Orient Freight Intel v.

Keihin Everett

FACTS: Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking Service Agreement with Matsushita. Under the Trucking
Service Agreement, Keihin-Everett would provide services for Matsushita's trucking requirements. These
services were subcontracted by Keihin-Everett to Orient Freight, through their own Trucking Service
Agreement executed on the same day.

When the Trucking Service Agreement between Keihin-Everett and Matsushita was about to expire,
Keihin-Everett executed an In-House Brokerage Service Agreement for Matsushita's Philippine
Economic Zone Authority export operations. Keihin-Everett continued to retain the services of Orient
Freight, which sub-contracted its work to Schmitz Transport and Brokerage Corporation.

In April 2002, Matsushita called Keihin-Everett about a column in the issue of the tabloid newspaper
Tempo. This news narrated the April 17, 2002 interception by Caloocan City police of a stolen truck
filled with shipment of video monitors and CCTV systems owned by Matsushita.

When contacted by Keihin-Everett about this news, Orient Freight stated that the tabloid report had blown
the incident out of proportion. They claimed that the incident simply involved the breakdown and towing.
Keihin-Everett independently investigated the incident. During its investigation, it obtained a police
report from the Caloocan City Police Station. The report stated, among others, that at around 2:00 p.m. on
April 17, 2002, somewhere in Plaza Dilao, Paco Street, Manila, Cudas told Aquino to report engine
trouble to Orient Freight. After Aquino made the phone call, he informed Orient Freight that the truck had
gone missing. When the truck was intercepted by the police along C3 Road near the corner of Dagat-
Dagatan Avenue in Caloocan City, Cudas escaped and became the subject of a manhunt.

The truck was promptly released and did not miss the closing time of the vessel intended for the
shipment. Matsushita terminated its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with Keihin-Everett,
effective July 1, 2002. Matsushita cited loss of confidence for terminating the contract, stating that
KeihinEverett's way of handling the April17, 2002 incident and its nondisclosure of this incident's
relevant facts "amounted to fraud and signified an utter disregard of the rule of law. KeihinEverett sent a
letter to Orient Freight, demanding P2,500,000.00 as indemnity for lost income.

It argued that Orient Freight's mishandling of the situation caused the termination of KeihinEverett's
contract with Matsushita. When Orient Freight refused to pay, Keihin-Everett filed a complaint dated
October 24, 2002 for damages.

In its complaint, Keihin-Everett alleged that Orient Freight's “misrepresentation, malice, negligence and
fraud" caused the termination of its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with Matsushita. Keihin-
Everett prayed for compensation for lost income, with legal interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and the costs of the suit.

The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Keihin-Everett. It found that Orient Freight was "negligent in
failing to investigate properly the incident and make a factual report to Keihin [-Everett] and Matsushita.
Orient Freight appealed the said Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued its
Decision affirming the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether Article 2176 is applicable in this case.

RULING: No. Negligence may either result in culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Culpa aquiliana is the
"the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation
between two persons not formally bound by another obligation," and is governed by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Negligence in culpa contractual, on the other hand, is "the fault or negligence incident in the performance
of an obligation which already-existed, and which increases the liability from such already existing
obligation. This is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the Civil Code:

Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

Article 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action
for future fraud is void.

Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is
also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances.

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on quasi-delicts differ in terms of conditions,
defenses, and proof. They generally cannot co-exist. Once a breach of contract is proved, the defendant is
presumed negligent and must prove not being at fault. In a quasi-delict, however, the complaining party
has the burden of proving the other party's negligence.

However, there are instances when Article 2176 may apply even when there is a preexisting contractual
relation. A party may still commit a tort or quasi-delict against another, despite the existence of a contract
between them.

Here, petitioner denies that it was obliged to disclose the facts regarding the hijacking incident since this
was not among the provisions of its Trucking Service Agreement with respondent. There being no
contractual obligation, respondent had no cause of action against petitioner. The obligation to report what
happened during the hijacking incident, admittedly, does not appear on the plain text of the Trucking
Service Agreement.

Petitioner argues that it is nowhere in the agreement. Respondent does not dispute this claim. Neither the
Regional Trial Court nor the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of the Trucking Service
Agreement to arrive at their respective conclusions. Breach of the Trucking Service Agreement was
neither alleged nor proved. While petitioner and respondent were contractually bound under the Trucking
Service Agreement and the events at the crux of this controversy occurred during the performance of this
contract, it is apparent that the duty to investigate and report arose subsequent to the Trucking Service
Agreement.

When respondent discovered the news report on the hijacking incident, it contacted petitioner, requesting
information on the incident. Respondent then requested petitioner to investigate and report on the veracity
of the news report. Pursuant to respondent's request, petitioner met with respondent and Matsushita on
April 20, 2002 and issued a letter dated April 22, 2002, addressed to Matsushita.

Respondent's claim was based on petitioner's negligent conduct when it was required to investigate and
report on the incident.

Consequently, Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code on negligence in the performance of an
obligation should apply
Dalen vs. MITSUI OSK Liner

FACTS: The petitioners of this case are the heirs of the deceased crew men of MV Sea Prospect who
died while in transit from Indonesia to Okinawa, Japan. The crew men, while on transit to Japan to deliver
nickle-ore, experience inclement weather. The vessel developed a list between 10 and 15 degrees to
starboard but was repaired by the crew men of the vessel. However, while nearing Okinawa, Japan to
seek refuge, the vessel listed again 3 to 5 degrees then to 90 degrees, taking water in the bridge, the
engine stopped, and the electric power being cut. After 30 minutes, MV Sea Prospect sunk, drowning 10
crew members.

The petitioners filed for damages and attorney’s fees against Mitsui OSK, a non-resident corporation, not
doing business in the Philippines, was the charterer of MV Sea Prospect while Diamond Camella, S.A.,
another non-resident corporation, not doing business in the Philippines, and of Panamanian registry is the
registered owner of the vessel, and Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay), the manning agents of
the respondents in the Philippines who hired the deceased crew members of the vessel.

Respondents alleged that petitioners and beneficiaries of the deceased seafarers received full payment of
death benefits based on their employment contract and Collective Bargaining Agreement. However,
petitioners allegedly demanded further compensation in connection with the sinking of the vessel and
threatened that an action arising from tort would be commenced in Panama should their demand be
unheeded. Hence, respondence filed before RTC Manila for Petition for Declaratory Relief and Approval
of the Compromise/Settlement Agreement against petitioners. Then, petitioners filed the complaint for
damages against respondents before the Admiralty Court of Panama. Respondent converted the petition
for declaratory relief into an ordinary civil action for breach of contract and damages and prayed for the
approval of the settlement agreement.

Petitions for claim of damages were also filled in the courts of Panama and the Labor Arbiter (LA) by the
petitioners. These cases were however dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction and the corporations were
not properly summoned because the corporations are not in the Philippines and not doing business in the
Philippines. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but
was dismissed saying that the claim, even if based on tort was already included in the quitclaims executed
in favor of the respondents. Petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari to the CA which was dismissed
reiterating the ruling of the LA and the NLRC. Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied via a Resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the claim for damages based on tort filed by petitioners before the LA was proper?

RULING: No, such claim falls outside of the area of competence or the LA and the NLRC. The instant
petition is denied.

RATIO: Here, the petitioners claim for damages is grounded on respondent’s gross negligence which
caused the sinking of the vessel and the death of the crew men. Based on this, the subject matter of the
complaint is for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court’s
jurisdiction. To sustain a claim of liability under the quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (1)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Here, petitioners argue that respondents are duty bound to exercise due diligence required by law to
ensure the safety of the crew and all the passengers therein. It was further averred that the negligence on
the part of the respondents is quite apparent when they allowed the vessel to load and transport wet cargo.
For failure therefore to exercise extra ordinary diligence required of them, the respondents must be held
liable for damages to the surviving heirs of the deceased crew members. Notwithstanding the contractual
relation between the parties, the act of respondents is a quasi-delict and not a mere breach of contract.
Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage
structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil
law.

COMMENTS: The SC discusses the power of the Labor Arbiter having no jurisdiction over tort cases.
To note, the SC was discussing whether the claim for damages by the petitioners arises from the
employeremployee relationship or not. With that issue, the SC formulated the “reasonable casual
connection rule” where in if there is a reasonable connection between the claim asserted and the
employeremployee relations. Here, the SC held that the petitioner’s claim for damages is grounded on
respondents’ gross negligence which cause the sinking of the vessel.

Carefully analyzing the claims of the petitioners, the SC held the subject matter of the complaint is one of
claim for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambient powers of the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.

In this case, SC discussed Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides, “Whoever by act or omission causes
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called quasi-delict.” Here, the SC emphasized that to claim liability under quasi-delict the elements of
damages suffered by the plaintiff, fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other for whose acts he
must respond, and the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by plaintiff.

To note, the SC noted the argument of the petitioners that respondents are duty bound to exercise due
diligence required by law to ensure the safety of the crew. Furthermore, they argue the act of respondents
is a quasi-delict and not a mere breach of contract. On further understanding, petitioners should be clear
on their basis of claim of damages. If the source of claim is properly stated and the suit is properly filed in
the competent court, the SC may over turned the decision in favor of the petitioners.
Air France vs. Carrascoso

FACTS: On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.

From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant
airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the
seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and
plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

RTC:
 Sentenced petitioner to pay respondent 
o 25k - moral damages
o 10k - exemplary damages
o 393.20 - difference in fare bet. first class and tourist
o 3k atty’s fees
 On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a First class ticket there can be no question
 Defendant’s own witness testified that the reservation for a first class accommodation for the
plaintiff was confirmed. the court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a
verbal understanding with plaintiff that the first class ticket issued to him by defendant would be
subject to confirmation in hong kong 

CA:
 Slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso’s plane ticket from 393.20 - 383.10
 affirmed the appealed decision “in all other respects
 We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the
indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. it received the corresponding
amount in payment of first class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its
employees.

ISSUE: Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages?

HELD: Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner
a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a
first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon
the availability of first class seats.

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding
the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the
hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy
matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that
there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have
long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe
the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.

Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if
another had a better right to the seat? To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an
averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the
complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set
forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the
action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint,
if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier.

Comments:

The Court said that although the relation of a passenger and carrier is contratual both in origin and nature,
the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier’s employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. 

Passengers are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature”
nevertheless “the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.”
Petitioner’s contract w/ respondent is one attended with public duty. The stress of respondent’s action
as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier - a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner’s manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. 

Art. 21 of the Civil Code says:

o Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages
Regino vs PCST

Petitioner: Khristine Regino assisted and represented by Armando Regino

Respondent: Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, Rachelle Gamurot, Elissa Baladlad
Topic: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

FACTS:

Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Regino went to college mainly through the financial
support of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and
statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers

In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution,"
the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each
student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly
implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores;
those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.

Khristine refused to pay for the tickets because she and her family were financially challenged and her
religion prohibited her from attending dance parties and celebrations

On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics,
her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from
taking the tests.

According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their
examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting
petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets,
allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and
Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCST's policy.

On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint 5 for damages against PCST, Gamurot
and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as moral
damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of
litigation and attorney's fees.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss6 on the ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an
administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper
administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
In her Comment to respondents' Motion, petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for
damages arising from respondents' breach of the laws on human relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with
the courts.

The RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.

RTC Ruling: The trial court noted that the instant controversy involved a higher institution of learning,
two of its faculty members and one of its students. It added that Section 54 of the Education Act of 1982
vested in the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) the supervision and regulation of tertiary
schools. Thus, it ruled that the CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy.

In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order dismissed the Complaint for "lack of cause of action"
without, however, explaining this ground.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on pure questions of law.

ISSUE: WON the complaint stated sufficient cause/s of action

RULING: YES, there were two causes of action, first, breach of contract, second, liability for tort

1. The first cause of action was for breach of contract

a. It was already ruled in Alcuaz v. PSBA and Non v. Danes II, that a contractual relationship subsists
between the school and the student. This relationship gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and
obligations

b. Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic standards,
completion of academic requirements and observance of school rules and regulations, the school would
reward them by recognizing their “completion” of the course enrolled in.

c. In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the
semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students’ taking the final examinations, and
ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the
school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally
imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.

2. Second cause of action is based on liability for tort

a. An academic institution may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students,
since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort

b. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and “demoralization
of unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code

c. In the case at bar, she was made to sit out her logic class while her classmates took the exam, and in her
statistics class, Baladad announced to the whole class that she wasn’t allowing petitioner and another
student to take their exams, and then ejected them from the classroom.

Liability for Tort

In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents "inhumanly punish students x x x by
reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner]
the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;"33 as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly
unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and had to lag behind in
her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental
agony and "demoralization of unimaginable proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the
Civil Code. These provisions of the law state thus:

"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

"Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal condition."

DOCTRINE: Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract.
An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.

Disposition: The petition is granted.

Andamo v. IAC

Facts: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo owned a parcel of land located in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.

This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4
(Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of
herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by respondent’s
waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present,
to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Clearly, from petitioner’s complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as
not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated
August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case
No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of
La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
Elcano vs Hill

Facts: Reginald Hill, the respondent in this case, killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano.
Subsequently, a criminal complaint was instituted against him based on the abovementioned killing.
Nevertheless, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake.

After the said judgment, plaintiffs filed a complaint in order to recover damages against the same
defendant Reginald Hill who is a minor, and was married at the time of the occurrence of the crime
alleged he had committed. His father, on the other hand, is Marvin Hill, with whom he is living and to
whom he is getting subsistence.

Thereafter, a motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. However, the Court of First Instance denied
the Motion to dismiss. Upon motion for reconsideration by the defendants, petitioner’s action for
recovery of damages was dismissed. Hence, petitioner appealed before the SC.

Issues:
1. Whether the action for recovery of damages against Reginald and Marvin Hill is barred by res judicata.
2. Whether there is a cause of action against Reginald’s father, Marvin.

Respondents: Marvin Hill is relieved as guardian of Reginald through emancipation by marriage. Hence
the Elcanos could not claim against Marvin Hill.

Ruling:

1. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

• There is need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault
or negligence as a source of obligation, which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs.
Garcia (73 Phil. 607).

• In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code
has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could
have been sued for civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.)

• Notably, Article 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that: “Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.”

• Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he
is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
2. Marvin Hill vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has come of age, as a matter of equity,
the former’s liability is now merely subsidiary.

• Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the case at bar, Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the killing.

• The joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending children is in view of the parental
obligation to supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons. On the other hand, the
clear implication of Art. 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do not any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.

Order appealed from REVERSED. Trial court ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion.
Cinco vs Canonoy

Facts:

• Petitioner Cinco herein filed a Complaint for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident
involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case
was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case,
counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the
criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides: (b) After a criminal
action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the
same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered;

• The City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof, having been denied, petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending
the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

• Respondent Judge Cannony dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to
property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the
criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper;
and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge.

Issue: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.

Ruling: The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner. It is evident that the nature of the action was one
arising from quasi-delict since Art. 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

Being predicated as a quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action
since Art. 2177 provides that the responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176 is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.

Comments: The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney
which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed
as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article
2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm"
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is
finally terminated.
Tison vs Pomasin

Facts: Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika
Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the
direction of Legaspi City while the tractortrailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the
opposite lane going towards Naga City.

The opposing parties gave two different versions of the incident.

Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father, was on board the jitney and seated on the passenger’s side.
He testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer
coming from the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-
trailer and it was dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers.

On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the
opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and
heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-
trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of
the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.

Gregorio was sent to the hospital for the injuries he sustained. However many of the passengers which are
also his relatives died including Laarni, the driver of the Jitney.

On the other hand, Jabon and one of the passengers of the truck sustained injuires.

Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck, extended financial assistance to respondents by giving them
P1, 000.00 each.

Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and
carelessness of petitioners.

Petitioners countered that it was Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the accident

RTC: rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for damages. The trial court
considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing and reliable than that of
Gregorio’s, a mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is not as focused as that of the
driver. The trial court concluded that Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The
trial court likewise upheld the Affidavit of Desistance as having been executed with the tacit consent of
respondents.

CA: The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon
caused the vehicular collision. In support of such finding, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on
Gregorio’s testimony that Jabon was driving the tractor-trailer downward too fast and it encroached the
lane of the jitney. Based on the gravity of the impact and the damage caused to the jitney resulting in the
death of some passengers, the Court of Appeals inferred that Jabon must be speeding. The appellate court
noted that the restriction in Jabon’s driver’s license was violated, thus, giving rise to the presumption that
he was negligent at the time of the accident. Tison was likewise held liable for damages for his failure to
prove due diligence in supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the truck. Finally, the appellate
court disregarded the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia because the latter had no written power
of attorney from respondents and that she was so confused at the time when she signed the affidavit that
she did not read its content.

Issue: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?

Ruling:

According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff. These requisites must be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The SC applied the findings of the trial court where it ruled that the Jitney driver was negligent. One
reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is
more focused than that of a mere passenger (Gregorio).

While it is logical that a drivers attention to the road travelled is keener than that of a mere passenger, it
should also be considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly circumstanced, and only as
a general rule, so that, it does not necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a driver and
a passenger, the former is more credible.

The factual setting of the event testified on must certainly be considered. The relative positions of a driver
and a passenger in a vehicle was not the only basis of analysis of the trial court. Notably, aside from
Jabons alleged vantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trial court also took into consideration
Gregorios admission that prior to the accident, the jitney was running on the curving and downward
portion of the highway.

The appellate court, however, took into account the other and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was
their jitney that was going uphill and when it was about to reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck
running very fast and encroaching the jitneys lane.

We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the
truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver’s license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of
fact, Jabon even asked the LTO to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code 8 which
would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was
violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision. Driving without a proper license is a violation of
traffic regulation.

In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions on
his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land
Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.

Petitioners presented the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia to exonerate them from any
liability. An affidavit of desistance is usually frowned upon by courts. Little or no persuasive value is
often attached to a desistance. The subject affidavit does not deserve a second look more so that it appears
that Cynthia was not armed with a special power of attorney to enter into a settlement with petitioners. At
any rate, it is an exercise of futility to delve into the effects of the affidavit of desistance executed by one
of the respondents since it has already been established that petitioners are not negligent.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the
mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of
the traffic regulation.

The petition is GRANTED.

Garcia vs Florido

FACTS: 

Petitioner German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia,
and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by
Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference. 
 
While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at 21 km, it collided with an
oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro
Tumala. Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment
and hospitalization.
 
Garcia et al. filed an action (CFI) for damages against both drivers and their owners for driving in a
reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due
regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car.
 
Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action.

 Petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the
present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case in a
complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence". With the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action
could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant
to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is
premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after
final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence.

Petitioners filed an opposition and  alleged that the action for damages was instituted not to
enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil
liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194.

CFI dismissed the complaint for damages  because the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict."
 
Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a criminal
action? 

HELD:  YES. 
 
The essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176- 2194 of the New Civil Code are
present in the complaint (elements of Quasi-Delicts): 

a) act or omission of the private respondents; 

 b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus
No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; 
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision; 
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or
negligence of private respondents;  -----PROXIMATE CAUSE
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. 

The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove
the vehicle does not detract from the nature and character of the action, based on culpa aquiliana.
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection
of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of
traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence.
 
The petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent
Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of
said accused. 
 
It is evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to
recover them in the present civil case.
 
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.

Remember: The same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality.

DOCTRINE: Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Supreme Transportation Liner vs San Andres

FACTS: Ernesto Belchez was driving Mabel Tours Bus owned by Antonio San Andres. Mabel Tours
Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was overtaking, hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and registered in
the name of Supreme Bus Transportation Liner, Inc., and driven by Felix G. Ruz.

On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the Court was instituted by Antonio San Andres,
owner of Mabel Tours Bus against Supreme Transportation Liner alleging actual damage to Mabel Tours
Bus and unrealized profits for the non-use of the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs in the
amount of P144,500.00 and P150,000.00, respectively. Claims for attorney's fees of P30,000.00,
appearance fee of P1,000.00, litigation expenses of P20,000.00 and cost of the suit were also lodged in
the complaint.

Subsequently, Supreme Bus Transportation Liner filed their answer with Counterclaim. They alleged
among others that complainant, San Andres has no cause of action against them. The proximate cause of
the vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the driver, Ernesto Belchez, who operated the Mabel
Tours Bus recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of
another vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite
direction resulting to head on collision on the lane of the Supreme Bus and, at the time of the accident,
operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside his franchise and without a registered plate.

In the decision ordered by the RTC, the complaint for damages filed by the Antonio San Andres was
dismissed for having failed to prove liability on the part of the defendant.

The counterclaim that was filed by the Supreme Transportation Liner was also dismissed for failure to
adhere to procedural requirements.

RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action disallowed
their right to recover damages from the respondent through their counterclaim.

Supreme Transportation Liner brought the counterclaim to the Court of Appeals and in the assailed
decision promulgated thereon, the CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal, stating that the RTC had correctly
ruled.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER’S COUNTERCLIAM WAS CORRECTLY

DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT DUE TO FAILURE TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO INSTITUTE A
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION.

RULING: NO. THE PETITIONER’S COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT CORRECTLY DENIED.

The petitioners' counterclaim should be ALLOWED and SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
despite their failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action.

The RTC erred on its outcome because its conclusion was founded on the obsolete version of the Rules of
Court. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the civil liability arising from the offense charged was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless such civil action was expressly waived or reserved.
The offended party was authorized to bring an independent civil action in the cases provided for in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code provided such right was reserved.
By the time when the RTC rendered judgment on November 24, 2008, the revised relevant rule of
procedure had already been promulgated and taken effect, and it had specifically deleted the reservation
requirement vis-a-vis the independent civil actions.

The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply to the independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.

Therefore, the petitioner’s counterclaim of acquiring civil actions should have been accepted and granted.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

promulgated on January 27, 2011; and REMANDS Civil Case No. T-2240 to the Regional Trial Court in
Tabaco City for further proceedings to allow the petitioners to present evidence on their counterclaim,
subject to the foregoing clarifications.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

Dulay v CA

Facts: As a result of an altercation between security guard Torzuela & Atty. Dulay at a carnival, the
former shot & killed the latter. Petitioner, widow of the deceased, filed an action for damages against
Torzuela & Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of Torzuela.

The trial court dismissed the complaint against Superguard & Safeguard since it did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict as there was no mention of any negligence on the part
of Torzuela in shooting Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. It also ruled
that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Arts. 100 & 103 of the RPC
as distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict.

The CA affirmed the order of the trial court.

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. Petitioners further contend that under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in
the selection or supervision of their employees. Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint was proper for failure to allege negligence attributable to
private respondents since quasi-delicts are limited to acts of negligence

Held: NO. It was erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss the complaint simply because it failed
to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents. There is no justification
for limiting the scope of Art 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Art.
2176 covers not only acts committed w/ negligence, but also acts w/c are voluntary & intentional.
Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act WON he is prosecuted or found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also
charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, & would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the 2, assuming the awards made in the 2 cases vary.

“Physical injuries” in Art. 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries
defined in the RPC. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, & attempted
homicide. In this case, where the accused is charged w/ homicide & not w/ reckless imprudence, a civil
action based on Art. 33 lies.

Under Art. 2180, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Art 2180 is direct & immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee & a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Thus, it is incumbent upon
private respondents that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection &
supervision of their employee.

 extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused
  It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in
the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for
trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
Montecalvo vs Tan
R Transport vs Yu

FACTS: At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J. Yu, after having alighted from a
passenger bus in front of Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who... was then employed
by petitioner R Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to Medical City Hospital where
she was pronounced dead on arrival.

The husband of the deceased, Luisito G. Yu, filed a Complaint for damages before the RTC of Makati
City against petitioner R Transport, Antonio Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport Corporation (MMTC)
for the death of his wife.

MMTC denied its liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus involved in the
incident, the actual owner, being R Transport. It explained that under the Bus Installment Purchase
Program of the government, MMTC merely purchased the subject bus, among several others, for resale to
petitioner R Transport, which will in turn operate the same within Metro Manila. Since it was not actually
operating the bus which killed respondent's wife, nor was it the employer of the driver thereof, MMTC
alleged that the complaint against it should be dismissed.

R Transport alleged that Yu had no cause of action against it for it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees and drivers and that its buses are in good condition.

Meanwhile, the driver Antonio Gimena was declared in default for his failure to file an answer to the
complaint. It also cited the case of Vargas vs. Langcay and Tamayo v. Aquino insisting that it should not
be held solidarily liable with MMTC for it is not the registered owner of the bus which killed the
deceased and contends that it is the registered owner of the vehicle, rather than the actual owner, who
must be jointly and severally liable with the driver of the passenger vehicle for damages incurred by third
persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicle.

ISSUE: Is R TRANSPORT correct in its argument that since it was not the registered owner of the bus
which bumped the victim; it cannot be held liable for the damage?

RULING: NO , Under Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary. In the Tamayo case the responsibility of the registered owner and actual operator of a
truck which caused the death of its passenger is not solidary, the same is due to the fact that the action
instituted was one for breach of contract.

However, It must be noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach of contract of carriage, as in
Tamayo, but a tort or quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
As such, the liability for which R Transport is being made responsible actually arises not from a pre-
existing contractual relation between petitioner and the deceased, but from a damage caused by the
negligence of its employee.

R Transport cannot, therefore, rely on the ruling in Tamayo and escape its solidary liability for the
liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of its subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to
the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

It has consistently been of the view that it is for the better protection of the public for both the owner of
record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver. As aptly stated
by the appellate court, “the principle of holding the registered owner liable for damages notwithstanding
that ownership of the offending vehicle has already been transferred to another is designed to protect the
public and not as a shield on the part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in, in order
to free itself from liability arising from its own negligent act.

Hence, considering that the negligence of driver Gimena was sufficiently proven by the records of the
case, and that no evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner to support its defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of Gimena, may be
held liable for damages arising from the death of respondent Yu's wife.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated
September 9, 2005 and August 8, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84175
are hereby AFFIRMED.
Tamayo vs Aquino

Facts: Epifania Gonzales (wife of Aquino) boarded a truck owned by Tamayo, holder of a certificate of
public convenience to operate. Allegedly, while Epifania was making a trip aboard the truck, it bumped
against a culvert on the side of the road, causing her death.

Aquino et al filed an action for damages against Tamayo. Tamayo answered alleging that the truck is
owned by Rayos, so he filed a 3rd party complaint against him (Rayos). The CFI ruled that Tamayo is the
registered owner, under a public convenience certificate but such truck was sold to Rayos one month after
the accident, but he (Tamayo) did not inform the Public Service Commission of the sale.

CFI held Tamayo and Rayos jointly and severally liable to Aquino.

CA affirmed, holding that, both the registered owner (Tamayo) and the actual owner and operator (Rayos)
should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the
Civil Code (solidary).

Issue: WON Art 2194 (solidary liability) is applicable; and, if NOT, how should Tamayo (holder of the
cert. of public convenience) participate with Rayos (transferee/operator) in the damages recoverable.

Held: No, Art 2194 is not applicable. The action instituted in this case is one for breach of contract, for
failure of the defendant to carry safety the deceased for her destination. The liability for which he is made
responsible, i.e., for the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising from a quasi-delict.

As the registered owner Tamayo and his transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-delict;
their responsibility is NOT SOLIDARY.

As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibility to the public or to any passenger riding
in the vehicle or truck must be direct. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the
registered owner should not be allowed to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so
that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured.

But as the transferee, who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is the one directly responsible
for the accident and death he should in turn be made responsible to the registered owner for what the
latter may have been adjudged to pay. In operating the truck without transfer thereof having been
approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the registered owner
and should be responsible to him (the registered owner), for any damages that he may cause the latter by
his negligence.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, in that the defendant-
appellant Tamayo is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff-appellees the sum of P6,000 as compensatory
damages for the death of the deceased, but that he (Tamayo) has the right to be indemnified by third-party
defendant-appellant Rayos of the amount he is hereby ordered to pay. With costs against appellants.
Sps Mangaron vs Hanna Via Design

FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint for damages under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Article 2180 of the same Code filed by spouses Emilio Mangaron, Jr. and Erlinda Mangaron
(petitioners) against Hanna Via Design and Construction - Deepwell Drilling Division (respondent),
Power Supply and Equipment Parts (Power Supply) and their company driver, Crestino T. Bosquit
(Bosquit).

Spouses Mangaron the petitioners invoked respondent's vicarious liability for the negligent driving of
Bosquit of an Isuzu Truck with Plate Number PLM 612 (subject vehicle), which bumped and dragged
their vehicle, a Ford Ranger Pick-Up with Plate Number XJZ-830. Said collision caused serious physical
injuries to petitioners, who were confined for a whole month at the Davao Doctors Hospital in Davao
City.

Among others, respondents questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case, contending that the
complaint is actually a criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting to physical injuries. Thus, the
complaint should have been filed in Davao City where the vehicular incident happened.

RTC denied the motion and held that the issues raised, that is, the ownership of the subject vehicle,
respondent's working relationship with Bosquit, and its culpability, are matters of evidence. Moreover, the
RTC maintained its jurisdiction over the case as the case is clearly civil in nature, a complaint for
damages.

CA upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC as the complaint spelled out a civil complaint for damages. Ruling
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, the CA opined that the case should have been
dismissed because the registered owner of the Isuzu Truck is Power Supply, and not respondent. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent(owner) is vicariously liable for the negligent driving of Bosquit
(driver)

RULING: In accordance with the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration, this Court has
consistently ruled that, with respect to the public and third persons, the registered owner of a motor
vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation regardless of who the
actual vehicle owner might be.

In this case, it is undisputed that the registered owner of the subject vehicle is Power Supply. However,
petitioners try to convince this Court to pronounce a ruling moored on a pragmatic stance, that is, by
ruling on respondent's liability based on its admission of its ownership over the subject vehicle. 
Truly, what the law seeks to prevent is the avoidance of liability in case of accidents to the detriment of
the public. In case an accident occurs, the liability becomes definite and fixed as against a specific person,
so that the victim may be properly indemnified without having to go through the rigorous and tedious task
of trying to identify the owner or driver of the concerned vehicle.
Thus, the registration of the vehicle's ownership is indispensable in determining imputation of liability;
thus, whoever has his/her name on the Certificate of Registration of the offending vehicle becomes liable
in case of any damage or injury in connection with the operation of such vehicle inasmuch as the public is
concerned 
The case of Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom is illustrative:

Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the
public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of
the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent, x x x
As between the registered owner and the driver, the former is considered as the employer of the latter, and
is made primarily liable for the tort under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
However, the application of the registered owner rule does not serve as a shield of the offending
vehicle's real owner from any liability. The law is not inequitable. Under the principle of unjust
enrichment, the registered owner who shouldered such liability has a right to be indemnified by means of
a cross-claim as against the actual employer of the negligent driver. In this way, the preservation of the
rights of the parties concerned would be upheld while championing the public policy behind the
registered owner rule.
 
Vda. De Bataclan v. Mariano Medina

Facts:
 At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina and driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite.
While on its way to Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until
it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.

 Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside the
driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to show that the freed
passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and
rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle.

 After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the
bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. 

 That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name
and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.

 After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100,
the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost
in the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to
SC. 

Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that
burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside. 

Held:
 The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected.

 The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by
the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it
was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. 

 In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. 

 Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that
in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus. 
  The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor
the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus.
 In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina
Transportation failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise
negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding and that the driver failed to changed
the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina. 

 The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety
of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had
been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.

Ratio:
 Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.

 Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Regala vs Carin

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City.
When petitioner decided to renovate his one storey residence by constructing a second floor, he under the
guise of merely building an extension to his residence, approached respondent for a permission to bore a
hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their respective properties, to which respondent verbally
consented on condition that petitioner would clean the area affected by the work.

In the course of the construction of the second floor, respondent and his wife Marietta suffered from the
dust and dirt which fell on their property. As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondent’s
satisfaction, respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the City Engineer and Building Official
of Las Piñas City. They alleged that the petitioner’s renovation, aside from lacking the necessary permits,
has caused damage as well as encroachment and invasion of privacy. The City Engineer’s Office issued
stop-work notices. However, despite the said notices, the petitioner continued with the construction.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent whom it awarded moral damages in the sum of
P100,000, exemplary damages of P100,000 and attorney’s fees of P50,000 plus costs of suit for
knowingly commencing the renovation of the house without the requisite building permit and
misrepresenting his true intent of introducing renovations. On appeal, the CA the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

HELD:

The petition is partly impressed with merit.

CIVIL LAW: Damages

In prayers for moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not
meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily
prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed
in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate
result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the damages
and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.

In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission
factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of
the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he
sustained were the proximate effect of petitioner’s act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to instead
look into the manner by which petitioner carried out his renovations to determine whether this was
directly responsible for any distress respondent may have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful
or illegal act or omission must have preceded the damages sustained by the claimant.
The Court ruled that the petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce
renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented
his real intent when he initially sought respondent’s consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential
since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties. The testimony of petitioner
and his witnesses demonstrated that they had actually taken measures to prevent, or at the very least,
minimize the damage to respondent’s property occasioned by the construction work. In addition to that,
before the construction began, measures were undertaken to prevent debris from falling into respondent’s
property and instructions were given to the workers to clean the area before leaving.

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. While the Court
harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to
respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondent’s property was malicious or
willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

However, the Court ruled that the petitioner cannot steer clear from any liability for the respondent and
his family’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property have, at the very least, been
inconvenienced from the incident borne of petitioner’s construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage
suffered by respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of any factual evidence to establish
the same. Thus, nominal damages were awarded in order that a right of the respondent which has been
violated or invaded by the petitioner may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Therefore, the petition is granted and the Court orders the petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P25,000 as nominal damages.