Hypatia, Inc.

A Woman's Thought or a Man's Discipline? The Letters of Abelard and Heloise

Author(s): Andrea Nye
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 1-22
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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A Woman'sThought
or a Man'sDiscipline?
The Lettersof AbelardandHeloise
ANDREA NYE

Thispaperis partof a largerprojectof recoveringthe workof womenthinkers.

Heloisehas traditionallybeen readas eithera foil of Abelardor his intellectual
appendage. In thispaper,I presentherviewson love,religiousdevotion,andlanguage
as an alternativeto philosophic
methodas it is conceivedby Abelard.

The nature and the existence of philosophy have never been more in
questionthan at the presentmoment.The distancesbetween Britishlinguistic
analysis and Continental hermeneutics,scientific empiricismand African-
Americanliberatorypragmatism,logicalsemanticsand feministcritiqueoften
seem unnegotiable.Any common groundcalled philosophyon which debate
could be carriedout among such diverseschools and movements has eroded
away.In each of these cases there is the same underlyingand perhapsunre-
solvabledifference:either philosophyis a professionaldiscipline independent
of political or social concernsor it is an ongoing criticaland culturaldiscourse
deeplyrootedin lived experience,dependenton interpersonalunderstanding,
and propheticof futureaction.
In what follows I consider this macroquestionof the nature and possible
futureof philosophyby wayof microstudyof a disagreementbetween a woman
student and her male philosophyteacher,a disagreementthat occurredat the
very beginnings of philosophy as an academicdiscipline. The woman is the
twelfth-centuryabbess Heloise. Her teacher is the famous Peter Abelard,
originatorof manyof the attitudesand practicesof academicphilosophyas we
know it today.At issue between them wereconflicting idealsof goodnessand
love but also differencesregardingthought and language.It is my hope that a
carefulreading of their dispute will show that the personal nature of their
disagreementis not irrelevantto the questionof the natureof philosophy.
Hypatiavol. 7, no. 3 (Summer1992) © by AndreaNye

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2 Hypatia

The story of Heloise and Abelard is celebrated in history and legend as

follows:
Abelard, at the peak of his fame as a philosopherand dialectician, jaded
with his many triumphsin intellectual combat, decides to turn his attention
to the conquestof a woman.Hearingof the beautyand intelligence of Heloise,
then a young girl, he convinces her uncle, a canon, to hire him as her tutor
with the plan of seducingher.They becomelovers,arediscoveredby the uncle,
and flee his anger.EventuallyHeloise bearsa child and a secret marriageis
contracted, apparentlywith the uncle's consent. When the uncle insists on
making the marriageknown, however,Abelardrefusesand removes Heloise
to the convent where she had been educated.Enragedthat Heloise can now
never live a normal life and afraidthat Abelardis confining her to be rid of
her,the uncle sendsa bandof men to castrateAbelard.After the deedhas been
done, Heloise takes religiousorderson Abelard'scommand.
Nine yearsafterthese unhappyevents, Heloise readAbelard'sconfessionary
autobiographyHistoriacalamitatum(The Story of my Misfortunes;Abelard
1933).1Distressedby what she took as a distortedaccount of what happened
between them, she initiated a correspondencein which she disputed his
teaching on the religiousvocation, love, and morality.She was not the only
one to do so. Abelardwasalreadyunderattackforhis interjectionof logic into
mattersof faith. Concernedthat the hundredsof inconsistenciesin Christian
teaching Abelardlisted in his tourde force, Sicet Non, might not be resolved,
powerful monastics like Berard of Clairvaux accused Abelard of heresy.
Regardlessof clerical resistance,however,Abelard'sphilosophy became the
new intellectual fashion. His brilliant expositions of classical authorities,
especiallyAristotle, his subtlereformulationsof logic, his slashingrefutations
of rivals, his insistence that rational understandingcould never tolerate
inconsistency had begun to detach learning from revelation and establish a
styleof disputationthat wouldbecomethe acceptedformof academiclearning.
Likemany male philosophersthroughouthistory,Abelardwaswilling, with
some ulteriormotives, to take on a woman student. Heloise had proven her
aptitude; even as a young girl she was known for her learning and her
intelligence. As Peter the Venerablewrotepraisingher:
I used to hear at that time of the woman, who although still
caught up in the obligation of the world, devoted all her
application to knowledge of letters.... And at a time when
nearly all the whole world is indifferentand deplorablyapa-
thetic towardsuch occupations,and wisdomcan scarcelyget a
foothold ... youhave surpassedall women in wisdom,andhave
gone furthereven than almosteveryman. (Heloise andAbelard
1974, 277)

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 AndreaNye 3

Heloise had a superiorearlyeducationin the nunneryof Argenteuilandhad

heardof the greatphilosopherPeter Abelardwell beforehe approachedher.
Abelard,with an ego that was secureif not overweening,was willing to treat
Heloise'sreputationforlearningas an attractionandnot a deficit. Her literacy,
he reasoned,would be an advantage.Not only did it afforda pretext for them
to be together as teacher and student, but it would also expand the field of
erotic exchange. When they were not togetherthey could correspond;when
together, philosophical discussion would provide added intimacy. With no
doubt of his eventual success,he beganher education.
By the time of Heloise'sletters to Abelard,however, it was clear that she
had greatlydisappointedher teacher.Abelardanswersher lettersreluctantly,
tired of her "continualcomplaint"and her lack of "rationality."He makesit
clearhow unphilosophicaland sinfulhe findswhat she sayson the subjectsof
love, ethics, personalobligation,and the church.Heloise confessesher failure
to disciplineher thought as her teacherwished:

Fornothing is less underourcontrol than the spirit,2which we

aremoreforcedto obey than we areable to command;when its
agitations move us, none of us can hold back their sudden
impulse and they easily breakthrough,and even more easily
overflowinto wordswhich areexpressionsof the passionof the
spirit. (Heloise and Abelard 1950-56, MS XV,94; 159)
In his answer,Abelardrefersher inability to discipline her mind to a special
weaknessof the femalesex forloose, undisciplinedspeech.In a diatribeagainst
the dangersof "idletalk,"Abelardliberallyquotesthe Bible:"Ifanyone thinks
he is religious,while not restraininghis tongue,he is deceivinghimselfandhis
religion is worthless"(James1: 26; quoted in MS XVIII,245; 188). Or, "Like
a city that is exposedandunprotectedby wallsis a man who in speakingcannot
restrainhis speech" (Proverbs25: 28; ibid.). We must "tether"our tongue to
the truth, he tells his troublesomeex-student, lest it "runall over the whole
worldin its thoughts.""Wemustdirectourthoughtto what can be understood
and adhereto it by thinking"(ibid.).
It is Heloise's"woman's"tongue, her feminine way of speaking,that partic-
ularlydisablesher in philosophy,accordingto Abelard.
The more subtle [the tongue] is in you (vobis), and the more
flexible becauseof the softnessof yourbody,the more mobile
and prone to wordsit is, and exhibits itself as the seedbedof all
evil. This defect in you is noted by the Apostle when he forbids
women to speakin church;not even on matterspertainingto
God does he permit them to speakunless they question their
husbandsat home. In discoursingof such things or whatever
things are to be done, he particularlysubjectsthem to silence,

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4 Hypatia

writingon this to Timothy:A womanmustlearnin silence and

with complete submission.I do not permita woman to teach,
nor to rule over a man, but to be silent. (MS XVIII, 245-46;
188-89)
This unrulinessof speech on Heloise's part requiredan especially vigilant
disciplineon the part of her teacher.With the institutionalizedpunishments
of low grades,failedtheses,andrefusalof tenureorpromotionnot yet available,
Abelard used more direct methods. Encouragedby her uncle, for whose
credulityhe had only contempt,Abelardused physicalpunishmentas he saw
fit to ensure Heloise's intellectual as well as erotic submission. Abelard
explains:

In giving her to me not only to teach but to punish with force,

what else was [her uncle] doing but offering me complete
license, and providingthe opportunity,whether I wished it or
not, for me to make her manageablewith threatsand blows if
persuasiondid not work. (MS XII, 183; 67)3

The aggressivemilitarystyle of this pedagogicaldiscipline is consistent with

the style of Abelard'snew philosophicallogic. In his autobiographyAbelard
describeslogic in martialterms. Like his soldier father, he is a professional
fighter,a fighterwith words.He "salliesout"on the field of conquestto defeat
his enemies. He gives them fatal blows with the sharpnessof his arguments.
He forcesthem to retreat,woundedand dishonored,fromthe field of battle.
But Abelard'sdiscipline, successfulas it may have been in defeatingaca-
demic rivalsand bringingaboutHeloise'ssexualsubmission,wasnot sufficient
to make her a philosopheron his terms. By the time of her letters, it is clear
that Heloise does not accept either the content or the style of the arguments
urgedon her by Abelard,argumentsthat were to prove decisively that owing
to his castrationlove must be over between them, that monasticismprovides
a more virtuous life than lay devotion, and that the remedy for earthly
disappointmentis surrenderto God. Some commentatorshave foundHeloise's
refusalto agreewith his logic so unbelievablein a respectedabbessthat they
have denied the authenticityof her letters.4
When Heloise'sauthentic voice has been recognized,commentatorshave
typicallypraisedthe philosopher'sreasonoverthe woman's"hysteria."Accord-
ing to the editorof Abelard'sand Heloise'sletters,J. T. Muckle,Abelardgives
a "reasoned reply" to Heloise's "impassionedreproaches, reflections and
entreaties,"and "it is quite evident that Abelardin his two repliestriesto raise
Heloise up to a truerlove of God."Muckleexpressessurprisethat Abelard,the
philosopher,is as patient as he is. Commentingon Abelard'srefusalto respond
to some of Heloise's complaints, he says: "One would expect that Abelard
wouldhave chided her and triedto set her right in regardto such extravagant

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 AndreaNye 5

and sinful dispositions."5Heloise'sproblem,accordingto Muckle, is that she

is irrevocablytrappedin her situation and in her emotions, which, although
admirableto romantics,are not relevant to philosophy.Other commentators
have been more harsh, arguing that Heloise's position is "ludicrous"or
"pathetic."6
Even sympatheticreadersof the letters,regularlycited by feministcommen-
tators,7have stressedthe lack of originalityof Heloise'sthought. Nowhere is
this more evident than in Etienne Gilson'sanxious explanation of Heloise's
argumentsagainstmarriage(Gilson 1960). Heloise arguesas follows:
God knowsI requirednothing fromyoubutyourself,purelyyou,
not anythingof yours,no marriagecontract,no dowry,nor did
I study how to gratifymy own desires,but ratheryours,as you
know.And if the title of wife seemsmoresaintlyor respectable,
sweeterforme alwaysis the name of friend,or, if you won't take
offense,even concubineor whore,becauseit seemedto me that
the more I was humble the more I would win your favor,and
also the less harmI woulddo to yourfame and reputation.You
yourselfdid not completelyforgetthis in yourown account;in
the letter of consolation I have spoken of above [Abelard's
autobiography]you did not think it unworthyto set out some
of the argumentsby which I tried to dissuadeyou fromjoining
us in an ill-fated marriage,but you remainedsilent about my
preference for a love that is free over a marriage that is
chains.... Neither wealth nor power,which dependson for-
tune, makes a person better,but rathervirtue. Not any less, if
someone more willingly marriesa rich man than a poor one,
and covets in her husbandnot himselfbut what belongsto him,
she weighsherselfas an objectforsale. Certainly,such a person,
drawninto marriageby such desires,is owed wages,not favor.
(MS XV, 70-71; 113-14)
This radical critique of the institution of arrangedmedieval marriages,in
which alliances were made for material wealth and social status, is not
interpretedby Gilson as a philosophicalposition but is explained away as a
misguidedstrategyof seductionon Heloise'spart.Heloise, he argues,ignoring
the sensualityof her descriptionsof physicalpassion, was essentiallychaste.
Herforemostdesirewasforcelibacyforboth her andAbelard.BecauseAbelard
would not accept this, the next best thing was fornication which preserved
Abelard'sreputation.To accomplishthis end, Heloise uses a "piece of soph-
istry."By appealingto what is base in Abelard,she encourageshim to live a
lie.
Following Abelard'slead, Gilson acknowledges"some"of Heloise's argu-
ment but fails to mention her "preference"for love over opportunisticmar-

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6 Hypatia

riage.Justas Abelarddid, he stressesher concern that nothing irrevocablebe

done to preventAbelardfromreturningto the celibacynecessaryfor advance-
ment in the church. She goes so faras to pose as a whore to entice Abelardto
what is "base"(Gilson 1960, 51-53). Gilson makesclearthe mythic underpin-
ning of his understandingof Heloise'ssituation:Eve, usingspeciousarguments,
tempted Adam to his downfall. "The devil knows well that the woman is
alwaysa readymade cause of man'sdestruction"(Gilson 1960, 63-64).
Insofaras Heloise has a philosophyof love and an ethics, Gilson continues,
these are derivative, borrowedfrom Abelard'sethics of intention and, via
Abelard,fromCicero'sview of disinterestedfriendship.The conflict between
Abelard and Heloise, in Gilson'sview, is not between two philosophiesbut
between theory and practice. Heloise is more intent on practicing what
Abelardpreachesthan is Abelard.To this end, in orderto trick Abelardinto
correct practice on his terms, she foolishly embarkson an "endlessroad of
moralcasuistry,"makingout "fornication"to be a meansto Abelard'seventual
honor rather than a sin against God's law (Gilson 1960, 58-59). The deep
sourceof her challenge to Abelard,Gilson concludes is neither moralitynor
the defense of behavior in accordance with morality, but an attempt to
exonerate herself from guilt. She borrowsAbelard's"moralityof intention"
becauseit allows her to arguethat what she did was innocent in motive and
so not culpable. Heloise, concludes Gilson, realizedin horrorthat she had
again repeatedthe originalsin of Eve and broughtabout the "downfall"of a
man. She was "guilty even before the marriagewhen she yielded to the
attractionsof the flesh"(Gilson 1960,64). In orderto defendherself,she grasps
onto Abelard'smorality of intention. Now she can claim that she brought
aboutevil but did not intend it and so is not culpable.
Although it may be understandablecoming from a Catholic philosopher
reactingto the scandalof a nun'sopen defenseof sexual love, this interpreta-
tion, which has been adopted by many commentators and which makes
Heloise's position derivative and reactive, is consistent neither with what
Heloise says in her letters nor with her position of authority.Although as a
young girl Heloise had been Abelard'sstudent, at the time of the letters she
was no powerlessdependent either intellectuallyor materially.As a nun and
abbess, she wrote from the one situation in which medieval women lived
relatively free from men's control. Although Heloise bowed to the official
ruling that convents be supervisedby monks as well as to Abelard'sdemand
that her policies as abbessbe guidedby himselfas male advisor,in practiceher
autonomy must have been considerable.8Her responsibilities as abbess
requiredconsiderableadministrativeand doctrinalskill. This was especially
truebecause,asHeloise complained,so little hadbeen done to definethe terms
of a monastic rule for women. In contrast, Abelard had miserablyfailed in
monasticlife.9

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 AndreaNye 7

Even more decisive than her actual position of authority,however, is the

substanceof Heloise's stated views on love and morality.In her first letter,
written after an extended silence on Abelard'spart and in response to his
autobiographicalexposition of their relationship,Heloise'ssubject is not her
frustratedsexualurges.Ratherher concernis with Abelard'sfailureto love and
to understandthe natureof love. Her argumentfocuseson the key concept of
responsibility.Abelardprofessedlove forher,but he did not and does not love,
she argued,because he does not recognizethe personalresponsibilitythat is
the actualcontent of love. This responsibilityis multifaceted.We are respon-
sible to those on whom we inflict wounds, to what we have established,to
those who love us, to those whomwe can makehappy,to those who have done
what we have askedthem to do. Relationsbasedon these obligationsare the
substanceof love.10What Heloise asksof Abelardis not the now impossible
sex act but the concern, care, presence to her, if only in letters, that would
fulfill these obligations.On this understandingof love, Abelard'scastrationis
irrelevant;a love based on mutual responsibilityand care survivesphysical
disability.It is clear, Heloise concludes, that Abelard never loved, but was
driven by a selfish craving for genital satisfaction.He marriedto ensurehis
exclusive possessionof the object of his craving;when the seat of the craving,
his genitals,was removed,so was his lust. Nor is his failureto love a fact over
which he has no control;he ought to have loved and he ought to love still.
Abelard'sresponseto this argumentis cool. In the impersonaltone he might
take to a strangerto whom he owes nothing, pepperinghis text liberallywith
eruditebiblicaland scholarlyreferences,he assuresher that he has confidence
in her ability to administerher convent. If she needs furtherinstructionin
spiritualmatters,he is at her disposal;otherwisehe wouldlike her to leave him
alone. In a second letter, goaded to a "rational"defense of his position by
Heloise'srefusalto obey and be silent, he makesexplicit what is implicit in his
first response.Of course, he says, sexual love is lust. Nowhere in any of his
ethical writingsis there any indication that he thought there was any other
kind of sexual love between men and women. Sexual "libido,"or lust, he
continues, is ugly and degrading.He could not keep himself from "dirtying
himselfas in a pigsty";he wasboundto her "withthe flamesof concupiscence";
he craved "miserable,obscene pleasures."The "placefrom which lust rules"
and the "sole cause of these desires"is the organ that God has mercifully
eliminatedin his case (MS XV,89; 147). In fact, it is not so much Abelardas
it is his "member"that God has punished.In this way,God "cuthim off from
the dirtin which he had been immersed,""cleansedratherthan deprivedhim"
in removingwhat is only "sordidand worthless"(MS XV, 89; 148).
So goes Abelard's"rational"argument.Yes,he said, of coursehe only used
Heloise to satisfyhis vile pleasures(MS XV, 92; 153). What man does any
differently?How muchbetter,he exhortsher,is the monasticlife he has chosen
forher than if she had marriedsomeoneelse and again"givenherselfup to the

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8 Hypatia

sordidnessof carnal pleasures and painful childbirth" (MS XV, 90; 150).
Abelard'salternative to lust is not another earthly love, which he cannot
imagineas different,but spirituallove for Christand, derivatively,of othersas
brothersand sistersin Christ.Throughouther letters,Heloise persistedin her
refusalto share this view of sensual passion as a vile genital craving." Her
mutuallyresponsiblelove is not a sexless love. Even after the physical act of
love has become impossible,she treasuresmemoriesof erotic pleasure."The
pleasuresof love we shared,"she says, "werefor me so sweet, they cannot
displeaseme, nor can they be erasedfrommemory;not only what we did, but
the places and times in which we did it, along with you yourself,are fixed in
my spirit,so that I live it all over againwith you and cannot, even in sleep, be
at peace" (MS XV, 80-81; 133).
If Abelard'sbody-phobicindictmentof sensuouspleasurehas been taken as
"reason"or "philosophy"in contrastto Heloise'sunphilosophical"passion,"
it can only be because a certain dualisticmetaphysicsis taken for grantedas
philosophy'sconceptual underpining.There are two parts to a man, a lower
part that is the body and a higher part that is the soul. The body, especially
certainpartsof the body,is the obvioussourceof the appetites,includingthe
sexual appetites.This is the metaphysicsthat is the basis for Abelard'scele-
bratedethics of intention. In the Ethics,he arguesthat sensual appetites are
weaknessesor defectsembeddedin a man'sphysicalnatureor bodily constitu-
tion and that these defectsarethe correlateandnecessarycondition forvirtue,
which is seated in the other partof a man, his rationalsoul. In his soul part,a
man may refuse to "consent" to bodily appetite in conformity to God's
command.Vice, therefore,is only in intent, in the refusalto withholdconsent,
and so in the "contemptfor God and offendingagainsthim" (Ethics4). The
essenceof vice is "toconsent to that which shouldbe refrainedfromaccording
to God" (Ethics16). The basisof virtue,or good intention, on the other hand,
is that "you believe that what you do pleases God and are not in any way
mistakenin that belief" (Ethics54). Abelard'sinnovation as a moralphiloso-
pher is to arguethat virtue is neither in deeds nor in good will, as Augustine
argued,but, regardlessof what is done or willed, in the correctrationalattitude
to what we do or will. If, for Augustine,good will remainslinked to the living
and acting body, for Abelard the rational consent that constitutes virtue is
completelyseveredfromand set in oppositionto the body and to any feelings
and desireslinked to the body.Abelard's"consensus"and "intentio"are not
the intelligent and feeling interiorspirit that is the springof action, but an
alienatedrationalobedience to a higherwill.12
This ethics, which most commentatorshave claimedHeloise borrowedfrom
Abelard,generatesa numberof morallyquestionableconsequences,some of
which Heloise explicitly denies. The majorityof Abelard'sexamples,perhaps
predictably,have to do with sex, the area in which a man's natural bodily
defects are supposedlystrongestand, therefore,most availableto be a pretext

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 AndreaNye 9

for virtuousjudgment.For Abelard,the more licentious and lustfula person

is, the more chance he or she has to be virtuousby withholding consent.13
Good thoughts, on the other hand, do not necessarilymake an action right.
A servantwho is attackedby his masterand to defend himself has to kill the
masterdoes not have an evil will, but a good will towardhis own defense;
nevertheless,says Abelard, he is guilty of sin becausehe consents to kill his
master.He should have "endured"his own murder(Ethics8, 24).14These
morallydubious results are a necessaryconsequence of a dualism in which
moralreasonis severedfromhuman life. They are also a symptomof the lack
of moraldevelopment Heloise criticizesin Abelard. In his ethics, there is no
impulse to spiritual regeneration;vicious appetites are accepted, or even
encouraged,so as to be the occasion for resistanceand contrition.
Heloise'sconception of love and obligation,on the other hand, is not based
on the samedualisticcategories.ForHeloise a personis not a bodyjoined with
a rational soul, but a complete organism.She makesno opposition between
the rationalsoul and the sinful body but instead distinguishesbetween outer
works and inner spirit. If this is a morality of "pure intention," as most
commentatorshave repeatedafterGilson and Muckle,it is very differentfrom
Abelard'svirtuousintention as will to obedience. Heloise's"it is not so much
what is done that is to be weighed, as it is the spiritin which it is done" (MS
XVI, 251; 175), in Abelard'sEthicsbecomes"the meritor the praiseworthiness
of the doer is not in the deed but in the "intention"(Ethics, 28).15No matter
what sinful things we do or will-and of coursewe will be malicious,greedy,
lustful-if we do not intend to disobeyGod, we have achievedvirtue.Farfrom
adoptingsuch an ethics to excuse herself,Heloise specificallyrefusesit in her
own case. Unlike the biblical villainessesshe cites, she did not mean to ruin
Abelard,although in fact she broughthis ruin about. But "even if innocence
clearsmy spirit,and no consent makesme a partyto this crime, so many sins
went before, that I cannot be completely immune from guilt" (MS XV, 80;
131). In other words,no simple lack of consent can excuse wrongdoing,guilt
andblameareinsteada resultof a complexof actionsand feelings.ForHeloise,
what dirtiesor purifiesthe soul is not "intention"in the sense of disobedience
or righteousjudgment,but "whatcomes from the heart (corde), thoughts of
adultery,or murder,etc.";vice is to have one's "spiritcorruptedby a depraved
will (pravavoluntate)"(MS XVII, 250-51; 174). Vice is not in the externalact
of murderor seduction;it is in the spiritof hatredor lust in which such acts
are done. The "feeling of the doing is what is criminal"(MS XV, 72; 115).
Heloise'svirtuous"animus"is not obedience to law but the "affectus"of an
action, the beneficence, as opposedto the malevolence, that promptsit (MS
XV,72; 115).16Evenwhatwe owe to God, in herview,is not so muchobedience
as it is heartfelt "devotion,"expressedin offerings,prayers,and thanks (MS
XVII, 251; 175-76).

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10 Hypatia

Heloise's ethics is consistent with her view of love. The interlocking

responsibilitiesthat are the substanceof love are owed to a whole person.
Responsibilities of care and devotion do not develop in a private battle
betweenphysicallust andspiritualobediencebut in a complexweb of concrete
interactions,dependencies, and sharedpleasuresthat constitute loving rela-
tionships. Such a conception of love is all but inexpressiblein the terms of
Abelard'sdualist metaphysics.Because the battle between appetite and law
that such metaphysicsmandatescannot be won in any but a temporaryway,
there can be no redemptionin human love. Abelard'snewfound virtue can
only be the renunciation of love for obedience to divine authority,and the
transfer to human beings of "love in Christ." In his own case, Abelard
concedes, this redemptionhad to be won throughextrememeans-the actual
mutilation of the uncontrollablepart of his body. Although we might have
thought the greatlogician'srationalsoul adequateto the taskof masteringthe
passions,Abelardconfesseshe had a particulardifficultywith self-control.This
might be, he speculatesnot without a note of pride,becausehis appetites,like
his reason,were extraordinarilyvirile.
Heloise refusesto think in terms of a metaphysicaldualismbetween soul
and body and rejects the moralityof commandand will that accompaniesit.
This continues to be evident when she writes of the monastic life. When
Abelardforbidsany discussionof their personalrelationship,Heloise contin-
ues her questioningin the only termsthat Abelardis willing to accept. If the
only permissibletopic is to be the spiritualguidanceof her order,then this will
have to be the bond between them and the meansfor them to continue their
dialogue on the nature of obligation and virtue. What, she challenges him,
should be the rule for a convent? The Benedictine rule was written for men.
"Certainly,those who wrote the rules for monks were not only completely
silent about women, but also laid down regulationsthat they knew were not
at all appropriatefor them" (MS XVII, 243; 162). What rulewouldaccommo-
date the differentbody of a woman, could take account of the fact that she
menstruatesand has less muscularstrength?Should the Benedictine rule be
relaxedto take account of women'sphysicalfrailty?17
Initially,Heloise'squestioningfocusedon the weaknessof women and the
necessity of adaptingthe Benedictine rule to their deficiencies, an approach
likely to get Abelard'swilling attention.18As her argumentdevelops,however,
it is no longer the weaknessof women that is in questionbut the adequacyof
any moralorderbasedon law,command,and obedience.The goal of monastic
life must be the highest form of virtue, she argues, but should virtue be
identified with the "outwardshow" of dietary laws, special clothing, and
penances?If the rule for women is relaxedso as to include only the giving up
of personal possessions,continence, and adherence to the morality of the
Gospels, would that not be enough?It was enough for the apostles,and even
for Christhimself. "Wouldthat ourreligioncould rise to this height-to carry

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 AndreaNye 11

out the Gospel,not to go beyondit, lest we attemptto be morethan Christians"

(MS XVII, 245; 164). No longer is it women'sfrailtythat requiresa relaxed
rule. Heloise indicts any code of monastic ethics that sets itself above the
simplemoralitypreachedby Christ.
First,she argues,an attention to outwardactions ratherthan the "stateof
the heart"encourageshypocrisy.In her denial of repentance for her sexual
desires,Heloise alreadyhad made clear how little she valued any "outward
show of penance,"whether to oneself or to others. She would not pretendto
be contritewhen in her heartshe still desiredand treasuredmemoriesof sexual
pleasure.Inevitablyher verybody,she said,wouldbetrayher in movementsin
her sleep and involuntarycriesof pleasure.She expressesher impatiencewith
those who "rashlyprofessmonasticobservance"and vow to follow rulesthat
cannot be kept and underwhich "nearlyall men give way,or ratherfail"(MS
XVII, 246; 167). It is not only women who are unsuited to asceticism. To
proposerulesagainstwhich the body will inevitablyrebel is to invite dishon-
esty whatever the sex. Heloise, as handy with Scriptureas Abelard, quotes
Paul: "Lawintervenes to multiply law-breaking"(Romans 5: 20; MS XVII,
245; 165).
Second, Heloise suggeststhat a monastic rule that goes beyond Gospel
moralityis an affrontto Christianfaith. Who is to say that the teachings of
Christ are not good enough or that the virtueof the apostlesis inferior?Jesus
didnot forbidwine or meat to his apostlesor insist that they wearspecialkinds
of clothing. They were to live as men amongmen. He instructedthem only to
avoid giving offense to other people by what they ate or drankaccordingto
the usages of those around them. A moralityof obedience to law or rules,
Heloise argues,is completelyalien to Jesus'moralteaching.Farfrominstituting
dietaryrulesand ritualobservances,Jesuscriticizedthe observanceof the Law
in Jewishpractice.Virtueis not obedience to the Law,he taught, but consid-
eration for others and purityof heart. Paul, writingto Timothy,goes so far as
to identify dietary rules with "subversivedoctrines." The essence of the
Christianmessageis the differencebetween "virtueand the show of virtue,"
between a "naturalhabit of virtue"and obedience to laws that are inevitably
the laws of men (MS XVII, 249-50; 173).
Heloise'svirtue does not requirethe heroic act of will of Abelard'sdualist
metaphysics. In Abelard'sethics, the inner evil of appetite is irradicable,
desirable even, so that the rational masteryof the soul over vice can be
exercised. Virtue can never be a "naturalhabit," because such a thing is
impossible.Heloise's virtue requiresnot willpowerbut a change of heart, a
change of heart, for example, in which a man might lear to love, seeing a
womannot as an object on which to gratifyhis lust but as a personwith whom
he has a relation involving mutualresponsibilities.In such a reformation,he
would win the "freedomof the Gospel"and not the "yoke"of the Law (MS
XVII, 251; 176).

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12 Hypatia

Abelard is unmoved by Heloise's argument.In the lengthy directions he

gives for her order,he constantlyemphasizesdiscipline and obedience. What
does following Christ mean? he asks. It means one puts aside possessions,
affection for those related to him, and his own wishes and "commitshimself
to be ruledby another'srule, not his own" (MS XVIII, 244; 186). The house
of God is an "armedfortress"with a commanderand a clear delegation of
authority(MS XVIII, 250; 196). The abbessis in charge, taking her orders
fromher spiritualhusbandChristaswell as fromhis subordinatesin the nearby
monasteryresponsiblefor directingthe external affairsof her convent. Their
ultimate superioris God who gives commandmentsto men, commandments
to be followed in obedience to the pope, the bishop, the abbot, and, finally,
the individual'swill in masteryover his sinfulbody.Forthis reason,there must
be a strict law for a woman'sorderand no loose, unsupervisedarrangements.19
In the convent the abbessrules,but she mustrule accordingto regulations.
Abelard, apparentlybelatedly realizingthe mistake of liberallyencouraging
womento be independentscholars,admonishesHeloise on the properconduct
of an abbess.She shouldbe over sixty-a requirementthat Heloise will not be
ableto meet forsome years.If she is "notlettered"-there is no insistencehere
that all nuns be educated-she should "accustomherselfnot to philosophic
studies as dialectical disputationsbut to the teaching of life and the perfor-
mance of works."If she thinks she must refer to the Scripturesin order to
understandbetter, she should not hesitate to "inquireand learn from the
educated"(MS XVIII,253; 201).20 Abelardis particularlyemphaticaboutthe
necessityfor male direction:
And so trulywe believe that convents observemorefirmlythe
religion of their calling if they are governedby the foresightof
spiritualmen (spiritalium virorum),and the same pastor is set
over the ewes and the rams:that is, the same one presidesover
women and men, and alwaysaccordingto the apostle:The man
is the head of the woman,just as Christis the head of man, and
God the head of Christ. (MS XVIII, 258; 210)21
In the chain of militarycommandthat is Abelard'sGod'sworldthere is a clear
hierarchythat allowsthe ethic of obedienceto operateeffectively.As Abelard
lays out the correctformsof convent life, the split between body and soul is
institutionalizedas the authorityof the rulingmasculinesoul over the various
evils of the female body,and the authorityof male clerics over convent life.
The restrictiveframeworkof this dualisticmetaphysicsis particularlyevi-
dent in one of Abelard'smost striking"rationalarguments,"as he attemptsto
persuadeHeloise to forgethim andrejoiceinsteadin her religiousvows. There
should be a greatpleasurefor her, Abelardtells her, in the bed of Christ, the
new husbandto whom he has relinquishedher. Apparentlynot remembering
or understandingHeloise'sindictmentof opportunisticmarriages,he urgeson

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 AndreaNye 13

her "a happy trade (commercium)of your marriedstate, for where you were
beforethe wife of a miserableman, now you arein the sublimebed of the King
of Kings"(MS XV, 83; 138). Remember,he tells her, the Ethiopianwoman,
blackflesh on the outsideand thereforeugly and poor,but white in bones and
soul on the inside and so lovely because she is loved by the king. The king,
Abelardextends his metaphor,must visit his black lover secretly because of
her blackness,just as Heloise will have intercoursewith Christ in the privacy
of the convent.
In this dubiousbut commonreductionof the sensualityof the Song of Songs
to heavenly love, which Abelard spins out with great rhetoricalflourish,is
evident the conceptual infrastructureof Abelard'srationality.The argument
is not only strictlyconstructedaccordingto the familiardualismof body and
soul but uses metaphoricalextensionsof that oppositionto drawcomplemen-
tary contrastsbetween inferiorwoman/superiorman, black flesh/white soul,
evil body/chastesoul. These dichotomies are the foundingconceptual frame
for much of mainstreamWesternphilosophysince Aristotle.22Their implica-
tion in racism, sexism, and sexual repressionhave been well documented.
What characterizesAbelard'sthought,however,is not only the specificbody-
phobic, racist, sexist oppositionsthat structureit but also the very discipline
of thoughtand languagethat originallyconstitutesuniversalconceptsand that
holds speech to a particularform. If Heloise'sthought is seen as irrational,it
is not only becauseshe refusedto accept the inferiorstatusof women, or black
skin, or the body, but also because her thought has no rigid institutional
scaffolding.Instead of structuralrelations between mind/body,white/black,
man/woman,Heloise'sthought has the flowing qualitythat Abelardfound so
dangerousin the female tongue. Unrestrainedby any canonical conceptual
order,such a thought and speech can, in truth,as Abelardfeared,deviatefrom
orthodoxyand "runall over the world,"as it flows directlyfromdesires,from
the body,fromthe tongue itself as the organof speech.23
Abelard'smost renownedcontributionto philosophy,his theory of univer-
sals,is the theoryof the conceptualdisciplinethat is to redeemsuch loose talk.
In a subtle negotiation between nominalism and Platonic realism, much
admiredby contemporarylinguists,Abelard arguedthat a universalis not a
thing or material essence, but a use of words.That use of words,he argued
against the nominalists, is caused by a resemblancebetween things. But the
resemblancein which universalscan be groundedis not intuited in sensual
experience.The abilitywe have to instituteuniversalconcepts such as "man"
or "soul"is the essence of rationality.Sensation and imaginationgive us only
confusedideasof a thing, but with a universal,we graspwhat somethingreally
is-for example,that it is a substance,or a body,orwhite. A universalis neither
a res (thing) or a vox (sound) but a sermon(term) whose meaningdependson
a "human institution" based on a rationally intuited resemblancebetween
things. It is with these universalsthat we areable to put ourthoughtsin order.

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14 Hypatia

The soul can be opposed to the body,white to black, man to woman by way
of oppositional qualities, and a logic constructedthat eliminates contradic-
tions fromdiscourse.24
Heloise not only refusesto adopt the particularconceptual orderurgedon
her byAbelard-soul overbody,manoverwoman,white over black-she does
not think in fixed oppositionallydefined concepts at all. An example is her
correction of Abelard'sincomplete and therefore distorted account of her
argumentsagainstmarriage.She begins by assertingnot a hierarchicaloppo-
sition but an apparentcontradiction:to be the whore (meretrix)of Abelard
wouldbe morehonorablethan to be the wife of an emperor(imperatrix)(MS
XV, 71; 114). Whore is not oppositionallydefined as a woman who is not a
wife, nor is wife defined as a womanwho is not a whore. Insteadthe semantic
dissonanceof the combination of wife/dishonorableand whore/honorableis
exploredby noting contradictionsin the actual institution of medieval mar-
riageas experiencedby women. When a womanmarriesfor statusand money,
saysHeloise, as twelfth-centurywomen were often forcedto do, it is the same
as prostitution.Such marriageswill alwaysbe unstable,and the partnersprone
to infidelity.As the woman wonderswhether she made the best bargain,she
becomes a whore, willing to "tradein" her old marriagefor a more advanta-
geous one.25
This critical insight suggestsin turna new concept of the marriagerelation,
basedon the commitmentto hold each other in the highest esteem, believing
that "thereis no better man or worthierwomanon earth"(MS XV, 71; 114).
Attributingthese wordsto the GreekphilosopherAspasia,Heloise calls them
"trulysaintly, more than philosophical opinion (sententia),they should be
called wisdom (sophiae)ratherthan philosophy"(MS XV, 71; 114).26 Fidelity
in marriagecan only be assuredwhen each believes the other to be the best.
The possibilityof such a love basedon mutualesteemcannot be thoughtwithin
the conceptual frameworkof Abelard'suniversals.The opposition between
mind and body reflectsinsteadan internalbattle between lust awakenedby a
woman and obedience to God. ForAbelard marriagecan only be motivated
by jealousy,by the need to securethe object of lust. As he admitsto Heloise,
he insistedon the secretmarriagethat has ruinedboth their lives because"had
younot been joined to me beforein marriage,at mywithdrawalfromthe world,
either at the suggestionof yourparentsor for the delights of carnalpleasure,
you might easily have clung to the world"(MS XV,90; 149). He is incapable
of appreciatingHeloise'sfidelityassuredby mutualesteem for the other,which
would require a moving beyond and out of the solipsistic drama of reason
pitched against appetite. Abelard'sjudgment can only be that Heloise is
irrational.She has not thought in universals;she has not separatedthings into
their correct metaphysicalcategories;she has not structuredher argument
accordingto what things are in their essence.

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 AndreaNye 15

InsteadHeloise thinks throughconflictual ideas and conflictual reality to

move towardnew conceptions of love and marriage.The idea of prostitution
helps her to understandthe actual realityof its supposedopposite, marriage.
Observationsof marriageas practicedsuggestthe idea of a new and different
kind of marriage.Insteadof Abelard'sthought held rigidlyin place by fixed
categoriesof being, Helosie'sthought is, just as Abelardcharged,flexible and
moving. Marriageand prostitutionchange in meaning as concepts come into
contact with the experiencedrealityof medievalmarriage.
In Heloise's thought there is a more complex relation between wordsand
things than in Abelard's "institution"of universals that reflect supposed
permamentresemblancesbetween things. As she works through reciprocal
interactionsbetween concepts and reality,Heloise is able to advance under-
standing of their situation where Abelard is not. His only escape from the
dichotomyof soul and body is to elevate that dichotomyto a higher level, to
an imaginary spiritual relation between the ruling soul of God and the
subservientreason of man. Similarly,the only solution he can suggest for
Heloise is that she accept the surrogateembracesof his superiorin lieu of his
own. This, needless to say, is an inadequatesolution in Heloise's view. She
refusesto accept Abelard'sinsistence that the failureof earthly love can be
made good by a transferof lustfulaffectionto God.
In Heloise's thought, there is a different kind of relationship between
passionsand concepts than in Abelard'slogic. It is not surprisingthat Abelard
has recently been discoveredby semioticians.27The "signifyingchain" of his
rationality,althoughoften troubledby irruptionsof bodilydriveswhich he sees
as both sinful and irrational,constantlyreestablishesitself as symbolicstruc-
ture. Fromthe standpointof Heloise, and, I think, most readerswho are not
philosophers or linguists committed to contemporary constructed or
deconstructedversionsof Abelard'sdialectic, this can only constitute a kind
of pathology.Abelardis not able to understandwhat Heloise writesto him or
to respond in any meaningfulway. Throughouthis "rational"argumentsis
evasion and irrelevancethat infuriatesHeloise and also the reader.The cause
of this communicativedisabilityis the very separationof passion and reason
in which he takessuch prideas a philosopher.On the one hand, there is logic,
conceptuallystructuredby dichotomousuniversals;opposedarethe evil appe-
tites to be repressedandmastered.The resultis that Abelard'srationalthought,
detachedfromthe issuesat hand, becomesan exercisein conceptualdexterity.
At the same time, his repressedemotions stagnate,breakingout in irritable
and sometimesmanic expressionsof impatienceand disgust.
ForHeloise, there is no such separationbetween passionand thought. Her
love and anger are constantly present in her language.Her passions are as
thoughtfulas her languageis passionate.Her desireis not thoughtlessphysical
reflex,fixed in genital sensationthat, when blocked,resultsonly in disruptive
irritability;it is embeddedin a matrixof approachesand responses,exchanges

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16 Hypatia

and dependencies,understandingand conflict betweenpersons.Her language

is not fixed in categoriesdivorcedfromexperiencethat supportonly defensive
assaulton rival positions,but flowsfromher past and presentexperience.Her
speech is not the involuntaryexpressionof bodily impulses,nor is it a pure
emotionlesslogic of the soul, but rathermoving and changingconceptualiza-
tions directedto and shapedfor the responsesof others.
The mutualunderstandingthat Heloise tries to establishis not the same as
the logical necessity forced on her by Abelard. The instrumentalvalue of
logical necessity was well describedby Abelard:
I will takeyouraccusationsone at a time to answer,not so much
to excuse myself as for an instructionand encouragementto
you, so that you will assentmorewillinglyto my requestswhen
you understandthe factsof reason,so that you will listen to me
morecarefullyin regardto yourclaimsasyou find me lesswrong
in mine, and so that you will be that much more afraid to
condemn as you see me less worthyof blame. (MS XV,83; 137)
Heloise'sconcern, on the other hand, is not to get Abelard to do what she
wantsbut to achieve an interpersonalunderstandingof the catastrophicevents
that have shaped their lives. Disturbedby the distortionin Abelard'sautobi-
ography,Heloise writes to reestablisha mutual understandingof what has
happened, to grasp interpersonallythe real dynamics of events and their
consequences,of actions and their motivations.In this project,I think it is fair
to say,Abelardshows no interestat all. ForAbelard,speech is an exercise of
will, a way to force acquiescenceto his wishes and opinions.
This is hardlythe firstor the last time a man and a womanhave misunder-
stood each other becauseof differentconceptionsof languageand its purpose.
Buttheirfailureto communicatealsoraisesa largerquestion.IfHeloise refused
to accept the disciplineof Abelard'sdialectic, if she refusedthe style of logical
debatethat has shapedthe philosophycurriculumand the institutionalstruc-
tures of the modern university,is this prophetic of the future?Will women
continue to be judged unsuccessfulas students and philosophers?Will they
continue to disappointtheir male mentors?Even though we now recognizeas
sexualharassmentAbelard'sruseto seducean innocent younggirl,the answer
is still in doubt. If rationality,logic, and correct methodologyare structured
according to universal categories that are sexist, racist, and body phobic,
womenmaynot be logicalorrational.Iflogicalthoughtrequiresthat categories
stayrigidlyfixed, not coming into contact with lived experienceand changing
as a result, then women may again fail to succeed. If philosophy persistsin
being a professionaldiscipline divorcedfrompassionateexperience and aspi-
ration, women may not be interested.
Heloise's thought not only has the negative quality of being unlike
Abelard's, it also offers a positive example. What would a philosophical

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 Andrea Nye 17

community be like in which Heloise's thought would be at home. It would

have to accommodate passionate speech that comes from the problematic
experience of women and of men. It would be motivated by a concern for
mutual understanding that can stabilize and repair relations between persons.
Its discussions would be critical and, at the same time, constructive of new
forms of understanding. Positions would be articulated not in battles of rival
wills maneuvering within an accepted framework of concepts that may have
lost any reference to experienced reality, but in the kind of free and open
discussion that Abelard refused. If philosophy as we know it has often perpet-
uated and articulated that refusal, might a new philosophical community be
informed by Heloise's and Aspasia's wisdom, their subtle, sensitive, mobile,
flexible women's tongues? Might philosophers finally admit what Saint Paul
and Abelard denied, that a woman can be the teacher of a man?

NOTES

1. Referencesthroughoutthe text are to the Latin texts of HistoriaCalamitatum

(Abelard19??)and of Heloise'sandAbelard'sletters(HeloiseandAbelard1950-56);the
translationsaremyown. Referencesarealsoappendedto BettyRadice'srecenttranslation
of the letters(Heloise 1974). Referencesto Abelard'sEthicsare to the Latintext edited
by D. E. Luscombe(Abelard1971;my translations).
2. Animusis more general then corde,or "heart,"which is the usual translation.
One's animuscan be one's reasoning,mind, conscience, will, as well as feeling and
emotion.
3. Abelardconfessesthat he did see the need forphysicaldisciplinethroughoutthe
tumultuouscourseof theirpedagogicalanderoticrelationship.Later,when Heloisegrew
more resistant to his sexual demands, the tone is harsher:"Even when, unwilling,
reluctant,and tryingto dissuademe, you resistedas muchas youcould,becauseyourswas
the weakernatureI often forcedyourconsent with threatsand beatings"(MS XV, 89;
147). Forthis methodof instruction,Abelardclaimedgoodauthority.God alsopunishes,
he tells Heloise to exonerateGod'sharshnessto them, but "this is a father'srod, not a
persecutor's sword;the fatherstrikesto correct,and to strikedown an enemy who kills"
(MS XV,92; 153).
4. See Muckle'sextensive reviewof the argumentsand evidenceforauthenticityin
his introductionto the Letters(MS XV,47-68). Muckleconcludesthat the evidence is
inconclusive, but there is nothing in the manuscriptsthat casts positive doubt on
authenticiy.His main worryis the unlikelinessthat such a reverednun couldhave such
a "sensualmind,"as well as that Heloise could have done the final editing. She, he is
sure, hardly would have wanted to "leave such a charactersketch of herself as her
'monumentumperennis'(MS XV, 67). See also Dronke'smore recent review of the
evidenceandhis argumentthat it wasthe "profane" passagesin Heloise'sfirsttwo letters,
and not textual evidence, that originatedthe claim that the letters are inauthentic
(Dronke1984, 108). Especiallyinterestingis Dronke'slinguisticanalysisof Heloise'sstyle
as distinctfromAbelard's,which wouldseemto put to restthe view that the whole series
was writtenby Abelard.

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18 Hypatia

5. Muckle'sintroductionto the Letters(MS XV,52, 59).

6. Forexample,Robertson(1972). Robertsonfinds Heloise'sargumentso "absurd"
(124) and "ludicrous"(126) that he insiststhat the lettersare not genuine but a fiction
manufacturedby Abelardfor the edificationof the nuns of Heloise'sconvent. Abelard's
intention,he says,is "toshowhow desparatelyHeloiseneededinstruction"andto expose
the "self-righteousunwillingness on her part to assume any responsibilityfor her
condition"(128). Grane (1970) gives a more balancedinterpretationthat gives some
credit to Heloise'saccountsof love and marriage.Grane admitsthat a "veryreasoned
attack could be mountedagainst[Abelard's]monkishpiety and grimasceticism"(69),
but he concludesthat Abelardhas been able to regainhis "intellectualintegrityon a
completelydifferentplane"with love of God (67), while Heloise remainsregressively
committedto the "synthesisof the heart'surgeand the mind'sclaritythat had always
motivatedher"(70).
7. For example,Waithe (1989): "In a long discussionGilson identifiesthe philo-
sophicalfoundationsof Heloise'sviewson love andfriendship.... it is clearthat Heloise
basedher view of love on Cicero'sphilosophy... she is devastatedto realizethat the very
argumentsand principles of morality she learned from Abelard and to which she
subscribed,did not move him or guidehis actionstowardsher"(73).
8. Although Abelard complains in his autobiographyabout how often he was
requiredto visit and advisethe nuns, Heloise insistedthat he had neglectedhis duty to
the convent. I am inclined to takeher accountover his, especiallyas duringthe time of
his supposedvisits he is known to have been busyelsewheredefendinghimself against
chargesof heresyand pooradministration.
9. After his maiming,Abelard retiredto the monasteryat St. Denis; there, his
high-handedcriticismscausedgeneralhatredamongthe brothersand he was banished
to a separateschool on the grounds.Accusedandconvictedof heresy,he wasimprisoned
for life in St. Medard,only to be releasedby the papallegate. When he returnedto St.
Denis, he infuriatedeveryone furtherwith a charge that the monasteryrecordswere
incorrect.The monkscomplainedto the kingandAbelardhad to flee again.Understand-
ably,afterall these difficulties,he was grantedpermissionto live alone as a monk, but
aftera few yearshe wasnamedabbotof St. Gilda'sin Brittany.There his relationswith
his chargeswereso troubledthat the monkstriedto kill him and he only escapedunder
armedguard.Furtherchargesof heresyoccupiedhim until the end of his life. By any
standard,Abelard,who set himselfup as Heloise'smentor,had no distinguishedrecord
of monasticleadership.In contrast,Heloise'sadministrationwasuniversallycommended.
In their firstyearat the Paraclete,the king exemptedthe nuns fromtaxes;the convent
wassupportedfinanciallyboth by the churchand by lay endowments.Even the uncom-
promisingBernardof Clairvaux,aboutto becomeAbelard'smortalenemy,had nothing
but praiseafterhis visit in 1131.
10. Heloise'sphilosophyof love is not, as most commentatorshave repeatedafter
Gilson (Gilson 1960, 56), Cicero'sview of the idealmasculinefriendshipas expressedin
De amicitia.First,Cicero is describingrelationsbetween men and not sexual relations
betweenmen and women.Second, the problematicof the Cicero piece is conflictsthat
arisebetweenloyaltyto friendsandpublicduty.Finally,Cicero'sansweris that one must
choose friends carefullyso that they are as like one as possible and not for mutual
advantage,so as to minimizethe chanceof sucha conflict.Heloisemayhave readCicero,
and even usedCicero,but her view is not his.
11. Manycommentatorshave wantedto see a conversionon Heloise'spart,as in her
laterlettersshe turnsto less personaltopics.See Dronke(1984, 137) for a reviewof the

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 Andrea Nye 19

sources.It is truethatshe acquiescesbeforeAbelard'sinsistencethatonly convent matters

be discussed,but her tone, as I readit, doesnot indicateagreementbut ratheracceptance
of the only termson which Abelardis willingto communicatewith her.
12. Although both AugustineandAbelardrejecta purelyexteriorethics that defines
sin as the commissionof some one or more of a list of proscribedactions, there are
significantdifferencesin theirethics.Augustinedistinguishesbetweenthe doingof willful
evil and the involuntarydoing of evil, but the will is still essentiallylinked to action as
the choice of which of ourinclinationsshouldbe gratified.Abelardrejectsthe will as the
seat of sin, makinga distinction between will, on the one hand, which is wanting or
desiringto do evil, and consent, on the other, which is obedience to God'scommand
(Ethics32). Over the will is a rationaljudgingthat an action is forbiddenby God that is
completelyautonomousof the body.
13. Abelardarguesin the Ethicsthat evil will is a necessarycondition for virtue
becauseit gives us somethingto struggleagainst.If we simplydid what we want or will,
we would not be commendablein God'seyes. Only a restrainedevil will can win the
"crownof glory";there is no rewardin doing good "willingly"(Ethics12). Virtue is in
submittingourwill, good or bad,to God's(Ethics12). In his second letter to Heloisehe
appliesthis ethics to her case. She is fortunate,he says,becauseshe is young and not
mutilated,and so still has the "thornof desire"that can be the occasionfor a virtuous
refusalof consent in accordancewith God'swill (MS XV,93; 154).
14.This is not a radicalpacifismon Abelard'spart.Thereareoccasionswhen consent
to killing is innocent-for example,whena convict ishungout of "zealforjustice"(Ethics
28).
15. Many have commentedon the similaritiesin wordingbetween Heloise'sand
Abelard'sformulas:"it is not what is done, but the spirit in which it is done." The
similarities,Muckle concludes,can only be explainedby common origin or imitation.
Disastrous,however,to the popularthesis that Heloise imitatedAbelardis the fact that
Abelard'sEthicswaswrittenwell afterthe letters.Not rulingout the possibilitythat "the
common source is Abelard'smind,"Muckle admitsthe possibilitythat the wordingin
Abelard'sEthicsand other laterwritingsmayhave been borrowedfromHeloise. Added
evidence is that Abelard'searlywordingin Sicet Non is verydifferent(MS XV,55-56).
16. In this, Heloise'sethics might seem to be closerto Augustine'sthan Abelard's.
One can only speculatewhatsomeof the differencesmightbe if moreof Heloise'swritings
were available.Augustine'slex aeterramight have been much less prominent.Also,
Augustine'sstrugglewith concupiscencemight have been resolvednot by a choice of
abstinencebut in an innertransformation of lust into moredevelopedformsof friendship,
commitment,exchangesof pleasure.
17. Heloise cites a numberof specificproblemsfora woman'sorder.The rulethat all
clothing shouldbe wool is impractical,consideringmenstruation.A diet without meat
maynot be appropriate, consideringwomen'sspecialneedsfornutrition.Becausewomen
are less prone to drunkenness,a strictprohibitionof wine may not be necessary.Is the
abbessto rule in the same way as the abbot?What should be her practicewhen male
guestscome to the convent, or worldywomen?What shouldbe the requirement,if any,
formanuallabor?
18. Heloise had no developedfeministposition that women and men are or should
be equalor the same.The emphasisin her discussionof a monasticruleforwomenis not
on women'sequalitybut on their differencesfrommen. Some of those differences,she
notes, are actuallybeneficialin monasticlife; for example,women are constitutionally
less likely to fall preyto gluttonyor drunkenness(MS XVII,245-46; 165-66).

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20 Hypatia

19. AbelardwarnsHeloise in no uncertaintermsof the dangersof a life independent

of maleauthority:"Therearethose who will not standany restrictionat all frommonks,
and who dispersethemselvesthroughoutvillages,cities, and towns,and even live alone
withoutthe observingof any rule,and areso muchthe worsethan worldlymen as they
fallawaymorefromtheirvocation.They nametheirdwellingplacesobedientaries,where
no rule is followed,abusingthem as if they were familyor privatehomes, and there is
nothingto be obeyedbutstomachandbodytherewherethey live astheywishwith friends
or family,the morefree in their own mannerthe less they have to fearfrom their own
consciences.Indeed, in such shamelessapostates,there is no doubt there are criminal
excessesthat mightbe venialsinsin others.Youshouldforbidyourselfnot only to consider
but even to hearaboutsuch a life" (MS XVII,250; 195-96).
20. Some commentatorshave cited Abelard'sinsistencethat nuns understandthe
meaning of the words in hymns and prayersas supportfor scholarshipin convents.
Abelard'sconcern,however,is with women's"ecstaticlanguage"and the possibilitythat
nuns maydelight in the melodyof their singing,ratherthan doctrine.The antidotehe
suggestsis not thoughtor philosophybut listeningand readingScripturewith attention
to receivedmeaningas opposedto mysticalecstasy(MS XVIII,286-87;258-59).
21. See the end of Historiacalamitatum (MS XII, 208-9; 101) fora similarargument,
but compareMS XVIII, 259; 213-14, where Abelardcautions that in orderto ensure
harmonyand peace, men'srule should not go againstthe will of the abbess.Abelard's
ambivalence reflects the many conflicts in the patriarchalchurch'sthinking about
monasticlife for women. The dangerousheritagefrompaganismof women'ssacerdotal
powerstill evident in manylocal religiouspracticesand unpleasantmemoriesof distur-
bancescausedby powerfulnoble abbessesin the earlydaysof monasticismprovokedthe
church to insist that nuns be closely controlledby male monastics.This creatednew
problemsas monksandchurchofficialscameinto contactwith womenandweretempted
by lust. On the other hand, if the convents were shut down, there would be no place
where loose women, women unattachedto men or "virgin,"could be cloistered.Also
troublesomewere the hermitessesof the early eleventh century,who representeda
resurgencein femalemysticismand a spiritualpoweruncontrolledby the male church;
conventswerenecessaryso that those who withdrewto the wilderness(anachoreta) could
be enclosed (inclusaor reclusa),confinedunderthe auspicesof some recognizedchurch
institution.Throughoutshifting policy, a precariousbalance was sought between the
segregationof women monasticsfrommen and the control of women by men. Similar
conflictsmighthave motivatedSugerto expel Heloise'snunsfromArgenteuiland make
it necessaryfor them to settle on Abelard'slandnearTroye.
22. Aristotle'sPolitics(bookI, chapter5) is the foundationaltext. Aristotlesets upa
mutuallyconfirmingset of symmetricaloppositionsbetweenmind/body,reason/emotion,
human/animal,master/slave,man/womanto justifythe naturaldominanceof men over
women,mastersover slaves,and Greeksover barbarians.
23. See Dronke'sstudyof the stylisticcharacteristicsof Heloise'swriting-rhythms,
cadences,dynamictensions-that constituteits expressivity(Dronke 1984, 107-39).
24. Abelarddiscussesuniversalsthroughouthis Logicaingredientibus (Abelard1933).
See my extendeddiscussionof his logic in Nye (1990).
25. See alsoDronke'sdiscussionof Heloise'sProblemata, latina,178,677-730
Patrilogia
(Dronke1984, 134-39). These werea seriesof unresolvedproblemsin the interpretation
of doctrine and Scriptureencounteredby the nuns of her order in their studies that
Heloise submittedto Abelardforconsultation.Unlike Abelard'sown Sicet Non, which
set out contradictionsamong variousauthoritiesto be resolvedby textual editing and

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 Andrea Nye 21

logic, Heloise'sproblemsweremorecloselyrelatedto contradictionsin the lived experi-

ence of a moralor spirituallife and, in manyinstances,werea continuationof themesin
her personalletters:Can you obey a law partially?Why should a convertedsinner be
welcomedwith morejoy?How is anysin forgivable?Can you sin in doingsomethingyour
husband and master commands?Abelard'sanswersto these, one might say, loaded
questionswere cool and mechanical,based,for the most part,on abundantquotation
ratherthan on thoughtor referenceto religiousexperience.
26. In a footnote,Radice(HeloiseandAbelard1974, 114) followstraditionby insisting
that Heloise derivedher knowledgeof AspasiafromCicero:althoughHeloise refersto
AeschinesSocraticus,who wrotea dialogueaboutAspasia,"thisis no proofthat Heloise
knew Greekas the passagewaswell known in the MiddleAges fromCicero'stranslation
of it in De inventione."Heloise'sreferenceto Aspasia,however,goes considerablybeyond
Cicero'sbriefreferencein De inventione.In orderto illustratewhat inductionis, Cicero
usedas an examplea scrapof conversationfromAeschines'dialoguein which, according
to Cicero,Aspasiausesthe followingargumentativestrategy:she getsXenophonandhis
wife to agreethat if they believe that theirneighborhas a betterspousethey wouldwant
a betterspousetoo; then she makesthem drawthe inferencethat if they areto be happy
togetherthey will have to make it so they areeach the best. Cicero makesno comment
on the philosophy that underliesthis move, but producesit only as an example of
inductiveargument.
27. See, for example,Kristeva(1984). Kristevahas developeda dualistictheoryof
languagein which necessarilyalienatedand oppressivesymbolicstructuresare opposed
to the primitive"semiotic"expressionof drivesandbodysensation.Myreadingof Heloise
differsradicallyfromdeconstructivereadingsinspiredby sucha linguistics-for example,
PeggyKamuf's,in which Heloise is understoodas transgressingor disruptingAbelard's
symbolicstructures(Kamuf1982). In myreading,the womanspeakingis not condemned
to transgressiveplay on the marginsof rationallanguage;rathershe attemptsto restore
communicativerelationsthat aremutualandproductiveof interpersonalunderstanding.

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Dronke,Peter.1984.Womenwritersof theMiddleAges.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
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Gilson, Etienne. 1960. HeloiseandAbelard.Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress.
Grane,Lief. 1970. PeterAbelard.Trans.FrederickCrowleyand ChristineCrowley.New
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Kamuf,Peggy.1982. Fictionsoffemininedesire.Lincoln:Universityof NebraskaPress.
Kristeva,Julia.1984. Therevolutioninpoeticlanguage,
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Nye, Andrea. 1990. Wordsof power:A feministreadingof thehistoryof logic.New York:

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