UPON CONVICTION

G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as
may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt
has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? 2 Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
trial.
An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper.
An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. 5 Even if the
conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review,
opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. 6 On the other hand, society has a compelling
interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough
to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s
flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. 8 Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused.

FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
CA denied the petition.
Reason: granting of bail should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his
health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention
while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.
It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough
to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

PETITIONER:
there is grave abuse of discretion in denying his application for bail.
that the conditions under 3 par of Sec 5, Rule 114 of RoC was present
that where the penalty is nore than 6 yrs but not more than 20 yrs (plus the prev row), bail must be absent.

ISSUE:
WON in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for
more than six years, the petitioner's application for bail should be granted absent any circumstances mentioned in the 3rd
par of Sec 5 of Rule 114 of the RoC.
"amo ba ni ang gina tawag nga discretionary?"

RULING:
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision
of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
 If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
a valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the
adverse party in either case.

Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.

1. petitioner failed to establish that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion.He never alleged.
He merely relied on the absence of circumstances.
2. admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary
3. the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is
exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which
is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 19 It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In
other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion.

the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or
erroneous conclusions of law or fact.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s
findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s Interpretation

First scenario:
1 recidivism
2 quasi-recidivism
3 habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration
4 previous escape from leagal confinement
5 evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without valid justification
6 commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon
7 circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail
8 undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal
9 other similar circumstances

Second scenario:
Existence of at least one (1) of the above circumstances.

Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado

1. BAIL IS A MATTER OF DISCRETION:
- after conviction by the RTC
- imprisonment of more than 6 yrs but not more than 20 yrs is imposed
- not one (1) of the above circumstances is PRESENT AND PROVED.

2. NO BAIL SHALL BE GRANTED:

- after conviction by the RTC
- imprisonment of more than 6 yrs but not more than 20 yrs is imposed
- any of the above circumstances is PRESENT AND PROVED.

Retired CA Justice Oscar M. Herrera

1. BAIL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
(before conviction)
- When the offense charged is not punishable by death, RP, or life imprisonment.

2. BAIL AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION

(upon conviction)
- Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, RP, or life imprisonment.

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending
appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.

SUMMARY:
1. BEFORE CONVICTION - RIGHT - APPROVED
2. UPON CONVICTION - NO SEC 5 OF RULE 114 - MAY OR MAY NOT BE APPROVED SINCE DISCRETIONARY
3. UPON CONVICTION - WITH SEC 5 OF RULE 114 - DISAPPROVED (APPROVAL = GRAVE ABUSE)
PRESENCE OF SEC 5 OF RULE 114 MUST BE PROVED.

A Final Word

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x
(emphasis supplied) 1avvphi1

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail
ends.

From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 BEFORE CONVICTION
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power
to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that
the accused appears at trial.

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari is filed by Sen Enrile against SB resolution as regards his PLUNDER case denying his
MOTION TO FIX BAIL and MR.

PLUNDER BACKGROUND:
JUNE 5, 2014
1. The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile with plunder on the basis of his involvement in the diversion
and misuse of the appropriations under the PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND (PDAF).
JUNE 10 & 16, 2014
2. Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him.
Omnibus motion. — A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
JULY 3, 2014
3. Bail denied; ground = premature = Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under
the custody of the law.
4. Warrant of arrest is issued.
5. He voluntarily surrendered to CIDG Director Benjamin Magalong.
6. Confined at the PNP General Hospital
JULY 7, 2014
7. Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at said hospital and MOTION TO FIX BAIL
8. His ARGUMENT:
- the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong;
- the penalty of plunder is reclusion temporal not perpetua
- he was not a flight risk and his age and condition must be considered.
JULY 14, 2014
9. Motion DENIED.
the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a determination
that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only
then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.

To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for
bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the
Court to fix his bail.

Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder, "the maximum
penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he
voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and thus bailable."

The argument has no merit.

 x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be
found guilty of the offense charged. x x x

Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and his physical
condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.

Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are considered in
fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail
without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
AUGUST 8, 2014
10. MR denied.
11. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall
within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.

12. COMMENT OF THE OMBUDSMAN:
- Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense;
- that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence
of his guilt, or the lack of it
- and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

ISSUE:
WON Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.
WON mandatory hearing is necessary to determine strong evidence of guilt.

RULING:

1. BAIL PROTECTS THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSSED TO DUE PROECSS AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or
during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
2. BAIL MAY BE GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT OR OF DISCRETION
Sec. 13, Article 3, Bill of rights
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

Sec. 7, Rule 114

No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

FIRST LEVEL COURTS:

1. BAIL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT BECAUSE THESE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO TRY CAPITAL OFFENSES.

RTC:
GR:
1. BEFORE CONVICTION = BAILABLE

XPN:
1. BEFORE CONVICTION = PENALTY IS DEATH, RP OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT + EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

3. ADMISSION TO BAIL IN OFFENSES PUNISHED BY DEATH, OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT, OR RECLUSION

PERPETUA IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Determination if guilt is strong = Hearing + Notice to the prosecution

a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114,
Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the
Fiscal is neither present nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether
or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:

x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent
with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing,
the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination.

PROCEDURE (Cortes v. Catral):

1. APPLICATION
2. NOTICE TO THE PROSECUTION
3. RECOMMENDATION OF THE PROSECUTION
IF DISCRETIONARY:
4. HEARING
5. DECIDE WON GUILT IS STRONG
6. IF NOT STRONG = APPROVE (WITH BAILBOND)
7. IF STRONG = DENY

ENRILE'S AGE:
Considered
Determination of penalty is a question of fact
Human rights
right to liberty = right to be admitted to bail
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a
clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely.
With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and
history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life
would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela
Rama v. The People’s Court:46

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to
exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction.50

The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8,
2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238
upon posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
 NOTICE IS ESSENTIAL

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774 May 27, 2004

PROV. PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant,

vs.
Judge ELIODORO G. UBIADAS, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Branch 72 respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS: Charges:
1. Gross ignorance of the law
2. Grave abuse of authority
3. Violations of the Code of Conduct
Respondent dismissed the case of PP v. Chia Say Chaw, et al. for illegal entry.
4. Failure to resolve the MR
5. Respondent granted bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. without notice to the prosecution.
6. Respondent disqualified him from appearing in the Case of PP v Esmane-Diaz

RESPONDENT:
1. No legal standing since he is not a party to the case
2. Territorial jurisdiction, where the accused was arrested, over scarborough shoal has not yet been
established
3. no inter-country agreement determining the common boundaries of the EEZ.
4. MR was filed after release from detention = academic
5. offense was bailable; hearing was conducted; prosecutor did not appear
6. complainant was not designated by the ombudsman

OCA:
1. no gross ignorance
2. notice must be served for bail

ISSUE: WON the respondent erred in granting bail without notice to the prosecution.

RULING:
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a
respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at
least his recommendation must be sought.
The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of
deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against
in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised
regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
 RULE 115 . RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

February 24, 2016

G.R. No. 208404

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
VICENTE LUGNASIN and DEVINCIO GUERRERO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
1. Accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping fro ransom.
2. Nicassius Cordero was allegedly kidnapped by the accused for ransom but was eventually released
without ransom money being paid
3. Accused denined the accusations.
4. The Court of Appeals also made a finding that accused-appellant Vicente made known their intentions
when he asked Cordero about his work, family, and a contact person, and told him that they would be
demanding 30 Million Pesos as ransom for his release.

RTC:
Death + indemnification

CA:
Reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole.
right to question illegal warrantless arrest is waived

Finally, in light of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court of
Appeals modified the penalty from Death to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole.

ISSUES:
Accused-appellant Devincio assigned the following errors in his Appellant’s Brief:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [DEVINCIO] GUILTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE
PRESENCE OF SUGGESTIVENESS IN [THE] IDENTIFICATION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
OF THE APPELLANT AS ONE OF HIS ABDUCTORS.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING [DEVINCIO]’S WARRANTLESS ARREST
AS ILLEGAL.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [DEVINCIO]’S RIGHTS UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.

Accused-appellant Vicente, for his part, posed a lone error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [VICENTE] DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
RULING: This Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the assailed judgment of conviction.

Article 267 of the RPC is amended by RA No. 7659

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention . — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female, or
a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

From the aforequoted provision, in prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom , the
prosecution must establish the following elements: (i ) the accused was a private person; (ii ) he
kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii ) the kidnapping or
detention was illegal; and (iv ) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.

The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and both the accused-
appellants’ culpability.

Identification of the Accused-Appellants.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court identification made by Cordero
to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz .: (1) the witness’
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3)
the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

1. Victim narrated the incident with accuracy.

2. length of time = 26 days

improper out-of-court identification can be cured with proper in-court identification.

An affirmative testimony merits greater weight than a negative one, especially when the former comes from
a credible witness. Categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill motive
on the part of the witness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of real weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing

As to the Alleged Illegality of

Accused-appellant Devincio
Guerrero’s Warrantless Arrest and
the Violation of His Rights Under
Republic Act No. 7438.

ACCUSED:
1. Illegal warrantless arrest
2. he was not informed of his constitutional rights at the time of the arrest.

SC:
1. Accused did not raise such issue during trial.
2. It was raised for the first time on appeal.
3. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect
in his arrest.

As regards accused-appellant Devincio’s argument that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438 were
violated, we likewise uphold the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:

With respect to appellant Devincio’s argument that his rights under RA 7438 were violated while he
was under custodial investigation, aside from his bare-faced claim, he has offered no evidence to
sustain such claim; and appellant Devincio (or appellant Vicente, for that matter) has not executed
an extrajudicial confession or admission for, as stated in People vs. Buluran and Valenzuela :

There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation
since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records show
that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation
of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which
an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction.
 RIGHT TO COUNSEL

January 27, 2016

G.R. No.190798

RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ, and DANIEL "BOBOT" IBAÑEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Crime: Frustrated homicide

Accused: Petitioners Ibanez
Victim: Rodolfo Lebria
RTC : convicted
CA : affirmed RTC's decision with modification

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

JULY 15, 2001 at 1:00am
- "bakit dito tinambak ang basura sa harap ng aking bahay na malawak naman ang
pagtataponan ng basura?"

- threw stones
- hit in the head using a shovel sworn declarations corroborated by testimonies
- stabbing

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

- denial
- victim stabbed Ronald within the vicinity of his home, 4 meters away from the house of
the victim.
- Rodolfo destroyed the bicycle of Ronald's son in law.
- victim stabbed Ronald and his son.
- Ronal filed a criminal complaint for attempted homicide but nothing came out of it.
ALLEGED DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
-Arraignment = counsel de oficio
- Hearing = counsel failed to appear despite notice (no motion or pleading)
Consequently, RTC's order includes conclusion that counsel's right to cross-examine the
witnesses is deemed waived .

- warrant of arrest was issues against Ronald fro failing to appear in the hearing;
- the court ordered the NBI, et al. to explain why the warrant of arrest against boyet and
vaid remains unimplemented and/or no return was submitted.

- Counsel de oficio withdrew.

- another counsel de oficio was appointed.

 - new counsel appeared for the petitioners but bobot and emilio failed to appear.
- warrants of arrest were issued against bobot and emilio and the bond posted by them for
their provisional liberty were ordered confiscated in favor of the government.

- new counsel attended the succeeding hearings despite the absence of the petitioners.
- on November 5, 2003, new counsel was relieved of his designation as counsel de oficio.

- on February 10, 2004, another counsel de oficio was appointed.

- 3rd counsel handled the cross-examination as well as the presentation of evidence and the
submission of memorandum.

RULING OF THE RTC:

- Petitioners are guilty.

PETITIONERS TO RTC and CA:

filed MR- denied; appealed to CA:
- Rodolfo is the agressor
- bobot acted in self defense
- they were deprived of their right to counsel.

CA's RESPONSE:
- Affirmed RTC
- modified the penalty from prision mayor to to prision correccional to prision mayor
maximum.
- petitioners filed MR but was denied.

hence, this petition.

ISSUE: whether the petitioners were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.

RULING:
The Court sustains the conviction of the petitioners with modification.

NO DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL:

The right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution which
states that:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x.

Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial . – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:

xxxx

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. x x x
Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de
oficio for the accused in the absence of private representation. It provides:

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before arraignment, the court shall
inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused
is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign
a counsel de officio to defend him.

SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering the gravity of the offense and
the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of
the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint
any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the

the petitioners insisted that they were denied of their right to counsel when their
counsel de oficio failed to appear on the June 18, 2003 trial court hearing during which
Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit gave their testimonies. As a consequence, the petitioners argued
that they were divested of the opportunity to cross-examine the said two prosecution
witnesses.

the OSG pointed out that since the beginning of the proceedings in the trial court until the
filing of the present petition before this Court, three (3) counsel de oficio were appointed
and represented the petitioners and to which designation the latter did not raise any
protest.

The OSG opined that the trial court judge made sure that the petitioners were adequately
assisted by a counsel de oficio when they failed to engage the services of a lawyer of their
own choice. Thus, the OSG recommended the dismissal of the petition.

THE SC AGREES WITH THE OSG

Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-
examine.
The case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the meaning and substance
of right to cross-examine as an integral component of due process with a colatilla that the same right may be expressly or
impliedly waived, to quote:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in
proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the
right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of
it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be
received or allowed to remain in the record.

in the June 18, 2003 hearing, Ronald, one of the accused, did not show up despite prior notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for
his provisional liberty was ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Ironically, Ronald comes to this Court asserting the
very right he seemingly waived and abandoned for not attending the scheduled hearing without justifiable cause. Moreover,
neither did the petitioners interpose any objection to the presentation of testimony of the prosecution witnesses during the June
18, 2003 hearing nor did their counsel de oficio subsequently seek a reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.

Guilt Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

At any rate, the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA, which are backed up by substantial evidence on record, led
this Court to no other conclusion than that the petitioners are guilty of frustrated homicide.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.

Here, intent to kill Rodolfo was evident in the manner in which he was attacked, by the concerted actions of the accused, the
weapon used and the nature of wounds sustained by Rodolfo.

Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy.

With respect to the petitioners’ defenses of denial and alibi, the Court concurs with the lower
courts’ rejection of these defenses. An assessment of the defenses of denial and alibi necessitates
looking into the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that in
determining who between the prosecution and defense witnesses are to be believed, the evaluation
of the trial court is accorded much respect for the simple reason that the trial court is in a better
position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they deliver their testimonies.44 As such, the
findings of the trial court is accorded finality unless it has overlooked substantial facts which if
properly considered, could alter the result of the case.

In contrast, the petitioners’ testimonies are self-serving and contrary to human reason and experience.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was at another
place at the time of the commission of the offense but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.48 Emilio himself admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene when the incident happened during
the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime
scene on the date and time in question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the positive
identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime.49 In the present case, Emilio was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants. Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused
himself and his immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his favor,50 as in this case, where Emilio, his
father and brother insisted that the former was somewhere else when the incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio’s
defense of alibi will not hold.

Anent Bobot's claim of self-defense, it is undeserving of any serious consideration or credence. Basic
is the rule that the person asserting self-defense must admit that he inflicted an injury on another
person in order to defend himself.51 Here, there is nothing on record that will show that Bobot
categorically admitted that he wounded Rodolfo.

Based on the foregoing, the Court upholds the trial and appellate courts' conviction of the petitioners for frustrated homicide. 1âwphi1
 RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
(SPECIMEN SIGNATURE)

G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929

FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, respondents.

Gregorio P. Formoso and Vicente Formoso for petitioner.

The respondents in their own behalf.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS: THIS IS A PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.

There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for

the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the
fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But
this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to
appear.

And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
"Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their
relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty
of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any
steps tending toward their invasion . Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the
constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as
well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth , the divulging, in
short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.

ISSUE: whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the
latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision
under examination.

Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in
open court in order that the jury maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in question.

BUT in this case:

1. this is only for an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it.
2. In the previous case, the act of writing was voluntary.
in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
3. The court believes that this case is similar to that of producing documents in one's possession
which may be refused under the protection of the privilege.
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
4. it is a positive, testimonial act.
5. the purpose of which is to establish something not yet in existence (to create evidence which may
seriously incriminate him)

PETITION GRANTED.
 RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
DNA TAKING FOR PATERNITY TESTING

[G.R. NO. 148220 : June 15, 2005]

ROSENDO HERRERA, Petitioner , v.

ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and
HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J. :

FACTS: THIS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW

CA affirmed RTC orders of DNA paternity testing of Rosendo Herrera.

Respondents Rosendo Alba represented by his mother Armi Alba filed a petition for compulsory
recognition, support, and damages against the petitioner.

Petitioner denied that he is the biological father of Rosendo.

Petitioner denied physical contact with Armi.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA.

In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test
had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.4

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

CA - the right only applies to testimonial compulsion.

ISSUE: WON the involuntary taking of DNA for paternity testing violated petitioner's right against self-
incrimination.

RULING: THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT.

Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

Purpose:
1. to adjudicate paternity
2. to secure a legal right associated with paternity such as
citizenship
support
inheritance

Burden of proof: on the person who alleges

Procedural aspects:
1. Prima facie case
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction,
corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative father.
2. Affirmative defenses
a. The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or
 b. The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

3. Presumption of legitimacy
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage. It can only be impugned under strict standards provided by
law.
4. Physical resemblance
Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a function of heredity,
there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological father.19
This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.

In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects.
1. Prima facie
a. assertion
b. corroborative - pictures
2. Physical resemblance
3. Affirmative defenses
respondent is Armi Alba's child with another man

DNA ANALYSIS AS EVIDENCE

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done
to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a
substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if
only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.

Admissibility:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously,
neither the Frye-Schwartzstandard nor the Daubert-Kumhostandard is controlling in the
Philippines.47 At best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our
decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not
otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court.

Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or non-existence.49 Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility
of expert testimony, provides as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or

training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue."

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence.
This privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress
The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant,
not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material.

PETITION DISMISSED
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.
 RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
RESETTING OF SCHEDULE OF ARRAIGNMENT

G.R. No. 166606 November 29, 2005

GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON and VAN D. LUSPO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIRST DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:

FACTS: THIS IS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

seeking to nullify the decision of the SB denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and MR.

Source of the case:

- investigation initiated by a letter-complaint that payrolls of 2,000 enlisted men of the Cordillera
Regional Command who were allegedly recipients of the 20M appropriated for combat, clothing, and
individual equipment allowance, were falsified.

- that there is conspiracy between the petitioners and other PNP officers in approving without
budgetary basis the release of the allotments in an aggregate amount of 20M.

Their arraignment was reset for several times, hence, petitioners filed on December 3, 2003 a motion to
dismiss claiming that the failure to arraign them within the period set under Republic Act (RA) No.
8493 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 have resulted in denial of their rights to speedy trial.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss and MR, both were denied.

ISSUE: WON the rescheduling of arraignment is tantamount ot violation of the right to speedy trial
WON the SB acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss.

RULING: THE PETITION LACKS MERIT

Reason for resetting:
1. MR on denied motions
2. Resolution received on the day the arraignment is to be held.
3. Upon request of one of the accused since the counsel of record is not available
4. Time given by the Court to the petitioners to file its opposition to a Bill of Particulars.

DELAYS must be vexatious, capricious, and oppressive.

ALLEGATION:
Petitioners claim that with the enactment of RA 8493, any delay in excess of the allowable number of
days within which trial should be conducted will give rise to the violation of the accused’s right to
speedy trial.

While the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 sets the time limit for the arraignment and trial of a case,
these however do not preclude justifiable postponements and delay when so warranted by the
situation. Section 2 of SC Circular 38-98 provides that the period of the pendency of a motion
to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment, shall
be excluded.

In People vs. Tee, the SC held that the right to speedy trial is deemed violated ONLY when:
1. the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
2. when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured;
3. when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.

The conduct of the prosecution and the defendant are weighed

and such factors as:
length of delay
reason for the delay
the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard
must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

In justifying the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the Sandiganbayan reasoned that although the
scheduled arraignments were postponed several times, they were however postponed for valid
reasons.

A careful examination of the records would show that the postponements were caused by
numerous pending motions or petitions.

PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.

DECISION OF THE SB DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND RESOLUTION DENYING

THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ARE AFFIRMED.
 RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
VEXACIOUS, CAPRICIOUS, AND OPPRESSIVE DELAY
"hindi prejudicial ang delay kay wala man sya nsubject sa proceeding"
G.R. No. 154155 August 6, 2008
THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,
vs.
BEN C. JURADO, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J. :

FACTS: THIS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.

of the decision of the CA revesing the decision and resolution of the Ombudsman
finding the Bureau of Customs Division Chief (BEN JURADO) administratively liable for neglect of
duty.

1992 - Maglei Enterprises applied for the operation of a Customs Bonded Warehouse.

Inspection was conducted

As part of the evaluation of Maglei’s application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A. Baliwag conducted an
inspection of Maglei’s compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag submitted a
report4 recommending approval of the application.

On March 16, 1992, respondent Jurado, who was then the Chief of the Warehouse Inspection Division,
adopted the recommendation of Baliwag. Then he indorsed the papers of Maglei to the Chief of the
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse Division (MMBWD), Rolando Mendoza.

Mendoza reported that Maglei has substantially complied with the physical and documentary
requirements and APPROVED its application.

Maglei was finally granted the authority to establish and operate Customs Bonded Warehouse.
By virtue of such authority, Maglei imported various textile materials which were then transferred to
the said warehouse. The textiles were to be manufactured into car covers for exportation.
Subsequently, it was discovered that said CBW did not exist.
Maglei's shipment of textile materials disappeared, without proof of the materials being exported or
the corresponding taxes being paid.

On September 29, 1997, the Fact Fidning Bureau of the OMB recommended the filing of criminal and
administrative charges against the officials of the BOC including the respondent/

On August 2, 1999, the OMB dismissed the criminal complaint on the ground of lack of prima facie
evidence.

August 16, 1992 - the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB rendered judgment against the
respondent administratively liable.

MR assailing the penalty of suspension was denied.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. In his appeal, respondent argued, among others, that his
right to a speedy disposition of his case had been violated; that the administrative case against him
should have been dismissed following the dismissal of the criminal charges against him; and that
there is no substantial evidence on record to make him administratively liable.

COURT OF APPEALS
Reversed and set aside.
Right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.

Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

"All persons shall the right to speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies."
 March 16, 1992 - the incident happened.
November 20, 1997 - case was filed (after more than 5 yrs)

Records disclose that on August 11, 1992, the complaint only charged George O. Dizon and 2 others. Then on February 13,
1996 or after almost 4 years, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB made another recommendation
which ultimately included Petitioner as among those to be charged. From February 13, 1996 to November 20, 1997 or a period
of more than one (1) year, what took them so long to decide that Petitioner be included in the charges?

From the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took the Ombudsman almost six (6)
years to decide that a case be filed against Petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the right of the respondent to speedy trial was violated.

RULING: THERE IS NO VIOLATION.

There is violation ONLY when:

1. The proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays
2. Unjustified postponements are asked for and secured
3. When without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.
4. Other circumstances.

Guidelines:
length of delay
reason for the delay
the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.

FIRST:

With respect to respondent, there were no vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays because he
was not made to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the report and findings of the FFB.

There is no showing that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process during the two-year period before the
filing of the proper informations, unlike in the Angchangco case where petitioner therein was deprived of his
retirement benefits for an unreasonably long time

SECOND:
In making a determination of what constitutes a violation of the right to the speedy disposition of
cases, this Court has time and again employed the balancing test .
The Guidelines
Length of Delay:
Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry
into the other factors that go into the balance.

"hindi prejudicial ang delay kay wala man sya nsubject sa proceeding"

Reason for the Delay:

weighted heavily against the government.
e.g: missing witness

Assertion or Non Assertion:

failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy
trial.

Prejudice:
it should be assessed in the light of the following interests:
1. to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (gkulong ka nga pretrial pa lang?)
2. to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
3. to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
e.g: defendant died; witnesses can no longer recall the event

PETITION IS GRANTED.
 RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
ARRAIGNMENT AFTER THE CASE WAS SUBMITTED FOR DECISION

G.R. No. 171020 March 14, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: PETITION FOR REVIEW

the decision of the CA affirming with modification the decision of the RTC
finding Alfredo Pangilinan guilty of 2 counts of rape (his daughter).
CA upheld the 2 death sentences but modified the award of damages.

September 9, 1995
Crime started to happen

March 17, 1997

Medical examination and filing of the case

October 30, 1997

Prosecution formally offered its evidence to be considered in the resolution of petition for bail
and be considered part of evidence in chief.

April 23, 1998

Petition for bail is denied

Defense presented its evidence, with the accused appellant as the sole witness, denying the allegations.

June 9, 1999
Trial court discovered that the appellant had not yet been arraigned.

June 17, 1999

Arraignment - pleaded not guilty.

Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it adduced during the hearing for the petition for bail as
part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence the trial court admitted, the trial court deemed the cases
submitted for decision.

"kay gin offer naman ni prosecution as part sang evidence-in-chief tung gi offer nya during th ehearing para sa
bail, which was accpeted by the trail court, gin consider na daun ni trial court nga submitted for decision ang
case."

September 9, 1999.
Conviction. 2 counts of rape (September 1995 and January 1997) ; death.

Trial court forwarded the records to the SC but the latter transferred it to the CA.
CA affirmed the death penalty but modified the damages

the CA elevated the case for automatic review to the SC.

ISSUE: WON the right to be informed of the accussations against the accussed was violated.
He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the
petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.

RULING: NO VIOLATION.
When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already acquired
jurisdiction over his person.

Ways to acquire jurisdiction over the person:

1. arrest
2. voluntary appearance
HENCE, his arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.

AS TO THE LATE ARRAIGNMENT:

It did not prejudice him. It was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any
objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.
The counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witness.

His counsel's active participation is an indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him.

CA'S DECISION IS AFFIRMED.

DEATH IS REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE.
 RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
RE-ARRAIGNMENT DUE TO AN AMENDED INFORMATION

G.R. No. 195032 February 20, 2013

ISABELO A. BRAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBA Y AN (1st Division), Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: THIS IS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

seeking to reverse and set aside the resolution of the SB denying his MR.

The governemnt entered into a MOA for street lighting projects for ASEAN Leader's Summit in
December 2006 with FABMIK Construction.
FABMIK obliged itself to use its own resources and that DPWH to guarantee the payment of the work
accomplished.
The project was completed in 10 days.
However, due to typhoon Seniang, the summit was rescheduled to January 2007.

4 contracts = 83.95M

After the summit, the Ombudsman directed DBM to cease and desist from relaesing funds as a
result of an investigation of a complaint that the projects were overpriced.

March 23, 2007 - charges for violation of anti-graft law (RA 3019) was filed against officials of DPWH
and the contractors (FABMIK) where Braza was the President.

June 6, 2008 - Braza was arraigned… not guilty.

August 14, 2008 - the motions for reinvestigation files by the Mayor of Lapu-Lapu and DPWH Officials

Braza filed a Motion for Reinvestigation

November 3, 2008 - Re-investigation

Braza filed his Manifestation,11 dated February 2, 2009, informing the Sandiganbayan of his intention
to abandon his previous motion for reinvestigation. He opined that the prosecution would merely use
the reinvestigation proceedings as a means to engage in a second unbridled fishing expedition to cure
the lack of probable cause.

On March 23, 2009, Braza filed a motion12 in support of the abandonment of reinvestigation with a
plea to vacate Information, insisting that the further reinvestigation of the case would only afford the
prosecution a second round of preliminary investigation which would be vexatious, oppressive and
violative of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case, warranting its dismissal with
prejudice.

Accordingly, the prosecution filed its amended information.

from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 301914 to violation of Sec. 3(e)15 of the same law.

Braza filed a motion to dismiss.

Braza averred that he could not be arraigned under the second information without violating the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

SB admitted the amended information; denied Braza's motion.

 The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not be placed in double jeopardy should he be arraigned
anew under the second information because his previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that
even if he was regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because the second
information charged an offense different from, and which did not include or was necessarily
included in, the original offense charged. Lastly, it found that the delay in the reinvestigation
proceedings could not be characterized as vexatious, capricious or oppressive and that it could not be
attributed to the prosecution.

Braza filed a MR with alternative motion to quash the information.

DENIED by SB.

ISSUE: WON the rights to speedy disposition of cases and against double jeopardy of Braza was violated.
Braza posits that set in on the basis of his "not guilty" plea in the first information and, thus, he can no
longer be prosecuted under the second information.

RULING: