Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 June 2014
FINAL
13/10/2014
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
HARRISON McKEE v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 1
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 22840/07) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by an Australian national, Mr Lee Sydney Harrison
McKee (“the applicant”), on 22 May 2007.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr M. Tomszer, a lawyer practising
in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and
Justice.
3. The applicant alleged that, in the civil proceedings lodged against the
Hungarian authorities for compensation, the courts ordered him to pay
excessive court fees.
4. On 30 April 2013 the application was communicated to the
Government.
THE FACTS
11. The respondents sought the review of the final decision before the
Supreme Court, arguing that the statements of a prosecutor expressed in the
course of criminal proceedings could not violate the accused’s personality
rights, even if they were detrimental to him. By a decision of 4 July 2007
the Supreme Court quashed the final decision and dismissed the applicant’s
action in its entirety. It found that the opinion of the public prosecutor had
been expressed in the context of the criminal proceedings conducted against
the applicant and thus constituted a legitimate exercise of her powers as a
prosecutor. The Supreme Court further ordered the applicant to pay the
court fees related to the first- and second-instance and the review
proceedings in the amount of altogether HUF 1,836,000 (approximately
EUR 6,000), instead of the aggregate amount of HUF 4,300,000
(approximately EUR 14,200) in principle applicable under sections
42, 46 and 50 of the Act on Stamp Duties (see paragraph 13 below).
12. Act no. III of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
The notion of court costs
Section 75
“(1) Court costs – apart from the exceptions specified under the law – shall mean all
reasonable expenses that emerged in connection with the parties’ expedient and bona
fide litigation before or outside the court (costs of preliminary inquiries and
correspondence, procedural fees, witness fees, expert fees, the fees of guardians ad
litem and interpreters, the cost of remote hearings and inspections, etc.).”
Section 77
“The court shall decide on the bearing of court costs in its judgment or in another
decision terminating the proceedings.”
Section 81
“(1) Where each party has won some claims and lost others, in determining the court
costs the court shall take into consideration the proportion of the successful and
unsuccessful claims as well as the sums advanced by the parties. If the difference
between the respective proportions and the sums advanced by the parties is
insignificant, the court shall order that each party should bear his own costs.
(2) In actions for damages or for other claims, the quantification of which is subject
to judicial discretion, the opposing party may be obliged to pay court costs in
proportion to the amount awarded against him even if the awarded amount is lower
than the one claimed, provided that the claimed amount cannot be regarded as
manifestly excessive.”
4 HARRISON McKEE v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT
Costs-and-fees-related arrangements
Section 84
“(1) Natural person parties (including interveners) unable to pay the costs of
litigation due to their income or financial position shall, upon request, be eligible for
full or partial exemption from payment of costs or fees. Exemption from payment of
costs or fees shall mean the following:
a) exemption from payment of court fees;
b) exemption from advancing and, unless this Act provides otherwise, paying the
costs and fees arising in the proceedings (witness fees, expert fees, the fees of
guardians ad litem and interpreters, public defender’s fees, cost of remote hearings
and inspections, etc.);
c) exemption from providing a security deposit for court costs;
d) request for representation by a legal aid lawyer, where it is allowed under the
law.”
Section 85/A
“(1) In lawsuits specified in a separate law the party (intervener) shall be eligible for
exemption from advancing court costs and expenses irrespective of his income or
financial situation and the criteria set forth in subsections (1)-(3) of section 85 (subject
matter exemption from advancing court costs and expenses).
(2) Where subject matter exemption from advancing court costs and expenses is
granted:
a) the costs and expenses specified in section 84 subsection (1) b) shall be advanced
by the state, except for those to be advanced by the party despite having been granted
subject matter exemption from advancing court costs and expenses;
b) a party shall be eligible for exemption from advancing court fees.”
13. Act no. XCIII of 1990 on Stamp Duties provides as follows:
Section 39
“(1) In civil contentious and non-contentious proceedings the duty base shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, be the value of the subject matter of the proceedings at the
time of their launching or, in remedy proceedings, the value of the claim or part of the
claim under dispute. ...”
Section 42
(1) For the duty base specified in sections 39-41, the amount of the duty shall,
unless otherwise provided by this Act, be as follows:
a) in contentious proceedings 6 % but not less than HUF 7,000 and not more than
HUF 900,000; ...”
Section 46
(1) For the duty base determined in line with sections 39-41 the amount of the duty
shall, in case of appeal against a judgment, be 8% but not less than HUF 7,000 and not
more than HUF 900,000. ...”
HARRISON McKEE v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 5
Section 50
(1) For the duty base determined in line with sections 39-41 the amount of the duty
shall, in case of review against a judgment, be 10% but not less than HUF 10,000 and
not more than HUF 2,500,000.”
THE LAW
A. Admissibility
18. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes
that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
B. Merits
had not been excessive and had not justified the imposition of such court
fees.
20. The Government disagreed. They considered that, even assuming
that court fees collected by Hungarian courts for dealing with civil claims
constituted a form of restriction on the individual’s access to a court, they
were legitimate to regulate access to courts and not in themselves contrary
to Article 6 of the Convention. Referring to the particular circumstances of
the case, the Government’s position was that the applicant himself had been
responsible for the fact that he had been ordered to pay a significant sum in
court fees, as he had indicated a grossly exaggerated amount in his claim
when instituting the proceedings, in the light of the domestic practice on
compensation for violation of personality rights. The Government further
argued that the applicant was not obliged to advance the court fees, there
was a statutory upper payment limit, and the law provided for some
flexibility as to the payment of court fees. Thus, according to the
Government, the restrictions were proportionate to the aims pursued,
especially in view of the fact that the applicant’s action had been 97%
unsuccessful according to the first- and second-instance courts.
21. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention embodies
the “right to court” – of which the right of access is one aspect – as a
constituent element of the right to a fair trial. This right is not absolute. By
its very nature it calls for regulation by the State and may be subject to
limitations permitted by implication. However, these limitations must not
restrict or reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that
the very essence of the right is impaired (see
Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 57, Series A no. 93).
22. The requirement to pay fees to civil courts in connection with claims
they are asked to determine cannot be regarded as a restriction on the right
of access to a court that is incompatible per se with Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention (see Stankov, cited above, § 52). However, the amount of the
fees assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of a given case,
including the applicant’s ability to pay them, and the phase of the
proceedings at which that restriction has been imposed are factors which are
material in determining whether or not a person enjoyed his right of access
and had “a ... hearing by [a] tribunal” (see Kreuz v. Poland, no. 28249/95,
§ 60, ECHR 2001-VI).
23. Similarly to the case of Stankov (cited above) on excessive court
fees, the present application concerns the payment of a fee that was not a
pre-condition for the examination of the case. The applicant benefited from
a subject-matter exemption from advancing court fees, thus he did not need
to advance the court fees as a prerequisite to initiating proceedings, and he
was under the obligation to pay court fees only if he lost or partly lost the
case, proportionately to the dismissed part of the claim. The court fees were
only assessed at the conclusion of the first-instance proceedings – increased
HARRISON McKEE v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 7
by the costs of the second-instance and review proceedings – and were only
due once the judgments became final, that is, following the delivery of the
Supreme Court’s decision.
24. The applicant thus had “access” to all stages of the proceedings and
the courts examined his case on the merits and delivered binding judgments
(see paragraphs 9-11 above).
25. In this respect, the Court reiterates that the Convention is intended to
guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusionary but rights that are
practical and effective. This is particularly so of the right of access to court
in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a
fair trial (see Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, § 24, Series A no. 32). In
practical terms, the imposition of a considerable financial burden due after
the conclusion of the proceedings may well act as a restriction on the right
to a court. The costs order against the applicant constituted such a restriction
(see Stankov, cited above, § 54).
26. As the Court has held before, such a restriction will not be
compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if
there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aims sought to be achieved (see Deweer v. Belgium,
27 February 1980, § 48-49, Series A no. 35). Contracting States enjoy a
certain margin of appreciation in that respect but the ultimate decision as to
the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court (see
Kreuz v. Poland, no. 28249/95, § 60, ECHR 2001-VI). The Court must
examine, therefore, whether this was achieved in the present case.
27. As regards the aims pursued by the general rules on costs, the Court
has accepted in its previous case-law that they were compatible with the
general administration of justice, for example to fund the functioning of the
judicial system and to act as a deterrent to frivolous claims, which can be
accepted as compatible with Article 6 of the Convention (see Stankov, cited
above, § 57). The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.
28. As regards the proportionality of the restriction, the Court notes at
the outset that the applicant initiated civil proceedings under section 84(1)
of the Civil Code alleging a violation of his personality rights, requesting
the domestic courts to establish an infringement of his right to a good
reputation, to order the respondents to provide “satisfaction” and to pay
compensation in the amount of HUF 390,000,000, all of which was finally
dismissed by the decision of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 11 above).
In the first- and second-instance proceedings the courts found that the
applicant’s action was 97% unsuccessful (see paragraph 20 above), and
imposed court fees on him established pro rata to the dismissed part of the
claim. These courts calculated the payable amount on the basis of the
statutory maximum per levels of jurisdiction, the combined amount of
which was nevertheless significantly less than the aggregated amount of 6%
and 8% of the claim. They relied on sections 42 and 46 of the Act on Stamp
8 HARRISON McKEE v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT
§ 60, ECHR 2006-XIV), thus the question of the State’s duty to compensate
for wrongs imputable to its authorities did not arise.
33. The Court further notes the Government’s position to the effect that
the applicant himself was responsible for the fact that he was ordered to pay
a significant sum in court fees, as he had indicated an excessive amount in
his claim when instituting the proceedings. They suggested that the
applicant’s claim for the equivalent of approximately HUF 390,000,000 was
frivolous and grossly exaggerated. They relied in particular on the fact,
unrefuted by the applicant, that the latter had failed to prove in any way the
alleged damages and that he had been represented throughout the
proceedings by a lawyer, who must have been aware of the existing case-
law in this respect and the ill-founded nature of the claim (see paragraph 9
above). The Court sees no reason to doubt that the applicant, with the help
of his lawyer, could have determined what would have been a “reasonable”
claim in his case and thus the amount of the court fees payable in case of an
unsuccessful action. In this respect it must be stressed that applicants who
deliberately inflate the value of their claims for compensation cannot be
expected to be exempted entirely from the payment of court fees or from the
requirement to contribute in a reasonable amount to the costs of taking the
action (see Kupiec v. Poland no. 16828/02, § 49, 3 February 2009; and
Kuczera v. Poland, no. 275/02, § 45, 14 September 2010).
34. The Court finally notes that various procedural solutions existed
under Hungarian law to avoid placing an excessive burden on litigants,
including an upper limit of HUF 900,000 in the first and second-instance
proceedings and HUF 2,500,000 in review proceedings. Moreover, litigants
unable to pay court costs due to their income or financial position were
eligible for full or partial exemption from paying court fees.
35. The foregoing considerations lead the Court to the conclusion that
the imposition of court fees is an aim compatible with the good
administration of justice and that domestic law and proceedings provided
adequate safeguards not to constitute a disproportionate financial burden on
bona fide claimants. Thus, it cannot be held that the applicant was unduly
restricted in his right of access to a court.
There has not, therefore, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
36. The applicant further complained that in the civil proceedings for
damages for the infringement of his personality rights, the domestic courts
decided on the merits of his action in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
37. In so far as the applicant’s complaint may be understood to concern
assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the
10 HARRISON McKEE v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT