G.R. No.

189122               March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to
guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal
justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not
yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final
adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s
interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.3

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically
begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. 4 An accused not
released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal
and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a
debt to society he has never owed.5 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however,
the accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review,
opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. 6 On
the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating
an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to
warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal
include the prevention of the accused’s flight from court custody, the protection of the
community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. 8 Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between
the interests of society and those of the accused.9

Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal
to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal
should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.10

The Facts

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent

application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail.13 It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing
well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner

… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement
during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the
physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.14

For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be allowed
pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s conviction. It
made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima facie determination that
there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.15

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted
to an appellant pending appeal.

The Issue

The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years,
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the

crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant
sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years’ imprisonment
should automatically be granted.

Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive

rules.

Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail
pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order,
such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16

Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none
of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less
proven by the prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the
Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal
by denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital
offense was strong.

We disagree.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess
of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending
appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the
rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve
petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of
discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of
discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 19 It must be so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for
certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise
of discretion.20

Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of
Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could
any such implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals
exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioner’s application
for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of
petitioner’s claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for
the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or
not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its
discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.

At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and
interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ
of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law
or fact.21 In this connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos:

… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts
would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order
may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally
frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of
allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the
administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.23 (emphasis supplied)

Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s

Interpretation

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty
imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first
scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism,
quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or
violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense
while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability
of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of
the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary
of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized
in the following rules:
 x x x           x x x          x x x

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec.
5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec.
5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or
any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court
(Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of
the same thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged
is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then
bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.25 (emphasis
supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the
appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal
may be denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where
none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should
be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where
the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will
exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending
appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls
within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may
consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; 27 on the basis thereof, it
may either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate
court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to
the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by
itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding
will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations
that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a
simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments reveals that it interprets the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the
trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a
situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is,
one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is
present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.

Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into
merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the
discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue —
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.

However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice."28 Choice occurs where, between
"two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one
possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker."29 On the other
hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.30 Thus, by
severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-
finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s
theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that "upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule
on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on
the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of
the case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the
matter.31 In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not,
under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his
conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond
the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the
applicant,33 among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or
disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial
determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact
which must be determined by the appellate court.34 In other words, a threshold requirement
for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for
delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts
will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking
advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports
with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower court’s exercise of discretionary
power was sound,36 specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment
shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error.37

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating
circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius38 rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five
situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to "the
following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant
situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be
considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.

Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioner’s
interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists.
Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years
of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not
exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is
more than six years’ imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating
conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed
six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.

Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more
accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious
crimes?

Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending
Appeal

Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the
provisions on bail pending appeal.

The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After
judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the
defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.

Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After
conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the
discretion of the court.

Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission of a capital
offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964
Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were
modified in 1988 to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense
or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated
January 20, 1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of
Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense
or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of
right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the
evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the
effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:

1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he
may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless
the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as
amended;

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense
than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding
paragraph shall be applied;

3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged,
his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution
of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal
before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid
down:

1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from
notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;

2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru
the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his
bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken
by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16,
1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)

SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the
same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than
twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and
with notice to the adverse party. (n)

SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules,
is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)

The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.

The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that
is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only
for strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital
offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary.
The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-
applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not
punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a
matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was
not punished by reclusion perpetua.39

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal
(of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid
down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying
which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain
conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail
pending appeal" configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended
Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a
matter of right before final conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy,
the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial
court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail
is prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal?
What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it
a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of
bail after due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal
parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and
procedural provisions on bail emanated.41 While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it
nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other
democratic societies.

In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending
appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion — particularly with respect to
extending bail — should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong
reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5."43

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to
admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which
may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to
show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the
probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much
more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.44 (emphasis
supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court
declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were
already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion."

A Final Word

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly,
the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial
discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the
trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards
approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the
rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise
consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent
effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long
delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the
post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely
to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely
in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery
of our criminal justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ AND
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
nullify and set aside the October 10, 2014 Resolution1 of public respondent Sandiganbayan
Fifth Division, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the (i) Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount
of Bail and the (ii) Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to Recall/List
Warrant of Arrest filed by accused Luzviminda S. Valdez, are GRANTED.

Let the Order of Arrest issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324
adopting the "no bail" recommendation of the Office of the Ombudsman be RECALLED.
Instead, let an Order of arrest in said cases be issued anew, this time, fixing the bail for each
offense charged in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

SO ORDERED.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit3 executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and
Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia,
Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City
Government. Among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of private
respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod City, particularly:
D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to P80,000.00;
D.V. No. 220 dated March 24, 2004 amounting to P68,000.00;
D.V. No. 278 dated April 13, 2004 amounting to P19,350.00; and
D.V. No. 325 dated April 30, 2004 amounting to P111,800.00 for Cash Slip No. 193402.4
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official receipts, it
was alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive
reimbursement from the Government the total amount of P279,150.00 instead of only
P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate overclaim of P274,306.75.

The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Office of the Ombudsman
- Visayas received the joint affidavit, which was thereafter resolved adverse to Valdez.

Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to
0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half
(SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 2175 and 171,6 in relation to
Article 487 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were raffled before public
respondent.

Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322, and 0324,
Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail.8 She argued that the three cases are bailable
as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying circumstance was alleged; the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged
from 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the RPC, the
imposable penalty is 20 years, which is the maximum of the medium period.

Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition9 that the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL)

is inapplicable as the attending circumstances are immaterial because the charge constituting
the complex crime have the corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary. Instead of a motion to fix bail, a
summary hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong is, therefore, necessary
conformably with Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of
the Rules.

Due to the issuance and release of a warrant of arrest, Valdez subsequently filed an Urgent
Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the
Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to Recall/Lift Warrant of Arrest.10 Petitioner filed a
Comment/Opposition thereto.11 Later, the parties filed their respective Memorandum of
Authorities.12

As aforesaid, on October 10, 2014, public respondent granted the motions of Valdez. It
recalled the arrest order issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324. In
lieu thereof, a new arrest order was issued, fixing the bail for each offense charged in said
cases in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Without filing a motion
for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter before Us to resolve the lone issue of
whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.

The Court shall first tackle Valdez's procedural objection. She avers that the petition must be
dismissed outright on the ground that it was filed without first filing a motion for
reconsideration before public respondent, and that, even if there are exceptions to the general
rule, this case does not fall under any of them.

We disagree.

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to
correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of
the case.

However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following exceptions
when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion
for reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the petition is perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and,

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is
involved.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The issue being raised here is one purely of law and all the argument, pros and cons were
already raised in and passed upon by public respondent; thus, filing a motion for
reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. Likewise, as petitioner claims, the resolution
of the question raised in this case is of urgent necessity considering its implications on similar
cases filed and pending before the Sandiganbayan. As it appears, there have been conflicting
views on the matter such that the different divisions of the anti-graft court issue varying
resolutions. Undeniably, the issue is of extreme importance affecting public interest. It
involves not just the right of the State to prosecute criminal offenders but, more importantly,
the constitutional right of the accused to bail.

Now, on the main issue:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The controversy is, in fact, not one of first impression. Mañalac, Jr. v. People14 already
resolved that an accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents where the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to
bail as a matter of right because it has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should be allowed to post bail since reclusion
perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense but merely describes the penalty actually
imposed on account of the fraud involved. It was also posited that Article 48 of the RPC
applies "only after the accused has been convicted in a full-blown trial such that the court is
mandated to impose the penalty of the most serious crime," and that the reason for the
imposition of the penalty of the most serious offense is "only for the purpose of determining
the correct penalty upon the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law." This Court,
through the Third Division, however, denied the petition and resolved in the affirmative the
issue of whether the constitutional right to bail of an accused is restricted in cases whose
imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.
Citing People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al.,15 in relation to Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules, it was held that Mañalac, Jr. is not entitled
to bail as a matter of right since he is charged with a crime whose penalty is reclusion
perpetua.

To recall, the amounts involved in Pantaleon, Jr. were manifestly in excess of P22,000.00. We

opined that the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and that
the ISL is inapplicable since it is an indivisible penalty. The Court's pronouncement is
consistent with the earlier cases of People v. Conwi, Jr.,16People v. Enfermo,17 and People v.
Pajaro, et al.18 as well as with the fairly recent case of Zafra v. People.19

The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and analogous cases are in keeping with the provisions of the
RPC. Specifically, Article 48 of which states that in complex crimes, "the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." Thus, in
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents, the prescribed
penalties for malversation and falsification should be taken into account. Under the RPC, the
penalty for malversation of public funds or property if the amount involved exceeds
P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, aside
from perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed
or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.20 On the other hand, the penalty
ofprision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for falsification
committed by a public officer.21 Considering that malversation is the more serious offense,
the imposable penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion perpetua, it being the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.

For purposes of bail application, however, the ruling in Mañalac, Jr. should be revisited on the
ground that Pantaleon, Jr. (as well as Conwi, Jr., Enfermo, Pajaro, et al., and Zafra) was
disposed in the context of a judgment of conviction rendered by the lower court and affirmed
on appeal by this Court. As will be shown below, the appropriate rule is to grant bail as a
matter of right to an accused who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00.

Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as
a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or
this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)

SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,

not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term "punishable" under the provisions
above-quoted?

In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty. People
v. Temporada,24 which was even cited by petitioner, perceptibly distinguished these two
concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined
therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the
"prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of
imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances which
when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be
imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable
penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be
the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court chooses
a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually imposed"
on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the one provided by the RPC before
conviction to determine whether the charge is bailable or not, while the penalty actually
imposed pertains to the prison sentence upon conviction.26 Hence, it is maintained that the
penalty imposable for the offense charged against private respondent is reclusion perpetua,
which makes Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 non-bailable.

The argument is erroneous.

Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00, the
"prescribed penalty" is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. After
trial, should the commission of such crime be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt, the "imposable penalty" is reclusion perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the
prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in
its maximum.27 The falsification, which is the means used to commit the crime of
malversation, is in the nature of a generic aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period.28 The phrases "shall be applied"
and "shall impose," found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of the RPC, are of similar
import as the phrase "shall be imposed" found in Article 48. Both Articles 63 and 64 refer to
the penalty to be imposed after considering the aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s.
Finally, the "penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua, considering that the ISL
finds no application as the penalty is indivisible.29

The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is spot on had it not
confused imposable penalty with prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, reading through the text of
the assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court actually meant prescribed penalty
whenever it referred to imposable penalty. Therefore, in essence, the ruling is correct.
Respondent court held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be imposed in its maximum period,
there is no doubt that, in case of conviction, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
The cases, however, are still at their inception. Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue. This is
not the proper time, therefore, to call for the application of the penalty contemplated under
Article 48 by imposing the same in its maximum period.

For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter of right, it is
the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which should be considered
and, not the penalty to be actually imposed. Illustrative cases such as Catiis v. Court of
Appeals, et al. and People v. Hu Ruey Chun evidently confirm this to be so.

xxxx

In both cases, therefore, it is the penalty imposable for the offense charged that was
considered for purposes of bail.

A circumspect reading of substantive law validates this view. Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution provides that: x x x x

On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

Notably, the word used is ["punishable,"] which practically bears the same meaning as
"imposable." It is only logical that the reference has a direct correlation with the time frame
"before conviction" since trial is yet to begin; hence, it can only be the penalty imposable of
the offense charged that can be considered for purposes of bail.

In these cases, the offenses charged are the complex crimes of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents. In determining the penalty imposable, it is
the penalty for the most serious crime which is considered. Between Malversation and
Falsification, it is Malversation which provides the graver penalty. As thus provided under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, "[i]f the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua."

The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied in its maximum period, or reclusion
perpetua, since this will already consider the application of the penalty in the event of a
conviction.

A clear perusal of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

The word used is "imposed," not imposable. Thus, the reference can only point to the time
when a judgment of conviction is impending. If and when "the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period," is thus applied in the
proper application of the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Certainly, this cannot be
considered for purposes of bail.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in charging a complex crime, the
information should allege each element of the complex offense with the same precision as if
the two (2) constituent offenses were the subject of separate prosecutions.31 Where a
complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.32

At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and
proved during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that
the supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has
terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of committing malversation.
Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the constituent offenses, i.e., either
malversation or falsification, or worse, none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.

It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same
only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust
for Us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused person's constitutional right to
bail for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently
grievous, odious and hateful. To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not
change the nature of the constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law. When committed through falsification of
official/public documents, the RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a capital
offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been
expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659.33 If truly a non-bailable offense, the law
should have already considered it as a special complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery
with homicide, rape with homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have
prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an accused charged with
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable when compared with an accused indicted for
plunder, which is a heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080,34 as amended by R.A.
No. 765935 and R.A. No. 9346.36 Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder
committed through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate amount or total value of
ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is alleged to have committed malversation of
public funds thru falsification of official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is
no longer entitled to bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as
P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been contemplated by the
law.

The foregoing interpretation is more favorable to Valdez as an accused following the rule of
lenity:
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when
the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to
the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.37ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.38 When there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws,
all must be resolved in favor of the accused.39 Since penal laws should not be applied
mechanically, the Court must determine whether their application is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law.40

For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents that involves an amount in excess of
P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a summary hearing on bail application is,
therefore, unnecessary. Consistent with Miranda v. Tuliao,41 an affirmative relief may be
obtained from the court despite the accused being still at-large. Except in petition for bail,
custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs sought by the defendant (such
as a motion to set aside no bail recommendation and to fix the amount of bail in this case)
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.42

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Private

respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez is entitled to bail, as a matter of right, in Criminal Case
Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324. Public respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth Division
should be guided by the latest Bailbond Guide. In any case, the amount should correspond to
the medium penalty multiplied by Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for every year of
imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213847               August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and
annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder
along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his
Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June
10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental
Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be
found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed
its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had
not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his
Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on
July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s
Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall
have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can
he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix
the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not
filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged
with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion
temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily
surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a
flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the
factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained
above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that
the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated
July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s
motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may
be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i)
where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if
ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of
right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that
the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his
guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk
taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he
is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to
wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as
follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at
the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with
death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence,
from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the
law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he
retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall
be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of
right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC
has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has
held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not
he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has
been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with
notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who
is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing
on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or
comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole
basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently
witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling
was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons
who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases.
(Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate
these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left
to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70
years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the
Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice
it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration
that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an
offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has
bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s
favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the
presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment
for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a
similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in
both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment
of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the
medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following
conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy;
(Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease ;
(Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring
; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1,
2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-
ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could
lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3)
coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a
future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS,
because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust
or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health
required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his
own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist
doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that
hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at
the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at
the PNP Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you
happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the
facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of
the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already
held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes
it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding,
influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the
petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis,
and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases,
later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any
avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by
the People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not
active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to
the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his
lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in
order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said
People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-
quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324)
and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on
the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the
People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on
bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have
his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in
the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense
but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales
of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at
the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear
showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the
ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the
Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and
SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No.
SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL
RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a
cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful
cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY
ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT.
GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO
MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO
ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC.
ROILO GOLEZ, Respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This petition for review1 seeks to nullify the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 17
September 2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The
Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by
lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido ("petitioners") on behalf of their
detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines),
Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and
Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees").
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay ("Gen. Cabuay"), Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"), who has custody of
the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya ("Gen. Abaya"), Sec. Angelo Reyes
and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines ("AFP"), Secretary of National Defense and National Security Adviser, because
they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"),
an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers
disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and
called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet
members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after
several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive
devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the
Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the
soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July
2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as
defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued
the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV
("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take
into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood
incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On
12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of
the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the
case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further
proceedings and decision thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within
ten (10) days from promulgation of the decision.3
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents
to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the
Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their
Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of
Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August
2003, the appellate court considered the petition submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition.
Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing
the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees
in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed
Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the
detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that
the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a
valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to
assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the
appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do
not directly affect the detainees’ liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the
detainees’ right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an
abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the
proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the
promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to
exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold
the constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance with the Standing Operations
Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for
two (2) hours a day.
SO ORDERED.4
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE
CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS’ DETENTION.5
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the Court’s 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue
that the Court’s Order had already foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their
petition.
Petitioners’ claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the
Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers’
detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees’ release, the Court would not have referred
the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released
the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners’ cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary
step in the hearing of the petition.6 The respondent must produce the person and explain the
cause of his detention.7 However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or
on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Court’s order to the Court of
Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy
of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the
detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case,
after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After
actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped
from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their
petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person.8 The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is
being illegally deprived of his liberty.9 If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the
court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then
the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is
not a writ of error.10 Neither can it substitute for an appeal.11
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where there is
deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of
due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.12
However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The
courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a
person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is
imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.13 Whatever situation the petitioner
invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to
void the entire proceedings.14
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees.
Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military
offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP
Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees – their clients –
any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees’ right to counsel
and violates Republic Act No. 7438 ("RA 7438").15 Petitioners claim that the regulated
visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and
the Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees’ right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the
personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo ("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners
further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees’ right against cruel and unusual
punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having contact with their
visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron
grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees’
cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement.16 However, the
fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the
public.17 RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention
officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and implement
reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b)
of RA 7438 provides:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – a) x x x
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate
family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor
or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen
by him or by any member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating
him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of
the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than
six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (₱4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may
be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a
detainee client "at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night." However, the last
paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification that "notwithstanding" the
provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the power to undertake such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations
governing a detainee’s confinement must be "reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety
and prevent his escape." Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the
government’s objective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee. The
law grants the detention officer the authority to "undertake such reasonable measures" or
regulations.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees’ right to effective
representation when petitioners’ visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours.
Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees’ rights entitle them to be released from
detention.
Petitioners’ contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render
void the detainees’ indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees’
release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees’
right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel,
but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are instructive on the
standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,18 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be
reasonably related to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that
purpose. Courts will strike down a restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless.19 
However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from skeptically questioning
challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities.20 The U.S. Supreme Court
commanded the courts to afford administrators "wide-ranging deference" in implementing
policies to maintain institutional security.21
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to
make regulations in detention centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the detainee’s safety and prevent his escape." In the present case, the
visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the
legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees
still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is
no impairment of detainees’ right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients
between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are
regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law
offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent
cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their
clients beyond the visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners
sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is not undermined
by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano
Commission,22 petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that
petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to
counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the
boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive
punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process
of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainee’s desire to live comfortably.24 The fact
that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees’ desire to live comfortably
does not convert those restrictions into punishment.25 It is when the restrictions are arbitrary
and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish.26 Courts will also infer intent to
punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the
restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose.27 Jail officials are thus not required
to use the least restrictive security measure.28 They must only refrain from implementing a
restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.29
We quote Bell v. Wolfish:
One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that
the "essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees’ presence at trial."
While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some
manner, we do not accept respondents’ argument that the Government’s interest in ensuring a
detainee’s presence at trial is the only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once
the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. "If the government could confine or
otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their
presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of
detention." The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage
the facility in which the individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may
require administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to
ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the Government must be able to take
steps to maintain security and order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit
drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in
maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if
they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had
he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of
the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial
detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees’ presence
at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a
valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention
and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.30

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some
harm or "disability," and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.31 Punishment
also requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the
inherent discomforts of confinement.32
Block v. Rutherford,33 which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on
contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of
innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet
convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal
conviction.34 Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff
hostage to effect escapes.35 Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling
in weapons, drugs, and other contraband.36 The restriction on contact visits was imposed
even on low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband
and weapons.37 The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact
visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.38
Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the
legitimate goal of internal security.39 This case reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine
enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that
courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to administrative
expertise.40
In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from
their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars
separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the
detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors.
The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation
regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with
visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention
Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from
passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure
security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and
ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute
punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP
Detention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt.
Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary
cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well and given regular meals. The Court of
Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the conditions now
prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with detainees. The Court of
Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention
Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New People’s
Army ("NPA") member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP
Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners’ argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees’ right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters
handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing.
Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because
there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the
Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights unless authorized by law.
The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and
outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison
facility and to avert coordinated escapes.41 Even in the absence of statutes specifically
allowing prison authorities from opening and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based
on the principle of "civil deaths."42 Inmates were deemed to have no right to correspond
confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the
right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications between the
inmate and his lawyer.43
Eventually, the inmates’ outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials
received respect.44 The confidential correspondences could not be censored.45 The
infringement of such privileged communication was held to be a violation of the inmates’
First Amendment rights.46 A prisoner has a right to consult with his attorney in absolute
privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the
administration of the institution.47 Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in
plots that threaten prison security.48
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by
convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono49 recognized
that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in
communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees’ mail addressed to public officials, courts
and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected for contraband
and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or
read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,50 involving convicted prisoners, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming
mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials could not read such mail from
attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from
attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The
prison regulation under challenge provided that ‘(a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read
and inspected,’ and no exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x
Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but
contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of
the prisoners. The narrow issue thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be
from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether
such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques fail to indicate
contraband.
xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an
attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be
imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the State require any such communications to
be specially marked as originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if
they are to receive special treatment. It would also certainly be permissible that prison
authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first identify himself
and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters marked privileged are actually
from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this
could in no way constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill
such communications, since the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not read
the mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent
attorneys, surely warrants prison officials’ opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of
Appeals that this should only be done in ‘appropriate circumstances.’ Since a flexible test,
besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible
constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a
rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and
perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.51
In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable
expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners
necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is
also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant
rights. These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain
rights, are "justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." The curtailment of
certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of "institutional
needs and objectives" of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security. Of course,
these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of
justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction.53
The later case of State v. Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v.
Travisono and made no distinction as to the detainees’ limited right to privacy. State v.
Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail may
be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as security or
discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser
act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible
with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure
institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the
prisoner’s expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered a paramount
interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society that "[l]oss of
freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement."
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted
inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally
pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those
who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who are charged with serious
crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a greater risk of escape than
convicted inmates.55 Valencia v. Wiggins56 further held that "it is impractical to draw a line
between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail
security."
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees’ non-privileged mail
poses a genuine threat to jail security.57 Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an
envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible
inspection by jail officials.58 A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy
for his incoming mail.59 However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited
protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could
not read the contents without violating the inmates’ right to correspond with his lawyer.60 
The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal
contraband.61
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the
detainees’ letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters
is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the
inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier
and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the
letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked
confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials
should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the
detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy
rights62 is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are
detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA
7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very
fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to
infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts
"balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison
administrators."63 The deferential review of such regulations stems from the principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny
analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.64
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in
committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.65 The junior officers are
not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed
takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members
of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.66
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf
and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a
better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together
with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend
largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the
military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted
prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions
in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and
prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford
injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and
inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions
of confinement.67 The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or
duration of confinement.68
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1774 : May 27, 2004
PROV. PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, Complainant, v. Judge
ELIODORO G. UBIADAS, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Branch
72, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By a Sworn Complaint1 dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial Prosecutor, now Regional
Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta (complainant) administratively charged Judge
Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with gross
ignorance of [the] law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, on motion of the
accused, by Order2 of July 9, 1997, Crim. Case No. 212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia
Say Chaw, et al., for illegal entry.
Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 219-97 [d]espite. .. the provision of
P.D. 1599 which established the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and [the
apprehension of the accused] within the 200 nautical miles of the. .. Zone, respondent
virtually surrender[ed] our sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction to the Chinese
government.3 cralawred
Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve, as he has yet to resolve, the
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997,
despite the lapse of more than two years since the filing of the motion. By such failure,
complainant charges respondent with violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which enjoins judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods, and of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which requires lower
courts to resolve cases or matters before them within three months or ninety days from date of
submission.
Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, without giving notice to the
prosecution, the petition for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause
against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 (Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act). 4 cralawred
Finally, complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him (complainant) from appearing in
Crim Case No. 634-99, People v. Esmane-Diaz, despite his (complainants) designation to
handle the prosecution of the case by the Ombudsman.
By Second Indorsement-Comment of March 20, 2000,5 respondent contends that petitioner
has no personality to initiate the complaint against him as he is not a party to the cases subject
thereof.
On the merits of the charges, respondent counters that territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were arrested within the vicinity of Scarborough
Shoal has not yet been established by controlling jurisprudence, given the conflicting claims
thereover by the Philippines and China and the absence of an inter-country agreement
determining the common boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone.6 cralawred
As to his failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of his July 9, 1997 Order
dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Crim. Case No. 212-97, respondent points out that said
motion was filed after the accused were already released from detention. He further points out
that during the pendency of said motion, representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) informed him that said office was not interested in setting aside the order of dismissal
but that it was suggesting an amendment of the order.7 Respondent explains though that since
the accused had already been released from detention and had left the Philippines, and the
interest of the DFA was merely for the amendment of the order of dismissal, the motion had
already become academic.
As to the second charge, respondent informs that the petition for bail of Mangohig who was
then under preliminary investigation, which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which
same date a copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig
heard on the morning of January 4, 2000 during which there was no appearance from the
Prosecutors Office; and that as the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a
bailable offense, respondent granted him bail.
As for his order disqualifying complainant in Crim. Case No. 634-99, respondent explains
that he had already reconsidered the same through his February 10, 2000 Order,8 he having
earlier failed to see petitioners designation by the Ombudsman.
In its August 16, 2002 Report,9 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found, as to the
first charge, that it was not shown that respondent acted with malice, oppression or bad faith
sufficient to find him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, it having appeared that respondent
based his dismissal order on his interpretation of a provision of law. The OCA thus concluded
that as respondents conclusions in his assailed order are not without logic or reason, and
unattended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith,10 he could not be faulted for gross
ignorance of the law. The OCA hastened to add, however, that respondent is nonetheless
required to act on the motion for reconsideration.
As to the second charge, the OCA stressed that the Rules of Court requires a movant to serve
notice of his motion on all parties concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof,
hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for bail without hearing the prosecutions side.
Finally, on the third charge, the OCA found that respondents explanations were fraught with
inconsistencies since his allegation that he failed to see complainants designation as
Ombudsman-Prosecutor in Crim. Case No. 634-99 is belied by his December 17, 2000
Order11 wherein he noted that complainant was deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman
to prosecute said case. The OCA in fact noted that respondents subsequent February 10, 2001
Order reconsidering his December 17, 2000 Order was issued only after the latter order had
attained finality and the instant case was filed.
The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
By Resolution of February 26, 2003,12 this Court noted the OCA Report and required the
parties to MANIFEST within twenty (20) days from notice, whether they are submitting the
case on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
By Manifestation dated April 1, 2003,13 complainant proffered additional charges against
respondent and submitted in support thereof, among other things an administrative complaint
filed by one Dr. Reino Rosete against respondent and photocopies of orders issued by
respondent. Dr. Rosetes complaint, which was addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo
Benipayo, is both undated and unsigned, however. In the same Manifestation, complainant
submitted the case for decision.
On May 9, 2003, the Docket and Clearance Division of this Court received an undated
manifestation14 of respondent stating that he was submitting the case on the basis of the
pleadings/records already filed in the case.
This Courts Findings
I.On the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges that, as mandated by the
Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the very
law they are supposed to apply to a given controversy.15 They are called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant
with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence.16 cralawred
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of Crim. Case No. 212-97 on
jurisdictional grounds is, however, a matter for judicial adjudication and the proper recourse
of a party aggrieved by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an
administrative complaint.17 cralawred
For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts are erroneous.18 Only in cases where the error is gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith may administrative sanctions be
imposed.19 There is no showing that this was the case here.
With respect to the non-resolution of the prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97 no resolution of which has been issued,
complainant, in his Reply to the Comment of respondent, refutes respondents explanation in
this wise:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997, the Chinese fishermen were not
yet released from detention. It was during the pendency of the motion that the Chinese
fishermen were allowed to leave by the Chief of Police of Subic, Zambales despite our
representation that they should not be released from jail as another case for illegal fishing was
still pending investigation.. .. The representatives from the Foreign Affairs merely wanted to
convey to Judge Ubiadas the serious implications of his Order of dismissal on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction on the territorial integrity and national security of our country. In fact,
Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon publicly denounced the Order of dismissal issued by
Judge Ubiadas as evidenced of an article which appeared in the July 13, 1997 issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer.Copy of said article is hereto attached as Annex A and made
integral part hereof.
There is no truth that they told Judge Ubiadas that they are no longer interested in the setting
aside of his Order of dismissal. In fact, the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of
dismissal was already filed in his Court and he even issued an Order dated 18 July 1997
submitting the said Motion for resolution. Copy of said Order dated 18 July 1997 is hereto
attached as Annex B and made integral part hereof. Since the said Motion for Reconsideration
of his Order of dismissal was already considered by him as submitted for resolution as of 18
July 1997, Judge Ubiadas should have resolved one way or the other, the said
motion.20 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were already released at the time of the filing
of the motion for reconsideration did not relieve respondent from resolving it as in fact he
even issued an order stating that it was submitted for resolution.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct direct judges to dispose of their cases promptly and within the prescribed
periods, failing which they are liable for gross inefficiency.21 cralawred
To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied
with, this Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 1322 which
provides, inter alia, that:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their
courts.Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date
of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of
three months to do so. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
This injunction is reiterated in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-9923 which requires all
judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases,
failure to observe which is a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to
speedy disposition of their cases.24 cralawred
Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent is liable for undue delay
in rendering a decision or order which is a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court and which carries the penalty of suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more
than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
II.On the grant of bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 271-99
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in
court against a respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be
given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought.25 So Fortuna v.
Penaco-Sitaca26 instructs:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
[A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance
with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded
an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for
bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be
exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after the
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence
thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)27 cralawred
True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4,
2000 at 8:30 a.m.28 Given the filing of the petition only the day before, at close to noontime,
it cannot be said that the prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to
present evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It
bears stressing that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on
the application for bail by showing that evidence of guilt is strong.29 cralawred
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely
requires the court to give a reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to
submit his recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for
hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing
on shorter notice, there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for
hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking
into account, inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence
of guilt in the hands of the prosecution.
In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610,30 which is punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently
indicted for statutory rape31 qualified by relationship which is punishable by death.
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived
of due process for which he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure32 which is a
serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the penalty
of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine
of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.33 cralawred
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance
the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being
subject to punishment prior to conviction,34 against the right of the State to protect the people
and the peace of the community from dangerous elements.35
III.On the failure to recognize complainants special designation from the Ombudsman in
Crim. Case No. 634-99
The brushing aside by the OCA of respondents explanation on the matter is well taken.
In the exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient,36 the Ombudsman is
authorized to call on prosecutors or lawyers in the government service for
assistance.37 Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of
his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation
and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein
provided shall be under his supervision and control.
It is on the basis of the above-quoted provision of law that Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
Jesus Guerrero endorsed Case No. OMB-1-98-2418 (Chan v. Esmane-Diaz) to complainant
with the instruction to file the Information and to prosecute the case.38 The indorsement
included an order to submit a monthly report to the Office of the Ombudsman of any actions
taken in relation to the case.
Respondents December 17, 1999 Order39 which states, inter alia, as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
The Officer-in-Charge of the City Prosecutors Office is hereby directed to designate any of
the Assistant Prosecutors of the City Prosecutors Office to take the place of Provincial
Prosecutor Dorentino Z. Floresta. While Prosecutor Floresta appears to have been deputized
by the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute this case, no special reason was given for such
authority. Instead, it appears that such designation was merely based on the premise that the
offense charged was committed in Subic municipality as erroneously indicated in the original
Information filed with this Court.
Inasmuch as the Information as amended, upon the initiative of Prosecutor Floresta himself,
shows that the place of the commission of the offense charged is in Olongapo City, the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor does not have the authority to continue prosecuting this case for
the People of the Philippines (Section 2, Rule 117, 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure). For
this reason, the Office of the City Prosecutor should take his place inasmuch as the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Olongapo has territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged.40 (Underscoring supplied),
shows that he was not only aware of complainants designation, hence, belying his explanation
that he must have overlooked the same. It also shows his ignorance of the above-cited
provision of the Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special reason for
the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of any prosecutor or government lawyer
to assist him.
It would appear though from respondents above-quoted December 17, 1999 Order that he was
of the belief that it was the City Prosecutor, rather than the Provincial Prosecutor, who had
territorial jurisdiction over the offense. It is in this light that he is given the benefit of the
doubt, absent any showing that he was motivated by malice or bad faith.
With respect to the charges raised against respondent in complainants April 1, 2003
Manifestation, by which complainant submitted an unsigned and undated complaint by a
certain Dr. Reino Rosete and copies of respondents other assailed decisions: While Section 1
of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, allows the institution of administrative
proceedings upon an anonymous complaint, the veracity of Rosetes complaint is doubtful as it
does not bear his signature. It is clearly not intended to be an anonymous complaint.
Finally, on the rest of the charges against respondent, this Court is unable to pass upon them
as complainant merely submitted photocopies of respondents assailed orders without stating
clearly and concisely the alleged acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of
conduct prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of Court or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 72,
Olongapo City, is found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross
ignorance of the law or procedure in granting an application for bail without affording the
prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00), with WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.