Brill

Does the Habit Make the Nun? A Case Study of Heloise's Influence on Abelard's Ethical
Philosophy
Author(s): BROOKE HEIDENREICH FINDLEY
Source: Vivarium, Vol. 44, No. 2/3 (2006), pp. 248-275
Published by: Brill
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 Does theHabit Make theNun?
A Case Studyof Heloise'sInfluence s EthicalPhilosophy
on Abelard'

BROOKE HEIDENREICH FINDLEY

Abstract
A carefulreadingofHeloise'sletters revealsbothhercontribution to Abelarďs
ethicalthoughtand the differences betweenher ethicalconcernsand his. In
her letters,Heloise focuseson the innatemoralqualitiesof the innerperson
- oftheinnerpersonthroughfalse
or animus.Hypocrisy themisrepresentation
outerappearance,exemplified by the potentially deceitfulreligioushabitor
- is a matterof
habitus greatmoralconcernto her. When Abelardresponds
to Heloise's ideas, firstin his lettersto her and later in his Collationes
and
Scitote ipsum, he turnsthe discussionaway fromher originalinterests. He
transforms her metaphorof the habitus as falseappearanceintoa discussion
of anothertypeof habitus , the habitualprocessof acquiringvirtue,and inte-
gratesher focuson the animus into his developingideas about sin as inten-
tion.Examining thedifferences betweenHeloise'sethicalthought and Abelard's
allowsus to appreciatethe distinctcontributions of both.

Recent scholarshiphas begun to recognize Heloise, not only for her

impressiveliterarytalent,but forher philosophicalcontribution, particu-
larly in the area of ethics. scholars
Increasingly, are realizingthat the
famouslettersaddressed by Heloise to Abelard can also be read as an
ethical treatise.Andrea Nye has shown how "[Heloise's] views on love,
religiousdevotion,and language [present]an alternativeto philosophic
method as it is conceived by Abelard."1Constant Mews has examined
Heloise's ethicalthoughton love, innerdispositionand intentionality and
is
concluded,not onlythatHeloise'sethicalphilosophy significantly different
fromAbelard's,but thather influenceon him in thisarea was "decisive."2

1 AndreaNye,A Woman's Thought TheLetters

ora Man'sDiscipline? andHeloise
ofAbelard ,
7.3 (1992),1-22,esp.1.
in:Hypatia,
2 ConstantMews,TheLostLoveLetters , NewYork1999,135.For
andAbelard
ofHeloise
ofHeloise's
overviews ethics, see 116-17, See alsoMews,Philosophical
131-35and 138-39.
Themesinthe Duorum
Epistolae , in:Bonnie
Amantium Wheeler toHeloise:
(ed.),Listening theVoice
a Woman
of Twelfth-Century , New York 2000,35-52.

BrillNV,Leiden,2006
© Koninklijke Vivarium
44,2-3
online
Alsoavailable - www.brill.nl/viv

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 ON ABELARD'S
HELOISE'SINFLUENCE ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 249

When he turnedto writingethicalworkslate in life,Mews argues:"Abelard

came closer to acknowledging[Heloise's] concerns,withoutever explic-
itlyacknowledgingher contribution."3
This article takes as its subject one specificcase in which Heloise's
influenceon Abelard's ethicalthoughtis apparent:a debate betweenthe
famous couple over the nature and ethical implicationsof hypocrisy,
loosely organized around the image of the habitus , or nun's habit. This
debate beginsin the couple's well-knownexchange of letters,but it does
not end there. Abelard continuesto reflecton it in two ethical works
that were most likelywrittenafterthe letterexchange: his Collationes (or
a
Dialogueof Philosopher with a Jew and a Christian), and Scitote ipsum(or
4 Yet the as Abelard treatsit in these works moves
Ethics). question away
fromHeloise's originalconcerns.What begins as Heloise's discussionof
sincerityand hypocrisy, of innerselfand outercovering,ultimately becomes
Abelard's examinationof intention,consentand the struggleforvirtue.
The habitusdebate providesa strikingexample of the phenomenonfor
whichMews has argued: Heloise did indeed have a profound,frequently
unacknowledgedinfluenceon Abelard's ethicalthought.As the following
discussionwill show, passages of his ethical philosophycan be traced
directlyto concernsraised in her letters.However,the habitus debate also
highlights some significant differencesbetweenHeloise's ethicalpreoccu-
pationsand Abelard's.While the ethicalproblemsthatAbelard takes up
are manifestlyinspiredby Heloise, his treatment of themremainsuniquely
his own. Examiningsuch pointsof disjunctionpermitsus to continuethe
processthatscholarslikeMews and Nye have begun: to separateHeloise's
philosophyfromAbelard's in order to appreciate,not only her influence
on her famoushusband,but the value of her thoughtin its own right.

3 Mews1999,172.
4 DatingAbelard'sworks is a difficult
issuethatwillbe treated
in moredetailbelow,
note46. The letters
are typicallydatedaround1133,soonafter theHistoria
calamitatimi
(1132).The Collationes
arecontroversial in date,butI acceptAllen'sargumentsthatthey
probablydatefrom aftertheletterexchange withHeloise.SeeJulieA. Allen,
Onthe Dating
ofAbailard's A Reply
Dialogus: toMews , in:Vivarium, 36 (1998),135-51.Payeralsodates
theCollationes
from sometime between 1136-39. SeePierreJ.Payer,A Dialogue
ofa Philosopher
witha Jewanda Christian
, Toronto 1979,6-8.TheScito teipsumseemstohavebeenincircu-
lationamong Abelard's
disciplesby1139.See D.E. Luscombe, Peter
Abelard's
Ethics
, Oxford
1971,XXX.

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250 FINDLEY
BROOKEHEIDENREICH

I. HeloiseRaisestheQuestion
Heloise devotesher firsttwo lettersto Abelard- her so-called "personal
- to an examinationof her own
letters" guiltand innocence,both in her
formerstate as Abelard's lover and in her presentstate as an outwardly
successfulabbess. Her concern is, continually,with the interrogation of
her own sincerity. What provesthather love forAbelard was selflessand
purelymotivated?What, on the otherhand, were the motivationsforher
religiousconversion,and what are the ethicalimplicationsof her appar-
ent success in the religiouslife?Heloise emergesfromthese lettersas a
self-identified"sincerehypocrite":the sincerityof her love forAbelard is
inextricably tied up with her religioushypocrisy,and her apparentcon-
versionis false preciselybecause her love for Abelard is true. That she
has taken the veil out of love forAbelard and followinghis command-
mentstandsas proofboth of the selflessness of her love forhim and the
hypocrisy of her outwardcommitment to God.5
Throughouther interrogation of sincerity and hypocrisy, Heloise insists
on the primacyof the innerself,or animus(mind,soul).6For Heloise, the
inner selfrepresentsthe core essence of the person, and hypocrisycon-
sists in seekingto conceal that inner self. Hence, she interrogatesthe
natureof her love forAbelardby asking"quemanimum in tesemperhabuerim"1
(whataffections I alwayshad towardsyou; or, literally, what soul I always
had in you); and demonstratesher continueddesire for him by describ-
" "8
ing the erotic memoriesthat nostro infixasuntanimo (are fixed in my
soul). The primacyof the inner selffor Heloise formspart of a larger
systemof contraststhatshe sets up betweeninside and outside,the inner
person and externalappearance, the spiritualand the corporeal. These

5 Heloise,
Epistola1, ed. EricHicks, Pierres
La VieetlesEpistres Abaelart sa Fame
etHeloys ,
Paris-Genève1991,52,67.Allreferences to theLatintextoftheEpistolae ofHeloiseand
Abelardwillbe from theHicksedition; English oftheletters
translations willbe myown.
6 Latindistinguishes
between theanimus soul,mindorconscience;
(therational alsoused
torefertothepassions ortheheart) andtheanima (thespirit thebreath).
orlife,literally
See OxfordLatin , ed. P.G.W.Glare,Oxford1982,132,134-35.Heloiseconsis-
Dictionary
usesthetermanimus
tently to refertowhatI havetermed theinnerself;shespecifically
placestheanimusin opposition to thosepartsoftheindividual thatsheconsiders to be
I havetranslated
exterior. animusas soulor mind.
7 Heloise,
Eto.1,51.
8 Heloise,
Ep. 2, 66.

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 HELOISE'S
INFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 251

opposingconceptsare apparentin the followingpassage,in whichHeloise

dramaticallyaccuses herselfof hypocrisy:
Castamme predicant, qui non deprehenduntypocritam;munditiam car-
nis conferunt in virtu
tem: cum non sit corporissed animivirtus,aliq-
uid laudis apud homineshabens,nichilapud Deum mereor,qui cordis
et renumprobatorest et in absconditovidet.9

People declareme to be chaste,who do notperceive[thatI am] a hyp-

ocrite.They ascribepurityof the fleshto virtue,but sincevirtueis not
of the body but of the soul [animus
], I have some praisefrommen but
do not deserveany fromGod, who is thejudge of heartand entrails
and sees whatis hidden.
In proclaimingthat "virtueis not of the body but of the soul," Heloise
opposes the physicalto the spiritual,and what is manifestto "what is
hidden"- specifically, what is inside the body (the "heart and entrails").
Heloise employsthe image thatwill particularlysparkAbelard's inter-
est,thatof the habit,as just one componentof thissystemof oppositions.
In herfirstletter,she uses the habitas a metonymy of externalappearance,
in
placing it parallel with the body and opposingit to the inner self:
Ad tuamstatim jussionemtamhabitůmipsa quam animumimmutarem,
ut te tam corporismei quam animiunicumpossessoremostenderem.10

Immediately at yourcommandI myself changedmyhabitand mymind

[animus
] alike,that I mightshow you to be the sole possessorof my
body and mindalike.
AlthoughHeloise here suggestsa harmoniouscorrespondencebetween
her externaland internalaspects,in her second lettershe insteademploys
the religioushabit as a metaphorof her own hypocrisy, using it to refer
to the purelyoutwardaspects of her conversion:

Tua me ad religionishabitůmjussio, non divinatraxitdilectio.. . . Diu

te,sicutet muitos,
simuladomea fefellit,
ut religioni
deputaresypochrisim.11
Your commandbroughtme to the religioushabit,not divinelove.. . .
For a long time,my feigningdeceivedyou as it did many others,so
thatyou tookhypocrisyforreligion.

9 Heloise,
Ep.2, 67.
10Heloise,
Et).1,49.
11Heloise,
Ep.2, 67.

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252 BROOKEHEIDENREICH
FINDLEY

Heloise's referenceto her nun's habit is closelyfollowedby a reference

to hypocrisyas a formof simulating(simulatio). Her choice of word sug-
gests a link between the religious habit and the adoption of a deceitful
appearance, since simulatiohas a visual connotation.12 In the lines that
follow,she developstheseconnectionsfurther, challengingAbelardto rec-
ognize her hypocrisyby lookingbeyond her habitus(whichmightbe read
here not onlyas "clothing,"but as "appearance")to her "internaldisease":

Nemo medicinaperitusinteriorem morbumex exterioris habitusinspec-

tionedijudicat.Nulla quicquidmeritiapud Deum optinent,que repro-
bis eque ut electiscommuniasunt. Hec autem ea sunt que exterius
aguntur,que nullisanctorum tamstudioseperaguntquantumypochrite.13
No one experiencedin medicinejudges an internaldiseaseby an inspec-
tionofexternalhabit[clothing/appearance]. Those thingsthattherepro-
bates and the elect have in commondo not gain any meritin God's
eyes.Those are certainly
thethingsthatare done outwardly, whichnone
of the saintsperformas ferventlyas the hypocrites.

Here, Heloise links the externalappearance or habit with the outward

worksthathave gained her the praiseof many,includingAbelard.Neither
her actions nor her dress,she argues,should be taken as representative
of her internalstate.
Heloise's imageryof hypocrisyas a contrastbetweeninternalselfand
externalappearance or actionsis familiarto us today,and it also speaks
to a richmedievaltradition.
In particular,the associationbetweenhypocrisy
and clothingas concealingcoveringgoes back long beforeHeloise. In his
homilyon the Sermonon theMount,Augustinetermedhypocrites "wolves
in sheep's clothing,"and the associationbetweenthisbiblical image and
the figureof the hypocritequicklyattainedproverbialstatus.14 Already,

12Heloise's
useofthetermsimulatio mayalsobe a nodto Gregory's discussionofthe
simulator
, as hecallsthefigureofthehypocrite inhisMoraliainlob.According
toGregory,
thesimulatorhasan "inordinateandobsessiveloveofpraise"; Heloiserecognizes
similarly,
thatherownthirst forAbelard'spraisehas led herto perform religious
hypocritically
actions.
See Frederic Amory, Whited TheSemantic
Sepulchres: totheHigh
ofHypocrisy
History
MiddleAges,in:Recherches de Théologieancienneetmédiévale,53(1986),
5-39,esp.25-30.
Gregory,likeHeloise, alsoassociates
thehypocrite withclothing:
thehypocrite's
clothing
likethemixedwoolandlinenforbidden
is double, in Deuteronomy,Amory 1986,26.
13Heloise,Ep. 2, 68.
14Augustine,
Desermone Dominiinmonte
, ed.Almut Mutzenbecher,Turnholt
1967(Corpus
Christianorum,SeriesLatina,35),132.Matthew 7:15already theimageofthe
contains
wolfinsheep's clothing,usedtodescribe"false buttomyknowledge
prophets," Augustine

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 HELOISE'S
INFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 253

in the CarolingiansatireDe Hypocritis , Theodulfususes the phrase to refer

specificallyto the hypocritical monks who are the butt of his criticism:
"A loose hood coversthe head, an ulteriormotivethe mind,/Uncarded
wool the limbs,sheep's clothingthe wolf. / The cloak outsideis double
[lined], the heart withintwo-faced."15 Sartorialhypocrisyamong monks
and nuns was also a favoritetopic of many of Heloise's contemporaries:
PeterDamian, St. Bernard,John of Salisbury,and Guibertof Nogent all
spilled ink on the subject.16And, well afterHeloise, such 13th century
writersas Jean de Meun and Rutebeufwould re-useAugustine'simage
as theyelaboratedon the tradition,again and again employingthe reli-
gious habit as a metaphorfor religioushypocrisy.17
For Heloise in these two letters,the metaphorof the habit functions
primarilyas a rhetoricaltool: it allows her to locate the selfin an interior
space, independentof its exteriorcovering.18 The importancethatHeloise
assignsto the animus, and the recurringimagesof interiority thatshe asso-
ciateswithit,place her squarelywithinthetraditionsof Roman Stoicism19

is thefirst
to associate themetaphor withhypocrites,
specifically thusvalidating a direct
linkbetween clothing andhypocrisy.
15Quotedin Amory 1986(n. 12),31.
16Amory 1986,31-33.
17The hypocritical monkFauxSemblant, whoexploits hisreligioushabitas a deceit-
fuldisguise,all thewhileinsisting that"thehabitdoesnotmakethemonk," playsan
important partinJeande Meun'sRoman dela Rose.FauxSemblant's discussionofsarto-
rialhypocrisy contains a specificreferenceto the"wolf in sheep'sclothing."
SeeJeande
Meun,LeRoman dela Rose, 11.11127-11139, ed.Armand Strubel,Paris1992,594.Jean's
concern withhypocrisy owesa debtto thepoemsofRutebeuf. Jean'sreference to the
wolfinsheep's clothing echoesRutebeuf's discussionofhypocritical
clothinginhisDiscorde
del'Université
etdesJacobins. See Rutebeuf, Discordedel'Université
etdesJacobins
, 11.41-56,
Oeuvres , eds.Edmond
complètes FaraiandJuliaBastin, Paris1959,t. 1, 240-41.See also
Strubel 1992,595 n. 1.JeantakesthenameFauxSemblant from Rutebeuf's Complainte
deGuillaumedeSaint Amour, 11.78-86,BastinandFaraieds. 1959,t. 1, 261-62.See also
Strubel 1992,585 n. 2.
18Heloise'sinterestin theinnerselfmayextend to herother, lessexamined writings.
Mews1999,131-34, hasshown thata rhetoric ofinteriority
or "innerdisposition"plays
a keypart,notonlyin Heloise's better-known letters
butin an earlier,
anonymous letter
collection
thatMewsbelieves shouldbe attributed toAbelard andHeloise.
19AsGretchen Reydam-Schils eventhough
explains, theStoictraditioningeneral views
bodyandsoulas "closely interwoven," "intheRomanStoicstheemphasis on interiority
is striking."
Reydam-Schils, TheRoman Stoics:
Self, andAffection
Responsibility, , Chicago2005,
35.Scholars havenotedAbelard's affinities
withtheStoics, mostimportantly inhisdevel-
opment ofan ethics basedonconsent andintention.See CalvinNormore, Abelard'sStoicism
anditsConsequences, in: StevenK. Strange andJackZupko(eds),Stoicism: Traditions
and
, Cambridge
Transformations 2004,132-47;PeterKing,Abelard's Intentionalist
Ethics
, in:The
Modern Schoolman, 72 (1995),228-31;Gerard Verbeke, ThePresenceofStoicism
inMedieval

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254 BROOKEHEIDENREICH
FINDLEY

and Augustiniándualism.20By contrast,Abelard's replyto Heloise will

be informedby an Aristotelian universe,in whichthe term"habit" stands
at the centerof a rich array of associationsthat go far beyond its link
to deceitfulappearance. The Aristotelianimportanceof the term may
explainwhy,whenAbelardtakeson thequestionsof sincerity and hypocrisy
that Heloise has posed, he does so almost exclusivelythrougha discus-
sion of the habit, makingwhat was forher one metaphoramong many
into the primaryfocus of his argument.21

II. AbelarďsReply:Two BlackBrides

In his replyto Heloise's second letter,Abelard returnstwiceto the image
of the religioushabit that she has invoked:first,in his discussionof the
"black bride" of the Song of Songs as a figureof the nun; second,in his
retellingof an anecdote fromhis and Heloise's past concerningHeloise's
own habitus.
The "black bride," or Ethiopian beloved of the Song of Songs, had
since Origen been taken to be a figureof the bride of Christ.22 Abelard
as a figureof the nun, notingin particularthather
reads her specifically

, Washington,
Thought D.G. 1983,51-53;andJohnMarenbon andGiovanni Orlandi (ed.
andtrans.), , Oxford
Collationes 2001,Iii.However, theprimacy oftheanimus forHeloise
hasno exactparallel in Abelard,as I willshowin moredetailbelow.
20On Augustine's understanding and oftheduality
ofinteriority between bodyand
- sometimes
soul termed "Augustinián - seeCharles
dualism" Sources
Taylor, oftheSelf:The
Making oftheModern , Cambridge
Identity 1989,127-42. Abelard's ethicalthought is mani-
fesdyinfluencedbyAugustine's doctrine thatsinoriginates intheinner person, specifically
in thewill.See L.M. de Rijk,Peter Abälard:MeisterundOpfer , in: Rudolf
desScharfsinns
Thomas(ed.),Petrus Abaelardus:
Person, Werk undWirkung.
, Trier1980,125-38, esp.137.
21In Abelard's ofanAristotelian
introduction context intothedebate, wealsoseewhat
might be termed thebeginnings ofanAbelardian fusion between theAristotelian andStoic
Theethical
traditions. systemthatAbelard beginstodevelop hereispreciselywhatMatthias
Lutz-Bachmann hastermed Abelard's ofa modified
"ethics - modified,
Stoicism" significantly,
bytheaddition of"theAristotelian concept ofhabitas an acquired disposition ofhuman
mind." Lutz-Bachmann, Modem AspectsofPeterAbelard's
Philosophical , in:TheModern
Ethics
Schoolman, 72 (1995),201-11, esp.207.
22The locus classicus
forthisis Origen's commentary on theSongofSongs,citedby
Abelard,Ep.2, 71.Allreferences totheLatintextoftheEpistolae ofHeloiseandAbelard
willbe from EricHicks, La VieetlesEpistresPierres
AbaelartetHeloyssa Fame , Paris-Genève
1991.English translationswillbe myown.Fora different ofthe"blackbride"
analysis
passage,seePeggy Kamuf, Fictions
ofFeminine , Lincoln1982,27-32.WhileKamuf's
Desire
hasa different
analysis purposethanmine, because shedoesnottreat theletters specifically
as a philosophicaldebate, sheidentifiessimilarthemes. "Theanalogy [between Heloise
andtheblackbride]can function to displaceHeloise's hypocrisybecauseit appearsto

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 HELOISE'SINFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 255

blacknessis similarto the blacknessof the nun's "exterior

habitus
."23Abelard
takesthisanalogybetweenthe habit and the bride'sblack fleshas a point
of departurefor an extendedredirectingof the interior/exterior images
that for Heloise functionas metaphorsof hypocrisy:

Habet autem Ethyopissaexteriorem in carne nigredinem, et quantum

ad exteriorapertinet,ceterisapparet feminisdeformior;cum non sit
tamenin interioribus dispar,sed in plerisqueetiamformosior atque can-
didior,sicut in ossibusseu dentibus. Quorum videlicetdentium candor
in ipso etiam commendatur sponso, cum dicitur:"et denteseius lacte
candidiores."Nigra itaque in exterioribus, sed formosain interioribus
est, quia in hac vita crebrisadversitatum tribulationibuscorporaliter
afflicta,
quasi in carne nigrescitexterius.24
The Ethiopianwomanhas a blackexterioron her flesh,and in all that
concernsher exteriorshe appearsuglierthanotherwomen.Still,she is
not differentfromthemin interiorthings,but in many thingsshe is
even morebeautifuland whiter,as in her bones or her teeth.Whiteness
of teethis commendedin the bridegroom himself, whenit is said "and
his teethare whiterthan milk."Thus, she is black in exteriorthings,
but beautifulin interiorthings.Because in thislifeshe is afflicted cor-
poreallywithfrequenttribulations of adversities,it is as if the exterior
of her fleshdarkens.
The analogythatAbelarddrawsbetweenthe nun's habitand the Ethiopian
woman's fleshhas the immediateeffectof elidingclothingwith flesh,a
covering that can easily be removed with the exteriorsurface of the
body itself.This is indicativeof an importantdifferencebetween what
exteriorappearance signifiesforHeloise and what it signifiesforAbelard.
While Heloise considersexteriorsto be superficialand potentiallydeceit-
ful,forAbelardthe bride'sexterioris an aspect of her identityas a whole.
Her externalblacknessdoes not conceal or contradicther internalwhite-
ness; rather,each complementsthe otherand togethertheyforma com-
plete entity.
Abelard'sdiscussionof the bride'sanima, or spirit,furtherillustratesthe
harmony between her interiorand exterior.Not only is the bride's anima

- evensanctify
sanction - thecontradiction
ofappearances.
Moreover,thissanction
is tied
notonlyto thereductionoftheinteriority
ofherdesirebutalsoto itsreappropriation
within
a noncontradictory
masculine
space,"Kamuf1982,30.
23Abelard,
Ep. 2, 71.
24Abelard,
Ep. 2, 72.

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256 FINDLEY
BROOKEHEIDENREICH

inseparablefromher flesh,but her fleshis the outward expressionof

:
her anima

Ossa quippe,que interiora

suntexteriori
carnecircumdata,et ipsiuscar-
nis quam geruntvel sustentant,
roburac fortitudosunt,bene animam
exprimunt, que carnemipsamcui inestvivificat, movetatque
sustentât,
regit,atque ei omnemvalitudinemministrat.25
The bones, that are withinand surroundedby exteriorflesh'exteriori
carné],and are the core and strengthof thatveryfleshthattheybear
whichbringsto life,sustains,moves
or sustain,expressthespirit[anima],
and rulesthe fleshitselfin whichit is contained,and furnishesall its
vigor to it.
For Abelard, animaand fleshforma unified,workingsystem:the anima
has the power to influenceand governthe flesh,while the fleshin turn
expressesthe "vigor"of the anima.This passage may be read as a direct
and animus.In responseto
responseto Heloise's polarizationof her corpus
Heloise's discussionof the animus(mind or inner self),Abelard invokes
the anima(the life forceanimatingthe flesh),suggestingby his veryter-
minologythe degree to which body and soul are inseparable.
Thus, Abelard revisitsHeloise's metaphorsof interiorand exterior,
black and white,soul and body, but he does so in order to forma new
system,one emphasizingharmonyand unityover polarization.In this
nor the
system,the interioris not necessarilyequated with truthfulness,
exteriorwith hypocrisy.In fact,the black bride's exteriorqualities are
the ones that Abelard linksto truthwhen he says:

amorsponsiearnsichumiliât.26
quia celestis
Sic veroearnsolverusdécolorât,
Thus surelythe truesun discolorsher,because thusthe celestiallove of
her bridegroom makesher humble.
The bride's black fleshowes its color to the "true sun" (sol verus). In
otherwords,God (frequendyreferredto by both Abelard and Heloise as
) is responsibleforher appearance, and leaves a markon her body
Veritas
thatexpressesthe humilitythatis in her soul. In the same way, the nuns'
habit is revelatoryof theirtrue nature,as the word "vere"(truly)in the
followingpassage indicates:

25Abelard,
Ep.2, 72.
26Abelard,
Ep.2, 72.

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 HELOISE'S
INFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 257

Ipse quippe cultusexteriornigrorumaut viliumindumentorum, instar

lugubrishabitusbonarumviduarummortuosquos dilexerant virosplan-
gentium,vos in hoc mundo. . . vereviduaset desolatasostendit.27
Indeed thisexteriorattireof black or vile clothing,a semblanceof the
mourninghabitof good widowslamentingtheirdead husbandswhom
theyloved, showsyou to be truly widowedand forsakenin thisworld
(emphasismine).
Markingthe importanceof clothingin this passage, Abelard uses three
differentwords to designate it: "cultus" " indumentum " and "habitus ."
" "
Significantly,cultus can mean not only an outfitor toilette(specifically,
any aspect of the appearance that is cultivated)but a cult, religionor
way of life.28Through his choice of words, Abelard emphasizes the
factthat the nuns' holy way of life {cultus)
is summedup by theircloth-
ing [cultus).
In the above passages, Abelard respondsto Heloise's use of the habi-
tusmetaphorby emphasizingthat the clothing(or flesh)of the nun (or
black bride) need not be symbolicof hypocrisy.However,when Abelard
discussesthe nun's habit again later in the same letter,he does use it to
explorethe implicationsof a deceitfulexterior.It is at thispoint that he
tellsan anecdote,takenfromhis and Heloise's own past,in whichanother
"black bride" figures:Heloise herself:

Nosti etiam,quando te gravidamin meam transmisi patriam,sacro te

habituindutam monialemte finxisse, et tali simulationetue quam nunc
habes religioniirreverenterillusisse.Unde etiam pensa quam conve-
nienterad hanc te religionemdivinajustifia - immo -
gratia traxerit
nolentem,cui veritànon es illudere,volensut in ipso luas habituquod
in ipsumdeliquisti,et simulationismendacioipsa rei Veritasremedium
prestet,et falsitatem
emendet.29
You knowthatwhenI sentyou to myhomelandpregnantyou disguised
yourselfas a nun dressedin a sacred habit,and irreverently mocked
withsuch a simulationthe religionthatyou now have. Now thinkhow
suitablydivinejustice,or rathergrace,has draggedyou all unwilling
to
this religiouslife,whichyou did not fear to mock,wishingthat you
shineforthin thatsame habitagainstwhichyou transgressed, and that

27Abelard,
Ep.2, 71.
28See Glare1982(n.6), 467.
29Abelard,
Ep. 2, 79.

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258 BROOKEHEIDENREICH
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a remedyforthe lie of the pretense,

the truthitselfof the thingfurnish
and emendthe falsehood.

Although,at the beginningof thispassage, Heloise's habit is a deceitful

coveringservingto conceal truth,it turnsout in the end that the habit
has actuallyreshapedtruth.God suppliesa remedyforfalse representa-
tion,not by changingthe representation so thatit will reflectrealitymore
accurately,but by changingrealityso thatthe representation willbecome,
at least in retrospect,true.The "pretense"(simulationechoing Heloise's use
of the word in a similarcontext)30 becomes "the truthitselfof the thing"
(;ipsareiventas).While Heloise believesthat appearance oughtto conform
to an inner reality,Abelard sets out to show her how realitycan and
does conformto appearance. In hindsight,Heloise's disguisefunctions,
not as a lyingsign, but as a propheticact- the sartorialequivalentof
a performative statement,perhaps. The habit has, quite literally,made
the nun.
The implicationsof Abelard's anecdote are especiallyrich because the
Latinwordhabitus evokesso manylayersof meaningwithintheAristotelian
traditionas Abelard knew it. As Abelard himselfputs it in his Dialéctica:
"habitusautemvocabulum habuiť (the
apudphilosophos
significationem
multiplicem
word habitushas had many meaningsfor philosophers).31 Habitusis one
of the termsused in the Latin versionof Aristode'sCategories : it describes
a settledstate,less easily altered than a "disposition"(<iispositio).32To a
logician like Abelard, therefore, it has a veryspecificuse as a technical
term.However, "habit" also has ethical connotationsof which Abelard
was equally aware. Accordingto a traditionoriginatingwith Aristotle,
and which Abelard knew throughBoethius' commentaryon Aristode's
Categories, virtueis a habit acquired throughdoing good.33Abelard cites

30Heloise, Ep.2, 67; seeabovepp. 251-52.

31PeterAbelard, , ed. L.M. De Rijk,Assen1956,109.Translation
Dialéctica mine.
32Aristotle,Categories trans.
andDe InterpretationenJ.L.Ackrill,Oxford 1963,24. See also
Marenbon andOrlandi2001(n. 19),128,n. 98.
33Forclarity, itis importantto understandthatAbelardknewthedefinition ofvirtue
as a habitfrom Boethius'commentary , andnotfrom
ontheCategories Aristotle's
Mcomachean
Ethics.We nowconsider theNicomacheanEthicsto be thelocus fortheideathat
classicus
virtue canbe acquired through butthistextwasnotyettranslated
habituation, intoLatin
andwastherefore unavailableto Abelard.ScholarsofGreekwillwantto notethatthe
multiple meanings intheLatinAristotle
ofhabitus resultfromsomething ofa confusion in
- a confusion
translation ofwhichAbelard wouldofcoursehavebeenunaware. In the
Nicomachean Ethics callsvirtue
, Aristotle a habit[Greekethos]. See Aristotle,
Nicomachean
Ethics anded.RogerCrisp,
, trans, NewYork2000,23.However, , Aristode
intheCategories

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 HELOISE'SINFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 259

thisdefinitionin his Sic etNon, and will later discussit in more detail in
his ethicalworks.34If virtueis a habit acquired throughthe practice of
virtuousactions,it is all the more symbolicallyapt thatbecominga nun
for Heloise should have resultedfromthe practiceof wearingthe nun's
habit,even if disrespectfully. In this anecdote turnedphilosophicalpara-
ble, we see Heloise in the process of acquiringthe "habit of the habit,"
so to speak. In thisway, Abelard's explorationof the symbolicpossibili-
ties of the habitusalso servesas a directresponseto Heloise's contention
that "virtueis not of the body but of the soul," insofaras it refocuses
the discussionon Aristotelianideas about the habitualprocess of acquir-
ing virtue.
In a sense,Abelard'sanecdote sidestepsthe issue of Heloise's hypocrisy
altogether,portrayingher instead as caught up in a granderscheme in
whichGod's designtakesprecedenceoverherown motivations. Nevertheless,
Abelard does not entirelyignorethe questionof hypocrisy:he also refers
to and condemnshypocritesin his letter.Significantly, however,he bases
his condemnationon a different of
understanding hypocrisy, one centered
not around falsehoodbut around "disrespect."Abelard does not referto
hypocritesas hidingtheirtruenatureunder a deceitfulhabit,but as "dis-
respecting"that habit. Condemningthose who, "sicutypocrite" (behaving
likehypocrites),disregardthe commandmentto prayin privateand instead
make a public spectacle of theirprayers,Abelard says:
- immo
Cuius quidemconsilii -
preceptidivini muitoshuiushabitusnos-
tricontemptores
adhuc gravitersustinemus.35
We stillendurewithdifficulty
themanywho holdin contempt
thiscoun-
sel- or ratherdivineprecept
- and thishabitof ours.

Abelard refersto hypocritesas disregarders,or holders-in-contempt

[con-
of the habit. Instead of being a concealingcoveringover their
temptores)

insteadusesa termthatmight be translated

as "settled
state"[Greek he opposed
hexis];
thistoa temporarycondition
[Greek diathesis
, Latindispositif.
See Marenbon andOrlandi
2001(n. 19),128,n. 98.TheLatintraditionrenders bothethos
andhexisas habitus.
Habitus
is further
related
to habere
(having),anothertermofimportance in theCategories,
making
thewordintoa particularly
richsiteofdisparateAristotelian
associations
thatarespecific
to theLatintradition.
34PeterAbelard,SicetNon, 144,ed. BlancheBoyerand Richard McKeon,Chicago
1976-77,497-98.On virtueas a habitin Abelard'slaterethical
works,seebelow.
35Abelard,
Ep. 2, 74.

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260 FINDLEY
BROOKEHEIDENREICH

truenature,the habit is a sign thattheyhave not yet learned to respect.

AlthoughAbelard is not referring to any wrongdoingof Heloise's in this
passage, there is still an analogy to be drawn here. In recountingthe
storyof Heloise's disguisein a nun's habit,Abelard seems less concerned
with the false externalappearance that she cultivatesthan with the dis-
respect thather choice of costumeimplies.He does not mentionthe exter-
nal/internaldichotomyat all, but he referstwiceto the factthatHeloise
"mocked" {illudere) the habit throughher misuseof it. Like the individuals
to whom Abelard refersin the above passage, Heloise was a hypocrite
because she "held the habit in contempt,"not because she used it as a
coveringto conceal her true nature.36
Kamuf has claimed of thisletter:"[Abelard's] counter-portrait [of the
black bride] [. . .] eradicatesthe charge of hypocrisyeven as it preserves
its formalstructure.[. . .] It is not the structureof hypocrisywhich is
convertedbut thevalue placed on it."37I agree thatAbelardhas effectively
emptiedHeloise's originalinside/outsidecontrastsof theirnegativevalue,
preservingthe structureof her metaphorswhile imaginingnew meanings
forthem. However,I would take issue withKamuf by emphasizingthat
- he has
Abelard has notceased to condemn hypocrites only moved the
label "hypocrisy"aside, away fromwhat has become an essentiallyunre-
lated discussionof clothingand the habitual process of acquiringvirtue.
Hypocrisynow refersto disrespector mockery, not to any contrastbetween
exteriorselfand interiorappearance. Indeed, hypocrisyas Heloise con-
ceives of it, the coveringover of the innerselfwitha falseexterior,can-
not exist accordingto Abelard. Instead, he considersthe exterior,even
if it is initiallyincompatiblewithtruthfulness,to be an aspect of the self
ratherthan a disguisingcoveringover the self (fleshratherthan cloth-
ing, as it were). In this way, he rejectsHeloise's idea of the self as an
interioressence thatremainsuntouchedby the mere "externals"of body,
clothingand insincereactions.

36JohnMarenbon teipsum
arguesthatin theScito Abelard all sinas, at base,
defines
ofGod."Marenbon,
"contempt ofPeter
ThePhilosophy Abelard
, Cambridge 1997,265-66.
Thiswouldimplythathiscondemnation ofcontempt hereis notspecificto hypocrisy,
mybelief
substantiating thathe is notparticularly in hypocrisy
interested at all.
37Kamuf1982(n. 22),29.

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 INFLUENCE
HELOISE'S ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 261

III. HeloiseEmptiesherMetaphors
In her thirdletter,ratherthan continuingto engage Abelard on a per-
sonal level by writingto him about her love, past and present,Heloise
begins to engage him on a professionallevel by askinghim to establish
a rule forher and her nuns. Yet even as she makes thisprofoundchange
in subjectmattershe continuesto referto the habitusthat has become a
bone of contentionbetweenherselfand Abelard. In so doing, she estab-
lishes a philosophicaland ethical continuitybetweenher "personal" let-
tersand this,the firstof the so-called "lettersof direction."
Early in her letter,Heloise says that she would like a rule "[qui] ex
integronostreconversionis
statumhabitumque describa
ť (that describesthe state
and habit of our conversionin its entirety).38 "The habit of our conver-
sion" is an enigmaticphrase. Habituscan also mean "nature,"and, for
the purposesof a literalreading,that seems the best way to understand
it here. Nevertheless, given Heloise's earlieruse of the habit as a symbol
ofthepurelyoutwardaspectsof conversion, her demandsoundscontentious.
In the lines that follow,Heloise makes it clear that she uses the word
habitus here,withwhat seems to be an ironicdisingenuousness, in its most
literalsense. She justifiesher requestfor a rule by pointingout that the
Benedictinerule is not well suited for women. In order to prove her
point, she begins with the example of clothing.Followingare the very
firstquestionsthat she asks Abelard about the Benedictinerule,just a
fewlines afterher requestthathe writethema rule describingthe "habit
of theirconversion":

Quid ad feminasquod de cucullis,femoralibus

et scapularibusibi scrip-
tumest?Quid deniquead ipsasde tunicisaut de laneisad carnemindu-
mentis,cum earumhumorissuperflui menstruepurgationes hec omnino
réfugiant?39
How does what is writtenthereabout cowls,breechesand scapulars
applyto women?And how whatis written abouttunicsor woolensworn
nextto the flesh,since theirmonthlypurgationsof superfluous
humor
are entirely
averseto thesethings?
Once again, Heloise takes up the issue of the habitus, but this time her
discussionremainson a literallevel. Instead of tacklingthe philosophical

38Heloise,
Ep. 3, 89.
39Heloise,
Ep. 3, 89.

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262 BROOKEHEIDENREICH
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questionsthatboth she and Abelard raised earlier,she descendsinto the

and even biological,questionsthat arise when the word habi-
nitty-gritty,
tus is understoodas simplyreferringto prescribedreligiousclothing -
more particularly, religiousclothingin its relationshipto the femalebody.
While tantalizing,her referencecomes as a non sequiturin the philo-
sophical debate that she originallysparkedwithAbelard.
The way in which Heloise is at once redirectingand continuingthe
debate,just as she redirectsand continuesthe correspondence,does not
become clear untillater in her letter,when yet another allusion to the
habitusarises. Once again, the referenceis a seeminglydisingenuousone:
this time, because the discussionof the habitusis not in Heloise's own
words, but contained within an extended quote from Augustine.Yet
Augustine'smessage turnsout to be Heloise's own. In this passage, as
Heloise tellsus, Augustinedistinguishes "intervirtutem
et virtutis
exhibitionem"
(betweenvirtueand the exhibitionof virtue),saying:
Continentia
non corporis,sed animevirtusest.Virtutesautemanimiali-
in
quando corporemanifestantur, aliquandoin habitulatent.40
Continenceis a virtue,not of the body but of the soul. Now virtuesof
the soul are sometimesmanifested in the body,and sometimeshide in
the habit.
It is surelyno coincidence that the passage of Augustinethat Heloise
citeshere is also the source of her self-accusation
of hypocrisyin her sec-
ond letter.Heloise now calls her reader's attentionto the fact that she
was echoing Augustine("continentia noncorporis
, sed animevirtusesť) when
she insisted,in her second letter,"non [est]corporis sed animivirtus
," with
specificreferenceto her own lack of continence.41 Merely by inserting
this citationinto her thirdletter,Heloise uses Augustine'sauthorityto
back up her originalpoint, implicitlyreclaimingher status as "sincere
hypocrite"and throwingdoubt on Abelard's conflicting understandingof
the habitusas a sartorialact.
As Heloise's quotation of Augustinecontinues,however,it becomes
clear thatAugustine'suse of the termhabitus is quite different
fromeither
Abelard's or Heloise's. While Heloise used the termto referto outward
and potentiallydeceitfulappearance, Augustineuses it here in one of its

40Heloise,
Ep. 3, 101.
41Heloise,
Ep.2, 67.

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 ON ABELARD'S
HELOISE'SINFLUENCE ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 263

alternatemeanings:"nature" or "mode of existence."Thus, he explains

"how virtuemay existin habit even if it does not in works"("quomodo sit
virtus , etiamsi
in habitu 2
nonsit in opere")
,4 by usingJohn the absti-
Baptist's
nence fromfood and drink as an example of "virtuein works," and
Christ'slack of abstinencefromfood and drinkas an example of "virtue
in habit." Similarly,he says:

Non est imparmeritumcontinentie in Johannequi nullasexpertusest

nuptias,et in Abrahamqui filiosgeneravit.
. . . Sed continentiam
Johannes
et in opere,Abrahamvero in solo habituhabebat.43
The meritof continenceis not unequal inJohn,who knewno wedlock,
and in Abraham,who begatsons.. . . ButJohn'scontinenceis in works,
and Abraham'sonlyin habit.
What Augustinemeans by "habit" in these passages, then,is effectively
the opposite of what Heloise meant by "habit" in her firsttwo letters.
There, Heloise used the metaphorof habit as disguisingcoveringto refer
to the hypocriticalappearance of virtue;here, Augustineuses the same
word, under an alternatemeaning,to referto the essentialnature from
which virtuousdeeds spring.By includingthis quote fromAugustinein
her letter,then,Heloise not only reveals the authoritative source of her
originalstatement about virtue'snot belonging to the body but to the
soul; she also displays the extent to which this statement functions
of
independently metaphors such as that of the habit. Her earlier insis-
tence on the splitbetween appearance and realityparallels Augustine's
divisionbetween "works" and "habit" (nature),yet her usage of termi-
nologyis opposite to Augustine's.Kamuf has noted Heloise's penchant
forbreakingdown oppositions,and here,in her skilledhands,we see the
termat the heart of her debate withAbelard being transformed into its
own antonym.44
Through her two seeminglydisingenuousreferencesto habit, Heloise
in factmakes a particularlyastuterhetoricalmove. Earlier,Abelard pre-
servedthe superficialstructures of her metaphorsof clothingas covering

42Heloise,
Ep. 3, 101.
43Heloise,
Et. 3, 102.
44Kamuf1982(n.22),44,argues thatHeloise's
letters
stagea "breakdownofthestruc-
tureofopposition."
As shedemonstrates,
Heloisefrequently
buildsargumentsor creates
aroundopposing
metaphors pairsofconcepts,
onlyto destabilize
or destroy
theputative
differences
on whichtheseoppositionsarebased.

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264 FINDLEY
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and insideversusoutside,even as he changed theirmeaningsto the detri-

mentof Heloise's originalpoint.Here, Heloise does the opposite:she dis-
mantlesher originalhabitus metaphor,while simultaneously repeatingthe
substanceof the argumentin which she exploitedit. Not acts, but the
nature of the person, are what determinesvirtue,she (and, as it turns
out, Augustine)insist.This is truewhetheror not the image of the habi-
tusis employedto elucidate the problem: in this letter,Heloise repeat-
edly mentionsthe habitus but pointedlydoes notemployit as a metaphor
in her argument.In thisway, she pulls the rug out fromunderAbelard's
and philosophicallysubtle manipulationof the word"habitus"
artistically
effectivelyputtinga stop to his refiguring of her metaphors.The real
question here, Heloise seems to say, is an ethical one: its substanceis
what is important,not the images withwhich she has illustratedit, and
which she can deconstruct just as easily as she has constructedthem.
In drawingan implicitdistinctionbetween the substanceof an argu-
mentand the metaphorsthatfacilitateits expression,Heloise is of course
creatinganothereven more effective metaphor.Subtly,she seemsto imply
thatby pursuingimages ratherthan substance,the letterratherthan the
spirit,Abelard has in a sense been guiltyof his own brand of rhetorical
hypocrisy. By contrast,Heloise continuesto focusrelentlessly on her orig-
inal question.It is possible to read this entireletteras a furtherinquiry
into"the difference betweenvirtueand the appearanceof virtue,"between
the essence of a person and her acts. That this inquiryhas been trans-
planted fromthe personal realm of Heloise's own experienceinto the
theologicalrealm of what constitutesan appropriaterule for nuns does
not make it any the less piercing.
By invokingAugustineas an authority, Heloise acknowledgesher strong
with Augustiniándualism: she, like Augustine,insistson draw-
affinities
ing a distinctionbetween a "virtueof mind" and a "virtueof works."
Her ethical focus,as we have seen, is on the inner essence of the per-
son, not on thatperson'soutwardsacts. Such views mightseem to recall
an ethicsof intention,or what we have now come to call "Abelardian
However,as I willarguebelow,thereremainsignificant
ethics."45 differences

45Indeed,de RijkhasshownthatAbelard's ethicalthoughtmaybe understood as a

oftheAugustinián
reworking Abelard's
doctrine: ofsinwiththemoment
identification of
consentparallels locationof sinin thewill.De Rijk 1980(n. 20), 137.
Augustine's
itis important
as I willarguebelow,
Nevertheless, to distinguish focus
Heloise's
between
ontheinnerselforessence closer
(perhaps toAugustine's andAbelard's
"will") pinpointing
ofa moment ofinneraction("consent") as sin.
thatcanbe identified

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 HELOISE'S
INFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 265

between Heloise's ideas here and the ideas that Abelard will eventually
put forwardin his worksof ethicalphilosophy.

IV. Continuations
of theDebate:The Collationes
and theScitote ipsum
At this point, Heloise's voice falls silent on the subject of habit and
hypocrisy.However,in Abelard's two major ethicalworks,the Collationes
and the Scitote ipsum, we can see him continuingto work throughthe
-
ideas thatHeloise has raised in her letters as it seems,seek-
persistently,
ing out answers
satisfactory with which to respond her challenges.46
to
The followingpassage of the Collationes acquires a new depth when it is
read as a continuationof the habitus debate, and a replyto Heloise's self-
accusationsof concupiscenceand hypocrisy.

Virtus,inquiunt,est habitusanimioptimus.. . . Est igiturhabitusqual-

itas rei non naturaliterinsita,sed studioac deliberationeconquistaet
difficilemobilis.Unde hanc quam naturalemin quibusdamcastitatem
nominantex corporisvidelicetfrigiditate vel aliqua complexionenature,
que nullam umquamconcupiscentie pugnamsustinetde qua triumphet,
nec meritumobtinet,nequaquam virtutibusconnumeramus. . . . Ubi
quippe non est aliqua repugnantiepugna, non est superantisvirtutis
corona, iuxtailludetiam magni vestiiphilosophi:'Non coronabitur quis
nisilegittime certaverit.'47

"Virtue,"theysay, "is an excellenthabitof the mind.". . . For habitis

a qualityof a thingnot presentin it by nature,but acquiredby striv-
ingand deliberation,and whichis difficult
to alter.So thechastity which
theycall naturalin some people,resultingfromfrigidity of the body or

46It willbe clearthatmydiscussion hereandin sectionV is basedon mybelief that

theCollationes
werecomposed Abelard's
after exchange ofletters
withHeloise.Scholars have
haddifficultyagreeingon a datefortheCollationes
, withMewsin particular proposing a
dateas earlyas themid- 1120s.See Constant Mews,OnDating theWorks ofPeter Abelard
,
in:Archives d'histoire
doctrinaleetlittéraire
duMoyen Age,52 (1985),104-126. However,
inhismorerecent workMewsleanstowards a dateintheearly1130s.See Mews, Abelard
andHeloise
, Oxford 2005,176.Countering Mews'1985article, Allenhasargued fora later
date.In particular,shemakesthecasethatthedefinition ofsinin theCollationes repre-
sentsa progressioninthinking from theCommentaria
inRomanos
, so thattheCollationes
must
havebeenwritten after
theCommentaria.See Allen1998(n.4), 148.The Commentaria has
inturn beenshown todatefrom after
Abelard's VII toHeloise.
Epistle See E.M.Buytaert,
PetriAbaelardi
Opera I, CorpusChristianorum
Theologica continuadomedievalis11,Turnholt
1969,36.AsI arguehere, thisparticular
passageoftheCollationes
makes senseas a response
to issuesraisedin Heloise's
letters.
47PeterAbelard, Collationes
, ed. MarenbonandOrlandi, Oxford 2001(n.19),128-30.

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266 FINDLEY
BROOKEHEIDENREICH

fromsomeconstitution ofnature,whichdoes nothave to struggle against

concupiscenceover whichit mighttriumphand whichdoes not obtain
merit,we in no wise reckonamongthevirtues. . . . Indeed,wherethere
is no fightagainstoppositionthereis no crownfora conqueringvirtue,
even accordingto the statement of yourgreatphilosopher:"He is not
crownedunlesshe has competedaccordingto the rules."48
Abelard begins his discussionof virtueby citingBoethius' definitionof
virtueas a habit,and explainingthathabitsare acquired qualitiesdifficult
to alter.These are ideas, ultimatelyderivingfromBoethius'commentary
on Aristotle,that Abelard has already discussedin his Sic etNon*9New
and striking here,however,are both Abelard's emphasison "strivingand
deliberation"as a means to acquiringvirtue,and his choice of the exam-
ple of chastityand concupiscence.Accordingto Marenbon and Orlandi,
the idea that the habit of virtuemust be acquired throughapplication
and hard work does not appear in Aristotleor Boethius,but is original
with Abelard.50Yet this is an idea that never appears in Abelard's dis-
cussionof virtueas a habit in the Sic etMn , suggestingthatit may have
been conceived later,perhaps as a way of replyingto Heloise. Indeed,
Abelard'sreferences and to "thefightforthecrown"specifically
to "striving"
recall his injunctionsto Heloise in his second letter,where he encour-
ages her to win virtueby strivingagainsther own desires:
nisi
cui enimsuperestpugna,superestet corona,quia 'non coronabitur
qui legitimecertaverit.'51
For whomthefightremains,thecrownalso remains,because "he is not
crownedwho has not competedaccordingto the rules."
Abelard's choice of concupiscenceas an example also seems tailoredto
Heloise's complaintsabout her inabilityto be "displeased"by eroticmem-
ories of herselfand Abelard.52Indeed, in this passage of the Collationes
,
Abelard almostseems to be backhandedlypraisingHeloise, implyingthat
she has proved she is not "frigid."Finally,a slightchange that Abelard

48Trans.Payer1979(n.4), 109.
49See alsoMarenbon combination
ofAbelard's
1997(n. 36),284,fora discussion of
andAristotle
Boethius here.
50Marenbon andOrlandi2001(n. 19),129n. 98; Marenbon 1997(n. 36),285.
51Abelard,
Ep. 2, 86.
52Heloise,
Ep. 2, 66.

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 HELOISE'S ON ABELARD'S
INFLUENCE ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 267

makes to Boethius' wordingmay perhaps be a nod to Heloise. While

Boethius' commentaryas quoted in the Sic et nonreferredto virtueas
"mentishabitus here Abelard calls virtuea "habitusanimi Optimus
."53
optimus"
Heloise's passionateinsistencethat virtueproceeds fromthe animusmay
be in his thoughtshere. It would seem that,as he writesthe Collationes ,
Abelard has not ceased to reflecton the ethical questionsthat Heloise
has posed, nor has he ceased to defendher cause and praise her as vir-
tuous,even as she herselfclaims to be sinful.However, despitehis sym-
patheticattentionto some of Heloise's concerns,Abelard continuesto
directthe conversationaway fromher originalfocuson hypocrisyas con-
cealmentof the self.Heloise's concealinghabit is here transformed into
the "habit of virtue";the possibilityof falsehoodand deceit never enters
into a discussionthat instead focuseson the struggleto conquer inborn
inclinationsthroughgood actions.
, Abelard continuesto develop the issues that he
In the Scitote ipsum
outlinesin this paragraph of the Collationes. He devotes severalpages to
proving that concupiscence in and of itselfdoes not constitutea sin,54
once again quotingthe Biblicalpassage about the struggleand the crown
to demonstratethat strivingagainst a bad inclinationleads to virtue.55
However,his most satisfactory answerto the problemof Heloise's claim
of persistentconcupiscence comes when he introducesthe idea of consent.

mulierem
Non itaqueconcupiscere sed concupiscentiae
consentire
peccatum
est, nec concubitus
voluntas sed consensus
voluntatis dampnabilisest.56
Sin is not lustingfora woman but consentingto lust; the consentof
the will is damnablebut not the will forintercourse.57
The "consentof the will" is perhaps the crucial componentof Abelard's
eventualsolutionto the problemthat Heloise has posed him: lust in and
of itselfis not a sin,as long as our willdoes not consentto it but continues
to struggleagainstit. Alongside"intention,""consent"comes to forma

53Abelard,
SicetNon144,p. 498.
54Abelard,Scito
teipsum, ed. D.E. Luscombe, Oxford 41-45.
1971,11-15,
55Abelard,
Scitoteipsum, 13.
56Abelard,Scito
teipsum, 14.
57Trans.Luscombe 1971(n. 4), 15.Interestingly,
Luscombe pointsoutthatthisis a
changein thinking
from theEpistola
, 15,n. 2. On theprogression
ofAbelard'sthinking
towardsthenotionof"consent" - a termthatdoesnotappearbefore theScito
teipsum-
seeMarenbon 1997(n. 36),259-60.

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268 BROOKEHEIDENREICH
FINDLEY

lynchpinof Abelarďs ethical system.58 De Rijk has demonstratedthat

Abelarďsidentification of sin as consentis in parta reworkingofAugustine's
doctrinethat sin originatesin the will. Accordingto de Rijk, Abelarďs
originalitywith respectto Augustineis to distinguishcarefullybetween
desire and consent,thus clarifyingAugustine'sconcept of the "will."59
Indeed, here we see Abelard combiningAugustiniánvoluntas withhis own
In revisitingAugustine,Abelard is also to some extentrevisit-
consensus.
ing Heloise: we have alreadyseen how Heloise inscribesher ethicswithin
the Augustiniántradition.
WhileI concurwithde Rijk'sobservations, I believethatwhereAbelarďs
ethicsdiffercruciallyfromboth Augustine'sand Heloise's is in Abelarďs
focuson sin as a momentof action , albeit mental action,ratherthan on
the innate good or bad qualities of the animus(Heloise) or the voluntas
(Augustine).Like Heloise, Abelard believes that outwardactions in and
of themselves are indifferent.However,unlikeHeloise,he does not attempt
to measurethe moral qualitiesof the innerpersonas a whole,but rather
to pinpointa momentof mental action that can be identifiedas a sin.
As Marenbon has shown,"intention"forAbelard bears a directrelation
to action: "intentions[. . .] are sinfulonly in relation to a definitely
intended(althoughperhapsprevented)action."60Furthermore, as Abelard
himselfspecifies,"consent" is a moment of mental action that can be
pinpointed:
Tunc vero consentimusei quod non licet,cum nos ab eius perpetra-
tione nequaquam retrahimusparati penitus,si dareturfacultas,illud
perficere.61
The timewhen we consentto what is unlawfulis in factwhen we in
no way draw back fromits accomplishment
and are inwardlyready,if
giventhe chance,to do it.62

58See Lutz-Bachmann 1995(n.21),208-09.

59De Rijk1980(n.20),137:„Abälards dieSündeseiderKonsens,
Grundthese, istim
Grundegenommen eineweitere,scharfsinnige desaugustinischen
Ausarbeitung Standpunktes
(„derWilleseidas Prinzip
desHandelns; dieSündebestehealsoimWillen"),denu. a.
dieSchuleAnselms vonLâonschonvertreten hatte.
Abälards zurursprünglichen
Beitrag
Lehrewares, des weiteren zwischenVerlangen undZustimmung
(Begierde) zu unter-
scheiden".
60Marenbon 1997(n. 36),256.
61Abelard,Scito
teipsum,14.
62Trans.Luscombe 1971(n.4), 15.Similarly,
Marenbon 1997(n. 36),262 describes

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 ETHICALPHILOSOPHY
ON ABELARD'S
INFLUENCE
HELOISE'S 269

AlthoughAbelard internalizesthe momentof sin, he is still concerned

withidentifying it as a moment,an act ratherthan an essence as it were.
Perhapsthisis whyHeloise's concernwiththe natureof the innerselfand
the possibilityof hypocrisyseems to hold only a limitedinterestforhim.
Andrea Nye sums up this differencesuccinctlywhen she explains
that virtue for Heloise depends on who an individual really is; for
Abelard,on how an individualacts by forceof will on who he is. As she
puts it:
Heloise'svirtuedoes not requiretheheroicact of willofAbelard'sdual-
ist metaphysics.In Abelard'sethics,the innerevil of appetiteis eradi-
cable, desirableeven,so thatthe rationalmasteryof the soul overvice
can be exercised.Virtuecan neverbe a "naturalhabit" because such
Heloise'svirtuerequiresnotwillpower
a thingis impossible. buta change
of heart.63

Nye's insight,thoughbased on her readingof the lettercollectionalone,

is fullyapplicable to the largercorpus of Abelard's ethicalwritings.The
keydifference betweenthe termanimusas Heloise uses it, and termssuch
and consensus
as intentio as Abelard uses them,has all too oftenbeen over-
looked. The concludingsectionof this essay will take a closer look at a
particulartextualmomentin Heloise's letters:one that servesto demon-
strateboth the importancethat she places on the animus , and the extent
to which criticalreceptionof her thoughtmay have tended either to
effacethat focus,or to mistakenlyattributeit to Abelard. This textual
momentalso indicatesjust how far we may need to reassess Heloise's
thoughtas separatefrom,althoughunquestionably influentialto, the philo-
sophical systemknown as "Abelardianethics."

or "Heloisian"Ethics?
V. "Abelardian"
In one of the more famouspassages of her firstletter,Heloise draws a
distinctionbetweenactionsand the spiritin whichtheyare accomplished,
in order to weigh her own guilt and innocence in the outcome of the
disastrouslove affair:

consent and prompting

as "a mentalact preceding of theoutward
theperformance
act".
sinful
63Nye1992(n. 1),11.

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270 BROOKEHEIDENREICH
FINDLEY

- -
Que plurimumnocens,plurimum ut nosti sum innocens:non enim
rei effectus,
sed efficientis in crimineest,nec que fiunt,sed quo
affectus
animo fiunt,equitaspensât.64
I who was harmfulin manythingswas also, as you know,innocentin
manythings.Crime is not in the doing of the thing,but the stateof
mind [affectus]
of the doing,and justicethinksnot of whatis done, but
in what spirit'quo animo]it is done.
Heloise reiteratesthis idea using similarwordingin her thirdletter:

Non itaque magnopereque fiunt,sed quo animo fiantpensandumest,

si illipiacerestudemus,
qui 'cordiset renumprobatorest' et 'in abscon-
dito videt.'65

Thus,we shouldnot thinkof whatis done,but in whatspiritit is done,

if we striveto please him who 'is the inspectorof heartand entrails'
and 'sees whatis concealed.'
This second passage repeats a pair of Biblical quotationsthat Heloise
used earlier in her self-accusationof hypocrisy.66 At all three of these
points,Heloise's focusis on the innerperson,representedby the animus ,
whom God is able to judge throughhis investigationof the "heart,"
"entrails"and "whatis concealed." It is the stateof the animusthatallows
us to assignguiltor innocence.Heloise's words are strikingand succinct
in theirexpressionof a fundamentalaspect of her ethical thought,but
theyalso contain an echo of one of her favoriteauthors.She draws her
turnof phrase fromAugustine'sDe sermone Dominiin monte , a textthat is
also veryconcernedwith the problemof hypocrisy:

Non ergoquid quisquefaciat,sed quo animofaciat,considerandum

est.67
Thereforenot whatsomeonedoes, but in whatspirithe does it, should
be considered.
The parallel betweenHeloise's words and Augustine'sdoes not mitigate
her originality,
but insteadmarksthe philosophicaltraditionwithinwhich

64Heloise,
Ep. 1,51.
65Heloise,
Ep. 3, 103.
66Heloise,
Ep. 2, 67; quotedabovep. 252.
67Augustine,
Desermone Dominiinmonte
, ed.Mutzenbecher mine.
(n. 14),137;translation

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 HELOISE'S ON ABELARD'S
INFLUENCE ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 271

she places herself.As we have already seen, it is typicalof Heloise to

reformulate statementsfromauthoritiesand incorporatethem seamlessly
into her text.
This is one of the more frequently quoted passages of Heloise's letters.
Yet, ironically,commentatorson her words have tended to term them
an expressionof Abelarďs"ethics of intention,"and even to implythat
Heloise is borrowingan idea of Abelard'sin orderto apply it to her own
case.68However,beforewe assume that Heloise's thoughtis derivativeof
Abelard'shere,we shouldstop to considertwo things.First,Heloise never
uses the word "intention"(;intentio ), a term typicalof Abelardian ethics;
instead, she speaks about the soul or innerselfand the emotionsor state
of mind (animus, Her focusis not on the intentionthatleads one
affectus).
to performa specificdeed, but on a certain state of being: a crucial
difference, as I have argued. Second, althoughAbelard was alreadycon-
sidering problemof intentionbeforethisletterwas written,onlythose
the
worksdemonstrably writtenafter thislettershow the influenceof thispas-
sage, with its focus on the animus.
Already,in works dating fromthe mid-1120s, before his correspon-
dence withHeloise, Abelard is in the processof thinkingthroughan eth-
ical distinctionbetween works (opera)and their source in the thought
"
).69In the Sic et Non, he states: omniaopera
or intention(iintentio
(cogitatio)
velbonavelmalaa cogitatone procedunt ."70And, in the TheologiaChristiana, he
" tota secundum intentionis
radičem sit"71 While
says: qualitasoperum accipienda
these statementsclearlylay the framework forsome of the ideas that he
will develop more fullyin the Scitote ipsum , theyare not directlyrelated
to Heloise's statementabout the primacyof the animus.However, four
different worksby Abelard, all of which probablypostdateHeloise's let-
ter, do contain echoes of her words. In the course of these passages,

68See EtienneGilson,HéloïseetAbélard, Paris1938,105-07; J.T.Mückle, ThePersonal

Letters
Between
AbelardandHeloise
, in:Mediaeval 15 (1953),47-94,esp.55-56;and
Studies,
BettyRadice,TheLettersofAbelardandHeloise , NewYork1974,18, 115n. 2. However,
Nye1992(n. 1),9 and 19 n. 15,recognizes thatthisis an entirely
unfounded assump-
tion.
69Indeed,Marenbon hasshown thatthefocuson "intentional wasnotin fact
ethics"
withAbelard,
original although hisdevelopment ofitwasmorecomplete thanthatofhis
"Abelard's
instead,
contemporaries: views. . . arethecontinuation anddevelopment ofa
Marenbon
longtradition," 1997(n. 36),252.
70Abelard,SicetNon142,p. 492.
71PeterAbelard, Christiana
Theologia , V, 49,Petri Abaelardi
Opera II, ed. E.M.
Theologica
Turnholt
Buytaert, 1969(Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio 12),369.
Mediaevalis,

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272 FINDLEY
BROOKEHEIDENREICH

Abelard develops Heloise's thought,and cruciallyfusesit with his own

by adding the term"intention"[intentio], thus changingthe focus of her
originalidea slightly.Following are the relevantpassages, given (to the
best of scholarlydating ability)in chronologicalorder.72

Nec tam quod fiat,quam quod quomodo vel quo animo fiat,pensan-
dum est.73
We shouldthinknot so much of what is done as of the way or spirit
in whichit is done.
[animus]
Hoc quidemest examenveraeiustitiae, ubi cunctaquae fiuntsecundum
intentionempensanturmagisquam secundum operumqualitatem.Quae
quidem operaJudaei magisquam intentionem cum nunc
attendebant,
Christianinaturalisuscitatajustifianon tam attendantquae fiuntquam
quo animo fiant.74
This is the considerationof truejustice,in which all that is done is
thought of accordingto the ratherthanaccordingto thequal-
intention
ityof the deed. Indeed, theJews are more attentiveto deeds than to
the intention,whilejusticeinventedby Christiannatureattendsless to
whatis done thanto the spirit[animus] in whichit is done.
vel quecumque usibus nostrissunt
Et nulla, credo, sunt instrumenta,
commodata,quibus pro intentionumqualitatetam male uti non pos-
simusquam bene; ad quod scilicetnichilrefertquid fiatsed quo animo
fiat.75

And, I believe,thereare no instruments or anythingsuitableforour

use whichwe are not able to use bothevillyand well throughthequal-
ityof our intention.In this,what is done is not what matters,but in
whatmind [animus] it is done.76
Non enim quae fiunt,sed quo animo fiantpensâtDeus, nec in opere
. . . Quis etiam
sed in intentionemeritumoperantisvel laus consistit.
electorumin his quae ad opera pertinent potestadequali?77
ypocritis

72On thedating seenote46 above.

oftheCollationes,
73PeterAbelard,
Rule
forReligiousWomen, in:Mediaeval
ed. T.P. McLaughlin, Studies,
esp.265.Translation
18 (1956),241-92, mine.
74PeterAbelard,
Commentarlainepistolam , Petri
PauliadRomanos Abaelardi
OperaTheofogica
I, ed. Turnholt
E.M.Buytaert, 1969(Corpus Christianorum, Mediaevalis
Continuatio 12),
mine.
65. Translation
75Abelard,
Collationes
, 210.
76Trans.Payer1979(n.4), 161.
77Abelard, teipsum
Scito , 28.

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 HELOISE'S
INFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 273

For God thinksnot of whatis done but in whatmindit may be done,

and themeritor gloryof thedoer lies in theintention,
notthedeed. . . .
Moreover,in respectof works,who among the elect can be compared
withhypocrites?78
Deus vero solus qui non tam quae fiunt,quam quo animo fiantadten-
dit,veraciterin intentione
nostrareatumpensâtet vero iudicioculpam
examinat.Unde et probatorcordiset renumdicitur et in abscondito
videre.79
Indeed God alone,who considersnot so muchwhatis done as in what
mind it may be done, trulyconsidersthe guiltin our intentionand
examinesthe faultin a true trial.Whence he is said to be both the
proverof the heartand the reinsand to see in the dark.80
Abelard's earliestreiterationof Heloise's words occurs in his "Rule for
nuns,"a textthatstandsas a directreplyto her letters.There, his words
are essentiallya quotation of hers.81In later works,however,he echoes
her wordsin conjunctionwithhis own thinking on intention,making"the
spiritin which somethingis done" appear to be anotherway of express-
ing "intention."The last two passages cited here, both fromthe Scitote
ipsum, seem to acknowledgeHeloise's contributionmore directly,since
theycombineher statementwithfurther echoes of her letters.In the first
of these passages, Abelard draws a connectionbetween Heloise's state-
mentand her condemnationof hypocriteswho, as she describesthemin
her second letter,energetically
pursuegood deeds withoutpossessinginner
virtue.82In the second,Abelard cites Heloise's statementalongsidea pair
of Biblical quotationsthat she uses twice in a similarcontext,83 creating
an especiallystrikingecho. At both of these points,Abelard also moves
his discussioncloser to Heloise's concerns: hypocrisy,concealmentand
the hidden selfrevealed to God.
In sum, here we see Abelard taking an arrestingphrase coined by
Heloise via Augustine,and reusingit as a way of both clarifying his own

78Trans.Luscombe 1971(n.4), 29.

79Abelard,Scito
teipsum
, 40.
80Trans.Luscombe 1971(n.4),41.
81A closelookat bothAugustine'swording andHeloise's showsthatAbelard
clearly
is notmerely echoingtheAugustine ofHeloise,
passageindependently butis specifically
reusingherwording: forexample, Abelard
repeatsHeloise's
"pensandum est"rather
than
"considerandum
Augustine's est."
82Heloise,
Ep.2, 68.
83Heloise,
Ep.2, 67,andEp. 3, 103.

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274 FINDLEY
BROOKEHEIDENREICH

thinking and buildingproductivelinksbetweenhis ideas and hers.However,

reading Abelard's reworkings withoutbeing aware of the originalcontext
of Heloise's statementmay tend to obscure the key difference between
Abelard's pinpointingof momentsof mental action, and Heloise's striv-
-
ing to uncovera particularstate of mind betweenthe momentof con-
sensusto a crime and the qffectus accompanyingthe doing of that crime,
as it were. Yet this distinctionis crucial to understandingthe difference
betweenAbelardianand Heloisian ethics.
Previousscholarshiphas not onlyfailedto acknowledgethisdifference,
it has even failedto recognizeHeloise's famousstatementas her own. It
is especiallypainfulto see Mückle,facedwiththisverycollectionof related
passages, attemptingto attributethe originalthoughtin Heloise's letters
to Abelard, speculatingthat "Heloise had likelyheard Abelard speak of
this doctrinemore than once" and that "we cannot rule out the possi-
bilitythatthe commonsource [ofthisidea] is Abelard'smind."84Instead,
the sequence of passages and the progressionof thoughtthat they dis-
play clearlypointsto Heloise's originalauthorshipof a striking statement,
and Abelard's reworkingof it over the course of the last decade of his
lifeto fitwith ethicalideas that he was already developing.
We may seem to have come a long way fromthe debate over habit
with which we started.However, the common thread lies in Heloise's
beliefthatany ethicaldiscussionmustbeginby uncoveringthe truenature
of the inner self.Virtue forher proceeds froman interioridentity - one
over which an individualmay not have completecontrol,for she seems
to believe her own animus , at least, to be unchangeableby any amount
of struggle.Concomitantly, sin as she understandsit has its root in false-
hood or hypocrisy, taken as a lack of correspondencebetweenthe inner
selfand an individual'souter appearance or actions.
In his multiplereuses of Heloise's statementabout the animus , as in
his transformation of her metaphorof the habitus , Abelard shows himself
to be more interestedin her imageryand turnsof phrase than in her
underlyingideas about the inner self. While this demonstrateshis cre-
ativityin effectingintelligentand artfulreworkingsof his source, it
has also tended to obscure the specificity of Heloise's thought.Abelard's
development of a comprehensivesystemof intentionalethics,based in
part on a fusionbetweenStoic and Aristotelian systems,remainsuniquely

84Mückle1953(n.68),55,56.

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 INFLUENCE
HELOISE'S ON ABELARD'S
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY 275

his. However,Heloise deservesrecognitionin her own rightforher explo-

rationof the ethicalimplicationsof interiorsubjectivity.85

, TN
Memphis
Rhodes College

85Theinteriority - and,I believe,

oftheselfis frequently - takenas a char-
mistakenly
modern
acteristically notion.
See,forexample, Taylor, whoframes hisstudyofinterior
inWestern
subjectivity thoughtas a history
ofthedevelopment of"modern 1989
identity,"
(n. 20),3. However, theStoicandAugustinián traditions
providestrongevidencethat,
evenin Antiquity,somethinkers didlocatetheselfin an interior
space.Heloiseis thus
notoriginal forherideasofinteriority
perse,butforherparticulardevelopmentofthose
ideasin an ethical
context.

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