COVID-19, Communication and Culture

‘In 2020 the global workplace underwent a fundamental change with the al-
most wholesale transfer of communicative labour from physical spaces in the real
world to virtual spaces online. This has had profound implications not only for
the way we work but also for how we communicate with one another as human
beings. In this much needed volume, Fiona Rossette-Crake and Elvis Buckwal-
ter present a pluridisciplinary range of contributions which reveal the manifold
experience of remote working in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic.
For scholars and students interested in how the pandemic has impacted on work
in the domains of discourse, communication, linguistic diversity, culture, man-
agement, public messaging, government policy or the operations of biopower
and surveillance, this collection is essential reading.’
John O’Regan, Professor of Critical Applied Linguistics,
University College London, UK
‘This volume is one of the first to take stock of the fundamental changes brought
on by the pandemic, both in how we as a society interact about a global crisis,
and how it affects our interactions in professional situations. The professional
and research insights from a group of thought leaders will appeal to an interdis-
ciplinary audience interested in exploring the pandemic through the lenses of
communication, culture and organisation.’
Erika Darics, Lecturer in Communication and Information
Science, University of Groningen, Netherlands
‘Of course, COVID-19 has been thoroughly researched from a public health and
epidemiology perspective. But it is so good to see scholars in social sciences and
communication get involved too, foregrounding other, equally relevant issues
like responsibility, power and trust through the powerful lenses of discourse,
narrative and culture. This is a highly welcome, timely volume indeed.’
Geert Jacobs, Professor of English Business Communication,
Ghent University, Belgium
COVID-19, COMMUNICATION
AND CULTURE
This book analyses some of the many upheavals brought about by the COVID-19
pandemic through the lens of the COVID-19–communication–culture inter-
face, with a particular focus on the new global, virtual workplace. It brings
together a pluridisciplinary and multinational team of researchers from the fields
of sociology and organisational studies, discourse analysis, linguistics, commu-
nication and cultural studies, and includes testimonials from actors within the
professional sector such as international managers, consultants and foreign trade
advisors.
The collection examines a wide range of phenomena including communica-
tion on the pandemic by public authorities, the pandemic as a discursive con-
struct, the digital turn and its impact on communication, the role of social media,
as well as national diplomacy and questions of surveillance, (bio)power and trust.
Issues pertaining specifically to the workplace focus on the impact of remote
work, including the challenge of building cohesive work relations and managing
cultural difference, distance recruitment, the new forms of professional online
communication, the future of the remote work model and questions of iden-
tity that are underpinned by the culture of professions. It aims to theoretically
inform some of the enormous changes which have been brought about by the
COVID-19 pandemic at multiple levels of our professional and social lives. It
concludes with a virtual round-table discussion on the question of cultural dif-
ference with respect to both the pandemic itself and work practice.
COVID-19, Communication and Culture: Beyond the Global Workplace will be
of great interest to academics and professionals interested in the communication
and discourse and the cultural impact of COVID-19.
Fiona Rossette-Crake is Professor in the Department of Applied Languages
at Université Paris Nanterre, France. Her research explores specialised commu-
nication, particularly new forms of public speaking. She is the author of Public
Speaking and the New Oratory: A Guide for Non-native Speakers (Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2019) and numerous journal articles.
Elvis Buckwalter is Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Lan-

guages at Université Paris Nanterre, France, and Director of Professional English
Training at Centre de Techniques Internationales (CTI) and Centre d’Etudes
Supérieures du Commerce International (CESCI). His research focuses on inter-
national marketing and trade and cultural studies.
The COVID-19 Pandemic Series
Series Editor: J. Michael Ryan
This series examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on individuals,

communities, countries, and the larger global society from a social scientific
perspective. It represents a timely and critical advance in knowledge related to
what many believe to be the greatest threat to global ways of being in more than
a century. It is imperative that academics take their rightful place alongside med-
ical professionals as the world attempts to figure out how to deal with the current
global pandemic, and how society might move forward in the future. This series
represents a response to that imperative.
Titles in this Series:
COVID-19 and Childhood Inequality

Edited by Nazneen Khan
The Color of COVID-19

The Racial Inequality of Marginalized Communities
Edited by Sharon A. Navarro and Samantha L. Hernandez
COVID-19, Communication and Culture

Beyond the Global Workplace
Edited by Fiona Rossette-Crake and Elvis Buckwalter
Social and Political Representations of the COVID-19 Crisis

Daniel Feierstein
Playful Pedagogy in the Pandemic

Pivoting to Games-Based Learning
Emily K. Johnson and Anastasia Salter
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com

COVID-19,
COMMUNICATION AND
CULTURE
Beyond the Global Workplace
Edited by
Fiona Rossette-Crake and
Elvis Buckwalter
Cover image: © Getty Images (Sorbetto)
First published 2023
by Routledge
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© 2023 selection and editorial matter, Fiona Rossette-Crake and
Elvis Buckwalter; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Fiona Rossette-Crake and Elvis Buckwalter to be identified
as author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
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ISBN: 9781032232638 (hbk)

ISBN: 9781032232614 (pbk)
ISBN: 9781003276517 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517
Typeset in Bembo
by codeMantra
For our students, past and present, and all members of the
young generation
CONTENTS
Lists of figures xv
List of tables xvii
List of contributors xix
Preface xxiii
J. Michael Ryan
Introduction 1
1 Introduction: COVID-19, communication, culture and the

workplace: multiple spaces, multiple interfaces 3
Fiona Rossette-Crake and Elvis Buckwalter
PART I
Communicating about COVID-19 19
2 Responding to the pandemic: a discourse analysis approach 21

Dominique Maingueneau
3 Wikipedia as a trusted method of information assessment

during the COVID-19 crisis 37
Antonin Segault
4 Understanding China’s “intermestic” online vaccination-

themed narrative strategy: towards a “Global community
of health for all”? 52
Zhao Alexandre Huang and Rudong Zhang
xii Contents
5 Formulating a discourse of solidarity amid COVID-19:

a positive discourse analysis of remarks given by
spokespersons from China’s foreign ministry 76
Yating Yu and Dennis Tay
6 COVID-19 and communication through the lens of culture 95

Elvis Buckwalter
PART II
Communication during COVID-19 113
7 Why face-to-face communication matters: a comparison of

face-to-face and computer-mediated communication 115
Almut Koester
8 COVID-19 and the rise of digitalised spoken

communication: the example of webinars 135
Fiona Rossette-Crake
9 Managing multilingual teams in a virtual context 155

Helene Tenzer
10 Communicating on the job during COVID-19: some

professional testimonials 163
Leticia Correa do Carmo, Maria Martha Gomez Villalon,
Océane Juste, Juan Pinargote and Perrine Rozec
PART III
COVID-19 and representations of the workplace 171
11 Remote work and the contemporary workplace: the

example of student internships in the context of France 173
Danièle Linhart
12 COVID-19 and the culture of professions: issues and

tensions in the group of health professionals 185
Sylvie Parrini-Alemanno
13 From privilege to duty: changing media representations of

remote work in France, the United States and Estonia 199
Raili Marling and Marge Käsper
Contents xiii
14 International managers and expatriates in the face of the

pandemic: impact and cultural issues 217
Corinne Saurel
15 Working internationally during COVID-19: professional

testimonials 228
Lucille Boulet, Olivier Motard and Samira Touam
Postface 235
16 Concluding virtual round-table discussion: COVID-19,

communication, culture and work practice 237
Index 249
FIGURES
6.1 E.T. Hall’s Interpersonal Distances based on proxemics 98

6.2 COVID-19 Stringency Index for Argentina and Saudi Arabia 106
6.3 COVID-19 Cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases per
million people for Argentina and Saudi Arabia 107
7.1 Continuum from lean to rich media 120
7.2 Still from an example of face-to-face negotiation 128
7.3 Still from an example of online negotiation 129
13.1 Sketch Engine visualisation of the collocational behaviour of
the noun “télétravail” in the Le Monde corpus 204
TABLES
4.1 Text modality of vaccination-themed Weibo posts 60

4.2 Text modality of vaccination-themed tweets 60
4.3 China’s vaccination-themed content types on intermestic social
media platforms 61
4.4 Using nuanced expressions for intermestic narratives 64
4.5 China’s international responsibility-related posts 65
4.6 Intermestic mutual argumentation tactic 66
6.1 Hofstede’s Long-Term Orientation scores for 23 countries based
on the Chinese Value Survey 101
7.1 The production and reception of speaking and writing 116
7.2 The characteristics of spoken and written language 117
CONTRIBUTORS
Academic contributors
Elvis Buckwalter is Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Lan-

guages at Université Paris Nanterre, France, and Director of Professional English
Training at Centre de Techniques Internationales (CTI) and Centre d’Etudes
Supérieures du Commerce International (CESCI). His research focuses on inter-
national marketing and trade and cultural studies.
Zhao Alexandre Huang is Associate Professor of Communication at Univer-

sité Paris Nanterre, France. His research interests include public diplomacy, stra-
tegic communication, public relations, social media and China’s propaganda and
international communication.
Marge Käsper is Lecturer and Researcher in French Studies at the University

of Tartu, Estonia. Her research brings together contrastive linguistics (between
Estonian and French) and discourse analysis.
Almut Koester is Professor of English Business Communication at Vienna

University of Economics and Business, Austria. Her research focuses on spoken
workplace discourse and business corpora. She is the author of The Language of
Work (Routledge, 2004), Investigating Workplace Discourse (Routledge, 2006) and
Workplace Discourse (Continuum, 2010) and numerous journal articles and chap-
ters in edited volumes.
Danièle Linhart is Emeritus Research Director at the French National Cen-

tre for Scientific Research (CNRS), France. A sociologist of work, she is the
xx Contributors
author of multiple books, including Burn out; travailler à perdre la raison (Le Lom-
bard, 2020) and L’insoutenable subordination des salariés (Sociologie Clinique, 2021),
which report on her research in managerial modernisation, the evolution of
labour in the public and private sectors and the role of work in society.
Dominique Maingueneau is Emeritus Professor in Discourse Analysis at

Sorbonne University, France. A pioneering figure in European discourse anal-
ysis, he associates a pragmatic outlook on discourse with linguistic theory and
the thought of Michel Foucault. He has published numerous books and articles
in many languages. His latest books include Les phrases sans texte (Armand Colin,
2012) and Discours et analyse du discours (Armand Colin, 2014).
Mehdi Majidi is an Associate Professor at Fort Hays State University, USA, and
also works as an International Consultant in sustainable socioeconomic devel-
opment. His recent publications include Cultural Perspective on Sustainable Socio-
economic Development: Corporate Social Performance in the Age of Irresponsibility-Cross
National Perspective (Information Age Publishing, 2016).
Raili Marling is Professor of English Studies at the University of Tartu, Estonia.

Her main areas of research are contemporary culture, the politics of affect and
discourses of gender and neoliberalism. She currently leads an Estonian Research
Council research project on the representations and representability of crises.
Sylvie Parrini-Alemanno is Professor in Communications at the Conservatoire

National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM), France. Her specific expertise pertains to the
health profession, health organisations, communication stakes of patients and the
elderly in the digital era, and the emerging field of organisational digital human-
ities. She is the author of numerous articles and several books, including Com-
munication Organisationnelle: Formes et Transformations Contemporaines (with Anne
Mayere, L’Harmattan, 2018).
Fiona Rossette-Crake is Professor in the Department of Applied Languages

at Université Paris Nanterre, France. Her research explores specialised commu-
nication, particularly new forms of public speaking. She is the author of Public
Speaking and the New Oratory: A Guide for Non-native Speakers (Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2019) and numerous journal articles.
Antonin Segault is Associate Professor of Information Sciences and Commu-

nication at Université Paris-Nanterre, France. His work focuses on collective
practices of producing, editorialising, verifying and sharing knowledge online,
particularly in relation to platforms such as Twitter, YouTube, Google Places and
Wikipedia. He has published several books, including Documenter Twitter: Défis et
méthodes pour la constitution de corpus de tweets (Balisages, 2020).
Contributors xxi
Dennis Tay is Associate Professor in the Department of English and Commu-

nication at Hong Kong Polytechnic University, China. His research interests in-
clude cognitive linguistics, metaphor theory, mental healthcare communication
and discourse data analytics. He is the Co-editor of Metaphor and the Social World
and Associate Editor of Metaphor and Symbol.
Helene Tenzer is Associate Professor of International Business at Tübingen

University, Germany. Her research focuses primarily on language diversity in
international management, multinational teams and organisational behaviour.
She has published on these topics in outlets such as the Journal of International Busi-
ness Studies and Academy of Management Learning and Education. In addition, she has
founded a research network on language issues in management with currently
over 100 international members.
Susanne Tietze is Professor of Multilingual Management at Sheffield Hallam

University, UK. She has a long-standing interest in language, discourse and
meaning, including the exploration of hegemonic practices enacted through
language. She is currently researching the role of English, language diversity
and translation in the production of management knowledge. Her latest book is
Management Research: A Language and Translation Perspective on Knowledge Production
(Routledge, 2021).
Yating Yu is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of English and Commu-

nication at Hong Kong Polytechnic University, China. Her research interests
are in gender studies, corpus linguistics, critical discourse analysis and metaphor
studies. She has previously published in journals including Social Semiotics, Gender
and Language and Feminist Media Studies.
Rudong Zhang is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Health Communication at the

Vanke School of Public Health at Tsinghua University, China. His research in-
terests include global health communication, public health campaigns and social
media engagement.
Professional contributors
Ludovic Bossé, Interfert, France
Lucille Boulet, MI-GSO | PCUBED, USA
Leticia Correa do Carmo, Commerce equitable France, France
Laurence Lucias, Centre Techniques Internationales (CTI), France
Maria Martha Gomez Villalon, Datawords, France
Olivier Motard, d.light, China
Océane Juste, PrestaShop, France
Juan Pinargote, Atomize, Sweden
xxii Contributors
Perrine Rozec, CCIFV, Vietnam

Corinne Saurel, Cultures et Statégies, France
Joselyne Studer Laurens, National Training Committee for French Foreign
Trade Advisors, France
Samira Touam, PageGroup, Germany
PREFACE
When the World Health Organization first declared COVID-19 to be a pan-

demic in March of 2020, there were few among us who would have predicted
the radical ways in which the world would change, much less the rapid speed at
which such changes would take place. The impacts on communication, culture
and work life that play a central role in this volume are also at the centre of my
own personal engagement with the pandemic. When the pandemic began, I set
about organising two edited volumes to examine the social, psychological, cul-
tural, economic and political impacts of the pandemic, never imagining that de-
cision would led me to edit three additional volumes, author a book and launch
a book series (of which this volume is a part). For me, the pandemic has altered
not only my workplace but also the very focus of my entire professional research
trajectory.
One of the benefits of being at the forefront of what I see to be the developing
field of COVID-19 studies is that I have the privilege of reviewing cutting-edge
scholarship in the area. This volume has been a particular privilege to review as it
cuts to the foundation of what has led to some of the more radical social and indi-
vidual transformations during pandemic times. The realms of education, labour,
family life and the media, among others, have all been subject to radical trans-
formations, often involuntarily. Central to grappling the wide-ranging impact of
these changes at all levels is to first understand the areas of work, communication
and culture. It is that lofty goal which the volume sets out to do and successfully
accomplishes.
This volume is a truly remarkable collection of scholars and professionals from
across a wide range of disciplines and from an array of public and private institu-
tions. The unique value of this volume lies not just in its intellectual scholarship
but also in the range of perspectives offered to analyse critical issues not just of
our pandemic present but also of the possibilities of our post-pandemic future.
xxiv Preface
One thing we have learned during this pandemic is that communication and cul-
ture are essential components to understanding individual and social change, and
this volume helps to clarify the very many ways why that is now truer than ever.
It is a privilege to be able to include this volume in The COVID-19 Pandemic
Series with the certainty that the insights and perspectives contained herein will
help shed light on many of the critical ways in which our world, and our lives,
have been transformed.
J. Michael Ryan
Series Editor, The COVID-19 Pandemic Series
January 2022
Introduction
1
INTRODUCTION
COVID-19, communication, culture and the
workplace: multiple spaces, multiple interfaces
***
This edited collection aims to contribute to the growing body of scholarship

which addresses, and will undoubtedly continue to address for many years to
come, the multiple ways in which the COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact
and accelerated change in all aspects of our professional, social and personal lives.
It follows closely on a number of previously published volumes of the Rout-
ledge COVID-19 Pandemic Series, engaging specifically with the agenda set
by Volume II, Social Consequences and Cultural Adaptations. The present volume
contributes to the discussions initiated by the collection in regard, for instance,
to government policy, ideology, globalisation and social inequities, and, in par-
ticular, looks at and beyond the global workplace. It offers up for examination a
number of “spaces” – those that are represented and instantiated, respectively, by
COVID-19, the workplace, communication and culture – which interconnect
and proffer a number of multiple interfaces. “Beyond” used in the title of this
book carries the implication that the pandemic calls notably for a remodelling of
the previously established concept of a global workplace, to which a virtual di-
mension now needs to be added, and is also used in the sense that this collection
goes beyond the workplace to establish parallels with the management of and
communication around the pandemic itself. The book is, hence, transdiscipli-
nary and brings together scholars from the fields of sociology and organisational
studies, as well as discourse analysis, linguistics, communication and cultural
studies. And, in addition to academic scholarship, it gives voice to professional
actors, who directly relate their first-hand experiences of the pandemic within
the global workplace.
Among the many areas of our lives which have been disrupted and disorgan-
ised by the pandemic, one sphere that has been particularly thrown into turmoil
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-2
4 Fiona Rossette-Crake and Elvis Buckwalter
is the world of work. The issue of work – like that of home-schooling, for ex-
ample, or that of protecting oneself from the virus – is central to the collective
COVID-19 experience. In the face of the government-imposed lockdowns that
were introduced to reduce the spread of the pandemic, and despite the incum-
bent difficulties, most of us were expected to “carry on” with our work as best
we could – which meant reverting to working from our homes. If the model of
remote work predates the pandemic, the year 2020 will be remembered for its
full-scale, swift implementation, whatever the level of the office hierarchy and
cultural context.
Consequently, the concept of the workplace has become somewhat of an apo-
ria. No longer can work be circumscribed to a specific place or space. While
during the successive lockdowns, people withdrew into their homes where they
were physically confined, in contrast, the place devoted to work expanded and
invaded personal and private space – and time. More hours were spent working,
not only because remote work procedures are prone to be more time-consuming,
particularly during the early stages of their implementation, and because discon-
necting from work when working from home can prove particularly difficult,
but also because work provided a way to pass the time in lockdown, as well as
a means of escape, in order to forget about personal fears concerning the virus
itself. People have also been able to escape into the virtual world provided by
the digital medium. The virtual, digital medium challenges the notion of space.
In terms of place, remote work is “virtual work” (Darics and Gatti 2019). And,
the notion of space is further challenged by the globalised world. This volume
deals particularly with the global workplace – that is, work which is not confined
within national borders, and which has notably been made possible thanks to
digital communication.
And not only has there been an incursion of work into time and space from
which it was more clearly dissociated in pre-pandemic times, but talking about
work has overrun our everyday, “non-work” conversations, with work giving
rise to some of the most talked-about topics of conversation of the epoch. Issues
regarding work practice and specialised communication have become objects of
discussion both in the mass media and on social media around the world. For
instance, almost one year into the pandemic, one French headline read “Why
videoconferencing exhausts our brain (and how to fight back)”;1 while another
read “Online teaching: a visio(n) of horror”.2 Similarly, lexicon relevant to pro-
fessional online communication has entered popular usage. For example, one
word used within the context of videoconferencing, the verb “unmute”, is em-
blematic of the pandemic experience because it became a “constant refrain”.3
And references to remote work abounded on social media, such as the humorous
stories posted by Instagrammers pretending to pull their hair out or yell at their
computers (that is, at the very interface of communication which, rather ironi-
cally, had allowed them to rise to fame).
If remote work was often viewed during the first weeks of the pandemic as a
novelty, a period of disenchantment quickly ensued. A headline in The New York
Introduction 5
Times dating from June 2020 bears witness to the growing uneasiness “What If
Working From Home Goes on … Forever?”4 By then, many workers had started
to experience a sense of isolation from being alone for days on end in front of a
computer screen. Importantly, the difficulties that have been encountered during
the practice of remote work have highlighted, by contrast, the benefits of the tra-
ditional model of face-to-face work. Challenges raised by remote work include
the involvement in team dynamics, or the psychological effects of mixing work
and private space. Remote work also emphasised – specifically because it was
lacking – the socialising function of the workplace according to the face-to-face
model.
However, well before COVID-19, traditional work models had already been
the objects of profound transformations. As argued by several contributors to this
volume, the pandemic has simply accelerated a number of phenomena that were
already underway. For instance, it has amplified a number of characteristics of
“the new work order”, a concept coined notably in discourse analysis a quarter
of a century ago (Gee et al. 1996) which underscores changes attributed to the
underlying values of neoliberalism and late capitalist society (Fairclough 1992;
Gee et al. 1996; Duchêne and Heller 2012; Holborow 2015). Interestingly, in the
lead up to 2020, the question of space had already become a central issue, due
to the replacement of individual offices by open-plan spaces, which engendered
noise and difficulties in concentration. This relative eclipse of individual offices,
already underway before COVID-19, would lead, in the COVID and post-
COVID eras, to the “flex-office”, whereby workers are required to “book” their
desk space in advance. Gradually, the worker has been pushed out of the office
space, and the process has been completed by the remote work model accelerated
by the pandemic. As underlined in this volume by the labour sociologist Danièle
Linhart, the office worker is no longer “at home” at the office: management has
moved from wanting to make workers “feel at home at the office”, to making
them engage in their work from home – or from anywhere for that matter. The
workplace of the future is hybrid and virtual, a workplace inhabited by nomadic
workers and by nomadic managers equipped with smartphones and laptops (Sau-
rel, this volume) – a Foucauldian heterotopia intrinsic to the COVID-19 and post
COVID-19 eras (Marling and Käsper, this volume).
COVID-19 and the workplace are articulated here via two other main spaces:
communication and culture. Communication has central stakes not only in the
professional and corporate spheres but also in the government sector. The new
economy (Duchêne and Heller 2012) and the resulting work order have com-
pounded the role of communication, as informed, for instance, by the shift to-
wards stakeholder communication (Darics and Koller 2018). And perhaps more
than any one phenomenon previously, the pandemic has sharpened our sense
of the almost tautological relationship between government management and
communication. Much of our experience of the pandemic – as well as our fear of
it – derives directly from how the pandemic has been communicated to us. Public
discourses on the pandemic are currently the object of much critical analysis (for
instance, Price and Harbisher 2022). However, while this volume will hopefully
complement such studies, the main objective here is not to present an exhaus-
tive analysis of public discourse but instead address a number of issues in regard
to communication during the pandemic. As the discourse analyst Dominique
Maingueneau identifies in his contribution to this volume, the virus is itself a
discursive reality, a rhetorical construct implemented by public authorities. Ac-
cording to his analysis, COVID-19 brought us close to a philosophical “thought
experiment” which, more than a “discursive moment” involving all the world
media talking about the management of the pandemic all day long, with people
only able to communicate through technical mediation, marked a discursive
“saturation”. Such a saturation was underpinned by all types of media and saw
the birth of new discursive resources and new discursive practices.
As such, the pandemic has accelerated the digital turn and made online com-
munication inescapable. The COVID-19 pandemic will have, indeed, consti-
tuted a defining moment for humanity’s relationship with the digital medium
– again, at multiple levels, for instance, not only in terms of the ways authorities
have used technology to manage the pandemic (statistics, QR codes and track-
ing) but also in the ways the digital has become a fully integrated part of the
human experience. For example, we have come to rely on social media, not
only to keep in touch with friends and loved ones but also to communicate as
“netizens” our views about the pandemic and its management. And of course, as
highlighted by the news headlines quoted above, a major part of the collective
COVID-19 experience has been the massive switch to online communication
for professional purposes. If pre-pandemic, computer-mediated communication
was already “ubiquitous in almost all workplace environments” (Darics and Gatti
2019: 237–238), the lockdowns meant that even the most technologically reticent
amongst us were forced to follow suit. During the first lockdown period in the
European spring of 2020, a survey revealed that the move to online communi-
cation was one of the main points of focus that mobilised organisations, who
turned their attention to systematising communication between headquarters
and the field, and ever-faster responsiveness.5
The collective pandemic experience has made painfully pertinent a number
of issues underlined previously in communication scholarship, particularly in the
field of specialised professional communication (for example, Darics 2015). Back
in 2008, Naomi Baron published Always on: Language in an Online and Mobile
World. Now, there is a general acknowledgement that the “hyperconnectivity”
(Quan-Haase and Wellman 2006: 285) of an “always on” culture has had radical
consequences on our working lives – again making work and personal time and
space permeable – and on our lives in general. Positive and negative effects of
online communication have received attention both before and since the pan-
demic (for example, Gabbiadini et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2019). During the pan-
demic, compulsory adoption of online communication led to negativity (screen
fatigue, stress) which added to the ambient anxieties of the virus. As highlighted
by the business communication scholar Almut Koester, attention or fatigue can
Introduction 7
be explained, for instance, by the degree to which presence and involvement are
re-construed within the online medium. Like that of remote work, the massive
turn to virtual communication has triggered a realisation of the value of face-to-
face communication, as well as a better understanding of what actually occurs
(cognitively, psychologically, socially) when we enter into communication with
others.
The final space which informs contributions to this volume is that of c ulture –
which is intrinsically linked to that of communication. Indeed, as expressed by
Edward Hall, the anthropologist and cross-cultural researcher, “[c]ulture is com-
munication, and communication is culture” (Hall 1959) – and so, as a principal
modality of expression, communication is coextensive to culture. Of course,
“what culture is” is subject to much discussion. In contrast to the formal institu-
tions provided by political and legal frameworks, it is regarded as an “informal
institution”. Defined as “the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits
of a racial, religious, or social group”, or as “the set of values, conventions, or
social practices associated with a particular field, activity, or societal character-
istic”,6 it encompasses both values and practices, which can be difficult to disso-
ciate (House et al. 2004). The somewhat nebulous dimension of culture has not
stopped anthropologists, sociologists and experts from a wide range of disciplines,
including the fields of mathematics and natural sciences, from speaking about it
in order to highlight the particularities of a group of people, for instance, at a
subnational, national or supernational level. Culture is also considered “a kind
of all-encompassing whole, which shapes all or most dimensions of our lives”.7
As “societal culture”, it “provides its members with meaningful ways of life
across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious,
recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres”
(Kymlicka 1996: 76), and “provides an anchor for their self-identification and the
safety of effortless secure belonging” (Margalit and Raz 1990: 448).
By definition, the pandemic is a global phenomenon, a direct consequence
of the globalised world in which we live. COVID-19 can be considered a cata-
lytic event (Bardi 2017) which, unlike previous catalytic catastrophes, has had
profound effects not just on one or several particular groups of people but rather
on the human race as a whole. Countries around the world have faced the same
“enemy” and decided on very similar measures (lockdowns, vaccinations) in an
attempt to “fight” it, according to a recurrent and global war metaphor – one that
has, moreover, triggered a call by linguists for alternative ways of talking about
COVID-19, the #ReframeCovid initiative (Olza et al. 2021). COVID-19 has
therefore generated a comparable global experience.
And so, where does the pandemic leave culture as a category or factor in the
analysis of the variable, specific social responses which it has elicited? While some
may consider that examining cultural specificities in relation to the pandemic
may make for another aporia, COVID-19 has thrown into sharp focus dispari-
ties and inequalities both within and between peoples and societies around the
planet – of which an issue of considerable note for the present volume concerns
the “digital divide” (Ryan and Nanda 2022).8 Differences in responses at the
national level are the object of much current scholarship (see, for instance, Adler
et al. (2022) for an analysis of the differences reflected in 19 national responses).
Such differences can be accounted for in light of dissimilarities between the
“formal” political and legal institutions specific to each country, but they can
also be accounted for in terms of culture (Chen et al. 2021). Indeed, COVID-19
can be regarded as a catalyst on culture in that it brings to the fore some funda-
mental differences embedded within cultural zones and national identities. And,
cultural differences can be identified both in the management of the pandemic
by public authorities and in the way the pandemic has been handled by organisa-
tions. For instance, in regard to the workplace, remote work was, depending on
the country, more or less widespread before COVID-19, and such discrepancies
resulted in different degrees of ease with which organisations and workers in
these countries adapted to the sudden switch to remote work due to the pan-
demic. In addition, depending on the language, the different names given to
remote work point to distinct perceptions within a specific linguistic-cultural
context (for example, focus on spatial versus technical dimensions) (see Marling
and Käsper, this volume).
Importantly, cultural differences at the national level have received particular
attention in organisational theory, which has systematised them, for instance, ac-
cording to a number of “cultural dimensions”, such as Hofstede’s (1980) original
four dimensions of “individualism”, “masculinity/femininity”, “power distance”
and “uncertainty avoidance”, or House et al.’s (2004) dimensions which include
“future orientation”, “gender egalitarianism”, “uncertainty avoidance”, “power
distance” and “performance orientation”. Certainly, any form of systematisation
can be regarded as problematic, particularly when dealing with the complexity
of culture. Within organisational studies, scholars warn of “the necessity to adopt
multi-level views when examining the effects of culture” (Miska et al. 2018) and,
of course, differences in national cultures are not necessarily as pertinent now
as they were 30 years ago, before the development of multinationals with their
many local subsidiaries. However, these cultural dimensions, taken together with
theoretical frameworks developed in cultural anthropology (Hall 1959, 1966)
and social anthropology (d’Iribarne 1988, 2019), make for useful vantage points
from which we can observe differences in the ways COVID-19 has affected and
been managed by different countries.
For instance, it can be argued that the pandemic has shown up contrasts be-
tween collectivism and individualism. If China’s rhetoric of a “Global commu-
nity of health for all” (Huang and Zhang, this volume) is designed to dissipate
tensions between the local and global levels and brush over the fact that the virus
was first reported in China, it can also be explained in regard to the culture of
collectivism which is said to characterise China’s national culture. The varying
degrees to which the individual self feels part of a community also inform per-
sonal responsibility, the types of sanitary measures which are implemented by
a particular country and the acceptability of these measures for the country’s
Introduction 9
population. For example, differences can be established between the types of

measures and accompanying legislation that were put in place in the United
Kingdom and lean towards individual responsibility, compared to those applied
in France, which tend to reflect collective responsibility, as overseen by gov-
ernment and through the force of law. In regard to attitudes to time and space,
the afore-mentioned cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, together with
Hall’s (1959) theories of “chronemics” and “proxemics”, can serve to elucidate
why members of certain cultures coped better than others during the pandemic.
For instance, members of cultures recognised for having a “long-term” concep-
tion of time may cope better with the constantly changing conditions of the pan-
demic than those belonging to cultures with a “short-term” conception or those
whose members display less tolerance for ambiguous situations and uncertainty.
Similarly, measures of social distancing may be easier for members of those cul-
tures in which it is more habitual to “keep one’s distance”.
Of course, culture does not only apply in the national sense, or even in the
subnational sense (for instance, regional variants, which may or may not coincide
with formal institutions, such as Germany’s “landers”). According to the defini-
tion quoted above, the notion of culture can be applied to any “particular field,
activity, or societal characteristic”, and so, it would be inaccurate to equate cul-
ture simply with nation or country. For instance, organisational scholars argue
against a sole focus on country as the predominant level of analysis (Caprar et al.
2015); other dimensions need to be taken into account, such as corporate cul-
tures, the cultures of specific sectors of activity or what organisational commu-
nications scholar Sylvie Parrini-Alemanno (this volume) refers to as “culture of
professions”. Culture can also be interpreted in light of particular job types, such
as that of “knowledge-workers”, a category that has been granted special impetus
in the context of the new work order. These cultural variants, like many others,
lend themselves to an analysis in terms, for instance, of Michel Foucault’s (1970)
“cultural spaces” in which manifestations of culture (language, institutions, re-
ligious beliefs, economic systems, etc.) share a common fabric of representations
proper not only to physical spaces (for example, homes, classrooms, hospitals, the
workplace) but to abstract ones as well (the Internet, media, institutions, art). For
instance, a specific cultural space that cuts through much of the present volume is
that born out of the technological revolution: the digital culture that of “digital
natives”, along with other variants, such as the participatory culture of horizontal
knowledge sharing which is enacted thanks to the communication formats of the
Internet and social media.
This volume is itself the product of a virtual and cross-cultural collabora-
tion between academics and professionals. A deliberate choice has been made
to provide direct access to the voices of various actors in the professional sphere.
Moreover, the academics and professionals who are brought together here work
in a number of different countries, including the United Kingdom, the United
States, China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Germany, Sweden, Estonia and France.
France is the object of several contributions. It presents a particularly interesting
case in point: some striking phenomena can be explained in light of national

culture and tend to confirm the “French exception” (Godin and Chafer 2004),
a concept that encompasses both an analytical framework and a political and
polarised discursive space which can be applied to domains as varied as politics,
culture, the media and sport. According to this framework, specific character-
istics of French culture are traced to the centralised, protectionist, Jacobin state,
which “is supposed to dominate civil society and to play a more powerful role
than in any other Western democracy” (Godin and Chafer 2004: xvi). This re-
sults in deeply embedded state intervention, heavy bureaucracy and ambivalent
relations between the citizen and the state, all of which are perfectly illustrated
by the pandemic. For instance, the sanitary measures implemented by the cen-
tralised French state – ranging from lockdowns to closures, from fines to national
and regional curfews implemented from October 2020 to June 2021 (sometimes
beginning as early as 6 pm), from declaration forms which needed to be filled
out every time citizens went outside their front door, to early implementation of
a “sanitary pass” – were among the most numerous, complex and long-standing
of those imposed by European countries, if not the world.
Interestingly, as the labour sociologist Danièle Linhart points out, such top-
down control is echoed in the French workplace, which is characterised by a
mutual lack of trust between managers and workers, and where workers take
personal pride in their work and abide by the “rules of the trade” on the ba-
sis of a “logic of honour” (d’Iribarne 2019) which flouts standardised rules and
regulations imposed by delocalised management. This mistrust is also linked to
recent history and, in particular, to the Trente Glorieuses (the post-second-world-
war economic expansion in France) where ideologies of class struggle permeated
the main workers’ unions. French managers are, therefore, convinced that they
have to manage a particularly rebellious workforce and that they must exercise
tight control so that work is carried out in the right conditions and according to
the required objectives. During the pandemic, ambivalent attitudes in regard to
work were further amplified, as attested by the personal testimonials of student
interns presented in this volume.
And, of course, it is interesting that COVID-19 arguably provides the ulti-
mate defining moment for the theory of “biopower” developed by the French
sociologist Michel Foucault (1977). This theory conceptualises biopolitical con-
trol by governments of the, thus, constructed, subjected lives of citizens. But if
COVID-19 is the defining Foucauldian moment, it also constitutes the invalida-
tion of the Foucauldian dystopia of control. Indeed, the pandemic administers a
lesson of the limits of control. One way of looking at the virus is to view it as a
scapegrace trickster – one that respects no borders and appears to be always one
step ahead of the public authorities who had set out to control it.
This collection is organised into three sections and moves from the wider
context of the pandemic to impacts closer to the workplace. The first section –
“Communicating about COVID-19” – groups together studies which ex-
amine communication and management of the pandemic itself. Dominique
Introduction 11
Maingueneau discusses some of the many discursive realities of the manage-

ment of the pandemic. He underlines the exceptional circumstances it provided,
whereby everyone in the world was talking about the same thing at the same
time – and for a very long time. He examines some discursive resources that
were used to respond to the anxiety of the population, the word of experts and
the translation of the pandemic into statistics, and two new discursive practices
which were born out of it, websites entirely devoted to presenting statistical
tables and, in France (and elsewhere), a daily briefing by government officials.
The following two chapters turn specifically to digital communication. An-
tonin Segault addresses the issue of information assessment as part of the broader
media crisis triggered by the digital revolution. He focuses on the specific case of
Wikipedia and its coverage of the pandemic. Zhao Alexandre Huang and Ru-
dong Zhang present a study of two social media, Twitter and Weibo, and analyse
how diplomacy and geopolitics are carried out through the new technology.
They compare the Chinese government’s different use of each media in order
to subtly legitimise China’s political initiative of “a global community of health
for all”. China’s management and communication of the pandemic are also the
object of the chapter by Yating Yu and Dennis Tay, who apply a positive dis-
course analysis approach to remarks published by government spokespersons on
official websites, examining the message of solidarity as a discursive construct. In
Chapter 5, Elvis Buckwalter engages explicitly with the issue of culture, apply-
ing a multidisciplinary framework to analyse how COVID-19 has been handled
by governments and citizens. Drawing, for instance, on data taken from the
statistic-based websites analysed by Dominique Maingueneau, he argues that
contrasts in regulations and communication used by governments can be under-
stood in light of differences in national cultures.
Communication remains at the heart of the discussions presented in Section I –
“Communicating during COVID-19” – which turns specifically to the work-
place and the field of specialised communication. Almut Koester compares face-
to-face and online communication. She reviews key theoretical issues which
have received considerable attention from linguists and communication scholars,
compares the effectiveness of different channels of communication in various
domains of work and presents empirical evidence which demonstrates the value
of spoken face-to-face communication.
Spoken communication is taken up again in regard to the digital context by
Fiona Rossette-Crake, who examines the specific example of webinars. Webi-
nars became very popular during the pandemic; they are intrinsically linked to
the corporate world and are analysed here as the product of the wider social con-
text and also in regard to the interactive regime which they enact. The question
of the global workplace is specifically addressed by Helene Tenzer, who identifies
the challenges of managing multilingual teams in a virtual context. She, hence,
focuses on the question of language diversity, highlighting the difficulties once
multilingual teams move online and formulating a number of recommendations
in order to overcome such difficulties. The last chapter of this section presents
testimonials of five professionals, Leticia Correa do Carmo, Maria Martha

Gomez Villalon, Océane Juste, Juan Pinargote and Perrine Rozec, who identify
the challenges that they faced while communicating on the job during the pan-
demic. They speak, for instance, about the “dehumanised” dimension of online
communication, the drawbacks of managing an online event in comparison to a
face-to-face one and the future of online communication.
Section III – “COVID-19 and representations of the workplace” – deals with
the workplace more generally, particularly in the global context. The issue of re-
mote work is addressed in many of the chapters, beginning with the sociological
study by Danièle Linhart. This study reports on the results of a survey carried
out with interns during the pandemic in the context of France and highlights the
perceived advantages and disadvantages of remote work. The results are inter-
preted in light of general attitudes to work and the chapter concludes by looking
towards the models of work which await us in the future.
In Chapter 11, Sylvie Parrini-Alemanno engages with the notion of culture
via her concept of “culture of professions”. While this collection is mostly con-
cerned with office work, the choice has been made to highlight the very spe-
cific aspects of the work of health professionals, whom the pandemic forced into
the spotlight. This chapter traces the changing representations of this profession
throughout the different stages of the pandemic and the ways their culture – and,
therefore, their identity – have been either reinforced or jeopardised.
In Chapter 12, Raili Marling and Marge Käsper present a cultural comparison
of the way remote work is represented in three national contexts, as reflected by
newspapers from three countries (the United States, France and Estonia). As the
status of remote work shifted under the effect of the pandemic from that of priv-
ilege to that of duty, media representations shed light on the challenges raised by
remote work depending on the national cultural context. In the following chap-
ter, intercultural communications consultant Corinne Saurel reviews the impact
of COVID-19 on international managers and expatriates. Based on observations
she made during coaching sessions she gave during the pandemic, she addresses
intercultural issues, highlights the means by which a sense of belonging and trust
were still maintained across borders and underlines that while online communi-
cation allowed managers to “keep in touch”, it did not replace the socialising that
is necessary in the workplace long-term.
This section ends with a chapter of testimonials from three professionals,
Lucille Boulet, Olivier Motard and Samira Touam, who were living and work-
ing outside their country of origin during the pandemic. The chapter compares
living and working conditions in Germany, China and the United States: it re-
ports on the different approaches adopted by the public authorities of each of
these three countries in order to manage COVID-19 and underlines specific
challenges faced within the international workplace during the pandemic and
how these managers and their organisations met them.
The collection concludes with a “virtual round-table discussion” which brings
together researchers and actors from varying workplaces. The panellists address
Introduction 13
the question of cultural difference with respect to both the pandemic and work
practice, as well as the short- and long-term impact of COVID-19 within the
global workplace. The format which has been chosen – a transcribed dialogue –
which echoes the format adopted in the two previous chapters of professional
testimonials, may be interpreted as a wink and a nod (again, a virtual one) to
the increasing hybridity of communication formats which, under the influence
of the digital medium, are seeing conventions and elements of spoken language
gaining ground within a number of formats based on written language.
We would like to conclude this introduction by identifying three recurrent
issues which emerge from a number of the chapters of this volume. The first per-
tains to the question of surveillance and power. Assisted by digital technology,
remote working brings with it a number of means of surveillance of workers
which are currently the object of debate in management and trade union circles.
Similar surveillance, again made possible by technology, in the form of QR
codes, and “vaccination” and “sanitary” passes, has been implemented by public
authorities in a number of countries around the world in an attempt to bring the
pandemic under control.
The question of surveillance points to the more general issue of power, as well
as to that of trust. Power, as crystallised by the COVID-19 pandemic, constitutes
the archetypal question of the postmodern era. Power is now being enacted in
new contexts and in new ways – such as the emblematic power to mute partic-
ipants’ microphones during an online conference, or to disconnect participants
from the meeting with the mere click of a button. It can be argued that the power
play inherent to communication practices has never been as coercive as it is now.
The same applies to the issue of which voices are being heard. Returning
again to the pandemic itself, there has been considerable debate about its cover-
age within mainstream media, which have sometimes been accused, whatever
the context of the country, of serving the purposes of government communi-
cation and leaving little room for counter-discourses, which have moved to the
social networks (at least, for those populations who have access to the Internet).
Questions of how information can be assessed and which source of information
can be trusted are paramount. Like solidarity, trust is constructed and maintained
discursively, and like never before, the main challenge for leaders, be they in
business or in government, is to succeed in gaining trust when they communi-
cate. Scholarship in this field offers multiple perspectives and remains essential.
The second issue concerns remote work, lifestyle and life choices and ine-
qualities generated by specific models of work. On the one hand, the new virtual
workplace that has been thrust onto organisations as a result of the pandemic
has facilitated work practice. For example, online interactions have been stand-
ardised through videoconferencing platforms with homogenous functionalities,
allowing for participants to work with colleagues around the world regardless of
time zones and creating new opportunities. But, on the other hand, remote work
and virtual communication raise challenges when it comes to building cohesive
work relations, managing cultural differences, establishing trust in the context of
building new partnerships or clinching new trade agreements. Looking beyond

the pandemic, many employers are toying with the idea of long-term remote
work or hybrid work models. But if work is the primary means for socialisation
in society as we know it, what sociological, psychological and cognitive impacts
can there be for a long-term and widespread implementation of remote work?
For instance, some young interns working remotely during COVID-19 admitted
that they had withdrawn into themselves, but in the end preferred to remain far
from the madding crowd of the open-place office. The pandemic has served as a
catalyst with people reassessing what they want from work, and the place work
takes in their lives. Currently, many members of the young generation who are
starting out in the workforce appear more motivated by the values of the com-
pany than by the salary package that the company offers.
Moreover, if COVID-19 marked the “democratisation” of remote work, it
does not provide benefits for all sectors of work and has left some workers more
vulnerable than others. For some, it simply results in increased workloads, more
dehumanised “processes” and increased power and control by managers – both
symbolically and concretely. Like the late-capitalist workplace of the first part of
the 21st century, the post-COVID-19 workplace is likely to be tough, a micro-
cosm of the power relations that play out in the world at large. One paradox is
that this is set against the backdrop of the surge in corporate social responsibility
discourses and the official concern shown for workers’ well-being via the crea-
tion of new positions such as “happiness” or “wellness” managers. And it should
be noted that while this volume contains testimonials from the private sector, it
can be posited that workers in the public sector face similar challenges, particu-
larly since similar styles of management have been adopted by public institutions
over the past three decades (Fairclough 1993). According to quantitative studies
released by the OECD, the overall impact of remote work during the pandemic
is “ambiguous” and varies depending on the country (OECD 2021). And, as
noted earlier, it also depends on the profession. Interestingly, among the recom-
mendations made to policymakers in order to sustain the benefits of remote work
into the future, a specific point is made of “helping surmount cultural hurdles”
(OECD 2020).
A third point which emerges from the volume and is linked to the previous
issue relates to the question of identity – and, therefore, culture. In most socie-
ties, as they have developed, much of our self-worth is based on our work, and
much of our individual identity is based on the sense of belonging to a specific
profession. This may, of course, vary according to culture (for instance, national
culture). However, just like the culture of professions of health workers, all cul-
tures of professions are undergoing acute transformations. Similarly, if for pre-
vious generations, “the office” had been a metonymy for work in general, the
model of remote work has made this rhetorical shortcut redundant. A sense of
redundancy is felt by many workers, such as those whose profession has been
made unnecessary due to technologisation, has been profoundly redefined (such
as teaching, with the rise of online teaching and automatised platforms) or has
Introduction 15
been stigmatised as providing a “non-essential” service in the context of imposed

closures introduced to control the pandemic. COVID-19 has thrown the work-
place into flux, accelerating changes that were already on the way prior to 2020.
One dimension not dealt with in this volume relates to generational culture. In-
deed, most of the testimonials presented are given by professionals who belong to
generations Y and Z, that is, the generations born as of the 1980s, defined notably
according to their adoption of new technology (“digital natives”). They are,
therefore, relatively at ease with a number of recently introduced online com-
munication and work practices – again, at least those who have the privilege to
access them (Ryan and Nanda 2022). The generational culture of workers born
earlier raises specific questions in terms of identity which also warrant attention.
A crisis of identity specific to work is one dimension of the identity crises that are
playing out for many as we move towards the second quarter of the 21st century.
Finally, we would like to return to the choices made while putting this vol-
ume together. It is hoped that the volume bears witness to the value of transdis-
ciplinary scholarship. Many of the aforementioned issues are multidimensional;
as such, they beg investigation from multiple angles and benefit from being ap-
proached from within several academic disciplines at once. The digital revo-
lution, and more specifically Web 2.0, has ushered in a new “information and
knowledge economy” and, at the same time, a new “cultural space”. This has,
for instance, resulted in a model of horizontal knowledge sharing and a de-
compartmentalisation of knowledge. With the difficulties of information assess-
ment mentioned earlier, academic research is increasingly more essential, and it
is thought that transdisciplinary scholarship has a legitimate place in this new
cultural context (without, however, cow-towing to it) and that it is no doubt also
better equipped to better apprehending the complexities of the post-COVID-19
world that awaits us.
Notes
1 Alice Galopin, France Télévisions, February 8, 2021. Our translation of the original
headline in French “Pourquoi la visioconférence met-elle notre cerveau K.-O. (et comment
riposter)?”.
2 French daily Libération, January 15, 2021. Our translation of the French “Donner des
cours à distance, une visio de l’horreur”.
3 According to Casper Grathwohl, President of Oxford Languages, speaking during
the webinar “Words of an unprecedented year”, December 16, 2020. https://lan-
guages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2020/#webinar
4 The New York Times, June 9, 2020.
5 The survey was carried out on interns completing internships to complete a two-year
master’s programme in intercultural and international management, Paris, June 2020.
6 Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
7 Entry for “Culture” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/culture/.
8 As highlighted by the authors, at the beginning of the pandemic, some 3.5 billion
people on the planet still did not have regular access to the Internet, and while digital
communication has no doubt grown, it is still a medium used by a relative global
minority. Consequences have notably been felt in education, social life and, of course,
employment, with inequalities in regard to the possibility of remote work depending
not only on access to the Internet but also on job type and geographical location:
“[t]he ability to transition one’s job online has as much to do with what kind of job it
is as to where the employee is living” (Ryan and Nanda 2022, page number to add).
See also Parrini-Alemanno, and concluding virtual round table discussion (both this
volume).
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Possibilities. London: Routledge.
PART I
Communicating about
COVID-19
2
RESPONDING TO THE PANDEMIC
A discourse analysis approach
Dominique Maingueneau
A situation of discursive saturation

We spontaneously understand the pandemic as a biological, medical or social
reality. If we adopt the first point of view, we study the structure of viruses, their
mutations, the release of antibodies, etc. If we adopt the second point of view,
we are interested in the modes of transmission, the drugs and the therapeutic
protocols. If we adopt the third point of view, we raise other questions: which
groups are the most affected, and for what reasons? What are the psychological
or economic consequences of a generalised lockdown? How is the authority of
scientific authorities questioned?
But it is also necessary to consider the pandemic as a reality emanating out
of discourse, to “loosen the apparently strong embrace of words and things”,
to “maintain the discourse in its consistency”, instead of making it “the sign of
something else” (Foucault 1969, 65). In fact, saying that the pandemic is also a
discursive reality is not strange: when we speak of COVID-19, we are, in fact,
speaking of a denomination constructed by an international organisation; when
we evoke “scientific facts”, we are, in fact, evoking scientific publications; when
we evoke “the figures of the pandemic”, we are, in fact, evoking a multitude of
semiotic practices of construction and diffusion of these figures; when we interview
a biologist on television, we are activating a genre and so on.
In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, the role played by discourse has
been reinforced by the existence of digital technologies, which allow utterances
to be produced or disseminated at any time, independently of well-established
information channels. Now, the population is constantly connected not only to
utterances coming from “above” but also to masses of utterances that constantly
assess these “official” utterances.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-4
22 Dominique Maingueneau
In this contribution, I will not deal with the consequences of the crisis on
discursive activities (in particular, the development of Online Video Platforms
for teaching or working), but only with discourses that deal with the pandemic.
It is impossible to explore all the multiple aspects of the discursive production
triggered by the pandemic; I will only highlight a few features that seem relevant
to approach this pandemic from a discourse analysis perspective. I will not take
into account the discourses that circulate on social networks, but I am well aware
that they play a very important role in this crisis. As we cannot deal with this
question without taking into account the different phases of the pandemic and
the countries concerned, I will draw my examples from the year 2020 and from
Western Europe, especially France. This period has not been chosen at random:
the illness caused by the COVID-19 SARS virus was hitherto unknown.
Successful treatments did not exist at first; therefore, medical treatment
was based on trial and error. Scientists across the globe started investigat-
ing the origin, composition, spread and ever new mutations of the virus
They collaborated in numerous attempts to develop a new vaccine and to
find adequate medication; this finally succeeded in the northern hemi-
sphere autumn and winter of 2020 and, in December 2020, the first elderly
patients in the UK were vaccinated.
(Wodak 2021, 2).
Not only did the population have very little reliable information about the dis-
ease (its origin, effects, mode of transmission), but it was subjected to a lockdown
or under the permanent threat of a lockdown. The conditions were, thus, met for
the development of an intense discursive production to respond to the anxiety
of the population.
Unlike other crises, the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic brought
us close to the conditions of a thought experiment. By “thought experiment”,
philosophers mean a way of solving a problem using imagination when the con-
ditions of an experiment are not feasible: “what would happen if…?” In the case
of the pandemic: what would happen if all the media in the world were dealing
with the same topic all day long? What would happen if humans could only
communicate through technical mediation?
I just asked the question “What would happen if all the media in the world
were dealing with the same topic all day long?” To designate this kind of sit-
uation, discourse analysts have at their disposal the concept of “discursive mo-
ment”: “the emergence in the media of an intense and diversified discursive
production about the same event (such as May 1968, War in Kosovo, Russian
intervention in Chechnya, the World Football Cup, the Cannes Festival, the
mad cow crisis…)” (Moirand, in dictionary edited by Charaudeau and Maingue-
neau 2002, 389). The COVID-19 pandemic highlights two characteristics of a
discursive moment – the intensity of production and the diversity of the genres
involved – but it also goes beyond this framework, for three reasons:
A discourse analysis approach 23
– In ordinary discursive moments, the production of texts may be intense,

but it does not saturate the entire media space for months on end, as the
COVID-19 did. In the first month, the pandemic was a kind of media black
hole that absorbed all the information.
– The event that triggers a discursive moment is in the principle of interest
only to a part, sometimes a very small part, of humanity, or even to a single
country: the mad cow crisis – just like the riots and strikes which occurred in
May 1968 in France – certainly was not a “discursive moment” in Indonesia
or Ecuador. But in the case of COVID-19 the whole world was concerned.
The virus threatens each individual for the sole reason that he or she is a hu-
man being; everyone must ask themselves what they should and should not
do to avoid getting sick. We can even go further: each region of the globe
was obliged to keep abreast of what was happening in other regions because
it could have an impact on everyone, directly or indirectly: should travellers
from a particular country be forbidden access? Did a new variant appear? Is
the focus of the pandemic shifting? Can we predict from the example of this
or that country the evolution in ours? Is the policy of our governments more
effective than the one implemented elsewhere? And so on.
– Even if they have monopolised the media’s attention, the September 11th
attacks in New York or the 2015 Islamist massacres in Paris have changed
the way of life of only a small minority of people. In the case of COVID-19,
it is the whole of existence that is concerned: to preserve one’s health, one
must be informed about the disease. The pandemic invaded the media but
also the whole existence of individuals, whose smallest gestures in daily life
were the subject of debate in the media: should we wash the vegetables? Is it
possible to touch elevator buttons? How far away should we stand from each
other? How long does the virus survive on paper? On metal? And so on.
Under these conditions, it would be more relevant to speak of “discursive

saturation”.
Crisis and experts

In regard to this pandemic, the term that is widely used is “crisis”, which can be
characterised in the following way: “The structure of discontinuity […] affecting
the regularly progressive development of a process whose meaning is thereby
decisively and significantly altered, compromised and put at risk” (Auroux 1998,
511).1 The regular process, by the very irruption of this discontinuity, retrospec-
tively reveals itself as harmony, as an equilibrium which has been threatened or
lost. The medical metaphor plays a key role here: the opposition between health
and disease, or life and death, lies in the background. From this viewpoint, the
notion of health crisis seems redundant: any crisis affects the health of an entity.
Among crises, we can distinguish a restricted subset, that of “catastrophes”:
an unexpected and brutal event that affects an entire community (Maingueneau
2019). Various types can be distinguished: material catastrophes (fires, hurri-

canes, tsunamis, etc.), economical catastrophes (such as the financial crisis of
2008) and so on. Some of them jeopardise the values of the community, causing
a momentary loss of its bearings. For the COVID-19 crisis, it is not only the lives
of people that are at stake but also fundamental values (Condit 2020; Piccoli et al.
2020; Qi 2021), as the debates that have emerged show: should the economy be
preferred to health? Can the dying be deprived of the presence of their families?
Is it democratic to monitor the entire population? Can religious cults be banned?
Do governments have the right to force the population to be vaccinated?
By nature, such a crisis creates a deep uncertainty: “everyone expects instruc-
tions for action, planning, explanations and ultimately security” (Wodak 2021,
2).2 The virus creates fear, and discourse is summoned to respond to that fear, to
restore a sense of security. There is no longer any neutral speech: it is only about
health or illness, life or death. When the media talk about the health crisis, their
speeches also help to reassure or worry, heal or make people sick. And it is on the
basis of this simple and brutal criterion that everything that is said in the media
is constantly assessed by the addressees.
Each type of catastrophe induces specific therapeutic manifestations of dis-
course. When the Islamist massacre occurred in Paris on November 13, 2015,
police response and compassion prevailed. On the one hand, the government in-
tervened to denounce the enemies, launch police investigations, mobilise the army,
in short, to restore order; on the other hand, we saw on social networks the out-
pouring of compassion towards Paris. In this regard, we can mention the sentences
“I am Paris” and “Pray for Paris” that instantly spread throughout the world.
Regarding the pandemic, we find the division between two sources of dis-
cursive production: that which comes from the authorities and the recognised
media, and that which comes from below, through social networks, blogs and
messages transmitted by smartphones. But in all cases, to reassure, to conjure up
anxiety, it is the scientific knowledge, carried by the word of experts that is at the
centre. They must above all show that the situation is intellectually under control
that the event that suddenly erupts is not opaque: certainly, a terrible evil assails
us, but thanks to science we know it and we know how to defend ourselves. The
difference between terms like “plague”, on the one hand, and “Coronavirus” or
”COVID-19”, on the other hand, is significant in this respect. Until the 19th
century, the name “plague” was used to designate any serious epidemic, like the
Latin word “pestis” which meant both “disease” and “destruction”. The disease
was, thus, understood from the point of view of its destructive effects on man.
On the other hand, “coronavirus” and “COVID-19” are scientific categorisa-
tions: “coronavirus” indicates a biological category (virus) and a subcategory (co-
rona); COVID-19 gives the same information in an abbreviated form by adding
“disease” and the number of the year of its appearance: “COronaVirus Infectious
Disease 2019”. By using a term stemming from scientific English and officially
validated by international organisations, the pathogen is enclosed in a category
whose properties have been well documented by scientists.
But a scientist is not an “expert” for his or her colleagues. He is an expert only
in the media. During the pandemic, the media have been swarming with experts
who are invited to give explanations to the lay person. However, this popularisa-
tion is not that of a mediator who tries to make scientific production intelligible
to an audience driven by a pure desire to understand: people demand immediate
answers on how to manage their lives.
Usually, when the demand for knowledge is triggered by an event (for in-
stance, hurricanes bring meteorologists to the television sets, assassinations are
the business of psychiatrists or psychologists), the explanations of the experts
serve above all to shed light on the events: they do not directly concern the
viewers’ existence. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 really affected the lives of only a
small part of the American people, but it did interest the entire population, in
the United States and in many other countries. This has nothing to do with the
popularisation implied by the COVID-19 crisis, which has immediate practical
consequences. If a professor of medicine comes on the television at prime time
and says that it is useless to wear a mask, these words, whether he or she likes it
or not, will serve to legitimise decisions made by actors in the health or political
world and will influence the behaviour of part of the population. If he or she
says that serological tests are not reliable or that antibodies only confer transitory
immunity, this may incite parents to put their children in school or not, or to go
back to work or not.
Anxious audiences reading or listening to the experts demand certain an-
swers. The problem is that experts often have differing opinions and that the
pandemic, by its multidimensional nature, exceeds the specialised knowledge
of each of them. Moreover, knowledge about the virus, its transmission and its
effects is constantly evolving: every day, a multitude of articles on the subject
are published. No infectious disease specialist who runs an overloaded hospital
department and has to answer questions from news websites, radio stations or
television channels is able to read this multitude of publications. And even if he
does, he will not arrive at certainties because these publications do not study the
same data in the same way and do not lead to the same conclusions.
Confronted with the demand for certainty, the experts provide responses
which oscillate between two extremes: they can authoritatively give precise and
assured answers or they can put forward their doubts, or even their ignorance.
But they do present this ignorance as being that of the entire scientific commu-
nity: “at the present time, research has not been able to establish whether…”, “we
do not yet know under what conditions…”, etc. When they speak in the media,
scientists are, in fact, subjected to two contradictory injunctions. They are given
the floor to deliver certainties; but they are invited because they belong to a com-
munity which values doubt and debate. The researcher interviewed in the media
is, thus, torn between the need to conform to the speech contract implied by the
genre in which he or she participates and the need to conform to the norms of
the superaddressee (Bakhtin 1981) that legitimise him or her as a scientist in the
eyes of his or her peers.
In media genres intended for the general public, the pressure to deliver cer-
tainties is much stronger than in programmes intended for an elite, where the
experts, to enhance their image, have on the contrary an interest in underlining
the complexity of the phenomenon and the absence of certainty. Scientists who
meet the expectations of the general public can become media “stars”, but they
run the risk of being sidelined by the scientific community. This is the case in
France of Professor Didier Raoult, who treated patients with hydroxychloro-
quine; he was accused by many colleagues of basing his statements on results
that were not scientifically validated, but he gained extraordinary popularity on
social networks (Smyrnaios et al. 2021).
The COVID-19 pandemic has also helped to highlight the fact that the tradi-
tional model of popularisation has been undermined by digital communication.
This phenomenon did not appear with the COVID-19 pandemic, but it took an
extreme turn on this occasion. In the traditional model, “high” utterances, that
is, words of authority, must be adapted for the lay person, who is located in an
inferior position. On social networks and in the comments on articles published
by websites, a multitude of utterances are always questioning the validity of the
texts produced by scientific authorities. They cast doubt on official figures, the
explanations given on the causes of the pandemic and the safety of vaccines,
and they promote alternative therapies to those recommended by the health au-
thorities. Digital communication has made it possible to have this systematic
contestation of what could be called the political-media “Authorised Sphere”,
which claims to submit to norms: moral norms (refusal of discrimination, insults,
etc.), but also intellectual norms (verification of sources, conformity to scientific
protocols, etc.). Likewise, on websites, the superiority of the journalist’s position
is constantly called into question by its association with an indefinite number of
“comments” or tweets of unknown origin that accuse the Authorised Sphere of
hiding the truth.
In the case of the COVID-19 crisis, the weakening of the traditional model of
popularisation has been aggravated by the fact that within the Authorised Sphere
itself the authority of Science has been eroded by a disruption in the normal
temporality of scientific publications.
In the ideal functioning of scientific production, as a first step the text begins
a slow process which leads it to a possible publication, after a series of revisions
requested by the reviewers. A second stage may then begin: the discussion of the
results by other publications, themselves submitted to reviewers. Once a result
has been stabilised, either because there is a consensus among specialists or be-
cause the hypothesis is deemed credible by a significant part of the community,
it can be popularised. But with the urgency created by the COVID-19 crisis,
these filters cannot work: thousands of articles are “published” on the Web with-
out any other control than that of their authors. Moreover – and this is just as
important – these texts are immediately read by actors closely linked to the me-
dia so that they can be massively disseminated outside the scientific world. This
diffusion inevitably generates controversies among scientists, which are amplified
by social networks. The debates about the efficiency of vaccination or hydrox-

ychloroquine blur the usual boundaries between common opinion, science and
politics:
This demonstrates once again the complexification of the contemporary

public space and the now functional integration of social networks into
the media system. This logic extends abroad and in particular to two
countries, the United States and Brazil, where the proposal to use HCQ
[=hydroxychloroquine] to cure COVID-19 has become a political issue
of primary importance, as it has been instrumentalised to justify the non-
interventionist policies of Trump and Bolsonaro.
(Smyrnaios et al. 2021, 52)
Politicians and experts

The words of scientific experts are at the centre of the discursive production gen-
erated by the pandemic, but the politicians are the ones who make the decisions.
Those in power must give the population the feeling that they are competent and
that the situation is under control thanks to the appropriate actions they are tak-
ing. The problem is that in the case of the pandemic, “appropriate” action cannot
ignore the authority of medical experts. The crucial question is, therefore, the
articulation between scientific and political discourse.
The official position of scientists is that they must not be contaminated by po-
litical imperatives: real science must be autonomous. As for the political leaders,
they keep saying that science should not dictate its will to politics, that tech-
nocracy is dangerous for democracy. In reality, as the sociology of science has
abundantly shown, in particular, the actor–network theory (Latour 1993; Akrich
et al. 2013), between these two worlds, the interferences are constant and they
become particularly visible with COVID-19, which mixes medical, industrial,
economic and ethical problems.
In the first months of the pandemic, one could observe two types of attitudes
towards scientists on the part of governments. Some kept them at a distance (like
Trump in the United States, or Bolsonaro in Brazil), but most of them, in order
to shield their decisions from any contestation, have constantly tried to show the
public that they were acting in accordance with the scientists’ advice. This is the
case in France.
On March 11, 2020, the government created a “scientific committee” of 11
experts:
The creation of this committee – or scientific “council” –, requested by

the Head of State, was announced this Wednesday, March 11, by the Min-
ister of Health Olivier Véran. Its mission, a press release from the Ministry
explained, is “to inform public decision-making in the management of
the health situation related to the coronavirus”. The committee, chaired
by Professor Jean-François Delfraissy (immunologist and president of the

National Consultative Ethics Committee), is composed of a total of 11
experts, doctors and researchers.3
For the government, what matters is that the media say that the decisions about
the management of the crisis will be made by taking into account the conclusions
of this committee:
It is after consultation with the “scientific committee” which is monitoring the coro-
navirus crisis that Emmanuel Macron announced the closure of day care
centers, schools, colleges, high schools and universities on Thursday, March
12 until further notice. It is also after consultation with this same committee that
the Prime Minister Édouard Philippe announced, this Friday, the ban on
gatherings of more than 100 people.4
But this strategy immediately runs into difficulties. Scrupulously following the
advice of medical experts to eradicate the pandemic cannot fail to trigger a seri-
ous economic crisis. Instead of a harmonious convergence between two types of
actors, politicians and scientists, the management of COVID-19 actually involves
a triangle that integrates politicians, medical experts and economic experts. Pol-
iticians would prefer to take a back seat to medical experts, but they are obliged
to do what is at the very heart of politics: make decisions with uncertain results in
situations where they do not control all the parameters. They are, thus, obliged
to produce statements for which they are fully responsible, to make rhetoric, in
order to justify debatable decisions to the population.
Moreover, an ambiguity appears in the qualifier “scientific” attributed to this
committee. A pandemic is not a biological phenomenon but a phenomenon with
multiple dimensions. Among the 11 members of this committee, we find, logi-
cally, professors of medicine (an immunologist, two infectious disease specialists,
a virologist, an epidemiologist) but also researchers from the social sciences. The
medical professors themselves are, in fact, personalities who have a double affilia-
tion: to medicine and health policy, in state or parastatal organisations. Thus, the
committee’s chairman, Jean-François Delfraissy, is not only an immunologist but
also since 2016 the president of the “National Consultative Ethics Committee
for Life Sciences and Health”. Another member, Franck Chauvin, is president of
the “High Council for Public Health”. This has advantages: politicians ask the
opinion of people with whom they work regularly and the two points of view are
easily harmonised. But this efficiency has its limits. Television and radio channels
are constantly inviting scientists with much greater authority to ask them to as-
sess the statements of the Committee.
In order to protect itself from criticism, on March 24, only 13 days after the
creation of the “Scientific Committee”, the French government created a second
one, the “Analysis, Research and Expertise Committee”. The same argument
was put forward to create both committees: “decision-making must be informed

by scientific experts”:
Faced with a health crisis of global proportions, public decision-making

must be informed by scientific experts. This is why the President of the Re-
public set up, on March 24, the COVID-19 Analysis, Research and Exper-
tise Committee (CARE), composed of twelve researchers and physicians,
and chaired by Françoise Barré-Sinoussi, laureate of the Nobel Prize for
Medicine. This independent body, which reports to Olivier Véran, Min-
ister of Solidarity and Health, and Frédérique Vidal, Minister of Higher
Education, Research and Innovation, fulfils a function of rapid scientific
expertise, at the request of the government, to which it sends opinions.5
The government was undoubtedly hoping to base its decisions on the indisputa-
ble authority of “Science”, but it seems impossible to make Science speak with a
single voice. It must now arbitrate between two “scientific” committees, which
obey distinct logics, while taking into account the multitude of “scientific” news
studies that circulate in the media, which themselves often relay information
from social networks.
Figures
If we now consider not the nature of the authority at the source of the discourses
on the pandemic but their content, it is impossible not to be struck by the crucial
role played by the figures and the graphic representations that they make possible
(for example, tables, maps and curves). This is an aspect that is less highlighted by
discourse analysts than lexicon or argumentation, because figures are transversal
to the genres and they do not fully belong to natural language. Yet they play a
key role in fighting against anxiety, by transforming the unrepresentable into
something representable and enclosing it in controlled grids.
Whereas the virus can be observed under an electron microscope, the pan-
demic as a pandemic exists only in the figures it leaves behind. Everyone has
heard of sick people in their neighbourhood or is in contact with a sick person
in their family, but this is not enough to constitute a pandemic. Even the health
staff in a hospital only see a certain number of sick people: they do not see the
pandemic. Once it is translated into figures that cover cities, regions, countries
and continents, the pandemic is no longer just this elusive and invisible force that
surrounds and dominates me, and it is also something that I can dominate. A fa-
mous thought of Blaise Pascal (1963, 513) from the 17th century comes to mind
here: “By space the universe encompasses me and swallows me up like an atom; by
thought I comprehend the world”. We could transpose his sentence as follows:
“The pandemic encompasses me and swallows me up like an atom: by figures
I comprehend it”. Numbers are meant to be objective and independent of any
culture; they can measure a pandemic which, by definition, is global; thanks to

them, it can be represented in a homogeneous way in any place on the planet.
It is not only during pandemics that figures play a key role in our societies
(Bacot et al. 2012). Just think of the economy, with its stock market fluctuations,
inflation rates, unemployment rates, growth rates or changes in gross domestic
product. But while few people regularly consult the economic figures in detail,
a considerable number of people scrutinise the pandemic figures every day with
concern. And never before have the media provided so many figures, in the most
diverse modes, which are constantly updated: for instance, the numbers of new
infections, hospitalised patients, patients in intensive care, cured patients, tests
performed, rate of reproduction of the infection or patients by age group. The
statistics even allow comparisons: between towns or regions of the same country,
between countries and between continents.
One interesting case in point could be found on The New York Times website
on May 26, 2020. Internet users could first see a table that did not list infected or
hospitalised patients, but the probability of the disease spreading in the United
States in the coming days, county by county. All you had to do was click on
“Search any U.S. area” to access the smallest divisions of the territory.
Perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon is that statistics are not only offered
by newspapers and news websites but are the sole content of specialised sites that
are not intended for a circle of epidemiologists although they are of great density
and complexity. For example:
– “COVID-19 Global tracker” (https://graphics.reuters.com/world-coronavirus-

tracker-and-maps/)
– “COVID Tracker” (https://covidtracker.fr/covidtracker-world/)
– “Coronavirus-Statistiques” (https://www.coronavirus-statistiques.com/)
– “Worldometers /coronavirus” (https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/)
These sites themselves are in addition to the extraordinarily detailed statistics

offered by the sites managed by the administrations in each country and by in-
ternational organisations.
This unprecedented proliferation is largely due to the possibilities offered by
computers: with a series of clicks, Internet users can choose their language and
build singular paths through curves and tables, according to the criteria they
choose. Not only can they go from level to level, but they can also modify a
table or a curve by changing the method of calculation: for instance, absolute
frequency, percentage, geometric or logarithmic progression.
The procedures for constructing the figures are insufficiently taken into ac-
count by discourse analysts. Producing figures means first of all arranging phe-
nomena in pre-established categories such as dead people, patients consulting a
doctor, masks stored in a warehouse, positive tests and transforming them into
figures. Indeed, when an employee in a vaccination centre or a pharmacy enters
figures into the cells of a worksheet, then sends this file to another employee,
who will himself or herself enter these data into a new worksheet and transforms
them into a curve generated by a programme; when other employees integrate
these curves into reports, notes, balance sheets, memorandums, we are far from
usual corpora that discourse analysts deal with. But discourse can no longer be
reduced to oral interactions and institutional texts; given the key role that figures
play in our society, we must take into account the practices that make them pos-
sible, even when they do not produce texts in the usual sense of the term. It is on
this obscure production that a wide range of institutions (public administrations,
research institutes, consulting firms, trade unions, NGOs, international organi-
sations, etc.) rely to fulfil their function.
In this regard, the comparison with the last major pandemic, the Hong Kong
flu (1968–1970), which killed more than one million people, is revealing. What
strikes commentators most today is the low media profile of this epidemic, which
was not on the front pages of newspapers. But the low visibility of this pandemic
was itself linked to the absence of standardised procedures for collecting and
transmitting data, in a world that did not have digital communication. In France,
we had to wait until 2003, with the research of epidemiologist Antoine Fla-
hault, to know the number of deaths, which was nonetheless considerable: 31,226
deaths in two months (Bourdelais 2006; Flahault and Zylberman 2008). Neither
the population nor the political authorities had the resources to represent, in real
time, the pandemic as a pandemic.
Usually, the media give figures from official organisations without systemat-
ically discussing their validity; they only serve as a basis for writing articles or
news. With the coronavirus the situation has changed. A multitude of contro-
versies develop over the reliability of the figures and the manipulations they may
have undergone, alongside the usual debates over the effectiveness of govern-
ment health policy.
A large number of articles question the official figures. This is the case, for
example, in this text from a radio station financed by the American government.
It talks about the situation in Iran in March 2020:
Conflicting Coronavirus Death Figures in Iran Range from 237

to 2,000
Although Iran announces new infection and death numbers daily, many
observers inside and outside the country have questioned the validity of official figures
for technical and political reasons.
Meanwhile, Iranian officials are still refusing to disclose the death toll in Teh-
ran, Qom and Gilan provinces, the worst affected parts of the country.
A local official in Gilan said on Sunday that at least 200 have died in the
province.
Some of the foreign-based Persian-speaking media outlets have put the
death toll over 500 last week and have been increasing the number gradu-
ally, citing “informed sources in Iran,” without any clear indication about
the status or position of their sources.
Inside Iran, Mostafa Faghihi, who maintains the pro-Rouhani En-

tekhab news website, topped the highest figures released by foreign-based
media and announced on his Telegram channel that the death toll is over
2,000, while calling on health minister Saeed Namaki to disclose the real figures.
(my emphasis)6
But what characterises the situation created by the pandemic is not the fact that one
cannot believe in official statistics from countries that are not considered very “dem-
ocratic”, but that in all countries, a considerable part of the debates has been devoted
not to discussing political decisions but to discussing the procedures for constructing
the statistics of the pandemic. The debate may concern both the techniques of rep-
resentation (advantages and disadvantages of such a kind of curve or histogram, the
necessity of systematically giving the figures in relation to the number of inhabitants
and so on) and the establishment of the basis for the calculation: should all the patients
who died in nursing homes for elderly people be included or not? What about those
who die at home? And about those who also suffer from other pathologies?
On the website of the weekly magazine Politico, for example, this article ques-
tions the British government’s statistics; written by someone who is presented
as a statistics specialist (David Spiegelhalter is chair of the Winton Centre for Risk
and Evidence Communication at the University of Cambridge and author of “The Art of
Statistics: Learning from Data”), it aims at giving “the true numbers”:
The trouble with coronavirus death tolls

Daily mortality figures don’t reflect the true numbers.
[…] According to the criteria used by the U.K. government, the 100,000
figure refers only includes people who died within 28 days of a positive
COVID test.
But in the early days and months of the pandemic, many people were
not initially tested and therefore were not included in the tally of COVID
deaths. Meanwhile, anyone who survived more than 28 days before suc-
cumbing to COVID will also not be included.
This, naturally, results in an undercount. On the flipside, someone who
is unfortunate enough to get a positive test, recover, only to be run over by
a bus two weeks later will be recorded as a COVID death.
For the most accurate statistics, it’s best to look at the Office of National
Statistics data on death registrations, which show that more than 100,000
people in the U.K. had already died with COVID on their death certifi-
cate by January 7, nearly three weeks ago. This number rose to 108,000 by
January 15, and the total now will be nearly 120,000.7
It is not only on television, in the print media or on radio stations that official
figures are challenged, but also on social networks and in comments posted on
news websites. Whatever the purpose of the argument, the figures always serve
as the ultimate proof.
There is nothing surprising about this. In the context of the pandemic, figures
are implicitly integrated into the curve of an elementary narrative that underlies the
whole crisis, the one that the authorities are trying to make people accept: the path
that leads from night to light, from death to health. The statistical curves are ab-
sorbed into a narrative curve that is organised around a “peak”, the crucial moment
when the epidemic will ebb, and with it the anguish. If the figures are false, the
world then becomes obscure and distressing: we can no longer fit into a reliable nar-
rative, organised around a point where the signs reverse, from negative to positive.
A ritual
When we adopt a perspective of discourse analysis on the pandemic, we cannot
simply consider the content of the utterances: we must also take into account the
institutions of speech that they imply. A crisis of such magnitude necessarily has
consequences for the very practices of production and dissemination of discourse.
We have seen above, for example, how the disruption of the normal temporality
of scientific publications has consequences on the authority that the population
grants to scientists. The creation of “scientific committees” by the government
results in the appearance of a collective actor who produces and puts into circu-
lation a certain kind of text but also in the appearance of individual speakers, that
is, the members of these committees, who speak in the media on behalf of the
committee or on their own behalf. It also happens that new discursive practices
appear: for example, these websites which are entirely devoted to epidemiologi-
cal statistics but are intended for the whole population.
To conclude, I will mention another practice that was triggered by the pandemic
and that is part of government communication. It closely links the three aspects I
have underlined in this contribution: the role of scientific experts, the relationship
between scientific authority and political decisions and the importance of figures.
When considering the discursive production of governments, the attention of dis-
course analysts is naturally drawn to the solemn speeches in which leaders justify
their decisions (Silva-Antunes et al. 2021; Wodak 2021). These speeches may deal
with an exceptional crisis, but they mobilise classical communication formats and
rhetorical resources. This is not the case for the routine of the “Point Presse Coro-
navirus” (Coronavirus Press briefing) which was established in France, during the
period of confinement, until the beginning of May 2020, every day between 7 pm
and 8 pm. The Director General of Health, named Jérôme Salomon, gave in an
unchanging setting the figures of the evolution of the pandemic in the country and
in the world for about a quarter of an hour: on average a figure every six seconds,
according to the calculations of one journalist (Groussard 2020). The figures could
be good or bad, but the discursive rite was there to give the feeling that, through
the presentation of figures that attested to a rigorous monitoring of the country,
competent authorities were in control of the situation.8
The calm voice of the speaker, the white wall, the flags, the transparent desk,
the self-designation of the discursive activity as “Point Presse” contributed to this
feeling that the crisis was under control. The term “Press point” derives from the
vocabulary of navigation; the maritime metaphor is particularly relevant here:
when a sailor marks the point, it is to fight against the anguish by determining
the exact position of a ship in the middle of the ocean.
In the first part of his “point presse”, the speaker presented figures in detail, then
he answered questions about the disease and the right way to fight it. Normally,
in this type of context, the speaker answers more or less unexpected questions
put by journalists who are placed in front of him. But in these “points presse”, be-
cause of the lockdown, the speaker has nobody in front of him. His collaborators
were, therefore, able to choose the questions and prepare the answers in advance;
these questions could be about the administrative aspects of the management of
the disease as well as about the effectiveness of this or that medicine. As a result,
the speaker – and through him the state he represented – seemed omniscient: he
was the master of the figures and could answer anything. This was made credible
by the hybrid character of this speaker, who cumulated the legitimacies of the
professor of medicine and that of the senior civil servant. He embodied the fusion
of science and politics that those in charge of managing the pandemic dream of.
Conclusion
This pandemic is not only a pandemic because it concerns all the people in all
countries, but also because it has modified all sectors of private and public life.
In whatever direction discourse analysts look, they can observe phenomena that
interest them. Discourse shares the paradoxical status of the coronavirus: it is
everywhere but invisible. Probably never in the history of humanity has an ep-
idemic provoked so many words, but these words are rarely considered as such:
they are supposed to be transparent to the reality they deal with. Diseases are
experienced as totally independent of the discourse about them. But in a world
where everything is connected and everyone is connected to multiple sources of
information, a world where, for instance, a news item from a Japanese newspaper
quoting a report from a British laboratory about a variant detected in a traveller
arriving from an African country can make the stock markets fall in a few min-
utes, redistribute the cards of the pharmaceutical industry and change the policy
of governments and the attitudes of ordinary citizens, it is hard to see how one
can dissociate world and discourse. Discourse is not only the space where we
talk about COVID-19: it is also the space where the pandemic is constituted and
managed. It is not only the viruses that circulate throughout the world, it is also
the discourses of all kinds that it makes possible and that interact with it.
Notes
1 Translations from original sources in French are my own.
2 On the relationship between crisis, uncertainty and fear, see also Bauman (2006).
3 Bénédicte Lutaud “Coronavirus: qui sont les experts du Comité scientifique chargé de con-
seiller Macron?”, Le Figaro, published online March 13, 2020 https://www.lefigaro.
fr/sciences/coronavirus-qui-sont-les-experts-du-comite-scientifique-charge-de-
conseiller-macron-20200313 [accessed April 29, 2020].
4 Ibidem, my emphasis.
5 “Comité analyse, recherché et expertise (CARE) Covid-19”, French Ministry of research
and higher education, https://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/cid151204/
le-comite-analyse-recherche-et-expertise-care-covid-19.html [accessed May 2,
2020].
6 Radio Farda, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/conflicting-coronavirus-death-figures-in-
iran-range-from-237-to-2-000/30477895.html [accessed June 10, 2021].
7 Politico, January 28, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-deaths-statistics-
data-cases-accuracy/amp/ [accessed May 20, 2021].
8 See the video of one of these press conferences, posted by the French Ministry of
Health (“COVID-19 Conférence de presse, par le Directeur général de la santé”) at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwm3xNti6kc.
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3
WIKIPEDIA AS A TRUSTED METHOD
OF INFORMATION ASSESSMENT
DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS
Antonin Segault
Introduction
Wikipedia is known as the largest online encyclopaedia; it is omnipresent in
Google search results and all-knowing even within the most specific domains.
Yet, the encyclopaedia is only one side of something larger, the outcome of a
complex method regulating the work of millions of persons around the world.
Initially, this process, a subject of pride in the community of contributors and
an epistemic curiosity for academics, was, however, quite unknown for a large
majority of readers. When evaluating the quality of the encyclopaedia, only the
outcome, the accuracy of the articles, was taken into account and compared
to authoritative information sources. But as the information landscape evolved
and the prestige of these institutions declined, it became clear that information
quality could no longer be reduced to authority. Attention, thus, turned to the
methods used to produce and assess information.
Like every large-scale crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic is also an information
crisis: new questions, new information, new uncertainties, new rumours and
new lies have been appearing all at once and have been travelling at a fast pace in
a globalised information ecosystem. This chapter investigates the role played by
Wikipedia in helping people make sense of such a situation. After revisiting the
norms and principles that governed the development of the encyclopaedia, it will
describe how the Wikipedia community managed to document the pandemic in
a reliable way. The scope and preciseness of this coverage are studied in relation
to the observance of the encyclopaedia’s rules and the use of specific tools. The
chapter will then demonstrate how this activity was made visible to the public
and contributed to a broader framing of Wikipedia as a trusted method to deal
with information.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-5
38 Antonin Segault
The Wikipedia ecosystem

A cornerstone of the Web, Wikipedia turned 20 in 2021. During this time frame,
it adopted and developed uncommon positions in terms of community organi-
sation, economic model and epistemological frame. Yet, its goals, principles and
method remain quite relevant to the challenges of today’s information landscape.
A giant and free encyclopaedia

Jimmy Wales created Wikipedia in January 2001, during experimentations on
Nupedia, an online encyclopaedia written by chosen groups of experts (Cardon
2015). One year later, as Nupedia sank in the complexity of this process, the more
open Wikipedia endured and prospered. Thanks to the wiki software it relies on,
the free encyclopaedia could be edited, improved and extended by anyone, any-
time, instantaneously. This allowed a quick growth of its coverage: 10,000 arti-
cles in September 2001, 45,000 in September 2002 and 100,000 in January 2003.
This success in the English language was soon extended to other languages: sev-
eral distinct editions were created in the first half of 2001 (in German, Catalan,
French or Swedish, for instance), and at the time of writing this chapter, there
are 312 editions. To this day, more than 54 million articles have been written by
more than 42 million registered users (and there are many more unregistered us-
ers) all over the world.1 Among these authors (predominantly young males with
diplomas in high education), some only made a few contributions while others
stayed on for years, engaging in durable carriers in what soon became a complex
community (Arazy et al. 2015; Joubert 2021).
Over the years, this community has developed a dozen “sister projects”
around the encyclopaedia, including a multilingual dictionary (Wiktionary), a
media library (Wikimedia Commons), a biology database (Wikispecies) and a
travel guide (Wikitravel). All of these projects share several key properties: col-
laborative content production that relies on open participation, donation-based
funding that enables free access for everyone (without advertisements) or free/
open licences (such as Creative Commons By-Sa) that allow the copying and
re-utilisation of content with few legal constraints. At odds with the perva-
sive knowledge economy, such properties connect these projects to the cur-
rent “participatory culture”, defined as “a culture with relatively low barriers
to artistic expression and civic engagement” ( Jenkins et al. 2015). This large
“Wikimedia Movement” is supported (financially, technically and legally) by
the Wikimedia Foundation, created in 2003 to “empower and engage peo-
ple around the world to collect and develop educational content under a free
license or in the public domain, and to disseminate it effectively and glob-
ally”.2 At a more operational level, local “chapters” (39 to this date, which are
mostly national associations) contribute to the mobilisation of the community,
usually through the organisation of events (conferences, training sessions and
competitions).
Wikipedia — A trusted method 39
For many years now, Wikipedia has been ranked among the most viewed
websites (Alexa, n.d.). Its articles often appear among the first suggestions of most
search engines, and some snippets are directly integrated into the result pages of
Google. The content of articles is also widely copied on other websites and inte-
grated into other services, either legally (thanks to the accommodating terms of
the Creative Commons By-Sa licence) or not (through many cases of plagiarism,
from student homework to academic articles (Laurent 2020)). Therefore, what
is written in the encyclopaedia has a significant impact on the information that
may be found, both online and offline. For example, in the domain of medical
information, Wikipedia has been identified as the most viewed resource online,
probably overtaking the offline resources too (Heilman and West 2015). This, of
course, raises crucial issues in terms of information quality.
The architecture of trustworthiness

A few million authors scattered around the world cannot expect to build an en-
cyclopaedia without some kind of structure or method to help them gather and
combine their contributions. In Wikipedia, this method is formalised into a set
of principles, policies and guidelines. The first principles (the “five pillars”) were
defined in 2002 (Cardon 2015): “Wikipedia is an encyclopaedia”; “Wikipedia is
written from a neutral point of view”; “Wikipedia is free content that anyone
can use, edit, and distribute”; “Wikipedia’s editors should treat each other with
respect and civility”; “Wikipedia has no firm rules”. From this point, policies and
guidelines have been continuously developed, improved and adapted through
discussions in the community.3 Several of these rules specifically address the
trustworthiness of the content of the articles.
While traditional encyclopaedias built their authority on the status of the
article’s authors, who are often experts in their field, this cannot be said for
Wikipedia’s wide community of (frequently anonymous) contributors (Doutreix
2020). The validity of their statements is based on references to external sources,
which, hence, transfers part of their authority to the article content (Sahut 2016).
In the first years of the encyclopaedia, references were scarce: only some articles
contained a bibliography section, which was often quite short. The current cita-
tion system (using footnotes) was developed in 2005 and, from this point, several
campaigns and tools (such as the iconic “citation needed” tag) were launched to
promote it, leading to its progressive generalisation (Langlais 2015). The use of
this system is precisely defined in the “Reliable sources” policy, underlining that
references are especially required for “material that is challenged or likely to be
challenged” and for “statements about living persons”.
The enforcement of these policies is mainly handled by the community it-
self. Since anybody can edit the encyclopaedia, anybody can rectify or “revert”
(cancel) a contribution that infringes a rule. Wikipedia, thus, exemplifies the
“wisdom of the crowd” principle (Surowiecki 2004): the large number of us-
ers dedicated to following and enforcing the encyclopaedia’s rules maintain a
40 Antonin Segault
state of “participative vigilance” that supports the quality of the articles (Cardon
and Levrel 2009). To limit the risk of conflicting contributions (known as “edit
wars”), the users are encouraged to the first debate on the article’s “talk page”. To
help with conflictual situations, some elected members of the community receive
functional roles, such as Administrator or Patrol, coupled with access privileges:
blocking IPs, protecting pages or validating contributions to protected pages
(Arazy et al. 2015). Studies have long shown the effectiveness of this architecture
of trustworthiness: a few years after its creation, Wikipedia’s articles had roughly
the same degree of accuracy as that of traditional encyclopaedias (Giles 2005;
Casebourne et al. 2012) while covering a far larger number of topics. But as the
broader context evolved, maintaining this level of accuracy has become more
and more challenging.
Knowledge in the post-truth era

In 2016, following the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the
Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, the Oxford Dictionary proposed
“post-truth” as their “word of the year”, to describe “circumstances in which ob-
jective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion
and personal belief ” (Oxford Dictionaries 2016). From this point, terms such
as “post-truth” and “fake news” have been widely used by both politicians and
journalists, while receiving critical attention from the academic community. In
fact, such expressions tend to hide the diversity of the phenomenon, which does
not make any distinction between accidental misinformation and intentional dis-
information (Marwick 2018), ignores the different types of problematic contents
that can be shared (Wardle 2017) and masks the mix of ideological, economic
and playful motivations of their authors (Frau-Meigs 2019). Yet, new forms of
complex biases and manipulation attempts have, indeed, been identified, threat-
ening the quality of information online.
Wikipedia, because of its open contribution system, has always been the target
of some forms of disinformation. Simple forms of vandalism (or “silly vandal-
ism”, according to Wikipedia’s policy), often through the deletion of (part of
the) articles or the addition of obscenities, are the most common. They seem to
be mainly caused by young peoples since their prevalence drops during holiday
periods and their targets (beside articles related to sexuality) include frequent
homework topics (such as art or historical events; Casilli 2015). However, as it
gained prominence in the information landscape, Wikipedia has attracted more
subtle operations of manipulation, from politicians polishing their biography be-
fore elections (Göbel and Munzert 2018), to communication agencies specialised
in discrete article edition ( Joshi et al. 2020).
Several policies have been adopted to prevent conflicts of interests among
the authors, including a mandatory disclosure of remunerated edits, limitations
on the use of multiple accounts (designated as “sock-puppetry”) and clear rules
regarding the reliability of sources. Wikipedia authors must also follow the
encyclopaedia’s specific position on the “neutral point of view”, embracing plu-

ralism and multi-perspectivity (Sant 2021), yet trying to reflect the relative im-
portance of each viewpoint in the sources. Specific WikiProjects, such as P atrols
and the Counter-Vandalism Unit, gather users dedicated to the surveillance of
articles and the development of methods (including bots) in order to fight van-
dalism and problematic edits. Some general characteristics of Wikipedia, such
as the choice not to rely on advertisement revenues, the central place of human
actors in most decisions and the absence of algorithmic recommendation sys-
tems, may also limit its vulnerability to disinformation campaigns (Keegan 2019;
McDowell and Vetter 2020).
Wikipedia and the pandemic

As a participative encyclopaedia with a worldwide audience, Wikipedia was not
unaffected by the COVID-19 pandemic that struck at the beginning of 2020.
While not completely fitting the encyclopaedia’s principles, the coverage of this
event was intense, especially in the first months of the pandemic. The resulting
articles were found to be quite reliable, relying strongly on some of Wikipedia’s
tools and policies to ensure information quality.
Crisis events in Wikipedia

Several rules of Wikipedia state precisely that current events are not ideal top-
ics for articles. In a section entitled “Wikipedia is not a newspaper”, the ency-
clopaedia’s guidelines explain that “While news coverage can be useful source
material for encyclopaedic topics, most newsworthy events do not qualify for
inclusion”.4 Criteria to determine the “notability” of an event include its tem-
poral and geographical scales and the depth and diversity of its media coverage,
while “routine” events such as accidents or crimes are usually considered less
notable.5 Most of these limitations stem from more general rules: the coverage
of ongoing events usually relies on the testimony of direct witnesses (forbidden
by the “No original research” principle) or precarious sources (while the most
robust ones required by the “Verifiability” principle, such as academic articles,
are usually published long after). For example, the first versions of the article on
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, written as the disaster unfolded, were
mostly based on press releases published by the plant’s owner, and media articles
largely inspired by these releases (Moats 2019). This “recentism” (the term used
in the guidelines to describe “an inflated or imbalanced focus on recent events”)
is also associated with long, overloaded articles, which are prone to controversies
and edit wars and do not really fit Wikipedia’s standards. Such contributions bet-
ter suit the goal of the sister-project Wikinews, developed to “report on a wide
variety of current news events”.6
However, there is a gap between these rules and the way the community op-
erates: when contributors face catastrophic events, little can be done to prevent
42 Antonin Segault
them from documenting it on the encyclopaedia (Ferron and Massa 2011). As a

matter of fact, the articles that gather the most contributors at a given time are
usually related to ongoing events (Keegan et al. 2013). Wikipedia’s readership
shows similar trends, with a large part of the monthly most-viewed articles be-
ing linked to current events, either recurring (holidays, sports) or exceptional
(Doutreix 2020). Such patterns suggest that the encyclopaedia is used in ways
similar to a news media, to find (and publish) information about an event as it
unfolds. This generates a tension between Wikipedia’s original encyclopaedic
ambitions and these pressing journalistic tendencies (Doutreix 2020).
The result is a relative tolerance towards the inclusion of current events in the
encyclopaedia, combined with efforts to limit (or, at least, to quickly fix) the ef-
fects of recentism. For example, even if such articles still mainly rely on press
sources, contributors often discuss the reliability of these sources on the Talk page,
sometimes even choosing to wait for confirmations before modifying the article
(Bubendorff and Rizza 2020). The resulting representation of the event may still
be unstable and disorganised in the first days, but it then tends to return to the en-
cyclopaedia’s standards (Ferron and Massa 2011). Such articles often display a spe-
cific message box, Template:Current, warning the readers that “information may
change rapidly as the event progresses, and initial news reports may be unreliable”.
The creation of Portal:Current events, which gathers all articles related to ongoing
events, and is easily accessible through a link in Wikipedia’s main menu, is another
indication of the lasting entanglement of Wikipedia and Wikinews’s goals.
The coverage of the pandemic

In 2020 and 2021, as the COVID-19 pandemic developed and lingered, the ac-
tivity on Wikipedia confirmed its central role in the information landscape. As
the crisis sowed uncertainty and confusion across the world, people turned to all
the information sources available. Thereby, in the year 2020, COVID-19-related
articles were among the most-viewed pages of all the large Wikipedia editions.7
Studies have, however, shown that this online information-seeking activity was
mostly driven by the media coverage of the crisis (rather than the virus incidence
itself ) and decreased after some time (even when media attention and virus in-
cidence remained high) (Gozzi et al. 2020). As an example, the “COVID-19
pandemic” article peaked at 1.4 million views per day in March 2020, when
the World Health Organisation declared COVID-19 a pandemic, but this rate
quickly dropped to around 50,000 views per day in the second part of the year.8
This influx of readership on Wikipedia came with an increase in the editing
activity. In the spring of 2020, the encyclopaedia received more edits than usu-
ally, with also a higher number of newly registered editors. Such growth can
be explained not only by the effect of lock downs on users’ activity but also by
the large amount of new information to deal with (Ruprechter et al. 2021). As
of October 2021, the term “COVID” was found in the titles of more than one
thousand articles on the English-language wiki, plus 470 in the Spanish one, 320
in the French one and 300 in the German one. These articles cover a wide range
of topics, from the biological effects of the disease to the protests against the po-
litical responses to the pandemic. Many articles give a local or specific scope on
topics that are also covered in more general articles, for instance: “COVID-19
pandemic in London”, “Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on education in
the Republic of Ireland”, “COVID-19 vaccination in Angola” or “Impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on the performing arts”. While many of these articles are
short, some of the general ones developed in quite an extensive way, with four
of them listed among the 50 longest articles of the encyclopaedia (“COVID-19
pandemic in the Czech Republic”, “Statistics of the COVID-19 pandemic in
Chile”, “Timeline of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020”, “COVID-19
pandemic in the State of Palestine”). In October 2021, the central “COVID-19
pandemic” article, created in January 2020, was 17,000 words in length, and the
result of 24,500 edits.
This reading and editing activity was supported by the long-standing structures
of the encyclopaedia such as Portals, reader-oriented collections of articles related
to a single topic and Projects, which are editor-centric coordination areas. The
Portal “COVID-19” was created on 18 March 2020, gathering more than 2,000
articles on the virus, the pandemic and its impact. Similar portals have been cre-
ated in several other languages such as French, Spanish or German. The WikiPro-
ject “COVID-19” appeared on 15 March 2020 (and labelled as an “offshoot” of
the pre-existing Medicine, Viruses and Disaster management WikiProjects), with
more than 2,000 articles within its scope. It includes task forces dedicated to case
counts (updated epidemiological data), equipment (documenting the needs and
shortages of masks, respirators, hospital beds) or translations (assessing and improv-
ing the availability of information in all editions of the encyclopaedia). While it
may be difficult to count the editors actually involved, the project’s page received
more than a thousand visits per day in March 2020,9 and 214 registered users still
displayed the project’s badge on their profile in October 2021.10
Dealing with uncertainty and complexity

The coverage of these complicated and unstable topics by such a large number of
editors required a high level of caution and discipline. Despite the proliferation
of publications on the topic and the urgency of the large readership, the encyclo-
paedia’s rules regarding references were observed quite dutifully. While the share
of academic sources among the references was, indeed, lower than before the
pandemic (Benjakob et al. 2021), the scientific references used were found to be
quite complete and robust, taken from reputable journals and avoiding preprints,
in accordance with the standards of WikiProject Medicine (Colavizza 2020).
When relying on media sources, the editors mainly quoted “legacy media out-
lets, like the New York Times and the BBC, alongside widely syndicated news
agencies like Reuters and the Associated Press, and official sources like WHO.
org” (Benjakob et al. 2021).
44 Antonin Segault
Many of the encyclopaedia’s tools and norms have been exploited to deal with
the quality of information during this crisis. Most COVID-19-related articles
have displayed (at least for a certain amount of time) warning messages such as
Wikipedia:Medical disclaimer (“Wikipedia does not give medical advice”) and
Template:Current (“This article documents a current event”). A specific template
“Current COVID-19” was occasionally used from April 2020 to October 2020
when the community decided to transform it into a simple redirection to Tem-
plate:Current.11 When integrating epidemiological statistics, the editors also in-
cluded precise explanations regarding the provenance of data, how to read it and
what biases might alter its accuracy (Segault 2020). This extensive use of warnings,
along with frequent page protections (by which administrators can suspend con-
tributions to an article, or limit it to specific categories of users), can be seen as an
attempt to slow down the evolution of the articles and facilitate their stabilisation
(Rizza and Bubendorff 2021). Reduced rates of “reverts” (when an edit is cancelled
by another editor, often because of a clear violation of the rules) may be seen as an-
other indicator of the quality of the contributions but could also be the result of the
administrators’ overwork due to the increase of activity (Ruprechter et al. 2021).
Beside this writing process focused on the quality and verifiability of informa-
tion, editors also paid close attention to the misleading or unproven statements that
spread during the crisis. Several articles have been created to list and decipher these
theories, such as: “COVID-19 misinformation”, “COVID-19 misinformation by
China”, “List of unproven methods against COVID-19” or “COVID-19 vaccine
misinformation and hesitancy”. The coverage of some of these topics has proven
to be controversial even within the Wikipedia community. For example, in the
French wiki, the heated discussions around the conspiracy movie “Hold-up” led
to the departure of a long-time editor. This shows that, while sharing the same
principles and following the same rules, the community is not entirely cut off from
the debates that arise in such situations (Rizza and Bubendorff 2021).
Discourses on the method

This intensive coverage of the pandemic on Wikipedia attracted considerable
attention and many reactions, both within and outside the Wikimedia commu-
nity. In this crisis situation, much of the commentary focused on the method that
supported the good overall quality of the encyclopaedia’s articles. This can be
linked to a broader evolution of the discourse on Wikipedia over the last years,
which stems from the ongoing media crisis and the specificities of the encyclo-
paedia’s epistemology.
Spotlight on the backstage

During the first month of the pandemic, many of the world’s largest media out-
lets published articles about the coverage of COVID-19 on Wikipedia. Most of
these articles share a focus on misinformation and how the editors have been
dealing with it: “How Wikipedia Prevents the Spread of Coronavirus Misin-
formation” (Wired, US, 15 March 2020), “The Coronavirus Is Stress-Testing
Wikipedia’s Policies” (Slate, US, 19 March 2020), “Meet the Wikipedia editors
fighting to keep coronavirus pages accurate” (DailyDot, US, 24 March 2020),
“How Indians Are Making A Difference In Wikipedia’s Fight On Coronavirus
Misinformation” (India Times, 29 March 2020), “Sur Wikipédia, le défi du tra-
vail d’information sur le coronavirus” (“Wikipedia: the challenge of the information
campaign of the coronavirus”, Le Parisien, France, 6 April 2020). These articles
are often long and detailed and include interviews of contributors and descrip-
tions of the encyclopaedia’s processes and norms (such as references or neutrality),
sometimes with a local perspective. Surprisingly, several highly laudatory titles
appeared after only a few weeks: “Why Wikipedia is winning against the coro-
navirus ‘infodemic’” (The Telegraph, UK, 3 April 2020), “Why Wikipedia Is
Immune to Coronavirus” (Haaretz, Israel, 8 April 2020). Published long before
any academic studies had assessed the quality of COVID-19 on Wikipedia, these
articles still present Wikipedia’s method as the answer to misinformation.
This positive media attention has, in turn, circulated inside the Wikimedia com-
munity: 20 of these articles have been included in a list of press coverage maintained
by editors (Wikipedia: Press coverage 2020), and some were directly mentioned on
the page of the WikiProject COVID-19. On the French encyclopaedia, message
boxes were added on top of the talk pages of several articles (“Maladie à coronavirus
2019”, “Pandémie de Covid-19”) with links to the press coverage of these articles.
Several pieces have also been written by members of the community itself and
published on its own information channels, such as the Signpost online newspaper.
For example, a “special report” entitled “Wikipedia on COVID-19: what we pub-
lish and why it matters” describes in positive ways the range and precision already
reached by Wikipedia’s COVID-19-related articles.12 In the English Wikipedia, a
very self-reflexive article, “Wikipedia coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic”, was
created in April 2020 to document the community’s efforts in several countries.
The community and its representatives also developed specific out-reach
activities about COVID-19. At the end of March 2020, the wiki displayed a
message from Katherine Maher, at this time the Wikimedia Foundation’s ex-
ecutive director, who explained that Wikipedia will “keep working around the
clock to bring you reliable and neutral information”.13 A new “Responding to
COVID-19” section appeared on the Foundation’s website, providing infor-
mation, links and data regarding the coverage of the crisis on Wikipedia. The
Foundation also published on Medium a long interview with four women who
were contributing to COVID-19 articles.14 In October 2020, the World Health
Organization announced a collaboration with the Wikimedia Foundation to
“expand access to trusted information about COVID-19”,15 which mainly con-
sisted in the publication of infographics on Wikimedia Commons. At a more
local level, the Wikimedia New York City chapter organised a symposium in
May 2020 to “answer questions the public may have about Wikipedia’s coverage
of the pandemic”.16
46 Antonin Segault
Becoming a trusted actor

This almost unanimous framing of Wikipedia as a reliable information source
can actually be traced back to a few years before the COVID-19 pandemic. As
the encyclopaedia evolved and the media crisis unfolded, the press coverage of
the encyclopaedia went through different phases, from scepticism to acceptance,
and even trust (Benjakob and Harrison 2019). At a time when traditional media
outlets proved vulnerable to misinformation (due to time pressure and cost cuts),
sensationalism (through audience races) and manipulation (by political discourses
or economical agreements), the specificities of Wikimedia were recognised as
strengths. The most complimentary articles, with titles such as “Wikipedia, the
Last Bastion of Shared Reality” (The Atlantic, US, 2018), mainly focused on the
edition process of the encyclopaedia:
It’s easy to imagine that the tools they developed for settling disputes
about Star Wars won’t be up to the challenge of saving some informational
common-weal, but then again, what does modern politics resemble more
than a vicious fandom at war with itself?
(The Atlantic)
According to these articles, Wikipedia should be trusted because its epistemology

seems efficient to counter disinformation, but not much is said about the role that
its economic model and open licences play in this success.
Such an evolution of the discourse on Wikipedia was also found in the
educational system. During its first years of existence, the encyclopaedia was
not well received in classrooms, and many teachers strongly discouraged their
pupils to use it, which left a long-lasting impression. To this day, first-year
university students, who have a rather positive perception of Wikipedia’s re-
liability, still pretend not to use it because they think it would not be well re-
ceived by their teachers (Sémel 2021). In the last decade, numerous pedagogic
projects have, however, been deployed, from middle schools to universities,
often engaging students in contributing to articles (Denel 2021). Through
such experiences, children and young adults get a concrete opportunity to
discover and apply the norms that regulate the activity of contributors. The
benefit of these projects is not limited to Wikipedia: studies have shown that
editing the encyclopaedia also contributes to the development of the students’
information literacies, such as assessing the reliability of information sources
(Dawe and Robinson 2017; McDowell and Vetter 2020). The norms of Wiki-
pedia are, thus, valuable not only as a tool to build a (relatively) trustworthy
encyclopaedia but also as a method to navigate a (relatively) confusing infor-
mation landscape.
In many ways, the Wikimedia Foundation appears to have embraced the new
centrality of its projects, through actions both within and outside the community.
In 2018, the Community Advocacy committee of the Foundation was renamed

Trust and Safety and now includes a Disinformation team focused on “support-
ing communities in identifying and countering disinformation campaigns on
Wikimedia Foundation platforms”.17 This team led investigations on large-scale
disinformation issues in the Croatian Wikipedia, or during Joe Biden’s presiden-
tial campaign. Since 2019, the Outreach Wiki (another wiki managed by the
community for outreach initiatives) includes a Wikimedia Education Program,
offering a large variety of resources such as a database of pedagogic activities
around the Wikimedia projects, or an incubator for new projects in education.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, this programme created the EduWiki Chal-
lenges, a series of online activities for the students in lock down, including ques-
tions related to disinformation. More recently, it launched the project Reading
Wikipedia in the Classroom, to support the integration of Wikipedia-related
literacies in education systems around the world.
Conclusions
This chapter was an attempt to describe and contextualise the coverage of the
COVID-19 pandemic on Wikipedia. The self-organised community of editors
who write the encyclopaedia’s articles has developed a complex set of rules to
assess and improve information quality. While some of these rules discourage the
coverage of ongoing events, such coverage has become frequent in the past few
years and the quality of the resulting articles remains quite high. During the first
months of the COVID-19 pandemic, a large number of articles were written on a
wide range of topics. The analysis of the content, references and discussion pages
of these articles demonstrates that the strict observance of the encyclopaedia’s
method guaranteed a precise and reliable description of the events. The abundant
media and community discourse around the coverage of this crisis sheds light on
Wikipedia’s editing process and its epistemic virtues. As such, the pandemic re-
inforced a pre-existing framing of this encyclopaedia as a trusted method to deal
with information in times of uncertainty.
The large praise of Wikipedia bears its own peril: from trusted method to
authoritative source, the step is small but not without consequences. Wikipedia’s
strength is that it allows anyone to have a clear understanding of how a piece of
information came to be included in the encyclopaedia and, therefore, directly
assess its reliability. The risk is that, eventually, what is a concrete feature of the
encyclopaedia might become an argument from authority. That is, people might
start trusting information because it was published on Wikipedia and not because
they checked its production process. Within the current media crisis, this could
well turn into a missed opportunity in terms of information literacies. For this
reason, beyond the successful coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, the peda-
gogic effort of the Wikimedia Foundation seems to be the most important lesson
to be learned from the recent sequence of events.
48 Antonin Segault
Notes
1 Data from the page “Size of Wikipedia” on Wikipedia’s website: https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Size_of_Wikipedia.
2 As described on the “About” page on the Wikimedia Foundation’s website: https://
wikimediafoundation.org/about/.
3 A complete list can be found on the page “List of policies and guidelines” on Wikipedia’s
website: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_policies_and_guidelines.
4 As stated in the “What wikipedia is not” policy on Wikipedia’s website: https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:What_Wikipedia_is_not.
5 More details in the “Notability” guideline on Wikipedia’s website: https://en.wiki-
pedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Notability_(events).
6 As described on the homepage of Wikinews’s website: https://en.wikinews.org.
7 For example, the list of the most viewed pages in 2020 on the English Wikipedia,
calculated by the PageViews tool: https://pageviews.toolforge.org/topviews/?pro-
ject=en.wikipedia.org&platform=all-access&date=2020.
8 As shown in the PageView figures for the article “COVID-19 pandemic” on the Eng-
lish Wikipedia: https://pageviews.toolforge.org/?project=en.wikipedia.org&redirect
s=1&start=2020-01-01&end=2020-12-31&pages=COVID-19_pandemic.
9 Data gathered by Enwebb and published on Wikimedia Commons under the GNU
General Public Licence: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wikiproject_
viewership_march_2020.png.
10 According to the statistics of Template:User WikiProject COVID-19 on Wikipe-
dia’s website: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:WhatLinksHere/
Template:User_WikiProject_COVID-19&limit=500.
11 Discussions on Template:Current COVID-19, in the forum Templates for discussion,
on Wikipedia’s website: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Templates_for_
discussion/Log/2020_October_14#Template:Current_COVID-19.
12 “Special report” published on the 29 March 2020, in the SignPost section of
Wikipedia’s website: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedia_Signpost/
2020-03-29/Special_report.
13 A screenshot of that message was published on Wikimedia Commons under the CC-
BY-SA licence: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WMF_coronavirus_pan-
demic_message_2.png.
14 Article “Meet some of the women sharing reliable COVID-19 information with
the world on Wikipedia” published by Wikimedia on the 3 April 2020: https://
medium.com/freely-sharing-the-sum-of-all-knowledge/women-reliable-covid19-
information-wikipedia-f1f9255c3672.
15 More details on the news release published by the WHO on its website: https://www.
who.int/news/item/22-10-2020-the-world-health-organization-and-wikimedia-
foundation-expand-access-to-trusted-information-about-covid-19-on-wikipedia.
16 According to the page of the symposium on Wikipedia’s website: https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Wikipedia:Meetup/NYC/Symposium_on_Wikipedia_and_COVID-19.
17 As described in the page of the Trust and Safety committee on Meta Wikipedia’s
website: https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Trust_and_Safety.
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4
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S
“INTERMESTIC” ONLINE
VACCINATION-THEMED
NARRATIVE STRATEGY
Towards a “global community of health for all”?
Zhao Alexandre Huang and Rudong Zhang
Introduction
The global health crisis surrounding COVID-19, which has spread since the
Northern-hemisphere spring of 2020, has redefined the meaning of public di-
plomacy. Border closures, repeated lockdowns, and a series of social distanc-
ing measures have brought international politics and the economy to a state of
uncertainty. The only certainty is the determination and the effort of national
governments to fight the SARS-CoV-2 virus and to seize the current crisis as
an opportunity to mobilise public diplomacy instruments, reach new political
outcomes, and strengthen international reputations.
As the country in which the COVID-19 outbreak began, and because it con-
cealed information related to the epidemic, China has had to deal with a severely
damaged international image (Chen et al. 2021). To change unfavourable per-
ceptions held by the international community, the Beijing government imme-
diately engaged in a series of communication activities to strengthen internal
and external public relations (Xinhua 2020). The aim was to rescue China’s
image and reputation from international criticism, manage both domestic and
international public opinion to restore Beijing’s legitimacy in the eyes of the in-
ternational community, and tell “the story of China’s fight against the epidemic”
(Xinhua 2020, para. 2). In July 2020, Beijing began providing vaccine assistance
to developing countries through international cooperation (Huang 2021). As of
September 2021, China had provided its own vaccines to 106 countries and four
international organisations (Global Times 2021).
Vaccination is currently one of the most effective ways to control the pan-
demic, and mass vaccination is the most crucial step in ending this global health
crisis (WHO, 2021). Nevertheless, multiple challenges have caused the global
vaccination growth rate to slow. On the one hand, the unequal distribution
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-6
Global community of health for all 53
of vaccines (Mathieu et al. 2021) reflects the emergence of “vaccine national-

ism” among leading powers (Bollyky and Bown 2020, 96) and the historical
imbalances in power and resources between developed and developing coun-
tries (Alaran et al. 2021); on the other hand, the dilemma of global vaccination
efficiency has cast doubt on the effectiveness and safety of COVID-19 vaccines,
which have emerged with unprecedented speed. “Vaccine hesitancy” (Omer
et al. 2009, 1981) reflects public concerns about vaccine safety and has the poten-
tial to gain high public attention, often leading to vaccination refusal (Dubé et al.
2013). During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine hesitancy has compromised
the fight against the virus and delayed the reconstruction of global public health
(Dror et al. 2020).
The above challenges provided Beijing with “strategic opportunities” to con-
struct international discourse power (Zhang 2021, para. 3), leading the govern-
ment to update its public diplomacy communication strategy for wielding soft
power, legitimise its political advocacy for “building a global community of
health for all” (Zhang 2021, para. 5), and gain the international endorsement
of its domestic vaccines. The Chinese government defined its domestically pro-
duced COVID-19 vaccines as a “global public good”, asserting its adherence
to “fairness and equity […to] strive to close the immunization gap” (Xi 2021a,
para.7). Moreover, according to China’s public health departments and scholars
(cf. Health Commission of Hebei Province 2021; Shi and Li 2021), effectively
countering domestic and international hesitation to pursue COVID-19 vacci-
nation relies not only on carrying out relevant education and intervention but
also on promoting positive online exchange and interaction between the public
and authorities to ensure vaccination policy implementation. Thus, Beijing has
actively mobilised social media platforms to strengthen its international and do-
mestic communication about domestic vaccines and enhance online interaction
and engagement with target audiences. The aim has been to eliminate vaccine
hesitancy while improving the credibility and reputation of its domestic vaccines
(Luo et al. 2021; Shi and Li 2021).
The aim of this study is to analyse Beijing’s intermestic vaccination-themed
narratives released on its domestic and international social media platforms
(Weibo and Twitter). The findings illustrate China’s vaccine-related propa-
ganda and public diplomacy efforts, describe Beijing’s domestic and interna-
tional communication strategy for digital public diplomacy, and demonstrate
its attempt to reduce distrust in the COVID-19 vaccines produced by China
and promote and demonstrate Beijing’s international image as a responsible
world power.
Public diplomacy, soft power, and social media

Scholars conventionally use public diplomacy to conceptualise a series of strate-
gic national communication actions taken by a government (Pamment 2012) in
order to influence, in subtle ways, the political participation of target audiences
54 Zhao Alexandre Huang and Rudong Zhang
through long-term, day-to-day, and durable communication practices (Huang

and Arifon 2018). As a vital instrument for wielding soft power, public diplomacy
mobilises communication methods and strategies, along with the nation-state’s
“soft power resources” (Nye 2004, 68), to make target audiences accept the value
orientations and positions promoted by a government. Soft power resources en-
compass all attractive elements of a country, namely, national culture, political
ideology, and public and foreign policy. These elements, once mediatised, con-
tribute to “agenda-setting, positive attraction, and persuasion” in the interna-
tional community (Nye 2021, 202).
For Nye (2019, 13), “soft power means getting others to want the same out-
comes you want”. Within this framework, public diplomacy has three dimen-
sions: (a) daily communication to explain and analyse policy decisions; (b) media
and political campaigns to achieve prefixed strategies and goals; and (c) long-
term and continual interaction with target audiences. Earlier public diplomacy
activities pursued a decisive and functionalist goal using a one-way broadcasting
campaign to harvest foreign public support. However, rapid growth in social me-
dia technology has redefined public diplomacy and challenged the conventional
model of international communication. In contrast to a one-way vertical flow of
information, newer forms of public diplomacy (e.g. digitalisation) embrace the
interaction and dynamics of various actors to achieve mutual understanding and
engage target audiences as stakeholders (Manor 2019). This open, direct, and
equal interaction model (Bjola and Jiang 2015) is a relational shift in the effec-
tive deployment of soft power (Zaharna 2007). According to Dolea (2018) and
Pisarska (2016), when the government uses social media for public diplomacy,
attraction and persuasion result in two-way, horizontal, people-to-people com-
munication and organisation–public interaction.
Indeed, public diplomacy on social media depends on an “institution-
alised network structure” (Huang and Wang 2019a, 2987) similar to inter-
personal relationships. First, the relationship-building technology of social
media is “user-centric” (Wehbe and Bouabdallah 2012, 680) and connectionist
(Chan-Olmsted and Wolter 2017). Mutual attention and interaction reflect a
shift from one-way communication to reciprocal exchange (Miike 2006). Sec-
ond, information sharing on social media sites reflects a “dynamic perspective”
of information production (Henneberg 2002, 95) as user generated (Ingenhoff
et al. 2021): “in a given series of communication exchanges, any third (or later)
transmission (or message) is related to the degree to which previous exchanges
referred to even earlier transmissions” (Rafaeli 1988, 14). Third, social media
communication and interaction follow the “holistic communication engage-
ment” model (Zaharna 2018, 320). Any online click is a copy of face-to-face
interaction. However, in the social network age, this kind of social link tran-
scends the binary relationship of sender and recipient; the clicks to like, repost,
or share elevate online interactivity, shifting the focus from individuals to global
networks that involve multiple interactions across various levels of participation
(Chewning 2018; Huang and Hardy 2019). Therefore, public diplomacy actors
have progressively adopted a long-term social constructive perspective (cf. Saffer

et al. 2013; Arsenault 2014; Dolea 2018; Manor 2019) known as “relations-a s-
communication” (Zaharna 2018, 321) to practice a public diplomacy 2.0 that
provides more dynamic and personalised forms of narrative to seduce and en-
gage target publics.
Engagement and narratives in the age of public diplomacy 2.0

Synonymous with interpersonal connection, interaction, and involvement, en-
gagement refers to an individual’s commitment and connection to a dynamic
relationship with various organised communication activities (Abdul-Ghani
et al. 2011). From the perspective of social psychology, engagement is “a dynamic
multi-d imensional relational concept […] designed to achieve or elicit an outcome
at the individual, organization, or social levels” ( Johnston and Taylor 2018, 18).
As a mode of two-way communication, engagement is a form of dialogue
(Taylor and Kent 2014) through which the “social construction” of meaning
and the “identity formation” of interacting parties occur (Wu and Wang 2018,
245). From the perspective of digital public diplomacy, engagement can lead to
interaction between stakeholders and target publics and strengthen the persua-
siveness of a country’s soft power via emotional incentive (Huang and Wang
2020; Khan et al. 2021). In this process, emotion is a “social product” (Bernard
2015, para. 13) that not only permits participation in social conventions (Goff-
man 1955) but also gives rise to powerful narratives (Ng and Kidder 2010) that
“organise the experience of creating and shaping cultural meaning” (Huang
and Wang 2019b, 72). Therefore, scholars also view engagement as an element
of “narrative transportation” (Kim et al. 2016, 305), the process through which
communication actors use “emotional labour” in narrative formulation (Allo-
ing and Pierre 2020) and recipients experience convergence, “where all mental
systems and capacities become focused on events occurring in the narrative”
(Green and Brock 2000, 701).
Strategic narrative is a vital strategic vector in digital public diplomacy (Roselle
et al. 2014), allowing actors to “maintain a decisive competitive advantage during
the communication” (D’Almeida 2012, 32). Postmodernists interpret communi-
cation as a process of narrative formulation to establish and configure collective
action (Bakhtin 1981; Lyotard 1984). In this process, persuasiveness depends on
the subtle design of the message so that it does not arouse negative cognitive re-
sponses from target publics but elicits solid affective resonance (Kang et al. 2020).
In the realm of public diplomacy, narrative can mediatise national policy for an
international stage, allowing others to understand the territorial characteristics,
unique attractions, technological and social advancements, history, and civilisa-
tion of a country (Huang 2020). Indeed, narratives that a state-actor formulates
are likely to align with the “dominant ideology on the global role of a govern-
ment within that same entity” (Boucheron 2017, 16), potentially creating a sense
of unity, cohesion, and solidarity.
China’s public diplomacy 2.0 model and its vaccination-themed

online engagement strategy
The credo tell China’s stories well has become the most crucial guideline in China’s
public diplomacy, the aim of which has been to “strengthen China’s capacity in
international communication” (Xi 2021b, para. 1). According to Chinese schol-
ars and politicians (cf. X. Chen 2015; Tan 2019; Q. Zhao 2019), tell China’s stories
well has the goal of enhancing the capacity of Chinese media and institutions to
formulate external propaganda that generates narrative transportation as Beijing
competes for “discourse power” in the international community (Tan 2016, 2).
In the context of China’s political communication, “discourse power” is the
persuasive capacity of the Chinese government to rationalise and legitimise its
political initiatives and foreign policies on the global stage ( Jin and Liu 2020). If
discourse is a social practice that helps construct reality, especially the deploy-
ment of power relations (Foucault 2006), then the discourse power of the Chi-
nese centralised regime results from narratives framed by state actors (Tan 2016):
the capacity of a sovereign state to present and make heard its voice and
therefore its cultural traits, its political and ideological values and ideas in
the international community so that foreign audiences hear them, then
accept and recognise them as such.
(X. Wang 2010, 59).
For Chinese President Xi Jinping (2021b), to enhance international discourse

power is “to straighten out Beijing’s internal and external propaganda (in Chi-
nese: neixuan & waixuan) system and create a media cluster with international
influence” (para. 3). On the one hand, this statement implies the special meaning
of propaganda in the Chinese political context. Indeed, the term propaganda (in
Chinese: xuanchuan) is synonymous with media communication, publicity, and
public relations in China (Wang 2008). It is part of the progressive ideology
represented by the Communist Party of China (CPC), which has promoted the
independence of the Chinese nation and the modernisation of the country (Liu
2013; Lu 2015). Hence, Chinese scholars and politicians used external propaganda
(waixuan) as a regular expression of public diplomacy. External propaganda re-
fers to the continuation of the internal propaganda led by the CPC to achieve
self-promotion and self-advocacy on the global stage (Zhao 2015; Zhou 2018).
On the other hand, President Xi’s proposal also reflects the intermestic charac-
teristics of China’s public diplomacy. Indeed, the large-scale use of social media
has blurred the existing geographical boundaries of international exchange. The
term “intermestic”, within the framework of international politics, refers to the
way “international and domestic affairs in the globalization age progressively
merge and encroach reciprocally” (Szondi 2009, 304). Furthermore, the open
access to social media has blurred the boundaries between domestic and inter-
national publics and communication channels. Therefore, the term intermestic
also underlines and coordinates the domestic (gaining support) and international
(engaging foreign publics) considerations of public diplomacy.
According to previous findings about China’s digitalisation of public diplo-
macy (Madrid-Morales 2017; Huang and Wang 2019a, 2021), Beijing’s social
media public diplomacy is an intermestic intertextual network of “highly cen-
tralised and politicised international communication practices” (Huang and
Wang 2021, 1912). On the one hand, the domestic Internet blockade restricts
access to international social media. Moreover, the central government’s absolute
control over domestic social media ensures that all messages of China’s internal
propaganda follow the desired political direction and promote the desired value
orientation (Shambaugh 2007; Arsène 2011). On the other hand, the CPC has
enrolled China’s state-owned media, which mobilise international social media
platforms to produce and spread strategic narratives. Such an intermestic prac-
tice is a collaborative strategy that allows Chinese public diplomacy actors to
disseminate differentiated content at home and abroad and interact with target
audiences (Zhao 2019).
With the advancement of clinical trials for China’s domestic COVID-19
vaccines in June 2020, Beijing’s release of Chinese-made vaccines as a means
for international assistance constituted a significant effort to restore its damaged
reputation. For Lee (2021) and Wu and Gelineau (2021), vaccine diplomacy
is a new instrument for rebuilding Beijing’s international standing. First, as
a kind of aid diplomacy, it demonstrates that Beijing is engaging in human-
itarian assistance by donating materials overseas (Chattu and Knight 2019).
Second, it is a subtle, mediated political communication strategy that promotes
Chinese-m ade vaccines and frames China’s image as a peaceful-loving bene-
factor through different narratives (Staden and Wu 2021). Third, at the 2021
Global Health Summit, Xi Jinping (2021a) defined China’s COVID-19 vac-
cines as “global public goods” (para. 7). To this end, China’s vaccine diplomacy
has also acquired the function of “public communication for general interest”
(Bessières and Huang 2021, 202), aiming for “the exchange and sharing of pub-
lic utility information” and “the maintenance of the social link with a mission
of defending collective interest” (207). For Chinese scholars and politicians (cf.
Bai 2021; Bi 2021; C. Zhang 2021), such vaccine diplomacy will help Beijing
strengthen its interaction with other countries and their citizens through coop-
erative COVID-19 vaccine research and development, vaccine aid, and vaccine
export and improve China’s reputation in the global health crisis. It will also
promote China’s soft power by demonstrating its international responsibility,
subtly legitimising and advocating a Beijing-centred post-COVID-19 interna-
tional order and cooperative framework related to the “global community of
health for all” (Xi 2021a, para. 6).
Moreover, Chinese scholars and politicians have regarded social media as a
“public health position” that facilitates the promotion of China’s domestic vac-
cines and vaccination (Shi and Li 2021, 91). The aim is, “through visual rep-
resentations” and dynamic narratives (Wu 2020, para. 2), to “promote the global
expression, regional expression, and decentralised expression of China stories

and China voices and enhance the affinity and effectiveness of international com-
munication” (Xi 2021b, para. 7).
Therefore, we analysed China’s vaccination-themed narratives published by
state-owned media outlets on both domestic and international social media plat-
forms (Weibo and Twitter). The aim was to examine Beijing’s intermestic online
communication strategy for promoting its domestic vaccines, motivating global
mass vaccination, and increasing confidence in the safety, quality, and efficiency
of its domestic vaccines. Two research questions guided the analysis:
RQ1: What are the narrative strategies of Chinese state-owned media outlets re-
garding vaccine diplomacy on two social media platforms: Weibo (domestic)
and Twitter (international)?
RQ2: Addressing audiences at home and abroad, how does Beijing coordinate
and intertextualise narratives on Weibo and Twitter?
Method
We observed the intermestic strategy used by Chinese state-owned media out-
lets to communicate about domestic vaccines on social media one month after
Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2021 Global Health Summit (May 21–June 20, 2021).
Chinese scholars have read this speech as Beijing’s commitment to show the
world its COVID-19 prevention results and participate in international health
assistance. As the research questions indicate, we selected two social media plat-
forms to collect data: Weibo and Twitter. Due to the Internet blockage system of
the central government, most Chinese netizens cannot access international social
media platforms (e.g. Twitter and Facebook). Weibo has become the mainstream
Chinese microblogging service that Beijing uses to distribute domestic public di-
plomacy and propaganda platforms. At the same time, Beijing considers Twitter
a vital international communication channel in order to expand its digital public
diplomacy (Huang and Wang 2021).
In order to retrieve and download all Chinese vaccine-related posts in English
and Chinese on Twitter and Weibo, we set three Twitter and four Weibo ac-
count monitors to observe three Chinese state-owned media outlets that publish
on both international and domestic social media platforms: People’s Daily (@
PDChina on Twitter, @人民日报 on Weibo), Xinhua News Agency (@Xh-
news on Twitter, @新华社 on Weibo), and China Global Television Network
(@CGTNOfficial on Twitter, @CGTN and @央视新闻 on Weibo).1 First, we
downloaded all tweets posted by these three institutions from 21 May 2021 to
20 June 2021. Next, we used the IF, ISNUMBER, and SEARCH functions in
Microsoft Excel to check whether part of any post matched the string “vaccine”;
this method yielded 919 tweets and 171 Weibo posts containing strings such
as “ChineseVaccine”, “SinoVac”,2 “SinoPharm”,2 “COVID-19Vaccines”, and
“COVID-19Vaccination”.
The aim of this study was to identify and classify different online engagement
strategies and narratives related to China’s vaccine diplomacy. First, we adopted
a semio-discursive perspective to analyse the textual information and visual con-
tent (e.g. stable image and video) in vaccine diplomacy-themed posts (Alexis
et al. 2016; Magdi Fawzy 2019). Indeed, the interactivity and intertextuality of
social media have produced a new online news writing style in which the mix-
ture of textual and visual context enables the transmission of online messages
through dynamic “multimodal interaction” (Magdi Fawzy 2019, 5). This rhetor-
ical condition can also “increase [the communicator’s] control over communica-
tion” (Ledin and Machin 2019, 168). In other words, the coordination between
textual messages and visual content in online information design (e.g. using im-
ages or videos to supplement or develop ideas in textual information) is likely to
make communication content more dynamic and attractive. This coordination
can also make the attitudes of target audiences more favourable, promoting on-
line communication engagement ( Johnston and Taylor 2018). Second, we used
a method of multilingual discourse and rhetorical analysis developed by Huang
and Wang (2021) and Huang and Hardy (2021) to explore how Chinese state-
owned media integrate online storytelling strategies in order to deliver narratives
to domestic and international publics and engage intermestic communities in
cross-cultural exchange.
We read each tweet and Weibo post carefully, coding them according to text
modality and vaccination-themed content type. Combining emergent thematic
coding and grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 2009), we coded 119 tweets
and 171 Weibo posts to build detailed categories, checking and improving the
codebook along the way.3 We each then coded 200 tweets to verify intercoder
reliability using ReCal2 (Freelon 2010). Krippendor’s Alpha for the two variables
were .97 (text modality) and .82 (vaccination-themed content type). Then, we
each coded 300 tweets separately.
Online engagement strategies used by the Chinese media

When promoting domestic vaccines to both domestic and international audi-
ences, Chinese state-owned media tended to use “text + static images” and “text
+ video clips” to visualise their arguments about and descriptions of vaccine de-
velopment and vaccination-related issues. On Weibo (see Table 4.1) and Twitter
(see Table 4.2), more than 90% of all posts included static images or videos. All
messages published by Chinese state-owned media outlets on Weibo contained
visualised communication media (image, video, or live video), while tweets con-
taining only text were the least common (n = 83, 9%).
This result also shows Beijing’s investment in managing impressions through
online public diplomacy activities (Huang and Wang 2020). As argued by Chi-
nese communication scholars (Wang et al. 2019, 5), visual expressions can help
Chinese public diplomacy actors organise online communication and “interac-
tions with strangers and partners and reduce ambiguity presented in short textual
TABLE 4.1 Text modality of vaccination-themed Weibo posts
Frequency Percent Cumulative percent
Text + Static image 106 62.4 62.4

Text + Video clip 54 31.8 94.1
Text + Live video 10 5.9 100
Total 170 100
TABLE 4.2 Text modality of vaccination-themed tweets
Frequency Percent Cumulative percent
Text only 83 9 9
Text + Static image 688 74.9 83.9
Text + Video clip 144 15.7 99.6
Text + Live video 3 0.3 99.9
Other 1 0.1 100
Total 919 100
messages”. Indeed, images and videos can expand the expressive capacity of short
messages on social media (e.g. tweets). Visual elements also improve the accuracy,
efficiency, fun, and sociality of digital diplomatic communication (Chen and Siu
2017; Lane et al. 2019). Moreover, using visual expressions in digital journalism
promotes interaction between news publishers and receivers, thereby establishing
and maintaining social relations through social media functions and devices, cre-
ating a space for social support, enhancing mutual understanding, and facilitating
the co-construction of meaning (Alloing and Pierre 2020; Lecheler 2020).
Online storytelling strategies used by the Chinese media

After reading social media posts about China’s vaccines and vaccination, we iden-
tified the various types of content presented by China’s state-owned media out-
lets (see Table 4.3). The “common types” are content themes and events shared
by Chinese media outlets in preparing intermestic public diplomacy narratives.
Among these common types, the specific content types account for different
proportions on Weibo and Twitter. On Weibo, the Chinese media focused on
and exaggerated the achievements of domestic vaccination (n = 35, 40.6%) and
aimed to motivate more people to join the Beijing-led COVID-19 immunity
campaign. On Twitter, the Chinese media defended Beijing’s geopolitical inter-
ests (n = 383, 41.7%) and tried to restore its international image (n = 208, 22.6%).
Chinese journalists also continued to report on the rapid progress of domestic
vaccination (n = 118, 12.8%) to dispel foreign public concerns about the safety of
China’s domestic vaccines.
TABLE 4.3 China’s vaccination-themed content types on intermestic social media platforms
Weibo Twitter
Vaccination-themed Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Frequency Vaccination-themed

content type percent content type
Common Market China’s domestic 6 3.5 3.5 4.2 4.2 39 Market China’s Common
types vaccines domestic vaccines types
Promote others’ 16 9.4 12.9 13.5 9.2 85 Promote others’
endorsement of China’s endorsement of
vaccines China’s vaccines
Demonstrate China’s 12 7.1 20.0 36.1 22.6 208 Demonstrate China’s
international international
responsibility and responsibility and
vaccine diplomacy vaccine diplomacy
Display China’s 35 20.6 40.6 49.0 12.8 118 Display China’s
achievements in achievements in
domestic mass domestic mass
vaccination vaccination
Declare China’s 5 3.0 43.6 90.6 41.7 383 Declare China’s
geopolitics and foreign geopolitics and
policy by using foreign policy by
vaccines/vaccination- using vaccines/
related content vaccination-related
content
(Continued)
Weibo Twitter
Vaccination-themed Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Frequency Vaccination-themed

content type percent content type
Weibo Encourage domestic 9 5.3 45.4 99.2 8.6 79 Cover other countries’ Twitter
content vaccination vaccination-related content
types news types
Update domestic COVID-19 29 17.1 65.9 100.0 0.8 7 Show foreign
news governments’
gratitude for Beijing’s
vaccine diplomacy
Update foreign COVID-19 31 18.2 84.2
news
Present Beijing’s 3 1.8 85.9
responsibility for
overseas Chinese and its
compatriots
Educate the population 4 2.4 88.3
about COVID-19 and its
vaccines
Highlight the advantages of 16 9.4 97.7
domestic vaccines
Other 4 2.4 100.0
Total 170 100.0 100.0 919 Total
However, due to the differences between the domestic and international au-
diences, Beijing appears to have adopted a specific narrative strategy for com-
municating with the domestic public on Weibo. As a social networking platform
in China, Weibo is subject to strict Internet information censorship by the cen-
tral government because the increasing democratisation of the Internet threatens
the authority of the CPC (Arsène 2011). As a supplement to public opinion re-
view, China has also strengthened the ability of state-owned media outlets to use
Weibo to spread favourable reports and control domestic public opinion (Creem-
ers 2015). Therefore, as Table 4.3 shows, Beijing’s particular narrative types on
Weibo focus on global COVID-19 news updates and revolve around advocacy
that aims to increase the willingness of the domestic community to administer
and receive Chinese domestic vaccines.
Furthermore, by comparing the intermestic social media posts published by
Chinese media outlets in the “common types” section of Table 4.3, we identified
the “central kitchen model” of China’s public diplomatic information produc-
tion (Huang and Wang 2021, 1924) to uniformly produce, review, and distrib-
ute vaccination-themed online narratives. Because of the government’s control
over and censorship of Weibo information production, the messages published
on Weibo often reflect the instruction of official decision-makers. Therefore,
messages published on Weibo reflect the careful preparation and strict revision
of authoritative discourse. For Huang and Arifon (2018), this type of authorita-
tive discourse implies a narrative bottom line set by the CPC regarding para-
diplomatic and international communication content. Above this bottom line,
Chinese journalists have a certain degree of freedom and use “meta-discourse and
semi-official discourse” (Oger and Ollivier-Yaniv 2006, 63) on Twitter to ex-
press the authoritative voices of Beijing in fragmented and subtle ways in order to
create a “polyphonic illusion” (Huang and Wang 2021, 1928). The core purpose
is to modify and camouflage Beijing’s authoritative discourse through various
narrative and rhetorical tools in order to “erase heterogeneity, mismatch, and po-
litical sense” (Oger and Ollivier-Yaniv 2006, 63) in China’s official declarations.
One event, two perspectives

In our dataset, Chinese media outlets used various tactics to distinguish domestic
propaganda from international communication reporting the same information.
First, Chinese journalists used nuanced expressions to describe sensitive political
topics to intermestic publics. For instance, as Table 4.4 shows, Chinese reporters
used different expressions on Weibo and Twitter to imply different actors in
Chinese domestic vaccine donation to Taiwan. On Weibo, the subject of the
narrative was the Chinese mainland, emphasising the Chinese government, im-
plying the geopolitical affiliation between China and Taiwan, and expressing the
positive and open attitude of Beijing in donating vaccines to Taipei. The purpose
of such a narrative was to convey to the Chinese domestic public Beijing’s deter-
mination to defend the one-China policy and the proactive position that Beijing
TABLE 4.4 Using nuanced expressions for intermestic narratives4
Weibo content Twitter content
@CGTN: “The Chinese mainland on @XHNews: “Two mainland entities have

Monday expressed willingness to expressed their willingness to donate
make speedy arrangements to provide COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan to help
COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan the island cope with a spike in local
compatriots. ‘We will consider infections: spokesperson”. (26/05/2021
sending experts to share experiences 9:30)
and provide consultations on the
fight against the virus if needed’, said
Zhu Fenglian, a spokesperson for the
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State
Council”. (24/05/2021 17:20)
has taken in its relations with Taipei. However, on Twitter, the Chinese media
shifted the narrative from “Chinese mainland” to “two mainland entities”, sof-
tening Beijing’s attitude towards Taiwan on the international stage. The notion
of “two mainland entities” represents China’s civil society. This rhetorical ap-
proach emphasised that the wishes of the Chinese people, not the leadership of
Beijing, motivated the donation of Chinese domestic vaccines. The implication
is that the relationship between China and Taiwan is a matter of human relations;
although the two sides have different political systems, the people in Taiwan and
the mainland belong to the Chinese nation and share a common history, culture,
and value system. From this point of view, donating vaccines to Taiwan is a way
of promoting civil society among compatriots.
Second, as shown in Table 4.5, at the domestic level, Chinese media outlets
used cases of vaccine nationalism in Western countries to underscore Beijing’s
international image of selflessness and nobility. At the international level, Chinese
reporters quoted third-party arguments and information (like sources from WHO,
foreign public health institutions) to endorse Beijing’s international initiatives and
construct China’s image as a benefactor. As Table 4.5 shows, on Weibo, Chinese
media narratives criticised Western vaccine companies, especially in the United
States, for reluctance to share vaccine patents. These narratives implied that these
Western countries were not fulfilling their commitment towards the well-being
of the international community. Accompanying video clips portrayed China as
a country that honours its promises to implement the international cooperation
initiative known as global community of health for all. On Twitter, Beijing produced
richer narratives on the same topic (see Table 4.5). It described the commitment
of Chinese politicians to distribute vaccines internationally and highlighted forms
of aid to foreign countries to show that Beijing was fulfilling its promises. In ad-
dition, Beijing released reports that developing and underdeveloped countries had
received China’s public health assistance, in order to promote Beijing’s humanitar-
ian actions and political engagement in the fair distribution of vaccines.
TABLE 4.5 China’s international responsibility-related posts5
@CGTN: “At the @PDChina: “#Mongolia on Wednesday received the

WTO, calls for vaccine 4th batch of supplies donated by Chinese government
intellectual property to fight the COVID-19 pandemic at an online
waivers are growing. handover ceremony”. (26/05/2021 18:45)
Who do you think @CGTNOfficial: “China’s President Xi Jinping
these pharmaceutical pledged $3 billion in aid over the next three years
companies are? Charities? to help developing countries recover from the
Long term versus short coronavirus pandemic. Xi proposed an international
term, money versus forum on vaccine cooperation Friday at the G20
lives, which will take the Global Health Summit”. (21/05/2021 20:46)
lead?” (27/05/2021 1:00)
@CGTN: “The WHO @CGTNOfficial: “Retweeted @Panda_Paws_:
has repeatedly stressed China’s humanitarian aids to Gaza include:
that the lack of medical
• $1 million cash transfer to Palestine
treatment in African
• $1 million donation to UNRWA (UN agency for
countries is a cruel
Palestinian refugees)
reality, and special
• 200,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines
attention has to be
• Helping treat the injured and relocate the homeless”.
paid to the dynamics
(21/05/2021 19:44)
of COVID-19 in the
@CGTNOfficial: “Namibian Vice President Nangolo
continent. The developed
Mbumba on Friday received his first dose of China’s
countries need to
#Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine”. (21/05/2021
keep their promises in
13:50)
providing Vaccines so as
@CGTNOfficial: “Quoted @CGTNOfficial:
to help Africa survive the
disaster. In this episode • China will stay committed to supporting WTO and
of BizBeat, CGTN’s Xia other institutions in making an early decision on
Cheng talks about this”. waiving rights on #COVID19 vaccines
(26/05/2021 1:00) • China to propose setting up an international forum
on vaccine cooperation to seek equitable distribution
of vaccines around the world (2/2)” (21/05/2021
12:46)
An intermestic mutual argumentation tactic

To address widespread vaccination hesitancy, Chinese state-owned media outlets
used an intermestic mutual argumentation tactic in their narrative formulations
(see Table 4.6). On Weibo, Chinese journalists reported to domestic audiences that
different countries and international organisations had recognised China’s domestic
vaccines. The aim of such releases was to enhance the confidence of Chinese people
in participating in local vaccination campaigns. And with the increase in China’s
large-scale domestic vaccination, Beijing cited daily record sizes of Chinese mass
vaccination in various Twitter narratives in order to continually demonstrate to the
global community the safety and reliability of Chinese-made vaccines.
TABLE 4.6 Intermestic mutual argumentation tactic6
@People’s Daily: “On June 19, @XHNews: “More than 1 billion

more than 1 billion doses of doses of COVID-19 vaccines had
COVID-19 vaccines had been been administered in China, as
administered in China. From the country pushes ahead with
100 million to 1 billion, the time the largest vaccination drive in
required for each additional 100 the history of New China. Read
million doses of the vaccination #XinhuaHeadlines for more:
has been reduced from 25 days https://t.co/hh6gTLv7Pv https://t.
to 5 days. Click the video and co/27BSJPkJIV”. (20/06/2021 15:43)
see ‘the speed of vaccination’ in
China! To establish the immune
barrier as soon as possible, let’s
fight together!” (20/06/2021
16:57)
@CGTN: “The Food and @CGTNOfficial: “Malaysia on
Drug Administration of the Saturday announced that it had
Philippines has approved the approved the Phase-III clinical trial
COVID-19 vaccine developed of the inactivated COVID-19 vaccine
Intermestic
by China’s Sinopharm for developed by China’s BioKangtai”.
emergency use in the country, (05/06/2021 16:25)
Director General Enrique
Domingo said on Monday”.
(08/06/2021 8:54)
@CGTN: “The World Health @PDChina: “It only took China 5
Organization (WHO) on days to increase covid_19 #vaccine
Tuesday has listed COVID-19 distribution from 600 million doses
vaccine from China’s Sinovac for to 700 million as the number of doses
emergency use. For more: link”. administered has continued to rise at
(01/06/2021 23:01) an ever-faster rate since the country
hit the landmark figure of 100 million
on March 27”. (03/06/2021 16:10)
@CGTN: “China’s Sinopharm has @PDChina: “300 MILLION! China
released the world’s first report has fulfilled its promise to make
on phase III clinical trials on #COVID19 vaccines global public
inactivated COVID-19 vaccines. goods and has provided a total of 300
The two vaccines, developed by million doses of vaccine worldwide, a
its Wuhan and Beijing institutes, spokesperson of the National Health
have an efficacy of 72.8% and Commission said on Monday”.
78.1%, respectively, according (31/05/2021 8:43)
to a company statement”.
(27/05/2021 13:30)
@PDChina: “More than 527.25
million doses of #COVID19
vaccines had been administered
across China as of Monday, the
National Health Commission said
Tuesday”.7(25/05/2021 7:08)
These intermestic arguments circulated in Beijing’s social media narratives

for both domestic and international audiences. Repeated statistics, arguments,
and testimonies gave the intermestic intertextual network constructed by Chi-
nese media an enumerative value, producing a cumulative rhetorical effect that
strengthened public certainty about the safety of Chinese-made vaccines.
Conclusion
The global pandemic of COVID-19 pushed the Chinese government to
strengthen the control and censorship of the media’s public diplomacy infor-
mation release, especially online narratives related to the vaccination and
Chinese-m ade vaccines. In this exploratory study, we reviewed and catego-
rised the vaccination-themed narratives of Chinese state-owned media outlets
on intermestic social media platforms (Weibo and Twitter). Such practices have
been an essential part of Beijing’s digital public diplomacy campaign during the
pandemic. They display the government’s sense of international responsibility
through visual narratives and subtly legitimise China’s political initiative to pro-
mote a global community of health for all.
By analysing online intermestic vaccination-themed narratives posted by
Chinese state-owned media outlets one month after the 2021 Global Health
Summit, we confirm Beijing’s use of the “central kitchen model” to produce
messages for global communication. Based on this model, Chinese journalists
used various narrative techniques and rhetorical devices to implement the central
government’s intermestic communication directives and frame China’s political
advocacies in a fragmented and subtle manner online. The core purpose is to
create the illusion of polyphony, a way for Chinese institutions to conduct inter-
national communication within a system of information censorship. The aim is
to promote and recognise specific political events through various perspectives,
opinions, and arguments without crossing the red line of censorship. Although
all of the social media posts we studied came from Chinese media outlets, they
incorporated multiple voices and various visual forms; crossed domestic and in-
ternational social networks; and followed Beijing’s blueprint, framework, and
objectives for “promoting the global expression, regional expression, and decen-
tralised expression of China stories and China voices” during the COVID-19
pandemic (Xi 2021b, para. 7).
In future studies, it will be pertinent for scholars to consider using an ex-
panded dataset of vaccination-themed para-diplomatic social media posts re-
leased by Chinese para-diplomatic actors on Weibo and Twitter. By combining
manual coding with computer learning (for example, semantic analysis and net-
work analysis), we may provide answers to the following questions: (a) What
are the network dynamics of China’s online promotion of vaccine diplomacy?
(b) By using social media communication, how do Chinese para-diplomatic ac-
tors generate a network synergy with other domestic non-state actors, foreign
counterparts, and partners to endorse Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy? (c) How can
Chinese para-diplomatic actors build interactive relationships with domestic and

foreign audiences on social media to frame Chinese-made vaccine-themed mes-
sages better?
Notes
1 China Global Television Network is an overseas communication network dominated by
China Central Television. Therefore, in the information collection of Weibo, we also
captured the content released by China Central Television (@央视新闻) to complete
the research corpus.
2 “SinoVac” and “SinoPhram” are two main Chinese domestic COVID-19 vaccine
brands.
3 Due to the small number of Weibo posts, we completed the coding process for these
data during this first step.
4 Source of Weibo content: CGTN [CGTN]. (2021, May 24). The Chinese main-
land on Monday expressed willingness to make speedy arrangements to provide
COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan compatriots. Weibo. Retrieved from https://share.
api.weibo.cn/share/270187210.html?weibo_id=4640519814383055;
Source of Twitter content: China Xinhua News [XHNews]. (2021, May 26). Two
mainland entities have expressed their willingness to donate COVID-19 vaccines to
Taiwan to help the island cope with a spike in local infections: spokesperson [Tweet].
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/XHNews/status/1397485356648329218.
5 Sources of Weibo content: CGTN [CGTN]. (2021, May 27). At the WTO, calls for
vaccine intellectual property waivers are growing. Weibo. Retrieved from https://
share.api.weibo.cn/share/270203053.html?weibo_id=4641360356836452; CGTN
[CGTN]. (2021, May 26). The WHO has repeatedly stressed that the lack of med-
ical treatment in African countries is a cruel reality, and special attention has to
be paid to the dynamics of COVID-19 in the continent. Weibo. Retrieved from
https://share.api.weibo.cn/share/270203247.html?weibo_id=4640997968970357;
Sources of Twitter content: People’s Daily [PDChina]. (2021, May 26). #Mongo-
lia on Wednesday received the 4th batch of supplies donated by Chinese govern-
ment to fight the COVID-19 pandemic at an online handover ceremony [Tweet].
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/PDChina/status/1397624828417486858 and
CGTN [CGTNOfficial]. (2021, May 21); China’s President Xi Jinping pledged $3
billion in aid over the next three years to help developing countries recover from
the coronavirus pandemic. Xi proposed an international forum on vaccine coop-
eration Friday at the G20 Global Health Summit [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://
twitter.com/CGTNOfficial/status/1395843422926278657; CGTN [CGTNOfficial].
(2021, May 21). China’s humanitarian aids to Gaza include: -$1 million cash transfer
to Palestine -$1 million donation to UNRWA (UN agency for Palestinian refu-
gees) -200,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines -Helping treat the injured and relocate
the homeless [Retweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/CGTNOfficial/sta-
tus/1395827858161942538; CGTN [CGTNOfficial]. (2021, May 21). Namibian Vice
President Nangolo Mbumba on Friday received his first dose of China’s #Sinopharm
COVID-19 vaccine [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/CGTNOfficial/
status/1395738767776878596; CGTN [CGTNOfficial]. (2021, May 21). - China will
stay committed to supporting WTO and other institutions in making an early de-
cision on waiving rights on #COVID19 vaccines - China to propose setting up an
international forum on vaccine cooperation to seek equitable distribution of vaccines
around the world (2/2) [Quote]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/CGTNOfficial/
status/1395722755543232512.
6 Sources of Weibo content: People’s Daily [人民日报]. (2021, June 20). On June
19, more than 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines had been administerated in
China. Weibo. Retrieved from https://share.api.weibo.cn/share/270225392.htm-

l?weibo_id=4650207901384836; CGTN [CGTN]. (2021, June 8). The Food and
Drug Administration of the Philippines has approved the COVID-19 vaccine de-
veloped by China’s Sinopharm for emergency use in the country, Director General
Enrique Domingo said on Monday. Weibo. Retrieved from https://share.api.weibo.
cn/share/270225780.html?weibo_id=4645737872493437; CGTN [CGTN]. (2021,
June 1). The World Health Organization (WHO) on Tuesday has listed COVID-19
vaccine from China’s Sinovac for emergency use. Weibo. Retrieved from https://
share.api.weibo.cn/share/270227378.html?weibo_id=4643414169883996; CGTN
[CGTN]. (2021, May 27). China’s Sinopharm has released the world’s first report on
phase III clinical trials on inactivated COVID-19 vaccines. Weibo. Retrieved from
https://share.api.weibo.cn/share/270228259.html?weibo_id=4641458499356893;
sources of Twitter content: China Xinhua News [XHNews]. (2021, June 20).
More than 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines had been administered in
China, as the country pushes ahead with the largest vaccination drive in the his-
tory of New China. Read #XinhuaHeadlines for more: https://t.co/hh6gTLv7Pv
[Tweet]. Retrieved from https://t.co/27BSJPkJIVhttps://twitter.com/XHNews/
status/1406638758623989760; CGTN [CGTNOfficial]. (2021, June 5). Malaysia on
Saturday announced that it had approved the Phase-III clinical trial of the inacti-
vated COVID-19 vaccine developed by China’s BioKangtai [Tweet]. Retrieved from
https://twitter.com/CGTNOfficial/status/1401213607266897923; People’s Daily
[PDChina]. (2021, June 3). It only took China 5 days to increase covid_19 #vaccine
distribution from 600 million doses to 700 million as the number of doses adminis-
tered has continued to rise at an ever-faster rate since the country hit the landmark
figure of 100 million on March 27 [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/
PDChina/status/1400484924126339073; People’s Daily [PDChina]. (2021, May 31).
300 MILLION! China has fulfilled its promise to make #COVID19 vaccines global
public goods and has provided a total of 300 million doses of vaccine worldwide,
a spokesperson of the National Health Commission said on Monday [Tweet]. Re-
trieved from https://twitter.com/PDChina/status/1399285435889721346; People’s
Daily [PDChina]. (2021, May 25). More than 527.25 million doses of #COVID19
vaccines had been administered across China as of Monday, the National Health
Commission said Tuesday [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/PDChina/
status/1397087058703773705.
7 People’s Daily [PDChina]. (2021, May 25). More than 527.25 million doses of
#COVID19 vaccines had been administered across China as of Monday, the National
Health Commission said Tuesday [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/
PDChina/status/1397087058703773705.
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5
FORMULATING A DISCOURSE OF
SOLIDARITY AMID COVID-19
A positive discourse analysis of remarks given by
spokespersons from China’s foreign ministry
Yating Yu and Dennis Tay
Introduction
Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was first detected in the city of China, Wuhan,
in December 2019 (Huang et al. 2020). One month after that, the World Health
Organisation (WHO) declared this outbreak to be a “Public Health Emergency
of International Concern” and later classified it as a pandemic (WHO, 2020b,
2020c). After fighting the pandemic for three months, China’s State Council
Information Office (2020) declared that China had successfully brought it under
control. However, COVID-19 spread all over the world with over 231 million
confirmed cases, as reported by the WHO (2021) on 28 September 2021.
The spread of COVID-19 results in economic recession and has a negative im-
pact on many people’s mental health and lives (Yelin et al. 2020). There has been
an outburst of discriminatory incidents against Chinese and Asian descendants
around the world (Wen et al. 2020; Zheng et al. 2020). In addition, some poli-
ticians and media repeatedly associated the virus with China or Wuhan, though
the WHO warned against such associations (World Health Organisation 2020a).
For instance, the former president of the United States, Donald Trump, used the
derogatory phrase “Chinese virus” on several occasions, either online or offline
(Zheng et al. 2020). The American daily newspaper, The Wall Street Journal, pub-
lished an article titled “China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia” in February 2020
(Mead 2020). Similarly, the American television channel Fox News repeatedly
reported stories that claimed COVID-19 is a Chinese bioweapon leaked from
the Wuhan Institute of Virology (Santos and Gatter 2020). These incidents could
potentially have an adverse impact on international cooperation and China’s na-
tional image in the world (Wen et al. 2020; Zheng et al. 2020).
In response to the heightened diplomatic tensions amid the global health cri-
sis, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their spokespersons formulated a
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-7
A discourse of solidarity amid COVID-19 77
discourse of solidarity. That is, they attempted to convey “a message of hope,

strength, encouragement and inspiration while playing the role of a unifier”
(Bartlett 2012; Hughes 2018; Nartey and Ernanda 2020, 1). The discourse of sol-
idarity is characterised by shared interests, collective aims, and change (Martin
2004). The discursive construction of solidarity can be realised via the use of
discursive strategies. In this study, a discursive strategy refers to the following:
A more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices),

adopted in order to achieve a particular social, political, psychological, or
linguistic goal. Discursive strategies are located at different levels of lin-
guistic organization and complexity.
(Wodak 2015, 12)
Investigating the discursive strategies can help uncover the ideological implica-
tions motivating the discourse of solidarity formulated by China’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and its spokespersons. This chapter examines how the discourse
of solidarity is formulated via the use of metaphor, lexical reiteration, and index-
icals and deontic modals.
Crisis communication and critical/positive discourse analysis

Over the past two decades, some scholars have suggested the use of a discourse
analytical approach to investigate crisis communication (McKie and Munshi
2009; Martinelli 2011; Öhman et al. 2016; Dunn and Eble 2015). The reason
is that the field of crisis communication tends to focus on how management is
performed in handling a crisis and reputation (Coombs and Holladay 2009; Kim
and Sung 2014; Benoit 2015; Coombs 2015) while ignoring the power dynam-
ics and ideologies behind that play a key role in communication. As Dunn and
Eble (2015, 721) point out, “No mechanism in any of the [crisis communication]
theories considers notions of power or class and how those notions impact the
organization’s success in navigating the crisis, and therein lies the gap”. Hence,
critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a transdisciplinary paradigm can be used to
fill this gap and investigate the relationships between social structure and lan-
guage effectively.
To expand the research paradigm of CDA, Martin (2004) proffers the need to
propose positive discourse analysis (PDA) as he perceives these two approaches,
CDA and PDA, as the conceptualisation of dualism, yin and yang, in ancient
Chinese philosophy. The traditional critical discourse approach focuses on “ide-
ologically driven discrimination with respect to gender, ethnicity, class and re-
lated social variables” (Martin 2004, 179). Different from CDA, PDA focuses
on advancing the “possibilities for transformations capable of enhancing human
flourishing and mitigating social ills” (Hughes 2018, 199). In other words, CDA
focuses on the deconstructive face of power while PDA centres around the con-
structive side. Martin (2004, 184) suggests that “deconstructive and constructive
78 Yating Yu and Dennis Tay
activity are both required” in studying the subversion of power and development
of social change. Hence, PDA can be used alongside CDA to highlight the con-
struction of values and the circulation of power with an emancipatory objective
in crisis communication ( Jinshuang and Rong 2020; Sultan and Rapi 2020).
As COVID-19 has become a global issue and is the object of mounting schol-
arly attention, Castro Seixas (2021, 3) suggests that it can be “considered an
opportunity to rethink and expand crisis communication theories”. It is not sur-
prising that an increasing number of communication studies have investigated
topics pertaining to COVID-19 with a critical perspective. For instance, Yu
(2021b) employed the dialectical relational approach to CDA to investigate how
China’s English-language news media handled crisis communication during the
COVID-19 health crisis. Her findings show that the state-run media drew on
three main discursive strategies: enemification, heroisation, and victimisation.
These strategies help to construct a discourse of resistance to defuse the dip-
lomatic tension and shape China’s national image. Similarly, by employing a
discourse-historical approach to CDA, Wodak (2021) investigated how govern-
ments in Austria, Germany, France, Hungary, and Sweden conducted crisis com-
munication during COVID-19 lockdowns. Her findings show that four frames
are prominent in governmental crisis communication: “a religious frame”, “a
dialogic frame”, “a frame emphasising trust”, and “a frame of leading a war”
(Wodak 2021, 1). These frames can help to alleviate the fear of death and refute
the denial of death. Castro Seixas (2021), similarly, employed CDA to examine
the use of militaristic metaphors by political representatives to manage the crisis
communication during COVID-19. Her findings show that political representa-
tives’ use of metaphor can help them show understanding towards the public and
promote resilience in tackling the health crisis. This challenges the generalised
insights that the war metaphor is inherently damaging and dangerous (Oswick
et al. 2020; Sabucedo et al. 2020).
Despite the significance of these studies, little research attention has been
given to the discursive construction of solidarity as a response strategy amid
global health crises in crisis communication. The studies reviewed above inves-
tigate ideologically driven resistance rather than the formation of community in
the interests of solidarity. In other words, they mainly focus on the deconstruc-
tion of power and manipulation rather than the reconstruction of solidarity. It
is important to investigate the discursive construction of solidarity amid global
health crises in crisis communication because this can impact international coop-
eration and global health governance (Calisher et al. 2020; Mian and Khan 2020;
Tay 2021). Moreover, it might affect a country’s national image and international
affairs in the long run (Wen et al. 2020).
Therefore, this study fills the research gap by investigating the construction
of solidarity through the remarks given by China’s foreign ministry spokesper-
sons and its ideological implications during COVID-19 within the framework
of PDA (Martin 2004). With this objective in mind, this study seeks to answer
the following research questions: (i) How has the discourse of solidarity been
formulated by China’s foreign ministry spokespersons? (ii) What are the ide-
ological implications underlying the discourse of solidarity? In what follows,
the study will describe the analytical procedures, data collection, analysis, and
conclusions.
Analytical procedures and data collection

This study employs PDA, a complementary perspective to the CDA paradigm,
“which functions to make the world a better place” (Martin 2004, 179). The
analysis concerns three key elements of discourse: text, discursive practice, and
sociocultural/geopolitical practice (Fairclough 1995). Text is defined as the prod-
uct of social process, and discourse refers to the social process itself (Brown and
Yule 1983). The second element, discursive practice, refers to the production,
distribution, and consumption of texts. The third element, sociocultural/geopo-
litical practice, refers to the wider sociocultural/geopolitical convention, order,
and structure, which influence and determine how language is used and con-
sumed. These three key elements work in tandem to reinforce each other.
Bartlett’s (2012) critiques that a fundamental shortcoming of PDA is its lack
of contextual framing. Following Bartlett’s (2012) suggestion for PDA to analyse
the text with wider sociocultural or geopolitical contexts, the analysis of this
study also follows Fairclough’s (1995) dialectical relational approach to CDA.
First of all, the texts needed to be analysed and scrutinised repeatedly to find
out the dominant linguistic features, rhetoric, and discursive strategies. To assist
this process, some software was applied to unveil the linguistic patterns. At the
second level, in conjunction with the descriptive analysis of texts, interpretations
were given, which focused on the relationships between the texts and discourse
producers. At the final level, explanations of the discourse dynamic were also
provided in relation to the wider geopolitical context.
To complement the framework of PDA, other linguistic tools were also em-
ployed for scrutinising the texts, including METALUDE (i.e. Metaphor at Ling-
nan University Department of English),1 Suggested Upper Merged Ontology
(SUMO),2 and Wordsmith 6.0 (Scott 2013). METALUDE was employed to
identify metaphors from the texts, and it provides the literal and metaphorical
senses of each metaphor. According to Charteris-Black (2011, 31), a metaphor
is “a shift in the use of a word or phrase by giving it a new sense”. SUMO was
used to check the semantic fields of lexical items.3 According to Brinton (2000,
112), “A semantic field denotes a segment of reality symbolised by a set of related
words. The words in a semantic field share a common semantic property”. Last
but not least, Wordsmith 6.0 (Scott 2013) was employed to generate a wordlist
that reveals the frequencies of all the words in the data.
A PDA framework is particularly useful for the current study due to its value
and “focus on community, taking into account how people get together and
make room for themselves in the world – in ways that redistribute power without
necessarily struggling against it” (Martin 2004, 184). In other words, it offers us
a suitable framework with which to analyse the how and why of China’s foreign
ministry spokespersons’ anti-epidemic rhetoric and its implications for issues
such as solidarity, international cooperation, and the role of leaders in crisis com-
munication. By combining PDA with Fairclough’s (1995) dialectical relational
approach, this study shows that the complementary use of both frameworks can
throw more light on crisis communication.
One hundred and four remarks on COVID-19, comprising 249,199 words,
were collected from the webpage of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.3 Al-
though the transcripts of the remarks are available in six different languages, for
the purpose of this study, we mainly collected the English texts for analysis. The
texts were translated from Chinese into English by the Ministry itself. The re-
marks were mainly given by four spokespersons, Geng Shuang, Hua Chunying,
Wang Wenbin, and Zhao Lijian. The target audience of these remarks includes
foreign diplomats, politicians, and international media reporters and editors (Wu
2019). All the data were then manually checked to make sure that the remarks
covered topics related to China’s response to COVID-19. The remarks were
published between 20 January and 30 June 2020, because 20 January was the date
when the first relevant remark appeared and 30 June was the date when the data
were collected for analysis.
Findings and discussion

In this section, we demonstrate how China’s foreign ministry spokespersons de-
ployed three main discursive strategies to promote solidarity in the global health
crisis. These include the use of metaphor, lexical reiteration, and indexicals and
deontic modals. The discourse of solidarity constructed by the spokespersons
has ideological implications for collectivism and humanitarianism, which are
inextricably intertwined with Beijing’s diplomatic concept – building “a com-
munity with a shared future for humankind”.4 This concept was proposed by
Chinese President, Xi Jinping, when he assumed office in 2012 and was later
recorded into the United Nations resolutions in 2017 (Liu and Zhang 2018).
It can be understood as a worldview that “take[s] the legitimate concerns of
others into consideration while in pursuit of self-interests and to promote the
common development of all countries while pursuing the development of our
own” (Suolang and Yao 2018, 33). Later, this concept was expanded into a global
health governance system, “a Global Community of Health for All” by President
Xi (2021) during COVID-19. In what follows, we will discuss each discursive
strategy with illustrative examples.
Use of metaphor
A dominant discursive strategy used by China’s foreign ministry spokespersons
to construct the discourse of solidarity is metaphor. Metaphor is effective rhetoric
used by politicians to popularise their discourse and conceptualise abstract ideas
into concrete things (Charteris-Black 2011). In addition, metaphor can help es-
tablish the juxtaposition of ideas such as in-group and out-group, good and evil,
etc. (Bhatia 2015; Nartey and Ernanda 2020). In order to amplify the threat of
COVID-19, China’s foreign ministry spokespersons used metaphor to negatively
frame COVID-19 as a common enemy of humankind that all nations must fight
against, making it more perceptible with a personification effect (Examples 1
and 2):
1 By taking strong measures, China is not just acting for the sake of its own
people, but for people across the world. In this battle against the invisible en-
emy, we are working around the clock to allow time for global preparedness,
fighting on the front lines to contain the virus and setting a new standard for
epidemic response (Geng 2020a).
2 The United States must understand that their enemy is the virus, not China.
The international community can only defeat the virus by pulling together.
Attacking and discrediting other countries will not save the time and lives
lost. We hope that those on the US side will respect facts, science, and in-
ternational consensus, stop attacking and blaming China for nothing, stop
making irresponsible remarks, and focus instead on fighting the epidemic at
home and promoting international cooperation (Geng 2020c).
In these examples, metaphorical phrases such as “battle”, “enemy”, “fight-
ing”, “front lines”, “defeat”, and “attacking” illustrate a wartime rhetoric
(Examples 1 and 2). They suggest the conceptual metaphors COVID-19 IS
AN ENEMY and ACTIVITY IS FIGHTING according to METALUDE
(Yu 2021a, 2021b).5 By positioning COVID-19 as a common enemy of hu-
mankind, such a strategy can determine a missile target for humankind to
aim at and fight against (Bhatia 2008; Yu 2021a). The use of emphatic ne-
gation “not China” in Example 2 presupposes that some nations such as
the United States (under the Trump administration) mistakenly attacked
the wrong target instead of COVID-19. These examples were produced in
the early context when some Western countries blamed China for the in-
itial spread of COVID-19, increasing discrimination against Chinese and
Asian descendants around the world (Wen et al. 2020; Zheng et al. 2020).
The tensions between China and some Western countries led by the United
States have been ongoing due to their different political systems and eco-
nomic interests and escalated during COVID-19 (Xu 2012; Yu 2021b).
Hence, by highlighting the threat of COVID-19, the use of metaphor can
effectively arouse the audience’s emotion of fear and unite them to fight
against COVID-19 and, hence, promote collectivism and humanitarianism.
The WAR metaphor is found to be similarly used in the Chinese English-
language newspaper to unite other nations of the world (Yu 2021a, 2021b).
In other countries, the WAR metaphor is commonly used to describe their
effort in tackling the pandemic (Oswick et al. 2020; Sabucedo et al. 2020;
Castro Seixas 2021), though researchers such as Koller and Semino (2020)
call for alternative ways of talking about COVID-19 as it might lead to anx-
iety or aggression towards people.
China’s foreign ministry spokespersons also used metaphor to position
other nations of the world as China’s allies to unite them, implying collec-
tivism. Phrases such as “comrades-in-arms” in Examples 3 and 4 imply the
conceptual metaphor NATIONS ARE ALLIES according to METALUDE
(Yu 2021a).
3 Africa and China are friends and now comrades-in-arms in the fight against the
COVID-19. Nothing can change or damage Africa–China friendship. In
the next stage, China and Africa will continue to stand firmly together to
secure the final victory against the pandemic (Zhao 2020b).
4 If the COVID-19 pandemic is comparable to the attack on Pearl Harbor and
the 9/11 attack, then the enemy the United States faces this time is the novel
coronavirus. The novel coronavirus is the common enemy of all mankind. In
the face of this war between human and virus, China and the United States
should be comrades in arms rather than enemies. Only with the concerted ef-
forts of the international community to combat the pandemic can we win the
war between mankind and the coronavirus once and for all (Hua 2020b).
5 Solidarity and cooperation is our most powerful weapon in this war. Having
claimed so many precious lives, COVID-19 serves as a stark reminder that
countries must rise above differences in geography, race, history, culture,
and social system (Zhao 2020f ).
When other nations of the world are perceived as China’s allies in the
pandemic war, “solidarity and cooperation” is compared to the most power-
ful “weapon” against COVID-19 (Example 5). To ease the dispute between
the United States and China, China’s foreign ministry spokespersons further
recalled collective memories of the past and compared COVID-19 to other
wars and terrorist attacks such as “the attack on Pearl Harbor and the 9/11
attack” (Example 4). The recall of history can effectively raise the alarm of
the audience and enables mental images of the past to be instinctively pro-
jected onto the present crisis, highlighting the importance of solidarity and
cooperation. As Wodak (2015, 11) indicates, “because history teaches that
specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a
specific action in a specific situation”.
When comparing other nations of the world to China’s allies, China’s
foreign ministry spokespersons also used metaphor to position WHO as the
leader of the fight against the pandemic. This comparison implies the con-
ceptual metaphor AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY IS A GENERAL
according to METALUDE (Yu 2021a) and this metaphor is evidenced by
phrases such as “leading the global fight” (Example 6).
6 We will continue to support WHO in leading the global fight against the virus
with concrete actions and work with the larger international community to
uphold global public health security (Zhao 2020e).
7 We see people around the world joining hands to fight off this epidemic, and
the WHO has repeatedly said that stigmatisation is more dangerous than the
virus itself. Why are certain people and media still promoting such an absurd
logic? What are they up to? (Zhao 2020i)
8 China calls on the international community to increase political and finan-
cial support for WHO so as to mobilise resources worldwide to defeat the
virus (Zhao 2020j).
This discursive positioning can lend credence to WHO and unite other
nations of the world to follow its lead. WHO advocates not to name the pan-
demic after a region or country, and yet some politicians, such as the former
president of the United States, Donald Trump, still used the derogatory phrase
“Chinese virus” (Zheng et al. 2020). And so, China’s foreign ministry spokes-
persons raised this point and are strongly against it (Example 7). By comparing
stigmatisation with the virus, it amplifies the danger posed by the aggressors.
China’s foreign ministry spokespersons also highlighted China’s support for
the WHO as the leader in the global fight against COVID-19 by rallying
financial support from the international community (Example 8). WHO has
no absolute authority over other nations of the world to follow its advice and
relies on its members’ voluntary funding and contributions to sustain its oper-
ation (Mahase 2020b). Incidents such as the US withdrawal from WHO ini-
tiated by Donald Trump in 2020 would undermine WHO’s work and global
efforts in fighting against COVID-19 (Mahase 2020a). Hence, China’s foreign
ministry spokespersons used the GENERAL metaphors to amplify the lead-
ership role of the WHO and rally support from the international community.
Lexical reiteration
Another dominant strategy used by China’s foreign ministry spokesper-
sons to construct the discourse of solidarity is the employment of lexical
reiteration. Halliday (1994) suggests that lexical choice is the most distinct
way of indicating ideational meanings and fields in communication. Aligned
with his theoretical position, this study finds that the principal focus of the
remarks of China’s foreign ministry spokespersons’ is enhanced by lexical
reiteration related to Beijing’s diplomatic concept, building “a community
with a shared future for humankind” and/or “a Global Community of
Health for All”, which they seek to promote.
Here, a word frequency list generated by WordSmith v.6.0 (Scott 2013)
was used to identify the most frequently used words and their semantic field
in the remarks of China’s foreign ministry spokespersons’. It is found that
“cooperation” (964) is the most frequently used lexical word in the remarks
in addition to the adjective “international” and proper nouns such as country
names (e.g. China). Other frequently used words include “support” (677),
“community” (647), “help” (376), “assistance” (343), and “coordination”
(197). According to SUMO, these words belong to the same semantic field
of COOPERATION. The reiteration of expressions in the same semantic
field can lead to over-lexicalisation, which enables the speakers to convey in-
formation about their preoccupations (Fowler et al. 1979). As demonstrated
throughout their remarks, the spokespersons presented a consistent discur-
sive strategy in their promotion of Beijing’s diplomatic concept, with impli-
cations for collectivism and humanitarianism. As Lam (2018, 200) points
out, “the lexical words are the main carriers of information and contribute
more to the semantic construction and communication”. A closer look at
the context within which these words are used shows their positive semantic
environments (Examples 9–12).
9 Amid the ongoing pandemic, China and the United States should strengthen
anti-epidemic cooperation, support WHO’s leading role, help developing
countries fight the virus, and contribute to cooperation in global public
health security (Zhao 2020d).
10 The pandemic has vividly demonstrated that all countries and all mankind
are a close-knit community with a shared future. Faced with the dual crisis
in terms of global public health and world economy, it takes partnership,
solidarity, and collaboration to secure the final victory. China is ready to
step up cooperation with all parties including the WEF to uphold multilat-
eralism and the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind,
conduct close coordination in macro-economic policies, foster an open
world economy, facilitate trade and investment liberation and facilitation,
safeguard stable and unimpeded global industrial and supply chains, and
work for the strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth of the world
economy (Geng 2020e).
As the examples show, these frequently used lexical words are found in
linguistic environments related to positive results such as “the final victory”,
“multilateralism”, “an open world economy”, “trade and investment liber-
ation and facilitation”, “stable and unimpeded global industrial and supply
chains”, “the strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth of the world
economy”, and “the accessibility and affordability of vaccines” (Examples
9–12). The positive results highlighted cover multiple dimensions ranging
from the control of the pandemic to the increase in international trade and
finance. This kind of lexical reiteration and structural patterning helps prime
the audience that cooperation will definitely be beneficial to humankind in
the fight against COVID-19, implying collectivism and humanitarianism.
The repetitive and positive use of lexical items in the spokespersons’ remarks
is rhetoric similarly used by the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, in his diplo-
matic speech amid the global health crisis ( Jinshuang and Rong 2020).
11 With the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind, China
has provided support and assistance to the international community
within its capacity while continuing to do a good job in epidemic control at
home. So far, the Chinese government has provided or is providing supplies
to 127 countries and four international organisations, including surgical

masks, protective gears, and testing reagents. China donated $20 million to
the WHO, sent 13 medical teams to 11 countries, and held over 70 video
conferences with experts from more than 150 countries and international
organisations. Localities, enterprises, and civil groups in China also donated
medical supplies to more than 100 countries, regions, and international or-
ganisations (Zhao 2020a).
12 Upholding a vision of a shared future for mankind, the Chinese government
attaches high importance to global public health. We will continue imple-
menting the initiatives and measures proposed by President Xi Jinping at the
virtual opening ceremony of the 73rd World Health Assembly, supporting
the WHO, Gavi and other international organisations to the best of our
ability, and contributing to the accessibility and affordability of vaccines in
developing countries as well as building a global community of health for
all (Zhao 2020g).
In tandem with their reiteration of expressions, the spokespersons also
used statistical evidence to further emphasise the importance of coopera-
tion and illustrate China’s humanitarian deeds in support of other nations of
the world as a role model, such as “127 countries”, “four international or-
ganizations”, “$20 million”, “13 medical teams”, “11 countries”, “70 video
conferences”, “150 countries”, and “100 countries” (Example 11). By con-
veying the statistics via parallelism with the repeated structure beginning
with actions such as “provided/providing”, “sent”, “held”, and “donated”,
the spokespersons were able to strengthen their persuasive force, compelling
their audience to accept it as an actual fact (Example 11).
One of the reasons why “community” is a highly frequent word in the
remarks is that it always appears in the context where the spokespersons
referred to the diplomatic concept, building “a community with a shared
future for humankind” and/or “a Global Community of Health for All”.
This diplomatic concept appears 128 times in the data, and it always co-
occurs with other lexical phrases belonging to the same semantic field of
COOPERATION (Examples 10–12). This concept provides the moral high
ground for the spokespersons to encourage win–win collaboration to fight
against COVID-19 in response to the heightened diplomatic tensions. This
echoes Yu’s (2021a) findings, which show the Chinese English-language
newspaper, governed by Beijing, has similarly employed the diplomatic con-
cept, building “a community with a shared future for humankind”, to pro-
mote international cooperation amid the global health crisis.
Use of indexicals and deontic modals

The final dominant strategy used by China’s foreign ministry spokespersons
to construct the discourse of solidarity is the use of indexicals and deontic
modals. The acceptance of a political goal – international cooperation – is
contingent on the context in which values and interests are shared by all
nations. Unsurprisingly, conveying the importance of this goal is not a dif-
ficult task for the spokespersons: in the first place, China is a victim of the
pandemic, just like the rest of the world (Example 13). Secondly, China was
the first country to be hit by the pandemic and to receive a lot of humani-
tarian assistance from other nations of the world. Later, when the pandemic
was brought under control domestically, China returned the favour to assist
other nations. China’s experience can be helpful to most, if not all, of the
nations that they are addressing. Hence, the indexicals “we/our/us” can be
an effective involvement strategy for the spokespersons to integrate China
with the international community and promote international cooperation,
with implications for collectivism and humanitarianism.
13 China is a victim, not an accomplice. As victims hit by the same virus, we
have a stake in each other’s well-being and should stay united and work to-
gether (Geng 2020d).
Generally, the use of the indexicals “we/our/us” can be seen as an in-
volvement strategy depending on the situation in which they are used. They
can be used to index people or groups either inside or outside their own
community or group. When the spokespersons used the indexicals “we/our/
us”, they may, sometimes, use them to refer to their nation or the Chinese
government (Example 14). However, when constructing the discourse of
solidarity, they used these indexicals anaphorically or cataphorically to refer
to Beijing and the audience, and more broadly, China and the international
communities (Examples 15–16). In this way, the spokespersons used the in-
dexicals to further put China into the geographical space of the world, a
larger community, and reinforce solidary without any boundary between
nations. Hence, they can effectively promote Beijing’s diplomatic concept
– building “a community with a shared future for humankind” and/or “a
Global Community of Health for All”.
14 We Chinese people trust our government (Hua 2020a).
15 The outbreak once again shows that we all live in a community of shared
future (Zhao 2020c).
16 It shows once again that we, as a community with a shared future, can al-
ways rely on each other in difficult times (Geng 2020b).
In addition to the use of the indexicals, the spokespersons also used deontic
modals such as “must, should, need” to indicate obligation and permission,
thereby intensifying the degree of compulsion. This can effectively convey
the urgent need in handling different problems caused by COVID-19. For
instance, the spokespersons highlighted xenophobia and racial discrimina-
tion against Chinese and Asian descendants amid the global health crisis and
were vocal in expressing anti-racism. They are against the use of virus names
associated with a country or region, such as “Chinese virus” or “Wuhan
virus”, and used the indexical and deontic modal “we should” to delegate
the responsibility to all nations and people (Example 17). In response to the
conspiracy theory that COVID-19 is a Chinese bioweapon leaked from the

Wuhan lab, the spokespersons again used the indexical “we” to emphasise
the obligation of all humankind to uphold “science, reason and cooperation”
(Example 17). The spokespersons also drew on authoritative sources such as
experts and authorities to strengthen their discursive stance. For instance, in
Example 18, the official is nominated by his full name “António Guterres”
and institutional affiliation and position “UN Secretary-General” to lend
credence to his authority. He advised nations of the world and all people to
fight against racism and prejudice.
17 We should all say no to “information virus” and “political virus”. By call-
ing it “China virus” and, thus, suggesting its origin without any supporting
facts or evidence, some media clearly want China to take the blame and their
ulterior motives are laid bare. The epidemic is a global challenge. The right
move should be working together to fight it, which means no place for ru-
mours and prejudice. We need science, reason and cooperation to drive out
ignorance and bias (Zhao 2020h).
18 UN Secretary-General António Guterres said “it is shameful to see increas-
ing acts of racial discrimination and prejudice as we fight the COVID19
pandemic” and “we must always fight racism and prejudice” (Geng 2020f ).
19 We believe that the common enemy we face now is the virus. China and
the United States are not enemies to each other, nor should we become
enemies or rivals. We should join hands to fight the epidemics (Hua 2020c).
The spokespersons’ repetitive use of indexicals and deontic modals suggests
collective efforts and shared responsibility among all nations of the world. It helps
strategically project the need for building “a community with a shared future for
humankind” and/or “a Global Community of Health for All” within the inter-
national community. Knowing full well that foreign diplomats and politicians
and the international community will get to hear their remarks in presence or
via the media, the spokespersons seek the opportunity to unite all the nations.
While acknowledging the potential conflicts and disputes between the United
States and China, the spokespersons also used “we” to refer to both countries as
allies and used “should” to emphasise their obligation to fight against the com-
mon enemy of humankind, COVID-19, together (Example 19).
Conclusion
Drawing on PDA, this study examined the discourse of solidarity constructed
by China’s foreign ministry spokespersons in response to COVID-19. It is found
that the discourse of solidarity is formulated via the use of metaphor, lexical
reiteration, and indexicals and deontic modals. The discursive construction of
solidarity casts China and its allies in a positive light, foregrounding the impor-
tance of cooperation with implications for collectivism and humanitarianism.
The spokespersons’ construction of solidarity is intertwined with wider discur-
sive and sociocultural contexts.
Regarding the discursive context, it is important to understand the role of

China's foreign ministry spokespersons in relation to the findings. Working for
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the spokespersons serve as Beijing’s com-
munication bridge to the world. In the face of the heightened diplomatic ten-
sions, it is not surprising that the spokespersons foregrounded the danger and
threat posed by COVID-19 so as to build solidarity and promote international
cooperation. This study brings different insights into Chinese diplomats’ use of
rhetoric, which is different from the so-called “wolf-warrior diplomacy” that is
characterised by assertive, confrontational, and high-profile styles (Cheng 2020;
Zhu 2020). Instead, the spokespersons’ cooperative effort has reflected China’s
decade-long foreign policy principle – “tao guang yang hui (being low-profile
while hard-working)” (Chen and Wang 2011). In the sociocultural context, the
spokespersons’ construction of solidarity has echoed Beijing’s vision of building
“a community with a shared future for humankind” and/or “a Global Com-
munity of Health for All” as a new model of global (health) governance system
(Liu and Zhang 2018; Zhang 2018; Xi 2021). Although this is different from
the Western model of nation-state governance, China’s successful control of the
pandemic has proved these models to be effective and legitimate (Yu 2021a). It
is solidarity, the formation of community, which has motivated the rhetoric of
the spokespersons.
As stated in the introduction, there is a little investigation in the existing liter-
ature into the discursive construction of solidarity in response to a global health
crisis. This case study, therefore, has filled this research niche by examining
how China’s foreign ministry spokespersons utilised the discourse of solidarity to
handle the pandemic, delegitimise the undue charges against China, and convey
its geopolitical messages to the world. The insights gained from this study are
instructive regarding the systematic construction of solidarity through linguistic
resources as an effective response strategy in building a country’s national image
as well as promoting international cooperation in the time of a global health
crisis. Additionally, this study also illustrates the potential benefits of a PDA
framework in expanding the field of crisis communication, thereby contribut-
ing to a small yet growing literature and promoting interdisciplinary research.
A limitation of the study is that it has only investigated the remarks given by
China’s foreign ministry spokespersons. Future studies can consider examining
presidential speeches in response to COVID-19 at international conferences.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by RGC Postdoctoral Fellowship Scheme funding
(PDFS2122–5H03).
Corpus of study
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Briefing Online on February 10, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
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s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1743009.shtml.
———. 2020b. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Daily Brief-
ing Online on February 11, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1743480.shtml.
———. 2020c. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular
Press Conference on April 20, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1771576.shtml.
———. 2020d. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1775332.shtml.
———. 2020e. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular
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———. 2020f. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press
Conference on March 24, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1760477.shtml.
Hua, Chunying. 2020a. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s
Regular Press Conference on April 2, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the People’s Republic of China. 2020. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1765251.shtml.
———. 2020b. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular
Press Conference on May 7, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1776881.shtml.
———. 2020c. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular
Press Conference on May 8, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1777215.shtml.
Zhao, Lijian. 2020a. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1768338.shtml.
———. 2020b. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press
Conference on April 15, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Re-
public of China. 2020. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1770103.shtml.
———. 2020c. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press
Conference on April 17, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Re-
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1770948.shtml.
———. 2020d. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press

Conference on June 18, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Re-
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1790023.shtml.
———. 2020e. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1785528.shtml.
———. 2020f. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1793427.shtml.
———. 2020g. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1785898.shtml.
———. 2020h. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press
Conference on March 4, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Re-
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1752172.shtml.
———. 2020i. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press
Conference on March 5, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Re-
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1752564.shtml.
———. 2020j. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press
Conference on May 19, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Re-
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1780716.shtml.
Notes
1 METALUDE is available at www.ln.edu.hk/lle/cwd/project01/web/introduction.
html.
2 SUMO is available at https://www.ontologyportal.org/.
3 The webpage of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is available at https://www.fm-
prc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/.
4 Beijing stands for the Chinese government.
5 Conceptual metaphors are written in capitals based on the practice of the contempo-
rary theory of metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 2003).
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6
COVID-19 AND COMMUNICATION
THROUGH THE LENS OF CULTURE
Elvis Buckwalter
Introduction
Never before in the course of modern history has an event like the COVID-19
health crisis had such profound effects on virtually all aspects of human exist-
ence. Since the identification and onset of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, in
December of 2019—and the subsequent worldwide spread of the coronavirus—
agents, both individual and institutional, have continued to grapple with the on-
going crisis of the pandemic, as it plays out. This means that the present volume
is, indeed, a work in progress, an endeavour to apprehend an unfolding global
crisis which challenges and tests the relation between government institutions
and those subject to them.
The aim of this chapter is, thus, to bring light to a better understanding of
the COVID-19 pandemic through the lens of culture. The underlying cultural
presumptions which inform the relations between government institutions and
those subject to the authority of the institutional order are necessary if we are to
comprehend how government communication in response to the pandemic is
inflected by this crucial variable. How control is exerted within cultural spaces
in order to meet authorities’ public health objectives is a central question in the
pursuit of our study on culture in the context of COVID-19. Indeed, cultural
considerations inform how government authorities communicate with their
constituents about the COVID-19 pandemic. This can, for instance, be demon-
strated in relation to diverse spatiotemporal-linguistic realms and various per-
spectives about what and where “culture” is.
First, we will examine the theoretical underpinnings of culture through the
prism of E.T. Hall and Geert Hofstede’s mapping of cultural dimensions, which
inherently correlate to Foucault’s heterotopia. Defined by Michel Foucault as
“the space in which we live” (Foucault, 1984 (1967)), a heterotopia reflects a
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-8
96 Elvis Buckwalter
heterogeneous cultural space delineated by national, sub-national, or trans-

national boundaries grouping together people with a common cultural identity.
Not only does this organisation instantiate how public authorities wield control
over their citizens’ minds and bodies—which Foucault calls “biopower”1—but
it also conditions the receptivity of this control by its citizens. Finally, we will
study a sampling of communication approaches employed by agents of biopower
who endorse various appliances, rules, and restrictions in their exercise of bio-
control over citizens (i.e. obligation to wear masks, social distancing guidelines,
lockdowns, vaccination passports, etc.) affording governments a predisposition
towards biopower under the pretext of COVID-19 prevention.
Edward Twitchell Hall

The American anthropologist, E.T. Hall (1914–2009), posited that “culture is
not one thing, but many. There is no one basic unit or elemental particle, no
single isolate for all culture” (Hall 1959). In addition to asserting what culture
is not, Hall affirms what culture is from a spatiotemporal perspective. On the
one hand, the study of how different cultures perceive time differently is called
“chronemics”, and on the other hand, “proxemics” is the term Hall gives to the
study of the utilisation of space from one culture to the next. Both chronemics
and proxemics serve to promote more profound insight into the characteristics of
a given culture based on one’s perceptions of time and space.
In an effort to gain a better understanding of chronemics, Hall (1959, 1966)
makes the distinction between polychronic and monochronic cultures. Com-
posed of the suffixes “poly” or “mono” and the Greek root “chronic” (from
chronos, meaning “time”), these terms inform how perceptions of time differ
between cultures. Whereas polychronic culture refers to those groups of people
willing to forego strict chronological order in favour of accomplishing any num-
ber of activities at the same time, monochronic culture describes those which
structure time in a successive, linear way. Drawing on the research of Hall,
Meyer (2014b) gives examples of both cultural types assimilating polychrony to
“flexible-t ime” and monochrony to “linear-time”. National cultures falling into
the linear-time category include northern European and English-speaking coun-
tries (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom,
Denmark, etc.), whereas those designated as “flexible-time” countries tend to
come from the Middle East, Africa, India, South America, southern Europe, and
Asia, with the notable exception of Japan, which is considered a monochronic,
linear-time country. Several countries (France, Poland, the Czech Republic,
etc.) fall in between these two contrasting temporal paradigms.
Hall further portrays culture as a series of messages that can be broken down
into sets, isolates, and patterns—all of which serve to orchestrate a shared spatio-
temporal perception within the territorial demarcations of a culture. In chrone-
mics, Hall describes a “set” as a mutually agreed-upon unit of time used by
people of the same culture to communicate more easily about timing issues.
COVID-19, communication and culture 97
For example, in most Western cultures, a set corresponds to a week, a day or an

hour. These sets can be further subdivided into their constitutive parts, called
“isolates”. A week is divided into the “work week” and the “weekend”, a day is
composed of the “morning”, afternoon”, “evening”, and “night”, and an hour
is made up of increments of “quarter hours” and “half hours”. Patterns are “the
way in which sets are strung together in order to give them meaning” (Hall
1959, 124) which represent deeply embedded organisational constructs. In our
example, both the 24-hour clock and the Gregorian calendar serve as patterns
from which sets and isolates are derived. Using chronemics is, therefore, useful in
cultural comparisons since perceptions of time fluctuate from one culture to the
next. In his study of the Navajo Nation, Hall describes temporal misunderstand-
ings which arose in interactions between members of the tribe and European–
American traders:
In the early days of the white traders the Indians had considerable difficulty
getting used to the fact that we Europeans divided time into strange and
unnatural periods instead of having a “natural” succession of days which
began with the new moon and ended with the old. They were particularly
perplexed by the notion of the week introduced by the traders and the
missionaries.
(Hall, 1959, 35–36)
In his research on chronemics of the Navajo Nation, Hall reveals that notions of
space are equally as important as time if we are to gain a better understanding of
a culture: “To the old-time Navajo time is like space—only the here and now is
quite real” (Hall 1959, 33). The study of space—coined “proxemics” by Hall—
seeks to shed light on how personal space or “microspace” is unconsciously struc-
tured between people on a culture-by-culture basis (Hall 1963).
In much the way Hall breaks down chronemics into sets, isolates, and pat-
terns, he applies the same taxonomy to proxemics. Culture is closely linked to
physical places, spaces, and how people interact with others in them. According
to research carried out by Hall (Hall 1966), four different sets have been identi-
fied, with each one describing a zone or space in which a comfortable distance
is generally maintained between subjects: intimate, personal, social, and public
spaces (see Figure 6.1). These set distances tend to vary according to the culture
they describe.
The first set is astutely called the “intimate” zone, which describes a space in
which there is the least physical distance between subjects—from 2 cm to 45 cm
at the most. Voluntarily maintaining such a close distance between two or more
individuals in this zone almost certainly invites physical contact such as embrac-
ing, kissing, whispering and, in general, a pervasive modality of touching. The
occupants of the intimate zone are frequently lovers or close family members,
like parents, children, and siblings. The second zone is called “personal space”
designating a distance of approximately 45 cm–120 cm between subjects, often
98 Elvis Buckwalter
PUBLIC SPACE
SOCIAL SPACE
PERSONAL
SPACE
INTIMATE
SPACE
1.5 ft
(0.45 m)
4 ft
(1.2 m)
12 ft
(3.6 m)
25 ft
(7.6 m)
FIGURE 6.1 E.T. Hall’s Interpersonal Distances based on proxemics (Thims, 2009).
friends or more distant family members. From this distance, visual and auditory
perceptions between subjects are relatively heightened; furthermore, comfort
levels in this range depend on what constitutes acceptable cultural norms. The
third zone, called “social space”, is the zone where, as the name implies, most
social interactions take place.
Impersonal business occurs at this distance, and in the close phase there
is more involvement than in the distant phase. People who work together
tend to use close social distance. It is also a very common distance for peo-
ple who are attending a casual social gathering.
(Hall, 1966, 121)
An average comfortable social distance for this space is estimated to be between

120 cm and 360 cm according to the culture. The fourth and final zone is called
“public space” in which interactions between individuals, if any, take place be-
tween 360 cm and 760 cm and beyond. The interface between people in these
spaces is, oftentimes, so distant that any involvement can be either avoided or
accepted; in the latter zone are located public speeches, theatrical reproductions
or other types of performance delivered by actors or public figures.
Hall’s contribution to cross-cultural studies and anthropology cannot be un-
derestimated; the introduction of chronemics and proxemics has provided in-
sight into otherwise complex spatiotemporal relationships and interactions of
people from different cultures.
Geert Hofstede
Recognised for his contributions to the field of cross-cultural management and
organisational culture, Geert Hofstede (1928–2020) was best known for two
volumes, Culture’s Consequences (1980) and Cultures and Organizations: Software of
the Mind (2010), in which he elaborated a framework to describe national culture
according to common spatial perceptions:
Culture is always a collective phenomenon, because it is at least partly

shared with people who live or lived within the same social environment,
which is where it was learned. Culture consists of the unwritten rules of
the social game. It is the collective programming of the mind that distin-
guishes the members of one group or category of people from others.
(Hofstede et al. 2010, 6)
After a career at IBM International as director of the Personnel Research

Department, Hofstede’s track record in the industrial sector has given his research
a unique spin as it relates to spatiotemporal cultural dimensions in a corporate
setting. Inspired by years of cross-cultural interactions in a business management
setting at IBM, Hofstede has had hands-on experience observing people engaged
in professional interactions (appointments, meetings, negotiations, marketing,
etc.), which has provided fodder for numerous intercultural case studies, not to
mention the theoretical groundwork necessary for the realisation of the GLOBE
project (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavioral Effectiveness) (Hofst-
ede 2010, ‘The Globe Debate’). The latter has laid the foundations of an exten-
sive database centred on IBM dimensions, the precursors to Hofstede’s cultural
paradigms, two of which are elucidated here: the uncertainty avoidance index
(UAI) and long- vs. short-term orientation (LTO).
Inspired by the work of organisational sociologist James G. March (1928–
2018) on the subject of uncertainty, Hofstede elaborated a metric for assessing
how people of various cultural backgrounds deal with the unknown. The uncer-
tainty avoidance dimension elaborated by Hofstede emphasises the ways people
react to looming ambiguity, which is posited as a major source of anxiety:
These ways belong to the domains of technology, law, and religion.

Technology, from the most primitive to the most advanced, helps peo-
ple to avoid uncertainties caused by nature. Laws and rules try to prevent
100 Elvis Buckwalter
uncertainties in the behavior of other people. Religion is a way of relating

to the transcendental forces that are assumed to control people’s personal
future. Religion helps followers to accept the uncertainties against which
one cannot defend oneself, and some religions offer the ultimate certainty
of a life after death or of victory over one’s opponents.
According to one’s national culture, reactions range between total acceptance

and absolute intolerance towards the unknown; furthermore, various strategies
exist for coping with these uncertainties. As illustrated above, technology, laws,
and religion all contribute to mitigating the negative consequences of unex-
pected events. Measuring a national culture’s propensity to reduce risks asso-
ciated with uncertainty, the UAI score is based on data collected by surveys
submitted to respondents of various nationalities.
As a fundamentally temporal paradigm, the UAI assesses how national cul-
tures perceive time, most notably how current actions relate to future results.
Based on the anthropological research of Michael Bond linking Confucianism
with economic success,2 a collaboration with Hofstede emerged to develop a
new cultural dimension whose data derived from the Chinese Value Survey
questionnaire (CVS) (Hofstede and Bond 1988) incorporating four principles of
Confucian teaching into already existing research: social stability, equality, fam-
ily orientation and perseverance. The LTO metric was hence born and defined
as follows:
Long-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues oriented toward

future rewards—in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole,
short-term orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past
and present—in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of “face,” and
fulfilling social obligations.
A cultural implication of LTO includes—but is not limited to—the propensity

for people of certain national cultures to engage in activities related to indulging
impulses, on the one hand, and restraining them, on the other hand. According
to Hofstede et al. (2010), instant gratification is, thus, linked to lower and re-
straint to greater economic success (Table 6.1).
The research of Hofstede et al. (2010) emphasises the high LTO rankings of
the emerging BRICS countries (notably China, India, and Brazil) along with the
“five dragons” (Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore) and correlates
a cultural tendency towards gratification deferral with long-term economic suc-
cess. Anglo-American cultures, Western countries and developed economies, in
general, tended towards lower LTO scores in this study. Hofstede’s research would
suggest that short- vs. long-term perception and/or management of time represents
a factor to take into consideration when trying to understand national culture.
TABLE 6.1 Hofstede’s Long-Term Orientation scores

for 23 countries based on the Chinese
Value Survey (Hofstede et al. 2010, 240)
Rank Country/Region Score
1 China 118
2 Hong Kong 96
3 Taiwan 87
4 Japan 80
5 Korea (South) 75
6 Brazil 65
7 India 61
8 Thailand 56
9 Singapore 48
10 The Netherlands 44
11 Bangladesh 40
12 Sweden 33
13 Poland 32
14 Australia 31
15 Germany 31
16 New Zealand 30
17 The United States 29
18 Great Britain 25
19 Zimbabwe 25
20 Canada 23
21 The Philippines 16
22 Nigeria 16
23 Pakistan 0
Michel Foucault
Just like a precise definition of culture defies any semblance of consensus, so
too does the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984). The
categories developed by Foucault, nevertheless, constitute a non-negligible con-
tribution to the field of culture as a strategic variable, notably by way of the
introduction of conceptions like “heterotopia” and “biopower” as they relate to
defining culture in a spatiotemporal framework.
In his seminal work, “The Order of Things” (Les mots et les choses), Michel
Foucault (1971) aptly uses the term “cultural spaces” that he associates with a
concept he coins “heterotopia”. From the Greek prefix hetero- (“other”, “dif-
ferent”, “unlike”, “irregular”) and the Greek root -topia (“place”, “space”, “re-
gion”), a heterotopia, therefore, designates, according to Foucault, a space where
a common set of characteristics are shared and are, at the same time, culturally
distinct from that of other spaces, according to Foucault. This patchwork of
cultural spaces, thus, presumes spatial, temporal, and linguistic dimensions with
their own specificities, i.e., not a melting pot of conformity, but rather a salad
bowl, that is to say a collection of common, but distinct constitutive parts. Fou-
cault illustrates the notion of heterotopia as a network of relations (Foucault
1969; 1984; Foucault and Miskowiec 1986):
One could describe, via the cluster of relations that allows them to be
deﬁned, the sites of temporary relaxation —cafes, cinemas, beaches. Like-
wise, one could describe, via its network of relations, the closed or semi-
closed sites of rest — the house, the bedroom, the bed, et cetera. […] The
space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the ero-
sion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and
gnaws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do
not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and
things. We do not live inside a void that could be coloured with diverse
shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which
are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one
another.
(Foucault and Miskowiec 1986, 24)
These networks of human relations take on spatial, temporal, and linguistic di-
mensions and could even be assimilated to the metaphor of sedimentation in
which layers of space accumulate over a given period of time (Foucault 1969).
In these layers can be found slices of human activity—such as discourse, prac-
tices, or rituals—, activities which can be examined in much the same way an
archaeologist might scrutinise an artefact uncovered from some ancient burial
ground (Doyon 2007). Albeit an illusory term, “culture”, thus, focuses on both
differences and commonalities found in each of these “slices” of the time–space–
discourse interface.
In a lecture given by Foucault in March 1967, Foucault characterises these cul-
tural spaces made of heterotopias, first by comparing them with utopias. Whereas
the latter ones represent only imaginary places, the former really do exist. Fur-
thermore, (real) heterotopias tend to counter the (unreal) utopias; therefore, they
are counter-imaginary, distinct and marked by “otherness”.
According to Foucault, heterotopias obey six leading principles (1967). First,
human cultures drive the creation and proliferation of these “other spaces”,
which can be regrouped into two categories: crisis heterotopias and heterotopias
of deviance. Whereas the former ones create spaces around people or groups of
people who are in a state of crisis or in a period of transition (that is, menstruating
women, the elderly, the “honeymoon trip”, and so on), the latter suggest people
or groups of people who have transgressed societal norms, consequently forming
heterotopias like prisons or psychiatric hospitals. The second principle describes
heterotopias which evolve over time. For example, cemeteries—which were for-
mally centrally located—were sacred spaces providing families the possibility to
give homage to their deceased friends and relatives in a convenient way. Ceme-
teries have subsequently come to be perceived and consequently relegated as dark
places of death and disease, resulting in their displacement to the periphery of

urban areas. The third principle is that heterotopias designate physical spaces that
are used in a multitude of ways. The example given here by Foucault is the gar-
den. At a very basic level, a garden is a place where people go for a leisurely stroll,
or to relax with a book. However, the garden has different meanings for different
people. For example, the ancient Persians perceived the garden to be a sacred
space constituting a rectangular microcosm of the world whose four corners con-
tained exotic vegetation from afar and at the centre of which a symbolic fountain
was placed—a umbilicus as it were—constituting the origins of humankind.
The fourth principle anchors heterotopias in a temporal space, likening them
to “slices in time”, which can, thus, be referred to as “heterochronies”. A het-
erochrony is a group of people sharing a common perception of time—another
time—which is different from all the others; Foucault describes these “temporal
heterotopia” as heterochronies. For example, a renaissance festival takes visitors
back in time to a bygone era, giving insight into what life might have been like
in the Middle Ages. To some extent, the museum is also a heterochrony since it
conserves collections of physical artefacts from a common time period. The fifth
principle states that there are boundaries that allow people to move in and out
of these heterotopias and that admittance to these cultural spaces can either be
compulsory, as is the case of a mental patient committed to a psychiatric hospital,
or subject to rites or rituals of purification, like the act of baptism in the Roman
Catholic Church. Finally, the sixth principle is that heterotopias are conceived
relative to other heterotopias. These are “heterotopias of compensation” which
aim to delineate a space distinct from other spaces in order to make improve-
ments on the latter.
Culture is composed of both spatiotemporal and discursive elements, accord-
ing to Foucault, and culture is inextricably linked to power. This power is de-
rived from a network of relations among which interactions naturally inspire
struggles for appropriation in a given domain, organising and structuring a given
spatiotemporal realm. In History of Sexuality, Foucault assimilates the “cluster” or
“network” of relations—the building blocks of culture—and their relationship
to power:
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the

multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they op-
erate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which,
through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or
reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one an-
other, thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions
and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the
strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional
crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the
law, in the various social hegemonies.
(1976, 92–93)
Understanding time, space, and language provides one of the tools necessary to
the agent of power, which boils down to controlling minds and bodies. Foucault
calls the exercise of this control “biopower”:
By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite sig-

nificant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological
features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a
general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th
century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological
fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called biopower.
(Foucault 1977, 1)
Informed by both cultural, but also biological characteristics, heterotopias form

spaces in which there exists a balance of power between an agent and a subject
“generally reserved for individuals in ‘a biological crisis’” (Foucault 2009 (1966),
26). If these biotopias become unbalanced in terms of who exerts more power over
whom, for example, in cases where public authorities practice biogovernmental-
ity over their citizens, this creates a cultural space within which administrators
control their constituents in biological terms through regulation of their physical
beings. Indeed, the involvement of the state in the biofunctions of a given group
of people contributes to their subjectivation, which is at the heart of the Fou-
cauldian debate on whether governments should have control over their popula-
tions’ physical bodies and personal space (Hall 1966).
Biogovernmentality is, therefore, central to the exercise of power and, more
particularly, biopower. From the prefix bio- that is, “biology”, “life”, biopower
is that which is exercised by authorities over subjects through biological con-
straints imposed by governments. Defined as “an explosion of numerous and
diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of
populations” (Foucault 1976), the Foucauldian notion of biopower considers
government intervention in a biological context—including upon the human
organism—not merely as an encroachment upon citizens, but as a way in which
governments wield the power of over citizens’ bodies, minds, and physical move-
ments (Rogers et al. 2013).
Space and culture under COVID-19

The role government control has played during the COVID-19 pandemic has
been critical to ensuring a safe space for a society’s constituents. As an approach
to facing the spatial challenges that governments must address in light of dan-
gers posed by the coronavirus, biogovernmentality aims at bringing solutions
to problems—such as virus transmission—posed within physical and cultural
spaces. Effective government control as regards public health policy, indeed, de-
pends on consideration of these physical spaces to bring to light the physical risks
associated with the pandemic (Kim and Kreps 2020).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the world have im-
posed restrictions on the movements of citizens and enacted physical and biolog-
ical constraints through mask mandates, lockdowns, curfews, border crossings,
and social distancing guidelines. Vaccine uptake—however, unintrusive a medi-
cal procedure—is yet another form of biopower used by governments to protect
constituents, albeit with the negative effect of breaching an organism’s biological
integrity by the introduction of antibodies.
How citizens have moved about in space during the COVID-19 crisis is a
matter of national culture but also of social distancing guidelines issued by public
health authorities. Despite spatial restrictions placed on citizens and the dramatic
alteration in protocols for in-person social interactions, a national culture’s pre-
disposition towards putting more or less distance between interlocutors will,
oftentimes, tend towards pre-pandemic conditions as reflected by the specific
national culture in terms of the personal distance at which people from the same
culture feel comfortable speaking to each other.
For example, for an individual from a country like the United States where
people feel more at ease with relatively greater distances between communicants,
social distancing guidelines might be received better (and potentially followed
more closely). In contrast, in a country where the physical space between sub-
jects tends to be relatively minimal—i.e., in which people feel more comfortable
“getting up close and personal”, so to speak—state-sponsored social distancing
guidelines might be perceived as more of an incursion upon individual liberties.
This is notably the case in France, where the tendency is to communicate in
relative proximity to one’s interlocutor, demonstrating how personal social space
hinges on cultural space. Hall’s research on proxemics (1966) notably concerns
subjects from various cultures and the distance they kept from each other while
speaking in various social situations. The COVID-19 pandemic has, indeed,
transformed the way people communicate (computer-mediated communication,
social media, etc.) and has blurred lines between public and private spaces.
Prior to the onset of the pandemic, Sorokowska et al. (2017) led a study based
on Hall’s proxemics (1966) on 9,000 subjects from 42 countries, on a country-
by-country basis to determine what people’s comfort thresholds are in terms
of distances, and personal space. As can be observed from the research of So-
rokowska et al., countries like Argentina on one end of the comfort scale, prefer-
ring less social distancing, and Saudi Arabia on the other preferring more social
distancing present interesting correlations in terms of stringency of COVID-19
restrictions. Because each of these two countries is located at opposite ends of
such a scale, they provide a pertinent—albeit non-exhaustive—example that I
will quickly present here.
As a basis for comparison, given that Argentina registers an average comfort
distance for social interaction between two interlocutors at approximately 80
cm, and Saudi Arabia reveals a considerably higher value estimated at approxi-
mately 130 cm, is there a correlation between the stringency of social distancing
guidelines imposed by public health authorities in both countries? Could there
be evidence that Argentina’s social distancing guidelines are stricter than those
of Saudi Arabia since Argentinians tend to get closer to one another when they
communicate? In other words, do they require subjection to a more stringent
biopolitical regulation of their social exchange with a view to the imposition of
norms which run counter to the culture’s ordinary practice of relational “close-
ness”? Would this proximity facilitate the transmission of the COVID-19 virus
resulting in higher infection rates? Conversely, would the public authorities in
Saudi Arabia be laxer in their application of social distancing guidelines given
that people there tend to stay farther apart from one another anyway?
Based on indicators such as social distancing guidelines, school closures, and
travel bans, the COVID-19 Stringency Index seems to corroborate the correla-
tion between strictness of government measures and average comfort zones for
interpersonal communication. Whereas Saudi Arabia scores relatively low on the
Stringency Index in comparison to Argentina during the pandemic, Argentinian
authorities remain comparatively stricter than their Saudi counterparts in terms
of social distancing guidelines (see Figure 6.2).
Furthermore, compared to Argentina, Saudi Arabia has a significantly lower
cumulative infection rate per million people than Argentina (see Figure 6.3). How-
ever, it is possible that the correlation between spatial culture and the number of
cumulative COVID-19 cases is due less to quantitative factors, and more to quali-
tative factors, such as Saudi Arabia’s prior experience with other contagious novel
C0VID-19 Stringency Index

The stringency index is a composite measure based on nine response indicators including school
closures,workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest).
120
100
80
60
40
20
Argentina Saudi Arabia
FIGURE 6.2 COVID-19 Stringency Index for Argentina and Saudi Arabia.
Cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases per million people between 03-02-2020 and 09-30-2021
6000000
5000000
4000000
3000000
2000000
1000000
Argentina Saudi Arabia
FIGURE 6.3 OVID-19 Cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases per million people
C
for Argentina and Saudi Arabia.
coronaviruses, like the MERS (Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak in

2012. Previous exposure to airborne viruses and their transmission, indeed, have
afforded Saudis familiarity with protective measures against viral transmission.
Communication, national discourse and culture under COVID-19

Ultimately, cultural considerations inform how government authorities might
more effectively communicate with their constituents about the COVID-19
pandemic. Considering the diversity of spatiotemporal-linguistic realms and the
sheer number of definitions in the literature about what and where “culture” is,
we are dealing here with how governments, in particular, utilise discursive strat-
egies with the public about COVID-19 issues.
Given the importance of adapting government communication to cultural
spaces, it would be advantageous to take into account national culture as a het-
erotopic unit. Since public policy is almost always applied by governments at
a national level—and only to varying degrees at subnational or transnational
levels—correlating culture with national boundaries would be an appropriate—
albeit non-perfect—framework. Biogovernmental discourse along with
COVID-19 mandates and legal directives are implemented at a national level, in
a political and geographic environment roughly equal to the confines of a coun-
try’s borders. Therefore, from both a legal and a legislative perspective, directives
implemented to curtail the health crisis are defined, implemented, and enforced
within the borders of a sovereign state or political space.
Nation states are not equivalent to national cultures, and nations may not be
the best units for studying cultures (Baskerville 2003). Just as corporate cultures
of some companies spread to their subsidiaries abroad, or as religious cultures
present in several countries share in a common liturgy regardless of nation states,

transnational cultures span across national borders. Conversely, sub-national cul-
tures include groups of people within a given country’s boundaries, such as pen-
itentiary cultures (Foucault 1975) or countercultures (Roszak 1968). However,
whatever transnational or sub-national cultures say about a group of people, gov-
ernment communication must target constituents at a national level.
As Edward Hall points out, “Culture is communication, and communica-
tion is culture” (Hall 1959). Discriminating amongst sub-national cultures while
governments struggle to communicate about COVID-19 mandates on a national
level would be counterproductive to public health policy objectives. Therefore,
given that legislation is enacted, and data overwhelmingly collected at a national
level, the official discourse of governments is considered in light of national cul-
ture since this unit is, oftentimes, the most readily available for studying culture
in the space defined by a country’s borders (Hofstede 2003).
Seen through this lens, national culture most certainly has an impact on the
way governments communicate with their constituents about the COVID-19
pandemic; furthermore, if Hall’s postulate that communication is at the heart of
culture is, indeed, accurate, one might begin to understand the groundwork of
biogovernmental discourse around public health policy from a cultural perspec-
tive, incorporating an important spatial element.
To curtail the spread of the virus, public authorities have implemented an
“official” discourse in government communication campaigns. Through the
discourse disseminated by public health authorities, citizens’ attitudes about
COVID-19 have been modified or, even in some cases, created. Diffusing text
about vaccine availability has created greater demand for the vaccine as govern-
ments and pharmaceutical companies have adopted a marketing-based approach
to encourage vaccine uptake (Evans and French 2021). Government communi-
cation campaigns in the COVID-19 era have, indeed, altered perceptions of the
reliability of certain vaccines, establishing an official discourse in favour of or
against certain vaccine brands. For example, French president Emmanuel M acron
declared on several occasions that the Astra-Zeneca vaccine caused phlebitis, a
discourse which was repeated in numerous media outlets despite evidence to the
contrary (Evans and French 2021). Furthermore, in an official speech on the 31st
of March, 2020,3 Macron both deplores the lack of surgical masks produced in
France emphasising the necessity for national sovereignty in the production of
medical supplies and equipment, and at the same time, rallies constituents to a
national cause garnering enthusiasm for public health policies (Dumont 2021).
In the United States, the contradictory official discourse of US Government
representatives during the COVID-19 pandemic reflects the schizophrenic at-
titudes among citizens, notably the stance on lockdown mandates. On the one
hand, public health officials, such as Dr. Anthony Fauci, repeatedly pushed for
continued restrictions on travel and stay-at-home orders at the beginning of the
pandemic while former president Donald Trump struggled to forgo health dan-
gers and stress the importance of opening the economy back up (Marques 2021).
Government communication about COVID-19 has legitimised discourses

which give substance to the national experience and contribute to the cultural
space held together by the glue of language. Chains of signifiers are the building
blocks of language and culture, allowing speaking subjects to communicate with
each other using the same points of reference (Buckwalter 2007), translating into
the creation of knowledge. Foucault recognised the link between knowledge and
words, particularly with regards to the medical field (1969, 1972):
[F]rom the nineteenth century medical science was characterized not so

much by its objects or concepts as by a certain style, a certain constant
manner of statement. For the first time, medicine no longer consisted of
a group of traditions, observations, and heterogeneous practices, but of a
corpus of knowledge that presupposed the same way of looking at things,
the same division of the perceptual field, the same analysis of the patholog-
ical fact in accordance with the visible space of the body, the same system of
transcribing what one perceived in what one said (same vocabulary, same
play of metaphor); in short, it seemed to me that medicine was organized
as a series of descriptive statements.
(Foucault 1972, 33)
Just as the medical field constitutes a corpus of knowledge created by the discur-
sive dimension of culture, so too does public health policy and the way govern-
ments communicate about it.
Language and discourse used in government communication campaigns about
the COVID-19 pandemic are indicative of government spokespersons’ medical
knowledge, and intentions in a more general sense. A medical doctor, for exam-
ple, has the expert authority to say what is and what is not possible in terms of
curtailing the spread of the virus. Doctor Fauci has more credence in making
recommendations to wear masks and get vaccinated because he is familiar with
the language contained in research on the benefits of social distancing and the
success of pharmaceutical trials. On the other hand, a politician might lack this
same authority when establishing public health policy, such as in the case of
Donald Trump’s briefing on April 23, 2020, in which he declared the benefits
of injecting disinfectants into patients diagnosed with COVID-19 to fight the
coronavirus.4 Although he lacked the medical authority, he still possessed the
political authority to make statements of a medical nature. This led to contradic-
tory messages among the political class and created an onslaught of conflicting
discourses, not to mention the ensuing medical risks (Hatcher 2020).
Hinged on country-specific characteristics, culture is concomitant to na-
tional discourse on COVID-19 policies put into place by governments. Insofar
as further research into national cultures serve to give insight into whether gov-
ernments are able to implement public health policies linked to the pandemic
effectively, other aspects of culture can be explored. The COVID-19 health crisis
raises issues of biogovernmentality, biopower, and the existence of biotopia.
Furthermore, COVID-19’s far-reaching effects have put all countries and

governments on a level playing ground in which they are all equally confronted
with the challenge of providing for various levels of discourse; for example, on
the one hand, a global discourse—a homotopia of sorts—in which it is agreed
among nations that the pandemic is dangerous and that international coordina-
tion is a prerequisite to curbing its ill effects. Still, on the other hand, there exists
a national discourse that informs measures to be taken to fight the pandemic.
China provides a pertinent example of the tension between the global and the
national levels of discourse, seeking to eradicate national differences and dis-
courses in order to impose a discourse of a “global community of health” (Yating
and Tay, this volume), taking China out of the spotlight.
Conclusion
The definition of what culture is and what cultural spaces are is a notoriously
complex subject for which there is little consensus within the scientific com-
munity. Despite the difficulty in pinpointing exactly what is meant by culture,
the theoretical frameworks of E.T. Hall, Hofstede and Foucault, respectively,
attempt to shed light on this question of culture by positioning culture in a
spatiotemporal context. Additionally, considering culture in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic allows for a common standard among nations to evaluate
cultural specificities; this has had the beneficial effect of not only putting national
cultures on a level playing ground with each other, but it has enabled analysts
to test the capacity of nations to respond to the pandemic in an effective way.
Whatever the cultural framework or model used, the consensus on culture seems
to be that there is very little consensus at all levels and that culture is both what
makes people the same and also what differentiates them from others.
By analysing various countries’ reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic, more
efficient government communication campaigns might be achieved in an effort to
curb the pandemic. A potential way to improve communication about pandemics
is to construe Foucauldian cultural spaces as representing a broad term used to
describe what heterotopia is: phenomena present in everyday society which both
bring citizens together through their commonalities but also sets them apart; in
effect, this is accomplished by distinguishing the “in group” from the “out group”.
Intercultural and cross-cultural studies in the analysis of government communica-
tion serve to define better spatiotemporal cultural spaces created by the discourse of
each of these groups subject to biogovernmentality. Exercising biocontrol, that is,
an obligation to wear masks, social distancing guidelines, lockdowns, vaccination
passports, etc., seems to afford governments the tools necessary to quell the global
COVID-19 pandemic, but perhaps at the high cost of loss of liberty.
As technology and medical research/development increase, the exercise of
biopower over citizens is bound to give rise to the expansion of biopolitics, regu-
lating fundamental rights of the physical human organism, modulating its inten-
tional agency, thus contributing to the hypothesis of intentional systemic control.
Biogovernmentality can then be considered a cultural strategy utilised by gov-

ernments to control citizens’ space, but perhaps for their own good to protect
them from imminent health risks associated with COVID-19.
Notes
1 Foucault, Michel. 1976. A History of Sexuality, Doubleday, Vol. I.
2 Franke, R.H., Hofstede, G. and Bond, M.H. 1991. Cultural roots of economic per-
formance: A research note. Strategic Management Journal 12: 165–173. https://doi.
org/10.1002/smj.4250120912.
3 https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/274028-emmanuel-macron-31-mars-2020-
souverainete-nationale-production-masques.
4 https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-coronavirus-press-conference-
transcript-april-23.
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PART II
Communication during
COVID-19
7
WHY FACE-TO-FACE
COMMUNICATION MATTERS
A comparison of face-to-face and
computer-mediated communication
Almut Koester
Introduction
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) was not a novelty when the
COVID-19 pandemic swept across the globe at the beginning of 2020. Espe-
cially in the domain of workplace and business communication, various forms
of digital communication had been in use at least in some form for many years.
Even online virtual communication, for example, in the form of virtual meet-
ings or instant messaging, was increasingly being used in many areas of business,
as attested by a range of research studies (e.g. Kupritz and Cowell 2011; Lock-
wood 2015; Lee 2018). Nevertheless, it was not until the COVID-19 pandemic
made much face-to-face (F-F) communication difficult or impossible that virtual
online communication became a necessity for large portions of the global pop-
ulation. As discussed in other chapters in this volume, the pandemic dramati-
cally accelerated a digitalisation of workplace communication that was already
underway.
While the ability to move previously “analogue” modes of workplace com-
munication online allowed much work to continue “as normal”, it was not long
before complaints of exhaustion and “burnout” from videoconferencing made
their rounds in the popular media (see Rossette-Crake and Buckwalter, 2022).
The feeling of isolation felt by many when working from home, and the sense
that something was missing in both private and workplace interactions online,
led to a rediscovery of the benefits of F-F, co-present communication. Starting
from this real-lived collective experience, and the sense of “something miss-
ing” from social and workplace interactions felt by many (including the author),
this chapter sets out to discover, from a sociolinguistic perspective, what exactly
makes F-F communication “special” and, therefore, irreplaceable by even so-
phisticated forms of online communication.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-10
116 Almut Koester
After reviewing some findings comparing the effectiveness of different chan-

nels of communication in various domains of work, this chapter will delve into
the question of what sets F-F, co-present communication apart from communi-
cation via other channels, in particular, virtual online communication. Drawing
on sociolinguistic research, the chapter proposes that the notion of “involve-
ment” (Chafe 1982; Tannen 1989, 2007) is useful in capturing the distinctive-
ness of F-F interaction. Furthermore, research in communication studies, where
there is a long tradition of comparing different media channels, also provides
relevant insights in this regard, particularly theories of media richness and social
presence. The final section of the chapter will attempt to apply the theoretical
notions discussed and illustrate the differences between F-F and virtual online
communication with some examples of recorded interactions from an educa-
tional business studies context. While admittedly small-scale and exploratory
in nature, the results confirm the distinctive and unique features of F-F inter-
action compared to other communication channels as predicted by the theories
and identified in previous research. By bringing together theories and research
from separate research traditions (sociolinguistics and communication studies), a
particularly compelling case can be made for the importance of F-F communi-
cation in all domains of human interaction, including educational contexts and
the workplace.
Speaking, writing and computer-mediated communication

In order to compare F-F interaction with CMC, it is useful to review the key
differences in the production and reception of F-F speaking and traditional forms
of writing, as summarised in Table 7.1.
Due to its ephemeral nature – the fact that speech production happens line-
arly in time – speech vanishes as soon as it is uttered (unless it is recorded) while
writing something down means leaving a record which may be more or less
permanent. While F-F conversation tends to be unplanned and spontaneous,
writing is planned although the amount of planning will depend greatly on the
text type. Conversation is structured through turn-taking, whereas the units of
TABLE 7.1 The production and reception of speaking and writing
Speaking (conversation) Writing
Temporary permanent
Spontaneous planned
turn-taking sentences and paragraphs
incomplete “sentences”1 and grammatical complete sentences and grammatical
inaccuracies are tolerated accuracy are important
speakers are co-present writer and reader are separated in time
and space
dialogue monologue
Why face-to-face communication matters 117
text production are sentences and paragraphs. As a result of the ephemeral and
spontaneous nature of speech production, incomplete clauses (or “sentences”) are
tolerated in speech, whereas the more permanent nature of writing means that
writers are expected to write in complete sentences and pay attention to gram-
matical accuracy. In F-F conversation, speakers and listeners are co-present in the
same space and at the same time, while writers and readers usually do not share
the same space, and text production is separated in time from text consumption.
A natural result of this difference is that speech tends to be dialogic (although
monologic forms of speech also exist), and writing involves monologue, although
the writer may try to involve the intended reader by making the writing more
“dialogic”.
The linguist Wallace Chafe (1982) theorised that such differences in the ways
in which speaking and writing are produced result in some key differences be-
tween spoken and written language with regard to two sets of opposing charac-
teristics: fragmentation versus integration and involvement versus detachment.
These characteristics and their key linguistic manifestations are summarised in
Table 7.2.
As Chafe (1982, 38–48) discusses, spoken language is more fragmented,
with “stringing together” (38) of units without connectives, or with basic co-
ordinating conjunctions (and, but), whereas writing is more integrated and com-
plex, using more subordinate clauses and nominalisations. Speakers are more
“involved” with their audience, which is manifested in the frequent use of the
first- and second-person pronouns, the use of discourse markers (for example,
well, I mean, you know), emphatic particles, such as really (expressing “enthusias-
tic involvement” [47]) and vague language and hedges (for instance, sort of ) in
contrast to a more impersonal precision in writing. In contrast, writers are more
detached from their readers as manifested, for example, in the use of passive
voice and again in nominalisation (which “suppresses involvement” in favour of
“abstract reification” [46]).
The characteristics of speech and writing shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 obvi-
ously represent idealisations at opposite ends of a continuum, and different genres
TABLE 7.2 The characteristics of spoken and written language
Spoken language (conversation) Written language
Fragmentation Integration
• coordination • subordination
• nominalisation
Involvement Detachment
• 1st and 2nd person reference • passive voice
• discourse markers • nominalisation
• emphatic particles
• vague language
118 Almut Koester
of speech and writing may display characteristics that fall somewhere in-between
these extremes. For example, a handwritten note scribbled to someone in the
same household and left on the kitchen table will probably not involve much
planning, will contain simple co-ordinate clauses and most likely not be very
permanent. In the same way, a formal speech will have involved a large amount
of planning (and may even be based on a written text) and may display features
of writing, such as nominalisation and subordination.
If we now try to describe the characteristics of CMC according to the same
criteria, the boundaries between speaking and writing become blurred or even
fall away entirely. Even emails, which constitute the most traditional form of
digital writing, may be written without much planning and may display char-
acteristics of spoken language, including fragmentation and involvement. While
writers and readers of emails do not share the same space, the separation in time
(i.e. the speed with which readers respond) may be greatly reduced from the time
it would take to respond, for example, to a letter. Newer forms of CMC, such as
text messaging (SMS), instant messaging or micro-blogging (for example, Twit-
ter), are even closer to speech in terms of the characteristics identified in Tables
7.1 and 7.2.
In her book on digital writing, Darics (2016) observes that such writing
resembles informal spoken communication but lacks the visual and audial
clues to interpret the meaning of the message, including facial expression,
gestures, tone of voice, volume, intonation and the physical setting. Darics
points out that this has implications for the way in which readers of digital
messages interpret the meaning and intention of the writer. With the visual
and audial cues of F-F communication missing, readers are likely to interpret
as meaningful all visual and stylistic features of the message, such as font type
and colour, upper or lower case letters, style of writing or punctuation, even if
this was not intended by the writer. For example, Darics (2016, 25) discusses
the example of an email between colleagues that was interpreted negatively by
the reader, as it ended with a double question mark (??). An ensuing clarifica-
tion between the sender and receiver of the message revealed that the double
question mark was unintended and was, in fact, a typographical error on the
part of the writer.
Daric’s example demonstrates some of the dangers and pitfalls inherent in
CMC. The speech-like characteristics of much digital writing lead writers to
assume that it will be understood in the same way as if they were speaking to
someone in an F-F interaction. But, in fact, this is not necessarily the case due
to the lack of contextual, visual and audial information. As Darics (2016, 74–79)
points out, the reason writers, sometimes, use emoticons in digital messages is to
compensate for this missing information and provide the receiver of the message
with clues as to how the message should be interpreted. Thus, emoticons can
convey a range of emotions, for example, a smiley face usually indicates a friendly
intent, or may show humour or irony. Along with punctuation (for example,
exclamation marks), they can also be used to soften or strengthen the message.
But, of course, the use of emoticons is not appropriate for many digital messages
(especially in business communication) and their use tends to be restricted to
very informal types of messages. The same is true for the use of bold font, upper-
and lower-case letters and exclamation marks, for example, for emphasis. This
limits the options for writers to compensate for the “missing” contextual features
of digital writing (compared to F-F interaction). Darics concludes that there are
three aspects of digital writing that readers and writers should be aware of to
avoid the dangers and pitfalls described above:
1 intentionality
2 the negativity effect
3 power and identity
Intentionality refers to the phenomenon (described above) that everything you

write is interpreted as intentional. Secondly, the negativity effect means that re-
ceivers are likely to interpret the message more negatively than intended. Finally,
in the case of workplace communication, the professional role and power rela-
tionship of the writer and reader always influence how the message is understood
(24–30). Kupritz and Cowell (2011) make a similar point in observing that while
the increased use of CMC in organisational contexts has “vastly increased data
points of information for workers, the depth of interpretation of this information
has diminished” (56). The residual effect of this, they argue, is that the potential
for misinterpretation and miscommunication has increased.
The dramatic increase in the use of CMC has blurred the boundaries between
spoken and written forms of communication reviewed at the beginning of this
section. Communication has become more complex with such an abundance
of different media being used; at the same time, it often seems to have become
prone to misinterpretation and miscommunication and, in some way, impover-
ished (see Kupritz and Cowell 2011; Darics 2016 above). To try and make sense of
this complexity and understand how certain media might be “impoverished”, I
will draw on two theories originating in communication studies: media richness
theory (MRT) and social presence theory (SPT).
Media richness theory

MRT (developed by Daft and Lengel 1984) proposes that different media can
be ranked on a scale from “rich” to “lean”. According to this theory, media are
considered rich if they:
• transmit nonverbal cues

• provide immediate feedback
• convey multiple cues
• support personalisation
• accommodate linguistic variety
120 Almut Koester
FIGURE 7.1 Continuum from lean to rich media
Writing in 1992, Yates and Orlikowski (309) plot a range of media used in or-
ganisational communication at the time along this media richness continuum, as
represented visually in Figure 7.1.
Now in the first quarter of the 21st century, with a much greater variety of
CMC in use, we can add many more media to this continuum. For example,
videoconferencing can be plotted in-between F-F and telephone communica-
tion in terms of media richness, and other types of CMC (for example, instant
messaging, Twitter) could be placed on various points of the scale.
MRT proposes that richer media are preferable for conveying equivocal or
ambiguous messages, whereas leaner media for unequivocal messages. A range
of empirical studies going back to the 1980s and 1990s have tested the theory
by examining the media choice preferences of both managers and employees in
organisations. Many studies confirm that there is, indeed, a link between media
choice and media richness though other factors, such as personality and organi-
sational context, were also found to be key factors influencing media choice (see
Yates and Orlikowski 1992; Kupritz and Cowell 2011). Here, I review a number
of recent studies from the last ten years.
Kupritz and Cowell (2011) carried out a study of employees’ perception of
communication channels used by management for different types of informa-
tion. All 24 employees interviewed worked for a major US bank with branches
in seven states. The study compared F-F communication (a media-rich medium)
with email (a leaner medium) and used structured interviews with questions such
as (63):
• What kind of information is (not) as productive to receive via email as F-F

communication with management?
• What type of information is absolutely critical to receive through F-F com-
munication with management?
The responses showed that employees found it critical to receive HR informa-

tion that is private (confidential), personal or sensitive in F-F communication;
however, they considered it just as productive to receive non-confidential infor-
mation via email as F-F. Certain types of information were identified as critical
to receive via email, in particular, time-sensitive information and information
pertaining to safety or security issues.
Lee (2018) examined media preferences of over 400 employees at different
levels of corporations in the United States and compared a range of channels: F-F
meetings, email, the Internet (for example, bulletin board, corporate website),
phone, print media and social media. Drawing on the notion of “symmetrical
communication”2 from public relations and organisational communication liter-

ature (e.g. Grunig 1992, cited in Lee 2018), she sought to identify which com-
munication channels are perceived as symmetrical in communication between
peers, managers and the CEO. The results indicated that there were clear dif-
ferences in which channels were perceived as symmetrical, depending on with
whom respondents were communicating. F-F meetings and videoconferencing
(both media-rich channels) were perceived as symmetrical by employees when
communicating with their peers or managers, whereas print media and the In-
ternet were not perceived as symmetrical. Interestingly, the results were differ-
ent in interactions between employees and the CEO: employees perceived less
media-rich channels, such as phone calls, email and print media, as symmetrical
when communicating with the CEO. This can be explained by the fact that em-
ployees did not have many opportunities to communicate via more media-rich
channels, such as F-F meetings, with the CEO. Lee speculates that employees
may even prefer receiving communications from the CEO in written form, such
as company newsletters, as more “tangible and verifiable” (14). Lee concludes that
overall, and particularly in communication between managers and employees, “a
richer medium such as face-to-face interactions turned out to be a significant
factor for employees to perceive the effectiveness of symmetrical communication
with their organization” (12).
A study by Braun et al. (2019) carried out in Germany with over 200 em-
ployees in a range of occupations and sectors came to a similar conclusion. The
study investigated the media preferences of employees in communication with
their supervisors. The employees were asked to rate their actual and ideal use
of different communication channels when communicating with their supervi-
sors. The media compared were F-F interaction, email and telephone calls. The
study found that F-F communication was perceived to be of higher quality than
telephone and email communication and that employees would have liked to
have even more F-F interaction with their supervisors than they did. The op-
posite trend was identified for email and telephone communication: employees
expressed a preference for having less communication via these channels. To
interpret these findings, the authors drew on MRT and media synchronicity
theory (MST). MST builds on MRT and proposes that synchronicity (which
includes, for instance, the ability to receive immediate feedback and fine tune the
message) is an important factor in comparing different media, especially newer
electronic ones, and their suitability for different tasks (Dennis et al. 1999, cited
in Braun et al. 2019). The theory states that media with high synchronicity are
more effective in situations where the interactants are trying to reach mutual
understanding and agreement (Braun et al. 2019, 54).
Drawing on both MRT and MST, Braun et al. (73) suggest that employees’
dissatisfaction with their actual use of media may indicate that many tasks are
handled via channels that are not appropriate for the level of task complexity.
Both theories state that highly equivocal tasks requiring mutual exchange of in-
formation and opinions are better handled via media-rich channels, such as F-F
122 Almut Koester
communication. This echoes a point made by Kupritz and Cowell (2011, 56) that
as CMC in organisational communication has increased, “the depth of interpre-
tation of this information has diminished” (see the previous section).
In summary, empirical studies drawing on MRT to compare the use of differ-
ent media channels in internal business communication have found that channel
preference depends on the purpose of the communication. F-F interaction is
considered essential for certain types of communication, in particular, personal
and confidential communication, and F-F communication is generally perceived
as more symmetrical.
Social presence theory and involvement
Social presence theory

According to MRT, F-F communication and videoconferencing are both media-
rich channels, and this is also confirmed by the studies reviewed to the extent
that they include videoconferencing at all. While virtual meetings were not new
prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, they were still the exception rather than the
rule. Video-conferencing software (for example, Zoom or Microsoft Teams)
only became widely used when F-F meetings became impossible or discouraged
due to the pandemic and largely replaced F-F meetings, especially during peri-
ods of lockdown. The question is whether videoconferencing, as a media-rich
channel, can, therefore, replace F-F communication. As the title of the chapter
suggests, this chapter argues that, while videoconferencing may be the right me-
dia choice in certain situations (and was often the only available choice during
the pandemic), it still lacks certain key elements that F-F interaction provides.
I will draw on SPT (Short et al. 1976) and the concept of involvement (Chafe
1982; Gumperz 1982).
SPT is concerned with the extent to which a medium conveys the perception
that other people are physically and emotionally present. Non-verbal cues are
important in conveying social presence, including the following types of cues:
visual (such as facial expression, gaze, eye contact), auditory (for instance, tone of
voice, volume, pitch), tactile (touching, shaking hands) and even olfactory cues
(that is, smells). Based on these criteria, F-F communication provides the high-
est social presence, whereas all kinds of CMC provide a lower social presence
(Kupritz and Cowell 2011, 59).
F-F communication also provides another key component of social presence,
which is physical space, as Kupritz and Cowell (2011, 63–64) point out. They
draw on the anthropologist E.T. Hall’s (1971) work on proxemics to underline
the primacy of the physical environment for human communication: “Nothing
occurs, real or imagined, without a spatial context, because space is one of the
principal organising systems for living organisms” (24, as quoted in Kupritz and
Cowell). Drawing on both MRT and SPT, Kupritz and Cowell argue that no
other media can truly replace F-F communication. It is the most media-rich, as it
has the highest availability of communication cues and also provides the highest
social presence: “[n]o matter how sophisticated, the virtual environment does
not surround the user in CMC as the physical environment does in face-to-face
communication” (64).
Involvement
Originating from sociolinguistics, the notion of involvement allows us to explore
what characterises interaction within a physical environment. As shown in the
first section of this chapter (see Table 7.2), Chafe (1982) developed the concept
of “involvement” in comparing spoken and written language and suggested that
spoken language is characterised by “experiential involvement” in contrast to the
“detachment” of written language. Co-presence and F-F contact are key aspects
of what makes spoken interaction “involved”. Involvement, thus, includes the
following aspects of F-F interaction (45):
• speakers and listeners share knowledge of the environment of the

conversation,
• speakers can monitor the effect of what they are saying on the listener and
• listeners are able to signal understanding and ask for clarification.
As reviewed above (see Table 7.2), linguistic manifestations of involvement in-

clude first and second person pronouns, discourse markers, emphatic particles,
vague language and hedging.
For the sociolinguist John Gumperz (1982), involvement is essential for the
maintenance of conversation. It is what enables speakers and listeners to make
accurate conversational inferences and participate in the conversation:
Once involved in a conversation, both speaker and hearer must actively re-
spond to what transpires by signalling involvement, either directly through
words or indirectly through gestures or similar nonverbal signals.
(Gumperz 1982, 1)
As this quote highlights, conversationalists signal involvement not only through

words but also through many non-verbal signals, such as gestures, gaze, body
language and facial expressions. Involvement, thus, occurs through a combina-
tion of verbal, visual, auditory and environmental cues and is closely tied to the
physical environment and the fact of being co-present.
The sociolinguist and student of Gumperz, Deborah Tannen (1989, 2007),
draws on both Chafe and Gumperz in further developing the notion of involve-
ment to include “an internal, emotional connection” as well as the idea of con-
versational achievement (1989, 12). In developing the idea that an emotional
124 Almut Koester
connection emerges in conversation, she draws on Chafe’s notion that “expe-

riential involvement” also has a psychological dimension. It means that in con-
versation, a speaker communicates in a way that “reflects the richness of his or
her thoughts… with complex details of real experiences” and is less concerned
about logical coherence than he or she would be in the case of writing (Gump-
erz 1982, 45). Thus, Tannen’s notion of involvement goes beyond the idea of
conversational achievement as drawing on a multitude of verbal and non-verbal
elements but also includes a kind of intimacy that evolves between the speakers
through interaction.
Tannen suggests that speakers use a range of linguistic devices or “strate-
gies” that foster this kind of involvement through the sound and sense patterns
they create. Some involvement strategies are primarily (though not exclusively)
sound-based, whereas others are more meaning-based. Sound-based strategies
include rhythm and patterns based on repetition and variation, for example, of
words and phrases. Primarily meaning-based strategies include indirectness, el-
lipsis, figurative language, imagery, detail and narrative (Tannen 1989, 17).
I would like to suggest that the notion of involvement, as proposed by Chafe
and Gumperz and further developed by Tannen, provides a powerful explanatory
framework from an interactional and linguistic perspective for identifying what
makes F-F conversation unique in comparison to communication via other media.
I will attempt to demonstrate this by applying this framework to some selected ex-
tracts from two data sets: (1) The ABOT Corpus, a collection of naturally occurring
workplace interactions (see Koester 2006) and (2) recordings of simulated negotia-
tions conducted by business students on a Master’s programme. Although workplace
and business contexts may not seem the obvious settings to look for involvement, re-
search in workplace discourse has demonstrated the key role played by interactional
and relational features of language (e.g. Holmes 2000; Holmes and Stubbe 2003;
Koester 2006, 2010; Schnurr 2013). Furthermore, as the recent large-scale move to
online communication has affected workplace and educational contexts even more
dramatically than social and family situations, it is particularly important to try to
identify what might have been lost through not being able to communicate F-F.
I will focus on two aspects of involvement in F-F interaction: physical co-
presence and intimacy. Features of physical co-presence include overlapping talk,
latching and turn completion. These are all features that relate to the interaction
management and conversational achievement aspect of involvement. I am using
the term “intimacy” to refer to the more emotional and interpersonal aspect of
the involvement, whereby speakers signal solidarity and affiliation. Signals of
intimacy include the use of the first- and second-person pronouns, repetition
and relexicalisation, experiential detail, narrative, vague language, expressive
language and emphatic particles. While the use of such signals of intimacy is
not entirely dependent on speakers being co-present, I would argue that they are
most likely to occur in F-F situations and that they are to a certain extent the
result of such co-presence.
Involvement in action
Extract 1 shows an instance of small talk that occurred between co-workers in
a university office in North America. Such non-transactional small talk is, of
course, the type of workplace interaction in which involvement features and
strategies are most likely to occur, and indeed, speakers used a large number of
strategies in the extract discussed. However, evidence from the ABOT corpus
showed that involvement strategies also occurred in transactionally oriented talk
(see Koester 2006, 13–159). In this encounter, Don refers to a French culinary
product (that real sweet chestnut stuff 3) that he brought back for Andy from a
trip to Paris.
Extract 1: Office small talk
Don, Andy and Helga work in the Registrar’s Office.

Andy comes into the front office; Helga comes in later
Don: Assistant Registrar
Jeff: Staff Assistant
Helga: Registrar
1) Don Something ↑very important I need to tell you.
2) Andy ⎣Yes
3) Andy ↑Oo:h.↓ Yes?
4) Don You know that… stuff… tha’ that we brought you from Paris? That
real
sweet chestnut stuff?
5) Andy ⎣Yeah. ⎣Uhu?
6) Don Rita said the ↑classic↓ way, to eat that stuff=
7) Andy =On pears.
[1.5]
8) Don On ↑whipped ↓cream.
[…]
21) Andy Well. you wanna hear somethin’ funny. [1 sec] I’d never heard
of the stuff.
[…]
32) Andy Well I went- I went home, I went home,
33) Helga ⎣Cardullo’s
34) Helga Yeah
35) Andy And… looked on my shelf and there was a- a- jar of it.
[1]
36) Don You’re ↑ joking!
37) Andy ⎣Someone obviously gave it to us for Christmas
38) Don ⎣That’s hilarious!
39) Don That’s so funny
126 Almut Koester
40) Andy ⎣So funny, I never heard it, an’ now I got - /???/→
41) Don ⎣Now you have
two of them
Involvement features that are directly linked to co-presence and conversational

management abound in the extract. Overlapping talk occurs in turns 1–2, 4–5,
32–33, 36–37, 37–38, 39–40 and 40–41, and there is one instance of latching
(turns 6–7). Turn completion occurs from turns 40–41, where Don overlaps with
Andy’s turn and completes it for him:
41) Don ⎣Now you have two of them
Discourse markers are used by speakers to react to previous turns (oh, turn 3)
and introduce topics (you know, turn 4) and narrative segments (well, turn 32).
According to Chafe (1982), participants in conversation use such “colloquial ex-
pressions” to “monitor the flow of information” (47), but, of course, they can also
signal an emotional involvement and intimacy. Andy’s “↑Oo:h.↓” in turn 3 is a
particularly good example of such a discourse marker, as the high-pitched onset
and the stretching of the vowel express interest and enthusiasm.
Involvement strategies that mainly signal intimacy (but are also at least partly
linked to co-presence) are also very frequent. I and you are by far the most fre-
quent pronouns, reflecting both an orientation of co-participants towards one
another and the sharing of experiences, when, for example, Andy relates the
anecdote (turns 32–40) of finding a second jar of the chestnut spread at home.
Turning to involvement strategies that Tannen (1989) describes as being mainly
sound-based, we find examples of word repetition and relexicalisation as well as
pattern repetition. Don uses the vague lexical item stuff three times from turns
4–6, and Andy repeats I went home in turn 32. Relexicalisation, which involves
using a synonym, rather than exact repetition, occurs from turns 36 to 40 with
the words joking (36) hilarious (38) and funny (39 and 40):
36) Don You’re ↑ joking!

37) Andy ⎣Someone obviously gave it to us for Christmas
38) Don ⎣That’s hilarious!
39) Don That’s so funny
This is a particularly interesting example of very close speaker co-ordination,

where Don and Andy fine tune their contributions to one another both in the
way they echo and vary each other’s words and in their ability to overlap their
turns without interrupting the flow of talk. In addition to repetition and relexi-
calisation of words and phrases, we also find some instances of pattern repetition,
where there is noticeable sound and rhythm. The first example occurs between
turns 7 and 8:
7) Andy =On pears.
[1.5]
8) Don On ↑whipped ↓cream.
Don’s “On ↑whipped ↓cream” echoes Andy’s turn (“On pears”) in its on +
noun structure. The dramatic pause of 1.5 seconds that Don lets elapse between
the two turns emphasises the rhythmic aspect of this pattern repetition. A similar
jointly constructed pattern repetition occurs from turns 35 to 36, where Andy’s
turn final phrase “a- jar of it” is responded to by Don (again after a dramatic
pause) with “You’re ↑ joking!”. There is alliteration with repetition of the same
initial sound ( jar and joking) and both words are spoken with emphatic stress.
Tannen refers to such repetition and patterning as the “poetics of talk” and ar-
gues that it is central to conversation – “a resource by which conversationalists
together create a discourse, a relationship, and a world” (1989, 97).
Extract 1 also uses involvement strategies that Tannen describes as mainly
meaning-based and that foster intimacy through the meanings shared. According
to Tannen, when speakers provide experiential detail, this leads to image-creation
(on the part of listeners) and involvement through the sharing of experiences
(Tannen 1989, 135). Such sharing of experience, frequently eliciting emotional
responses, also occurs through narrative storytelling. In turn 4, Don provides de-
tail in identifying and describing the French product he brought back for Andy:
“That real sweet chestnut stuff?”. Later, Andy recounts the anecdote (turns 32–37)
of how he discovered that he already had a jar of the same product at home. The
story follows a classic narrative structure (see Labov 1972). He introduces the story
with a typical narrative frame or story abstract (“Well. you wanna hear somethin’
funny”, turn 21), and an orientation, providing background information (“I’d
never heard of the stuff”, turn 21), but is then interrupted (turns ellipted) before he
can actually tell the story. The story itself introduces a complicating action (“Well
I went- I went home…”, turn 32) leading up to a resolution (“and there was a- a- jar
of it”, turn 35). That this narrative creates involvement is clear from the listen-
ers’ enthusiastic response, describing the story as hilarious and funny, as discussed
above. Finally, emphatic particles (very important, real sweet, so funny) and expressive
vocabulary ( funny, hilarious, joking), often spoken with emphatic stress, also signal
involvement and foster an informal, intimate atmosphere.
Extracts 2 and 3 are from an educational setting but also reflect a business
context, as they are transcribed from video recordings of simulated negotiations
conducted by business students on a master’s programme. Extract 2 is from a class
that took place prior to the pandemic and where the simulations were conducted
F-F, whereas extract 3 is from a class that took place during the pandemic in
2021, and in which the simulations were done online via Zoom. Comparing
these two extracts, thus, directly enables us to compare F-F and online interac-
tion and identify any differences between the interaction via these two channels.
128 Almut Koester
According to MRT, both F-F and online meetings are media-rich, with F-F
interactions defined as the most media-rich. The two brief extracts chosen are
both from the same sales negotiation and both show the student negotiators sum-
marising what has been agreed so far in the negotiation.
Extract 2 shows the F-F negotiation. Students are negotiating in pairs in two
teams, and in the extract M from the seller’s team summarises the agreement so
far. A still from the beginning of the extract is shown in Figure 7.2.
Extract 2: Face-to-Face negotiation
Sellers: M (male) and E (female): on the left

Buyers: K (female) and S (male): on right
1) M: So uhm =
2) E: = Okay, yeah
3) M: ⎣ if I may summarise, the payment terms … 60-60 days =
4) K: Yeah =
5) E: Mhm,
6) M: without interest
7) E: ⎣ without interest,
8) M: but you give us the war-100 per cent bank warranty
9) K: ⎣Yeah, we give you 100 per cent warranty …
10) S: And ⎣K: and⎦ if it’s really necessary […]
As the extract shows, although Martin is the one to make the summary, he
does not do this as a monologue. His negotiating partner, E, supports him (turns
FIGURE 7.2 Still from an example of face-to-face negotiation

2, 5 and 7) and K from the buyer’s party confirms and shows agreement with the
summary (turns 4 and 9). In turn 10, S from the buyer’s team comes in with a
further point with K’s support. As the students are simulating a crucial stage of a
business negotiation, it is not surprising that in this brief extract, unlike in extract
1, we find no involvement strategies of the kind that signal interpersonal affiliation
or intimacy. However, there are many features that show participants’ involve-
ment in the interaction and that are dependent on the speakers’ co-presence. The
fine-tuning of the speakers’ contribution is manifested in latching and overlapping
talk. Furthermore, the participants use discourse markers and back-channel devices
to manage the turn-taking (so, but, and) and show listenership (okay, yeah, mhm).
As the negotiations were video-recorded, the role played by the physical en-
vironment can also be observed. The students are sitting at a table in pairs next
to their negotiating partners and opposite the other negotiation team. The video
recording shows how they monitor the interaction through their gaze, gestures
and body language. This is illustrated in the still of the video (Figure 7.2), which
shows M making an open gesture and directing his gaze towards the other party
at the beginning of his summary. Having access to the visual and physical dimen-
sion of this interaction allows us to see how the close co-ordination of the partic-
ipants in jointly managing the turn-taking and flow of talk is entirely dependent
on sharing the same physical space and their ability to interpret extra-linguistic
cues of gaze, body language and gestures. This is what enables such a close co-
ordination of talk involving latching, overlaps and joint turn-construction.
Extract 3 shows a comparable brief episode from the same simulated negoti-
ation conducted online via Zoom. It also shows J, one of the negotiators from
the buyer’s team, summarising the agreement so far and P from the seller’s team
responding (see Figure 7.3).
FIGURE 7.3 Still from an example of online negotiation

130 Almut Koester
Extract 3: Online negotiation
J (female): bottom right

P (male): top left
1 J: But just to sum it up. So: we decided to: uhm … to: to the price of
uhm 18 million in total sum, to 90 days payment terms, and to the
uhm INCO term: uhm CFR. Is it right.
2 P: Yes… yes. Uhm, the CFR, i- it it would be great um to to hear
confirmation from your side uhm regarding the sole suppliership. This
is … this is very much in our interest you know,
Despite the similarity in the situation and the negotiation move being performed,
the interaction in extract 3 is in stark contrast to the F-F one in extract 2. The
speakers do not share the same space, but are all four in different physical spaces,
as can be seen by the different backgrounds that are visible on the computer
screen. They can only see each other’s faces and parts of their upper bodies, and
each is reduced to a two-dimensional space. In online conferencing, eye contact
is not possible, nor is simultaneous speech. This has a number of consequences
for the interaction. Unlike in extract 2, the summarising move is performed as a
monologue with some pauses and hesitations, but with no contributions or con-
firmations from the other participants. P does not speak until J has finished her
turn, and his response mirrors J’s turn in being monologic and punctuated with
hesitations and brief pauses.
Unlike the interaction shown in extract 2, there are no involvement features,
except for the discourse marker but at the beginning of turn 1 and the response
token yes at the beginning of turn 2. While both negotiations were friendly and
collaborative, clearly, the possibilities of the negotiating parties in the online ne-
gotiation for building rapport were much reduced with no possibility of making
eye contact or showing involvement through gestures, body language or collab-
orative turn-construction and interactive back-channelling.
Discussion and conclusion

This chapter has explored the distinctiveness of F-F communication in com-
parison to other channels of communication, in particular, videoconferencing,
which arguably comes closest to replicating F-F communication. Drawing on
MRT and SPT originating in communication studies, and the notion of in-
volvement developed within sociolinguistics, I have attempted to demonstrate
that F-F communication has distinctive and unique characteristics that cannot
be fully replicated via other media channels, even in virtual online meetings.
Empirical research carried out in a range of organisations demonstrated em-
ployees’ preference for F-F communication in many situations. It was found that
media-rich channels, such as videoconferencing, can compensate some features
of F-F communication but cannot replace it.
The notion of involvement brings a sociolinguistic perspective to MRT and

provides a tool for analysing actual interactions to identify how linguistic, para-
linguistic and extralinguistic elements combine to create media-rich instances of
communication. In F-F communication, the fact that interactants share the same
physical environment and are physically co-present provides the basic condition
for the first aspect of involvement discussed: the ability of speakers and listeners
to make accurate conversational inferences by drawing on a range of verbal and
non-verbal cues and participate in the conversation (Gumperz 1982). The second
aspect of involvement, intimacy, whereby speakers signal affiliation through a
range of sound- and means-based “involvement strategies” (Tannen 1989, 2007),
is not as tied to co-presence as the first set of involvement features; for example,
experiential detail and personal narratives can also be communicated via CMC
(for instance, videoconferencing) or even non-visual media (such as telephone
calls). However, I would like to suggest that these intimacy features of involve-
ment have their origin in physical co-presence and that their use in other media
besides F-F interaction involve a kind of replication which is dependent on hav-
ing used and experienced them in previous F-F conversations.
The data extracts from workplace and educational contexts provided a testing
ground for the ideas put forward in the chapter. The analysis of extract 1, from
small talk episode among co-workers, showed the participants in the conversa-
tion deploying a great number and variety of involvement strategies, both of the
first type closely tied to co-presence as well as the second more sound, language
and meaning-based intimacy features. The two data extracts (2 and 3) from
the simulated student negotiations provide an ideal opportunity to compare F-F
communication and online video-mediated interaction, as the two extracts were
not only from the same sales negotiation (from different years) but also showed
the same speech act or discourse move – summarising the agreement reached.
While extract 2 from the F-F negotiation was rich in involvement features of co-
presence with speakers collaboratively constructing the discourse and supporting
and responding to each other’s contributions, these features are entirely missing
from extract 3 of the online negotiation, where only one person speaks at a time
and non-linguistic cues such as direction of gaze and other body language are not
available. The extracts stand in stark contrast, and their comparison shows clearly
how much is lost in transferring F-F meetings, such as negotiations, to an online
medium. While intimacy features of involvement did not occur in extract 2, due
to the transactional orientation of this stage of the negotiation and probably also
the educational context, there is, nevertheless, interpersonal involvement. The
transcript and the still photograph taken from the video recording give some
indication of how co-presence and the availability of non-verbal communication
cues, such as facial expressions, gaze, gestures and body language, contribute to a
kind of interpersonal involvement that could be essential to relationship building
in a business interaction such as a negotiation.
This chapter has set out to demonstrate that F-F communication provides
a media richness and fosters a kind of involvement that make it a unique
132 Almut Koester
channel that is essential for human communication and, therefore, irreplacea-

ble by other media channels. The focus has been on workplace and educational
contexts, as these are the areas of communication most dramatically affected
by the shift from F-F to online communication. As only a few selected data
extracts were analysed, the ideas put forward are necessarily exploratory in
nature and would need to be confirmed by follow-up studies. However, even
the scant evidence presented here provides some compelling evidence for the
importance of F-F communication for many types of interaction, and perhaps
a warning signal for what might be lost if too much communication is moved
online.
Transcription Conventions
, slightly rising tone
? high rising tone
. falling tone
! animated intonation
… noticeable pause or break of less than 1 second within a turn
- word/phrase cut off, e.g. false start
italics emphatic stress
: colon following vowel indicates long vowel sound
:: extra colon indicates longer vowel sound
® speaker’s turn continues without interruption
A step up in pitch (louder)
¯ A shift down in pitch (softer)
/ / words between slashes show uncertain transcription
/?/ indicates inaudible utterances: one? for each syllable
ë overlapping or simultaneous speech
= latching: no pause between turns
[ ] words in these brackets indicate non-linguistic information, e.g. pauses of 1
second or longer (the number of seconds is indicated), speakers’
gestures or actions
[…] part of the text or conversation has been left out
Notes
1 The sentence is a written convention. Although in common usage reference is often
made to “speaking in sentences”, this is not entirely accurate. The term is used here
to emphasise the contrast between speech and writing.
2 The concept of “symmetrical communication” is based on the premise that individ-
uals and organisations should use communication to manage behaviour rather than
to control or manipulate. While asymmetrical communication is one-way and top-
down, symmetrical communication fosters two-way, dialogic communication. (Lee
2018, 3).
3 A chestnut paste (crème de marron).
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8
COVID-19 AND THE RISE
OF DIGITALISED SPOKEN
COMMUNICATION
The example of webinars
Fiona Rossette-Crake
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic triggered immense upheaval within the field of spe-
cialised, spoken professional genres (Koester and Handford 2013). The swift and
quasi-compulsory switch from in-person to online communication has made for-
mats such as online meetings, conference calls and online job interviews com-
monplace. Within these dialogic (i.e. interactive) setups, webinars – of which the
very name underlines their digital raison d’être – present an interesting case in point.
Although the first usage of the term “webinar” dates back to 1998 (Merriam Web-
ster), it was not until the COVID-19 pandemic that – together with other words
such as “unmute” (see introduction to this volume) – it became the object of such
wide usage in so many cultural contexts.1 The term has been used to refer to
numerous types of online formats, from small-scale setups, involving a relatively
small number of participants who may or may not already know one another,
to more large-scale, public “events” that target the wider body of stakeholders.
During the pandemic, corporate event management used these large-scale online
events as a substitute for live events, given that measures of social distancing made
it impossible to bring people together within the same venue.
Webinars, therefore, correspond to a heterogeneous category. They are closely
linked to the corporate world but, at the same time, they can be organised for a
number of purposes by various actors within the professional sphere. Like many
formats engendered by the digital medium, they provide a perfect example of
discourse as social practice (van Dijk 2008): that is, a discourse which both pro-
motes and is, at the same time, shaped by the constantly evolving social context.
In the case of webinars, the “context” is multilayered and includes both the
specific context of the sanitary crisis and the general social and economic en-
vironment of the first quarter of the 21st century, in which the sanitary crisis is
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-11
136 Fiona Rossette-Crake
embedded. Within the general social and economic context, a determining fac-
tor has been the technological advances brought about by the digital revolution.
As an object of study, webinars are interesting from a number of perspectives:
– they represent discursive practice which is both informed by and informs the
social context;
– they highlight the complexity of digital communication and the cognitive
issues raised for users; these are particularly prevalent in the case of spo-
ken communication (e.g. cognitive overload; communication effectiveness)
compared to written communication;
– they constitute new discursive competencies and generate pedagogical inter-
est within the field of specialised communication.2
This chapter focuses on the first two dimensions, which serve to highlight the
pedagogical stakes which inform the third item on this list.
The example of webinars raises a number of questions. For example, in what
respects does the medium itself – that is, the technology – condition the dy-
namics of the communication? In other words, how do the choices made by
software developers who design the online platforms used to host webinars
(both general online platforms such as Google Meet or Microsoft Teams and
those which offer a specific “webinar” format, such as Zoom) format and con-
strain the communication enacted by users? Expanding on this question, we
could also examine whether or not this online format is influencing choices
in communication offline, as has already been observed for other digital com-
munication (for instance, the influence of text-messaging on spelling or that of
Twitter on concision).
A second question pertains to discursive genre and the instability of these new
formats. For instance, do they qualify as a distinctive “genre” (Swales 1990)? Are
they to be distinguished from other digitalised spoken formats, such as online
meetings, or online academic conferences, which also became a regular part of
our daily lives during the COVID-19 pandemic?3 And can they be compared
with the online public-speaking formats which are closely linked to the corpo-
rate sector and belong to the category of “the New Oratory” (Rossette-Crake
2019)? The New Oratory groups together formats such as keynote presentations,
TED talks and three-minute-thesis presentations, all of which were introduced
during the first decade of this century. These formats combine in a novel way a
live performance on stage in front of a physically present audience, with digital
dissemination via online video. The live performance is conditioned by the fact
that it is filmed for digital dissemination; in turn, the live delivery is experienced
by proxy by the Internet users. During the pandemic, the New Oratory formats
had to move to a 100%-online setup and forego the physically present audience.
In some instances, the scenography (for instance, speakers sitting in front of their
webcams, delivering their speeches via the same online platforms) has been dif-
ficult to distinguish from that of some webinar formats.
The example of webinars 137
A third issue concerns the tension between the digital medium and spoken
communication – be it monologic speech, where one speaker produces a rela-
tively self-sufficient segment of speech (for instance, the New Oratory and we-
binar openings), or dialogic speech, which involves at least two speakers and is
structured around turn taking (for instance, online meetings or the panel dis-
cussions during webinars). Web 2.0 presents a paradox in that it enacts commu-
nication which is virtual but is, at the same time, intrinsically interactive and
participatory (Eyman 2015; Hodgson and Barnett 2016). Emblematic of “an age
of total interconnectedness” (Ong, quoted in Walter 2005), Web 2.0 discur-
sively construes interaction and participation, in an attempt, it can be argued,
to compensate for the virtual setup. But because of the virtual setup, does such
interaction/participation simply remain a construct? The question is even more
pertinent in the specific case of digitalised speech: typical face-to-face speech is
characterised, among other features such as spontaneity and non-permanence, by
the co-presence of participants (Koester, this volume), which potentially makes
it incompatible with the virtual medium.
In what follows, I begin by providing an overview of some of the discursive
and cognitive issues raised by digitalised spoken communication. We will then
turn to the specific case of webinars, which are first defined and compared to
a “hypergenre” (Maingueneau 2010) and are then analysed according to their
specific online “interactive regime”, as enacted via multiple technical devices
and initiated via a contract of engagement which is realised by discursive and
linguistic means.
Digitalised speech: some discursive and cognitive issues
Speech within the digital medium: a paradox?

Digital communication has been the object of considerable academic interest,
notably in the fields of workplace and organisational communication, which par-
ticularly experiment with new communication formats. However, as underlined
by Koester (this volume), most work has focused on written formats such as
email, the text of websites or blogs (see, for instance, Darics 2016; Darics and
Koller 2018), while there has been relatively little study of digitalised speech.4 If
digital technology has blurred the distinction between speech and writing, it can
still be useful to return to the intrinsic properties of each, as well as to their spe-
cific functions. For instance, speech is inherently “empathetic and participatory”,
plays on the vocal resonance of meaning and the “interiority of sound” and has
an intrinsic link to human experience (Ong 1982). Of course, what is being re-
ferred to here is speech in its prototypical form: that produced in a face-to-face
context. Importantly, the functions of empathy and participation – that is, under-
standing others and feeling understood, as well as feeling part of and connected
to a community – are directly underpinned by the fundamental characteris-
tic of face-to-face spoken communication: physical co-presence. Co-presence
presupposes a specific context, defined by the specific space and time in which
the participants are brought together. Such requirements clearly appear at odds
with the virtual component of digital communication, whereby participants do
not share the same space, nor necessarily the same time.5 And so, this raises the
following question: if co-presence is to be taken as a benchmark for speech, does
this not make the very notion of “digitalised spoken communication” somewhat
of an oxymoron – and therefore a paradox? – a paradox more acute than the
notion that Web 2.0 be both virtual and participatory (cf. introduction)? Indeed,
it can be posited that the online medium distorts the essential makeup of spo-
ken communication far more than in the case of writing – despite the potential
affinity that can be identified between the sense of participation associated with
typical (pre-digital) speech and the participatory culture of Web 2.0. This raises
a number of questions. For instance, how is such a discrepancy negotiated by
the digital medium? In what ways is the digital medium reinventing speech?
And can digitalised speech, nevertheless, prove a functionally effective form of
communication?
The stakes of co-presence and contextualisation, including their ability to
induce empathy and participation, appear in the following line of argument in
favour of live (albeit monologic) spoken performances which, due to an effect of
contrast, have taken on added value in the virtual, digital context:
In a world where we experience so many of our interactions via the tablet/

smartphone and social media feed, a need for something “real” and tan-
gible has developed. […] We have become so removed from reality, that
those occasions when we do sit in a room with hundreds or thousands
of others watching a speaker have become all the more powerful, potent
and necessary. We think we are in a more socially connected world, able
to “share” every nugget of interest we stumble upon online, yet this is
no substitute for the atmosphere and sense of bonding that comes with a
funny, poignant, insightful or (crucially) unfiltered moment at a crowded
live performance.
(Hickman 2017; original emphasis)
These sentiments are expressed by an actor and promoter of what he himself

refers to as the “speaking industry”. The “atmosphere and sense of bonding”
described can be compared with what Goffman (1981) identifies in his discussion
of platform skills as the “infusion that ties the text into the occasion”. Such an
“infusion” can, in turn, be linked to the concept in classical rhetoric of kairos:
that is, the special effect incumbent on the dynamics of the moment, of a speech
performed for a specific audience in a specific time and place. In contrast, kairos is
negated by the very nature of the digital medium, which leads to a “context
collapse” in which “multiple audiences, usually thought of as separate, co-exist
in a single social context” (Marwick and Boyd 2010, 145).6 In addition, and in
contrast to the “unfiltered moment” referred to above, the digital medium can
produce the effect of a filter – “what we see on a computer screen is a highly

mediated, filtered and designed version of the world” (Kern 2014, 342) – and the
sense of removal from reality, even forgery: “the computer is a forgery of sorts, a
fake landscape that works to synthesise disparate elements into a cohesive whole”
( Johnson 1997, 238).
Embodiment
The notion of presence – which is also taken up by Koester in this volume – can
be likened to that of speaker embodiment (Rossette-Crake 2019, 10) and linked
to the general issues posed by digital rhetoric in terms of authenticity and rep-
resentation of the self (Turkle 1995). During the COVID-19 pandemic, most
instances of digitalised speech were reduced to a “disembodied” representation
of the speaker. The New Oratory formats (e.g. TED talks, keynotes, etc.) pro-
vide an interesting case in point. The New Oratory that predates the pandemic
had renewed the established practices of past oratory by removing the lectern
from the stage, presenting speakers whose bodies appeared in full view of the
audience, walked freely about the stage, used body language as an important
component of delivery and, hence, literally “embodied” their rhetoric. How-
ever, during the pandemic, many New Oratory formats – just like most other
examples of digitalised speech, including webinars – resorted to speakers sitting
and speaking in front of the webcams of their computers. The speaker’s head was
removed from his/her body and a return to the “talking heads” characteristic of
the television era occurred.
The question of embodiment (or lack of it) also concerns that of the online,
virtual community. Online communities are “transient” and “disembodied”
(Drasovean and Tagg 2015). Indeed, because members are brought together in a
virtual space, it is necessary, in order to create a sense of community, to construe
an “affinity space” (Gee 2004) or establish common ground. In consequence, on-
line communities are construed not by physical embodiment but by other means
– such as, for instance, common interest(s), the persistence of interactions and
the “emotional attachment” or sense of community among users (Herring 2008,
921). Similarly, in a study of the construal of the community of users within the
website TED.com, Drasovean and Tagg (2015) insist on the role of online affili-
ations, and linguistic and discursive norms.
Returning to the specific case of digitalised speech and to that of the speaker,
embodiment by the speaker also involves the way she/he occupies the space and
setting – hence, again, the tight link with context. This includes what type of
space the speaker chooses to occupy and how this may or may not be exploited to
construe meaning. Because participants do not share the same space, the speaker
can choose his/her specific setting. In lockdown during the pandemic, numer-
ous social actors – from managers and employees, teachers and students, to New
Oratory speakers and webinar participants – allowed others into their homes
virtually, blurring even further the already-disputed division between private
and professional spheres that had begun under the new work order (Gee et al.
1996). During the pandemic, speakers spoke not only from home offices but also
from their living rooms, kitchens and, sometimes, bedrooms: all of a sudden,
digitalised speech gave way to new scenographies. With this has come a greater
sense of intimacy, as well as informality. And in regard to the New Oratory for-
mats, components of “private” speaking have crept into what had generally been
recognised as “public”-speaking formats.
Cognitive overload
Finally, the challenge of renegotiating or re-construing embodiment and con-
text (together with the sense of empathy and participation) is compounded by
the cognitive issue of maintaining participants’ attention. Whatever the context
of communication, it is difficult to obtain and maintain the attention of partic-
ipants, but this is even more the case on the computer screen. Digital commu-
nication does not simply enact multimodality (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006)
– that is, the concurrent superposition of several meaning-making resources (e.g.
written, visual, audio) – it also enacts “polyfocality” ( Jones 2004). For instance,
in the case of online meetings, conferences or webinars, participants are faced
with an online conference platform composed of several windows (for example,
a window in which the speaker appears, other windows in which other partici-
pants appear, a window featuring the slide presentation, a chat box, etc.) which
multiply the points of focus and disperse attention.
In addition, participants typically “multitask” and do other things on their
computer at the same time, with their screen further sub-divided between the
online conference platform, their email interface, various files, etc. – not to men-
tion the fact that the technology allows them to have more than one online
conference platform open at once and, therefore, attend several meetings/events
simultaneously! Not only is there a question of cognitive overload, but there is
also a question of cognitive distraction or dispersion – without forgetting the
real-life distractions that may also be simultaneously taking place off screen (for
instance, interruption from children doing home-schooling, doorbell ringing,
etc.).
These possibilities are part of the potential of face-to-face speech compared
to writing which, on the contrary, requires participants (writer, reader) to be
isolated, does not allow for the intrusion of others and promotes a sense of being
first and foremost with oneself (Ong 1982). In many regards, because participants
are not just “spending time with themselves” as it were, speech is more tiring
than writing, and, hence, digitalised speech more challenging than digitalised
written communication.
To these remarks can be added recent scholarship carried out in the wake of
the COVID-19 pandemic in regard to both “zoom fatigue” (Bailenson 2021)
and cognitive overload (Schmitt et al. 2021). Bailenson defines a “nonverbal
overload” that he attributes to four main factors: excessive amounts of close-up
eye gaze, cognitive load, increased self-evaluation from staring at the video of
oneself and – a final factor that is linked to the previously mentioned issue of
embodiment – constraints on physical mobility.
Towards a definition of webinars
Webinars, or “learning from your armchair”

Let us now turn to the specific case of webinars. “Webinar” is a portmanteau
word designating “a web-based seminar”. Inscribed in its very name are the dig-
ital medium (“web”) and an educational/instructional component (“seminar”),
as highlighted by dictionary definitions of the term (with my emphasis in italics):
a live online educational presentation during which participating viewers can

submit questions and comments (Merriam Webster)
an occasion when a group of people go on the internet at the same time to
study and discuss something (Cambridge)
a presentation or seminar (= a meeting for discussion or training) that is
conducted over the Internet (Oxford English Dictionary)
However, webinars are more than simply seminars moved online. As also un-
derlined by these definitions, webinars are intrinsically interactive, implying not
attendees but participants who are required to actively participate/contribute (cf.
“submit questions and comments”; “discuss something”). In their very definition,
webinars, therefore, foreground the intrinsic interactivity of Web 2.0, which, as
will be observed below, is taken to new levels. Such a high degree of interac-
tivity is conditioned, in default of spatial co-presence, by temporal co-presence,
or synchronicity, a point that is also underscored by a number of definitions (cf.
“live”; “at the same time”).
Webinars are specific to the corporate world7 and are iconic of the corporate
sector, as suggested by the (only) example given by the OED:
Our company uses webinars to develop leadership skills.
The format is, moreover, particularly iconic of the technological sector. Let us
turn to the write-up of a webinar series produced by the French multinational
ATOS, an information technology company:
BIODATAlks are 30-45 minute interactive webinars, hosted by the Bio-

Data Innovation Centre at the Wellcome Genome Campus and featuring
a variety of genomics and biodata experts – from established companies
to start-ups and academic spinouts. These online sessions are designed to
introduce you to thought-leaders, founders and experts who have created
successful teams and enterprises in the biodata and genomics fields. With
absolutely no pre-recorded content, speakers expect to have questions

thrown at them, so please have one or two comments/questions up your
sleeve to make sure you get the most out of these informal discussions.8
Interactivity is explicitly mentioned (“interactive webinars”) and is also un-

derlined by the very name of the series (another portmanteau word) “Bioda-
talks” (i.e. “talk” as opposed to a “speech”), the word “discussion” and the
phrase “questions thrown at you”. Such interactivity is conditioned by the
shared time variable (cf. “With absolutely no pre-recorded content”). Techno-
logical research and innovation are associated with attributes from the sphere
of education (“campus”; “academic”). Informality is another feature (“infor-
mal discussions”), echoing the ethos of the entrepreneur of the start-up, high-
tech era (Rossette-Crake 2020). The write-up appears under the details of an
up-coming webinar,9 whose format is described as an “Informal 30–45 min
virtual Q&A session” and whose target audience (“Life Sciences PhD students
and PostDocs”) is clearly identified as belonging to the sector of education/re-
search. Both interactional and educational aspects are again cited as arguments
in response to the question “Why attend?”, for instance: “100% live sessions de-
signed to be interactive”, “Experts will answer all your questions”; “Meet new
people, connect with peers, and learn from the comfort of your armchair/ sofa/
deck chair”. According to these arguments, learning can be conducted from an
armchair – even a deck chair – and is facilitated by proximity (“direct access to
innovators, entrepreneurs and experts”).
The afore-cited write-up exemplifies the language of marketing discourse,
including corporate newspeak (e.g. “spinout”; “thought-leaders”). Webinars
may aim to be educational, but they also clearly serve the purposes of market-
ing and branding and can be added to the list of communication formats which,
whatever the specific sector, participate in stakeholder communication (Darics
and Koller 2018).10 For instance, it is not uncommon that webinars be hosted
by the company’s community manager. In addition, the educational purpose
confirms the phenomenon of life-long learning that defines the new work order
and is partly the consequence of hyper-competition (Gee et al. 1996). Finally,
the influence of the corporate world is confirmed by the interactive format
itself. If interconnection is a fundamental feature of Web 2.0 (cf. introduc-
tion) and digital rhetoric (Boyle et al. 2018; Warnick 2007), it is taken to new
levels by webinars and echoes the horizontality of contemporary work rela-
tions, which informs the “new knowledge economy” (McElhinny 2012) – that
whereby knowledge is “shared” horizontally rather than imparted uniquely in
one direction, vertically.
A “hypergenre”: multiple purposes, multiple formats

Up until now, webinars have been presented as a genre to be added to the cate-
gory of “spoken professional genres” (Koester and Handford 2013). However, if
we consider that a discursive genre is defined by a specific and common purpose,

a common subset of social actors and similar choices in formatting and stag-
ing (Swales 1990), such common points prove difficult to identify for webinars,
which constitute a heterogeneous category at many levels. Let us review five
concrete examples of webinars that took place during the COVID-19 lockdown
periods and briefly compare them in terms of purpose, participants and general
format and scenography.
Example 1: a webinar entitled “The Future of Transport – Challenges and
Opportunities”, jointly organised by the French high-tech multinational Atos,
and the American international technical professional services firm Jacobs11
Purpose: to bring together experts from the transport industry who discuss,
according to the webinar’s subtitle, “challenges and opportunities in these dis-
ruptive and uncertain times”.
Participants and general format: The webinar is introduced by the vice presi-
dent and head of sales for the United Kingdom and Ireland at Jacobs, is closed by
the vice president for retail and logistics at Atos and brings together a panel of six
“experts” from the transport industry, whose discussion is moderated by another
actor from the transport industry. In total, it runs for 49 minutes.
Scenography: The opening minutes feature a speaker delivering her introduc-
tion from what appears to be her living room (a sofa can be seen on the right
of the screen; there are bookshelves with books and framed photographs in the
background, paintings on the wall, soft lamps, etc.). She is dressed fairly casually
in a black jumper; as she speaks, she appears to be reading from what is visibly a
previously scripted speech on her computer screen. At this stage of the webinar,
the webinar platform is composed of only one window, in which she features; as
soon as it moves to the panel discussion, the participant who is currently speak-
ing features in a main window, and the other panellists appear in small windows
aligned at the bottom of the screen. With the exception of the one slide used to
introduce the panellists, the webinar does not contain a slideshow.
Example 2: A webinar entitled “Unilever Careers”, organised as part of a
series during a “career week” by Enactus, a Canadian group of business leaders
that targets university graduates and their professional integration12
Purpose: To inform graduates or soon-to-be graduates about career opportu-
nities and the recruitment process at Unilever.
Participants and general format: It is introduced and closed by the president
of Enactus and again brings together a panel – here, a panel of three profession-
als working at Unilever – which is mediated by the manager of partnerships at
Enactus. The webinar runs for 45 minutes.
Scenography: Unlike the previous example, participants are speaking from
settings which appear less personal and could be interpreted as an office setting
(e.g. no sofas in sight, close-up shots which avoid inclusion of background); sim-
ilarly, the (implicit) dress code appears more formal (e.g. blouses, jackets). The
opening address does not appear to be read from a screen. During the first min-
utes of the webinar, only one screen (featuring the current speaker) is displayed,
but once the webinar moves into the panel discussion, the platform divides into
five screens of the same size (the first is immobile and contains the Unilever logo,
the four others each feature a speaker) and this display does not vary during the
panel discussion (i.e. the participant speaking at a specific moment does not ap-
pear larger than the others). The webinar does not include a slideshow.
Example 3: A webinar entitled “Major health crises and the OED: language
evolution and challenges in health communication”, organised by the Oxford
English Dictionary13
Purpose: To discuss language issues in relation to the pandemic, and more
specifically to “look beyond English” to see how other languages have integrated
COVID-19 terminology.
Participants and general format: It is hosted by the OED community man-
ager, it does not take the form of a panel discussion, but is composed of two
presentations, one by an OED lexicographer and the other by a PhD candidate
in anthropology, after which questions are taken. The question–answer part lasts
for 25 minutes of this 110-minute webinar.
Scenography: From beginning to end, the webinar features a slideshow, which
takes up the greater part of the screen, and the three participants are reduced to
small windows aligned vertically on the left of the screen. Compared to the two
previous examples, the focus is not on the speakers themselves, but on the con-
tent, as it is instantiated on the slides.
Example 4: A webinar entitled “How to Launch a Successful Startup”, or-
ganised by Stanford University14
Purpose: To provide advice on how to launch a start-up.
Participants and general format: This webinar features a Harvard professor
and an executive from Boeing (who previously worked for Microsoft) as well as
an (unnamed) host. After the host brief ly introduces the two participants, the
Harvard professor is given the f loor. The webinar, which lasts for 58 minutes,
then takes the format of a one-to-one conversation between the hosts, with the
professor asking questions to the executive. There do not appear to be questions
from viewers, and there is no reference to a chat box. The host brief ly takes the
f loor at the end of the webinar to thank the two participants.
Scenography: The webinar window is divided into four windows: the two
main participants feature in the two top windows, the host in the bottom left
window and the bottom right window is static and displays the “Stanford On-
line” logo. The dress code of the two participants is a mixture of formal and
casual ( jacket and white shirt but no tie). Throughout the webinar, the Stanford
professor sips from a mug, an accessory or prop that enhances the informal,
chatty feel. The webinar contains no slideshow.
Example 5: A webinar entitled “Decision-Taking and Cognitive Bias: the
Example of COVID-19”, organised by the French business school HEC (École
des hautes études commerciales de Paris) as part of their series “HEC Paris Insights”15
Purpose: To share the analysis of the business school professor in order to pro-
vide support to the general community during the pandemic.
Participants and general format: The webinar takes the form of a conference
given by a business school professor, who is the main participant, and is brief ly
introduced by an executive director from the school, who also closes the session.
The conference takes up almost all of the 60 minutes of the webinar, and the host
asks one question at the end. The format is therefore predominantly “magistral”.
Scenography: Similar to the OED webinar, a slide presentation takes up most
of the conference platform window; the conference speaker appears in a very
small window in the top right corner. The host does not appear on the screen.
From this short review of five examples that had been chosen fairly ran-
domly, two common purposes emerge. First, each webinar serves to promote
the company/brand (each webinar is showcased on the company’s website),16
and second, each enacts knowledge-sharing. The notion of sharing is, for in-
stance, announced by the host of the French business school webinar (cf. share
analysis) and is also made explicit by both the Stanford webinar host, who tells
participants: “you can all enjoy the wealth of knowledge they [the participants]
have to share with you” and the Enactus/Unilever webinar host, who makes
reference to representatives from Unilever Canada who “are going to share
their journeys that brought them to a career at Unilever”. Knowledge-sharing
is also instantiated by the collaborative dimension of most of the webinars: with
the exception of the last example, they involve professionals from more than
one company or institution, are the result of partnerships and enact a “coming
together” of professionals. Such knowledge-sharing upholds the values of life-
long learning and the pursuit of self-improvement which inform the contem-
porary workplace.
However, in addition to these two general purposes, specific and distinct aims
can be identified. These include, depending on the webinar, to discuss, inform
or share advice or analysis. For instance, Webinars 2 and 4 purport to provide
advice (how to be recruited; how to launch a startup) and, hence, share an imme-
diate pragmatic purpose, while the other examples aim to stimulate analysis and
ref lexion which may serve at a later date in order to determine specific future
corporate strategy.
An even greater degree of heterogeneity can be noted in terms of a number
of participants (two participants in example 5; three in examples 3 and 4; four
in example 2; eight in example 1), general format (e.g. panel discussion with or
without questions from viewers, one conference, two conferences followed by
questions, etc.) and scenography (e.g. number of windows, slideshow). There-
fore, rather than qualifying as a “genre”, webinars may better be described
as a “hypergenre” (Maingueneau 2010). A hypergenre is a very general for-
mat, close to what Fairclough (2003, 68) refers to as a “disembedded genre”,
which allows room for variation at multiple levels. Hypergenres are prolific
in the digital realm: emails and blogs are prototypical examples. TED talks
provide another illustration (Rossette-Crake 2019). In regard to webinars, a
great amount of variation concerns the interactive regime itself, to which we
now turn.
Webinars and their online “interactive regime”
Multiple forms of interaction

If interactivity is an intrinsic part of Web 2.0, it is particularly prominent in
webinars. Foregrounded in dictionary definitions of the format, interactivity is
taken to new levels by webinars, where it enacts the “knowledge sharing” that
is a feature of the hypergenre. Webinars constitute a new discursive practice that
combines, perhaps like never before, multiple forms of interaction, or “occa-
sion[s] when two or more people or things communicate with or react to each
other” (Cambridge dictionary), and bring to the fore interpersonal meanings
(Halliday and Matthiessen 2014). Interactivity is closely associated with the no-
tion of “engagement”, according to the specific sense that has developed within
the context of the “socially” oriented Web 2.0.17 The verb “engage” appears for
instance in the afore-mentioned presentation of the Atos webinar: “This online
session will be more valuable and interesting for all participants if you engage
with the presenters”. Thanks to this amplification of interactivity, it can be ar-
gued that webinars avoid the pitfalls of much digital communication and succeed
in fulfilling the “interactive” and “participatory” functions associated with tra-
ditional (face-to-face) speech. As already noted, this interactivity hinges upon
the condition of synchronicity, which guarantees a shared temporal context in
default of a shared context in spatial terms.
Interactivity takes multiple forms. These include the expression of reactions
via the use of emoji or emoji-type icons (applause, raised hand, thumbs up, joyful
face, surprised face, etc.), screen sharing, posting of comments in the chat box,
hosting in pairs, surveys/polls (a feature that will be taken up further below) and
the central actions of asking and responding to questions. The action of asking
questions can be divided into two main categories:
i questions that are verbalised by participants (cf. the “throwing of questions”

in the previously quoted Atos write-up), whereby participants are requested
to raise a virtual hand (by clicking on the icon representing a hand) and then
wait to be invited to ask their question verbally;
ii questions that are written in the chat box.
Another (less common) case is that of the host addressing pre-planned,

“scripted” questions to the speakers. Policy for asking questions varies: in some
webinars, a preference is announced for one of the above options, while in
others, the options coexist, which, hence, creates from the outset a polyfo-
cal, multilayered interaction. Variation can also be noted in regard to how
questions are relayed to the target addressee (the participant who is expected
to answer the question). This depends on the presence or not of a “host” and
whether or not she/he assumes the role of moderator. In addition, the chat
box can be used as a “primer” whereby participants first type their questions
into the chat box and are then invited to verbalise them directly to the target
addressee. Possibilities include
i the host monitors the virtual raise of hands and invites the participant to
verbalise the question,
ii the target addressee checks directly for the virtual raise of hands and invites
the participant to verbalise the question,
iii the host reads out the question from the chat box,
iv the host invites the participant to read out or paraphrase the question he/she
had previously typed in the chat box,
v the target addressee directly reads out the question from the chat box, and
vi the target addressee invites the participant to read out or paraphrase the
question typed in the chat box.
In addition, the questions placed in the chat box can also be answered in writ-
ing, directly via the chat box – either by the target addressee of the question or
by other participants. Further differences can be noted as regards whether or not
the content of the chat box is accessible to Internet viewers who watch the webi-
nar asynchronously, after the webinar has taken place. For instance, questions in
the OED webinar are moderated by the host, who refers to “questions that have
come in” – presumably via a chat box, which, however, does not appear next to
the recording. And during the webinar, messages can be sent via the chat box to
the whole group, or to specific participants; in the latter case, embedded, “private
conversations” are initiated within the “plenary” conversation.
Technological mediation and negotiation of power

The quick review above highlights the extent of the options offered by webinars,
and the complexity of the participant setup and participant roles which result.
Webinars not only combine multiple forms of interaction but also allow for man-
ifold networks of interaction between participants – as illustrated by the possibil-
ity to embed private conversations. And like a number of other forms of digital
communication, webinars feature participants whose roles are constantly being
modified and renegotiated. In this, they contrast with other forms of speech for
which participant roles are more stable, such as face-to-face casual conversation,
where speakers take turns in speaking, or public speaking formats, which are
based on the asymmetry of a sole speaker who holds the floor in front of an au-
dience. Webinars also constitute a heightened degree of complexity compared to
other technologically mediated formats, such as those that emerged thanks to the
advent of the electronic media.18
The possibilities provided by webinars are dictated directly by the technology, in
terms of both the options integrated by software developers into the online confer-
ence platforms and the possibilities provided by other digital tools. For instance, some
conference platforms have now built-in tools to conduct polls and automatically
calculate the results. The communication is, therefore, mediated – or, to cite the
metaphor used elsewhere in the literature, “filtered” – by the technical interface.
Due to the technical options on offer, webinar organisers are, therefore, faced
with a number of choices, or to a modal channelling of the choices made availa-
ble, in a digital reworking of the McLuhan mantra “the medium is the message”.
These choices place them in a position that allows them to control many aspects
of the interaction, beginning, for instance, with whether or not to mute partici-
pants’ microphones or turn off their cameras. Such options inform new means of
negotiating, asserting and maintaining power (Fairclough 1989) and compound
the power-play which is an intrinsic part of workplace and corporate discourse
practice (Holmes and Stubbe 2015; Vaara et al. 2005). For example, in regard to
the embedding of private messages within the chat box, organisers can remove
this option for general participants and make it available solely to themselves and/
or the hosts. Other options relate to the identity of participants. Organisers de-
cide whether or not to authorise participants to display their profile photos, name
themselves, share their screen, ask questions anonymously, and whether or not
the list of participants is visible only to the organisers and/or hosts. This means,
for instance, that, in some cases, speakers are required to answer questions with-
out knowing the identity of the participant who asked it; conversely, participants
ask a question without knowing who can overhear them.
If control is one aspect of power play, vulnerability constitutes the other side of the
coin. Speakers participating in webinars can be placed in a position of vulnerability
due to the fact that they can be asked innumerable questions, via multiple channels
and from potentially any participant. Certain expressions, which are used precisely
in order to attract participants, construe a sense of forcefulness, such as the notion
of “throwing” questions at speakers that appears in the afore-cited presentation of
the Atos webinar series, or, according to the description associated with one of the
webinars of the series, that of “grilling” speakers (“Enjoy ‘grilling’ the experts!”).
Whether or not it places them in a position of vulnerability, hosts and speakers
need to be able to manage the influx of questions that are, sometimes, simul-
taneously directed at them. This can result in a type of “interactive overload”,
which partly overlaps with a form of cognitive overload. Another negative effect
of interactive overload involves the general participants, who can feel frustrated
if their questions (for instance, those questions placed in the chat box) are left
unanswered. In some instances, participants can be left with the sense of an un-
authentic, false or “staged” interaction which does not succeed in taking their in-
dividual requests or needs into account. While participants do generally comply
with invitations to participate, some may be left at the end of the webinar with
the impression that the interaction is superficial, and simply a construct.
The “contract of engagement”

To conclude this appraisal, let us briefly focus on the interactive contract that
is presupposed by the webinar format and is implicitly accepted by users. For
it is a point worth noting that users do generally play their part and comply by
responding to invitations to participate. For instance, they do place questions or
comments in the chat box, react via an applause emoji, participate in a poll, and
so on – all conventions that would quickly become integrated by participants of
most forms of digitalised speech during the course of the pandemic. Users know
that this is expected of them, according to an interactive contract – or “contract
of engagement”. If this contract is an integral part of the hypergenre and precedes
each specific instance of a webinar, it is also set up and (re)negotiated in the we-
binar’s opening moves.
Webinars open with a series of introductory remarks pronounced by succes-
sive speakers, beginning with the host (segments of monologic speech), before
leading into other activities, such as a panel discussion, launch of the slideshow,
and so on. One of the functions of these opening remarks is to reiterate the con-
tract of engagement, for instance, by announcing the policy adopted for asking
questions and providing an overview of the forms of interaction which are in
store:
During the session you have the option of using the live chat facility which
hopefully you can see to your right, to network, to share thoughts and to
pose questions anonymously via the questions tab. (ATOS-Jacobs webinar
host)
And then we’re going to have the panelists answer some scripted ques-
tions that we planned ahead of time, before opening up to questions from
the audience. And I know we’ve got some great questions the rest of the
week on our other webinars, so I’m sure we’ll see the same today. (Enactus-
Unilever webinar host)
Another means for setting up a contract of engagement is to initiate it as of the

opening moments via a poll. Polls are a new addition to the live conference setup:
thanks to the technology, they can now be carried out automatically in real time.
Polls have been devised as an iconic component of webinars and are precisely
recommended by webinar guides for use during the opening minutes. For in-
stance, the “Unilever careers” webinar begins with a 20-second poll based on the
question “have you ever considered a career at Unilever?”, for which participants
can choose between three options (“yes”; “no”; “I am intrigued and here to learn
more”). After announcing the question and the options, the host launches a call
for participation (“Go ahead and cast your results”); the results are automatically
calculated; the host announces that according to the poll (and rather unsurpris-
ingly), 44% of participants “are intrigued” and conclude with a statement that
serves to legitimate the webinar (“So you are all in the right place”).
Legitimating the event is another function fulfilled by webinar openings. If it
is a characteristic of introductory remarks whatever the context, it is typically ac-
complished in webinars by construing a sense of excitement, notably via the use
of subjective, positively connoted language, such as when the Enactus-Unilever
host refers to “some great questions” in the extract quoted above. Subjective lan-
guage, which contributes to the contract of engagement (for instance, by em-
phasising the engagement of the host), typically includes positively connoted
adjectives, adverbs and adjectives expressing high degree, and references to ex-
citement and pleasure, for instance:
We are so excited to have you join us today for the Unilever Careers webinar
(the Enactus-Unilever host)
I’m really pleased to be able to introduce today’s webinar (Atos-Jacobs
webinar host)
I would love to introduce Michael Lepech […] I’m going to go ahead and
turn it over to our wonderful speakers today (Stanford webinar host)
Such language choices construe a sense of the exceptional and participate in

the discursive staging of an event. When implemented to this extent, it is what
makes webinars distinct from some other digitalised speech formats, such as on-
line meetings or online academic conferences but makes them comparable with
some New Oratory formats. Creating the feeling of a live event is also achieved
via other lexical items and imagery, such as when the Enactus-Unilever host
speaks of “kicking off today’s webinar” – as if we were attending a live sporting
event. Interestingly, as in the three extracts quoted above, the adverb “today”
creates an explicit reference to the here-and-now and to the synchronicity which
underscores the live event.19
Finally, engagement is fostered by language choices that reflect informality
and resemble those typical of spoken dialogue. This is particularly the case for
the introductory remarks pronounced by the main speakers, which tend to be
less scripted and less formal than those of the hosts. For instance, in the Stanford
webinar, the syntax of the in-house academic echoes that of spoken dialogue:
clauses are strung together via discourse markers such as “and” and “so”, con-
tain other discourse markers (“you know”; “sort of ”), markers of hesitation and
self-correction (“um”, “uh”), colloquial, informal lexis (“cool”; “OK”) and in-
clude a direct interrogative:
Thanks Hanna, and Dr. Fors, thank you so much for taking the time
to spend with me today to chat about this really cool topic of entrepre-
neurship. So you know, I’d like to frame today’s discussion around um sort
of uh for those familiar with late-night US television, um sort of a David
Lieberman-style top ten in which we talk about some of the, the top ten
things that can happen anywhere, and in this case if it’s possible I’d like
to talk about the top ten things that can go wrong with a startup, talk
about some failures, and I think by looking at those things that can go
wrong, I think there’s a tremendous amount to learn there, in how to
prevent the things from going wrong, and how to make them go right.
And I know that there’s a few of these that you’re probably thinking are
more important than others, and maybe we can spend a little more time
on them. Does that sound OK?
This sequence exemplifies the “conversationalisation” that Fairclough (1993)

identifies as a characteristic of the technologisation of public discourse, in both
written and spoken forms. Informed by late capitalist society, it is present in
other digitalised or semi-digitalised speech formats, such as the New Oratory.
Conversationalisation contributes here to the contract of engagement and sets
up an interactive tone: despite the fact that these opening remarks constitute a
segment of monologic speech (they precede the discussion which will be initiated
with the other main speaker), conversationalisation suggests a dialogue. Even if
it is staged (simulated), conversationalisation adds another layer to the interaction
that is intrinsic to the webinar format.
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted some of the stakes of spoken online communica-
tion, based on the example of webinars, one of the new discourse practices which
flourished during the COVID-19 pandemic. While it has been demonstrated
that they constitute a heterogeneous category in terms of the social actors that
they bring together, their specific purpose, and the format that they take, they
share a number of features which make them qualify as a hypergenre.
A lot of the phenomena examined here potentially concern many of the for-
mats of digitalised speech that developed during the pandemic. Webinars were
chosen as a case in point because of their close link with the corporate world. They
are used for purposes of branding and event management and reflect contempo-
rary work values of collaboration, knowledge-sharing, and self-improvement.
Like other forms of digitalised speech, they are iconic of the blurring of public
and private spheres that has been accentuated by the pandemic. Such a blurring
can be gauged from a number of factors – from informal dress code and intimate
setting, to language choices (for example, conversationalisation).
Webinars enact multilayered forms of interaction that are underpinned by the
wide range of technical options now made available by the digital medium. If the
possibilities have only been briefly analysed here, and beg a far more detailed ex-
amination, it is clear that the resulting communication setup is extremely com-
plex, based on an interpersonal network whereby participant roles are frequently
renegotiated. An “interactive regime” is underpinned by a contract of engage-
ment that is intrinsic to the hypergenre and is reenacted in the opening moves
of webinars. It can be argued that such manifold and composite interaction work
to resolve certain issues raised by the virtual nature of online communication.
Problems of co-presence and context are partially solved by the condition of syn-
chronicity imposed by webinars: participants come together not in a shared space,
but in a shared temporal frame. In this way, webinars guarantee the functions of
interactivity and participation traditionally associated with spoken discourse. At
the same time, a new form of cognitive or “interactive” overload, dissipation,

and dispersion arises, together with new forms of power play, which have specific
stakes in the corporate world.
Notes
1 For instance, it is not until the first (Spring 2020) lockdown period, at the end of the
2019–2020 academic year, that webinars were mentioned in the internship reports
presented by students enrolled in the masters program in intercultural management
(“Master M2i”) at Paris Nanterre University, France.
2 For instance, in job offers in the field of even management, webinars are now specif-
ically mentioned among the missions of the future recruit (e.g. jobs advertised as of
autumn 2021 for the French-based video-game company Ubisoft).
3 For example, academic conferences are rarely referred to as “webinars” by their or-
ganisers, who appear reticent to adopt the term, but this is not necessarily the case
for students, some of whom have used the term “webinar” in the case of an academic
conference.
4 The absence of work on spoken digital communication was also a point taken up at
the panel convened by A. Koester, “Spoken business communication in the digital
age: Face-to-face and computer-mediated communication in dialogue”, organised
during the conference of the Association of Business Communication, hosted by the
Vienna University of Economics and Business, August 26–28, 2021.
5 In this, the digital medium contrasts with the electronic medium of radio and television,
said to have ushered in an era of “second orality” (Ong 1982), in which “we live with a
sense of personal presence which is a new and invigorating human experience” (ibid.).
6 Similarly, the title of a study by Jones (2004) addresses “The problem of context in
computer-mediated communication”.
7 Importantly, webinars are not (yet) used by the traditional sectors of education: for
example, on university websites, the only webinars that feature do not relate to the
curriculum or research but deal with student life and the student community (e.g.
how to enrol as a student); interestingly, private business schools and management
faculties provide exceptions to this (as in example 5 quoted in the section relating to
hypergenre).
8 https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/biodatalks-the-promise-of-edge-technologies-in-
life-sciences-innovation-tickets-108848603102# [accessed 15 May 2021]
9 The webinar is entitled “The promise of edge technologies in life sciences innova-
tion”, scheduled for July 14, 2021.
10 Reference is commonly made to “marketing webinars”, although the term may be
considered pleonastic. For example, a Google search (conducted May 5, 2021) of the
term “marketing webinar” yielded 164,000,000 results.
11 October 27, 2020; 342 views as of October 17, 2021; available at https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=rSCcMDOCi2A [accessed June 14, 2021].
12 May 14, 2020; 367 views as of October 17, 2021; available at: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=fA0CIPu2FCs [accessed June 14, 2021].
13 January 28 2021; 366 views as of October 17, 2021; available at: https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=dPmNXSLslA8&t=8s [accessed June 14, 2021].
14 April 9, 2021; 4933 views as of October 17, 2021; available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=_1vFaKwJTlQ [accessed June 14, 2021].
15 Original title (that I translated): “Prise de Décision et Biais Cognitifs: l’Exemple du
COVID-19”; April 7, 2020, 303 478 views as of October 17, 2021; available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6IAOM3Ei2o
16 For instance, even the Oxford English Dictionary is an organisation that is construed
as a brand.
17 In the context of Web 2.0., particularly that of the social networks, “engagement”
can be defined as “the fact of being involved with something”, or “the process of
encouraging people to be interested in the work of an organisation” (meanings 4 and
5 identified by the Cambridge Dictionary).
18 For instance, interviews and debates aired on radio and television introduced a new,
three-tier or “trilogue” setup between journalist/interviewer, interviewee(s), and ra-
dio listeners/television viewers (Kerbrat-Orecchioni and Plantin 1995).
19 Reference to the here-and-now is a typical rhetorical strategy in public speaking (e.g.
“I stand before you here today…”) (Rossette-Crake 2019).
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9
MANAGING MULTILINGUAL TEAMS
IN A VIRTUAL CONTEXT
Helene Tenzer
Introduction
Virtual teams are defined as groups of people “working together from different
locations and possibly different time zones, who are collaborating on a com-
mon project and use information and communication technologies intensively
to co-create” (Garro-Abarca et al. 2021, 2). These teams help corporations to
combine a dispersed workforce and leverage diffuse knowledge and skills for col-
laborative innovation. Over the last two decades, virtual teams have been grow-
ing in number and importance (Mak and Kozlowski 2019), as global companies
have increasingly used them to facilitate joint creation among global or regional
experts (Chmielecki 2021; Garro-Abarca et al. 2021). With the outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic, this trend has grown exponentially as even organisations
which previously only had a modest percentage of team members working vir-
tually transferred their entire staff to the home office (Newman and Ford 2021).
A Gartner (2020) survey predicting substantial long-term increases for remote
work suggests that COVID-19 will accelerate trends towards virtual teamwork
even past the immediate impacts of the pandemic (Kniffin et al. 2021).
In the absence of face-to-face meetings, virtual team members communicate
via email, telephone or videoconferences, use chats, instant messaging and shared
documents on common platforms (Schweitzer and Duxbury 2010). Research on
information and communication technology has developed media choice theo-
ries such as media richness theory (Daft and Lengel 1987) or media synchronic-
ity theory (Dennis et al. 2008) to help virtual collaborators choose the optimal
communication media to facilitate mutual understanding. These theories rec-
ommend the use of particular means of communication for particular team tasks.
They are widely adopted by both researchers and practitioners, yet they neglect
a crucial foundation of team communication: language. Given the increase of
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-12
156 Helene Tenzer
linguistic diversity at the workplace (Fiset and Bhave 2021), many virtual teams
face language barriers between their members, that it “obstacles to effective
communication, which arise if interlocutors speak different mother tongues and
lack a shared language in which they all have native proficiency” (Tenzer et al.
2014, 509). Whereas media richness and media synchronicity theory offer gen-
eral recommendations in regard to which media to select for which kind of tasks,
they do not consider how language barriers might influence media utility.
This chapter will review empirical findings on the profound impact of lan-
guage barriers on media choice in virtual teams, indicating that we may have to
rethink seminal media choice theories for multilingual virtual work environments.
On this basis, we suggest a future research agenda to keep scholarly theory up to
pace with the rapid developments in communication technology and the reality
of today’s globalised workplaces. We will also offer practical recommendations for
virtual team leaders bridging language barriers between employees at remote loca-
tions and for corporations seeking to upgrade their media infrastructure.
The impact of language barriers on media

choice in virtual teams
Media richness theory (Daft and Lengel 1987) focuses on the core proposition
that different communication media can be positioned on a continuum of “rich-
ness”. This trait captures a medium’s ability to carry non-verbal cues, provide fast
feedback and support the use of natural language. E-communication tools such as
videoconferencing, which immediately convey a variety of cues, are considered
richer than written media such as emails or file-sharing platforms. The latter
are classified as “lean” media, as they only include verbal cues and additionally
involve temporal delays in communication.
Media richness theory recommends matching media to collaborative tasks
based on their richness and the equivocality of the task. Complex tasks, which
are open to varying interpretations, require a team to share equivocal knowl-
edge and to make sense of it through intense and interactive communication.
Examples would be questions that have no clear answers or discussions in which
team members hold different positions. Rich media are deemed most suitable for
such tasks because the richer a medium is, the more cues on a given task it will
provide, and the more equivocality will be reduced. Leaner media are considered
sufficient for sharing simple and unequivocal knowledge such as reporting num-
bers or other types of unambiguous data (Klitmøller and Lauring 2013).
Based on an extensive ethnographic field study, Klitmøller and Lauring (2013)
explored the relationships between language barriers, media choice and the type
of knowledge shared in multilingual virtual teams. Interestingly, they witnessed
frequent breakdowns of equivocal knowledge sharing attempts over the phone
and in videoconferences, as accented speech and varying levels of proficiency
in the team language English impeded exchanges through these rich media.
Emails were found to reduce equivocality in multilingual teams much more ef-
ficiently, as they erased issues of pronunciation and speech production. Directly
Managing multilingual teams 157
contradicting media richness theory, Klitmøller and Lauring (2013), therefore,

propose that in the face of language barriers, lean media are more effective for
equivocal knowledge sharing than rich media.
Language challenges appeared less acute when the teams under study shared
simpler and unequivocal knowledge such as dates and time slots for meetings,
project milestones or deadlines. In these situations, team members typically
opted for phone calls as the fastest option. In contrast to Daft and Lengel’s (1987)
proposition, Klitmøller and Lauring (2013) conclude that in team settings fraught
by language barriers, rich media are more effective for unequivocal knowledge
sharing than lean media.
Tenzer and Pudelko (2016) similarly found that media synchronicity theory
(Dennis et al. 2008) needs to be reconsidered for multilingual settings. This theory
predicts which media choices should enable the highest performance outcomes for
virtual communication for two primary information processes: the conveyance of
information and the convergence of meaning. Whereas conveyance involves the
transmission and individual processing of large chunks of information, conver-
gence focuses on the discussion and negotiation of different interpretations.
To define the most suitable media type for each of these information pro-
cesses, media synchronicity theory distinguishes between synchronous and asyn-
chronous communication. For the mere conveyance of information, Dennis
et al. (2008) recommend using asynchronous media such as emails or file-sharing
platforms, which allow participants to process large information volumes at any
time and at their own speed. These media are “rehearsable”, as they enable the
sender to edit and fine tune a message before sending it, and “reprocessable”, as
they allow the recipients to spend as much time as they need decoding a message.
Whereas these media capabilities support the conveyance of straightforward in-
formation, they are deemed to hinder the convergence of ideas by delaying joint
sensemaking. Dennis et al. (2008), therefore, consider media supporting higher
synchronicity such as telephone or videoconferences more effective for converg-
ing knowledge. These media are characterised by high transmission velocity and
the use of natural symbol sets, that is, they include visual cues like gestures along
with verbal cues through speaking.
Tenzer and Pudelko (2016) found these propositions confirmed in interviews
with leaders and members of monolingual virtual teams. They also found the
theory’s predictions for conveyance processes mirrored in multilingual virtual
teams. For more complex convergence processes, however, they discovered that
media capabilities extolled as highly beneficial in monolingual settings turned
into liabilities once language barriers came into play. In the multilingual teams
they studied, synchronous media characterised by natural (speech-based) symbol
sets and high transmission velocity could not be relied on for joint sensemaking
because team members experienced communication across language barriers as
cognitively very taxing. When speaking on the phone, non-native speakers of the
virtual teams’ working language needed to process a foreign language, under-
stand different accents and immediately respond to their conversation partner. In
communication about highly complex topics, the requirement to master linguistic
158 Helene Tenzer
challenges while simultaneously thinking and deciding about the task frequently
created cognitive overload. Cognitive resources that were tied up with language
processing could no longer be dedicated to the content of communication. Conse-
quently, synchronous communication processes suffered from incomplete under-
standing and reduced input by non-native speakers of the working language.
In contrast, Tenzer and Pudelko (2016) found that the rehearsability and re-
processability of asynchronous communication media gained particular relevance
in their multilingual teams. Whereas media synchronicity theory describes these
capabilities as inadequate for converging ideas, they effectively supported mutual
understanding between teammates speaking different mother tongues. Allowing
multilingual virtual team members to compose messages in the foreign language
at their own pace, look up words in online dictionaries and think about the re-
sponses they received at rest, asynchronous communication freed up cognitive
resources to be used for discussion input.
While reducing team members’ cognitive burden, these media choices also
created a daily flood of emails, which many found difficult to cope with. Ten-
zer and Pudelko (2016), therefore, suggest supplementing purely synchronous or
asynchronous media with communication channels such as chat or instant messag-
ing, which allow employees to communicate in a written, but timely form. The
team members and leaders they interviewed found these media useful to sort out
language-based misunderstandings during large teleconferences. The authors also
recommend integrated web-based communication systems like Zoom, WebEx,
Microsoft Teams and Slack, which enable not only voice and videoconferencing
but also screen- and file-sharing as well as chats between two employees or within
a group. These systems provide multiple channels to secure mutual understanding,
thus enhancing the effectiveness of multilingual virtual team communication.
Opportunities for future research

The discovery that seminal media choice theories need substantial modifications
in multilingual settings suggests several promising avenues for future research.
Building on the above-reviewed studies, international business research could
contextualise other media choice theories to multilingual virtual work envi-
ronments. For example, media naturalness theory (Kock 2011) could be probed
under a language lens, not only in close-knit work teams but also in communi-
cation with suppliers, customers and local institutions.
Moreover, language diversity between team members is only one example of
how diversity influences technology use in virtual teamwork. Whereas manage-
ment scholars have intensely studied how various diversity dimensions influence
the capability of collocated teams to fulfil their complex and interdependent tasks
(Tasheva and Hillman 2019), research on diversity in virtual collaboration is still
comparatively scarce. Besides language, many other forms of diversity may be
explored in relation to media choice and utility. Most notably, cultural diver-
sity is closely connected with language diversity. International business research-
ers increasingly recognise that all communication is intertwined with speakers’
cultural backgrounds (Boussebaa and Brown 2017), as culture provides meaning

for the messages encoded in the language (Wang et al. 2020). Rich media fully
represent culturally distinct communication behaviour, thus possibly enhancing
the danger of misunderstandings (Klitmøller and Lauring 2013). By conveying
surface-level cultural cues, videoconferences might additionally foster stereotyp-
ing and social boundary creation between team members, whereas lean media
might play down such differences between team members (Spears et al. 2001).
These dynamics are omnipresent in global virtual collaboration and, therefore,
warrant a more focused line of investigation.
Research on male and female communication styles in virtual teams also sug-
gests that gender diversity may influence media preferences, choice and utility.
According to Furumo and Pearson (2007), asynchronous computer-mediated
communication equalises interactions among male and female team members.
How could this influence idea generation and output? Age diversity between
the younger generation of “digital natives”, who were born in 1990, and the
older “digital migrants” (Garro-Abarca et al. 2021) might also influence media
adoption. How does the younger team members’ familiarity with social media
and the digital world influence their media choice and use in virtual teams? How
do different generations interact on this basis and how might media competence
affect seniority-based power relations?
Finally, virtual teams research in management has so far focused on traditional
technologies such as email, phone or videoconferencing, chat, instant messaging
and discussion boards (Gilson et al. 2015). In contrast, the role of social media
in group functioning has been largely neglected. Early research has found that
teams communicating remotely focus primarily on task accomplishment (Mar-
tins et al. 2004). Do social media, which are very personal in nature, augment or
detract from this focus? How do mostly private networks like Instagram or pro-
fessional networks like LinkedIn influence team interpersonal processes, affective
outcomes and member liking? New developments in three-dimensional virtual
environments such as Second Life have also become potential collaboration plat-
forms for virtual teams, yet have received scarce research consideration to date.
3D virtual environments are communication systems in which multiple partici-
pants share the same digital space even though sitting in remote physical locations.
This technology allows participants to navigate, manipulate objects and interact
with one another via avatars. To which extent does this support understanding
and increase motivation? Other technological features such as mobile apps could
also answer interesting questions with regard to team processes. Research on such
new and emerging technologies of computer-mediated communication could
help update media choice theories and provide guidance for multinational corpo-
rations wishing to develop their communication infrastructure.
How to manage multilingual teams in a virtual context

The sudden changes brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic required leaders
of physically collocated teams to transition into e-leaders from one day to the
160 Helene Tenzer
next (Chamakiotis et al. 2021). These leaders and their subordinates had to sud-
denly shift their work patterns from an office to a home environment, making
the challenges inherent in virtual teamwork particularly daunting (Newman and
Ford 2021). Many of these challenges revolve around communication, an essen-
tial predictor of virtual team effectiveness (Kock and Lynn 2012; Garro-Abarca
et al. 2021). The above-reviewed research findings allow us to develop practical
recommendations for virtual team leaders and their corporations.
First, leaders should strive to foster a psychologically safe and linguistically
inclusive work environment in their virtual teams. Tolerating the media choices
of team members who struggle with the working language can already go a long
way in this direction. Many team leaders and members with high proficiency
in the team’s working language become impatient if their less fluent colleagues
rely too much on written communication. These employees should understand
the cognitive challenges of processing a foreign language and accept their team-
mates’ preference for writing emails, as these “unhurried” media can assist mu-
tual understanding.
Second, it may be worthwhile to use media redundantly, i.e. to send impor-
tant messages through several communication channels (Leonardi et al. 2012).
As managers frequently feel overwhelmed by the amount of information they
receive, repeating messages through different media may at first glance appear
inefficient. As Tenzer and Pudelko’s (2016) study has shown, however, this
practice may help bridge language barriers, prevent costly misunderstandings
and improve knowledge sharing in multilingual virtual teams. This additional
“safety net” also reduces language-based anxiety among virtual team members
and fosters trust between colleagues. Therefore, not only the less proficient team
members but also fluent and native speaking colleagues should repeat messages
to ensure understanding.
Third, technical support by organisations is critical for virtual team function-
ing (Newman and Ford 2021). Multinational corporations are well advised to
invest in integrated web-based communication systems such as Zoom, WebEx,
Microsoft Teams and Slack, as the multiple communication channels of these
technologies offer foster understanding between teammates speaking different
native languages. Ideally, they should complement these tools with asynchronous
media like Microsoft OneDrive, SharePoint, Drop Box or Google Docs. Pro-
viding virtual teams with different modes of communication ensures everyone’s
access (Kilcullen et al. 2021) and helps leverage the large performance potential
of multilingual virtual teams.
Fourth, leaders need to motivate their subordinates to use these new me-
dia while human resource developers must enable them to do so. Most of the
younger generation of “digital natives” is highly skilled in the use of the lat-
est technology, yet some older employees might be unwilling or unable to use
innovative communication systems to their full advantage. To facilitate their
participation in virtual communication, team leaders need to champion the use
of integrated communication systems as tools to overcome language barriers and
explain the benefits of communicating through several different channels. Com-

plementing these efforts, multinational companies should provide training in the
access to and functions of new communication technologies while ensuring that
newly introduced communication systems are compatible with the existing IT
infrastructure, work tasks and the corporate communication culture.
Conclusion
During successive waves of the COVID-19 pandemic, virtual communication
technologies have kept teamwork going despite social distancing mandates.
Even before the pandemic, they united colleagues from all over the globe with-
out relocating them, thus allowing increasingly diverse teams to collaborate.
As this chapter shows, however, the relationship between virtual communica-
tion technology and diversity is not a one-way street. Diversity also influences
how team members evaluate and use various communication media. Bearing
this in mind may not only inspire a new line of research in international busi-
ness communication; it may also help virtual team members to bridge their
differences.
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10
COMMUNICATING ON THE JOB
DURING COVID-19
Some professional testimonials
Leticia Correa do Carmo, Maria Martha Gomez Villalon,

Océane Juste, Juan Pinargote and Perrine Rozec
This chapter hands the virtual floor over to actors in the professional sphere.
They were asked to discuss the changes that have occurred during the pandemic
and analyse their communication on the job – both with colleagues and with
clients and external partners and contractors. Face-to-face (FTF) communica-
tion is compared with online communication in its many forms. Each of these
managers works either in the digital sector (such as software or digital content
production) or in sustainability (fair trade, the ecological transition, corporate
social responsibility). Collectively, they, therefore, provide what may be consid-
ered a representative snapshot of workplace communication within these rapidly
growing, iconic sectors of the moment. Their observations bring to light a num-
ber of phenomena, such as digital inequalities, pragmatic issues of online com-
munication (for instance, politeness, misunderstandings), the need to recreate a
human dimension in online work relations and negotiations, the challenges of
hosting webinars and other online events, and the emerging space that is likely
to be dedicated to hybrid events.
Juan Pinargote, Manager of Customer Success and Client

Services, Atomize, Sweden
How did the pandemic affect the division of labour for you between FTF communication
and online communication – both with your work colleagues and with clients and external
partners?
Before the pandemic, we had a lot more FTF communication: I would say
it accounted for 90% of communication with my work colleagues, with virtual
communication tools used only in very specific circumstances. But with the
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-13
164 Leticia Correa do Carmo et al.
pandemic, this took a 180-degree turn and almost 100% of communication took
place virtually. We had to build new ways of working.
When it comes to clients and external partners, before 2020, we used to com-
municate with them virtually around 70% of the time. This is because a lot of
our clients and partners are based all over the world. And with the pandemic, this
was reinforced because we stopped visiting other countries and started hosting a
lot of virtual events that in the past used to be held in person.
What online formats and platforms do you use most?
With my colleagues, we used and continue to use Slack, Google tools, emails,
Jira and Hubspot. With clients it is mainly email and Googlemeets. What has
particularly increased since 2020 are video chats on Googlemeets, as well as Slack
calls and chats.
What effects have these changes had on you?
Of course, it has been challenging. When I had a question or any doubts about
how to do things, I had to send an email, a message through Slack, or try calling
a colleague, which got a bit tedious. On the bright side, there have been many
positive aspects. My schedule became a lot more flexible; I could work from an-
ywhere I wanted, I did not have to worry about tight schedules, I realised that I
was saving a lot of time during my working day and was, indeed, more produc-
tive. Sometimes, I miss the small talk with colleagues FTF, but we do take the
time to do this online as well.
What do you identify as the main challenges posed by online communication generally?
I would allow myself to define challenges as opportunities on this point. For
example, we realised that hosting online events instead of in-person events cre-
ated more visibility for us since a lot more people attended online. Meeting
someone in person would always have a slightly different effect, but meeting
people online, video chatting with clients and colleagues, and getting to see their
families and babies, sometimes, in the background turned out to be warmer and
more fun sometimes.
Have you experienced any problems when communication online?
I have not experienced specific problems. When it comes to writing online,
at least from my experience, people tend to make an extra effort to be clearer. In
my line of work, when topics are very complex, a video chat is always the option
that is chosen, and I have never experienced any misunderstandings other than
those that would happen anyway in a normal, FTF situation.
What do you estimate to be the place of online communication in the future (post-pandemic)?
I would like to hope for a greener future. FTF events and gatherings will still
take place, but the lesson from the pandemic is that online communication can-
not be underestimated. This pandemic has not just shown us what difference we
can make at work but also the bigger impact we can make in our lives and within
our environment in general. I think our generation is becoming more flexible,
Communicating on the job during COVID-19 165
and generally more conscious. I do not see “a” place for online communication
in the future, I humbly believe that online communication is “the” future, and
we are already seeing it.
Maria Martha Gomez Villalon, Digital project manager,

Datawords, France
How did communication on the job change for you due to the pandemic?
I would say that beforehand, 65% of my communication was FTF and 35%
online (via, for instance, email, ticketing systems, video calls, phone calls and
professional instant messaging tools). Virtual communication with colleagues
was mostly exclusively with those who lived in other countries. With the pan-
demic, the use of professional instant messaging increased by almost 100% in
order to “talk” with colleagues with whom I normally worked in close proxim-
ity (for instance, in the same building). Quick in-person meetings turned into
instant messaging and emails in order to organise video calls. My time organising
and attending quick calls increased by about 50%. And during calls, we always
had our webcams on – even if it was not mandatory, it was something that we
did naturally.
As for clients, before the pandemic, it was basically 50–50. Virtual communi-
cation with clients had always been a big part of my job as I work with clients in
different countries. And I had also communicated virtually with clients based in
the same country as mine. We were used to online communication, but we could
also have FTF meetings, business lunch meetings and attend events together. The
in-person meetings were very important in order to build a more trustworthy re-
lationship. Since COVID-19, we have had to find new ways to do this and, at the
same time, not lose the human dimension of communication. Also, before the
pandemic, we normally tried to schedule regular business lunch meetings with
clients. Of course, these could not continue, and there was no 100%-satisfactory
equivalent format – instead, we proposed video calls to talk about projects. And
these video calls also had to replace business trips to go to see clients in their own
countries – in my case, this impacted trips to New York and Geneva.
You manage projects which develop digital content for clients around the world, ranging
from social media and website localisation to e-commerce. But in terms of your own online
communication during the pandemic, did it raise specific challenges for you?
One issue was the technical problem of a bad Internet connexion – not on my
side, but for other colleagues. Sometimes, I had to take over some of their tasks
because they did not have the necessary working conditions. I also remember the
case of a client who had transferred some assets for me to work on but had no
idea of what she was sending as her Internet connexion was too bad to download
the files. Another challenge was to find the moment that suited other colleagues
for a call. Waiting until everyone was available – which could, sometimes, take
one or two weeks – meant that some subjects, even those that required very
quick answers, had to wait. Everyone was (and still is) overbooked with calls. Of
course, before the pandemic, we had planned meetings, but being at the office at
the same time was, sometimes, easier. However, one good thing is that when we
do get to the call, we all get to the point instead of beating around the bush for
an hour because we all know time is very limited.
Are any challenges related to cultural differences?
Cultural differences are part of my everyday life as I work with people based
all around the globe – literally, I could list at least 58 different markets. And for
me, the main challenge is to be more patient. One example that springs to mind
involves a production team based in Asia with whom we work. We needed to
adapt to the way they learn and work. Some things that might be normal for us
in Europe might not be as obvious for them – and vice versa. Most of the time
they will not ask for help, either because they do not feel they are in a trustful
environment or because they are probably concerned about our reaction if they
ask a question. We normally had weekly calls where we would only talk about
projects, but we came up with the idea to share something more personal before
talking about work. We introduced a “Cactus meeting”, a type of meeting that
had already been done before 2020 in our company, had started with our Ameri-
can team, and was then adopted by different teams throughout the company. This
team meeting with a funny name was created in order to generate more team
cohesion. During this meeting, everyone takes one minute to share something
personal and something professional. It lets people get to know each other better,
discover things they have in common, and get advice if needed. When this was
introduced to our Asian team, it changed everything for the better. During these
Cactus meetings, we started to share anything and everything – something fun
we did during the week or weekend, the plans we had for the following week,
anything unpleasant that was going on, whatever we felt like, even pictures of
our pets. By adding this personal touch, we are now really a team and everyone
feels confident enough to reach out whenever they need clarification or help.
Overall, what do you identify as the main challenges of online communication?
The main challenge is to keep the human dimension at the core of the com-
munication and not forget that there is a person at the other end reading your
message, email, ticket, listening to you or seeing you through the camera. And
that that person also has feelings, which are probably very similar to yours, par-
ticularly during the pandemic. Another challenge, which is linked to this first
point, is to keep messages as polite and friendly as possible. With the ongoing
pandemic, this took on even greater importance. I have learnt to weigh my
words even more. These have been hard times for everyone, and I think we need
to keep that in mind, even professionally.
How do you see the future?
The future is still uncertain, but I am certain that online communication
is here to stay. However, I do think that we need human contact. During the
pandemic, my office in Paris has always remained open for those who want to go
work there (even during lockdown). But during the few times that I have been to
the office, I feel I cannot concentrate. I want to talk to people around me and I
get distracted very easily! I do think that if and when the time comes to go back
more permanently, it will be an interesting process to readapt to work back at the
office. I think that companies are learning that for many positions, people can
work from any place and that they can even cut down on most operational costs,
such as big offices and the utilities that come with them, business trips and meet-
ings and so on. At the same time, I am afraid that this will also lead to the growth
of the gig economy and bad working conditions, particularly if companies also
start turning long-term contracts into short-term and freelancing contracts.
Perrine Rozec, CSR Manager, French Chamber of Commerce and

Industry (CCIFV), Vietnam
How did the pandemic affect the division of labour for you between FTF communication
and online communication?
Before the pandemic, 90% of communication with colleagues was FTF; the
remaining 10% concerned communication with members of our team who were
located in another city so that was done virtually. With clients and partners,
communication was 100% FTF. With the pandemic, we started to communicate
more by instant messaging, phone and emails. Video conferencing was also a
new format we used for the events we organised (conferences, networking, etc.).
Working in South-East Asia, did you notice any cultural differences?
In Vietnam, everything happens on Facebook, personally and professionally.
It is a tool we use regularly, so it is not a problem to be on it at work. The for-
mat is flexible and you can contact companies outside traditional office hours or
during weekends or holidays – and get an answer! It is not perceived as a stressful
or an aggressive form of communication. This use of Facebook can be explained
by the fact that professional and personal lives are not as separated in South East
Asia as in Europe, or at least not like they are, for instance, in France. This makes
for an up-beat pace: things happen more quickly and this usually benefits your
business. For me, the challenge is in France, where communication seems slow.
When communication moves at a slow pace and when there are too many in-
tervals, this affects the amount of time it takes to build up trustworthy business
partnerships.
How do you see communication in the future?
Post-pandemic, I hope online communication will be considered an integral
part of work. Like any other type of format, it has its advantages and disadvan-
tages, but I think it is up to the user to create his or her own balance between
online and in-person communication. This balance depends on many different
factors, such as corporate culture (for example, the hierarchy, the size of the
company), generation gaps and the specific sector. I see a bright future for online
communication as it allows us to connect easily with people abroad and, hence,
save resources, travel time, energy and so on. But I also think that in-person
communication will remain very important: virtual communication cannot al-
low you to build up the same level of trust with customers as that obtained at a
meeting or a professional lunch for example. I believe it is not about one commu-
nication method replacing another, each complements the other.
Océane Juste, Marketing Programme Coordinator,

PrestaShop, France
How has the pandemic changed your communication on the job?

Instant messaging platforms such as Slack and videoconferencing platforms
such as Zoom have become essential, be it to communicate with clients, external
contractors, or colleagues. Previously, videoconferencing had been used almost
exclusively for exchanges with people who were geographically far away (espe-
cially in an international context). With the pandemic, heads of companies have
realised that we can manage and engage in projects very successfully from home,
notably by using these videoconferencing tools, which have an advantage over
telephone conversations, because we can see colleagues without physically being
in the same place. In addition, in my company, asynchronous communication
(email, Slack, etc.) is now preferred to synchronous communication (real-time
communication, such as the telephone, or FTF meetings). The fact that I do not
have to respond immediately to all requests means that I am less stressed at work
and can organise my time better.
Have you encountered any problems internationally?
As part of my job, I organise events all over the world. I have encountered
some difficulties in organising webinars and motivating potential speakers in
some parts of Africa, where Internet access is limited. For this reason, the webi-
nar format has not been exported so well to this continent.
What specific challenges would you identify in regard to online communication?
Some people have difficulty expressing themselves in writing: they may lack
clarity or forget certain polite phrases when trying to write a message quickly.
Similarly, it is more difficult to interpret things like the intonation and the body
language of colleagues in a videoconference meeting compared to a FTF con-
text. So, I believe online communication can lead to more misunderstandings
than offline communication.
Another point is more general and concerns how business actually gets done.
As part of my job, I am in charge of animating and federating communities,
including an e-traders’ club. I organise monthly meetings for these e-traders.
These have been held exclusively online since March 2020. However, we were
lucky enough to be able to organise a large FTF event (+600 people) in October
2021. I had the opportunity to meet some of the Club members on site and I had
lunch with about ten of them. This informal moment allowed the Club members
to network and do business together, which would have been difficult to do in
the setting of a webinar, where the participants cannot exchange ideas as freely,
where there are no informal moments, the fear of speaking up, or sometimes an
unwillingness to show one’s face and, therefore, turn off the webcam.
Leticia Correa do Carmo, Communications Officer,

Commerce equitable France
Before the pandemic, how would you evaluate the percentages of FTF and online commu-
nication you had with your work colleagues?
About 70% of communication with colleagues was FTF and 30% online,
mostly in the form of emails which guaranteed a written trace of our exchanges
about different missions or projects.
What were the main types of problems you encountered with the onset of the pandemic?
I work for a non-profit association. In 2020, we were able to keep up our
activities despite working remotely. But this was not without difficulties. Our IT
equipment at that time was mainly composed of fixed computers. The pandemic
forced us to invest in laptops to make us more agile and flexible. But there are still
a lot of questions about responsible and agile IT that need attention, particularly
for a non-profit without a big budget like ours. I have noted great inequalities in
terms of the quality of the computer equipment or the Internet network, which
has become absolutely essential to support the constant exchange of live video
and audio streams. Employees are also unequal in their knowledge and mastery
of computer tools. This can lead to frustration on both sides (for those who have
mastered the tool and are losing patience and for those who are less at ease and
cannot use it). These inequalities often result in a significant loss of time and,
therefore, a loss of efficiency on a project or a meeting for example.
As communications officer, one of your roles is to organise events and training sessions.
Could you describe the sector of online events before 2020?
Before 2020, we had started to develop webinar formats for training purposes.
We had tested a product from the company LogMeIn, which was equivalent
to Zoom, but which seemed a little more secure at the time (back then, Zoom
had a security flaw because of the “connect with Facebook” option, which was
later removed). At that point in time, interest in webinar formats was starting to
develop, for both short training sessions of one or two hours in length for profes-
sionals who cannot always travel and also for volunteers in our network whom
we accompany. In 2019, we organised two training sessions in the lead-up to our
main annual event, one in person, which brought together around 50 partici-
pants, and a complimentary training session in a webinar format, which brought
together around 30 participants.
In the sector of event management, what was the effect of moving everything online during
the pandemic and how do you see the future?
Our main event every year is the “Fair Trade Fortnight”. Generally, it is a
15-day event, similar to the European Week for Sustainable Development, when
networks of volunteers, shops, companies and local authorities organise differ-
ent events and activities in various places, such as markets, shops, town halls or
schools, in order to raise awareness about responsible consumption and fair trade
in economic exchanges. The pandemic forced us to completely rethink this im-
portant moment of the year. The advantage of moving all our activities online
was that we almost tripled the number of participants in our training sessions
before the Fair Trade Fortnight: going digital has allowed us to reach out to all
the people who are interested but who cannot necessarily travel.
Now that holding some in-person events has become possible again, we have
had to find a compromise between the desire to meet in person again, and the
need to allow people who are fragile and most vulnerable to the virus to still
attend an event. This has forced us to develop the hybrid format. It is not an easy
format to organise and it requires a lot of skills. But it is a format that is really
taking off, and the sound, image and event technicians are expanding their skills
in audio and video recording, interactive platforms and duplex retransmission,
which come after the first technical layer of physical management of the event
(such as a microphone, slide presentations) – and this is only at the technical
level, without forgetting the traditional logistics of event management, such as
welcoming the participants. As far as events are concerned, there is currently a
consensus that we can no longer really do without a minimum hybrid option.
PART III
COVID-19 and representations
of the workplace
11
REMOTE WORK AND THE
CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE
The example of student internships in the
context of France
Danièle Linhart
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic led to the rapid spread of remote work around the
world. This chapter focuses on the question of student internships. It reports
on the results of a survey carried out with interns during the pandemic. The
students, who had undertaken an internship to complete a two-year master’s
programme in intercultural and international management,1 were asked to keep
a logbook for the duration of their six-month work experience as well as fill in
a questionnaire. The internships took place during the second main lockdown
period, from January to June 2021. For the majority of the interns, this resulted
in remote-working conditions, either full-time or part-time. The internship sur-
veys provide insights into the experience of remote work for interns. They are
also analysed in relation to the specific features of French management and the
attitudes of French people towards work, which are, thus, both confirmed and
enlightened.
The survey covers 35 students, some of whom are not French. They are
mainly specialised in marketing and communication. It should be noted that
the overwhelming majority of these trainees are women. All of them responded
seriously and efficiently to the request made by their teachers to write a logbook.
Although the format was short, most of them made a real effort of introspection
in order to identify and relate their impressions and experience during the rather
unusual time when they were supposed to share the life of professionals in a
company, assume tasks and functions that they were just discovering, and all the
while work for the most part from home.
Their testimonies reflect an effort to be honest and authentic, and this ex-
plains why some of their statements may appear contradictory or ambivalent. It is
important to underline that when they began their internships, which lasted six
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-15
174 Danièle Linhart
months, some of them abroad (for instance, in China, Italy, Belgium or Spain),
they hoped to develop the skills linked to their education programme, learn ap-
propriate professional behaviour, develop interpersonal skills, nurture networks
and, for many of them, be permanently recruited by the company at the end of
their internship. This was, therefore, a crucial period for them and a major factor
that would determine their success would be the degree to which they became
integrated within the company. In their logbooks, the student interns are ex-
tremely aware of the rather extraordinary conditions in which their internships
are taking place, and they ask themselves many questions. Almost all of them
consider that they did get the benefits of a “real” internship despite the fact that
they spent a lot of their time working remotely. Most of the interns consider that
they successfully became a part of the company and that they learnt a lot.
Interns in times of a pandemic

A first distinction can be drawn between aspects of remote work that were gen-
erally felt to be advantageous and those that proved a drawback. Depending on
the intern, remote work was either conducted on a part-time or a full-time basis.
However, even for interns who only worked partially from home and were able
to go into the office sometimes, this did not mean that they were in a position to
meet all their colleagues because the other colleagues were not necessarily in the
office during the same periods. In other cases, some interns switched during the
course of their internship from face-to-face work to remote work, or from part-
time to full-time remote work, and then back to face-to-face work. The interns
clearly identify the negative and positive aspects of both formats.
The advantages of remote work

The main advantages of remote work noted by the interns included:
– the time saved from not needing to commute to work, or time saved from
not needing to get dressed in a presentable manner, which meant more time
for sleep or more time for getting on with work;
– the possibility to manage their time, take more time over their work and
spend more time on assignments;
– the ease with which they were able to concentrate at home, whereas at work
there is noise and there are colleagues coming and going;
– a less stressful atmosphere, thanks to less contact with unpleasant manage-
ment or colleagues who could be disturbing or “spy” on them in open-plan
work spaces;
– the feeling of greater freedom, of being able to work wherever they want,
of more independence, in a context where interns cannot ask as many ques-
tions, and so, they rely on their own skills, which they are, therefore, able to
develop faster;
Remote work and the contemporary workplace 175
– greater self-confidence – because the interns cannot rely on others (such as

the tutor, the hierarchical superior or other colleagues) to help them (it is
much less easy to obtain information and advice when more formal means
of communication, such as the telephone or e-mail, replace face-to-face
communication);
– the possibility provided by videoconferencing to attend more meetings than
would have been possible in normal circumstances – this allowed the interns
to be better informed about their work, department and the company.
The disadvantages of remote work

Conversely, the disadvantages of remote work that were highlighted by the in-
terns included:
– lack of the benefits of the face-to-face setting, where they learn better, can
ask as many questions as they would like, can avoid misunderstandings and
obtain advice;
– lack of motivation compared to face-to-face work when they are “at the
centre of the action” and at the heart of the company’s culture;
– lack of accountability and feedback, which are reassuring and allow the work
to be supervised when necessary;
– less sociability, a need that can only be satisfied in person (interaction with
colleagues nurtures friendships and brings a lighter dimension to the work-
place, with shared lunch breaks among the best moments, whereas at home,
they can feel “alone and abandoned”;
– the difficulty of being able to disconnect and switch off from work when at
home (reconciling private and professional life is much more complex dur-
ing remote work compared to face-to-face work);
– the fatigue of sitting in front of a computer screen all day, which can be
“mind-numbing”.
Widely shared ambivalent attitudes

Even if all the interns appreciated, for instance, the possibility of limiting
commuting time, almost all the logbooks reflected fundamentally ambivalent
attitudes that combined positive and negative feelings towards remote work.
Indeed, ambivalence is probably what best characterises the interns’ attitudes
towards remote work. This echoes the ambivalence that, more generally, is typ-
ical of the way that employees consider their work.2 Most people seek meaning
and self-fulfilment through work, as well as social contact; they cannot do
without their jobs, but, at the same time, they feel the tyrannical hegemony
attached to them. Because of the way it is imposed in our society, work creates
a “take-it-or-leave-it” situation. While people cannot do without it – and you
cannot do without it in a society which was conceived, shaped and organised
by and for work – people have to put up with fatigue, stress, lack of time, con-
straints and controls.
The logbooks of the interns shed light on this ambivalence in regard to remote
work. Some cannot decide whether, all things considered, it is more positive or
more negative for them. For example, one intern writes:
When I’m alone in my room, it’s difficult to stay focused, and I don’t really
want to work. It really helps if I have a colleague near me. I can ask for
advice directly. It’s hard to get up in the morning to go to work and find
myself all alone. I’m less motivated because I’m all alone, every day, in front
of my computer, without being able to take a break with other colleagues
and get some fresh air. […] The advantage of being at home is when I don’t
feel well, I don’t have to put on a good face. Remote work allows people
to manage their time, without having a specific work routine imposed on
them that might not suit them. You don’t have to go to the office every day
if it’s not efficient and takes up time and energy. I’m learning to organise
myself, to communicate clearly and effectively.
Similarly, according to another intern:
Remote work is not so bad because I don’t like the boss, who is conde-
scending, who asks me to do things that don’t make sense, and doesn’t give
me any feedback. I’m quite happy to stay at home and not see my boss.[…]
I need to be supervised, it reassures me. When I work remotely, my days
are all the same, the internship weighs on me, I’m asked to do things that
don’t make sense.
And, here are two further examples which reflect a similar ambivalence:
Remote work is really good, I sleep more and I don’t have a daily commute
of one hour and a half. It has enabled me to improve my skills faster, to be
autonomous, and the videoconferences still allow for contact. […] It’s dif-
ficult to disconnect in the evening. It’s good to communicate in real life. I
love going to the office, it’s great to see colleagues; we disconnect on time
so that we don’t get home too late, these are great days.
Remote work gives me a bit more freedom and autonomy. I organise
myself at the beginning of the week for all the tasks I have to do. I’m in
a start-up which has no offices but puts a rented flat at our disposal. I was
afraid of the virus but I didn’t dare to tell my tutor because I didn’t feel
comfortable. I felt inferior, and I didn’t dare contradict my tutor who asked
me to take off the mask when I spoke to clients on the phone. I couldn’t tell
my tutor about my fear. I was reluctant to go face-to-face. […] But I started
to feel a bit more tired than usual, I can’t explain how this tiredness started
– being locked up at home most of the time and being on my computer all
day, my body was tired. But I’m glad I’m not face-to-face. […] I miss the
human side, the real colleagues and talking to people other than in front of
a screen, and seeing other things that are outside my flat.
These ambivalent attitudes provide arguments in favour of a hybrid work

model, whereby work time would be organised so that it includes the possi-
bility of remote work but allows for a certain balance. Many interns argue for
such a model.
There are, however, other interns who, despite expressing conflicting opin-
ions, do identify a preference for either remote work or face-to-face work. Such
a preference can be explained in light of the personality of the intern. Indeed, the
interns themselves highlight certain personality traits to justify their preference.
For instance, the logbook of one young woman, which combines differing opin-
ions, includes quite a positive general assessment of remote work:
Remote work is very good because you can get some rest. I have a daily
three-hour commute and at home it’s quieter and there are no disturbing
colleagues. But you need a balance, a real link with colleagues to fully
feel part of things. I ask myself a lot of questions. I feel uneasy, I’m afraid
of being judged by my colleagues, so I was better able to work remotely
because I wasn’t physically with them. But I do also need interaction, to be
face-to-face, and not stay locked up at home.
The following intern also has a very positive view:
Remote work gives me a real sense of freedom. I am a very discreet person,

and am by nature quite independent. I really appreciate working remotely;
it’s a calm environment compared to the open space. My stress level goes
down when I work at home. I feel anxious every time someone mentions
the idea of returning to the office. I’m always a little apprehensive. Some-
times I get a little frustrated that I can’t bond with my colleagues. I feel
like they are close friends outside the office. However, I wouldn’t say I miss
this aspect because I like working at home. I don’t like speaking in front of
others, so working remotely allows me to express myself more confidently.
I am very independent, I enjoy my assignments, but I feel that my work is
meaningless because I have almost no feedback. One of the most annoying
things about remote working is not knowing if your colleagues really like
you. I like remote work because I don’t feel spied on. The company hasn’t
installed software on my computer to track my activity throughout the day.
I work faster at home because I am more focused. I now know that this
way of working suits me perfectly. As an introvert, I am very happy to have
been able to do my internship remotely.
In contrast, the outcome can be rather negative for other interns:
Unconsciously, because I am working remotely, I don’t have a fixed time to

finish and “go home”. I find it hard to stop. I am a perfectionist, and I take
more time to do my assignments because I can work at any time. So I work
until 8pm, whereas in the office I leave at 6.30pm [this intern has a daily
three-hour commute.] But what I miss the most is the contact, the social
interaction, and then my body gives out on me. I have less break time. The
best moments are the moments on site, face-to-face.
These attitudes towards remote work indirectly convey judgements about work
in general. Indeed, for some, to be autonomous and have a feeling of freedom, it
is better to be far from the workplace and far from their direct hierarchy. When
one intern declares herself to be rather independently minded, she believes she
should stay where she is most in her element – that is, at home, where she is able
to organise herself, even if colleagues are missing. Criticism of the workplace
can be identified in the sacrifice that these interns are prepared to make: they
are prepared to give up sociability, which they consider important, in order to
gain autonomy and freedom. For others, the most important thing about work
is to be part of the company with their colleagues, to feel part of a professional
community from whom they can learn, and with whom they wish to cooperate,
in order to increase their skills and acquire the professional autonomy that they
are seeking.
The ambivalence which is at the heart of their attitudes to remote work, and
to work in general, is both confirmed and enlightened by a number of distinctive
features which characterise the French workplace, at least for those interns who
are French, whether their internship takes place in France or abroad.
Distinctive features of the French workplace

Remote work became compulsory in France as of the beginning of the pan-
demic. At least for the fields in which it was technically possible, it was imposed
by the Ministry of Labour for health reasons and immediately applied to several
million people (about 40% of workers). Before the pandemic, France was one of
the countries in which this type of work was the least widespread (it had only
concerned up until then about 8% of workers) despite the demands of trade un-
ions who had relayed the requests of certain employees aspiring to work remotely
one or two days per week.
After the first two-month lock-down period from mid-March to mid-May
2020, surveys reflected a high level of satisfaction in regard to remote work.
Management reported that the new form of work did not have a negative impact
on productivity or the quality of the work. Despite rather difficult conditions,
such as the presence of children who had to be taught and fed several times a
day, and despite the impossibility for remote workers to benefit from a change of
scene or means of unwinding, the work objectives were achieved and the high
level of commitment to work was recognised by many managers. Some manag-
ers even became quite excited and seemed determined to make this form of work
permanent for many of their employees, which could lead to significant savings
in terms of office rentals and local supervision. For most company managers, it
was a pleasant surprise to discover that remote work was, indeed, feasible.
As for the employees who had the opportunity to work remotely, they re-
sponded positively to surveys and polls of various kinds. In spite of the problems
mentioned, to which can be added those linked to housing that is more or less
adapted to remote work, the employees expressed real satisfaction. They did not
complain about having to stay at home for the duration of their work, and they
said so. They were happy not to have to take public transport, and not to have to
work face to face at the office, which would have put them at a certain amount of
risk or potential exposure to the virus (at the time, there were no masks or pro-
tective hand gels). Some of them also felt happy to escape from open office spaces
where they did not always have allocated desks, where they did not feel at home,
where they were disturbed by the noise, the smells, the eyes of the hierarchy on
them, and, sometimes, also the eyes of colleagues. They took comfort from the
fact that they could work in an environment that was familiar to them and bene-
fitted from a certain degree of independence in managing their schedules. Some
of them were inclined to “knuckle down” to their work in order to demonstrate
that this form of work could constitute a real alternative. It can also be hypothe-
sised that work also provided a means of escape from difficult times and avoided
too much thinking about an invisible virus that was lurking and threatening their
lives. It can also be assumed that they wanted to show their gratitude to their
management, who expressed trust in their employees via skilfully engineered
communication.
However, things seemed to change during the second lockdown period
(which began in France in November 2020). Management no longer displayed
the same enthusiasm, and some employees became weary of the obligation to
work remotely.
Such an evolution over just a few months illustrates the complexity of what is
involved in remote work as a work practice as well as the conflicting feelings it
arouses from the point of view of both employers and remote workers.
The employer and the weight of mistrust

The conviction persists that workers must be kept under control and that it is
risky to let go of the reins. This conviction is more strongly held by French
employers than their foreign counterparts. This is because the recent history of
France has been strongly marked, in terms of class struggles, by a major confron-
tation between the working class and employers, of which the three-week gen-
eral strike and factory occupations which took place in May 1968 remain iconic.
Moreover, as the sociologist Philippe d’Iribarne (1988) has analysed, in France,
the relationship to work is characterised more strongly than elsewhere by a “logic

of honour”. According to this logic, each worker tends to put his or her honour
on the line in their work and is not satisfied by simply abiding by the terms of the
work contract. This has led to a predisposition to want to work according to the
“rules of the trade”, the “rules of the art” and according to professional and civic
values, rather than working according to the rules and regulations decided upon by
management. For French managers, it is imperative to find ways to make the rela-
tionship of subordination perceptible within wage negotiations – that is, to estab-
lish a real hold on employees so that they renounce their own values and interests
and comply strictly with the working methods which have been decided for them.
Managers seek to implement this control via various strategies. First, there are
organisational choices which structure constraint and control: work is regulated
by a framework of requirements, procedures, codifications, protocols, methodol-
ogies, processes and reporting. These are not only in accordance with Taylorian
prescription but also take advantage of new technologies. In addition, specific
methods mobilise employees and make them vulnerable via the systematisation
of individualisation, personalisation and the psychologisation of the relationship
between each person and his or her work (for example, objectives and evalua-
tions are personalised) and the generalisation of open office spaces and systematic
competition.
This new model is accompanied by measures devised by Human Resource
Managers (HRM) specialised in happiness and well-being, the “chief happiness
officers”, whose role is to “seduce” employees and obtain their consent by creat-
ing a pleasant environment in which various services are provided, ranging from
domestic services (concierge services) to health (yoga, meditation, dietary ad-
vice), recreational (table football rooms, video games, ping pong, team-building
weekends, festive evenings) and gourmet services (free sweets and drinks).
The model also draws on the practice of perpetual change (exemplified by
the company France Télécom, as demonstrated by the lawsuit brought against
their managers between May 6 and July 11, 2019 (Beynel 2020)), which makes
the knowledge and individual and collective experience of employees obsolete,
plunging them into a real dependence on their hierarchy, who, thus, has less
difficulty in imposing standardised working norms. Such a quest for continual
change, which is amplified by the general acceleration that characterises our
contemporary societies, has the effects of devaluing the skills and professionalism
of employees, placing them in a distressing situation and limiting their ability to
assert themselves in defining their work. Since Taylor, management has always
considered that knowledge is a source of power and that power should be confis-
cated so that it remains the exclusive property of management. Helped by experts
and consultants, management can, thus, unilaterally decide on the most efficient
and profitable work criteria. The practice of systematic change is, therefore, a
managerial resource which reinforces the control over employees and turns them
into lifelong apprentices as they have to keep learning everything over and over
again in order to cognitively master their activities.
Under these conditions, it is understandable that remote work poses a problem

when it removes the employee from the influence of the corporate workplace.
It is true that digital technology can effectively relay organisational constraint
and control via software that transmits the imposed procedures, protocols and
work methodologies and that it makes it possible to monitor the behaviour of
remote workers. But to what extent may remote workers seek to circumvent this
framework, simulate and conceal their behaviour or introduce biases so that they
can put their own stamp on their work, and, at the same time, relieve pressure?
And to what extent may they be tempted to pretend, to do as little as possible
or to do exactly as they like, given that the real and shared dimension of work
tends to disappear when workers are continuously confronted with the computer
screen, in the familiar spaces of their domestic, private lives? Management is not
convinced that the permanent dispersal of employees outside the company in
places that escape the culture and the atmosphere of the company, as well as the
hierarchy and colleagues, can make it possible to control the conformity of the
commitment of employees to the work that is configured by management.
For these reasons, before the pandemic, French employers were initially more
reticent than their foreign counterparts in regard to the spread of remote work.
However, as mentioned above, they have discovered the “virtues” of such a work
practice. In the majority of cases, remote workers have internalised the norms
and requirements and want to give full satisfaction to their hierarchy and man-
agement. Why not take advantage of such an experience by rethinking the spatial
strategies that can bring people into working mode? The temptation to transform
employees into remote workers is all the more tempting as it responds to a real
request on their part and can be gauged as a sign of confidence in employees as
well as a step towards their well-being. It is no longer a question of trying to
make the employee feel at home in the company, but of making him/her feel
part of the company when at home. This is all the more tempting for employers
because remote work, which leads to atomisation, makes it more complicated
for collective trade unions to carry out their actions which are often a source of
conflict and problems for management.
The employees need to take a step back

What accounts for some of the aforementioned behaviour of remote workers?
Beyond the anxiety-provoking circumstances linked to the pandemic itself (for
instance, working at home is safer and more reassuring), some remote work-
ers have appreciated the opportunity to take a step back from their company,
colleagues and hierarchy. Managerial modernisation has, indeed, broken down
the solidarity-based collective bodies which had, in the past, provided a con-
text for strong sociability, shared values and the feeling of common goals and a
common destiny. It is now everyone for themselves – everyone is searching for
symbolic and financial recognition, and for professional and personal success.
The hierarchy is not a resource that can be counted on in the event of a problem
but is instead a source of pressure and sanction, and colleagues are unsupportive
competitors. All of this weighs heavily and creates a feeling of vulnerability and
subjective insecurity (Linhart 2015), especially as work is determined by proce-
dures, protocols and methodologies imposed and designed by specialists, experts
and consultants who are far from the concrete realities of the field and the specific
professions. This is because work is constantly controlled and evaluated accord-
ing to the logic of “more and more”. This includes tertiary work and the work of
managers and engineers at the highest level (Linhart 2021).
This situation is particularly perilous and confronting for employees: they
have to mobilise themselves cognitively and emotionally and are expected to
demonstrate their personal qualities and commit themselves fully in order to
make the restrictive working methods that are unilaterally imposed on them
effectively. Work is, thus, increasingly experienced as a solitary ordeal and not
as the socialising activity it was once intended to be. So for some, staying at
home alone in front of the computer screen appears consistent with what work
has become. Remote work, therefore, allows them to introduce a relative
freedom in terms of their schedule, reduce the fatigue created by commuting
and feel at home at work. But let there be no mistake: this is a form of escape
that reflects a painful relationship with work, whereby the feeling of being
able to fulfil oneself by contributing to producing something useful and sat-
isfying for others (the recipient) is replaced by that of a loss of meaning and
social purpose.
Ambivalence, once again

For employees, taking such a step back creates the risk that their relationship
with work will deteriorate even further. This relationship is already fragile be-
cause of the fact that technical and material conditions are currently aggravating
the constraining, abstract and arbitrary dimension of work. When workers are
alone in front of their computer screens, the quality of commitment becomes
even more problematic, and there is the risk of losing meaning and developing
a feeling of derealisation, fiction and emptiness. For whom, for what, and with
whom do we work? And who is doing the work – the computer? the software?
invisible people?
The problem is that the “real world” is missing. Loneliness is becoming a far
more frequent feeling. While other colleagues may not necessarily be likeable,
represent potential competition, and are motivated by their own ego, they are
still real people, real people who come from different backgrounds, experience
different problems, and with whom it can, therefore, prove interesting to mingle.
In our society, in order that people feel that they exist socially, they have to be
literally “taken out of themselves” and able to get out of their house and partic-
ipate, for instance, in exchanges, encounters and confrontations with problems
that are not limited to those of the domestic, family and emotional spheres of
their own lives.
A number of managers have noted that in the absence of exchanges and emu-
lation within groups, the inventiveness and reactivity of employees and the qual-
ity of their commitment to their work suffer. While atomisation and remoteness
may be reassuring and offer savings in office rentals and local hierarchy, they
present the risk of having a negative impact on the quality of the work.
There is, therefore, a certain amount of ambivalence and tension for all of the
protagonist roles which make up the contemporary workplace. For employers,
there is always the latent fear of letting go and seeing employees do as they please
and at their own pace, and the fear that employees will lose their inventiveness
and the capacity for innovation. At the same time, employers are tempted to save
money on office space and supervising staff and feel satisfaction at the idea that
remote workers could be self-motivated at home. For employees, a sense of satis-
faction is derived from being able to take a step back from the work environment
and from activities which can be frustrating and a source of ethical conflict. And
at the same time employees are taking a headlong jump into a new dimension,
one where work is de-socialising and leads them to withdraw into themselves,
loose a sense of meaning and develop a lower capacity to collectively question the
rules of the game that have been imposed.
Hence, the “quite natural” idea of the generalisation of a hybrid spatial organ-
isation, based on remote work on a part-time basis, for instance, the possibility of
one, two or even three days per week of remote work, the terms of which are to
be negotiated with the organisations that represent employees. This may well an-
swer a real need on the part of employees. However, such hybridisation is already
accompanied by a change that is not without consequences for the employee’s
relationship with work and the company. Indeed, some departments have already
undertaken the transformation of their open spaces into flex offices. This means
that there are fewer offices than there are employees and that, in order to obtain
a place, an employee has to reserve it by e-mail the day before, in the same way
as one would book a ticket for a train journey. This considerably transforms the
rules of the game in a way that risks making employees feel that they do not have
a real place in the company, are no longer “at home” in the company and are no
longer comfortable or part of a professional group that has meaning for them. If
everything is done to ensure that, as mentioned above, remote workers feel part
of the company when they are working at home, this could well lead to them
no longer feeling at home in their company, and instead of feeling like collabo-
rators who occasionally drop by the office, and have little in common with their
colleagues.
Conclusion: returning to the experience of the interns

Interns have very specific needs which distinguish them from the employees
working in the company. Interns seek to discover the environment of the com-
pany (colleagues, tutors, hierarchy, management) which should enable them to
develop their skills while testing their professional choices. From this point of
view, remote work could be considered a major obstacle to the success of such
placements. A few rare exceptions aside, all the interns considered that they car-
ried out a real internship, that they did not regret having completed it during
the period of the pandemic when some were practically working from home all
the time, or at least a good part of the time. Some interns even thought that they
were able to benefit because they were more autonomous, developed a sense of
organisation, carried out their missions more efficiently and progressed more
quickly. This does not prevent them from regretting the lack of contact with
colleagues and tutors from a professional point of view, or the lack of sociability
from a social point of view.
As mentioned above, some interns who participated in the survey were critical
in regard to the organisation of work and the ways in which employees are mobi-
lised: for them, in order to be able to organise themselves at work and to develop
their skills, it is better to be far from the pressures, control and atmosphere of the
company. This is expressed in a more roundabout way by other interns who said
that they do not have the personality that corresponds to the requirements of the
accepted model – that they are, for instance, too independent, or too discreet, or
have too great a need for freedom, or too great a fear of being judged and feeling
inferior. In fact, the interns identify quite acutely the harmful effects of actions
by management who, due to a lack of trust, seek to pressure, coerce, control and
evaluate their employees.
In contrast, the interns do feel from the outset a lack of sociability and are
looking for contact with colleagues. But it should be remembered that they are
not, and have never been in the past, in competition with colleagues, whereas
this is not the case for the employees of the company.
Notes
1 The students were enrolled in a master’s program at the University of Paris Nanterre,
France.
2 The term “employee” is used here in contrast to that of “intern”.
References
Beynel, Eric, ed. 2020. La raison des plus forts; chronique du Procès France Télécom. Paris: Les
Editions de l’Atelier.
d’Iribarne, Philippe. 1988. La logique de l’honneur. Gestion des entreprises et traditions nation-
ales. Paris: Le Seuil.
Linhart, Danièle. 2015. La comédie humaine du travail. De la déshumanisation taylorienne à la
surhumanisation managériale. Toulouse: Erès.
Linhart, Danièle. 2021. L’insoutenable subordination des salariés. Toulouse: Erès.
12
COVID-19 AND THE CULTURE
OF PROFESSIONS
Issues and tensions in the group of health
professionals
Sylvie Parrini-Alemanno
Introduction
Since 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic (approximately 5.3 million deaths world-
wide up until November 2021),1 like the Spanish flu before it (40–50 million
deaths worldwide from February 1918 to April 1920),2 has been spreading. The
health of all has been put to the test, and the resulting health crisis has brought to
the fore the role of healthcare workers, the only experts trying, if not stopping it,
at least treating it. These health workers are doctors and paramedics who are em-
ployed in healthcare institutions. It should be noted that in such a crisis situation,
the organisation of care, the human and material resources, and the cohesion
of these professionals are decisive and can even prove a matter of life or death –
unfortunately, this expression is not being used allegorically. And yet, if we take
the example of France, these hospital professionals, who have complained in
recent years about the decrease in their material conditions of work and their low
pay, have not hesitated to brave the pandemic by placing themselves as closely as
possible to its source – that is, the intensive care units. The media coverage of
their daily life in public and private hospitals in France has had surprising effects
on the population. And so when a vaccine was found in record time, why then
did some of these professionals refuse to be vaccinated, without expressing any
medical justification, braving radical sanctions and, in some cases, abandoning
their profession as caregivers?
In this chapter, we focus on the sector of the medical profession who have
been in the front line of the COVID-19 pandemic in the sociological sense of
“group of professionals”. We approach this group from the point of view of the
notions of the professional group and “culture of professions” and put forward
the hypothesis of a strong culture specific to hospital carers which has a strong
impact on their identity and, therefore, behaviour. The culture of the medical
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-16
186 Sylvie Parrini-Alemanno
profession is symbolically forged by an oath and the imagined “milieu” of the

hospital and is identified by an activity and values which are closely associated
with the exposure to health risks, whatever the working conditions. This study
combines a communicative approach to social representations in the media with
a sociological approach to professional groups. It aims to elucidate how the pan-
demic has reshaped, reinforced and/or weakened this supposedly specific culture
of the medical profession – from the first periods of confinement to the periods
of the sanitary pass and vaccination, the latter have been particularly divisive,
creating new tensions between personal and professional culture. It is posited
that a conflict of levels of personal and professional social norms, whose hierarchy
is notably recomposed in a more or less rational way in a crisis situation, could
provide a heuristic in order to understand the internal dynamics of a professional
group in an environment with a vocational culture (Alemanno 2015).
Epistemologically, we base our reflection on an approach adopted in the in-
formation and communication sciences that draws from the sociology of profes-
sional groups as well as psycho-sociology. It is possible to consider that the norms
that govern social groups are neither fixed nor definitive and that the notion
of “prudence” constitutes a hermeneutic of deliberation. Chronologically, this
study extends from the first period of praise that was hypermediatised and dram-
atised in the theatrical sense of the word, to the period of vital, on-the-spot work
in the face of the impossibility of teleworking during subsequent lockdowns, to
the period of contradictions and division due to the vaccination policy and the
obligation in France for health personnel to be vaccinated.
This chapter, which reports on ongoing research, adopts a comprehensive
approach based on the “interpretive or participatory” examination of social phe-
nomena, and draws on the analysis of two types of verbatim – those that appeared
in the media and those resulting from interviews carried out with healthcare
workers working in a French hospital. This analysis, which has been manual to
date, is reinforced by an automated semantic analysis, the results of which cannot
be indicated here. A contextual analysis, as well as an evaluation of the effects
on the environment, is also in progress. However, it is thought that some of the
results are sufficiently relevant and allow us to start thinking about the relation-
ship between the COVID-19 pandemic context and its effects on hospital care
professionals.
Some epistemological foundations for a reflection on a specific

professional group
As outlined above, the sociology of professions and professional groups is inte-
grated here within the framework of information and communication sciences,
with the aim to understand the situation of care workers who have been working
in hospitals during the period of COVID-19. The focus is on extreme profes-
sional behaviours which have proven decisive in the context of a pandemic. The
information and communication sciences approach allows us to examine the
COVID-19 and the culture of professions 187
movements of these care workers and the considerations of the population and
the public authorities towards them. Sociological indications enlighten us on the
social and cultural representations that organise this professional group of medi-
cal professionals, its divisions and also its collective strengths.
Chapoulie (1973) warned that traditional models of analysis of occupational
groups had to be questioned insofar as these groups are in constant flux and crisis.
As a result, a functionalist theory of occupations, rooted in the flexible function-
alism of Parsons and Merton, emerged from a critique of previous structural-
functionalist theories (Durkheim, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown). These
theories recognised the contribution of group behaviour to social functioning.
Following Radcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard built a comprehensive anthropo-
logical (and non-explanatory) approach to social behaviours that are organised
according to global and complementary logics, which are both rational and mag-
ical. The notion of “function” that is central to these theories leads to the notion
of “professional groups”, which also draws on a critical perspective and the trend
(epistemologically dominant in France) towards interactionism (Champy 2009).
Ultimately, the notion of the profession is called into questioned and re-
placed by that of “professional groups characterised by their ‘professional action’”
(Idem). After a virtuoso review of the state of the art concerning these two the-
oretical approaches of the notion of the profession (as socio-regulatory function
and as an interactionist dynamic of incessant renegotiations of statuses), Champy
(2009, 76) proposes a third approach: he proposes “characterising a particular
type of profession” both by their “prudential practice” and by the statutory legal
protection from which they benefit.
To clarify this notion of prudential practice, Champy refers to the work of au-
thors (notably Pierre Aubenque 1963) who analyse Aristotle’s notion of prudence,
phronesis (the right measure, prudence), which is antinomic to hubris (excess and
excessiveness). We shall retain here that prudence is a disposition to act in one’s
own interest as well as in the general interest and that the human being has the
possibility of modifying his/her environment by an action whose immediate
effects remain uncertain and whose long-term consequences are unpredictable.
Indeed, deciding and acting presuppose the acceptance of a partial mastery of
the situations that one experiences as an individual or as a group.
In an indeterminate future, politics is not a matter of science but of ‘timely

and effective knowledge’ in a given situation, ‘approximate knowledge’
(p. 113), which always involves the risk of failure. Hence the value of de-
liberation prior to decision-making.
(Granjon 1999,138, citing Aubenque 1993)
The term “political” here is taken in the sense of governance, organisation, and
the power to act and make people act, and it is not done alone but after formal
and informal deliberations. Aristotle evokes an “uncertain dialogue of deliber-
ating men” (Ibid.). As we can see, Champy, thus, makes the prudential practices
of the professions explicit; the practices stabilise the professions within the norm
and also give them a negotiating and deliberative potential. “At the most, pru-
dential knowledge allows for the reduction of the imponderables that threaten
any human attempt to remedy the earthly disorder” (Idem., 139). This expla-
nation of prudence interests us in that it could explain the actions of medical
personnel seen as particularly imprudent in times of COVID-19.
In fact, it is possible that we be faced with a kind of limited rationality that
is assumed in a situation of uncertainty such as that in which the pandemic has
placed health professionals. These reflections are based on the fact that we are
not talking here about prudent people but about a study of prudence. This latter
assertion must be taken into consideration in order to understand the prudential
practices of healthcare professionals in healthcare institutions.
The notion of professional group is not as simple and fixed as it seems. We
believe that the social representations (Galand and Salès-Wuillemin 2009) that
circulate within the group and those that are sent back to them from outside
the group, particularly through mediatised processes such as strikes, which are
frequent in France, contribute to the construction of a professional group. Its psy-
chosocial and legal delimitations also involve the work of social representations.
The theory of social representations (Moscovici 1961) associates and integrates
the systems of information and communication which diffuse figures, images,
and speeches in a recurring way. A case in point is that of propaganda, notably in
regard to the limits between the information that is given and the propaganda in
a situation of crisis. We will not discuss these modalities of information dissem-
ination because the debates on television and in the digital media were mainly
based on the speeches and announcements of the political leaders in France, in
association with the daily dissemination of the statistics of infections, hospital-
isations in intensive care, and deaths. During this pandemic, the audience, as
Moscovici (1961) had identified, was confused and not specific. Nevertheless, the
media contributed to constructing the representation of caregivers at the front
line of a war against the virus in order to save lives.
This multi-referencing that we propose creates a framework to understand
the construction of a professional reference group in a pandemic situation. This
framework emerges from the context of an unprecedented health crisis with pre-
cise characteristics in France, which we propose to describe after having outlined
our field of study.
In the field of a French healthcare institution: a comprehensive

approach to a population of caregivers
The institution under study here is a private hospital of multidisciplinary care
covering all medical, surgical, and obstetrical activities, follow-up care, and ex-
ploration, with a personnel of approximately one thousand.
We undertook a survey of 80 health workers, doctors, and nurses working
directly in the intensive care units or in connection with these units. More
than 78% of the respondents were women, aged between 22 and 64 years of
age. The average length of service in the institution is eight years. Most of the
female population have a family or at least one child, are active and committed
to their work, having chosen this profession, with a small percentage of the
nurses (7%) who would have preferred to become doctors. The institution is
located in a region of France where there was no overcrowding in the intensive
care units but where the French national-level emergency “white plan” was
implemented.
We submitted a post-COVID-19 questionnaire to our study population. This
questionnaire proposes three sections of closed questions. The first section con-
cerns an assessment of the population’s own decisions to intervene within the
institution and/or in other institutions in other regions of France that required
assistance during the first phase of the disease, that is, at the time when there
was a shortage of materials and personnel. The second section focuses on the
emergency “white plan” and its impact on patient care, and on representations
of illness and death in the institutions. This second section concerns the period
between 2020 and 2021, a mixed period of lockdowns and re-openings with
the arrival of various vaccines. The third section addresses the fifth wave of the
pandemic with its vaccination and re-vaccination periods, the health pass, the
vaccination pass, the management of the contradictions of healthcare personnel
who were not vaccinated and the impact on the cohesion of the group of caregiv-
ers.3 We also doubled the questionnaire with qualitative interviews in order to
collect statements from the same staff in our target population according to the
same three thematic sections.
A partial result of this questionnaire is that as soon as the pandemic was
announced and the first patients affected by it began to arrive in the institu-
tion, commitment was very strong. The lack of equipment aroused anger and
fuelled the current demands for upgrading but did not affect the motivation
to intervene. The few staff who resigned or were afraid were sidelined and
considered useless by their colleagues. The determination to “help” led some
to move to hospitals in other regions which lacked the speciality of anaesthe-
sia and intensive care. A local entrepreneur made his private plane available
to transport a team of volunteers from this facility. Respondents describe the
horror for the families who could not see the deceased patients before their
burial, the local funeral services which were overwhelmed, and their col-
leagues on site who were exhausted. On the whole, they do not regret their
commitment.
The deprogramming of operations for other pathologies seemed to them to be
useful, and even indispensable, but insufficiently targeted and territorialised in its
entirety. In the region of the respondents, the institution could have continued
their care activities despite the COVID-19 patients, who were isolated in dedi-
cated spaces which were protected from and for the exterior world.
During the interviews, these staff members distinguish between the general
care and the physical care of a patient. There are the two notions of being “in
contact” and “bodily contact” when a patient must be moved. Surveillance in the
intensive care unit is constant and, depending on the number of hours worked,
the staff end their day exhausted. And this exhaustion is only denounced in peri-
ods of lesser crisis, between lockdowns and during the vaccination period.
The population under study expresses a strong emotion when evoking the ap-
plause of the population relayed by the media. This gives meaning to their action
and they appreciate the fact that the courage of this specific sector of healthcare
workers, those who are always in contact with patients, is recognised. They feel
different from other professionals in the health sector.
The vaccination period gives these workers a chance to “breathe” and they
are generally in favour of vaccination. They refer to those who do not want to
be vaccinated as “crazy”, irresponsible people who put themselves and others at
risk. Those who are vaccinated feel different from those who are not: “we are all
different”, they say.
To understand these verbatims and the group that emerges from them, it is
necessary to go back to the context that surrounds and determines the essential
actions of this emerging professional group.
The pandemic: the healthcare sector under strain
The dramatic arrival of the virus

As early as November 2019, a rumour began to spread concerning a lung disease
said to be fatal in China in the city of Wuhan, and whose infectious agent, as
we would know as of December 2019, is a severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 known as SARS-CoV-2. At the beginning of January 2020, the
announcement of the deaths in the province of Hubei by the BBC launched the
media coverage of what would become a pandemic and bring about successive or
concomitant lockdowns in all countries.
In France, March 15, 2020 marked the first of a series of lockdowns of var-
ying degrees of prohibition of movement and saw the introduction, followed
by the radicalisation and permanence of social-distancing “barrier gestures”,
in correlation with the search for stability versus economic security (cf. May
11, June 2, June 22, 2020, respectively, marked phases 1, 2, 3 to come out of
the first lockdown). In the year 2020, daily life was transformed and became
synonymous with remote work and remote social contact – to varying levels
of success, depending on the quality of housing, professional activities, private
lives, and access to the internet. The year 2021 was also marked by lockdowns,
the most severe began on February 22, 2021, in some regions, and was extended
to the whole of France from April 3 to June 9, 2021. It was at this point that
vaccination campaigns began, with August 9, 2021, marking the introduction
of the sanitary pass.
This is the panorama of the social effects of this pandemic which marked
a drastic fall in the acceptability and bearability of loss of life – as noted in
comparison to the Spanish flu a century earlier which caused ten times more
deaths than COVID-19 – and hence led to drastic lockdowns, increased pro-
tection of the elderly and hospitalisation in intensive care units, to the point
of saturation of services and the creation of “field hospitals”. A selection of so-
called essential services (for instance, in France, food and hardware stores, or
rubbish collection) remained accessible while teleworking (Aguilera et al. 2016)
was introduced for businesses in sectors where it was possible, while the closure
of others (restaurants, hotels, leisure) was imposed. Streets in many countries
were plunged into emptiness and silence – an unprecedented phenomenon – and
resembled scenes from a disaster film more than those of a war, in the face of an
invisible, microscopic enemy, suspended in the air: a virus.
But protective lockdowns were not possible for the medical profession. Health
professionals remained on call and hospital staff were not only mobilised, but in
contact with the disease and, during the early days, sometimes without masks,
protective clothing or disinfection products, all of which were in shortage, just
like oxygen therapy respirators and other indispensable equipment. There was
also a shortage of anaesthesia and intensive care personnel, who could not be
replaced by other staff.
The situation for medical personnel: the emergency “white” plan

(“plan blanc”)
The personnel were mobilised fairly quickly by an emergency “white” plan. In
France, the white plan is a mechanism that has been in place since the law 2004-
806 of August 9, 2004, and constitutes a legal obligation: “Beyond the legal obli-
gation, the elaboration of a white plan constitutes the means for an establishment
to anticipate and prepare its response to serious health emergencies”.4 In the case
of the pandemic, it was triggered on February 25, 2020, to manage the massive
influx of COVID-19 victims in the intensive care units in the regional hospitals
of Creil and Compiègne. It was extended to many other regions of France from
March 6, 2020, enlarged on March 13, 2020, and has not been lifted since but
simply relaxed.
From the date of its implementation, the daily life of healthcare staff was
greatly modified. Staff were exceptionally mobilised in certain departments
and overall solidarity in the teams was particularly active to make up for the
absence of colleagues who were ill or too tired from the intense sequence of
shifts. Resuscitation doctors and anaesthetist nurses volunteered to help in
other regions where the intensive care units were full, and the staff were over-
worked and exhausted. Solidarity and the strong feelings of group cohesion
related to the medical activity of care gave them the identity of “carers”. This
identity, although it existed previously, acquired a very special dimension with
regard to its indispensability in the face of illness due to the expertise associ-
ated with it, and also in regard to the overall cohesion to serve a population
said to be in danger.
The media and hospital staff during the pandemic: lockdown and
vaccination periods
In the media, these medical personnel were widely represented as they carried
out their work, especially during the deadliest year, 2020, which was obviously
unprepared. In this context, the media broadcast every day the number of peo-
ple hospitalised, those in intensive care, and the contamination rate. These figures
frightened the population, but they served to validate the lockdowns and social dis-
tancing measures.5 Public policies were presented through traditional media such as
public and private television channels, the national and local general press, and so-
cial media, in order to exercise control and management of public health in France,
with the institutional body Santé publique France serving as the main mouthpiece.6
This chaotic 24-month period between 2021 and 2021 coincided with the arrival
of the vaccine followed by the obligation of vaccination for health workers.
This indispensable hospital staff received wide coverage throughout the differ-
ent chronological chapters of COVID-19. In France, social representations (Jodelet
1989; Moscovici 1961) linked to the medical environment divide this sector of
activity between urban care professionals and hospital care professionals. The latter,
which found itself in contact with patients and in the limelight, was suddenly no
longer “in the limelight” but became “the target” of the media, who were report-
ing that some hospital workers did not want to be vaccinated even though the law
required them to do so. This led to numerous reports on the subject, such as the one
on September 8, 2021, in the French daily, Les Echos, which headlined “Compul-
sory vaccination: ‘hundreds’ of potential suspensions of hospital personnel”.7 The
relationship between the risk and the benefit of the vaccine collided with scientific
data that was being shared and was circulating in the medical community.
Even if it has been reasonably proven that the circulation of a variant such as
Omicron is intense, the more likely it is to mutate if not curbed by a vaccine or
antibodies. This is why the vaccine protects against severe forms of the Delta or
Omicron virus. Despite these explanations, which the medical personnel cannot
fail to know or understand, it was, for instance, reported on July 5, 2021, on a
news channel, FranceTVinfo, that
[a] geriatric nurse in an institution in Saint-Maur-des-Fossés (Val-de-

Marne), is rejecting the vaccine outright. According to her, there is not
enough hindsight […] Along with other equally distrustful colleagues, she
is even considering leaving the profession if the obligation is implemented.
If the number of people vaccinated does not increase rapidly, the govern-
ment will propose a law making vaccination compulsory for health work-
ers before the end of July”.8
Hospital healthcare workers: a contact-only activity

This hospital care staff has an activity based solely on contact. But in the con-
text of a pandemic, to avoid being contaminated, barrier gestures are necessary,
and self-isolation proves the most effective measure. Contact is lethal without
hermetic protection (the virus is micrometric and airborne). However, in the
early days, when protective equipment was lacking, this category of personnel
continued to work.
While the biopolitical regime that was implemented during the pandemic in
all Western countries inevitably infringed on individual freedoms, it aimed to
protect the population by reducing the congestion in hospital services. Medical
personnel have been in the front line, and their commitment is continuing to
make a difference in facing the disease. From the most critical time of the pan-
demic until the time of vaccination, their work has kept them close to, and in
contact with, patients. This profession does not allow for a distant professional
relationship with either the patients or other team members.
For these doctors and nurse anaesthetists, the pandemic has highlighted the
complexity of substitution between different types of caregiver positions and the
problems of non-competence in the context of ventilation and oxygen delivery.9
In the event of fatigue or even the death of certain personnel, their replacement
is impossible. Expert caregivers, particularly in resuscitation specialties, volun-
teered to join other hospitals in France in high-risk regions.
The risks incurred by this group of professionals astonished and then moved
the population, who applauded them from their windows and balconies at 8
pm every evening during the first lockdown period. Health took centre stage
in everyone’s lives and the carers became indispensable vectors. The media, the
population, and political leaders praised their courage and self-sacrifice in a con-
text where the political treatment of the French healthcare system was being
decried by these very professionals, who were complaining about the “financial-
isation” of healthcare.
The existence of professional groups is not new. The group of health profes-
sionals is based on an activity and values that expose them first and foremost to
health risks, regardless of the conditions in which they provide care, and it is also
culturally founded on the Hippocratic oath. And even though the (precarious)
equilibrium of this uncertain period depended on massive vaccination, the vac-
cine has divided them. This “new” situation has placed strain on caregivers, who
are torn between their personal culture and their professional culture. Important
questions include what this long unfolding of the pandemic reveals about the
health professions, the key health issues (of patients) which unite them and the
agonistic tensions (about their own health in times of vaccination) that pull them
apart.
The period of praise that was hypermediatised and dramatised in the theatri-
cal sense of the word highlights this specific category of hospital care staff as op-
posed to the rest of the medical profession. The portrayals provided by the media
illustrate what the sociologist Erving Goffman inscribed in the staging of every-
day life (1996 [1956]) as interactions organised within the physical limits of the
institution of a hospital. We can also talk about the “co-presence” highlighted
by the psycho-sociologist Anne Ancelin-Schutzenberger (1999) in this staging
of everyday life: as she explains, in every interaction, at any given moment, the
role of each person is largely determined by the role of the other, from whom
cues are taken.
From the period of vital, on-the-spot work in the face of the impossibility of
remote work during the mass hospitalisations and deaths, to the period of contra-
dictions and division due to the vaccine policy, this group of health professionals
exists, has been constituted by the media, and is deeply inscribed in the social
representations of the population. It continues to be a sub-group within the large
group of health workers, but it is surrounded by an indelible aura that reinforces
each of its members. It is difficult at present to say whether the decision to reject
vaccination by some members of this group of hospital workers divides the group
or strengthens it.
Our study, which is still in progress, follows the trajectory of the pandemic,
the lockdowns, the crisis due to the overcrowding of the hospitals, and the ab-
sence of protective clothing. This period is associated with laudatory hyperme-
diatisation because the public realised that remote work, unlike for the rest of the
population, was impossible for the staff who were monitoring, supervising, and
caring for hospitalised patients.
The media coverage at the beginning of the pandemic focused on the courage
of the personnel in the frontline of the “war” against the virus, to use the words
of the French President, who said “we are at war” six times during his televised
speech at the beginning of the first lockdown period, broadcast on all main
television channels on March 16, 2020, at 8 pm.10 The virus sounded the death
bell for the freedoms we had experienced up until then, with total lockdowns
and even total bans on movement. We saw this virus trigger an unknown and
deadly disease for the weakest (individuals with co-morbidity – fragility linked
to pathologies or treatments imposed by pathologies such as chemotherapy – and
elderly individuals). Several factors combined to increase the visibility of the
group of carers: the shortage of masks and protective clothing, and the heroic
behaviour of some carers, going as far as self-sacrifice. This extreme moment
began a narrative that will go down in history and that inaugurates a singular
place for the hospital, for hospital workers “at the bedside” of the patient, a place
of care, life, and death.
But the time of contradictions and divisions due to the vaccine policy can-
not be avoided, even if it is only a question of a small number of caregivers.
The self-interest of some resurfaces and brings with it the desire for autonomy,
as well as fears, anxieties, and predictions of death. An analysis of the social
representations in the media, in conjunction with the sociology of professional
groups, sheds light on the way in which the pandemic has recomposed this pro-
fessional group. The former and current particularities of this group, based on
the symbolism of an oath and immersed in the imagined “milieu” of the hospital
(Canguilhem 1965), united by a professional activity, and currently mobilised by
the crisis “situation” of the pandemic, constitute an identity framework that the
health pass and the vaccination pass have shaken, albeit momentarily.
Discussion and conclusion

The hypothesis was first put forward of (re)cohesion of a professional group due
to the fact that it is and feels itself to be the only specialists facing the health
emergency of a deadly pandemic. Two reflections on this point beg pursual. The
first relates to the social relationship to death in which hospital services partici-
pate; the second concerns the performative identity of the professional group of
hospital workers.
Death is not the death of distant people in a war situation, but a death that
is close, humanised and in this sense terrifying. However, at the same time, it
should be noted that the lethality of COVID-19 is, for example, much lower
than that of the Spanish flu. The discourse in the media remains contradictory,
claiming that this pandemic is not by far the deadliest in history, but, at the same
time, describing the number of families who have been deprived of a loved one
and were, for instance, bereaved at the time of Christmas 2020. They talk about
the horror, a horror that has gone viral.11 This dramatisation contributed to the
fear and even the panic of the population, who were stunned by the lockdowns
and closures.
Indeed, the media disseminated horror images of patients clumped together in
corridors, the deceased grouped in halls and overworked undertakers trying to
avoid contact with the dead, disease-bearing bodies. Sociological reflections on
the “transformations of the conditions of dying” and the “new forms of sociali-
sation of death” (Castra 2018) demonstrate that the hospital has become the place
to die. Castra (2018, 60) indicated in 2018 that, contrary to the great postmod-
ernist trend, “death is most often the outcome of a long struggle against chronic
illness and occurs in the highly technical and professionalised world of the hospi-
tal”, but that it is not “de-socialised” or reduced into the intimate sphere (2018,
60). The author believes that a “movement of medicalisation […] runs through
our societies” and that “the hospital is a new space of normativity around dy-
ing” (2018, 61). This is also why, at the same time, the media images during the
pandemic and the terrible experience of those who had a loved one hospitalised
brought it to the fore in real life, in its most brutal relational form. This was all
the more striking as it was accompanied by a ban on families seeing the patient
during his or her illness and even death. The media spoke of the “lonely death of
a loved one” and the spectre of contagion invaded the care institutions. Only the
nursing staff made it possible to maintain a distant link through mobile phones.
Through the hypermediatisation of the intensive care units, COVID-19 ex-
posed live scenes of a professional category focused upon its patients. In their
operation of prudential practice, the circular identificatory mechanisms re-
actualised a tacit deliberation between them, around caring together, caring im-
mediately, caring with their means despite the perilous deficiencies of the lack
of protective material. It is in this way that, supported by the redundant images
of the media, a group (or part of a group) emerged from the medical profession
in the conditions of an unprecedented crisis. The unlimited commitment of the
staff up to the point when they were completely exhausted, or what we call a per-
formative identity in action, created a unity for this professional group. The pru-
dential practice that characterises it has functioned like cement in a risk situation.
However, the strong particularity of this group of hospital workers “in the field”
is that they are interventional and integrate risk into their activity as an essential
component. This particularity is also a weakness. Indeed, the management of the
second part of the COVID-19 pandemic with the appearance of the vaccine, and
then the imposition of the vaccine, redistributed roles, and responsibilities. In-
dividuals became untied, regained their independence from the group and some
even considered leaving their profession as carers.
We are led to conclude that cultural norms, legal norms, and anthropological
(or psycho-social) norms compose the united behaviour in any group and de-
termine its destiny. However, if these norms are thoroughly described by social
psychology (Fischer 2020), the dynamics of these norms are predominant and
deserve attention. From the perspective of a systemic approach to communica-
tion, we can posit, following the example of the Palo Alto researchers, that the
relationship of predominance of one norm over the other takes precedence over
the content of these norms. In a crisis and major risk situation (the beginning of
the COVID-19 pandemic), the desire for complementarity among hospital car-
ers, for support of all kinds and sympathy (suffering together) takes precedence
and constitutes the singularity of this professional group based on the values of
help and mutual help, care, and cure. However, in the post-vaccination pan-
demic context, this group, without disintegrating, may see some of its members
detach themselves from the group as a result of this major risk environment.
Some nurses abandon the professions, some doctors withdraw from the hospital
system and others, more uncertain, are ill, “playing” on declaring themselves
“contact cases” in a more or less lasting way. It is true that the figures for these
withdrawals are low, but they are unprecedented and clearly triggered by the pe-
riod of COVID-19, the deterioration of working conditions, and the deafness of
political leaders. Intra-group exchanges are not friendly, and this group of carers
does not escape the anathema of the weakening of the group by the splintering
of its individuals.
The situation of COVID-19 is original and edifying in regard to the po-
tential of creation and reconstruction of individuals and groups. And regarding
the specific group of health professionals under study here, our communicative
approach to relationships combined with that of the sociology of professional
groups is heuristic because it sheds light, in particular, on the dynamics of this
prudential practice that binds this group together, its correlation with the inten-
sity of risk and its sensitivity to the media environment.
Notes
1 Source: Santé publique France.
2 Source: World Health Organisation.
3 The details concerning this obligation for healthcare workers are set out on the website
of the French Ministry of Health, https://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/grands-dossiers/
vaccin-covid-19/je-suis-un-professionnel-de-sante-du-medico-social-et-du-social/
obligation-vaccinale [accessed November 22, 2021].
4 http://cpn.rmi.fr/Qu-est-ce-que-le-plan-blanc-d-un.html [accessed November 30,
2021].
5 https://france3 -reg ions.francet vinfo.fr/provence-a lpes-cote-d-azur/a lpes-
maritimes/nice/chiffres-du-covid-on-vous-explique-pourquoi-il-y-difference-
sources-1916056.html [accessed January 22, 2021].
6 According to the website of the institution, “Santé publique France is the national pub-
lic health agency. Created in May 2016 by ordinance and decree, it is a public admin-
istrative establishment under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. Our mission:
to improve and protect the health of populations. This mission is based on three
major axes: anticipation, analysis and action.” https://www.santepubliquefrance.fr/a-
propos [accessed November 19, 2021].
7 Obligation vaccinale: des “centaines” de suspensions potentielles dans le personnel des hôpi-
taux”, https://www.lesechos.fr/economie-france/social/obligation-vaccinale-des-
centaines-de-suspensions-potentielles-dans-le-personnel-des-hopitaux-1344389
8 https://www.francetvinfo.fr/sante/maladie/coronavirus/vaccin/covid-19-pourquoi-
certains-soignants-hesitent-ils-a-se-faire-vacciner_4691065.html [accessed Septem-
ber 9, 2021].
9 As documented on the website of the World Health Organisation: https://apps.who.
int/iris/handle/10665/332340 [accessed September 9, 2021].
10 ht t ps://w w w.lemonde.f r/pol it ique/a r t icle/2020/03/17/nous- som mes- en-
g uer re -f ace - au- coron av i r u s - em m a nuel-m ac ron- son ne -l a-mobi l i s at ion-
generale_6033338_823448.html.
11 For instance: “Europe watched in horror as northern Italy became the epicentre of
the disease on the continent. In March Orlando Gualdi, mayor of the village of
Vertova in Lombardy, where 36 deaths were recorded in 25 days, expressed his dis-
may: “It’s absurd to see that in 2020 there can be a pandemic like this, worse than
a war…”. https://www.sudouest.fr/sante/coronavirus/monde/covid-19-pandemie-
confinement-recit-d-une-annee-2020-qui-a-change-le-monde-1625100.php [accessed
January 5, 2021].
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13
FROM PRIVILEGE TO DUTY
Changing media representations of remote work
in France, the United States and Estonia
Raili Marling and Marge Käsper
Introduction
Long before the COVID-19 pandemic, the nature of work had changed consider-
ably owing to the rise of the knowledge economy, in which knowledge-intensive
activities, rather than physical inputs, support fast technological change (Powell
and Snellman 2004). Technological innovations, especially the improvement of
computer technology, had made it possible to perform work from spaces other
than the traditional office. As Felstead and Henseke (2017, 196) argue, about 14%
of British workers were doing remote work in 2014, and 24% of American work-
ers in 2015. Similar trends were reported for other countries (Vilhelmson and
Thulin 2016). Euphoric media headlines have called this shift the new industrial
revolution (Rist 2020) or the rise of digital nomads (Chayka 2018). This shift
has been celebrated as a major advancement in 21st-century work life, improv-
ing work-life balance and overall job satisfaction (Kelliher and Anderson 2010;
Felstead and Henseke 2017). Different studies have also shown that remote work
does not reduce productivity or performance (Golden and Gajendran 2018). The
movement of paid work to the home also has its negative consequences, like the
erasure of the line between work and leisure and the lengthening of work hours
(Hilbrecht et al. 2008; Adisa et al. 2017). However, despite these negative impli-
cations, before the COVID-19 pandemic, remote work was generally viewed as
a privilege available mainly to the elites of the knowledge economy.
The COVID-19 pandemic dramatically altered this landscape. Quarantine
measures made traditional work life impossible and forced not just white-collar
workers but other sectors of the labour force to work from home. As a result,
during the pandemic, private life and work became hopelessly entangled. While
remote work used to be a privilege available to only a small percentage of work-
ers, it became the new norm, and even a duty, during the pandemic (Eurofound
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-17
200 Raili Marling and Marge Käsper
2020). This led to the redefinition of both work and private life. Which suffered
more is up to debate (Lederlin 2020). It is increasingly clear that work practices
will end up being transformed when the pandemic ends (Barrero et al. 2021).
However, the discussion about remote work takes very specific forms in dif-
ferent countries, depending on their value systems and labour laws that also af-
fect the way in which remote work and the attendant pressures are handled.
That is why this chapter compares the situation in three countries with distinct
value systems and laws: the individualist United States (Hofstede 1991), France,
a country famous for its strong labour movement (d’Iribarne 1989),1 and Estonia,
which has a long tradition of neoliberalism and prides itself on its technological
infrastructure, both of which should facilitate transition to remote work (Velmet
2020). This study is part of a broader research project which focuses on the rep-
resentations and representability of crises in a culturally comparative context.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a crisis that brings to the fore the shifts that were
already underway earlier. Specifically, the chapter uses a Foucauldian frame-
work to analyse the representation of remote work to identify long-term spatio-
temporal shifts in the understanding of work and both universal and culturally
specific patterns.
The chapter focuses on traditional newspapers as they contain dominant nar-
ratives about remote work from the perspective of the state, the business commu-
nity and the workers. This chapter argues that newspapers not only describe the
spread and changing the meaning of remote work but also identify problems and
provide visions of the future. Because of their relatively slow speed (in compar-
ison with the social media), newspapers not only describe the situation but also
attempt to place the events in a broader frame, as “crisis explainers” (Kutter 2014)
and as a source of social representations (Moscovici 1963).
Remote work during COVID-19

The pandemic has marked an enormous change in workplace practice and is
generating much research interest by academics in organisational management
and work sociology as well as the actors themselves who make up the professional
field. As Oksanen et al. (2021, 1) observe, “the crisis became a massive natural ex-
periment in using technologies that enable social distancing and remote work”.
According to the Eurofound (2020) survey, in France, about 30% of workers
experienced a significant decrease in their working hours by July 2020, while
for about 30%, they remained the same. In Estonia, by comparison, only about
12% of workers reported a decrease in working hours and the large majority
(about 50%) stated that their working hours remained the same. This suggests
that Estonians seemed to be better prepared for the transition to remote work.
According to the same study, Estonians were significantly more optimistic about
the future than the French, most probably because the first wave ended by May
2020 and led to a quick renormalisation of life until December 2020. US Census
Bureau statistics, collected in December 2020, also showed a switch to remote
From privilege to duty 201
work, but mostly among the workers with higher levels of education and income
(among those who earned 200,000 USD or more a year, 73.1% of those surveyed
switched to remote work, while only 12.7% of the lowest income people (earning
25,000 USD or less a year) were able to switch to telework (Marshall et al. 2021).
Oksanen et al. (2021) focus on Finland, where 60% of workers participated in
remote work during the pandemic, the highest proportion in Europe (Eurofound
2020). Thus, remote work was widely used and accepted. However, according
to the same source, rates of “techno-stress” were extremely high. This, however,
was smaller among the population that was used to remote work before the
pandemic.
An Austrian study (Weitzer et al. 2021, 1824) showed that about 25% of the
working population worked from home and that 72% of this group would prefer
to continue remote work after the pandemic. However, Pieh et al. (2020) showed
that younger respondents who were experiencing labour market instability bore
the greatest mental health burden during the crisis. As in other countries (Kay
2020; Utoft 2020), married women, especially women with children, experi-
enced decreased mental health because of the increase in caregiving responsi-
bilities. The surprising finding from Weitzer et al. (2021, 1834) was that people
preferred remote work because it had fewer distractions than working in the
office and that remote work was, in fact, perceived to be more productive.
These studies provide a useful frame for the analysis of media representa-
tions. Official statistics confirm the widespread of remote work but also sharp
demographic distinctions in regard to who exactly benefited from it. Although
previous research had reported on the increase in life-work balance as a result of
remote work, this was not necessarily the case in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic where childcare facilities and schools were closed, thereby increas-
ing demands on parents. This chapter will also be attentive to the discourses of
productivity and mental health that emerge from the first exploratory studies of
remote work during COVID-19.
Foucauldian insights
The pandemic period has seen the resurgence of interest in the work of Michel
Foucault and his theorisation of surveillance and control in Discipline and Punish
(Surveiller et punir). Specifically, there has been debate over the increase of state
control and surveillance during special pandemic mitigation measures, but also,
equally importantly, self-regulation and self-discipline (e.g. Couch et al. 2020).
Thus, this chapter touches upon references to surveillance that have been part
of the discussion of remote work that had already begun in the 1990s (Delage
2018). However, the power of the narrative of control should not be exaggerated,
as the crisis has also been accompanied by protests and passive non-compliance.
The same can be said of the workplace context, where the feared surveillance
measures have largely failed to materialise (for example, this issue does not ap-
pear in 2020 in the corpora analysed here). Thus, this chapter is more interested
in the general shift from the option of remote work to an obligation of remote
work and the extent to which this imposition of an obligation is reflected on a
linguistic level.
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (L’archéologie du savoir) (1969, 164, 209–210), in
the analysis of comparative facts ( faits comparatifs), as well as in The Order of Things
(Les mots et les choses) (1966, 233),2 Foucault uses the term “positivity” (positivité)
to describe parallel, differently shaped changes within a general shift in differ-
ent domains. Positivity is the given that does not change dramatically and that
appears implicitly and sporadically but cumulatively in texts that do not have an
overt connection with each other, creating a systemic unity. Thus, for Foucault,
large-scale changes can be characterised as a change in the “configuration of
positivities”, which for him designates
the way in which, within each one, the representative elements function in
relation to one another, in which they perform their double role as desig-
nation and articulation, in which they succeed, by means of the interplay
of comparisons, in establishing an order.
(English translation in Foucault 1989, 240)
In other words, different terms and keywords may emerge in different systems,
creating different models, but comparisons are made possible by the play of anal-
ogy and differences revealed in discourse. By studying the practices of writing
about remote work this chapter hopes to capture, on the one hand, the discursive
practices and points of focus in the three countries studied and, on the other
hand, the shared large-scale changes that can be noted in the global redefinition
of work.
This chapter also attempts to address these trends in terms of heterotopias,3
a notion that Foucault uses to mark spaces that cultures define as somehow dis-
turbing the normal order of things by their otherness or contradictoriness (e.g. a
zoo is a heterotopia because it brings together creatures that would not meet in a
normal ecosystem; Foucault’s examples include cemeteries, prisons and brothels)
(Foucault 1986). Heterotopias exist within the larger society as both a mirror
and a space of disturbance: they are within the larger world and yet also offer a
dislocated mirror image of this world. This chapter is interested, in particular, in
whether remote work can be seen as a heterotopia because of the shifting percep-
tions of time and space involved when work is relocated or dislocated. Hetero-
topias are not viewed as sites of resistance, but rather as sites that make order and
knowledge production visible (Topinka 2010, 55–56). This is a broader process
that this chapter traces in the shifting understanding of work.
Methodology and corpora

To delineate the representations, the study used the most widely used words
for remote work in the three countries studied: “remote work” in English,
“télétravail” in French and “kaugtöö” in Estonian. The English and Estonian terms
focus on spatiality and distance, the French term on the online modality of work.
Thus, the terms actually already have somewhat different emphases. However,
in the pilot study, other alternatives (“telecommuting”, “travail à distance” (which
is quite close to “remote work”), “kodukontor” (close to “home office”)) did not
elicit enough data for a robust discussion.4 This study was interested in finding
not necessarily the closest terms linguistically, but the most widely used ones.
Also, the terms were already in use before the pandemic, which makes it possible
to place the COVID-19 pandemic material in a diachronic context.
The corpus of analysis was derived from the most prominent quality papers of
the three countries under study: The New York Times (NYT) (USA), Le Monde
(LM) (France) and Postimees (PM) (Estonia). The electronic archives of the news-
papers were accessed in December 20205 to create two corpora. The first fo-
cused on March 2020 when COVID-19 became a public emergency in all three
countries. A contrast was provided by the corpus from October 2020 when the
pandemic had not just been normalised, but the countries were also bracing for
the second (or even third) wave of the pandemic. For comparison, later examples
are also used, but these are not analysed systematically.
The study used two tools to read and analyse the corpora: Sketch Engine and
Hyperbase. Sketch Engine is a corpus analysis platform that includes numerous
pre-loaded corpora but also the possibility of uploading one’s own corpora, like
the ones used in this chapter. The study used the WordSketch tool that pro-
vides a one-page overview of a word’s grammatical and collocational behaviour
in the corpus that can be easily visualised (see Figure 13.1 for an example of
the collocational behaviour of the noun “télétravail” in French). When necessary,
the analysis moved from the WordSketch to the Concordance function to check the
examples in their specific context of occurrence and validate the interpretation.
Hyperbase is a lexicometric tool frequently used in French logometry that allows
researchers to determine the relative frequencies of words and their distribution.
Hyperbase was particularly useful for the present chapter as it allows the analyst
to see a longer text extract and this functionality was important for validating
claims in this chapter. In this project, Sketch Engine was used for the analysis of
large corpora, and Hyperbase for in-depth analysis of texts.
The corpora for the different languages varied: there were 2,895,992 words
in the NYT corpus and 1,591,286 words in the LM corpus (counted by Sketch
Engine). The PM corpus was manually gathered to identify all texts that con-
tained references to remote work (“kaugtöö”). This elicited a corpus of only 8,378
words.
The search in these corpora for texts related to remote work (or in French
“télétravail” and in Estonian “kaugtöö”) elicited the following numbers of men-
tions of each search term for March and October of 2020: New York Times: 18
occurrences in March, 8 occurrences in October; Le Monde: 124 occurrences in
March, 149 in October and Postimees: 36 occurrences in March and 13 in October.
Already, the numbers were strikingly different. The LM corpus featured more
FIGURE 13.1 S ketch Engine visualisation of the collocational behaviour of the noun
“télétravail” in the Le Monde corpus
texts on the topic of remote work, which suggested that it was a newer issue that
required more discussion and analysis. As for the NYT, it can be hypothesised
that, before the pandemic, remote work had already become normalised in the
white-collar work force and that during the pandemic, newspapers were more
interested in the more dramatic labour market tensions, as reflected in texts ded-
icated to unemployment and the work of the frontline workers. The emphasis
placed on remote work in the relatively high number of LM articles may be
explained by the fact that remote work does not fit the work values in France,
where the separation of work and leisure is sharper and workers’ rights to vaca-
tion are respected, unlike in the United States (d’Iribarne 1989). The scarcity of
texts in the PM corpus may be due to the country’s general willingness to adopt
technology in public administration and work life, which, for instance, made the
tools for transitioning to remote work more easily available than in many other
countries.
To contextualise the analysis of the corpora gathered for the present study and
test the assumption that before COVID-19 remote work was framed as a privi-
lege, a brief analysis of the representation of remote work before the COVID-19
pandemic was performed. For English and French, the general TenTen web
corpora available via Sketch Engine were used. For the Estonian language, the
Estonian Reference Corpus 1990–2008 was consulted. A similar trend is ap-
parent across all three languages: remote work was shown to be the privilege
of the more educated and wealthier sector of the labour market. The articles
covered white-collar workers and discussed life-work balance. As remote work
was viewed as a privilege and is associated with positive vocabulary (in English
words like “OK”, “fine” and “great”, in Estonian “mõnus” (comfortable, cosy),
“meeldima” (to like) and “võitma” (to win)). In Estonia, remote work was also
linked to people moving to the countryside. In the Frenchweb 2012 corpus, one
of the two most frequent verbs to collocate with “télétravail” was “encourager”
(to encourage). In the sentences where “télétravail” appeared as the subject, the
context suggested discussions about its nature (“constituer”) or what it could offer
(“le télétravail peut…”). When deontic modality occurred, it was in a hypothet-
ical consideration mode (“le télétravail devrait”) (“should be”). Intriguingly, the
English-language corpus had references to the negative sides of remote work,
such as weight gain or other issues related to a sedentary lifestyle. Such consider-
ations confirm that remote work had been fairly widely experienced before the
pandemic.
Despite small differences, in all three countries, remote work was talked about
before COVID-19 as an exciting new development made possible by the spread
of the knowledge economy and the development of telecommunication tools. It
was also represented as a privilege that was only available for a small segment of
the working population.
Discussion
This section identifies and discusses the thematic patterns and configurations
suggested by Foucault in regard to the discussion of remote work as a problem or
an opportunity in the three cultures under study. To avoid repetitions, the sec-
tion mostly discusses the data not by country, but according to thematic clusters.
The subchapter first examines the perspective of the state and society (reports,
euphoric celebration of innovation and coping strategies), before turning to the
level of the individual (attention to individual rights, productivity control, stress,
problems with infrastructure that let down the workers, etc.). Examples from
the corpora are cited in the original language and are accompanied by our own
translations into English which attempt to respect both the target language and
the linguistic phenomena being discussed in the source language. Examples are
viewed in the context of the corpus and not identified by author or date.
1 Societal challenges
In all countries, the use of evocative and often dramatic language in re-
gard to the shift to remote work as the new norm could be observed. This
was most dramatic in the LM corpus where remote work got the most at-
tention. For example, Le Monde wrote that remote work spread like wildfire
(“ feu de paille”) across the globe (the examples did not cover France but
countries like Dubai and Qatar and the work of global companies like Twit-
ter, Apple and Microsoft). This is gauged in the following example:
Le télétravail s’est répandu comme un feu de paille. Twitter, LinkedIn, Micro-
soft, et même Apple, vendredi, ont demandé à leurs employés de s’abstenir de
venir au bureau. (Telecommuting has spread like wildfire. On Friday,
Twitter, LinkedIn, Microsoft and even Apple asked their employees
not to come to the office.)
Although the comparison with wildfire may seem dramatic, the image was
used to stress not the lack of control but the speed at which remote work
spread. The newspaper hinted that France had to follow the same pattern in
the public sector, as some companies in the private sector had already imple-
mented remote work. For example, Froment-Maire (2020, 57) has shown
that while it was not widespread in the public sector in France before the
crisis, “finally, the health crisis has shown that teleworking could constitute
a valuable tool in the perspective of the modernization of local authorities”.
In the LM corpus, texts tended to stress the duty of the citizens to engage
in remote work, especially in October when people were required to work
remotely as the country faced the threat of the second wave. For instance,
the phrase “de nouveau obligatoire” – “the new requirement” – was recurrent
in the corpus. This elicited comparisons with other countries (like Finland),
where remote work was practised even when the COVID-19 statistics were
not as high as in France:
En Finlande, un pays vanté pour la qualité de son enseignement, l’objectif est,
au contraire, de maintenir les écoles ouvertes. Les adultes sont, eux, contraints
au télétravail au moins jusqu’à la fin de l’année. (In Finland, a country
praised for the quality of its education, the objective is, on the con-
trary, to keep schools open. Adults are the ones who have to do remote
work, at least until the end of the year.)
There were also interesting linguistic changes between March and October:
while in March, the French modal “devoir” (a close equivalent to “must”)
appeared mostly with the qualifier “if possible”, in October the requirement
was expressed with greater certainty. For instance, in March, the phrasing
was more cautious:
Toutes les autres entreprises doivent, pour l’instant et en priorité, placer leurs sal-
ariés en télétravail quand c’est possible. (Employees in all the other compa-
nies have to switch, when it is possible, to remote work immediately.)
In October, fewer softening devices were used:
Le retour au télétravail, lui, a été generalisé. (The return to remote work
has become general.)
The compulsory nature of remote work was introduced in newspaper

discourse largely through quotations from government officials, but Le
Monde coverage helped create an optimistic representation of remote work
that sought to demonstrate its effectiveness in combating COVID-19. This
can also be observed in the shift in the use of deontic modality: while in
March there were recommendations to “prefer” or to “adopt” remote work,
by October this had become a duty (cf. “devoir”, “obligatoire”).
A parallel trend can be identified in texts that stress the increasing spread
of remote work. For example, one article mentioned that the use of re-
mote work programmes and other related services had increased despite the
recession:
Avec le coronavirus, ‘le marché du télétravail a peut-être pris sept ans d’avance’
(With the coronavirus, “the remote work market may have jumped
ahead by seven years”.)
In Estonia, the Postimees also covered the wide spread of remote work. While
the LM corpus overwhelmingly stressed the necessity of remote work, the
PM one discussed the practical organisation of remote work. This can be
analysed as being one of the Foucauldian positivities whereby the notion of
need is conceptualised differently in the two newspapers. There is a telling
local article in the Postimees that explicitly stated in March, one day after
the state of emergency was declared in Estonia, that remote work was the
rule and that all face-to-face meetings were to be postponed. Even the Es-
tonian MPs discussed shortcomings in the work practices of the parliament
in March that did not allow remote sessions, which forced them to change
the rules of order. The focus was not so much on whether to transition to
remote work, but how.
In the United States, the NYT corpus reflected a similar normalisation
of remote work although American technology companies were celebrated
as trailblazers:
America is now following the lead of Silicon Valley tech companies
like Google and Facebook. They were among those that allowed em-
ployees to work from home even before the pandemic hit in full force
in March.
Such stories stressed the dramatic increase in the use of different confer-
encing apps like Zoom and Teams:
Microsoft said the number of users on Teams had grown 37 percent
in a week to more than 44 million daily users. There have been at
least 900 million meeting and call minutes on Teams every day. “We
believe that this sudden, globe-spanning move to remote work will
be a turning point in how we work and learn,” wrote Jared Spataro, a
corporate vice president at Microsoft.
There were similar optimistic stories about startups that were succeeding
despite quarantines. The debate seemed to be about whether this change
should be permanent. Indeed, the one element that stood out in the NYT
corpus was the vision of global change:
One big question, said Amy Myers Jaffe, an oil expert at the Council
on Foreign Relations, is whether the coronavirus outbreak could per-
manently alter people’s work and transportation habits as companies
get more comfortable with remote work and videoconferencing, re-
ducing oil demand over time. “It will be interesting to see if we see big
structural changes once this crisis subsides,” she said.
As remote work had been an accepted practice among white-collar work-
ers, the New York Times talked less about the phenomenon itself and instead
focused on advice on how to cope, making recommendations about techno-
logical solutions. The question was not whether to do remote work, but how
to do it most productively.
Remote work is also a matter of relocation. Indeed, wealthier citizens
of cities like New York City moved to less densely populated locations.
Relocation is mentioned not just in relation to the United States but also
to Europe. The discussion of space was also present in other corpora, for
example, in regard to concern about whether remote work may accelerate
delocalisation in France:
La généralisation du télétravail pendant le confinement pourrait accélérer ce
mouvement de delocalisation. (The wide spread of remote work during
confinement could speed up the delocatisation process.)
Yet this, in the case of LM, was also seen as presenting benefits, as regional
economies benefited from the influx of new arrivals spending their money
in local shops. However, in the NYT stories, the movement of wealthy tech
workers to rural areas was also seen as a potential strain on smaller healthcare
systems. This concern did not appear in the LM corpus; instead, there were
some idyllic references to remote work from vacation spots:
[…] le télétravail depuis son lieu de vacances est l’aspiration d’une cible plutôt
jeune, et préfigure sans doute le monde du travail de demain. (teleworking
from their vacation spots is the aspiration of a rather young target audi-
ence, and undoubtedly foreshadows the working world of tomorrow.)
In other words, relocation of work and workers was represented as a societal
challenge…
Other public issues also increasingly colonised the press. Research pre-
dating COVID-19 pointed to the fact that remote work actually tended to
have a positive effect on productivity and that people got more work done
from home than in the office (Golden and Gajendran 2018). This was also
discussed in the context of the pandemic. The New York Times admitted that
people became more productive because there were fewer interruptions:
Once you’re set up and know what to expect, though, you can enjoy
the time savings and productivity boost many people who work from
home enjoy.
This could perhaps be viewed as another positivity in the broader transfor-
mation in the nature of work where the worker is to be committed to work,
regardless of the place in which the work takes place.
The issue that all newspapers addressed was that remote work was not
available to all workers. Newspapers extensively covered the work of the
frontline workers who did not have the luxury of remote work, but the term
“remote work” was not used in those texts and, thus, they did not appear
in our corpora. This is why this important issue that warrants a separate
analysis is not discussed at length in this chapter. Another issue pertains to
the more vulnerable workers, namely, those who lost their jobs, which is
addressed, for instance, in the NYT corpus:
The nation is mired in a so-called K-shaped recovery in which some
people and businesses have thrived as companies shifted to remote
work and consumer demand skewed toward goods over services.
Other workers have fallen into prolonged unemployment and a wave
of small businesses have shuttered or are close to doing so.
One social group remains relatively absent from the representation of remote
work across all three countries: the workers who belonged to the informal
economy before the crisis and who were left with no benefits and no op-
tions. While it stands to reason that this category would prove more difficult
to represent precisely because it concerns the informal economy, the lack
of representation of these workers in the texts analysed here suggests that
these texts remain relatively blind to the social injustices that the pandemic
created. Remote work might be a heterotopia for the neoliberal knowledge
workers, but one that is deterritorialised is independent of specific spaces and
comes with many exclusions.
In line with this exclusion of the underprivileged, as well as the associa-
tion between remote work and the notion of privilege (for instance, in re-
gard to white collar workers), the notion of remote work that emerges from
the corpora under investigation here stresses the obligation to cope with
remote work on an individual level. It points to the obligation that is placed
on the workers to create a personal heterotopia. This is, indeed, one of the
features of the neoliberal subject analysed by Foucault. The neoliberal sub-
ject “responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially intro-
duced into the environment” (Foucault 2008, 270). That is, the individual is
supposed to respond to personal challenges and demonstrate resilience. The
question of individual challenges and their representation in the texts under

study are taken up in the next subsection.
2 Individual challenges
Such societal challenges created challenges for individual workers who
had to adjust to the changing norms. In the LM corpora, remote work raised
concerns about the rights of workers. Editorials talked about rules and rights,
including the right to refuse work if the employers did not guarantee suita-
ble working conditions, such as personal protective equipment for workers
who were in direct contact with the public. Stories cited sociologists who
warned about the emergence of invisible inequalities (“petites inégalités”) or
even explicit discrimination when the management was safely doing remote
work, but not the rest of the staff:
C’est discriminatoire. Quand ils voient que la direction est planquée en télétra-
vail avec des salaires de plus de 7 000 euros par mois, les salariés sont écœurés.
(This is discriminatory. When they see that the management is hidden
away doing teleworking with salaries of more than 7000 euros, em-
ployees are disgusted.)
In March, especially, there were references to practical questions that arose
in the context of work and also to the shift in work culture that was said to
derive from the world of start-ups:
Les équipes de Station F – soit une grosse trentaine de personnes – se sont
évidemment astreintes au même régime que les start-up qu’elles accompagnent
et se sont mises en télétravail pour continuer à répondre aux demandes des
résidents. (The Station F teams – that it, around thirty people – have
obviously followed the same regime as the start-ups they support and
have teleworked to continue to respond to residents’ requests.)6
In general, the discussion of workers’ rights was limited in the LM corpus to
the private sector, as was the case for the discussion of remote work gener-
ally. Some examples also mentioned investors’ right to dividends. However,
the trade unions were less happy, as many workers were still not able to
transition to remote work and had to continue to work in open-plan offices.
Such concerns were absent from the NYT corpus. Companies and organ-
isations that were not prepared for remote work were the targets of criticism,
together with the “privilege-blind” who were able to enjoy hobbies that
were impossible for people who lacked the privilege of remote work. There
were more stories, however, about how to make one’s home into a space
of work that was “a nicer place in which to find refuge”, creating a type of
personal heterotopia. The advice could be quite explicit:
If telecommuting becomes more regular for you, your employer might
even spring for other essential home-office gear, such as a monitor,
an external keyboard, an office chair, and a height-adjustable desk, to
make working from home ergonomic. Remote work makes it possible

to work from anywhere – even on your couch or bed. But few people
are productive in slouchy positions, which are also bad for your back.
Ideally, your home office would be in a room with a door.
In the case of Foucauldian analysis, it is also important to be attentive to the
discourses that were present in a latent form. Thus, it is not surprising that
the stress on the obligation of remote work created a concern with individ-
ual rights, especially privacy, which was endangered when the public world
of work invaded the private sphere. More recently, during 2021, there has
been a lot of concern in the US press about privacy issues in connection
with remote work, such as discussions about whether employers have the
right to install monitoring software on the computers of remote workers.
However, this issue was present only latently in the NYT corpora from
2020. There were numerous texts about surveillance, but these dealt with
the monitoring of the sick and included critical stories about the handling
of the health crisis in China. The LM corpus dealt with similar issues of
surveillance in relation to the management of the pandemic, but not in
relation to the workplace. Surveillance issues, whatever the sphere, were
not discussed in the Estonian articles. Surveillance remained a public issue
in 2020. It was only in 2021 that companies started to raise questions about
whether remote workers were maintaining their productivity. This, in
turn, infringed on the workers’ privacy, and in 2021, there were NYT ar-
ticles describing how people learned to live with some level of surveillance
at home. That is, the social issue became an individual-level challenge, but
only gradually.
Other individual-level challenges related to social contact and integra-
tion. The LM corpus reported that remote work made it harder for new
employees to integrate a team. This concern was not explicitly present in the
NYT corpus, but there was some discussion of the emotional effects of re-
mote work, especially the loss of the emotional office dynamic: people liked
the free time, but they “also miss the social interaction of an office space”.
This created new anxieties for workers and one manager admitted that “this
is a psychology problem now”. The NYT corpus covered the personal prac-
tices of workers, such as exercise, meditation, socialisation and also the use
of productivity apps. Thus, the NYT corpus suggested that it was up to the
worker to build a comfortable work environment at home and develop the
skills and practices that they needed to remain productive. The rights of
workers or the responsibilities of employers were not mentioned in the NYT
corpus in connection with remote work.
The Estonian corpus reflected the neoliberal ethos of Estonia in that it
incorporated components belonging to the discourse of “the survival of
the fittest”, including the “necessary sacrifice of the weaker” (this last noun
phrase appears as a headline in March 2020).
Nüüd tegutseb enamik kontoritöötajaid kodus ja arvan, et kellel seetõttu oma

lõik tegemata jääb, peabki üsna pea kogu oma töö käest ära andma. Kriis
nõrgemaid ei salli. (Now most office workers work from home and I
think that those who fail to do their share as a result have to give up
the job altogether. The crisis does not tolerate the weak.)
Similar bluntness characterised some cited experts who pointed out that
“the market economy is harsh” (“turumajandus on karm”) and that both un-
employment and bankruptcies were inevitable in crises. Interestingly for
the present study, this expert also hinted at the continued transformation of
the work place, in connection with automatisation as “viruses do not affect
robots” (“robotile viirus külge ei hakka”).
However, there were also positive visions of how the pandemic-era ex-
perience of remote work could lead to an improved use of remote work in
non-crisis contexts (for example, by allowing ease of movement between
work sites and allowing people to move to rural areas of Estonia that are be-
ing emptied by the pull of big cities). The PM corpus stood out with its cel-
ebration of working from forests and the discussion of whether the existing
digital infrastructure would support such a dispersal of the population. Per-
haps also because the Estonian and English words emphasised spatiality in
their noun phrases, there were recurring references to distance. In contrast,
the LM corpus paid more attention to workers as members of collectives,
their rights, but also the domestic setting and the importance of maintaining
a healthy life-work balance:
Confinement et surconnexion: “Il n’y a pas à culpabiliser de se déconnecter du

télétravail”, Notifications à la chaîne, multiplication des coups de fils, “sky-
péros” à volonté… Dans ce nouveau contexte, où il faut parfois aussi gérer
le télétravail et les enfants, comment trouver un équilibre? (Lockdown and
over-connection; “There is no reason to feel guilty about disconnect-
ing from remote work”; Chain notifications, multiplication of the
number of phone calls; numerous “skyperos”… In this new context,
where it is also necessary to manage remote work and children, how
can we hit a balance?)
People were urged to stay in touch with their colleagues and collaborate
with other parents. Interestingly, the LM corpus also reported that single
people found remote work easier than people who had to shoulder parenting
duties although solitude was also described as “very strange” (“terriblement
étrange”). In other words, the LM corpus, in contrast to the NYT one, re-
flected that even when French workers adopted remote work, they preferred
to keep home separate from work and, thus, as mentioned in one extract,
would have preferred to do remote work from some pleasant space outside
of the home. This is a significant difference in the heterotopias created in
the two cultures.
There were also a few positive feature stories about people who were
coping and possible scenarios for the future. In the PM corpus, this could
be seen in an October 2020 story about how people had learned “to live
with the virus” (“kuidas viirusega koos elada”) by arranging their work more
flexibly and making sure that laws allowed this. This was also in tune with
the tone of Estonian neo-liberalism. The sort of discussion of workers’ rights
that was observed in LM was absent in the PM corpus.
The NYT corpus showed traces of rethinking some of the key features
of the workplace, such as the assumption that productivity and creativity are
greater in the office. There were also significant traces of the spill-over of
the language of the public sphere into the private sphere and, thus, societal-
level challenges also became individual ones within this broader neoliberal
framework. In addition, there were first attempts to reconceptualise work,
echoing academic research published in the course of 2020. For instance,
Sarthou-Lajus (2020) in the editorial of Études points out that “digital la-
bour” (“production numérique”) at home requires the rethinking of the collec-
tivism that had developed out of industrial labour. However, interestingly,
the present study also confirms that despite the traces of spill-over of neo-
liberal language into the private sphere in connection with remote work in
newspaper discourse, working from home also strengthened the understand-
ing that work life is built on a sense of community and personal interaction.
This provides hope that the neoliberal conceptualisation of work will con-
tinue to be challenged.
Conclusion
The analysis based on the comparison of the three newspaper corpora from
March 2020 and October 2020 confirms that some of the new definitions of
remote work are, indeed, likely to persist. However, there is also a tendency to-
wards increasing the blending of work and private life, and the resultant erasure
of leisure. This may well lead not to a better life-work balance, but to a culture
of overwork. The culture of overwork featured notably in the American NYT
corpus, which did not mention workers’ rights in connection with remote work.
In contrast, discourse about the obligation to work remotely was particularly
visible in the French LM corpus, which highlighted the emergence of discussions
about the rights of teleworkers. Estonian society, characterised by its pragmatic
individualism, seemed to accept remote work without too much discussion as a
new normality and paid particular attention to digital infrastructure.
Thus, one of the Foucauldian positivities that informed the material was the
culturally divergent emphases of the discourses surrounding remote work. The
American corpus, for example, stood out with its emphasis on time, productivity
and personal responsibility. The Estonian corpus placed more emphasis on space,
in particular, the possibility of working from remote locations like the forest, and
the attendant concerns with infrastructure. Finally, the French corpus was the
only one to dwell extensively on people as members of groups and communities.

Thus, the analysis points to the presence of culturally specific patterns in the
otherwise global experience of remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The analysis also highlights a troubling link between remote work and neoliberal
technologies of the self in which a worker is supposed to be “an entrepreneur of
himself ” (Foucault 2008, 225–226). Only the French corpus showed explicit
resistance to this discourse.
A more general finding of this chapter is, however, that it is possible to detect
the emergence of a new definition of the office and perhaps even of work. The
chapter proposes that the home office has become something of a Foucauldian
heterotopia, which is both disturbing and contradictory, with the potential to
reshape the perception of both work and private life. Moreover, the traditional
office is also increasingly being redefined as not so much a site of labour but first
of all a site of face-to-face communication. Beyond all of the technical solu-
tions that are adopted, it is the private dimension, manifested in practices like
socialisation and small talk, that had always previously been integrated into the
sphere of work, that is ultimately lacking the most in the era of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Acknowledgements
Research for this paper was supported by the Estonian Research Council (grant
PRG 934 “Imagining Crisis Ordinariness”).
Notes
1 This is reflected in the culture of the “social pact” (“le pacte social”), including a “joy
of fighting” (“plaisir de lute”) described by d’Iribarne (1989).
2 The original French titles are cited in the references, but for the sake of clarity,
English translations are used in the text.
3 Foucault first mentions heterotopias in the introduction to Les mots et les choses, but we
mostly rely on the article “Des espace autres”, published in 1984 and translated into
English with “Of Other Spaces” in 1986. There are other translations, but the work
presented here is based on definitions provided in the original translation.
4 The alternatives that were tested produced significantly fewer results. For example,
in the US corpus there were four times fewer references to telecommuting than to
remote work. In the French corpus, “travail à distance” was used about 20 times less
frequently than “télétravail.”
5 The corpus was gathered by student research assistants Liina Maurer, Susanna Mett
and Kiur Kaldvee, and students Katariina Helene Arrak and Hanna-Lisette Viilma.
6 Station F is a major start-up campus in Paris.
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94: 1823–1837. doi: 10.1007/s00420-021-01692-0.
14
INTERNATIONAL MANAGERS AND
EXPATRIATES IN THE FACE OF THE
PANDEMIC
Impact and cultural issues
Corinne Saurel
Introduction: intercultural stakes in the context of COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken up the world of work and has had a major
impact on social interactions. The emergence of remote working as a new stand-
ard of working behaviour has led to feelings of uneasiness and even suffering
among many groups of society: teenagers, students, the elderly, single people,
young parents, employees and so on.
Within companies, remote working and lockdown have brought unique chal-
lenges to managers. For international managers and expatriates, the addition
of the international dimension increases the complexity of working together.
For international project managers, problems particularly concerned unfulfilled
objectives and delays in projects in the event that the crisis would be prolonged.
For expatriates, the social isolation for those placed in mandatory or voluntary
quarantine during the COVID-19 epidemic, combined with the need to adapt to
new cultural environments and the absence of familiar forms of interaction, has
led to increased distress and loneliness.
Curiously, the situation of expatriates and, to a lesser extent, that of interna-
tional managers, who face the added difficulty of working in remote cultural
environments, have received little attention or media coverage. However, the
health crisis has placed the international manager and the expatriate in an ex-
ceptional situation. This chapter proposes to examine the experience of both
categories during the pandemic. It draws on more than 30 intercultural coaching
sessions with managers and executives during the 18-month period that followed
the beginning of the pandemic and proposes to draw some initial lessons from
remote working in the era of COVID-19. Ninety percent of the respondents
were men between 25 and 58 years old who work in international groups; they
are all managers or executives. The analysis distinguishes between international
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-18
218 Corinne Saurel
project managers and expatriates even though many of them combine both roles.
However, distinguishing between the two categories allows for a better under-
standing of the specific stakes of each.
International managers and expatriates who are in contact with several cul-
tures have been strongly exposed to several types of distance, be it cultural, ge-
ographical or social distance. In the context of the global crisis, the international
dimension adds a further layer of complexity that is not always well identified by
the management of international companies. However, in order to be successful,
intercultural cooperation requires significant efforts of openness and understand-
ing in order to accept and integrate cultural differences.
At the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, many international managers felt
abandoned and lost. Companies were busy dealing with emergencies in the field
and rethinking the organisation of work to comply with the health and safety
instructions imposed by public authorities. Some departments, especially Human
Resources, were at a loss and did not know how to help. Therefore, how did
international project managers and expatriates deal with the challenges of the
COVID-19 crisis? Both categories have stakes in the international sector. How-
ever, do they define themselves in the same way? Do they need to meet the same
challenges? Other points addressed in what follows include how they managed
to collaborate with their foreign partners and the lessons and ideas that can be
drawn from their experiences.
The international project manager
A nomad manager
First of all, a distinctive feature of the international project manager is his/her
territory of action. Each manager covers several large geographical areas. Often,
their geographical location does not determine their function. The company
sees no added value in bringing together in the same workplace teams whose
members are scattered around the world. When their office is maintained in their
home country, and when they do know their work colleagues, it is often because
of friendships that have been forged over the past, during meals together at the
cafeteria, coffee breaks or during the birthday celebration of a former colleague
whose office was located on the same floor.
Often, there are no shared professional goals other than the general feeling
of belonging to the same organisation. It does not matter where the manager is,
be it in a different time zone or a different space. International project managers
draw on their communication tools and applications and use them at the airport,
in a hotel room, in a meeting room or in the company’s local office. Their work
is carried out outside the geographical location in which they are located.
Project managers work in a cross-functional way according to a non-
hierarchical working method whose essential purpose is to achieve results and
meet shared objectives. They collaborate on projects with cross-functional,
Impact and cultural issues 219
cross-site, cross-country and cross-cultural communities in their field of compe-

tence, in keeping with the “functionalist and instrumental” model of the organ-
isation, which is above all perceived as “a system of tasks to be carried out and
objectives to be achieved” (Amado et al. 1990).1
They can have wide responsibilities and manage a virtual, international and
multicultural team. Depending on the specific case, they move physically be-
tween their base and the countries with which they interact. They work “with”
them and “elsewhere” while they are passing through for a few days or on a short
assignment (one to six months). They may not know their colleagues other than
virtually. They see themselves as nomad managers or citizens of the world.
Depersonalised stakes at the heart of international collaborations

Like a traveller without luggage, the international project manager’s ally comes
in the form of sophisticated technological equipment: a laptop computer and
a smartphone packed with collaborative applications that facilitate multimodal
communication and place the manager at the heart of the company’s organisa-
tional system. Electronic exchanges are numerous and varied and reflect a process
of integrated collaboration which, above all, encourages action and gives senders
legitimacy and power to carry out tasks. This is all the easier as interpersonal re-
lations are devoid of emotional power and because management in project mode
emphasises achievement and not the individual. Because the stakes are deperson-
alised, the professional relationship can appear impersonal and distant. Interna-
tional managers manage their collaboration in a world of micro-meaning and
asynchronous time in which individuals cross paths but do not move together.
During the pandemic, the number of emails sent exploded. In the absence
of personalised exchanges due to the fact that it was impossible for managers to
meet, international project managers were faced with countless emails in which
they had to explain technical details in writing (“It’s a constant flux of emails day
and night, it never ends”).2 In addition to being overwhelmed by emails, project
managers were also anxious about potential delays in projects.
International managers are accustomed to the virtual space that contributes to
the construction of their virtual identity. They know how to establish modes of
virtual interaction by creating a common dynamic around a shared goal in order
to get their interlocutors to carry out the tasks at hand. In this context, inter-
national managers continued to do what they usually did but, in addition, they
formalised the tasks to a greater degree, anticipated more, clarified expectations,
communicated more by writing and provided written feedback – all of which
increased virtual exchanges tenfold.
The virtual identity of the project manager

The international project manager often imposes his/her own pace on others,
according to their own “internal time” (Gasparini 1990). Managers impose their
220 Corinne Saurel
own pace on teams scattered across several locations in different countries with-
out taking into consideration time differences or cultural differences. This can
be viewed as a barrier to collaboration as it maintains continuous work regardless
of local geophysical or cultural realities. Furthermore, it creates a space for inter-
actions that, while they are interactive, personalised and dynamic, maintain the
fantasy of an authority over interlocutors who are supposed to collaborate and
move forward together in a standardised and convergent manner.
Project managers establish a framework for work based on the principle of ac-
tion thanks to which they claim their legitimacy. In this way, they forge a “real”
virtual identity that is, it can be argued, that of the virtual or nomadic leadership
of modern times, where “the notion of territorial dominance thus serves the
functions of appropriation and identity” (Fischer 1990).
On a general level, the COVID-19 crisis led to delays in projects, incon-
sistency in data due to the general disorganisation of work, and, of course, the
discomfort of working at home according to the different living conditions
which will not be developed here. However, the remote work that was im-
posed on all workers did not disturb the daily work of international project
managers because they were already well versed in virtual teamwork (“it did
not change anything for me”). Evidence for this is provided by the decision of
many international companies, which were mostly Anglo-Saxon or Scandina-
vian, to maintain these nomadic managers in remote work without allocating
physical offices.
The expatriate in the “host country”
The thwarted illusions of a new life

In contrast to international managers who are already well equipped with all the
technological equipment and are experienced in the implementation of standard-
ised and globalised processes, expatriates faced a difficult situation. This point is
still underestimated by Human Resource departments. Expatriates were delayed
in taking up a new posting, and sometimes, the posting was simply suspended or
cancelled. During the intercultural coaching sessions that were provided during
this period, people complained of numerous professional, personal and family
difficulties.
The various surveys conducted among expatriates identify the following cri-
teria that generally influence the choice to expatriate: remuneration, health/
well-being, leisure, making new friends, travel and personal happiness.3
Contrary to the situation of the international manager, expatriation is often
based on a family project (when the expatriate is not single). The partner and
children accompany the expatriate and must find their feet to integrate a “new
life here and now”. When the decision is made to live and work in a country
other than one’s own, it requires a significant amount of risk-taking and much
courage on the part of the family to embark on such an adventure: one must
rebuild one’s life, move away from family members and friends and secure a new
position in an unknown cultural environment. The new configuration heralds a
new life of profound identity changes. If the partner fails to become integrated,
the whole family unit may explode, resulting in a professional break-up or even
a family break-up. Importantly, during the COVID-19 crisis, a majority of ex-
patriates decided not to take their families with them and instead moved to the
foreign country alone.
The new expatriates: logistic and family difficulties,

and a crisis of identity
The intercultural support sessions carried out between February 2020 and June
2021 demonstrate that a distinction needs to be made between new expatriates
who were starting out and those who had already been in the country for some
time. Some experiences took place before vaccination became widespread or,
in some cases, for emerging countries, was offered in small quantities to locals,
which meant that expatriates who had not been vaccinated beforehand were not
given priority.
During the pandemic, new expatriates found themselves in complex living
situations and caught in fluctuating sanitary situations where protection measures
were unclear or constantly changing, while all the while trying to meet their
main aim of securing their new job.
In the face of this unprecedented crisis, many types of problems added up,
from logistic issues to health problems, customs procedures and documents to
concerns over receiving a visa because of administrative uncertainties and delays.
Also, countries varied in their track-record with respect to remote work. Indeed,
remote work has not been developed to the same degree in all countries. For
instance, according to a survey dating from 2017:4
– in the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg, remote work is developed

twice more than in France;
– in Brazil, India and Australia, managers often work remotely;
– in the United States, remote work has been common for many years;
– France is affected by presenteeism,5 just like Japan, where only 20% of peo-
ple work remotely.
A risky move
In some countries of expatriation, the technological equipment (smartphone,
computer, printer) was not installed, and computer connections were poor.
Technical support had to be organised, which caused impatience and distress for
those who were used to managerial efficiency and wanted to secure their new
position (“I don’t have a computer or a business mobile phone, my login still
hasn’t been created”).
222 Corinne Saurel
All these obstacles were a test on the nerves, on top of compulsory confinements
in hotels or rentals with strict government instructions. Forced isolation for between
one week and one month meant that the period of cultural adaptation, which is so
important to start out confidently in a new environment, was jeopardised.
Many expatriates had to change their plans and move well ahead of their
family (“What should I do? Leave my wife and children and just go?”). Some
countries closed their borders, which gave rise to specific but no less exhausting
strategies, such as moving closer to the host country in order to be in the same
time zone as colleagues, work on projects at the same time and, therefore, suc-
cessfully complete the trial phase in the new position. For example, a manager
who was set to run a factory in the United States moved to Mexico in order to be
able to work and establish himself among his new colleagues who were waiting
for him in the United States. The challenge was to stay in the game at all costs
and above all to position oneself (“I am still waiting on my work permit for the
US but I have to stay on track”).
Others arrived too late in the country, and the job had been taken up by
local teams who had assigned themselves the different roles in the expatriate’s
absence. For the expatriate, managing his future colleagues from a distance with-
out knowing them was doomed to fail. The confinement did not help. And the
expatriate ended up being as it was neutralised.
Culture shock involves four phases: (i) a “honeymoon” period based on many
illusions about the country; (ii) homesickness with doubts and regret for family
and friends; (iii) realisation of reality and (iv) acceptance of the situation (Oberg
1960). The culture shock inherent in the expatriation experience was particularly
violent during the weeks of total isolation (“I am still in lockdown, I can’t go out
[…] it’s like a jail” (in Japan)). Fear of the virus, sometimes, created extreme sit-
uations, exemplified by the story of a manager who tested negative on boarding
a plane but was positive on arrival in the country of expatriation, was accused
of introducing the virus and was ostracised and subjected to collective hysteria.
Different perceptions of cultural integration

Some expatriates are still suffering the after-effects of the strong feelings of aban-
donment and powerlessness and the sense of being locked away (“I feel lonely”
(in Italy); “I don’t know anyone” (in Indonesia)). Their initial experiences on
arrival in the country leave them with the bitter-sweet taste of a real waste that of
having had only virtual contact with their new colleagues and of having missed
out on a human experience.
Some expatriates ended up breaking their contract or were repatriated by the
parent company because the “cultural grafting” that had been attempted remotely
had not worked. Other expatriates simply waited for their contract to end, serving
their time and looking ahead to when they would be reunited with their families
back in their country of origin. Others continued to try rather half-heartedly to
become integrated (“I don’t want to make any more effort” (in Kazakhstan)).
On the contrary, there were others who had moved from African countries
(for instance, Nigeria or Tunisia) to France, where they felt safer and were con-
tent to just bide their time despite the confinement and the scale of the pandemic
(“My company took care of everything, I’m vaccinated and I’m staying in a stu-
dio”). Others felt that they were living in “a bubble”, protected from reality and
removed from time and space; they participated in virtual meetings with their
future colleagues without really being aware of the differences in cultural con-
text (“It doesn’t change anything for me, it’s quite unreal” (Uzbekistan)).
Since then, things have evolved, and some companies (for instance, in the
United Kingdom) have developed for all new expatriates in confinement remote
integration processes based on procedures that have been formalised in writing.
Such explicit guidelines demonstrate the ability to contractualise the welcome
procedure in order to create a feeling of belonging and reduce feelings of distance
and isolation. The stages of integration of an expatriate include for instance:
– initial contact with members of the IT department, who come and install
the computer equipment;
– the expatriate is initiated into the social codes and made aware of the “cul-
tural blunders” to avoid thanks to distance learning programmes;
– the human resources department presents the company and its values;
– the expatriate meets with the whole team and is introduced to the head of
the department;
– the expatriate meets with direct colleagues;
– there are explicit exchanges about the new position and the responsibilities
attached to it.
Expatriates already in the country: a pre-existing social link

For expatriates who were already set up in the country before the pandemic,
the dilemma they experienced was quite different. The question they faced was
whether they should stay or leave. During the first phase of the pandemic, in the
midst of the general panic, their primary concern was to protect themselves from
the virus and avoid falling ill due to the unsatisfactory level of certain health
infrastructures in their host country (for instance, Tunisia, Indonesia, India, Co-
lombia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Mongolia or Morocco). Due to the initial shock of
the pandemic, most of them sent their families back home, and some decided to
stay on their own. Daily life became more difficult because of the confinement
and the local language. The bond with the parent company suffered. The follow-
ing testimonials are revealing:
“I feel like I am far away from everything, my company is not taking care
of me anymore, I have no news, I am on my own here”
“I don’t dare to go out, for example to buy groceries, and I don’t know
the local language well”
224 Corinne Saurel
“Small shops don’t have websites for online orders”

“The consulate is not providing any news”
However, unlike new arrivals, some of the expatriates who were already based
in the country were able to rely on the mutual aid provided by their local col-
leagues, for example, in Morocco (“My colleagues brought me food that their
family had prepared and left it outside my door”; “My colleagues phoned me
regularly to check that I was OK”). One expatriate was very surprised by the
solidarity that his colleagues demonstrated and the fact that it triggered a better
mutual and cultural understanding:
“I discovered very loyal colleagues, and a very warm country. This ordeal
brought us closer. I was constantly being contacted and interrupted by my
collaborators who were checking up on me! I changed profoundly and I
grasped the strength of relationships, the meaning of a ‘big family’ and
what it means to give your word.”
In cases where contact had been established prior to the crisis, a system of mutual
aid was set up. Rituals to make someone feel welcome vary around the world and
according to culture. For instance, welcoming traditions in Morocco highlight
human relations and friendliness which are part of Moroccan culture and which
correspond to a form of loyalty. During the pandemic, prior face-to-face col-
laboration between Moroccan employees and their managers facilitated human
relations despite social distancing, confirming observations already made in the
field of intercultural management:
The degree of integration strongly influences the density of interactions

in a team. Distance and isolation can make it more difficult to feel part of
a team, but they are not prohibitive provided that other factors, such as
historical factors, compensate for them (Chevrier 2012a)
In the case of the French expatriate who worked in Morocco, communication

was also facilitated by a common language (French). The additional problems of
understanding the local language when it is not the expatriate’s language, which
weigh heavily on international collaborations, will not be discussed in detail
here.
In an unprecedented situation which provokes anxiety, the survival of the
company depends not so much on “working together” (organisation) as on
“being together” (relations). This provides an argument for adopting a more al-
truistic and collaborative management style. Maintaining human contact with
people we know well, via videoconferencing or telephone calls, can, to some
extent, reduce feelings of loneliness and the sense of loss of meaning at work.
However, this also depends on how trust is perceived, which is also culturally
dependent.
Shared difficulties of intercultural communication for project

managers and expatriates
Online communication
Before the COVID-19 crisis, international project managers were used to work-
ing with numerous collaborative communication platforms and professional
workflows (such as Teams, Zoom, shared folders, business applications, in-house
applications, etc.), and expatriates were led to adopt the exact same tools while
working remotely during the pandemic. To compensate for the lack of physical
meetings, communication rituals were set up. For example, virtual team meet-
ings were held regularly several times a week or once a fortnight depending on
the degree of autonomy of the employees.
Interestingly, the reactions to online communication have varied. The inter-
national project managers were the most comfortable with the online tools, as
they are modern nomads who consider that these are the means which guarantee
efficient work:
“We had already introduced weekly meetings, this makes it easier to co-
ordinate things. We also have virtual working groups. This means that we
have to prepare our documents, formalise them and be precise and clear.
In the end we save time. If we need clarification, we phone each other.
Our workflow applications and shared documents are very powerful, it all
works really well.”
Emoticons are used to structure the organisation of meetings. Order and speak-
ing time are closely monitored (“Meetings are more efficient: we put our hands
up virtually if we want to talk” (on Zoom)). Often, the creation of WhatsApp
forums (Cuenca Montesino 2019) allows for spontaneous discussions within the
working group. Well-prepared videoconference meetings are shorter and more
efficient. The hierarchy becomes less visible, and team members are more en-
gaged and less stressed.
Some companies set up interesting initiatives that ultimately failed, such as
weekly web cafés (“There were 40 of us at the beginning for virtual coffee, now
there are just 5 people. It’s always the same thing, it is so repetitive and we still
don’t know each other”).
However, such professional exchanges work well in explicit and homogene-
ous cultural contexts and in cases where people know how to work on their own.
In such a context, one person leads the meeting, there is no restraint, everything
is voiced and formalised, decisions are taken and a written report clarifies the
instructions and actions to be performed. During the pandemic, this method of
exchange was the preferred working process of international managers, who are
used to working quickly, getting straight to the point and focusing on achieving
their objectives.
226 Corinne Saurel
The challenge of overcoming cultural distance

On the other hand, the new expatriates felt helpless: they had left their home
country behind in order to establish themselves on new territory, meet on a daily
basis people with different cultural codes and engage in a different life routine.
New expatriates were left trying to interpret emails and messages and capture the
personality, state of mind and way of thinking of their foreign colleagues with-
out knowing them (“Sometimes there are forty of us in a virtual meeting and I
don’t know any of them” (expatriate at The World Bank in Washington)). Their
lack of understanding of the cultural context, together with the susceptibility of
their interlocutors, whom they only saw through the screen, led to numerous
misunderstandings or intercultural blunders. These included words that were too
direct and perceived as hurtful, or messages written without copying in the local
leader (“I don’t know who’s who” (in Indonesia)).
For some, the key challenge was to succeed in having real work exchanges,
especially with people who always say yes or who need guidance (“People say
that yes, they have understood, but I’m not sure they have”). They complain that
they cannot deepen the dialogue and cannot verify the information transmitted
in the field (“Projects are prepared approximately. We don’t have the experience
of the field. Do we have the right facts?”). Indeed, during online meetings, it is
not easy when each person has to take their turn to speak and wait patiently for
the other to finish. Some expatriates pinpoint a lack of feedback (“Microphones
and cameras are turned off. There are few questions, and sometimes no feedback.
Do they understand? What did they understand?”) and fear that the information
is not accurate enough when, for instance, the object of the meeting is to deter-
mine long-term international investment budgets.
Online communication prevents participants from identifying certain para-
linguistic signals such as facial expressions, attitudes, gestures or silence. Inter-
preting such cues is already a complex matter when working internationally
because their meanings can vary depending on the culture. For instance, in one
cultural context, the silence of participants can be interpreted as a sign of agree-
ment, but in another, it can mean the opposite. Loss of such cues can, therefore,
be particularly damaging for international cooperation.
Conclusion
Without doubt, international managers have coped well with social distancing,
given their mode of collaboration whereby everything is done to ensure smooth
and standardised work processes despite the existence of cultural specificities.
In contrast, new expatriates found themselves confronted with the difficulties
of interpreting messages, deciding on the right attitude to adopt and the right
way to “team up”, understanding new norms and values and defending their
scope of responsibilities, all of which had to be done from a distance. For some,
the cultural context of their social interactions was too implicit and prevented
them from becoming accepted. They had not foreseen such a cultural gap and
were not prepared to anticipate certain blunders that it would be difficult to make
up for in a face-to-face setting later.
The COVID-19 crisis has deepened relational and intercultural complexity.
In the case of expatriation, common work goals are not enough to guarantee so-
cialisation within an intercultural context. Experience proves that bonds of trust,
shared common values and shared history weave an invisible but solid thread that
creates the cultural encounter. Such socialisation is not the same as simply “being
in touch” or “keeping in touch”.
Notes
1 Translations of quotations from French cited in this article are my own.
2 Quotations between brackets were gathered during the surveys that were carried out
for this study during coaching sessions.
3 For example, Internations Survey 2021, https://www.internations.org/expat-insider/
4 Survey conducted by Morar Consulting, 2017 for Polycom. See: https://start.lesechos.
fr/au-quotidien/voyage-expatriation/les-pays-champions-du-teletravail-ne-sont-
pas-ceux-que-vous-croyez-1178157 [accessed June 15, 2021].
5 “Presenteeism” refers to the phenomena of self-imposed obligation to be in the office,
for various reasons.
References
Amado, Gilles, Claude Faucheux and André Laurent. 1990. “Changement Organisa-
tionnelle et réalités culturelles.” In L’individu dans l’organisation: les dimensions oubliées,
edited by Jean-François Chanlat, 629–661. Québec: Les Presses de l’université Laval.
Chevrier, Sylvie. 2012. “Peut-on faire virtuellement équipe? Le cas des équipes interna-
tionales de projet.” Nouvelle revue de psychosociologie 14: 35–50.
Cuenca Montesino, José Maria. 2019. “L’application WhatsApp dans la communication
professionnelle: un catalyseur de la confiance interculturelle.” In Langues et pratiques
du discours en situation professionnelle, edited by Fiona Rossette and Mercè Pujol Berche,
131–162. Limoges: Lambert-Lucas.
Fischer, Gustave-Nicolas. 1990. “Espace, Identité et Organisation.” L’individu dans l’organ-
isation: les dimensions oubliées, edited by Jean-François Chanlat, 165–183. Québec: Les
Presses de l’université Laval.
Gasparini, Giorgio. 1990. “Temps et travail en Occident.” In L’individu dans l’organisation:
les dimensions oubliées, edited by Jean-François Chanlat, 199–214. Québec: Les Presses
de l’université Laval.
Oberg, Kalervo. 1960. “Cultural Shock: Adjustment to New Cultural Environments.”
Practical Anthropology 7(4): 177–182.
15
WORKING INTERNATIONALLY
DURING COVID-19
Professional testimonials
Lucille Boulet, Olivier Motard and Samira Touam
Introduction
This chapter provides testimonials from professionals who work for an interna-
tional company and are based in a country which is not their country of origin.
Each holds a management position in a specific sector – communications, part-
nerships, or operations and recruitment. These professionals were asked to share
their analysis of how COVID-19 was managed in their host country and to pro-
vide an account of the ways in which their work practices were challenged and
transformed during the pandemic.
These first-hand experiences highlight some differences in the way the health
crisis was managed by countries on three different continents: Germany, China,
and the United States. Differences can be noted in terms of the role of local as
opposed to the national government, the degree of permanency of sanitary meas-
ures, the question of personal responsibility or that of surveillance.
The testimonials also provide some insights into the types of solutions that
companies put in place in response to specific challenges created by the pan-
demic, be it border closures or remote work. While all three professionals inter-
viewed were already used to remote work before the pandemic, they each address
specific problems that were experienced by employees for whom remote work
was a new experience. These range from issues pertaining to work space, time
management, or childcare and homeschooling, to “onboarding”, engagement in
work, and managing virtual teams.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-19
Working internationally during COVID-19 229
Samira Touam, Head of Internal Communications, Europe,

PageGroup, Germany
What is your position and the missions attached to it?
I am head of internal communications Europe for PageGroup, a recruitment
consultancy company which is present in 36 countries and employs 6,000 people
worldwide. We place professionals in our client companies, who are looking to
hire across different specialities, disciplines, and at ranging levels of different
industries. So, we basically match them together, the candidates and the client
companies. My role is to manage at the European level internal communica-
tions. And so what do we do in internal communications? I see our role as fulfill-
ing three purposes. First, we want to ensure that our people are informed about
what is going on in the company that they feel like they know the latest news or
any changes and whatever is relevant to them. Secondly, we want to make sure
that our people have the possibility to stay connected and collaborate together,
by using the right tools and the right communication channels. And thirdly, we
want to increase the engagement throughout the workforce. And, therefore,
these roles relating to internal communications became even more important
when COVID-19 hit because we had to react and go into crisis-response mode.
What specific issues can you identify in terms of how COVID-19 was handled in
Germany?
I think it was very similar to many European countries, but there were some
differences. I personally saw the differences because I am in touch with colleagues
in 13 countries in Europe, and everyone had a very different situation to handle.
So in Germany, the first lockdown hit on March 22, 2020. What it meant for us
was that the schools closed, employees were asked to work from home, non-essen-
tial stores were closed and we had restrictions in regard to who we were allowed
to see outside of our home. But it was not as strict as it seemed to be in France or
Spain, where there was a really tight lockdown. We did not have that. I was still
able to go out and take walks, and if I wanted to meet one friend, I could do that.
And the other particularity of Germany is that there is no one rule for the entire
country. Germany is organised into 16 regions, called “landers”, and every lander
has a different set of policies and different rules. This means that the 16 regions are
not used to adopting a similar model, and so the particular challenge for Germany
has been how to adopt a unified approach across the country. We finally got there,
but one year after the beginning of the pandemic, the government finally made
the decision to adopt the same rules across the country. For instance, the same
measures were to be applied nation-wide depending on the incidence level (50,
100, etc.). So that brought some clarity, and like many other European countries,
we were happy to have some restrictions loosen up and have more freedom.
So how did you adapt your work missions during COVID-19?
I would identify three distinct issues that we had to address. The first one
concerned how to respond to a crisis situation, and how to manage the first steps.
230 Lucille Boulet et al.
The second one was how to ensure that our people who now work from home
stay connected and feel engaged with their work and with their colleagues and
their teams across the board. And the third point, which was a very important
one, was how to make sure that we provided all the resources to allow our peo-
ple to have some kind of wellbeing. That is, looking at mental health, how were
people coping?
So in terms of the first challenge, responding to the crisis situation, like every-
one else we just did not know at first what we were doing. We had questions
such as how long is this going to last? What are the measures that we should put
in place within the company? How do we communicate about that? So at first,
it was all about communicating about basic health and safety measures, keeping
your distance, just coming to the office if we really had to, washing hands, and
so on. But another challenge was, like in any crisis situation, the rapidity, and the
reactivity that was required. You had to be on your toes. Decisions from various
governments, in Germany or in other countries in Europe, were changing all the
time. Every week we had a new set of policies that we had to communicate to
staff. This was a big part of my work during the first weeks of lockdown.
After this initial period, things settled a little, and we understood that this
crisis was going to last for a while. So, we had to adapt and make it work in the
mid- and the long term. We, therefore, focused on making sure that people stay
connected and engaged with their work. How did we do that? There were var-
ious approaches. On the one hand, there is the technology and the connectivity
part. For example, we reacted by making our desktop office computers available
for people to take home because not everyone had a laptop, not everyone was
set up at home. We tried to make everything available so that people had com-
puters, big screens, and so on, in order to guarantee a better quality of remote
working.
Another project that targeted engagement pertained to working space. Every-
one has a different life situation. Depending on the country or city, the cost of
rent is not the same, so our staff has smaller or bigger living spaces. How did we
accommodate this and how did we make people feel all right about it? What we
did was that we encouraged people to share how they worked. We organised
an internal campaign and we asked people to share photos of their home setup.
Sometimes, the setup was quite fancy, with a nice home office, but for others
who lived in a studio apartment, they might have needed to take their ironing
board and place their laptop on that, and that became their office desk. But we
made this project fun, got people to share, and suggested that every working
space was fine that everyone was doing the best they could in the situation with
which we were all confronted.
The other important role relates to team management. It was really important
for us to provide our managers with tools, techniques, and knowledge, in order
to allow them to manage their team remotely. Personally, I was already used to
that before the pandemic because I have always worked remotely, my manager
has always been in a different country, my team is based in Spain and I am based
in Germany. But for most people, this was not the case. Therefore, we provided
online training modules and a one-page sheet of “tricks and tips”. At the end of
the day, the main message that we wanted to convey to our employees was that
trust is a very important factor. Managers cannot have a productive team if they
cannot trust their team.
Last but not least, there was a focus on mental health and well-being. This was
such an important factor. Some people were at home alone, and they spent their
entire day in front of the computer. But everyone has a different life situation,
and some of our employees have a large family, so they were at home with, for
instance, three children trying to do home-schooling while, at the same time,
trying to conduct important meetings. How could that be managed? It was im-
portant for us to convey the idea that regardless of how our employees were set
up, whatever their life situation, it was fine, we would accommodate them and
find ways to make it work. For instance, some people preferred working early
in the morning and then again later in the evening, taking a break during the
day; others needed breaks to go outside. Making people feel all right about their
working conditions was one of our big priorities.
Olivier Motard, Manager of international partnerships,

d.light, China
What were the challenges of the pandemic while living and working in China?
In China, we only had two weeks of remote work. This may come as a sur-
prise because the virus started in China. And after that, people were then fairly
free in their movements within the country. We could move about, but this was
conditioned by the use of a QR code. The communication with the government
was conducted via WeChat, the Chinese instant messaging application, and it
was constant. Regularly, people were asked for their health code and it was nec-
essary that this code be green in order to go anywhere. For example, my building
manager asked me for my QR code every time I left and came back home.
In terms of travel restrictions abroad, I have been restricted to staying in
China since the beginning of the pandemic simply because I could leave but I
could not return. During the pandemic, coming to or returning to China re-
quired a lot of paper work; companies had to put in writing that an employee
was very important to the company. And then once back, there would have been
a mandatory hotel quarantine and a home quarantine with camera surveillance,
whereby a camera would be installed in front of a returning traveller’s front door
for one week. The camera has a movement detector and if your door is open for
too long, you immediately get a phone call.
We also had communication with the French Consulate and the French
Embassy, who supported the French expats here, either to enable them to get
back to France, which was difficult because there were very few flights, or to get
back to China. I know foreigners who could not get back to China even though
they had their families, a wife and children, here.
One thing that we really experienced as foreigners in China was the “Laowai”
feeling. “Laowai” is an informal term for “foreigner” in Chinese. Once the pan-
demic started to really develop, the government began to refer to “imported
cases”, because most of the cases were coming from outside the country. Chinese
people, therefore, thought that the virus was being imported by foreigners. But
months later, it was actually made clear that these “imported” cases were due
to the Chinese diaspora (the Chinese diaspora is made up of about 50 million
people) who were returning home to China. And of course, in any case, foreign-
ers could not get into China because the borders were closed for them. But the
communication around these “imported cases” created a misunderstanding for
Chinese people, which the government corrected in 2021 by underlining that
these imported cases had been the result of Chinese nationals who were coming
back home.
And what would you say about remote work, and how your company adapted during
the crisis?
My company is a US company, and my team works abroad. So before the
pandemic, I was already used to remote work. And inside the company, online
working had already been widely developed. Otherwise, in China, the official
remote-work period lasted for two weeks and then it was back to the office. The
difference was that in the office there were really strict rules to respect, such
as wearing masks, social distancing, or reducing the attendance for in-person
meetings. In addition, our company put in place kindergartens for the children
of employees because the schools in China were closed and would remain that
way for three to four months. This was put in place by the company very quickly,
during the two-week closure, which meant that as soon as we went back to the
office on the Monday morning after the closure, the parents were able to bring
their children directly to the office.
Another point concerns the detailed communication we were receiving from
Human Resources in regard to the hot spots of the virus. And in addition, there
was intensive tracking conducted by Human Resources, which was requested
by the local government: we had weekly and monthly WeChat exchanges, with
surveys to fill out to inform authorities of our movements within China. So, this
was something that was organised by the company at the local level.
Lucille Boulet, Global Talent Acquisition Partner, MI-GSO |

PCUBED, USA.
What is your position and what are the missions attached to it?
I work for a global consultancy firm that provides project management ser-
vices. Our customers are spread across all the industries: oil and gas, automotive,
eerospace, and so on. My role is to recruit business managers. I am based in the
United States, but I could, in fact, be based anywhere. I take care of the United
States and Canada, but I also manage the recruitment of business managers for
our headquarters in France, Europe, Australia, and South-East Asia. Our subsid-
iary of the Alten group is made up of close to 2,000 people now, and the whole
Alten group is made up of nearly 40,000 people.
What was specific to the management of the pandemic where you were living?
Of course due to the state system, here in the United States, there was no
national policy to deal with the situation. And in addition, on the national level,
we changed presidents during the pandemic. Culturally, what I feel is specific
to the United States is the trust. Here, I felt that people in power, the govern-
ments, trusted the population. However, California does provide an exception
to this. California is more diverse and is also closer to Europe in mentality. That
is why regulations were put in place here, first in the form of the lockdown, and
also in the wearing of masks. When the lockdown lifted and things became a
bit more flexible, I think we had more constant policies. For example, during
all the months of the pandemic, we had to wear masks. In contrast, this was not
the case in France, where the wearing of masks was enforced on and off. I can
remember seeing images from France during summer 2020 of people no longer
wearing masks, I found that really surprising, and then the masks were back on
again in the autumn.
How did the pandemic affect your work?
My company is specialised in project management and change management,
we are meant to be experts on this, so I would say that we were well prepared
and we coped well with the pandemic.
What is specific to my experience in regard to the pandemic is that I began my
job on the first day of lockdown in California. To date, I have never physically
met my managers. One is in France, the other in Detroit – so quite far from Cal-
ifornia. During my onboarding,1 I had met my local team here in San Francisco,
where I am based, but they do not have the same role as I do, and we are not
involved in any team work.
Another factor, which is cultural, because hiring conditions are far more flexi-
ble in the United States than in a lot of countries, was that I was let off because of
the pandemic. This was after having been recruited and having worked for only
one month in March 2020. I, therefore, did not work from April to December
of 2020. I was hired again in January 2021. But, in fact, this turned into an op-
portunity for me. For the first time in my career, I was able to take a break, and
I benefitted from this both personally and professionally because when I came
back, I was given new responsibilities. My scope was widened: beforehand, I had
covered the United States, and now, I cover basically the whole global context.
Since January 2021, all my work has been remote. I have only been to the
office once, just to get an office chair! In my experience, the biggest challenge
about remote work is time management. I am capable of working all day, from
early morning until late at night. The difficult thing about my role, which in-
volves recruiting across the globe, is managing the different time zones. I soon
realised that working all hours of the day may be all right initially, but it is
not viable in the long term. You need to have a life outside of work. So, this is
something that I am working on. For instance, from California, I can work with
Australia and France in the morning.
Another problem which is specific to my mission of recruitment is that of
onboarding, which remains a challenge in the context of remote working. When
someone starts in a new company, it is already difficult for them to knock on an
office door to meet colleagues and ask them questions. But with remote work,
it is even harder to pick up the phone and ring colleagues whom one has not yet
met.
Note
1 “Onboarding”: “the act or process of orienting and training a new employee”, first
known use dates from 1988 (Merriam Webster dictionary).
Postface
16
CONCLUDING VIRTUAL
ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION
COVID-19, communication, culture and
work practice
Introduction
The following discussion aims to bring together some of the axes of enquiry that
inform many of the individual contributions of this volume. It provides insights
from both researchers and professionals, who were asked to address two main
questions. The first relates to how the management of COVID-19 and com-
munication about the pandemic may confirm or disaffirm preconceived notions
about cultural differences. The second question pertains to work practice and
how it may evolve and/or devolve in the long- and the short term as a result of
the pandemic. The latter question is addressed in general terms by the researchers
who make up this virtual panel and is taken up by the professionals in respect to
their specific sector of activity (for example, recruitment, international trade).
The discussion brings to light a number of issues, including links between man-
agement of the pandemic by national governments and management within the
workplace, the role of the pandemic as a wake-up call or as an accelerator of
pre-existing trends, the role of technology, the question of trust and the phenom-
enon of surveillance and the continual adaptation that has become a requirement
for social actors in all sectors of activity.
Almut Koester, Professor of English business communication,

Vienna University of Economics and Business
In your opinion, how can the management of COVID-19 be related to notions of cultural
difference?
This is a very interesting question, and we need to wait for in-depth studies to
be conducted on this point. I am always a bit wary of cultural studies which only
DOI: 10.4324/9781003276517-21
deal with national culture. There is also regional culture, organisational culture,
and, with the pandemic, there are a number of other factors which come into
play, such as the political structures, the health system and so forth, but I’m sure
there are going to be some interesting studies about these various aspects. I do
not feel that I am an expert on this, but I would like to mention one study that
relates to the question of gender.1 This study addresses the question of whether
countries that are run by female leaders did better in terms of infection numbers
and death numbers than those run by male leaders. The study was based on the
first lockdown period. Of course, as the authors point out, there is one problem
with drawing any conclusions in that there are not that many countries led by
female leaders, but some of the countries included in this study were Finland,
Norway, Germany, New Zealand, Taiwan and Hong Kong. At least based on the
first lockdown, it seemed that death rates were lower in countries led by female
leaders. If we compare, for example, Scandinavian countries such as Norway and
Sweden, it seemed like death rates in countries led by female leaders were lower.
I did a quick check to see what the situation was in Spring 2021. For example, if
we take Germany, there have been 1,000 deaths per million inhabitants, which
is still in the high category, but it is lower than that of some other countries such
as France or Great Britain. The authors of this study were interested in feminine
leadership styles and explored for instance whether women are more risk-adverse
and whether they have a more collaborative management style, but it is based on
models that we first need to assume are accurate.
How do you think work practice will evolve and/or devolve due to the pandemic?
It will be interesting to see if there is radical change like there generally is
after a crisis, be it a crisis such as a war, or a financial crisis. Yes, we can wonder
whether it is going to be “back to business as normal”. In regard to communica-
tion in the workplace and the distinction between face-to-face communication
and that of other mediated channels, I believe that face-to-face communication
will continue to play an important role because it fulfils an essential need. Hav-
ing said that I do think that other channels will be used more and more, perhaps
in situations where face-to-face communication is not essential, and I would
hope that the channels chosen for communication are actually those that are the
best ones for the specific purpose in point. In terms of workplace communica-
tion, it seems to be that there has been some disenchantment with respect to new
technologies. This has also been the case for blended learning. The model of
blended learning had been in the pipeline for a number of years, and then with
the pandemic, we all suddenly had to do it, and we realised that it was not the
panacea. While there are benefits, there are also lots of issues, and there is a flip
side.
A more general issue that I would like to make in terms of what happens next
relates to one of the “chances” that have come out of this pandemic. It seems that
we have had a wake-up call, such as the wake-up call about the environment –
not that we were not aware of the problem of the environment before, but the
Concluding virtual round-table discussion 239
pandemic has increased awareness of environmental degradation. In regard to

the workplace, surveillance is, for instance, not new, but the problems it raises
have been shown more starkly during the pandemic. We need to ask ourselves if
this warrants closer attention. Do we really need to think about this? What level
of surveillance do we want? Workplace surveillance brings to the fore cultural
differences. As we have learned from some of the contributions to this volume,
in the United States, it seems to be determined more by the company, while in
other countries, such as France, it seems to be the government.
So, what I hope is that these types of wakeup calls that have come out of the
pandemic will see us re-evaluate and engage with some of these problems or
developments, which are not new. How do we want to interact in the future?
How do we want to shape the way we work? Clearly, there are benefits about
having more flexible work for certain professions, but, at the same time, there
are problems of isolation, increased control and incursion of work into private
spaces. Hopefully at the end of it, we will develop new practices that try to in-
tegrate some of the benefits of these new forms of communication that we have
been forced to use and also fix some of the problems we already had before the
pandemic.
Susanne Tietze, Professor of Multilingual Management, Sheffield

Hallam University
Do you see work practices changing due to the pandemic?

Yes, I do see work practice changing, and the major shift involves the location
of work. Some years ago, before COVID-19, I did work on how work practices
change when remote work is introduced. The trends that were emerging back
then continued to develop up until the onset of the pandemic. Technology is an
action potential in which work practices are now intrinsically inscribed. I think
a distinction has to be made between different occupational groups, and I do
not believe that everyone will necessarily benefit from these changes in regard
to remote work and technology. I have not seen any empirical evidence which
would support a sort of win-win-win scenario; I am more sceptical about how
this will play out. I think it will play out well for people such as academics, we
are global elites, we are knowledge workers, and for us, this may well work
because it increases our flexibility, interconnectivity, knowledge and networks.
We can work from home or go into the office and hook up there. So, it can ac-
tually prove advantageous for academics as well as other knowledge work-based
groups. However, I am not so sure about other occupational groups, for instance,
what is referred to as semi-skilled occupational groups, who may work from
home but who, from the work I have done, are output-controlled. Due to remote
working, the work has shifted away from being present in the office. And this
raises issues of surveillance. These groups are controlled in various ways and it
will be interesting to see how this pans out in the future.
What worries me a little is the increasing trend towards working individually.

More hours are now spent working individually, or in very small units, and I
wonder what this will mean in the long term. But this question, which is an
open question, concerns trends which are already well established, and the trends
are concomitant with a decline of union density. Usually, we exercise solidarity
with other human beings when we know them. I am not saying we cannot get
to know each other through the new media, but there are also limits to it, and I
wonder whether the pandemic has accelerated these trends more than had been
predicted.
So yes, the workplace will change quite radically. I take courage from the
contribution of employers who are very proactive and quite accepting and sup-
portive of different ways of working. And underlying these changes are shifts in
values, behaviours and practises that I think as researchers it is our job to keep
an eye on, communicate to policymakers and make more prevalent in the public
discourses.
And what is your opinion on managing cultural differences in a multicultural and multi-
lingual workplace?
There is partly conflicting evidence on this. I have not researched this specific
question, and as a researcher, I am a bit hesitant to simply give my opinion. I
think cultural preconceptions, be it on a national basis, or on a basis of ethnicity,
religion or gender, run really deep. I think the most productive way of dealing
with them, notably in the workplace, is for people to have face-to-face contact
with each other and learn about each other. But making this happen through a
medium like Zoom is not without challenges: it is possible, but it is hard work.
So while I would hedge my position, I am rather pessimistic about how cultural
differences can be managed in the context of remote, technologically mediated
work. This is a very interesting research topic.
Mehdi Majidi, Professor at Fort Hays State University and

international consultant in sustainable socioeconomic
development
Part of your research relates specifically to the cultural dimensions of management. What are
your initial observations in regard to the management of the pandemic?
We can identify clear differences in the management of the pandemic in dif-
ferent countries as well as different approaches and styles used by governments
to communicate their initiatives, regardless of the political system involved. For
instance, certain leaders “weaponised” the pandemic for domestic political gain
or international trade negotiations. My work and experience focuses on the trust
factor between governments and citizens, the degree of collectivism versus in-
dividualism in cultures at national levels as well as the humanistic management
approach at the organisational level. In my current research on the cultural di-
mensions of COVID-19 management, my preliminarily observations are to some
degree supported by the findings presented in Bloomberg’s “Covid Resilience

Ranking Report”, notably their conclusion that a widespread degree of govern-
ment trust and social compliance is an ongoing factor of consistently high-ranked
economies.2
In addition to the link you draw between trust and economic level, what other factors have
particularly been fore-grounded by the global health crisis?
Another striking factor is, depending on the culture, the perception of self as
part of the community and the interdependency of the individual and the whole
within both individual and collective spheres. To take a very concrete example,
this difference is illustrated in the way we communicate our home address. It
seems that there is a difference in perception of community when, in writing
our home address, we start with our name, street, city and country, in contrast to
starting with the country. In the latter case, this seems to say that a country should
exist in order for the city, street and my home to exist and, therefore, for myself to
exist as an individual who lives there. Certain contributions to this volume, such
as those which address China’s handling of the crisis and their narrative strategy of
a “global community of health for all”, can be set against the backdrop of such cul-
turally determined perceptions of self as part of the community and humanity as a
whole. China offers an interesting case in point, which confirms many aspects of
Geert Hofstede’s work on cultural dimensions, such as the way we measure time
and what we consider or not to be long-term as opposed to short term.3 Measur-
ing cultural dimensions in China, researchers realised that the Western definition
of “long-term” is relatively short in the context of this national culture, where it
is understood in terms of civilisation and history. Thus, researchers had to divide
the concept of “long-term” into nuanced notions of “perceivable long-term” and
“non-perceivable long-term” to better match the reality.
Another issue that has been thrown into the limelight due to the pandemic
is that of trust in relation to Information Technology (IT) and Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI), and the activities of these companies and Big Data in the manage-
ment of the pandemic. The health crisis has accelerated the power of AI, which
has been presented as an essential technology for the survival of humanity. How-
ever, there has not been sufficient reflection on the general governance of IT and
AI companies. The speed and span of AI and Big Data, not only as they stand but
as they progress, have been causing discussions which are often loud and contro-
versial. In current work in preparation on the relationship between intelligence
and consciousness, I discuss these concerns, not only in regard to ethics and
integrity in business management but also in regard to the general conversation
about the future and existence of humankind as we know it. Despite necessary
reservations, there can be no doubt about the overall benefits of the new inno-
vations in every aspect of life at the individual, social and global levels. Of the
many issues facing our world, one of the most pressing – healthcare – is a prime
example that demonstrates how this vast field can benefit from established and
emerging technologies.
AI, Big Data and robots are becoming more and more self-sufficient and in-
dependent of human involvement in their operations. It can be argued that the
rapid advancement of these technologies is making individuals irrelevant within
the general model of socioeconomic development and that these advances are
putting an end to individualism and liberalism. As Shoshana Zuboff writes in
her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019), the business model of Internet
companies is centred on the aim to sell the future behaviour of human beings
and accurately predict human decisions about consumption or political opin-
ions.4 This market of the future is, theoretically and practically, similar to other
determining marketplaces of the future such as that of the oil market. However,
they currently lack adequate regulations and a sustainable business model which
would bring into play moral and ethical values. Short-term survival should not
prevent us from reflecting over the long-term (or rather not-perceivable long-
term) survival of humanity.
Danièle Linhart, Sociologist of work, Emeritus research director,

CNRS, France
As a sociologist, how do you evaluate the influence of culture in regard to the management
of the pandemic?
The management of the pandemic is very interesting to think about in rela-
tion to the workplace. If we take the example of France, it is striking to see that
the way in which the French government dealt with this pandemic is culturally
linked to the dominant ideology of French management with respect to its em-
ployees. For instance, when the pandemic began, the government considered
that it was at all costs necessary to establish a hold on French citizens, in order
to prevent the epidemic from flaring up. And in the context of a democracy like
the French one, which is real and has resisted the pandemic, it was necessary to
establish a psychological hold on the French people to avoid any waves.
At the outbreak of the pandemic, France, unlike other countries, was coming
out of the crisis of the “yellow vests” protest movement, which had been consid-
ered very threatening, very problematic and violent. And, at the same time, there
had been many demonstrations against plans to reform pensions. So, France was
in turmoil, and the government needed to guarantee subordination. I deliberately
choose the term “subordination” as it is also valid for the workplace since employ-
ees are linked by a bond of subordination to their management. In a way, the gov-
ernment wanted to ensure the subordination of the French citizen and developed
communication that was quite extreme with the aim to scare and even terrorise
and infantilise. So, to scare people, there was a lot of information about the danger
and about the totally unprecedented and global nature of the pandemic. There
was also infantilisation because there was really the idea of “do what you are
told”, even if the various measures that were announced could be contradictory.
For example, the French people were first told not to wear masks because they
would not know how to wear them; then, a few months later, there was a 135-
euro fine if the French were caught in the street without a mask. And we can also
talk about infantilisation because of the lack of trust. For instance, French citizens
had to fill out authorisations to leave their house and make sure every line of the
authorisation was filled out; otherwise, they were liable for a fine.
This reminded me of the book by the Canadian author Naomie Klein, The
Shock Doctrine (2007), which is extremely interesting because it shows how gov-
ernments want to impose a kind of “revolution”, especially within the frame-
work of liberalism, or ultra-liberalism, by sending shocks or electroshocks to
the population so that they consider that they must comply with the govern-
ment’s proposals, which, therefore, appear reassuring. Klein does not use the
term “infantilisation”, but there is a parallel in that a shock is imposed in order
to start again, as if with a clean slate, and start a new chapter in the history of
the country.5
How does this specifically relate to the workplace?
For me, as a sociologist of work, I’ve already written that I had the impression
that what was being applied during the pandemic to the French citizen was the
same managerial logic that applies in the French workplace. How is this so? Be-
cause in French companies there is a logic of stripping French employees of their
skills and their experience, in order to create a kind of subjective precariousness
among employees, which encourages them to give themselves directly over to
managerial instructions and follow to the letter the procedures, protocols, pro-
cesses and practices provided by other specialists. So the idea of vulnerability, of
making employees vulnerable so that they hand themselves over to the experts
and management, is something that I have really seen at work in French compa-
nies. And to illustrate the strategy of chaos I can take an example that dates back
to the end of the 1990s. Back then, I was talking to a middle-level manager of
the then-national public telecommunications company, France Télécom. He told
me that his job consisted of “producing amnesia”. He said to me:
We want to engineer a commercial shift, we are going to leave the public

sector and privatise. And so we have to wipe the slate clean, we have to
make the public service agents forget all their previous professional values
of public service.
And when I asked him how he planned to achieve this, he replied that it was
simple – “we shake the coconut tree, we change everything all the time, and
therefore we make the experience and knowledge of employees obsolete so that
we can rebuild other professional behaviour”. This illustrates something intrinsic
about French management, which is defined by extremes: humanisation on the
one hand, and Taylorisation on the other, with a third factor which is that of
perpetual change in order to strip employees of their collective skills and experi-
ences so as to make them dependent on management.
And I believe that all this is an inherent part of French culture. There is
the preconceived idea that being a manager in France is complicated. As some
managers say, France is “Grèviland”, or “Strike-land” because it is the country
where employees strike the most, and where it is necessary to be the most wary
of employees. French managers say that the French still look to 1789 – the recent
yellow vest protest movement is a good example of this –, and managers have also
not forgotten 1968 when there was a three-week general strike with occupation
of all the factories. All this convinced French managers that it was much more
difficult to be a manager in France and that they had to find ways, democratic
ways, to obtain the consent of the French employee, and we have seen similar
phenomena in the way the French government has managed the health crisis.
Laurence Lucias, Instructor and pedagogical officer for

adult training in international commerce, Centre Techniques
Internationales (CTI), France
One of your roles is to accompany job applicants during the job search procedure. Like
workplace practice and procedures more generally, this is one area that has undergone radical
change due to the health crisis, has it not?
Yes, the job recruitment procedure has been transformed, together with the
work of human resource managers. The skills that are sought by recruiters are
also changing, as organisations adapt to new work practices. There are also career
transformations as people adapt to the new job market and move to the sectors
which have resisted and have even benefited from the crisis, such as health, the
agro-food industry, purchasing and logistics, engineering and production, IT
and marketing. Each of these sectors requires specific training.
An interesting comparison can be drawn between the sanitary crisis and the
financial crisis of 2008, which was the last crisis to have affected the job market
in such a major way. Unlike in 2008, when there were many layoffs and retire-
ment plans, when people were not replaced and profitability was the only con-
cern, recruitment did not come to a halt in 2020 and 2021, but simply declined.
And more recently, depending on the sector and the country, recruitment has
even picked up quite suddenly. Also, compared to 2008 and its aftermath, com-
panies have acted quite differently during the sanitary crisis, which has been a
shared, planetary social experience.
For some of the transformations, you view COVID-19 as an accelerator of changes that had
already been set in motion beforehand. What were these trends?
A number of transformations concern digitalisation, marketing and personal
branding. For example, for some years now, artificial intelligence has been used
to perform the first part of the selection process (for instance, the scanning of
CVs for key terms relating to the job offer). And many job interviews were al-
ready being carried out via the digital interface, including formats adopted by
big organisations whereby applicants are recorded introducing themselves and
responding to questions with the computer screen to talk to, but no recruiter or
physical person. The selection process is now typically hybrid and contains mul-
tiple, carefully orchestrated stages. However, at the same time, what we are cur-
rently observing, since business has picked up, is that the pace of the recruitment
process has also picked up. Procedures which were drawn out over a fortnight
are now completed within two days: for instance, a phone interview will be im-
mediately followed the next day by a face-to-face interview, with the applicant
receiving the job offer immediately after that. What is also moving at a fast pace
are the changes occurring in the way job offers are being disseminated. A very
recent trend is that it is no longer simply the social media specialised in recruit-
ment, such as LinkedIn, that companies are using to post job offers, they are also
turning to other platforms, such as Instagram. To reach out to applicants, compa-
nies are using all the social media and not just the professionally oriented media.
This is linked to another crucial change, which concerns the relationship be-
tween the recruiter and the job applicant. And, I think this is what has changed
the most in the past two years. Beforehand, it was the applicant who was in a
weak position and who was the only protagonist whose job it was to convince
the other party. Now, companies have to work on attracting the applicant and
on convincing them to join the company. To recruit the right person, recruiters
have to adapt, be innovative and creative.
So the sanitary crisis has given rise to new forms of behaviour?
Applicants have not become less demanding due to the crisis. They are look-
ing for new things, such as a company that is virtuous, ecologic, fair and sustaina-
ble, a company that carries out concrete actions to favour diversity and inclusion.
They are also more focused on their own health and well-being, want to have
flexible working arrangements and are now asking to be able to work both from
home and, at the same time, go into the office. Flexibility has been democratised.
The pandemic has seen the advent of the “neo-worker” generation who appre-
ciate this mode of working.
Ludovic Bossé, Entrepreneur and CEO of Interfert (organic

fertilisers and soil improvement products)
How has the pandemic affected international business negotiations?

With each crisis we face, what deteriorates between countries and, therefore,
also between international companies and business partners is trust. Trust can-
not be forged, for example, via meetings on Zoom. Online communication is
useful for maintaining a business relation (and this is what we have done during
the pandemic), but trust is something that needs to be built up in person and at
the moment it is really important to get back and meet clients and partners again
“for real”.
From a more technical point of view, it is also becoming more and more
difficult to launch a commercial partnership because what counts most now is
financing. For instance, a purchasing company has to provide solid, up-front

financial guarantees; otherwise, the supplier will simply not deliver the goods or
services. Credit insurers and banks play a crucial role in these relations, but they
themselves are becoming much stricter about providing guarantees. This is even
leading to customers making cash payments to ensure that the goods are, indeed,
delivered to them.
And these issues add to the already widely recognised escalating costs of transport and raw
materials?
Yes, the pandemic slowed down international trade, and so, the supply of
transport was reduced. This immediately made international logistics much
more expensive. For example, between November 2020 and October 2021, the
cost of transport for a shipping container was multiplied by 14. Due to this crisis,
the question of what is essential has become central. Certain sectors of activity
have become essential because they enable us to meet our so-called primary
needs (in particular, food, water and hygiene). In addition, it is becoming cru-
cial for manufacturers to protect themselves by securing their raw materials;
otherwise, many sites risk stopping production. Commercial operators are, thus,
concentrating on their essential needs. Up until now, we have worked according
to a “just-in-time” model. This has to change. Many manufacturers now want to
constitute “emergency” stocks, but this artificially increases demand and prices.
There is a saying that if you stretch the elastic band too far, it breaks and this is
what is happening now. Shortages of raw material supplies are going to continue
to multiply.
And what would you say about changes in workplace stakes more generally?
Any crisis provides opportunities that are seized by the most daring people.
The pandemic has acted like an accelerator for the new generation. We have to
keep up with new technologies, be curious, listen out for new things and antic-
ipate. We also have to be extremely reactive and extremely flexible. Everyone is
working faster, but when we work faster, we are more prone to make mistakes, so
we have to exercise precaution as well. This is a period which requires everyone
to reinvent themselves.
Joselyne Studer Laurens, Vice President of the National

Training Committee for French Foreign Trade Advisors
(Commission nationale Formation des Conseillers du Commerce
extérieur de la France)
You are a member of the Committee of French Foreign Trade Advisors. Could you explain
what purpose this serves and how your role has been affected by COVID-19?
There are currently 4,800 French foreign trade advisors, both women and
men, who represent 1,700 companies. We are appointed by the French Prime
Minister, but we remain independent. We work on a voluntary basis to fulfil
three main missions: improve the attractiveness of France in terms of trade, ad-
vise public authorities and encourage young people to work in the international
sector. We work for periods abroad, and for other periods in France. Some of us
are “global nomad managers” who travel around with our smartphone and com-
puter; others are expatriate managers although expatriation is becoming a thing
of the past due to the cost and the fact that technology makes it less essential.
Nowadays, it is more common practice for international companies to hire local
managers who are bicultural or even tri-cultural.
Since COVID-19, work practices have, indeed, undergone a profound trans-
formation. We are faced with technological changes, we have to respect these
changes and we have to anticipate. First of all, there is far more exchange. Thanks
to technology, we can bring together a lot of people from all over the world at
any time, and this helps exchange enormously. I can also quote the example of
our members who were blocked in China when there was the initial outbreak
of the pandemic. Even though they were stuck there, thanks to technology they
were able to continue to work and develop their businesses. The major challenge
is always to continue to serve the customer and thanks to digital technology; they
were able to continue to produce and serve their customers. This is all thanks
to remote work and digital technology and also to the fact that we have all been
profoundly flexible in terms of work capacity. Today, we are all needing to adapt
constantly.
We can help certain transformations because one of our roles is to advise the
public authorities. To make change happen faster, we can highlight specific ex-
amples to the authorities, who are often very slow to move. For instance, we have
moved things quite a lot with supply chains, in particular, by using the block
chain. We are looking at how to use new tools in order to have, for example,
“smart contracts”, contracts that can be settled as soon as the respective parties
have reached an agreement.
What are some of the problems of remote work that you identify?
One problem with distance is the first contact with a business partner. The
first contact is always difficult, even when you meet for the first time, and you
see each other and talk to each other. It is even more difficult at a distance. We
all spend almost ten hours a day in front of our computer, with Zoom, Micro-
soft Teams, whatever, and this is all quite complicated. But the fact remains that
today it is this technology which has enabled us to rise to the challenge of the
pandemic, to continue to produce and supply all channels, and this is a reality
which we also have to recognise.
Another big problem today is that there is a resurgence, a redeployment, of
violence, be it verbal violence, violence on the social networks and so on. Why
is this? It is because we no longer converse. It is not because we send an email
of three lines or listen politely to what someone says that we exchange points
of view, according to the art of negotiation, or the “art of conversation”, like
in the days of the salons of 18th-century France, when women were present in
philosophical and literary circles. Today, unfortunately, we have lost the art of
conversation. This is regrettable, and it needs to be put back on the agenda.
Can work practice change for the better? What role can advisors like yourself play?
We all have a responsibility when we recruit young people and when we man-
age employees all over the world in accordance with local cultures. One issue
is that of diversity. We have to make progress on gender diversity. Twenty-one
years ago, when I became a trade advisor, only 4% were women. Now, the figure
is between 12% and 14%. And, more generally, we need to work on representa-
tiveness of people from all over the world. Things need to be opened up more.
COVID-19 has undoubtedly made it possible to shake things up – not the co-
conut tree of employees who are going to fall, but the coconut tree of mentalities
which are fixed in square boxes. And, it is particularly true that in France we still
have heavy hierarchical systems. So is this potential going to be seized? My fear
is that it will not and that people will go back to their old habits. But the younger
generations are perhaps different. The researchers and sociologists will be able to
say more about this, but I hope that the younger generations of leaders will be
able to bring about change and break with past constraints. For instance, just as
citizens are increasingly setting their conditions in terms of the management of
the pandemic, so too are young people when they come to work in a company.
A young person who is recruited will now make it clear what they would like,
fix certain terms, announce certain work values. I can give you a personal exam-
ple. For a recent event, I wanted the programme to be printed on glossy paper.
But my young project manager told me that I could not, that I had to think of
the environment and that I had to send the program out digitally, or else use
recycled paper. But, of course, digital communication also weighs on carbon
consumption. So, we had a discussion about this and we came to a compromise:
we decided to use recycled paper and also to send the program out digitally. So,
things are moving forward because young people have different priorities, and a
different way of thinking.
Notes
1 Garikipati, Supriya & Kambhampati, Uma S. “Are women leaders really doing better
on coronavirus? The data backs it up.” The Conversation, August 28, 2020. https://
theconversation.com/are-women-leaders-really-doing-better-on-coronavirus-the-
data-backs-it-up-144809 [accessed November 11, 2021].
2 “Covid Resilience Ranking: The Best and Worst Places to Be in 2021.” https://
www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/ Page 1 of 15 [accessed
October 24, 2021].
3 https://geerthofstede.com [accessed October 24, 2021].
4 Zuboff, Shoshana . 2019. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human
Future at the Frontier of Power. New York: Public Affairs Publishers.
5 Klein, Naomie. 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Toronto:
Penguin Random House.
INDEX
anthropology 8, 99, 144 137–138, 140, 147, 160, 164, 168, 202,
Argentina 105–107 219, 223, 231, 241
argumentation 29, 65–66 community 8, 23–26, 37–41, 44–47, 52–88,
artificial intelligence 241, 244 110, 137, 139, 142, 144, 178, 192, 200,
asynchronous 157–160, 168, 219 213, 241
contextualisation 138
biopower 10, 96, 101, 104, 105–106, control see power
110, 193 conversation 116–117, 123–124, 126–127,
biotopia 104, 109 131–132, 144, 147, 157, 247–248
bioweapon 76, 87 coordination (syntactic) 117
blended learning 238 copresence 123–124, 126, 129, 131,
Brazil 27, 100–101, 221, 223 137–138, 141, 151, 191
corporate social responsibility 14, 163, 167
Chafe, Wallace 116–117, 122–124, 126 culture: corporate 167; digital 9; national 8,
Champy, François 187 10, 14, 54, 99–100, 105, 107–108, 238,
China 8–9, 12, 44, 52–54, 56, 58, 63–76, 241; participatory 9, 38, 138; work 210
81–88, 95, 100–101, 110, 174, 190, 211, culture shock 222
228, 231–232, 241, 247 cultural space 9, 15, 96, 104, 105, 109
citizen 10, 242–3
cognitive overload 136, 140, 148, 158 democracy 10, 27, 242
cohesion (at work) 13, 55, 139, 166, 185, dialogic 78, 117, 132, 135, 137
189, 191, 195 digital divide 8
communication: computer-mediated/ digitalisation 54, 57, 115, 244
digital/online communication 4, D’Iribarne, Philippe 8, 10, 179, 200, 204
6, 11–12, 15, 26, 31, 58–59, 105, discourse marker 126, 130
115–116, 124, 132, 135, 136–138, 140, diversity 245, 248; cultural 158–161;
146–147, 151, 152, 159, 163–169, linguistic 11, 156, 158
225, 226, 245, 248; face-to-face 11,
115–132, 175, 214, 238; organisational ecological transition (the) 163
120–122, 137; spoken 11, 138–152, email 118, 120–121, 140, 155, 159,
115–132, 157; virtual 7, 13, 115, 157, 164–166, 168, 247
160–161, 163, 165, 168; written 136, empathy 137–8, 140
140, 160, 161, 116–120, 124, 132, emotion 40, 55, 81, 190
250 Index
engagement 38, 53, 54–56, 59, 137, 146, Japan 96, 100, 101, 221, 222
148–151, 228–230 journalism 60
English (language) 24, 38, 42, 45, 78, 156,
205 knowledge 15, 40, 109, 155, 156, 157, 160,
environment, the 238, 248 180, 187, 188, 202, 209
Estonia 200, 203, 205, 207, 211, 212 knowledge economy, the 15, 38, 142, 145,
event management 135, 151, 170 146, 199, 205
expatriation 221–222, 227 knowledge worker 9, 209, 239
expert 25, 109
language 8, 9, 11, 13, 29, 30, 77, 79, 104,
Fairclough, Norman 5, 14, 79, 145, 148, 151 109, 117, 123, 124, 131, 144, 149–150,
Foucault, Michel (Foucauldian) 5, 10, 21, 156, 157, 158, 160, 168, 205, 213, 223,
56, 95–96, 101–104, 108–110, 201–202, 224; body 129, 130, 131, 139; foreign
207, 210–213, 213, 214 157, 158, 160; local 223, 224; spoken
France 9–12, 22–23, 26–27, 31, 33, 167, 118, 123; written 117, 123; working 157,
178–180, 185–193, 200, 203–204, 158, 160; vague 117, 123
206, 208, 221, 223, 229, 231, 233–234, lockdown 4, 6, 21, 22, 34, 108, 122, 139,
238–239, 242–244, 246–247 143, 152, 167, 173, 179, 190, 192, 193,
194, 212, 217, 222, 229, 230, 233, 238
gender 8, 77, 159, 238, 240, 248
generation gap (the) 159, 160, 164, 168, management (corporate) 5, 10, 13, 14, 77,
245, 246 99, 120, 152, 158, 159, 173, 174, 178,
genre (discursive) 21, 25, 136, 142–143, 145 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 232, 233
Germany 9, 12, 78, 96, 101, 121, 228, manager: Community 142, 144; nomad
229–231, 238 218; project 165, 218, 219, 248
Gumperz, John 122–124, 131 mass media see media
media, the 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 22–33, 38,
Hall, Edward T. 7, 95–98, 104, 108, 110 41–47, 76, 78, 80, 83, 87, 108, 115,
Halliday, Micheal A. 83, 146 116, 121, 185, 186, 190, 192–195, 199;
hiring see recruitment mass 4; social 4, 11, 53–68, 105, 120,
heterotopia 5, 95, 101–103, 110, 202, 209, 165, 245
210, 214; homotopia 110 media richness theory 116, 119–122, 128,
Hofstede, Geert 99–100, 108, 110 130, 131, 155–159
home-schooling 4, 140, 231 media synchronicity theory 155–156
Hong Kong 31, 100, 101, 238 meeting (business) 13, 141, 164, 166, 168,
horizontal (e.g. work relations, knowledge- 169, 207, 218, 225, 226
sharing) 9, 15, 54 modality (grammatical) 86, 205, 206, 207
monologic 117, 130, 137, 138, 149, 151
identity 12, 14–15, 96, 119, 185, 191, multimodality 59, 140, 219
194–196, 219–221 multinational 141, 143, 159, 160, 161
India 96, 100, 101, 221, 223 multitask 140
informality (+ informal) 118, 119, 127, 140,
142, 144, 150, 151, 187 negotiation 128–131, 247
instant messaging 115, 118, 120, 155, 158, neoliberalism (+ neoliberal) 5, 200, 209,
159, 165, 167, 168, 231 211, 213, 214
interaction 97–99, 105, 115–132, 137–142, new economy see neoliberalism
159, 175, 177–178, 187, 193, 211, 213,
217–219, 224–226 office 4–5, 12, 125, 160, 166–167, 174,
intercultural see management 176–179, 183, 199, 201–201, 206, 208,
intern 174, 176, 177, 178 210–214, 218–220, 230–234, 239, 245;
Internet, the 9, 13, 58, 63, 120, 121, 136, flex 5, 183; home 5, 140, 143, 155,
141, 169, 190 160, 174, 176–179, 201–203, 206, 208,
intonation 118, 132, 168 210–214, 230–234, 245; open-plan 5, 14,
involvement theory 122–127, 129, 130, 131 180, 210
Index 251
open space (office) see open-plan office storytelling 59–60, 127

onboarding 228, 233–234 subordination (syntactic) 117–118
surveillance 13, 41, 190, 201, 211, 228,
participation 53–57, 137–140, 149–151, 231–232, 237, 239
160–161 sustainability 84, 163, 140, 142, 145
patient(s) 22, 26, 30, 32, 103, 109, 189–195 synchronicity 121, 141, 146–147, 150,
policy (public) 14, 28, 31, 34, 40, 54–55, 63, 155–161, 219
104, 107–109, 194, 240
power 8, 10, 13–14, 53–57, 77–79, 103–105, Tannen, Deborah 116, 123–124, 126–127,
119, 147–148, 152, 159, 180, 219, 222; 131
biopower 96, 101, 104–105, 109–110, Taylorisation 180, 243
193; control 10, 13–15, 33–35, 63, 67, technology 6, 11, 13, 15, 54, 99–100, 110,
84–88, 95–96, 100, 104, 110–111, 148, 136–137, 140–141, 147, 149, 155–156,
176, 179–184, 192, 201, 239 158–161, 199, 204, 207, 230, 237, 239,
procedure (management) 4, 105, 180–181, 241, 247; digital 13, 181, 199, 230, 241
221, 223, 243–245 telework see remote work
pronoun (personal) 117, 123–124, 126 text-messaging 59–60, 115, 118–120, 136,
proxemics 96–99, 105, 122 155, 159, 165, 167, 231
public authority (public authorities) 21, time zone 13, 155, 218, 222, 233
26–29, 33, 37, 63, 95, 109 tracking see surveillance
Trump, Donald 27, 40, 76, 81, 83, 108, 109
QR code 6, 13, 231 trust 10, 12–13, 37–47, 53, 160–162,
quarantine 199, 208, 217, 231 165–168, 179, 184, 192, 224, 227, 231,
233, 237, 240–245
recruitment (hiring) 143, 228–229, turn-taking 116, 129, 137
232–234, 237, 244–245
uncertainty 8, 9, 24, 42–44, 47, 52;
relexicalization 124–126 avoidance 8, 9, 99–100, 188
remote office see home office United States, the (U.S.A.) 12, 25, 27, 30,
remote work (telework) 4–8, 12–16, 40, 64, 76, 81–84, 87, 96, 101, 105, 108,
155–156, 159, 161, 169, 173–184, 186, 120, 199–214, 221–222, 228, 232–233,
190–191, 194, 199–214, 215–227, 228, 239
230–234, 239–240, 247
repetition (lexical) 124, 126–127, 205 vaccination see vaccine
rhetoric 6, 8, 14, 28, 33, 59, 63–64, 67, vaccination passports 96, 110, 186,
79–81, 84, 88, 138–139, 142 189, 194
vaccine 7, 13, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 43, 44,
sanitary pass 10, 13, 186, 190, 186, 189, 52–68, 84, 85, 105, 108–110, 185–196,
190, 194 221, 223
Saudi Arabia 105–107 value 11, 138, 180–181, 226–227; cultural 5,
skill 138, 141, 170, 176, 178, 180, 183–184, 64, 78–79, 100–101, 105, 200; ideological
211, 239, 243–244; interpersonal 174 56; moral 14, 24–25, 54, 196, 242–243;
Slack (platform) 158, 160, 164, 168 social 7, 57, 86, 145, 151, 180–181, 186,
social distancing 9, 96, 105–106, 109–110, 204, 248
135, 161 video conference 4, 13, 115, 120–122,
socialisation 14, 197, 211, 214, 227 130–131, 155–161, 168, 175–176, 208,
social media see media 224–225
social networks see social media Vietnam 9, 167
social presence theory 119, 122–123 virtual team 5, 11, 122, 155–161, 167,
solidarity 11, 13, 55, 76–88, 124, 181, 191, 219–220, 223, 225, 228, 247
224, 240 visual cue 118, 122–123, 129, 131, 157
spokesperson 11, 64, 66, 76–88, 109
statistics 6, 11, 30, 32–33, 44, 85, 188, Web 2.0 15, 137, 142
200–201, 206 webinar 11, 135–152, 163, 168, 169
252 Index
website (corporate) 11, 26, 120, 137, 139, World Health Organisation (WHO) 42, 45,
145, 165, 224 66, 76, 82–85
WeChat 231–232
wellbeing 14, 64, 86, 180–181, 220, Zoom 122, 127, 129, 136, 140, 158,
230–231 160, 168–169, 207, 225, 240, 245,
work setting see office 247

COVID-19, Communication and Culture - Beyond The Global Workplace

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‘In 2020 the global workplace underwent a fundamental change with the al-

Elvis Buckwalter is Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Lan-

This series examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on individuals,

Titles in this Series:

COVID-19 and Childhood Inequality

The Color of COVID-19

Social and Political Representations of the COVID-19 Crisis

Playful Pedagogy in the Pandemic

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com

ISBN: 9781032232638 (hbk)

1 Introduction: COVID-19, communication, culture and the

2 Responding to the pandemic: a discourse analysis approach 21

3 Wikipedia as a trusted method of information assessment

4 Understanding China’s “intermestic” online vaccination-

5 Formulating a discourse of solidarity amid COVID-19:

6 COVID-19 and communication through the lens of culture 95

7 Why face-to-face communication matters: a comparison of

8 COVID-19 and the rise of digitalised spoken

9 Managing multilingual teams in a virtual context 155

10 Communicating on the job during COVID-19: some

11 Remote work and the contemporary workplace: the

12 COVID-19 and the culture of professions: issues and

13 From privilege to duty: changing media representations of

14 International managers and expatriates in the face of the

15 Working internationally during COVID-19: professional

16 Concluding virtual round-table discussion: COVID-19,

6.1 E.T. Hall’s Interpersonal Distances based on proxemics 98

4.1 Text modality of vaccination-themed Weibo posts 60

Elvis Buckwalter is Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Lan-

Zhao Alexandre Huang is Associate Professor of Communication at Univer-

Marge Käsper is Lecturer and Researcher in French Studies at the University

Almut Koester is Professor of English Business Communication at Vienna

Danièle Linhart is Emeritus Research Director at the French National Cen-

Dominique Maingueneau is Emeritus Professor in Discourse Analysis at

Raili Marling is Professor of English Studies at the University of Tartu, Estonia.

Sylvie Parrini-Alemanno is Professor in Communications at the Conservatoire

Fiona Rossette-Crake is Professor in the Department of Applied Languages

Antonin Segault is Associate Professor of Information Sciences and Commu-

Dennis Tay is Associate Professor in the Department of English and Commu-

Helene Tenzer is Associate Professor of International Business at Tübingen

Susanne Tietze is Professor of Multilingual Management at Sheffield Hallam

Yating Yu is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of English and Commu-

Rudong Zhang is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Health Communication at the

Perrine Rozec, CCIFV, Vietnam

When the World Health Organization first declared COVID-19 to be a pan-

Fiona Rossette-Crake and Elvis Buckwalter

This edited collection aims to contribute to the growing body of scholarship

population. For example, differences can be established between the types of

case in point: some striking phenomena can be explained in light of national

Maingueneau discusses some of the many discursive realities of the manage-

testimonials of five professionals, Leticia Correa do Carmo, Maria Martha

building new partnerships or clinching new trade agreements. Looking beyond

been stigmatised as providing a “non-essential” service in the context of imposed

A situation of discursive saturation

– In ordinary discursive moments, the production of texts may be intense,

Under these conditions, it would be more relevant to speak of “discursive

Crisis and experts

2019). Various types can be distinguished: material catastrophes (fires, hurri-

by social networks. The debates about the efficiency of vaccination or hydrox-

This demonstrates once again the complexification of the contemporary

Politicians and experts

The creation of this committee – or scientific “council” –, requested by

TABLE 4.1 Text modality of vaccination-themed Weibo posts

TABLE 4.2 Text modality of vaccination-themed tweets

TABLE 4.4 Using nuanced expressions for intermestic narratives4

TABLE 4.5 China’s international responsibility-related posts5

TABLE 4.6 Intermestic mutual argumentation tactic6