why his notarial seal was found in
the documents.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Belaro failed to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties of his office
which are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. His negligence therefore
not only caused damage to those directly affected by the notarized documents but also
undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. Hence, it
is but proper to hold Atty. Belaro liable for his negligence as a notary public and as a lawyer.

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