Guillermo Salvador vs. Patricia, Inc. GR. No.

195834, November 9, 2016

DOCTRINE:

Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil Code as builders in
good faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the respondent's comments,... which they did not deny,
they had been lessees of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to
possession in good faith, their occupation not being in the concept of owners.

Facts:

This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property occupied
by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.

Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their
respective improvements along Juan Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in
their Complaint pending the quieting of title on the merits.

The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of
Manila. A Complaint-in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land
occupied by the plaintiffs. Another Complaint-in-Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was also filed
alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.

A preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants.

To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and
respondent Patricia, Inc., the RTC appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three geodetic
engineers as commissioners,... the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and
against Patricia, Inc., permanently enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the
former from their respective premises, and from collecting any rentals from them. The RTC
deemed it more sound to side with two of the commissioners who had found that the land
belonged to the City of Manila

On appeal, the CA,... reversed the RTC's judgment... and dismissed the complaint. The CA
declared that the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to
maintain a suit for quieting of title; castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber stamp of the
majority of the commissioners; opined that the RTC should have conducted hearings on the
reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper the adjudication of the boundary dispute
in an action for quieting of title

The CA denied the motions for reconsideration

Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.

Issues:

The petitioners did not show that they were real parties in interest to demand either injunction or
quieting of title

The petitioners did not have a cause of action for injunction

Ruling:

Even assuming that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for quieting of title, the
petitioners failed to allege and prove their interest to maintain the suit. Hence, the dismissal of
this cause of action was warranted.

An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil action governed by the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for quieting
of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked
to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to put things
in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But "for
an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.

To determine whether the petitioners as plaintiffs had the requisite interest to bring the suit, a
resort to the allegations of the complaint is necessary.

The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show their authority or
other legal basis on which they had anchored their alleged lawful occupation and superior
possession of the property. On the contrary, they only contended that their continued
possession of the property had been for more than 30 years; that they had built their houses in
good faith; and that the area had been declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under
Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended. Yet, none of such reasons validly clothed them with
the necessary interest to maintain the action for quieting of title. For one, the authenticity of the
title of the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc. was not disputed but was even admitted by them
during trial. As such, they could not expect to have any right in the property other than that of
occupants whose possession was only tolerated by the owners and rightful possessors. This
was because land covered by a Torrens title cannot b e acquired by prescription or by adverse
possession.

Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil Code as builders in
good faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the respondent's comments,... which they did not deny,
they had been lessees of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to
possession in good faith, their occupation not being in the concept of owners.

the Court observes that the fact that the area was declared an area for priority development (APD)
under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended, did not provide sufficient interest to the
petitioners. When an area is declared as an APD, the occupants would enjoy the benefits provided
for in Presidential Decree No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban land Reform in the Philippines and
Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof). In Frilles v. Yambao,... Presidential Decree
No. 1517 only granted to the occupants of APDs the right of first refusal, but such grant was true
only if and when the owner of the property decided to sell the property. Only then would the right
of first refusal accrue. Consequently, the right of first refusal remained contingent, and was for
that reason insufficient to vest any title, legal or equitable, in the petitioners. Moreover, the CA's
adverse judgment dismissing their complaint as far as the action to quiet title was concerned was
correct. The main requirement for the action to be brought is that there is a deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding casting cloud on the plaintiffs' title that is alleged and shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, the
eliminates the existence of the requirement. Their admission of the genuineness and authenticity
of Patricia, Inc.'s title negated the existence of such deed, instrument, encumbrance or proceeding
that was invalid, and thus the action must necessarily fail.

Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a

particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a
particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction
seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and
contained in the judgment.

Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected
and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has
fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose.

Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be protected. The records
show, however, that they did not have any right to be protected because they had established
only the existence of the boundary dispute between Patricia, Inc. and the City of Manila. Any
violation of the boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would give rise to the right of action in favor of
the City of Manila only. The dispute did not concern the petitioners at all.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO
ORDERED.
FILIPINAS ESLON MANUFACTURING CORP. v. HEIRS OF BASILIO LLANES, GR No.
194114, 2019-03-27

DOCTRINE:

Raising the invalidity of a certificate of title in an action for quieting of title is NOT a collateral
attack because it is central, imperative, and essential in such an action that the complainant
shows the invalidity of the deed which casts cloud on his title. In other words, at the heart of the
Complaint for Quieting of Title instituted by petitioner FEMCO is the nullification of OCT No. 0-
1040 in order to remove the cloud besetting its own title. This is manifestly a direct attack.

Facts:

[Petitioner FEMCO] is a manufacturer of "eslon pipes and accessories." Its manufacturing plant
is located within a 50,528 square-meter land, known as Lot B-2, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. (TCT) T-17460 (a.f.), which is situated in Barrio Sta. Felomina, Iligan City.

Atty. Alfredo Busico, counsel for [respondents] Heirs of Basilio Llanes, wrote a Letter to the
management of [petitioner] FEMCO informing them that its plant site may have encroached into
his clients' properties

In a Letter dated 16 February 1994, Atty. Gerardo Padilla, counsel for [petitioner] FEMCO,
replied that his client's property is covered by a valid certificate of title - TCT No. T-17460 (a.f.)-
He also informed Atty. Busico that upon his inquiry with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City, he
discovered that:1) Lot 1911 is titled in the name of one Basilio Llanes. His title thereto is
evidenced by OCTNo. 0-1040 (a.f.) based on Decree No. N-182390 dated April 17,1968
[allegedly issued by the Hon. Teodulo Tandayag of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Lanao del
Norte.]2) Per Cadastral record, only Messrs. Pio Echaves and Pedro Q. Solosa filed an
answer/claims for Lot 1911, which answer still exists.3) Again, per record, your client Basilio
Llanes did not file an answer/claim to said Lot 1911.4) Finally, per record, Lot 1911 is NOT yet
decreed in the name of any person, let alone your client Basilio Llanes.Atty. Padilla concluded
that OCT No. 0-1040 (a.f.) which is registered in the name of Basilio Llanes is spurious.No
further communication between Atty. Busico and Atty. Padilla transpired thereafter.

Issues:

The central issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding that: (1)
petitioner FEMCO's Complaint for Quieting of Title is a prohibited collateral attack on a
certificate of title; (2) petitioner FEMCO, in filing its Complaint, resorted to a wrong remedy since
a separate action would require the modification or interference with the judgment or order of
another co-equal court; and (3) petitioner FEMCO had no personality to institute the Complaint.

Ruling:

The Complaint for Quieting of Title as a Prohibited Collateral Attack against Certificates of Title

The CA posits that since in petitioner FEMCO's Complaint for Quieting of Title, the relief actually
sought for was the nullification of OCT No. 0-1040 (a.f.) and all other titles emanating therefrom:
"This action is clearly an indirect or collateral attack because the suit which [petitioner] FEMCO
filed before the [RTC] prayed for a different relief, which is not proper in an action for quieting of
title. Instead, it referred to the annulment of OCT No. 0-1040 and Decree No. N-182390,
including the subsequent transfer certificates of title."18

In essence, the CA believes that an action for quieting of title which involves a challenge to the
validity of a certificate of title is a collateral attack which is prohibited by law.

The CA is mistaken.

Jurisprudence explains that an action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its
objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action
to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.19

An action to quiet title or to remove the clouds over a title is a special civil action governed by
the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for
quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to put
things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and
not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear
introduce: the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he
deems best. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to
be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.20

In the instant case, the Complaint filed by petitioner FEMCO alleged and, as found by the RTC,
sufficiently proved these two requisites for quieting of title: that petitioner FEMCO has a legal
right in the subject property by virtue of TCT No. T-17460 (a.f.); and that the deed claimed to be
casting a cloud on the title of petitioner FEMCO, i.e., OCT No. 0-1040 (a.f.) based on Decree
No. N-182390 dated April 17, 1968, is invalid, null, and void.

Hence, raising the invalidity of a certificate of title in an action for quieting of title is NOT a
collateral attack because it is central, imperative, and essential in such an action that the
complainant shows the invalidity of the deed which casts cloud on his title. In other words, at the
heart of the Complaint for Quieting of Title instituted by petitioner FEMCO is the nullification of
OCT No. 0-1040 in order to remove the cloud besetting its own title. This is manifestly a direct
attack.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated August 23, 2010 promulgated by the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, Twenty-First
Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 62936 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
September 30, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, City of Iligan,
Branch 6 in Civil Case No. 06-3337 is REINSTATED.
DESIDERIO DALISAY INVESTMENTS v. SSS G.R. No. 231053, April 04, 2018 Action to Quiet
Title, Dacion en Pago, Contract of Sale

MARCH 25, 2021

DOCTRINE:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

FACTS:

Respondent SSS filed a case before the Social Security Commission (SSC) against the Dalisay
Group of Companies (DGC) for the collection of unremitted SSS premium contributions of the
latter’s employees.

Desiderio Dalisay, then President of petitioner offered the subject land and building to offset
DGC’s liabilities.

Atty. Cabarroguis, representing DGC, stated that he has “the authority to offer [the properties] in
the amount of 2 million pesos.” He also assured them that that they will turn the properties over
to SSS free of liens and encumbrances. The offer for dacion was accepted at the appraised
value of P2,000,000. As regards the implementation of the dacion, Atty. Cabarroguis stated that
“[t)]he Legal Department of the SSS can prepare the Deed of Sale or whatever documents that
have to be prepared. My clients are ready to vacate the premises and you can have it occupied
anytime.”

The SSC then informed DDII of its acceptance of the proposed dacion in payment, including its
specified terms and conditions.

Dalisay passed away and the company’s total obligations allegedly amounted to
P15,689,684.93.

Later, PNB executed a Deed of Confirmatory Sale in favor of DDII for properties that it
reacquired, including the property subject of the present dispute.
Eddie A. Jara, Assistant Vice-President of the SSS, executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over
the properties subject of the instant case because of the companies’ failure to turn over the
certificates of title to SSS.

Jara formally demanded the certificates of title over the properties subject of the dacion. Jara
stated that the titles were not delivered to the SSS in violation of the express terms in the dacion
in payment that the Dalisay group should deliver the titles after the release of the mortgage with
the PNB.”

Dalisay-Tirol, who was then the President of DDII, stated that the corporation could not at that
time give due course to and act on the matter because of several issues that need to be
resolved first.

Despite repeated written and verbal demands made by SSS for DDII to deliver the titles of the
subject property, free from all liens and encumbrances, DDII still failed to comply.

DDII filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against SSS.

DDII asserted that it is the owner of the subject property.

According to DDII, there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. Consequently, there
was no dation in payment to speak of, contrary to the claim of SSS.

SSS argued that the offer for dacion was categorically accepted by SSS, thereby perfecting
such.

The RTC held that there was no perfected dacion in payment between the parties.
Consequently, SSS has no legal personality to own, possess, and occupy the property.

On appeal, the CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE the RTC decision insofar as it granted the
complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages in favor of [DDII].

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was a perfected “Dacion en Pago”.

RULING:

We resolve to deny the petition.

Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or
any interest therein.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:

(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and

(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.

Here, if it can be proved that the proposed dacion was perfected, or even consummated, then
SSS’ claim which allegedly casts a cloud on DDII’s title is valid and operative, and consequently,
the action for quieting of title filed by DDII will not prosper.

Dacion en pago

Among other modes, an obligation is extinguished by payment or performance. There is

payment when there is delivery of money or performance of an obligation. Corollary thereto,
Article 1245 of the Civil Code provides for a special mode of payment called dacion in payment
(dacion en pago).

In dacion en pago, property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money. The
debtor delivers and transmits to the creditor the former’s ownership over a thing as an accepted
equivalent of the payment or performance of an outstanding debt. In such cases, Article 1245
provides that the law on sales shall apply, since the undertaking really partakes—in one
sense—of the nature of sale; that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the
debtor, the payment for which is to be charged against the debtor’s obligation.

As a mode of payment, dacion en pago extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of
the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties
by agreement—express or implied, or by their silence—consider the thing as equivalent to the
obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished. It requires delivery and
transmission of ownership of a thing owned by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of the obligation. There is no dacion in payment when there is no
transfer of ownership in the creditor’s favor, as when the possession of the thing is merely given
to the creditor by way of security.

In the case at hand, in order to determine whether or not there was indeed a perfected, or even
consummated, dacion in payment, it is necessary to review and assess the evidence and
events that transpired and see whether these correspond to the three stages of a contract of
sale. This is so since, as previously mentioned, dacion en pago agreements are governed,
among others, by the law on sales.

Stages of a contract of sale

Briefly, the stages of a contract of sale are:

(1) negotiation, covering the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate
interest in the contract to the time the contract is perfected;

(2) perfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements of the sale,
which is the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the object of the contract and upon the
price; and

(3) consummation, which begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under
the contract of sale, culminating in the extinguishment thereof.

Here, DDII having divested itself of any claim over the property in favor of SSS by means of sale
via dacion en pago, petitioner has lost its title over the property which would give it legal
personality to file the action for quieting of title.

At this point, it is well to remind DDII that it cannot escape its liability from SSS by giving the
latter possession over the property with the representation that it is doing so as partial
settlement of its unremitted SSS premiums and penalties due only to take the property back
decades thereafter, seek condonation of its obligations, and to make matters worse, claim
payment of back rentals from SSS. While it is true that the value of the property has definitely
significantly increased over the years compared to the P2,000,000 amount for which it was
offered to SSS, still, such is not sufficient justification for DDII to turn its back on its obligations
under the dacion en pago agreement. In fact, the turn of events convinces Us that DDII’s
actions are tainted with bad faith.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed August 12, 2016 Decision and
March 10, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03233-MIN are
hereby AFFIRMED. The complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 29,353-02, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Petitioner Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. is hereby ordered to:

1. Execute the Deed of Sale over the properties in favor of respondent Social Security
System, consistent with the terms and conditions of the dacion en pago agreed upon by
the parties as embodied in SSC Resolution No. 849 - s. 82 within ten (10) days from
finality of this Decision; and

2. Surrender the Owner's Duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18203, T-18204,
T-255986, and T-255985, as well as the Tax Declarations over said properties to
respondent Social Security System within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision.

Should petitioner Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. refuse to execute said Deed of Sale, the
Clerk of Court shall execute such in favor of respondent Social Security System.

The Register of Deeds of Davao City is directed to cancel the subject titles and issue new ones
in the name of respondent Social Security System.

Respondent Social Security System is ordered to re-compute petitioner's obligations

accordingly, reckoned from June 17, 1982, the date when respondent communicated its
acceptance of the offer.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES JAIME AND CATHERINE BASA, SPOUSES JUAN AND ERLINDA OGALE
REPRESENTED BY WINSTON OGALE, SPOUSES ROGELIO AND LUCENA LAGASCA
REPRESENTED BY LUCENA LAGASCA, AND SPOUSES CRESENCIO AND ELEADORA
APOSTOL, Petitioners, v. ANGELINE LOY VDA. DE SENLY LOY, HEIRS OF ROBERT
CARANTES, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR BAGUIO CITY, AND THE CITY ASSESSOR'S
OFFICE OF BAGUIO CITY, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

In the present case, the petitioners failed to present the original copies of the purported
deeds of sale in their favor, the case for quieting of title did not have a leg to stand on.
Petitioners were unable to show their claimed right or title to the disputed property,
which is an essential element in a suit for quieting of title.

Facts:

Basa Carantes, the predecessor-in-interest of Manuel Carantes and herein respondent Robert
Carantes, owns a 496 square meter residential lot in New Lucban, Baguio City. The subject
property was mortgaged to respondent Angeline Loy and her husband in 1994; they foreclosed
on the mortgaged and were the highest bidder during the auction sale. After consolidating
ownership over the subject property on March 31, 2006, a writ of possession was issued in their
favor.

On May 30, 2006, herein petitioners filed a petition for quieting of title with prayer for injunctive
relief and damages against the respondents. Petitioners claimed that in 1992 and 1993, 351
square meters of the subject property have already been sold to them by the respondent Robert
Carantes by virtue of deed of sale executed in their favor and that they took possession of the
351 square meter portion sold to them. Thus, petitioners prayed that the documents,
instruments, and proceedings relative to the sale of the subject property to respondent Angeline
Loy be cancelled and annulled, and that they be awarded damages.

Issue: Is the submitted preponderant evidence by the petitioner has proved their case for
quieting of title?

Ruling:
No. The preponderant evidence has not proved their case for quieting of title because the
plaintiffs did not presented the original copies of the purported deeds.

The Supreme Court held that in order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is
essential that the plaintiff must have equitable title to, or interest in the property which is the
subject matter of the action.

Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that original document must be produced;
exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. (2a)

In the present case, the petitioners failed to present the original copies of the purported deeds of
sale in their favor, the case for quieting of title did not have a leg to stand on. Petitioners were
unable to show their claimed right or title to the disputed property, which is an essential element
in a suit for quieting of title. Their belated presentation of the supposed originals of the deeds of
sale by attaching the same to their motion for reconsideration does not deserve consideration
as well; the documents hardly qualify as evidence.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed dispositions of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 JOSE S. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. RICARDO S. OCAMPO SR., respondent
G.R. No. 227894 | July 5, 2017

DOCTRINE:

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.

FACTS:

Petitioners and respondent are brothers, both sons of the Basilio Ocampo and Juliana Sunglao

In the complaint, respondent alleged that her and petitioner are co-owners of the 150 sq. m. lot
left behind by their parents. The subject property was originally registered in their parents’
names.

Respondent claims that petitioner and his wife conspired in falsifying his signature on a
notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement with Waiver and effecting the transfer of the property in the
name of petitioner under TCT No. 102822, which was issued on November 24, 1970. Based on
a finding by the NBI that respondent’s signature was forged, an Information was filed against
petitioner, the notary public, and two others. Respondent requested for partition of the property,
but petitioner refused to do so and secretly mortgaged the property for P200,000.00.

In their Answer, petitioner and his wife claimed that their parents executed a Deed of Donation
Propter Nuptias of the Subject Property in their favor as they were getting married, with a
promise on their part to demolish the old house and replace it with a new two-storey house,
which they did. To build the new house, they obtained a P10,000 loan from the DBP, with
petitioner and his parents as borrowers
Petitioner further alleged that his parents gave respondent several properties outside Metro
Manila, which respondent eventually lost. Petitioner and his wife then allowed respondent to
stay at the second floor of the house. Petitioner was able to pay the DBP loan through a loan
secured from the SSS with the consent of his father. He claimed that on September 30, 1970,
their father executed the ESW and secured respondent’s signature. By virtue of the ESW,
petitioner was able to have TCT No. 36869 cancelled and have TCT No. 102822 issued in favor
of himself and his wife.

Finally, petitioner argued that TCT No. 102822 became indefeasible one year after its issuance
on November 24, 1971, and that the action to annul TCT No. 102822 had prescribed since it
was filed only on June 29, 1992, or 21 years and 7 months from the issuance of the title. He
further claimed that the action to annul the ESW is a collateral attack on the title, and the rule on
nonprescription against a co-owner does not apply since he and his wife had become exclusive
owners of the Subject Property.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. However, the CA declared
the RTC’s decision null and void.

Thereafter, respondent filed a motion for writ of execution before the RTC. However, the motion
was denied on the ground that there is nothing to execute since the setting aside of the RTC
Order calls for the case to be tried on the merits. Thus, the RTC set the case for
Pretrial.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer which was granted by
the RTC. In the Amended Answer, petitioner alleged that after their mother passed away in
1965, the P3,000.00 balance of the DBP loan was paid through an SSS loan. Petitioner alleged
that in consideration of the loan, respondent and their father waived their rights to the property
under the ESW. Petitioner further claimed that on November 19, 1970, their father executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale, where he sold his interest in the Subject Property for P9,000.00 in favor
of petitioner.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
In dismissing the petition, the CA found that respondent was able to prove that his signature on
the ESW is not genuine, based on his and his wife’s testimony, as well as the NBI report.
According to the CA, this finding of forgery was also supported by petitioner’s own admission on
cross-examination that he was not present when the ESW was executed. Based on the
evidence presented, the preponderance of evidence weighed in favor of respondent and against
petitioner.

As to petitioner’s argument that the action is a collateral and not a direct attack on the title, the
CA found it unmeritorious and ruled that the action precisely assails the validity of petitioner’s
title on the ground that it is based on a forged document, and it is also an action for
reconveyance. Thus, the CA ruled that the action to annul the ESW is imprescriptible since it is
a void or inexistent contract.

Petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the appeal and in
affirming the RTC Decision. Petitioner claims that the ESW, being a notarized document, enjoys
a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. He claims that there was no clear
and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.

Even assuming that the ESW is void or inexistent, petitioner argues that the action filed by
respondent is barred by the doctrine of estoppel by laches. The ESW was executed and
notarized on September 30, 1970. However, it was only on July 1, 1992 that respondent filed
the present case for partition and annulment of title, claiming that the ESW was forged. Thus,
petitioner argues that there was an unreasonable delay on respondent’s part to assert his rights
and pursue his claims against petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for annulment of title and partition has already prescribed

RULING:
Under the Torrens System, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of 1 year from the date of entry of the decree of registration,
without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for
the fraud. However, actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts may be allowed beyond
the one-year period.
As elucidated in Walstrom v. Maps Jr., the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the
name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject
property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real
owner by the person in whose name it is registered. In an action for reconveyance, the decree
of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in 10 years
from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

By way of additional exception, the Court has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance
despite the lapse of more than 10 years from the issuance of title where the plaintiffs therein
were in actual possession of the disputed land, converting the action from reconveyance of
property into one for quieting of title. Imprescriptibility is accorded to cases for quieting of title
since the plaintiff has the right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned
before initiating an action to vindicate his right.

Given the falsity of the ESW, it becomes apparent that petitioner obtained the registration
through fraud. This wrongful registration gives occasion to the creation of an implied or
constructive trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. An action for reconveyance based
on an implied trust generally prescribes in ten years. However, if the plaintiff remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title of possession does not run
against him. In such case, his action is deemed in the nature of a quieting of title, an action that
is imprescriptible.

In this case, the complaint for partition and annulment of the title was only more than twenty (20)
years since the assailed title was issued. However, both petitioner and respondent were
residing at the subject property at the time the complaint was filed. Considering that respondent
was in actual possession of the disputed land at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
present case may be treated as an action for quieting of title.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty
affecting title to real property.

Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure an adjudication that a claim of title to
or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant
and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim. In
an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one
who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of
both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and
even to abuse the property as he deems best.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or
encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished or barred by extinctive
prescription; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title.

Since it was already established that respondent’s signature on the ESW, which was the basis
of petitioner’s title over the property, was forged, then it is only necessary for the cloud on
respondent’s title to be removed. Thus, the trial court’s order to cancel TCT No. 102822 and
uphold the parties’ co-ownership was proper.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 3 0,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Manila in Civil Case No. 92-61716, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 28, 2016 in CA-G.R. CV No. 99908, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
The Regional Trial Court shall proceed with the partition of the subject lot with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
FORTUNATO ANZURES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ERLINDA VENTANILLA and ARTURO
VENTANILLA, respondents
G.R. No. 222297 | July 9, 2018

DOCTRINE:
Article 494 of the New Civil Code reads:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

FACTS:
On Oct. 12, 2012, respondents filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Fortunato
Anzures. In their complaint, respondents alleged, among others, that they were the owners of a
residential house situated in Barangay Sta. Ines, Bulakan, Bulacan; that the house had been
declared for taxation purposes in their names for the year 2012; that the property stands on a
289 square meters parcel of land under OCT No. 2011000008 registered in the names of
petitioner and his wife Carolina Anzures (Carolina); that later, by virtue of a Deed of Donation,
petitioner and his wife Carolina donated 144 square meters portion of the land in favor of
respondents; that Erlinda Ventanilla “indicated to partition the said property,” but the house
situated on said property constitutes a stumbling block on the partition of the said property; that
being the owners of the property, respondents merely tolerated the occupation of the property
by petitioner; that they demanded he vacate the house to give way to the subdivision and
partition of the property but to no avail.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner averred that he and his late spouse Carolina were
the owners of the residential house; that he was also the registered owner of the 289 square
meters parcel of land, having bought the same from Erlinda Ventanilla for P150,000.00; that his
possession and ownership of the land was evidenced by OCT No. 2011000008; that he was the
rightful owner of the residential house as shown by the tax receipts confirming the religious
payments he made from 1998 to 2011.
Petitioner also denied the genuineness and authenticity of the deed of donation because at that
time, Carolina was mentally and physically incompetent to execute the same. He contended that
he had no knowledge of the deed and he never affixed his signature thereon.
Evidence shows that the property was originally owned by one Vicenta Galvez, who died
intestate on October 6, 1967. After her death, her sole heirs, executed a “Waiver of Rights over
the Unregistered Parcel of Land” in favor of their nieces, Erlinda Rodriguez and Carolina
Rodriguez on May 31, 2000.
To confirm and firm up the waiver and transfer, they also executed a “Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land” in favor of Erlinda and Carolina. In said document, the three sold,
transferred and conveyed, absolutely and unconditionally, the subject “parcel of land with
improvements” to the two, “their heirs or assigns, free from all liens and encumbrances.”
On October 31, 2008, Carolina and Erlinda executed a “Pagkakaloob ng Bahagi ng Lupa na
may Kasunduan,” whereby the two gave 1/3 of the subject property to their brother, Emiliano;
the three siblings agreed to place the property in the name of Carolina; and that they stated that
although the property would be registered in her name, the three of them would still be the co-
owners of the property. Emiliano later waived his right over the property in favor of Carolina and
Erlinda, thus, cementing the co-ownership of the 2 sisters.
On September 23, 2010, the property was placed under the operation of the Torrens system of
land registration. Pursuant to their agreement, it was registered in the name of “Carolina R.
Anzures, Filipino, na may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Fortunato Anzures.”
On March 21, 2011, Carolina executed a deed of donation, which donated 144 square meters of
the subject property to Erlinda as an acknowledgement of their co-ownership thereof. The
donation does not appear to have been registered, but it is a recognition that they are both co -
owners with equal shares.
On October 11, 2011, Filomena and Rosalina executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Waiver of Rights,” whereby they waived their rights over the house in favor of Erlinda.
On the basis of this extrajudicial settlement of estate with waiver of rights, the respondents claim
that they are the owners of the house; that the petitioner is occupying the house by virtue of
their tolerance; that they have demanded that he vacate the same; and that despite demands,
he refused to do so. As petitioner refuses to vacate the premises, respondents claim they were
constrained to file an action for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE:
whether or not respondents have a cause of action to eject petitioner from the subject property
RULING:
From the documentary records, the property is co-owned by Carolina and Erlinda. Being co-
owners of the property, they are also the co- owners of the improvement thereon, including the
subject house. This is clear from the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land dated August
2, 2000, executed in favor of Erlinda and Carolina, whereby the three heirs of Vicenta Galvez,
namely, Filomena Rodriguez Rivera, Enriqueta Rodriguez and Rosalina Rodriguez sold,
transferred and conveyed, absolutely and unconditionally, the subject “parcel of land, with
improvements” to the “two,” “their heirs or assigns, free from all liens and encumbrances.”
Respondents cannot rely on the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights dated
October 11, 2011, whereby Filomena and Rosalina waived their rights over the house in favor of
Erlinda. On said date, Filomena and Rosalina no longer had the right to convey the house as
they were no longer the owners thereof. As evidenced by the August 2, 2000 deed of sale of
unregistered land, they already sold the property together with the improvements to the two
sisters, Carolina and Erlinda. In fact, the title has been placed in Carolina’s name, pursuant to
their agreement.
Being a co-owner of the property as heir of Carolina, petitioner cannot be ejected from the
subject property. In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with
each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising [his] rights over the whole
property. Each co owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he
shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is
actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-owner
exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of it.
Ultimately, respondents do not have a cause of action to eject petitioner based on tolerance
because the latter is also entitled to possess and enjoy the subject property. Corollarily, neither
of the parties can assert exclusive ownership and possession of the same prior to any partition.
If at all, the action for unlawful detainer only resulted in the recognition of co-ownership between
the parties over the residential house.
The parties, being co-owners of both the land and the building, the remedy of the respondents is
to file an action for partition.

WHEREFORE, the petitiOn is GRANTED. The July 24, 2015 Decision and the December 18,
2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 136514, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful detainer is DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
Sps. Primo Inalvez and Juliana Inalvez vs. Bayang Nool, et al. G.R. No. 188145 April 18,
2016

DOCTRINE:
Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any person and he causes
the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the
benefit of the true owner.

Facts: The records showed that the subject property was originally covered by TCT No. 583986
originally registered in the names of Spouses Nicolas and Francisca Nool and Spouses Cornelio
and Bayang, with an area of 15.1441 ha. On May 3, 1965, Spouses Cornelio and Bayang sold a
large portion of their one-half share of the landholding to the petitioners and Maria Zamora
(Zamora). Then, on April 16, 1980, the new set of owners, namely, Spouses Macayanan,
Zamora, Spouses Cornelio and Bayang, and the petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) over the whole property in favor of Tarlac Development Bank (TDB) to secure a loan of
Pl0,000.00. Unfortunately, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the title to the subject property
was consolidated with TDB, together with the corresponding issuance of TCT No. 188251.13
On April 17, 1985, TDB sold the parcel of land to the petitioners and Spouses Jim and Liberty
Baluyot (Spouses Baluyot). Hence, TCT No. 188251 was cancelled and TCT No. 1882521 was
issued in the names of the petitioners and Spouses Baluyot. Meanwhile, the respondents
continued possession of the subject lot. On June 16, 2000, the petitioners instituted a complaint
for ejectment, collection of shares and damages, against the respondents alleging that since
Bayang is Juliana's sister, they allowed the respondents to cultivate 2-ha portion of the subject
property with the obligation to share the landowners 25% of the harvest proceeds thereof. The
respondents' cultivation thereof was purportedly conditioned upon the payment to the petitioners
of a rightful share in the produce. Thus, when the respondents failed to fulfil their undertaking,
the petitioners instituted an ejectment complaint against them. For her part, Bayang averred that
she and her late husband were the actual and registered co-owners of the subject property,
which they inherited from her father, together with the petitioners. Bayang denied having sold
portions of their property to the petitioners and Zamora.

Issue: Whether or not the Bayang is a co-owner since she inherited the land from her father and
thus made the petitioners a trustee of the land as co-owners?
Held: YES. Records show that the subject property was originally owned by Juliana and
Bayang's father, Cleto Macayanan under Original Certificate of Title No. 1665. "Pursuant to
Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any person and he causes
the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the
benefit of the true owner." Bayang, being an heir and a co-owner, is thus entitled to the
possession of the subject property. This was confirmed by the issuance of TCT No. 58439 in the
names of Spouses Nicolas and Francisca for one-half share, Spouses Cornelio and Bayang for
one-eighth share, Zamora for one-fourth share, and the petitioners for one-eighth share.
Evidently, a co-ownership existed between the parties prior to the foreclosure and consolidation
of title in favor of TDB and the subsequent re-acquisition thereof by the petitioners.
Coownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.Before the partition
of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota proportionate share in the
entire land or thing. Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the 14
alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In case of foreclosure, a
sale would result in the transmission only of whatever rights the seller had over of the thing sold.
Indeed, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the farmer's knowledge and consent as in the case at
bar. The mortgage of the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who never benefited.
As correctly emphasized by the CA, the petitioners' right in the subject property is limited only to
their share in the co-owned property. When the subject property was sold to and consolidated in
the name of TDB, the latter merely held the subject property in trust for the respondents. the
rights of the respondents as co-owners of the subject property were never alienated despite
TDB's consolidation of ownership over the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 19, 2008 and the Resolution
dated May 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89378 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES PRIMO INALVEZ AND JULIANA INALVEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. BAYANG NOOL,
ALLAN NOOL AND CELESTINO NOOL, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 188145, April 18, 2016

DOCTRINE:

1.Certificate of Title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the

property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of
ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this
jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that
the doctrine finds no application. 2. A document evidencing a sale transaction, such as a deed
of sale, which is duly notarized is considered a public document and therefore enjoys the
presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution

FACTS: The records showed that the subject property was originally covered by TCT No. 58398
originally registered in the names of Spouses Nicolas and Francisca Nool and Spouses Comelio
and Bayang, with an area of 15.1441 ha. On May 3, 1965, Spouses Cornelio and Bayang sold a
large portion of their one-half share of the landholding to the petitioners and Maria Zamora ,
which sale was inscribed on the title as Entry No. 5- 4972.Consequently, TCT No. 58398 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 58439 was issued in the names of the following co-
owners: Spouses Nicolas and Francisca (one-half share); Zamora (one-fourth share); Spouses
Cornelio and Bayang (one-eighth share); and the petitioners (one-eighth share). On June 4,
1979, Spouses Nicolas and Francisca sold their entire one-half share over the property in favor
of Spouses Abraham and Olivia Macayanan (Spouses Macayanan).The new set of owners,
namely, Spouses Macayanan, Zamora, Spouses Cornelio and Bayang, and the petitioners
executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over the whole property in favor of Tarlac Development
Bank (TDB) to secure a loan of P10,000.00. Unfortunately, the mortgage was foreclosed, and
TDB sold the parcel of land to the petitioners and Spouses Jim and Liberty Baluyot The
petitioners instituted a complaint for ejectment, collection of shares and damages, against the
respondents before the DARAB. The respondents' cultivation thereof was purportedly
conditioned upon the payment to the petitioners of a rightful share in the produce. Thus, when
the respondents failed to fulfil their undertaking, the petitioners instituted an ejectment complaint
against them. For her part, Bayang averred that she and her late husband were the actual and
registered co-owners of the subject property, which they inherited from her father, together with
the petitioners. Bayang denied having sold portions of their property to the petitioners and
Zamora. She further denied having signed any document consenting to the mortgage of the
subject property and refuted the genuineness of her husband's signature as appearing on the
REM executed with TDB. Lastly, the respondents argued that they are deemed to have already
acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription since they have been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30 years. On
January 14, 2002, the DARAB dismissed the case upon finding that no tenancy relationship
exists between the parties. Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of
possession, damages with an application for preliminary injunction against the respondents
before the RTC. After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of the petitioners. The
trial court dismissed the respondents' claim of ownership over the subject property taking note
of the sale and transfer effected by Spouses Cornelio and Bayang over a large portion of their
inherited property in favor of Zamora and the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed and set
aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for recovery of possession upon finding
that a coownership existed between the parties. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it
was denied, hence, this petition.

Issue: The main issue before this Court is whether a co-ownership exists between the
petitioners and the respondents.

Held: The petition has no merit. In this case, the petitioners' cause of action for recovery of
possession is grounded on their alleged exclusive ownership of the subject property which they
merely purchased from TDB. Here, records show that the subject property was originally owned
by Juliana and Bayang's father, Cleto Macayanan under Original Certificate of Title No. 1665.
"Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any person and
he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of
law for the benefit of the true owner." "Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
trustee for the others." "Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or
co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota proportionate share in the entire land or thing." "Should a co-owner alienate or
mortgage the coowned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to
the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.""In case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission only of whatever
rights the seller had over of the thing sold." Indeed, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership
of a co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the former's
knowledge and consent as in the case at bar. The mortgage of the inherited property is not
binding against co-heirs who never benefited. When the subject property was sold to and
consolidated in the name of TDB, the latter merely held the subject property in trust for the
respondents. When the petitioners and Spouses Baluyot bought back the subject property, they
merely stepped into the shoes of TDB and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain
thereto. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by
another person during registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to
knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third
person. The alleged incontrovertibility of title cannot be successfully invoked by the petitioners
because certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and cannot be used as
a shield for the commission of fraud. From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the CA did
not err in declaring that the petitioners have no legal basis to recover possession of the subject
property. Except for their claim that they merely purchased the subject property from TDB, the
petitioners presented no other justification to disprove co-ownership. Since the mortgage of the
co-owned property was done without the respondents' consent, they cannot be deemed to have
lost their share as a consequence of the subsequent foreclosure and sale of the co-owned
property. In the same way, the petitioners, as mere co-owners, had no right to mortgage the
entire property for their right to do so is limited only to that portion that may be allotted to them
upon termination .

WHEREFORE, the petition denied. Downloaded

Case Title: G.R. No. 196470, April 20, 2016; ROSARIO VICTORIA AND ELMA PIDLAOAN,
Petitioners, v. NORMITA JACOB PIDLAOAN, HERMINIGILDA PIDLAOAN AND EUFEMIA
PIDLAOAN, Respondents.

Doctrines: 1. One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system has a right to
rely on what appears on the face of the certificate of title and need not inquire further as to the
property's ownership. 2. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on
another's land in good faith, the land owner may either: (a) appropriate the works as his own
after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. 3. Principle that a
notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity

Facts: The petitioners Rosario Victoria and Elma lived together since 1978 until Rosario left for
Saudi Arabia. In 1984, Elma bought a parcel of land with an area of 201 square meters in
Lucena City and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T50282. When Rosario came
home, she caused the construction of a house on the lot but she left again after the house was
built. Elma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot to a certain Thi Hong Villanueva in
1989.When the properties were about to be foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for help from her
sister-in-law, Eufemia Pidlaoan, to redeem the property.5 On her part, Eufemia called her
daughter abroad, Normita, to lend money to Elma. Normita agreed to provide the funds. Elma
allegedly sought to sell the land. When she failed to find a buyer, she offered to sell it to Eufemia
or her daughter.8On March 21, 1993, Elma executed a deed of sale entitled "Panananto ng
Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad" transferring the ownership of the lot to Normita.9 The
last provision in the deed of sale provides that Elma shall eject the person who erected the
house and deliver the lot to Normita. The document was signed by Elma, Normita, and two
witnesses but it was not notarized. When Elma and Normita were about to have the document
notarized, the notary public advised them to donate the lot instead to avoid capital gains
tax.1On the next day, Elma executed a deed of donation in Normita's favor and had it notarized.
TCT No. T-50282 was cancelled and TCT No. T70990 was issued in Normita's name. Since
then, Normita had been paying the real property taxes over the lot but Elma continued to occupy
the house. Rosario found out about the donation when she returned to the country a year or two
after the transaction. In 1997, the petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract,
cancellation of TCT No. T-70990, and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against
Eufemia, Normita, and Herminigilda Pidlaoan. The petitioners argued that: first, they co-owned
the lot because both of them contributed the money used to purchase it; second, Elma and
Normita entered into an equitable mortgage because they intended to constitute a mortgage
over the lot to secure Elma's loan but they executed a deed of sale instead; and third, the deed
of donation was simulated because Elma executed it upon the notary public's advice to avoid
capital gains tax. In their answer, the respondents admitted that the deed of donation was
simulated and that the original transaction was a sale.They argued, however, that there was no
agreement to constitute a real estate mortgage on the lot. The RTC ruled that Rosario and Elma
co-owned the lot and the house. Thus, Elma could only donate her one-half share in the
lot.Hence, the respondents appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC's decision and
dismissed the petitioners' complaint. The CA held that Elma and Normita initially entered into
two agreements: a loan and a sale. They entered into a loan agreement when Elma had to pay
Thi Hong Villanueva to redeem the property. Thereafter, Elma sold the property to Normita.
They subsequently superseded the contract of sale with the assailed deed of donation. The CA
also held that the deed of donation was not simulated. It was voluntarily executed by Elma out
of gratitude to Normita who rescued her by preventing the foreclosure of the lot. Moreover, the
deed of donation, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity. Considering
that no conclusive proof was presented to rebut this presumption, the deed of donation is
presumed valid. The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.

Issues: 1. Whether Rosario is a co-owner because she caused the construction of the house,
which has a higher market value than the lot; 2. Whether the deed of donation is simulated; and
3. Whether the transaction was a mere equitable mortgage;

Held: 1. Considering that these issues are inter-related, we shall jointly discuss and resolve
them. At the outset, we note that the issues raised by the petitioners in the present case require
a review of the factual circumstances. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court distinguished
between a question of law and a question of fact in a number of cases. A question of law arises
when there is doubt on what the law is on a certain set of fact, while a question of fact exists
when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law,
it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants. If the issue invites a review of the evidence on record, the question posed is one of
fact. The factual findings of the CA are conclusive and binding and are not reviewable by the
Court, unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions. One of these exceptions is
when the findings of the RTC and the CA are contradictory, as in the present case. By granting
the appeal and dismissing the petitioners' complaint, the CA effectively ruled that the transfer of
ownership involved the entire lot rather than only half of it as the RTC held. The lower courts'
differing findings provide us sufficient reason to proceed with the review of the evidence on
record. First, we rule that Elma transferred ownership of the entire lot to Normita. One who
deals with property registered under the Torrens system has a right to rely on what appears on
the face of the certificate of title and need not inquire further as to the property's ownership. A
buyer is charged with notice only of the claims annotated on the title.The Torrens system was
adopted to best guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized. In the present case, the records of the case
show that Elma alone purchased the lot in 1984 from its previous owners. Accordingly, TCT No.
T-50282 was issued solely in her name. Thus, Normita bought the lot relying on the face of the
TCT that Elma and no other person owned it. We acknowledge that registration under the
Torrens system does not create or vest title. A certificate of title merely serves as an evidence of
ownership in the property. Therefore, the issuance of a certificate of title does not preclude the
possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real property, or
that the registered owner is only holding the property in trust for another person. In the present
case, however, the petitioners failed to present proof of Rosario's contributions in purchasing
the lot from its previous owners. The execution of the transfer documents solely in Elma's name
alone militate against their claim of co-ownership. Thus, we find no merit in the petitioners' claim
of co-ownership over the lot. At this point, we address the petitioners' claim that Rosario co-
owned the lot with Elma because the value of the house constructed by Rosario on it is higher
than the lot's value. We find this argument to be erroneous. We hold that mere construction of a
house on another's land does not create a co-ownership. Article 484 of the Civil Code provides
that coownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Verily, a house and a lot are separately identifiable properties and can pertain to
different owners, as in this case: the house belongs to Rosario and the lot to Elma. Article 448 of
the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on another's land in good faith, the land owner
may either: (a) appropriate the works as his own after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder
to pay the price of the land. The law does not force the parties into a co-ownership.29 A builder
is in good faith if he builds on a land believing himself to be its owner and is unaware of the
defect in his title or mode of acquisition.30 As applied in the present case, Rosario's
construction of a house on the lot did not create a co-ownership, regardless of the value of the
house. Rosario, however, is not without recourse in retrieving the house or its value. The
remedies available to her are set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code. Second, on the nature of
the transaction between Elma and Normita, we find that the deed of donation was simulated and
the parties' real intent was to enter into a sale. The petitioners argue that the deed of donation
was simulated and that the parties entered into an equitable mortgage. On the other hand, the
respondents deny the claim of equitable mortgage and argue that they validly acquired the
property via sale, relying on the presumption of regularity of public documents. We first dwell on
the genuineness of the deed of donation. There are two types of simulated documents -
absolute and relative. A document is absolutely simulated when the parties have no intent to
bind themselves at all, while it is relatively simulated when the parties concealed their true
agreement.34 The true nature of a contract is determined by the parties' intention, which can be
ascertained from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. In the present case, Elma and
Normita's contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that they were about to have the
contract of sale notarized but the notary public ill-advised them to execute a deed of donation
instead. Following this advice, they returned the next day to have a deed of donation notarized.
Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that would transfer the ownership of the
subject matter of their contract but disguised it as a donation. Thus, the deed of donation
subsequently executed by them was only relatively simulated. The CA upheld the deed of
donation's validity based on the principle that a notarized document enjoys the presumption of
regularity. This presumption, however, is overthrown in this case by the respondents' own
admission in their answer that the deed of donation was simulated. Judicial admissions made by
a party in the course of the proceedings are conclusive and do not require proof. Notably, the
respondents explicitly recognized in their answer that the deed of donation was simulated upon
the notary public's advice and that both parties intended a sale. Considering that the deed of
donation was relatively simulated, the parties are bound to their real agreement.3The records
show that the parties intended to transfer the ownership of the property to Normita by absolute
sale. This intention is reflected in the unnotarized document entitled "Panananto ng
Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad."40cralawred The petitioners insist that the deed of sale
is an equitable mortgage because: (i) the consideration for the sale was grossly inadequate; (ii)
they remained in possession of the property; (iii) they continuously paid the water and electric
bills; (iv) the respondents allowed Victoria to repay the "loan" within three months;41 (v) the
respondents admitted that the deed of donation was simulated; and (vi) the petitioners paid the
taxes even after the sale. Notably, neither the CA nor the RTC found merit in the petitioners'
claim of equitable mortgage. We find no reason to disagree with these conclusions. An equitable
mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality or other requisites demanded by
statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a
debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law.42 Articles 1602 and 1604 of the Civil
Code provide that a contract of absolute sale shall be presumed an equitable mortgage if any of
the circumstances listed in Article 1602 is attendant. Two requisites must concur for Articles
1602 and 1604 of the Civil Code to apply: one, the parties entered into a contract denominated
as a contract of sale; and two, their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of
mortgage. In the present case, the unnotarized contract of sale between Elma and Normita is
denominated as "Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad." Its contents show an
unconditional sale of property between Elma and Normita. The document shows no intention to
secure a debt or to grant a right to repurchase. Thus, there is no evidence that the parties
agreed to mortgage the property as contemplated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the
contract is not one of equitable mortgage. Even assuming that Article 1602 of the Civil Code
applies in this case, none of the circumstances are present to give rise to the presumption of
equitable mortgage. One, the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the sale price was
unusually inadequate. In fact, the sale price of P30,000.00 is not unusually inadequate
compared with the lot's market value of P32,160 as stated in the 1994 tax declaration. Two, the
petitioners continued occupation on the property was coupled with the respondents' continuous
demand for them to vacate it. Third, no other document was executed for the petitioners to
repurchase the lot after the sale contract was executed. Finally, the respondents paid the real
property taxes on the lot. These circumstances contradict the petitioners' claim of equitable
mortgage. A review of the sale contract or the "Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang
Bayad" shows that the parties intended no equitable mortgage. The contract even contains
Elma's undertaking to remove Rosario's house on the property. This undertaking supports the
conclusion that the parties executed the contract with the end view of transferring full ownership
over the lot to Normita. In sum, we rule that based on the records of the case, Elma and Normita
entered in a sale contract, not a donation. Elma sold the entire Normita. Accordingly, TCT No. T-
70990 was validly issued in Normita's name.

WHEREFORE, we hereby PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The March 26, 2010 decision and
March 15, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 89235 are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the parties entered into a contract of sale, not a
donation, and that petitioner Elma Pidlaoan sold the whole disputed property to respondent
Normita Jacob Pidlaoan.
Case Title:

G.R. No. 220008, SOCORRO T. CLEMENTE, as substituted by SALVADOR T. CLEMENTE,

Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Public Works and
Highways, Region IV-A),

Respondent; CARPIO, J.:

Doctrine:

An heir may file an action for reconveyance of possession as a coowner thereof, provided that
such heir recognizes and acknowledges the other co-heirs as co-owners of the property as it will
be assumed that the heir is acting on behalf of all the co-heirs for the benefit of the coownership.

Facts:

Municipal Mayor Amado A. Clemente (Mayor Clemente), Dr. Vicente A. Clemente, Judge Ramon
A. Clemente, and Milagros A. Clemente (Clemente Siblings) were the owners of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50896. During their lifetime, they executed a
Deed of Donation dated 16 March 1963 over a one-hectare portion of their property (Subject
Property) in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

In 2004, almost forty-one (41) years after the Deed of Donation was executed, Socorro, as heir
and successor-in-interest of Mayor Clemente, filed a Complaint, and subsequently an Amended
Complaint, for Revocation of Donation, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession alleging that
the Republic of the Philippines failed to comply with the condition imposed on the Deed of
Donation, which was to use the property “solely for hospital site only and for no other else, where
a government hospital shall be constructed”.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On 24 September 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision
dismissing the case on the ground of prematurity.

In a Resolution dated 4 April 2008, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Socorro. Thus, Socorro appealed to the Court of Appeals. Ruling of the Court of Appeals In a
Decision dated 17 October 2014, the CA denied the appeal, finding that while there may be basis
for the recovery of the property, Socorro, as an heir of a deceased co-donor, cannot assert the
concept of heirship to participate in the revocation of the property donated by her successor-in-
interest. The CA held, thus: Prescinding simply from the hypothetical effect of succession for
Socorro T. Clemente, neither was there any assertion on the initiatory leading nor evidence from
the plaintiff-appellant as to any judicial or extrajudicial settlement of the estate of her husband as
co-donor. And without any representation from Socorro T. Clemente on the Amended Complaint
as to previous determination of heirs, full liquidation of the estate and payment of estate debts, if
any, it cannot be assumed, and the plaintiff’s representatives cannot assert heirship, that a portion
of the property donated was still part of the estate of Socorro T. Clemente’s husband. Corollary
thereto, Section 2, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court illuminates that until liquidation of the
property, neither the widow nor the heirs can sue for participation therein.

Issue/s:

Whether the full settlement of the estate is required before the petitioner may institute an action
for revocation of donation, reconveyance, and recovery of possession of property.

Held:

No.

There is no need for the settlement of the estate before one of the heirs can institute an action on
behalf of the other co-heirs. Although an heir’s right in the estate of the decedent which has not
been fully settled and partitioned is merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the heir
the right to exercise acts of ownership. Thus, even before the settlement of the estate, an heir
may file an action for reconveyance of possession as a co-owner thereof, provided that such heir
recognizes and acknowledges the other co-heirs as co-owners of the property as it will be
assumed that the heir is acting on behalf of all the co-heirs for the benefit of the co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 17 October 2014 Decision and the 14 August 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 91522 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64, is ORDERED to cause the
cancellation by the Register of Deeds of Quezon of TCT No. T-51745 and the issuance, in lieu
thereof, of the corresponding certificate of title in the name of the heirs of Amado A. Clemente, Dr.
Vicente A. Clemente, Judge Ramon A. Clemente, and Milagros A. Clemente.
Case Title:

Heirs of Roger Jarque vs Marcial Jarqie, Lelia Jarque-Lagsit, and Teresita Jarque-Bailon
(G.R. No. 196733) (J. Jardeleza) (November 21, 2018)

Doctrine:

While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no
right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thine; in common to the
exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or
ideal portion without any physical adjudication. An individual co-owner cannot adjudicate to
himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual
partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the coowner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners.
What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the
portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his
successional rights. (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

Facts:
This case involves the claim over unregistered land in Boton, Sorsogon, Lot No. 2560. The
property was declared under the name of Laureano Jarque. Laureano was married to Servanda
and they had four children, namely: Roger, Lupo, Sergio, and Natalia. Petitioners are the heirs
of Roger, while respondents are the children of Lupo. Both parties claim ownership over the
land. Petitioners claimed that Roger inherited the lot from Laureano. And upon Servanda’s
death in 1975, the property was ceded to Roger. And that Roger, during his lifetime had, by
mere tolerance, allowed Lupo and his descendants to remain on the property. Respondents
claim that Servanda, during her lifetime, sold the lot with the right to repurchase, and had
requested and authorized her granddaughter Dominga to redeem the property. Dominga then
transferred all her rights over the property to Lelia and therefore, they acquired ownership over
the property. The MCTC ruled in favor of Petitioners and held that they were the rightful owners
and possessors of the property, and that respondent’s possession cannot ripen into ownership
because it was not adverse, but was only by petitioner’s mere tolerance. The RTC affirmed in
toto the MCTC’s Decision. However, on appeal, the CA reversed such decision and declared
that because Laureano died in 1946, the Old Civil Code governed. And as the wife of Laureano,
Servanda had part ownership of the conjugal property, which gave her the right to dispose of
her share in the conjugal property. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari wherein the
petitioners argue that under the Old Civil Code, Servanda could not inherit from Laureano since
all their children were qualified to inherit from him. Servanda did not have authority to alienate
the property. Respondents countered that it was not shown that Laureano and Servanda were
married, or that the property is conjugal or even exclusively the property of Laureano.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the property, Lot no. 2560, forms part of the conjugal partnership of gains.
2. Whether or not co-ownership existed even there is no partition had transpired.

Held:
1. Yes. Laureano died in 1946, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 386 or the New
Civil Code on August 30, 1950. At the time of his death, the governing law as to the property
relations between husband and wife and the successional rights among the decedent's heirs is
the Old Civil Code. Under the Old Civil Code, the default property regime of the husband and wife
is the conjugal partnership of gains. This includes: (1) property acquired for a valuable
consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is
made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only; (2) property obtained by the industry,
wages or work of the spouses or of either of them; and (3) the fruits, income, or interest collected
or accrued during the marriage, derived from the partnership property, or from that which belongs
separately to either of the spouses. Unless proved otherwise, properties acquired during the
marriage are considered partnership property.
2. Yes. Assuming there was no partition, the co-ownership between Servanda and the heirs to
the estate of Laureano over the net remainder of the conjugal partnership subsisted at the time
Servanda allegedly executed the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase in 1972. Article 493 of
the New Civil Code, which is a re-enactment of Article 399 of the Old Civil Code, provides for the
extent of a co-owner's right over his share in the co-ownership: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his pa:t1and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the coownership. In interpreting Article 493 of the New Civil Code, we
said in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals that: While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-
owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto
and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by
mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or
determinate part of the thine; in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right
over the thing is represented by an abstract or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. An
individual co-owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite potion of the land or
thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time
all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing
owned in common by all the co-owners. What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided
aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition.
Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights. (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied; citations omitted.)
Accordingly, while Servanda may sell her undivided aliquot share as a co-owner, she may not
alienate the whole of Lot No. 2560 to the exclusion of the other co-owners. More importantly,
Servanda cannot claim specific title to the property. Thus, what may only be considered sold to
Benito, and which was eventually redeemed by Dominga, is Servanda's right over her undivided
aliquot share in the property-not the right over her lot.55 Thus, Dominga may only claim such
rights that Servanda had possessed at the time of the sale.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The MCTC Decision dated March 7, 2007 is
REINSTATED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) The amount of P950.00 representing
the payment made by Dominga Jarque shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
date of judicial demand on August 26, 200572 until June 30, 2013, and interest at the rate of 6%
per annum, computed from July 1, 2013 up to the date of finality of this Decision; and (2) the
awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees shall likewise earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the time of the finality of this Decision. The total monetary awards
shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
finality of judgment until its satisfaction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 218731, February 13, 2019

NICOMEDES AUGUSTO, GOMERCINDO JIMENEZ, MARCELINO PAQUIBOT, AND

ROBERTA SILAWAN, PETITIONERS, v. ANTONIO CARLOTA DY AND MARIO DY,
RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: Rule 18, Section 5 provides that both parties and their counsel are mandated to
appear at a pre-trial except for:

(1) a valid excuse; and

(2) appearance of a representative on behalf of a party who is fully authorized in writing to enter
into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter
into stipulations or admissions of facts and documents.

Facts: Respondent Antonio Carlota Dy filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deeds and
Titles against petitioners Nicomedes, Gomercindo, Marcelino, Roberta and the Register of Deeds.

While initiating the paperworks to secure a certificate of title in his name, he discovered that
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over Lot No. 4277 were already issued in petitioners' names.

At the pre-trial, petitioners and their counsel did not appear. Thus, the RTC declared them in
default and allowed Antonio to present evidence ex parte.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Antonio may present evidence ex parte for failure of the the
petitioners for failure to present at the pre-trial.
Held: Yes. Rule 18, Section 5 provides that both parties and their counsel are mandated to appear
at a pre-trial except for:

(3) a valid excuse; and

(4) appearance of a representative on behalf of a party who is fully authorized in writing to enter
into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter
into stipulations or admissions of facts and documents.

Petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference. They did not even give any excuse for their
non-appearance. It was only during the appeal in the RTC that petitioners explained that their
non-attendance was due to the fact that their counsel lost his calendar. At any rate, this still cannot
be considered a justifiable excuse for their non-attendance. Thus, the RTC properly issued an
Order allowing respondents to present evidence ex parte.

As it now stands, the RTC could only render judgment based on the evidence offered by
respondents during the trial. The petitioners lost their right to present their evidence during the
trial and on appeal due to their inattentiveness and disregard of the mandatory attendance in the
pre-trial conference.

onsidering the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Hence, the
appealed Decision dated November 20, 2014 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CEB
C.V. No. 04753 insofar as it affirmed the RTC, is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 16, 1978 executed by Nicolas Aying, married
to Maura Augusto in favor of Gomercindo Jimenez to the extent of 1,331.75 square meters
of Lot No. 4277 is declared VALID;

2. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 25, 1989 executed by Filomeno Augusto in
favor of Antonio Carlota Dy involving 2,363.5 square meters of Lot No. 4277 is
declared VALID;
 3. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 10, 1989 executed by Filomeno Augusto in
favor of Nicomedes Augusto involving 300 square meters of Lot No. 4277 is
declared VALID;

4. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated Julyl4, 1987 executed by Mariano Silawan in favor of
Marcelino Paquibot is declared VOID;

5. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 23, 1994 executed by Rodulfo Augusto in favor of
Mario Dy is declared VOID; and

6. The Extrajudicial Settlement by Sole and Only Heir executed by Roberta Silawan insofar
as the 1,331.75 square meters representing one-fourth of her undivided share in Lot No.
4277 is declared VALID. The Confirmation of Sale embodied in the said document
is STRUCK DOWN.

Pursuant thereto, the subject property (Lot No. 4277) comprising an area of 5,327 square meters
shall be partitioned to the following persons, in the following manner:

1. To Gomercindo Jimenez, married to Estela Jimenez, an area containing 1,331.75 square

meters, more or less;

2. To spouses Antonio Carlota Dy and Jean Dy, an area containing 2,363.5 square meters,
more or less;

3. To spouses Nicomedes Augusto and Gaudencia Augusto, an area containing 300 square
meters, more or less; and

4. To Roberta Silawan, an area containing 1,331.75 square meters, more or less.

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby ORDERED to CANCEL all
Transfer Certificates of Title issued replacing OCT No. RO-3456, as well as their corresponding
Tax Declarations, as follows: (a) TCT No. 48562 in the name of spouses Nicomedes Augusto and
Gaudencia Augusto; (b) TCT No. 48563 in the name of Gomercindo Jimenez, married to Estela
Jimenez; (c) TCT No. 48564 in the name of Marcelino Paquibot, married to Elena Paquibot; and
(d) TCT No. 48565 in the name of Roberta Silawan, and ISSUE new ones in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA A. BAYAN* v. CELIA A. BAYAN, GR No. 220741, 2019-08-14

DOCTRINE:

any co-owner can mortgage their undivided share in the co-owned property in accordance with
Article 493[20] of the Civil Code

Facts:

Petitioners, together with respondent Celia, are the registered co-owners of three parcels of
residential and commercial land

Celia, acting for herself and as alleged Attorney-in-Fact of Angelina and Jaime, was able to obtain
loans on three different occasions from her co-respondents Tanghal and Dy

To secure the payment of her loans, Celia executed a fraudulent Special Powers of Attorney
(SPAs) which supposedly embodied her authority to act on behalf of her frail mother Angelina and
her brother, Jaime, who was permanently living in the United States. With such spurious authority,
Celia executed in favor of Dy and Tanghal a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage

Angelina and Jaime insisted that all the transactions made by Celia were without their knowledge
and consent and their signatures embodied in the SPA were forged. This prompted them to file
the instant action. However, during the pendency of the case, Dy and Tanghal proceeded to
foreclose the mortgage.

Regional Trial Court (RTC)... ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring as null and void... the two
SPAs... the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Contract... the CA issued the now appealed Decision
partially granting the appeal.

The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City: (a) determine the exact extent
of the respective rights, interests, shares, and participation of Defendants-Appellants Tanghal and
Dy and the Plaintiffs-Appellees over the subject properties, and (b) thereafter, to effect a final
division, adjudication, and partition in accordance with law.

all the parties (Dy, Tanghal and Petitioners) filed their respective Motions for Partial
Reconsideration/Partial Motions for Reconsideration.

they prayed that the CA partially reconsider its Decision by granting their right of legal redemption
over the one-third (1/3) share of Celia through the payment of one-third of the mortgage debt...
the CA issued a Resolution denying all the parties' Motions for Partial Reconsideration for lack of
merit

We are constrained to deny their Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The right of redemption was
not prayed for much less alleged in the Complaint, hence, We cannot now include a determination
of the same in Our resolution.

Petitioners argued that they belatedly raised the issue of their right of legal redemption because
it was only on appeal that the partial validity of the mortgage was entertained by the CA and that
the latter had ruled that Celia had the right to sell or even mortgage her undivided interest in the
property pursuant to Article 493

Issues:

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petitioners cannot raise
their right of legal redemption for the first time on appeal even though it was not relevant to raise
the same before the trial court's level.

Ruling:

The issue of right of legal redemption was neither raised in the RTC nor was even mentioned in
the proceedings before the CA. As mentioned, it was raised for the very first time only in
petitioners' Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the CA. We agree with the CA that this is not
allowed. No question will be considered on appeal much more in the motion for reconsideration
with the appellate court, when it was not raised in the court below.

In legal pre-emption or redemption under the Civil Code of the Philippines, written notice of the
sale to all possible redemptioners is indispensable.

the Court in the case of Etcuban v. Court of Appeals[16] has clarified that even if it was not sent
by the vendor as long as the redemptioners were notified in writing, the same is sufficient for their
right to redeem to accrue

In the instant case, the fact that petitioners alleged in their complaint about the foreclosure sale
of the mortgage, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale and their annotation/inscription on TCT...
conclusively shows that petitioners were notified of the sale and were furnished said documents,
and is tantamount to an actual knowledge of such fact of sale. No other notice is needed because
the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale itself confirms the fact of sale, its perfection and its due execution.
The bottomline is that petitioners need not wait for the Court to make a definitive ruling on the
validity or invalidity of the mortgage made by their co-owner. They should have known that any
co-owner can mortgage their undivided share in the co-owned property in accordance with Article
493[20] of the Civil Code. Upon notice of the foreclosure sale or receipt of any written notice of
the fact of sale, petitioners' right of legal redemption had already accrued such that they should
have included said issue at the very onset in their complaint. Not having raised the same with the
lower court, it cannot be entertained for the first time in the Motion for Reconsideration with the
appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision dated January 5, 2015
and the Resolution dated September 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 96204
are AFFIRMED.
HEIRS OF FELICIANO YAMBAO V. HERMOGENES YAMBAO G.R. No. 194260 (APRIL 13,
2016)

DOCTRINE:

In order that co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known
to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

FACTS: The heirs of Feliciano prohibited Eleanor and the heirs of Hermogenes from entering the
co-owned property. The heirs of Feliciano argued that Feliciano solely owned the property and
was in possession of the subject property in the concept of owner since time immemorial.

ISSUE: WON prescription runs as between co-owners

RULING: A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere
actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse
because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription
does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a
clear repudiation of the coownership. Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if
there is adverse, open, continuous and exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the
other co-owner/s. In order that co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-
owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon
must be clear and convincing. Thus, in order for prescription to run between co-owners, there
must be an express or manifest repudiation of that trust, they must repudiate or perform acts that
will extinguish the trust or fiduciary relationship between the co-owners. Only from that time will
prescription start to run, otherwise the fact that they had not done anything to the title or the
ownership of the other co-owners as regards to the co-owned property, prescription will not run,
because that they do not possess it in the concept of an owner since they acknowledge the right
of other co-owners to possess the same property. Did the Heirs of Feliciano acquired the property
through prescription?

NO. Although the issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation
of any trust, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible as between co-owners. In order for
the prescriptive period (10 yrs.) for an action to demand partition to begin to run, (1) there must
be a demand for partition and (2) must be coupled with the fact that the other co-owners are not
anymore in possession of the said property. Only when these 2 requirements concur that there
will be repudiation. This is because the partition of the property will put to an end the co-ownership.
However, in this case, the action did not prescribe because the heirs of Hermogenes only ceased
to be in possession when they were ejected from the said property. It cannot be said that the heirs
of Feliciano possessed the said property for 10 years in the concept of an owner, since they
allowed their co-owners to possess the same property. The court ruled in favor of the heirs of
Hermogenes.
CITY OF BATANGAS v. PHILIPPINE SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, GR No. 195003,
2017-06-07

DOCTRINE:

the ordinance (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
(v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable.

Facts:

PSPC owns and operates a refinery

. (SPEX) is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.

In furtherance of... to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum, the
Department of Energy (DOE) executed Service Contract No. 38 (SC 38) with SPEX under which
SPEX was tasked to explore and develop possible petroleum sources in North Western Palawan.

SPEX's exploration led to the discovery of an abundant source of natural gas... which thereafter
gave rise to the Malampaya Project.

The Malampaya Project required the construction of a 504-kilometer offshore pipeline for the
transport of natural gas from Malampaya field to Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's Tabangao
Refinery.

the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed Ordinance which requires heavy industries
operating along the portions of Batangas Bay... to construct desalination plants to facilitate the
use of seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities.

PSPC filed against Batangas City... praying that the Assailed Ordinance be declared null and void.

PSPC averred that the Assailed Ordinance constitutes an invalid exercise of police power as it
failed to meet the substantive requirements for validity

PSPC argued that the Assailed Ordinance contravenes the Water Code of the Philippines... and
encroaches upon the power of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) to regulate and
control the Philippines' water resources

PSPC alleged that the Assailed Ordinance unduly singles out heavy industries, and holds them
solely accountable for the loss of water and destruction of aquifers without basis,... PSPC
contended that the Assailed Ordinance was not posted or published... nor were public hearings
or consultations... conducted thereon

Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod maintained that they have the power to enact
the Assailed Ordinance pursuant to the general welfare clause under the LGC

According to them, the rationale of the Assailed Ordinance is to stop PSPC and other industries
similarly situated from relying "too much" on ground water as coolants for their machineries, and
alternatively promote the use of seawater for such purpose, considering that fresh ground water
is a "perishable commodity."... the RTC rendered a Decision,... the questioned ordinance is
INVALID,... The RTC gave credence to the testimony of PSPC's witness Engineer... there is no
threat of depletion of the groundwater resource[s] in the Tabangao-Malitam [w]atershed that
purportedly may result from PSPC's deep well pumping.

the CA... affirmed the RTC's decisions

City Ordinance No. 3, S. 2001 contravenes Presidential Decree No. 1067, better known as "The
Water Code of the Philippines" as it is an encroachment into the authority of the [NWRB]. The use
of water resources is under the regulatory power of the national government.

Issues:

The sole issue for this Court's determination is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
which declared the Assailed Ordinance invalid.

Ruling:

The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time and again, the Court has ruled that
in order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law. Moreover, substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must
not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (vi)
must not be unreasonable.

Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of
its police power. This claim is erroneous.

Accordingly, the Assailed Ordinance mandates all heavy industries operating along Batangas Bay
to use seawater in the operation of their respective facilities, and install desalination plants for this
purpose. Failure to comply with this mandatory requirement would have the effect of precluding
continuous operation, and exposing noncompliant parties to penal and administrative sanctions

There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions
of the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use
of ground water which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB.

Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated May 25, 2010 and Resolution dated December 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90373 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, GR No.
183543, 2016-06-20

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 549 in relation to Articles 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad faith
has a specific obligation to reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the former
received, and that the latter could have received had its possession not been... interrupted.

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner[4] of a 120-hectare piece of government property in Diliman, Quezon City,
reserved for the establishment of the National Government Center.[5] By virtue of Proclamation
No. 1670[6] issued... on 19 September 1977, President Ferdinand Marcos reserved a seven-
hectare area thereof and granted respondent usufructuary rights over it.[7]

Respondent occupied a total of 16 hectares, thereby exceeding the seven-hectare area it was
allowed to occupy.[8] It leased the excess to private tenants.[9]

On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127[10]
revoking the reserved status of the remaining 50 hectares of the 120-hectare property. Petitioner
was expressly authorized to commercialize the area and sell it to the public... through bidding.
President Fidel Ramos subsequently issued Executive Order No. 58[11] on 15 February 1993
creating an inter-agency executive committee (Executive Committee) composed of petitioner and
other government agencies to oversee the comprehensive... development of the remaining 50
hectares, therein referred to as the North Triangle Property.

As respondent occupied a prime portion of the North Triangle Property, the Executive Committee
proposed the transfer of respondent to areas more suitable to its operations.

On 12 August 1994, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint[13] for injunction with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner. Respondent sought the
protection of its occupancy and possession of the property reserved... for it under Proclamation
No. 1670.

On 11 November 1994, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner from
causing the relocation of respondent.

Petitioner's certiorari petition was denied by the CA,[18] which remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings on the matter of petitioner's counterclaim.
In a Decision dated 21 January 2005,[22] the RTC validated the turnover of the excess to
petitioner, but disallowed the recovery of rent, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

The trial court found that respondent had leased the excess to various establishments upon
authority given by Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda.[23] As he had administrative
control over respondent at the time, he gave it that authority to enable... it to earn income to
finance its operations, considering that it no longer received any donation from the national
government since 1986.[24]

The RTC also found that respondent had protected the excess by developing it and keeping
squatter syndicates from taking possession.[25] For that reason, the expenses it incurred for the
development of the excess were more than sufficient to compensate... petitioner in terms of rent.

In the assailed Decision dated 8 April 2008,[28] the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issues:

Petitioner now comes before us raising the sole issue of whether it is entitled to recover rent,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses from respondent

Ruling:

Since respondent had no right to act beyond the confines of the seven-hectare area granted to it,
and since it was fully aware of this fact, its encroachment of nine additional hectares of petitioner's
property rendered it a possessor in bad faith as to the excess.

While respondent may have been allowed by then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda
to lease the excess to various establishments, such authority did not come from petitioner, who
is the owner. At any rate, even if petitioner tolerated the encroachment by respondent,... that fact
does not change the latter's status as a possessor in bad faith. We have ruled that a person
whose occupation of realty is by sheer tolerance of the owner is not a possessor in good faith.

Under Article 549 in relation to Articles 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad faith
has a specific obligation to reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the former
received, and that the latter could have received had its possession not been... interrupted.[38]
The provisions state:

Article 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the
legitimate possessor could have received, and shall have a right only to the expenses mentioned
in paragraph 1 of article 546 and in article 443. The expenses... incurred in improvements for pure
luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in bad faith; but he may remove
the objects for which such expenses have been incurred, provided that the thing suffers no injury
thereby, and that the lawful possessor does not... prefer to retain them by paying the value they
may have at the time he enters into possession.

Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have... acquired
by reason thereof.

Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third
person in their production, gathering, and preservation. (Emphases supplied)

As provided in the law, respondent shall be made to account for the fruits it received from the time
it took possession until the time it surrendered the excess to petitioner. Respondent has admitted
that it leased out the excess to various establishments and earned profits... therefrom.[39] Having
done so, it is bound to pay the corresponding amounts to petitioner.

Respondent, however, shall be entitled to a refund of the necessary expenses it incurred.

Necessary expenses are those made for the preservation of the land occupied,[40] or those
without which the land would deteriorate or be lost.[41] These may also include expenditures that
augment the income of the land or those that are incurred for its cultivation, production, and
upkeep.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 8 April 2008 and Resolution dated 30 June
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85262 are hereby SET ASIDE.

Let the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, for the
reception of evidence for the purpose of determining the amounts the parties are entitled to, as
well as their respective rights and obligations over the excess of the seven-hectare... area, from
the time respondent took possession until the same was surrendered to petitioner, in accordance
with Articles 549, 546, and 443 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
ANACLETO C. MANGASER v. DIONISIO UGAY, GR No. 204926, 2014-12-03

DOCTRINE:

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat. strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed... within one (1) year from
the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of
the property.

Facts:

On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser... tiled a complaint for Forcible Entry with
Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay (respondent)

In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of
land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632 square meters and covered
by OCT No. RP-174 (FP-13787)... hat... on October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that
respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a residential
house thereon without his knowledge and consent

Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up the following defenses...
that he had been a resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached the
age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of land in that place then known as

Sta. Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of land was designated as part of
Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union due to a survey made by the government; that he introduced more
improvements on the property by cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a "bahay...
kubo"; that in October 2006, he installed a fence made of "bolo" to secure the property; that in
installing the fence, he was guided by the concrete monuments which he knew to be indicators of
the boundaries of petitioner's property; that while he could not locate some of the... monuments,
he based the boundaries on his recollection since he was around when these were installed; that
he knew the boundaries of petitioner's property because he knew the extent of the "iron mining"
activities done by a company on the said property; that petitioner was never... in actual possession
of the property occupied by him, and it was only on October 31, 2006 when he discovered the
alleged intrusion; that it was not correct to say that be refused to vacate and surrender the
premises despite receipt of the demand letters because in his... letter-reply, he assured petitioner
that he would voluntarily vacate the premises if he would only be shown to have intruded into
petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to him; and that instead of showing the
boundaries to him,... On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent

It stated that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied by respondent
was within his lot titled under OCT No. RP-174 ( 13789)

It also explained that... petitioner failed to prove his prior physical possession of the subject
property... the RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner.

t relied on the cases of Barba v. Court of Appeals[9] and Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions,
Inc.,[10] which held that in ejectment cases, possession of the land did not only mean actual or
physical possession but also included the subject of the thing to the action of one's will or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. The

RTC stated that petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the property as evidenced by his
OCT... nd tax declaration, dating back as early as 1995.

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

it emphasized that petitioner must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of
the property in dispute. The word "possession," as used in... forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases, meant nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law.

he CA wrote that petitioner was not in physical possession despite the presentation of the OCT
No. RP-174( 13789) and his tax... declarations

What petitioner proved was legal possession,... not his prior physical possession.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF

0WNERSHIP OF PETITIONER WHICH MAY ESTABLISH PRIOR POSSESSION OVER THE
PROPERTY BY HEREIN PETITIONER.

Ruling:

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat. strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed... within one (1) year from
the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of
the property.

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material
possession of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to
the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence... thereon is not
admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.

here is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession
of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of
possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence... thereon is not admissible,
except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.

As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior
physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the
sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence... of it "is not a ground for
the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."... while prior physical
possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in
respondent's position is evident from the principle that possession can... be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

The case of Quizon v. Juan... also stressed this doctrine.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of
acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of
public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the... like.[33] The reason for
this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to
have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.[34]
It is sufficient... that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.[35] Here,
respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these circumstances. He could not even say
that the subject property was leased to him except that he promised that he... would vacate it if
petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the subject property
by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth Act No.
141 and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds
Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of... ownership shall be resolved
in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of
ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance to
determine the issue of possession and only if the... question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership.

The issuance of an original certificate of title to the petitioner evidences ownership and from it, a
right to the... possession of the property flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has
a Torrens title over the property is entitled to the possession thereof.

gainst the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that
he had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the... issue of
ownership, the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2012 Decision and the December 5, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The August 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union,
is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Suarez vs Emboy, Jr. 718 SCRA 677, CASE DIGEST – RULE 70 Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer

DOCTRINE.: In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be
alleged and sufficiently established:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.

Facts: A house occupied by the Emboys, stands in the subject lot. They claim that their mother
had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share. They
had stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn
succeeded her own parents. Felix and Marilou Emboy were asked to vacate the subject lot and
to transfer to another lot. They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance. The Emboys
received a demand letter from Suarez requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed
that Suarez had already purchased the subject lot. However, the Emboys did not heed the
demand. Suarez filed before the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer.

MTCC: Upheld Suarez and the Emboys were ordered to vacate the subject lot. RTC affirmed
MTCC. CA: Suarez’ complaint was neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but
essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.

Issue: Whether or not Suarez’ complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and
proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

Conflicting Position:

Emboy: They have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades.
That Suarez was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis
pendens (petition for nullification of the partition) clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. That
the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Suarez, had never physically
occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Suarez’ claim that their possession of the
subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.

Suarez: She bought the subject lot from the registered owners thereof and the persons who
allowed the Emboys to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she
claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand to vacate the
same.

Held: No. Suarez had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer.

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and
sufficiently established:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Suarez failed to clearly
allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house
upon it. Suarez was likewise silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents
to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about. Instead, Suarez formulated a
legal conclusion that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue
of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully
withholding the subject lot’s possession after Suarez, as purchaser and new registered owner,
had demanded for the former to vacate the property. It is worth noting that the absence of the first
requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the Emboys’ claim that for decades, they
have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.
The jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not been amply
alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment
proceedings. Suarez can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose.
The Emboys on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished
pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of the lot where ownership
over the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.

CA is affirmed.
SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ and AMELIA CONCIO-DELA CRUZ vs. SPOUSES
RUFINO R. CAPCO AND MARTY C. CAPCO

G.R. No. 176055, March 17, 2014

DOCTRINE:

• A complaint, to sufficiently make out a case for unlawful detainer and fall under the
jurisdiction of the MeTC, must allege that:

(1) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of the plaintiff;

o Here, the Complaint alleged that the spouses Dela Cruz’ predecessor-in-
interest, Teodora, is the registered owner of the property per TCT No. 31873
and that she tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation of the lot.

(2) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and;

o The spouses Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the property through

conveyance and they extended the same tolerance to the spouses Capco.
The spouses Dela Cruz demanded for the spouses Capco to vacate the
property but to no avail; hence, they sent the latter a formal demand letter
which, per the attached copy to the Complaint, is dated September 1, 2003.

(4) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

o The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or within one year from the time
the formal demand to vacate was made

Facts:
• In 2003, Sps. Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the Sps. Capco before
the MeTC of Pateros. They alleged that Amelia’s mother, Teodora, acquired the said property
by virtue of a Court Decision (RTC Pasig).

o The said property was eventually registered in Teodora’s name. Teodora, out of
neighborliness and blood relationship, tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation
thereof.

o Subsequently, the subject property was conveyed to the spouses Dela Cruz.

• Intending to construct a house thereon and utilize the space for their balut and salted eggs
business, the spouses Dela Cruz thus demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the property.

o As the spouses Capco refused, the matter was brought before the Barangay Lupon
for conciliation wherein several meetings were held but to no avail.

• In their Answer, the spouses Capco pointed out that the Complaint is defective for failing to
allege the exact metes and bounds of the property. Neither is a title attached thereto to show
that the spouses Dela Cruz are the owners of the disputed property.

o Be that as it may, the Sps. Capco asserted that they have all the rights to occupy the
subject property since respondent Rufino Capco (Rufino) is an heir of its true owner.
In fact, they established their balutan business and built their house thereon as early
as 1947. By way of counterclaim, the spouses Capco prayed that the spouses Dela
Cruz be ordered to pay them exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.

• The exhibits submitted by the spouses Dela Cruz, included, among others, copies of the (1)
RTC Decision dated October 3, 1983 in Land Registration Case No. 9511; (2) TCT No. 31873
in the name of Teodora; and, (3) Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodora T.
Concio wherein her heirs agreed to assign, transfer and convey the property to Amelia. For
their part, the spouses Capco presented (1) two 1993 tax declarations covering their house
and a camarin which both stand on a lot owned by Juan E. Cruz (Juan) and (2) several
receipts evidencing their payment of real property taxes.

MTC= Favored Sps. De La Cruz for sufficient identification of property through technical
description of the TCT. Did not give credence to Sps. Capco’s assertion that the complaint did not
properly identify the property. Also, it was because of Teodora’s tolerance that the possession
remained under Sps. Capco. Upon her death, the heirs executed an extra judicial settlement.
Subsequently, this was all transferred to petitioners. As such, basing on the foregoing, METC
rejected Sps. Capco’s possession of the assailed property. Directed them to pay P500.00 per
month as reasonable compensation from September 1, 2003 until subject property is vacated.

RTC= Affirmed MTC in toto.

• In view of the Decision of the RTC, the spouses Dela Cruz filed a Motion to Remand and
Direct Court of Origin to Issue a Writ of Execution and later, a Motion to Withdraw Back
Rentals under Judicial Custody.

• The spouses Capco, for their part, moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Decision. These
motions were resolved by the RTC through an Omnibus Order which denied the same.
Further, the Motion to Remand is GRANTED and the Motion to Withdraw Back Rentals is
deferred for the consideration of the court of origin.

• Undeterred, the spouses Capco filed a Petition for Review with the CA.

CA= Reversed. Favored Sps. Capco. Sps. De La Cruz’s complaint merely alleged that the Sps.
Capco’s possession of the property was by the tolerance of their predecessors-in-interest and
‘out of neighborliness and blood relationship’. The evidence presented does not show how the
spouses Capco came into possession. It is not clear whether the portion occupied by the spouses
Capco lies therein or in the other half adjudicated in favor of Hermogenes Reyes. In view of this,
it opined that there is a need to physically determine the exact boundaries of the land covered by
TCT No. 31873 which, however, cannot be done in a mere summary proceeding in an ejectment
case but rather in an accion publiciana or accion reindivicatoria before the RTC. MR=Denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the complaint sufficiently makes out a case for unlawful detainer. (YES.)
Held:

• The CA intimated in its assailed Decision that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
spouses Dela Cruz’ Complaint for ejectment since the same failed to describe how the
spouses Capco’s entry to the property was effected or how and when the dispossession
started, as held in Go and Melchor. Such a requirement, however, does not apply in this case.
The Court has already clarified in Delos Reyes v. Odones that:

The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into
the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the
filing of the complaint before the MTC.

• The timeliness of the filing of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this
case. Hence, the failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco
came into possession of the property does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over it.

• A complaint, to sufficiently make out a case for unlawful detainer and fall under the jurisdiction
of the MeTC, must allege that:

(5) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;

o Here, the Complaint alleged that the spouses Dela Cruz’ predecessor-in-interest,
Teodora, is the registered owner of the property per TCT No. 31873 and that she
tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation of the lot.

(6) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(7) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and;

o The spouses Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the property through conveyance
and they extended the same tolerance to the spouses Capco. The spouses Dela
Cruz demanded for the spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no avail;
hence, they sent the latter a formal demand letter which, per the attached copy to
the Complaint, is dated September 1, 2003.
 (8) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

o The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or within one year from the time the
formal demand to vacate was made

• Clearly, the Complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer as to vest
the MeTC jurisdiction over it.

• CA opined that there is a need to determine if the lot occupied by the spouses Capco really
forms part of the property over which the spouses Dela Cruz claim to have a better right to
possess.

o The Court, however, thinks otherwise. One of the three issues defined during the
preliminary conference is "whether or not the [spouses Capco] are occupying the
subject property by mere tolerance of the plaintiffs".It is therefore safe to conclude
that there is no dispute with respect to the identity of the property. What was
clearly up for resolution before the MeTC was only the question of whether the
spouses Capco are occupying the property by mere tolerance of the spouses
Dela Cruz.

• Moreover, the evidence submitted in this case establishes that the lot subject of this
Complaint for ejectment is the same lot being occupied by the spouses Capco. As
mentioned, the spouses Capco submitted tax declarations covering their house and a camarin
as well as the corresponding receipts evidencing their payments of real property taxes.
Notably, the declared owner of the lot on which these properties stand, as written in the
receipts for the years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998, is Juan. Yet, the receipts for the years 2000,
2001, 2002, and 2003 no longer reflect Juan as the owner but Teodora. This change tends
to support the conclusion that the lot occupied by the spouses Capco, which was
previously owned by Juan, is the portion adjudicated in favor of the spouses Dela Cruz’
predecessor-in-interest, Teodora. This is further confirmed by the affidavit of the
Municipal Assessor of Pateros, Mr. Emmanuel España. Besides, the spouses Capco
appear to have acknowledged the fact that the spouses Dela Cruz owned the lot that
they are occupying. As shown by the records during the first meeting before the
Barangay Lupon, respondent Marty C. Capco asked Amelia if the latter could just sell
the lot to them [the spouses Capco] so that their business built thereon would not
suffer.
• It is thus clear that the lot being occupied by the spouses Capco is the same lot over which
the spouses Dela Cruz claim to have a better right to possess. Contrary therefore to the CA’s
pronouncement, there is no need to physically determine the extent of the land covered by
T.C.T. No. 31873.

o The spouses Dela Cruz are able to establish by preponderance of evidence that
they are the rightful possessors of the property.

• The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property – possession
de facto and not possession de jure. But where the parties to an ejectment case raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties
has the better right to possess the property.

o Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses
Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino
as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the property.

▪ Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of
ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it
must be emphasized that "[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is
only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property."

o The spouses Dela Cruz were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that
they are the owners of the lot. Their allegation that the subject property was
adjudicated to Teodora by virtue of a decision in a land registration case and
was later conveyed in their favor, is supported by (1) a copy of the Decision in
the said land registration case; (2) the title of the land issued to Teodora (TCT
No. 31873), and, (3) the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
Teodora wherein the latter’s heirs agreed to convey the said property to Amelia.

• The spouses Capco, on the other hand, aside from their bare allegation that respondent
Rufino is an heir of the true owners thereof, presented nothing to support their claim.

o While they submitted receipts evidencing their payments of the realty taxes of their
house and the camarin standing in the subject property, the same only militates against
their claim since the latest receipts indicate Teodora as the owner of the land.
Moreover, the spouses Capco’s attempt to attack the title of Teodora is futile. "It has
 repeatedly been emphasized that when the property is registered under the Torrens
system, the registered owner's title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be
collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been
held that it does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable."

• All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion, as affirmed by the RTC, that the
spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material possession of the subject property. As
its present owners, they have a right to the possession of the property which is one of the
attributes of ownership.

SC= Petition is GRANTED. Decision and Resolution of CA ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. RTC
and MTC Decision REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.
BONIFACIO PIEDAD v. SPS. VICTORIO GURIEZA AND EMETERIA M. GURIEZA, GR No.
207525, 2014-06-10

DOCTRINE:

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court... within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession" and must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had lawful
possession of the property, either by virtue... of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b)
eventually, the defendant's possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by
the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant's right of possession;
(c)... thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
the enjoyment thereof; and (d) within one (1) year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment... the Court holds that Bonifacio had
clearly established his cause of action for unlawful detainer

Facts:

instant case stemmed from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages[5]filed by Bonifacio
against Sps. Gurieza

Bonifacio alleged... that he is the absolute owner of the 1/3 middle portion of a parcel of residential
land designated as Lot 1227, located at La Torre, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, with an area of
4,640.98 square meters (subject lot) which he acquired through intestate succession from hi...
father... who inherited the same from the latter's parents, Alejandro Piedad (Alejandro) and
TomasaVillaray (Tomasa

He also claimed that his ownership of the subject lot took place even before his father's death and
was validated through a Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and

Partition (Deed of Confirmation) executed by Alejandro and Tomasa's legal heirs.

Bonifacio alleged that before migrating to Hawaii, he built a bungalow on the subject lot and
assigned numerous caretakers to look after it, the last of which were Sps. Gurieza

Sps. Gurieza allegedly took interest of the bungalow and the subject lot after learning from an
employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that Lot 1227 is
public land
MTC ruled in Bonifacio's favor, and, accordingly, ordered Sps. Gurieza to vacate the subject lot,...
RTC affirmed the MTC ruling in toto... the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling... heirs of
Alejandro and Tomasa, did not sign the Deed of Confirmation

Issues:

whether or not the CA correctly reversed the RTC ruling and, consequently, dismissed Bonifacio's
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against Sps. Gurieza.

Ruling:

The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material possession
of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any... of the parties

An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category
of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance
without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that... he/she will
vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.[18]

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court... within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession" and must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had lawful
possession of the property, either by virtue... of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b)
eventually, the defendant's possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by
the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant's right of possession;
(c)... thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
the enjoyment thereof; and (d) within one (1) year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment... the Court holds that Bonifacio had
clearly established his cause of action for unlawful detainer

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 18, 2013 and the
Resolution dated June 5, 2013 of the Court of A peals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117686 are hereby
REVERSED and SET A IDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 27, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28 in Civil Case No. 6974 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
FE U. QUIJANO v. ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, GR No. 164277, 2014-10-08

DOCTRINE:

An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding
designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved.

Facts:

Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the
possession is deemed illegal from the beginning.

The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their father, the
late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land registered in the latter's name under Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 0-188 of the Registry of Deeds in Cebu City with an area of

15,790 square meters, more or less.

On

April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring
600 square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante (respondent),... On July 25, 1991, Eliseo,
sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of his share in the property to the
respondent, with their deed of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the approval of Eliseo's
siblings,... On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition to divide their father's estate (consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land) among
themselves.

Due to the petitioner's needing her portion that was then occupied by the respondent, she
demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several demands, the last of which was by the letter
dated November 4, 1994,[7] the respondent refused to vacate, prompting... her to file agamst him
on February 14, 1995 a complaint for ejectment and damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
of Cebu City (MTCC),... The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had
been by mere tolerance of Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact the owner and lawful
possessor of the property, having bought it from Eliseo
On February 5, 1996, the MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner,... On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the judgment of the MTCC, and dismissed the complaint,[12]
holding that the summary proceeding for ejectment was not proper because the serious question
of ownership of the disputed property was involved

On May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[15] affirming the decision of the RTC, and
dismissing the case for ejectment, but on the ground that the respondent was either a co-owner
or an assignee holding the right of possession over the disputed... property.

Issues:

To be resolved is the issue of who between the petitioner and the respondent had the better right
to the possession of the disputed property.

Ruling:

An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding
designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved.19 The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or material
possession (possession de facto) of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly
deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence, even if the question of
ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue but only to
determine the question of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked
with the question of possession.20 The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely
provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to
the property.21

Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed property, the CA properly
ruled on the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining who between them had the
better right to possess the disputed property.

The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano Quijano, and passed
on to his heirs by operation of law upon his death.22 Prior to the partition, the estate was owned
in common by the heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased.23 In a co-ownership,
the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the property pro
indiviso and exercising her rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the
property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot
be determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership
of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.24

Even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and partitioned
and is thus merely inchoate, Article 49325cralawred of the Civil Code gives the heir the right to
exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent
in 1990 and 1991, he was only a co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion
that would be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not vest
ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred only the seller's pro
indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property
until it is partitioned.26

As Eliseo's successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right under
Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition
undertaken without his consent.27 Article 497 states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing
owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot
impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made
notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the
debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.

The respondent could not deny that at the time of the sale he knew that the property he was
buying was not exclusively owned by Eliseo. He knew, too, that the co-heirs had entered into an
oral agreement of partition vis-a-vis the estate, such knowledge being explicitly stated in his
answer to the complaint, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
12. That defendant, before he acquired the land from Eliseo Quijano was informed by the latter
that the portion sold to him was his share already; that they have orally partitioned the whole lot
before defendant acquired the portion from him.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

His knowledge of Eliseo's co-ownership with his co-heirs, and of their oral agreement of partition
notwithstanding, the respondent still did not exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo
made it appear to the respondent that the partition had already been completed and finalized, the
co-heirs had not taken possession yet of their respective shares to signify that they had ratified
their agreement, if any. For sure, the respondent was no stranger to the Quijanos, because he
himself had served as the lawyer of Eliseo and the petitioner herself.29 In that sense, it would have
been easy for him to ascertain whether the representation of Eliseo to him was true. As it turned
out, there had been no prior oral agreement among the heirs to partition the estate; otherwise,
Eliseo would have questioned the deed of extrajudicial partition because it did not conform to
what they had supposedly agreed upon. Had the respondent been vigilant in protecting his
interest, he could have availed himself of the rights reserved to him by law, particularly the right
to take an active part in the partition and to object to the partition if he wanted to. It was only on
September 30, 1992, or two years and five months from the time of the first sale transaction, and
a year and two months from the time of the second sale transaction, that the co-heirs executed
the deed of extrajudicial partition. Having been silent despite his ample opportunity to participate
in or to object to the partition of the estate, the respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately
agreed upon by the Quijanos.

There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the property thereby
covered and is entitled to its possession.30 However, the Court cannot ignore that the statements
in the petitioner's complaint about the respondent's possession of the disputed property being by
the mere tolerance of Eliseo could be the basis for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves
the defendant's withholding of the possession of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled, after
the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession under the contract, whether
express or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the
possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
possess.

To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be
established. With the averment here that the respondent's possession was by mere tolerance of
the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice.
At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her or her predecessor's tolerance,
or her co-heirs' permission for him to occupy the disputed property.31 But she did not adduce such
evidence. Instead, she appeared to be herself not clear and definite as to his possession of the
disputed property being merely tolerated by Eliseo, as the following averment of her petition for
review INDICATES.

6.9. Their ignorance of the said transaction of sale, particularly the petitioner, as they were
not duly informed by the vendor-co[-]owner Eliseo Quijano, [led] them to believe that the
respondent's occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of Eliseo, so that
upon partition of the whole property, said occupancy continued to be under tolerance of the
petitioner when the subject premises became a part of the land adjudicated to the
latter;32 (emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In contrast, the respondent consistently stood firm on his assertion that his possession of the
disputed property was in the concept of an owner, not by the mere tolerance of Eliseo, and actually
presented the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the property to him.33

Considering that the allegation of the petitioner's tolerance of the respondent's possession of the
disputed property was not established, the possession could very well be deemed illegal from the
beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail.34 Even so, the Court would not
be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for forcible entry because the complaint contained
no allegation that his entry in the property had been by force, intimidation, threats, strategy or
stealth.
Regardless, the issue of possession between the parties will still remain. To finally resolve such
issue, they should review their options and decide on their proper recourses. In the meantime, it
is wise for the Court to leave the door open to them in that respect. For now, therefore, this
recourse of the petitioner has to be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 26, 2004 subject to
the MODIFICATION that the unlawful detainer action is dismissed for being an improper remedy;
and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
PAUL P. GABRIEL v. CARMELING CRISOLOGO, GR No. 204626, 2014-06-09

DOCTRINE:

It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to... all the attributes of ownership
of the property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,[15] this Court declared that
the "age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession...
thereof."

As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on
the same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

Facts:

Crisologo (Crisologo)... filed her complaint[5] for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with
Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo

C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the MTCC

Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a
total area of approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates
of title Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-13935 and T-13936; that... the properties were
covered by an Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said
properties were updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners unlawfully
entered, occupied her properties by stealth, by force and without her prior... consent and
knowledge, and constructed their houses thereon

On the other hand, petitioners countered that

Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided in

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles, hence, the titles were void; that
petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous
possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was never in prior... possession
and had no valid title over the subject land.
the MTCC rendered a decision in favor of Crisologo... the RTC reversed and set aside the decision
of the MTCC... the CA rendered the assailed decision, setting aside the RTC decision and
reinstating that of the MTCC

Issues:

who between petitioners and respondent Crisologo have a better right of possession over the
subject parcels of land.

Ruling:

the Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land.

The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that

fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their
quest to defend their possession of the properties in an "accion... publiciana," not in a direct action
whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. This is the attack
that possession of a Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain, much
less accord credit to, the... petitioners-defendants' claim of fraud to impugn the validity of the
respondents-plaintiffs' title to their property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS v. BERNARD C. FERNANDEZ, GR No. 193426, 2014-09-29

DOCTRINE:

Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid therefor.

Facts:

Ludwin Fernandez[,] visited the Legenda Hotel... owned and operated by the appellant... egenda
had... installed several... cameras as part of security measures

The monitors revealed that Ludwin changed x x x $5,000.00 worth of chips into smaller...
denominations.

Legenda admitted... that its surveillance staff paid close attention to Ludwin simply because it was
"unusual" for a Filipino to play using dollar-denominated chips.

fter Ludwin won $200.00 in a game of baccarat, he redeemed the value of... chips worth
$7,200.00. A review of the CCTV recordings showed that the incident was not the first time
Ludwin visited the Casino,... An operation was launched by Legenda to zero-in on Ludwin... he
went with another brother, Deoven[,] to the casino at around the same time

After playing (and losing $100.00) only... the siblings had their chips encashed at two separate
windows. Since the cashiers were apprised of a supposed irregularity, they "froze" the
transaction.

Legenda's internal security officers accosted Ludwin and Deoven and ordered them to return the
cash and they complied... because they were being pulled away.

They were held for about seven hours

The ultimatum was simple: they confess that the chips were given by a certain employee, Michael
Cabrera, or they... would not be released from questioning.
The same line of questioning confronted them when they were later turned-over for blotter
preparation to the Intelligence and Investigation Office of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(IIO SBMA).

Finally, the brothers... succumbed to Legenda's instruction to execute a joint statement implicating
Cabrera as the illegal source of the chips.

Due to hunger pangs and fatigue,... respondent filed Civil Case... for recovery of sum of money
with damages against petitioner, on the premise that... he went to Legenda with his brothers...
that he handed over Legenda casino chips... which... belonged to him, to his brothers for the latter
to use at the casino; that petitioner accosted his brothers and unduly and illegally confiscated his
casino chips... and that petitioner refused and continues to refuse to return the same to him
despite... demand.

Petitioner's Answer

9] essentially alleged that right after Ludwin and Deoven's transactions with the Legenda cashier
were frozen... they voluntarily agreed to proceed to the Legenda security office upon... invitation,...
where Ludwin voluntarily informed security... that it was

(Cabrera)... who gave him the casino chips for encashment,... nd rewarded him... with P1,000.00
for every $1,000.00 he encashed;... that they volunteered to testify against Cabrera;... that Ludwin
and Deoven voluntarily executed a joint affidavit before the Olongapo City Prosecutor's Office,...
the trial court held:

There is no dispute that the subject chips were in the possession of the plaintiff. He claims he got
hold of them as payment for car services he rendered to a Chinese individual.

there is no direct evidence to prove the theory of the defendant

Petitioner appealed... arguing that Ludwin and Deoven's admission

City Prosecutor's Office... the casino chips strongly indicates that the chips were stolen... from
Legenda;... the CA issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the trial court

CA likewise held that Ludwin's and Deoven's statements and admissions at the Legenda security
office are inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights

Petitioner maintains that the presumption of title under Article 559... cannot extend to respondent's
brothers, who admitted during the investigation at the Legenda security office and in their Joint
Affidavit[18] that the chips came from Cabrera, and not respondent;... does not help to convince
the Court of its position,

Issues:

issue is whether or not plaintiff can be considered the lawful owner of the USD $5,900 worth of
casino chips that were confiscated.

Ruling:

if petitioner should stick to its theory that Cabrera stole the subject casino chips, then its failure to
file a criminal case against the latter including Ludwin and Deoven... does not help to convince
the Court of its position,... there appears to be no evidence on record other than mere allegations
and suppositions that Cabrera stole the casino chips in question;... such conclusion came
unilaterally from petitioner, and for it to use the same as foundation to the claim that Ludwin,
Deoven and respondent are dealing in stolen chips is clearly irregular and unfair.

there should be no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in Ludwin's and Deoven's
possession were stolen; petitioner acted arbitrarily in confiscating the same without basis.

Joint Affidavit... does not even bear such fact; it... merely states that the chips came from Cabrera.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.� The assailed April 27, 2010 Decision and August 24,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91758 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION v. LEY CONSTRUCTION, GR No. 161589, 2014-11-
24

DOCTRINE:

A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of
which there are two kinds, namely: (1) that filed against a tenant, and (2) that brought against a
vendee or vendor, or other person unlawfully withholding possession of any... land or building
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express
or implied.

Facts:

The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building located in Makati City

The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of the premises (subject property) through the
petitioner's authorized agent, Century

Properties Management, Inc. (Century Properties).

the petitioner gave the respondent possession of the subject property under a stipulation to the
effect that in case of the respondent's default in its monthly... rentals, the petitioner could
immediately repossess the subject property.

the respondent expressed the intention to purchase the entire 1,068.67 square meters, including
the subject property.

The parties executed a contract to sell, denominated as a reservation agreement, in which they
set the purchase price at US$3,420,540.00,... The 80% balance was to be paid in 13
installments... beginning on March 1, 1997 until March 1, 1998. The reservation agreement
contained the following cancellation or forfeiture provision

Any failure on [the respondent's] part to pay the full downpayment, or deliver the post-dated
checks or pay the monthly amortization on the due date, shall entitle [the petitioner], at its option,
to impose a penalty interest at the rate of three percent (3%) per... month... r to cancel this
agreement without need of any court action and to forfeit, in its favor, any reservation deposits or
payments already made on the unit, without prior notice.
After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying the stipulated monthly
amortizations. An exchange of letters ensued... the respondent asked the petitioner to modify the
terms of the reservation agreement to allow it to purchase only the subject property.

the petitioner's counsel... reminded the respondent of its US$961,546.50 liability to the petitioner
under the terms of the reservation agreement. In another letter dated February 5, 1998,[7] the
petitioner's counsel informed the respondent of its failure to pay its amortizations... since August
1997, and demanded the payment of US$961,564.50.

the respondent submitted the following proposals, namely: (1) that the US$538,735.00 paid under
the reservation agreement be applied as rental payments for the use and occupation of the subject
property in the... period from March 1997 to February 28, 1998; (2) that the balance of
US$417,355.45 after deducting the rental payments from March 1997 to February 28, 1998
should be returned to it; and (3) that the respondent be allowed to lease the subject property
beginning March 1998.

The petitioner, through its counsel's letter of March 9, 1998,[9] rejected the respondent's
proposals, and demanded the payment of US$3,310,568.00, representing the respondent's
unpaid balance (as of March 2, 1998) under the reservation agreement. The... petitioner further
evinced its intention to cancel the contract to sell, and to charge the respondent for the rentals of
the subject property corresponding to the period from August 1997 to March 1998, during which
no amortization payments were made.

the petitioner's counsel informed the respondent of the cancellation of the reservation agreement
and the forfeiture of the respondent's payments; and demanded that respondent pay the rentals
of P9,782,226.50 and... vacate the subject property.

On July 9, 1999, the petitioner filed the complaint for ejectment in the MeTC following the
respondent's failure to comply with the demands to pay and vacate.

The respondent resisted the complaint,[12] arguing that the contract of lease dated January 31,
1997 had been simulated or, in the alternative, had been repealed, negated, extinguished and/or
novated by the reservation agreement; that the petitioner had... failed to observe its undertaking
to allow the respondent to collect rentals from the other lessees of the subject property; that the
petitioner had unjustifiably refused to renegotiate or to amend the reservation agreement; and
that the petitioner had violated the rule on... non-forum shopping considering the pendency of
another case between the parties in Branch 57 of the RTC in Makati City.
the MeTC, ruling in favor of the petitioner, found that the respondent's lawful possession of the
property had been by virtue of the contract of lease, but had become unlawful when the
respondent had failed to comply with its obligation to pay the monthly... rentals for the subject
property; and that, in any event, the reservation agreement proved that the petitioner had held
the better right to possess the subject property as the owner thereof.

The respondent appealed to the RTC.

In the meantime, on November 6, 2001, the respondent turned over the possession of the leased
premises to the petitioner.

the RTC rendered its judgment nullifying the MeTC's decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
holding that the appropriate action was either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria over
which the MeTC had no jurisdiction.

The petitioner appealed to the CA.

the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC,[15] declaring that the respondent's possession was not
by virtue of the contract of lease but pursuant to the reservation agreement, which was more of a
"contract of... sale."

Not in agreement with the decision of the CA, the petitioner filed the present petition.

Issues:

The decisive question is whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana, or
accion reivindicatoria.

Ruling:

The appeal has merit.

There are three kinds of real actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, namely: accion de reivindicacion, accion publiciana and accion interdictal. The first seeks
the recovery of ownership as well as possession of... realty.[18] The second proposes to recover
the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding.[19] The third refers to
the recovery of physical or actual possession only (through a special civil action either... for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer).

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over accion interdictal.
The allegation of the... assessed value of the realty must be found in the complaint, if the action
(other than forcible entry or unlawful detainer) involves title to or possession of the realty, including
quieting of title of the realty.

A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of
which there are two kinds, namely: (1) that filed against a tenant, and (2) that brought against a
vendee or vendor, or other person unlawfully withholding possession of any... land or building
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express
or implied.

"In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in
his pleading."[27] The plaintiff must prove that it... was in prior physical possession of the premises
until it was deprived thereof by the defendant.

Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in... forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved
only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession.

For the action to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, therefore, the
complaint must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property,
either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) the... defendant's possession of
the property eventually became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of
the expiration or the termination of the defendant's right of possession; (c) the defendant
thereafter remained in possession of the property and... thereby deprived the plaintiff the
enjoyment thereof; and (d) the plaintiff instituted the action within one year from the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession.[31]

The complaint herein sufficiently alleged all the foregoing requisites for unlawful detainer,... 3. On
January 31, 1997, the defendant and the plaintiff's authorized agent, Century Properties
Management Inc. (CPMI), a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the x x x Philippines x x x entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the latter... leased
from the former a portion of the 25th Floor of the PSB (hereinafter referred to as the PROPERTY).
x x x.

4. On March 19, 1997, the defendant decided to purchase from the plaintiff the 25th Floor of
the PSB by virtue of a Reservation Agreement of the same date. x x x.
 5. However, on August 1997, the defendant started to default in its amortization payments
on the above-mentioned purchase. x x x.

xxxx

8. Sometime in March 1999, the defendant requested from the plaintiff and CPMI that the
Reservation Agreement be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the above-mentioned Contract
of Lease be revived. The plaintiff and CPMI acceded to such request x x x.

9. However, contrary to the express provisions of the Contract of Lease, the defendant failed
to pay to the plaintiff the rentals for the use of the PROPERTY when they fell due.

10. x x x the plaintiff also formally made a notarial cancellation of the aforementioned purchase
and demanded that defendant peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.

11. However, despite such demand, the defendant has failed and/or refused and continues to
refuse and fail to peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.[32]

As earlier shown, the final letter dated May 25, 1999 of the petitioner's counsel demanded that
the respondent vacate the subject property,[33] to wit:

In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue occupying the subject
premises. Hence, final and formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and quietly
vacate the same within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be... constrained
to file the appropriate legal action to protect our client's interests.

Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to charge you the amount
of P9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of January 22, 1999.

After the demand went unheeded, the petitioner initiated this suit in the MeTC on July 9, 1999,
well within the one-year period from the date of the last demand.

The aforequoted allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer, vesting the
MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint.

Indeed, the possession of the latter, although lawful at its commencement, became... unlawful
upon its non-compliance with the former's demand to vacate.

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on October 9, 2003 by
the Court of Appeals affirming the decision rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 58; REINSTATE the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, of Makati City; and ORDER the respondent to pay the costs
of suit.

SO ORDERED.