REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC) BOOK I

A. Fundamental and General Principles in Criminal Law [WEEK 1]

1. Definition of Criminal Law
a) Branch of law that defines crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment
b) Crimes are actions that are prohibited, or omissions that are compelled, by law and
punished by it.

2. Limitations of Crinimal Law

a) Ex-Post Facto Law
• which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal,
and punishes such action; or
• which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
• which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
it was committed; or
• which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant; or
• which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation
of a right which when exercised was lawful; or
• which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, [G.R. No.
145184. March 14, 2008]

b) Bill of Attainder
• legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial
trial. [Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes vs. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162. January 07, 2020]
• encroaches on the courts' power to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and to impose the
corresponding penalty, violating the doctrine of separation of powers. [Dissenting, Rafael Baylosis vs.
Apolonio R. Chavez, Jr., G.R. No. 83341. January 30, 1990]
• For a law to be considered a bill of attainder, it must be shown to contain all of the following: "a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. [Arnel P. Misolas vs. Benjamin V. Panga, G.R. No. 83341. January
30, 1990]
• The most essential of these elements is the complete exclusion of the courts from the determination of
guilt and imposable penalty. [Arnel P. Misolas vs. Benjamin V. Panga, G.R. No. 83341. January 30, 1990]

c) General in application
• The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either [by] the object to which it is directed or by [the] territory within which it is to operate. It does
not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. [Lao
H. Ichong vs. Jaime Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
• The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. [Conrado L. Tiu
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999.]
• Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
[Conrado L. Tiu vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999.]

d) No cruel or unsual punishments, nor excessive fines

3. Characteristics of Criminal Law

a) Generality
• Exceptions: Cases provided by international law; Cases provided by treaty stipulations; and Laws of
preferential application
• under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such,
enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to
any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside
his official functions. [Jeffrey Liang vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000.]
 b) Territoriality
• Applicable to all crimes committed within the limits of Philippine territory, except:
o commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
§ Registered under Philippine laws
§ If beyond the maritime zone (12 nautical miles from the baseline), considered an extension of
Philippine territory
§ If within another country, laws of the foreign country applies
§ If not prosecuted in foreign country, can be tried in Philippines
§ if warship, country which it belongs (extension of territory)
§ French Rule - crimes committed on board a foreign merchant vessel while on the waters of another
country are not triable in that country unless those which affect the peace and security of that
country or the safety of the state is endangered
§ Anglo-American Rule - crimes are triable in that country unless such crimes affect merely the
internal management of the vessel
o forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities
issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
o liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the preceding number;
o public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
o commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book
Two of this Code.

c) Prospectivity
• Criminal Laws do not retroact
• Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code… [Joemar Ortega vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 151085,
August 20, 2008.]
• A judicial decision, although by its nature is prospective in operation may be given retroactive effect in
favor of the offender, since it forms part of the legal system of the Philippines, and so as not to infringe
the constitutional right of the accused to equal protection of the law. [Mario Gumabon vs. Director of
Prisons, G.R. No. L-30026, January 30, 1971.]

d) Liberally construed in favor of the offender

• It is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or
equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge
the field of crime or multiply felonies. [Joemar Ortega vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 151085,
August 20, 2008]
• Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to
construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and
admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused
muter its provisions is to be preferred. [Joemar Ortega vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 151085,
August 20, 2008]

B. Felonies
1. Criminal Liabilities and Felonies
a) Definition of felonies
• ARTICLE 3. Definition. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are
committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
• Where there is intent, there is no negligence
• DOLO CULPA
Intentional unintentional
Malice results from negligence
Freedom/intelligence Freedom/intelligence
• crimes be committed without intent?
o By means of culpa
o Offenses that are mala prohibita
• Mala in se - wrong from its very nature; Felonies punished by RPC; Intent is an element; Good faith is a
defense; Test is not the law punishing it but by the very nature of the act itself; Wrongful in nature,
inherently immoral.
• Mala prohibita - Wrong because it is prohibited by law; If no law, not considered a wrong; Act constitutes
the offense, and intent is to commit a crime is not material; and Intent to perpetuate the prohibited act is
essential – conscious, free and voluntary
• FELONY - criminal liability is based in dolo or culpa; good faith of lack of criminal intent is a valid defense;
 degree of accomplishment are considered; mitigating and aggravating circumstances are taken into
account in imposing the penalty; and degree of participation is considered
• OFFENSE - enough that the prohibited act was voluntarily perpetrated; good faith of lack of criminal intent
is not a defense; acts give rise to crime only when consummated; mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are not considered; andall who perpetrated the prohibited act are penalized to the same
extent

b) Mistake of Fact
• Elements - act or omission; misapprehension of facts; good faith and in honest belief; voluntary but not
intentional; would have been lawful if true; no fault or negligence
• in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time,
he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would
have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act. [United States vs. Ah Chong, G.R.
No. L-5272, March 18, 1910.]
• he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into
his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger
which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge. [United States
vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 18, 1910.]

c) Criminal Liability
• any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
o proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
[Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling, Co., G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017]
o efficient cause of death, accelerates his death, proximate cause of death
o there is an intervening cause, not direct cause of death
o pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in
violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not
have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan's death
caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious
deadly assault against Cabiedes. [People of the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July
15, 2015.]
• impossible crimes
o act is performed; would be a crime against person or property; not accomplished; inherent
impossibility; inadequate or ineffectual means; If act constitutes another felony, no impossible crime
is committed; anddid not know the circumstances leading into the impossibility
o The accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod
guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of
an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both
of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. [Intod v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992.]
o petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against
property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that
the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers.
Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully
taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless. [Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July
13, 2009.]

d) Degrees of accomplishment
• Subjective Phase
• Objective Phase
• “to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which
intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which
should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed
all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding
further, it cannot be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated
felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between
the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed
which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the
offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is
stopped short of that point by same cause apart from his from his voluntary desistance. [United States vs.
Eduave, G.R. No. 12155. February 2, 1917.]
• Elements of an attempted felony:
 o The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
o He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
o The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
o The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.(People of the Phil. vs. Ian Contreras, G.R. Nos. 137123-34, August 23, 2000; People of
the Phils. vs. Freddie Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003)
• Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts which
consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end. One
perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory
acts constitute a consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated
offense.[People vs. Lamahang, 62 Phil. 703 (1935)]
• It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from
criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before
his desistance. (people of the Phils. vs. Freddie Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003)
• An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense….in the words
of viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
• On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively
the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase.
The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will
of the offender. he did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a
consequence, it was due to something beyond his control. [United States vs. Eduave, G.R. No. 12155.
February 2, 1917.]
• A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present. [Art. 6, RPC]
• Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually
attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. X x x the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the
male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements
and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable
how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. [People of the Phil. vs. Ceilito Orita, G.R. No.
88724, April 3, 1990]
• The felony is consummated when the penis touches the pudendum, however slightly. [People of the Phil.
vs. Crisanto Oliver, G.R. No. 123099, February 11, 1999 to People of the Phil. vs. Antonio Gastador, G.R.
No. 123727, April 14, 1999]
• EJACULATION is not an element of the crime. [People of the Phil. vs. Antonio Gastador, G.R. No. 123727,
April 14, 1999, Felix Rait vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 180425, July 31, 2008]
• When the unlawful taking is complete and the article has come under the FINAL CONTROL AND
DISPOSAL of the offender, the theft is consummated. So mere abstraction by the accused of a belt from
the baggage of a passenger of a vessel and secreting it in his desk in the customs house where it was
discovered is consummated theft. [US vs. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754]
• “there is no language in article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the "free disposition of the items
stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. Diño itself did not
rely on philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later flores was ultimately content
in relying on diño alone for legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and even
if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same
holds true of empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since found favor from this court. We
thus conclude that under the revised penal code, there is no crime of frustrated theft.” [Aristotel Valenzuela
vs. People of the Philippines. G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007]
• Attempted
o victim was not hit despite 4 shots due to poor aim (People vs. Calalo, 59 Phil 715]
o injury not fatal – shot on the knee [People vs. Pilones, L-32754, July 21, 1978]
• Frustrated
o victim was mortally wounded who was stabbed but did not die due to timely medical intervention
[People vs. Mercado 51 Phil 99]
o offender believes that he has committed all acts of execution to produce the death [People vs.
Borinaga 55 Phil 433 – victim was not hit when stabbed but accused believed he has done so]
• If wound is:
o mortal and dies – consummated
o mortal and death does not result due to medical assistance – frustrated
 o not sufficient to cause death and intent to kill is evident – attempted
o not sufficient to cause death and intent to kill is NOT evident – physical injuries
• Raising a bolo as if to strike or stab the victim without delivering the blow constitute light threats. [US vs.
Simeon 3 Phil 688]
• No intent to kill but firearm is discharged not directed at the victim– alarm and scandals (Art. 155, par. 1)

e) Proposal and Conspiracy

• Conspiracy
o A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. [People of the Philippines v. Rogelio Natindim, G.R. No. 201867,
November 4, 2020. See also Art. 8, RPC.]
o whether they act through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively.
[People of the Phil. vs. Noel Agda, et al., G.R. No. L-36377, January 30, 1982 to People of the Phil.
vs. Joselito Villalobos, G.R. No. 71526, May 27, 1992]
o CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A CRIME - mere agreement is sufficient means to commit a crime
o Revised Penal Code
§ Conspiracy to Commit Treason (Art. 115)
§ Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion (Art. 136)
§ Conspiracy to Commit Sedition (Art. 136)
§ Conspiracy to Commit Arson (PD 1613)
§ Conspiracy to Maliciously Damage any Building or Personal or Real Property by Explosives or
Incendiary Device (PD 1728)
o Special Laws
§ Conspiracy to Violate Sec. 1, 2 &3 of CA 616
§ Conspiracy to Commit Offenses under the Dangerous Drugs Act
o CONSPIRACY AS MEANS TO COMMIT A CRIME- overt acts to realize the criminal purpose must also
be performed by the conspirators
• Proposal
o There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to
some other person or persons. [Art. 8, RPC]
o Person has decided to commit a crime, and proposes its commission to another
o Revised Penal Code
§ Proposal to Commit Treason (Art. 115)
§ Proposal to Commit Rebellion (Art. 136)
§ Proposal to Maliciously Damage any Building or Personal or Real Property by Explosives or
Incendiary Device (PD 1728)
o If proposal is accepted, conspiracy exists

C. Circumstances affecting Criminal Liability

1. Justifying circumstances
• those wherein the acts of the actor are in accordance with law and, hence, he incurs no criminal and civil
liability
• An accused who pleads any justifying circumstance in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code admits to the
commission of acts that show the commission of a crime. It thus becomes his burden to prove the justifying
circumstance with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, his conviction for the crime charged
follows. [People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Olarbe, G.R. no. 227421, July 23, 2018]
• Self-Defense
o “That which anyone should do for the safety of his own person is to be adjudged as having done justly
in his favor” [People vs. Cuadra, No. L-27973, October 23, 1978, 85 SCRA 576.]
o “The law on self-defense is founded on necessity. Unless the person attacked is so placed that either
he has to forfeit his life or take the life of the assailant, he cannot be completely justified in killing
him. The right to kill depends upon the right to live to which all other rights are subordinated.” [People
vs. Bayocot, G.R. No. 55285. June 28, 1989.]
o It is axiomatic that when an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime.
Accordingly, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused who must then prove with clear and
convincing proof the following elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. [People vs. Comillo, [G.R. No.
186538. November 25, 2009.]
o Unlawful Aggression
§ The indispensable requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that the victim must
have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or the stranger. Without such unlawful
aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance. [People of the Philippines
v. Rodolfo Olarbe, G.R. no. 227421, July 23, 2018]
§ The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending
himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must
 establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least,
imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. [People of the Philippines v. Melanio
Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011]
§ Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of the appellant that the victim was about
to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn out his knife. There is aggression only when the
one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life. The peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not just speculative. [People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Patriarca,
G.R. No. 245950, January 20, 2020]
§ An act of aggression when its author does not persist in his purpose, or when he discontinues his
aggression such that the object of his attack is no longer in peril, is not unlawful aggression.
[People of the Phil. vs. Maximo Geneblazo, G.R. No. 133580, July 20, 2001]
§ Even if indeed there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, it ceased the moment he
fell on the ground from the first gunshot. Thus, by the time the accused-appellant shot the victim
again in the head, there was no longer any danger to avert to justify the killing…When an unlawful
aggression that has begun no longer exist, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill
or even wound the former aggressor. To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in
his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was
no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the offender.
[People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Patriarca, G.R. No. 245950, January 20, 2020]
§ Appellant Lutgardo testified that he and Pedro grappled for possession of the knife during the
incident. He shouted for help to appellant Romulo, who then came to his aid by hitting Pedro with
a ukulele. This enabled appellant Lutgardo to snatch the knife from Pedro and to eventually stab
the latter with it. It appears from the foregoing that the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of
Pedro ceased to exist when appellant Lutgardo seized the knife from the former, as there was no
more actual danger on appellant Lutgardo's life. The latter then had no justifiable reason to stab
Pedro in the stomach. In valid self-defense, the aggression still exists when the aggressor is killed
or injured by the person making a defense. Thus, when the unlawful aggression ceases to exist,
the person defending has no more right to kill or even injure the aggressor. [Mahawan v. People,
G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 737, 746.]
§ If the person attacked allowed sometime to lapse after he suffered the injury, such would not
constitute self-defense but an act of revenge. [People vs. Banzuela 31 Phil. 564]
o Reasonable Necessity
§ Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression does not mean
absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient
tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the
calmness of reason. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In each
particular case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative,
in accordance with the rules of rational logic. The accused may be given the benefit of any
reasonable doubt as to whether or not he employed rational means to repel the aggression.
[Prudencio Ganal, Jr., v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248130, December 2, 2020]
§ “If the unlawful aggression has already terminated, this element cannot be present, because there
is nothing to be prevented or repelled.” [People vs. Alconga 78 Phil. 366]
§ The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the time nor the
sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. For, in
emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in
law for the consequences. [Prudencio Ganal, Jr., v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248130,
December 2, 2020]
§ It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason,
that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the
harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. [Prudencio Ganal, Jr., v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248130, December 2, 2020]
§ “If the aggressor merely employed his fists and the attack is in the open, the person attacked
must resist with the arms that nature gave him or with other means at his disposal short of taking
life. [People vs. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 643]
§ The gauge of rational necessity is to be found in the situation as it appears to the individual who
is the object of the aggression. The instinct of self-preservation more often than not is the moving
power in man’s action in defending himself. [People vs. Artuz, 71 SCRA 116.]
§ a. Whether the means employed was the only one which the defender could avail of under
the circumstances / b. That a person attacked does not use his rational mind but acts according
to his instinct of self-preservation
o Sufficient Provocation
§ The third requisite - lack of sufficient provocation - requires the person mounting a defense to be
 reasonably blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching
an assault. This also requires a consideration of proportionality. As explained ….. "[p]rovocation
is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to
attack the person claiming self-defense. [Nicolas Velasquez v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 195021, March 15, 2017]
§ “Sufficient” means proportionate to the damage caused by the act and adequate to stir one to its
commission. [People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil 366]
§ The provocation even if sufficient but not immediately preceding the act is within the scope of the
third element. [Castanares vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 567]
§ Undoubtedly appellant herein did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or
attack on her person by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for Francisco to be
angry at his wife for finding her on the road in the middle of the night, however, he was not justified
in inflicting bodily punishment with an intent to kill by choking his wife's throat. All that appellant
did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband, which is not
a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. [People vs. Boholst-Caballero, [G.R. No.
L-23249. November 25, 1974.]
§ Imputing to a person the utterance of vulgar language is sufficient provocation (People v. Sotelo,
55 Phil 396).
§ Demanding an explanation from one who constructed a part of his fence on the land of the former
is not sufficient provocation. (US v. Pasca, 28 Phil 224)
o Self-Defense of property – It is necessary that there be an attack on the property coupled with an
attack on the person of the one entrusted with said property. Art. 429. The owner or lawful
possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (Civil Code of the Philippines)
o Self-Defense Of Chastity - There must be an attempt to rape. [People v. Jaurigue, 76 Phil 174] It is
not necessary that the actual act be committed, as the mere imminence thereof will justify the woman
to kill the offender, if she has no other means to defend herself. [People v. De La Cruz, 61 Phil. 344]
o SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under
the Revised Penal Code. [Republic Act No. 9262]
• Defense of Relative
o Spouses, Ascendants, Descendants, Legitimate, adopted, or natural brothers or sisters, Relatives by
affinity in the same degree, and Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree
o For defense of a relative to be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) unlawful
aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making the defense
took no part therein. [People of the Phil. vs. Virgilio Caabay, et al., G.R. Nos. 129961-62, August 25,
2003]
o In both self-defense and defense of relatives, whether complete or incomplete, it is essential that
there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. After all, there would be nothing to prevent or
repel if such unlawful aggression is not present. [Petronilo Napone, Jr., v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017]
o Appellant invokes the defense of a relative, thereby admitting the fact that he did hack the deceased
on that fatal day. Correspondingly, a person who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear
and convincing evidence the presence of the necessary justifying circumstance. Having admitted the
slaying of the victim, he is criminally liable unless he is able to convince the Court that he acted in
legitimate defense. [People of the Phil. vs. Virgilio Caabay, et al., G.R. Nos. 129961-62, August 25,
2003]
o In the event that not all of the aforementioned requisites are attendant, the accused shall be entitled
to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative pursuant to Article 13 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code. [People of the Phil. vs. Emilio D. Santos, G.R. No. 99259-60, March 29,
1996]
o His failure to report the attempt on the life of his sister to the authorities and his hiding in a remote
place is certainly incompatible with his claim that be killed the deceased in defense of his sister.
[People of the Phil. vs. Sergio R. Pospos, G.R. No. L-40310, July 25, 1983]
o The natural impulse of any person who has killed someone in defense of his person or relative is to
bring himself to the authorities and try to dispel any suspicion of guilt that the authorities might have
against him. [Ricardo Balunueco vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126968, April 9, 2003]
• Defense of Stanger
o The justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of stranger, like alibi, is a defense which can
easily be fabricated. Hence, it is inherently weak, and in order that it may be successfully invoked,
accused-appellant must prove the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending was not induced
by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. [People of the Phil. vs. SPO1 Rafael Trapane, G.R. No.
134534, August 29, 2002]
o A relative not included in defense of relatives is entitled to defense of stranger.
 o Third element emphasizes that the offender “be not induced” by hate , resentment, or other evil motive.
o So even an enemy may invoke defense of a stranger as long as he is induced by a motive that is
generous and not evil.
o Husband attacking his wife with a bolo. Person struggled with the husband for possession of the
weapon. Person killed husband in the struggle. Defense of strangers recognized. [People v. Valdez
58 Phil 31]
o Absent either or both of the last two (2) requisites, the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense
of stranger may be appreciated. However, in either case, unlawful aggression is always an essential
element. It has been held that without unlawful aggression, there could never be a defense, complete
or incomplete. [People of the Phil. vs. Irving D. Flores, G.R. Nos. 103801-02, October 19, 1994]
o In the instant case, that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Leopoldo Potane had been
adequately established, as discussed earlier with regard to the circumstance of self-defense. Then,
that the means employed by Alampayan in trying to prevent Leopoldo Potane from further attacking
Masipequina with a bolo were reasonable is clearly evident, as Alampayan only shot at Leopoldo
Potane's thigh to prevent him from further pursuing Masipequina who was trying to escape Leopoldo
Potane's attack. Finally, that Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive is shown by the fact
that he, together with Masipequina, only proceeded to the place where the incident happened to look
for Leopoldo Potane because they had been ordered by their substation commander to apprehend
Leopoldo Potane who had shown signs of mental derangement and had threatened his relatives with
a bolo. [Norberto Masipequina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51206, August 25, 1989.]
• State of Necessity
o In order to avoid evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another
o First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
§ It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional
provocation of the party invoking the same…the act of the accused in a state of necessity is
justifying circumstance; hence, lawful….The accused does not commit a crime in legal
contemplation; hence, is not criminally and civilly liable. Civil liability is borne by the
person/persons benefited by the act of the accused. [People of the Phil. vs. Jesus G. Retubado,
G.R. No. 124058, December 10, 2003]
o Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
o Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
o Exists when there is a clash between 2 unequal rights, the lesser right giving way to the greater right.
Must not be due to negligence or for violation of any law by the actor. Only justifying circumstance
with a civil liability, but is not born by the actor, but by the person benefited by his act. Damage is
caused to person or property to avoid evil or injury.
o In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought
to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not
applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her
own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated
checks to secure her obligation. [Manila Doctors Hospital, Inc. v. So Un Chua, G.R. No. G.R. No.
150355 , July 31, 2006]
o Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not
have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.
In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty's own failure to pay her
mother's hospital bills. [Manila Doctors Hospital, Inc. v. So Un Chua, G.R. No. G.R. No. 150355 , July
31, 2006]
• Fulfillment of Duty
o To successfully invoke this justifying circumstance, an accused must prove that: (1) he acted in the
performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence
of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. [PO2 Bernardino Cruz v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020]
o Policeman who was attacked by an escaped prisoner when he demanded his surrender; Prisoner ran
away, policeman fired gun killing him. (fulfillment of duty as prisoner had obligation to surrender and
right to commit assault) [People vs. Delima, 46 Phil 768]
o Prisoner escaped. Guard fired and prisoner hit on thigh at a distance of 4 meters. No absolute
necessity to fire again resulting to death. Prisoner could have easily been captured. [People vs.
Tengyao, L-14675, Nov. 29, 1951]
o In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes an incomplete one thereby converting
it into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code. [People of the Phil. vs.
Ernesto Ulep, G.R. No. 132547, September 20, 2000]
o These requisites are absent in this case. Appellant was not performing his duties at the time of the
shooting, because the men he shot had not been indiscriminately firing guns in his presence, as he
alleges. Further, as found by the RTC, "nothing was mentioned in [his] direct testimony that he was
there to effect an arrest. [People of the Phil. vs. Carmelo Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February
23, 2004]
o In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for
 some lawful purpose. [People of the Phil. vs. Coloma Tabag, et al., G.R. No. 116511, February 12,
1997]
• Obedience to Superior Order
o Elements:
§ An order has been issued by a superior
§ Order is for a legal purpose
§ Means to carry out said order is lawful
o Compliance with a superior order is justifiable only where the order was "lawful" and that the accused
acted without criminal intent. In this case, the alleged order was not within legal bounds, but at the
same time, the petitioner, in complying therewith, had indeed criminal designs. [Isidro Recamadas vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. L-53694-99, November 5, 1987]
o Order to torture is illegal and the accused is not bound to obey. [People v. Margen 85 Phil 839]
o Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the
subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith…This
is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed
order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious
disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears
the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption
that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the
payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains
one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia. [Luis A. Tabuena vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 103501-03 and 103507, February 17, 1997]

2. Exempting circumstances
• those wherein there is an absence in the agent of the crime any of all the conditions that would make an
act voluntary and, hence, although there is no criminal liability, there is civil liability
• Imbecility and Insanity
o In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation
of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment
because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom
of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus probandi
rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and he must prove it by clear and
positive evidence. [People of the Phil. vs. Melecio Robiños, G.R. No. 138453, May 29, 2002]
o As an exempting circumstance, insanity means that the accused must have been deprived completely
of reason and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime or be incapable of
entertaining criminal intent. [People o the Phil. vs. Roberto Mengote, G.R. No. 130491, March 25,
1999]
o When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.
[People of the Phil. vs. Roberto Estrada, G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000]
o An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. [People
of the Phil. vs. Roberto Estrada, G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000]
o An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is
followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution. [People of the Phil. vs. Roberto
Estrada, G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000]
o Insanity the developed after the commission of the felony does not exempt the offender. As to whether
the offender is to be held for trial, with the assistance of counsel. [US vs. Guendia 37 Phil 337]
o Insanity itself is a condition, not a thing. It is not susceptible of the usual means of proof and to this
fact is due the unusual difficulty of making proof of its existence and measuring its effect, when once
proven to exist. As no man can look into the mind of another, the state of such mind can only be
measured as the same is reflected in the actions of the body it is created to govern. Thus, we have
held that mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby we read the thoughts, the motives and
emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of
sound mind. In interpreting these physical manifestations, scientific knowledge and experience have
been resorted to by our judicial agencies. [People of the Phil. vs. Fernando Madarang, G.R. No.
132319, May 12, 2000]
o The allegation of insanity must be clearly proved. The law presumes all acts to be voluntary. Not every
aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is insanity. [People of the Phil. vs. Teotimo
Danao, G.R. No. 96832, November 19, 1992]
o Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: "Insanity is a manifestation in
language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or
disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion,
inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or
disordered volition." Article 800 of the Civil Code provides: "The law presumes that every person is
of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary." The allegation of insanity must be clearly
proved. The law presumes all acts to be voluntary. Not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of
mental deficiency is insanity. [People of the Phil. vs. Teotimo Danao, G.R. No. 96832, November 19,
1992]
 o If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be
acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may
be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but
rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution. [People of
the Phil. vs. Roberto Estrada, G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000]
o Our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom
of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted
an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an
accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's
volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence,
whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show
complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a mitigating, not an
exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the
offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving
him of the consciousness of his acts." [People of the Phil. vs. Policarpio Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. 54135,
November 21, 1991]
§ Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common
form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. In previous cases where
schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumstance, it has mostly been rejected by the
Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment
of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts. [People of the Phil. vs. Guillermo Florendo, G.R.
No. 136845, October 8, 2003]
§ Accused-appellant's charade of amnesia is evidently a desperate gambit for exculpation. Yet,
amnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a criminal charge unless it is shown by competent proof
that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his action and that it was wrong. Failure
to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the crime was
performed. [People of the Phil. vs. Cresencio Tabugoca, G.R. No. 125334, January 28, 1998]
§ The doctor’s testimony however did not help accused-appellant’s case because although he
admitted having initially categorized accused-appellant as insane, the doctor eventually
diagnosed accused-appellant to be afflicted with pedophilia, a mental disorder not synonymous
with insanity. He explained that pedophilia is a sexual disorder wherein the subject has strong,
recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and physical fantasies about children which he tries to fulfill,
especially when there are no people around. He claimed, however, that despite his affliction the
subject could distinguish right from wrong. In fact, he maintained that pedophilia could be
committed without necessarily killing the victim although injuries might be inflicted on the victim
in an effort to repel any resistance. [People of the Phil. vs. Ralph Velez Diaz, G.R. No. 130210,
December 8, 1999]
§ Epilepsy per se is not an exempting circumstance. As early as 1927, the Court has dismissed the
defense of epilepsy thus: Neither can the defense of lack of free will of the accused Ciriaco
Aguilar, who is an epileptic, be sustained. While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an epileptic was susceptible
to nervous attacks that may momentarily deprive him of his mental faculties and lead him to
unconsciously attempt to take his own life and the lives of others, nevertheless, it has not been
shown that he was under the influence of an epileptic fit before, during, and immediately after the
aggression. [People of the Phil. vs. Ronaldo Almaden, G.R. No. 112088, March 25, 1999]
o Imbecility, like insanity, is a defense which pertains to the mental condition of a person. Our caselaw
projects the same standards in respect of both insanity and imbecility, that is, that the insanity or
imbecility must constitute complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act, or total
deprivation of freedom of the will. [People of the Phil. vs. Laroy T. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 93752, July
15, 1992]
o The defendant-appellant, Rolando Aragon, may be mentally deficient, but his feeblemindedness does
not exempt him from criminal liability. [People of the Phil. vs. Rolando Aragon, G.R. No. L-51736,
August 4, 1988]
• Minority
o RA9344 SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of
age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
o Discernment means the mental capacity to full appreciate the consequences of one’s unlawful acts
(People v. Navarro, [CA] 51 OG 4092) or to determine right and wrong. This may be known and
should be determined by considering all the circumstances afforded by the record of the case, his
 appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only before and during the commission of
the act but also after and even during trial. [People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580]
• Accident
o Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability is a factual issue. The appellant was
burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his affirmative defense that the victim’s death
was caused by his gun accidentally going off, the bullet hitting the victim without his fault or intention
of causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the
part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either with criminal
intent or with fault or negligence. The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is
performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
(4) without any fault or intention of causing it. An accident is an occurrence that “happens outside the
sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of
humanly foreseeable consequences.” If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of
negligence. [People of the Phil. vs. Federico Genita, G.R. No. 126171, March 11, 2004]
o The act of firing a shotgun at another is not a lawful act. [People of the Phil. vs. Ricardo T. Agliday,
G.R. No. 140794, October 16, 2001]
o At all events, accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here, however, the
act of accused-appellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not being in self-
defense, is unlawful. [People of the Phil. vs. Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr., G.R. No. 127818, November
11, 1998]
o An accident is a fortuitive circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Negligence, on the other
hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand without which such other person
suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. [People of the Phil. vs. Ferdinand Fallorina, G.R.
No. 137347, March 4, 2004]
o For the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated considering accused-appellant's
flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that
he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead,
indicates his culpability of the crime charged. [People of the Phil. vs. Federico Abrazaldo, G.R. No.
124392, February 7, 2003]
• Compulsion of Irresistible Force
o Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under
the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In Del Rosario, however, we held that
for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. [People of the Phil. vs. Narciso
Saldaña, et al., G.R. No. 148518, April 15, 2004]
o A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury, is insufficient. [People of the Phil. vs.
Diarangan Dansal, G.R. No. 105002, July 17, 1997]
o As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less
powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an
armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was
threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger.
A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and
security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day. [People of the
Phil. vs. Joselito Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999]
• Impulse of uncontrollable fear
o To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than or at least equal to that committed. A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must
be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape. [People of the Phil. vs.
Florentino Labuguen, et al., G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020]
o A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse
of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not
act with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. { People of the Phil. vs. Nelida Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January
19, 2011]
o Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough….the compulsion must be of such
a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. [People
of the Phil. vs. Michael Nunez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997]
 o Irresistible force is a physical force coming from a stranger while uncontrollable fear is an impulse
coming from within the person of the actor himself. In irresistible force, the actor acts without a will,
while in the uncontrollable fear, the actor acts not against his will but because he is engendered by
the fear. Both refer to external influences and not to physiological need.
o Under the situation, the alleged threat can hardly be characterized as real and irresistible, since it
could not have induced in the appellant a well-grounded fear for his life or limb. Before force or
intimidation can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an effect upon an
individual that, inspite of all resistance on his part, it reduces him to a mere instrument . . . who acts
not only without will, but against his will. [People of the Phil. vs. Nicolas Serrano, G.R. No. L-45382,
May 13, 1985]
o there was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat to his life and his family as he was an active
participant in the commission of the crime charged. He acted on his own free will and was not under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear as he claims."…Zuñiga had every opportunity to escape while
they were passing through the cornfields on their way to the Padre's house. However, he did not avail
of the said chance. He did not perform any overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof. [People of the Phil. vs. Florentino
Labuguen, et al., G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020]
• Insuperable or lawful cause
o Neither can we consider the seventh exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause, because this exempting circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law
to be complied with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive
which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law commands. [People of the
Phil. vs. Josefina Bandian, G.R. No. 45186, September 30, 1936]
o The law imposes a duty on the part of the offender to perform an act. If he fails to do so, he violates
the law. But if the failure is due to a lawful or insuperable cause, he is criminally exempt.
o Failing to deliver prisoners within the prescribed period does not constitute a crime if due to an
insuperable cause. [US vs. Vicentillo, 19 Phil 118]
• Instigation and Entrapment
o Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means
for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their
agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would
otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or
design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the
accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the
accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been
said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent," while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary
criminal." [People of the Phil. vs. Noel Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013]
o In entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in fragrante
delicto. In entrapment, the crime had already been committed while in instigation, it was not and could
not have been committed were it not for the instigation by the peace officer. [People of the Phil. vs.
Romeo A. Bay, G.R. No. 101310, May 28, 1993]
o There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, for while in the latter case the
instigator practically induces the will be accused into the commission of the offense and himself
becomes a co-principal, in entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping
and capturing the law breaker in the execution of his criminal plan. [People of the Phil. vs. Romeo
M. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 87607, October 31, 1990]
• Good faith in malum prohibitum?
o Lack of knowledge cannot constitute a valid defense, for lack of criminal intent and good faith are not
exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum. Thus, this Court has
uniformly held that the uncorroborated claim of an accused of lack of knowledge that he had a
prohibited drug in his possession is insufficient. To warrant his acquittal, accused-appellant must
show that his act of transporting the package containing marijuana in his tricycle was done without
intent to possess a prohibited drug. [People of the Phil. vs. Florentino Del Mundo, G.R. No. 138929,
October 2, 2001]
o Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohihitum because it is punished as
an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing
the act, It cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes
the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the
act so punished, regardless of criminal intent. [People of the Phil. vs. Antonio M. Rivera, G.R. No.
86491, December 11, 1992]