CASES - NATIONALITY and DOMICILE

Velilla vs. Posadas

FACTS:
- That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.
- That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, by virtue of which
will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still
is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, United States of America.
- That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate
of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
- That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition will of the deceased Arthur Graydon
Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in a decree dated May
5, 1931.
- That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the
deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.
- That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of bonds
and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank
deposits and other personal properties.
- That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of the late
Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return.
- That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period from January 1,
1931 to June 30, 1931, was also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate
of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody. .
- That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for
the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter.
- That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the letter of the
Collector of Internal Revenue.
- That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. Palmer
another letter.
- That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in a letter
- That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000
on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019.75 on January 19, 1932, making assessment
for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax against
said estate.
- That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by
Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
- The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of the
present case.

In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and
documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen,
came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in these
Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He had no
business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds
and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank
deposits and other intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners of
appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the
purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his death was
located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no
property of any kind located anywhere else.

ISSUE: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?

HELD: PHILIPPINES

RATIO: There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted
a new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for
some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not claim
that Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and
cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live
there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal
domicile in Paris in February, 1929.

The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to
where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is
no evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on
his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the
establishment of a legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he
did not intend to return to Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in
Paris.

His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a
transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The
evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence from his legal
domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive
that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Cullion Leper
Colony for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately confined, because
his affliction became graver to us while he was absent than it was on the day of his
precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well
known, as he might do in foreign parts.

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual
residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of
this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila
where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any
foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To
effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice
of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or
provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new
domicile in a foreign country.
Saludo vs. American Express

FACTS: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express
International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager,
and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen,
of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent
AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing
credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE
Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein
respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with
summons and other court processes at their office address.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner
Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first
dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card
to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor
occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the
Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines
to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay
its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the
corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late
payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were
canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.

Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental
anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a
result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to
pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUES: Whether the term resides' means the actual residence or domicile of the decedent
at the time of his death?

HOLDING: The term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed
with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law,
Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.

Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile
in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and
another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have
residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol.
1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual,
personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with
intention to stay there permanently.

'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length
of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising
his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for
doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays
physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because
it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr.
as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and
physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family
court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent
acquired Australian citizenship.

In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since
October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were
divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in
November.

On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993,
before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved
by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the
ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence,
this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be
authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and
compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be
demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly
because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.

Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However,
there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited
divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce
the respondent procured.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still
restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries
again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy”. This shows that
the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed
to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with
other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to the alleged foreign law.

Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent
can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a
quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.